World Economic Outlook: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
WORLD
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
Policy Pivot, Rising Threats
2024
OCT
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
WORLD
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
Policy Pivot, Rising Threats
2024
OCT
©2024 International Monetary Fund
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lished twice a year, in the spring and fall. The WEO is prepared by the IMF staff and
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Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund. 2024. World Economic Outlook:

Policy Pivot, Rising Threats. Washington, DC. October.
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CONTENTS
Assumptions and Conventions vii
Further Information ix
Data x
Preface xi
Foreword xii
Executive Summary xiv
Chapter 1. Global Prospects and Policies 1

Uncertainty Seeping through as Policies Shift 1
The Outlook: Stable yet Underwhelming—Brace for Uncertain Times 6
Risks to the Outlook: Tilted to the Downside 15
Policy Priorities: From Restoring Price Stability to Rebuilding Buffers 18
Box 1.1. The Global Automotive Industry and the Shift to Electric Vehicles 22
Box 1.2. Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s Baseline Projections 24
Commodity Special Feature: Market Developments and the Inflationary Effects of
Metal Supply Shocks 28
References 39
Chapter 2. The Great Tightening: Insights from the Recent Inflation Episode 41
Introduction 41
What Happened? Dissecting Inflation Dynamics 43
The Monetary Policy Reaction 48
Lessons for Monetary Policy: A Model-Based Analysis 51
Summary and Policy Implications 55
Box 2.1. The Role of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies 58
Box 2.2. The Role of Price-Suppressing Policies 60
References 62
Chapter 3. Understanding the Social Acceptability of Structural Reforms 65
Introduction 65
Social Acceptability of Reforms: A Primer 68
The Challenge of Implementing Structural Reforms: Key Facts 68
Attitudes toward Reforms: Evidence from Surveys 71
Tools and Strategies for Sustainably Advancing Reform Agendas: Lessons from
11 Country Cases 76
Conclusions and Policy Implications 78
Box 3.1. Policies to Facilitate the Integration of Ukrainian Refugees into the
European Labor Market: Early Evidence 80
References 81
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 iii

WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: Polic y Pivot, Rising Threats
Statistical Appendix 85
Assumptions 85
What’s New 85
Data and Conventions 86
Country Notes 87
Classification of Economies 89
General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook
Classification 89
Table A. Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in
Aggregate GDP, Exports of Goods and Services, and Population, 2023 91
Table B. Advanced Economies by Subgroup 92
Table C. European Union 92
Table D. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source
of Export Earnings 93
Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position,
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and Per Capita Income Classification 94
Table F. Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods 96
Table G. Key Data Documentation 97
Box A1. Economic Policy Assumptions underlying the Projections for Selected Economies 107
Box A2. Revised World Economic Outlook Purchasing-Power-Parity Weights 111
List of Tables 114
Output (Tables A1–A4) 115
Inflation (Tables A5–A7) 122
Financial Policies (Table A8) 127
Foreign Trade (Table A9) 128
Current Account Transactions (Tables A10–A12) 130
Balance of Payments and External Financing (Table A13) 137
Flow of Funds (Table A14) 141
Medium-Term Baseline Scenario (Table A15) 144
World Economic Outlook Selected Topics 145
IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, October 2024 155
Tables
Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections 10
Table 1.2. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections at
Market Exchange Rate Weights 12
Annex Table 1.1.1. European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 33
Annex Table 1.1.2. Asian and Pacific Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Annex Table 1.1.3. Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Annex Table 1.1.4. Middle East and Central Asia Economies: Real GDP,
Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment 36
Annex Table 1.1.5. Sub-Saharan African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
Annex Table 1.1.6. Summary of World Real per Capita Output 38
Table 3.1. Hypotheses to Boost Policy Support 73
Table 3.2. Historical Employment Protection Legislation Reform Episodes 76
iv International Monetary Fund | October 2024

contents
Table A2.1. Changes in World GDP Shares from Purchasing-Power-Parity Revisions 112
Table A2.2. Revisions to Real GDP Growth of World Economic Outlook Aggregates 113
Online Tables—Statistical Appendix
Table B1. Advanced Economies: Unemployment, Employment, and Real GDP per Capita
Table B2. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP
Table B3. Advanced Economies: Hourly Earnings, Productivity, and Unit Labor
Costs in Manufacturing
Table B4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices
Table B5. Summary of Fiscal and Financial Indicators
Table B6. Advanced Economies: General and Central Government Net Lending/Borrowing
and General Government Net Lending/Borrowing Excluding Social Security Schemes
Table B7. Advanced Economies: General Government Structural Balances
Table B8. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: General Government
Net Lending/Borrowing and Overall Fiscal Balance
Table B9. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: General Government
Net Lending/Borrowing
Table B10. Selected Advanced Economies: Exchange Rates
Table B11. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Broad Money Aggregates
Table B12. Advanced Economies: Export Volumes, Import Volumes, and Terms of
Trade in Goods and Services
Table B13. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region: Total Trade in Goods
Table B14. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Source of
Export Earnings: Total Trade in Goods
Table B15. Summary of Current Account Transactions
Table B16. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Summary of
External Debt and Debt Service
Table B17. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:
External Debt by Maturity
Table B18. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Analytical Criteria:
External Debt by Maturity
Table B19. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Ratio of External Debt to GDP
Table B20. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Debt-Service Ratios
Table B21. Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Medium-Term
Baseline Scenario: Selected Economic Indicators
Figures
Figure 1.1. Growth and Inflation Revisions 2
Figure 1.2. Inflation Surprises and Importance of Food in CPI 2
Figure 1.3. Recent Inflation Developments 3
Figure 1.4. Labor Market Developments 3
Figure 1.5. Monetary Transmission 4
Figure 1.6. Fiscal Policy Stance 5
Figure 1.7. Pressure on Emerging Markets 6
Figure 1.8. Globalization and Trade Fragmentation 6
Figure 1.9. Trade Fragmentation: Cold War and Now 7
Figure 1.10. Continued Rotation to Services 7
Figure 1.11. Global Assumptions 8
Figure 1.12. Growth Outlook 9
Figure 1.13. Inflation Outlook 14
Figure 1.14. Medium-Term Outlook 14
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 v

Figure 1.15. Current Account and International Investment Positions 15

Figure 1.16. Inflation Surprises and Changes in Inflation Expectations 16
Figure 1.17. Social Unrest Levels 17
Figure 1.18. Required Fiscal Consolidation 19
Figure 1.19. Government Spending Composition and Future Income Growth 20
Figure 1.1.1. Productivity and Global Value Chains in the Automotive Sector 22
Figure 1.1.2. Global Share of Electric Vehicles 23
Figure 1.2.1. Forecast Uncertainty around Global Growth and Inflation Projections 24
Figure 1.2.2. Impact of Scenario A on GDP and Headline Inflation 26
Figure 1.2.3. Impact of Scenario B on GDP and Headline Inflation 27
Figure 1.SF.1. Commodity Market Developments 28
Figure 1.SF.2. Consumption of Copper and Oil 30
Figure 1.SF.3. Intermediate Input Expenditure Share of Metals and Oil in
Gross Output in the United States 30
Figure 1.SF.4. Countries’ Input-Output Network Exposure to Metals and Oils 31
Figure 1.SF.5. Impulse Responses 32
Figure 2.1. Cross-Country Inflation Dynamics 42
Figure 2.2. Movements in Sectoral Price Dispersion 43
Figure 2.3. Sectoral Characteristics and Inflation Dynamics 44
Figure 2.4. Energy Price Pass-Through into CPI Inflation 45
Figure 2.5. Sectoral Inflation and Price Flexibility 45
Figure 2.6. Evolution of Phillips Curves 46
Figure 2.7. Inflation Drivers in the United States, Other Advanced Economies, and
Emerging Markets 47
Figure 2.8. Monetary Policy Tightening 48
Figure 2.9. Comparison of Inflation Episodes 49
Figure 2.10. Monetary Policy Transmission to CPI during Tightening Episodes 50
Figure 2.11. Phillips Curve under Different Constraints 51
Figure 2.12. Impacts of Supply Constraints and Commodity Sector Shocks 52
Figure 2.13. Counterfactual Monetary Policy 54
Figure 2.14. Role of Coordinated Monetary Policy 54
Figure 2.15. Alternative Policy Rules 55
Figure 2.1.1. Central Bank Balance Sheets 58
Figure 2.1.2. Estimated Impact of Monetary Policy and LSAP Tightening 59
Figure 2.2.1. Discretionary Inflation Stabilization Policies during the Pandemic 60
Figure 2.2.2. Euro Area Actual and Counterfactual Energy Price Levels 60
Figure 3.1. Structural Reforms: Uneven Convergence amid Public Resistance 66
Figure 3.2. Reform Episodes by Implementation Outcome 69
Figure 3.3. Strategies for Building Consensus for Reform 70
Figure 3.4. Relative Importance of Reform Strategies for Predicting Reform Implementation 71
Figure 3.5. Drivers of Reform Support 72
Figure 3.6. Effect of Information Strategies on Reform Support 74
Figure 3.7. Reasons for Nonsupport and the Role of Compensatory and
Complementary Measures 75
vi International Monetary Fund | October 2024

ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONS
A number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World Economic Outlook
(WEO). It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates remained constant at their average levels during July
30, 2024–August 27, 2024, except for those for the currencies participating in the European exchange rate mech-
anism II, which are assumed to have remained constant in nominal terms relative to the euro; that established
policies of national authorities will be maintained (for specific assumptions about fiscal and monetary policies for
selected economies, see Box A1 in the Statistical Appendix); that the average price of oil will be $81.29 a barrel in
2024 and $72.84 a barrel in 2025; that the three-month government bond yield for the United States will average
5.4 percent in 2024 and 3.9 percent in 2025, that for the euro area will average 3.5 percent in 2024 and 2.8 per-
cent in 2025, and that for Japan will average 0.1 percent in 2024 and 0.5 percent in 2025; and that the 10-year
government bond yield for the United States will average 4.1 percent in 2024 and 3.5 percent in 2025, that for the
euro area will average 2.4 percent in 2024 and 2.5 percent in 2025, and that for Japan will average 1.0 percent in
2024 and 1.3 percent in 2025. These are, of course, working hypotheses rather than forecasts, and the uncertain-
ties surrounding them add to the margin of error that would, in any event, be involved in the projections. The
estimates and projections are based on statistical information available through October 7, 2024, but may not
reflect the latest published data in all cases. For the date of the last data update for each economy, please refer to
the notes provided in the online WEO database.
The following conventions are used throughout the WEO:
• . . . to indicate that data are not available or not applicable;
• – between years or months (for example, 2023–24 or January–June) to indicate the years or months covered,
including the beginning and ending years or months; and
• / between years or months (for example, 2023/24) to indicate a fiscal or financial year.
• “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
• “Basis points” refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of
1 percentage point).
• Data refer to calendar years, except in the case of a few countries that use fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in
the Statistical Appendix, which lists the economies with exceptional reporting periods for national accounts and
government finance data.
• For some countries, the figures for 2023 and earlier are based on estimates rather than actual outturns. Please
refer to Table G in the Statistical Appendix, which lists the latest actual outturns for the indicators in the
national accounts, prices, government finance, and balance of payments for each country.
What is new in this publication:
• Following the recent release of the 2021 survey by the World Bank Group’s International Comparison Pro-
gram for new purchasing-power-parity benchmarks, the WEO’s estimates of purchasing-power-parity weights
and GDP valued at purchasing power parity have been updated. For more details, see Box A2 in the Statistical
Appendix.
• For Bangladesh, fiscal year estimates of real GDP and purchasing-power-parity GDP are now used in country
group aggregates.
• For Zimbabwe, the authorities have recently redenominated their national accounts statistics following the
introduction on April 5, 2024 of a new national currency, the Zimbabwe gold, replacing the Zimbabwe
dollar. The use of the Zimbabwe dollar ceased on April 30, 2024.
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 vii

In the tables and figures, the following conventions apply:

• Tables and figures in this report that list their source as “IMF staff calculations” or “IMF staff estimates” draw
on data from the WEO database.
• When countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.
• Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect rounding.
• Composite data are provided for various groups of countries organized according to economic characteristics or
region. Unless noted otherwise, country group composites represent calculations based on 90 percent or more of
the weighted group data.
• The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on maps do not imply, on the part of
the IMF, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
As used in this report, the terms “country” and “economy” do not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is
a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities
that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
viii International Monetary Fund | October 2024

FURTHER INFORMATION
Corrections and Revisions

The data and analysis appearing in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) are compiled by the IMF staff at the
time of publication. Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness, accuracy, and completeness. When errors are
discovered, corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and
on the IMF eLibrary (see below). All substantive changes are listed in the online table of contents.
Print and Digital Editions

Print
Print copies of this WEO can be ordered from the IMF bookstore at imfbk.st/551243.
Digital
Multiple digital editions of the WEO, including ePub, enhanced PDF, and HTML, are available on the
IMF eLibrary at eLibrary.IMF.org/WEO.
Download a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the charts therein from the IMF website at
www.IMF.org/publications/weo or scan the QR code below to access the WEO web page directly:
Copyright and Reuse

Information on the terms and conditions for reusing the contents of this publication are at www.imf.org/external/
terms.htm.
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 ix

DATA
This version of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) is available in full through the IMF eLibrary (www.elibrary.
imf.org) and the IMF website (www.imf.org). Accompanying the publication on the IMF website is a larger com-
pilation of data from the WEO database than is included in the report itself, including files containing the series
most frequently requested by readers. These files may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.
The data appearing in the WEO are compiled by the IMF staff at the time of the WEO exercises. The histor-
ical data and projections are based on the information gathered by the IMF country desk officers in the context
of their missions to IMF member countries and through their ongoing analysis of the evolving situation in each
country. Historical data are updated on a continual basis as more information becomes available, and structural
breaks in data are often adjusted to produce smooth series with the use of splicing and other techniques. IMF
staff estimates continue to serve as proxies for historical series when complete information is unavailable. As a
result, WEO data can differ from those in other sources with official data, including the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics.
The WEO data and metadata provided are “as is” and “as available,” and every effort is made to ensure their
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness, but these cannot be guaranteed. When errors are discovered, there is a
concerted effort to correct them as appropriate and feasible. Corrections and revisions made after publication are
incorporated into the electronic editions available from the IMF eLibrary (www.elibrary.imf.org) and on the IMF
website (www.imf.org). All substantive changes are listed in detail in the online tables of contents.
For details on the terms and conditions for usage of the WEO database, please refer to the IMF Copyright and
Usage website (www.imf.org/external/terms.htm).
Inquiries about the content of the WEO and the WEO database should be sent by mail or online forum
(telephone inquiries cannot be accepted):
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700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431, USA
Online Forum: www.imf.org/weoforum
x International Monetary Fund | October 2024

PREFACE
The analysis and projections contained in the World Economic Outlook are integral elements of the IMF’s
surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member countries, of developments in international
financial markets, and of the global economic system. The survey of prospects and policies is the product of a
comprehensive interdepartmental review of world economic developments, which draws primarily on information
the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with member countries. These consultations are carried out
in particular by the IMF’s area departments—namely, the African Department, Asia and Pacific Department,
European Department, Middle East and Central Asia Department, and Western Hemisphere Department—
together with the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department; the Monetary and Capital Markets Department; and
the Fiscal Affairs Department.
The analysis in this report was coordinated in the Research Department under the general direction of
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Economic Counsellor and Director of Research. The project was directed by Petya
Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, and Jean Marc Natal, Deputy Division Chief, Research
Department.
The primary contributors to this report are Silvia Albrizio, Jorge Alvarez, Hippolyte Balima, Emine Boz,
Damien Capelle, Pragyan Deb, Bertrand Gruss, Eric Huang, Thomas Kroen, Toh Kuan, Colombe Ladreit, Alberto
Musso, Diaa Noureldin, Galip Kemal Ozhan, Nicholas Sander, Yu Shi, Sebastian Wende, and Sihwan Yang.
Other contributors include Maryam Abdou, Hites Ahir, Gavin Asdorian, Tohid Atashbar, Jared Bebee, Christian
Bogmans, Benjamin Carton, Francesca Caselli, Yaniv Cohen, Allan Dizioli, Wenchuan Dong, Angela Espiritu,
Rebecca Eyassu, Pedro de Barros Gagliardi, Ganchimeg Ganpurev, Ziyan Han, Alexander Kia Howe, Chris
Jackson, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon, Eduard Laurito, Jungjin Lee, Weili Lin, Barry Liu, Jorge Miranda-Pinto, Joseph
Moussa, Dirk Muir, Cynthia Nyanchama Nyakeri, Emory Oakes, Pablo Vega Olivares, Maximiliano Jerez Osses,
Andrea Pescatori, Clarita Phillips, Naissa Pierre, Rafael Portillo, Shrihari Ramachandra, Nirav Shedge, Arash
Sheikholeslam, Martin Stuermer, Nicholas Tong, Roc Walker, Xueliang Wang, Isaac Warren, Evgenia Weaver,
Philippe Wingender, Yarou Xu, Max Yarmolinsky, Jiaqi Zhao, Canran Zheng, Dian Zhi, and Liangliang Zhu.
Gemma Rose Diaz from the Communications Department led the editorial team for the report, with
production and editorial support from Michael Harrup and additional assistance from Lucy Scott Morales,
James Unwin, Grauel Group, and Absolute Service, Inc. Elad Meshulam, Mishri Someshwar, and John Michael
Burkhardt from IMF Creative Lab assisted with the design of the surveys used in Chapter 3. Gabriele Ciminelli,
Davide Furceri, Daisuke Fukuzawa, Ergys Islamaj, and Duong Trung Le provided updated estimates of selected
IMF Structural Reform Database series used in Chapter 3. Tatiana Goriainova and Sylvie Poirot from CSF Library
provided data licensing services and support.
The analysis has benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from other IMF departments, as
well as by Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on October 8, 2024. However, estimates,
projections, and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive
Directors or to their national authorities.
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 xi

FOREWORD
The Global Battle against Inflation Is shocks themselves, followed by improvements in labor
Almost Won; A Policy Triple Pivot Is supply, often linked to immigration. But monetary
Now Needed policy played an important role too by helping to keep
The global battle against inflation has largely been inflation expectations anchored, avoiding deleterious
won, even though price pressures persist in some wage-price spirals and a repeat of the disastrous infla-
countries. After peaking at 9.4 percent year over year tion experience of the 1970s.
in the third quarter of 2022, headline inflation rates The return of inflation to near central bank targets
are now projected to reach 3.5 percent by the end of paves the way for a much-needed policy triple pivot.
2025, below the average level of 3.6 percent between The first—on monetary policy—has started. Since
2000 and 2019. June, major central banks in advanced economies have
Moreover, despite a sharp and synchronized tight- started to cut their policy rates, moving their policy
ening of monetary policy around the world, the global stance toward neutral. This will support activity at a
economy has remained unusually resilient throughout time when many advanced economies’ labor markets
the disinflationary process, avoiding a global recession. are showing signs of weakness, with rising unemploy-
Growth is projected to hold steady at 3.2 percent in ment rates. It will also help ward off the downside
2024 and 2025, even though a few countries, espe- risks.
cially low-income developing countries, have seen The change in global monetary conditions is easing
sizable downside growth revisions, often as a result of the pressure on emerging market economies, with their
increased conflicts. currencies strengthening against the US dollar and
While the global decline in inflation is a major mile- financial conditions improving. This will help reduce
stone, downside risks are rising and now dominate the imported inflation pressures, allowing these countries
outlook: an escalation in regional conflicts, monetary to pursue more easily their own disinflation path.
policy remaining tight for too long, a possible resur- However, vigilance remains key. Inflation in services
gence of financial market volatility with adverse effects remains too elevated, almost twice as high as before
on sovereign debt markets (see October 2024 Global the pandemic. Some emerging market economies are
Financial Stability Report), a deeper growth slowdown facing a resurgence of inflationary pressures, some-
in China, and the continued ratcheting up of protec- times because of elevated food prices. Furthermore,
tionist policies. we have now entered a world dominated by supply
What accounts for the decline in inflation? As disruptions—from climate, health, and geopolitics.
Chapter 2 of this report argues, the surge and sub- It is always harder for monetary policy to maintain
sequent decline in global inflation reflects a unique price stability when faced with such shocks, which
combination of shocks: broad supply disruptions simultaneously increase prices and reduce output.
coupled with strong demand pressures in the wake of Finally, while inflation expectations have remained well
the pandemic, followed by sharp spikes in commodity anchored this time around, it may be harder next time,
prices caused by the war in Ukraine. These shocks led as workers and firms will be more vigilant in protect-
to an upward shift and a steepening of the relationship ing their standards of living and profits going forward.
between activity and inflation, the Phillips curve. As The second pivot is on fiscal policy. Fiscal space
supply disruptions eased and monetary policy tight- is also a cornerstone of financial stability. After years
ening started to constrain demand, normalization in of loose fiscal policy, it is now time to stabilize debt
labor markets allowed inflation to decline rapidly with- dynamics and rebuild much-needed fiscal buffers.
out a major slowdown in activity. Clearly, much of the While the decline in policy rates provides some fiscal
disinflation can be attributed to the unwinding of the relief by lowering funding costs, this will not be
xii International Monetary Fund | October 2024

FOREWORD
sufficient, especially as long-term real interest rates clear-eyed assessment of the diminished prospects in
are much above prepandemic levels. In many coun- the region—and the associated challenges.
tries, primary balances, the difference between fiscal Faced with increased external competition and struc-
revenues and public expenditures net of debt service, tural weaknesses in manufacturing and productivity,
need to improve. For some countries, like the United many countries are implementing industrial and trade
States and China, debt dynamics are not stabilized policy measures to protect their workers and industries.
under current fiscal plans (see October 2024 Fiscal While these measures can sometimes boost investment
Monitor). In many others, while early fiscal plans and activity in the short run—especially when they
showed promise after the pandemic and cost-of-living rely on debt-financed subsidies—they often lead to
crises, there are increasing signs of slippage. The path retaliation, are unlikely to deliver sustained improve-
is narrow: unduly delaying adjustment increases the ments in standards of living at home or abroad, and
risk of disorderly market-imposed adjustments, while should be firmly resisted when they do not carefully
an excessively sharp turn toward fiscal consolidation address well-identified market failures or national secu-
would be self-defeating and hurt economic activity. rity concerns. Instead, economic growth must come
Success requires staying the course by implementing from ambitious domestic reforms that boost technol-
gradual and credible multiyear adjustments without ogy and innovation, improve competition and resource
delay, where consolidation is necessary. The more allocation, further economic integration, and stimulate
credible and disciplined the fiscal adjustment, the more productive private investment.
monetary policy will be able to play a supporting role. Yet while structural reforms are as urgent as ever,
But the willingness and ability to deliver disciplined they often face significant social resistance. Chapter 3
and credible adjustments have been lacking. of this report explores the factors that shape the social
The third pivot—and the hardest—is on structural acceptability of reforms, one of the prerequisites for
reforms. Much more needs to be done to improve their eventual success. A clear message emerges from
growth prospects and lift productivity, as this is the the chapter: better communication can only go so far.
only way we can address the many challenges we Instead, building trust between the government and
face: rebuilding fiscal buffers, aging and declining its people—a two-way process throughout the policy
populations in many parts of the world, young and design—and the inclusion of proper compensatory
growing populations in Africa in search of opportunity, measures to mitigate distributional effects are essential
tackling the climate transition, increasing resilience, features. This is an important lesson that should also
and improving the lives of the most vulnerable, within resonate when thinking about ways to further improve
and across countries. Unfortunately, medium-term international cooperation and bolster our multilateral
global growth remains lackluster, at 3.1 percent. While efforts to address common challenges as we celebrate the
much of this reflects China’s weaker outlook, medi- 80th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions.
um-term prospects in other regions, such as Latin
America and the European Union, have also deterio- Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
rated. The recently published Draghi report offers a Economic Counsellor
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 xiii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Global growth is expected to remain stable yet Risks to the global outlook are tilted to the down-
underwhelming. At 3.2 percent in 2024 and 2025, side amid elevated policy uncertainty. Sudden erup-
the growth projection is virtually unchanged from tions in financial market volatility—as experienced
those in both the July 2024 World Economic Outlook in early August—could tighten financial conditions
Update and the April 2024 World Economic Outlook. and weigh on investment and growth, especially in
However, notable revisions have taken place beneath developing economies in which large near-term exter-
the surface, with upgrades to the forecast for the nal financing needs may trigger capital outflows and
United States offsetting downgrades to those for debt distress. Further disruptions to the disinflation
other advanced economies—in particular, the largest process, potentially triggered by new spikes in com-
European countries. Likewise, in emerging market and modity prices amid persistent geopolitical tensions,
developing economies, disruptions to production and could prevent central banks from easing monetary
shipping of commodities—especially oil—conflicts, policy, which would pose significant challenges
civil unrest, and extreme weather events have led to to fiscal policy and financial stability. Deeper- or
downward revisions to the outlook for the Middle longer-than-expected contraction in China’s property
East and Central Asia and that for sub-Saharan Africa. sector, especially if it leads to financial instability,
These have been compensated for by upgrades to the could weaken consumer sentiment and generate neg-
forecast for emerging Asia, where surging demand for ative global spillovers given China’s large footprint in
semiconductors and electronics, driven by significant global trade. An intensification of protectionist pol-
investments in artificial intelligence, has bolstered icies would exacerbate trade tensions, reduce market
growth. The latest forecast for global growth five efficiency, and further disrupt supply chains. Rising
years from now––at 3.1 percent—remains mediocre social tensions could prompt social unrest, hurting
compared with the prepandemic average. Persistent consumer and investor confidence and potentially
structural headwinds—such as population aging and delaying the passage and implementation of necessary
weak productivity—are holding back potential growth structural reforms.
in many economies. As cyclical imbalances in the global economy
Cyclical imbalances have eased since the beginning wane, near-term policy priorities should be carefully
of the year, leading to a better alignment of economic calibrated to ensure a smooth landing. In many
activity with potential output in major economies. countries, shifting gears on fiscal policy is urgently
This adjustment is bringing inflation rates across coun- needed to ensure that public debt is on a sustain-
tries closer together and on balance has contributed able path and to rebuild fiscal buffers; the pace of
to lower global inflation. Global headline inflation is adjustment should be tailored to country-specific
expected to fall from an annual average of 6.7 percent circumstances. Structural reforms are necessary to lift
in 2023 to 5.8 percent in 2024 and 4.3 percent in medium-term growth prospects, but support for the
2025, with advanced economies returning to their most vulnerable should be maintained. Chapter 3
inflation targets sooner than emerging market and discusses strategies to enhance the social acceptability
developing economies. As global disinflation continues of these reforms—a crucial prerequisite for successful
to progress, broadly in line with the baseline, bumps implementation. Multilateral cooperation is needed
on the road to price stability are still possible. Goods more than ever to accelerate the green transition and
prices have stabilized, but services price inflation to support debt-restructuring efforts. Mitigating the
remains elevated in many regions, pointing to the risks of geoeconomic fragmentation and strengthen-
importance of understanding sectoral dynamics and of ing rules-based multilateral frameworks are essential
calibrating monetary policy accordingly, as discussed in to ensure that all economies can reap the benefits of
Chapter 2. future growth.
xiv International Monetary Fund | October 2024

1
CHAPTER
GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES
Uncertainty Seeping through as Now, as before, the global outlook will be shaped
Policies Shift largely by fiscal and monetary choices, their interna-
tional spillovers, the intensity of geoeconomic frag-
The past four years have put the resilience of the
mentation forces, and the ability of governments to
global economy to the test. A once-in-a-century pan-
implement long-overdue structural reforms. With infla-
demic, eruption of geopolitical conflicts, and extreme
tion approaching central bank targets and governments
weather events have disrupted supply chains, caused
striving to manage debt dynamics, the policy mix is
energy and food crises, and prompted governments
expected to shift from monetary to fiscal tightening
to take unprecedented actions to protect lives and
as monetary policy rates are brought down, closer to
livelihoods. The global economy has demonstrated
their natural levels. How fast such rotations occur in
resilience overall, but this masks uneven performance
individual countries will have consequences for capital
across regions and lingering fragilities.
flows and exchange rates.
The negative supply shocks to the global econ-
The level of uncertainty surrounding the outlook
omy since 2020 have had lasting effects on output
is high. Newly elected governments (about half of the
and inflation, with varied impacts across individual
world population has gone or will go to the polls in
countries and country groups. The sharpest contrasts
2024) could introduce significant shifts in trade and
are between advanced and developing economies.
fiscal policy (Box 1.2). Moreover, the return of finan-
Whereas the former have caught up with activity and
cial market volatility over the summer has stirred old
inflation projected before the pandemic, the latter are
fears about hidden vulnerabilities. This has heightened
showing more permanent scars (see the October 2023
anxiety over the appropriate monetary policy stance—
World Economic Outlook), with large output short-
especially in countries where inflation is persistent and
falls and persistent inflation (Figure 1.1). They also
signs of slowdown are emerging. Further intensification
remain more vulnerable to the types of commodity
of geopolitical rifts could weigh on trade, investment,
price surges that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
and the free flow of ideas. This could affect long-term
(Figure 1.2; October 2023 and April 2024 World
growth, threaten the resilience of supply chains, and cre-
Economic Outlook).
ate difficult trade-offs for central banks. On the upside,
Since the beginning of the year, signs have emerged
governments could succeed in building the necessary
that cyclical imbalances are being gradually resorbed,
consensus around overdue and difficult-to-pass struc-
with economic activity in major economies better
tural reforms (Chapter 3), which would boost growth
aligned with their potential. These developments
and enhance fiscal sustainability and financial stability.
may have helped bring inflation rates across countries
closer together, but the momentum in global disinfla-
tion appears to have slowed in the first half of the year
(July 2024 World Economic Outlook Update). Goods Steady Disinflation, yet Bumps in the
prices have stabilized, and some are declining, but Road Still Possible
services price inflation remains high in many coun- In many advanced economies, disinflation has come
tries, partly reflecting rapid wage increases, as pay is at a relatively low cost to employment, thanks partly
still catching up with the inflation surge of 2021–22. to offsetting supply developments. These included
This has forced some central banks to delay their pol- a faster-than-expected decline in energy prices and
icy-easing plans (Chapter 2), putting public finances a surprising rebound in labor supply, bolstered
under more pressure, especially in countries where by substantial immigration flows that helped cool
debt-servicing costs are already high and refinancing labor markets (April 2024 World Economic Outlook).
needs significant. Moreover, temporary sectoral bottlenecks during
International Monetary Fund | October 2024 1

WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: POLIC Y PIVOT, RISING THREATS
Figure 1.1. Growth and Inflation Revisions Figure 1.2. Inflation Surprises and Importance of Food in CPI
(Percentage points, relative to January 2020 WEO Update) (Percent)
20 100
AEs AEs
EMMIEs EMMIEs
LIDCs 80 LIDCs
(deviation from Jan. 2020 WEO Update)

Average annual CPI inflation, 2020–24
15
60
10
Inflation rate
40
5
20
0
0
−5 −20
−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 0 20 40 60 80
Cumulative GDP growth Food and non-alcoholic beverages’ weight in CPI
Source: IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: X-axis reports latest estimates for cumulative GDP growth from 2020 to 2024 Note: The solid line denotes linear regression. AEs = advanced economies; CPI =
in deviation from January 2020 WEO Update forecast. Y-axis reports latest estimates consumer price index; EMMIEs = emerging market and middle-income economies;
for inflation rate in 2024 in deviation from January 2020 WEO Update forecast. AEs = LIDCs = low-income developing countries; WEO = World Economic Outlook.
advanced economies; EMMIEs = emerging market and middle-income economies;
LIDCs = low-income developing countries; WEO = World Economic Outlook.
prepandemic trends. Even as labor market pressure has

and after the pandemic led to a steepening of the started to ease (Figure 1.4, panel 2), wage negotiators
Phillips curve and implied a small sacrifice ratio (the have continued to aim for sizable raises to counter the
slack required to decrease inflation). As explained in cost-of-living squeeze felt after the 2021–22 inflation
Chapter 2, a temporarily steeper Philips curve helps surge (Figure 1.4, panel 1). That nominal wage growth
explain both the rapid surge in inflation and the— continues to run higher after the inflation surge is
so far—relatively painless disinflation (Figure 1.3, consistent with past inflationary episodes—when real
panel 1). wages catch up to their equilibrium level determined
Since the beginning of 2024, signs that cyclical by labor productivity—and does not necessarily risk a
imbalances are being gradually resorbed have helped wage-price spiral (see Chapter 2 of the October 2022
bring inflation rates across countries closer together World Economic Outlook).
(Figure 1.3, panel 2). Disinflation has continued With output gaps expected to close, and assuming
broadly as expected but did show signs of slowing in no disruptions to labor supply in advanced economies,
the first half of the year, suggesting potential bumps on wage growth is expected to moderate. Whether recent
the road to price stability (July 2024 World Economic increases translate into further persistence in core infla-
Outlook Update). The persistence in core inflation tion will depend on (1) the impact of recent real wage
has been driven primarily by services price inflation. increases on unit labor costs, which itself depends on
At 4.2 percent, core services price inflation is about labor productivity, and (2) the willingness of firms to
50 percent higher than before the pandemic in major absorb increased unit labor costs in their profit margins.
advanced and emerging market economies (excluding These two factors seem to be working differently in
the US). This contrasts with core goods price inflation, the largest two advanced economies but should still
which has declined all the way to zero (Figure 1.3, allow disinflation to continue. In the United States,
panel 3). Recent increases in shipping rates, especially wage growth has reflected productivity gains lately,
for routes to and from China, have put upward pres- keeping unit labor costs contained. In the euro area,
sure on goods prices. However, this source of upward recent wage increases have exceeded productivity,
pressure has been mitigated so far by declining prices raising unit labor costs (Figure 1.4, panel 3). However,
for exports from China (Figure 1.3, panel 4). European firms should be able to absorb those costs,
Stubbornness in services price inflation partly given large increases in profit shares in recent years
reflects higher nominal wage growth relative to (Figure 1.4, panel 4).
2 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES
Figure 1.3. Recent Inflation Developments Figure 1.4. Labor Market Developments
3.0 1. Sacrifice Ratio for Inflation 2. Headline Inflation Distribution 6 1. Wage Growth
(Change in output gap for (Percent, year over year) (Percent, year over year)
2.5 a change in inflation) 5
24:Q2 4
2.0
3
1.5 23:Q1 2 Posted wage (major AEs)
1.0 US ECI
1 EA union wage
22:Q1
0.5 0
2019:Q1 20:Q1 21:Q1 22:Q1 23:Q1 24:
21:Q1 Q2
0.0
1990:Q4–94:Q1
22:Q4–24:Q1
2000:Q1–02:Q2
08:Q3–09:Q3
20:Q1 2.5 2. Vacancy to Unemployment

(Ratio) 2019:Q4
2019:Q1 2.0 Peak
−10 −5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Latest
1.5
10 3. Sticky Inflation Driven by Services 1.0
(Percent, three month over three month, annualized)
8 0.5
Core goods
6 Core services, excluding US
US core services 0.0
JPN USA GBR DEU EA CAN AUS KOR FRA
4
30 3. Unit Labor Costs
2 2015–19 averages (Percent, year over year) United States
20 Euro area
0 Japan
10 United Kingdom
2
Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Aug.
2018 19 20 21 22 23 24 24 0
−10
20,000 4. Rising Shipping Costs 180
(US$ per 40 ft. container; index, 2010 = 100, right scale) −20
Composite 2017:Q1 18:Q1 19:Q1 20:Q1 21:Q1 22:Q1 23:Q1 24:
15,000 Los Angeles to Shanghai 160 Q2
Rotterdam to New York
Rotterdam to Shanghai 4. Inflation and Profit Shares
10,000 Shanghai to New York 140
(Percent, annualized)
Shanghai to Rotterdam
China export prices (right scale) 2010–19
5,000 120 2020–21
US
2022
2023–24:Q1
0 100 Labor share
2013 15 17 19 21 23 24 Profit share
2010–19
Other input share
Euro area
2020–21
Sources: Haver Analytics; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;
and IMF staff calculations. 2022
2023–24:Q1
Note: In panel 1, sample includes 37 advanced economies. Panel 2 shows the density
distribution of headline inflation developments across 32 advanced economies and −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
13 emerging market and developing economies. The vertical line indicates the 2019:Q1
median. In panel 3, the two aggregates are the purchasing-power-parity-weighted Sources: Eurostat; Haver Analytics; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; and IMF staff
averages. Sample includes 11 advanced economies and 9 emerging market and calculations.
developing economies that account for approximately 55 percent of 2021 world output Note: In panel 4, US decomposition uses data on factor shares from the nonfinancial
at purchasing-power-parity weights. corporate sector only. Euro area decomposition is based on whole-economy data. Data
labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country
codes. AEs = advanced economies; EA = euro area; ECI = Employment Cost Index.

Policy Mix: Tight Monetary, Loose Fiscal Policies Figure 1.5. Monetary Transmission
Economic developments over the past four years 6 1. Real Policy Rate Paths in Major Economies
have had a lot to do with how individual countries (Percent)
4
have deployed fiscal and monetary policies since the
Projections
pandemic. 2
Following an initial period of easing, monetary policy
0
has tightened significantly, with central banks in many United States
emerging markets starting earlier than major central −2 Euro area
China
banks in advanced economies (Chapter 2). Most central −4 Other AEs
banks stopped increasing nominal policy rates in the Other EMDEs
−6
first half of 2023. But real rates continued to rise as Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Dec.
inflation expectations started to decline (Figure 1.5, 2020 21 22 23 24 25 26 26
panel 1), tightening the monetary policy stance further.
8 2. Median Bank Lending and Deposit Rates across Advanced Economies
Real policy rates are currently above estimates of the (Percent)
7
natural rates and thus are acting to cool down economic Policy rate
6 Cash deposit rate
activity and bring inflation back to target.
5 Mortgage rate
Higher policy rates have led to higher mortgage and
4
bank lending rates, a sign that the first leg of monetary
3
transmission has worked as expected. The pass-through
2
to market rates has been gradual but seems to have fin-
ished. The increase in borrowing costs has in turn held 1
back private credit growth and investment, moderating 0

Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jul.
aggregate demand (Figure 1.5, panels 2 and 3). 2019 20 21 22 23 24 24
The contrast with fiscal policy is striking. Despite
1.6 3. Real Credit Growth
a strong rebound in activity in 2022 and generalized (Percent change, month over month)
inflationary pressures, fiscal policy has remained looser. 1.2 Euro area: Change in credit to residents
Some slippage with respect to consolidation plans is US: Change in credit from all commercial banks
0.8
evident (see the October 2024 Fiscal Monitor), except in
low-income developing countries, where limited fiscal 0.4
space has constrained their ability to tackle energy and 0.0

food crises (Figure 1.6, panel 1). From 2022 to 2024,
−0.4
monetary policy tightened significantly in most coun-
tries, but fiscal policy lagged and even eased in many −0.8
Jun. Jun. Jun. Jun.
instances (Figure 1.6, panel 2), complicating the task 2021 22 23 24
of central banks in their effort to rein in inflation and
delaying the necessary rebuilding of fiscal buffers. Tight Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Consensus Economics; European Central
Bank; Federal Reserve Board; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
monetary policy combined with relatively loose fiscal
Note: In panel 1, the gray area denotes discretionary tightening periods (nominal rate
policy, particularly relevant in the United States, may be hikes, excluding China), and the blue area denotes nondiscretionary tightening periods
one of the key factors that has led to dollar appreciation (nominal rate pauses, excluding China). Sample includes 16 AEs and 65 EMDEs. “Other”
aggregates are medians. Real rates are calculated by subtracting 12-month-ahead
in 2024. inflation expectations, computed based on Consensus Forecast surveys of professional
This is expected to change. With public-debt-servic- forecasters, from nominal policy rates. The 12-month-ahead inflation expectations are
constructed as the weighted sum of forecasts for the current and subsequent calendar
ing costs on an upward trend in emerging market and years (see Buono and Formai 2018). Projections for United States and euro area real
developing economies and a recent jump in the United rates are based on market-implied policy rates and inflation swaps for expected
inflation. Panel 2 includes Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
States (Figure 1.6, panel 3), the baseline assumes a and the United States. In panel 3, credit growth is deflated by GDP deflator. AEs =
rotation of the policy mix. Necessary fiscal consoli- advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies.
dation in many economies is expected to slow down
growth and calls for looser monetary policy, which
should in turn help governments trim deficits more
easily (see “Policy Priorities: From Restoring Price
Stability to Rebuilding Buffers”).

Figure 1.6. Fiscal Policy Stance Returning Financial Market Volatility

3 1. Fiscal Slippage In the first week of August, global financial mar-
(Percentage points; 2024 minus 2022 primary balance) kets experienced significant turbulence, interrupt-
2
ing a steady and rapid ascent of equity markets.
1 Weaker-than-expected jobs data raised concerns about
a potential recession in the United States, leading to
0
a stock market correction. This, combined with the
−1 Bank of Japan’s decision to hike interest rates, resulted
Projected consolidation
−2 Actual consolidation in a rapid unwinding of Japanese-yen-funded carry
trades, which amplified the equity market correction
−3
World AEs Euro EMMIEs China LIDCs (see Box 1.3 of the October 2024 Global Financial
excluding area Stability Report and Box 1.4 of the April 2023 Global
euro area
Financial Stability Report).
16 2. Monetary-Fiscal Policy Mix Markets have rapidly stabilized. The Chicago Board
(Percentage points) Options Exchange Volatility (VIX) Index, after having
12 RUS surged to its highest point since 2020, has returned to its
Latest real policy rates
historical average. However, vulnerabilities that contrib-

8 BRA
MEX uted to the recent increase in market volatility persist.
IDN USA CAN DEU These include the disconnect between economic uncer-
4 ZAF AUS
FRA GBR IND ITA tainty and market volatility (see Chapter 1 of the October
KOR
0 2024 Global Financial Stability Report) and overstretched
JPN CHN
equity valuations, particularly in the technology sector.
−4
−4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Revised market expectations regarding US mone-
Change in structural primary balance, 2022−24 tary policy have aligned the outlook for rate cuts there
20 3. General Government Interest Payments
more closely with those for other advanced economies,
(Percent of general government revenues) halting the appreciation of the US dollar against the
16 AEs excluding US currencies of major advanced economies. However,
EMMIEs
LIDCs depreciation pressures remain high in emerging market
12 US and developing economies (Figure 1.7, panel 1). Many
8
of these economies, which began hiking interest rates
earlier, have also started easing earlier, leading to a nar-
4 rowing of differentials between their policy rates and
that of the United States.
0
2008 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 29 For some emerging market and developing econ-
omies faced with large short-term external financing
Source: IMF staff calculations. needs—often a significant share of their buffer of net
Note: In panel 1, the projected and actual consolidations are from January 2022 international reserves—sovereign borrowing spreads
WEO Update and October 2024 WEO, respectively; the panel uses the primary
balance to broaden the country coverage. In panel 2, the primary balance refers to have increased since April, posing an additional
the general government structural primary balance in percent of potential GDP, and challenge (Figure 1.7, panel 2). Although few of these
G20 economies are presented, except for Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, owing
to lack of data availability. In panel 3, the projections are based on the October 2024 economies are in debt distress—defined as having
WEO. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization spreads greater than 1,000 basis points—heavy reliance
(ISO) country codes. AEs = advanced economies; EMMIEs = emerging market and
middle-income economies; LIDCs = low-income developing countries; WEO = World
on short-term external financing reveals vulnerabilities
Economic Outlook. to sudden currency swings.
Rising Geopolitical Tensions but Limited Impact

on Global Trade So Far
Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, global trade
volume as a share of world GDP has not deterio-
rated. However, signs of geoeconomic fragmentation

Figure 1.7. Pressure on Emerging Markets Figure 1.8. Globalization and Trade Fragmentation
20 1. Exchange Rate Depreciation versus US Dollar 70 1. Global Trade Development and Outlook
10 (Percent appreciation from January to September 20, 2024) (Percent of GDP)
0 60
Total trade
−10 Goods trade
−20 50
−30
−40 40
−50 Global
−60 30 financial
−70 Jan. 2–Apr. 16 Apr. 16 to date Cumulative crisis
−80 20
1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 20 25 29
MYS
ZAF
POL
IDN
ROU
DZA
CHN
PHL
IND
HUN
PER
CHL
COL
BRA
MEX
TUR
EGY
NGA
ETH
2 2. Changes in Goods Trade Growth
4,500 2. Short-Term External Financing Needs and Sovereign Spreads (Percentage points; difference in trade growth before and after war)
4,000 (Basis points) 1
3,500 0
3,000 BLR −1
Sovereign spreads
BOL
2,500
−2
2,000 GHA
1,500 ARG −3
TUN
1,000 CMR EGY SLV −4
500 MOZ KEN −5
TUR
0
GEO −6
−500 Between blocs Within blocs
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Short-term external financing needs, 2025
(percent of net international reserves) Sources: Gopinath and others 2024; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: In panel 1, “trade” is defined as the sum of exports and imports. Global trade
and GDP for percentage calculation are in current US dollars. Dashed portions of
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
graph lines indicate October 2024 World Economic Outlook forecasts. In panel 2,
Note: In panel 1, percentage appreciation is computed as the difference in log change is calculated as the average trade growth during 2022:Q2–24:Q1 minus the
exchange rates. In panel 2, fitted regression line is y = −19.5 + 4.47x, with a slope average trade growth during 2017:Q1–22:Q1 within and between blocs. For the
t-statistic equal to 2.51. The regression is weighted by purchasing-power-parity GDP. current period, bloc definition is based on a hypothetical Western bloc centered on
The sample excludes EMDE oil exporters. Data labels in the figure use International the US and Europe and a hypothetical Eastern bloc centered on China and Russia.
Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. EMDE = emerging market and Bilateral quarterly growth rates are computed as the differences in log bilateral
developing economy. trade, which are then aggregated using bilateral nominal trade as weights.
have started to emerge, with increasingly more trade

occurring within geopolitical blocs rather than between emerging market and developing economies (hamper-
them (Figure 1.8). Specifically, when the averages for ing income convergence), increase costs and risks for
the periods 2017 to 2022 and 2022 to the first quarter businesses, and induce a larger economic cost for the
of 2024 are compared, goods trade growth is observed green transition (Box 1.1).
to have declined by approximately 2½ percentage
points more between geopolitically distant blocs than
within blocs. The Outlook: Stable yet
A more fragmented global trade landscape could Underwhelming—Brace for
emerge if geopolitical tensions continue to develop in a Uncertain Times
way similar to that during the Cold War (Figure 1.9). There has been little change in the global growth
Although fragmentation, if it goes hand in hand with outlook since the April 2024 World Economic Outlook.
an increase in intrabloc trade, may not necessarily Following the postpandemic rebound, the global
imply rapid deglobalization (Gopinath and others projection for GDP growth has been hovering at about
2024), it could reduce the resilience of global supply 3 percent, both in the short and the medium term.
chains, increase funding costs, disrupt cross-border Weak growth extends beyond the disinflation period,
capital flows (see Chapter 3 of the April 2023 Global suggesting that potential growth has been durably
Financial Stability Report) and lower market efficiency, affected (see Chapter 3 of the April 2024 World Eco-
slow the transfer of knowledge between advanced and nomic Outlook).

