buildings

Article
Exploring the Sustainability-Oriented Strategies of Small- and
Medium-Sized Construction Enterprises in China’s Construction
Industry under Financing Guarantee Constraints: A Multi-Agent
Computational Model Approach
Zhu Mei 1 , Wenbo Han 1 , Jingjing Zhang 1, * and Qiaomei Zhou 2, *

1 School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China; [email protected] (Z.M.);

[email protected] (W.H.)
2 School of Intellectual Property, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
* Correspondence: [email protected] (J.Z.); [email protected] (Q.Z.)

Abstract: In the context of China’s swift urbanization and heightened sustainability challenges, SM-
CEs in the construction industry play a critical role in driving both economic growth and sustainable
development. This pioneering study introduces an integrative approach blending sustainability-
oriented strategies (SSs) with financing guarantees, addressing key obstacles faced by these firms.
Leveraging a multi-agent computational model, we dissect the dynamic interplay among construction
SMCEs, governmental bodies, financial institutions, and guarantors, underscoring the transformative
impact of financing guarantees on sustainable advancement. Our investigation reveals that optimally
structured financing guarantees not only resolve funding challenges but also actively foster adher-
ence to sustainability practices. This dual functionality positions such financial instruments as key
enablers of SMCEs’ quest for sustainability, aligning economic objectives with ecological imperatives.
Furthermore, we spotlight the transformative effect of strategic management on elevating SMCEs’
Citation: Mei, Z.; Han, W.; Zhang, J.; commitment to sustainable operations. Collectively, these insights offer actionable pathways for
Zhou, Q. Exploring the SMCEs embarking on sustainability endeavors, showcasing innovative financial solutions that do not
Sustainability-Oriented Strategies of detract from their economic prosperity.
Small- and Medium-Sized
Construction Enterprises in China’s Keywords: sustainability-oriented strategies; SMCEs; multi-agent; financing guarantees;
Construction Industry under construction industry
Financing Guarantee Constraints: A
Multi-Agent Computational Model
Approach. Buildings 2024, 14, 3002.
https://doi.org/10.3390/
1. Introduction
buildings14093002
As the Chinese economy and urbanization rapidly progress, the construction industry
Academic Editor: Ahmed Senouci is experiencing unprecedented growth [1]. Small- and medium-sized construction enter-
Received: 18 July 2024 prises (SMCEs) are pivotal in this expansion, driving urban and community infrastructure
Revised: 12 September 2024 development [2,3]. Concurrently, the global push for sustainability, coupled with the Chi-
Accepted: 18 September 2024 nese government’s focus on sustainability, imposes pressure on the construction sector to
Published: 21 September 2024 transform [4]. The Chinese government has responded with policies like the “General Spec-
ification for Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy Utilization in Buildings”, setting
clear energy conservation standards, and the “14th Five-Year Plan for Energy Conservation
and Green Building Development”, which outlines sustainable goals for the industry. In
Copyright: © 2024 by the authors. this context, SMCEs, as industry linchpins, are crucial for achieving sustainable transfor-
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. mation, and to contribute significantly to societal and environmental sustainability, they
This article is an open access article should adopt a sustainability-oriented strategy (SS) [5]. Economically, SMCEs can drive
distributed under the terms and
development by embracing advanced green technologies and optimizing resource use [6–8];
conditions of the Creative Commons
socially, their use of green building materials can mitigate environmental impacts and en-
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
hance societal safety [9]. Specifically, SSs refer to enterprises adopting safe, environmentally
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
friendly, and green development means to conform to safety, environmental, and green
4.0/).

Buildings 2024, 14, 3002. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14093002 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/buildings

Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 2 of 21

development requirements, thereby achieving sustainable development [10], and SMCEs’

SSs can provide an effective template for promoting societal sustainable development on a
broader scale.
Despite SMCEs’ active efforts toward sustainable development, they face a range of
complex and urgent challenges [11]. On one hand, the transformation toward sustainabil-
ity in China’s construction industry has progressed rapidly. Since the first sustainability
standard in construction was introduced in 1986, the Chinese government has established
a comprehensive policy framework covering sustainability goals, strategies, and pathways,
and 84% of construction projects in China currently meet sustainability criteria, with the
scale continuing to grow. This market competition therefore puts pressure on SMCEs that
have yet to transition. On the other hand, many SMCEs struggle to implement SSs due to
factors such as a small scale, limited resources, slow technology adoption, and funding
shortages [12]. For instance, liquidity issues often hinder investment in green technologies
or the implementation of sustainable measures [13,14]. Meeting these sustainability stan-
dards raises development costs by 5–15% compared to traditional construction, creating
significant barriers for SMCEs transitioning to sustainable practices [15,16]. These chal-
lenges not only affect the competitiveness of SMCEs but also exacerbate broader societal
sustainability issues. Supporting SMCEs in successfully implementing SSs and finding
effective solutions to these challenges is therefore crucial for achieving both industry and
societal sustainability goals [17].
To tackle these challenges, the government has implemented measures to guide and
regulate SMCEs’ sustainable development. Revised laws like the “Environmental Protection
Law” and “Occupational Safety and Health Law” set minimum standards and enforce
penalties for non-compliance. The government also engages the public and media to expose
unsustainable practices, encouraging enterprises to improve their social responsibility. A
key new approach is to link SSs with financial tools, particularly financing guarantees.
Given the close link between sustainable development and financial health, a company’s
financial credit status is crucial [18]. It is thus feasible for government agencies to use
financial tools, particularly inclusive finance mechanisms like financing guarantees, to
reinforce SS guidance. Some practices already include enterprises’ SS choices as part of
financing conditions. For example, Sichuan’s re-guarantee institutions have partnered with
the Environmental Protection Bureau to support sustainable projects. The People’s Bank of
China in Taizhou promotes integrating sustainability with inclusive finance, focusing on
SMCEs to drive their sustainable growth. In Zhejiang, a strategic agreement ties corporate
safety and environmental standards to credit, and Jiangnan Bank in Jiangsu offers up to
CNY 20 million in loans to SMCEs meeting these standards.
Using inclusive finance tools like financing guarantees to guide SMCEs toward SSs
has proven effective. In the Chinese construction industry, green finance has significantly
advanced technologies such as renewable energy utilization, advanced lighting, and water-
saving innovations, leading to the development of green materials. These technological
advancements have increased the market acceptance of green buildings, encouraging
SMCEs to adopt SSs more actively [19]. The integration of green buildings with inclusive
finance has also broken the capital-intensive development bottleneck in the construction
industry, fostering a virtuous development cycle. This not only expands the prospects
for SMCEs adopting SSs but also helps address financing challenges and maturity mis-
matches, supporting structural adjustments and improving the information disclosure
system [20]. Additionally, government-backed guarantee agencies have implemented
sustainable development certifications for construction projects, establishing risk-sharing
mechanisms to encourage capital flow into SMCEs adopting SSs [21–23]. For example, the
Huzhou government has developed a sustainability evaluation system for the construction
industry, requiring that applications for inclusive loans meet this certification. Similarly,
Jiangxi government’s “Safety, Environmental Protection Qualified Loan” plan provides
financing to enterprises that meet both safety and environmental standards. These mea-
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 3 of 21

