Maciel Padilla Paper

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
REDES 2003
Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies
October 28-30, 2003, Santiago, Chile

Panel: Mexico and the Hemispheric Security Agenda
Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations
Agustin Maciel-Padilla
Mexico
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2
15 August 2003.
Name: Agustin Maciel-Padilla
Institution: Department of War Studies

School of Social Science and Public Policy
King’s College London
University of London
Title: Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations
Outline: 1. Introduction
2. Overview
2.1. Background: Anti-smuggling Measures
2.2. Post-war Years: Eradication Campaigns
2.3. 1980s and Beyond: Escalation of Militarisation
3. Assessment
4. Conclusions
3
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS.
1. Introduction.
In contrast to the predominant state-centred challenges of the bipolar world, in the
post-Cold War era the United States confronts a variety of non-state threats to its
national security. The illicit trade in drugs, which is not a new phenomenon, stands
out as one of these challenges, particularly in the context of hemispheric security
relations. Although drug trafficking and control are international issues not restricted
to U.S.-Mexican relations, they have a long history in the bilateral agenda, and have
been the source of both conflict and co-operation throughout the years. This is a
predictable situation in this part of the globe, where an industrialised nation, which is
also the biggest drug market in the world, shares a long and porous border with a
developing neighbour, which also happens to be a significant drug producer and
transit country.
Drug issues became prominent in the bilateral relationship after World War II
(WWII), when drug use increased in the United States in the context of a growing
international production. After a long period of bilateral, albeit often forced, co-
operation during the post-war years, conflict reached a high point at the end of the
1960s. In September 1969, the United States carried out an interdiction operation on
its Southwest border to compel Mexico, after disrupting legitimate flows in the area,
to intensify its efforts against drug trafficking. As a result of this unilateral and
coercive measure the United States and Mexico strengthened co-operation, making
drug trafficking a less salient issue in their bilateral agenda for the next 15 years. In
1985, nevertheless, the murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special
Agent in Mexico gave way to a new cycle of conflict, which created a volatile
situation again. Ever since, drugs have remained as one of the most important items
on the bilateral relationship, more at the insistence of the United States than at that of
Mexico.
In the opinion of Richard Craig from Kent State University, notwithstanding
that Mexico has been a key country for U.S. anti-drug efforts, he characterises U.S.
drug policy towards its southern neighbour as ‘cyclical, unilateral, incident-prone and
4
highly contentious’.1 In the same way that illegal immigration has been the most
sensitive issue in U.S.-Mexican relations, drug trafficking has been the main source of
tension. The prevalent view in Mexico is that the source of the problem is the U.S.
inability to limit its domestic demand for drugs. The dominant U.S. view is that the
Mexican government fails to effectively control supply, among other reasons because
of pervasive corruption. For the United States, at the end, the difference is that while
illegal immigration is seen as a more ambivalent and longer-term threat, drug
trafficking is an unequivocal and immediate danger. The bilateral management of the
issue, in general, has been asymmetrical by having been defined mainly in U.S. terms,
which have stressed the supply-side in detriment of the demand-side of the problem.
The result has been an unbalanced approach. Differences about the impact of the
problem in each of the two countries also explain differing approaches. While in
Mexico in general drug use has been low (although it has been increasing in recent
years), the major threat from drug trafficking has been the challenge it poses to
governmental authority. In the United States, in contrast, drug consumption is
substantially higher and affects its society (including public health and social order)
and economy. Abroad, especially in the Western Hemisphere, the issue has also been
linked to long-term U.S. foreign policy goals such as market-oriented reforms and the
promotion of democracy and human rights, although U.S. drug control policies often
seem to be at odds with these objectives themselves. The corrupting influence of drug
trafficking, nevertheless, ultimately affects the national security of producer/transit
and consumer countries alike.
One additional factor complicating the common response to the problem has
been its politicisation in the United States, which in turn has placed limits to bilateral
understanding and co-operation. This is what Guadalupe Gonzalez from the Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE) refers to as ‘the overtly political
treatment of the problem’ in the United States.2 On the one hand, the high level of
politicisation of the issue in the United States makes costly for politicians to appear as
‘soft on drugs’, and this fact usually limits available options to deal with the problem.
1
R. B. Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics Policy toward Mexico: Consequences for the Bilateral Relationship’, in
G. Gonzalez and M. Tienda (eds.), The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations, Dimensions of
U.S.-Mexican Relations, Vol. 4, Papers prepared for the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United
States-Mexican Relations, (San Diego, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California,
San Diego, 1989), p.78.
2
G. Gonzalez, ‘The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations: Introduction’, in Gonzalez and
Tienda, Drug Connection, p.1.
5
On the other hand, the manner in which the United States has often addressed the drug
issue has created tensions in U.S.-Mexican relations. The standard U.S. response has
been to implement unilateral policies and to identify drug availability as the source of
the problem, transferring thus the costs and consequences of the so-called ‘war on
drugs’ into the area of supply. For Mexico, this has meant that eradication,
interdiction, and immobilisation operations have had to be carried out within its
territory. Resembling its view about illegal immigration, the Mexican government’s
perspective about drugs emphasises the demand side of the problem, as already
discussed. In this context, the U.S. supply-side approach is considered not only to
have created frictions with Mexico but it has also proved to be ineffective.3 In the
opinion of Samuel Del Villar from El Colegio de Mexico, this point is important
because ‘failing to view the drug market as an integrated market hinders both
understanding and effective government responses’.4 This is not only a view from
south of the border. For instance, according to Peter Smith from the University of
California, San Diego,
The fundamental source of the drug problem, of narcotrafico in the
Americas, is the presence of and power of consumer demand. Demand for
drugs is most conspicuous in advanced industrial countries, in Europe, and –
especially important for Latin America- in the United States. Demand is what
creates the market for drugs. So long as demand continues, there will be
people engaged in supply.5
Even though the drug phenomenon is demand-driven to a large extent, compared to
other Latin American drug-producer countries, Mexico has shown determination in its
anti-drug programmes. In fact, in the opinion of two RAND Corporation specialists,
Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, ‘Mexico may represent the “end case”, in terms of
what the United States can reasonably expect from efforts at drug control within the
context of continued U.S. demand’.6 However, as it will be discussed below, while the
U.S. supply-oriented approach has been a convenient political statement in
3
M. Ruiz-Cabañas, ‘Mexico’s Changing Illicit Drug Supply Role’, in Gonzalez and Tienda, Drug
Connection, p.63.
4
S. I. Del Villar, ‘Controlling the U.S.-Mexican Drug Market’, in Gonzalez and Tienda, Drug
Connection, p.94.
5
P. H. Smith, ‘The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options’, in P. H. Smith
(ed.), Drug Policy in the Americas, (Boulder, CO: Westviwe Press, Inc., c1992), p.2.
6
P. Reuter and D. Ronfeldt, ‘Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-U.S. Drug Trade in the 1980s’, in
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 3, Fall 1992, p.90.
6
Washington, it has not served the interests of U.S. drug policy by failing to address
the problem.
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to analyse drug trafficking in U.S.-
Mexican relations as one of the outstanding trans-border threats to U.S. national
security. The specific objective is to understand the impact of this illegal activity in
the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). That is, to find
out how drug trafficking affects the United States when an increasing exchange of
goods and services across the border has to be balanced with the need to maintain
legitimate flows at the same time. Keeping these economic flows is important not
only for the well being of the region, but also for Mexican stability more in general.
The hypothesis of this chapter holds that bilateral drug control policies have been
dominated by the U.S. approach that has identified supply as the root of the problem.
The evidence suggests, however, that international enforcement measures such as
control at the source and interdiction have not affected in a meaningful way the
availability of drugs in the United States. In this sense, U.S. drug policy has not only
failed to contribute to U.S. national security and to its stated goal of protecting the
well being of U.S. citizens, but it also has put at risk Mexico’s stability by transferring
there the costs of fighting drugs.
In the specific case of Mexico, this supply-oriented strategy has been based on
the militarisation of drug control. This approach has not only to a higher level of
violence and human rights abuses in the country, but it also has increasingly exposed
the military, one important pillar of stability in the country, to drug-related corruption.
It is difficult to argue that if the Mexican military were not involved in drug control
activities the situation would be better. The danger of corruption among its ranks,
nevertheless, is a serious and real concern. Instability in Mexico as the result of
increased drug corruption is a clear and evident threat to U.S. national security,
perhaps more than drug trafficking itself. It is not difficult to imagine, for instance,
the impact on north-bound migration from large-scale violence in the context of an
extended drug war in Mexico. In this sense, it is important for the United States to
reassess its approach in favour of a more balanced drug control policy, and to
understand the consequences of drug trafficking for Mexico itself. More than a
‘Mexican threat’, drug trafficking is a ‘threat to Mexico’ as well, and this seems not to
be clearly understood, or partially understood in Washington.
7
2. Overview.
Historically, the primary U.S. response to drug use has been to address the supply-
side of the problem. Besides its proximity, Mexico’s dual role as producer of
marihuana and heroin, and later also as a transhipment point for cocaine bound to the
United States, guaranteed the place of the country at the centre of U.S. anti-drug
policy. In this context, the U. S. government has consistently ‘encouraged’ its
Mexican counterpart to confront production and trafficking, and Mexico has
responded even at the peril of its own stability. However, the Mexican government
has also responded because of its own interest, in particular the need to avoid any
challenge to its authority from drug traffickers. Mexico’s anti-drug campaigns,
nevertheless, have failed to significantly stem the flow of drugs into the United States,
not only because of the persistence of U.S. demand but also because of the existence
of corruption within its security organisations. The combination of these factors has
become the source of tension between the two countries in the last decades. Although
economic issues have been for long time at the top of the bilateral agenda, drug
trafficking has become increasingly important in the recent decades. The reasons that
explain this phenomenon are, according to Umberg, (1) the central position of Mexico
in trafficking of cocaine and methamphetamine; and (2) the fact that in Mexico there
is a growing realisation that drugs are not just a ‘gringo’ problem, that drug
trafficking is also dangerous to Mexico because it creates corruption and undermines
its law enforcement institutions, and also because there is a growing demand in the
country.7
2.1. Background: Anti-smuggling Measures.