Figure 1.9. Trade Fragmentation: Cold War and Now Figure 1.10. Continued Rotation to Services
(Percentage points)
110 1. Relative Price of Core Goods versus Core Services
Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine (February 2022) (Core-goods-to-services ratio)
Cold War (initial year: 1947) 105
1.0 1. Trade between Blocs 100
95
Trade semi-elasticity for flows
0.5
90 United States
between blocs
0.0 Euro area

85
−0.5 80
Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jul.
−1.0 2015 17 19 21 23 24
−1.5 60 2. Recent PMI trends

0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 (Index, 50+ = expansion)
Number of quarters since the start of the episode 55
0.5 2. Trade with Nonaligned Countries 50

Trade semi-elasticity for flows with
0.0 45 Developed markets: Manufacturing

nonaligned countries
Emerging markets: Manufacturing

40 Developed markets: Services
−0.5 Emerging markets: Services
35
Jan. Jul. Jan. Jul. Jan. Aug.
−1.0 2022 22 23 23 24 24
−1.5 Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 Note: Solid lines denote GDP growth from the October 2024 World Economic Outlook,
Number of quarters since the start of the episode and dashed lines denote GDP growth forecasts from the April 2024 World Economic
Outlook, respectively. PMI = purchasing managers’ index.
Sources: Gopinath and others 2024; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The figure plots the change in global trade between blocs (panel 1) and with
nonaligned countries (panel 2) during the Cold War (blue line, with t0 = 1947) and since
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (red line, with t0 = 2021:Q4). For each episode, the figure is tending to boost activity in the services sector in
plots the semi-elasticity of trade for flows, estimated using a difference-in-differences advanced and emerging markets but is dampening
approach, with bilateral goods trade values on the y-axis, with importer-exporter,
importer-year, and exporter-year fixed effects controlled for, and the associated manufacturing. Manufacturing production is also
90 percent confidence bands. The missing category is trade within blocs. The Cold War increasingly shifting toward emerging market econ-
results are obtained using yearly data from 1920 to 1990—excluding the World War II
years (1939–45), and with 1947 as an excluded year—and the bloc definition based on omies—in particular, China and India—as advanced
Gokmen (2017). The results for the most recent period are based on quarterly trade data economies lose competitiveness (Figure 1.10,
from 2017:Q1 to 2024:Q1 (with 2021:Q4 as an excluded quarter), with the wider bloc
definition based on the ideal point distance (a measure based on voting patterns in the panel 2).
United Nations General Assembly computed by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten [2017]).
Global Assumptions
The picture is far from monolithic, however, and Before regional developments are discussed, it is
important sectoral and regional shifts underpin the important to review the key assumptions about com-
stable global outlook that has emerged since the modity prices and fiscal and monetary policy on which
April 2024 World Economic Outlook. Relative to the baseline projection is predicated.
prepandemic trends, goods prices remain elevated With acknowledgment of exceptional policy uncer-
compared with those for services, a lingering effect tainty associated with newly elected governments in
of the pandemic and its aftermath, which saw strong 2024 (in 64 countries representing about half of the
demand for goods alongside supply constraints global population), the baseline projection is flanked
(Figure 1.10, panel 1). Consequently, behind stable with two alternative scenarios, which lay out the main
growth figures, a global shift from goods to ser- implications for growth and inflation of shifts in
vices consumption is underway. This rebalancing trade and fiscal policy. The scenarios are meant to be

illustrative but are quantitatively plausible alternatives Figure 1.11. Global Assumptions
around the baseline (Box 1.2).
120 1. Energy and Food Prices
• Commodity price assumptions: Oil prices are expected (Index, 2022:Q4 = 100)
to rise by 0.9 percent in 2024 to about $81 a barrel 110 Energy
Food
as production cuts by OPEC+ (Organization of 100
the Petroleum Exporting Countries plus selected 90
nonmember countries, including Russia), sustained
80
global oil demand growth, and geopolitical ten-
70
sions in the Middle East offset strong non-OPEC+
supply growth. Overall, however, prices for fuel 60
commodities are projected to fall on average by 3.8 50
2022:Q4 23:Q4 24:Q4 25:
percent—owing to declines in prices of natural gas Q4
(by 16.4 percent) and coal (by 18.0 percent) as they
come off their 2022 peaks—but less rapidly than 7 2. Monetary Policy Projections
(Percent, quarterly average)
assumed in April (Figure 1.11, panel 1). Food prices 6 United States
5 Euro area
are expected to decline by 5.2 percent in 2024 and by Japan
a further 4.5 percent in 2025 as global grain produc- 4
tion is forecast to reach record highs in 2024–25. 3
• Monetary policy assumptions: Compared with that in 2
April 2024, the anticipated trajectory of policy rates 1
for major central banks in advanced economies has 0
shifted. In the euro area, 100 basis points of cuts −1
are expected in 2024 and 50 basis points in 2025, 2023:Q1 24:Q1 25:Q1 26:Q1 27:Q1 28:Q1 29:Q1 29:
Q4
bringing the policy rate to 2.5 percent by June
2025. In the United States, the Federal Reserve 1.0 3. Fiscal Policy Projections
(Percentage points; change in fiscal balance)
pivoted to cutting rates in September, starting with
a 50 basis point drop. The federal funds rate is pro- 0.5
jected to reach its long-term equilibrium of 2.9 per-
cent in the third quarter of 2026, almost a year 0.0
earlier than what was expected in April. In Japan,
however, policy rate projections have been revised −0.5
upward (since the April 2024 World Economic
Outlook), reflecting the Bank of Japan’s rate hike in −1.0
July. The policy rate is projected to continue to rise 2023 24 25 26 2023 24 25 26
Advanced economies Emerging market and
gradually over the medium term toward a neutral developing economies
setting of about 1.5 percent, consistent with keeping
inflation and inflation expectations anchored at the Source: IMF staff calculations.
Bank of Japan’s 2 percent target. Note: In panels 1 and 2, solid lines denote projections from the October 2024 World
Economic Outlook and dashed lines from the April 2024 World Economic Outlook. Also,
• Fiscal policy assumptions: Governments in advanced the dotted line in panel 1 denotes projections from October 2023 World Economic
economies are on average expected to tighten their Outlook. In panel 3, the fiscal balance used is the general government structural
primary balance, which is the cyclically adjusted primary balance corrected for a
fiscal policy stances in both 2024 and 2025, halv- broader range of noncyclical factors such as changes in asset and commodity prices.
ing primary deficits by 2029. However, contrasts
between the euro area and the United States are
important. In the baseline, the US fiscal deficit is 2024, although with some cross-country differ-
only marginally trimmed down, remaining at about ences. Large contrasts are apparent in the emerging
6.1 percent in 2029, with about half of this reflect- market and developing economies country group as
ing interest rate expenses. Under current policies, well. Whereas fiscal stances are expected to remain
the US public debt is not stabilized, reaching almost relatively loose on average in emerging markets,
134 percent of GDP in 2029. In the euro area, on fiscal consolidation is ongoing among developing
the other hand, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected economies. Over the past few years, many low-
to have stabilized already at about 88 percent in income countries have either lost market access or

been forced to drastically scale back deficits because Figure 1.12. Growth Outlook
higher interest rates have pushed up borrowing
6 1. Growth Outlook
costs (see Chapter 1 of the October 2024 Global (Percent; dashes = April 2024, dots = October 2023)
Financial Stability Report). Forced consolidation is 5
expected to bring down their debt-to-GDP ratios to
4
47.4 percent in 2029 from 54.8 percent in 2024, a
reduction of about 1.5 percent of GDP every year. 3
2
World
Baseline Outlook: Stable Growth amid 1 Advanced economies
Continuing Disinflation 0
Emerging market and developing economies
2023 24 25 26 27 28 29
Global growth is expected to remain broadly flat—
decelerating from 3.3 percent in 2023 to 3.1 percent by 3 2. Cyclical Forces Waning and Output Gaps Closing
2029—and is largely unchanged from World Economic (Percent)
2
Outlook forecasts in April 2024 and October 2023
(Tables 1.1 and 1.2; Figure 1.12).1 Under the surface, 1
however, offsetting revisions have brought major econ- 0
omies closer together as cyclical forces wane and GDP
moves closer to potential. As inflation recedes, policy −1
United States Euro area Japan
rates are expected to follow suit, preventing undue −2 Korea China India
increases in real interest rates. Interest rates are expected Brazil Mexico
−3
to gradually descend toward their natural levels: the lev- 2023 24 25 26
els of risk-free real interest rates compatible with output
Source: IMF staff calculations.
at potential and inflation at target.
Note: In panel 1, solid lines denote GDP growth from the October 2024 World Economic
Although global revisions to the forecast since April Outlook, and dashed and dotted lines denote GDP growth forecasts from the April 2024
have been minimal, offsetting shifts at the country World Economic Outlook and the October 2023 World Economic Outlook, respectively.
group level reflect recent shocks and policies, most
notably in emerging market and developing econo-
mies. Cuts in production and shipping of commodities line with potential. In the United States, growth is
(oil in particular), conflicts, and civil unrest have led expected to decelerate, with output reaching potential
to downward revisions to the regional outlooks for from above by 2029. In the United Kingdom and
the Middle East and Central Asia and for sub-Saharan the euro area, on the other hand, activity is projected
Africa. At the same time, surging demand for semi- to accelerate, closing the output gap from below. In
conductors and electronics, driven by significant Japan, where the output gap is already closed, GDP is
investment in artificial intelligence, has fueled stronger expected to grow in line with potential.
growth in emerging Asia. • In the United States, projected growth for 2024 has
been revised upward to 2.8 percent, which is 0.2
percentage point higher than the July forecast, on
Growth Outlook: Major Economies Draw account of stronger outturns in consumption and
Closer Together nonresidential investment. The resilience of con-
Following a reopening rebound in 2022, growth sumption is largely the result of robust increases in
in advanced economies markedly slowed in 2023 and real wages (especially among lower-income house-
is projected to remain steady, oscillating between 1.7 holds) and wealth effects. Growth is anticipated
and 1.8 percent until 2029. This apparent stability to slow to 2.2 percent in 2025 as fiscal policy is
conceals differing country dynamics as various cycli- gradually tightened and a cooling labor market
cal forces unwind and economic activity gets back in slows consumption. With GDP growth lower than
potential, the output gap is expected to start closing
in 2025.
1For the global and regional aggregates, this World Economic
• In the euro area, growth seems to have reached
Outlook report uses the newly revised purchasing-power-parity GDP
weights based on the latest release from the International Compari- its lowest point in 2023. A touch weaker than
son Program; see the Statistical Appendix for details. projected in April and July 2024, GDP growth is

Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections

(Percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Difference from July Difference from April
Projections 2024 WEO Update1 2024 WEO1
2023 2024 2025 2024 2025 2024 2025
World Output 3.3 3.2 3.2 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Advanced Economies 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
United States 2.9 2.8 2.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3
Euro Area 0.4 0.8 1.2 –0.1 –0.3 0.0 –0.3
Germany –0.3 0.0 0.8 –0.2 –0.5 –0.2 –0.5
France 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.2 –0.2 0.4 –0.3
Italy 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.0 –0.1 0.0 0.1
Spain 2.7 2.9 2.1 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0
Japan 1.7 0.3 1.1 –0.4 0.1 –0.6 0.1
United Kingdom 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0
Canada 1.2 1.3 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Other Advanced Economies2 1.8 2.1 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 –0.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.4 4.2 4.2 0.0 –0.1 0.1 0.0
Emerging and Developing Asia 5.7 5.3 5.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.1
China 5.2 4.8 4.5 –0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
India3 8.2 7.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0
Emerging and Developing Europe 3.3 3.2 2.2 0.0 –0.3 0.1 –0.6
Russia 3.6 3.6 1.3 0.4 –0.2 0.4 –0.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.2 2.1 2.5 0.3 –0.2 0.2 0.0
Brazil 2.9 3.0 2.2 0.9 –0.2 0.8 0.1
Mexico 3.2 1.5 1.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.9 –0.1
Middle East and Central Asia 2.1 2.4 3.9 0.0 0.0 –0.4 –0.3
Saudi Arabia –0.8 1.5 4.6 –0.2 –0.1 –1.1 –1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.6 3.6 4.2 –0.1 0.1 –0.2 0.1
Nigeria 2.9 2.9 3.2 –0.2 0.2 –0.4 0.2
South Africa 0.7 1.1 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
Memorandum
World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates 2.8 2.7 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
European Union 0.6 1.1 1.6 –0.1 –0.2 0.0 –0.2
ASEAN-54 4.0 4.5 4.5 0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.0
Middle East and North Africa 1.9 2.1 4.0 –0.1 0.1 –0.6 –0.2
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 4.4 4.2 4.2 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Low-Income Developing Countries 4.1 4.0 4.7 –0.2 –0.4 –0.5 –0.4
World Trade Volume (goods and services) 0.8 3.1 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Imports
Advanced Economies –0.7 2.1 2.4 –0.3 –0.3 0.1 –0.4
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 3.0 4.6 4.9 0.4 0.1 –0.3 0.8
Exports
Advanced Economies 1.0 2.5 2.7 –0.1 –0.2 0.0 –0.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.6 4.6 4.6 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.7
Commodity Prices (US dollars)
Oil5 –16.4 0.9 –10.4 0.1 –4.4 3.4 –4.1
Nonfuel (average based on world commodity import –5.7 2.9 –0.2 –2.1 –1.8 2.8 0.2
weights)
World Consumer Prices6 6.7 5.8 4.3 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2
Advanced Economies7 4.6 2.6 2.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies6 8.1 7.9 5.9 –0.1 0.0 –0.3 –0.2
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during July 30, 2024–August 27, 2024. Economies are listed on the
basis of economic size. The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted. WEO = World Economic Outlook.
1 Difference based on rounded figures for the current, July 2024 WEO Update, and April 2024 WEO forecasts. Global and regional growth figures are based on
new purchasing-power-parity weights derived from the recently released 2021 International Comparison Program survey (see Box A2) and are not comparable
to the figures reported in the July 2024 WEO Update or the April 2024 WEO.
2 Excludes the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area countries.
3 For India, data and forecasts are presented on a fiscal year basis, and GDP from 2011 onward is based on GDP at market prices with fiscal year 2011/12 as a
base year.
4 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
5 Simple average of prices of UK Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. The average price of oil in US dollars a barrel was $80.59 in 2023;
the assumed price, based on futures markets, is $81.29 in 2024 and $72.84 in 2025.
6 Excludes Venezuela. See the country-specific note for Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections (continued)

(Percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Q4 over Q48
2023 2024 2025 2024 2025 2024 2025
World Output 3.4 3.3 3.1 0.1 –0.2 0.1 0.0
Advanced Economies 1.7 1.9 1.7 0.2 –0.1 0.1 0.0
United States 3.2 2.5 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1
Euro Area 0.2 1.2 1.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 –0.1
Germany –0.2 0.3 1.3 –0.5 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5
France 1.3 0.7 1.5 –0.1 0.0 –0.4 0.0
Italy 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.5 –0.7 0.3 0.0
Spain 2.3 2.9 2.0 0.6 –0.1 1.0 –0.1
Japan 0.9 1.8 0.2 0.2 –0.1 0.1 –0.3
United Kingdom –0.3 2.1 1.1 0.6 –0.5 0.6 –0.2
Canada 1.0 2.3 2.1 0.1 –0.1 0.5 –0.2
Other Advanced Economies2 2.0 1.8 2.6 –0.1 –0.2 –0.3 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.7 4.4 4.3 0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.2
Emerging and Developing Asia 5.9 5.4 5.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3
China 5.4 4.5 4.7 –0.1 –0.2 0.1 0.6
India3 7.8 6.7 6.5 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1
Emerging and Developing Europe 4.3 2.3 2.7 –0.1 –0.7 –0.9 0.1
Russia 4.8 2.4 1.2 0.6 –0.5 –0.2 0.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.3 2.1 2.9 –0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3
Brazil 2.2 3.5 2.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.7
Mexico 2.3 1.3 1.4 –1.7 0.3 –0.6 –0.4
Middle East and Central Asia ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Saudi Arabia –4.3 2.1 4.6 –0.5 0.3 –1.0 –1.3
Sub-Saharan Africa ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nigeria 3.2 3.5 3.7 0.2 1.0 0.0 1.2
South Africa 1.3 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.4 –0.2
Memorandum
World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates 2.8 2.8 2.6 0.1 –0.2 0.1 0.0
European Union 0.5 1.6 1.4 –0.1 –0.4 0.0 –0.3
ASEAN-54 4.2 6.3 3.0 0.8 0.2 1.2 –0.1
Middle East and North Africa ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 4.7 4.4 4.3 0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.2
Low-Income Developing Countries ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Commodity Prices (US dollars)
Oil5 –4.4 –7.3 –4.9 –4.9 0.8 –1.3 0.6
Nonfuel (average based on world commodity import –0.2 3.8 0.5 –3.9 0.0 3.0 0.1
weights)
World Consumer Prices6 5.7 5.3 3.5 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
Advanced Economies7 3.2 2.3 2.0 –0.2 0.0 –0.1 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies6 7.8 7.7 4.7 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
7 The assumed inflation rates for 2024 and 2025, respectively, are as follows: 2.4 percent and 2.0 percent for the euro area, 2.2 percent and 2.0 percent for
Japan, and 3.0 percent and 1.9 percent for the United States.
8 For world output, the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 90 percent of annual world output at purchasing-power-parity weights.
For emerging market and developing economies, the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 85 percent of annual emerging market and
developing economies’ output at purchasing-power-parity weights.

Table 1.2. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections at Market Exchange Rate Weights
(Percent change)
2023 2024 2025 2024 2025 2024 2025
World Output 2.8 2.7 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Advanced Economies 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.3 4.0 4.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Emerging and Developing Asia 5.5 5.1 4.8 –0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.2
Emerging and Developing Europe 3.1 3.1 2.3 –0.1 –0.3 0.0 –0.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.2 1.9 2.4 0.2 –0.2 0.0 –0.1
Middle East and Central Asia 1.5 2.1 4.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.5 –0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 3.4 4.1 –0.2 0.1 –0.2 0.1
Memorandum
European Union 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 –0.1 0.1 –0.2
Middle East and North Africa 1.3 1.8 4.0 –0.3 0.0 –0.7 –0.3
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 4.3 4.0 4.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.1
Low-Income Developing Countries 4.1 3.8 4.8 –0.3 –0.4 –0.6 –0.3
Note: The aggregate growth rates are calculated as a weighted average, in which a moving average of nominal GDP in US dollars for the preceding three years is
used as the weight. WEO = World Economic Outlook.
1 Difference based on rounded figures for the current, July 2024 WEO Update, and April 2024 WEO forecasts.
expected to pick up to a modest 0.8 percent in 2024 Growth Outlook: Emerging Markets Get
as a result of better export performance, in partic- Support from Asia
ular of goods. In 2025, growth is projected to rise
In a manner similar to that for advanced economies,
further to 1.2 percent, helped by stronger domestic
the growth outlook for emerging market and devel-
demand. Rising real wages are expected to boost
oping economies is remarkably stable for the next two
consumption, and a gradual loosening of monetary
years, hovering at about 4.2 percent and steadying at
policy is expected to support investment. Persistent
3.9 percent by 2029. And just as in advanced econo-
weakness in manufacturing weighs on growth for
mies, offsetting dynamics are occurring between coun-
countries such as Germany and Italy. However,
try groups. Compared with that in April, growth in
whereas Italy’s domestic demand is expected to ben-
emerging market and developing economies is revised
efit from the European Union–financed National
upward by 0.1 percentage point for 2024, reflecting
Recovery and Resilience Plan, Germany is experi-
upgrades for Asia (China and India) that more than
encing strain from fiscal consolidation and a sharp
offset downgrades for sub-Saharan Africa and for the
decline in real estate prices.
Middle East and Central Asia (Table 1.1).
• Offsetting dynamics are also at play among other
• Emerging Asia’s strong growth is expected to subside,
advanced economies. Growth is expected to deceler-
from 5.7 percent in 2023 to 5.0 percent in 2025.
ate in Japan in 2024, with the slowdown reflecting
This reflects a sustained slowdown in the region’s
temporary supply disruptions and fading of one-off
two largest countries. In India, the outlook is for
factors that boosted activity in 2023, such as the
GDP growth to moderate from 8.2 percent in 2023
surge in tourism. With respect to April, growth
to 7 percent in 2024 and 6.5 percent in 2025,
is revised downward, by 0.6 percentage point, to
because pent-up demand accumulated during the
0.3 percent for 2024, reflecting a temporary supply
pandemic has been exhausted, as the economy
disruption in the car industry and the base effect of
reconnects with its potential. In China, the slow-
historical data revisions. An acceleration to 1.1 is
down is projected to be more gradual. Despite
predicted in 2025, with growth boosted by private
persisting weakness in the real estate sector and low
consumption as real wage growth strengthens. In
consumer confidence, growth is projected to have
the United Kingdom, in contrast, growth is projected
slowed only marginally to 4.8 percent in 2024,
to have accelerated to 1.1 percent in 2024 and is
largely thanks to better-than-expected net exports.
expected to continue doing so to 1.5 percent in
Compared with that in April, the forecast has been
2025 as falling inflation and interest rates stimulate
revised upward by 0.2 percentage point in 2024 and
domestic demand.

0.4 percentage point in 2025. Recent policy mea- amid reduced tightness in the labor market and
sures may provide upside risk to near-term growth. slower wage growth. In Türkiye, growth is expected
• In contrast, growth in the Middle East and Cen- to slow from 5.1 percent in 2023 to 2.7 percent
tral Asia is projected to pick up from an estimated in 2025, with the slowdown driven by the shift
2.1 percent in 2023 to 3.9 percent in 2025, as the to monetary and fiscal policy tightening since
effect on the region of temporary disruptions to oil mid-2023.
production and shipping are assumed to fade away.
Compared with that in April, the projection has Inflation Outlook: Gradual Decline to Target
been revised downward by 0.4 percentage point for Although bumps on the path to price stability are
2024, mainly the result of the extension of oil pro- still possible, global headline inflation is projected to
duction cuts in Saudi Arabia and ongoing conflict in decrease further, from an average of 6.7 percent in
Sudan taking a large toll. 2023 to 5.8 percent in 2024 and 4.3 percent in 2025
• In sub-Saharan Africa, GDP growth is similarly pro- in the baseline. Disinflation is expected to be faster in
jected to increase, from an estimated 3.6 percent in advanced economies—with a decline of 2 percentage
2023 to 4.2 percent in 2025, as the adverse impacts points from 2023 to 2024 and a stabilization at about
of prior weather shocks abate and supply constraints 2 percent in 2025—than in emerging market and
gradually ease. Compared with that in April, the developing economies, in which inflation is projected
regional forecast is revised downward by 0.2 per- to decline from 8.1 percent in 2023 to 7.9 percent
centage point for 2024 and upward by 0.1 percent- in 2024 and then fall at a faster pace in 2025 to
age point for 2025. Besides the ongoing conflict 5.9 percent.
that has led to a 26 percent contraction of the There is a great deal of variation across emerging
South Sudanese economy, the revision reflects slower market economies, however, which is evident in the
growth in Nigeria, amid weaker-than-expected activ- difference between median and average inflation
ity in the first half of the year. (Figure 1.13, panel 1). Inflation in emerging Asia is
• In Latin America and the Caribbean, growth is projected to be on par with that in advanced econ-
projected to decline from 2.2 percent in 2023 to omies, at 2.1 percent in 2024 and 2.7 percent in
2.1 percent in 2024 before rebounding to 2.5 per- 2025, in part thanks to early monetary tightening
cent in 2025. In Brazil, growth is projected at and price controls in many countries in the region. In
3.0 percent in 2024 and 2.2 percent in 2025. This contrast, inflation forecasts for emerging and develop-
is an upward revision of 0.9 percentage point for ing Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and
2024, compared with July 2024 World Economic sub-Saharan Africa remain in double-digit territory on
Outlook Update projections, owing to stronger account of large outliers amid pass-through of past cur-
private consumption and investment in the first half rency depreciation and administrative price adjustment
of the year from a tight labor market, government (Egypt) and underperformance in agriculture (Ethi-
transfers, and smaller-than-anticipated disruptions opia). For most countries in Latin America and the
from floods. However, with the still-restrictive mon- Caribbean, inflation rates have dropped significantly
etary policy and the expected cooling of the labor from their peaks and continue to be on a downward
market, growth is expected to moderate in 2025. trend. However, large countries in the region have
In Mexico, growth is projected at 1.5 percent in experienced upward revisions since the April 2024
2024, reflecting weakening domestic demand on the World Economic Outlook that reflect a mix of (1) robust
back of monetary policy tightening, before slowing wage growth preventing faster disinflation in the
further to 1.3 percent in 2025 on a tighter fiscal services sector (Brazil, Mexico), (2) weather events
stance. Overall, offsetting revisions leave the regional (Colombia), and (3) hikes in regulated electricity tariffs
growth forecast broadly unchanged since April. (Chile).
• Growth in emerging and developing Europe is The decline in global inflation in 2024 and 2025
projected to remain steady at 3.2 percent in 2024 reflects a broad-based decrease in core inflation,
but to ease significantly to 2.2 percent in 2025. unlike the situation in 2023, when headline infla-
The moderation reflects a sharp slowdown in tion fell mainly because of lower fuel prices. Core
Russia from 3.6 percent in 2023 to 1.3 percent in inflation is expected to drop by 1.3 percentage
2025 as private consumption and investment slow points in 2024, following a 0.1 percentage point

Figure 1.13. Inflation Outlook Figure 1.14. Medium-Term Outlook

(Percent)
12 1. Inflation in AEs and EMDEs
(Percent) AEs average 10
10 AEs 45-degree line
AEs median EMMIEs
EMDEs average LIDCs ETH
Five-year-ahead forecast (2029 growth)

8 EMDEs median 8
BGD
6
UZB
6
4
IND
NGA IDN
2
4 USA
0 GBR
2018 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 FRA
2 CHN
DEU
6 2. Inflation Outlook BRA
(Percentage points; deviation from inflation target) JPN RUS
4 0
0 2 4 6 8 10
One-year-ahead forecast (2025 growth)
2
0 Note: Bubble size reflects size of the economy using 2024 GDP in
purchasing-power-parity international dollars. Data labels in the figure use
−2 International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. AEs = advanced
Oct. 2023 WEO Apr. 2024 WEO Oct. 2024 WEO economies; EMMIEs = emerging market and middle-income economies; LIDCs =
−4 low-income developing countries.
2024 25 26
Sources: Central bank websites; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations. basis, and by the end of 2025, most economies are
Note: In panel 1, the averages are calculated using purchasing-power-parity GDPs as
weights. Panel 2 shows the distribution (box-whisker plot) from each WEO report. The
expected to be either at target or within a stone’s
blocks in the middle of the boxes are the medians, and the upper (lower) limits of the throw of it.
boxes are the third (first) quartile. The whiskers show the maximum and minimum
within a boundary of 1.5 times the interquartile range from upper and lower quartiles,
respectively. AEs = advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging market and developing
economies; WEO = World Economic Outlook. Medium-Term Outlook: A Low-Growth
Regime Setting In
Absent a strong drive for structural reforms, output
decrease in 2023, with advanced economies leading growth is expected to remain weak over the medium
this decline. Factors contributing to lower core infla- term (see Chapter 3 of the April 2024 World Economic
tion include the delayed effect of tight monetary Outlook).
policies as well as diminishing pass-through effects Although monetary policy is expected to return to
from earlier declines in prices, especially in those for a neutral stance by 2025 in the world’s largest econo-
energy. mies, growth in most economies is expected to remain
Overall, returning inflation to target is expected feeble over the medium term. For many advanced
to take until 2025 in most cases. Although the and emerging market economies, the five-year-ahead
pace of disinflation for the median economy has forecast is weaker than the one-year-ahead forecast
been faster than expected in October 2023, the (Figure 1.14), suggesting that persistent headwinds to
dispersion across economies is now expected to be growth will remain prevalent over the medium term.
larger. Comparison of official inflation targets with Structural challenges such as population aging,
the latest forecasts for a representative group of weak investment, and historically low total factor
inflation-targeting advanced and emerging market productivity growth are still holding back global
economies suggests that annual average inflation will growth. The five-year-ahead forecast for global growth
exceed targets (or the midpoints of target ranges) stands at 3.1 percent, indicating continued medio-
in more than three-quarters of these economies in cre medium-term prospects relative to prepandemic
2025 (Figure 1.13, panel 2). But a great deal of this forecasts. Compared with those in April 2024, medi-
reflects annual carryover effects from 2024. Infla- um-term growth prospects for advanced economies
tion is expected to decline steadily on a sequential are unchanged. Although investment is expected to

pick up and productivity growth is also expected to Figure 1.15. Current Account and International Investment
see some normalization, the continued demographic Positions
drag is likely to produce an offsetting effect. Cerdeiro, (Percent of global GDP)
Hong, and Kammer (2024) discuss underlying drivers European creditors European debtors
of recent productivity divergence between the United China United States
Japan Others
States and euro area economies that may continue to Oil exporters Discrepancy
define medium-term growth trends in these economies.
For emerging market and developing economies, 3 1. Global Current Account Balance
medium-term growth prospects have not improved 2
compared with those in the April 2024 World Eco-
1
nomic Outlook and are still much weaker than they
were in prepandemic projections. This partly reflects 0
prolonged scarring from the shocks of the past few
−1
years, especially for low-income developing countries.
It also reflects a slower pace of structural reforms, −2
which is holding back productivity growth. −3
Projected slowdowns in the largest emerging market 2005 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
and developing economies imply a longer path to close 30 2. Global International Investment Position
the income gaps between poor and rich countries.
Having growth stuck in low gear could also further 20
exacerbate income inequality within economies. IMF 10

staff analysis suggests that periods of low economic
0
growth lasting four years or more tend to widen
income inequality within countries, because sluggish −10
job creation and wage growth—as well as weaker fiscal −20
positions preventing redistribution—tend to affect
−30
low-income earners disproportionately (IMF 2024). 2005 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29

Trade Growth Historically Low, yet in Line with Note: European creditors are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Output Growth Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland; European
debtors are Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; oil exporters are Algeria,
Global trade is expected to continue to grow Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
in line with GDP, reaching an average of 3¼ per-
cent growth annually in 2024 and 2025, following
a period of near stagnation in 2023. Despite an commodity prices decline. Creditor and debtor stock
increase in cross-border restrictions affecting trade positions reached historically elevated levels in 2022,
between geopolitically distant blocs, the global trade- with the increases reflecting widening current account
to-GDP ratio is expected to remain stable. Intrabloc balances. They are expected to moderate slightly over
trade and trade with third countries have been com- the medium term as current account balances gradually
pensating forces so far. narrow. In some economies, gross external liabilities
Meanwhile, global current account balances–– remain large from a historical perspective and pose
the sums of absolute surpluses and deficits––are risks of external stress.
expected to continue to decline from their 2022 peaks
(Figure 1.15). As reported in the IMF’s 2024 External
Sector Report, the significant moderation of current Risks to the Outlook: Tilted to the
account balances in 2023 toward prepandemic levels Downside
reflected a reversal of large current account surpluses in The most prominent risks and uncertainties
commodity-exporting countries, continued economic surrounding the outlook are now discussed. A mod-
recovery from the pandemic, and a slowdown in global el-based analysis that quantifies risks to the global
goods trade during 2023. Over the medium term, outlook and plausible scenarios—including shifts in
global balances are expected to narrow gradually as trade and fiscal policies—is presented in Box 1.2.

Downside Risks Figure 1.16. Inflation Surprises and Changes in Inflation

Since the July 2024 World Economic Outlook Update, Expectations
(Percentage points)
adverse risks have gained more prominence.
• Monetary policy tightening bites more than intended. 4
One year ahead
Although policy rates are projected to normalize, 3 Three years ahead
an unanticipated back-loaded strengthening of the
2
Inflation expectations changes

transmission of earlier rate increases could lead to
a faster-than-anticipated deceleration in near-term 1
growth and rising unemployment. Though the
0
impact on growth is unlikely to be persistent given
concurrent policy easing, a rapid weakening of −1
activity could also work its way adversely through −2
consumer and business sentiment. This would place
−3
a stronger drag on household spending and prompt
businesses to dial back their investment plans, either −4
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
(or both) of which could create a negative feedback Inflation surprises
loop to growth. In such circumstances, however,
lower energy prices would cushion some of the neg- Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Survey of Consumer Expectations; and IMF
ative effects on growth as lower demand would push staff calculations.
Note: The figure covers the period January 2020 to May 2024. Dashed lines show fitted
oil prices down. values. Inflation surprises are measured as the difference between actual year-over-year
• Financial markets reprice as a result of monetary inflation and one-year (three-year) inflation expectations from one (three) years prior.
policy reassessments. The global economy is at the Changes in inflation expectations are measured as the changes in one-year (three-year)
inflation expectations relative to one (three) years prior.
last mile of disinflation, which may present greater
challenges to monetary policy than expected if
the cost of reducing inflation in terms of unem- and a low buffer of international reserves will be
ployment (the sacrifice ratio) is closer to prepan- most affected, as many are already subject to large
demic estimates than suggested by recent evidence sovereign borrowing spreads (Figure 1.7, panel 2).
(Figure 1.3, panel 1). If underlying inflation With little room to maneuver on fiscal policy,
proves more persistent than expected, consumers forcing a front-loaded fiscal consolidation could
may adjust their near-term inflation expectations precipitate an economic downturn amid a fragile
(Figure 1.16), forcing central banks to adjust the recovery. Low-income countries will be particularly
path of monetary policy normalization. This would at risk given their limited fiscal space and the need
weaken consumer and business confidence, lead to maintain expenditure on programs supporting the
to market repricing and tighter financial condi- most vulnerable.
tions, and slow economic recovery. Given existing • China’s property sector contracts more deeply than
vulnerabilities (see Chapter 1 of the October 2024 expected. Conditions for the real estate market
Global Financial Stability Report), financial market could worsen, with further price corrections taking
turbulence could resurge, prompting sizable price place amid a contraction in sales and investment.
corrections. Contagion effects are possible and The experiences of Japan in the 1990s and the
could increase risks to financial stability by, among United States in 2008 suggest that a further price
other things, triggering sovereign debt stress in correction is a plausible downside risk if the crisis is
emerging markets. not adequately addressed. Further price drops could
• Sovereign debt stress intensifies in emerging market and dent consumer confidence (which is already at his-
developing economies. Although spreads have eased toric lows) even more, further weakening household
since peaking in July 2022, some emerging market consumption. This could cause domestic demand
and developing economies are still vulnerable to a to falter, with negative spillovers to both advanced
repricing of risk. This could further increase their and emerging market economies given China’s
sovereign spreads and push them into debt dis- rising footprint in global trade (see Chapter 4
tress. Countries with large external financing needs of the April 2024 World Economic Outlook).

Government stimulus to counter weakness in Figure 1.17. Social Unrest Levels

domestic demand would place further strain on (Percent of economies experiencing major social unrest)
public finances. Subsidies in certain sectors, if
7
targeted to boost exports, could exacerbate trade All APAC
tensions with China’s trading partners. 6 EUR ME and CA
SSA WH
• Renewed spikes in commodity prices arise as a result
of climate shocks, regional conflicts, or broader 5
geopolitical tensions. Intensification of regional 4

conflicts, especially given the wider span of con-
flict in the Middle East, or the war in Ukraine, 3
could further disrupt trade, leading to sustained
2
increases in food, energy, and other commodity
prices. Commodity price volatility may result in 1
higher inflation, especially for commodity-import-
0
ing countries, and restrict central banks’ room to Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jun.
maneuver. Extreme heat and prolonged droughts 2018 19 20 21 22 23 24 24
amid record high temperatures worldwide could
Sources: Barrett and others 2022; and IMF staff calculations.
also have an impact on harvests, adding to pres-
Note: The figure shows the share of economies within a world region experiencing
sures on food prices and food security. Low-in- major events of social unrest (including protests, riots, and major demonstrations) in
come countries are likely to be disproportionately the preceding 12 months. All = all economies; APAC = Asia and Pacific; EUR = Europe;
ME and CA = Middle East and Central Asia; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WH = Western
affected, since food and energy costs take up a Hemisphere.
large part of household expenditures there.
• Countries ratchet up protectionist policies. A broad-
based retreat from a rules-based global trading sys- Upside Risks
tem is prompting many countries to take unilateral
More favorable outcomes for global growth than in
actions. Not only would an intensification of protec-
the baseline forecast are also plausible:
tionist policies exacerbate global trade tensions and
• Stronger recovery in investment in advanced economies:
disrupt global supply chains, but it could also weigh
Public investment in advanced economies could
down medium-term growth prospects by limiting
accelerate to meet various pressing policy objectives,
positive spillovers from innovation and technology
from the green transition to upgrading infrastructure
transfer, which fueled growth in emerging market
and boosting investment in science and technology.
and developing economies as globalization took off.
This type of investment could also crowd in the
• Social unrest resumes. Reports of social unrest—
private sector, increasing private investment, and
including protests, riots, and major demonstra-
lead to a higher-than-projected recovery in global
tions—have picked up in some regions, although
demand and trade. Higher aggregate demand could
globally they remain fewer in number than the
be inflationary, although the pressure could be
recent peak in late 2019 to early 2020 (Figure 1.17).
mitigated by the extent to which these investments
However, a resurgence of social turmoil, poten-
enhance supply-side capacity (see Chapter 3 of the
tially driven by higher inflation, higher taxes, and
October 2022 World Economic Outlook). It also
associated loss of purchasing power; spillovers from
depends on how these investments are financed:
conflicts; and rising inequality, could slow economic
fiscal slippage in advanced economies could further
growth, particularly in countries with more lim-
slow the pace at which central banks can bring
ited scope to cushion the impact through policies
inflation to target.
(Hadzi-Vaskov, Pienknagura, and Ricci 2023).
• Stronger momentum of structural reforms: Many
Social unrest could also complicate the passage and
advanced and emerging market economies may
implementation of necessary reforms. Chapter 3
accelerate structural reform efforts to prevent pro-
emphasizes the crucial role of social consensus in
ductivity and potential growth from further lagging
achieving successful and sustainable implementation
those of their more productive peers. Faster imple-
of structural reforms.
mentation of macro-critical structural reforms to

increase labor force participation (such as measures ments in some cases. In particular cases, when risk-off
to better integrate immigrants and women), to episodes translate into higher borrowing costs—putting
reduce misallocation in labor and capital markets, financial sectors under more stress—the importance of
or to help stimulate business innovations (Arnold, close supervision and comfortable buffers cannot be
Claveres, and Frie 2024) could lead to higher medi- overstated.
um-term growth. • Carefully calibrate monetary policy. Monetary policy
needs to be carefully calibrated to ensure the res-
toration of price stability while supporting growth
Policy Priorities: From Restoring Price and employment. In economies with core inflation
Stability to Rebuilding Buffers persistently above target, it is crucial to maintain a
Near-term policies should be carefully calibrated restrictive stance, keeping real interest rates above
and sequenced to ensure a smooth landing. As central the neutral level until there is clear evidence of
banks adopt a less restrictive stance, a renewed empha- sustained cooling in underlying inflation. This
sis on medium-term fiscal consolidation is urgent. This approach is vital to preserving the achievements of
is necessary to restore budgetary flexibility, fund prior- many central banks in anchoring long-term inflation
ity investments, and ensure long-term debt sustainabil- expectations. Where underlying inflation is dimin-
ity. If inflation descends and approaches targets, central ishing consistently, in sync with inflation expecta-
banks should also take into account the implications of tions, a transition to a more neutral policy stance
monetary policy for growth and employment, as long would be warranted. In such cases, the policy rate
as it does not undermine the goal of achieving price can be dropped gradually to avoid undue increases
stability. Easing monetary policy, while still keeping in real interest rates. When the economy cools down
inflation and inflation expectations on a downward faster than expected, and to the extent that inflation
path to target, would support growth and employ- remains under control and on a downward path to
ment and also ease debt-servicing costs. This would target, real rates could be reduced to support growth
in turn facilitate fiscal consolidation in a favorable and employment and keep output close to potential,
feedback loop in which tighter fiscal policy paves the accounting for lags in the transmission of monetary
way for looser monetary policy. Implementing robust policy. Throughout this process, it is important to
supply-enhancing reforms would help curb inflation communicate consistently a commitment to price
and reduce debt, enabling economies to boost growth stability.
toward prepandemic rates, and accelerate progress • Mitigate disruptive foreign exchange volatility. As
toward higher income standards. Multilateral cooper- countries follow different paths to disinflation,
ation is essential to limit the costs and risks associated central bank policies may become less synchronized,
with geoeconomic fragmentation and climate change, potentially leading to increased capital flows. For
speed up the transition to green energy, and support instance, US inflation that is more persistent than
debt restructuring. expected could elevate interest rate expectations,
causing the US dollar to appreciate. This would
push up domestic prices in economies with higher
Ensuring a Smooth Landing import dependence and greater shares of dollar-in-
With output gaps gradually closing and inflation voiced imports, potentially exerting pressure on
on a downward trajectory and approaching targets their financial sectors (Gopinath and Gourinchas
in many countries, the priority should be to ensure 2022; Adrian, Natalucci, and Wu 2024). The IMF’s
a smooth landing. Monetary policy should remain Integrated Policy Framework offers country-specific
flexible and adjust based on a comprehensive analysis guidance on appropriate policy responses in such
of incoming data and their implications for growth scenarios. For countries with deep foreign exchange
and inflation projections. As before, the focus should markets and low foreign currency debt, adjusting
be to keep short- and long-term inflation expectations policy rates and allowing exchange rate flexibility are
anchored. The varying pace of disinflation and mone- advisable. When market stress arises, rapid and deci-
tary easing across advanced and emerging market and sive use of tools to provide liquidity support, while
developing economies could trigger great exchange rate avoiding moral hazard, can help limit contagion. In
volatility, necessitating the use of alternative instru- contrast, for countries with shallow foreign exchange

markets or substantial foreign currency debt, tight- Figure 1.18. Required Fiscal Consolidation
ening global financial conditions might trigger a (Percentage points)
rise in risk premiums and lead to “taper tantrums”
7
as investors offload domestic currency assets, posing
6
systemic risks to financial stability and growth
5 ITA
Change in structural primary balance

uncertainties. In these situations, while maintaining CHN
4
suitable monetary and fiscal policies, temporary
3
foreign exchange interventions or capital flow man- GBR
2 BRA USA
agement measures could be appropriate. Macro-
1 DEU FRA
prudential measures should help mitigate financial KOR IND
0
vulnerabilities stemming from large foreign-cur- AUS
−1 CAN IDN
rency-denominated debt exposures. When sharp JPN
−2
exchange rate movements threaten to de-anchor WEO forecast
−3
inflation expectations, temporary foreign exchange Debt-stabilizing combination
−4
interventions may support monetary policy, pro- −4 −2 0 2 4 6
vided sufficient reserves are available and the cost of Change in interest-growth differential
using monetary policy alone is excessive. Countries
vulnerable to external shocks could consider using
Note: “Debt-stabilizing combination” refers to the change in structural primary balance
the global financial safety nets provided by interna- needed to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at its 2023 level, given the projected change
tional financial institutions, such as precautionary in the interest-growth differential from 2023 to 2024. Data labels in the figure use
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. WEO = World
financial arrangements from the IMF. Economic Outlook.
• Restore macroprudential buffers and ensure financial
stability. With borrowing costs still higher than
before the pandemic, it is crucial to carefully monitor ease overall inflationary pressures. For countries with
serious misalignments in financing conditions and limited fiscal space, the reallocation of spending toward
strengthen supervision. This includes implementing initiatives that support and enhance productivity and
Basel III reforms to protect the financial system from competitiveness can stimulate economic growth and
potential repercussions of a sudden repricing of risk release some of the pressure on overall spending. It is,
and anticipating stress in the banking sector. Where however, important to ensure continuous support to
feasible, macroprudential buffers deployed during the the most vulnerable during fiscal consolidation, safe-
pandemic and the 2021 global energy crisis should be guarding key social spending and safety nets. Strong
gradually rebuilt in the context of a rapidly evolving commitments, clearly defined medium-term fiscal pol-
real estate market. In the event of market strains, icy plans, clear communication of objectives and policy
central banks should be prepared to deploy neces- rationale, and careful sequencing (see Chapter 3) are
sary financial stability tools, providing prompt and essential to maintain popular support, credibility, and
forceful liquidity support to limit contagion (Adrian, confidence; prevent disruptive market reactions; and
Gopinath, and Gourinchas 2023). ensure debt sustainability.
• Urgently devise credible fiscal plans to avoid disruptive
adjustments. Restoring depleted fiscal buffers requires
Rebuilding Fiscal Buffers while Avoiding a consolidation path that is carefully calibrated
Debt Distress to country-specific economic conditions. Unduly
Fiscal deficits and government debt are still above delaying consolidation may lead to market-imposed
what they were before the pandemic, and debt-ser- disruptive adjustments, while excessively front-load-
vice costs remain high and rising in many countries. ing the adjustments may end up hurting economic
To ensure debt sustainability and restore long-term activity and putting an undue burden on vulner-
budgetary flexibility, it is important for many coun- able members in the society. Where consolidation
tries, including both advanced and emerging market is necessary, its pace should be gradual and well
economies, to tighten fiscal policy (Figure 1.18). In communicated to avoid abrupt adjustments that
countries where inflation remains elevated, fiscal con- could diminish economic activity, trigger spikes
solidation can also reduce aggregate demand and help in debt ratios, and undermine public support for

