111

The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico

David Pedigo
Beloit College


Over the past decade, Mexico and Central America have become cen-
tral battlefields in the global war on drugs, which is creating an
increasingly unavoidable problem for the United States. The problem
goes beyond the obvious health issues that the drug trade presents in-
ternationally; in addition to this, the violence and lawlessness resulting
from the drug war threatens to turn Mexico into a failed state. This
paper seeks to analyze the exact process by which Mexico has begun its
descent into failed statehood and create policy suggestions to prevent
this outcome. This paper first analyzes some of the literature that cur-
rently exists on Mexicos drug war, as well as the international war on
drugs in general. In doing so, it draws on some of the prior observa-
tions that have been made in order to construct a theory that explains
the causes of state failure in Mexico. Through the identification of
these causes, the paper renders policy suggestions that may serve to
reverse the process. This paper ultimately concludes that the key threat
of state failure in Mexico is caused by the power of drug cartels, which
have undermined the states monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Any policy that does not address the cartels ability to undermine the
states security apparatus will fail to effectively stop Mexicos descent
into state failure.

Introduction

Few topics are more relevant to the national security of the United
States today than the crisis in Mexico, which threatens to create a failed state
on the southern border. In 2009, noted international relations scholar John
Mearsheimer listed the ongoing drug war in Mexico as the number one issue
that had been overlooked by President Obama, saying that, There is the very
real possibility that Mexico will implode on Obama's watch and become a
failed state, which would surely cause serious problems north of the Rio
Grande.
1
This claim has been echoed by Steven David, another eminent
scholar in the field of international relations, who states in his book, Cata-
strophic Consequences, that, there is no question that if violent instability
engulfs Mexico, American vital interests would be threatened.
2

112

While no single definition of a failed state currently exists, one of
the most widely accepted indicators of state failure is what Max Weber re-
ferred to as the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a
states territory. In other words, failed states emerge when the ultimate author-
ity to provide security and enforce the rule of law comes from a power other
than the state.
3
By this qualification, Mexico certainly is not a failed state to-
day, but it does exhibit many characteristics of a captured state, wherein the
state itself is manipulated by other actors -- in this case drug cartels. There are
also some regions throughout Mexicos territory where drug cartels have more
influence over the rule of law than the state, and can therefore be considered
failed provinces or failed cities. In these regions, cartels freely murder
mayors, police officers, and journalists that challenge their authority, some-
times within feet of police posts. Not only is the Mexican state unable to pro-
vide security for its population, but cartels have increasingly influenced gov-
ernment policy through intimidating, killing, or buying off state actors. As both
Mearsheimer and David suggest, state failure in Mexico would have devastat-
ing effects for the United States. Some of the violence and lawlessness of the
drug war in Mexico have already begun to leak across the border. In 2005, the
governors of Arizona and New Mexico declared their border regions with
Mexico to be a disaster area on the grounds that they were devastated by
human smuggling, drug smuggling, kidnapping, murder, and destruction of
property.
4
There have also been recent concerns over southern Arizona be-
coming a no-go zone controlled by drug traffickers.
5
These instances lend
credibility to the presupposition that failed cities like the ones in Mexico
may begin to emerge in the United States as well if Mexicos recent trends are
not reversed.
In this paper, I will examine the prospects for Mexico to avoid be-
coming a failed state. The first section will provide a background of the cur-
rent drug war, giving a historical analysis of how the situation has developed to
what it is today. This section will examine the goals of past policies and how
they succeeded or failed to meet such goals. In the next section I will provide
a review of debates and theories currently surrounding this topic and examine
the opinions, criticisms, and suggestions of experts in the field. I will then
begin the next section by briefly explaining how I mean to test my own theory
on the conflict in Mexico. This theory posits that cartel power relative to the
state apparatus is the central variable causing Mexicos descent toward failed
state status, and a policy to prevent state failure must effectively reduce this
power. The next section will offer evidence to support this theory and explain
the causal links between these variables. In doing so, it will offer policy sug-
gestions on how to reduce the power of cartels and restore the Mexican states
monopoly on the use of force. I will then end with a brief conclusion.

Background

The drug war in Mexico is not an isolated incident; rather, it is simply
113

the next phase of an international conflict several decades in the making. The
United States has dominated drug policy in Latin America, and though it has
come a long way since its origins in the late 1980s, so has the drug trade itself.
This section will trace the history of the drug war through Latin America: first
by analyzing drug policy in Colombia, then by examining recent policies in
Mexico.

Colombia

While the United States has been concerned with drug production in
Latin America since the Nixon Administration, it was not until the late 80s
that the war on drugs began to truly escalate. On April 8, 1986, President
Reagan issued National Security Directive No. 221, which stated that drug
trafficking directly threatened U.S. National Security.
6
The Reagan admin-
istration, as well as the administration of George H.W. Bush that followed,
placed an emphasis on eliminating the supply of drugs from the foreign coun-
tries they were produced in before they made their way to the United
States. Such supply-side policies characterized the Andean Initiative that Pres-
ident Bush launched in 1989, which provided assistance to Andean countries
that were embattled with drug traffickers. Colombia was a central focus of this
aid, receiving over $600 million in aid over five years.
7

By all accounts, the Andean Initiative failed to accomplish its goal of
reducing the supply of drugs in the United States. Just like the supply-side
efforts of the Reagan administration, the Andean Initiative was able to eradi-
cate a large amount of drug crops, but was unable to permanently stem produc-
tion. Crop eradication, which has made up the vast majority of U.S. counter-
narcotic aid to Colombia, also had several adverse effects.
8
Instead of reduc-
ing the supply of drugs, the eradication of crops simply destroyed the liveli-
hoods of the small-scale farmers that cultivated them, fermenting in them a
sense of contempt and distrust of both Americans and their own government.
As noted regional security expert Russell Crandall writes, the tremendous
pressure these countries felt to conform to Washingtons wishes and the result-
ing destruction of peoples livelihoods due to crop eradication were only en-
dangering these nations already fragile democracies.
9

The main lesson learned from these measures was that the supply of
drugs on the international level could not be stopped. The global market for
drugs, it seemed, functioned in the same way as any other global commodity
market: when one source becomes compromised, another one emerges. This
phenomenon, known as the balloon effect, explains why supply-side tactics
have shifted the drug market geographically instead of diminishing it.
10

During this period, U.S. aid to Colombia began to focus more and
more on military and police force in an effort to combat the rising influence of
Colombian drug cartels. It was at this point that the Colombian police and
military, in conjunction with U.S. advisors, began their kingpin strategy in
fighting the cartels. This strategy was centered on arresting or killing the lead-
114

ers of the Cali and Medelln cartels that controlled Colombias drug trade.
11

The drugs themselves were no longer the focal point of policy; rather, it was
the criminal organizations that promoted instability and threatened the Colom-
bian state.
This period also saw a rising concern over the issue of police reform.
Drug trafficking organizations had penetrated the government on many levels,
especially in law enforcement. Efforts to improve law enforcement began in
the 1990s, but dramatic results were not seen until after the implementation of
Plan Colombia, a U.S.-financed antinarcotics package, in 2000. Part of this
package was a disengagement decree passed by the Colombian government,
which gave authorities the power to dismiss any police officer or soldier for
alleged corruption without the need of legal proceedings. This resulted in hun-
dreds of discharges from both the police and military due to suspected criminal
links. While this rather draconian decree was ruled unconstitutional in 2008, it
significantly reduced corruption by providing real accountability to the police
and armed forces. The decree was also supplemented by substantial salary
increases, which made law enforcement careers appealing. The more account-
able and legitimate police force caused a sharp decrease in crime and violence.
The annual reported number of kidnappings shrunk from 3,000 in 2000 to 600
in 2008 and the number of extortion cases dropped from 2,000 in 2004 to 830
in 2007.
12
The murder rate in Colombia, while still very high, has dropped
from 67 homicides per 100,000 people in 2002 to 33 in 2009.
13