Throughout the years, as already noted, there has been a symbiotic relationship
between U.S. domestic and international drug control efforts. While regulations such
as the 1909 Act and the 1914 Harrison Act strengthened the U.S. position in the
international anti-drug movement, the domestic enforcement of these laws, in turn,
required other countries, especially in Latin America, to limit the production and
7
Interview with Thomas J. Umberg, Attorney at Law, Morrison & Foerster LLP, former Deputy
Director for Supply Reduction, The White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Irvine, CA, 7 August 2001.
8
export of drugs. As a matter of fact, this region was an early target of U.S. anti-drug
diplomacy by being the closest source of drugs.8
The first attempts to obtain the co-operation of Latin American governments
were largely unsuccessful. Countries such as Bolivia and Peru, as discussed above,
were frequently reluctant to affect their coca leaf market. Mexico, in contrast, was
willing to restrict the drug-related trade. According to Toro, Mexico was willing to
co-operate with the United States because it wanted to limit the impact of U.S. anti-
drug law enforcement. That is, it was clear that U.S. restrictions on production and
trade in drugs, as well as the adoption of the 18th Amendment in 1919, would have an
immediate impact abroad, first of all on its immediate neighbours.9 In the case of
Mexico, in particular, U.S. drug control created incentives to exporters who wanted to
take advantage of the new underground markets. While Mexican marihuana had been
produced and exported to the United States since the 19th century, opium became
available in Mexico since Chinese immigrants brought it to the states of Sinaloa and
Sonora in the 1910s and 1920s. Both ‘export products’ were therefore available in
Mexico.
Notwithstanding that the United States requested the co-operation of Mexico
and Canada to control drugs and alcohol, respectively, U.S. law enforcement officers
frequently crossed the Mexican border in ‘hot pursuit’ of Mexican or U.S. criminals,
including dealers.10 In response to this problem, in 1916 the Mexican revolutionary
regime prohibited the importation of opium in order to stop illegal crossings into
Mexican territory. The fact that citizens from both countries used the common border
for illicit activities was seen as a destabilising factor in Mexico. This was not only
because of the smuggling of arms into the country in the context of a civil war, but
also because of the possibility for opposing forces to seek haven in the United
States.11 In this context, in 1923 President Alvaro Obregon banned the importation of
all drugs into the country and two years later, his successor Plutarco Elias Calles,
negotiated an anti-smuggling treaty with the United States. After one year,
nevertheless, the U.S. government decided to end the agreement with Mexico by
preferring ‘freedom of action’ regarding the sale of arms, also because from its
8
M. C. Toro, ‘War’ on Drugs. Causes and Consequences, Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug
Trade, Volume Three, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, c1995 by the United Nations
University and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), p.6.
9
Ibid., p.7.
10
Idem.
9
perspective the treaty had not prevented the smuggling of alcohol into the country. In
1927 President Calles signed a decree prohibiting the export of heroin and marihuana
and, two years later, the Mexican penal code established stricter penalties for both
drug growers and manufacturers.12 By 1931 Mexico had also forbidden exports of
drugs and signed that year’s international drug control convention.13 One of the
consequences of banning drug imports and exports in both countries was, as it could
be expected, the creation of an underground drug trade along the common border.
Because of these early anti-drug programmes focused on smuggling, however,
production remained basically unaffected. That made sense because during the 1920s
and 1930s, most of the opium entering the United States came from Italy, France,
Asia and the Middle East, and the Mexican supply of heroin during this period was no
more than 10 to 15% of the total.14
It is important to note that from the very beginning, Mexican law enforcement
activities were affected by corruption, even to the point where officials often became
active participants in illegal activities, especially in regions far from central control
such as northern Mexico. A dispatch sent to DoS on 7 May 1926 by U.S. Consul
Henry C. A. Damm in Sonora illustrates the situation at the time:
… The informant states that last year an attempt was made to grow poppy but
that the plantations were destroyed by order of officials of the Mexican
government… This year, however, no effort seems to be made to stop the
production of the narcotic, although two weeks ago an inspector from
Nogales visited Oquitoa and Altar. The American informant has heard that
this inspector collected 15,000 pesos, as tax on the fields…15
Right from the start, therefore, one of the consequences of Mexican anti-drug efforts
was the corruption of Mexican officials, and this issue would become a highly
contentious one in the bilateral relationship with the United States in the years to
come. However, and even with all their limitations, the Mexican programmes were
11
Ibid., p.8.
12
Idem.
13
Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics Policy toward Mexico’, p.72.
14
M. Ruiz-Cabañas, ‘Mexico’s Changing’, p.53.
15
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 812.104/108, National Archives,
Washington, DC, in W. O. Walker III (ed.), Drugs in the Western Hemisphere. An Odyssey of Cultures
in Conflict, Jaguar Books on Latin America, Number 12, (Wilmington, DE: A Salisbury Resources,
Inc. Imprint, c1996), p.59.
10
regarded as ‘a drug control system exceeded in the Western Hemisphere only by that
of the United States’.16
2.2. Post-war Years: Eradication Campaigns.

During the second half of the 1930s, unabated U.S. domestic demand (although at
lower levels) and proposed changes to Mexican drug policy, led Washington to
‘encourage’ Mexico City to adopt a restrictive policy similar to that of the United
States.
During this period, U.S. drug control threatened to exacerbate the sensitive
state of relations with Mexico (as a result of the oil expropriation in 1938), eroding
therefore the common understanding sought by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
‘Good Neighbor Policy’. At issue was the proposal of Leopoldo Salazar-Viniegra,
head of Mexico’s Public Health Department, in reference to the creation of a state
monopoly for the sale of drugs. Fearing that this regulation would lead to an increase
in drug trafficking and to reverse the efforts to suppress drug use in the country,
Washington increased its pressure on the Mexican government, leading to Salazar’s
eventual resignation in August 1939. Despite Salazar’s departure, his proposals took
effect in 1941 and, in response, the United States threatened to impose an embargo on
all medical drug exports. In this context, Mexico did not only have to reconsider its
decision but also, from then on, future anti-drug bilateral co-operation followed the
lines established by U.S. officials.17
In an evident contradictory action, nevertheless, during the war the United
States actually encouraged legal production of Mexican opium and marihuana (hemp)
for the allied war effort. By 1943, however, when the United States changed its pro-
production stance, opium had become Sinaloa’s largest cash crop.18 According to a
July 1943 letter from the U.S. embassy in Mexico to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
It is with regret the Bureau of Narcotics must report that along with Iran and
Cuba, Mexico has now become the principal source of supply of smuggled
drugs seized in the illicit traffic throughout the United States… There are
indications that the acreage planted to the opium poppy in Mexico has been
16
Toro, ‘War’ on Drugs, p.11.
17
W. O. Walker III, Drug Control in the Americas, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico
Press, 1989), 119-33, 259-61, Reprinted by permission of the University of New Mexico Press, in
Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, pp.64-80.
11
increasing each year. Since a large portion of this opium is unquestionably

intended for entry into the illicit traffic in the United States, the situation
should be viewed with much concern.19
It seems that the factors that contributed to the growth of heroin and marihuana
production in Mexico after the war were the disruption of traditional heroin routes,
and an increase in U.S. consumption of marihuana. That is, as a consequence of the
interruption of traffic from Europe and Asia through Central America, Mexico
became an attractive point for smuggling heroin into the United States.20 On the
Mexican border, seizures of smoking opium in 1943 were 30 times as large as two
years before. The major seizure from Mexico made by the U.S. Customs Service
during 1943 consisted of 12.33 kg. of smoking opium found at Yuma, Arizona.21
In this context, in 1948 Mexico launched its first national eradication
campaign, which included two innovative aspects. First, at the request of the Attorney
General’s Office (AGO), for the first time, military units helped in the destruction of
plants as a permanently assigned force. Second, eradication programmes were
extended to states other than the traditional drug producers (i.e. Sinaloa, Durango and
Chihuahua, referred to as the ‘Critical Triangle’). By the end of the 1950s, the
military was also destroying marihuana and opium poppy fields in Baja California,
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Sonora and Yucatan.22
In general terms, drug production and trafficking increased in spite of the
government’s campaign, mainly because of three factors that would continue to affect
Mexican efforts in the years to come. First, the remote and inaccessible areas where
marihuana and opium poppies have traditionally been grown have made the utilisation
of aircraft a requirement for success. Second, without the extensive use of herbicides
and defoliants, it became apparent that there was no possibility for an effective
campaign. And third, any effort to eliminate drug cultivation and smuggling would be
resisted. It is important to note that although reconnaissance planes had been an
integral part of Mexico’s campaign since its inception, it frequently was affected by
18
Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics’, p.72.
19
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 812.114 Narcotics/1363, National
Archives, Washington, DC, in Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, p.125.
20
Toro, ‘War’ on Drugs, pp.11-12.
21
General Records, Record Group 59, 812.114 Narcotics/1363, p.126.
22
12
the lack of aircraft, spare parts, and pilots.23 In this sense, it was not until late 1961,
after Mexico became again the target of U.S. pressure, that it began to acquire U.S.
equipment to conduct a more effective campaign.24
On 4 and 5 January 1961, U.S. and Mexican delegates met in Washington,
DC, to informally explore ways to improve anti-drug co-operation. On that occasion
the U.S. delegation offered, and the Mexican one accepted, the provision of U.S.
training and equipment for Mexico’s efforts, and thus both sides issued ‘The United
States-Mexico Joint Comunique on the Control of Illicit Narcotics’. According to
Walker, if it is true that this declaration acknowledged the interdependence of the
drug problem, the U.S. offer, most importantly, ‘marked the first step toward
militarization of the war on drugs in the Americas’.25 Within this framework, Mexico
received an anti-drug assistance package from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID), for which it contributed $50,000, intended for by the United
States to solidify a long-term counter-drug relationship.26
This intensified programme was made possible by exchange of notes on 26
June 1961 between the two governments, and thus the United States procured the
equipment for the location and destruction of marihuana and opium poppy fields in
Mexico. Under this agreement, AID supplied 2 helicopters, 2 light planes, 10 Jeep
trucks (with radios and spare parts), 20 flame-throwers and 50 rifles (with spare parts
and ammunition). This equipment was provided in addition to training for 3 helicopter
pilots and 3 mechanics, plus transportation to the United States and factory visits for
the pilots of the fixed-wing aircraft.27 According to the ‘United States-Mexican
Narcotics Control Program’, issued by DoS on 27 September 1962, the provision of
this aid ‘would emphasise continued faith in control at the source as the basis of U.S.
anti-drug policy’.28 As shown in Table 5-5, the assistance package resulted in a
23
R. B. Craig, ‘La Campaña Permanente: Mexico’s Antidrug Campaign’, in Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 1978: 107-31, notes omitted. Reprinted by permission
of the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, in Walker, Drugs in the Western
Hemisphere, p.176.
24
25
U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene
Kansas, in Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, p.169.
26
Idem.
27
Records of the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Box 1, John F.
Kennedy Presidential Library, Columbia Point, Massachussets, in Walker, Drugs in the Western
Hemisphere, p.173.
28
Idem.
13
significant increase of opium poppy plantations destroyed in Mexico after only one
year of operation.
Table 5-5.
Opium Poppy Plantations Destroyed in Mexico.
Year Number of Fields
1958 110,243
1959 513,00
1960 521,092
1961 8,636
1962 3,890,316
Source: Records of the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Box 1, John
F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Columbia Point, Massachussets, in Walker, Drugs in the Western
Hemisphere, p.174.
Mexico’s new capability, however, also made future campaigns more difficult to
wage as opium and marihuana growers, aware of the increased probability of aerial
detection, began to hide their crops among legitimate ones and also to plant smaller
plots in even more remote areas.29 Moreover, the U.S. demand for drugs did not
recede during this time, and an increasing amount of Mexican marihuana and a
constant supply of heroin entered the United States in the 1960s.30 This is part of the
reason why bilateral co-operation did not prevent the U.S.-Mexican relationship from
deteriorating at the end of the 1960s, as it will be discussed below.
Also in response to U.S. pressure, in 1961 the Mexican government signed the
UN Single Convention, which became law in April 1967. The convention included,
nevertheless, several provisions that appeared to be controversial. First, Article 33 on
‘Possession of Drugs’ established that ‘The Parties shall not permit the possession of
drugs except under legal authority’. Furthermore, Article 38 (1) on ‘Measures against
the Abuse of Drugs’ stipulated that,
The Parties shall give special attention to and take all practicable measures
for the prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early identification,
treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the
persons involved and shall co-ordinate their efforts to these ends.31
29
Ibid., pp.176-177.
30
31
United Nations, Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
as Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, UN
Treaties and Resolutions, [online] available: http://www.incb.org/e/conv/1961/index.htm? (17/12/02).
14
According to one interpretation, given that the 1961 convention established the
standards for the regulation of the drug market, the provisions above had therefore an
impact on the U.S. market, and by implication on Mexico’s illegal production. In the
opinion of Del Villar, the convention essentially established a double standard by
repressing supply while tolerating the demand for drugs. In this sense, the convention
could have set the stage for the significant growth of the U.S. illegal drug market in
the 1960s and 1970s, for the corrupting flow of drugs toward Mexico, and for the
creation of major crime organisations.32 According to Gonzalez, this kind of approach
to the problem (i.e. treating use with relative tolerance while strongly attacking
production) only contributes to high drug prices that in turn provide the main
incentive for the growth of the illegal industry.33 In fact, this is one of the most
frequent arguments used by the Mexican government to criticise the U.S. drug control
perspective.
In order to respond to increasing drug consumption in the United States, the
Nixon Administration implemented a series of policies to deal with Mexican
marihuana, and then with Turkish opium.
Marihuana.
In the 1960s, increasing smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border coincided with a
growth in drug consumption among young people in the United States. From 1962 to
1967, for instance, the proportion of people between 19 and 25 years old that had ever
tried marihuana went up from 4% to 13%.34 This widespread use, in turn, attracted
U.S. official attention to marihuana from Mexico, in particular.35
In this context, on 21 September 1969 President Richard Nixon ordered
‘Operation Intercept’ on the border with Mexico, which was characterised as ‘the
nation’s largest peace-time search and seizure operation by civil authorities’.36 This
unilateral measure, supposedly designed to stop the northbound flow of marihuana
into the United States in one massive strike, in reality was intended to force Mexico to
‘do something about drugs’, after the disruption it caused to legitimate trade in the
region. This was evident in the fact that,
32
Del Villar, ‘Controlling’, p.107.
33
Gonzalez, ‘Drug Connection’, p.14.
34
Ibid., p.15.
35
Ruiz-Cabañas, ‘Mexico’s Changing’, p.47.
36
Craig, ‘Campaña Permanente’, p.177.
15
Although more than 5-million citizens of the United States and Mexico passed
through this dragnet during the 3-week operation, virtually no heroin or
narcotics were intercepted from tourists. But… the ultimate objective of
Operation Intercept was not to seize narcotics but to pressure Mexico to
control it at the source by eradicating the production of marijuana and opium
poppies in Mexico.37
While in the short-term the operation became a major diplomatic incident that
increased tensions in U.S.-Mexican relations, in the long run it succeeded in
influencing Mexico to act against drugs. First, as an indirect result of the measure,
Mexico began to acknowledge the existence of a growing domestic drug problem, and
to address it as an integral part of its national campaign. Second, it led to an
improvement of bilateral efforts under ‘Operation Co-operation’, which followed
‘Operation Intercept’ on 11 October 1969.38
Under this bilateral arrangement Mexico increased its manual eradication and
interdiction efforts in the ‘Critical Triangle’, but the result was far from satisfactory
due to transportation, geographical and technological factors as it had been in the past.
While the U.S. government, in particular, was interested in joint law enforcement
operations along the common border in order to increase effectiveness, the Mexican
authorities opted instead for an aerial herbicide spraying campaign. This course of
action seemed to be influenced by the fact that previous Mexican eradication efforts
had only led to a greater proliferation of armed peasants and dealers in the
countryside. Avoiding the possibility of organised violence in rural areas and keeping
drug traffickers under control, therefore, were important considerations behind
Mexico’s decision.39 As in the 1930s, in the 1970s Mexican officials were willing to
fight production and smuggling into the United States because of increased flows
threatened Mexico’s autonomy in the implementation of its domestic anti-drug
programmes.40 As already noted, one of the U.S. government’s long-sought objectives
had been to convince Latin American leaders to equate drugs with threats to national
security in order not only to increase its influence but also to dictate their anti-drug
programmes. Mexico’s proximity to the United States and their porous common
border had seemingly made it relatively easier for Washington to achieve these
37
E. Epstein, Agency of Fear, (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s, c1978), p.83.
38
Idem.
39
40
Idem.
16
objectives in Mexico. Mexican authorities, nevertheless, were able to limit U.S.

