Lacson vs.

Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 128096
Jan 20, 1999
Facts:
Eleven people, suspected to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang (a criminal
group involved in bank robberies), were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG), which included the petitioners and others who later intervened in the
case. Initially, the incident was seen as a legitimate police operation. However, a media
report from a police officer raised doubts, suggesting that the killings might have been a
summary execution rather than a shootout. This led the Ombudsman to form an investigative
panel, which concluded that the operation was legitimate. However, after a review, a board
of prosecutors recommended charging 26 individuals, including the petitioners, with multiple
murders. The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime.
The petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan (anti-graft court) did not have
jurisdiction over the case. They claimed that under R.A. No. 7975, the case should fall under
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) because none of the accused were
high-ranking government officials or police officers. While their motion was still pending, R.A.
No. 8249 was passed, which changed the law to allow the Sandiganbayan to hear cases
even when the accused were not classified as "principal" accused, as long as they were
public officials.
The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8249,
arguing that it violated their right to due process and equal protection. They claimed that the
law was introduced specifically to give the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their case, which
was still pending. They also argued that the law was retroactive, meaning it applied to cases
already in court, which they believed was unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case despite the amended law,
considering the nature of the crime and the status of the accused officers.
Ruling:
No, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case.
The legal basis for determining the jurisdiction of a court lies in the nature of the
offense and the official capacity of the accused. Under R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving government officials, but only if those officials
are classified as having a specific salary grade or rank. However, R.A. No. 8249, which
amended the law, extended jurisdiction to include cases against both principals and
accessories. While this amendment expanded the scope of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction,
it still requires that the offense be related to the accused's official functions. In the present
case, the charges were not shown to be directly linked to the accused officers’ official duties
as law enforcement officers, as the killing of the victims was not alleged to have been
committed during the performance of their official functions. In this case, the amended
information did not specify that the murders were intimately connected to the accused
officers' duties, such as carrying out arrests or investigations. Since there was no clear
allegation that the crime was directly related to their office, the offense was considered a
plain murder, falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rather than the
Sandiganbayan. The Court noted that for the Sandiganbayan to exercise jurisdiction, the
crime must be committed in relation to the official duties of the accused.
Wherefore, the petitioners’ motion questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
is granted, and the case is hereby ruled to fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court
People of the Philippines v. Libertad Lagon and Hon. Judge Isidro O. Barrios
G.R. No. 45815
May 18, 1990
Facts:
On July 7, 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City,
charging Libertad Lagon with estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. The accusation was based on Lagon issuing a check for P4,232.80 in payment
for goods, knowing that she had insufficient funds, and the check subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial, but on December 2, 1976, the City Court dismissed the
case, ruling that the penalty for the offense (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818)
was beyond the court’s authority to impose. The judge cited that jurisdiction is determined by
the law in force at the time the criminal information is filed, and since the penalty for the
crime had been increased after the alleged commission of the offense, it fell beyond the
jurisdiction of the City Court. The case was dismissed without prejudice to refiling it in the
proper court.
The People filed a Petition for Review, asserting that the City Court had jurisdiction
over the case.
Issue:
Whether the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over the estafa case filed
against Libertad Lagon, given that the penalty for the offense had been increased by
Presidential Decree No. 818 after the alleged commission of the crime.
Ruling:
No, the City Court of Roxas City did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Under the law in effect at the time the criminal information was filed, the penalty for
the offense had been raised by P.D. No. 818 from prision correccional to prision mayor in its
medium period, which exceeded the maximum penalty that the City Court could impose. In
this case, the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 818, which increased the penalty for estafa
under Article 315, effectively shifted the jurisdiction from the City Court to the Court of First
Instance, as the new penalty exceeded the City Court’s maximum jurisdictional limit of
prision correccional (up to 6 years imprisonment or a fine of up to P6,000). This principle
was reiterated in prior cases, including **People v. Purisima** and **People v. Buissan**,
where the Court emphasized that jurisdiction is tied to the penalty that could be imposed, not
to the penalty that might be actually imposed after trial.
Wherefore, the petition for review is denied, and the order of the City Court of Roxas
City dismissing the case is affirmed. The case may be refiled in the proper court, which in
this instance is the Court of First Instance, as the penalty prescribed under the amended law
exceeds the City Court's jurisdictional limit. No costs are awarded.