sures have not only promoted SMCEs’ adoption of SSs but also demonstrate the effective
of financial means.
Nevertheless, the effective use of financial tools like financing guarantees to guide SM-
CEs’ sustainable development and encourage their adoption of SSs remains underexplored.
While the relationship between corporate financing and sustainability has been studied,
the literature lacks focus on the heterogeneity and interactive complexity of SS guidance,
particularly from the perspective of financing guarantee policies [24]. For instance, ques-
tions remain about the effectiveness of policy guidance that relies solely on monitoring
sustainable development levels, how financing guarantees can drive SMCEs to adopt SSs,
and how to maximize the effectiveness of these policies. Government departments, as
the primary entities guiding SMCEs’ SSs and overseeing the financing guarantee system,
should, with fiscal support and institutional alignment, enhance the supervision of the
financing guarantee system and use market-based incentives to encourage SS adoption,
thereby injecting “financial vitality” into corporate sustainability efforts, an approach that
can elevate enterprises’ sustainable development levels. Therefore, this research aims to
(1) explore the pathways and mechanisms by which financing guarantee policies guide
the SS behaviors of small- and medium-sized construction enterprises and (2) investigate
effective strategies for this guidance.
To address these issues, this study employs a computational experiment method
based on multi-agent interactions to simulate the evolution of SMCEs’ SS decisions under
different guidance strategies, offering insights for optimizing government policies that
guide SMCEs in adopting SSs. This research makes several innovative contributions. First,
it explores the pathways and mechanisms for guiding corporate SSs, going beyond a mere
analysis of influencing factors. Second, by introducing financing guarantees as a new
perspective, it comprehensively examines the relationship between SMCEs’ financing and
sustainable development, offering a novel approach to guiding SMCEs’ SSs. Third, using a
computational experimental method, it accounts for subject heterogeneity and simulates
multi-agent interactions at the micro level, with macro-level phenomena emerging as a
result, thereby more accurately reflecting reality. This research illuminates the impact of
government strategies on guiding SMCEs’ SSs, aligning corporate behavior with regulatory
objectives, and provides valuable insights for optimizing policies aimed at enhancing
SMCEs’ sustainable development.

2. Literature Review
In the face of global environmental challenges and economic transitions, the sustain-
able development of SMCEs has increasingly become a focal point for policymakers and
academic researchers alike [25–27]. To address the common barriers SMCEs face in their
sustainable development journey—such as resource shortages, a lack of initial capital for
sustainable initiatives, and high costs [28]—Álvarez (2019) identifies financing difficulties
and inadequate working capital as significant constraints [29]. Gimhani (2021) further
confirms the negative impacts of these constraints on the sustainability of SMCEs in con-
struction [30]. Zulu (2023) argues that cognitive, regulatory, economic, and cost-related
factors collectively hinder the sustainable development of SMCEs in the construction sec-
tor [31]. Government policy interventions also play a crucial role in guiding corporate
behavior. Zhang (2022) finds that government policies can effectively shape corporate
behavior by creating incentives for internalizing sustainable production strategies [13]. Joo
(2018) highlights that government interventions can enhance corporate environmental and
technological innovation capabilities [32]. Peng H. (2021) shows that command-and-control
environmental regulations have greater impacts on the willingness to undertake green
innovation compared to incentives [33], while Xu (2022) argues that a combination of
environmental regulation and subsidies is more conducive to fostering corporate green
innovation [34]. Furthermore, the combined use of direct subsidies and tax incentives is
more effective for carbon emission reduction programs [35]. Green credit policies, which
rely on fiscal measures to regulate environmental governance, have significantly reduced
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 4 of 21

enterprise wastewater and harmful gas emissions while promoting green innovation [36,37].
Liu (2023), through a credit market and safety production linkage model, demonstrates
the government’s key role in guiding SMCEs’ safe production behaviors [38]. Mei (2017),
through qualitative research, illustrates that achieving safety production objectives in SM-
CEs requires government intervention and guidance [39]. Feng (2022) argues that linking
financing with enterprise safety and environmental requirements through compatible
incentive mechanisms can achieve mutual benefits [40]. Chen (2022) suggests that by
disclosing sustainability information, setting realistic expectation targets, and determining
appropriate penalties, the government can effectively guide enterprises toward positive
development [41]. Taking a supply chain management perspective, Zhou (2022) notes that
the influence of core enterprises’ safety production management behaviors is closely tied
to government policies [42].
The above studies clearly demonstrate that the government can effectively influence
SMCEs’ sustainable development behaviors [43,44]. However, SMCEs often face significant
constraints in their sustainable development due to financing difficulties, a challenge
that is particularly pronounced [29]. Financing guarantees, as a crucial financial tool,
can significantly shape the development models of enterprises, especially in the areas of
innovation and green technology [45,46]. Although the current body of literature provides
a strong foundation for this study, the aforementioned studies tend to focus on the impacts
of individual factors, lacking an analysis of the interaction mechanisms among multiple
factors under complex strategies. Moreover, the research on the impacts of financing
guarantee systems on corporate behavior primarily centers on innovation and financing
activities. Research that integrates financing guarantees with corporate SS guidance from a
sustainable development perspective is limited, with most studies emphasizing traditional
regulatory approaches. In terms of methodology, most studies employ static empirical
surveys or econometric methods to analyze the relationships between influencing factors.
While some scholars utilize evolutionary game theory, it fails to fully capture the complex,
multi-agent interactions characteristic of intricate systems. Computational experimentation
methods based on multiple parties offer a more comprehensive approach to analyzing
the complex nonlinear interactions among parties, with macro-level phenomena emerging
from micro-level behaviors. These methods are particularly useful for exploring impact
mechanisms and pathways and solving complex system problems, and have been widely
applied in corporate safety and environmental protection research [47,48]. For instance,
Fang (2023) used a computational experiment model to explore the factors influencing
employee safety production behaviors [49].
Building on this rationale, this study constructs a multi-agent computational experi-
ment model that considers the interactions among multiple parties, simulates the evolution
of SMCEs’ SSs under various regulatory guidance strategies, and explores the evolutionary
paths and intrinsic impact mechanisms of SS guidance for SMCEs from the perspective of
financing guarantees.

3. Mechanistic Analysis of Guiding SMCE SSs in the Construction Industry under

Financing Guarantee Constraints
3.1. Research Method
The multi-agent computational modeling approach is a powerful research method
that is widely used in fields such as economics, social sciences, and artificial intelligence to
simulate and analyze complex systems composed of multiple interacting agents. In this
approach, each agent operates autonomously, following specific rules and behaviors, which
may include decision making, learning, and adaptation based on interactions with the
environment or other agents. This approach is particularly useful for studying collective
behaviors or patterns arising from agent interactions, offering insights that are difficult to
discern when analyzing components in isolation.
Given that this research involves interactions among entities like the government,
SMCEs, banks, and guarantee institutions, and addresses activities such as financing con-
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 5 of 21

straints, SS selection, and supervision—encompassing mechanisms like financing, sustain-

ability guidance, and government regulation—it represents a complex system. Additionally,
this study is grounded in practical scenarios, making the multi-agent computational mod-
eling approach an appropriate method for this research.