influence over Mexican drug policy by demonstrating its willingness to undertake not
only bilateral but also unilateral anti-drug campaigns.41 This has been a pattern that
has been repeated by Mexico throughout the years.
In this context, and with U.S. assistance, Mexico took a further step in its anti-
drug efforts in the form of an unprecedented aerial herbicide programme called
‘Operation Condor’.42 The AGO managed the campaign, and acquired from the
United States an air wing larger and better equipped than most Latin American air
forces to launch the ‘largest herbicide program in history’. The operation included the
commitment of the Mexican Secretary of Defence who saw in it an opportunity for
officers to gain experience in what resembled guerrilla warfare, and the initiative also
benefited from an unprecedented co-ordination between the Federal Judicial Police
(FJP), the military, and U.S. drug officials, as well as sincere anti-corruption efforts.43
In this sense, it did not take long before Mexico became Washington’s example of
anti-drug co-operation. Mexico City, for its part, was able to recover control of the
‘Critical Triangle’ by dealing with drug growers and traffickers, and at the same time
with actual or potential guerrillas. That is, the operation also contributed to eliminate
a direct challenge to the Federal government’s legitimacy at the local level.44
Building on ‘Operation Condor’, Mexico extended its anti-drug efforts by
establishing a U.S.-style ‘war on drugs’, ‘The Permanent Campaing’ (La Campaña
Permanente), which has been a supply-side-oriented programme focusing on crop
eradication and border control. Under this framework, Mexican marihuana decreased
from more than 75% in 1976 to a low level of 4% in 1981 (to rebound to 30% in
1986) of total supply in the United States. The brief vacuum left by Mexico,
nevertheless, was soon filled by Colombia, the United States itself, and other sources
such as Jamaica, which also re-emerged to satisfy the U.S. demand.45
Opium.
41
D. C. Kinder, ‘Bureaucratic Cold Warrior: Harry J. Anslinger and Illicit Narcotics Traffick, in
Pacific Historical Review, 50, (May 1981): 169-91, in Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere,
p.167.
42
43
Ibid., pp.74-75.
44
Ibid., p.75.
45
Ruiz-Cabañas, ‘Mexico’s Changing’, pp.48-49.
17
Regarding Turkish opium, following President Nixon’s call in June 1971 to wage a
‘war against drugs’, his administration resorted to diplomatic pressure, and promises
of $35 million in aid, to persuade Turkey to impose a ban on opium production after
its 1972 harvest. In this context, Turkish eradication programmes and the
government’s prohibition that followed, contributed to dislocate the so-called ‘French
Connection’ (i.e. manufacturers of Turkish heroin based in Marseilles with extensive
distribution networks in the United States).46 However, in a way that underlines the
problem inherent in supply-oriented strategies, opium control in Turkey caused an
increase in opium cultivation in Mexico, as producers continued to supply the U.S.
demand for heroin by operating in its ‘Critical Triangle’.47 From 1972 to 1975,
Mexican heroin increased from 10-15% to 80% of the total U.S. supply, estimated at
more than 6 metric tons (mt.).48 In this context, Mexico’s emergence as a major
heroin production and smuggling centre clearly resulted from stricter enforcement
efforts in other parts of the world, showing that drug production is extremely mobile.
For all practical purposes, Mexico’s stepped up eradication efforts in the context of its
mentioned anti-drug campaigns, decreased its participation in the U.S. heroin market
from 67% in 1976 to 25% in 1980.49 As in the case of marihuana, however, reduction
of supply was not accompanied by a corresponding trend in U.S. consumption, and a
new source of heroin, the ‘Golden Crescent’, replaced Mexico by increasing its
participation in the U.S. market from virtually 0% in 1976 to 60% in 1980.50 Every
time a source has been suppressed, or significantly limited without a similar reduction
in demand, the resulting vacuum has been filled by a new supplier in a relatively short
period of time.
By the early 1970s, drug trafficking had become one of the most salient issues
in U.S.-Mexican relations. Toward the end of the decade, and in spite of its efforts,
Mexico was the focus of U.S. attention as a major exporter of both marihuana and
heroin. Mexico, for its part, was reluctant to admit its productive capacity.
Furthermore, the Mexican government countered that if it not were for the U.S.
demand, there would be no reason for Mexican peasants to cultivate drugs. According
46
When the Italian government prohibited the manufacture of heroin in 1952, the Mafia replaced this
supply with Turkish morphine that was usually trasformed in herioin in the French city of Marseilles.
See Ibid., p.53.
47
D. R. Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997, (London:
Continuum, 2001), p.200.
48
49
Ibid., p.54.
18
to Craig, Mexico’s argument was basically correct. However, because of the fact that
demand has been a given, it seems that there was another problem that was
exclusively Mexican. He explains that Mexico is a poor country in many respects,
which is particularly true in the rural sector that has largely been neglected by Mexico
City, in spite of official rhetoric to the contrary. In his opinion, therefore, it is no
accident that precisely the major drug-producing states have also been the centres of
rural poverty, guerrilla movements, land seizures and caciquismo.51 Within this
context of poverty-profit on the one hand, and sustained demand on the other hand,
there has often been disagreement that has affected U.S.-Mexican drug control co-
operation.
The success of Mexico’s anti-drug campaigns in the 1970s was brief. By
1983-1984, the country’s production and smuggling levels were up again, and
Mexican traffickers had already increased their share in total U.S. imports to around
one-third in both the marihuana and heroin markets, and even in a third and new one,
the cocaine market. How did it all happen? There are several complementary
explanations.
First, according Toro, although Mexican officials in charge of ‘Operation
Condor’ were optimistic about the possibilities of suppressing drug production, the
consequences and limitations of eradication programmes were not really clear when
they embarked on the initiative. She explains that in theory, stricter anti-drug law
enforcement, particularly eradication and interdiction programmes, tend to create
‘cartels’ in the market by pushing less efficient, smaller, traffickers out of business,
thus benefiting the most powerful and organised ones. Furthermore, those willing and
capable of resisting increased enforcement usually do so by buying protection or
escalating violence.52 These were precisely the unintended consequences that became
evident only a decade after ‘Operation Condor’ began.
Second, according to Craig, the reasons that led to an increase in Mexico’s
participation in the U.S. drug market, and eventually to the lowest point in U.S.-
Mexican relations since ‘Operation Intercept’, were several. He notes the use of
smaller plots cultivated year-round and at higher altitudes (9,000 ft.) beyond the reach
of capable aircraft; inter-bureaucratic rivalry that affected efficiency; Mexico’s
50
Ibid., p.55.
51
Craig, ‘Campaña Permanente’, p.187.
52
19
economic crises which not only limited the government’s resources but also
encouraged corruption by making payments in dollars more attractive in the context
of the peso devaluation; an increase in U.S. demand for cocaine in the 1980s; and
closely related, the emergence of Colombia as a major drug-producing centre which
resulted in a more profitable role for Mexican traffickers, as cocaine transhipments
routes shifted to Mexico after the implementation of U.S. interdiction operations in
South Florida and the Caribbean.53
This latter development occurred during the first half of the 1980s, when the
establishment of Joint Task Force No. 4 (JTF-4) in Southern Florida increased
interdiction of Colombian cocaine trafficking in the Caribbean. When this traffic was
blocked in the air, the road transportation network through Mexico to the United
States became a key in the cocaine trade. In this context, the Mexican organisations
that controlled smuggling offered their services to Colombia’s cocaine exporters,
developing thus a strategic alliance.54 One of the reasons why road transportation
networks became attractive, was the relatively open access across Mexico’s southern
border, in addition to the existence of numerous clandestine airstrips close to the U.S.
border. Under these circumstances, using Mexico as a transhipment point became a
relatively low-risk way to smuggle cocaine from the Andes into the United States.55
One interesting phenomenon which eventually occurred, was that Mexican smugglers
would demand payment in the form of product from Colombians, around 40-50% of
each cocaine shipment, which in turn allowed them to expand their own distribution
networks, especially in the western part of the United States. Mexican smugglers
would also take advantage of an increasing U.S. methamphetamine market, thanks in
part to U.S. law enforcement crackdown on domestic producers.56
According to DEA officials, JTF-4 operations were ‘highly successful’, and
this aspect was identified as the reason why up to a third or more cocaine entering the
United States was flowing thus through Mexico across the U.S.-Mexican border,
rather than through the traditional routes across the Caribbean!57 Mexico, therefore,
became the victim of other’s ‘success’. According to Bagley, however, this was
53
Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics’, pp.76-77.
54
P. R. Andreas, Border Games. Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, c2000), p.53.
55
Reuter and Ronfeldt, ‘Quest for Integrity’, p.92.
56
Andreas, Border Games, pp.59-60.
57
B. M. Bagley, ‘Myths of Militarization: Enlisting the Armed Forces in the War on Drugs’, in P.H.
Smith (ed.), Drug Policy in the Americas, (Boulder, CO: Westviwe Press, Inc., c1992), p.135.
20
hardly a ‘success’ because JTF-4 operations did not disrupt, much less halt, drug
smuggling into the United States; they merely shifted trafficking methods and routes,
without seriously affecting neither availability nor prices.58 The JTF-4 model was
eventually extended to the U.S.-Mexican border in March 1983, when President
Reagan created the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to act as
‘interface’ between DoD and LEAs in order to co-ordinate resources for drug
interdiction efforts.59 According to Timothy Dunn from the University of Texas at
Austin, the ‘war on drugs’ expanded in dramatic fashion on the U.S.-Mexican border
during the 1986-1992 period in response to the rise of illegal drug trafficking in the
region, which was due in part to the disruption caused by earlier drug-interdiction
efforts in South Florida.60
2.3. 1980s and Beyond: Escalation of Militarisation.