fiscal plans. In certain cases, front-loading fiscal Figure 1.19. Government Spending Composition and Future
adjustments may be necessary to alleviate stress Income Growth
on sovereign debt, particularly in economies that (Percentage points)
have already lost or are about to lose market access. 4 1. Linear Predictions of Income Growth
To achieve lasting consolidation, a credible medi-
um-term plan is essential. This plan should signal
3
a commitment to and identify measures sufficient
for meeting medium-term targets based on realis-
2
tic assumptions about interest rates, revenues and 95 percent confidence bands
spending, and the growth effects of the consolida- 95 percent confidence bands
1 Normal period
tion. In addition, it is critical for the plan’s credibil- Fiscal consolidation period
ity to put a strong institutional framework in place,
0
including binding legislation and fiscal frameworks 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43
to support medium-term consolidation plans.
• Safeguard growth-enhancing measures while reducing 1 2. Income Growth Difference
inequality. During fiscal consolidation, it is crucial to
maintain a growth-friendly approach to adjustments
0
while mitigating the adverse impacts of consolidation
on poverty and inequality, which could help increase
social acceptability and gather political support. −1 95 percent confidence bands
Continuing public investments, particularly in areas Income growth difference
that boost productivity and competitiveness—such as
public and digital infrastructure—can yield positive −2
growth (Figure 1.19). In addition, implementing 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43
Public investment (percent of government spending)
structural reforms to reduce market inefficiencies
and increase labor supply can amplify the benefits of Source: Kass-Hanna, Kpodar, and Tessema 2020.
these growth-friendly investments. Key elements for Note: “Fiscal consolidation” is defined as a reduction of 1 percent of GDP or more in
a well-designed consolidation plan will vary across the primary deficit in two consecutive years after the fiscal deficit has climbed above
3 percent of GDP. Panel 1 plots predictions of medium-term income growth (GDP per
countries (see the October 2024 Fiscal Monitor). capita, five-year-forward moving average) in the two periods. Panel 2 plots differences
• Ensure debt sustainability. Many countries, particu- in the growth impacts in the two periods. It shows that the spending share of public
investment is as important during consolidations as in good times.
larly emerging market economies and low-income
countries, have stretched their ability to service their
debt with borrowing costs and sovereign spreads
still elevated and therefore require significant fiscal Engineering Faster Medium-Term Growth and
adjustments to ensure government debt sustain- Combating Climate Change
ability (see the October 2024 Fiscal Monitor). In To boost productivity and resolve key structural
instances in which countries are in or at high risk bottlenecks, targeted reforms are vital in areas that
of debt distress, achieving debt sustainability may include health care, education, labor markets, compe-
require not only well-timed fiscal consolidation, but tition, and digitalization. Effective and clear communi-
also debt restructuring (see Chapter 3 of the April cation to garner consensus and stakeholder engagement
2023 World Economic Outlook). Recent progress in is essential for successful implementation of these
improving international sovereign debt resolution reforms. In some countries, first-generation reforms
frameworks, including the Group of Twenty (G20) aimed at revitalizing domestic markets and opening up
Common Framework and the Global Sovereign economies, including governance reforms to strengthen
Debt Roundtable, is helping bring together debtors institutions, could have a significant impact on growth
and creditors and facilitate predictable restructuring. (Budina and others 2023).
It is critical to continue building on these initiatives • Advance macrostructural reforms. Carefully sequenced
and improve the efficiency of creditor coordination reforms targeting long-term structural weak-
in cases that are not eligible for treatment under the nesses are crucial for reviving productivity growth
Common Framework. and attracting infrastructure and human capital,

especially when fiscal space is limited. This is To reduce long-term energy security risks, scaling
increasingly important as medium-term growth back fossil fuel investments should be matched
prospects continue to weaken. Key reforms include by increases in clean energy supplies. In addition,
enhancing human capital by expanding health care investments in climate adaptation and infra-
coverage and increasing access to early childhood structure are essential, particularly for regions
and higher education, with a focus on affordabil- most vulnerable to climate shocks. Improving
ity and quality; reducing labor market rigidity climate-risk-monitoring systems and risk manage-
and increasing labor force participation, especially ment frameworks and strengthening safety nets and
among women; reducing barriers to competition insurance are necessary to build climate resilience.
and supporting start-ups; and advancing digitaliza- Mobilizing climate finance for both adaptation and
tion. By accelerating growth, such reforms can also mitigation in low-income countries will require
alleviate concerns about potential short-term growth coordinated efforts by international organizations,
costs of the transition to clean energy (see Chapter 3 private investors, country authorities, and donors
of the October 2022 World Economic Outlook) and (see the October 2023 Fiscal Monitor).
create the necessary fiscal space for implementation. • Strengthen multilateral cooperation. Multilateral
Given the historical challenges in passing structural cooperation is essential in preventing fragmenta-
reforms, policymakers should engage in active and tion, sustaining economic growth and stability, and
effective communication to build consensus. It addressing climate change. Trade policies should be
is vital to design policy measures thoughtfully to clear and transparent to stabilize expectations, lessen
ensure that reforms are sustainable and their benefits investment distortions, and reduce volatility in
are widely shared. This includes early engagement markets, including those for agricultural and critical
with key stakeholders during policy design and mineral commodities. To combat climate change,
crafting complementary and compensatory measures establishing a “green corridor” agreement will secure
that consider the potential distributional effects of the flow of critical minerals essential for the green
the reforms. Continuous engagement and robust transition, and increased sharing of data on these
institutions can help build trust (see Chapter 3). minerals can reduce uncertainty and price volatility.
• Accelerate the green transition and address climate Industrial policies could be envisaged to address
change. Comprehensive and global policy actions well-established negative externalities or market
are required to meet greenhouse gas reduction failures that horizontal policies cannot tackle.
goals aiming to limit global temperature increases However, industrial policies should be well designed,
to 1.5–2.0°C above preindustrial levels. Carbon with benefits greater than costs, and should protect
pricing, subsidies for green investments, and car- fiscal sustainability and external stability. These
bon border-adjustment mechanisms can support policies should avoid protectionist measures and
the green transition while maintaining consistency remain compliant with WTO agreements. Pro-
with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. moting a common platform for the transfer of
Green industrial policies in China, the United low-carbon technologies to emerging market and
States, and the European Union, among others, developing economies and to regulate disruptive
should be designed to complement carbon pric- technologies such as artificial intelligence can help
ing and avoid discriminatory elements and to be reduce emissions and foster global prosperity. In this
fully consistent with international law obligations context, priorities should be restoring a fully and
of these countries. Significant emissions cuts are well-functioning WTO dispute settlement system
achievable by helping firms with high emissions and achieving greater clarity and coherence between
per unit of output adopt frontier technologies. climate considerations and trade rules.

Box 1.1. The Global Automotive Industry and the Shift to Electric Vehicles
The rising adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) Figure 1.1.1. Productivity and Global Value
represents a fundamental transformation of the global Chains in the Automotive Sector
automotive industry. It will have far-reaching conse-
quences for patterns of investment, production, inter- Total Manufacturing Automotive
national trade, and employment. This box documents
some key steps in the evolution of the automotive 250 1. Value Added per Worker
(Thousands of US dollars)
sector and charts possible economic and regional
200
implications.
The car industry stands out among manufacturing 150
sectors in several ways. First, it is very capital intensive,
with high investment (including for innovation), and 100
a significant capital share is value added. The sector
relies on skilled labor and pays wages that reflect the 50
high value added per worker (Figure 1.1.1, panel 1).
Second, multinational firms in the sector operate in 0
Japan Korea Euro US Brazil China India South
many countries along deep global value chains mea- area Africa
sured by the share of foreign value added in produc-
tion (Figure 1.1.1, panel 2). Finally, despite having 50 2. Foreign Value Added
(Percent of production)
many competitors, carmakers manage to have effective
product differentiation and extract a sizable share of 40
the consumer surplus, particularly at the top end.
30
With the sector having high wages, showing strong
profits, using a high degree of technology, and having 20
large export markets, many countries see it as strategic.
In 2022, the transportation sector generated 10
36 percent of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
the United States, 21 percent in the European Union, 0
Japan Korea Euro US Brazil China India South
and 8 percent in China (IEA 2024b). Emissions from area Africa
transportation have failed to decline at the same pace
as those from electricity generation and industry in the Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
past 15 years. Therefore, the shift to electric vehicles Development, Trade in Employment database and Trade in
Value-Added indicators; and IMF staff calculations.
for personal transportation is a key part of the reduc-
tion of GHG emissions. To foster the adoption of
EVs, both supply- and demand-side policies have been
implemented across the world (IEA 2024a).
On the demand side, the European Union has set Cost reduction relies on two main pillars: innovation
out an ambitious goal of reducing emissions from and increasing returns to scale. It explains the global
cars by 50 percent for 2030–35 from the 2021 levels race for innovation in EVs among large carmakers
in its “Fit for 55” package. In the United States, the and battery manufacturers that resulted in the rise of
Inflation Reduction Act includes subsidies for EV many newcomers in the United States (Lucid, Rivian,
purchases and the deployment of charging stations. Tesla) and even more in China (BYD, Geely, Wuling,
Supply-side policies aim at closing the cost and and the like). The rise of lithium ion battery manu-
convenience gaps between EVs and conventional facturers has been even faster, as the industry started
internal combustion engine vehicles, which is a key only 25 years ago.
obstacle to a widespread adoption of EVs. Policies As a result of policies and technological break-
are targeting the entire EV value chain: vehicles, throughs in batteries, the global transition from
batteries, and extraction and processing of metals. conventional vehicles to EVs has accelerated in
recent years (Figure 1.1.2, panel 1) and comes with a
The authors of this box are Benjamin Carton and Philippe redistribution of comparative advantages. In particular,
Wingender. the role of China in both production and exports has

Box 1.1 (continued)

Figure 1.1.2. Global Share of Electric dramatically increased compared with that 15 years
Vehicles ago (Figure 1.1.2, panels 2 and 3).
The EV transition will have global and regional
20 1. World: Share of Electric Vehicles macroeconomic implications. An IMF working paper
(Percent in units) (Wingender and others 2024) estimates the macro-
15 economic implications of a policy-driven shift to EVs
in the European Union by 2035. Two main channels
are at play: (1) regulation moves demand away from
10
conventional vehicles and toward EVs, and (2) China
continues to enjoy a relative cost advantage in building
5 EVs. Under realistic EV market penetration scenarios,
GDP in Europe is reduced by about 0.3 percent in
0 the medium term. In these scenarios, employment
2010 12 14 16 18 20 22 23 declines in the automotive sector, and labor reallocates
30 2. Share in Global Car Exports gradually to less capital-intensive sectors (with lower
(Percent in value) value added per worker).
2023 The analysis also emphasizes that the ability to
2010 import EVs from China softens the trade-offs between
20
economic and climate goals. With fewer imported
EVs, climate policies have to be more stringent to
10 reach the same climate goal, and households’ purchas-
ing power is reduced. Imports of EVs also redistribute
gains and losses between countries specializing in car
0 manufacturing (losing market share) and net car-im-
DEU JPN USA KOR MEX CHN porting countries (gaining purchasing power). The EV
40 3. Share in Global Car Production transition will have implications beyond car manufac-
(Percent in units) turing: for the energy sector, for instance, with a shift
2023 from gasoline to electricity to fuel car fleets, or for
30
2010 demand for minerals.
20
10
0
CHN JPN IND DEU KOR ESP BRA USA
Sources: IEA 2024a; International Organization of Motor

Vehicle Manufacturers; International Trade Centre; and IMF
staff calculations.
Note: Data labels in the figure use International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) country codes.

Box 1.2. Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s

Baseline Projections
The IMF’s Group of Twenty (G20) and Global Inte- Figure 1.2.1. Forecast Uncertainty around
grated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) models are used in Global Growth and Inflation Projections
this box to derive confidence bands around the World (Percent)
Economic Outlook forecast and to quantify two
scenarios. WEO baseline projection
6 1. US GDP Growth 4. Global GDP 6

Risks to growth are currently considered moderately Growth
5 5
tilted to the downside. The risk of global growth fall-
ing below 2 percent—an outcome that has occurred 4 4
only five times since 1970—in 2025 is now assessed at 3 3
17 percent, compared with 12 percent in April, in part 2 2
because the risk of a recession in the United States 1 1
has increased moderately. Risks for global inflation are 0 0
considered broadly balanced. −1 −1
Confidence Bands −2 −2
2023 25 27 29 2023 25 27 29
The G20 model (Andrle and others 2015) is
10 2. US Inflation 5. Global Inflation 10
used here to interpret historical data and recover
the implied economic shocks. The shocks are then 8 8
sampled and fed back through the model to generate
6 6
predictive distributions. Unlike in the April 2024
World Economic Outlook, shocks from years in which 4 4
US recessions took place are sampled more frequently
2 2
when constructing the confidence bands for 2025 and
2026 projections. The approach reflects the assessment 0 0
that US recession risks have increased somewhat in
−2 −2
the near term on account of labor market develop- 2023 25 27 29 2023 25 27 29
ments.1 Data from five recessions are oversampled:
7 3. US Policy Rate 6. Global Core 7
those in 1969, 1982, 1990, 2001, and 2008. Shocks Inflation
for all countries are also oversampled for those years to 6 6
exploit possible co-movements in the data. 5 5
Panels 1–3 in Figure 1.2.1 show the distributions
4 4
for US growth, headline inflation, and the federal
funds rate, respectively. The probability of US growth 3 3
falling below 0.8 percent in 2025—corresponding to 2 2
a short-lived US recession starting in the fourth quar- 1 1
ter of 2024—is about 25 percent. That is a modest
0 0
increase from the risk of recession in the April 2024 2023 25 27 29 2023 25 27 29
World Economic Outlook (17 percent). The risk of
average US headline inflation falling below 1.5 per- Source: IMF staff calculations.
cent in 2025 is assessed at about 40 percent; the risk Note: Each shade of blue represents a 5 percentage point
of the federal funds rate falling below 3 percent for probability interval. WEO = World Economic Outlook.
2025 is about 28 percent.
The authors of this box are Jared Bebee, Chris Jackson, Gene Panels 4–6 in Figure 1.2.1 show the distributions
Kindberg-Hanlon, Dirk Muir, and Rafael Portillo. for global growth and headline and core infla-
1The implications of greater recession risks for the distribution
tion, respectively. The balance of risks for global
of 2024 growth are not considered, because the first-half outturn
is already known and a hypothetical recession would start in the growth is also tilted to the downside, whereas
fourth quarter at the earliest. risks for global inflation remain broadly balanced.

Box 1.2 (continued)

The probability of global growth in 2025 falling about twice the estimated effect from the previous epi-
below 2 percent is assessed at about 17 percent. The sode. The increase in uncertainty is global. The euro
probabilities of global measures of average headline area experiences a decrease in investment similar to
and core inflation falling below 3 percent in 2025 that in the United States, and other regions, including
are estimated at about 20 percent and 15 percent, China, experience a hit that is about half as large. The
respectively. impact on investment fades starting in 2027.
Taxation of business income in the United States.
Scenarios Many of the provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and
The G20 and GIMF models are then used to Jobs Act (TCJA) relating to the taxation of business
simulate two scenarios, each consisting of various income are due to expire at the end of 2025, leading
layers. Scenario A is considered a plausible downside to less generous depreciation allowances and raising
alternative to the current baseline. Scenario B looks at the effective tax rate for some businesses. Scenario
policies advocated to address existing imbalances in the A assumes these expiring provisions are renewed for
world economy. If implemented, policies in scenario 10 years, lowering business income taxes by about
B could reduce the likelihood of policies in scenario 4.0 percent of baseline GDP, cumulatively, between
A materializing. Both scenarios assume endogenous 2025 and 2034.
monetary and fiscal policy responses (automatic sta- Migration flows to the United States and Europe.
bilizers). It is also assumed that exchange rate stability Migration has been boosting labor force growth in
plays a role in China’s monetary policy.2 advanced economies in recent years, raising poten-
tial output and reducing inflationary pressures, most
Scenario A has five layers:
notably in the United States. Whereas a normalization
A global increase in tariffs. Trade tensions lead to a
is projected in the World Economic Outlook baseline for
permanent increase in tariffs starting in mid-2025 and
both the United States and the euro area, scenario A
affecting a sizable swath of global trade. The United
assumes further reductions in net migration, starting
States, the euro area, and China impose a 10 per-
in 2025. As a result, the US labor force is permanently
cent tariff on trade flows among the three regions; a
reduced by 1 percent by 2030 and the euro area labor
10 percent tariff is also levied on trade flows (in both
force by 0.75 percent, relative to the baseline.
directions) between the United States and the rest of
Global financial conditions. Three factors result
the world. The increase in tariffs directly affects about
in a moderate tightening in financial conditions in
one-quarter of all goods trade, representing close to 6
2025–26. First, the scenario has a negative impact on
percent of global GDP.3 The revenue generated by the
the world economy, trade, and uncertainty. Second,
tariffs is transferred back to households.
US monetary policy is (endogenously) tighter than in
Greater trade policy uncertainty. US tariff hikes
the baseline, because of a (small) net increase in US
in 2018–19 increased uncertainty over future trade
inflation. Third, debt increases further, more so in the
policies and adversely affected investment, especially
United States, adding to concerns about debt sustain-
in manufacturing. In scenario A, the tariff increases
ability. As a result of these factors, sovereign premiums
similarly raise trade policy uncertainty from mid-2025
in emerging markets (excluding China) increase by
onward.4 It is assumed that US aggregate investment
50 basis points, while corporate premiums increase by
declines by about 4 percent relative to the baseline,
50 basis points in advanced economies and China and
100 basis points in other emerging markets. Term pre-
2The GIMF model is used for scenario A, as it is better suited
miums also increase by 40 basis points in the United
for the analysis of tariffs and provides a more detailed treatment States and by 25 basis points in the euro area.
of corporate taxes (Anderson and others 2013; Carton, Fernan-
dez-Corugedo, and Hunt 2019). Scenario B uses the G20 model. Scenario B has two layers:
3Tariff scenarios were analyzed in the World Economic Outlook
Rebalancing in China. Reforms are implemented
in 2018 and 2019. The share of global trade affected by higher
tariffs here is about four times larger than in those scenarios. The
that strengthen China’s social safety net by expanding
increase in tariffs is smaller (about one-third of those there). coverage and increasing accessibility of social security
4See, for example, Caldara and others (2020). Chapter 2 of benefits. As a result, the private saving rate gradually
the October 2024 Global Financial Stability Report provides an falls relative to the baseline starting in 2025 and is
in-depth discussion of various measures of uncertainty and of the 3 percentage points of GDP lower by 2027. The saving
channels through which they affect activity.

Box 1.2 (continued)

rate gradually converges back to the baseline starting in
Figure 1.2.2. Impact of Scenario A on GDP
2030.
and Headline Inflation
Higher EU public investment. Subdued produc-
tivity growth and ambitious green transition goals Tariffs
have underscored the need for higher investment in Add trade policy uncertainty
Add renewal of US TCJA
Europe, most recently advocated in the European
Add lower migration
Commission’s “The Future of European Competi- Add global financial conditions
tiveness.” In scenario B, countries in the European
Union undertake a region-wide expansion in public 1. GDP Level 2. Headline Inflation
(Percent) (Percentage points)
investment, which increases by 1.5 percent of the
0.4 United States United States 0.4
region’s baseline GDP on average during 2025–30
and remains permanently higher by 0.5 percent of 0.0 0.2
baseline GDP after that, to sustain higher public −0.4
0.0
capital. About half of the surge is financed by higher −0.8
deficits and the rest by a reallocation of government −1.2 −0.2
spending. −1.6 −0.4
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30
Impact on World Output and Inflation
0.4 Euro area Euro area 0.4
Figures 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 present the effects for scenar-
0.0 0.2
ios A and B. Panel 1 in each figure shows the effects on
−0.4
the level of GDP during 2024–30 for three economies 0.0
(China, United States, euro area) and for the world. −0.8
−1.2 −0.2
Panel 2 shows the effects for inflation. Effects on GDP
are presented as percent deviations from the baseline, −1.6 −0.4
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30
whereas effects on headline inflation are presented as
percentage point deviations from the baseline.5 0.4 China China 0.4
In scenario A, the increase in tariffs affects activity in 0.0 0.2
all regions. Imposing tariffs on imports raises domes- −0.4
tic input costs, and higher tariffs on exports lower 0.0
−0.8
external demand. The net effect on inflation depends −0.2
−1.2
on the relative strength of these two channels but is
small. There is a small negative impact on investment; −1.6 −0.4
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30
the impact on consumption is limited, because tariff
revenue is transferred back to households. Across 0.4 World World 0.4
regions, the impact on the United States is larger, 0.0 0.2
because US trade flows are subject in their entirety to −0.4
the new tariffs: GDP falls by 0.4 percent in 2025 and 0.0
−0.8
by 0.6 percent in 2026. The impact on other regions −0.2
−1.2
and the world reaches –0.3 percent of GDP by 2026,
−1.6 −0.4
and global imports and exports also fall by about 2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30
4 percent, relative to the baseline. The effects on GDP
are permanent, however. The trade policy uncertainty Source: IMF staff calculations.
layer has a more immediate impact on global activ- Note: Results are shown as deviations from baseline projections.
TCJA = Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
ity. Global investment (not shown) falls by close to
2 percent by 2026, lowering GDP by 0.4 percent over
the same period, while global inflation falls by 10 basis
points.
5The impact on growth rates can be approximated by sub-
tracting the effects on output from the previous year.

Box 1.2 (continued)

Figure 1.2.3. Impact of Scenario B on GDP The temporary renewal of US TCJA provisions
and Headline Inflation raises US investment by about 2 percent in 2025 and
4 percent in 2026, relative to the baseline. US GDP
China rebalancing increases by 0.4 percent, and inflation increases by an
Add public investment in Europe average of 20 basis points over 2025–30, prompting
higher US policy rates. Spillovers to other regions
1. GDP Level 2. Headline Inflation
(Percent) (Percentage points)
are negative as investment demand decreases slightly
0.4 United States United States 0.3 outside the United States. The decrease in migration
flows to the United States and euro area permanently
0.3 0.2 reduces potential output in both regions and raises
0.2 0.1 inflation along the adjustment path. GDP falls by
0.5 percent in the United States and by 0.4 percent in
0.1 0.0 the euro area in 2025, whereas inflation increases by
0.0 −0.1 about 20 basis points and 15 basis points for the two,
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30 respectively. As domestic demand falls in the United
States and the euro area, GDP in the rest of the world
3.0 Euro area Euro area 1.0
also dips. Finally, the tightening in global financial con-
2.5 0.8 ditions reduces activity globally, more so in emerging
2.0
0.6 markets excluding China (not shown).
1.5
0.4 The combined effect of scenario A is a decrease
1.0
in global GDP of about 0.8 percent by 2025 and
0.5 0.2
1.3 percent by 2026, relative to the baseline, with
0.0 0.0
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30 some of the effects fading over time. US GDP falls by
about 1 percent relative to the baseline in 2025. The
3.0 China China 3.0 impact on global inflation is by contrast muted, at
2.5 2.5 –10 basis points by 2026, reflecting the role of both
2.0 2.0 demand and supply factors in the scenario.
1.5
1.5 In scenario B, the China rebalancing layer gener-
1.0
1.0 0.5 ates an increase in China’s domestic absorption. The
0.5 0.0 positive effect on China’s GDP peaks at 2.5 percent
0.0 −0.5 by 2027 relative to the baseline, and headline inflation
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30
increases by 90 basis points in 2025 and by as much
1.2 World World 0.6
as 140 basis points in 2027. The rebalancing reduces
1.0 0.5 China’s current account by more than 1 percent of
0.8 0.4 GDP and benefits global activity, but the effect on
0.3 inflation outside China is small. The EU public invest-
0.6
0.2 ment layer steadily raises the level of GDP in the euro
0.4 0.1
0.2 area, which peaks at 2.5 percent above the baseline by
0.0
0.0 −0.1 2030. Productivity increases, raising private invest-
2024 26 28 30 2024 26 28 30 ment and potential output and limiting inflationary
pressures: inflation is about 40 basis points higher than
Source: IMF staff calculations. the baseline over 2025–30. Spillovers to other regions
Note: Results are shown as deviations from baseline are small. The combined effect of layers in scenario B
projections.
is a 0.5 percent increase in world GDP and a rise of
30 basis points in headline inflation in 2025.

Commodity Special Feature: Market Developments and the

Inflationary Effects of Metal Supply Shocks
Primary commodity prices increased between February Figure 1.SF.1. Commodity Market Developments
and August 2024, driven by natural gas, precious
400 1. Commodity Prices1
metal, and beverage prices. In oil markets, supply cuts (Index, 2016 = 100, US CPI adjusted)
by OPEC+ (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting All commodities
300
Countries plus selected nonmember countries, includ- Base metals
ing Russia) and geopolitical tensions in the Middle Food
200 Energy
East offset strong non-OPEC+ supply growth. Beverage
prices continued their ascent, which was driven by the 100
impact of El Niño on tropical crops. Gold prices soared
0
owing to geopolitical uncertainty and rising anticipation 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
of rate cuts. This Special Feature analyzes the role of
metals in the economy and their impact on inflation.1 120 2. Brent Crude Oil Price Forecasts
(US dollars per barrel; expiration dates on x-axis)
April 2023 WEO
100
Commodity Market Developments October 2023 WEO
April 2024 WEO
Oil prices steadied between February and August October 2024 WEO
80
2024 amid OPEC+ production cuts and Middle East
tensions. Before weakening in September, oil prices
60
held steady, with oil trading in a range of $75 to $90 2024 25 26 27 28 29
a barrel between February and August, averaging $83
a barrel. Oil demand growth for this year was expected 10 3. Past Global Oil Demand Growth and 2024–25 Forecasts2
(Percent change)
to match its 21st century average, but this forecast
5
was surrounded by great uncertainty (Figure 1.SF.1,
panel 3).2 Deep production cuts by OPEC+, totaling 0
5.86 million barrels per day (mb/d), have put a floor Annual growth
21st century average
on prices, partially offsetting strong output growth in −5 Consensus Economics forecast
non-OPEC+ countries, led by Canada, Guyana, and OPEC forecast EIA forecast
the United States (Figure 1SF.1, panel 4). −10
2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Fears of a broader regional escalation of tensions in
the Middle East have added a volatile risk premium 8 4. Oil Supply Changes in OPEC+ and Non-OPEC+ Countries3
(Million barrels per day)
to oil prices, though no major supply disruptions have 1.6
4 2.4
occurred so far. A rise in Red Sea maritime attacks 0.4 1.5
has dislocated seaborne oil flows, decreasing traffic −5.2
0
through the Suez Canal by almost two-thirds and 1.2 3.0 −0.3 −0.9
largely rerouting it around the Cape of Good Hope, −4
OPEC+ Non-OPEC+
though tanker rates for both products and crude oil −1.4
−8
2020 21 22 23 24
1The contributors to this Special Feature are Christian Bogmans,
Jorge Miranda-Pinto, Andrea Pescatori (team lead), Martin Stuermer, Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Consensus Economics (CE); Haver Analytics; IMF,
and Xueliang Wang, with research assistance from Wenchuan Dong, Primary Commodity Price System; International Energy Agency (IEA); Refinitiv
Maximiliano Jerez Osses, Joseph Moussa, and Tianchu Qi. This Datastream; US Energy Information Administration (EIA); and IMF staff calculations.
Special Feature is based on Miranda-Pinto and others (2024). Note: CPI = consumer price index; OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
2As of its September reports, the International Energy Agency Countries; WEO = World Economic Outlook.
forecasts 0.90 million barrels a day (mb/d) in average demand 1Latest actual CPI value is applied to the dashed forecast.
growth for 2024, compared with OPEC’s 2.00 mb/d, the US Energy 2Data on past growth are from the IEA. 2024–25 forecast area is shaded. Baseline blue
Information Administration’s 0.94 mb/d, and Consensus Economics’ line in shaded area represents IEA forecast. Forecasts from CE, OPEC, and EIA are also
polling of 0.75 mb/d. Most of the discrepancy relates to the pace included. CE does not have a 2025 forecast. All forecasts are from the latest September
of demand growth in economies outside of the Organisation for 2024 reports of the respective entities.
3OPEC+ denotes OPEC members plus some other oil-producing countries. Numbers
Economic Co-operation and Development.
are adjusted to account for Angola’s departure from OPEC. Data are from the IEA, which
assumes an extension of OPEC+ cuts for 2024.
Commodity Special Feature Market Developments and the Inflationary Effects of Metal Supply Shocks
have dropped back to pre-conflict prices. Russian oil, retrenched on account of weaker demand projections
exported primarily to China and India, has been trad- from China.
ing above the Group of Seven price cap for most of the Agricultural commodity prices declined. Between Feb-
past year—but at a $15–$20 discount to Brent. ruary and August 2024, the IMF’s food and beverages
Futures markets suggest that prices will rise by price index decreased slightly, by 2.4 percent, as large
0.9 percent year over year to average $81.3 a barrel in price increases for beverages were more than offset by
2024 and then fall to $67.0 in 2029 (Figure 1.SF.1, decreases in prices for other food categories. Cereal
panel 2). Risks to this outlook are tilted to the prices declined by 14.3 percent, with global grain pro-
downside. Upside price risks from an escalation of the duction forecast to reach a record high over marketing
Middle East conflict or from a prolonged extension year (MY) 2024–25. Cocoa prices increased by 20.4
of OPEC+ cuts are outweighed by risks of weaker percent, peaking at a record high in April, in line with
oil demand in China and the United States—which expectations by the International Cocoa Organization
collectively account for almost 40 percent of global of an 11 percent decline in global cocoa supply for
demand—as well as in Japan and other advanced MY 2023–24 on account of El Niño and crop diseases
economies, and a rise in OPEC+ production to regain in West Africa. Coffee prices rallied, rising by 33.8 per-
market share. cent, following weather-related supply concerns in key
Natural gas prices rose because of weather and supply producers Brazil and Vietnam. Rice prices declined by
concerns. Title Transfer Facility (TTF) trading hub 7.5 percent, retreating from a multiyear peak reached
prices in Europe rose 26.4 percent between February in January of this year, as crop conditions improved in
and August to $10.2 a million British thermal units India and other parts of Asia. Upside risks stem from
(MMBtu), though they remain well below their peak in further trade disruptions in the Black Sea and new
2022. Price increases were driven by warmer-than-ex- food export restrictions. Larger-than-expected harvests
pected summer weather in the Northern Hemi- constitute the most important downside risk.
sphere and a potential cutoff from Russia’s remaining
Europe-destined pipeline gas. Subdued economic
activity in the European Union and high storage levels Metals Matter: The Economic Relevance
capped further price increases. For liquefied natural gas, of Critical Inputs
Asian prices increased by 49.8 percent following strong Since the end of World War II, oil has played a
import demand from Japan and especially China and major role, among commodities, as a source of shocks
India, and US Henry Hub prices rose by 16.8 percent. for the global economy and inflation (see, for example,
Futures markets suggest that TTF prices will average Hamilton 1983; and Kilian 2008, 2009). However, the
$10.4/MMBtu in 2024, decreasing to $8.2/MMBtu in shift from fossil fuels to metals as inputs to energy sys-
2029. Henry Hub prices may rise from $2.3/MMBtu in tems may render the global economy less oil intensive
2024 to $3.6/MMBtu in 2029, as US export capacity and relatively more metals intensive (Boer, Pescatori,
is expected to almost double through 2027, according and Stuermer 2024). The International Energy Agency
to the US Energy Information Administration. Risks to predicts that demand for copper may grow by a factor
this outlook are balanced. of more than 1.5, and the consumption of oil could
Metals prices increased. The IMF’s metals price decline by 25 percent by 2030 in a net zero emissions
index increased by 7.7 percent between February and scenario (Figure 1.SF.2; IEA 2022).
August 2024 (Figure 1.SF.1, panel 1). Gold prices At the same time, metals production could become
surged by 21.9 percent to record highs against the US less reliable because of geopolitical tensions. Since
dollar, driven by geopolitical uncertainty, expectations most metals production is geographically concentrated
of US rate cuts, and past US consumer price index (more so than that of oil) and most metals are not eas-
(CPI) inflation. Conversely, iron ore prices fell by ily substitutable, trade disruptions could lead to sharp
19.9 percent, affected by reduced demand from the swings in prices, with a growing economic impact as
steel and construction sectors in China. Copper (alu- the global economy and energy systems become more
minum) prices soared by 8.1 (7.8) percent, reaching a reliant on metals (Alvarez and others 2023).3
record nominal high in early July, fueled by growing
demand from renewable energy sources, electricity 3New trade restrictions, including those on metals trade, have
grids, electric vehicles, and data centers. However, almost doubled since the start of the war in Ukraine (Gopinath and
starting in July, both copper and aluminum prices others 2024).

Figure 1.SF.2. Consumption of Copper and Oil Figure 1.SF.3. Intermediate Input Expenditure Share of
(Index) Metals and Oil in Gross Output in the United States
(Percent)
600
Global copper consumption index (100 = 1970)
Global crude oil consumption index (100 = 1970) 1. Metals’ Direct and Indirect Expenditure Share, Top 10 Sectors
500 Net zero emissions scenario Paper products
Net zero emissions scenario Direct
Misc. manufacturing Indirect
400 Construction Domar weights
Other transp.
Furniture
300
Nonmetal products
Motor vehicles
200 Elec. equipment
Machinery
100 Fab. metals
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1970 80 90 2000 10 20 30 40 2. Oil Direct and Indirect Expenditure Share, Top 10 Sectors
Farms
Sources: Boer, Pescatori, and Stuermer 2024; Schwerhoff and Stuermer 2019; Direct
Transit passengers Indirect
International Energy Agency 2022; and IMF staff calculations.
Warehousing Domar weights
Note: We assume that consumption equals production in 1970–2020.
Mining excl. oil/gas
Other transp. equip.
Utilities
Employing time series econometrics and a quanti- Rail transp.
tative production network model, this Special Feature Truck transp.
investigates how metals are used in an economy and Water transp.
how they affect fluctuations in inflation, using oil as a Air transp.
0 10 20 30 40 50
comparator.
Source: Miranda-Pinto and others 2024.
Note: “Direct” is sectoral intermediate input expenditure of metals (oil) as a share of
Metals Embodied in Investment Goods sectoral gross output. “Indirect” is Leontief inverse share element minus “Direct.”
The Domar weight is the ratio of the nominal value of each industry’s gross output to
Primary metals are embodied in the production of GDP and is expressed by the bubble size. The highest Domar weight is for construction
investment goods in a different way than oil is. In fact, (9.59 percent), and the lowest is for water transportation (0.03 percent). We define the
metals sector as the sum of the non-oil and non-gas mining sector and the primary
even as metals like copper and aluminum represent only metals sector. The oil sector is the sum of the oil and gas mining sector and the
a small fraction of final consumption expenditure (for petroleum manufacturing sector. equip. = equipment; excl. = excluding; Misc. =
example, 0.01 percent against 2.6 percent for oil and miscellaneous; transp. = transportation; Elec. = electrical; Fab. = fabricated.
coal products in the United States), they are critical direct

intermediate inputs into the production of investment fuel to produce energy, mostly in transportation (air,
goods. For example, metals represent more than 10 water, truck, rail) and utilities (Figure 1.SF.3, panel 2).
percent of direct input expenditure in US sectors for elec- This makes the effect of an oil price shock on headline
trical equipment and machinery (Figure 1.SF.3, panel 1). inflation more immediate. Once the indirect component
Because metals are embodied in investment goods, is considered, fabricated metals and machinery stand
they are also indirect inputs. For example, to produce out, with 28 percent and 46 percent shares, respectively,
vehicles, metals are used not only for the body of the for the United States (Figure 1.SF.3, panel 1). Shares are
car, but also for the machines used to assemble the car. also sizable for motor vehicles and electrical equipment
To capture these indirect effects, a production network and appliances.
model with flexible prices (for example, Balke and
Wynne 2000) is used.
As shown later empirically, the fact that key upstream Metals Are Important in Many Countries’
sectors providing capital are highly exposed to metals Production Networks
implies a slower and more persistent response of infla- The relevance of metals in the production network
tion to metals price shocks. In contrast, gas and petro- is even more pronounced in some countries than
leum products are much less embodied in machines in the United States. Figure 1.SF.4 plots the (total
and investment goods. Instead, they are used chiefly as input-output network) exposure to metals and oil,

Commodity Special Feature Market Developments and the Inflationary Effects of Metal Supply Shocks
Figure 1.SF.4. Countries’ Input-Output Network Exposure to Several results stand out from Figure 1.SF.4. First,
Metals and Oil the heterogeneity in the exposure of production is
(Percent) starker than the one in the exposure of consumption
Network exposure to metals Network exposure to oil
across countries. This is because consumption prefer-
ences are likely similar across countries, leading to less
0.4 1. Production heterogeneity in consumption exposure. At the same
time, the location of production of tradable goods is
0.3 independent of the location of consumption, creating
more heterogeneity in production exposure. More-
0.2 over, differences in technological adoption also induce
significant heterogeneity in sectoral exposures to metals
0.1 and oil across countries. For instance, whereas the
total metal exposure of the motor vehicle sector in the
0.0 average country is 16 percent, the 10th percentile is
5 percent, and the 90th percentile is 34 percent.
CHN
CHL
ZAF
TWN
KAZ
JPN
RUS
IDN
PER
KOR
TUR
AUS
MAR
SVN
BGR
IND
THA
SVK
CZE
POL
MMR
LUX
MEX
ARG
MYS
Second, metals are more relevant than oil in produc-
0.3 2. Consumption tion in 7 of the top 25 countries. Nevertheless, once
consumption shares are used to aggregate, only three
countries display larger exposure to metals than to oil.
0.2 Indeed, the median CPI exposure is three times larger
for oil than for metals.
Third, there are significant cross-country differences.
0.1
Although the median country has a metals exposure of
0.03, a country in the 90th percentile has an exposure
0.0
that is five times larger than that of a country in the
10th percentile of the distribution. For instance, a
NOR
RUS
IND
SVK
TWN
ZAF
JPN
CHN
POL
TUN
BGR
SVN
THA
EST
KHM
CZE
HUN
KOR
TUR
LUX
SAU
CHL
MYS
CAN
PHL
10 percent supply-driven increase in metals prices would

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff generate a 0.36 percentage point increase in China’s
calculations. CPI, compared with a 0.1 percentage point increase for
Note: The figure depicts countries’ network exposure for the year 2018. Data labels the United States, according to the network model.
in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
Sectoral exposures are weighted by (1) sectors’ value-added share in total value added
(panel 1) and (2) sectors’ final consumption share.
The Impact of Metal Supply Shocks
on Inflation
at the aggregate level, for the top 25 countries, using To study the inflationary consequences of metal and
input-output data from the Organisation for Economic oil supply shocks empirically, this Special Feature follows
Co-operation and Development.4 Panel 1 aggregates Silva (2023) and uses a small open economy production
sectoral exposures to metals and oil using value-added network model (see Online Annex 1.1).5 To test the
shares, which are suited for use in gauging the expo- implications of the model, local projections instrumental
sure of an economy to metals and oil on the production variables (LP-IV) methods are employed. These estimate
side. Panel 2 shows the exposure to metals and oil the effects of copper and oil price shocks for a balanced
on the consumption side. It uses final consumption panel of 39 countries from 1996 to 2019.6
expenditure shares, the relevant measure for CPI, to Panel 1 of Figure 1.SF.5 shows the cumulative
construct the consumption exposure, which indicates 12-month effects of copper and oil supply shocks on
the percent increase in the CPI of a country follow- headline and core inflation. A 10 percent increase in
ing a 10 percent negative supply shock that results in copper prices raises both headline and core inflation by
about a 15 (16) percent increase in metals (oil) prices,
on average, across countries. 5All online annexes are available at www.imf.org/en/Publications/
WEO.
6The instruments for copper and oil prices are the copper supply
4The data cover 45 sectors for 2018 and include imports of inter- shocks from Baumeister, Ohnsorge, and Verduzco-Bustos (2024) and
mediates, which are sizable in the case of metals and oil. the oil supply shocks from Baumeister and Hamilton (2019).

Figure 1.SF.5. Impulse Responses To highlight the delayed and persistent effects on
(Percent) headline and core inflation, panel 2 of Figure 1.SF.5
shows the cumulative 48-month effects of metal and oil
The figure shows impulse responses to a 10 percent increase in the prices of copper
(left side) and oil (right side) for countries with a high (90th percentile) and low (10th supply shocks. A 10 percent increase in copper prices
percentile) network exposure to metals and oil. leads to a cumulative 0.5 percentage point increase over
48 months in core inflation for the group of countries
2.0 1. 12 Months
Headline
with high network exposure to metals. In contrast, a 10
1.5 Core percent increase in oil prices does not cause any signifi-
1.0 cant increase in core inflation over the long term.7
Overall, empirical results underscore the delayed and
0.5
persistent effects of metals prices on inflation through
0.0 production networks’ long-lasting effects on marginal
costs through the cost of capital.8
−0.5
−1.0
Average High
Copper
Low Average High
Oil
Low
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Primary metals play a major role as intermediate
2.0 2. 48 Months
inputs for investment goods in production networks.
Headline
1.5 Core Given how they enter the production network, metal
supply shocks can have significant, persistent effects
1.0
on core and headline inflation. In contrast, oil supply
0.5 shocks affect mostly headline inflation.
0.0 Does this make the work of central banks easier or
more difficult? Central banks have typically “looked
−0.5
through” oil price shocks, provided these shocks were
−1.0 not excessively large. As the energy system moves away
Average High Low Average High Low
Copper Oil from fossil fuels, however, such an approach may not
work well when economies face major fluctuations in
Sources: Baumeister and Hamilton 2019; Baumeister, Ohnsorge, and Verduzco-Bustos metals prices.9 Monetary authorities may eventually
2024; and IMF staff calculations.
need to react to metal supply shocks, because these
Note: Panel 1 shows the 12-month responses, while panel 2 shows the 48-month
responses. Copper = impulse responses to copper supply shock. Oil = impulse shocks have a more persistent effect on core inflation.
responses to oil supply shock. “High” and “Low” indicate the 90th and 10th percentiles In conclusion, central banks must be prepared for a
of network exposure to metals (for copper shock) and oil (for oil shock). Blue and
red squares are the response for headline consumer price index (CPI) and core CPI. potentially more metals-intensive global economy in
Whiskers indicate the 90 percent confidence intervals. which metals price shocks could become increasingly
more relevant. Their impact on inflation may initially
about 0.2 percentage point within 12 months, whereas appear subtle but could prove to be quite persistent.
oil price shocks show a substantial effect on headline 7The persistence of the copper and oil price shocks is roughly
inflation, but not on core. similar. However, copper price shocks have a stronger 48-month
There are, however, significant differences in the effect on copper prices than oil supply shocks have on oil prices.
response of inflation as a function of countries’ network See Online Annex 1.1 for more details. Country heterogeneity is not
significant for oil.
exposure to metals and oil. The 12-month cumulative 8The more persistent effect of metals price shocks is consistent
effect of a 10 percent increase in prices on headline with the version of the model with a capital stock (see Online
(core) inflation is 0.5 (0.3) percentage point for copper Annex 1.1). Also, since copper represents 30 percent of the IMF’s
trade-weighted base metals index, these estimates are a lower bound
and 0.7 (0.1) percentage point for oil in countries with
in the case of a supply shock that increases base metals prices by
high network exposure to metals and oil. For countries 10 percent, as this effect is expected to be three times greater.
with low network exposure to metals and oil, the effect 9Supply shocks to metals markets are more dispersed than those
of a 10 percent increase in prices on headline (core) for oil markets, as they typically do not hit each of the metals mar-
kets at the same time. This has so far made the magnitude of supply
inflation is 0.1 (0.2) percentage point for copper and shocks for the aggregate primary metals sector smaller than that for
0.5 percentage point (0.1) percentage point for oil. those in the petroleum sector.