The narco-violence in Colombia has dissipated significantly, but a
broader view calls in to question the effectiveness of U.S. drug policy. The
destruction of the supply lines and power structure of Colombian cartels direct-
ly contributed to the rise of Mexican cartels. As former DEA Administrator
and Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Robert Bonner
notes, the increasing reliance of the drug trade on flows through Central Amer-
ica and Mexico, led the Mexican trafficking organizations to create their own
distribution networks in the United States and within Mexico, eventually
eclipsing the Colombians influence.
14
In this sense, it seems as though the
ballooning action of drug flows is accompanied by a similar movement of
cartel power. Now, even after the destruction of Colombian cartels, the drug
trade is just as profitable and violent as ever. As Colombian activist lvaro
Jimnez Milln once said, what Plan Colombia did was transfer the violence
to Mexico and move the cocaine to Africa [and] Europe. Is that success?
15


Mexico Confronts the Cartels

While Mexico has been a relatively stable democracy for decades, its
political scene was completely dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) until the election of Vicente Fox in 2000. Before then, the PRI-led
government, having been in power for 70 years, had established strong ties
with many drug cartels, allowing them unhindered territorial control as long as
they kept violence to a tolerable level. As Steven David notes, with one party
115

in charge of political power, jobs, and funding, it provided one stop shop-
ping for the drug lords to increase their influence and ensure noninterfer-
ence.
16

Over his six year term, Vicente Fox made confronting cartel influence
within the government, and law enforcement in particular, his top priority, but
in a political environment with such widespread corruption he found that the
only way to do so was to centralize the police under his own jurisdiction. He
created two supposedly incorruptible federal police agencies; the Federal
Agency of Investigation (AFI) and the Subattorney Generals Office for Spe-
cial Investigation of Organized Deliquency (SEIDO).
17
Unfortunately, both of
these agencies became deeply infiltrated by drug cartels; 457 AFI officers were
indicted on corruption charges by 2005, and in 2008 the head of SIEDO was
imprisoned for working with cartels.
18

Municipal police forces, in some cases, were even worse. Fox re-
placed the entire police force of Nuevo Laredo with the Mexican military in
2005, and the military was later sent to the Michoacn and Chihuaha provinces
to restore order once the local police forces had proven to be too corrupt.
19

In 2006, Foxs predecessor, Felipe Caldern, openly declared war on
the drug cartels, officially beginning the war on drugs as it currently exists in
Mexico. Caldern continues to rely on the Mexican military to conduct his
intensified counternarcotic operations. Although military presence persists, the
Caldern administration has recognized the need for the police to be at the
helm of law enforcement operations and has seen considerably more success in
the area of police reform than the Fox administration. Calderns secretary of
public security, Gnaro Garca Luna, has implemented rigorous new screening
practices for police hires and current members on the force. He has already
carried out many arrests of federal, state, and municipal officers, having
purged 284 federal police in June of 2007 alone. Mexican police are now re-
quired to bare their credit card and bank accounts, submit to polygraph tests,
and reveal their family members -- all to screen for possible cartel connections.
Although reforms that increase oversight have historically been met with pro-
test (beat police in Mexico City walked out on their jobs in response to reforms
in 1997),
20
these oversight mechanisms have actually been accompanied by an
increase in recruitment, with a 30% increase seen in the federal police force in
2009 alone.
21
In order to stop the corruption associated with existing police
agencies, Caldern has also suggested replacing Mexicos two federal police
forces with a single, highly professional organization modeled after European
law enforcement agencies, and Luna is now pushing for the elimination of
Mexicos municipal police agencies in an effort to incorporate them into the
state police.
22


Help from the U.S.

Due to the historically widespread corruption in Mexican law en-
forcement, the United States has been hesitant to cooperate with its southern
116

neighbor. Information sharing has been discouraged, as many U.S. law en-
forcement agencies fear this intelligence would simply be forwarded to cartels.
Even supposedly trustworthy allies in Mexico have been corrupted, such as
former drug czar General Jess Gutirrez Rebollo, who was arrested in 1997
for collaborating with the Jurez cartel months after the U.S. drug czar praised
him as a guy of absolute, unquestioned integrity.
23
In the same year, the
DEA publicly commented that, there is not one single law enforcement insti-
tution in Mexico with which the DEA has an entirely trusting relationship.
24

However, recent years have seen a shift away from this frictional rela-
tionship. In 2005, the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
(SPP) was signed between Presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox and
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin.
25
This partnership established working
groups to address external threats to North America, create streamlined and
secured shared borders, and strengthen prevention and response techniques
within North America.
26
Then, in 2008, President Bush and Felipe Caldern
signed a three year, $1.4 billion security agreement called the Mrida Initia-
tive, which provided funding and equipment for Mexican counternarcotic oper-
ations. This initiative greatly increased the level of cooperation and infor-
mation sharing between the two states and established the goals of breaking the
power and impunity of criminal organizations, strengthening regional security
systems, reforming the justice system, and diminishing the demand for drugs
in Mexico and Central America.
27

There is much debate as to whether or not the SPP and the Mrida
Initiative were effective in their goals or even if their goals were appropriate.
As the next section will explore in more detail, there is much controversy as to
whether these programs were truly concerned with increasing cooperation and
preventing state failure in Mexico or if they were simply mechanisms through
which the United States could expand the jurisdiction of its own security poli-
cies.

Literature Review

The drug war in Mexico is an extremely complicated problem and
almost all policies or suggestions have been rife with controversy. This sec-
tion seeks to examine the current debate over what effective policies in Mexi-
cos drug war look like. This debate is essentially split between those who
believe that drug policy and regional security has evolved to address the im-
portant causes of the conflict in Mexico and those who believe that a major
shift in policy is still required. Among those who advocate a shift, further divi-
sions exist as to what exactly this shift should entail.

Bilateralism (or Lack Thereof)

The aforementioned Robert Bonner takes the stance that policy in the
117

Mexican drug war should be formed around the example of the policies em-
ployed in Colombia. A staunch supporter of the U.S.-backed policy in Colom-
bia, Bonner points to the kingpin strategy as an example of a good crime-
fighting policy. Bonner states that, success in Colombia hinged on identify-
ing, locating, and capturing the kingpins and key lieutenants of the organiza-
tions that made up the Cali and Medelln cartels. He refutes the argument that
such policies only create a power vacuum, arguing instead that, not anyone
can effectively run a large, multinational drug trafficking organization.
28
His
points seem to be well-founded, as both the Medelln and Cali cartels that
dominated the drug trade in Colombia were both effectively routed by 1996,
after the death of their leaders.
However, Bonner does qualify the effectiveness of purely offensive
tactics such as the kingpin strategy. He asserts that it must be the police, not
the armed forces, which ultimately win the battle against cartels. He notes that
the military is ill-suited to the task of crime fighting, which requires,
investigations to support prosecutions, the recruitment of informants, and the
use of electronic surveillance to gather evidence.
29
Bonners only critique of
U.S. anti-narcotics policies in Colombia and Mexico is that funding packages
sent the wrong messages to these governments in the early stages of conflict by
focusing on military aid. In the Mrida Initiative, just as in the Andean Initia-
tive, the majority of early aid went to military spending.
30

More adamant supporters of U.S. counter-narcotics policies, such as
Steven Hendrix, defend this military funding due to the unfortunate reality that
civilian law enforcement and police are simply not ready to confront the well-
armed and well-organized drug cartels in Mexico. Hendrix frames funding the
military as an action that will buy the Mexican government the time it needs to
properly reform the police.
31
Though Bonner is critical of militarization, he is
in the same line of thinking as Hendrix, characterizing the Mrida Initiatives
military emphasis as a necessary stopgap measure.
32