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino vs. People of the Philippines and Monica Nealiga
G.R. No. 200465
April 20, 2015
Facts:
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino, the petitioner, was charged with a violation of Section 46
of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 6938), which pertains to the
unlawful imposition of personal interest in a cooperative contract. Asistio was the
Chairperson and Managing Director of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative. The charge arose from Asistio’s alleged unlawful personal
interest in an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola, which bypassed the
cooperative. The agreement resulted in pecuniary losses to the cooperative over three
consecutive school years. The prosecution argued that Asistio acted in her personal
capacity, sidestepping the cooperative's interests. After the prosecution presented its
evidence, Asistio filed a Demurrer to Evidence, seeking dismissal of the case on several
grounds, including jurisdictional issues.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dismissed the case, reasoning that the
matter was under the jurisdiction of a lower court, interpreting the penal provision under the
Cooperative Code to fall within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTC).
The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that
the RTC had jurisdiction over the case, and ordered the remand of the case for further
proceedings. Asistio filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 65,
claiming that the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion, and expressing concerns
about double jeopardy if the case proceeded.
Issue:
Whether the **Regional Trial Court (RTC)** had proper jurisdiction over the criminal case
involving the violation of **Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines** (Republic
Act No. 6938), given the penalty and the nature of the offense.
Ruling:
Yes, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had proper jurisdiction over the criminal case.
The legal basis for determining the proper court jurisdiction lies in the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which provide that criminal cases punishable by imprisonment
exceeding 6 years should fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In this
case, the penalty for the violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code is prison
correctional, which can range from 6 months to 6 years imprisonment, thus surpassing the
Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) jurisdictional threshold. Additionally, Section 46 deals with
violations that involve fiduciary duties and financial management within cooperatives, which
implicates matters of corporate governance an area typically handled by the RTC. The Court
of Appeals correctly reversed the RTC's initial dismissal based on a misunderstanding of the
jurisdictional limits, affirming the RTC's jurisdiction as the case involves a serious offense
with financial consequences that demands a higher court's attention.
Wherefore, the Court finds that the Regional Trial Court had proper jurisdiction over
the criminal case for the violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code. The Court of
Appeals' decision is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the RTC for further proceedings
consistent with its jurisdiction.
Morillo vs. People
777 SCRA 207
Facts:
Richard Natividad, Milo Malong, and Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as
contractors with business in Pampanga, purchased construction materials worth
P500,054.00 from Armilyn. According to their agreement, 20% of the amount should be paid
within seven days, and the remaining 80% should be paid within 35 days with post-dated
checks. After the final delivery, Richard made an initial payment of P20,000.00 and issued
two post-dated checks from Metrobank, Pampanga. However, when Armilyn deposited the
checks at Equitable PCI Bank, they were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Upon notifying
Richard about the dishonor, he replaced the checks with two more post-dated checks from
Metrobank, but these were also dishonored. Despite demand for payment, Richard and his
partners did not make good on the checks, prompting Armilyn to file a case for violation of
B.P. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law) against Richard and Milo Malong before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) in Makati City.
Richard appealed, arguing that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over
the case since the checks were issued and delivered in Subic, Pampanga, and none of the
elements of the offense occurred in Makati. He also contested the absence of the public
prosecutor, claiming the prosecution was improperly delegated to a private prosecutor. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decisions of the lower courts, ruling that MeTC had no jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
held that the elements of the crime of BP 22 occurred in Pampanga—where the checks were
issued, where Richard was notified of the dishonor, and where the drawee bank (Metrobank)
was located. Thus, the case should have been filed in Pampanga, not Makati. Armilyn filed
an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City had proper jurisdiction
over the case for violation of **B.P. 22** (Anti-Bouncing Check Law), despite the dishonor of
the checks occurring in Pampanga and the checks being issued and delivered in Subic,
Pampanga.
Ruling:
Yes, the MeTC of Makati City had proper jurisdiction over the case for violation of
B.P. 22.
The jurisdiction for B.P. 22 cases is based on the principle that the offense is a
transitory or continuing crime, where acts material and essential to the commission of the
crime may occur in different locations. The court where any of the essential elements of the
crime take place has jurisdiction to try the case. In this case, the dishonor of the checks, the
knowledge of dishonor, and the demand for payment all occurred in Makati City, even though
the checks were issued in Pampanga. The dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank
(Metrobank) occurred when they were deposited at the Equitable PCI Bank in Makati, which
establishes the MeTC’s jurisdiction over the case. The ruling in Rigor v. People, which
clarified that the venue for B.P. 22 cases is not restricted to the place where the check was
issued or delivered. Rather, the place where any material element of the crime occurred
such as the dishonor of the check or knowledge of insufficiency of funds gives a court
jurisdiction. In this case, the dishonor of the checks and the subsequent demand were
directly related to events that transpired in Makati, thereby giving MeTC of Makati City the
authority to hear and decide the case.