Annex Table 1.1.1. European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change, unless noted otherwise)
Real GDP Consumer Prices1 Current Account Balance2 Unemployment3
Projections Projections Projections Projections
2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
Europe 1.5 1.7 1.7 9.9 7.9 5.3 2.2 2.5 2.3 ... ... ...
Advanced Europe 0.5 1.0 1.4 5.7 2.4 2.0 2.8 3.1 3.0 5.9 6.0 5.8
Euro Area4,5 0.4 0.8 1.2 5.4 2.4 2.0 1.6 2.6 2.4 6.6 6.5 6.4
Germany –0.3 0.0 0.8 6.0 2.4 2.0 6.2 6.6 6.4 3.0 3.4 3.2
France 1.1 1.1 1.1 5.7 2.3 1.6 –1.0 0.1 –0.1 7.4 7.4 7.2
Italy 0.7 0.7 0.8 5.9 1.3 2.1 0.0 1.1 1.4 7.7 7.0 7.2
Spain 2.7 2.9 2.1 3.4 2.8 1.9 2.7 3.4 3.2 12.2 11.6 11.2
The Netherlands 0.1 0.6 1.6 4.1 3.2 2.3 9.9 10.0 10.1 3.6 3.9 4.2
Belgium 1.4 1.1 1.2 2.3 4.3 2.1 –1.0 –0.3 0.0 5.5 5.7 5.7
Ireland –5.5 –0.2 2.2 5.2 1.7 1.8 8.1 12.0 11.2 4.3 4.4 4.4
Austria –0.8 –0.6 1.1 7.7 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.4 5.1 5.6 5.6
Portugal 2.3 1.9 2.3 5.3 2.5 2.1 1.4 2.0 2.3 6.6 6.5 6.4
Greece 2.0 2.3 2.0 4.2 2.9 2.1 –6.9 –6.5 –5.3 11.1 10.5 10.1
Finland –1.2 –0.2 2.0 4.3 1.2 1.9 –1.1 –1.2 –1.2 7.2 8.3 7.4
Slovak Republic 1.6 2.2 1.9 11.0 2.8 5.1 –1.6 –1.7 –1.4 5.8 5.6 5.7
Croatia 3.1 3.4 2.9 8.4 4.0 2.8 1.1 1.5 0.9 6.2 5.6 5.5
Lithuania –0.3 2.4 2.6 8.7 0.9 2.4 1.9 2.8 2.9 6.9 7.3 7.1
Slovenia 2.1 1.5 2.6 7.4 2.0 2.7 4.5 3.4 2.5 3.7 3.5 3.5
Luxembourg –1.1 1.3 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.6 6.8 6.9 7.0 5.2 5.8 5.9
Latvia –0.3 1.2 2.3 9.1 1.4 2.2 –4.0 –3.8 –3.6 6.5 6.7 6.5
Estonia –3.0 –0.9 1.6 9.1 3.4 2.0 –1.7 –3.4 –3.3 6.4 7.5 7.1
Cyprus 2.5 3.3 3.1 3.9 2.2 2.0 –12.1 –10.1 –8.3 6.1 5.3 5.1
Malta 7.5 5.0 4.0 5.6 2.7 2.5 0.9 1.2 2.3 3.1 3.0 3.0
United Kingdom 0.3 1.1 1.5 7.3 2.6 2.1 –2.0 –2.8 –2.8 4.0 4.3 4.1
Switzerland 0.7 1.3 1.3 2.1 1.3 1.0 6.9 8.2 7.6 2.0 2.4 2.5
Sweden –0.2 0.9 2.4 5.9 2.1 2.0 6.5 6.6 6.1 7.7 8.5 8.3
Czech Republic –0.1 1.1 2.3 10.7 2.3 2.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 2.6 2.8 2.5
Norway 0.5 1.5 1.8 5.5 3.3 2.4 17.9 14.5 12.5 3.6 4.3 3.8
Denmark 2.5 1.9 1.6 3.4 1.8 2.2 9.8 9.0 9.3 2.8 2.9 3.0
Iceland 5.0 0.6 2.4 8.7 6.0 3.3 1.1 0.2 0.1 3.4 3.8 3.8
Andorra 1.4 1.4 1.6 5.6 3.6 2.5 17.0 17.2 17.3 1.6 1.6 1.6
San Marino 0.4 0.7 1.3 5.9 1.3 2.0 13.9 6.2 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9
Emerging and Developing Europe6 3.3 3.2 2.2 17.1 16.9 11.1 –0.5 –0.3 –0.7 ... ... ...
Russia 3.6 3.6 1.3 5.9 7.9 5.9 2.5 2.7 2.6 3.2 2.6 3.0
Türkiye 5.1 3.0 2.7 53.9 60.9 33.0 –4.0 –2.2 –2.1 9.4 9.3 9.9
Poland 0.2 3.0 3.5 11.4 3.9 4.5 1.5 0.8 0.0 2.8 3.2 3.3
Romania 2.1 1.9 3.3 10.4 5.3 3.6 –7.0 –7.5 –7.0 5.6 5.6 5.4
Ukraine7 5.3 3.0 2.5 12.9 5.8 9.0 –5.4 –8.1 –14.3 19.1 14.2 12.7
Hungary –0.9 1.5 2.9 17.1 3.8 3.5 0.2 1.6 0.6 4.1 4.4 4.2
Belarus 3.9 3.6 2.3 5.0 6.0 6.4 –1.8 –2.0 –2.4 3.5 3.0 2.9
Bulgaria 1.8 2.3 2.5 8.6 2.8 2.6 –0.3 –1.0 –1.7 4.4 4.3 4.2
Serbia 2.5 3.9 4.1 12.4 4.5 3.6 –2.6 –4.2 –4.8 9.4 9.1 9.0
Note: Data for some countries are based on fiscal years. Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix for a list of economies with exceptional reporting periods.
1 Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.
2 Percent of GDP.
3 Percent. National definitions of unemployment may differ.
4 Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.
5 Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices except for Slovenia.
6 Includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.
7 See the country-specific note for Ukraine in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Annex Table 1.1.2. Asian and Pacific Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
Asia 5.0 4.6 4.4 2.6 2.2 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 ... ... ...
Advanced Asia 2.0 1.6 1.9 3.6 2.4 2.1 4.4 4.7 4.6 2.8 2.9 3.0
Japan 1.7 0.3 1.1 3.3 2.2 2.0 3.6 3.8 3.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
Korea 1.4 2.5 2.2 3.6 2.5 2.0 1.9 3.9 3.6 2.7 2.9 3.0
Australia 2.0 1.2 2.1 5.6 3.3 3.3 0.3 –0.9 –1.1 3.7 4.1 4.4
Taiwan Province of China 1.3 3.7 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.7 13.8 14.8 14.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
Singapore 1.1 2.6 2.5 4.8 2.6 2.2 19.8 17.8 17.7 1.9 1.9 1.9
Hong Kong SAR 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.1 1.7 2.3 9.2 9.8 9.2 2.9 2.8 2.7
New Zealand 0.6 0.0 1.9 5.7 2.7 2.2 –6.9 –6.3 –5.0 3.7 5.1 5.1
Macao SAR 80.5 10.6 7.3 0.9 1.1 2.0 36.0 33.2 33.3 2.7 1.8 1.8
Emerging and Developing Asia 5.7 5.3 5.0 2.4 2.1 2.7 1.0 0.8 0.9 ... ... ...
China 5.2 4.8 4.5 0.2 0.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 5.2 5.1 5.1
India4 8.2 7.0 6.5 5.4 4.4 4.1 –0.7 –1.1 –1.3 ... ... ...
Indonesia 5.0 5.0 5.1 3.7 2.5 2.5 –0.2 –1.0 –1.2 5.3 5.2 5.1
Thailand 1.9 2.8 3.0 1.2 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
Vietnam 5.0 6.1 6.1 3.3 4.1 3.5 5.8 3.0 2.7 2.0 2.1 2.0
Malaysia 3.6 4.8 4.4 2.5 2.8 2.5 1.5 2.6 2.8 3.6 3.5 3.5
Philippines 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.0 3.3 3.0 –2.6 –2.2 –1.8 4.4 4.4 5.2
Other Emerging and Developing Asia5 4.1 4.3 4.1 11.5 9.7 9.6 –1.0 –0.9 –1.4 ... ... ...
Memorandum
ASEAN-56 4.0 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.3 2.3 3.1 2.7 2.7 ... ... ...
Emerging Asia7 5.8 5.4 5.1 2.0 1.8 2.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 ... ... ...
2 Percent of GDP.
4 See the country-specific note for India in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
5 Other Emerging and Developing Asia comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Lao P.D.R., Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
6 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
7 Emerging Asia comprises China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Annex Table 1.1.3. Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and
Unemployment
2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
North America 2.8 2.5 2.1 4.2 3.1 2.0 –2.9 –3.0 –2.8 ... ... ...
United States 2.9 2.8 2.2 4.1 3.0 1.9 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 3.6 4.1 4.4
Mexico 3.2 1.5 1.3 5.5 4.7 3.8 –0.3 –0.7 –0.9 2.8 3.0 3.3
Canada 1.2 1.3 2.4 3.9 2.4 1.9 –0.7 –1.0 –1.3 5.4 6.2 6.2
Puerto Rico4 0.6 1.0 –0.8 3.5 1.6 1.9 ... ... ... 5.9 6.2 6.5
South America5 1.5 1.8 2.7 19.8 23.7 10.9 –1.4 –1.2 –1.3 ... ... ...
Brazil 2.9 3.0 2.2 4.6 4.3 3.6 –1.0 –1.7 –1.8 8.0 7.2 7.2
Argentina –1.6 –3.5 5.0 133.5 229.8 62.7 –3.2 0.6 0.6 6.1 8.2 7.6
Colombia 0.6 1.6 2.5 11.7 6.7 4.5 –2.5 –2.5 –2.6 10.2 10.2 10.0
Chile 0.2 2.5 2.4 7.6 3.9 4.2 –3.5 –2.3 –2.7 8.7 8.5 8.0
Peru –0.6 3.0 2.6 6.3 2.5 1.9 0.8 0.3 –0.1 6.8 6.8 6.5
Ecuador 2.4 0.3 1.2 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.8 2.4 3.4 4.2 4.0
Venezuela 4.0 3.0 3.0 337.5 59.6 71.7 3.1 4.1 3.3 ... ... ...
Bolivia 3.1 1.6 2.2 2.6 4.3 4.2 –2.6 –5.4 –5.5 4.9 5.0 5.1
Paraguay 4.7 3.8 3.8 4.6 3.8 4.0 0.3 –0.6 –2.5 6.2 6.3 6.3
Uruguay 0.4 3.2 3.0 5.9 4.9 5.4 –3.8 –2.7 –2.6 8.3 8.4 8.0
Central America6 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.2 2.6 3.5 –1.3 –1.1 –1.2 ... ... ...
Caribbean7 7.5 11.9 5.5 13.1 6.9 6.2 2.2 5.6 1.7 ... ... ...
Memorandum
Latin America and the Caribbean8 2.2 2.1 2.5 14.8 16.8 8.5 –1.1 –0.9 –1.1 ... ... ...
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union9 3.9 4.5 3.6 4.0 3.0 2.0 –11.6 –11.1 –10.8 ... ... ...
1 Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. Year-end to year-end changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix. Aggregates exclude
Venezuela.
2 Percent of GDP.
4 Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States, but its statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
5 See the country-specific notes for Argentina and Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
6 Central America refers to CAPDR (Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic) and comprises Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama.

7 The Caribbean comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

8 Latin America and the Caribbean comprises Mexico and economies from the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. See the country-specific notes for Argentina and
Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

9 Eastern Caribbean Currency Union comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as Anguilla and
Montserrat, which are not IMF members.

Annex Table 1.1.4. Middle East and Central Asia Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and
Unemployment
2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
Middle East and Central Asia 2.1 2.4 3.9 15.6 14.6 10.7 3.7 1.7 0.8 ... ... ...
Oil Exporters4 2.0 2.4 3.9 11.1 8.6 8.2 6.2 4.0 2.7 ... ... ...
Saudi Arabia –0.8 1.5 4.6 2.3 1.7 1.9 3.2 0.4 –1.8 3.8 ... ...
Iran 5.0 3.7 3.1 40.7 31.7 29.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 8.1 8.0 8.4
United Arab Emirates 3.6 4.0 5.1 1.6 2.3 2.1 10.7 8.8 8.2 ... ... ...
Kazakhstan 5.1 3.5 4.6 14.6 8.6 7.2 –3.3 –1.5 –2.7 4.8 4.8 4.8
Algeria 4.1 3.8 3.0 9.3 5.3 5.2 2.5 1.3 –0.8 ... ... ...
Iraq –2.9 0.1 4.1 4.4 3.2 3.5 4.5 –1.9 –3.4 ... ... ...
Qatar 1.2 1.5 1.9 3.1 1.0 1.4 17.1 13.4 13.3 ... ... ...
Kuwait –3.6 –2.7 3.3 3.6 3.0 2.4 31.4 28.2 23.7 ... ... ...
Azerbaijan 1.1 3.2 2.5 8.8 2.1 4.8 11.5 6.1 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.3
Oman 1.3 1.0 3.1 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.4 2.3 1.4 ... ... ...
Turkmenistan 2.0 2.3 2.3 –1.6 6.3 8.0 4.7 4.0 2.7 ... ... ...
Bahrain 3.0 3.0 3.2 0.1 1.4 1.8 5.9 5.3 4.5 6.3 ... ...
Oil Importers5,6 2.1 2.4 4.0 22.8 24.7 14.7 –3.1 –4.6 –4.4 ... ... ...
Egypt 3.8 2.7 4.1 24.4 33.3 21.2 –1.2 –6.6 –6.4 7.2 7.2 7.4
Pakistan –0.2 2.4 3.2 29.2 23.4 9.5 –1.0 –0.2 –0.9 8.5 8.0 7.5
Morocco 3.4 2.8 3.6 6.1 1.7 2.3 –0.6 –2.0 –2.3 13.0 13.4 12.6
Uzbekistan 6.3 5.6 5.7 10.0 10.0 9.4 –7.7 –6.3 –6.1 6.8 6.3 5.8
Tunisia 0.0 1.6 1.6 9.3 7.1 6.7 –2.7 –3.5 –3.4 16.4 ... ...
Sudan7 –18.3 –20.3 8.3 77.2 200.1 118.9 –3.6 –3.9 –8.6 46.0 58.0 55.7
Jordan 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.4 –3.5 –5.0 –4.0 22.0 ... ...
Georgia 7.5 7.6 6.0 2.5 1.1 2.6 –4.3 –5.8 –5.9 16.4 14.5 14.5
Armenia 8.3 6.0 4.9 2.0 0.2 3.1 –2.3 –4.2 –4.8 12.6 13.0 13.5
Tajikistan 8.3 6.8 4.5 3.7 4.5 5.9 4.9 0.3 –1.7 ... ... ...
Kyrgyz Republic 6.2 6.5 5.0 10.8 5.1 5.0 –48.2 –21.7 –6.5 9.0 9.0 9.0
Mauritania 6.5 4.4 4.2 4.9 2.7 4.0 –8.8 –7.2 –8.7 ... ... ...
West Bank and Gaza7 –5.4 ... ... 5.9 ... ... –16.6 ... ... ... ... ...
Memorandum
Caucasus and Central Asia 4.9 4.3 4.5 9.8 6.9 6.9 –2.1 –1.5 –2.0 ... ... ...
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, 1.6 2.1 3.9 16.5 15.9 11.4 4.6 2.2 1.3 ... ... ...
and Pakistan6
Middle East and North Africa 1.9 2.1 4.0 15.0 14.8 11.6 5.1 2.5 1.5 ... ... ...
Israel7,8 2.0 0.7 2.7 4.2 3.1 3.0 4.8 3.4 4.4 3.5 3.1 3.4
2 Percent of GDP.
4 Includes Libya and Yemen.
5 Includes Djibouti, Lebanon, and Somalia. See the country-specific note for Lebanon in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
6 Excludes Afghanistan and Syria because of the uncertain political situation. See the country-specific notes in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
7 See the country-specific notes for Israel, Sudan, and West Bank and Gaza in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
8 Israel, which is not a member of the economic region, is shown for reasons of geography but is not included in the regional aggregates.

Annex Table 1.1.5. Sub-Saharan African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.6 3.6 4.2 17.6 18.1 12.3 –2.7 –3.2 –2.9 ... ... ...
Oil Exporters4 2.4 2.7 3.2 20.7 29.3 22.6 2.2 1.0 0.2 ... ... ...
Nigeria 2.9 2.9 3.2 24.7 32.5 25.0 1.7 –0.5 –0.7 ... ... ...
Angola 1.0 2.4 2.8 13.6 28.4 21.3 3.8 3.3 1.5 ... ... ...
Gabon 2.4 3.1 2.6 3.6 2.1 2.2 5.4 5.1 3.1 ... ... ...
Chad 4.9 3.2 3.8 4.1 4.9 3.7 –0.9 –1.7 –2.5 ... ... ...
Equatorial Guinea –6.2 5.8 –4.8 2.5 4.0 2.8 –0.8 –0.4 –2.7 ... ... ...
Middle-Income Countries5 3.1 3.1 3.9 9.4 6.3 5.2 –3.6 –3.3 –2.5 ... ... ...
South Africa 0.7 1.1 1.5 5.9 4.7 4.5 –1.6 –1.6 –1.9 33.1 33.7 33.9
Kenya 5.6 5.0 5.0 7.7 5.1 5.2 –4.0 –4.1 –4.1 ... ... ...
Ghana 2.9 3.1 4.4 39.2 19.5 11.5 –1.4 –2.5 –2.0 ... ... ...
Côte d’Ivoire 6.2 6.5 6.4 4.4 3.8 3.0 –8.0 –5.4 –1.3 ... ... ...
Cameroon 3.2 3.9 4.2 7.4 4.4 3.5 –3.9 –2.8 –3.5 ... ... ...
Senegal 4.6 6.0 9.3 5.9 1.5 2.0 –18.8 –12.7 –8.3 ... ... ...
Zambia 5.4 2.3 6.6 10.9 14.6 12.1 –1.9 –0.2 6.9 ... ... ...
Low-Income Countries6 5.7 5.2 5.9 26.3 23.1 11.0 –6.0 –5.9 –5.7 ... ... ...
Ethiopia 7.2 6.1 6.5 30.2 23.9 23.3 –2.9 –3.4 –4.8 ... ... ...
Tanzania 5.1 5.4 6.0 3.8 3.2 4.0 –5.3 –3.9 –3.4 ... ... ...
Democratic Republic of the Congo 8.4 4.7 5.0 19.9 17.8 9.2 –6.3 –4.0 –2.0 ... ... ...
Uganda 4.6 5.9 7.5 5.4 3.5 4.4 –7.4 –6.6 –6.6 ... ... ...
Mali 4.4 3.8 4.4 2.1 2.5 2.0 –7.1 –5.5 –3.5 ... ... ...
Burkina Faso 3.1 5.5 5.8 0.7 2.1 2.0 –8.0 –3.8 –1.2 ... ... ...
2 Percent of GDP.
4 Includes Republic of Congo and South Sudan.
5 Includes Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles.
6 Includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, and
Zimbabwe.

Annex Table 1.1.6. Summary of World Real per Capita Output

(Annual percent change; in constant 2017 international dollars at purchasing power parity)
Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
World 2.2 1.9 2.5 2.5 1.8 –3.9 5.6 2.6 2.3 2.7 2.3
Advanced Economies 0.9 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.4 –4.5 5.8 2.5 1.1 1.3 1.5
United States 0.8 1.1 1.8 2.4 2.1 –3.0 5.7 2.2 2.4 2.3 1.7
Euro Area1 0.5 1.5 2.4 1.5 1.3 –6.5 6.4 3.2 0.0 0.5 1.0
Germany 1.4 1.5 2.3 0.8 0.8 –4.2 3.6 0.6 –1.1 –0.4 0.6
France 0.5 0.5 2.0 1.3 1.7 –7.8 6.4 2.3 0.8 0.8 0.8
Italy –0.9 1.5 1.8 1.0 0.6 –8.6 9.7 5.0 0.8 0.7 0.8
Spain –0.1 2.8 2.7 2.0 1.1 –11.4 6.7 5.5 2.3 1.7 1.0
Japan 0.6 0.8 1.8 0.8 –0.2 –3.9 3.0 1.5 2.2 0.8 1.6
United Kingdom 0.4 1.1 2.0 0.8 1.1 –10.7 8.3 4.0 –0.1 0.6 1.1
Canada 0.6 0.0 1.8 1.3 0.4 –6.1 4.7 2.1 –1.5 –1.5 1.0
Other Advanced Economies2 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.1 1.3 –2.2 6.0 1.8 0.7 1.5 1.7
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.0 2.8 3.3 3.4 2.4 –3.1 5.9 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.1
Emerging and Developing Asia 6.7 5.8 5.6 5.5 4.5 –1.4 7.0 3.9 5.2 4.7 4.4
China 9.0 6.2 6.4 6.3 5.6 2.1 8.4 3.0 5.4 4.9 4.6
India3 5.3 7.0 5.6 5.3 2.8 –6.7 8.8 6.3 7.3 6.0 5.5
Emerging and Developing Europe 2.7 1.2 3.6 3.3 2.3 –1.8 7.4 2.0 3.6 3.4 2.5
Russia 2.4 –0.1 1.6 2.7 2.1 –2.5 6.2 –0.9 3.9 3.8 1.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.8 –2.0 0.3 0.2 –0.9 –7.9 6.6 3.5 1.5 1.2 1.8
Brazil 1.9 –4.0 0.7 1.1 0.6 –3.9 4.3 2.6 2.5 2.6 1.8
Mexico 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 –1.3 –9.1 5.4 2.9 2.3 0.6 0.5
Middle East and Central Asia 1.6 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 –4.3 2.7 3.3 0.1 4.8 2.1
Saudi Arabia 0.5 –1.9 0.8 5.9 1.5 –8.1 7.7 2.8 –2.7 –0.5 2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.2 –1.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 –4.3 2.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.6
Nigeria 3.6 –4.2 –1.8 –0.7 –0.4 –4.3 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.7
South Africa 1.1 –0.8 –0.3 0.0 –1.3 –7.5 3.8 0.7 –0.8 –0.4 0.0
Memorandum
European Union 0.9 1.7 2.8 2.0 1.8 –5.8 6.7 3.5 0.2 0.8 1.4
ASEAN-54 3.7 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.2 –5.5 3.3 4.5 3.0 3.5 3.6
Middle East and North Africa 1.2 2.5 –0.5 0.5 –0.3 –4.5 2.9 3.3 0.0 0.2 2.2
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 4.2 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.6 –2.9 6.5 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.4
Low-Income Developing Countries 3.1 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.5 –2.3 1.9 2.0 1.7 3.1 2.4
1 Data are calculated as the sum of those for individual euro area countries.
3 See the country-specific note for India in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
4 ASEAN-5 comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

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2
CHAPTER
THE GREAT TIGHTENING: INSIGHTS FROM THE
RECENT INFLATION EPISODE
The recent global inflationary experience was charac- unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus1 deployed
terized by a complex set of events. During COVID-19 by advanced economies and some emerging markets
lockdowns, demand shifted toward goods and then pivoted initially increased savings. Over time, however, a
toward services as economies reopened. These demand drawdown of those savings boosted demand, widen-
shifts occurred in the context of supply disruptions and ing supply-demand imbalances and spurring inflation
unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus. Subse- as capacity remained constrained. The situation was
quently, the war in Ukraine led to spikes in commodity exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, which led to a
prices. Evidence suggests that the pass-through of sectoral global food and energy crisis. By mid-2022, global
price pressures to core inflation and the steepening of the inflation had tripled relative to its prepandemic level
inflation-slack relationship—that is, the Phillips curve— (Figure 2.1, panel 1).
are essential to understanding the global surge in infla- These inflationary pressures tested monetary policy
tion. This evidence is consistent with key sectors hitting frameworks and resulted in a global tightening cycle, or
their supply bottlenecks as demand rotated across sectors “Great Tightening.” The sectoral nature of the shocks,
and was boosted over time by a drawdown of savings. the accompanying relative price shifts, and the uncer-
This chapter offers a new lesson and confirms an old one tainty about their ultimate inflationary effects, as well
for monetary policy. In extreme cases when sectoral supply as the desire to prevent scarring from the pandemic,
bottlenecks are widespread across an economy and interact made it a challenge for central banks to calibrate the
with strong demand, inflation can surge, but tighter pol- timing and pace of monetary responses. Central banks
icy can bring it down quickly with limited output costs. had to rely on tools and frameworks that did not fully
Outside of such cases, when supply bottlenecks are con- account for the features of the new economic land-
fined to specific sectors, conventional policy rules, such as scape. The simultaneous use of multiple policy levers
those that target measures of core inflation, perform well. by many countries, including balance sheet policies,
price-suppressing measures, and fiscal policy, required
assessment of their joint effects in real time. Despite the
Introduction global nature of the tightening cycle, central banks did
The past three years have witnessed an extraordinary not start their rate hikes at the same time, with some
set of inflationary events. Initially, the COVID-19 (for example, Brazil and Chile) moving earlier than
pandemic triggered widespread economic shutdowns, others, depending on country-specific circumstances and
causing many businesses to cut back on production. As the timing and asymmetric effects of shocks.
the recovery began with pandemic restrictions still in Taking stock of the experience since late 2020,
place, consumer demand for goods surged. However, this chapter aims to disentangle the contribution of
producers struggled to ramp up supply quickly enough shocks and policy responses in accounting for the
amid ongoing supply-chain disruptions, leading to inflation surge and the subsequent disinflation, with
price pressures in the goods sector. When economies the goal of drawing lessons for monetary policymakers.
reopened, price pressures shifted as pent-up demand The chapter’s findings can be informative as rising
for services was released. While instrumental in con- geopolitical tensions and extreme weather events are
taining the economic fallout from the pandemic, the likely to trigger further sectoral shocks, and as central
banks review their monetary policy strategies and
The authors of this chapter are Jorge Alvarez (co-lead), Emine Boz
(co-lead), Thomas Kroen, Alberto Musso, Galip Kemal Ozhan, Nich- 1Fiscal stimulus amounted to an average of about 12 percent of
olas Sander, Sebastian Wende, and Sihwan Yang, under the guidance GDP in advanced economies and to an average of 4 percent of GDP
of Jean-Marc Natal. Research assistance was provided by Canran in emerging markets (Deb and others 2024); quantitative easing
Zheng and Weili Lin. The authors thank Benjamin Carton, Rafael policies amounted to about 20 percent of GDP in several advanced
Portillo, and Silvana Tenreyro for their very helpful comments. economies (Erceg and others 2024a).

Figure 2.1. Cross-Country Inflation Dynamics The chapter tackles these questions in three parts.
It first lays out stylized facts, both using raw data and
1. Global Inflation 2. Consumer Price Inflation
14 (Percent, year over year, Forecast Discrepancies 6 through the lens of empirical Phillips curves. The sec-
12 SAAR) (Median, year over year, ond part documents the monetary policy response and
AEs percent) 4 transmission across countries and time. Third, findings
10
EMs from the empirical section motivate the development
8 LICs 2
6
of a new multisector network model. The model is
4 0 used to construct counterfactual scenarios to assess the
importance of sectoral capacity constraints, the global
2
AEs EMs −2 nature of monetary tightening, and other fundamental
0 LICs
factors in driving both the recent inflation surge and
−2 −4
2013: 16: 19: 22: 24: 2021 22 23 24: the ensuing disinflation. This part also compares the
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 performance of alternative simple policy rules under
3. Stable Inflation Expectations 4. Muted Real Wage Responses
different scenarios.
10 (Percent) and No Wage-Price Spiral 25 The chapter’s main findings are as follows:
EMDEs, 12 months ahead (Percent, annualized rate) • Price surges in specific sectors and their broadening over
8 EMDEs, long term EMDEs, nominal wage 20
AEs, 12 months ahead growth time were a defining feature of the recent inflation epi-
AEs, long term EMDEs, CPI inflation sode. Price pressures emerged sooner and were more
6
AEs, nominal wage growth 15
AEs, CPI inflation
pronounced in the goods sector and in sectors with
4 10 higher energy dependence and flexible prices. The
spillovers from higher prices in the energy and other
2 5
sectors to core inflation played an important role.
0 0
Overall, there is little evidence in most economies—
2018: 20: 22: 24: 2017: 19: 21: 23: 24: with the possible exception of the US—to suggest
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1
that inflation was driven by labor market strength,
Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; International Labour Organization; at least during peak inflation.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff calculations. • Price Phillips curves steepened, but wage Phillips curves
Note: In panel 1, lines are the median of consumer price index (CPI) inflation within did not. The relationship between economic slack
each analytical group. The band depicts the 25th to 75th percentiles of data across
economies. In panel 2, forecast discrepancies are derived by comparing one-year-ahead and inflation in the data—that is, price Phillips
inflation forecasts with actual figures in the April World Economic Outlook. The bars curves—shifted upward and steepened. In other
represent median inflation rates, and the whiskers extend from the 25th to the
75th percentiles of data across economies. The data for the first quarter of 2024 are
words, inflation accelerated faster than expected
annualized year-over-year percent changes. Panel 3 reports quarterly 12-month- and when unemployment declined, and in the same
five-year-ahead inflation expectations. Panel 4 reports real wages computed as nominal vein, disinflation took place with fewer job losses
wages (defined on a per worker basis) divided by the CPI and then indexed to 100 in
each country in the first quarter of 2017. Each line reports the group median. than expected. This was not the case for wage
AEs = advanced economies; EMs = emerging markets; EMDEs = emerging market Phillips curves, as wages did not spike in the same
and developing economies; LICs = low-income countries; SAAR = seasonally adjusted
annual rate. way as prices did.
• Interaction of supply bottlenecks with demand pres-
sures can rationalize the steepening of price Phillips
frameworks. The chapter’s analysis is structured around curves. The decline in capacity in sectors that were
the following questions: in high demand—for example, in durable goods
• What accounts for the recent inflation dynamics early in the pandemic and in transportation during
in advanced economies and in emerging market reopening—contributed significantly to inflationary
and developing economies? What role did sectoral pressures.
shocks and capacity constraints play, and how did • Tightening on a global scale can be more effective than
they interact with monetary and fiscal policy? that by individual countries, as it can lower the price
• Was the monetary policy response or its transmis- of tradable goods, especially commodities.
sion unusual relative to the past? • The prevalence of supply bottlenecks and their interac-
• What lessons can be drawn for monetary policy? tion with demand are key for policy responses. A diag-
Did the global nature of tightening make a nosis of the drivers of inflation, though challenging
difference? in real time, remains vital.

CHAPTER 2 THE GREAT TIGHTENING: INSIGHTS FROM THE RECENT INFLATION EPISODE
◦ When the Phillips curve is steep for an economy Figure 2.2. Movements in Sectoral Price Dispersion
overall, the benefits of monetary tightening are (Percent)
amplified. In other words, counteracting the
35
inflationary effects of demand in the presence US
Europe
of prevalent supply bottlenecks—as experienced 30
recently—presents a favorable sacrifice ratio.
25
◦ However, when supply constraints are confined to
the commodity sector, conventional policy rules, 20
such as those targeting measures of core inflation,
remain appropriate. Reacting strongly to flexible 15
commodity prices, when supply constraints are 10

present only in those sectors, brings down infla-
tion fast but risks a recession later. In contrast, 5
targeting sticky prices results in more gradual
0
disinflation with a smoother output path. 2019:Q1 20:Q1 21:Q1 22:Q1 23:Q1 23:Q4
The chapter focuses mainly on the role of policy Sources: Eurostat; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Figure shows average sectoral price dispersion measured using the cross-sectoral
interest rates through conventional demand channels. standard deviation of producer price index (PPI) inflation for European countries
As such, it is complementary to other work focusing on (Norway, UK, EU countries) and the United States. The red line is quarterly standard
the role of central bank communications in inflation deviation across US PPI sectors. Each blue square represents one European country’s
cross-sectoral standard deviation, and the blue line represents the median of European
expectations (see Chapter 3 of the October 2023 World countries in each given quarter.
Economic Outlook), financial market risks, balance sheet
policies (Box 2.1), price-suppressing measures (Box
2.2), liquidity measures, and other policy instruments centage points (1.1 percentage points for emerging
beyond policy rates. Although lessons in these areas can markets and 1.5 percentage points for low-income
be drawn from recent experience, the stability of long- countries). The disinflation of 2023–24 also pro-
term inflation expectations and the lack of broad-based gressed faster than expected, with negative forecast
financial distress motivate the chapter’s focus on interest errors this time, especially for forecasts made in 2023
rates, economic slack, and sectoral activity. regarding 2024 inflation.
Even though global inflation reached unprece-
dented levels in recent history, the feared de-anchoring
What Happened? Dissecting Inflation of inflation expectations reminiscent of the 1970s
Dynamics (Carvalho and others 2023) did not materialize,
Starting in late 2020, inflation rose simultane- although short-term expectations and nominal wages
ously and unexpectedly across the world to levels not went up (Figure 2.1, panels 3 and 4). Crucially, real
seen since the 1970s (Figure 2.1, panel 1). Annual wage growth remained contained in most economies
inflation peaked in 2022 at about 8 percent in the and wage-price spirals—simultaneous accelerations of
median advanced economy and emerging market nominal wages and prices—did not occur in line with
and extended beyond that in the median low-income most historical experience (Alvarez and others 2024).
country, before receding over the course of 2023. The A defining feature of this inflationary episode was
inflation surge was largely unexpected. Starting in the prevalence of large sectoral shifts driven by both
2021, World Economic Outlook forecasts, like many supply and demand. As a result of these shifts, relative
others, underestimated inflation for many countries, prices changed and the variation in inflation across
as evidenced by positive forecast errors in panel 2 of sectors spiked (Figure 2.2). Two main forces were at
Figure 2.1.2 The positive forecast errors were even play. First, demand initially rotated toward goods amid
larger in 2022, particularly for advanced economies, lockdowns and supply-chain disruptions (Figure 2.3,
in which the median forecast error reached 2.5 per- panels 1 and 2). This caused goods inflation to take
off, before a rebalancing of demand as the lockdowns
2Koch and Noureldin (2024) provide an in-depth analysis of eased. Because of this, inflation peaked earlier and
inflation forecast errors. higher in goods than in services. Second, the war

Figure 2.3. Sectoral Characteristics and Inflation Dynamics in Ukraine placed substantial pressure on noncore
components of headline inflation. These drove the
14 1. Average Sectoral Inflation 2. Real Sectoral Consumption 120
(Percent, annualized) (Group average; index,
lion’s share of both the increase and the subsequent
12
EMDEs, goods 2019:Q4 = 100) 110
decrease in overall inflation (Figure 2.3, panel 3),
10 EMDEs, services with a major role for food price inflation, particularly
8 AEs, goods
100 in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central
AEs, services
6 Asia, whereas energy prices were the primary driver of
4 90
EMDEs, goods inflation dynamics in Europe.
2 EMDEs, services The increases in commodity prices had substan-
AEs, goods 80
0 tial downstream effects, because commodities are an
AEs, services
−2 70 input for many other sectors. Using international
2018: 20: 22: 24: 2019: 21: 23: 24:
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 input-output tables, the chapter computes the direct
and indirect energy dependence of sectors through
16 3. Inflation Driven by Energy and Food Prices their supply chains. Inflation initially surged in
14 (Percent, annualized) Food CPI, all items
Energy, transport, and housing energy-dependent sectors in 2021, even before the
12 Other war in Ukraine began. During 2022, inflation in
10
energy-dependent sectors peaked; inflation broadened
8
and started rising in sectors with low energy depen-
6
4
dence. Whereas inflation came down markedly in the
2 energy-dependent sectors, it was just plateauing in
0 less energy-dependent industries at the end of 2023
−2 (Figure 2.3, panel 4), and these industries then became
2020 21 22 23 20 21 22 23 20 21 22 23 20 21 22 23 20 21 22 23 the primary drivers of overall inflation.
Sub-Saharan Asia and Pacific Europe Middle East Western
Africa and Central Asia Hemisphere This is broadly consistent with past patterns in
transmission of energy shocks across sectoral net-
14 4. Sectoral Inflation and Energy Dependence works: energy shocks spread according to sectoral
(Percent, annualized)
12 price flexibility and energy dependence (Online Annex
High energy dependence
10 Low energy dependence Figure 2.2.6), with stronger pass-through in more
8 energy-dependent sectors and in sectors with more
flexible prices (Minton and Wheaton 2022; Afrouzi,
6
Bhattarai, and Wu 2024). Even though the energy
4
price shocks were extraordinarily large this time
2 around (Online Annex Figure 2.2.2), the pass-through
0 was not necessarily out of line. Historically, the peak
2018: 20: 22: 24:
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 pass-through from a 1 percentage point increase in
energy prices into consumer price index (CPI) infla-
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, Consumer Price Index (CPI) data portal; Organisation for tion at the country level was about 0.06 percentage
Economic Co-operation and Development; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; and IMF staff
calculations.
point in advanced economies and 0.17 percentage
Note: Panel 1 displays the average inflation rates for goods (excluding food and energy) point in emerging market and developing economies.3
and services across a sample of 30 AEs and 13 EMDEs over time. Data are reported
as deviations from 2018–19 average. Panel 2 shows the purchasing-power-parity
GDP-weighted average of real sectoral consumption across AEs and EMDEs, normalized 3These estimated magnitudes are in the ballpark of those in Task
to the fourth quarter of 2019. Panel 3 shows the median contributions and aggregate Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the ESCB (2010);
inflation rate for each region. For panel 4, energy dependence is computed as the total Choi and others (2018); Minton and Wheaton (2022); and Afrouzi,
share of oil, gas, and utilities in sectoral inputs. Sectors are defined as energy dependent Bhattarai, and Wu (2024). The larger impact on emerging market
if their energy dependence is above the median. Remaining sectors have low energy and developing economies partly reflects the greater share of
dependence. Sectoral inflation rates (measured as sectoral value-added deflators) are energy-intensive sectors (for example, mining and manufacturing) in
collapsed by median within each group. AEs = advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging
those countries (see also the October 2023 Asia and Pacific Regional
market and developing economies.
Economic Outlook). Online Annex Figure 2.2.4 additionally tests for
nonlinearities in pass-through, which are a feature of some structural
models, such as that of Cavallo, Lippi, and Miyahara (2023).
Although there is some evidence for nonlinearities in energy price
pass-through, there is no evidence for a broad-based postpandemic
strengthening of these nonlinearities. All online annexes are available
at www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO.

Figure 2.4. Energy Price Pass-Through into CPI Inflation Figure 2.5. Sectoral Inflation and Price Flexibility
(Percentage points) (Percent, annualized rate)
Change in pass-through, 2020–23 High price flexibility Low price flexibility Consumer price inflation
Baseline energy inflation pass-through
8 1. Drivers of US PCE Inflation
0.10 1. Advanced Economies 7
6
0.05 5
4
3
0.00
2
1
−0.05
0
−1
−0.10 Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jun.
0 4 8 12 2019 20 21 22 23 24 24
Quarters
12 2. Drivers of Euro Area HICP Inflation
0.3 2. Emerging Market and Developing Economies
10
0.2 8
0.1 6
0.0 4
2
−0.1
0
−0.2
−2
−0.3 2019: 20: 21: 22: 23: 24:
0 4 8 12 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q2
Quarters
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, Consumer Price Index (CPI) data portal; and IMF staff calculations.
calculations. Note: Inflation is measured as HICP inflation across euro area sectors. Sectoral
Note: Figure reports results of local projections of country-level consumer price price flexibility is computed using data from Rubbo (2023). Sectoral data feature
index (CPI) inflation on energy prices for a 100 basis point energy price shock. The 12 HICP sectors. Sectors are split along median of price flexibility, and then inflation
sample covers 2010–24 data for 26 advanced economies (AEs) and 9 emerging market is aggregated across countries using PPP country weights and within-country HICP
and developing economies (EMDEs). COVID period is defined as the third quarter of weights. PCE = personal consumption expenditures; HICP = harmonised index of
2020 onward. The first two quarters of 2020 are excluded. Controls include two lags of consumer prices; PPP = purchasing power parity.
output gap, CPI inflation, policy rate, and change in nominal effective exchange rate.
Regressions also include country fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by
country and time. Lines report local-projection coefficients for up to 12 quarters ahead
alongside 95 percent confidence bands (dashed lines). this chapter using statistical inflation decompositions
and in Box 2.2, in which the role of price-suppressing
measures in containing (energy) inflation is explored.
The values were comparable this time around, because Partly because of the role of energy and commod-
the pass-through from energy prices into CPI inflation ity price shocks, headline inflation was initially led
did not strengthen materially across a wide range of by more price-flexible goods sectors such as energy,
countries (Figure 2.4; Online Annex Figures 2.2.4 vehicles, and household equipment and followed by
and 2.2.5).4 Moreover, countries with lower energy flexible-price services sectors such as restaurants, hotels,
price inflation, notably Asian emerging market and and recreation. These flexible-price sectors explain
developing economies (Online Annex Figure 2.2.2, the bulk of the rise and fall in inflation observed in
panel 4), had lower overall CPI inflation, suggesting the United States and the euro area. Sectors with
that energy prices may have played a prominent role more rigid prices did not experience substantial price
in inflation dynamics—a theme that is revisited in increases until late 2022 and early 2023. By the end
of 2023, however, inflation was driven primarily by
4The strength of oil price pass-through across countries may be
inflexible-price sectors such as clothing, communica-
affected by the level of fuel excise taxes (Ahn 2024), with stronger tions, and health (Figure 2.5, panels 1 and 2). The
pass-through in countries with lower rates for these taxes. chapter’s structural model captures different degrees of

price stickiness across sectors and the pass-through of Figure 2.6. Evolution of Phillips Curves
inflation from flexible to sticky prices over time.
1. Aggregate Phillips Curves
Before turning to the implications of these patterns 20 (Percent) Pre-COVID
for monetary policy, this section further dissects these 16 Post-COVID
inflation dynamics through the lens of aggregate and
12
sectoral Phillips curves.
8
4
Shifting and Steepening of the Phillips Curve 0
Monetary policymakers pay particular attention to −4
the relationship between economic slack and inflation,
−8
or the Phillips curve, because this relationship pro- −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
vides a measure of forgone employment and output
Core Goods
as a cost of lowering inflation. Prior to the pandemic, Services Wages
the relationship was relatively flat, suggesting a weak
trade-off between output and inflation (Blanchard 2. Change in Phillips Curve 3. Change in Phillips Curve
Slope Intercept
2016; Del Negro and others 2020; Hazell and others 4 (Percentage points) (Percentage points) 12
2022; Rubbo 2023).5 In other words, before 2020,
even when the economy was close to full employment, 0 8
inflationary pressures were weak. However, during the
pandemic, the empirical Phillips curve notably steep- −4 4
ened and shifted upward (Figure 2.6; Ari and others
2023; Benigno and Eggertsson 2023; Gudmundsson, −8 0
Jackson, and Portillo 2024; Inoue, Rossi, and Wang
2024). These patterns were particularly pronounced in
−12 −4
advanced economies, and when comparisons are made AEs EMs AEs EMs
across sectors, the shifting and steepening of empirical
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
Phillips curves were somewhat more pronounced for
Note: Throughout the figure, the first two quarters of 2020 are excluded. In panel 1,
goods than for services inflation (Figure 2.6, panels 2 x-axis shows unemployment gap and y-axis denotes core inflation deviation. Inflation
and 3; Online Annex Figure 2.2.7). The steeper slope measures are residualized on a country fixed effect within each country. Blue and
red lines are linear fits with a sample of 29 advanced economies and 15 emerging
of the empirical Phillips curve implies that for a given markets during the period from the first quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2024.
decrease in economic slack, a larger increase in inflation “Post-COVID” is defined as the first quarter of 2020 onward. The unemployment gap is
was observed; conversely, a given increase in economic estimated using a univariate Hodrick-Prescott filter. Outliers with deviations of inflation
from country average by more than 20 percentage points are excluded. Panels 2 and
slack was associated with a larger decline in inflation. 3 report distribution of Phillips curve slope changes and intercept changes across
This pattern is consistent with the finding in the previ- countries from country-level estimations of pre-2020 and post-2020 raw Phillips curves.
Outside values (more than 1.5 interquartile ranges below first quartile or above third
ous section that forecasts, presumably based on flatter quartile) are excluded from boxplots. AEs = advanced economies;
prepandemic Phillips curves, underestimated inflation EMs = emerging markets.
when it was surging and overestimated it when it was
declining.
To test these relationships at the country level, the version of the model, which controls for other factors,
chapter estimates empirical Phillips curve relation- including lagged inflation (to control in turn for poten-
ships country by country and compares coefficients tial mean reversion), inflation expectations, and energy
before and after the pandemic. The results confirm and import prices (Online Annex Figure 2.2.7, panels 1
that the patterns were nearly universal across advanced and 2).6
economies and most emerging markets (Figure 2.6,
panels 2 and 3). This holds true as well in a richer 6Hooper, Mishkin, and Sufi (2020); McLeay and Tenreyro (2020);
and Hazell and others (2022) argue for identifying Phillips curves
5As discussed in McLeay and Tenreyro (2020), the flat prepan- from regional data to mitigate concerns about cost-push shocks biasing
demic Phillips curve may also partly be the result of monetary policy Phillips curves estimates from aggregate data. A regional estimation
that accommodated cost-push shocks and successfully stabilized within the euro area with time fixed effects (Online Annex Figure
economies in the wake of demand shocks. 2.2.7, panels 5 and 6) confirms results presented earlier in the chapter.