3.2. Research Mechanism

The SSs of SMCEs in the construction industry are critical to their contributions at
economic, environmental, and social levels. SSs refer to enterprises adopting safe, environ-
mentally friendly, and green development practices to comply with safety, environmental,
and green development standards, thereby achieving sustainable development. These
include proactively implementing eco-friendly policies in production activities, adhering to
safety and health standards, and fulfilling social responsibilities across various dimensions.
These practices not only demonstrate the enterprises’ foresight and long-term development
strategy but also ensure their competitiveness amid increasing environmental and safety
challenges. Studies by Xu (2022) and Zulu (2023) highlight the key roles of government
environmental oversight, credit guarantee financing, and effective financial tools in promot-
ing the sustainable development of SMCEs in the construction industry [31,34]. Together,
these factors form a dynamic system that influences sustainable behavior in enterprises,
integrating aspects such as the environment, health, regulation, industry, economy, and
corporate governance. In this context, this study constructs a four-party system comprising
SMCEs in the construction industry, banks, the government, and financing guarantee
companies. In practice, the guidance of an enterprise’s sustainable development through
financing guarantees is predominantly led by the industrial and information departments
and supported by regulatory agencies. Therefore, in model construction, the government
entity includes both regulatory agencies and the industrial and information departments—
the latter leading and supervising financing guarantees, while regulatory agencies such as
the safety supervision bureau and the environmental protection bureau are responsible for
overseeing daily safety and environmental compliance, as well as assessing the sustainable
development levels of enterprises.
Firstly, to ensure that the daily operations of SMCEs in the construction industry align
with sustainable development standards—such as safety, environmental protection, and
green practices—SMCEs must comply with government regulations to achieve sustainable
development goals. Enterprises seeking financial support through financing guarantees
must meet government-imposed sustainability criteria, ensuring that the lender only sup-
ports companies that align with sustainable development principles. SMCEs that meet
these criteria can access bank loans through the financing guarantee system, where guar-
antee institutions and cooperative banks sign contracts and provide loans to qualifying
enterprises. The government then evaluates the sustainability of SMCEs within the financ-
ing guarantee system, penalizing those whose sustainability levels fall below the required
standards and offering financial incentives, such as interest rate discounts and premium
subsidies, to those that meet the criteria. At the end of each cycle, all entities calculate
their profits, with SMCEs required to repay the principal and interest on time; failure to do
so triggers the guarantee process, where the guarantee institution and cooperative bank
compensate according to a predefined ratio. Subsequently, SMCEs adjust their investments
and enter the next cycle; those that become insolvent exit the system. For SMCEs that
enter the compensation process, the guarantee institutions and cooperative banks must
recover the principal and interest in the following period. At the end of the system cycle,
the involved entities evaluate each other’s profits to determine operational strategies for the
next cycle. If SMCEs cannot repay the loan, they enter the compensation process, and the
guarantee institution and cooperative bank execute the corresponding compensation based
on the agreed ratio. Throughout each cycle, the interactions and decisions of all members
aim to optimize sustainable development and ensure the long-term stability of the entire
system. All events in the experiment are related to the focal party (Fagent, representing
SMCEs in the model), with other entities playing various roles at different stages of the
 sponding compensation based on the agreed ratio. Throughout each cycle, the interacti
and decisions of all members aim to optimize sustainable development and ensure
long-term stability of the entire system. All events in the experiment are related to
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 focal party (Fagent, representing SMCEs in the model), with other entities playing 6 of 21 vari
roles at different stages of the Fagent behavior cycle iteration. To facilitate the compu
tional experiment simulation, the sequence of events is represented in the workflow d
Fagentshown
gram behavior
in cycle
Figureiteration.
1. To facilitate the computational experiment simulation, the
sequence of events is represented in the workflow diagram shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Model workflow diagram.

Figure 1. Model workflow diagram.
From the above, it is clear that the guidance of SMCEs to maintain SSs is primarily
achieved
Fromthrough two aspects.
the above, Onthat
it is clear one the
hand, government
guidance departments
of SMCEs directly guide
to maintain SSs is prima
SSs by setting access conditions for SMCEs’ financing guarantees.
achieved through two aspects. On one hand, government departments directly On the other hand, guide
government departments regularly assess the sustainability levels of SMCEs, implement
by setting access conditions for SMCEs’ financing guarantees. On the other hand, gove
preferential policies related to sustainability within the financing guarantee system, and
ment
definedepartments regularly assess
the relevant operational the sustainability
procedures levels of SMCEs,
and specific requirements implement pre
of the financing
ential policies
guarantee related
system, toloan
such as sustainability within
interest rates, the financing
risk-sharing guarantee
proportions, system, and defi
and compensation
the relevant By
procedures. operational procedures
creating a favorable and specific
financing requirements
environment, SMCEs areof incentivized
the financingto guaran
participate and meet the corresponding sustainable development requirements, thereby
indirectly guiding SSs. The guiding mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.
 system, such as loan interest rates, risk-sharing proportions, and compensation proce-
dures. By creating a favorable financing environment, SMCEs are incentivized to partici-
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002
pate and meet the corresponding sustainable development requirements, thereby indi-
7 of 21
rectly guiding SSs. The guiding mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Guidance mechanism.

Figure 2. Guidance mechanism.
4. Model Construction
4. Model Construction
This study abstracts four types of parties based on real-life scenarios, including the
This study
government abstracts four
(represented types in
as Gagent ofthe
parties based
model), on real-life
small- scenarios, including
and medium-sized the
construction
government (represented as Gagent
enterprises (represented Fagent in thethemodel),
model),small-
banksand medium-sized
(represented construction
as Bagent in the
enterprises
model), and(represented
the guaranteeasinstitution
Fagent in(represented
the model), as banks (represented
Iagent as Bagent
in the model). Amongin the
these,
model),
the SMCE and the guarantee
(Fagent) institution
is adaptive, making(represented
choices basedason
Iagent in the model).
the environment Among
and these,
interactions
the SMCE
with other(Fagent)
parties. is adaptive, making choices based on the environment and interactions
with other parties.
4.1. Model Assumptions
4.1. Model Assumptions
To construct the model more effectively based on the real-life circumstances of SMCEs
in theTo
construction industry,
construct the modelthe following
more assumptions
effectively based on arethe
proposed:
real-life circumstances of
SMCEs in the construction industry, the following assumptions
Assumption 1. SMCEs construct homogeneous buildings with no are proposed:
significant differences in
production costs, and the decision making of these enterprises regarding SSs is bounded rational
Assumption 1. SMCEs
behavior, all aiming construct
to maximize homogeneous buildings with no significant differences in pro-
profit.
duction costs, and the decision making of these enterprises regarding SSs is bounded rational be-
Assumption 2. The
havior, all aiming guarantee
to maximize institution is a policy-oriented guarantee company, financed by
profit.
government funds and supported by a fiscal compensation mechanism, and it does not aim for profit.
Assumption 3.
Assumption 2. The
The guarantee institutionfactors
complex influencing is a policy-oriented
of an SMCE’sguarantee
sustainable company,
production financed by
level are
government funds and supported by a fiscal compensation mechanism, and it does
simplified into the cost input of sustainable behavior and the attitude towards it. The higher the not aim for
profit.
input and the better the attitude, the higher the level of sustainable production, and increased input
is the most direct manifestation of the effectiveness of SS guidance.
Assumption 3. The complex influencing factors of an SMCE’s sustainable production level are
Assumption
simplified into 4.theAll
costSMCEs
input offace financial constraints.
sustainable behavior andGiven the objective
the attitude towardsreasons such
it. The as a low
higher the
collateral value and low credit level, the possibility of obtaining loans through other means
input and the better the attitude, the higher the level of sustainable production, and increased input is minimal;
therefore,
is the mostthis study
direct assumes thatofSMCEs
manifestation can only obtain
the effectiveness bank loans through financing guarantees,
of SS guidance.
without collateral, excluding other loan methods, and the finances obtained through financing guarantees
can only be used
Assumption 4.for
Allregular
SMCEs production operations
face financial or sustainable
constraints. production
Given the objectiveactivities.
reasons such as a low
collateral value5.andApart
Assumption low credit level,
from the theofpossibility
level sustainableof obtaining
production,loans
it is through
assumedother means isinmin-
that SMCEs the
imal; therefore, this study assumes that SMCEs can only obtain bank loans through financing
construction industry can satisfy all other entrance conditions set by the bank and guarantee institutions.
guarantees, without collateral, excluding other loan methods, and the finances obtained through
financing guarantees
4.2. Description can only be used for regular production operations or sustainable production
of Parties
activities.
4.2.1. SMCEs in the Construction Industry: Fagent
At the beginning of the system, an Fagent is generated, whose main purpose in the
system is to obtain bank loans to maintain normal production and operations and to
maximize profits. Their main activities are as follows:
1. Production and operation activities
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 8 of 21