In order to respond to these two challenges, more powerful organisations and
increasing production and trafficking, the Mexican government relied even more on
the Mexican military, also in part because of corruption within the law enforcement
organisations. All things equal (with exception of the expanded military presence and
more resources), however, the basic anti-drug structure turned out to be ineffective,
which confirmed the existence of corruption among Mexican drug officials.61
In this context, relations between the United States and Mexico began to
deteriorate in the first half of the 1980s. For instance, in 1984 the discovery of
thousands of tons of marihuana in a location called ‘El Bufalo’, Chihuahua, was
interpreted as evidence of the involvement of Mexico’s anti-drug forces.62 The
suspicion that an operation of such a magnitude could only be explained by corruption
within Mexico’s security apparatus, proved to be correct after the kidnapping, torture,
and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in February 1985,
which apparently was carried out by elements of the Federal Directorate of Security
(DFS), a kind of state police, in collusion with drug traffickers.63 In fact, it was later
58
Idem.
59
T. J. Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992. Low Intensity Conflict
Doctrine Comes Home, (Austin, TX: University of Texas at Austin, Center for Mexican American
Studies, c1996), p.109.
60
Ibid., p.112.
61
62
Ibid., pp.30-31.
63
21
discovered that the Camarena case had been related to the crackdown in Chihuahua
the year before.64
This situation created a new cycle of conflict in the bilateral relationship. In
the United States, members of Congress and drug policy officials began to express
very negative views about Mexico. According to Walker, tensions across the border
had not been so great since the oil expropriation controversy in 1938, and that was the
reason why any improvement in the bilateral relationship had to wait until after the
presidential elections in both countries in 1988.65 Meanwhile, in response to the
Camarena incident, the DEA launched Operation Intercept II, which partially closed
the border for 8 days in February 1985, and Operation Leyenda, which will be
discussed below, which deepened the crisis and reminded Mexican officials of their
country’s vulnerability to U.S. drug policy. It is important to note that the DEA was
not only particularly harsh in its criticism of Mexican authorities, but it also exerted
intense pressure in the investigation that eventually led to the arrest of drug trafficker
Rafael Caro-Quintero, believed to be behind Camarena’s murder.66
As a consequence of this episode, the Mexican government recognised that
drug trafficking posed a threat to Mexico’s society and institutions, and set out to
reform its security apparatus. First, despite the fact that Mexican authorities had
traditionally avoided making any reference to national security in order to prevent the
United States from using the concept to justify interventionist policies (preferring
instead making references to sovereignty), President Miguel De la Madrid eventually
followed President Reagan’s statements by declaring that drug trafficking affected
Mexican interests, and therefore that it should be considered a threat to national
security.67 The reality was that the concept of ‘sovereignty’ was also too narrow for
dealing with an international context that had changed in course of the last decade,
including new aspects such as Mexico’s emergence as an important oil exporter, the
outbreak of armed conflicts in Central America, and recurrent economic crisis
threatening the stability of the country. Second, drug control programmes were
strengthened. After the DFS was disbanded in 1985, it was replaced by the General
64
65
W. O. Walker III, ‘The Foreign Narcotics Policy of the United States since 1980: An End to the War
on Drugs?’, International Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1, (Winter 1993-94): 37-65. Reprinted by permission
of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, in Walker, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, p.238.
66
67
K. Doyle, ‘The Militarization of the Drug War in Mexico’, in Current History, Vol. 92, No.571,
February 1993, p.84.
22
Direction for Investigation and National Security (DGISN), which included the
National Office for Information and National Security, an intelligence unit for the
analysis of national security issues.68 Furthermore, in 1987, approximately 25% of the
total armed forces in active duty (25,000 soldiers) was participating in year-round
manual eradication, along with 580 FJP agents and ‘the largest air fleet of its kind in
the continent’ (helicopters and light aircraft) for aerial spraying and personnel
transport.69
President Carlos Salinas, De la Madrid’s successor, reasserted that drug
trafficking represented a national security threat:
The fight against drugs is a high priority in my government for three
fundamental reasons: because it constitutes an assault on the health of
Mexico’s citizens, because it promises to affect Mexican national security, and
finally, because the community of nations must stand together on this issue.70
In contrast to the United States where the definition of drug trafficking as a national
security issue helped to justify the military’s support to LEAs in the ‘war on drugs’, in
Mexico the definition did not have the same purpose because the military was already
involved in anti-drug missions. Instead, it allowed the Mexican government to portray
the fight against drugs to be in the own interest of the country, and not only in that of
the United States. In this context, the purpose of this definition was political rather
than legal or programmatic, by providing the base for generating support for an
increasingly expensive, difficult, and controversial effort.71
As already discussed, Mexico’s growing participation in the cocaine trade
gave way to more sophisticated criminal organisations, the most prominent of which
were the so-called Gulf, Tijuana and Juarez cartels.72 Ironically, the shift in cocaine
flows from the U.S. Southeast to the Southwest occurred exactly at the same time the
United States and Mexico were planning to establish a closer economic relationship.
In this context, the task for the Salinas Administration was not only to cope with more
powerful drug trafficking organisations thanks to the U.S. ‘success’, but also to
demonstrate a greater commitment regarding this issue due to rising U.S. political
68
69
70
C. Salinas, Speech to U.S.-Mexico XIX Interparlamentary Meeting, Zihuatanejo, Mexico, 28 April
1989, quoted by Reuter and Ronfeldt, ‘Quest for Integrity’, p.110.
71
Ibid., p.115.
72
P. R. Andreas, ‘U.S.-Mexico Drug Control in the Age of Free Trade’, in Borderlines, Vol. 8, No. 4,
April 2000, p.1
23
expectations.73 This reason was only part of the whole picture, however. President
Salinas’ anti-drug efforts could have also been driven by personal and political
interests, such as the need to keep his party under control, especially after its integrity
had turned into a major issue in a system where the opposition was gathering strength
for the first time in many decades.74 Moreover, President Salinas’ election had been
highly contested, and according to some versions he in fact lost the election to the
left-wing party candidate.
The Salinas government implemented several reforms. It formed a National
Security Cabinet within the Office of the Co-ordination of the Presidency; late in
1988 it created the Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Investigation and
Combat of Drug Trafficking (Subprocurador para la Investigacion y Combate al
Narcotrafico) as well as new units within the FJP; and in early 1989, it established a
new intelligence agency, the Centre for Investigation and National Security (CISEN),
which replaced the DISEN.75 Later on, within the Office of the Assistant Attorney
General, it created in 1992 the Centre for Drug Control Planning (CENDRO) to co-
ordinate intelligence information, and in 1993 the National Institute to Combat Drugs
(INCD) that became the leading agency for anti-drug activities. In general terms, the
resources devoted to drug control by the AGO tripled from the late 1980s to the early
1990s, and this build-up was particularly impressive given that it occurred during a
time of cuts in overall government spending.76
Showing a renewed willingness to work with the United States, in 1989
Mexico signed a comprehensive agreement on bilateral co-operation and, in 1990, it
endorsed the Treaty on Co-operation for Mutual Legal Assistance. These accords, in
turn, created various bilateral interagency groups for co-ordinating the anti-drug
effort. Reflecting the increasing importance of drugs in the bilateral agenda, President
Salinas also established a new section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
General Direction for Special Affairs, in order to deal with drug and arms trafficking,
and drug policy specialists were assigned to the Mexican embassy and consulates in
the United States. Furthermore, to strengthen Mexico’s international image, in 1990
73
Andreas, Border Games, p.53.
74
75
Ibid., pp.112-113.
76
24
the government became part to the 1988 UN Convention against Trafficking in Illicit
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.77
At the operational level, that same year Mexico created the Northern Border
Response Force (NBRF) in order to apprehend traffickers and to break up their
networks before they were able to land at airstrips with the intention of crossing the
border. A U.S. military counter-drug team based at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City
worked closely with the unit, providing operational planning assistance and sharing
drug trafficking intelligence information.78 From the U.S. point of view, this co-
operation was seen as the key to ultimate counter-drug success because, in the words
of one U.S. military officer, ‘without Mexican support the situation closely paralleled
a low-intensity conflict in which the guerrilla had a perfect sanctuary’.79
The Salinas government also extended the anti-drug role of the military. A
new Army Staff Section (S-10) focused on drug control, and about one-third of the
military’s budget was devoted to that effort by the end of the 1980s. 80 As a result of
its growing anti-drug mission, the military became ‘the supreme authority, or in some
cases the only authority in parts of some states, among them Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Jalisco
and Guerrero’.81 In this context, U.S. anti-drug and military aid to Mexico increased
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, after economic integration was accompanied by
security and military co-operation. For instance, traditional low levels of U.S. military
and security assistance to Mexico began to increase during the early 1980s as the
country implemented FMI-mandated ‘structural adjustment’ policies as the result of
its economic crisis. According to a report, between 1984-1993 Mexico obtained 10
times more U.S. arms than it had accumulated between 1950-1983. U.S. military aid
provided to Mexico during the 1982-1990 period included F-5 aircraft, Bell 212
helicopters, C-130 transport planes and other aircraft, excess Jeeps and light trucks,
communications equipment, and spare parts for U.S.-made vehicles and planes. In
addition, Mexico leased UH-1H helicopters, and the United States sold or licensed
77
Idem.
78
Dunn, Militarization, p.139.
79
Maj. D. E. Brown, Deputy Chief of Operations (JTF-6), ‘Drugs on the Border: The Role of the
Military’, in Parameters, Vol. XXI, No. 4, Winter 1991-1992, p.58
80
81
R. A. Camp. Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico, (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, c1992), p.92.
25
$750 million worth of military equipment to Mexican security forces during the same
period.82
On the U.S. side, the shift in drug smuggling from the Southeast to the
Southwest provided the rationale for escalation of militarisation as already mentioned,
and in this context in Novembar 1986 Joint Task Force No. 6 (JTF-6) was established
at Fort Bliss, Texas. Its objective, in general, was to co-ordinate active duty and
Reserve military support for civilian LEAs along the Southwest border.83 Since the
beginning, however, this initiative faced several limitations. Besides the already
discussed Posse Comitatus statute and the prohibition of active duty and Reserve units
to enter into private lands without the written permission of the owner, one important
concern has been Mexican sensitivity to the U.S. military presence. Although this
sensitivity has often been expressed by the Mexican press and human rights advocates
in both countries in the form of worries about the ‘militarisation of the border’,
according to one U.S. military officer this has been more a concern about military
apprehension of illegal aliens and potential human rights abuses.84 What is important
to point out is that what is popularly called the ‘militarisation of the border’, is not the
permanent presence of U.S. troops along the dividing line to deter undesirable flows,
but the military support DoD provides to LEAs in order to deal with those flows. This
information was confirmed, for instance, by the head of the U.S. Customs Service in
San Diego, CA. Asked about the kind of support his agency received from DoD he
replied:
We do. Is very small in the sense of dozens of National Guards people, and
when we say ‘militarization’ it is not in the common sense; they are not
carrying guns, they are not making arrests, they are simply helping perhaps…
maybe to look at cargo or running x-rays, things like that so, at least for
82
S. B. Wilson, The Slippery Slope. U.S. Military Moves into Mexico, Mexico Committee, Earth First!,
Media Center, March 1997, Berkeley, CA, [online] available:
http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/usa/slip_slope_feb97.html (22/09/00), p.4.
83
Its activities have included reconnaissance operations, the most frequently requested, which include
soldiers or Marines accompanied by members of the LEA asking for the support; the use of sensors
such as Army Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) and Marine Sensor and
Control Management Platoon (SCAMP); ground surveillance radar operations; aerial reconnaissance;
intelligence analysis; engineer support to construct walls with pierced steel planking (the PSP used for
temporary aircraft runways); military transportation, and training in proximity to the border (terrain
denial) in order to disrupt smugglers’ patterns through military precsence. See Brown, Drugs on the
Border’, pp53-58.
84
Ibid., p.58.
26
Customs we don’t have deployed units with automatic weapons and things
like that.85
In 1990 the Southwest border was also formally designated as a High-
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), as part of a programme authorised by the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to be administered by the ONDCP. According to that
office,
The Southwest border HIDTA was designated as a single HIDTA with the
awareness that due to the complexity and enormous challenges posed by the
Southwest border, more so than in any other part of the nation, a high level of
coordination among law enforcement agencies is required with other related
drug law enforcement and intelligence entities in the region.86
The HIDTA headquarters were located in El Paso, Texas, in order to implement
border-wide initiatives and co-ordinate regional partnerships in Arizona, California,
New Mexico, West Texas and South Texas. Its overall mission has been to develop
joint interdiction, intelligence, investigation, and prosecution efforts to reduce drug
trafficking in the area. In FY2000, for instance, HIDTA’s initiatives included the
‘Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System’ (an El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC]-
managed information programme), the ‘Southwest Border Unit’, the ‘Research
Analysis Section’ (another EPIC programme devoted to prepare profiles of major
drug trafficking organisations), and the ‘Southwest Border HIDTA Management and
Coordination’ (to identify successful efforts, devise initiatives and recommend the
allocation of resources).87
These efforts were complemented in 1994 with the establishment of the
Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI), which is a regional strategy to dismantle
Mexican organisations. The SWBI is also a co-operative effort carried out by the
LEAs in order to combat the threat posed by Mexican-based trafficking groups
operating along the Southwest border. In particular, the SWBI focuses on
organisations by targeting the communication systems of their command and control
centres. Working in concert, the DEA, FBI, Customs Service, and U.S. Attorneys’
Offices around the country conduct wiretaps to identify all levels of the Mexico- or
85
Interview with Edward W. Logan, Special Agent in Charge, Office of Investigations, United States
Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, San Diego, CA, 6 August 2001.
86
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), ‘Southwest Border HIDTA, High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA), [online] available: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/sw-
content.html (19/02/03), p.2.
87
Ibid., p.3.
27
Colombia-based organisations. This allows the DEA to track drug traffic from
Colombia or Mexico to the United States. This initiative is based on the DEA’s belief
that the only way to successfully attack these organisations is to build cases against
their leadership and their command and control functions. Once drug leaders are
incarcerated, organisations are left in disarray and unable to conduct their business in
the United States. Under this initiative, several operations carried out with bi-national
task forces in Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, have resulted in the arrest of 156
individuals and the seizure of over 22,000 kilos of illegal drugs and $35 million
dollars. The SWBI has also helped to reduce corruption, violence, and alien
smuggling associated with drug trafficking activities carried out along the border.88
The significant results of the Mexican drug enforcement offensive during the
Salinas years, more arrests and seizures, were officially promoted as evidence of
unprecedented U.S. and Mexican resolve and co-operation in fighting drugs. During
his six year-term in office, arrests nearly doubled, prominent traffickers were jailed
(such as the leader of the Gulf cartel, Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo), and principal
figures in the Camarena case were convicted.89 While in both countries the hope was
that these actions would foster a positive image of bilateral relations in the eve of
NAFTA, in the United States worries about the agreement being exploited by drug
traffickers were dismissed by the U.S. administration. Instead, it pointed out that
NAFTA would encourage interdiction efforts, and that even though the border was
being made more business-friendly, it was being made also more secure.90
All these indicators of government resolve were misleading, nevertheless,
because they obscured the failings and flaws of the enforcement effort. According to
Peter Andreas from Brown University, the operational achievements of the U.S. and
Mexican anti-drug campaigns during the Salinas years were actually aided by an
expanding drug trade: there were more drugs to seize and more smugglers to arrest.
Similarly, record eradication levels were facilitated by high crops of marihuana and
opium poppy.91 Moreover, the impressive drug enforcement statistics masked the fact
that the Mexican crackdown was selective: old guard smugglers were targeted (those
88
U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), ‘Southwest Border Initiative’, DEA Programs, Inside the DEA,
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), [online] available: http://www.dea.gov/programs/sbip.htm
(19/02/03), p.1.
89
90
Ibid., p.58.
91
Ibid., p.60.
28
connected to Colombia’s Medellin cartel), while the business of other smugglers

