WP 2024123
WP 2024123
WP 2024123
123
Anjal Prakash a, Noor Kumar c, Ashwini Chhatre a, Shriya Thakkar b, * and Aaditya Dar d
a
Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, India
b
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge LA 70808, USA
c
Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
d
Economist, Amazon, Virginia, USA
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
AP, 0000-0002-3749-0854; NK, 0009-0008-5200-8000; AC, 0000-0002-5374-7867; ST, 0000-0003-0446-6513; AD, 0000-0002-6745-6358
ABSTRACT
The rate of groundwater extraction has seen an exponential rise in India over the past few decades. Several districts in the
country face groundwater depletion and contamination issues, threatening agricultural and domestic usage. The overexploita-
tion of the resource can be attributed to the sowing of water-intensive crops, distortionary subsidies, the absence of incentives,
asymmetrical information, and regulatory bottlenecks. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the experiences of various
states of India in regulating groundwater extraction. It discusses both the legal and institutional components of the current
framework and explores groundwater conservation policies from both the demand and supply sides. The paper highlights
the issues of zoning and registration of wells, the promotion of water-saving practices, the implementation of recharge projects
for aquifers and wells, and the improvement of groundwater governance as potential solutions to alleviate the ongoing crisis.
Furthermore, the paper emphasises the importance of sustainable management, community engagement, and regulatory
frameworks to tackle issues like groundwater depletion. Lastly, it suggests actionable steps for policymakers to promote sus-
tainable practices and ensure a secure future for India’s groundwater resources.
Key words: Community engagement, Groundwater depletion, Groundwater regulation, Governance, India
HIGHLIGHTS
• A comparative analysis of the experiences of various states of India in regulating groundwater extraction.
• Highlights the issue of zoning and registration of wells.
• Promotion of water-saving practices, implementation of recharge projects for aquifers and wells, and improvement of
groundwater governance are potential solutions to alleviate the ongoing crisis.
1. INTRODUCTION
India is one of the largest groundwater users in the world (World Bank, 2020). Groundwater accounts for 60% of
irrigation needs in agriculture and serves more than 80% of domestic water demand. The country’s exhaustible
and invisible groundwater resources have been put under tremendous pressure in the last few decades to meet the
needs of the rising population and shifting consumption patterns. An inefficient public service delivery system,
distortionary subsidies and incentives, the introduction of cheap and easily available pumping and drilling equip-
ment, and administrative and regulatory bottlenecks have contributed to the ongoing groundwater crisis in India.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY 4.0), which permits copying,
adaptation and redistribution, provided the original work is properly cited (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Furthermore, rising groundwater pollution may render the resource unusable before its depletion. It is esti-
mated that approximately 60% of districts will show signs of groundwater depletion within two decades,
risking at least 25% of agriculture production (World Bank, 2020; Roome, 2022) (see Figure 1 for details). More-
over, the effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate the present situation (Bhattarai et al., 2023). Changes in
rainfall patterns affect the natural groundwater recharge potential. This adds another layer of complexity to the
issue, especially for the marginalised. Historically, groundwater development across the world has been charac-
terised by ‘anarchy’ (Shah, 2008), leading to a ‘silent revolution’ with users exploiting groundwater resources in
an unplanned and unmanaged fashion. There is a need to maintain a robust groundwater governance framework
that considers the social norms influencing behaviour towards groundwater use in India. Groundwater govern-
ance is defined as ‘the political, social, economic and administrative systems which affect the use,
development, and management of the resources and the equity and efficiency of water services and allocation’
(UNDP-SIWI Water Governance Facility, 2013).
Increasingly, there is a noticeable shift in focus from resource development to management, with a consider-
able emphasis on demand-side measures apart from existing supply-side interventions. A legal, regulatory
framework to govern groundwater establishes rights and obligations within a specific context that goes beyond
non-binding policies to facilitate sustainable management and ensure the protection and conservation of the
resource, something that was earlier left to chance.