Hendrix also underscores the more progressive features of the Mrida
initiative. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Initiative is its emphasis on
information sharing between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement institutions.
This marks a significant departure from the bilateral policies of the past, which
were characterized by a lack of trust and repeated jurisdiction infringements.
33

The initiative also emphasizes the modernization of Mexicos judicial system,
with much of the funding going towards training police forces on human rights
and supplying lie detector tests for vetting police recruits. In order to ensure a
corruption-free process, personnel in charge of this vetting will in turn be vet-
ted by U.S. law enforcement.
34

Unfortunately, as Bonner observes, it will be several years before the
Mexican Federal Police are strong enough to take over this war from the army.
And even then, the military will likely have to assist the police in confronting
heavily armed paramilitary units of the cartels.
35
For most critics of security
policy in Mexico this is not acceptable, nor is the relative amount of funding
allocated to the military. While the Mrida Initiative does provide funding for
118

institutional reform and set up mechanisms for transnational cooperation, it is
not enough. Forty percent of Mridas funding was allocated for military pur-
poses,
36
as opposed to less than one quarter to judicial reform and institution
building.
37

These critics, who include the majority of experts on this topic, view
the war on drugs thus far to be a failure. According to this school of thought,
Mrida, like the SPP, is simply another manifestation of the dominance of U.S.
priorities in the regional security polity.
In her critique of security integration in North America, Monica Ser-
rano explains how U.S. security theories have dominated security policies in
North America through initiatives such as Mrida and the SPP. One of these
theories, which she refers to as security maximization, is based on the belief
that there is essentially no limit to resources that should be allocated to the
heightening of security.
38
Security-maximizing logic ignores the trade-offs
and unintended consequences that come from increased security measures and,
therefore, is potentially counterproductive. For example, the increased military
spending in Mexico, while intended to combat criminality, also funded an in-
stitution with a long history of corruption and human rights abuses. As the
military becomes more corrupt, the possibility that this funding is going direct-
ly to cartels also emerges.
In their study on law enforcement in Latin America, sociologists Lu-
cia Dammert and Mary Malone examine another U.S. security theory: zero
tolerance law enforcement. As opposed to community based law enforce-
ment, which focuses on preventative action and community participation, the
zero tolerance approach is much more aggressive, with an emphasis on de-
terring crime through serious punishments and high arrest rates. Community
based strategies have the long term goals of decreasing victimization and in-
creasing the trustworthiness of police forces, while zero tolerance strategies
seem to assume that the confiscation of illegal materials and the arrests of
criminals are enough to subdue crime.
39
In Latin America, the zero toler-
ance approach also often deteriorates into a repressive and overly aggressive
style. As Dammert and Malone explain, this is because most Latin American
countries such as Mexico lack the same police reforms, infrastructure, and
funding that have made zero tolerance policies marginally effective in the
United States.
40

Manuel Prez Rocha joins Monica Serrano in her criticism of regional
security policies. The SPP, Rocha asserts, is simply a wider framework by
which the United States has guaranteed its two neighbors to the north and
south subordinate and adopt measures to guarantee its security priorities and
extend its security perimeter.
41
In this framework, the security priorities of
the United States are not entirely in line with those of Mexico, and this dispari-
ty leads to the adoption of policies that are counterproductive for the security
of the Mexican state and its people. The Mrida Initiatives emphasis on mili-
tary funding and hardware, according to Rocha, was born not out of the belief
that the military was the best institution for the job at the time, but rather out of
119

the understanding that military presence in border towns like Ciudad Jurez
and Nuevo Laredo were necessary for the security of the southern U.S. border.

Mexican Domestic Policy

Rocha, like almost all critics of the drug war, spurns the use of the
military as inefficient, even counterproductive, by saying, more military in-
volvement in the drug war has increased corruption within the institution, gen-
erated human rights violations, and failed to make a dent in the narcotics
trade.
42
Indeed, between 2000 and 2008 there were 2,966 registered com-
plaints against the military to the Mexican National Human Rights Commis-
sion (CNDH) and 6,874 recorded violations to civil guarantees.
43
One hundred
thousand soldiers also deserted the army between 2000 and 2006, providing
experienced new recruits for the cartels.
44

Former Costa Rican Vice President Kevin Casas-Zamora suggests that
the sole focus of drug and security policy in Mexico should be on reforming
the police and judicial institutions so as to confront cartel power within the
government. Mexicos problem is not territorial control, but the penetration
of public institutions by organized crime, he explains.
45
Casas-Zamora
insists the only important figure in Mexicos drug war is that 98.5 percent of
crimes go unpunished.
46
A successful policy, he asserts, will be one that im-
proves the conviction rate. Using the military to deter short term violence will
not improve this as long as the police force is too inefficient or corrupt to con-
duct proper investigations. In short, Casas-Zamora completely rejects the use-
fulness of the military at all and sees little use for the kingpin strategy.
Security policy expert George Grayson has a more nuanced view of
the subject. While he notes that continued reliance on the military to pursue
the drug lords is a recipe to broaden corruption within the armed forces, he
also acknowledges that, the creation of a professional, honest, national police
force is a pipedream.
47
In the absence of any truly desirable crime fighting
force, Grayson simply stresses the importance of developing intelligence net-
works, regardless of the institution responsible for doing so. Grayson has ap-
plauded the increased cooperation and information sharing between U.S. and
Mexican intelligence units since the Mrida Initiative. This cooperation was
instrumental in December 2009, when DEA intelligence helped Mexican forc-
es locate and kill Arturo Beltrn Leyva, head of the Beltrn Leyva cartel, as
well as capture Teodoro Garca Simental, head of a minor operation south of
Tijuana.
48

While he acknowledges its clear limits, Grayson believes Calderons
war on drugs to be a tolerable, even necessary policy. The kingpin strategy is
certainly not the key to victory, but the successful execution of complex law
enforcement operations, such as the killing of Beltrn Leyva, are symptomatic
of a well-functioning law enforcement institution. According to Graysons
analysis, it may be too early in the game to abandon the crackdown on cartels.
120

Former Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castaeda, one of the harshest
and most vocal critics of Mexicos drug war, argues that the increase in vio-
lence and cartel power in recent years is the result of, not the cause for, Calde-
rons war on Mexican drug cartels. This point is not without merit; there were
over 5,800 drug-related killings in Mexico in 2009 compared to 2,100 in 2006
when Calderons crackdown began.
49
Spikes of violence also coincide with
military action against cartels; for example, the months following the death of
Arturo Beltrn Leyva were the deadliest months in Mexicos anti-cartel opera-
tions, and saw the execution of the family of a Mexican Marine who aided in
Leyvas death.
50

Instead of confronting the cartels, Castaeda calls for a tacit deal
with some drug cartels, which would permit them to continue to operate their
illegal businesses in exchange for curbing violent acts.
51
This seems to entail a
return to the previous system under the PRI, when the state acted as an arbiter
for drug cartels. Robert Bonner is openly critical of this suggestion, as is Ste-
ven David, who observes that, no society can maintain itself indefinitely while
tolerating pervasive criminal activity in its midst.
52
David insists that toler-
ance of illegal activity creates a sense of social helplessness that undermines
the rule of law as well as the government that supposedly enforces it.
Although Castaeda insists that the increased violence signifies a fail-
ure of bilateral policy, the goals of these policies have not actually been to de-
crease violence. Neither the SPP nor the Mrida Initiative had stated goals of
decreasing violence. Mrida supporters such as Steven Hendrix even acknowl-
edged that the Mrida Initiative may actually increase levels of violence in
Mexico as organized crime fights back.
53
Hendrix suggests that the U.S. con-
cern in the region is more concerned with preventing the development of narco
-states and kleptocratic regimes than it is with preventing violence in the short
term. Success, therefore, is measured more through corruption levels than
through murder rates.