Wherefore, the Supreme Court affirms the jurisdiction of the MeTC of Makati City to
try the case for violation of B.P. 22. The ruling of the Court of Appeals, which had reversed
the trial court's decision, is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the MeTC of Makati
City for the proper disposition.
Wilfred N. Chiok vs. People of the Philippines and Rufina Chua
G.R. No. 179814
December 07, 2015
Facts:
On June 9, 1995, Rufina Chua entrusted a total amount of PHP 9,563,900.00 to
Wilfred Chiok, with the purpose of having him purchase shares of stocks. Chua deposited
PHP 7,100,000.00 into Chiok’s Far East Bank account and later handed him an additional
PHP 2,463,900.00 in cash. However, Chiok failed to deliver any stock certificates or return
the funds. Instead, he issued two interbank checks, which were both dishonored when
presented for payment. In response, Chua demanded the return of her money, but Chiok did
not comply. This led Chua to file a formal complaint for estafa against him. Chiok, in his
defense, claimed that their arrangement was part of an unregistered partnership and that the
funds were not entrusted to him as a mere loan or investment. On December 3, 1998, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Chiok of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) acquitted Chiok
due to insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the
acquittal, the CA found Chiok civilly liable for PHP 9,500,000.00, ordering him to pay the
amount to Chua. Chiok then filed a petition with the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify or
amend the CA's decision.
Issue:
Whether the Philippine courts had proper jurisdiction over the criminal case filed by
Rufina Chua against Wilfred Chiok for estafa.
Ruling:
Yes, the Philippine courts had proper jurisdiction over the criminal case filed by
Rufina Chua.
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction is determined by several factors, including the
nature of the offense, the location where the crime was committed, and the residency of the
accused. In this case, the offense of estafa, under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
was committed within the Philippines, as the alleged fraudulent transactions occurred in the
country. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the area where the complaint was filed had
territorial jurisdiction over the matter. Moreover, Chiok was a resident of the Philippines,
which further solidified the jurisdiction of the local courts. In the Revised Penal Code, which
defines the jurisdiction of Philippine courts over crimes committed within the national
territory. Under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, "crimes committed within the Philippine
archipelago" are punishable under Philippine law, regardless of whether the offender is a
Filipino or a foreigner. Since the crime of estafa was committed in the Philippines, and the
parties involved were both residents of the country, the RTC had the authority to hear and
decide the case. The fact that Chiok was acquitted in the criminal aspect does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court, which was properly invoked at the outset of the case.
Wherefore, the Philippine courts, specifically the Regional Trial Court, had the correct
jurisdiction over the criminal case filed by Chua. The proceedings were valid, and the
subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court further affirmed the proper
exercise of jurisdiction in this matter. Thus, there was no issue regarding the jurisdiction of
the trial courts over the estafa charge.
Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde
G.R. No. 217456
Nov 23, 2015
Facts:
This case involves petitioners Marilou S. Laude and Mesehilda S. Laude, who are the
family members of Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, who was allegedly murdered by US Marine
L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton on October 11, 2014, in Olongapo City. A complaint for
murder was filed against Pemberton on October 15, 2014, and he was detained at Camp
Aguinaldo on October 22, 2014.
The Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder on December 15, 2014, and
Pemberton was arraigned on December 19, 2014. On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed
an Urgent Motion to transfer Pemberton's custody from Camp Aguinaldo to the Olongapo
City Jail and to allow media coverage of the proceedings. This motion was denied by Judge
Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde on December 23, 2014, for lack of merit, and a subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration was denied on February 18, 2015.
Petitioners, asserting that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion,
filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the denial was based on procedural
technicalities and that their motion should have been granted.
Issue:
Whether the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the murder case involving U.S.
Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton, despite his status as a foreign national, under the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States.