Production and operation activities are the focus of SMCEs in the construction industry.
Based on the principle of rational economic parties, the objective of each Fagent is to
produce and manage to achieve maximized profits. SMCEs in the construction industry
deliver or sell completed projects for profit, and assuming that this profit Li,t follows a
uniform distribution between e1 and e2 , then Li,t can be represented as follows:

Li,t ∼ U(e1 , e2 ) (1)

2. Sustainability-oriented production activities

The sustainable production activities of SMCEs in the construction industry are carried
out simultaneously with production and operation activities. The cost of sustainable
production is described by the company’s sustainable production investment, which mainly
includes investments in sustainable production facilities, sustainable production training for
employees, emergency rescue, sustainable production management, and participation in the
standardization rating for sustainable production, which is closely related to the enterprise’s
sustainable production level and can reflect the enterprise’s level of sustainability to a
certain extent.
The sustainable production investment of construction enterprise i in period t is
represented by Ii,t . Each Fagent will have a certain initial sustainable production investment.
In accordance with the literature [40], this study considers that the sustainable production
level of the Fagent is related to the investment—the higher the cost of sustainable production
invested by the enterprise, the higher the level of sustainability of the enterprise. The
sustainable production level of enterprise i in period t, Si,t , can be expressed by the following
formula, where a and b are control coefficients, and Sa is the sustainable production attitude
possessed by the Fagent:
a·Sa + b·Ii,t
Si,t = (2)
1 + a·Sa + b·Ii,t
The system will generate an initial value of Sa for the Fagent, which is related to the
Fagent’s sustainable production investment in the first period, Ii,1 , and can be represented
as Ii,1 = A0 ·Sa . Starting from the second period, the system will dynamically adjust the
sustainable production investment value according to the automatic learning algorithm
(which will be described later).
The enterprise’s investment in sustainable production not only yields outputs [4], but
according to the input–output function, the sustainable production output of construction
SMCEs can be represented as Yi,t = B· I γ ·eu , where B is the sustainable production level
coefficient, γ is the output elasticity of sustainable production cost investment, and eu
represents the randomness factor affecting the level of sustainability. Therefore, the income
from sustainable production for this period can be represented as follows:

Ei,t = Yi,t − Ii,t (3)

3. Financing activities
When the government proposes sustainable development level access requirements
for the financing guarantee system, enterprises that meet the sustainable production access
conditions S0 can submit a written application to the government and accept the qualifica-
tion review by the financing guarantee company and the cooperative bank. If they pass
the review, they need to pay a guarantee premium Bi,t = πmi,t (π is the guarantee rate) to
the guarantee company, then sign a contract according to the regulations, obtain the loan,
and repay the principal and interest on time. Assume that the loan an SMCE can obtain
in period t is mi,t , the bank loan interest rate is r, and the investment income of SMCE i in
period t after obtaining the loan is VFi,t .
If the SMCE fails to repay the principal and interest on time (default), the cooperative
bank will pursue recovery through legal means. If the recovery amount after the T0
period is still insufficient to settle the principal and interest, the guarantee institution and
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 9 of 21

the cooperative bank will share the compensation loss according to a certain ratio, and
the SMCE will bear the cost of breach of trust Di,t . Moreover, in the next period of the
enterprise’s default, they will assume the responsibility of being pursued for recovery,
represented by Qi,t as the amount of principal and interest owed from the previous period
recovered in this period.
4. Expected earnings
Based on the above analysis, the expected earnings of SMCE i in period t when t > 1
is Ui,t can be expressed as the following formula:

Ui,t = Li,t + Ei,t + VFi,t − Bi,t − rmi,t + mti,t + Gi,t − Di,t − φi,t − φ′ i,t − Qi,t (4)

where ti,t and Gi,t are the government’s interest discount rate and premium subsidy to the
enterprise, respectively, and φi,t and φ′ i,t are the fines for not meeting daily sustainable
production supervision standards and for enterprises whose sustainable development level
falls below the entry conditions after entering the financing guarantee system, respectively.
These parameters will be detailed later in the text.
5. Learning mechanism
SMCEs have the capacity to learn, which is mainly reflected in sustainable production
investments. This study uses an automatic learning algorithm to describe the bounded
rationality of the Fagent’s learning ability. The algorithm first needs to assess the following:
• Whether the sustainable production investment for this period has increased compared
to the last period;
• Whether the earnings for this period have increased compared to the last period.
Based on the results of the assessment, SMCEs adjust the probability of changes in the
sustainable production investment according to the rules shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Probabilistic adjustment rules for sustainability-oriented inputs.

Changes in Sustainability-Oriented Inputs Changes in Earnings Probability Variation

 
Increase Increase pd − ε/2, pi + ε, pc − ε/2
 
Increase Decrease or remain unchanged pd + ε/2, pi − ε, pc + ε/2
 
Decrease Increase pd + ε, pi − ε/2, pc − ε/2
 
Decrease Decrease or remain unchanged pd − ε, pi + ε/2, pc + ε/2
 
Unchanged Increase pd − ε/2, pi − ε/2, pc + ε
 
Unchanged Decrease or remain unchanged pd + ε/2, pi + ε/2, pc − ε

In this context, ε represents the change in the probability of the volume of sustain-
able production inputs. The probability vector for changes in a company’s sustainable
production input can be expressed as p = (pd , pi , pc ), where pd , pi , and pc represent the
probabilities that the company’s sustainable production inputs for the next period will
decrease, increase, or remain unchanged, respectively, and pd + pi + pc = 1. The initial
value is set to p = (pd , pi , pc ) = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4). During the experiment, pd, pi, and pc are
adjusted according to the rules presented in the table mentioned above.
The probability of change in the sustainable production input of SMCEs in the con-
struction industry is a learning process. The system generates a random number c ∈ [0, 1],
and companies adjust the probability of change in their safety production input volume at
the end of each period based on the interval value of the random number. The rule for this
adjustment is
 Ii,t − ∆I1 0 ≤ c < pd


Ii,t+1 = I + ∆I pd ≤ c < pi + pc (5)

 i,t i 2 c
Ii,t p + p ≤ c ≤ 1
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 10 of 21

where ∆I1 and ∆I2 represent the amount by which the company’s sustainable development
cost input decreases or increases each period.
6. “Death” and “rebirth” of SMCEs in the construction industry
To better reflect reality, the model posits that Fagents can go bankrupt and exit the
system, while also positing the entry of new Fagents. An Fagent will go bankrupt and exit
the system if it meets one of the following conditions: (1) if SMCE i lacks sufficient funds
for two consecutive periods (indicating that pursuit of compensation still cannot cover the
previous period’s debts), then Ki,t ≤ 0 (Ki,t represents the total funds of enterprise i in
period t); (2) if the actual earnings for consecutive t periods are less than 0, then Ui,t ≤ 0;
and (3) under daily government supervision of SMCEs, when these enterprises i have
a high frequency of not meeting sustainable development standards. Additionally, new
Fagents will be generated and join the system.