However, the patterns were less pronounced for the Figure 2.7. Inflation Drivers in the United States, Other
empirical wage Phillips curve, which did not steepen Advanced Economies, and Emerging Markets
much in either advanced economies or emerging (Percent, year-over-year rate)
markets, but shifted upward as short-term inflation Expectations Slack
expectations increased (green boxplots in Figure 2.6, Other pass-through Energy pass-through
panel 3). Because wages were less responsive, recent Residual Headline: Energy
Headline: Other Headline
inflation dynamics likely did not reflect, at least not
solely, excessive tightness in the labor market. The 10 1. United States
chapter’s structural model rationalizes the steepening 8
of the Phillips curve with shocks and constraints that 6
originate outside of the labor market. 4
2
0
Pass-Through of Commodity Price Shocks −2
If a richer estimated Phillips curve is employed −4
2020: 21: 22: 23: 24:
(Online Annex Figure 2.2.7), inflation in different Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1
countries can be decomposed through use of a meth-
odology similar to that of Ball, Leigh, and Mishra 10 2. Other AEs
(2022) and Dao and others (2024). Such a statistical 8
decomposition does not break down the contribution 6
of structural shocks to inflation but instead provides 4
a correlational analysis of key factors contributing to 2
inflation dynamics.7 0
Across the board, with the possible exception of the −2
United States during the later period, since mid-2022, −4

2020: 21: 22: 23: 23:
tight labor markets (a proxy for the amount of slack Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q4
in the economy) play a moderate role in explaining
10 3. EMs
inflation dynamics (Figure 2.7). This result is con-
8
sistent with findings noted earlier in the chapter of a
6
muted real wage response and limited changes to the
4
wage Phillips curve. Instead, energy shocks and other
2
shocks to headline inflation played an outsized role.
0
These shocks were subsequently passed on to broader
−2
inflation, with import prices accounting for a sizable
−4
part of the pass-through in emerging markets. Finally, 2020: 21: 22: 23: 23:
long-term inflation expectations remained anchored Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q4
across countries and did not directly contribute to Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
inflation dynamics. Note: US inflation drivers are estimated on monthly data (following Dao and others
More specifically, US inflation (Figure 2.7, 2024) and then converted to quarterly; for other countries, estimation is conducted on
quarterly data. “Slack” is measured using the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio for AEs
panel 1) was initially driven by energy price shocks and using the unemployment gap (estimated using a univariate Hodrick-Prescott filter)
and other sector-specific shocks as shortages and the for EMs. Country-level contributions for AEs and EMs are aggregated across country
pandemic disrupted supply chains. These headline groups using purchasing-power-parity GDP weights. Fitted values for inflation gap are
converted into 12-month rates. AEs = advanced economies; EMs = emerging markets.
shocks subsequently passed through into broader
7The impact of economic slack also captures the aggregate
demand effects of fiscal stimulus or monetary policy. The impact

through short-term inflation expectations is captured under pass-
through, and the impact of food prices is captured under other
headline shocks. The specification employed in the chapter allows
labor market tightness to affect core inflation directly, rather than
only indirectly through wage inflation, consistent with the evidence
of Dao and others (2024).

inflation in 2021 and early 2022. Since mid-2022, Figure 2.8. Monetary Policy Tightening
however, the main driver of US inflation has been (Percent)
a tight labor market.8 By the first quarter of 2024,
Euro area Japan Other AEs
labor market tightness was still contributing 2.5 per- China Other EMDEs Early hikers
centage points to US CPI inflation, which was partly Other Asia United States
offset by a modest deflation in energy costs.
4 1. Monetary Tightening: Real Policy Rate
In contrast, the contribution of labor market slack
to inflation in other advanced economies and emerg- 2
ing markets was small. Inflation in other advanced 0
economies, particularly those in Europe (Figure 2.7,
−2
panel 2), was initially driven by large energy price
shocks that passed through into broad inflation, with −4
the pass-through of energy price shocks alone contrib- −6
uting more than 2.5 percentage points to CPI inflation
at its peak. For emerging markets (Figure 2.7, panel 3), −8
Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Aug.
import price pass-through was a significant driver 2020 21 22 23 24 24
of inflation pass-through, which would include any
8 2. Economic Conditions at Liftoff
exchange rate effects, because import prices in local
Inflation deviation from target
currency were used.9 6 Output gap
Understanding the recent inflation dynamics requires 4
understanding how sectoral shocks, including those
in the energy and commodity sectors, led to broad- 2
based inflationary pressures. Going beyond traditional 0

models with one sector, the multisector structural model
−2
employed here sheds further light on the pass-through 2021 2022
of sectoral shocks across the production network. −4
BRA HUN CHL MEX KOR GBR POL NZL CAN USA EA
(Q1) (Q2) (Q3) (Q3) (Q3) (Q4) (Q4) (Q1) (Q1) (Q1) (Q2)
The Monetary Policy Reaction Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics;
and IMF staff calculations.
Faced with the pandemic, central banks worldwide
Note: Sample comprises 16 AEs and 65 EMDEs. “Other” aggregates are medians.
initially adopted expansionary monetary policies aimed “Early hikers” are Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, and
at stimulating economies and maintaining financial Poland, which hiked much earlier than major central banks. In panel 1, real rates are
constructed as nominal rates minus one-year-ahead inflation expectations. Panel 2
stability (Figure 2.8, panel 1). As broader inflation- reports economic conditions at first interest rate hike during current tightening
ary pressures emerged, central banks transitioned to cycle for early hikers other than Peru, Canada, the euro area, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Countries are sorted by the timing of their first interest rate
tightening policy. Although the tightening was broadly hike. Inflation is reported as deviation of central bank’s targeted inflation rate from
synchronized, its exact timing and pace varied across central bank target in quarter of first tightening. The output gap data are annual. Data
labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country
countries, depending on the impact of the shocks on codes. AEs = advanced economies; EA = euro area; EMDEs = emerging market and
developing economies.
8As argued by Ball, Leigh, and Mishra (2022); Barnichon and
Shapiro (2024); and Bernanke and Blanchard (2024), labor market

tightness in the United States is measured using the vacancy-to-
unemployment ratio. Elsewhere, labor market tightness plays a much individual economies, the timing of lockdowns and
smaller role, regardless of the measure of tightness (vacancy-to-
unemployment ratio or unemployment gap). Again, except in
reopening, and initial conditions and institutional
the case of the United States, using the output gap as the mea- features. For example, commodity price increases after
sure of economic slack results in similar findings (Online Annex the start of the war in Ukraine led to terms-of-trade
Figure 2.2.7, panels 3 and 4), as does using country-by-country
improvements for exporters, but to terms-of-trade
estimates for countries for which monthly data are available.
9Online Annex Figure 2.2.8 provides a detailed breakdown, deteriorations for importers. Central banks with a
highlighting, among other features, the importance of energy and history of low and stable inflation had built policy
headline shocks in eastern European emerging market and develop- credibility and could afford to “look through” seem-
ing economies. Residuals across emerging markets overall could be
explained partly by the cross-border transmission of global liquidity ingly transitory supply shocks for longer. In contrast,
(Choi and others 2017). the presence of wage and price indexation mechanisms

limited room to maneuver in many countries. Finally, Figure 2.9. Comparison of Inflation Episodes
variation in other policy settings, such as the size of (Percent)
fiscal stimulus or price-suppressing measures, moti-
Inflation Median real rate Median nominal rate
vated different monetary responses. These differences
resulted in some emerging market and developing Headline Inflation Short-Term Interest Rate
economies, such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, starting
20 1. Resolved in 1970s 2. Resolved in 1970s 8
their rate hikes earlier than others. Conversely, Asia
exhibited a more tempered response, and the United 16
States adjusted its policies relatively later (Figure 2.8, 4
12
panel 2).
8 0
4
Policy Responses Compared with −4
0
Those in the 1970s
−4 −8
The energy price shocks of the 1970s, which also −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
had global repercussions, offer a natural, though
imperfect, benchmark for comparing policy responses 20 3. Unresolved in 1970s 4. Unresolved in 1970s 8
during the recent inflation surge. The benchmarking 16
is imperfect because of the transformative changes in 4
12
monetary policy frameworks and policy credibility
since the 1970s and the fact that the recent experience 8 0
coincided with a pandemic.
4
Such comparisons are facilitated by identifying infla- −4
tionary episodes in a global sample. Following Ari and 0
others (2023), this section defines an inflation episode −4 −8
as a period with an increase in inflation of more than −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
2 percentage points in a year. Such episodes are then

20 5. Post-2020 6. Post-2020 8
grouped as “resolved” or “unresolved,” in which an epi-
sode is considered resolved if inflation declines in the 16
4
neighborhood of 1 percentage point of its pre-episode 12
level within a five-year window. Comparison of the
post-2020 and 1970s episodes yields the following 8 0
observations (Figure 2.9): 4

• Post-2020 inflation episodes have been more pro- −4
0
nounced and persistent compared with the resolved
episodes of the 1970s, with inflationary pressures −4 −8
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
building sharply during the episodes (shaded gray
areas in the figure) and continuing to rise in the Sources: Ari and others 2023; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
subsequent year. Note: “Median” refers to median outcome across inflation episodes. Inflation and
short-term nominal interest rates are normalized to the preceding year (t − 1) as zero,
• Nominal interest rate hikes during resolved epi- with deviations shown thereafter. Real interest rates are shown in levels rather than
sodes of the 1970s were larger, as real rates swiftly normalized deviations. Blue-shaded areas indicate the 25th to 75th percentiles of data
transitioned to contractionary territory (Figure 2.9, across inflation episodes. Gray-shaded areas denote identified inflation episodes, and
green-shaded areas indicate projections.
panel 2). In contrast, post-2020 episodes involved
a milder nominal rate adjustment and a more
prolonged expansionary policy stance, indicated by
sustained negative real interest rates.
• During unresolved episodes, the median policy stance
remained consistently expansionary, characterized by
more prolonged and more negative real interest rates
than observed after 2020.

Overall, the recent episode lies between the resolved Figure 2.10. Monetary Policy Transmission to CPI during
and unresolved episodes of the 1970s in terms of Tightening Episodes
inflation dynamics and the speed of the policy
0.0
response. This conclusion for the policy response is
corroborated when comparing the deviations from
policy rates that would be implied by a simple policy −0.5
rule targeting inflation and the output gap (Online
Annex Figure 2.2.9). Although inflation expectations
data for the 1970s are limited, proxying the degree of −1.0
inflation expectations anchoring using past inflation
volatility reveals that inflation expectations were more
strongly anchored this time around (Online Annex −1.5
Figure 2.2.10).
−2.0
1 4 1 4 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 3
Transmission of Monetary Policy Tightening: US Euro area UK India Brazil Mexico
Continuities and Changes
As has been documented in this chapter, monetary
Note: The bars denote the country median peak response, and the whiskers represent
policy tightening kick-started after the initial extraor- the upper and lower bounds of the 68 percent HPD set of responses. 1 = 1990s to 2019,
dinary pandemic effects subsided, with most of the 2 = 2021 to 2022, 3 = 2021 to 2023, 4 = 2022 to 2023. CPI = consumer price index;
HPD = highest posterior density set.
tightening occurring later in the episode.
But did the extraordinary shocks result in mon-
etary transmission that was very different from
historical experience? The answer is not obvi- transmission over time. The comparison focuses on the
ous because some forces at play point to weaker transmission of a standardized monetary policy tight-
transmission, whereas others point to a stronger ening shock, as estimated by a vector autoregression
transmission. For example, the policy transmission model with time-varying coefficients, across selected
through housing markets may have weakened in countries during tightening cycles since the 1990s.10
some countries, given that the growing popularity of Estimates from the model suggest that the peak
fixed rate mortgages may have reduced the sensitiv- effects of consumer prices vary somewhat in response
ity of households’ payments to rising interest rates to the tightening shock (Figure 2.10; Online Annex
(see Chapter 2 of the April 2024 World Economic Figure 2.3.2). However, the analysis does not detect a
Outlook). Similarly, excess household savings have systematic and statistically significant difference in the
buffered household finances in many countries and magnitude of the responses when the post-2022 price
may have resulted in resilience in consumption responses are compared with the average transmission
even as policy tightened. The globally synchronized observed during the tightening cycles in the 1990s
nature of the tightening may have weakened the through 2019. This conclusion also holds when the
exchange rate channel of monetary policy, whereas it full path of impulse responses over time, as opposed
may have strengthened other channels, for example, to only the peak effects, are compared (Online Annex
through the world price of commodities (Bernanke, Figure 2.3.1).
Gertler, and Watson 1997; Blanchard and Galí Several caveats are in order. The methodology
2007b; Auclert and others 2023). Moreover, a employed in this section is designed to detect, using
steeper Phillips curve, as documented in the previ- data available, significant changes in the overall trans-
ous section, may imply that tightening could have mission of policy tightening so far in countries’ tight-
a small effect on output but a strong disinflationary ening cycles. It therefore does not rule out moderate
impact. Given these different forces, this section
measures overall transmission. 10The chapter focuses on the post-1990 period after countries
The preliminary evidence suggests some varia- adopted inflation-targeting regimes. Methodological details and
tion but not a broad-based and significant change in further results are provided in Online Annex 2.3.

changes, given uncertainty surrounding the estimates, Figure 2.11. Phillips Curve under Different Constraints
or the possibility that its conclusions will change once (Percent)
more data become available.
3 1. Phillips Curve with Occasionally Binding Constraints 1.0
Inflation on impact
2 Inflation on impact without constraints 0.8
Lessons for Monetary Policy: Share of economy constrained (right scale)
A Model-Based Analysis 1 0.6
Guided by the chapter’s findings so far, this section

0 0.4
develops a new global model with input-output link-
ages, the Global Dynamic Network Model, to derive −1 0.2
further policy insights. Crucially, the model includes
these features: −2 0.0
−1.2 −1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
• Rich input-output linkages across sectors and countries. Real GDP on impact
To replicate the transmission of price pressures in
4 2. Phillips Curve with Constraints Plus Sectoral Demand Shocks 1.0
individual sectors to core inflation, as in the empir-
Inflation on impact
ical section, the model considers multiple sectors 3 Inflation on impact without constraints or shocks 0.8
that are connected through input-output linkages. Share of economy constrained (right scale)
Relative demand for each sector can change both as 2 0.6
a response to prices rising more in some sectors and
1 0.4
if households’ tastes change, as happened, for exam-
ple, when demand for goods relative to services rose 0 0.2
during the pandemic lockdowns. Because it features
two countries with trade linkages, the model can −1 0.0
−1.2 −1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
assess the role of synchronized global tightening. Real GDP on impact
• Occasionally binding supply constraints. The model
features sectoral constraints, in the form of limits on Source: IMF staff calculations.
the maximum employment level of firms, that bind Note: The blue line shows combination of the impact effect of real GDP (x-axis) and
inflation (left scale) on monetary policy shocks of various sizes, with panel 2 also
occasionally. These constraints mimic supply bottle- including a relative demand shock. The gray bars (right scale) show the share of the
necks, and as will be shown, they are a key ingredient economy constrained. The red line shows the same combination without any supply
bottlenecks imposed. The Phillips curve shape will depend on choice of constraints.
for rationalizing the recent steepening of the aggregate
Phillips curve documented in the empirical section
and observed in many countries (Gudmundsson,
Jackson, and Portillo 2024; Comin, Johnson, and Widespread Bottlenecks and Rationalization of
Jones 2023). In normal times, employment is rarely Steep Phillips Curves
near these limits. However, in extreme cases such as To illustrate how the model can account for
lockdowns, in which the maximum employment in the steepening of Phillips curves, both panels in
a sector may fall, or demand may surge in certain Figure 2.11 present the relationship between peak
sectors (durable goods is an example), then these con- effects of inflation and output in a scenario in which
straints can limit production. Such dynamics would monetary policy starts out contractionary (on the
result in higher prices in sectors with binding supply left) and gradually becomes more expansionary (on
constraints and would also trickle down to the rest the right). In both panels, the supply constraints are
of the economy, especially if constrained sectors are set such that they become binding in more sectors as
major providers of inputs to other sectors and those demand strengthens.
inputs are not easily substitutable. • Steepening. When monetary policy is contraction-
• Aggregate and sectoral shocks. Given the potential role ary and demand is low, sectors operate below their
of monetary and fiscal stimulus during an episode, labor constraints, and increases in demand lead
the model allows for monetary policy shocks as well to both higher employment and higher inflation.
as shocks to aggregate demand, in addition to a rich However, as policy becomes more expansionary,
set of sectoral demand and supply shifts. more sectors hit their supply constraints, as shown

by the gray bars in panel 1 of Figure 2.11 (see also Figure 2.12. Impacts of Supply Constraints and Commodity
Online Annex Figure 2.4.1). In turn, firms in these Sector Shocks
sectors cannot increase employment and output, (Percent deviation, unless noted otherwise)
and instead, prices must rise to equalize supply and Aggregate and Sectoral Data
demand. When such constraints are widespread,
adding up across sectors for the entire macroeco- 1. Inflation 2. Real GDP
(Percent, quarter over ROW sectoral data
nomy reveals a nonlinear relationship between 50 quarter, annualized) 40
US sectoral data
inflation and output; that is, a nonlinear aggregate 40 ROW US 30
Phillips curve (blue line). In the absence of supply 30 20
bottlenecks, the analysis would have resulted in a 20
10
10
linear aggregate Phillips curve (red line), under- 0
0
scoring the importance of the bottlenecks as a key −10 −10
mechanism in the model to account for the findings −20 −20
of the empirical section.11 −30 −30
2019: 20: 21: 22: 23: 2019: 20: 21: 22: 23:
• Shifting. Panel 2 of Figure 2.11 illustrates how the Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4
Phillips curve can shift when relative demand shocks
are also added. In that case, high-demand sectors Contribution of Supply Constraints
hit their supply constraints and face upward price
15 3. Inflation 4. Real GDP 12
pressures. At the same time, other sectors produce
10 8
less because of weak demand. The combination of
higher prices (in constrained sectors) and weak out- 5 4
put (in unconstrained sectors) leads to an upward 0 0
shift in the aggregate Phillips curve. −5 −4
Goods and energy
−10 Services −8
Because the model allows for both a steepening and Other shocks Observed
−15 −12
a shift of the Phillips curve, the relative strength of the 2019: 20: 21: 22: 23: 2019: 20: 21: 22: 23:
two alternatives is then determined by the data. Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4
Impact of Commodity Supply and Demand
Role of Constraints and Commodity-Specific 12 5. Inflation 6. Real GDP 2

Shocks 10 0
8 −2
To unpack the role of supply constraints and
6
commodity-sector-specific shocks through the lens of −4
4
the model, this section takes the model to the data and −6
2
Observed −8
presents counterfactual scenarios. 0 No energy or
With the United States and the rest of the world −2 agr. shocks −10
set as the two countries or regions in the model, −4 −12
2019: 20: 21: 22: 23: 2019: 20: 21: 22: 23:
sectoral and aggregate shocks are quantified to match Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4
the data. Because the matched data include inflation
Sources: Eurostat; Federal Reserve Economic Data; Organisation for Economic
and output, the model matches the sectoral dispersion Co-operation and Development; and IMF staff calculations.
shown in panels 1 and 2 of Figure 2.12 (similar to the Note: The line in panel 3 shows inflation, and the line in panel 4 shows real GDP. The
empirical section). In the same figure, panel 4 shows bars in panels 3 and 4 show the contributions from different groups of shocks. Note
that the sum of all bars will equal the black line in each period. In panels 5 and 6 the
that supply constraints were an important persistent “No energy or agriculture shocks” scenario assumes that monetary policy shocks
drag on real GDP during this period. In addition, remain as in the observed data, but monetary policy responds to changes in inflation,
and that identified supply constraints in noncommodity sectors remain. agr. =
agriculture; ROW = rest of the world.
11Other mechanisms can also result in a steepening of the Phillips
curve, such as asymmetries in wage setting, quasi-kinked demand for

goods or informational frictions, and state-dependent pricing (Ilut,
Valchev, and Vincent 2020; Harding, Lindé, and Trabandt 2022,
2023; Benigno and Eggertsson 2023; Dupraz 2024; Karadi and
others 2024).

they led to significant upward price pressures early in Policy Experiments

the pandemic, contributing 2–3 percentage points to
To draw policy lessons, this section undertakes
US inflation during 2020–22 and playing a role in the
two sets of analyses. The first comprises counterfac-
subsequent disinflation, with a negative net contribu-
tual scenarios with policies set differently from what
tion after 2023 (Figure 2.12, panel 3).12 The infla-
central banks actually did. Because the data are first
tion impacts appear to be less significant than GDP
matched to the recent period featuring the effects of
effects, largely because the supply bottlenecks—even
the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the resulting
if they may last for an extended period—raise prices
policy lessons are more relevant for such tail event
persistently, leading to one-off rather than persistent
situations. The second set of analyses considers a hypo-
increases in inflation.13
thetical run-of-the-mill scenario. It features a supply
Because the empirical decompositions attribute an
constraint binding only for food and energy and a
important role to “headline shocks,” which include
positive aggregate demand shock. For example, it could
shocks to food and energy prices, a scenario with a
capture a situation in which a drought or a geopolitical
similar spirit can be considered. Specifically, panels 5
shock constrains supply in agriculture and energy and
and 6 in Figure 2.12 turn off the shocks specific to the
is accompanied by fiscal support to contain its effects.
agriculture and raw energy sectors. The exercise reveals
In comparison with the experience since the pandemic,
that inflation would have been lower when these shocks
the share of sectors subject to supply bottlenecks would
are turned off, especially around the beginning of the
be much smaller in this scenario.
war in Ukraine, when supply constraints in these sectors
were tightest. Turning off shocks specific to commodity Counterfactual Scenarios
sectors makes a smaller difference for GDP.
The counterfactual scenarios first ask, Would different
Although the important role of the agriculture
policy choices by central banks have made a difference
and raw energy sectors in regard to inflation broadly
during the inflation surge? And how would they have
aligns with the empirical analysis (if findings for the
interacted with bottlenecks? To answer these questions,
US are used to compare the two, given the model’s
Figure 2.13 presents cases in which policy tightens three
calibration), the two exercises are not identical. One
quarters earlier than observed, combined with different
important difference arises because shocks specific to
assumptions about the presence of bottlenecks.
agriculture and raw energy, which are turned off in
• Tightening earlier, shown by the solid red lines,
this exercise, are not the only drivers of prices in their
lowers peak inflation by about 2 percentage points
corresponding sectors. That’s why turning off shocks
relative to the data (Figure 2.13, panel 1) but results
to these sectors does not mean that their prices remain
in a 0.8 percentage point reduction in real GDP
constant throughout the exercise. In fact, the analy-
(Figure 2.13, panel 2) for 2022.
sis suggests that aggregate demand shocks (especially
• Comparing two versions of the “earlier tightening”
because agriculture and energy have relatively flexible
counterfactual further reveals the role of supply
prices) and constraints in other sectors (which raise
bottlenecks. When capacity constraints are imposed
input prices) play a role, too. In contrast, empirical
at levels estimated from fitting the model to the data
decompositions take these sectoral prices as exogenous
(solid red lines), tighter policy has greater potency
and measure their contributions to core inflation rela-
in lowering inflation, with low output cost relative
tive to a case in which they are unchanged, remaining
to the case in which the constraints are assumed
agnostic about their drivers.
away (dashed red lines). This is because the con-
straints steepen the Phillips curve, as shown earlier,
12The blue and red bars in panels 3 and 4 include supply con- making expansionary policies more inflationary but
straints and their interactions with other shocks. “Other shocks,” also making it less costly to bring down inflation
shown by the gray bars, include everything else. Because all shocks through monetary tightening. This comparison
interact with supply constraints in complex ways, producing more
highlights how supply bottlenecks can steepen the
detailed bars implying mutually exclusive contributions of shocks
would be misleading. Phillips curve and affect the cost of disinflation.
13Supply bottlenecks can arise from tightening supply constraints
for a given level of demand and their interaction with demand. The Would different policy choices by other central
reported contributions measure the total impact of supply con-
straints, capturing the effects of supply constraints both in isolation banks have made a difference? In the counterfactual
and in combination with demand. scenario, the rest of the world tightens monetary

Figure 2.13. Counterfactual Monetary Policy Figure 2.14. Role of Coordinated Monetary Policy
(Percent) (Percent, quarter over quarter, annualized)
Observed Agriculture, mining, and energy Manufacturing (right scale)

Tighten early (right scale) ROW delays tightening
Tighten early + no bottlenecks Services (right scale) Observed
12 1. Inflation 12 10
(Quarter over quarter, annualized)
10
10
8 5
8
6
4 6 0
2
4
0 −5
2021:Q2 22:Q1 23:Q1 23:Q4 2
0.5 2. GDP
(Deviation from steady state) 0 −10
0.0 2022:Q1 23:Q1 23:Q4
−0.5
Sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
−1.0 Development; and IMF staff calculations.
−1.5 Note: “The rest of the world (ROW) delays tightening” scenario assumes ROW hiking is
−2.0 delayed three quarters and US rates remain as observed. Identified labor constraints are
assumed to remain. The right-hand y-axis shows percentage point difference in sectoral
−2.5 inflation between the observed data and “ROW delays tightening” scenario.
−3.0
−3.5
2021:Q2 22:Q1 23:Q1 23:Q4 Hypothetical Scenario
Sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and The analysis next turns to a hypothetical scenario
Development; and IMF staff calculations. with positive aggregate demand shocks combined with
Note: “Tighten early” scenario assumes rates rise three quarters earlier. Standard negative capacity constraint shocks in the agriculture,
monetary policy counterfactuals assume identified labor constraints remain. “No
bottlenecks” assumes the wedge between the marginal product of labor and wages mining, and energy sectors for both countries or
(shadow price of constraint) is kept consistent with the data, but the constraint does regions in the model. As explained in this chapter, this
not bind.
would correspond to a milder set of shocks than those
considered so far.
Figure 2.15 compares four simple monetary policy
policy later than the United States (Figure 2.14).14
rules in this scenario: (1) targeting inflation in sectors
This delayed synchronization in tightening slows the
with the stickiest prices;16 (2) “inflation forecast target-
domestic disinflation process. The difference between
ing,” which aims to stabilize the four-quarter moving
observed inflation and the counterfactual scenario is
average of future CPI inflation; and (3) “average
displayed by the bars in Figure 2.14 for each sector.15
inflation targeting,” in which the central bank targets
Agriculture, mining, and energy—sectors with highly
the average of the preceding four quarters of inflation,
flexible prices—experience stronger inflation than the
as well as (4) a sectoral Taylor rule that targets equally
other sectors, and although inflation diminishes in
CPI inflation and sectoral inflation in agriculture,
these sectors over time, they generate further waves of
mining, and energy, which are the sectors subject to
price increases in manufacturing and services through
supply constraints but also those with the most flexible
input-output linkages.
prices. The first three rules tend to be widely used
or discussed, and the last one helps assess whether
14Even though this simulation considers the United States, a simi-
lar mechanism would be applicable for other economies. 16These sectors are information technology and telecommunica-
15The figure reports both the direct and indirect effects, for exam- tions; finance and insurance; professional, scientific, and technical;
ple, including the impact that food and energy prices likely have on education, health, and government services; and arts, entertainment,
the prices of other goods and services. and recreation.

Figure 2.15. Alternative Policy Rules inflation, which is lower than inflation on impact,
(Percent deviation from steady state, quarter over quarter, annualized, y-axis; and leads to a surge in inflation and inflation
quarters, x-axis)
expectations. Despite higher nominal rates, this rule
Targeting stickiest prices Inflation forecast targeting delivers lower real rates than the other policy rules.
Average inflation targeting 50/50 on CPI and constrained sectors This leads to higher output initially but requires a
Flexible prices
prolonged medium-term reduction in real GDP to
5 1. Interest Rates 2. Inflation 1.2 bring inflation to target.17
1.0
• The policy rule with the higher weight on food
4
and energy tightens markedly more on impact,
0.8
3 because food and energy prices are more flexible
0.6 and sensitive to the demand shock, and these
2
0.4 sectors themselves are supply constrained. The
1 imposition of supply constraints, even if binding
0.2
0 0.0
persistently, has transitory effects on inflation
(Online Annex Figure 2.4.5).18 When policy
−1 −0.2
1 5 10 15 20 1 5 10 15 20 focuses on these sectors, it overreacts to transitory
inflation, delivering a sharp recession. As shocks
0.8 3. GDP 4. Inflation Expectation 1.2
dissipate, food and energy prices fall faster than the
0.6 1.0 overall CPI, because they are more flexible, leading
0.8 to a rapid fall in policy rates, and in turn, inflation
0.4
0.6 and GDP surge. Although this policy rule delivers
0.2 relative prices closer to the flexible-price bench-
0.4
0.0 mark in the short term, in the longer term, relative
0.2
price movements are more persistent, distorting
−0.2 0.0 resource allocation for longer (Online Annex
−0.4 −0.2 Figure 2.4.6).
1 5 10 15 20 1 5 10 15 20
• “Average inflation targeting” features inflation and
Source: IMF staff calculations. GDP responses that are most like those arising
Note: The Taylor rules are identical except for the inflation measure targeted. “Targeting from the rule targeting inflation in the sectors with
stickiest prices” targets the five sectors with the steepest Phillips curves. “Inflation the stickiest prices. The main difference is that the
forecast targeting” targets the four-quarter moving average of future CPI inflation.
“Average inflation targeting” represents average inflation targeting in which the central delayed response of average inflation targeting to
bank targets the average of the previous four quarters of inflation. “50/50 on CPI and inflation delivers a more gradual return of inflation
constrained sectors” targets CPI inflation and sectoral inflation in agriculture, mining,
and energy. “Flexible prices” shows relative prices in a scenario without nominal to target, which leads real GDP to remain below the
rigidities in any sector market. In each case the Taylor parameter is 3, the persistence steady state in the medium term for longer.
parameter is 0.5, and neither GDP nor the output gap is targeted. CPI = consumer price
index.
Summary and Policy Implications

A defining characteristic of the recent inflationary epi-
front-loading the policy adjustments in response to
sode was the prominence of sectoral shifts amid policy
price increases in constrained sectors is appropriate.
stimulus and capacity constraints, partly arising from
Because monetary policy can only alleviate the effect of
nominal frictions on an economy’s response to shocks, 17These downsides from forecast-based policy rules relative to
a benchmark “efficient” economy output for the case targeting realization-based inflation are similar to the results from
in which prices and wages are assumed to be perfectly Erceg, Lindé, and Trabandt (2024). Despite the broad similarities in
flexible is also shown, in panel 3 of the figure. their conclusions, the frameworks in the two studies are different in
terms of specific scenarios considered and the underlying mecha-
Comparing the alternative policy rules yields the
nisms. For example, Erceg, Lindé, and Trabandt (2024) allow price
following insights (Figure 2.15): and wage setters to index more intensively after prolonged periods of
• Targeting inflation in the stickiest-price sectors high inflation, amplifying the costs of delayed policy tightening.
18Supply constraints require higher prices to realign demand in a
delivers relatively fast disinflation. By contrast, the
sector to be consistent with the constrained production available.
inflation forecast targeting rule ends up “running Once prices have risen, no further price increases are required to keep
the economy hot” by responding to medium-term sectoral demand low. This leads to a transitory effect on inflation.

supply-chain disruptions. Statistical decompositions • Putting them together. Central banks should consider
attribute an important role to price pressures arising including well-defined escape clauses in their policy
from individual sectors and their spillovers to core infla- frameworks to tackle inflationary pressures when
tion. Evidence also suggests that the relationship between aggregate Phillips curves steepen. Forward guidance
inflation and economic slack shifted and steepened. should internalize those escape clauses and allow for
In line with the empirical findings, a newly developed front-loading of tightening in such situations.
structural model can account for the transmission of
sector-specific price pressures to the rest of an economy, This distinction aligns with earlier IMF work that
as well as the shifting and steepening of Phillips curves, suggests refining the traditional prescription to “look
with a mechanism running through binding supply through” temporary supply shocks. In this context,
constraints combined with demand shocks. Gopinath (2022, 2024) underscores that second-round
Even though the episode was unique, central banks effects can be significant if supply shocks are large and
can still draw lessons from the experience, especially as far reaching, particularly when the economy is already
they review their monetary policy frameworks. In this overheated with high inflation. The chapter’s differ-
vein, the chapter offers the following insights. entiation between widespread bottlenecks and those
Sectoral supply constraints tend to have large but confined to specific sectors mirrors the earlier work’s
short-lived effects on inflation as they start to bind. focus on the size and scope of shocks. In addition, the
Steeper Phillips curves stem from the interaction of chapter’s emphasis on the interaction of these bot-
these constraints with demand shocks. Hence, pol- tlenecks with demand pressures relates to the earlier
icymakers should aim to differentiate between the work’s observation about the importance of recogniz-
immediate and transitory effects of sectoral constraints ing an already overheated economy.
and their more persistent impact when combined with While “running the economy hot” may have
demand pressures. benefits—for example, facilitating relative price adjust-
The chapter draws an important distinction between ment when shocks are permanent and the economy
the steepening of aggregate Phillips curves and that needs to adjust accordingly (Guerrieri and others 2021;
of sectoral Phillips curves. In doing so, it offers a new Guerrieri and others 2023), those benefits need to be
policy insight and reaffirms an old one. weighed against the risk of a potential de-anchoring
• New lesson. When supply bottlenecks are prevalent of inflation expectations and wage-price spirals. When
and combined with strong demand, the aggre- balancing these risks, central banks should consider not
gate Phillips curve steepens, as it did in the recent only the most likely outcomes but also the distribution
episode. In such cases, policy tightening is effective of risks, and they should keep inflation from drifting
because it can ease demand pressures and bring too far from target for an extended period, especially
down inflation quickly with limited output costs; in when inflation expectations are less anchored and
other words, the sacrifice ratio is low. Monitoring policy credibility is weaker (Gopinath 2024).
whether key sectors bump against their supply bot- A better understanding of sectoral dynamics can
tlenecks in an overheated economy is crucial. help central banks calibrate their policy responses more
• Old lesson. When supply bottlenecks are con- effectively. Therefore, investing in improved models and
fined to specific sectors, such as commodities, data collection over time would be a valuable endeavor.
standard rules, such as those focusing on infla- • Developing models that capture sectoral linkages
tion in sectors with the stickiest prices, remain and heterogeneity—as exemplified by the model in
appropriate (Blanchard and Galí 2007a; Natal this chapter—can be a step in the right direction,
2012). Although sectoral Phillips curves steepen which should be considered as central banks plan
in constrained sectors, their effects may not spread to revamp their modeling approaches in the context
widely enough to cause a steepening of the aggre- of their framework reviews (for example, Bank of
gate Phillips curve. In that case, monetary tight- England 2024).
ening can achieve a sharp decline in commodities’ • The collection of more granular sectoral data would
flexible prices, but at the expense of lower output, allow sectoral networks to be mapped out and mod-
and over time, inflation will undershoot as flexible els to be refined. How much and how fast sectoral
commodity prices decline and other prices also price pressures propagate across an economy, for
react to tighter policy. example, depending on the centrality or criticality

of sectors or the degree of price stickiness, could be rate channel would be muted relative to the lower trad-
quantified through such data. able goods prices channel to the extent that the policy
• High-frequency sectoral indicators of supply con- tightening is synchronized.
straints and demand pressures can support policy- Credible policy frameworks remain a valuable asset
making in real time. Disruptions in supply chains for central banks. The recent experience is a case
can arise both upstream (such as component short- in point: inflation expectations remained anchored
ages) and downstream (such as congested ports), and and wage-price spirals did not materialize even as
surveys of producers could help identify them early. policymakers navigated difficult policy trade-offs
Constraints may also emerge from the labor market: under immense uncertainty in countries with cred-
although many central banks monitor labor market ible frameworks. Better understanding of inflation
indicators, analyzing them at the sectoral level could expectations formation across different horizons and
provide a more detailed understanding of shortages. economic agents would help inform policymaking
In addition, measures of overall supply-demand mis- (Adrian 2023; Alvarez and Dizioli 2023; Brandão-
matches (such as back orders) could highlight the Marques and others 2023; October 2023 World
interacted effects of supply and demand shocks. Economic Outlook).
It is important to emphasize that providing a
Open economies can benefit from positive spillovers precise quantification of the drivers of inflation in
of other central banks’ policy tightening through lower the context of simultaneous shocks during a once-
tradable goods prices. Such spillovers can be particularly in-a-century pandemic is an inherently difficult task.
important for countries that have high exposure to those Reduced-form empirical analyses provide suggestive
prices—for example, those for food and energy, and correlations. Using aggregate data or single-sector
limited policy levers to respond to them—for example, models leads to difficulties in the identification of
low-income countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. demand and supply shocks, given input-output
Exchange rate depreciations and their pass-through into linkages: supply constraints in one sector can cause
inflation can exert upward price pressures in countries lower demand in complementary sectors that produce
with flexible exchange rate regimes if they are not hiking their intermediate inputs. The chapter’s multisector
interest rates at the same time.19 However, the exchange model can capture such interlinkages and emphasizes
supply constraints but also finds that their interaction
19Although such currency movements can facilitate expenditure
with demand shocks must have played an important
switching, financial frictions or weakly anchored inflation expecta- role in generating the size and persistence of inflation
tions can hamper macroeconomic stability. observed in the data.

Box 2.1. The Role of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies

Since the global financial crisis, central banks have Figure 2.1.1. Central Bank Balance Sheets
expanded their toolkits by using balance sheet policies (Percent of GDP)
to achieve their objectives at the effective lower bound
(ELB). This box documents that the unwinding of United States
such policies, specifically quantitative tightening (QT), Euro area
United Kingdom
has had minimal effects so far, partly because of its Japan
slow and predictable implementation, facilitated by 150
timely and extensive communication.
Central banks engaged in quantitative easing 130
(QE) during the pandemic. QE was initially aimed
110
at mitigating acute pandemic-related financial
distress in spring 2020 and was used by many 90
emerging markets as well as advanced economies.
However, advanced economy central banks con- 70
tinued to expand their balance sheets even after
50
the easing of financial distress in order to provide
macroeconomic stimulus, although their policy 30
rates were constrained by the ELB. Overall, during
2020–22, central bank balance sheets grew by more 10
than 20 percent of GDP in Japan, the United King- 2018: 19: 20: 21: 22: 23: 24:
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1 Q1
dom, and the euro area, and by about 18 percent
of GDP in the United States (Figure 2.1.1). QE Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
undertaken in this period is estimated to have had Note: Figure reports stock of central bank asset holdings as a per-
sizable effects in containing financial distress and centage of GDP at monthly frequency. United Kingdom data ends
supporting economic activity. in the second quarter of 2023 due to five-quarter reporting lag.
Once inflation surged, central banks began
hiking policy rates and unwinding balance sheet
policies, but QT is not merely QE in reverse.1 First, has had a small, possibly slightly negative, effect on
central banks generally resort to QE when short-term short-term rates while raising term premiums by
policy rates are constrained by the ELB. This is not about 12 basis points (Figure 2.1.2). Du, Forbes, and
the case with QT, which has been used alongside Luzzetti (2024) find that active QT tended to have a
policy tightening. Second, if QT and rate hikes are stronger impact on long-term rates than passive QT
at least partially substitutable, greater QT can be during the recent episode. They also find that the
partly offset by a slower tightening of policy rates—its cumulative impact of QT announcements since 2021
effects, therefore, are more muted.2 Third, QT may has equaled at most two or three rate hikes in some
take place against a steeper Phillips curve (Erceg and countries, thus contributing moderately to a tighter
others 2024a). policy stance.3
Evidence suggests that the effects of QT have so However, QT may have larger effects, especially
far been modest. Erceg and others (2024a), drawing if conducted more rapidly or on a larger scale.
on large-scale asset purchase shocks since the late When reducing its balance sheet size, a central
1990s, find that a one-standard-deviation QT shock bank withdraws reserves from the banking system.
The author of this box is Thomas Kroen.
1QT can occur passively when a central bank does not reinvest 3Overall, QT has not been used as an explicit tool to tighten
assets that mature or when it actively sells assets (Du, Forbes, policy, instead largely working in the background. Moreover,
and Luzzetti 2024). because experience with QT started only in 2021, the external
2The peak impact on inflation from a one-standard-deviation validity of these estimates in a macroeconomic environment
QT and a similar-sized policy rate shocks is estimated to be very different from the postpandemic recovery remains an open
comparable in Erceg and others (2024a). empirical question (Du, Forbes, and Luzzetti 2024).

Box 2.1 (continued)

Although there was excess liquidity during the pan- Figure 2.1.2. Estimated Impact of Monetary
demic, QT may have stronger effects once reserves Policy and LSAP Tightening
become scarce, as witnessed in the United States (Percent)
in 2019 (Du, Forbes, and Luzzetti 2024). Finan-
cial stability risks could also come to the fore: US 1.50 LSAPs
commercial banks became more liquidity dependent Conventional
1.25
through higher issuance of credit lines and increased
financing via uninsured deposits, which raised the 1.00
risk of sudden deposit withdrawals, as took place 0.75
in March 2023 (Acharya and others 2023). Finally,
0.50
advanced economies’ QT strengthens their currencies
(through higher term premiums) more than con- 0.25
ventional tightening (through the short-term policy 0.00
rate). Hence, there is more pressure on the curren-
−0.25
cies of emerging market and developing economies
(Figure 2.1.2). This worsens inflation-output trade- −0.50
offs in those economies, especially in those with a −0.75
fixed exchange rate that must raise rates sharply to One-month rate Ten-year TP US dollar NEER
maintain their pegs (Erceg and others 2024a). In
Sources: Erceg and others 2024a; and IMF staff calculations.
contrast, conventional tightening can achieve similar
Note: Monetary policy shocks are from Lewis (2023). The figure
macroeconomic outcomes with smaller adverse inter- reports median quarterly impulse responses from estimation as
national spillovers (Erceg and others 2024a). in Erceg and others (2024a), along with 68 percent error bands
for the United States. Shocks are scaled to a one-standard-
deviation shock. LSAPs = large-scale asset purchases; NEER =
nominal effective exchange rate; TP = term premium.

Box 2.2. The Role of Price-Suppressing Policies

Countries have frequently resorted to tools other Figure 2.2.1. Discretionary Inflation
than monetary policy to combat inflation. The Stabilization Policies during the Pandemic
recent inflationary episode was no exception. This box (Percent of countries)
takes stock of inflation stabilization policies imple-
mented historically and in the postpandemic recovery 80
AEs EMs LICs
and discusses their rationale and limitations.
70
Energy and consumption subsidies. Subsidies
have historically been used to maintain lower prices, 60
especially for energy (Black and others 2023). During
50
the pandemic, most governments subsidized fuel
and electricity and reduced value-added taxes, sales 40
taxes, and excises on essential goods (Figure 2.2.1).
30
Subsidies work by absorbing increases in costs, thus
limiting the pass-through to prices. They can tame 20
inflation driven by temporary cost-push shocks. Dao
10
and others (2023) find that energy subsidies played
a significant role in stabilizing inflation in the euro 0
area (Figure 2.2.2) in the recent episode. However, Subsidies Trade Price
subsidies have substantial fiscal costs, do not align with
Sources: Amaglobeli and others 2023; IMF, Database of Energy
climate-change-related goals, and often fail to target and Food Price Actions.
the vulnerable. They also distort relative prices, leading Note: Based on surveys of 174 countries conducted from March
to overconsumption of subsidized goods, which fuels to July 2022. AEs = advanced economies; EMs = emerging
further price rises (Erceg and others 2024b). markets; LICs = low-income countries.
Import tax reductions and export restrictions.
Following the pandemic, many countries resorted to
reducing import taxes and imposing export restrictions Figure 2.2.2. Euro Area Actual and
to stabilize domestic prices, especially in emerging Counterfactual Energy Price Levels
markets and low-income countries (Figure 2.2.1). (Index; January 2020 = 100)
Import tax cuts lower imported goods prices and
Actual
increase domestic supply, whereas export restrictions Counterfactual without energy price measures
can ease domestic inflationary pressures. However, tax
cuts have fiscal costs, and both policies induce adverse 260
international spillovers by reducing global supply or
240
increasing global demand, thereby contributing to fur-
ther price increases (Giordani, Rocha, and Ruta 2016). 220
Price and wage controls. Historically, price and 200
wage freezes have been used to curb inflation, in the
180
United States and Europe in the 1960s and 1970s,
among other instances. They have been used again to 160
some degree since the pandemic, particularly in emerg- 140
ing markets and low-income countries, primarily on
120
essential food items (Figure 2.2.1). In specific contexts,
such as when dealing with monopsony (for example, 100
minimum wage) or monopoly (for example, electricity 80
pricing) power, these controls can be justified. How- Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. Apr.
2020 20 21 21 22 22 23 23
ever, they often lead to adverse outcomes, such as the
emergence of black markets and shortages, and prevent Sources: Dao and others 2023; and IMF staff calculations.
adjustment in relative prices. Note: “Actual” indicates the electricity, gas, and other fuels series of
the harmonised index of consumer prices.
The author of this box is Damien Capelle.

Box 2.2 (continued)

Other policies. Government-led negotiations have are useful for addressing inflation coming from cost-
been historically employed in many countries to coor- push shocks and shifts in inflation expectations, their
dinate wage and price setting, during the pandemic as practical implementation needs to be clarified, and
well as at other times. Although they can be instru- monetary policy is a better instrument for bring-
mental in managing wage-price spirals and anchoring ing down inflation arising from excessive aggregate
expectations, they can also distort relative prices. demand.
Finally, tax on inflation policies, which involve taxes To conclude, countries have employed additional
proportional to a firm’s increase in prices, was widely tools to stabilize inflation when monetary policy is
discussed and implemented in several advanced and limited, such as during cost-push shocks or under
emerging market economies in the 1970s and 1990s. an exchange rate peg. However, monetary policy
Capelle and Liu (2023) show that by providing firms remains the primary tool for managing demand-driven
with incentives to moderate their price increases, tax inflation. The use of alternative tools requires careful
on inflation policies can offer substantial stabilization assessment of their effectiveness and trade-offs to mini-
gains under certain conditions. Although these policies mize potential adverse side effects.