However, the legal regime requires reformed rules and, more importantly, evidence-based priorities rooted in
science. Consequently, sustainable groundwater management must address key dimensions to facilitate improved
implementation, such as integrating institutions at all levels, accountability, involvement of stakeholders, manage-
ment of incentives, and issues related to capacity and knowledge building, financial bottlenecks, political will,
enforcement, and compliance.
This paper is divided into six sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 describes the different facets of
groundwater regulation in India. Section 3 provides a comparative analysis of the experience of different states
in regulating abstraction through a legal lens. Section 4 focuses on key policies related to groundwater
conservation and managing incentives. Section 5 explores participatory groundwater management and commu-
nities in action. The last section offers a brief conclusion and a way forward.
in practice, the earlier bills solely focused on landowners and ignored the interests of the landless and margina-
lised, eventually resulting in the ‘grandfathering’ of prevailing issues (Kulkarni et al., 2015). Moreover, they failed
to incorporate user groups and community-based participatory processes, making the regime very difficult to
implement, enforce, and comply with.
Subsequently, the Model Bill of 2011 was considered more progressive and prioritised drinking/domestic
needs, leading to provisions for groundwater protection zones and security plans. These guarantee a safe water
supply, especially during disasters like droughts and floods (UNDP-SIWI Water Governance Facility, 2013).
The Model Groundwater (Sustainable Management) Bill of 2017 is landmark legislation with various novel fea-
tures (Cullet, 2018). It recognises the fundamental right to safe drinking water and the doctrine of public trust in
groundwater. It introduces a collectivistic dimension to an otherwise individual-centric conceptualisation of
groundwater rights. Borrowing from environmental law, the Bill also embodies the prevention (of environmental
degradation), precautionary, and polluter pay principles.
Furthermore, it provides an institutional framework that enshrines the tenets of subsidiarity and decentralisa-
tion of powers and functions in line with the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India. This aims to
ensure appropriate groundwater management in a bottom-up approach from the local to the state level, framed
around existing rural and urban local administrative units at the village, gram, block, district, and municipal
levels. The 2017 Model Bill also allows for the creation of district groundwater councils responsible for coordi-
nating groundwater security plans between panchayats and municipalities.
In addition, the Bill integrates the duties and obligations of users concerning water harvesting, recharge, con-
servation, and prevention of contamination and wastage. It mandates routine assessments to determine social
and environmental impacts and social audits to ensure transparency. These tools are regularly used in other
areas of law but have not been incorporated into water law.
The Model Bill of 2017 is not devoid of concerns and ambiguities (Biswas et al., n.d.). The Bill fails to ade-
quately outline concrete, actionable steps on several issues despite articulating the problems on paper. For
instance, to integrate groundwater and surface water planning practices in tandem, there is a need to transform
operating structures across different institutional setups, prioritising the incorporation of scientific norms and
technical capacity building. This will be driven by allocating funds to collect good quality data, research and
development, and training programmes. Similarly, the Bill does not standardise the implementation of ground-
water security plans, which creates room for confusion and leads to asymmetrical planning, rendering the
purpose of a ‘model’ bill futile.
Furthermore, factors related to climate change and water quality are largely omitted. Concerning the latter,
even though improper waste disposal processes of untreated industrial materials, chemicals, and urban waste
have been flagged as major issues, these are discounted in the regulatory framework. The redressal mechanisms
mandated by the Bill also require more consideration. It has been argued that directing grievances to an
appointed officer will fall short of upholding justice due to ‘a significant potential for abuse’. Moreover, mediation
may be an inappropriate route to resolve disputes when parties to a conflict vary in terms of their clout and pos-
ition of privilege.
Furthermore, these acts restrict groundwater regulation to areas notified by the CGWA only. Provisions for
registration of existing structures like wells, tube wells, borewells, and drilling rigs used for private groundwater
abstraction are accompanied by blanket bans on the construction of new structures, restrictions on the depth of
structures, and demarcation of groundwater conservation/protection zones near sources of drinking water. There
are inadequate safeguards regarding water quality and contamination, decentralisation of powers and functions,
compliance, enforcement, and user and stakeholder involvement.