Ruling:
Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case. While the defendant, L/CPL
Joseph Scott Pemberton, is a U.S. Marine, the jurisdiction over crimes committed within the
Philippines is governed by Philippine law.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States
provides that U.S. military personnel are subject to Philippine criminal jurisdiction for
offenses committed during their stay in the country. This means that despite Pemberton’s
foreign status, the Philippine courts can exercise jurisdiction over the murder case since the
crime occurred within Philippine territory. The provisions of the VFA, particularly Article V,
which grants Philippine authorities jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel for crimes
committed in the Philippines, subject to certain conditions regarding custody. In the case of
Pemberton, the crime occurred within Philippine territory, and the VFA does not exempt
foreign nationals from Philippine criminal jurisdiction. However, the issue of custody was a
separate matter, governed by the VFA's provisions that require negotiations between the
U.S. and Philippine governments. The Court clarified that the Philippine courts’ jurisdiction is
not diminished by the defendant's nationality, though it acknowledged that custody may be
subject to diplomatic arrangements.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Philippine courts had jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case against Pemberton for the crime committed in the Philippines. The
Court also noted that while jurisdiction over the crime was clear, the issue of custody and
detention of the accused was subject to the provisions of the VFA, which required resolution
between the governments of the Philippines and the United States. Thus, the Philippine
courts retained authority to adjudicate the case, but custody issues were subject to
international agreements.
Atienza vs. People
G.R. No. 188694
Feb 12, 2014
Facts:
Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro were employees at the Court of Appeals
(CA) in the Philippines. They were implicated in a scheme involving robbery and the
falsification of public documents, particularly the alteration of CA decisions.
The case stemmed from an incident in March 1995 when Juanito Atibula, a Records
Officer at the CA, was approached to alter original decisions of the CA. Later, Volume 266 of
the CA Original Decisions was discovered missing and tampered with upon its return. The
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which led to the filing of
criminal charges for robbery and falsification of public documents against Atienza, Castro,
and another individual named Dario.
The NBI and the Office of the Ombudsman initially filed charges, with some charges
dismissed due to insufficient evidence but probable cause found for robbery and falsification.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila tried the case. Despite the petitioners' defense,
including alibi and disputes regarding the evidence, the RTC found them guilty. This decision
was upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA), leading to a petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had proper jurisdiction over the charge of
falsification of public documents in this case.
Ruling:
No, the RTC did not have proper jurisdiction over the charge of falsification of public
documents in this case. According to the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification of
public documents is a less serious offense that falls under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or other inferior courts, not the RTC.
Under Section 32 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. 129), as
amended, and the rules governing jurisdiction over crimes, less serious offenses such as the
falsification of public documents should be tried in the lower courts, such as the MeTC or
MTC, depending on the value or nature of the crime. The RTC only has jurisdiction over
more serious offenses or those specifically assigned to it by law. In this case, the charge of
falsification, being a less serious offense, did not meet the threshold for RTC jurisdiction and
thus should have been tried by a lower court.
Wherefore, the Court holds that the Regional Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the
charge of falsification of public documents. The case is hereby remanded to the appropriate
lower court with jurisdiction over such offenses. The petitioners’ conviction by the RTC is
therefore nullified, and the charges shall be reconsidered under the proper jurisdiction.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Marcelino A. Dechavez
G.R. No. 176702
November 13, 2013
Facts:
Marcelino A. Dechavez was the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture
(NSCA) from 2001 until his retirement in 2006. On May 5, 2002, Dechavez and his wife,
Amelia, used the NSCA’s service vehicle (a Suzuki Vitara) for a trip to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. While returning to the NSCA, they were involved in a minor vehicular accident.
To support an insurance claim for the damages, Dechavez executed an affidavit to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), stating that the trip was an official one and
that it was urgent, as no NSCA drivers were available. Based on this affidavit, GSIS
approved an insurance claim of ₱308,000. The NSCA also paid ₱71,000 for the vehicle’s
depreciation, while Mrs. Dechavez received ₱6,000 for third-party liability.
In November 2002, a group of 20 NSCA faculty and staff filed a complaint with the
Commission on Audit, accusing Dechavez of improper use of government funds. The COA
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Subsequently, the complainants filed a case with
the Ombudsman, charging Dechavez with dishonesty under the Administrative Code of
1987, arguing that the trip was personal, not official, and that the insurance claim was
fraudulent. The Ombudsman found Dechavez guilty of dishonesty and ordered his dismissal
from service. Dechavez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Ombudsman denied.
The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Ombudsman’s
decision. The Ombudsman, in turn, filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman had proper jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case of dishonesty against Marcelino A. Dechavez, despite his retirement
from service prior to the resolution of the case.