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3
CHAPTER
UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF
STRUCTURAL REFORMS
As the world grapples with a prolonged period of eco- Introduction

nomic weakness, demographic shifts, and the imperative
The global economy has been enduring a prolonged
of navigating the green transition and technological
period of structural weakness, and medium-term
upheavals, the urgency for structural reforms is clearer
prospects under current policies remain bleak. The
than ever. Policymakers are being urged to implement
slowdown in global growth is attributed largely to
measures that foster competition, facilitate resource
aging populations, weak investment, and structural
allocation to emerging sectors, and bolster labor supply
frictions that hinder the reallocation of capital and
amid aging populations. However, despite the clear need
labor toward productive firms (see Chapter 3 of the
for action, securing broad social acceptability for policy
April 2024 World Economic Outlook [WEO]). This is
changes has often been a significant obstacle, with reform
especially concerning because demographic pressures
efforts waning since the global financial crisis amid rising
are expected to continue, and structural transforma-
public resistance. This chapter explores the factors that
tions related to the green transition and technolog-
shape public attitudes toward structural reforms and
ical changes will require significant investment and
assesses the effectiveness of various strategies for increasing
resource reallocation.
the social acceptability of policy changes. It finds that
In this context, policymakers are urged to advance
resistance to reforms often transcends economic self-interest
structural reforms—that is, to update the rules and
and instead is deeply rooted in behavioral factors that
policies that shape how an economy operates—to
include perceptions, misinformation, and trust deficits.
boost productivity, employment, and growth. Key
Information strategies that raise awareness of the need
priorities include easing entry barriers and fostering
for reform and correct misinformation about policies and
competition in product markets to facilitate the reallo-
misperceptions about how they work can significantly
cation of resources across sectors, thus helping coun-
boost reform support. However, effective strategies require
tries harness the potential benefits of new technologies.
more than just better communication. They must be
Similarly, reforms to encourage workers to work longer
backed by a strong institutional framework that fosters
and to facilitate the integration and improve the skill
trust and a two-way dialogue from the early stages of
matching of foreign-born workers can help counter-
policy design. Thorough consultation with all stakehold-
balance the labor supply challenges posed by aging
ers and the public is essential for identifying mitigating
populations.
measures to address the personal and societal concerns
However, progress on progrowth structural reforms
that undercut support for reform. This chapter under-
has historically been slow and uneven across countries
scores the potential of informed, inclusive, and trust-based
and policy areas (Figure 3.1, panel 1). Although com-
approaches not only to enhance the quality of policies but
promises regarding noneconomic goals may play a role
also to significantly increase the likelihood of implement-
(for instance, prioritizing state control in certain sectors
ing and sustaining structural reforms that are critical
for national security reasons), securing social accept-
for boosting productivity, employment, and growth.
ability for policy changes is often a major challenge
(Figure 3.1, panel 2). A large body of literature on the
political economy of reforms has emphasized that weak
acceptability and slow progress reflect the uneven distri-
The authors of this chapter are Silvia Albrizio (co-lead), Hippolyte
bution of the costs and benefits they entail, across the
Balima, Pragyan Deb, Bertrand Gruss (co-lead), Eric Huang,
Colombe Ladreit, and Yu Shi, with support from Yaniv Cohen, economy and over time (for example, Boeri and Nava-
Shrihari Ramachandra, and Isaac Warren. Tohid Atashbar, Max retti 2006). There is mounting awareness, however, that
Yarmolinsky, and Arash Sheikholeslam provided computational and resistance to policy changes is often rooted in behav-
technical assistance. Christopher Roth was an external consultant.
The chapter benefited from comments by Santiago Levy and internal ioral aspects that may dwarf the economic self-interest
seminar participants and reviewers. and equity considerations that have traditionally

Figure 3.1. Structural Reforms: Uneven Convergence amid on factors that influence the social acceptability of
Public Resistance structural reforms, and (2) to identify strategies, tools,
and institutions that can enhance the acceptability of
1. Regulatory Stance
(Ratio to the highest score across all countries and periods) policies, with the ultimate objective of passing reforms
1.0 that closely align with desired plans, end up being
0.9 implemented, endure over time, and pave the way for
0.8 advancing broader agendas. To achieve these objectives,
0.7 the chapter seeks to address the following questions:
0.6 • Historical overview of reform episodes. How difficult
0.5
has it been to implement structural reforms? How
1980
2010 common is the reliance on active communication
0.4
2019 and consultation strategies, as well as the use of
0.3
complementary or compensatory mitigating mea-
0.2
sures, to garner consensus, and how effective are
0.1 these strategies in practice?
0.0 • Drivers of social acceptability. What drives individ-
AEs EMEs AEs EMEs
EPL PMR uals’ attitudes toward reforms? To what extent do
individual characteristics and economic self-interest
40 2. Protests by Reform Area determine support? What is the role of perceptions,
(Number of countries)
35 information, and other beliefs in driving policy
Pensions PMR-electricity preferences?
30 EPL Migrant integration
Trade • Policy toolkit for consensus and reform sustainability.
25 Can information strategies correct misperceptions
about reforms, notably regarding the need for and
20
the effect of policy changes, and influence attitudes
15 toward reforms? What other tools, strategies, and
10 institutions can help policymakers forge consensus,
improve the policy design process, and ensure that
5
reforms not only are implemented but also endure?
0
1994 96 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
To answer these questions, the chapter focuses on
Sources: IMF, Structural Reforms Database; Mass Mobilization Project; and IMF staff a set of product and labor market reforms. It begins
calculations. by leveraging a novel narrative database to uncover
Note: Panel 1 shows the cross-country distribution of product and labor market reform key facts surrounding reform attempts since the mid-
indices—where higher values denote looser regulatory stance—expressed as a ratio to
the highest score across all countries and periods in the sample. The marker inside each 1990s to ease product market regulation (PMR) and
box represents the median; the upper and lower edges of each box show the top and increase competition in the electricity sector, provide
bottom quartiles; and the black markers denote the top and bottom deciles. Panel 2
shows the five-year moving averages of the number of countries facing protests, with incentives for the labor supply of elder workers, and
x-axis labels indicating the final year of the rolling window. AEs = advanced economies; integrate foreign-born workers into the labor market.
EMEs = emerging market economies; EPL = employment protection legislation; PMR =
product market regulation. The chapter then collects new evidence from surveys
of individuals to (1) investigate how beliefs and, in
particular, misinformation and misperceptions about
underpinned public economics analysis. Among various policies affect support for reforms and (2) test whether
behavioral factors influencing reform acceptability, mis- providing information—for instance, on how poli-
information about the problems tackled by the reform cies work or complementing reforms with measures
and misperceptions about how policies work can be that address specific concerns—can increase support.
critical deterrents to support (for example, Douenne and Finally, the chapter conducts an in-depth review of
Fabre 2022; Duval and others 2024). 11 labor market reform episodes to contextualize les-
Motivated by the urgent need to move forward sons from the survey analysis and identify a broader set
on inclusive growth reform agendas, this chapter of strategies and tools that have helped policymakers
pursues two intertwined objectives: (1) to shed light build consensus and sustain reform efforts.

CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS
The chapter’s main findings are as follows: tory measures) that address not only self-interest,
• Passing structural reforms has typically been challeng- but also distributional and other societal concerns,
ing, but the use of strategies to garner consensus is can improve acceptability. However, lack of trust
associated with higher chances of implementation. A in the parties involved in the reform and in gov-
historical overview of reform episodes shows that the ernments’ ability to adequately implement policies
pace of reform efforts has more than halved since and mitigating measures can still undermine social
the global financial crisis of 2008–09. Moreover, a acceptability.
substantial fraction of reforms that are attempted are • An expanded toolkit and a strong institutional setting
never implemented—nearly 20 percent of policies fostering a two-way dialogue with stakeholders and
aimed at increasing competition in the electricity the population at large can help policymakers garner
sector and almost 50 percent of those providing support for implementing and sustaining reforms.
incentives for workers to work longer—or get passed Effective strategies require far more than enhancing
only after being diluted amid resistance. The mac- communication. The chapter’s review of country
roeconomic or political context in which reforms cases confirms the importance of trust in both the
are attempted can sometimes matter, but it does message and the messenger. Conducting and dif-
not seem determinant. Instead, the use of commu- fusing policy research by independent, nonpartisan
nication and consultation strategies and mitigating institutions has often been key to raising awareness
measures are more reliable predictors of reform about the need for reform and building consensus.
implementation. A strong institutional setting that facilitated con-
• Beliefs and perceptions are key determinants of attitudes sultations with stakeholders, including in the policy
toward structural reforms. Socioeconomic character- design stage, helped cement trust in policymak-
istics underlying individuals’ economic self-interest ing and move forward reforms that also endured.
do influence policy views but, for instance, in the Instead, attempts to pass reforms that were not
surveys conducted for this chapter they account for tailored to domestic conditions or that were pushed
only 6 percent of individuals’ support for reforms to along with multiple other major reforms often faced
increase competition in network sectors and 11 per- major implementation challenges or were eventually
cent for policies to integrate foreign-born workers. reversed.
Instead, individuals’ beliefs and perceptions explain
about 80 percent of reform support, and misinfor- The chapter’s findings and their implications for
mation about policies and misperceptions about boosting the chances of reform implementation
how they work account for about half that support. come with some caveats. First, social acceptability is
• Communication and information strategies, as well as not the only factor that matters for implementation
complementary and compensatory measures, can shift success. For instance, vested interests can influence
policy views, especially when forged in a context of decision-making bodies and affect the course of reform
trust. Randomized survey experiments on different attempts, regardless of whether the population broadly
policy areas and in countries at different stages agrees with the proposed reform. Second, the strategies
of development show that providing information underscored in this chapter to cement social accept-
to populations can correct misperceptions about ability are not a substitute for sound policy design.
policies and increase support for reforms. Raising The findings underscore that a poor understanding
awareness regarding the need for reform can often of policy mechanisms undermines public support,
help, and explaining the effect of policies and but a better understanding will not (and should not)
how they work appears critical to increasing social help policymakers pass policies that are ill designed.
acceptability for reforms. For instance, in the surveys Third, public resistance can reflect justifiable concerns
conducted for this chapter, additional support about inappropriately designed reforms. In the same
for migrant integration policies in the group that vein, social acceptability should not be viewed as an
received information about how those policies work end in itself. Some inconsistent, counterproductive, or
was equivalent to more than 40 percent of the share welfare-detrimental reform attempts may encounter
of those in the control group who were opposed. little social resistance, and yet the reforms they are
Survey analyses also show that tailored mitigating advocating should not be passed. This underscores
measures (complementary policies and compensa- the importance of the chapter’s finding on the role of

knowledge and understanding of policies. A sustained Individuals’ views on policies—and consequently, the
effort to make independent and trustworthy policy social acceptability of reforms—are also significantly
analysis widely available can help protect societies from influenced by their beliefs and perceptions, including
opportunistic populist proposals that hide costs and those regarding the effects of policies and the willing-
undesirable outcomes. Finally, understanding country- ness or ability of policymakers to implement them as
and policy-area-specific conditions is critical. However, promised.
with appropriate caveats, the broad principles drawn in For instance, lack of trust in plans to compensate
this chapter from different policy fields and countries those affected by policy changes has either derailed tax
at various stages of development can still help policy- and subsidy reforms or required the use of earmark-
makers navigate the challenges of implementing and ing schemes and other commitment solutions at the
sustaining reforms. cost of efficiency considerations (Guillaume, Zytek,
and Farzin 2011; Douenne and Fabre 2022; Kanbur
and Levy 2022). Similarly, if potential winners do not
Social Acceptability of Reforms: A Primer comprehend how a policy change will benefit them,
In essence, structural reforms are policy changes they may not trust or support it (Stantcheva 2021;
that modify acquired rights and economic rents with Dechezleprêtre and others 2022; Alfaro, Chen, and
the aim of improving the allocation of resources in the Chor 2023; Dabla-Norris and others 2023; Duval and
economy. As such, they inevitably create winners (the others 2024).
beneficiaries from efficiency gains) and losers (those With these considerations in mind, the rest of the
whose rents or acquired rights the reforms affect neg- chapter investigates how policymakers can enhance the
atively).1 For instance, reforms to foster competition social acceptability of policies, with the ultimate objec-
can boost output and reduce prices, benefiting workers tive of implementing and sustaining structural reforms.
and consumers throughout the economy, but the It focuses on policies that have been previously identi-
immediate targets are the rents of the few firms with fied as critical to facilitating the reallocation of resources
market power under existing rules and the workers in across sectors and boosting labor supply amid aging
those firms. populations (for example, Ostry, Prati, and Spilimbergo
The implications for the acceptability of reforms 2009; Chapter 3 of the April 2016 WEO; Chapter 3 of
are, however, less straightforward than simply iden- the October 2019 WEO; Chapter 4 of the April 2020
tifying winners and losers and eventually offsetting WEO; Budina and others 2023; Chapter 3 of the April
losses. Gains and losses from reforms are unevenly 2024 WEO) but does not explore their macroeconomic
distributed not only across society, but also over time effects—or what constitutes solid policy design—since
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003). Costs are often more this has been covered extensively.
evident in the short term and concentrated in a few
well-organized and easily mobilized groups, whereas
gains are diffused and mostly accrue slowly over time. The Challenge of Implementing
This dynamic makes the status quo appealing, as its Structural Reforms: Key Facts
costs are not immediately apparent and the material- Despite the well-recognized challenges of pass-
ization of payoffs is uncertain (Fernandez and Rodrik ing structural reforms, there is a surprising lack of
1991; Tompson 2009). cross-country data documenting both successful and
Securing social acceptability for reforms can be unsuccessful reform attempts. To fill this void, this
challenging, even when they are designed to balance chapter constructs a new database that tracks product
increasing overall welfare with fairly compensating and labor market reform episodes during 1996–2023
those who are adversely affected. A growing body (Online Annex 3.2).2 The documented reforms aimed
of literature has pointed out that public resistance is to (1) ease product market regulation to increase
not based solely on objective economic self-interest competition in the electricity sector (PMR-electricity
grounded in individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics, hereafter), (2) provide incentives for labor participa-
such as employment status, age, and education level. tion among elder workers (elder LP hereafter), and
1See, for instance, Boeri and Navaretti (2006), Tompson (2009),

and Alesina and others (2023) for discussions on the political econ- 2All online annexes are available at www.imf.org/en/Publications/
omy of structural reforms. WEO.

(3) increase the integration of foreign-born workers Figure 3.2. Reform Episodes by Implementation Outcome
into labor markets (migrant integration hereafter). The (Total number of reform episodes)
database is constructed using text analysis of quarterly
The intensity of reform efforts has declined over time, and a substantial share of
country reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit reform attempts are either dropped or implemented amid resistance and diluted.
(EIU) spanning 26 advanced economies, 36 emerging
market economies, and 14 low-income countries. For Implemented Implemented (resisted)
Implemented (diluted) Not implemented
each policy area covered, it allows each country-year
observation to be classified into one of three catego- 140 1. PMR-Electricity: Increase Private Participation and Competition
ries: (1) no relevant reform was under discussion, (2) a 120
reform was under discussion but was not yet imple- 100
mented, or (3) a reform was implemented.3 Validation 80
tests confirm that the data set accurately captures 60
reform information from the EIU reports. 40
A first notable observation is that the number of 20
reform episodes, including those when policy changes 0
were discussed but not implemented, has declined over 1996–2008 2009–23 1996–2008 2009–23 1996–2008 2009–23
AEs EMEs LICs
time in almost all policy fields and country groups
(Figure 3.2). Splitting the sample in half around the 70 2. Migrant Integration: Integrate Foreign-Born Workers into Workforce
time of the global financial crisis shows a particularly 60
sharp drop in PMR-electricity reform episodes—despite 50
still-large cross-country heterogeneity in regulatory 40
stances. The pace of elder LP reforms in advanced 30
economies and emerging market economies has also 20
slowed in recent years, notwithstanding rising longev- 10
ity.4 The reduction in reform intensity could reflect 0
shrinking scope for reforms in some policy areas and 1996–2008 2009–23 1996–2008 2009–23 1996–2008 2009–23
AEs EMEs LICs
countries, such as PMR in network sectors in advanced
economies. However, it has coincided with a docu- 60 3. Elder LP: Provide Incentives for Labor Supply of Elder Workers
mented increase in social discontent, notably since
50
the global financial crisis, as captured by episodes of
40
civil unrest, as well as distrust in public institutions,
dissatisfaction with democracy, and lower voter turn- 30
out (OECD 2021). This suggests that less appetite for 20

policy change among the public may have deterred 10
policymakers from even attempting needed reforms. 0
The data also reveal how difficult it has been his- 1996–2008 2009–23 1996–2008 2009–23 1996–2008 2009–23
AEs EMEs LICs
torically to pass reforms. Only about 50 percent of all
PMR-electricity and elder LP reforms that have been Source: IMF staff calculations.
discussed in advanced economies over the past three Note: The figure shows the shares of reform episodes across reform areas by
decades were eventually implemented. The implemen- implementation outcome: implemented (not resisted); implemented but resisted;
implemented but resisted and diluted; and not implemented. AEs = advanced
tation rate for elder LP reforms in emerging market economies; EMEs = emerging market economies; LICs = low-income countries; LP =
economies is comparable, whereas for PMR-electricity labor participation; PMR = product market regulation.
3The first category can include both cases in which a reform was reform episodes, the share of implemented reforms
not needed and those in which it was needed but was not being con- is 90 percent for emerging market economies and
sidered. Earlier structural reform databases (for instance, Alesina and
others 2023) identify only implemented reforms, with no-reform for low-income countries. The implementation rate
observations including both categories (1) and (2). for migrant integration reform episodes is comparable
4There have been barely any attempts to undertake elder LP
across country groups, at about 80 percent.
reforms in low-income countries, which is not surprising, because
most are still benefiting from a youthful and growing working-age
In addition, in a significant fraction of episodes
population or have incipient pension programs. that did end in reform implementation, the reform

was nonetheless resisted by the public, as evidenced Figure 3.3. Strategies for Building Consensus for Reform
by strikes, protests, or riots: roughly 22 percent of (Share of reform episodes using each strategy, percent)
migrant integration episodes, 30 percent in the case of
The use of consensus-building strategies has varied widely across episodes, reform areas,
PMR-electricity episodes, and as many as 40 per- and income groups.
cent for elder LP reform episodes. In many of those
episodes, policymakers had to scale down the scope of 70
Consultation and communication
the reform to secure its implementation (for instance, Complementary and compensatory
60
this occurred in nearly 40 percent of resisted elder
LP reform episodes and in as many as 45 percent of 50
episodes in the second half of the sample). Moreover,
40
public resistance need not always preclude implemen-
tation, but it may affect the sustainability of a reform. 30
Indeed, additional analysis reveals that among reforms
that were enacted but later reversed, a higher share had 20
faced resistance when implemented (Online Annex
10
Figure 3.2.1).
0
AEs EMEs LICs AEs EMEs LICs AEs EMEs LICs
Strategies for Building Consensus for PMR-electricity Migrant integration Elder LP
Structural Reforms Source: IMF staff calculations.

Earlier studies argue that communication and Note: The figure shows the shares of reform episodes using each strategy by reform
and country income group. AEs = advanced economies; EMEs = emerging market
consultation efforts aimed at informing voters and economies; LICs = low-income countries; LP = labor participation; PMR = product
stakeholders of both the need for and the goals of market regulation.
reform have often played a key role in securing imple-
mentation and reducing the chances of policy reversals
(for example, Tompson 2009; OECD 2010). Besides Although countries in all income groups have
early engagement with all stakeholders, those studies used both sets of strategies across reform areas, in a
also underscore the role that mitigation measures have significant share of reform episodes (close to half, on
played in securing consensus. However, the evidence average), the use was not prominent enough to be
on the use of these strategies is drawn largely from captured in the data (Figure 3.3). Advanced economies
case studies covering a handful of mostly advanced appear to have resorted more often to consultation and
economies. To shed light on how extensively used these communication strategies, compared with their use of
strategies are and what role they may have played for complementary and compensatory measures, although
securing implementation, this section shows evidence the share of reform episodes in which they used
based on two new indicators (see details in Online these mitigating measures has picked up significantly
Annex 3.2): since the global financial crisis. In contrast, emerging
• Use of consultation and communication strategies. An market economies and low-income countries seem to
indicator variable records whether policymakers have relied more on complementary and compensa-
resorted to any of several tools—such as consul- tory measures, particularly in PMR-electricity reform
tations, hearings, referendums, or independent episodes, in which subsidies or price controls were
communication agencies—to communicate, engage, frequently part of the policy packages.
and negotiate with various stakeholders at any point The heterogeneity in both the use of strategies to
within a reform episode. secure consensus and the implementation outcome
• Complementary and compensatory measures. Analo- across reform episodes raises a natural question:
gously, an indicator variable captures whether the Has the use of these strategies helped overcome the
authorities considered any of various mitigating challenges of passing reforms? Although causal effects
measures—such as job training programs, temporary cannot be convincingly tested with these aggregate
job protections, price subsidies, or grandfathering data, an exploration of historical correlations based on
clauses—aimed at compensating those negatively multinomial logit regressions suggests that these strate-
affected by reforms or to offset transition costs. gies are associated with a more than 6 percentage point

increase, on average, in the likelihood of implementing Figure 3.4. Relative Importance of Reform Strategies for
proposed reforms across policy areas, with stronger Predicting Reform Implementation
effects for attempts facing resistance (Online Annex (Share of implementation likelihood explained, percent)
Figure 3.2.2). Indeed, in reform episodes that are met
Consensus-building strategies significantly boost chances of implementing reforms.
with public resistance, reaching implementation is
more likely when explicit efforts to consult or com- Reform strategies
PMR-electricity
municate with social stakeholders are used than when Macroeconomic context Communication and consultation
they are not used. Also, the use of compensatory and Compensatory and complementary
Macro framework Other factors
complementary measures is generally associated with a Political context
higher likelihood of implementing reform proposals in Reform strategies
the case of both resisted and less resisted episodes, with
integration
Macroeconomic context
Migrant
some differences across reform areas. Macro framework
This does not mean that the use of these strate- Political context
gies is the only factor determining reform outcomes. Reform strategies
The analysis also finds that the macroeconomic and Macroeconomic context
Elder LP
political contexts in which reforms are attempted (for Macro framework
instance, whether a reform is proposed in good times Political context
or after a severe crisis, or at the beginning of a new 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
administration versus closer to the next elections) can
somewhat influence the likelihood of reform propos- Source: IMF staff calculations.
als being implemented. However, the correlations are Note: The figure shows the relative predictive power of each set of factors for the
implementation of reform proposals across different areas. Estimates are obtained
not always consistent, with the role and significance through dominance analysis based on a multinomial logistic regression (Online
of individual variables varying across reform areas Annex 3.2). PMR = product market regulation; LP = labor participation.
(Online Annex Table 3.2.3).5 In addition, when the
importance of reform strategies is compared with that
of other factors for predicting the implementation incorporate their concerns when designing reforms.
of reform proposals, reform strategies jointly explain To shed light on this matter, the chapter uses surveys
about 28 percent of the implementation likelihood, on of 12,600 individuals from six countries covering two
average, across different policy areas (Figure 3.4). This different policy areas (Online Annex 3.3; Albrizio and
is relatively large: by comparison, the variables captur- others 2024a, 2024b):
ing the macroeconomic context or the political context • PMR reforms to enhance private participation and
explain 16 percent and 22 percent, respectively, on foster competition in the electricity and telecommu-
average. Taken together, this suggests that active use of nications sectors in emerging market and developing
consultation, communication, and mitigating strategies economies (the survey is conducted in Mexico,
is a more robust predictor of implementation success Morocco, and South Africa). Attracting private
than the context in which reforms are attempted. investment is critical to narrowing infrastructure
gaps that can affect the ability of these economies
to harness benefits from digitalization and artificial
Attitudes toward Reforms: intelligence technologies (for example, Balza and
Evidence from Surveys others 2020; Devine and others 2021; Cazzaniga
The role of reform design strategies documented and others 2024). Public attitudes toward these
in the previous section highlights the importance of policies, however, have been notably negative in the
understanding what drives individuals’ skepticism past (for example, Fay and Morrison 2007; Andrés,
regarding policy change and how policymakers can Schwartz, and Guasch 2013).
• Migrant integration policies to integrate foreign-born
5Earlierstudies have also documented ambiguous relationships workers into labor markets in advanced economies
between the likelihood of reform implementation (with respect to (the survey covers Canada, Italy, and the United
nonreforming, without distinguishing reform discussions from other Kingdom), such as improving the recognition of
nonreform observations) and potential drivers related to cyclical con-
ditions, macroeconomic policies, and political factors (see discussion immigrants’ qualifications and experiences, offering
in Duval, Furceri, and Miethe 2020). free language courses and professional training, and

Figure 3.5. Drivers of Reform Support

(Share of support explained, percent)
Individuals’ reform support is driven primarily by beliefs and perceptions, especially about the effect of policies.
1. PMR Reform 2. Migrant Integration Policies
Socioeconomic characteristics Socioeconomic characteristics
Knowledge and effect of policies

Knowledge and effect of policies
Beliefs and perceptions
Beliefs and perceptions

Market economy
Stereotypes
Trust and corruption
General trust and universalism
Views and satisfaction with sector
Distribution and equity Contact with other cultures
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Source: IMF staff calculations based on IMF-YouGov survey.

Note: The figure shows the results of a dominance analysis that quantifies the share of variance in support for reforms or policies explained by individuals’ socioeconomic
characteristics and different sets of beliefs and perceptions based on an ordinary least squares regression (Online Annex 3.3.1). The regression controls for country fixed
effects and treatment indicators, whose contributions are not shown. PMR = product market regulation.
providing job placement programs that connect be affected by the design of reforms (Online Annex
immigrants with employers looking for their specific 3.3.1):
expertise. These policies can boost labor supply and • Not surprisingly, those who believe that productive
productivity amid aging populations (for example, activities should be handled primarily by private
Aiyar and others 2016; Mitaritonna, Orefice, and firms and that the government should not intervene
Peri 2017; Chapter 4 of the April 2020 WEO) but in price-setting decisions support PMR reforms, and
are often resisted on account of various concerns (for overall, market-oriented beliefs account for a sub-
example, Dennison and Dražanová 2018; Grigorieff, stantial share (35 percent) of policy views. Respon-
Roth, and Ubfal 2020; Alesina and Tabellini 2024). dents who perceive the distribution of income in
their country as unfair are less supportive. And
distributional concerns, together with trust and per-
Predicting Policy Support: The Role of Beliefs ceptions on corruption, weigh as much as individual
What drives individuals’ attitudes toward reforms? characteristics in explaining support.
Policy preferences can be determined, first, by people’s • Stereotypes about immigrants play a key role in
socioeconomic characteristics (such as age, education explaining individuals’ support for migrant integra-
level, employment, income level, and geographic tion policies. Respondents who have a positive view
location), which underpin their economic self-interest. of immigrants (for example, that they are hardwork-
They can also be influenced by a wide range of per- ing), associate immigrants with refugees, or think
ceptions and beliefs, including those regarding policies that immigration can have a positive economic
(that is, how much individuals know about policies and cultural effect are more likely to support these
and how they think policies may affect outcomes they policies, whereas the opposite is true for those who
care about, such as jobs, prices, and crime rates). associate immigrants with illegal workers or a nega-
The results from both surveys reveal that individ- tive economic or cultural outcome.
ual characteristics do play a role but account for only • Importantly, knowledge about and perceptions of
6 percent of individuals’ support for PMR reforms the effect of policies explain more than 50 percent
and 11 percent of support for migrant integration of support for migrant integration policies. Respon-
policies (Figure 3.5; Online Annex Figure 3.3.2). dents who correctly identify policies for better
Instead, policy views are driven primarily by individ- integrating foreign-born workers or who believe
uals’ beliefs and (mis)perceptions, some of which can that integrating immigrants can be beneficial for the

Table 3.1. Hypotheses to Boost Policy Support

Survey Treatment: Information Provided Hypothesis
PMR Reform Status quo: Factual evidence on the cost, quality, and access to electricity or telecommunications
Status quo
services.
Status quo + effects of policies: Adds research-based evidence on the effect of policies to foster
competition in network sectors on cost, quality, and access to electricity and telecommunications
services.
Migrant Integration Policies Effect of policies: Research-based evidence on the effect of policies to integrate foreign workers on labor Effect of policies
market outcomes for native workers, public finances, and immigrants’ crime rates.
Effect of policies + mechanisms: Adds detailed information explaining the mechanisms through which
immigration policies lead to those outcomes.
Immigrants’ stories: Three stories sourced from newspaper articles about immigrants’ struggles in the
Empathy
labor market, their perseverance, and their success.
Source: IMF staff compilation.
Note: PMR = product market regulation.
economy are more likely to support such policies. individuals who receive an information treatment at
Knowledge and perceptions of policies also explain random with responses of those who do not makes it
the lion’s share (37 percent) of support for PMR possible to causally test these hypotheses.6
reforms. Individuals are more likely to support the Testing the status quo hypothesis is particularly
reform if they believe that private firms competing relevant for PMR reforms, because these often entail
in the sector will lead to lower prices, higher quality, opportunity costs (for example, a missed opportunity
or broader access to electricity or telecommunica- to improve competitiveness), which individuals find
tions services. harder to visualize than actual costs of not reform-
ing, as in the case of unsustainable pension programs
The importance of beliefs in shaping policy support (Tompson 2009). The results show that raising
extends beyond the areas included in this study. For awareness of the need for reform has a positive impact
example, Duval and others (2024) find that beliefs play on support for PMR reforms in the electricity sector
a bigger role in explaining attitudes toward employ- (Figure 3.6). Compared with that in the control group,
ment protection legislation than individual socioeco- support increases by 4.5 percentage points for respon-
nomic characteristics (such as employment status or dents who receive the status quo treatment.7 The effect
education level). Dechezleprêtre and others (2022) and is also positive, but not statistically significant, for the
Dabla-Norris and others (2023) find similar results for telecommunications sector. This may reflect that, on
climate policies. average, respondents perceive private participation as
higher in the telecommunications sector, so simply
informing them that there is room for improvement
Information Strategies to Boost Reform does not necessarily change their views on allowing
Acceptability private firms to operate in the sector.
Because knowledge and perceptions of policies However, when information about the need for
strongly influence individuals’ attitudes toward reform is complemented with research-based evi-
structural reforms, this section uses an experimental dence on the effect that PMR reforms have had on
setup to investigate how providing information about
policies affects support for reforms. Survey respon- 6The analysis controls for a rich set of individual characteris-
dents are randomly assigned at the country level tics, beliefs and perceptions, and country fixed effects (Online
Annex 3.3.2). Moreover, although the survey questions can elicit
to different groups before their perceptions of and individuals’ policy support directly, one concern is that self-reported
views about policies are elicited in order to test three preferences may not match real behavior. Several studies have
hypotheses, reported in Table 3.1, regarding the role nonetheless shown that when both survey responses and real-world
behaviors can be measured, they tend to correlate (for example, Fehr,
of information strategies in boosting policy support:
Epper, and Senn 2021). Although the setting here does not allow
(1) providing information on the costs of not reform- real-world behavior to be measured, the survey includes real-stakes
ing (status quo hypothesis), (2) explaining the effect of questions (for example, gathering willingness to sign a petition) that
policies (effect-of-policies hypothesis), and (3) providing a can serve as a proxy. The results are reported in Online Annex 3.3.2.
7In all treatments, respondents are given the sources for the evi-
real-life narrative of immigrants’ experiences (empathy dence on the effect of policies and links to the relevant publications.
hypothesis). Comparing responses on policy support by Examples of treatments are reported in Online Annex 3.3.2.

Figure 3.6. Effect of Information Strategies on Reform oppose migrant integration policies in the control group.
Support Moreover, the effect on reform support is even larger
(Additional support relative to the control group, percentage points) (10.5 percentage points) when respondents are given an
explanation of the mechanisms underlying the policy
Information strategies that raise awareness about the need for reform and correct
misperceptions about how policies work can significantly boost reform support. effects under the effect of policies + mechanism treatment
(equivalent to about 42 percent of the share opposed in
Status quo the control group). Importantly, heterogeneous analysis
Telecom
shows that explaining how policies work is particu-

Status quo + effect of policies
PMR reform
larly effective in shifting support among respondents

with negative stereotypes of immigrants and politically
Status quo
Electricity
right-leaning respondents (Online Annex Table 3.3.2).

Status quo + effect of policies Additional results confirm that the information
treatment in both surveys influences reform support by
Effect of policies
Migrant integration
addressing individuals’ misperceptions about the effect

Effect of policies + mechanism of policies. It has a statistically significant and large effect
on the share of respondents in the PMR survey who
Immigrants’ stories perceive competition in the provision of electricity and
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 telecommunications services as beneficial for consumers
(Online Annex Table 3.3.1). Similarly, respondents who
Source: IMF staff calculations based on IMF-YouGov survey. receive either of the two treatments on the effects of pol-
Note: The figure shows the difference in support shares between each treatment icies are significantly more likely to believe that policies
group and the control group. Dark-blue bars denote that the difference is statistically
significant at the 90 percent confidence level according to the regression analyses in to integrate immigrant workers can have a positive effect
Online Annexes 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. PMR = product market regulation. on natives’ jobs, public finances, and crime rates (Online
Annex Table 3.3.2). The effect is stronger in particular
price, quality, and access to electricity and telecom- for crime rates, suggesting that misperceptions about
munications services in other countries, the effect is foreign-born workers and crime are a key channel for
stronger and statistically significant in regard to both support for policies related to migrants.
sectors (the status quo + effect of policies treatment in The empathy hypothesis is particularly relevant in the
Figure 3.6), lending support to the effect-of-policies context of immigration, in which negative attitudes
hypothesis. The share of respondents who would sup- are often driven by concerns about cultural and work
port PMR reforms increases by almost 16 percentage ethic differences (Dennison and Dražanová 2018;
points, on average, across sectors, from 41.4 percent Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2023). The treatment
in the control group to 57.1 percent among those evaluates whether appealing to empathy, by highlight-
who receive the treatment.8 This additional support is ing real-life examples of policy-related obstacles faced
equivalent to 46.7 percent of the share of respondents by immigrants in entering the labor market, has a
who oppose PMR reforms in the control group. different impact than providing information on the
Similarly, the share of respondents who would support benefits of integration policies. The treatment is indeed
migrant integration policies increases by about 9 percent- effective in increasing support for migrant integration
age points between the control group and those who policies, but with a less pronounced effect than for the
receive the effect-of-policies treatment (and the effect is effect-of-policies treatment.
statistically significant).9 The treatment effect is also Taken together, the survey experiments show that
equivalent to 30 percent of the share of respondents who beliefs not only play a key role in driving reform
support but can also be shaped by policy interventions.
8Providing information about the benefits of easing regulation has
Providing clear information on the impact of policies is
also been found to increase support for labor market reforms (see
particularly effective in increasing support for reforms.10
Duval and others 2024).
9The effect-of-policies treatment is designed to address four
potential misperceptions related to key drivers of attitudes toward

immigration identified in the literature: labor market concerns, 10Although misinformation campaigns can induce misperceptions
welfare concerns, security concerns, and cultural concerns (Alesina and decrease policy support (for instance, Di Tella, Galiani, and
and Tabellini 2024; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Dennison and Schargrodsky 2012; Alesina and Tabellini 2024), this does not lessen the
Dražanová 2018; Dražanová 2020; Haaland and Roth 2020). case for enhancing information efforts by policymakers seeking reform.

Figure 3.7. Reasons for Nonsupport and the Role of Compensatory and Complementary Measures
(Share of responses, percent)
Concerns about the effects of reforms on others, especially the vulnerable, are key obstacles for reform, but adequate mitigating measures can boost support.
1. PMR Reform 2. Migrant Integration Policies

Price Overcrowding public services
Personal
Personal
Quality Housing costs
Job loss Job and wage losses
Affordability for poorest
Fairness to natives
Access for poorest
Societal
Fiscal burden concerns

Coverage in remote areas
Societal
Security concerns
Overall job losses
Overall job losses
National security risk
Uncertainty Cultural differences
Other
Don’t trust evidence provided Opt to support Uncertainty Opt to support
Other
Remain against Remain against
Unspecified Unspecified
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 50 100 0 10 20 30 0 50 100
Source: IMF staff calculations based on IMF-YouGov survey.

Note: The blue bars show the distribution of respondents’ reasons for not supporting the reform (control group only). The yellow (red) bars display the proportion of these
respondents that would opt to support (remain against) policies if offered mitigating measures (Online Annex 3.3.3). PMR = product market regulation.
Understanding Individuals’ Concerns to concerns about the price or quality of services or the
Improve Policy Design possibility of losing one’s job represent 22 percent of
Merely explaining the need to reform and how responses.
policies can improve outcomes is not enough to secure • The primary reasons for not supporting migrant
comprehensive support. Addressing distributional con- integration policies are concerns about fairness—
cerns, unintended side effects, and the short-term costs specifically, the belief that it is unfair to assist
of reforms requires additional strategies, as reflected immigrants when many locals struggle to find
by the evidence that compensatory or complementary jobs—followed by worries that public services like
measures have often helped tilt the balance toward hospitals, schools, and public transport may become
securing reform implementation. To shed light on overcrowded. Self-interest concerns account for
these strategies, the surveys zoom in on individuals 30 percent of responses, with access to public services
who say they would not support policy change. This or housing featuring more prominently than jobs.
helps to (1) identify the main reasons for nonsupport
and (2) test whether complementing reforms with Importantly, the results indicate that, irrespective of
mitigating measures would change their support. the concerns raised by respondents, offering tailored
When responses are grouped according to whether complementary and compensatory measures can signifi-
individuals are concerned that policy changes would cantly foster support for reforms (Online Annex 3.3.3).
hurt them directly (personal concerns) or would hurt Although results should be interpreted as indicative rather
their communities (societal concerns), the results from than causal evidence, 50–80 percent of respondents in the
the two surveys indicate that societal concerns play a control group initially opposed to PMR reforms indicate
much larger role (Figure 3.7). they would change their stance toward support if mitigat-
• The two most cited concerns against PMR reforms are ing measures were taken to address their concerns—for
consequences for the poorest households in terms of example, respondents who express concerns about the
service affordability and access if private companies cost and quality of utility services following PMR reforms
are permitted to manage the sector. Taken together, are asked if they would change their support, assuming
all societal concerns account for more than half of the government committed to creating an independent
total responses. In turn, self-interest or personal regulatory agency (Figure 3.7, panel 1). Further analysis

shows that mitigating measures play an important role Table 3.2. Historical Employment Protection Legislation
in boosting support from individuals who may fear job Reform Episodes
losses from PMR reforms, such as workers in public utility Country Classification
companies or individuals with close connections to them. Country Cases at Reform Reform Status
The share of respondents who would change their Bolivia (1985) LIC Reversed in 2006
Brazil (2017) EME Implemented with some resistance
stance varies more across specific concerns and is gener-
Denmark (1990s) AE Implemented and sustained
ally somewhat lower for those initially against migrant
France (2015–17) AE Implemented with some resistance
integration policies, but still sizable, at about 50 percent,
Georgia (2006) LIC Reversed in 2013
on average (Figure 3.7, panel 2). One of the comple- Germany (2003–05) AE Implemented with some resistance
mentary policies that would significantly increase sup- India (2014–2020) EME Legislated in 2020 but not yet fully
port is international coordination and cooperation. The implemented
EU Temporary Protection Directive, enacted in response Korea (2016) AE Largely withdrawn as a result of
to the massive inflow of immigrants during the war resistance
Mexico (2012) EME Implemented and sustained
in Ukraine, is a good example of a cross-country agree-
Peru (2008) EME Implemented with adjustments
ment that, together with member states’ policies aimed
Vietnam (2012) LIC New labor code enacted in 2012
at removing barriers to accessing labor markets, has and sustained
helped achieve high employment rates for foreign-born Source: IMF staff compilation.
workers in record time (Box 3.1). Note: AE = advanced economy; EME = emerging market economy; LIC = low-income
Individuals who say they would still oppose reforms country.
mostly cite reasons related to trust in the parties

involved and doubts about institutions’ ability to confirms that effective communication of the need for
implement reforms or mitigating measures effectively reform and how policies work can shift individuals’
(Online Annex Table 3.3.3). This is in line with attitudes toward reforms. It also highlights the need
results in OECD (2024) showing that, on average, to complement reforms with additional measures to
only 39 percent of the population in a country finds address concerns. But how have these strategies been
it likely that the government will clearly explain how deployed in practice? And what other tools and institu-
individuals will be affected by a reform, with lower tions have helped policymakers sustain reform efforts?
shares in countries where trust in government is To shed light on these questions, this section examines
weaker. These findings highlight the importance of 11 reform episodes in countries of different income
designing mechanisms that build trust in the reform levels (Table 3.2; Online Annex 3.4). To facilitate
process. Examples of such mechanisms include the use comparability, the analysis focuses on one policy field,
of crowdsourcing or participatory budgeting to allow employment protection legislation (EPL), in which it
collective understanding, design, and oversight of the has proved particularly difficult to enact reforms over
reform and compensatory measures (OECD 2022), or the past four decades. It is also a policy area in which
the use of pilot cases, as discussed in the next section. intertemporal trade-offs can lead to strong resistance
The findings also underscore that strengthening trust and political gridlock: the benefits of deregulation
in public institutions through reforms to address accrue only gradually over time, whereas deregulation
governance and corruption vulnerabilities, as advocated can lead to higher unemployment and lower wages
in IMF engagement with member countries (see IMF in the short term (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).
1997, 2018), can also pave the way for the successful Understanding what has helped to build consensus
implementation of labor and product market reforms. and overcome political resistance in this context can
be particularly useful for other reform areas that entail
similar trade-offs.
Tools and Strategies for Sustainably
Advancing Reform Agendas: Lessons
from 11 Country Cases Building Consensus for Reform
A historical overview of product and labor market Despite varying outcomes in terms of implementa-
reform attempts suggests that strategies to build con- tion status, a commonality among the majority of the
sensus are associated with higher chances of implemen- successfully legislated reforms has been the achieve-
tation. Survey analysis presented earlier in the chapter ment of some level of consensus prior to legislation.

In some instances, the necessity for reform was demon- demonstrate the benefits of reforms and build public
strated by economic crises, such as Bolivia’s hyperin- confidence, particularly for EPL reforms, which often
flation crisis in the 1980s or high unemployment rates involve substantial up-front costs with delayed and
in countries such as Denmark (early 1990s), Germany indirect benefits. For instance, pilot projects and eval-
(early 2000s), and France (after the euro area crisis). uations have commonly been employed in Denmark
These situations made it clear that the status quo was when introducing new labor market measures, such
unsustainable and changes were needed to revive the as paid leave arrangements (Madsen 1999) and public
labor market and the economy. However, the macro- employment services (Hendeliowitz and Woollhead
economic context alone was neither a sufficient nor 2007). Similarly, in India, key principles deployed in
a necessary condition for the reforms. Governments the states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, which pioneered
needed to employ multiple approaches to successfully more flexible labor laws, skill development initiatives,
garner consensus: and job creation strategies, were later adopted for
• Securing explicit electoral mandates for reform. A national labor law reforms.
strong electoral mandate for policy changes, under- • Policy research and international comparisons. In Bolivia
pinned by effective communication and far-reaching and Brazil, for instance, policy analysis by indepen-
efforts to convince voters and stakeholders of the dent researchers helped raise awareness about how
need for reform during an electoral campaign, was much more rigid these countries’ labor markets were
instrumental in several instances for EPL reform compared with those of peers and how deregulation
success (Tompson 2009). For example, the eco- could enhance productivity growth and competitive-
nomic policy agenda that President Emmanuel ness. International financial institutions also played
Macron proposed for the 2017 French presidential a crucial role in some cases by raising awareness and
election included a labor reform aimed at intro- providing analysis that local authorities could lever-
ducing flexibility in hours worked and collective age. For example, the IMF stressed the importance of
bargaining, with the goal of reducing unemploy- easing restrictive labor laws in India during bilateral
ment to 7 percent by 2022. In India’s 2014 elec- consultations (see IMF 2012, 2013, 2014). Similarly,
tions, the Bharatiya Janata Party campaigned on the IMF identified labor market rigidities as the most
the “Gujarat model” for growth and development, challenging structural problem in Germany (IMF
featuring business-friendly policies with simplified 2001) in the early 2000s, and the Organisation for
regulatory frameworks and relatively flexible labor Economic Co-operation and Development identified
laws to attract industries. Successful election out- comprehensive labor reform in Germany (OECD
comes may have signaled some public buy-in of the 2001) and France (OECD 2015) as top priorities.
new government’s economic policy agenda. Strong
electoral campaigns also helped in regard to reforms No single approach has been sufficient on its own to
in Georgia, Mexico, and Peru. build a strong case for reforms. In nearly all episodes,
• Extensive communication with key stakeholders. governments have had to adopt multiple strategies to
Engaging early with key stakeholders, such as trade build consensus, especially when facing strong resis-
unions and business associations, has also been tance. This has been particularly evident when trade
an effective approach toward communicating the unions were politically influential yet fragmented—
need for EPL reforms. In Denmark, continuous with each representing a small fraction of the labor
social dialogue and tripartite negotiations involv- force and thus hesitant to support any reform that did
ing workers, employers, and the government have not directly benefit its own members, even if beneficial
been a long-standing practice with respect to labor for the broader workforce—as in Bolivia and India,
market issues (Petersen 1998). In France, the 2007 or when achieving consensus required agreements at
Larcher Act mandated national-level negotiations multiple levels. For example, in India, full implemen-
between the government and social partners regard- tation of new labor codes required both federal and
ing labor law matters, but the 2016 El Khomri law state-level agreements. And sometimes reform adoption
was adopted without prior negotiations and was has built on numerous previous reform attempts across
followed by protests (Gazier 2019). different administrations, as in Brazil, where attempts
• Pilot cases. Using pilot cases, with key measures to increase labor market flexibility can be traced back
usually deployed first in only a few regions, can help to the 1990s (de Oliveira 2018).