4.2.2. Government Entity: Gagent

In the system, the Gagent plays crucial roles in supervising the level of sustainable
development, regulating the market as a whole, and optimizing the environment of the
financing guarantee system. It acts as the guiding body for the SSs of small- and medium-
sized construction enterprises. Since government policies, once set, will not be frequently
altered in the short term, the government’s capacity for learning is not considered. The
main activities of Gagent are as follows:
(1) Supervision of sustainability levels
The traditional method of the government to guide the sustainable development
activities of small- and medium-sized construction enterprises involves the measurement
and supervision of sustainability levels, as mentioned in reference [19]. Assuming the
government periodically evaluates the sustainability levels of all small- and medium-sized
construction enterprises in the market, if it is found that these companies’ sustainability
levels have not reached the government’s prescribed sustainable production standard S1
during inspections, penalties will be imposed on the enterprises in the form of fines. The
amount of penalty φi,t is related to the gap between the sustainability level of enterprise i
in period t and standard S1 , with the penalty rule as follows:

χ·|Si,t − S1 | Si,t < S1
φi,t = (6)
0 Si,t ≥ S1

where χ represents the government’s penalty adjustment coefficient for small- and
medium-sized construction enterprises that do not meet the sustainability levels, mea-
suring the intensity of penalties. In addition, the government also needs to supervise
small- and medium-sized construction enterprises entering the financing guarantee
system to encourage their sustainability levels to continuously meet the system’s entry
conditions and penalize companies whose sustainability levels have fallen below these
conditions (e.g., non-compliance with safety levels and environmental standards), with
the penalty rule as follows: 
Pi,t Si,t < S0
φ′i,t = (7)
0 Si,t ≥ S0
where Pi,t denotes the base value of the penalties imposed by the government on com-
panies within the financing guarantee system whose sustainability levels are below the
entry conditions.
(2) Subsidies for the financing guarantee system
The government intervenes in the financing guarantee system in a timely and encour-
aging manner, designing reasonable mechanisms, formulating and implementing relevant
policies to guide the mutual cooperation among various entities in the financing guarantee
system, and forming long-term alliance constraints [20]. The government’s subsidies to
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 11 of 21

the financing guarantee system mainly manifest in providing loan interest subsidy mecha-
nisms for small- and medium-sized construction enterprises. The extent of government
interest subsidies is related to the sustainability development levels of these small- and
medium-sized construction enterprises, and the rules for setting government financing
subsidy t are as follows: 
0.02 Si,t ≥ S2
ti,t = (8)
0 Si,t < S2
S2 is the threshold level of sustainable development that small- and medium-sized
construction enterprises need to reach when receiving subsidies, and S2 ≥ S1 . In addition,
the government will also subsidize the premium for financing guarantees according to
the sustainability development situations of these companies. Let us denote Gi,t as the
premium subsidy given by the government to company i in period t, with the subsidy rule
as follows: 
 50%· Bi,t S3 ≤ Si,t < 1
Gi,t = 100%· Bi,t S2 ≤ Si,t < S3 (9)
0 Si,t < S2


By actively addressing the financing difficulties of small- and medium-sized con-

struction enterprises and improving their SSs, the government can enhance its reputation,
expand the scale of commercial bank profits, and increase the number of employment
positions. These social welfare benefits can be accounted for as additional income for
the government, Sgov . The supervision and intervention of the government in the financ-
ing guarantee system entail certain costs, denoted as Csup , including resource allocation,
platform construction, etc.

4.2.3. Bank Entity: Bagent

The bank cooperates with the financing guarantee companies, providing loans to
small- and medium-sized construction enterprises and generating interest income. If the
enterprises do not default, the interest income acquired by the bank from them is int =
∑in=1 rmi,t , and Sbank = ∑in=1 αmi,t represents the bank’s investment returns, with α being
the bank’s investment return rate. If small- and medium-sized construction enterprises
default, the bank will proceed to compensation, and if the shortfall is still not covered after
a T0 period, the bank will bear a certain proportion of the compensation loss, denoted as
the bank’s share of compensation loss ratio A1 .
Moreover, the bank also incurs certain costs, including the credit qualification review
cost of the loaned small- and medium-sized construction enterprises C1 , loan cost C2 , the
compensation loss Lbank of small- and medium-sized construction enterprises in case of
default, and the collection cost C3 . Based on the analysis above, the expected revenue
expression of the bank Ubank can be described as follows:

Ubank = Sbank + int − η1 C1 − C2 − Lbank − k1 C3 + rmi,t (10)

where the costs of qualification review C1 and collection cost C3 for small- and medium-
sized construction enterprises are shared between the financing guarantee companies and
cooperating banks, and η1 and k1 are the proportions of these two costs shared by the
cooperating banks. Additionally, Lbank can be calculated from the total compensation
amount of all enterprises in the current period, Lbank = A1 ·∑in=1 Qi,t ; the bank’s loan cost
C2 is related to the loan amount mi,t ; and the collection cost is related to the amount Qi,t to
be collected.

4.2.4. Guarantee Institution Entity: Iagent

Entrusted by government departments, guarantee institutions provide loan guarantees
for small- and medium-sized construction enterprises, earning premium income, supported
by the treasury. The activities of the guarantee institution entity can be divided into pre-
event, during-event, and post-event stages.
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 12 of 21

In the pre-event stage, the guarantee institution and cooperating banks jointly screen
small- and medium-sized construction enterprises that meet the entry conditions (i.e.,
credit qualification review), sharing the credit qualification review cost C1 with the bank.
During the event (guarantee stage), the guarantee institution provides financing guarantees
for approved small- and medium-sized construction enterprises, with the guarantee cost
being GI and earning premium income F = ∑in=1 πmi,t , π being the guarantee rate, while
also earning investment income Sins = ∑in=1 βmi,t , with β being the guarantee institution’s
investment return rate. When small- and medium-sized construction enterprises default,
entering the post-event stage (compensation stage), the bank proceeds with collection
first, and if the shortfall is still not covered after a T0 period, the guarantee institution
needs to compensate according to the risk-sharing ratio, denoted as A2 , with the possible
compensation loss being Lins = A2 ·∑in=1 Qi,t .
In summary, the expected revenue expression of the guarantee institution entity Uins
can be represented as follows:

Uins = Sins + F − η2 C1 − GI − Lins − k2 C3 (11)

where η2 and k2 , respectively, denote the proportion of the costs of credit qualifica-
tion review and collection cost borne by the guarantee institution amongst small- and
medium-sized construction enterprises, and the guarantee cost GI is related to the
guarantee amount mi,t .