drinking water under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. To safeguard this fundamental right, any legislation
on groundwater must protect public drinking water sources to reduce health-related externalities. The Supreme
Court of India has held, ‘Drinking is the most beneficial use of water, and this need is so paramount that it cannot
be made subservient to any other use of water, like irrigation, so that right to use of water for the domestic pur-
pose would prevail over other needs’. As a result, in their respective groundwater bills/acts, the states of Andhra
Pradesh, Haryana, Kerala, and Maharashtra, among others, prohibit the sinking of a well within a specified dis-
tance of a public drinking water source without the permission of the required authority.
enforcement agency to ensure compliance in actual practice. However, states differ across the range of fines they
impose. There are no data to ascertain which rates work better in enforcing good behaviour and preventing the
breach of the law; variations in fines and periods of imprisonment across states indicate a certain sense of arbi-
trariness in the decision-making process.
In the case of Andhra Pradesh, a person in breach of any rule made under the act will pay a fine between 1,000
and 5,000 rupees. Furthermore, damaging or obstructing the public water supply system or contaminating the
groundwater through improper waste disposal mechanisms shall be punished with a sentence of 1–6 months
or with a fine between 2,000 and 50,000 rupees or both, along with the cost of repairing the same. Subsequent
offences will be penalised with twice the fine prescribed originally.
According to the Bihar Ground Water Act (2006), an offender will be fined up to 5,000 rupees for the first vio-
lation and up to 10,000 rupees for any additional violation or imprisoned for 6 months or both. If a company
commits an offence, every person in charge of the business activities at the time of the offence will be considered
guilty and liable for the punishment. This provision applies to Karnataka, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh,
and Haryana.
Furthermore, the Haryana legislation fines a user of groundwater who obstructs the state authority with a pen-
alty between 5,000 and 10,000 rupees for the first offence. For the second offence, the punishment extends to
10,000 rupees or imprisonment up to 6 months or both. In addition to the above, the third offence is fined
10,000 rupees daily until the infringement continues.
Karnataka has different fines and terms of imprisonment for different categories of offences: the acts of
obstructing the authority or wilfully refusing to provide information and digging a well without a permit from
the authority can be fined up to 5,000 rupees and/or with imprisonment up to 6 months; contravention of any
other provision of the act can be fined up to 10,000 rupees or with imprisonment up to 1 year. An additional pen-
alty of 100 rupees per day may be imposed in case of continued obstruction. In addition to the above, the
authority may seize the well and tools if no certificates have been obtained for drilling.
In the case of Kerala, a person in breach of any rule made under the act will be liable to fines up to 500 rupees
and 1,000 rupees for the first and subsequent violations, respectively. Unauthorised construction or use of wells is
punishable with a fine of up to 2,000 rupees for the first transgression and 10,000 rupees or imprisonment of up to
6 months for successive violations.
Maharashtra imposes one of the highest user fines. Contravention of any provision of the act can result in a fine
of up to 10,000 rupees for the first offence and up to 25,000 rupees and/or imprisonment for up to 6 months for
subsequent violations. Similarly, Odisha’s groundwater law penalises an offender with a fine of up to 10,000
rupees for the first violation and up to 15,000 rupees and/or imprisonment for up to 6 months for the subsequent
violations.
Likewise, the Uttar Pradesh Ground Water (Management and Regulation) Act (2019) mandates a fine from 2 to
5 lakhs rupees and/or imprisonment for 6 months to 1 year for the first offence by any commercial or bulk user of
groundwater. The second offence will be liable to a fine that is double the initial amount, along with the impri-
sonment term originally prescribed. The NOC granted to the user will be stand-cancelled. Furthermore, on
contravention of provisions related to the pollution or contamination of groundwater, the bulk user will be sub-
jected to imprisonment for 2–3 years and a fine from 5 to 10 lakhs rupees for the first violation and with
imprisonment between 5 and 7 years and a fine between 10 and 20 lakhs rupees in case of subsequent violations.
government price and procurement policies, and choice of crops, among others. It has been increasingly recog-
nised that incentives must be central in any policy to induce appropriate behaviour. Most programmes focus
either on controlling demand or augmenting the supply of groundwater. Moreover, schemes in other sectors
like energy, land, chemicals, waste disposal, tourism, mining, and industries also considerably influence ground-
water exploitation. These sectoral linkages make for a very complex environment where a beneficial policy
direction in one segment may prompt a deleterious effect in another.