(those related to Colombia’s rising Cali cartel) expanded.92
Although the image of cross-border commitment and progress on the drug war
was sustained long enough for the free trade accord to be approved, the consequences
of both enhanced law enforcement and NAFTA itself generated new problems that
threatened to undermine the bilateral relationship. First, a perverse result of increased
Mexican law enforcement was the creation of more opportunities for corruption and
increased incentives for smugglers to buy off those doing the enforcement, which in
turn attracted more intensive U.S. media and congressional attention. 93 The problem
of corruption in Mexico was exacerbated by the fact that when President Salinas took
office he did not reform the Mexican criminal justice system but simply expanded the
size and power of an already corrupted apparatus.94 Secondly, the implementation of
NAFTA not only made the task of border interdiction more difficult, but it also
attracted even more political and media attention to the deficiencies of the interdiction
effort. It seems that smugglers were adapting by increasingly hiding their drug
shipments within the rising volume of commercial trucks, railcars and passenger
vehicles crossing the border.95 A report written by an intelligence officer at the U.S.
embassy in Mexico City claimed that cocaine traffickers had established factories,
warehouses, and trucking companies as fronts in Mexico in anticipation of increasing
cross-border commerce under NAFTA.96
As already mentioned, this prospect was not publicly discussed during
negotiations over the free trade accord in the early 1990s. Moreover, law enforcement
agents who worked in and on Mexico while President Salinas was negotiating the
agreement with the United States, said they were often discouraged by political
pressure to keep the drug issue from jeopardising improvements in the economic
relationship between the two countries. At crucial moments, they asserted,
intelligence struggled with policy and policy won.97 Nevertheless, this situation
contrast sharply with the view from the DEA:
92
Ibid., p.61.
93
Andreas, ‘U.S.-Mexico’, p.2.
94
Andreas, Border Games, p. 62.
95
Ibid., p.52.
96
P. R. Andreas, ‘U.S.-Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Borders’, Foreign Policy, No. 103, Summer
1996, p.57.
97
T. Golden, ‘Mexico and Drugs: Was U.S. Napping?’, in The New York Times, July 11, 1997, [online]
available: http://query.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F10812F7 (20/02/03), p.2.
29
Illicit drugs are smuggled in record levels into the United States via the 2,000-
mile U.S./Mexico border. Over the past few years, Mexican based trafficking
organizations have succeeded in establishing themselves as the preeminent
poly-drug traffickers of the world, using our shared border to smuggle illicit
drugs into the United States. These organizations present an increasing threat
to the national security of this country, with voluminous amount of drugs,
violent crime, and the associated corruption of public officials in Mexico.
Mexico is the largest transshipment point of South American cocaine destined
for the United States, and 65% of this cocaine reaches American cities via the
U.S./Mexico border. Mexico also remains a major source country for heroin
and marijuana, and many of these Mexican based trafficking organizations are
utilized by Colombian Cartels to transship drugs destined for the United
States. 98
According to the same report, as the same time this threat has been present in
the U.S.-Mexico border, the boundary has remained highly porous. In FY2000, for
instance, 293 million people, 89 million cars, 4.5 million trucks, and 572,583 rail cars
entered the United States from Mexico. This growing volume of commercial and
pedestrian traffic, however, is perceived to create significant opportunities for drug
trafficking organizations to introduce their illegal goods into the United States.99 In
this context, the drug threat presented by the U.S./Mexico Border is equated with the
national drug threat, by defining to a certain extent the overall drug threat against the
United States.100 The DEA’s perception of the threat from the Mexican border is
shared by the Customs Service. In the opinion of Edward Logan,
With the Mexican border, of course, it’s a very robust activity you know,
certainly drug smuggling is number one activity that we see coming out of
Mexico, marijuana, cocaine, heroine, methamphetamine, pharmaceuticals, and
often times because of the increasing volume of trade caused by NAFTA, the
drug cartels try to mask their smuggling activity in legitimate cargo. So it is
very difficult, and of course most of the legitimate trade, maquiladora factories
want to avoid the utilization of their operations for drug smugglers; the fact is
98
U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), Statement by Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommitte, March 29, 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct032901.htm
(22/11/02), p.1.
99
Idem.
100
Ibid., p.2.
30
that their operations get penetrated either in the trucking area or low-level
employees who certainly can’t stand the pressure of organized crime.101
However, having to avoid delays, it seems that Customs Service agents can not
realistically inspect most of the vehicles entering from Mexico. In this context, the
domestic political context has dictated that the border has to remain highly porous.102
Projecting an impression of cross-border commitment and progress in the anti-
drug campaign was more politically expedient for U.S. and Mexican leaders than
whether or not the drug supply was actually reduced. Regardless of its deterrent
effect, the escalation of enforcement efforts helped them to avoid political attacks and
to keep the drug issue from affecting the broader process of economic integration. In
other words, a policy that failed to achieve its stated goal nevertheless helped to
realise other key political objectives, such as the creation and maintenance of
NAFTA.103 According to other versions, drug control was not really sacrificed for the
sake of the agreement, but became part of a more complex situation. In the opinion of
Logan, trying to reconcile an open border for legitimate trade with the need to protect
against undesirable flows is a ‘continuing balancing act’. He adds that ‘there is
political pressure to make sure on certainly the U.S. side that we have enough controls
to make sure that the border is not completely wide-open’.104
It is important to mention that Mexican anti-drug co-operation with the United
States was reduced toward the end of the Salinas Administration. From 1993 until
1995, the government of Mexico decided to combat drug trafficking activities with
reduced U.S. assistance. The reason was Mexico’s protest after the United States had
encouraged the abduction of doctor Humberto Alvarez-Machain from Mexican
territory to face charges in the United States of involvement in Camarena’s murder,
when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that such action did not violate the U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty. Mexico reacted initially by banning U.S. drug control activities on
its soil, and eventually decided, in 1992, that it would no longer accept U.S. counter-
drug assistance except minor technical one. This so-called ‘Mexicanisation policy’
resulted in a reduction in counter-drug contact between the United States and
101
Interview with Edward Logan.
102
103
Ibid., p.84.
104
31
Mexico.105 This policy remained in effect until 1995, as it will be discussed below,
when the Mexican government accepted again U.S. counter-drug assistance for both
law enforcement and military anti-drug activities.
In general terms, the U.S. and Mexican response to the continued failures of
interdiction was further escalation rather than reassessment. After taking office in
December 1994, President Ernesto Zedillo declared that drug trafficking was
‘Mexico’s number one security threat’.106 The fact that the situation had not improved
was evident in DoS’s reports covering 1991-1997. They established that Mexico
supplied 20 to 30% of the heroin, up to 80% of the foreign-grown marihuana, and that
the country was the transhipment point for between 50% to 60% of U.S.-bound
cocaine shipments and up to 80% of methamine precursor chemicals like ephedrine.
The report stated that Mexican trafficking organisations dominated the manufacture
and distribution of methamphetamine, and that Mexico was an important source of
‘designer’ drugs and illicit steroids. According to law enforcement estimates, 70% of
cocaine smuggled into the United States came through Mexican sea, land, or air
space.107 Furthermore, according to press reports, the increasing demands of Mexican
traffickers had led Colombian cartels to shift back to the Caribbean, with about 40%
of the cocaine passing through that area with Puerto Rico as the main gateway.108
President Zedillo’s response to continuing corruption was to turn again to the
military. In late 1995, the armed forces took over the command of the FJP in
Chihuahua, bringing in active duty and former officials in a pilot project to
incorporate military personnel into the organisation. Since then, generals were
assigned to command positions in at least 19 state civilian police agencies (out of 32)
and Mexico City. Soldiers replaced agents in Chihuahua, Tamaulipas and Nuevo
Leon. Moreover, mid-level local commanders frequently met with police and judicial
105
K. L. Storrs, Specialist on Latin American Affairs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under
Zedillo, December 1994 to March 1998’, CRS Report to Congress, Foreign Affairs and National
Defense Division, Received through the CRS Web, 98-161F, Congressional Research Service (CRS),
The Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Updated March 4, 1998, p.5.
106
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Drug Control. Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico, Report
to Congressional Requesters, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO/NSIAD-96-
163, Washington, DC, 12 June 1996, p.18.
107
Storrs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts’, pp.2-3.
108
D. Farah and S. F. Kovaleski, ‘Cartels Make Puerto Rico a Major Gateway to the U.S.’, in The
Washington Post, February 16, 1998, p.A1.
32
officials to design public security strategies.109 In December 1996, generals also took
over the FJP, the INCD and CENDRO. Reportedly, the mid-level officials and the
operational units to support them also came from the armed forces. At the same time,
CISEN was increasingly controlled by the military as well.110 Moreover, to have an
idea, by early 1998 around 40% of the 180,000-member army was focusing on drug
control.111
The intensified participation of the Mexican military in anti-drug activities,
however, did not produce a significant change. Comparison between President
Salinas’ last 3 years and President Zedillo’s first 3 years shows only the continuation
of an intensive campaign.
Table 5-6.
Mexican Counter-drug Activities, 1992-1997.
1992 1993 1994 Totals 1995 1996 1997 Totals
Seizures
Cocaine (mt) 38.8 46.2 22.1 107.10 22.2 23.6 34.9 80.7
Opium (mt) 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.45 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.76
Heroin (mt) 0.09 0.06 0.29 0.456 0.203 0.363 0.115 0.681
Marihuana (mt) 405 495 528 1,428 780 1,015 1,038 2,833
Methamphetamine (mt) - - 0.26 - 0.496 0.172 0.039 0.707
Ephedrine (mt) - - - - 4.9 6.7 0.608 12.208
Illicit Drug Labs 4 5 9 18 19 19 8 46
Arrests
Nationals 27,639 17,551 6,860 51,780 9,728 11,038 10,572 31,338
Foreigners 208 75 146 429 173 207 170 550
Total 27,577 17,626 7,006 52,209 9,901 11,245 10,742 31,888
Eradication
Opium (ha) 6,860 7,820 6,620 21,300 8,450 7,900 8,000 24,350
* 10,959 15,389 14,671 17,416 47,476
Marihuana (ha) 12,100 9,970 8,495 30,565 11,750 12,200 10,500 34,450
* 14,207 21,573 22,769 23,385 67,727
* Government of Mexico’s figures.
Source: Storrs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Effort under Zedillo’, p.4.
Although these figures do not provide the amount of total drugs produced or reflect
the capabilities of drug traffickers and the effectiveness of reporting methods either,
while arrests and cocaine seizures decreased during this period, seizures of marihuana
and drug laboratories increased in a more perceptible way.
109
D. E. Schulz, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The United States, Mexico, and the Agony of
National Security, U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 1997), Part
I, [online] available: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/ (17/12/98), p.2.
110
Ibid., p.3.
111
33
The militarisation of drug control in Mexico has also led to a greater