Ruling:
Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman retained jurisdiction over the administrative case
even after Dechavez's retirement from service.
The legal basis for the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is rooted in the principle that the
jurisdiction of administrative bodies, such as the Ombudsman, attaches once a case is filed,
and the official's subsequent resignation or retirement does not render the case moot or
academic. This has been affirmed in several rulings, including the cases of Office of the
Ombudsman v. Andutan Jr. and Baquerfo v. Sanchez, which emphasize that the dismissal or
resignation of a public official does not preclude the Ombudsman from rendering a decision
on an administrative charge filed prior to the official's cessation from service. In this case, the
complaint against Dechavez was filed while he was still in office, and his retirement did not
affect the Ombudsman's authority to resolve the matter.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court finds that the Ombudsman properly exercised its
jurisdiction over the administrative case against Marcelino A. Dechavez, despite his
retirement. The Court's jurisdiction, once vested at the time the case was filed, remains
intact, and the Ombudsman’s decision to proceed with the case and impose penalties was
legally correct. The petition is granted, and the Ombudsman’s ruling is reinstated.
Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) vs. The Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
Facts:
This case concerns Major General Carlos F. Garcia, a retired officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), who faced charges of violating the Articles of War,
specifically charges of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman and Conduct
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline. These charges were based on his failure to
disclose his full assets and his holding of an immigrant status in the USA. Following the
military's legal proceedings, Garcia was found guilty by the General Court Martial, which
imposed a sentence that included dismissal from service, forfeiture of pay and allowances,
and two years of confinement at hard labor. The President of the Philippines confirmed the
court martial’s decision.
Garcia challenged the confirmation of the sentence on several grounds, including
that his retirement from military service should have terminated the court martial's jurisdiction
over him. He filed a petition for certiorari and a habeas corpus petition with the Supreme
Court, arguing that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
sentence and that preventive confinement should be credited against his sentence.
Issue:
Whether the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction over Major General Carlos F.
Garcia after his retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ruling:
Yes, the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction over Garcia even after his
retirement.
In the principle that once criminal jurisdiction has properly attached, it remains with
the tribunal until the case is fully resolved. Under the Articles of War, military courts retain
jurisdiction over active-duty personnel until the completion of legal proceedings, regardless
of whether the accused has retired. In Garcia's case, although he reached the compulsory
retirement age, the charges against him were initiated while he was still in service, and the
court martial proceedings were ongoing at the time of his retirement. The Court emphasized
that the General Court Martial maintained jurisdiction because the legal process had already
begun and was not interrupted by his retirement.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial
over Garcia, affirming that his retirement did not affect the ongoing proceedings and did not
terminate the military court’s authority to resolve the charges against him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO
PLAZA
G.R. No. 169004
September 15, 2010
Facts:
Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, with
a salary grade of 25, was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 (The Auditing Code of the Philippines) for his failure to
liquidate a cash advance of ₱33,000.00 that he had received on December 19, 1995. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 27988 alleged that Plaza, despite being duty-bound to
liquidate the cash advance within the period required by law, deliberately failed to do so,
despite repeated demands, causing damage to the government. The charge was for failure
to liquidate the cash advance in relation to his position as a public official.
Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Sandiganbayan on April 7, 2005, arguing that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since his position was classified under
salary grade 25, which is below the minimum salary grade threshold for the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan agreed and issued a Resolution on July
20, 2005, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, but without prejudice to it being filed in
the appropriate court. The petitioner (People of the Philippines) then filed a petition to
reverse this decision, arguing that the Sandiganbayan does indeed have jurisdiction over the
case, as the offense was committed in relation to Plaza’s position as a public official.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a public official with a salary grade
of 25 who is charged with a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445),
even if the official’s position is not one of those explicitly enumerated under Section 4(a) of
P.D. No. 1606.
Ruling:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is governed by Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606,
which grants the court jurisdiction over public officials charged with crimes committed in
relation to their office, regardless of their salary grade, provided they hold positions as public
officials. The law specifically extends Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to offenses that are
closely tied to the official's duties, even when the official does not have a salary grade of 27
or higher. In this case, Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City with a salary grade of 25, was charged with failing to liquidate a cash advance, an
offense committed in relation to his position as a public official. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction under Section 4(b) because the crime was committed in relation to his office,
even though his salary grade is below 27.
Wherefore, the petition of the People of the Philippines is granted, and the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is nullified and set aside. The
case is remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with the
jurisdictional rule set forth in Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606.