Another water-saving technique worth mentioning is laser land levelling. This involves levelling fields at a high
degree of precision using laser guidance technology since traditional belief dictates that flat fields help achieve
more effective irrigation. A paper published in 2015, which studies the usage of laser levellers in Punjab, finds
that laser levellers achieve a reduction of 25% in total water used and in cumulative time devoted to irrigation
(Larson et al., 2016). The farmers who embrace the practice also note savings in labour costs and an estimated
6–12% increase in crop yields, highlighting large private benefits.
However, the study reports that many farmers do not invest in the practice due to financial constraints and
externalities associated with asymmetrical information. The former restricts small farmers, in particular, from
adopting a laser leveller, causing them to demand a minimum 20% reduction in its price. An information gap
persists concerning the advantages of laser levelling. This, along with both informal social networks and
formal institutional relationships, influences how farmers individually decide to use this technology.
country. A recently published study advocates planting alternative cereals to enhance water use and nutrition in
India collectively (Davis et al., 2018). The authors estimate that the average water depth needed for cultivating
sugarcane in Maharashtra is 670 mm. The corresponding figures for millet, soybean, and wheat are 20, 95, and
637 mm, respectively. Consequently, shifting from water-intensive crops like sugarcane or wheat to millet or soy-
beans will yield substantial water savings.
In addition to this, a study conducted by the Bharti Institute of Public Policy at the Indian School of Business
estimates that a 10% substitution of sugarcane (a primary crop) with millet in a particular command area would
save 4.45 thousand million cubic feet (TMC) water (Singh et al., 2020). The authors argue that this setup of water
savings through crop substitution has the potential to redefine the current framework and mindset about water
infrastructure. It will result in water savings in the catchment areas, which will directly help raise existing reser-
voirs’ water levels. On the other hand, since the crop water requirement will fall in the command area, this excess
water can be provided to those regions where the water demand exceeds its supply. Hence, crop switching makes
the augmentation of supply infrastructure in rural and urban settlements with inadequate resources possible.
A report by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development and the Indian Council for Research on
International Economic Relations concludes that rice cultivation should be shifted to India’s eastern and central
states. At the same time, wheat production should continue in the northern region to deal with the ongoing water
crisis (Sharma et al., 2018). The authors demonstrate that the states of Punjab and Haryana have low irrigation
water productivity (IWP) in rice compared to the central and eastern states of Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, and
Chhattisgarh, despite higher irrigation coverage, indicating inefficiency in irrigation practices. This can be attrib-
uted to energy subsidies, which lead farmers to pump water indiscriminately. However, the opposite holds for
wheat concerning IWP in the north versus the east.
Furthermore, the report suggests that the procurement policy requires a strategic rethink. One of the key
reasons farmers in the northern and western regions are opposed to growing less water-intensive crops is the
absence of guaranteed state procurement, which currently exists for rice and wheat. What is more surprising is
that this occurs despite lower minimum support prices in rice compared to pulses in certain years (Abraham,
2019).
In another campaign, the Government of Punjab targeted the groundwater-energy nexus to reduce the rapid
depletion of groundwater in the state. The Paani Bachao, Paise Kamao programme was launched on a pilot
basis in 2018 on 6 of the state’s 5,900 power feeders (Chaba, 2020a, 2020b). Under this, the government offers
monetary incentives to farmers in the form of a direct benefit transfer for every unit of electricity they conserve
relative to a pre-determined electricity allocation contingent on the motor capacity of each tubewell. As per an
article in The Tribune, they will receive INR 4/kWh of electricity saved. However, there is no extra charge for
consumption beyond the allocation specified for each farmer (Kaur, 2019). Still, recent research shows that
this initiative had a weak conceptual footing as it allowed the farmers with disproportionately high-capacity
pump sets to use excessive amounts of groundwater without losing the cash incentives (Kumar et al., 2022).