U.S. Domestic Policy

It is widely recognized that the profitability of the drug trade is fueled
by the massive demand from the United States. Every year, the United States
illegally imports more than 200 tons of cocaine, 1500 tons of marijuana, 15
tons of heroin, and 20 tons of methamphetamines.
54
More than 90 percent of
the cocaine and most of the marijuana and methamphetamines come through
Mexico.
55
These drugs feed a $200 billion a year industry that caters to 13
million Americans every month.
56
The success of efforts to decrease this de-
mand has been minimal; between 2002 and 2008, the number of illicit drug
users in the US decreased by less than half of one percent.
57

Jorge Castaeda and George Grayson both agree that the only effec-
tive way to address this huge rate of consumption may be to legalize drugs on
both sides of the border. To be sure, this would not actually decrease the de-
mand for drugs; rather, it would transform the dynamics of the drug market so
121

that drug dealers do not reap such immense profits from it. Legalization is an
example of what prominent drug expert Ethan Nadelmann refers to as a harm
reduction policy, rather than a demand reduction policy. Reducing demand,
as Nadelmann observes, is next to impossible; Theres virtually never been a
drug-free society, and more drugs are discovered and devised every year.
58
A
harm reduction policy, by contrast, would focus on curbing the negative social
effects of drugs, rather than the supply or demand of drugs themselves. There
is no doubt that drugs have negative effects on ones health, but at least in
Mexico the costs of prohibition far outweigh the health costs of drugs.

Research Design

Drug and security policies in Mexico have thus far failed to eliminate
the threat of state failure or state capture. State institutions continue to be pen-
etrated by criminal elements and in some regions the cartels have more authori-
ty over the legitimate application of force and rule of law than the state does.
This is because many past policies have either ignored or failed to significantly
impact the underlying problem of cartel power. The U.S.-dominated security
paradigm for the region has historically focused on blocking the flows of drugs
and violence into the United States, yet as Monica Serrano notes, while all of
these problems meet at the border, none of them have their roots there.
59
To
wait until the problems associated with the drug trade reach the border is to
ignore the true threat: the possibility of state failure or state capture in Mexico.
In the next section, I will provide my own analysis of the conflict in
Mexico and examine why exactly Mexico is descending toward failed state
status. In diagnosing the cause of state failure in Mexico, I also hope to build
policy suggestions that may effectively cure it. In the following pages, I will
argue that the central catalyst of state failure in Mexico is the loss of the states
monopoly on the application of force within its territory.
However, to say that Mexico is descending toward failed state status
because the state has lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of force would be
to ignore the full spectrum of causality. Max Weber has already made this
analysis, albeit not through a specific case study, and so to point out this con-
nection would be a touch repetitive. Therefore, I will further argue that the loss
of the Mexican states monopoly on the application of force is caused by the
power of drug cartels relative to the state, which in turn is maintained through
the ability of the cartels to outbid the state in both quasi-military and economic
terms.
The full spectrum of causality, then, is as follows: cartels are able to
influence virtually any state or non-state actor (since this is a relatively micro
case study, individuals will be considered actors) through either intimidation or
bribery, giving them the ability to operate with impunity and even eclipse the
state in some areas of Mexico. This, in turn, undermines the states monopoly
on the legitimate use of physical force, which puts Mexico in danger of becom-
ing a failed state. Therefore, I argue that in order to avoid state failure, the
122

Mexican government must assert its monopoly on the legitimate use of force
by curbing the power of cartels. This will be no easy task, so as I provide an
analysis of the methods through which cartels obtain and maintain their power,
I will also outline specific policy suggestions for how these methods can be
stopped.

Avoiding State Failure

In this section, I will make my case for a policy that effectively reduc-
es cartel power in Mexico. I will begin by reviewing evidence for why Mexico
is in danger of becoming a failed state and explaining why cartel power is the
central determinant of this danger. Then, I will provide suggestions for poli-
cies that would successfully reduce cartel power to a level where they are una-
ble to threaten the states monopoly on the use of force, which would therefore
prevent Mexico from becoming a failed state.

Cartel Power and State Failure

There is some disagreement as to whether or not Mexico is truly in
danger of becoming a failed state. Jorge Castaeda, for example, insists that
Mexico faces no such danger, as the state is no more infiltrated by crime today
than it has been over the last thirty years.
60
Others simply point to the fact that
although Mexico seems dangerous, the national homicide rate is less than half
that of Brazil and less than one quarter that of Venezuela.
61

Both of these claims miss the bigger picture. Corruption of state ac-
tors is only one of several methods through which cartels gain power, and
while higher homicide rates are characteristic of failed states, they are not per-
fect indicators of state failure. The most accurate way to measure Mexicos
descent toward state failure is to examine the states monopoly on the use of
force, and when the state can only punish 1.5 percent of crimes and cannot
protect itself from cartel reprisals, it is clear that this monopoly has been lost.
However, this does not mean that Mexico is currently a failed state.
The state still retains its monopoly on the use of force in most of the country.
But there are various areas, mostly near the border, where it does not. Ciudad
Juarez, which annually experiences 173 murders per 100,000 people,
62
is per-
haps the most drastic example of this (by comparison, there are 27 murders for
every 100,000 people in Sudan).
63
In one of the most telling examples of the
Mexican states loss of monopoly on the use of force, Jurez Police Chief Rob-
erto Orduo Cruz was forced to resign in 2009 after the Jurez cartel followed
through on its threat to kill a police officer every 48 hours until he resigned.
64

Instances like this are not limited to Jurez; the police chief in the
nearby town of Praxedis, G. Guerrero, recently abandoned her post and sought
asylum in the United States.
65
Throughout the country, a total of 17 mayors
have been killed in the last year alone.
66
Areas such as these, where cartels, not
123

the state, have the final say in matters of public security can be considered
failed cities.
So, if Mexico itself is not a failed state, but rather a state with several
failed cities, then the ultimate measure of failure is when cartels are able to
exercise the same level of influence as they have in failed cities like Juarez on
the national level. Mexico certainly has not reached this level yet. Although
cartels have been able to corrupt and assassinate leaders on the national level,
this phenomenon is not nearly as widespread as it is on the local level, and high
ranking federal authorities have never fled to the United States for asylum or
resigned for fear of cartel retribution in recent history.
From these examples, it is not difficult to see why cartel power is the
principal catalyst of Mexicos descent toward state failure. These are not in-
stances of the state shooting itself in the foot, nor are they symptoms of popular
unrest or economic hardship. Every instance of the deteriorating rule of law,
from the corruption and deaths of state actors to the high rates of homicide in
certain areas, are direct results of cartels grabbing for power. If the state is to
restore the rule of law and regain its monopoly on the use of force throughout
its territory, then it must arrive at a point where cartels are no longer able to
directly influence regional or national policymakers. It is inevitable that some
police will continue to die and be corrupted, but mayors and police chiefs
should not have to bow to the wishes of cartel bosses, even in small towns.

Components of Cartel Power

As previously stated, the central variable of Mexicos descent toward
state failure is the power of drug cartels relative to the Mexican state, but mak-
ing this connection is not enough to base a successful policy on. It is also nec-
essary to understand the process through which drug cartels are able to achieve
this power. This section will analyze how exactly cartels achieve their power
in order to better understand how cartel power undermines the states monopo-
ly on the legitimate application of force. It will also explain how this process
can be stopped.
One useful way to examine cartel power is by looking at an ultimatum
that is often presented by cartels: plata o plomo? (silver or lead?). This ques-
tion reveals the two techniques that cartels employ to assert their power: brib-
ery and intimidation. Cartels in Mexico have grown to be incredibly effective
at both, and whenever one method fails the other one will almost certainly pre-
vail. The ability of cartels to pursue both strategies so efficiently is essentially
where they derive the power that undermines the states monopoly on the use
of force.