Carefully Crafted Policy Design extended into the 2010s. Conversely, when governments
have pursued multiple substantial market-oriented
The case studies reviewed indicate that, besides
reforms simultaneously (Online Annex Table 3.4.1),
securing strong consensus, a well-articulated policy
reform implementation has usually been less successful:
design that balances the needs of different social interest
in Bolivia and Georgia, for instance, some of the reforms
groups is critical to implementing sustainable reforms.
that were enacted were eventually reversed. This could
One particularly effective approach is to involve social
reflect the fact that negotiating extensively in several
partners in negotiations during the policy design stage.
reform areas at the same time eventually exhausts govern-
In Denmark, for instance, key policy changes have often
ments’ political capital or that fast-track implementation
been the result of tripartite negotiations among business
of multiple substantial reforms does not allow govern-
associations, trade unions, and the government. Similarly,
ments to adequately balance social interests.
key principles in Mexico’s 2012 labor reform were based
on extensive parliamentary negotiations among political
parties representing diverse social interest groups. Conclusions and Policy Implications
To ease the negative effect of less stringent employ-
Policymakers worldwide are under pressure to revive
ment protection on workers, several countries have
improvements in living standards and ensure their
supplemented flexibility-enhancing reforms with
economies flourish amid ongoing structural changes
compensatory measures, such as improved social secu-
that present both opportunities and challenges. In this
rity and unemployment benefits (Online Annex Table
context, it is critical to implement policies and reforms
3.4.1). Examples include Brazil, Denmark, France,
that boost labor participation and facilitate the reallo-
Germany, and Korea. Complementary measures to
cation of labor and capital to high-productivity firms
facilitate the reallocation of workers, such as enhanced
and growing sectors. Historically, gaining the necessary
active labor market policies and training programs,
social and political support to enact and sustain these
have been included in episodes in Denmark, France,
policies and reforms has been a formidable challenge.
Germany, and Vietnam. These measures have often
This chapter presents several strategies that policymak-
helped garner support for EPL reforms.
ers can employ to navigate this challenge, enhance the
Independent research institutes and think tanks can
social acceptability of their reform agendas, and thereby
also play a crucial role in facilitating better policy design
increase the chances of successful implementation.
and communicating the benefits of labor reforms to the
Although the context in which reforms are
public. For instance, during Germany’s Hartz reforms,
attempted can sometimes influence the outcomes, it is
the economic research institutes RWI and ZEW were
by no means determinant. Historical evidence shows
commissioned to develop a conceptual framework
that active use of multipronged strategies to build con-
for evaluating draft policies (Hopp 2019). In France,
sensus is a more reliable predictor of implementation
independent institutions such as France Stratégie and
success. These strategies include consultation and com-
the CESE not only conduct labor market analyses and
munication efforts and mitigating measures to com-
policy evaluation but also advise the government and
pensate those affected by reforms. However, whether
facilitate dialogue with various sectors of society.
individuals see themselves as winners or losers with
regard to prospective policy changes is not determined
Incremental Implementation solely by objective socioeconomic characteristics—such
Incremental rollout of reform measures, starting as employment status, education level, or income.
with focused areas that do not immediately threaten Individuals’ views on policies—and thus the social
core benefits of several social groups, is often associated acceptability of reforms—are driven largely by beliefs
with stronger sustainability of reforms. For instance, such as trust in government and institutions, distri-
an important focus of Brazil’s reform was on reducing butional concerns, and perceptions about the effects
excessive labor litigation costs, India’s labor reform efforts of policies on themselves and their communities (for
began with consolidating and standardizing minimum example, the overall availability of jobs, access to pub-
wage regulations across all sectors, and France started lic services for the neediest, and national security).
with simplifying collective bargaining. In Denmark, Importantly, the chapter’s analysis, based on random-
although the first wave of labor reforms occurred in ized survey experiments, shows that certain communica-
the early to mid-1990s, subsequent reforms, including tion interventions can shift individuals’ perceptions and
measures targeting youth and long-term unemployment, policy views. First, informing them about the cost of not

undertaking necessary structural reforms raises awareness mitigating measures that increase reforms’ acceptability.
of the need for the reforms and increases support for As the chapter’s survey results show, these measures do
policy change. Second, trustworthy communication on not always involve compensating those who lose out,
the economic effects of policies is effective in correcting which needs to be balanced against fiscal constraints.
misperceptions. For instance, providing research-based Sometimes they entail providing the necessary insti-
evidence on the impact on crime rates of granting tutional framework and participatory mechanisms to
work permits to foreign-born workers significantly build trust regarding a reform, which can be achieved
boosts support for policies to facilitate these workers’ even in a fiscally constrained environment.
integration into labor markets. Although the survey Finally, the chapter’s findings underscore how lack of
experiments conducted for this chapter focus on specific trust can drive resistance to policy change, even when
policies, the consistency of results across distinct policy the benefits of reforms are explained and mitigating
fields and countries at different stages of development measures are considered. For instance, in the context of
lends support to the general applicability of their policy the experimental surveys discussed in the chapter, the
implications. main reason cited by respondents for ultimately not
The lessons from the chapter’s survey analysis and supporting policy change is lack of trust in the parties
review of country-specific reform episodes extend far involved in the reform and, notably, skepticism about
beyond simply improving communication or market- governments’ ability to implement an adequate reform
ing reforms. An effective communication strategy must or deliver mitigating measures. Some mechanism designs
be supported by a strong institutional framework that have proved useful for reducing mistrust in the context
fosters trust among all stakeholders and the general pop- of specific reforms. For instance, the Islamic Republic of
ulation. For instance, the chapter’s review of historical Iran handed out cash transfers ahead of phasing out sub-
cases underscores the importance of independent policy sidies in a 2010 reform (Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin
research to build awareness of the need for reform and 2011). Although funds from the transfers could not be
to achieve consensus. Establishing credible and inde- withdrawn until the reform was implemented, the fact
pendent public bodies—such as the CPB Netherlands that individuals could see the deposits in their accounts
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Productivity raised confidence regarding the compensation plan.
Commission in Australia, or the Conseil d’orientation However, changing deep-rooted values, like trust, is not
des retraites in France—that conduct and validate policy an easy task and takes time (Tabellini 2008). Countries
analysis can be particularly helpful (Tompson 2009). that manage to leverage early engagement and effective
At the same time, dialogue needs to take place in communication to unlock reform support typically have
both directions. For instance, the case studies examined a high degree of mutual trust rooted in many decades of
in the chapter indicate that not only consultation with dialogue among social partners.
stakeholders, but also their involvement in the reform Previous IMF studies have underscored the impor-
design stage, plays a key role for reform sustainability. tance of “first-generation” governance reforms—such as
Policymakers across the globe are appropriately scaling enhancing the rule of law, controlling corruption, and
up their toolkits to incorporate citizens’ views into the establishing an impartial public administration—for
policy design process. Examples of tools deployed to economic growth (see Chapter 3 of the October 2019
foster an effective two-way dialogue include large-scale WEO; and Budina and others 2023). The findings in
surveys (Blanchard and Tirole 2021), scenario planning this chapter indicate that strengthening governance can
(Volkery and Ribeiro 2009), participatory budgeting also be critical to successful passage of second-generation
(OECD 2022; Nicol and Burn-Murdoch 2024), labo- reforms in product and labor markets. The importance
ratories to evaluate policies through focus groups and of carefully designing policy changes and advancing
pilots (such as the Avalua·lab in Valencia), and open governance reforms to overcome trust deficits also needs
town hall meetings (such as the Grand débat national to be reflected in IMF program design.
organized in response to the Yellow Vest movement In summary, effective reform design should involve
in France). New civic technologies, such as digital thorough consultation and communication. Expanding
community engagement platforms, are also opening policymaking toolkits to enable a more participative
the potential to improve representation and citizen reform process not only strengthens public understand-
participation processes (see further discussion and ing of reform proposals but also reinforces trust in
examples in Stankova 2019 and OECD 2022). These public institutions, leading to greater social acceptance
tools can help identify individuals’ concerns and find and successful implementation of policies.

Box 3.1. Policies to Facilitate the Integration of Ukrainian Refugees into the
European Labor Market: Early Evidence
The integration of immigrants into the EU labor access to the labor market.2 For instance, they simpli-
market during 2022–23 was significantly faster fied entry requirements for certain regulated profes-
than in the past. Following a slump in global migra- sions and provided a range of measures to facilitate
tion as the pandemic shut down borders, immigration access to the labor market, including language courses,
into the EU reached a historic high in 2022—driven skills validation and recognition of qualifications, skills
by more than 4 million refugees from Ukraine—and mapping, financial incentives for employers to recruit
remained above prepandemic levels in 2023. About TPD beneficiaries, and on-the-job training (EMN
two-thirds of jobs created between the end of 2019 2024). Other factors also facilitated swift labor market
and the end of 2023 were filled by non-EU citi- integration during the recent episode. First, survey
zens, even as the unemployment rate for EU citizens data show that individuals displaced from Ukraine are
remained at record lows.1 Available data suggest that highly educated, with most having a tertiary educa-
Ukrainian refugees integrated into EU labor markets tion (Caselli and others 2024). Second, a tight labor
noticeably faster than previous waves of refugees. market in many EU countries also supported fast
Several countries have already estimated employment integration. Nevertheless, as is common in regard to
rates among Ukrainian refugees at about or above immigrants, there is evidence of widespread worker
50 percent, which is usually achieved only five or overqualification and skills mismatches (EMN 2024),
more years after arrival (OECD 2023). Migrants have which points to further room for improvement in
helped meet unprecedented labor demand during this immigrant integration policies.
period. The recent experience offers important policy
Among other factors, the EU Temporary Protec- lessons. Granting asylum seekers early access to private
tion Directive (TPD), along with member states’ and public sector labor markets and self-employment,
efforts, played a crucial role in the swift integra- as the current TPD has done for Ukrainian refugees,
tion of foreign-born workers in the recent episode. is a key prerequisite for their speedy integration into
The TPD provided immediate protection and rights workforces (Aiyar and others 2016). The availability of
across countries, including residency rights, access to language courses is also crucial to enabling immigrants
housing and social welfare assistance, medical or other to overcome one of the most important barriers to
assistance, and means of subsistence. At the same time, obtaining a job. Finally, simplified entry requirements
many EU member states removed barriers to ensure for certain regulated professions, skills validation,
and recognition of qualifications are also important
The authors of this box are Francesca Caselli and Frederik elements for successful integration of refugees.
Toscani.
1It is still too early to assess the effect of the recent immigra- 2For specific country examples, see EMN (2024) and Caselli
tion wave on native workers’ wages. and others (2024).

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STATISTICAL APPENDIX
T
he Statistical Appendix presents historical rates1 of 1.090 and 1.097, and yen–US dollar conver-
data as well as projections. It comprises eight sion rates of 150.0 and 143.6, respectively.
sections: Assumptions, What’s New, Data It is assumed that the price of oil will average $81.29
and Conventions, Country Notes, Classifica- a barrel in 2024 and $72.84 a barrel in 2025.
tion of Economies, General Features and Composition National authorities’ established policies are assumed
of Groups in the World Economic Outlook Classifica- to be maintained. Box A1 describes the more specific
tion, Key Data Documentation, and Statistical Tables. policy assumptions underlying the projections for
The first section summarizes the assumptions selected economies.
underlying the estimates and projections for 2024–25. With regard to interest rates, it is assumed that the
The second section briefly describes the changes to three-month government bond yield for the United States
the database and statistical tables since the April 2024 will average 5.4 percent in 2024 and 3.9 percent in
World Economic Outlook (WEO). The third section 2025, that for the euro area will average 3.5 percent in
offers a general description of the data and the conven- 2024 and 2.8 percent in 2025, and that for Japan will
tions used for calculating country group composites. average 0.1 percent in 2024 and 0.5 percent in 2025.
The fourth section presents selected key information Further it is assumed that the 10-year government bond
for each country. The fifth section summarizes the clas- yield for the United States will average 4.1 percent in
sification of economies in the various groups presented 2024 and 3.5 percent in 2025, that for the euro area
in the WEO, and the sixth section explains that classi- will average 2.4 percent in 2024 and 2.5 percent in
fication in further detail. The seventh section provides 2025, and that for Japan will average 1.0 percent in
information on methods and reporting standards for 2024 and 1.3 percent in 2025.
the member countries’ national account and govern-
ment finance indicators included in the report.
The last, and main, section comprises the statis- What’s New
tical tables. Statistical Appendix A is included here; • Following the recent release of the 2021 survey by the
Statistical Appendix B is available online at www.imf. World Bank Group’s International Comparison Pro-
org/en/Publications/WEO. gram for new purchasing-power-parity benchmarks,
Data in these tables have been compiled on the basis the WEO’s estimates of purchasing-power-parity
of information available through October 7, 2024, but weights and GDP valued at purchasing power parity
may not reflect the latest published data in all cases. have been updated. For more details, see Box A2.
For the date of the last data update for each economy, • For Bangladesh, fiscal year estimates of real GDP
please refer to the notes provided in the online WEO and purchasing-power-parity GDP are now used in
database. The figures for 2024–25 are shown with the country group aggregates.
same degree of precision as the historical figures solely • For Zimbabwe, the authorities have recently rede-
for convenience; because they are projections, the same nominated their national accounts statistics follow-
degree of accuracy is not to be inferred. ing the introduction on April 5, 2024, of a new
national currency, the Zimbabwe gold, replacing the
Zimbabwe dollar. The use of the Zimbabwe dollar
Assumptions ceased on April 30, 2024.
Real effective exchange rates for the advanced econ- 1In regard to the introduction of the euro, on December 31, 1998, the
omies are assumed to remain constant at their average Council of the European Union decided that, effective January 1, 1999,
levels measured during July 30, 2024–August 27, the irrevocably fixed conversion rates between the euro and currencies
2024. For 2024 and 2025 these assumptions imply of the member countries adopting the euro are as described in Box 5.4
of the October 1998 WEO. See that box as well for details on how the
average US dollar–special drawing right conversion conversion rates were established. For the most recent table of fixed con-
rates of 1.331 and 1.341, US dollar–euro conversion version rates, see the Statistical Appendix of the April 2023 WEO.

Data and Conventions staff estimates. While attempts are made to align data
on gross and net debt with the definitions in the
Data and projections for 196 economies form the
GFSM 2014, as a result of data limitations or specific
statistical basis of the WEO database. The data are
country circumstances, these data can sometimes devi-
maintained jointly by the IMF’s Research Department
ate from the formal definitions. Although every effort
and regional departments, with the latter regularly
is made to ensure the WEO data are relevant and
updating country projections based on consistent
internationally comparable, differences in both sectoral
global assumptions.
and instrument coverage mean that the data are not
Although national statistical agencies are the
universally comparable. As more information becomes
ultimate providers of historical data and definitions,
available, changes in either data sources or instrument
international organizations are also involved in statis-
coverage can give rise to data revisions that are some-
tical issues, with the objective of harmonizing meth-
times substantial. For clarification on the deviations
odologies for the compilation of national statistics,
in sectoral or instrument coverage, please refer to the
including analytical frameworks, concepts, definitions,
metadata for the online WEO database.
classifications, and valuation procedures used in the
Composite data for country groups in the WEO are
production of economic statistics. The WEO database
either sums or weighted averages of data for individual
reflects information from both national source agencies
countries. Unless noted otherwise, multiyear averages
and international organizations.
of growth rates are expressed as compound annual rates
Most countries’ macroeconomic data as presented
of change.3 Arithmetically weighted averages are used
in the WEO conform broadly to the 2008 version
for all data for the emerging market and developing
of the System of National Accounts (SNA 2008). The
economies group—except data on inflation and money
IMF’s sector statistical standards—the sixth edition of
growth, for which geometric averages are used. The
the Balance of Payments and International Investment
following conventions apply:
Position Manual (BPM6), the Monetary and Finan-
Country group composites for exchange rates, inter-
cial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide, and the
est rates, and growth rates of monetary aggregates are
Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014 (GFSM
weighted by GDP converted to US dollars at market
2014)—have been aligned with the SNA 2008. These
exchange rates (averaged over the preceding three
standards reflect the IMF’s special interest in countries’
years) as a share of group GDP.
external positions, monetary developments, financial
Composites for other data relating to the domestic
sector stability, and public sector fiscal positions. The
economy, whether growth rates or ratios, are weighted
process of adapting country data to the new standards
by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share
begins in earnest when revised versions of the manuals
of total world or group GDP.4 For the aggregation
are released. However, full concordance with the most
of inflation in advanced economies (and subgroups),
recent versions of the manuals is ultimately dependent
annual rates are simple percent changes from the
on the provision by national statistical compilers of
previous years; for the aggregation of world inflation
revised country data; hence, the WEO estimates are
and inflation in emerging market and developing
only partly adapted to the most recent versions of these
economies (and subgroups), annual rates are based on
manuals. Nonetheless, for many countries, conversion
logarithmic differences.
to the updated standards will have only a small impact
on major balances and aggregates. Many other coun- 3Averages for real GDP, inflation, GDP per capita, and com-
tries have partly adopted the latest standards and will modity prices are calculated based on the compound annual rate of
continue implementation over a number of years.2 change, except in the case of the unemployment rate, which is based
The fiscal gross and net debt data reported in the on the simple arithmetic average.
4See Box A2 in the Statistical Appendix of the October 2024 WEO
WEO are drawn from official data sources and IMF for a summary of the revised purchasing-power-parity-based weights
as well as Box 1.1 of the October 2020 WEO, “Revised Purchasing
Power Parity Weights” in the July 2014 WEO Update, Appendix 1.1
2Many countries are implementing the SNA 2008 or European of the April 2008 WEO, Box A2 of the April 2004 WEO, Box A1 of
System of National and Regional Accounts 2010, and a few coun- the May 2000 WEO, and Annex IV of the May 1993 WEO. See also
tries use versions of the SNA older than that from 1993. A similar Anne-Marie Gulde and Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, “Purchasing Power
adoption pattern is expected for the BPM6 and GFSM 2014. Please Parity Based Weights for the World Economic Outlook,” in Staff Studies
refer to Table G, which lists the statistical standards to which each for the World Economic Outlook (Washington, DC: International
country adheres. Monetary Fund, December 1993), 106–23.

Composites for real GDP per capita in purchasing- owing to a lack of clarity within the international
power-parity terms are sums of individual country data community regarding the recognition of a government
after conversion to international dollars in the years in the country. Data reported in the WEO contain a
indicated. structural break in 2021 as a result of the change from
Unless noted otherwise, composites for all sectors calendar year to solar year reporting; the actual reported
for the euro area are corrected for reporting discrepan- GDP growth rate for solar year 2021 is –20.7 percent.
cies in transactions within the area. Unadjusted annual Algeria: Total government expenditure and net
GDP data are used for the euro area and for the major- lending/borrowing include net lending by the govern-
ity of individual countries, except Cyprus, Ireland, ment, which mostly reflects support to the pension
Portugal, and Spain, which report calendar-adjusted system and other public sector entities.
data. For data prior to 1999, data aggregations apply Argentina: The official national consumer price index
1995 European currency unit exchange rates. (CPI) starts in December 2016. For earlier periods,
Composites for fiscal data are sums of individual CPI data for Argentina reflect the Greater Buenos Aires
country data after conversion to US dollars at the aver- Area CPI (prior to December 2013); the national CPI
age market exchange rates in the years indicated. (IPCNu, December 2013 to October 2015); the City
Composite unemployment rates and employment of Buenos Aires CPI (November 2015 to April 2016);
growth are weighted by labor force as a share of group and the Greater Buenos Aires Area CPI (May 2016 to
labor force. December 2016). Given limited comparability of these
Composites relating to external sector statistics are series because of differences in geographic coverage,
sums of individual country data after conversion to weights, sampling, and methodology, the WEO does
US dollars at the average market exchange rates in the not report average CPI inflation for 2014–16 and end-
years indicated for balance of payments data and at of-period inflation for 2015–16. Also, Argentina dis-
end-of-year market exchange rates for debt denomi- continued the publication of labor market data starting
nated in currencies other than US dollars. in the fourth quarter of 2015, and new series became
Composites of changes in foreign trade volumes available starting in the second quarter of 2016.
and prices, however, are arithmetic averages of percent Costa Rica: The central government definition was
changes for individual countries weighted by the US expanded as of January 1, 2021, to include 51 public
dollar value of exports or imports as a share of total entities in accordance with Law 9524. Data back to
world or group exports or imports (in the preceding 2019 are adjusted for comparability.
year). Dominican Republic: The fiscal series have the
Unless noted otherwise, group composites are following coverage: public debt, debt service, and
computed if 90 percent or more of the share of group the cyclically adjusted/structural balances are for the
weights is represented. consolidated public sector (which includes the central
Data refer to calendar years, except in the case of government, the rest of the nonfinancial public sector,
a few countries that use fiscal years; Table F lists the and the central bank); the remaining fiscal series are
economies with exceptional reporting periods for for the central government.
national accounts and government finance data. Eritrea: Data and projections for 2020–29 are
For some countries, the figures for 2023 and earlier excluded from the database because of constraints in
are based on estimates rather than actual outturns; data reporting.
Table G lists the latest actual outturns for the indi- India: Real GDP growth rates are calculated in accor-
cators in the national accounts, prices, government dance with national accounts with base year 2011/12.
finance, and balance of payments for each country. Iran: Historical figures for nominal GDP in US
dollars are computed using the official exchange rate
up to 2017. From 2018 onward, the NIMA (the
Country Notes country’s domestic Forex Management Integrated Sys-
Afghanistan: Data for 2021–23 are reported for tem) exchange rate, rather than the official exchange
selected indicators, with estimates for fiscal data. Esti- rate, is used to convert nominal rial GDP figures into
mates and projections for 2024–29 are omitted because US dollars. The IMF staff assesses that the NIMA rate
of an unusually high degree of uncertainty given that better reflects the transaction-value-weighted exchange
the IMF has paused its engagement with Afghanistan rate in the economy over that period of time.

Israel: Projections are subject to heightened uncer- IMF’s methodology. Therefore, data for 2018–22 are
tainty owing to the conflict in the region and thus may affected by these transfers, which amounted to 1.2
undergo revisions. percent of GDP in 2018, 1.0 percent of GDP in 2019,
Lebanon: Fiscal and national accounts data for 0.6 percent of GDP in 2020, 0.3 percent of GDP in
2022–23 as well as debt data for 2023 are IMF staff 2021, 0.1 percent of GDP in 2022, and 0 percent
estimates and not provided by the national authorities. thereafter. See IMF Country Report 19/64 for further
Estimates and projections for 2024–29 are omitted details.5 The disclaimer about the public pension
owing to an unusually high degree of uncertainty. system applies only to the revenues and net lending/
Sierra Leone: Although the currency was rede- borrowing series.
nominated on July 1, 2022, local currency data are The coverage of the fiscal data for Uruguay was
expressed in the old leone for the October 2024 WEO. changed from consolidated public sector to nonfinan-
Sri Lanka: Data and projections for 2023–29 are cial public sector with the October 2019 WEO. In
excluded from publication owing to ongoing discus- Uruguay, nonfinancial public sector coverage includes
sions on restructuring of sovereign debt. the central government, local government, social secu-
Sudan: Projections reflect the IMF staff ’s analysis rity funds, nonfinancial public corporations, and Banco
based on the assumption that the ongoing conflict de Seguros del Estado. Historical data were also revised
will terminate by the end of 2024 and that reen- accordingly. Under this narrower fiscal perimeter—
gagement and reconstruction will commence shortly which excludes the central bank—assets and liabilities
thereafter. Data for 2011 exclude South Sudan after held by the nonfinancial public sector for which the
July 9; data for 2012 and onward pertain to the counterpart is the central bank are not netted out in
current Sudan. debt figures. In this context, capitalization bonds issued
Syria: Data are excluded from 2011 onward because in the past by the government to the central bank are
of the uncertain political situation. now part of the nonfinancial public sector debt.
Timor-Leste: Published data for real GDP refer to Venezuela: Projecting the economic outlook,
non-oil real GDP, while published data for nominal including assessing past and current economic develop-
GDP refer to total nominal GDP. ments used as the basis for the projections, is rendered
Turkmenistan: Real GDP data are IMF staff esti- difficult by the lack of discussions with the authorities
mates compiled in line with international methodolo- (the most recent Article IV consultation took place in
gies (SNA), using official estimates and sources as well 2004), incomplete metadata for limited reported statis-
as United Nations and World Bank databases. Esti- tics, and difficulties in reconciling reported indicators
mates of and projections for the fiscal balance exclude with economic developments. The fiscal accounts
receipts from domestic bond issuances as well as include the budgetary central government; social
privatization operations, in line with GFSM 2014. The security; FOGADE (the country’s deposit insurance
authorities’ official estimates for fiscal accounts, which institution); and a reduced set of public enterprises,
are compiled using domestic statistical methodologies, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. Following some
include bond issuance and privatization proceeds as methodological upgrades to achieve a more robust
part of government revenues. nominal GDP, historical data and indicators expressed
Ukraine: Revised data for national accounts are as a percentage of GDP have been revised from 2012
available for 2000 and after and exclude Crimea and onward. For most indicators, data for 2018–22 are
Sevastopol from 2010 onward. IMF staff estimates. The effects of hyperinflation
Uruguay: In December 2020 the authorities began and the paucity of reported data mean that the IMF
reporting national accounts data according to the SNA staff ’s projected macroeconomic indicators should be
2008, with base year of 2016. The new series begin interpreted with caution. Broad uncertainty surrounds
in 2016. Data prior to 2016 reflect the IMF staff ’s best these projections. Venezuela’s consumer prices are
effort to preserve previously reported data and avoid excluded from all WEO group composites.
structural breaks. West Bank and Gaza: Projections for 2024–29 are
Starting in October 2018 Uruguay’s public pension excluded from publication owing to the unusually high
system received transfers in the context of Law 19,590
of 2017, which compensates persons affected by the 5Uruguay: Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, Coun-
creation of the country’s mixed pension system. These try Report 19/64 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund,
funds are recorded as revenues, consistent with the February 2019).

degree of uncertainty. Annual data for the unemploy- Table C lists the member countries of the European
ment rate are available up to 2022. Union, not all of which are classified as advanced
Zimbabwe: The Zimbabwe authorities have recently economies in the WEO.
redenominated their national accounts statistics
following the introduction on April 5, 2024, of a new
national currency, the Zimbabwe gold, replacing the Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Zimbabwe dollar. The use of the Zimbabwe dollar The group of emerging market and developing
ceased on April 30, 2024. economies (155) comprises all those that are not classi-
fied as advanced economies.
The regional breakdowns of emerging market and
Classification of Economies developing economies employed in the WEO are
Summary of the Economy Classification emerging and developing Asia; emerging and develop-
The economy classification in the WEO divides the ing Europe (sometimes also referred to as “central and
world into two major groups: advanced economies eastern Europe”); Latin America and the Caribbean;
and emerging market and developing economies.6 Middle East and Central Asia (which comprises the
This classification is not based on strict criteria, eco- regional subgroups Caucasus and Central Asia; and
nomic or otherwise, and has evolved over time. The Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan);
objective is to facilitate analysis by providing a rea- and sub-Saharan Africa.
sonably meaningful method of organizing data. Table Emerging market and developing economies are also
A provides an overview of the classification, showing classified according to analytical criteria that reflect
the number of economies in each group by region and the composition of export earnings and a distinction
summarizing some key indicators of their relative size between net creditor and net debtor economies. Tables
(GDP valued at purchasing power parity, total exports D and E show the detailed composition of emerging
of goods and services, and population). market and developing economies in the regional and
Some economies remain outside the classification analytical groups.
and therefore are not included in the analysis. Cuba The analytical criterion source of export earnings
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are distinguishes between the categories fuel (Standard
examples of economies that are not IMF members, and International Trade Classification [SITC] 3) and
the IMF therefore does not monitor them. nonfuel and then focuses on nonfuel primary products
(SITCs 0, 1, 2, 4, and 68). Economies are categorized
into one of these groups if their main source of export
General Features and Composition of earnings exceeded 50 percent of total exports on aver-
Groups in the World Economic Outlook age between 2019 and 2023.
Classification The financial and income criteria focus on net
Advanced Economies creditor economies, net debtor economies, heavily indebted
poor countries (HIPCs), low-income developing coun-
Table B lists the 41 advanced economies. The seven tries (LIDCs), and emerging market and middle-income
largest in terms of GDP based on market exchange economies (EMMIEs). Economies are categorized as
rates—the United States, Japan, Germany, France, net debtors when their latest net international invest-
Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada—constitute ment position, where available, was less than zero or
the subgroup of major advanced economies, often their current account balance accumulations from
referred to as the Group of Seven. The members of the 1972 (or earliest available data) to 2023 were negative.
euro area are also distinguished as a subgroup. Com- Net debtor economies are further differentiated on the
posite data shown in the tables for the euro area cover basis of experience with debt servicing.7
the current members for all years, even though the The HIPC group comprises the countries that are
membership has increased over time. or have been considered by the IMF and the World
Bank for participation in their debt initiative known as
6As used here, the terms “country” and “economy” do not always
refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by interna- 7During 2019–23, 41 economies incurred external payments
tional law and practice. Some territorial entities included here are arrears or entered into official or commercial bank debt-rescheduling
not states, although their statistical data are maintained on a separate agreements. This group is referred to as economies with arrears and/or
and independent basis. rescheduling during 2019–23.

the HIPC Initiative, which aims to reduce the external The LIDCs are countries that have per capita
debt burdens of all the eligible HIPCs to a “sustain- income levels below a certain threshold (based on
able” level in a reasonably short period of time.8 Many $2,700 in 2017 as measured by the World Bank’s Atlas
of these countries have already benefited from debt method and updated following new information in
relief and have graduated from the initiative. early 2024), structural features consistent with limited
development and structural transformation, and exter-
nal financial linkages insufficiently close for them to be
8See David Andrews, Anthony R. Boote, Syed S. Rizavi, and
widely seen as emerging market economies.
Sukwinder Singh, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: The
Enhanced HIPC Initiative,” IMF Pamphlet Series 51 (Washington, The EMMIEs are those emerging market and devel-
DC: International Monetary Fund, November 1999). oping economies not classified as LIDCs.

Table A. Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP, Exports of Goods
and Services, and Population, 20231
(Percent of total for group or world)
Exports of Goods and
GDP1 Services Population
Number of Advanced Advanced Advanced
Economies Economies World Economies World Economies World
Advanced Economies 41 100.0 40.7 100.0 61.8 100.0 13.8
United States 37.0 15.0 16.1 9.9 30.7 4.2
Euro Area 20 29.3 11.9 42.6 26.3 31.8 4.4
Germany 7.8 3.2 11.2 6.9 7.7 1.1
France 5.6 2.3 5.5 3.4 6.0 0.8
Italy 4.7 1.9 4.1 2.5 5.4 0.7
Spain 3.4 1.4 3.2 2.0 4.4 0.6
Japan 8.5 3.5 4.8 3.0 11.4 1.6
United Kingdom 5.5 2.2 5.6 3.5 6.2 0.9
Canada 3.3 1.4 3.7 2.3 3.7 0.5
Other Advanced Economies 17 16.4 6.7 27.2 16.8 16.2 2.2
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 7 72.4 29.5 50.9 31.5 71.2 9.9
Emerging Emerging Emerging
Market and Market and Market and
Developing Developing Developing
Economies World Economies World Economies World
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 155 100.0 59.3 100.0 38.2 100.0 86.2
Regional Groups
Emerging and Developing Asia 30 56.7 33.6 49.4 18.9 55.3 47.6
China 31.6 18.7 29.7 11.3 20.7 17.9
India 13.4 7.9 6.6 2.5 21.0 18.1
Emerging and Developing Europe 15 13.2 7.8 15.6 6.0 5.4 4.6
Russia 6.0 3.5 3.9 1.5 2.2 1.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 33 12.3 7.3 14.1 5.4 9.5 8.2
Brazil 4.1 2.4 3.3 1.3 3.1 2.7
Mexico 2.9 1.7 5.5 2.1 1.9 1.7
Middle East and Central Asia 32 12.3 7.3 16.8 6.4 13.1 11.3
Saudi Arabia 1.9 1.1 3.1 1.2 0.5 0.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 45 5.4 3.2 4.1 1.6 16.8 14.4
Nigeria 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 3.3 2.8
South Africa 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.8
Analytical Groups2
By Source of Export Earnings
Fuel 26 9.8 5.8 16.0 6.1 9.7 8.4
Nonfuel 127 90.2 53.5 84.0 32.1 90.2 77.7
Of which, Primary Products 35 4.9 2.9 5.0 1.9 9.3 8.0
By External Financing Source
Net Debtor Economies 118 48.8 28.9 42.5 16.2 67.1 57.8
Of which, Economies with Arrears and/or
Rescheduling during 2019–23 41 5.7 3.4 3.9 1.5 12.6 10.9
Other Groups2
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 96 92.9 55.1 96.0 36.7 77.2 66.5
Low-Income Developing Countries 58 7.1 4.2 4.0 1.5 22.8 19.7
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 39 2.9 1.7 2.1 0.8 12.8 11.1
1 GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity valuation of economies’ GDP. The number of economies comprising each group reflects those for which
data are included in the group aggregates.

2 Syria and West Bank and Gaza are omitted from group composites for source of export earnings, and Syria is omitted from group composites for net external
position, because of insufficient data. Syria is not included in Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies or Low-Income Developing Countries.

Table B. Advanced Economies by Subgroup

Major Currency Areas
United States
Euro Area
Japan
Euro Area
Austria Germany Malta
Belgium Greece The Netherlands
Croatia Ireland Portugal
Cyprus Italy Slovak Republic
Estonia Latvia Slovenia
Finland Lithuania Spain
France Luxembourg
Major Advanced Economies
Canada Italy United States
France Japan
Germany United Kingdom
Other Advanced Economies
Andorra Israel San Marino
Australia Korea Singapore
Czech Republic Macao SAR2 Sweden
Denmark New Zealand Switzerland
Hong Kong SAR1 Norway Taiwan Province of China
Iceland Puerto Rico
1 On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People’s Republic of China and became a Special
Administrative Region of China.

2 On December 20, 1999, Macao was returned to the People’s Republic of China and became a Special
Administrative Region of China.
Table C. European Union

Austria France Malta
Belgium Germany The Netherlands
Bulgaria Greece Poland
Croatia Hungary Portugal
Cyprus Ireland Romania
Czech Republic Italy Slovak Republic
Denmark Latvia Slovenia
Estonia Lithuania Spain
Finland Luxembourg Sweden

Table D. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings1
Fuel Nonfuel Primary Products
Emerging and Developing Asia
Brunei Darussalam Kiribati
Timor-Leste Marshall Islands
Mongolia
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
Latin America and the Caribbean
Ecuador Argentina
Guyana Bolivia
Venezuela Chile
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Middle East and Central Asia
Algeria Afghanistan
Azerbaijan Mauritania
Bahrain Somalia
Iran Sudan
Iraq Tajikistan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola Benin
Chad Botswana
Republic of Congo Burkina Faso
Equatorial Guinea Burundi
Gabon Central African Republic
Nigeria Democratic Republic of the Congo
South Sudan Eritrea
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
1 Emerging and developing Europe is omitted from the table because no economies in the group have fuel or nonfuel primary products as the main source of
export earnings.

Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and
Per Capita Income Classification
Per Capita Per Capita

Net External Heavily Indebted Income Net External Heavily Indebted Income
Position1 Poor Countries2 Classification3 Position1 Poor Countries2 Classification3
Emerging and Developing Asia Poland * •
Bangladesh * * Romania * •
Bhutan * * Russia • •
Brunei Darussalam • • Serbia * •
Cambodia * * Türkiye * •
China • • Ukraine * •
Fiji * • Latin America and the Caribbean
India * • Antigua and Barbuda * •
Indonesia * • Argentina • •
Kiribati • * Aruba * •
Lao P.D.R. * * The Bahamas * •
Malaysia • • Barbados * •
Maldives * • Belize * •
Marshall Islands • • Bolivia * • •
Micronesia • • Brazil * •
Mongolia * • Chile * •
Myanmar * * Colombia * •
Nauru • • Costa Rica * •
Nepal * * Dominica * •
Palau * • Dominican Republic * •
Papua New Guinea * * Ecuador * •
Philippines * • El Salvador * •
Samoa * • Grenada * •
Solomon Islands * * Guatemala * •
Sri Lanka * • Guyana • • •
Thailand • • Haiti * • *
Timor-Leste • * Honduras * • *
Tonga * • Jamaica * •
Tuvalu • • Mexico * •
Vanuatu * • Nicaragua * • *
Vietnam • • Panama * •
Emerging and Developing Europe Paraguay * •
Albania * • Peru * •
Belarus * • St. Kitts and Nevis * •
Bosnia and Herzegovina * • St. Lucia * •
Bulgaria * • St. Vincent and the * •
Hungary * • Grenadines
Kosovo * • Suriname * •
Moldova * * Trinidad and Tobago • •
Montenegro * • Uruguay * •
North Macedonia * • Venezuela • •

Table E. Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region, Net External Position, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and
Per Capita Income Classification (continued)
Per Capita Per Capita

Net External Heavily Indebted Income Net External Heavily Indebted Income
Position1 Poor Countries2 Classification3 Position1 Poor Countries2 Classification3
Middle East and Central Asia Cameroon * • *
Afghanistan • • * Central African Republic * • *
Algeria • • Chad * • *
Armenia * • Comoros * • *
Azerbaijan • • Democratic Republic of * • *
Bahrain • • the Congo
Djibouti * * Republic of Congo * • *
Egypt * • Côte d’Ivoire * • *
Georgia * • Equatorial Guinea • •
Iran • • Eritrea • * *
Iraq • • Eswatini • •
Jordan * • Ethiopia * • *
Kazakhstan * • Gabon • •
Kuwait • • The Gambia * • *
Kyrgyz Republic * * Ghana * • *
Lebanon * • Guinea * • *
Libya • • Guinea-Bissau * • *
Mauritania * • * Kenya * *
Morocco * • Lesotho * *
Oman * • Liberia * • *
Pakistan * • Madagascar * • *
Qatar • • Malawi * • *
Saudi Arabia • • Mali * • *
Somalia * • * Mauritius • •
Sudan * * * Mozambique * • *
Syria4 ... ... Namibia * •
Tajikistan * * Niger * • *
Tunisia * • Nigeria * *
Turkmenistan • • Rwanda * • *
United Arab Emirates • • São Tomé and Príncipe * • *
Uzbekistan • * Senegal * • *
West Bank and Gaza * • Seychelles * •
Yemen * * Sierra Leone * • *
Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa • •
Angola * • South Sudan * *
Benin * • * Tanzania * • *
Botswana • • Togo * • *
Burkina Faso * • * Uganda * • *
Burundi * • * Zambia * • *
Cabo Verde * • Zimbabwe * *
1 Dot (star) indicates that the country is a net creditor (net debtor).
2 Dot (star) indicates that the country has (has not) reached the initiative’s completion point, which allows it to receive the full debt relief committed to at the initiative’s decision point.
3 Dot (star) indicates that the country is classified as an emerging market and middle-income economy (low-income developing country).
4 Syria is omitted from group composites for net external position and per capita income classification for lack of a fully developed database.

Table F. Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods1

National Accounts Government Finance
Afghanistan Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
The Bahamas Jul/Jun
Bangladesh Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Barbados Apr/Mar
Bhutan Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Botswana Apr/Mar
Dominica Jul/Jun
Egypt Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Eswatini Apr/Mar
Ethiopia Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Fiji Aug/Jul
Haiti Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Hong Kong SAR Apr/Mar
India Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
Iran Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
Jamaica Apr/Mar
Lesotho Apr/Mar Apr/Mar
Marshall Islands Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Mauritius Jul/Jun
Micronesia Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Myanmar Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Nauru Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Nepal Aug/Jul Aug/Jul
Pakistan Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Palau Oct/Sep Oct/Sep
Puerto Rico Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Samoa Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Singapore Apr/Mar
St. Lucia Apr/Mar
Thailand Oct/Sep
Tonga Jul/Jun Jul/Jun
Trinidad and Tobago Oct/Sep
1 Unless noted otherwise, all data refer to calendar years.