By July 2019, INR 15.74 lakh was distributed as subsidies to over 200 farmers (PSPCL, 2019). Moreover, the
Punjab government has announced the extension of the scheme to cover another 250 feeders so far. In this endea-
vour, they are being supported by organisations like the World Bank, Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
(J-PAL), The Energy and Resources Institute, IT Power India and Punjab Agricultural University. Among
these, J-PAL is studying the programme’s impact in the form of a randomised control trial in 150 of the 250 fee-
ders chosen under the expansion. The Jyotigram Yojana in Gujarat highlighted its unique approach to
groundwater management through electricity rationing rather than legislation, the challenges faced in its
execution, unintended consequences on low-income farmers, and suggestions for more effective management
strategies based on peak irrigation demand (see Box 1).
Another example is the solar pumps influencing groundwater usage in India, particularly in agriculture. Pro-
pelled by solar energy, these pumps offer a sustainable and eco-friendly alternative to traditional diesel or
electric pumps. Their rising popularity stems from government initiatives promoting renewable energy adoption
and improving irrigation efficiency. Solar pumps influence the water table by enabling farmers to extract more
groundwater (Bassi, 2020).
Furthermore, metering has been recommended to sever the links between highly subsidised, flat-rate tariffs for
electricity and groundwater depletion. A paper published in the Water International journal studies how West
Bengal achieved complete metering of all tube wells in 2007, especially without significant opposition from
the farmers in the state (Mukherji & Das, 2014). Most states replaced metered connections with a low flat
tariff rate due to the rising transaction costs of the former in the 1980s. Subsequently, this also became a constant
political tactic to secure votes.
However, West Bengal was the only state where tariffs kept steadily increasing over the years since the 1990s.
The authors argue that this enabled the state government to implement metering without much resistance since it
was a more attractive option for the farmers. The flat tariffs that farmers in West Bengal were being charged were
fixed at much higher rates than metered connections, especially relative to the size of their land. For farmers with
smallholdings, the operating cost of irrigation was unsustainable under a flat tariff structure as opposed to a
metered regime, which was based on the actual hours of water used. Consequently, the study reports that the
mean cost of power was between Rs. 8 and 8.9/h under the flat-rate regime, whereas the same cost under a
metered connection ranged between Rs. 6.5 and 7.3/h.
In addition, Mukherji & Das (2014) conclude that metering allowed farmers to earn more profits from selling
water because even though the cost of electricity per unit of water consumed declined for pump owners, the price
of selling water did not follow a similar downward decline. Moreover, metered agricultural consumers now pos-
sess better bargaining power than water buyers because they are no longer compelled to sell water to recover a
part of their fixed costs as those in a flat-rate system would be subjected to do. In this context, another study by
Kumar et al. (2011) empirically showed how metering and charging pro-rata for power use are viable options for
managing groundwater and the energy economy. Further analysis showed that pro-rata pricing would foster
Box 1. Did the Jyotigram Yojana help with groundwater management in Gujarat?
The Jyotigram Yojana in Gujarat launched in 2006 serves as a case study of a unique approach to addressing
the challenges of groundwater over-extraction without enacting legislation. Gujarat faced logistical and
capacity-related constraints and a potential backlash from farmers, making groundwater regulation through
legislation unfeasible. Instead, the state leveraged the electricity–groundwater nexus to control over-abstrac-
tion. One of the central elements of the Jyotigram Yojana was the rationing of power supplies to limit
groundwater pumping. Before the programme, large electricity subsidies encouraged farmers to dig deeper
wells and use powerful pumps. The programme divided electricity supply into separate phases for agricultural
and domestic users, ensuring uninterrupted metered supply for non-agricultural purposes, 8 h of subsidised
power supply per day for existing pumps, and metering for new connections.
However, the initiative faced challenges. Farmers opposed the requirement for permission from the ground-
water authority to energise newly built irrigation wells, and the issue was politicised. This highlights the
difficulties in implementing such policies, including limited capacity and concerns about governance and
political will.
The programme had unintended consequences, with low-income farmers bearing a significant burden. Water
prices increased for marginal farmers and landless labourers due to reduced access to groundwater for irriga-
tion. Some small farmers even leased their land to well owners because of decreased water availability. This
had economic implications, with a 40–60% rise in pump irrigation prices in cash sales.