militarisation of U.S.-Mexican relations. Although Mexico had traditionally resisted
U.S. military aid in order to maintain its independence and sovereignty, military
contacts between the two countries began to increase. An important step in this
direction was taken in October 1995, when the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J.
Perry, visited Mexico (the first ever visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense), and the
following April his Mexican counterpart, General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, visited
the United States. In the 1995 meeting, Secretary Perry stated,
Standing side by side, our two presidents showed the world that the United
States and Mexico are good neighbors and good friends. My goal, and the goal
of my visit, is to help our nations forge closer security ties, because when it
comes to stability and security, our destinies are inextricably linked. So let us
build a new bilateral security relationship based on openness, trust,
cooperation and mutual respect.112
In the meeting the following year, both governments agreed to establish a bilateral
working group to explore ways to co-operate in four different areas: a) counter-
narcotics, b) natural disasters, c) force modernisation, and d) education and
training.113 While most of these efforts concentrated on the fourth area, it is important
to note that they emphasised the challenge posed by drug trafficking. 114 According to
the GAO, during FY1996 and FY1997 DoD provided the Mexican military with $76
million worth in equipment and training. The equipment provided is shown in Table
5-7.
Table 5-7.
112
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), ‘New Generation of U.S.-Mexico Cooperation and Trust’,
Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Mexican Ministry of Defense,
Mexico City, Oct. 23, 1995, Defense Issues, Vol. 10, Number. 96, Office of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC, [online] available:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/di95/di1096.html (10/07/97), p.1.
113
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASDPA), ‘US/Mexico Defense Meeting, April
24, 1996’, Background Briefing, [online] available:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1996/x042896_x0424mex.html (23/03/00), p.2.
114
U.S. security assistance to Mexico included the following: a) Mexico received more assistance
through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme than any other country
in the region in 1996 and 1997; b) Mexican personnel ranked first in the region in attendance at the
School of Americas in 1997 and second in 1996; c) Mexican personnel ranked first in the region in
attendance at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy in 1996 and 1997; d) in 1997, Mexico was
second in the region in counter-drug assistance received through DoD’s ‘Section 1004’ account. See G.
W. Grayson, Mexico’s Armed Forces. A Factbook, A Military Studies Report of the CSIS Americas
Program, Mexico Project, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, c1999),
p.66.
34
DoD Counter-drug assistance provided to or planned for the Mexican Military, Fiscal
Years 1996-97.
Dollars in Millions
Source of Value of Type of
Assistance Assistance Assistance
Excess defence articles $5 20 UH-1H helicopters
Section 506 (a)(2) $37 53 UH-1H helicopters

drawdown 4 C-26 aircraft
2-year UH-1H spare part package
Section 1004 $26 About 70% is planned to be used

for training and the remainder for the
purchase of equipment
Section 1031 $8 UH-1H spare parts
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Drug Control. U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts
Face Difficult Challenges, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-98-154, National
Security and International Affairs Division (NISIAD), Washington, DC, June 1998, p.3.
Regarding the equipment provided, all of the helicopters and the C-26 aircraft were
delivered to the Mexican military during 1996 and 1997, and Mexico also received
some logistics and training support.115 In addition to this counter-drug assistance, the
Mexican military used its own funds to purchase two Knox-class frigates from the
United States through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme. These frigates
were valued at about $7 million and were delivered to Mexico in August 1997.116
U.S. counter-drug assistance was supposed to enhance the ability of the
Mexican military to conduct counter-drug missions by allowing it to perform
reconnaissance and increased eradication missions, as well as to bolster the air
mobility of ground troops. However, at that time, key elements of DoD counter-drug
assistance were of limited usefulness or could have been better planned and co-
ordinated by U.S. and Mexican military officials. For example, the 73 UH-1H
helicopters were not useful to meet some counter-drug missions, and their operational
capabilities were limited because of the lack of adequate spare parts. The four C-26
aircraft were provided to the Mexican military even though there was no clearly
identified requirement for this kind of aircraft. According to U.S. embassy military
officials, the Mexican military was not using the C-26 aircraft. In addition, inadequate
co-ordination between the U.S. Navy and other DoD agencies resulted in the transfer
of the two frigates without being properly equipped, and after Mexican Navy
115
GAO, Drug Control. U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges, p.2.
116
Ibid., p.3.
35
personnel had already been trained.117 It is important to mention that eventually, in an

event without precedent at such scale, all the helicopters were returned to the United
States by the Mexican government. In the first place, the idea behind the provision of
these helicopters was the need to create the rapid reaction capability for the U.S.-
trained Grupos de Fuerzas Especiales Aerotransportadas (GAFES) to reach
clandestine runways to seize the Carabel and even Boeing 707 aircraft loaded with
tons of cocaine. According to the account of an insider during the affair,
The problem was that Mexico was being given old equipment, and the
problem with old equipment, we are talking about helicopters and ships that
were used in Vietnam, is that it requires a lot of maintenance, and this is
expensive maintenance; and this is not only in Mexico but also in other parts
of the world; when countries are given this equipment, overnight they have a
capability which cannot be used because it does not have the right
maintenance, and besides they [helicopters] are unable to fly at the altitude
required by the Mexican armed forces. Thus, at some point the helicopters did
not fly anymore because of problems such as cracks, they have problems
because they are old, then you have a problem and what to do? And what
happened was that, which had never happened before, was that Mexico
returned the 73 helicopters to the United States which, it has never been
returned equipment to that level… Dangerously it became a problem in which
Mexicans would say, ‘you are giving us this “junk”, and the United States
would say ‘it is that you do not know how to keep the helicopters’, and the
truth is that both had some reason… This was absolutely a problem that could
have been diplomatically very complicated and could have affected other
areas of the relationship.118
Militarisation has not only created problems as the one described above, but the
expanded military role in drug control (and thus proximity to smugglers) has also
increased the risk of greater corruption within its ranks. One wake up call in this
regard had been the 1991 incident in Tlalixcoyan, Veracruz. On that occasion, as ten
agents from the FJP attempted to apprehend smugglers delivering 800 pounds of
cocaine from a small plane on a remote airstrip, soldiers opened fire on the agents,
killing seven of them, after which the traffickers escaped.119 The most serious
117
Ibid., p.5.
118
Interview with Ana Maria Salazar, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug
Enforcement Policy and Support, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Mexico City, 21 June 2002.
119
36
incident, however, was the February 1997 arrest of General Jesus Gutierrez-Rebollo,
the head of INCD, on charges of being working for Amado Carrillo Fuentes, leader of
the Juarez cartel, which occurred only eight days after the White House ‘Drug Czar’,
General Barry McCraffrey, described him as a ‘honest man and a non-sense field
commander’.120 As a result of this incident the INCD was dismantled, and the
Mexican government created the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against
Health (Fiscalia Especial para la Atencion de Delitos Contra la Salud [FEADS]).
The Mexican response to such corruption, however, was to reinforce the militarisation
trend which, while it was welcome in Washington, it had the potential to deepen
corruption and to create other problems that will be discussed below.
It is important to mention that regarding the certification process, there was no
controversy during the Salinas years. During the period of President Zedillo, however,
revelations of deepening corruption and the expanding power of Mexico’s drug
smuggling organisations led Mexico to the centre stage in Washington’s certification
debate. Beginning in early 1996, although the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
for FY1996 (P. L. 104-99 and P. L. 104-107) abandoned a House-passed restriction
on aid to Mexico on the condition that the country controlled illegal drug trafficking,
the report demanded U.S. efforts to encourage greater Mexican action regarding these
issues. Later on, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Alfonse M. D’Amato and
Representatives Miller and Shaw criticised Mexican drug control efforts and
introduced measures calling for disapproval of the president’s certification (S. J. Res.
50/H. J. Res. 162) and for action against the country unless drug trafficking was
controlled (S. Res. 218/H. Res. 362/ H. Res. 2947), but action was not completed on
these measures.121 In this context, in 1996 President Clinton was faced with the
prospect of decertifying Mexico, and straining relations, or doing nothing, and
inviting congressional allegations. In 1996 the way out to distract attention from
Mexico was to decertify Colombia, but this eroded the credibility of the
administration’s drug performances review.122 It was in this context that U.S.-Mexico
counter-drug co-operation increased, as already described.
Under President Zedillo, the full range of law enforcement, military and
border control co-operation increased. Against the background of a continuing drug
120
Golden, ‘Mexico and Drugs’, p.13.
121
Storrs, ‘Mexican Drug Certification Issues’, p.2.
122
37
flow and incidents of corruption, President Clinton visited Mexico in May 1997. On
that occasion, President Clinton stated:
Drugs are not simply a Mexican problem or an American problem –they are
our common problem. The enormous demand for drugs in America must be
stemmed. We have just a little less than five percent of the world’s population
–yet, we consume one third of the world’s cocaine, most of which comes from
Mexico. The money we spend on illegal drugs fuels narco-traffickers who, in
turn, attack your police and prosecutors and prey on your institutions. We
must face this curse together, because we cannot defeat it alone. My friends,
the battle against drugs must unite our people, not divide them.123
In this context, in a bilateral commitment to confront the drug threat, both
governments signed the Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against
Drugs, which established the High Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCG) to
provide for cabinet-level co-ordination twice a year. Subordinate working groups on
money laundering, chemical control, demand-reduction, prisoner transfer, extradition
and mutual legal assistance met four times a year to co-ordinate policies. Acting
through these groups, the two countries agreed to develop a draft joint strategy when
President Zedillo visited Washington in mid-November 1997, which was then
announced in February 1998. The United States/Mexico Bi-national Drug Strategy
was defined by the objectives set forth in the declaration. These goals were: a) to
reduce the consumption, production, and traffic of illicit substances in both countries;
b) to treat the problems generated by drugs in terms health and safety in both
societies; and c) to agree on additional actions to address related-crimes such as
diversion of precursors and chemicals, arms trafficking and money laundering.124 The
two presidents also signed a protocol to the bilateral extradition treaty that permitted
temporary extradition for trials of cross-border criminals, and a hemispheric
convention against illegal firearms trafficking. In the law enforcement area of co-
operation and training, in particular, the United States became involved in the training
and screening of the new FEADS, the Organised Crime Unit that implemented
Mexico’s new Organised Crime Law, the anti-drug bilateral Border Task Forces
123
Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Address to the People of Mexico, Mexico
City May 7, 1997, The White House, [online] available: http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/5/75.text.1 p.5.
124
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), United States/Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy,
February 1998, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p.2.
38
(BTFs), and the Financial Intelligence Unit which dealt with the new anti-money
laundering legislation.125
Following the mid-February 1997 arrest of General Gutierrez-Rebollo, some
members of Congress urged President Clinton to send Mexico a message for forceful
action by making a national interest certification. However, when the president fully
certified Mexico in late February 1997, both Houses introduced resolutions of
disapproval through Representative Shaw (H. J. Res. 58) and Senator Paul Coverdell
(S. J. Res.19, 20 and 21).126 Responding in part to criticism form Mexico and the
administration, the Senate, on 20 March 1997, voted 94 to 5 to pass the Corverdell-
Feinstein amendment to H.R Res. 58, which instead of disapproving the president’s
certification, required a report by 1 September 1997 on Mexican efforts to strengthen
drug control in 10 areas and U.S. efforts in some other areas. The Mexican areas for
reporting included effective action against drug cartels and co-operation in law
enforcement, extradition, eradication and money laundering activities. The U.S. areas
included implementation of effective domestic anti-drug educational campaigns and
international interdiction and law enforcement programmes, and additional
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents at the border.127 Although
Congress did not complete action on this measure within the specified time, President
Clinton abided by the Senate version of H.R Res. 58, and the administration reported
as promised in September 1997.128
President Clinton certified Mexico again on 26 February 1998 citing increased
drug seizures, the creation of the new anti-drug force, progress in the return of
fugitives, tough sentencing of major traffickers and the legislation against organised
crime and money laundering. He also cited U.S.-Mexico co-operation through the
HLCG and the bi-national drug control strategy. Several members of Congress
criticised the decision, however, and introduced resolutions to disapprove the
president’s certification arguing inadequate efforts to arrest major drug traffickers, to
extradite Mexican citizens to the United States on drug-related charges, and to permit
DEA agents to carry arms in Mexico for their protection.129 In the Senate, Coverdell,
Feinstein, Jesse Helms and Kay Bailey Hutchinson co-sponsored S. J. Res. 42 (which
125
Storrs, ‘Mexican Drug Certification Issues’, p.5.
126
Ibid., p.3.
127
Ibid., p.4.
128
Idem.
129
Ibid., p.5.
39
if approved would disapprove the president’s certification and require withdrawal of