Plata: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Cartel Organization

Plata oriented tactics make up the soft power of cartels. This kind
124

of power gives cartels their influence within the state apparatus, encourages
corruption, and pushes Mexico toward becoming a captured state more than a
failed one. In order to understand how drug cartels in Mexico use these meth-
ods to assert their power, an analysis of the risks and benefits of the drug trade
is necessary.
The two central actors in the drug war are the drug cartels and the
Mexican state. To be sure, these are not the only actors, but for the purposes of
this section they are the most relevant ones. Because both actors are inherently
opposed to each other, they are constantly undermining the others power
while trying to bolster their own. Since this power is derived from the people
that work for each actor, this power struggle is won by attracting more and
better human capital. Working for either side in this conflict poses certain ben-
efits and risks, and so the side that can offer the best benefit-to-risk ratio would
ostensibly attract more human capital and thus gain a power advantage. There-
fore, a coherent policy in this area would concentrate on four areas: increasing
the benefits and decreasing the risk of state cooperation, and decreasing the
benefits and increasing the risk of cartel cooperation.
One of the states key problems is that so many of its own army and
police officers are won over by cartels, and it is easy to see why. The average
salary for a police officer in Mexico is about US$350 a month, while the for-
mer chief security official in Nuevo Leon, Carlos Juregui, estimated that car-
tels can pay off policemen at rates closer to US$800 a month.
67
Federal police
officers, who generally handle drug trafficking investigations, make more than
that (between US$14,000 and US$24,000 a year), but cartels have also been
known to pay more.
68
In fact, cartels have even paid high enough of a price to
buy U.S. Customs agents, who generally start out at about $70,000 a year. One
such a case occurred in 2009, when it was discovered that a customs inspector
named Luis F. Alarid made around $200,000 in just a few months by helping
cartels smuggle drug shipments across the border. In Alarids case, working
with the cartels was so profitable that the seven year prison sentence he knew
that he would receive did nothing to deter him. This case is by no means an
isolated incident, as arrests of Custom and Border Protection agents have in-
creased by 40 percent in the last few years.
69

The obvious solution to this problem is simply to increase the wages
of police officers so that it becomes more beneficial to be an honest police of-
ficer than to risk a law enforcement career on working with drug cartels. Some
progress has been made in this area already; Gnaro Garca Lunas reforms
have included salary increases much like the successful police reforms that
were seen in Colombia in the last decade.
70
However, it also appears that the
Mexican state may never be able to resolve this disparity in benefits merely by
increasing the benefits it offers. With the immense profitability of the drug
trade, cartels seem to be able to buy allies at any level of government, and have
even been able to plant spies within the presidents office.
71
What is more, the
drug cartels are very conscious of the importance of maintaining this edge. For
example, after the Mexican army raised the monthly salary for soldiers to about
125

US$1100 per month in 2007, the cartels promptly doubled that amount as the
standard pay for its own men.
72

Nonetheless, there are other ways for the state to achieve a favorable
benefit-to-risk ratio relative to the cartels. One way would be to reduce the
benefits that cartels are able to offer, which would entail an attack on the prof-
itability of the drug trade. Unfortunately, drug policy in Mexico, much like
security policy, is heavily influenced by the United States and is generally inef-
ficient at making a significant impact on the drug trade. U.S. drug policy relies
on zero-tolerance methods that focus on reducing the demand for drugs
through prosecution and interdiction. However, as previously mentioned, U.S.
demand has remained constant, with illicit drugs making up a $200 billion in-
dustry that caters to an estimated 13 million Americans each month. U.S. drug
policy also targets supply by attempting to interrupt the flow of illicit drugs
before they reach the border. The United States spends $40 billion dollars a
year trying to intercept drug flows, but only 5 to 15 percent of illegal drugs
coming into the United States are actually seized.
73
Meanwhile, the United
Nations estimates that 70% of drug shipments would have to be intercepted to
significantly impact the drug trade.
74

In light of the failure of both demand and supply reduction policies,
the best way to undermine the profitability of the drug trade may be to consider
the legalization of some drugs just as Castaeda, Grayson, and Nadelmann
have suggested. As a 2001 article in The Economist put it, drugs are expen-
sive partly because their price reflects the dangers involved in distributing
and buying them.
75
The legalization of drugs on both sides of the border
would eliminate these dangers, and therefore lead to a much lower price for
drugs. This would significantly decrease the profit margins of Mexican drug
cartels, disabling them from offering such high prices for allegiances.
Legalization entails a drastic departure from conventional drug policy
as advocated by the United States. In the past, the United States has pressured
Mexico away from legalization and decriminalization measures, such as Presi-
dent Foxs proposal in 2006, which was eventually rejected by the Mexican
Congress after Washington came out strongly against it.
76
Nonetheless, Mexi-
co eventually decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana,
heroin, cocaine, and other drugs in 2009.
77
While this is substantially more
than the United States has done, it is only a first step. This policy does not
decrease the profitability of the drug trade; it merely frees up the law enforce-
ment resources that have been squandered on prosecuting drug users instead of
more dangerous criminals. If legalization measures in Mexico are to affect the
cost-benefit ratio of the Mexican drug cartels, they must address the production
and distribution of drugs, not just the consumption.
Both states should at least consider the complete legalization of mari-
juana. This would certainly hurt some Mexican cartels, as cannabis production
currently accounts for around 20 to 50 percent of cartel profits.
78
There is al-
ready some political inertia in both states for full legalization; after the passage
of its decriminalization law, Mexico has already begun to move toward legali-
126

zation, and although marijuana is still fully illegal in most states in the United
States, around 40 percent of Americans say that marijuana should be taxed,
controlled and regulated like alcohol.
79
In other words, the full legalization of
marijuana may be a controversial issue, but it is not politically impossible and
it would mean a significant loss in the benefits that cartels could offer.
It is important that the state also focus on offering lower-risk opportu-
nities in addition to relatively higher-benefit ones. There is significantly less
work to be done in this area, as it is generally already more dangerous to be
involved in the drug trade than it is to stay out of it. Being employed by a car-
tel means attracting fire not only from law enforcement but also from other
cartels. In fact, the majority of the killings in cities like Jurez and Nuevo La-
redo are between rival drug cartels.
80

There will always be some dangers inherent in law enforcement jobs,
regardless of the environment, but there are some crucial steps that the Mexi-
can state can take to improve the safety of its police force. One such example
is Secretary Gnaro Garca Lunas suggestion of eliminating Mexicos local
and municipal police agencies and incorporating them into the state police.
81