Shah et al. (2008) suggest shifting to a more rational tariff structure that matches peak irrigation demand,
which is highest for around 30–40 days each year. Increasing the power supply during these peak periods
and reducing it during the rest of the year can achieve a more effective consumption of groundwater and elec-
tricity. The Jyotigram Yojana in Gujarat exemplifies a pragmatic approach to groundwater management by
leveraging the electricity–water nexus. Gujarat’s groundwater dynamics have sparked heated discussions
among scholars and policymakers. A paper by Kumar & Perry (2019) critiques this approach. The authors
present data based on empirical evidence and observe that the increase in groundwater resources since
2002 results from various intertwined factors. These include shifts in rainfall affecting crop irrigation needs,
natural groundwater recharge patterns, and additional recharge from irrigation return flows, notably from
the Sardar Sarovar project. Despite changes in electricity supply policies under the Jyotigram Yojna, there
is no significant impact on groundwater withdrawal for irrigation, concludes the paper. While electricity
supply policies have not effectively regulated groundwater usage, interventions like surface water irrigation
and improved rainfall have mitigated energy challenges.
equitable, efficient, and sustainable groundwater usage and prove economically viable for small-holder farmers,
with more efficient pump rental markets and reducing the monopoly power of large well owners (Kumar et al.,
2013a, 2013b). Implementing an effective power tariff policy based on the actual consumption of electricity by the
farmers, combined with the enforcement of volumetric allocation of groundwater based on the consideration of
sustainable yield of the aquifers, could effectively tackle issues of efficiency, sustainability, and equity in ground-
water usage in India (Kumar, 2005; Kumar et al., 2011; Sidhu et al., 2020).
yields, indicating severe consequences for the agricultural sector and a compounding of the drinking water crisis. To
absorb runoff water, which eludes the natural recharge process and enhances groundwater resources, the artificial
recharge of aquifers has gained momentum as a significant supply-side measure (Sakthivadivel, 2007). More often
than not, this ‘groundwater recharge movement’ in India entails community-based participation and involvement.
Groundwater conservation is a key priority for the Government of India, with the Central Government sup-
porting State efforts through technical and financial aid. The CGWB has devised a Master Plan for Artificial
Recharge to Groundwater, outlining structures for diverse terrains to capture 185 billion cubic metres of mon-
soon rainfall. Additionally, initiatives like the Jal Shakti Abhiyan and Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana
aim to enhance water access and irrigation efficiency. The Atal Bhujal Yojana targets groundwater management
in stressed areas, while Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGS) incorporates
water conservation projects. Guidelines from the Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs encourage rainwater har-
vesting, supported by grants from the 15th Finance Commission for rural bodies’ initiatives (PIB, 2023).
More recently, Mazhapolima, a decentralised, community-based well recharge programme in Trichur in
Kerala, was initiated in 2009. Most households depend on dug wells, which are prone to drying up during the
summer. As a result, this project aims to augment groundwater in dug wells by channelling rainwater runoff
from rooftops during the monsoon season. Households fit a pipe in their roof directly linked to open wells, bor-
ewells, ponds, or other structures to store water.
This entire system enables families to endure the summer season. It has improved drinking water availability in
the district and eliminated the threat of water scarcity. More than 30,000 well recharge and rainwater storage
structures have been built as part of the project (Mazhapolima – WAFA, n.d.). Consequently, it has reduced
the odds of public spending on tankers in water-stressed regions. It has also weakened the impact of natural
events like droughts. Furthermore, using rainwater is safe and does not lead to water quality issues. The pro-
gramme strengthens the spirit of decentralisation, Panchayati Raj institutions and generates knowledge about
local water resources (Mazhapolima – A Community-Based Open Well Recharge Programme, n.d.).