5. Simulated Experiments
5.1. Experimental Parameter Design
This study utilized the Netlogo 6.1.0 software package to simulate the evolution of
the sustainable development level of SMCEs under different scenarios, aiming to measure
the guiding effects of various measures on the SSs of these companies. The study also
simulated the changes in the earnings of three entities, namely Fagent, Bagent, and Iagent,
to assess the economic impacts of related guiding measures on each entity.
To closely align with reality, this study designed the number of experimental samples
based on the average number of SMCEs involved in sustainability level standard loans in
real prototypes. Certain parameters, such as the profit Li,t , sustainable production attitude
Sa, and loan amount mi,t , are distributed within a specific range randomly to accommodate
the heterogeneous characteristics of different small- and mid-sized construction enterprises.
Other parameters, such as the qualification review costs for Fagent, compensation and
recourse costs, loan costs for Bagent, and guarantee costs for Iagent, are all related to the
loan amount mi,t obtained by the SMCEs and the unpaid principal and interest Qi,t . The
settings of the common experimental parameters and the personalized parameters for each
entity, considering the real objective prototypes, are derived from empirical values obtained
after multiple software tests and training and comparisons with real prototypes. Table 2
lists the main parameters’ values and assignment rules.

5.2. Simulated Experiments and Result Analysis

This study designed three experimental scenarios: Scenario 1 is restricted by only the
government’s regular sustainability level supervision, which serves as a control group that
allows for a comparison between the guidance provided by the financing guarantee system
and traditional government intervention methods; Scenario 2 stipulates that besides sus-
tainability level supervision, the government also puts forward sustainability development
level requirements for SMCEs in the construction industry within the entrance criteria of
the financing guarantee system; Scenario 3, apart from the government’s regular sustain-
ability supervision and the sustainable development level requirements in the entrance
criteria, introduces subsidy measures related to sustainable development into the financing
guarantee system, specifically in the form of penalties for system-internal SMCEs in the
construction industry that do not meet sustainability levels along with discount interest
and premium subsidies. At the onset of the experiment, one hundred Fagent entities, one
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 13 of 21

Gagent entity, one Bagent entity, and one Iagent entity are generated, with a set operational
cycle of 500 periods.

Table 2. Table of main system variables, parameter ranges, and assignment rules.

Variable/
Meaning Value Range Assignment Rules
Parameter
Li,t Profit of SMCEs 1000–1500 Random distribution
A0 Control Coefficient of SS Attitude 5 Set through multiple training and testing
Sa Attitude of SSs for SMCEs 0–0.5 Random distribution
Level of the Coefficient of Sustainable
B 7 Set through multiple training and testing
Development
γ Elasticity of the Output of Cost Input for SSs 0.75 Set through multiple training and testing
r Interest Rate for Loans 0.05 Fixed value
Pi,t Penalty Baseline Value 500 Fixed value
ε Change Quantity of the Probability of SS Input 0.1 Set through multiple training and testing
∆I1 Amount of Increase in SS Input 25 Set through multiple training and testing
∆I2 Amount of Decrease in SS Input 50 Set through multiple training and testing
χ Penalty Coefficient 800 Set through multiple training and testing
mi,t Loan Amount Obtained by SMCEs 1000–1500 Random distribution
A1 Proportion of Guarantee Borne by Banks 0.2 Fixed value
Proportion of Guarantee Borne by Guarantee
A2 0.8 Fixed value
Institutions
C1 Cost of the Qualification Examination 300–500 Random distribution

5.2.1. Experiments on the Evolutionary Impacts of Different Guidance Strategies on the SSs
of SMCEs in the Construction Industry
The purposes of this experiment are to explore the evolutionary trends of the average
sustainable development investment amount and average sustainable development level
among SMCE groups under the three scenarios, and to compare the guiding effects of
different policies on the SSs of SMCEs in these scenarios. The experimental results are
shown in Figure 3.
As indicated in Figure 3a, all three scenarios exert a certain guiding effect on the SSs
of SMCEs. These enterprises are motivated to increase their investments in sustainable
production. During the 500 cycles, the average sustainable production investment level of
the SMCE groups shows an increasing trend, but the speed of increase and the maximum
investment level reached at the end of the evolution differ among the scenarios. Under
Scenario 1, regular government supervision has a certain guiding effect on the SSs of
SMCEs, but the growth rate is the slowest, with the sustainable production investment
level reaching only about 650 at the end of the evolution. Under Scenario 2, the average
sustainable production investment level of the construction company groups increases
faster than in Scenario 1, with the level reaching about 800 at the end. In Scenario 3,
the sustainable production investment level increases the fastest, with the level reaching
around 1000 at the end of the evolution.
From Figure 3b, we learn that in all three scenarios, the average sustainable develop-
ment level of SMCEs improves to some extent, but the level reached at the stable state after
evolution differs. Starting from around the 100th cycle, all three scenarios enter a stable
evolutionary state. Scenario 1 fluctuates between 0.5 and 0.6, the lowest among the three
scenarios. Scenario 2 is higher than Scenario 1, stabilizing at the fluctuation between 0.7
and 0.8. Scenario 3 is the highest, stabilizing around 0.9; starting from the 220th cycle, it
reaches 0.9 and remains stable.
 Buildings 2024, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 14 of 21

(a)

(b)
Figure
Figure 3. (a) 3. (a) Theofimpacts
The impacts of guidance
different different guidance
strategiesstrategies on SS investments
on SS investments by SMCEs.
by SMCEs. (b) The(b) The
impacts of
impacts of different different
guidance guidanceonstrategies
strategies on the sustainable
the sustainable development development level of SMCEs.
level of SMCEs.

The reasons Asfor

indicated
the above in states
Figureare 3a,asall three scenarios
follows: When theexert a certainonly
government guiding effect on the SS
supervises
the everydayof SMCEs. These level
sustainability enterprises are motivated
of the companies, to increase
penalty measures their
caninvestments in sustainab
force the enter-
production.
prises to pay attention toDuring the 500
sustainable cycles, the but
production, average sustainable
the effect production
is limited. investment level
The sustainability
level standards set via
the SMCE the everyday
groups shows an safety supervision
increasing trend,procedures
but the speed areofnot very high,
increase and and
the maximu
so their impacts on thelevel
investment sustainability
reached at development
the end of investments
the evolution and sustainable
differ among production
the scenarios. Und
levels of the enterprises
Scenario are limited.
1, regular With thesupervision
government introductionhas of the government’s
a certain guidingsustainable
effect on the SSs
development requirements
SMCEs, in the entrance
but the growth rate is the conditions
slowest, of thethe
with financing guarantee
sustainable system,
production investme
the SS guiding
level effect becomes
reaching evident
only about 650foratSMCEs,
the endwith significant
of the evolution. improvements
Under Scenario in both
2, the averag
the investment in sustainable
sustainable productiondevelopment
investment and theof
level sustainable development
the construction company level. This increas
groups
implies that the inclusive finance role of the financing guarantee system can attract
faster than in Scenario 1, with the level reaching about 800 at the end. In Scenario 3, th SMCEs.
The enterprises have anproduction
sustainable incentive toinvestment
enhance SSslevel to meet the entry
increases theconditions for obtaining
fastest, with the level reachin
loans, and around
the sustainability
1000 at theassessment
end of the and supervision measures within the system have
evolution.
a certain deterrent effect on these enterprises. When the government implements interest
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 15 of 21

subsidies and premium subsidies for the financing guarantee system, if enterprises can
obtain these subsidies, the cost of the loan is significantly reduced. The reduced loan costs
can effectively compensate for the cost of the sustainable production investment, and so
SMCEs are willing to invest more to enhance sustainable production levels to meet the
subsidy standards and obtain loans at a lower cost. Under this scenario, the investment in
sustainable production and the sustainable development level of the enterprises reach a
more ideal state, hence showing the most optimal guiding effect.
The results indicate the following: (1) The current singular regulatory guidance mea-
sures for sustainable development can have a certain guiding effect. Still, as the measures
are not very forceful or demanding, they cannot further guide the SSs of SMCEs, and so
other strategies should be used in combination. (2) Through the government’s implementa-
tion of regular supervision of sustainable production using the financing guarantee system
and raising the sustainable development requirements for SMCEs entering the system, ef-
fective SS guidance can be realized. (3) Subsidy measures related to sustainable production
have a better guiding effect than merely setting sustainable production requirements in the
entrance criteria.