Local police officers are generally more at risk for both being corrupted and
assassinated because, as former Federal Police Chief Edgar Milln Gmez stat-
ed, local police forces have the most contact, the most presence in the streets,
so they are the most infiltrated.
82
Since local police work in the same general
area that they live in, the cartel elements that they come into contact with are
often familiar with them. Cartels use this knowledge to threaten police as well
as their families in order to extort or intimidate them.
83
Local police depart-
ments are viewed as so ineffective that American DEA officials still refuse to
work with them for fear that it would put them at risk. The proposed restruc-
turing of local police agencies may help reduce the risk associated with local
police by offering a broader geographic area for officers to work in and by in-
troducing them to the stronger oversight mechanisms of the state police forc-
es.
84
Policies that decrease the risks for uncorrupt police officers go hand-
in-hand with policies that increase risks for those that choose to work with car-
tels. Increasing oversight and anti-corruption measures within law enforce-
ment institutions is the most obvious way to do so; an increased likelihood of
being discovered and more severe punishments significantly increase the risks
for police officers that choose to become involved with cartels. This was the
main pillar of the disengagement decree in Colombia and it has been the big-
gest measure of Garca Lunas success so far.
However, not all cartel members work within the police force or other
public institutions. For this reason, in order to truly affect the risks involved
with the drug trade the police must be able to attack all cartel members, wheth-
er they are inside or outside of state institutions. For this reason, a tacit deal
like the one that Jorge Castaeda suggests may be a step in the wrong direc-
tion. The logic behind his suggestion is that while a negotiation with cartels
may decrease the risk associated with cartel involvement, it would also make
127

police officers and innocent civilians safer. However, this reasoning assumes
that cartels can be trusted enough to follow through on such a deal. In reality,
the only guarantee would be that cartels could operate with relative impunity
while the safety of others would hinge entirely on the discretion of the cartels.
Castaedas suggestion also ignores historical trends. Although the
current environment in Mexico may seem violent, it is markedly less so now
than it was under the PRI, when the government did have a tacit deal of sorts
with the cartels. Indeed, in 2008 the murder rate in Mexico was 12 for every
100,000 people, down from 17 in 1997 and 20 in 1980.
85
Negotiation is not a
realistic policy in any case, as Garca Luna has publicly come out harshly
against it, asserting that we [the government] are obligated to confront crime.
That is our job, that is our duty, and we will not consider a pact.
86


Plomo: Public Security and the Threat of Drug Cartels

Unfortunately, gaining a relatively favorable cost-benefit ratio over
the cartels may not be enough for the state to destroy cartel power in Mexico.
Whenever cartels seek to improve their cost-benefit ratio, they have historically
done so through killing or intimidating those who stand in their way. The last
two police chiefs of Ciudad Jurez resigned due to threats from cartels,
87
and
the cartels have assassinated targets as high profile as the chief of the Mexican
federal police Edgar Milln Gmez
88
and gubernatorial candidate Rodolfo Tor-
re Cant.
89
Cartels also frequently coerce innocent civilians to assist in the
drug trade under the threat of violence, in extreme cases transforming entire
towns such as Aguascalientes into drug running operations in only two or three
years. Although many civilians are hesitant to get involved with cartels, local
police forces often do not offer any sort of protection, and so death threats are
understandably effective.
90
Inability to provide public goods such as security is a criterion for
state failure, and it creates an environment that allows cartels to thrive.
91
In
order to avoid this, the Mexican state needs to ensure safety for those who do
not cooperate with cartels. The kingpin strategy advocated by Robert Bonner
is useful because it sends the message that cartel members, and especially lead-
ers, are not safe. However, as critics of this strategy, such as Kevin Casas-
Zamora, are right to point out, this strategy has a very limited use. Casas-
Zamora characterizes Calderns crackdown as a parading [of] military victo-
ries, or a sort of PR campaign against the cartels.
92
A PR campaign may in-
deed be necessary to maintain public support for the government, but when
cartels counter with PR campaigns of their own (by posting beheadings on
Youtube, for example), the notion that cartels are not safe is accompanied by
the notion that those who oppose them are not safe either.
93

In order for the state to guarantee security for the general public, a re-
evaluation of some policing strategies might be necessary. First and foremost,
the limits of security maximization and zero tolerance policies should be recog-
nized. The role of the army in civilian affairs, for example, must be re-
128

examined. It is important to note that what the Mexican government seeks is a
monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. Legitimacy, as Max Weber
defines it, hangs on the perception of the governed. If the state is to exist, he
reasons, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that
be.
94
If the applicant of physical force is mired with human rights abuses
against the very people it is supposed to protect, this will undermine that au-
thority. A closer look at the Mexican Constitution reveals further challenges to
the legitimacy of the military as an applicant of force, since Articles 118 and
129 explicitly forbid the involvement of the military in civilian matters.
95

The fact that the majority of Mexican citizens approve of the use of
the Mexican military in the war against the cartels is the only redeeming argu-
ment for the continuance of this policy.
96
This statistic alone means that the
use of the military may not be as detrimental to public security as most critics
believe, but in light of the armys high desertion rate, human rights abuses, and
occasional reluctance to pursue cartels leaders (as was the case with the pursuit
of Arturo Beltrn Leyva),
97
it may be time to transition the army away from
center stage. Even if the majority of citizens approve of the military, the abys-
mal 1.5 percent conviction rate must be improved, and doing so means em-
ploying investigative and prosecutorial techniques that the military lacks. Af-
ter years of police reforms and increased information sharing with U.S. law
enforcement agencies, Mexico may be ready to charge its federal police with
the majority of counternarcotic operations once more.
Additionally, community based law enforcement techniques that em-
phasize preventative action and community participation, like the ones advo-
cated by Malone and Dammert, may prove to be useful in some areas of Mexi-
co. For a successful model of this type of strategy, Mexico needs only to look
at police reform in Brazil, which included the establishment of the police paci-
fication units, or peace police. These police officers, who are generally
picked straight out of the academy so that they are not corrupt, work in 12 hour
shifts and perform social work within the community. This approach has al-
ready led to the pacification of some of Rio de Janeiros most violent slums,
98

where in just one year the homicide rate fell 20 percent and the street burglary
rate fell by 31.7 percent.
99
Although such a new approach is risky in the cur-
rent environment of insecurity, it warrants consideration as a strategy for long
term security.
While no concrete policy has materialized to implement any of these
changes in Mexico, some promising prospects have been seen recently. With
the timeframe of the Mrida Initiative at an end, the Obama administration has
unveiled its unofficial strategy entitled Beyond Mrida, which represents a
significant departure from some of the more controversial pillars of the Mrida
Initiative. In addition to cutting $257 million from the military budget in 2011,
Beyond Mrida involves a significantly larger commitment to institutional
reform, with $207 million of the $346 million requested foreign assistance
budget in 2011 being allocated to this area.
100
This new strategy also opens up
the possibility of community based police tactics, as it places an emphasis on
129

building strong and resilient communities, which was almost entirely absent
from the Mrida Initiative. Although a specific budget for this area has not
been laid out, it has been reported that this strategy will be implemented in
conjunction with civil society groups, most likely primarily in Ciudad Jurez
and Tijuana.
101


Conclusions

State failure is indeed an imminent threat in Mexico, but it is not inev-
itable. Even the failed cities that have begun to characterize its border region
are not unavoidable realities. It is necessary, however, for policies to have the
appropriate goals in mind, as well as a clear understanding of how those goals
can be realistically accomplished, before the current situation can be reversed.
This goal must be to reduce the power of cartels so that the Mexican state can
gain a monopoly on the use of legitimate force throughout its territory. This
monopoly cannot be fully achieved through policies that aim to stop the flow
of drugs or reduce short term violence; these are merely symptoms of cartel
power.
While statistics such as homicide rates and levels of drug trafficking
are certainly indicative of cartel activity, they are not necessarily accurate indi-
cators of cartel power. Indeed, over the short term, spikes of violence may
even signify the desperate attempts of cartels to assert their power when it is
being threatened. While it may be more difficult to measure, a more relevant
indicator of cartel power may be the frequency with which state actors such as
mayors, police chiefs, governors, etc. are forced out of their post or bribed by
cartels. Bribery is never likely to stop outright, but it is not overly ambitious to
aim to create a Mexico where cartels can no longer influence high ranking pub-
lic officials by violence and intimidation. Higher arrests and conviction rates
would also be indicative of the states regained monopoly on the use of force.
To put this in perspective, while the arrest rate in the United States is in the 90
th