However, there are strong critiques of water harvesting and artificial recharge schemes in how they are concep-
tualised, planned, and implemented in the country. Artificial recharge schemes built in the country heavily depend
on runoff water from the local catchments (Glendenning & Vervoort, 2011). Such schemes are largely implemented
in the naturally water-scarce regions that coincide with the groundwater-overexploited regions. These regions are
characterised by low to medium rainfall, high aridity, and high year-to-year variation in rainfall and, as a result,
have extremely low runoff potential (Kumar et al., 2008). Large-scale water harvesting and recharge interventions
in the catchments of these regions cause several negative downstream effects (Kumar et al., 2008; Ray & Bijarnia,
2006). Furthermore, some of the main issues identified include negative downstream hydrological impacts, high
variability in rainfall, making structures unreliable, increased unit costs during wet years, negative welfare outcomes
due to high externalities in closed basins, and poor physical efficiency due to groundwater–surface water inter-
actions and limited storage capacity of underlying hard rock aquifers (Kumar et al., 2008).
The Andhra Pradesh Groundwater Borewell Irrigation Scheme (APWELL), initiated in 1995, classifies mar-
ginal farmers into ‘Water User Groups (WUGs)’ and ‘Borewell User Associations (BUAs)’. These user
organisations are then aided with constructing and operating small borewell systems. The resulting information
generated can be leveraged by the farmers while preparing crop plans – prompting decisions to cultivate less
water-intensive crops or to diversify the choice of crops – and ensuring proper maintenance and sustainable man-
agement of groundwater (Reddy et al., 2012). Participatory hydrological monitoring is also a significant
component of the programme, which has led to the training of 3,450 WUGs, 600 female self-help groups, and
250 BUAs (Garduño et al., 2009).
A subsequent scheme in Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh Farmer Managed Groundwater Systems
(APFAMGS), launched in 2003, relies on knowledge and capacity building to impact individual behaviour and
facilitate rational decisions. Complicated scientific and technical concepts related to crop selection, groundwater
availability, water-saving methods, crop water budgeting, and improved agricultural practices are translated and
made more accessible to users (Garduño et al., 2009). As per a recent study, access to symmetric information
allows farmers to evaluate their risk better and manage resources more sustainably while maintaining profitability
at the same time. However, the absence of social regulation and incentives in the form of cash or subsidies limits
the scheme’s impact (Reddy et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the Managed Aquifer Recharge through Village-Level Intervention (MARVI) programme in
Gujarat and Rajasthan focuses on demand-side measures to ensure groundwater sustainability. Village users can
examine the efficacy of existing rainwater harvesting and groundwater recharge structures. A group of farmers is
chosen for advanced training to learn how to monitor, recognise, and influence village-level decisions regarding
groundwater (Bhujal Jankaars – MARVI, n.d.). MARVI combines conventional knowledge with the latest technol-
ogy. The MyWell mobile phone application is a case in point. It facilitates water security projects, plans cropping
patterns based on groundwater availability, and promotes widespread sharing of knowledge and data.
Technology is also enhancing the functioning of the Mukhya Mantri Jal Swalaban Abhiyaan in Rajasthan (Gov-
ernment of Rajasthan, n.d.). Launched in 2016, the scheme aims to implement measures for water conservation
and water harvesting in rural areas to increase the irrigated area and ensure the availability of drinking water.
People’s participation by involving villagers and beneficiaries is central to this scheme. After water usage require-
ments for different purposes are determined at the village level, a water budget is prepared, and potential project
areas are identified. Water harvesting of available runoff is envisaged through the treatment of catchment, use of
existing structures, repair of ill-functioning structures, and construction of new ones. The latter is accompanied by
geo-tagging to ease verification processes and enhance transparency. In addition, a mobile application has also
been created to track the progress of ongoing activities, with the provision to supplement the same by uploading
photographs directly to the application.
Most recently, the Atal Bhujal Yojana (World Bank, 2018), initiated in the year 2020 by the Government of
India in collaboration with the World Bank, covers the states of Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The programme focuses on supply-side interventions like water har-
vesting, sustainable management, recharge of aquifers and water conservation. Strengthening people’s
involvement at the community level is a central part of the project. The scheme is expected to improve capacity
building and groundwater monitoring networks, prepare prudent water budgets and community-led water secur-
ity plans and emphasise demand-side activities such as diversification of produce, micro-irrigation and separation
of electricity feeders (Atal Bhujal Yojana, n.d.).