assistance) and S. J. Res. 43 (which if approved would disapprove the president’s
certification but would permit him to avoid the withholding of assistance if he
subsequently found that vital U.S. national interest required non-application of
sanctions). In the House, Representatives Shaw and John L. Mica introduced H. J.
Res. 114, which was a similar motion. The Senate considered the measures on 26
March 1998. Objection was raised to S. J. Res. 43, and S. J. Res. 42 was opposed by
arguing that the resolution would harm relations with Mexico and terminate recent co-
operative efforts. For its part, S. J. Res. 42 was defeated by a vote 45 to 54.130
The dynamics of the certification process, and other unilateral actions carried
out by the U.S. government, complicated the efforts to promote a more efficient co-
operation with Mexico. For instance, on 18 May 1998, the Departments of the
Treasury and Justice announced the end of a 3-year Customs Service money
laundering investigation called ‘Operation Casablanca’, which targeted Mexico’s
Juarez and Colombia’s drug cartels. In one of the largest money laundering
investigations in U.S. law enforcement history, the initiative resulted in a series of
arrests, indictments against Mexican banks and bankers, and the seizure of more than
$100 million in drug proceeds. Although the Mexican government initially co-
operated in the investigation by arresting five bankers involved in the case, it later
condemned the initiative after learning that U.S. agents had conducted part of the
undercover operations in Mexico without approval of Mexican officials. The incident
was addressed through the establishment of guidelines for consultation on sensitive
law enforcement activities by the two Attorney Generals, and a bilateral agreement
signed in February 1999.131 Although this incident represented a low point in co-
operation between the two countries, it also showed how distrustful U.S. officials
were of their Mexican counterparts in the context of past corruption scandals.
At the end of the day, U.S. pressures and the dynamics of certification led to
further escalation of law enforcement co-operation and militarisation. While on the
Mexican side the response was the increased involvement of the armed forces, on the
U.S. side escalation primarily translated into more law enforcement personnel and
130
Idem.
131
U.S. Department of State (DoS), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998, Released
by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, DC, February
1999, [online] available:
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_rep/major/Mexico.html (04/04/00), p.5.
40
new surveillance and detection equipment at the border. This technology has been
particularly important to filter out illegal flows without disrupting legitimate traffic in
the area. For example, rather than manually unloading and inspecting cargo containers
(a labour- and time-intensive process), there has been a turn toward the use of non-
intrusive inspection technologies. This has been reflected in the installation of giant x-
ray, drive-through, machines capable of scanning entire truck cargoes at each of the
39 official POEs to be completed by the year 2003, with the cost of $3.5 million each.
This high-tech aspect has also been present in Mexico. For example, in February 1999
Mexican officials announced a new $400 million three-year anti-drug plan, which
included the purchase of new equipment such as infrared cameras for aircraft
surveillance, x-ray machines for the border POEs, and encrypted satellite
communications gear, in addition to new helicopters, aircraft and speedboats.132
It is important to note that on 4 September 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003 (S.
1401), which included Sections 741-745 containing modifications to the certification
process. These provisions would modify the certification procedures for FY2002-
FY2004, requiring the president to designate only the worst offending countries
subject to sanctions, and encouraging the convening of a high-level conference to
develop a multilateral strategy. On 24 October 2001, the Senate passed the Foreign
Appropriations Act for FY 2002 (H. R. 2506), with an amendment by Senators Dodd
and Hutchinson (S. Amdt. 1959) that incorporated the provisions of S.1401 as
reported, except that modifications would apply only to FY2002 and to countries in
the Western Hemisphere.133
According to DoS, bilateral U.S.-Mexico law enforcement co-operation has
improved under the Fox Administration mainly through information sharing, and this
co-operation continued in 2001. According to his campaign promises to improve
public security, to deal with impunity, and to stop public corruption, President
Vicente Fox created two new Cabinet-level entities that support Mexico’s counter-
drug efforts: 1) a National Security Council to co-ordinate national security policy,
and 2) the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) which incorporated the National Public
Andreas, ‘U.S.-Mexico Drug Control’, p.2.

132
K. L. Storrs, Specialist on Latin American Affairs, ‘Drug Certification Requirements and Proposed
133
Congressional Modifications in 2001’, CRS Report to Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division, Received through the CRS Web, RL30892, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The
41
Safety System (NPSS) and the Federal Preventive Police (FPP). President Fox also
revitalised the Secretaria de la Contraloria y Desarrollo Administrativo
(SECODAM) which investigates public corruption.134
Institutional weaknesses within LEAs remain a serious obstacle to their
efficiency and credibility. There have been some changes, nevertheless. First, the
AGO has been reorganised. In early 2001, the administration reformed the FJP by
creating a new Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) inaugurated in October 2001. The
AFI, which is 3,500-strong, incorporates former PJF and personnel from other
components of the AGO, and plans to expand its personnel to 6,000 by the year 2006.
Another important change is the transformation of CENDRO into an independent
intelligence organisation under the AGO, which will include not only drug trafficking
issues but also terrorism, trafficking in arms and people.135
In terms of bilateral law enforcement, operations carried out in 2001 led to an
unprecedented ability to share the most sensitive law enforcement intelligence without
compromise. The joint U.S.-Mexico effort to create specially vetted units hold the
promise of improving the AGO’s capacity to investigate important drug trafficking
cases and to eliminate the existence and toleration of corruption within the law
enforcement sector. The intense law enforcement actions of Mexico resulted in the
May 2001 arrest of the ex-Governor of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva, after a two-
year manhunt. He apparently used his post to facilitate the transhipment of drugs and
to launder drug money.136 Seizures and arrests also kept pace with the efforts carried
out in previous years as shown in Table 5-8.
Table 5-8.
Mexico Statistics (1994-2001).
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Opium
Potential Harvest (ha) 5,795 5,050 5,100 4,000 5,500 3,600 1,900 4,400
USG Est. Impact (ha) 6,620 8,450 7,900 8,000 9,500 7,900 7,600 7,400
Eradication (ha) 11,036 15,389 14,671 17,732 17,449 15,469 15,300 15,350
Cultivation (ha) 12,415 13,500 13,000 12,000 15,000 11,500 9,500 11,800
Potential Yield (mt) 60 53 54 46 60 43 25 71
Cannabis
Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Updated November 6, 2001, [online] available:

http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/030101.pdf (10/03/03), p.i.
134
U.S. Department of State (DoS), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2002,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Washington, DC, [online]
available: http://www.state.gov/documents.PDF (22/11/02), p.V-28.
135
Ibid., pp.V-28-V-29.
136
Ibid., p. V-29.
42
Potential Harvest (ha) 10,550 6,900 6,500 4,800 4,600 3,700 3,900 4,100
USG Est. Impact (ha) 8,495 11,750 12,200 10,500 9,500 19,400 13,000 7,400
Eradication (ha) 14,227 21,573 22,961 23,576 23,928 33,583 33,000 33,300
Cultivation (ha) 19,045 18,650 18,700 15,300 14,100 23,100 16,900 11,500
Potential Yield (mt) 5,908 12,400 11,700 8,600 8,300 6,700 7,000 7,400
Seizures
Opium (mt) 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.34 0.15 0.80 0.27 0.48
Heroin (mt) 0.297 0.203 0.363 0.115 0.120 0.258 0.268 0.24
Cocaine (mt) 22.1 22.2 23.6 34.9 22.6 33.5 18.3 29.3
Cannabis (mt) 598 780 1,015 1,038 1,062 1,459 1,619 2,007
Methamphetamine (mt) 0.265 0.496 0.172 0.039 0.096 0.358 0.555 0.396
Arrests
Nationals 6,860 9,728 11,038 10,572 10,034 10,261 - -
Foreigners 146 173 207 170 255 203 - -
Total 7,006 9,901 11,245 10,742 10,289 10,464
Labs Destroyed 9 19 19 8 7 - - 18
Source: DoS, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2002, p.V-36.
Besides several changes aimed at eliminating corruption in law enforcement

organisations, such as eventual provision of adequate salaries and benefits and an
emphasis on professionalisation, the NPSS maintains a national police registry to
prevent police officials dismissed for corruption from being hired by another law
enforcement entity. In 2001 the AGO expanded its vetting process by reviewing
14,000 employees including federal prosecutors, police agents, forensic experts, and
pilots assigned to counter-drug duties, and of these 1,100 employees were dismissed
for irregularities discovered during reviews which included polygraphs and
toxicological tests.137
The HLCG was abandoned by mutual consent with the inaugurations of the
two presidents. However, the five working groups of the HLCG (i.e. money
laundering, demand reduction, arms trafficking, interdiction and precursor chemicals)
continue to meet under the auspices of the Legal Working Group of the Binational
Commission (BNC) or the Law Enforcement Plenary.138
As a result of the events of September 11, border security has become an
important issue for both governments, and co-ordinated drug control programmes are
supposed to contribute to that objective. In this context, the main goals of U.S.-
Mexico bilateral counter-drug operations in 2002 included reducing the demand of
drugs in both countries, targeting criminal organisations, improving bilateral co-
ordination on chemical diversion investigations, supporting Mexico’s institutional
137
Ibid., p.V-32.
138
Idem.
43
development, continuing training and technical co-operation programmes, making use

of effective extradition procedures and enforcing more effectively laws against money
laundering. The U.S. government, however, has expressed criticism about the last two
points. First, it considers that although Mexico has a money laundering law since
1996, it has only made a few successful prosecutions and convictions. Second, the
Mexican Supreme Court’s decision to deny extradition in possible life sentence cases
is considered to present ‘a serious obstacle towards bringing fugitives to justice’.
Likewise, abuse of the ‘Amparo’ (injunction process) is believed to hinder both
criminal prosecutions and extradition cases, creating the perception that Mexico is a
safe haven for fugitives.139
The events of September 11 apparently led to a decline in drug availability in
the United States, but most of the change has had only short-term effects. For
instance, availability of heroin is reported to have declined in 12 cities (i.e. Baltimore,
Columbia [SC], Denver, Detroit, El Paso, Honolulu, Memphis, Miami, New Orleans,
New York, Seattle and Sioux Falls). Due to heightened security at POEs, drug
trafficking routes also changed in 7 cities (i.e. Denver, Honolulu, Miami, New York,
Portland [ME], St. Louis and Seattle). Nevertheless, regarding declines in border
areas such as Detroit, Portland [ME] and El Paso, they were only short-term and soon
reverted to ‘business as usual’. Other cities such as Boston Miami, New York and
Washington DC, experienced price-gouging, ‘super sales’ and drug adulteration
practices, but these also were mainly short-term effects.140 In the context of the long-
term effects of the terrorist attacks, one important aspect yet to be seen is the degree
to which the United States will succeed in restructuring security co-operation with
Mexico to fit its anti-terrorist policy. While for the time being President Fox has been
willing to strengthen North American security co-operation and has shown his support
for the Bush Administration’s anti-terrorist campaign, the Mexican public seems to be
less enthusiastic about these policies. According to one view, in Mexico ‘the greatest
threat to internal security continues to be “common crime”, not terrorism’.141 In this
context, notwithstanding unprecedented bilateral law enforcement co-operation, the
139
Ibid., p.V-35.
140
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), ‘Special Topic: The Impact of September 11’, in
Pulse Check. Trends in Drug Abuse, July-December 2001 Reporting Period, p.2.
141
K. Paterson, ‘Deepening U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: As NAFTA’s Anti-narcotics Apparatus
Focuses on Public Security, Human Rights Activists Grow Worried’, in Borderlines, Vol. 9, No. 11,
December 2001, [online] available: http://www.us-mex.org/borderlines/2001/bl84/bl84security.html
(24/01/02), p.8.
44
current focus of U.S. foreign policy could create a potential tension between the
security priorities of both countries.
3. Assessment.
As already discussed, no issue in U.S.-Mexican relations generates more controversy
than that of drugs. In turn, within this issue, one of the most sensitive aspects is the
way in which the drug trade has corrupted Mexican authorities. This corruption,
which has taken many forms and has occurred at different levels, has often
complicated the response to the threat in a bilateral way. Reuter and Ronfeldt point
out that in this context, the United States has been led to more aggressive postures,
‘not so much by the extent of drug flows from Mexico as by the perception that the
Mexican control efforts are corrupt’. They add, ‘the Mexican drug problem, as it
affects bilateral relations with the United States, is essentially an issue of integrity’.142
Most accounts of U.S.-Mexican diplomacy regarding drug trafficking stress the
pressure on Mexico to ‘do something about drugs’. Interpreting Mexican drug control
policy as a direct response to U.S. diplomatic pressure, however, disregards Mexico’s
own interest in fighting an illegal activity whose growth and forms of operation
confront the Mexican state with a major challenge.143
The most serious drug corruption-related incident between the two countries
was the murder of Camarena. In the opinion of Craig, it was not the reality of the drug
programme’s corruptibility, but the extent to which it had corroded the campaign that
came as a surprise, particularly its penetration of upper echelons of the Mexican
FJP.144 During the second half of the 1980s, public accusations of corruption in
Mexican governmental institutions, in particular the army, police units, and some
branches of the judiciary, appeared frequently in the U.S. media and in congressional
hearings assessing Mexican drug control efforts. Nevertheless, what really surprised
the Mexican government and people was the public nature of Washington’s criticism,
which inflamed Mexican nationalism.145 It also touched on the question of
commitment, as Mexicans wondered how serious was the U.S. determination to solve
the problem vis-à-vis Mexican efforts, when Mexico’s relative sacrifices exceeded
142
143
144
145
Idem.
45
those of Washington, and this, at a time of economic and political instability.146