5.2.2. Experiments on the Evolutionary Impacts of Parameter Changes in Different

Guidance Strategies on the SSs of SMCEs in the Construction Industry
To further investigate the impacts of parameter changes in the SS guidance strategy
on the guidance effect for SMCEs, this experiment takes Scenario 3—which has the highest
average sustainable development level after evolutionary stabilization—as an example to
explore the impacts of changes in the entrance criteria S0 , as well as the subsidy conditions
for interest and premiums (S2 and S3 ), on the SSs of the group of SMCEs. The experimental
results are as shown in Figure 4.
In the experiment investigating the impact of entrance condition changes on the
average sustainable development level of SMCEs, with fixed parameters S1 = 0.45, S2 = 0.65,
and S3 = 0.75, we observed the influence of variations in S0 on the experimental outcomes.
From Figure 4a, it is evident that changes in entrance conditions have a minimal impact
on the average sustainable development level of SMCEs in the initial stage. In the mid-
stage, low and medium entrance conditions do not significantly affect the companies’
average sustainable development level, but higher entrance conditions surprisingly do
not offer better guidance. The medium level of entrance conditions in the later stages has
the best guiding effect on the SSs of SMCEs. The reason might be that, regardless of the
entrance conditions, SMCEs can afford the costs associated with pursuing those conditions
and are capable of striving for a higher level of sustainable development in the initial
stage. As the entrance conditions gradually become stricter, SMCEs need to expend more
costs to enter the financing guarantee system, and maintaining a sustainable development
level higher than the entrance conditions after entering the system also puts pressure on
these companies. When the entrance condition is at a medium level, the enterprises can
afford the costs of achieving these conditions and are motivated to pursue subsidies to
offset the costs, and the sustainable development level can therefore evolve to the highest
level. However, when the entrance conditions are high, although the enterprises’ average
sustainable development level can meet the conditions, the high costs involved mean that
after reaching the subsidy threshold, the companies no longer have the motivation to
pursue a higher level of sustainable development due to the excessive investment.
In the experiment analyzing the impacts of the interest and a 50% premium subsidy
threshold on the average sustainable development level of SMCEs with fixed parameters
S0 = 0.45, S1 = 0.45, and S3 = 0.85, a change in S2 was observed due to its influence on the
experimental outcomes. As depicted in Figure 4b, a higher threshold evidently produces
a more pronounced effect on the SS guidance, with a faster growth rate. The reason
for this phenomenon may be that the threshold is related to both the interest subsidy
and premium subsidy. Since the subsidies are relatively generous, they have a strong
appeal to SMCEs. Therefore, regardless of the changes in the threshold, if the amount of
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 16 of 21

subsidy can cover the costs of sustainable development for the SMCEs, these companies
are motivated to adopt SSs.
In the experiment evaluating the impact of a 100% premium subsidy threshold on the
average sustainable development level of SMCEs with fixed parameters S0 = 0.45, S1 = 0.45,
and S2 = 0.55, the effect of variations in S3 on the experimental outcome was observed.
According to Figure 4c, the difference between low and high subsidy thresholds is minimal,
with the guidance effect of the lower threshold being slightly better than that of the higher
one. This is because when the subsidy threshold is low, companies incur lower costs but can
still obtain subsidies, and so they can therefore afford to pursue a higher level of sustainable
development. However, when the subsidy threshold is high, companies must first incur
higher costs to improve their sustainable development level before they can use subsidies
to compensate
Buildings 2024, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW for the considerable costs of reaching the threshold. Consequently, once they 16 of 22
reach the threshold, they no longer have the incentive to incur additional costs to pursue
even higher thresholds.

(a)

(b)
Figure 4. Cont.
 Buildings 2024, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW 17 of 22
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 17 of 21

(c)

Figure Figure 4. (a)

4. (a) The The impact
impact of changes
of changes inthe
in S0 on S0 on the average
average sustainable
sustainable development
development level
level of of SMCEs.
SMCEs.
(b) The(b) The impacts
impacts of interest
of interest and asubsidy
and a 50% 50% subsidy threshold
threshold on theon the average
average sustainable
sustainable development
development
level of SMCEs. (c) The impact of a 100% premium subsidy threshold on the average sustainable
level of SMCEs. (c) The impact of a 100% premium subsidy threshold on the average sustainable
development level of SMCEs.
development level of SMCEs.

In the experiment
The experiment indicatesinvestigating
that under the theguidance
impact ofpolicy
entrance condition
of Scenario 3, changes
the average on the av-
eragedevelopment
sustainable sustainable development
level of the grouplevel ofof SMCEs
SMCEs,has with fixed parameters
reached the highest S1 level= 0.45,
among S2 = 0.65,
and S3 = 0.75, we observed the influence of variations in S0
all scenarios. Adjusting the strategy parameters can still affect the average sustainable on the experimental outcomes.
From Figure
development 4a, it isa small
level within evident that but
range, changes
it needsin entrance conditions
to be maintained haveaareasonable
within minimal impact
on the average sustainable development level of SMCEs
scope. Thresholds that are neither too high nor too low produce optimal guidance effects, in the initial stage. In the mid-
while a moderate threshold can both play a guiding role and not impair the profits of av-
stage, low and medium entrance conditions do not significantly affect the companies’
SMCEs, erage
thussustainable
achieving the development
best guidance level, but higher entrance conditions surprisingly do not
effect.
offer better guidance. The medium level of entrance conditions in the later stages has the
6. Conclusions
best guiding effect on the SSs of SMCEs. The reason might be that, regardless of the en-
trance
This study conditions,
constructs SMCEs can afford
a multi-agent the costs associated
computational experiment withmodel
pursuing those conditions
to explore the
and are capable of striving for a higher level of sustainable
mechanism of guiding the SSs of SMCEs through the financing guarantee system in practice. development in the initial
stage. the
It compares As the entrance
evolution of conditions
the averagegradually
sustainable become stricter, SMCEs
development level ofneedSMCEs to expend
under more
costs
different to enterstrategies
guidance the financing andguarantee
examines system, and maintaining
the impacts of changes in a sustainable
various guidance development
strategylevel higher than
parameters theSSs
on the entrance
of SMCEs.conditions
This studyafterprovides
enteringdecision-making
the system also puts pressure on
references
these companies.
for strategies to guide theWhen SSs ofthe entrance
SMCEs, andcondition is at a medium
the main conclusions are aslevel, the enterprises can
follows:
afford the
(1) Different costs of strategies
guidance achieving can these conditions
influence the and
SSs are motivated
of SMCEs to pursue
to varying subsidies to
degrees,
offset
with the costs,
different and the
effects. Thesustainable
most effective development level can therefore
strategy combines evolve to with
daily supervision the highest
level. However, when the entrance conditions are high,
the sustainable development entrance conditions of the financing guarantee system,although the enterprises’ average
along with related premium and interest subsidy strategies. While continuing daily that
sustainable development level can meet the conditions, the high costs involved mean
after reaching
supervision, thethe subsidy threshold,
government the companies
should therefore no longer
implement the have the motivation
financing guaranteeto pur-
sue a higher
system linked level
to theofsustainable
sustainabledevelopment
developmentlevels due to ofthe excessive investment.
loan-seeking enterprises and
In the
establish experiment
a subsidy analyzing
mechanism. Thistheapproach
impacts of the interest
would not only andenhance
a 50% premium
the role of subsidy
threshold
the financing onguarantee
the average sustainable
system development
in inclusive finance but level
alsoofguide
SMCEs SMCEswith to fixed parameters
improve
S0 = sustainable
their 0.45, S1 = 0.45, and S3 = 0.85,
development a change in S2 was observed due to its influence on the
levels.
experimental outcomes. As
(2) In the scenario where SS is guided through depicted in Figure 4b, a higher
the financing threshold
guarantee evidently
system, changes produces
ina subsidy
more pronounced
thresholdseffect on the SSconditions
and entrance guidance,have with moderate
a faster growthimpacts rate.
on The
SMCEs’reason for
this However,
SSs. phenomenon may be that
excessively highthe threshold
subsidy is related
thresholds andtoentrance
both theconditions
interest subsidy can and
premium
lead subsidy. Since
to unsustainable the subsidies
development costs, are relatively
causing SMCEsgenerous, they have
to abandon a strong
the pursuit ofappeal
to SMCEs.
higher Therefore,
sustainable regardlesslevels.
development of theConversely,
changes in the threshold,and
if thresholds if the amount of
conditions aresubsidy
too low, there is little incentive for these enterprises to strive for higher sustainable
development levels. Both extremes are therefore counterproductive to guiding SMCEs’
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 18 of 21