Furthermore, in this context, Kumar’s (2023) recent work highlights an extensive review of regional variations
and public policies that have shaped the groundwater sector within the context of South Asia. Among other
important water management paradigms and solutions, Kumar (2023) highlights the importance of well-defined
property rights, which could be efficient markets for water allocation, thereby boosting agricultural growth and
resource use efficiency.
In order to fully empower community-driven initiatives, establishing higher-order institutions and a supportive
legal framework is imperative. These structures are the backbone, providing guidance, resources, and legitimacy
to grassroots efforts. Without them, the potential of such initiatives remains constrained. Obstacles persist despite
the noble intentions of community-driven endeavours. Social control, incentives, and equitable information dis-
semination are crucial challenges that must be addressed. By fostering an enabling environment through
appropriate regulations and incentives, these hurdles can be overcome, fostering the growth of sustainable com-
munity-driven initiatives.
Integrating technology further enhances the effectiveness and transparency of such programmes. Mobile appli-
cations and geo-tagging systems offer tools for real-time monitoring, data collection, and accountability. This
technological integration ensures that resources are utilised efficiently and that decisions are made based on accu-
rate information. While commendable strides have been made in addressing issues such as groundwater extraction
and water table depth, it is essential to recognise the broader context. Neglecting aspects like groundwater quality
and pollution could undermine the holistic effectiveness of community initiatives. Acknowledging these limitations
underscores the ongoing need for comprehensive and inclusive approaches to water management.
India’s groundwater crisis necessitates institutional strategies combining community-driven, legal, and regulat-
ory approaches. To implement sustainable groundwater management techniques, safeguard water quality, and
guarantee equitable access to this crucial resource, communities, scientists, and policymakers must collaborate.
Failure to do so could have disastrous effects on India’s food production, rural livelihoods, and water supplies.
scientists, and policymakers are critical for implementing sustainable groundwater practices, preserving water
quality, and ensuring equitable access to this fundamental resource. Failing to align these efforts could profoundly
affect food security, rural livelihoods, and overall water availability in the country.
7. BEYOND THE HORIZON: KEY RESEARCH AND POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR INDIA’S
GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY
Based on the analysis of India’s groundwater crisis presented in the paper, further research into unexplored areas,
exploration of interdisciplinary solutions, and proposing actionable steps for policymakers are essential for effective
groundwater management. To delve deeper into unexplored areas, research could focus on understanding the socio-
economic impacts of groundwater depletion, exploring the role of climate change on groundwater sustainability, and
investigating innovative technologies for recharge projects. Interdisciplinary solutions could involve collaborations
between hydrologists, policymakers, social scientists, and technology experts to develop holistic approaches to
groundwater conservation. This could include integrating traditional knowledge with modern technologies, promot-
ing sustainable agricultural practices, and implementing community-based water management schemes.
Future research in India’s groundwater management could focus on several key areas. First, investigating the
impacts of climate change on groundwater availability, recharge rates, and quality across different regions is
essential for adaptation strategies. Second, exploring the socio-economic effects of groundwater depletion on
communities, agriculture, and urban areas can provide insights into addressing livelihood challenges and food
security issues. Third, researching innovative recharge techniques can offer sustainable solutions for improving
groundwater balance in areas facing resource depletion. Additionally, studying the role of community partici-
pation in governance and decision-making processes can enhance local water management practices. Lastly,
evaluating and improving existing groundwater policies through policy analysis and implementation assessments
is crucial for promoting effective regulation and sustainable groundwater practices in the future.
Proposed actionable steps for policymakers could include formulating stringent regulations on groundwater
abstraction, incentivising water-saving agricultural practices, and investing in awareness campaigns for sustain-
able water use. Additionally, policymakers could prioritise funding for research on water quality monitoring,
strengthen institutional frameworks for groundwater governance, and promote community participation in
decision-making processes. By embracing these strategies, policymakers can work towards ensuring a more sus-
tainable and secure future for India’s groundwater resources.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare there is no conflict.
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First received 10 May 2024; accepted in revised form 8 July 2024. Available online 19 July 2024