Following this line of argument in Mexico, the question about why Mexicans do not
often hear about major U.S. anti-drug achievements was posed during the interviews.
In the opinion of Cardenas,
Definitely happens [the dismantling of networks in the United States]. But I
think it all is a problem of perception because the fact that a drug trafficking
network has been dismantled in New York or Chicago or in Los Angeles does
not necessarily is going to be a headline news here in the United States,
because for one news to be a headline news in the United States, it has to
compete with many, many other news, so TV channels and media in general
have to determine that a news is valid for the half an hour on air of their
programme, so it is very difficult… unless there had been casualties during an
operation, or there had been a super-multimillion dollar seizure, it is difficult
for an operation to make it to the news. I’ll give you an specific example: the
seizures of the U.S. Coast Guard in the Pacific area right now, normally, these
seizures which involve really big amounts of metric tons of cocaine, normally
do not make it to the news programs…147
According to Umberg, the reason that explains the lack-of-commitment perception in
Mexico is the different structure of the trade in the United States:
Yes. That’s a custom question. The question is usually posed: ‘How come you
don’t arrest your kingpins in the United States? There is so much… there are
so many drugs being distributed that there must be kingpins…’… drug
trafficking in the United States is organised differently than in Mexico and
Colombia. It’s much more diffused; in other words, there’re maybe more
people involved in drug distribution and typically once we know their name,
they’re arrested… there are not too many people, drug dealers, who
dominate… unless you get to be pretty well-known, after we get enough
information to indict you, we usually catch you pretty quickly, before you get
to be charged of drugs for a large area. Now, we did, you know, years ago,
there were I think even larger drug traffickers that we did arrest them by…
and that was a big deal, now it is much more spread out. Do we still have drug
distribution? Obviously so. Do we… If we had some success? We had some
success, internationally, production in Peru and Bolivia of cocaine is down

146
147
Interview with Juan Pablo Cardenas, Policy Analyst, Mexico, Central America & Caribbean, The
White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),
Washington, DC, 29 May 2001.
46
dramatically, I think there have been successes between the United States and
Mexico in the last four years that… for example, poppy production in Mexico
is down, marihuana production in Mexico is down, there are… the cartels that
existed in Colombia don’t exist the way they used to exist. So all those things
are successes. Do we still have a long way to go? Yes, absolutely, we still
have a long way to go.148
In the context of the 1985 incident, the Mexican government considered the
accusations and scrutiny of its programmes a violation of its sovereignty. Reflecting
public outrage, the Mexican press made a case against ‘American police agents’
whose presence in Mexico represented a ‘violation of national sovereignty’, and
presented the activities and declarations of those agents as unacceptable meddling in
Mexico’s internal affairs.149
Mexicans have criticised the United States for trying to manipulate one issue
in order to exert pressure on Mexico in other issues, to raise concerns about Mexico’s
stability, and to damage Mexico’s political image for political reasons. These themes
were present in the Mexican criticism of U.S. policy during the multiple crises of the
1980s, when it was argued that the United States was deliberately exaggerating the
drug problem to the detriment of Mexican sovereignty and security, possibly to
compel Mexico to change its policies toward Central America.150 Responding to
whether U.S. pressure on the Camarena affairs was really motivated because of
Mexico’s policies toward Central America, Craig suggested that it did spring from an
accumulation of frustrations over Mexican stances on various issues. One such
problem, but only one, was the deterioration of Mexico’s eradication programme in
the face of continued U.S. warnings. Furthermore, from Washington’s perspective,
Mexican policy initiatives on everything from economics to tuna had become an
irritant. In the meantime, the feeling was that the United States had gone out of its
way to help Mexico through its economic crises. Camarena was the outlet. The
incident and its aftermath showed, however, how much the overall relationship had
deteriorated and how important the drug issue was to both countries.151
148
Interview with Thomas Umberg.
149
Toro, ‘War’on Drugs, p.63.
150
G. Gonzalez, ‘El Problema del Narcotrafico en el Contexto de la Relacion Mexico-Estados Unidos’,
Carta de Politica Exterior Mexicana, Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE), Abril-
Septiembre 1985, pp.20-28.
151
Ibid., p.86.
47
Operation Leyenda marked a turning point in terms of Mexico’s perception of

the threat posed by U.S. drug policy, in particular the extraterritorial application of the
law, as in the case of Antonio Alvarez-Machain, who was taken by force from Mexico
to stand trial in the United States. This incident renewed tensions in U.S.-Mexican
relations, to the point where Mexico, as already discussed, reduced its anti-drug co-
operation with the United States. Taking suspected foreign traffickers by force for
prosecution in the United States was considered as an unacceptable practice by both
affected governments and the international community. Government officials and
public opinion in many countries, including the United States, regarded the
‘internationalisation’ of police and judiciary powers an unacceptable breach of
international law. As a result of the abduction, Mexico protested the breach of its
territorial sovereignty, the violation of the 1978 U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, and
U.S. disregard for international law, mainly by its Supreme Court.152
Even tough ties between the United States and Mexico have been strengthened
after NAFTA, the problem of Mexican corruption and U.S. lack of trust is still
present. According to Cardenas, the issue about corruption in Mexico has not
disappeared in the context of the bilateral relationship, but at least it is not treated in
the way it was in the aftermath of the Camarena incident. He also states that although
trust is complete at the highest levels of government, in his opinion, for this trust to
filter down to the lower levels, it will be a matter of years.153 Trust can also vary
according to the issues. From Edward Logan’s point of view, the level of depth and
openness is totally dependent on the issue. For instance, in the area of drugs, and
because of Mexican corruption, co-operation is more difficult than in the areas of
weapons smuggling, child pornography, trade fraud and to a certain degree in the area
of money laundering, which are less sensitive areas than drugs. In his view, ‘at the
level of personal trust’ is where the best work is done between the United States and
Mexico. Nevertheless, it is also a disappointment because the moment people leave
office, this becomes a process of having to construct that personal trust all over again,
‘back to square one’.154 According to his experience as Deputy ‘Drug Czar’, Umberg
points out that there is trust between certain people and institutions, but accepts that
the DEA and the Customs Service do not trust either their counterparts or any other
152
Toro, ‘War’on Drugs, p.65.
153
Interview with Juan Pablo Cardenas.
154
48
institution in Mexico. Although he considers that trust is improving, ‘all it takes there
is one really bad incident and that trust goes away… you know, another Kiki
Camarena, another Gutierrez-Rebollo, something like that and it all is gone’.155
Lack of control over both foreign police and local traffickers in the 1980s,
explains in part why the Mexican government defined drug trafficking as a threat to
Mexico’s national security, and why it had to restructure its programmes against
drugs. In this context, Mexico has had two priorities regarding drugs. On the one
hand, to guarantee its autonomy from U.S. law enforcement programmes. On the
other hand, to control the activities of drug traffickers and to ensure that they cannot
operate as an independent power, challenging the control of entire regions and
spreading violence and corruption.156 Achieving these goals domestically and
internationally, also explain why drug trafficking led the Mexican criminal justice
system to concentrate the bulk of its resources and attention on enforcing anti-drug
laws. A point can be made that the two factors are related to U.S. national security.
First, lack of state control over drug trafficking might lead to a further weakening of
the state and to instability. Second, further pressure on Mexico’s anti-drug
programmes could lead to an erosion of co-operation with the United States,
complicating thus the response to the problem.
4. Conclusions.
Historically, the United States has defined drug use as a law enforcement, rather than
as a public health, problem, and this has resulted in a biased an unbalanced approach
toward the issue. This perspective has not only favoured tougher domestic law
enforcement which has imposed a significant burden on its judicial system, but it also
has created destabilising effects for those producer and transit countries where the
U.S. supply-side approach has been imposed. The lack of effectiveness of both the
domestic and international aspect of U.S. drug control is evident in the fact that after
two decades of considerable spending in eradication and interdiction campaigns
abroad, drug prices and purity have increased, and the domestic demand has not
receded. Both, demand and production have shown a remarkable resilience not only in
terms of the mobility of production as a result of stepped up control efforts, but also
on the demand side by the adaptability to new drugs.
155
Interview with Thomas Umberg.
156
Ruiz-Cabañas, United States, p.68.
49
Because of its proximity and dual role as producer of marihuana and heroin,
and later as a transhipment point for cocaine bound to the U.S. market, Mexico
guaranteed its place at the centre of U.S. anti-drug policy. On the one hand, under
U.S. pressure, Mexico adopted a prohibitionist approach in its drug policy, whose
clearest expression was the militarisation of its eradication efforts early on. The
response to the problem, however, has not been without consequences for the country
to the extent that increased enforcement has led to the strengthening of drug
organisations and to greater corruption within its security organisations. The
combination of persistence of demand in the United States and failed Mexican drug
control efforts, has serious security implications for both countries. In the United
States, drug use erodes not only the health and well being of U.S. citizens, but it also
affects its economic strength, its system of administration of justice, and degrades its
social values. In Mexico, drugs have started to become a public health problem in
localised areas of the country, mainly those close to the U.S. border. Drug trafficking
has also generated violence and the concentration of law enforcement resources in
anti-drug activities, in a society whose main demand in the last two decades has been
for more public security. One of the most serious threats to Mexico, however, has
been the involvement of the Mexican military in anti-drug missions. The military has
not only become increasingly politicised by taking more and more law enforcement
roles, which is a concern in a country in the middle of a democratic transition, but it
has also been systematically exposed to corruption, risking therefore to gradually lose
its prestige, its cohesion, and its historic role as one of the guarantors of the country’s
stability. The United States should understand that drug trafficking is not so much a
‘Mexican threat’ but a ‘threat to Mexico’, and act accordingly by designing a more
balanced strategy to deal with the challenge posed by drugs. That is in the interest
both of the United States and Mexico, especially in the context of a closer economic
relationship.

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Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies

October 28-30, 2003, Santiago, Chile

Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations

Name: Agustin Maciel-Padilla

Institution: Department of War Studies

Title: Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations

DRUG TRAFFICKING IN U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS.

2.1. Background: Anti-smuggling Measures.

2.2. Post-war Years: Eradication Campaigns.

increasing each year. Since a large portion of this opium is unquestionably

objectives in Mexico. Mexican authorities, nevertheless, were able to limit U.S.

2.3. 1980s and Beyond: Escalation of Militarisation.

connected to Colombia’s Medellin cartel), while the business of other smugglers

Source: Storrs, ‘Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Effort under Zedillo’, p.4.

The militarisation of drug control in Mexico has also led to a greater

Section 506 (a)(2) $37 53 UH-1H helicopters

Section 1004 $26 About 70% is planned to be used

Section 1031 $8 UH-1H spare parts

personnel had already been trained.117 It is important to mention that eventually, in an

if approved would disapprove the president’s certification and require withdrawal of

Andreas, ‘U.S.-Mexico Drug Control’, p.2.

Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Updated November 6, 2001, [online] available:

Besides several changes aimed at eliminating corruption in law enforcement

development, continuing training and technical co-operation programmes, making use

those of Washington, and this, at a time of economic and political instability.146

Craig, ‘U.S. Narcotics’, p.82.

Operation Leyenda marked a turning point in terms of Mexico’s perception of

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