SSs. The government should maintain reasonable entrance conditions and subsidy
thresholds to ensure that the expected profits of SMCEs can offset their sustainable
development costs.
(3) Guiding the SSs of SMCEs essentially involves enabling these enterprises to make
satisfactory decisions regarding sustainable development under bounded rationality.
The SS decisions made by enterprises are influenced not only by their own profits
but also by their environment and the behavior of other enterprises. The government
should recognize the uniqueness of SMCEs, actively promote sustainable develop-
ment education, guide them to voluntarily enhance their awareness of sustainable
development, and foster a supportive atmosphere for sustainable development.

7. Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research

7.1. Theoretical Contributions
This study contributes to the research on guiding the SSs of SMEs, particularly by
integrating financial constraints with government guidance, and exploring new policy
guidance methods. Utilizing a multi-agent computational experiment model, our study
advances the current understanding of the subject in several groundbreaking ways.
(1) We introduce a new model designed to map the execution complexities of SSs
among SMCEs in detail. This innovative approach highlights the intricate interde-
pendencies and the multifaceted pathways of interaction between parties. Unlike
conventional econometric frameworks that often oversimplify these dynamics,
our model provides a more comprehensive and integrative perspective on the
mechanisms driving SS implementation.
(2) A key finding of our research is that financing guarantees go beyond their tradi-
tional role as funding mechanisms, emerging as strategic tools crucial for endorsing
sustainable practices. This insight supports the argument that inclusive financial
instruments should be carefully designed to meet economic goals while also serving
as vital catalysts for broader environmental and societal impacts.
(3) Our findings contribute to the discussion on bounded rationality, revealing the com-
plex balancing act SMCEs perform in aligning sustainability goals with financial
constraints. This diverges from the traditional view of these entities as purely rational
parties, uncovering a more nuanced decision-making process influenced by a combi-
nation of regulatory mandates, financial incentives, and sustainability orientations.
(4) The methodological advancements in this research offer a powerful tool for dynami-
cally analyzing policy interventions, significantly enhancing the framework for eval-
uating the immediate impacts of regulatory changes on business behavior. This
novel approach encourages scholars and policymakers to replicate our model in vari-
ous scenarios, thereby deepening the understanding of different policy instruments’
effectiveness over time.
In summary, our study challenges and extends conventional theoretical paradigms,
providing fresh insights into the interconnected areas of strategic management, sustainable
development, and corporate finance. This work bridges critical gaps and lays the ground-
work for future research aimed at navigating the complexities of sustainable transformation
in the construction sector. Through these theoretical innovations, we aim to elevate both
academic and practical discussions, steering them toward more sustainable, inclusive, and
financially viable outcomes.

7.2. Practical Contributions

This research not only illuminates new academic pathways but also opens the door
to tangible, actionable strategies for industry practitioners and policymakers, marking a
significant step towards blending theory with practice.
Our findings carve out a roadmap for the integration of sustainable and financial
strategies within SMCEs, particularly those in the construction sector. This study guides
business leaders towards seamlessly incorporating SSs with their economic objectives.
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 19 of 21

By viewing sustainability as a key strategic asset rather than merely a regulatory hurdle,
companies can unlock new dimensions of competitive advantage. This holistic approach
not only champions environmental stewardship but also propels businesses towards a
sustainably profitable future.
The insights derived from our investigation are instrumental for policy architects.
The nuanced understanding of the varying impacts of financing guarantees on SMCEs’
sustainability practices highlights the necessity of balanced policy frameworks. Moderate,
well-calibrated policy thresholds emerge as essential levers for fostering sustainable de-
velopment synergies alongside economic vitality. Hence, our research enriches the policy
toolkit with nuanced strategies tailored for nurturing a sustainable business ecosystem
without compromising on growth dynamics.
One of the salient contributions of this study lies in demonstrating the dual utility
of financing guarantees—mitigating financial barriers while simultaneously propelling
sustainability initiatives. Our analysis urges financial entities to recalibrate their service
portfolios to encompass sustainability-centric offerings, thus enabling SMCEs to pursue
their sustainability agendas effectively. By evidencing the symbiotic potential between
finance and sustainability, we pave the way for financial products that act as conduits for
sustainable transformation within the SMCE domain.
In summary, the practical dimensions of our study have far-reaching implications,
offering a rich tapestry of strategies for industry leaders, policymakers, and financial
institutions. By foregrounding a nuanced appreciation of the complex interplay between
sustainability, finance, and policy, our research charts a course towards a more sustainable,
economically robust future for SMCEs. With these practical contributions, we aspire to
foster a paradigm shift in how sustainability is perceived, practiced, and promoted within
the business community and beyond.

7.3. Limitations and Future Research

While acknowledging the rigorous and methodical nature of our research, it is also
imperative to recognize its limitations. Firstly, given the reliance of this study on com-
putational simulations, the robustness of our projected scenarios is contingent upon the
underlying assumptions of model parameters. As a result, discrepancies may arise when
these scenarios are compared with the complex realities of the world. Secondly, since this
study is based solely on the Chinese context, it does not account for cultural diversity or
differences in institutional environments, thereby presenting an opportunity for future
research to integrate cultural and institutional diversity and consider cross-regional studies.
Thirdly, this study simplifies the consideration of the breadth and diversity of financial
mechanisms such that future research could further incorporate a broader range of financial
mechanisms to enhance the model’s universality and precision.

Author Contributions: Methodology, Q.Z.; Software, Q.Z.; Writing—original draft, Z.M. and
W.H.; Writing—review & editing, J.Z. All authors have read and agreed to the published version
of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant
number 72004081) and The Key Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Colleges and
Universities in Jiangsu Province (grant number 2022SJZD017).
Data Availability Statement: The original contributions presented in the study are included in the
article, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding authors.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Buildings 2024, 14, 3002 20 of 21

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