percentile and the conviction rate is over 50 percent,
102
the arrest rate in Mexi-
co is 22 percent and the conviction rate is 1.5 percent.
103
Mexico should by no
means be expected to match these rates of its much more developed neighbor
to the north, but this comparison shows that a dramatic increase is certainly
needed.
This is no small task, and Mexico cannot do it alone; it will require
substantial assistance from the United States. This means more than financial
assistance; the United States must own up to its role in the drug war through
implementing effective policies. U.S. intelligence networks in the DEA and
other law enforcement bodies are much better established than their Mexican
counterparts, and these networks will continue to be useful in the pursuit of
cartel members in the future. However, nothing would more significantly im-
pact the drug war in Mexico than the full legalization in the United States of at
least some drugs. As mentioned earlier, it would completely change the dy-
namics of the drug trade and weaken the cartels in a way that perhaps nothing
130

else could.
It should also be noted that while cartel power is the principle threat to
the Mexican state, reducing this power will not solve all of Mexicos ills, and
crime and violence will most likely persist even after cartels are weakened. In
Jamaica, for example, local gang bosses, or dons have continued to draw
influence from urban communities and engage in turf battles even after the
shift of major drug flows to the Central American corridor. The dons in Jamai-
ca are able to maintain their power networks because of a lack of alternative
economic opportunities to crime.
104
Undermining the power of drug cartels in
Mexico may help to avoid state failure, but the persistence of crime itself is an
economic problem at heart. However, this is an entirely separate issue.
Crippling the cartels in Mexico may also cause the drug trade to relo-
cate once more, just as it did after Plan Colombia. In fact, this has already be-
gun to happen in Central America, which is now seeing increased levels of
violence, with Honduras and El Salvador exhibiting the highest national homi-
cide rates in the world (more than 60 murders a year per every 100,000 peo-
ple).
105
Unfortunately, given the history of the drug trade, this may simply be
an unavoidable consequence. From the U.S. perspective, this at least means
relocating the violence away from the border, but once again, this is a separate
issue entirely.
The cartels of Mexico have created an incredibly complex and danger-
ous system that undermines the rule of law, robs the Mexican state of its mo-
nopoly on the use of force, and threatens to turn Mexico into a failed state.
Destroying this power structure will be equally complex. It will take years,
cost billions of dollars and thousands of lives, and may ultimately be an incom-
plete victory. Just as the drug trade will never be completely stopped, drug
traffickers will never completely lose power. Though it may seem to be a
thankless struggle, doing nothing may create a failed state in Mexico, which, as
Mearsheimer and David have both observed, would have catastrophic results
for both the United States and Mexico.













131

Sources Cited

Alsema, Adriaan. "Colombia's Murder Rate Down 45% During Uribe: Po-
lice." Colombia Reports. January 20, 2009.
Archibold, Randal C. "Wanted: Officers to Retake Mexico." New York
Times 12 Mar. 2011.
Archibold, Randal C. "War Without Borders: Hired by Customs, but Working
for the Cartels." New York Times December 17, 2009.
Arteaga Botello, Nelson. "The Merida Initiative: Security Surveillance Harmo-
nization in Latin America." European Review of Latin America and
Caribbean Studies (2009): 103-10.
The Associated Press. "Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession." New York Times
21 Aug. 2009: A12.
Barrionuevo, Alexei. "In Rough Slum, Brazil's Police Try Soft Touch." New
York Times October 10, 2010.
Benton, Allyson. "Just How Dangerous Is Mexico?" Foreign Policy March 16,
2010.
Bergman, Marcelo. "Creating New Soldiers in Mexico's Drug War." Foreign
Policy May 17, 2010.
Bonner, Robert C. "The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico's Drug
Cartels. Foreign Affairs 89.4 (2010): 35-47.
Casas-Zamora, Kevin. "Mexico's Forever War." Foreign Policy December 22,
2010.
Castaeda, Jorge G. "De-Narcotize US-Mexican Relations." New Perspect 27.3
(2010): 54-57.
Castaeda, Jorge G. "What's Spanish for Quagmire?" Foreign Policy January-
February 2010, 177th ed.: 78-81.
"The Case for Legalisation." The Economist July 6, 2001.
"Central America: The Tormented Isthmus." The Economist. April 14, 2011.
Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics Bureau of Justice Statistics, US
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, (2004).
Corchado, Alfredo. "A Fighting Chance." The Wilson Quarterly 33.2 (2009):
18-23. Print.

132

Crandall, Russell. The United States and Latin America after the Cold War.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008.
Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs: US Policy toward Colombia. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008
Dammert, Lucia, and Mary Fran T. Malone. "Does It Take a Village? Policing
Strategies and Fear of Crime in Latin America." Latin American Poli-
tics and Society 48.4 (2006): 27-51.
David, Steven R. Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Inter-
ests. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2008.
Davis, Diane E. "Undermining the Rule of Law: Democratization and the Dark
Side of Police Reform in Mexico." Latin American Politics & Society
48.1 (2006): 55-86.
Drum, Kevin. "The Patriot's Guide to Legalization: Have You Ever Looked at
Our Marijuana Policy? I Mean, Really Looked at It?" Mother
Jones July-August 2009: 49-52.
"Failed State Index Scores 2010." The Fund for Peace: Promoting Sustainable
Security. 2010.
Grayson, George W. Mexico Narco-violence and a Failed State? New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Transaction, 2010.
Haddick, Robert. "This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War, Does America Have
to Win It?" Foreign Policy September 10, 2010.
Hendrix, Steven E. "The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America:
The New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized
Crime, Corruption, and Violence." International Law Review 5.2
(2008): 107-25.
Homicide Statistics, Criminal Justice and Public Health Sources - Trends
(2003-2008) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
"Inside the Ivory Tower." Foreign Policy. February 16, 2009.
Kellner, Tomas, and Francesco Pipitone. "Inside Mexico's Drug War." World
Policy Journal 27.1 (2010): 29-37.
Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. "The Long War of Genaro Garca Luna." New York
Times July 13, 2008.
Lacy, Marc. "In Mexican City, Drug War Ills Slip Into Shadows." New York
Times June 12, 2009.
Lacy, Marc. "With Force, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way." New York
Times February 28, 2009.
133

Lake, Jennifer and Villarreal, M. Angeles. The Security and Prosperity Part-
nership of North America: An Overview and Selected Issues Con-
gressional Research Service May 27, 2009.
Makin, Elisabeth. "Mexican Police Chief Seeks Asylum in the US." New York
Times March 8, 2011.
Nadelmann, Ethan. "Drugs." Foreign Policy. Washingtonpost.Newsweek Inter-
active, LLC, September-October 2007.
National Center for Health Statistics. Health, United States, 2010: With Spe-
cial Feature on Death and Dying. Hyattsville, MD. February 2011.
No, Joo. "Bairros Com UPP Tiveram Queda Na Criminalidade." O Dia.
April 21 2010.
Prez Rocha, Manuel. "The Failed War on Drugs in Mexico." Transnational
Institute (2009).
Robins, Ted. "U.S. Trains Mexican Federal Police To Combat Drugs 89.3
KPCC." Home 89.3 KPCC. NPR, April 13, 2010
Romero, Fernando. Hyperborder: the Contemporary US-Mexico Border and
Its Future. New York, NY: Princeton Architectural, 2008.
Serrano, Monica. "Integration and Security in North America: Do Good Neigh-
bours Need Good Fences?" International Journal 61.3 (2006): 611-
32.
Sives, Amanda. "Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clientelism
in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica." Latin American Perspectives 29.5
(2002): 66-89.
Tuckman, Jo. "Leading Politician Rodolfo Torre Cant Murdered in Mexi-
co." The Guardian June 29, 2010.
"Under the Volcano: The Drugs Trade Has Spread Corruption and Violence
across Mexico. Can the Police Ever Catch up with Them?" The Econ-
omist October 14, 2010.
Weber, Max. Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation edit. Owen, David,
and Strong, Tracy B. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co. 2004.
Wilson, Christopher E., and Eric L. Olson. "Beyond Merida: The Evolving
Approach to Security Cooperation." Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars (Mexico Institute). University of San Diego Trans
-Border Institute. May 2010.
"Year of the Dead." Foreign Policy 22 Dec. 2010.
134

Notes

1) "Inside the Ivory Tower." Foreign Policy. February 16, 2009. Accessed
April 2, 2011.
2) Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American
Interests. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2008) 88.
3) Max Weber. Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation edit. Owen, Da-
vid, and Strong, Tracy B. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co. 2004).
4) David 85.
5) Robert Haddick. "This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War, Does America
Have to Win It?" Foreign Policy September 10, 2010. Accessed March 15,
2011
6) Russell Crandal. Driven by Drugs: US Policy toward Colombia. (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008) 29.
7) Ibid. 31
8) Ibid. 35
9) Ibid. 43
10) Ethan Nadelmann. "Drugs." Foreign Policy. Washingtonpost. Newsweek
Interactive, LLC, September-October 2007: 26.
11) Robert C. Bonner "The New Cocaine Cowboys: How to Defeat Mexico's
Drug Cartels. Foreign Affairs 89.4 (2010): 35-47.
12) Tomas Kellner and Francesco Pipitone. "Inside Mexico's Drug War."
World Policy Journal 27.1 (2010): 36.
13) Adriaan Alsema. "Colombia's Murder Rate Down 45% During Uribe: Po-
lice." Colombia Reports. January 20, 2009. Accessed March 4, 2011.
14) Bonner.
15) Alfredo Corchado. "A Fighting Chance." The Wilson Quarterly 33.2
(2009): 18-23.
16) David 107.
17) Diane E. Davis "Undermining the Rule of Law: Democratization and the
Dark Side of Police Reform in Mexico." Latin American Politics & Society
48.1 (2006): 73.
18) David 109; George W. Grayson. Mexico Narco-violence and a Failed
State? New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2010.
19) David 108-109.
135

20) Davis 68.
21) Kellner, Pipitone 37.
22) Ibid 36; Grayson.
23) David 109.
24) Ibid 109.
25) Crandall, Russell. The United States and Latin America after the Cold War.
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008) 238.
26) Jennifer Lake and M. Angeles Villarreal. The Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America: An Overview and Selected Issues Congres-
sional Research Service (May 27, 2009).
27) Hendrix.
28) Bonner.
29) Ibid.
30) Ibid.
31) Steven E. Hendrix "The Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America:
The New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime,
Corruption, and Violence."International Law Review 5.2 (2008): 107-25.
32) Bonner.
33) Crandall, US and Latin America 46.
34) Hendrix.
35) Bonner.
36) Hendrix.
37) Manuel Prez Rocha. "The Failed War on Drugs in Mexico." Transnation-
al Institute (2009).
38) Monica Serrano. "Integration and Security in North America: Do Good
Neighbours Need Good Fences?" International Journal 61.3 (2006): 625
39) Lucia Dammert and Mary Fran T. Malone. "Does It Take a Village? Polic-
ing Strategies and Fear of Crime in Latin America." Latin American Politics
and Society 48.4 (2006): 37
40) Ibid 38.
41) Prez Rocha.
42) Ibid.
43) Ibid.
136

44) Grayson.
45) Kevin Casas-Zamora. "Mexico's Forever War." Foreign Policy 22 Dec.
2010.
46) Ibid.
47) Grayson.
48) Ibid.
49) Jorge G. Castaeda, "What's Spanish for Quagmire?" Foreign Policy Janu-
ary-February 177th ed. (2010): 78-81.
50) Grayson.
51) Jorge G. Castaeda, "De-Narcotize US-Mexican Relations." New Perspect
27.3 (2010): 54-57.
52) David. 97.
53) Hendrix.
54) Marcelo Bergman. "Creating New Soldiers in Mexico's Drug War." For-
eign Policy May 17, 2010.
55) David 87.
56) Grayson.
57) National Center for Health Statistics. Health, United States, 2010: With
Special Feature on Death and Dying. Hyattsville, MD. (February 2011) 253.
58) Nadelmann 25.
59) Serrano 618.
60) Castaeda, Quagmire 80.
61) Benton, Allyson. "Just How Dangerous Is Mexico?" Foreign Policy March
16, 2010.
62) "Year of the Dead." Foreign Policy 22 Dec. 2010.
63) Homicide Statistics, Criminal Justice and Public Health Sources - Trends
(2003-2008) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
64) Marc Lacy. "With Force, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way." New York
Times February 28, 2009.
65) Elisabeth Makin. "Mexican Police Chief Seeks Asylum in the US." New
York Times March 8, 2011.
66) Randal C. Archibold "Wanted: Officers to Retake Mexico." New York
Times March 12, 2011.
137

67) "Under the Volcano: The Drugs Trade Has Spread Corruption and Vio-
lence across Mexico. Can the Police Ever Catch up with Them?" The Econo-
mist October 14, 2010.
68) Ted Robins. "U.S. Trains Mexican Federal Police To Combat Drugs 89.3
KPCC." Home 89.3 KPCC. NPR, April 13 2010.
69) Randal C. Arcibold "War Without Borders: Hired by Customs, but Work-
ing for the Cartels." New York Times December 17, 2009.
70) Kellner, Pipitone 37.
71) Davis 70.
72) Grayson.
73) Ibid.
74) Fernando Romero, Hyperborder: the Contemporary US-Mexico Border
and Its Future. (New York, NY: Princeton Architectural, 2008).
75) "The Case for Legalisation." The Economist July 6, 2001.
76) Grayson.
77) The Associated Press. "Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession." New York
Times August 21, 2009.
78) Kevin Drum. "The Patriot's Guide to Legalization: Have You Ever Looked
at Our Marijuana Policy? I Mean, Really Looked at It?" Mother Jones July-
August 2009: 49-52.
79) Grayson.
80) Marc Lacy. "In Mexican City, Drug War Ills Slip Into Shadows." New York
Times June 12, 2009.
81) Kellner, Pipitone 36 .
82) Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. "The Long War of Genaro Garca Luna." New York
Times July 13, 2008.
83) Archibold, Wanted.
84) Kellner, Pipitone 37.
85) Benton.
86) Kurtz-Phelan.
87) Lacy, Force.
88) Kurtz-Phelan.
89) Jo Tuckman. "Leading Politician Rodolfo Torre Cant Murdered in Mexi-
co." The Guardian June 29, 2010.
138

90) Kellner, Pipitone.
91) "Failed State Index Scores 2010." The Fund for Peace: Promoting Sustain-
able Security 2010.
92) Casas-Zamora.
93) Kurtz-Phelan.
94) Weber.
95) Nelson Arteaga Botello. "The Merida Initiative: Security Surveillance Har-
monization in Latin America." European Review of Latin America and Carib-
bean Studies (2009):87.
96) Grayson.
97) Ibid.
98) Alexei Barrionuevo. "In Rough Slum, Brazil's Police Try Soft Touch."
New York Times October 10, 2010.
99) Joo No. "Bairros Com UPP Tiveram Queda Na Criminalidade." O Dia.
April 21, 2010.
100) Christopher E. Wilson and Eric L. Olson. "Beyond Merida: The Evolving
Approach to Security Cooperation." Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars (Mexico Institute). University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute.
(May 2010): 4.
101) Ibid. 5.
102) Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics Bureau of Justice Statistics,
US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, (2004).
103) Casas-Zamora.
104) Sives, Amanda. "Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clien-
telism in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica." Latin American Perspectives 29.5
(2002).
105) "Central America: The Tormented Isthmus." The Economist. April 14,
2011.