Table G. Key Data Documentation

National Accounts Prices (CPI)
System of Use of Chain-
Historical Data Latest Actual National Weighted Historical Data Latest Actual
Country Currency Source1 Annual Data Base Year2 Accounts Methodology3 Source1 Annual Data
Afghanistan Afghan afghani NSO 2023/24 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023/24
Albania Albanian lek IMF staff 2022 1996 ESA 2010 From 1996 NSO 2022
Algeria Algerian dinar NSO 2023 2001 SNA 1993 From 2005 NSO 2023
Andorra Euro NSO 2023 2010 ... NSO 2023
Angola Angolan kwanza NSO and MEP 2022 2015 ESA 1995 NSO 2023
Antigua and Barbuda Eastern Caribbean CB 2022 2018 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
dollar
Argentina Argentine peso NSO 2023 2004 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Armenia Armenian dram NSO 2022 2005 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Aruba Aruban florin NSO 2023 2013 SNA 1993 From 2000 NSO 2023
Australia Australian dollar NSO 2023 2023 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2023
Austria Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan manat NSO 2022 2005 SNA 1993 From 1994 NSO 2022
The Bahamas Bahamian dollar NSO 2023 2018 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Bahrain Bahrain dinar NSO and IMF staff 2023 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Bangladesh Bangladesh taka NSO 2022/23 2015/16 SNA 2008 NSO 2022/23
Barbados Barbados dollar NSO and CB 2016 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Belarus Belarusian ruble NSO 2022 2018 SNA 2008 From 2005 NSO 2023
Belgium Euro CB 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1995 CB 2023
Belize Belize dollar NSO 2022 2014 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Benin CFA franc NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Bhutan Bhutanese ngultrum NSO 2021/22 2016/17 SNA 2008 NSO 2022/23
Bolivia Bolivian boliviano NSO 2023 1990 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Bosnia and Bosnian convertible NSO 2022 2015 ESA 2010 From 2000 NSO 2023
Herzegovina marka
Botswana Botswana pula NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Brazil Brazilian real NSO 2023 1995 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar MoF 2023 2010 SNA 2008 MoF 2023
Bulgaria Bulgarian lev NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1996 NSO 2023
Burkina Faso CFA franc NSO and MEP 2022 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Burundi Burundi franc NSO and IMF staff 2022 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2022
Cabo Verde Cabo Verdean escudo NSO 2022 2015 SNA 2008 From 2011 NSO 2022
Cambodia Cambodian riel NSO 2022 2014 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Cameroon CFA franc NSO 2022 2016 SNA 2008 From 2016 NSO 2022
Canada Canadian dollar NSO 2023 2017 SNA 2008 From 1980 MoF and NSO 2023
Central African CFA franc NSO 2021 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2022
Republic
Chad CFA franc NSO 2022 2017 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Chile Chilean peso CB 2023 2018 SNA 2008 From 2003 NSO 2023
China Chinese yuan NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Colombia Colombian peso NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 From 2005 NSO 2023
Comoros Comorian franc NSO 2022 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Democratic Republic Congolese franc NSO 2020 2005 SNA 1993 From 2005 NSO 2023
of the Congo
Republic of Congo CFA franc NSO 2021 2005 SNA 1993 NSO 2023

Table G. Key Data Documentation (continued)

Government Finance Balance of Payments
Statistics Statistics
Historical Data Latest Actual Manual in Use Accounting Historical Data Latest Actual Manual in Use
Country Source1 Annual Data at Source Subsectors Coverage4 Practice5 Source1 Annual Data at Source
Afghanistan MoF, NSO, and IMF 2023/24 2001 CG C CB 2020 BPM 6
staff
Albania IMF staff 2022 1986 CG,LG,SS,MPC, NFPC ... CB 2022 BPM 6
Algeria MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Andorra NSO and MoF 2023 ... CG,LG,SS C NSO 2022 BPM 6
Angola MoF 2022 2001 CG,LG Mixed CB 2022 BPM 6
Antigua and Barbuda MoF 2023 2001 CG Mixed CB 2023 BPM 6
Argentina MEP 2023 1986 CG,SG,SS C NSO 2023 BPM 6
Armenia MoF 2022 2001 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Aruba MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Australia MoF 2022 2014 CG,SG,LG,TG A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Austria NSO 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Azerbaijan MoF 2022 2001 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
The Bahamas MoF 2022/23 2014 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Bahrain MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Bangladesh MoF 2022/23 2001 CG C CB 2022/23 BPM 6
Barbados MoF 2023/24 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Belarus MoF 2022 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2022 BPM 6
Belgium CB 2023 ESA 2010 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Belize MoF 2022 1986 CG,MPC Mixed CB 2023 BPM 6
Benin MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB 2021 BPM 6
Bhutan MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2022/23 BPM 6
Bolivia MoF 2022 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Bosnia and MoF 2022 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS Mixed CB 2022 BPM 6
Herzegovina
Botswana MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Brazil MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Brunei Darussalam MoF 2023 1986 CG,BCG C NSO and MEP 2023 BPM 6
Bulgaria MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Burkina Faso MoF 2023 2001 CG CB CB 2022 BPM 6
Burundi MoF 2022 2001 CG Mixed CB 2022 BPM 6
Cabo Verde MoF 2022 2001 CG A NSO 2022 BPM 6
Cambodia MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Cameroon MoF 2022 2001 CG Mixed MoF 2022 BPM 6
Canada MoF and NSO 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Central African MoF 2022 2001 CG C CB 2021 BPM 5
Republic
Chad MoF 2022 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 5
Chile MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG A CB 2023 BPM 6
China MoF, NAO and IMF 2023 ... CG,LG,SS C GAD 2023 BPM 6
staff
Colombia MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS ... CB and NSO 2023 BPM 6
Comoros MoF 2022 1986 CG Mixed CB and IMF staff 2022 BPM 5
Democratic Republic MoF 2022 2001 CG,LG A CB 2022 BPM 6
of the Congo
Republic of Congo MoF 2023 2001 CG A CB 2021 BPM 6


Costa Rica Costa Rican colón CB 2023 2017 SNA 2008 From 2016 CB 2023
Côte d’Ivoire CFA franc NSO 2022 2015 SNA 2008 From 2015 NSO 2023
Croatia Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 NSO 2023
Cyprus Euro NSO 2023 2010 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Czech Republic Czech koruna NSO 2023 2020 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Denmark Danish krone NSO 2022 2010 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2022
Djibouti Djibouti franc NSO 2021 2013 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Dominica Eastern Caribbean NSO 2023 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
dollar
Dominican Republic Dominican peso CB 2023 2007 SNA 2008 From 2007 CB 2023
Ecuador US dollar CB 2023 2018 SNA 2008 From 2018 NSO and CB 2023
Egypt Egyptian pound MEP 2022/23 2021/22 SNA 2008 NSO 2023/24
El Salvador US dollar CB 2023 2014 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Equatorial Guinea CFA franc MEP and CB 2023 2006 SNA 1993 MEP 2023
Eritrea Eritrean nakfa IMF staff 2019 2011 SNA 1993 IMF staff 2019
Estonia Euro NSO 2023 2020 ESA 2010 From 2010 NSO 2023
Eswatini Swazi lilangeni NSO 2022 2011 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Ethiopia Ethiopian birr NSO 2022/23 2015/16 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Fiji Fijian dollar NSO 2022 2014 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Finland Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
France Euro NSO 2023 2020 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
Gabon CFA franc MEP 2021 2001 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
The Gambia Gambian dalasi NSO 2023 2013 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Georgia Georgian lari NSO 2023 2019 SNA 2008 From 1996 NSO 2023
Germany Euro NSO 2023 2020 ESA 2010 From 1991 NSO 2023
Ghana Ghanaian cedi NSO 2023 2013 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Greece Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Grenada Eastern Caribbean NSO 2022 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
dollar
Guatemala Guatemalan quetzal CB 2023 2013 SNA 2008 From 2001 NSO 2023
Guinea Guinean franc NSO 2021 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Guinea-Bissau CFA franc NSO 2022 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Guyana Guyanese dollar NSO 2023 20126 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Haiti Haitian gourde NSO 2022/23 2011/12 SNA 2008 NSO 2022/23
Honduras Honduran lempira CB 2023 2000 SNA 1993 CB 2023
Hong Kong SAR Hong Kong dollar NSO 2023 2021 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2023
Hungary Hungarian forint NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Iceland Icelandic króna NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1990 NSO 2023
India Indian rupee NSO 2023/24 2011/12 SNA 2008 NSO 2023/24
Indonesia Indonesian rupiah NSO 2023 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Iran Iranian rial CB 2023/24 2016/17 SNA 2008 CB 2023/24
Iraq Iraqi dinar NSO 2023 2007 ... NSO 2023
Ireland Euro NSO 2023 2022 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023


Costa Rica MoF and CB 2023 1986 CG,NFPC C CB 2023 BPM 6
Côte d’Ivoire MoF 2023 1986 CG A CB 2022 BPM 6
Croatia MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG A CB 2023 BPM 6
Cyprus NSO 2023 ESA 2010 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Czech Republic MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Denmark NSO 2022 2014 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2022 BPM 6
Djibouti MoF 2023 2001 CG A CB 2023 BPM 5
Dominica MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Dominican Republic MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Ecuador MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS Mixed CB 2023 BPM 6
Egypt MoF 2021/22 ... CG,LG,SS,NFPC C CB 2022/23 BPM 5
El Salvador MoF and CB 2023 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Equatorial Guinea MoF and MEP 2023 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 5
Eritrea IMF staff 2019 2001 CG C IMF staff 2019 BPM 5
Estonia MoF 2023 1986/2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Eswatini MoF 2022/23 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Ethiopia MoF 2022/23 1986 CG,SG,LG C CB 2022/23 BPM 5
Fiji MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Finland MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
France NSO 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Gabon IMF staff 2021 2001 CG A IMF 2021 BPM 6
The Gambia MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB and IMF staff 2023 BPM 6
Georgia MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Germany NSO 2023 ESA 2010 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Ghana MoF 2023 2001 CG CB CB 2023 BPM 5
Greece NSO 2023 ESA 2010 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Grenada MoF 2022 ... CG CB NSO and CB 2022 BPM 6
Guatemala MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Guinea MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB and MEP 2022 BPM 6
Guinea-Bissau MoF 2022 2001 CG A CB 2022 BPM 6
Guyana MoF 2023 1986 CG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Haiti MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2022/23 BPM 5
Honduras MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS Mixed CB 2023 BPM 5
Hong Kong SAR MoF 2023/24 2001 CG C NSO 2023 BPM 6
Hungary MEP and NSO 2023 ESA 2010 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Iceland NSO 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
India MoF and IMF staff 2022/23 1986 CG,SG C CB 2023/24 BPM 6
Indonesia MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG A CB 2023 BPM 6
Iran MoF 2021/22 2001 CG C CB and IMF staff 2022/23 BPM 5
Iraq MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Ireland MoF and NSO 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6


Israel Israeli new shekel NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 From 1995 NSO 2023
Italy Euro NSO 2023 2020 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
Jamaica Jamaican dollar NSO 2023 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Japan Japanese yen GAD 2023 2015 SNA 2008 From 1980 GAD 2023
Jordan Jordanian dinar NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Kazakhstan Kazakhstani tenge NSO 2023 2005 SNA 1993 From 1994 NSO 2023
Kenya Kenyan shilling NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Kiribati Australian dollar NSO 2022 2019 SNA 2008 IMF staff 2023
Korea South Korean won CB 2023 2020 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2023
Kosovo Euro NSO 2023 2016 ESA 2010 NSO 2023
Kuwait Kuwaiti dinar MEP and NSO 2023 2010 SNA 1993 NSO and MEP 2023
Kyrgyz Republic Kyrgyz som NSO 2023 2005 SNA 2008 From 2010 NSO 2023
Lao P.D.R. Lao kip NSO 2023 2012 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Latvia Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Lebanon Lebanese pound NSO 2021 2019 SNA 2008 From 2019 NSO 2023
Lesotho Lesotho loti NSO 2022/23 2012/13 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Liberia US dollar IMF staff 2023 2000 SNA 1993 CB 2023
Libya Libyan dinar MEP 2021 2013 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Lithuania Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 2005 NSO 2023
Luxembourg Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1995 NSO 2023
Macao SAR Macanese pataca NSO 2023 2022 SNA 2008 From 2001 NSO 2023
Madagascar Malagasy ariary NSO 2022 2007 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Malawi Malawian kwacha NSO 2022 2017 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Malaysia Malaysian ringgit NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Maldives Maldivian rufiyaa MoF and NSO 2022 2019 SNA 2008 CB 2022
Mali CFA franc NSO 2022 1999 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Malta Euro NSO 2023 2010 ESA 2010 From 2000 NSO 2023
Marshall Islands US dollar NSO 2021/22 2014/15 SNA 2008 NSO 2021/22
Mauritania New Mauritanian NSO 2023 1998 SNA 2008 From 2014 NSO 2023
ouguiya
Mauritius Mauritian rupee NSO 2023 2006 SNA 2008 From 1999 NSO 2023
Mexico Mexican peso NSO 2023 2018 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Micronesia US dollar NSO 2021/22 2003/04 SNA 2008 NSO 2022/23
Moldova Moldovan leu NSO 2023 1995 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Mongolia Mongolian tögrög NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Montenegro Euro NSO 2023 2006 ESA 2010 NSO 2023
Morocco Moroccan dirham NSO 2023 2014 SNA 2008 From 2007 NSO 2023
Mozambique Mozambican metical NSO 2022 2019 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Myanmar Myanmar kyat MEP and IMF staff 2020/21 2015/16 ... NSO and IMF 2020/21
staff
Namibia Namibian dollar NSO 2023 2015 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Nauru Australian dollar IMF staff 2020/21 2006/07 SNA 2008 NSO and IMF 2022/23
staff
Nepal Nepalese rupee NSO 2022/23 2010/11 SNA 2008 CB 2022/23
The Netherlands Euro NSO 2023 2021 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
New Zealand New Zealand dollar NSO 2023 20096 SNA 2008 From 1987 NSO and IMF 2023
staff


Israel MoF and NSO 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS ... NSO 2023 BPM 6
Italy NSO 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Jamaica MoF 2023/24 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Japan GAD 2022 2014 CG,LG,SS A MoF 2023 BPM 6
Jordan MoF 2023 2001 CG,NFPC C CB 2023 BPM 6
Kazakhstan MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Kenya MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Kiribati MoF 2022 1986 CG C NSO and IMF staff 2022 BPM 6
Korea MoF 2023 2001 CG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Kosovo MoF 2023 1986 CG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Kuwait MoF 2023 2014 CG,SS Mixed CB 2023 BPM 6
Kyrgyz Republic MoF 2023 ... CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Lao P.D.R. MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Latvia MoF 2023 ESA 2010 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Lebanon MoF 2021 2001 CG C CB and IMF staff 2023 BPM 6
Lesotho MoF 2022/23 2014 CG,LG C CB 2022/23 BPM 6
Liberia MoF 2023 2001 CG A CB 2023 BPM 5
Libya CB 2023 1986 CG,SG,LG C CB and IMF staff 2022 BPM 5
Lithuania MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Luxembourg MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Macao SAR MoF 2022 2014 CG,SS C NSO 2023 BPM 6
Madagascar MoF 2022 1986 CG CB CB 2022 BPM 6
Malawi MoF 2023 2014 CG C NSO and GAD 2022 BPM 6
Malaysia MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG C NSO 2023 BPM 6
Maldives MoF 2022 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Mali MoF 2022 2001 CG Mixed CB 2022 BPM 6
Malta NSO 2023 2001 CG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Marshall Islands MoF 2021/22 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2021/22 BPM 6
Mauritania MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Mauritius MoF 2022/23 2001 CG,LG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Mexico MoF 2022 2014 CG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Micronesia MoF 2020/21 2001 CG,SG A NSO 2017/18 BPM 6
Moldova MoF 2023 1986 CG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Mongolia MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Montenegro MoF 2023 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Morocco MEP 2023 2001 CG A GAD 2023 BPM 6
Mozambique MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG Mixed CB 2022 BPM 6
Myanmar IMF staff 2019/20 2014 CG C IMF staff 2021/22 BPM 6
Namibia MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Nauru MoF 2021/22 2001 CG Cash IMF staff 2022/23 BPM 6
Nepal MoF 2022/23 2001 CG C CB 2022/23 BPM 5
The Netherlands MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
New Zealand NSO 2023 2014 CG,LG A NSO 2023 BPM 6


Nicaragua Nicaraguan córdoba CB 2022 2006 SNA 2008 From 1994 CB 2023
Niger CFA franc NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Nigeria Nigerian naira NSO 2023 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
North Macedonia Macedonian denar NSO 2023 2005 ESA 2010 NSO 2023
Norway Norwegian krone NSO 2023 2021 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
Oman Omani rial NSO 2023 2018 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Pakistan Pakistan rupee NSO 2023/24 2015/16 SNA 2008 NSO 2023/24
Palau US dollar MoF 2022/23 2018/19 SNA 1993 MoF 2022/23
Panama US dollar NSO 2022 2018 SNA 1993 From 2018 NSO 2023
Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea NSO and MoF 2022 2013 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
kina
Paraguay Paraguayan guaraní CB 2022 2014 SNA 2008 CB 2023
Peru Peruvian sol CB 2023 2007 SNA 2008 CB 2023
Philippines Philippine peso NSO 2023 2018 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Poland Polish zloty NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 2015 NSO 2023
Portugal Euro NSO 2023 2016 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
Puerto Rico US dollar NSO 2022/23 2017 ... NSO 2023
Qatar Qatari riyal NSO and MEP 2023 2018 SNA 1993 NSO and MEP 2023
Romania Romanian leu NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 2000 NSO 2023
Russia Russian ruble NSO 2023 2021 SNA 2008 From 1995 NSO 2023
Rwanda Rwandan franc NSO 2023 2017 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Samoa Samoan tala NSO 2022/23 2012/13 SNA 2008 NSO 2022/23
San Marino Euro NSO 2022 2007 ESA 2010 NSO 2023
São Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé and NSO 2023 2008 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Príncipe dobra
Saudi Arabia Saudi riyal NSO 2023 2018 SNA 2008 From 2018 NSO 2023
Senegal CFA franc NSO 2022 2014 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Serbia Serbian dinar NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 2010 NSO 2023
Seychelles Seychelles rupee NSO 2022 2014 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Sierra Leone Sierra Leonean leone NSO 2023 2018 SNA 2008 From 2010 NSO 2023
Singapore Singapore dollar NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 From 2015 NSO 2023
Slovak Republic Euro NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1997 NSO 2023
Slovenia Euro NSO 2023 2010 ESA 2010 From 2000 NSO 2023
Solomon Islands Solomon Islands NSO and CB 2022 2012 SNA 1993 CB 2023
dollar
Somalia US dollar NSO 2022 2022 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
South Africa South African rand NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
South Sudan South Sudanese NSO and IMF staff 2023 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2022
pound
Spain Euro NSO 2023 2020 ESA 2010 From 1995 Other 2023
Sri Lanka Sri Lankan rupee NSO 2022 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
St. Kitts and Nevis Eastern Caribbean NSO 2022 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2022
dollar


Nicaragua MoF 2022 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2022 BPM 6
Niger MoF 2023 1986 CG A CB 2023 BPM 6
Nigeria MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
North Macedonia MoF 2023 1986 CG,SG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Norway NSO and MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Oman MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Pakistan MoF 2023/24 1986 CG,SG,LG C CB 2023/24 BPM 6
Palau MoF 2022/23 2001 CG A MoF 2022/23 BPM 6
Panama MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS C NSO 2022 BPM 6
Papua New Guinea MoF 2022 2014 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Paraguay MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS, C CB 2022 BPM 6
MPC,NFPC
Peru CB and MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS Mixed CB 2023 BPM 5
Philippines MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Poland MoF and NSO 2023 ESA 2010 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Portugal NSO 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Puerto Rico MEP 2022/23 2001 CG A ... ... ...
Qatar MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB and IMF staff 2023 BPM 6
Romania MoF 2023 2014 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Russia MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,SS Mixed CB 2023 BPM 6
Rwanda MoF 2023 2014 CG Mixed CB 2023 BPM 6
Samoa MoF 2022/23 2001 CG A CB 2022/23 BPM 6
San Marino MoF 2022 ... CG A Other 2022 BPM 6
São Tomé and MoF and Customs 2023 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Príncipe
Saudi Arabia MoF 2023 2014 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Senegal MoF 2022 2001 CG C CB and IMF staff 2022 BPM 6
Serbia MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS,other C CB 2023 BPM 6
Seychelles MoF 2023 2001 CG,SS C CB 2022 BPM 6
Sierra Leone MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Singapore MoF and NSO 2022/23 2014 CG C NSO 2023 BPM 6
Slovak Republic NSO 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Slovenia MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Solomon Islands CB 2022 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Somalia MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB and IMF staff 2023 BPM 5
South Africa MoF 2022 2001 CG,SG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
South Sudan MoF and MEP 2023 2014 CG C MoF, NSO, MEP, and 2023 BPM 6
IMF staff
Spain MoF and NSO 2023 ESA 2010 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Sri Lanka MoF 2022 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
St. Kitts and Nevis MoF 2022 1986 CG,SG,LG C CB 2022 BPM 6


St. Lucia Eastern Caribbean NSO 2022 2018 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
dollar
St. Vincent and the Eastern Caribbean NSO 2022 2018 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Grenadines dollar
Sudan Sudanese pound NSO 2019 1982 ... NSO 2022
Suriname Surinamese dollar NSO 2022 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Sweden Swedish krona NSO 2023 2023 ESA 2010 From 1993 NSO 2023
Switzerland Swiss franc NSO 2023 2015 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
Syria Syrian pound NSO 2010 2000 SNA 1993 NSO 2011
Taiwan Province of New Taiwan dollar NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
China
Tajikistan Tajik somoni NSO 2023 1995 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Tanzania Tanzanian shilling NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Thailand Thai baht MEP 2023 2002 SNA 1993 From 1993 MEP 2023
Timor-Leste US dollar NSO 2022 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Togo CFA franc NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Tonga Tongan pa’anga CB 2022/23 2016/17 SNA 2008 CB 2023/24
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago NSO 2022 2012 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
dollar
Tunisia Tunisian dinar NSO 2023 2015 SNA 1993 From 2009 NSO 2023
Türkiye Turkish lira NSO 2023 2009 ESA 2010 From 2009 NSO 2023
Turkmenistan New Turkmen manat IMF staff 2022 2006 SNA 2008 From 2007 NSO 2022
Tuvalu Australian dollar PFTAC advisors 2021 2016 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Uganda Ugandan shilling NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 CB 2023
Ukraine Ukrainian hryvnia NSO 2023 2016 SNA 2008 From 2005 NSO 2023
United Arab Emirates U.A.E. dirham NSO 2023 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
United Kingdom British pound NSO 2023 2022 ESA 2010 From 1980 NSO 2023
United States US dollar NSO 2023 2012 SNA 2008 From 1980 NSO 2023
Uruguay Uruguayan peso CB 2023 2016 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Uzbekistan Uzbek som NSO 2023 2020 SNA 1993 NSO and IMF 2023
staff
Vanuatu Vanuatu vatu NSO 2022 2006 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
Venezuela Venezuelan bolívar CB 2018 1997 SNA 1993 CB 2023
Vietnam Vietnamese dong NSO 2023 2010 SNA 1993 NSO 2023
West Bank and Gaza Israeli new shekel NSO 2023 2015 SNA 2008 NSO 2023
Yemen Yemeni rial IMF staff 2022 1990 SNA 1993 NSO,CB, and IMF 2022
staff
Zambia Zambian kwacha NSO 2022 2010 SNA 2008 NSO 2022
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe gold NSO 2022 2019 SNA 2008 NSO 2023


St. Lucia MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
St. Vincent and the MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Grenadines
Sudan MoF 2021 2001 CG Mixed CB 2021 BPM 6
Suriname MoF 2022 1986 CG Mixed CB 2022 BPM 6
Sweden MoF 2022 2001 CG,LG,SS A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Switzerland MoF 2023 2001 CG,SG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Syria MoF 2009 1986 CG C CB 2009 BPM 5
Taiwan Province of MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
China
Tajikistan MoF 2023 1986 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
Tanzania MoF 2023 1986 CG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Thailand MoF 2022/23 2014 CG,BCG,LG,SS A CB 2023 BPM 6
Timor-Leste MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Togo MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2021 BPM 6
Tonga MoF 2022/23 2014 CG C CB and NSO 2022/23 BPM 6
Trinidad and Tobago MoF 2022/23 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Tunisia MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Türkiye MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS,other A CB 2023 BPM 6
Turkmenistan MoF 2022 1986 CG,LG C NSO 2022 BPM 6
Tuvalu MoF 2023 ... CG Mixed IMF staff 2021 BPM 6
Uganda MoF 2023 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Ukraine MoF 2023 2001 CG,LG,SS C CB 2023 BPM 6
United Arab Emirates MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,SS Mixed CB 2023 BPM 5
United Kingdom NSO 2023 2001 CG,LG A NSO 2023 BPM 6
United States MEP 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG A NSO 2023 BPM 6
Uruguay MoF 2023 1986 CG,LG,SS,NFPC, C CB 2023 BPM 6
NMPC
Uzbekistan MoF 2023 2014 CG,SG,LG,SS C CB and MEP 2023 BPM 6
Vanuatu MoF 2022 2001 CG C CB 2023 BPM 6
Venezuela MoF 2017 2001 BCG,NFPC,SS,other C CB 2018 BPM 6
Vietnam MoF 2022 2001 CG,SG,LG C CB 2023 BPM 6
West Bank and Gaza MoF 2023 2001 CG Mixed NSO 2023 BPM 6
Yemen MoF 2022 2001 CG,LG C IMF staff 2022 BPM 5
Zambia MoF 2022 1986 CG C CB 2022 BPM 6
Zimbabwe MoF 2023 1986 CG C CB and MoF 2022 BPM 6
Note: BPM = Balance of Payments Manual; CPI = consumer price index; ESA = European System of National Accounts; SNA = System of National Accounts.
1 CB = central bank; Customs = Customs Authority; GAD = General Administration Department; MEP = Ministry of Economy, Planning, Commerce, and/or Development;
MoF = Ministry of Finance and/or Treasury; NAO = national audit office; NSO = National Statistics Office; PFTAC = Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre.
2 National accounts base year is the period with which other periods are compared and the period for which prices appear in the denominators of the price relationships used to calculate
the index.
3 Use of chain-weighted methodology allows countries to measure GDP growth more accurately by reducing or eliminating the downward biases in volume series built on index numbers
that average volume components using weights from a year in the moderately distant past.
4 BCG = budgetary central government; CG = central government; LG = local government; MPC = monetary public corporation, including central bank; NFPC = nonfinancial public
corporation; NMPC = nonmonetary financial public corporation; SG = state government; SS = social security fund; TG = territorial governments.
5 Accounting standard: A = accrual accounting; C = cash accounting; CB = commitments basis accounting; Mixed = combination of accrual and cash accounting.
6 Base year deflator is not equal to 100 because the nominal GDP is not measured in the same way as real GDP or the data are seasonally adjusted.

Box A1. Economic Policy Assumptions underlying the Projections for

Selected Economies
Fiscal Policy Assumptions Austria: IMF staff fiscal projections are based on
The short-term fiscal policy assumptions used in the authorities’ latest medium-term plans, adjusted
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) are normally to reflect the IMF staff ’s macroeconomic assump-
based on officially announced budgets, adjusted for tions and assuming some moderate expenditure
differences between the national authorities and the restraint over the medium term in line with histor-
IMF staff regarding macroeconomic assumptions ical patterns.
and projected fiscal outturns. When no official bud- Belgium: Projections are based on the 2024 Bud-
get has been announced, projections incorporate getary Plan, and other available information on the
policy measures judged likely to be implemented. authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjustments for the
The medium-term fiscal projections are similarly IMF staff ’s assumptions.
based on a judgment about policies’ most likely Brazil: Fiscal projections are based on the author-
path. For cases in which the IMF staff has insuffi- ities’ budget proposal, fiscal measures announced by
cient information to assess the authorities’ budget the authorities, and staff estimates and assumptions.
intentions and prospects for policy implementation, Canada: Projections use the baseline forecasts
an unchanged structural primary balance is assumed from the Government of Canada’s Budget 2024,
unless indicated otherwise. Specific assumptions the one-time disbursement for the compensation
used in regard to some of the advanced economies and agreement-in-principle for long-term reform of
follow. (See also Tables B5 to B9 in the online First Nations Child and Family Services and Jordan’s
section of the Statistical Appendix for data on fiscal Principle, and the latest provincial budget updates.
net lending/borrowing and structural balances.)1 Chile: Fiscal projections are based on the authori-
Argentina: Fiscal projections are based on the ties’ budget projections, adjusted to reflect the IMF
available information regarding budget outturn, staff ’s macroeconomic projections.
budget plans, and IMF-supported program targets China: IMF staff fiscal projections incorporate
for the federal government; on fiscal measures the 2024 budget as well as estimates of off-budget
announced by the authorities; and on IMF staff financing.
macroeconomic projections. Denmark: Estimates for the current year are
Australia: Fiscal projections are based on data aligned with the latest official budget numbers,
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the adjusted where appropriate for the IMF staff ’s
fiscal year (FY)2024/25 budgets published by the macroeconomic assumptions. Beyond the current
Commonwealth government and the respective year, the projections incorporate key features of
state/territory governments, and the IMF staff ’s the medium-term fiscal plan as embodied in the
estimates and projections. authorities’ latest budget. Structural balances are
net of temporary fluctuations in some revenues
1The output gap is actual minus potential output, as a
(for example, North Sea revenue, pension yield tax
percentage of potential output. Structural balances are expressed revenue) and one-offs (COVID-19–related one-offs
as a percentage of potential output. The structural balance is are, however, included).
the actual net lending/borrowing minus the effects of cyclical France: Projections for 2024 onward are based
output, corrected for one-time and other factors, such as asset
and commodity prices and output composition effects. Changes
on the country’s 2018–24 budget laws, Stability
in the structural balance consequently include effects of tempo- Programme 2024–27, draft medium-term program-
rary fiscal measures, the impact of fluctuations in interest rates ming bill, and other available information on the
and debt-service costs, and other noncyclical fluctuations in net
authorities’ fiscal plans, adjusted for differences in
lending/borrowing. The computations of structural balances are
based on the IMF staff ’s estimates of potential GDP and revenue revenue projections and assumptions on macroeco-
and expenditure elasticities. (See Annex I of the October 1993 nomic and financial variables.
World Economic Outlook.) Estimates of the output gap and of Germany: Projections are based on the latest
the structural balance are subject to significant margins of uncer-
tainty. Net debt is calculated as gross debt minus financial assets approved federal budget, draft federal budget
corresponding to debt instruments. (if applicable), EU Stability Programme, and

Box A1 (continued)
medium-term budget plan. They also take into is projected based on the 2024 state budget and
account data updates from the federal statistical partial information on the other components.
office (Destatis) and the Ministry of Finance. Italy: The IMF staff ’s estimates and projections
Greece: Data since 2010 reflect adjustments in are informed by the fiscal plans included in the
line with the primary balance definition under the government’s 2024 Economic and Financial Doc-
enhanced surveillance framework for Greece. ument (DEF). All historical national accounts data
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Pro- and projections reflect the official published series,
jections are based on the authorities’ medium-term updated as of October 4, 2024.
fiscal projections for expenditures. Japan: The projections reflect fiscal measures the
Hungary: Fiscal projections include the IMF government has already announced, with adjust-
staff ’s projections for the macroeconomic frame- ments for the IMF staff ’s assumptions.
work and fiscal policy plans announced in the 2024 Korea: The forecast incorporates the latest annual
budgets. budget, any supplementary budget, any proposed
India: Projections are based on available informa- new budget and medium-term fiscal plan, and IMF
tion on the authorities’ fiscal plans, with adjust- staff estimates.
ments for the IMF staff ’s assumptions. Subnational Mexico: The 2020 public sector borrowing
data are incorporated with a lag of up to one year; requirements estimated by the IMF staff adjust for
general government data are thus finalized well some statistical discrepancies between above-the-line
after central government data. IMF and Indian and below-the-line numbers. Fiscal projections for
presentations differ, particularly regarding disinvest- 2024 are informed by the estimates in Pre-Criterios
ment and license-auction proceeds, net versus gross 2025; projections for 2024 onward assume contin-
recording of revenues in certain minor categories, ued compliance with rules established in the Federal
and some public sector lending. Starting with Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law.
FY2020/21 data, expenditure also includes the The Netherlands: Fiscal projections for 2024–29
off-budget component of food subsidies, consistent are based on the IMF staff ’s forecast framework
with the revised treatment of food subsidies in the and are also informed by the authorities’ 2024
budget. The IMF staff adjusts expenditure to take budget, the 2024 Spring Memorandum, the new
out payments for previous years’ food subsidies, government’s coalition agreement, and Bureau for
which are included as expenditure in budget esti- Economic Policy Analysis projections.
mates for FY2020/21. New Zealand: Fiscal projections are based on the
Indonesia: The IMF staff ’s projections are based FY2023/24 Half-Year Economic and Fiscal Update.
on the latest budget, extrapolating using projected Portugal: The projections for the current year are
nominal GDP (and its components as needed) with based on the authorities’ approved budget, adjusted
application of judgment to reflect the authorities’ to reflect the IMF staff ’s macroeconomic forecast.
spending and revenue policies over the medium Projections thereafter are based on the assumption
term. of unchanged policies. Projections for 2024 reflect
Ireland: Fiscal projections are based on the coun- information available in the 2024 budget proposal.
try’s Budget 2024. Puerto Rico: Fiscal projections are informed by
Israel: Projections for Israel are subject to signif- the Certified Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth of
icant risks given the unpredictability of the impact Puerto Rico, which was prepared in October 2023,
of the conflict in the region. Fiscal projections are certified by the Financial Oversight and Manage-
based on the assumption that in the short-term ment Board.
higher government spending is used to support Russia: The fiscal rule was suspended in March
the economy and cover military costs, but after 2022 by the government in response to the
2024 fiscal measures are expected to help contain sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine,
the fiscal deficit. The general government balance allowing for windfall oil and gas revenues above

Box A1 (continued)
benchmark to be used to finance a larger deficit in which are phased out throughout 2024. Forecasts
2022 as well as savings accumulated in the National reflect grants and loans under the EU Recovery and
Welfare Fund. The 2023–25 budget was based on Resilience Facility disbursed over 2023–27.
a modified rule with a two-year transition period Sweden: Fiscal estimates are based on the authori-
which set the benchmark oil and gas revenues ties’ budget projections, adjusted to reflect the IMF
fixed in rubles at Rub 8 trillion, compared with a staff ’s macroeconomic forecasts. Cyclical adjustment
fixed benchmark oil price at $40 a barrel under the on the fiscal accounts is calculated by accounting
2019 fiscal rule. However, in late-September 2023, for output gap.
the Ministry of Finance proposed reverting to the Switzerland: The projections assume that fiscal
earlier version of the fiscal rule from 2024 onward policy is adjusted as necessary to keep fiscal bal-
to determine the price of oil and gas revenues but ances in line with the requirements of Switzerland’s
set the benchmark oil price at $60 a barrel. The fiscal rules.
new rule allows for higher oil and gas revenues to Türkiye: The basis for the projections is the
be spent, but it simultaneously targets a smaller IMF-defined fiscal balance, which excludes some
primary structural deficit. revenue and expenditure items that are included in
Saudi Arabia: The IMF staff ’s baseline fiscal the authorities’ headline balance.
projections are based primarily on its understand- United Kingdom: Fiscal projections are based
ing of government policies as outlined in the on the March 2024 forecast from the Office for
2024 budget and recent official announcements. Budget Responsibility (OBR) and the January 2024
Export oil revenues are based on WEO baseline release on public sector finances from the Office
oil price assumptions and the IMF staff ’s under- for National Statistics. The IMF staff ’s projections
standing of oil production adjustments under the take the OBR forecast as a reference and overlay
OPEC+ (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting adjustments (for differences in assumptions) to both
Countries, including Russia and other non-OPEC revenues and expenditures. The IMF staff ’s fore-
oil exporters) agreement and those unilaterally casts do not necessarily assume that the fiscal rules
announced by Saudi Arabia. announced on November 17, 2022, will be met at
Singapore: FY2023 projections are based on the end of the forecast period. Data are presented
revised figures based on budget execution through on a calendar year basis.
the end of 2023. FY2024 projections are based on United States: Fiscal projections are based on the
the initial budget of February 16, 2024. IMF staff June 2024 Congressional Budget Office baseline
projections include (1) an increase in the goods and the latest treasury monthly statement, adjusted
and services tax from 8 percent to 9 percent on for the IMF staff ’s policy and macroeconomic
January 1, 2024; and (2) an increase in the carbon assumptions. Projections incorporate the effects of
tax from S$5 a tonne to S$25 a tonne in 2024 and the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
2025 and S$45 a tonne in 2026 and 2027.
Monetary Policy Assumptions
South Africa: Fiscal assumptions are informed
by the 2024 budget. Nontax revenue excludes Monetary policy assumptions are based on the
transactions in financial assets and liabilities, as established policy framework in each economy. In
they involve primarily revenues associated with most cases, this implies a nonaccommodative stance
the realized exchange rate valuation gains from the over the business cycle: official interest rates will
holding of foreign currency deposits, sale of assets, increase when economic indicators suggest that
and conceptually similar items. The Eskom debt inflation will rise above its acceptable rate or range;
relief is treated as a capital transfer above-the-line they will decrease when indicators suggest inflation
item. will not exceed the acceptable rate or range, that
Spain: Fiscal numbers for 2023 include energy output growth is below its potential rate, and that
support measures amounting to 1 percent of GDP, the margin of slack in the economy is significant.

Box A1 (continued)
With regard to interest rates, please refer to the Japan: Monetary policy assumptions for Japan
Assumptions section at the beginning of the Statis- are based on the IMF staff ’s assessment of the
tical Appendix. most likely path for interest rates, considering
Argentina: Monetary projections are consistent the broader macroeconomic outlook, the Bank of
with the overall macroeconomic framework, the Japan’s communications, and market expectations.
fiscal and financing plans, and the monetary and Korea: Projections assume that the policy rate
foreign exchange policies. will evolve in line with the Bank of Korea’s forward
Australia: Monetary policy assumptions are guidance.
based on the IMF staff ’s analysis and the expected Mexico: Monetary policy assumptions are consis-
inflation path. tent with inflation converging to the central bank’s
Brazil: Monetary policy assumptions are consis- target over the projection period.
tent with the convergence of inflation within the New Zealand: Monetary projections are based on
tolerance band by the end of 2024. the IMF staff ’s analysis and expected inflation path.
Canada: Projections reflect the gradual unwind- Russia: Monetary policy projections assume
ing of monetary policy tightening by the Bank of that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation is
Canada as inflation slowly returns to its mid-range adopting a tight monetary policy stance.
target of 2 percent by early 2025. Saudi Arabia: Monetary policy projections are
Chile: Monetary policy assumptions are consis- based on the continuation of the exchange rate peg
tent with attaining the inflation target. to the US dollar.
China: Monetary policy assumptions are consis- Singapore: Broad money is projected to grow in
tent with inflation gradually rising and the output line with the projected growth in nominal GDP.
gap closing over the medium term. South Africa: Monetary policy assumptions are
Denmark: Monetary policy is to maintain the peg consistent with maintaining inflation within the
to the euro. 3–6 percent target band over the medium term.
Euro area: Monetary policy assumptions for euro Sweden: Monetary policy assumptions are based
area member countries are drawn from a suite of on IMF staff estimates.
models (semi-structural, DSGE [dynamic stochastic Switzerland: Monetary policy should remain
general equilibrium], Taylor rule), market expec- responsive to incoming data, while taking
tations, and European Central Bank Governing into account international monetary policy
Council communications. developments.
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: The Türkiye: The baseline assumes that the monetary
IMF staff assumes that the currency board system policy stance will remain in line with announced
will remain intact. and observed policies.
Hungary: The IMF staff ’s estimates and projec- United Kingdom: Monetary policy assumptions
tions are informed by expert judgment based on for the UK are based on the IMF staff ’s assess-
recent developments. ment of the most likely path for interest rates,
India: Monetary policy projections are consistent considering the broader macroeconomic outlook,
with achieving the Reserve Bank of India’s inflation model results, the Bank of England’s inflation
target over the medium term. forecasts and communications, and market
Indonesia: Monetary policy assumptions are in expectations.
line with inflation within the central bank’s target United States: The IMF staff expects the Federal
band over the medium term. Open Market Committee to continue to adjust the
Israel: Monetary policy assumptions are based on federal funds target rate in line with the broader
gradual normalization of monetary policy. macroeconomic outlook.

Box A2. Revised World Economic Outlook Purchasing-Power-Parity Weights

Comparing output, income, and other key This PPP data update leads to revisions in PPP
economic indicators across countries is essential GDP weights and to revisions in regional and global
for analyzing global economic performance and aggregates, as outlined in more detail below. Over-
guiding policy decisions. To facilitate this compar- all, the magnitude of the revisions resulting from
ison, one approach is to convert nominal values the new ICP release was smaller compared with the
from local currencies into a common currency, previous ICP release (see, for example, Box 1.1 of the
such as the US dollar. However, this approach falls October 2020 World Economic Outlook).
short of recognizing differences in price levels across
PPP Weight Changes for Regions and Economies
countries: the same income, when expressed in US
dollars, will buy more goods and services in a coun- Based on the results of the new ICP release
try where prices are lower. extrapolated to 2024, price levels are estimated to
To adjust for differences in price levels across be lower for most countries compared with the
countries, purchasing-power-parity exchange extrapolated data based on the previous ICP release.
rates (PPPs) are used. PPPs both convert different As a result, PPP-based GDP is estimated to be
currencies to a common currency and show, with higher for both advanced economies and emerging
reference to a base economy (the United States), market and developing economies.
the relative price of the same basket of goods and However, in relative terms, the increase in PPP
services across countries. In the World Economic GDP experienced by emerging market and develop-
Outlook, PPPs are used to convert nominal GDP ing economies was bigger than that experienced by
expressed in local currency to PPP-based GDP, thus advanced economies. For this reason, the share of
enabling comparison of economic output across advanced economies in world GDP decreased from
countries.1 PPP GDP is further used as weights 40.9 percent, based on the previous PPP measures
when computing regional and global real GDP (Table A2.1, column 3), to 40.2 percent, based on
growth rates and other real sector aggregates. The new PPPs (column 6) in 2024. This corresponds to a
same weights are also used to derive regional and 0.7 percentage point decline for the advanced econ-
global inflation measures. omies (column 7). The share of emerging market
PPPs are sourced from the International Com- and developing economies increased from 59.1 to
parison Program (ICP), maintained and published 59.8 percent, a mirror 0.7 percentage point increase.2
by the World Bank in coordination with other The revisions for advanced economies are driven
international institutions, including the Interna- mostly by the decline in the US share. Among
tional Monetary Fund. In May 2024, new PPPs emerging market and developing economies, Russia
were released for the 2021 reference year. Revised and India drove most of the upward revision. But
results for the preceding reference year, 2017, and not all emerging market and developing econ-
estimates of annual PPPs for 2018–20 were also omy regions experienced an upward revision. The
released. In the October 2024 World Economic Middle East and Central Asia share of world GDP
Outlook, following the standard methodology, PPPs decreased by 0.3 percentage point in 2024.
are derived by taking the new 2017–21 data and Impact of PPP Revision on Aggregate Growth
extrapolating it to all preceding and subsequent
years using growth rates in relative GDP deflators Given the relatively small changes in world GDP
(the GDP deflator of a country divided by the shares, the impact of the new weights on world and
GDP deflator of the United States).
2The PPP-based share of world GDP for emerging market
The author of this box is Evgenia Weaver. and developing economies is in general higher than the market
1PPPGDP=NGDP/PPPEX, where NGDP is nominal GDP in exchange rate share of 41.2 percent (column 8), whereas for
local currency and PPPEX is the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) advanced economies it is lower than the market exchange rate
exchange rate. See World Economic Outlook frequently asked share of 58.8 percent, reflecting the role of PPPs in accounting
questions for more information on the use of PPPs. https://www. for price level differences between advanced economies and
imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/frequently-asked-questions. emerging market and developing economies.

Box A2 (continued)
regional aggregates is negligible. Table A2.2 shows 0.1 percentage point in either direction, and are
aggregate real GDP growth rates for 2023–25 driven by changes in weights for some of the
derived using previous and new weights. The slower-, or conversely faster-, growing economies
differences are small (columns 7–9), not exceeding within those economy groups.
Table A2.1. Changes in World GDP Shares from Purchasing-Power-Parity Revisions

(Percent, unless noted otherwise)
Previous Weights New Weights Difference2 US Dollar GDP Share
2017 20211 20241 2017 2021 20241 2024 2024
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advanced Economies 44.0 42.3 40.9 43.6 41.6 40.2 –0.7 58.8
United States 16.0 15.9 15.6 15.9 15.2 15.0 –0.6 26.5
Germany 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.4 3.1 0.0 4.3
France 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 0.0 2.9
Italy 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 0.0 2.2
Spain 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.0 1.6
Japan 4.3 3.8 3.6 4.3 3.6 3.4 –0.2 3.7
United Kingdom 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.2 0.0 3.3
Canada 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.0 2.0
Other Advanced Economies3 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.9 6.8 6.6 0.0 8.3
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 56.0 57.7 59.1 56.4 58.4 59.8 0.7 41.2
Emerging and Developing Asia 29.6 32.2 33.9 30.1 32.5 34.3 0.4 23.9
China 16.1 18.4 18.9 16.6 18.5 19.1 0.2 16.6
India 6.7 7.0 7.9 6.8 7.3 8.2 0.3 3.5
Emerging and Developing Europe 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.4 8.1 7.8 0.4 5.0
Russia 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.7 3.6 0.7 2.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 8.0 7.3 7.2 7.9 7.3 7.2 0.0 6.1
Brazil 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.1 2.0
Mexico 2.1 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.7 –0.1 1.7
Middle East and Central Asia 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.3 7.2 –0.3 4.5
Saudi Arabia 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.1 –0.1 1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 0.1 1.7
Nigeria 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.2
South Africa 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 –0.1 0.4
Emerging Market and Middle-Income 52.1 53.7 55.1 52.4 54.3 55.7 0.6 39.2
Economies
Low-Income Developing Countries 3.9 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.2 0.1 2.0
Note: Columns (1)–(6) show shares of world GDP in purchasing-power-parity (PPP) terms. Previous shares are based on the International Comparison
Program (ICP) 2017 release for reference years 2011–17; new shares are based on the ICP 2021 release for reference years 2017–21. Column (8) shows
shares of world GDP in US dollar terms.
1 Extrapolations.
2 Difference between column (6) (new) and column (3) (previous); percentage points.

Box A2 (continued)
Table A2.2. Revisions to Real GDP Growth of World Economic Outlook Aggregates
(Percent, unless noted otherwise)
Previous Weights New Weights Difference1
2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
World 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Advanced Economies 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Other Advanced Economies2 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.2 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging and Developing Asia 5.7 5.3 5.0 5.7 5.3 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Emerging and Developing Europe 3.4 3.1 2.3 3.3 3.2 2.2 –0.1 0.1 –0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.5 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Middle East and Central Asia 2.0 2.4 4.0 2.1 2.4 3.9 0.1 0.0 –0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.5 3.6 4.1 3.6 3.6 4.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Emerging Market and Middle-Income 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Economies
Low-Income Developing Countries 4.0 3.9 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.7 0.1 0.1 0.0
Note: Columns (1)–(6) show real GDP growth rates aggregated using previous purchasing-power-parity (PPP) shares based on the International
Comparison Program (ICP) 2017 release and new PPP shares based on the ICP 2021 release.
1 Difference between columns (4)–(6) (new) and columns (1)–(3) (previous); percentage points.

List of Tables1
Output
A1. Summary of World Output
A2. Advanced Economies: Real GDP and Total Domestic Demand
A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP
A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP
Inflation
A5. Summary of Inflation
A6. Advanced Economies: Consumer Prices
A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices
Financial Policies
A8. Major Advanced Economies: General Government Fiscal Balances and Debt
Foreign Trade
A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices
Current Account Transactions

A10. Summary of Current Account Balances
A11. Advanced Economies: Current Account Balance
A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Current Account Balance
Balance of Payments and External Financing

A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances
Flow of Funds
A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing
Medium-Term Baseline Scenario

A15. Summary of World Medium-Term Baseline Scenario
1When countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.

Table A1. Summary of World Output1

(Annual percent change)
Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
World 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.6 2.9 –2.7 6.6 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1
Advanced Economies 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.3 1.9 –4.0 6.0 2.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
United States 1.6 1.8 2.5 3.0 2.6 –2.2 6.1 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.1
Euro Area 0.8 1.8 2.6 1.8 1.6 –6.1 6.2 3.3 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.2
Japan 0.5 0.8 1.7 0.6 –0.4 –4.2 2.7 1.2 1.7 0.3 1.1 0.5
Other Advanced Economies2 2.4 2.3 3.0 2.5 1.9 –4.0 6.4 3.3 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.9
Emerging Market and Developing 5.6 4.4 4.8 4.7 3.7 –1.8 7.0 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.2 3.9
Economies
Regional Groups
Emerging and Developing Asia 7.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 5.3 –0.5 7.7 4.4 5.7 5.3 5.0 4.5
Emerging and Developing Europe 3.1 1.7 4.2 3.6 2.5 –1.8 7.1 0.6 3.3 3.2 2.2 2.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.0 –0.8 1.4 1.1 0.2 –6.9 7.4 4.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.6
Middle East and Central Asia 4.2 4.3 2.6 2.7 1.9 –2.2 4.4 5.5 2.1 2.4 3.9 3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.2 1.5 3.0 3.3 3.2 –1.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.4
Analytical Groups
Fuel 4.3 2.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 –3.8 4.2 5.3 2.2 2.7 3.8 3.1
Nonfuel 5.8 4.7 5.3 5.1 4.1 –1.5 7.3 3.8 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0
Of which, Primary Products 3.9 1.3 2.8 1.6 0.8 –6.1 7.6 3.3 0.6 0.6 3.8 2.9
Net Debtor Economies 4.7 3.9 4.7 4.5 3.3 –3.5 7.0 4.9 4.6 4.3 4.4 4.8
Net Debtor Economies by
Debt-Servicing Experience
Economies with Arrears and/or Rescheduling
during 2019–23 4.1 2.8 4.0 3.6 3.3 –0.7 3.9 1.0 3.2 2.7 4.0 4.9
Other Groups
European Union 1.1 2.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 –5.6 6.4 3.7 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.5
Middle East and North Africa 3.9 4.8 2.2 2.1 1.3 –2.4 4.2 5.5 1.9 2.1 4.0 3.6
Emerging Market and Middle-Income
Economies 5.6 4.5 4.8 4.6 3.6 –1.9 7.2 4.0 4.4 4.2 4.2 3.8
Low-Income Developing Countries 5.7 3.4 4.5 4.7 5.0 0.1 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.0 4.7 5.2
Memorandum
Median Growth Rate
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.2 –3.6 5.0 4.2 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.5
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 3.7 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.5 –5.2 4.9 4.6 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.9
Low-Income Developing Countries 5.1 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.6 –1.1 5.0 4.0 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.8
Output per Capita3
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 4.0 2.8 3.3 3.4 2.4 –3.1 5.9 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.1 2.9
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 4.2 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.6 –2.9 6.5 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.2
Low-Income Developing Countries 3.1 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.5 –2.3 1.9 2.0 1.7 3.1 2.4 2.9
World Growth Rate Based on Market
Exchange Rates 2.5 2.6 3.4 3.2 2.6 –3.0 6.4 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.5
Value of World Output (billions of US dollars)
At Market Exchange Rates 68,493 76,598 81,479 86,497 87,772 85,519 97,403 101,409 105,685 110,065 115,494 139,652
At Purchasing Power Parities 91,744 117,123 123,709 131,583 139,434 139,120 155,448 172,267 184,258 194,569 204,473 248,716
1 RealGDP.
2 Excludeseuro area countries, Japan, and the United States.
3 Output per capita is in international dollars at purchasing power parity.

Table A2. Advanced Economies: Real GDP and Total Domestic Demand1
Q4 over Q42
Average Projections Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029 2023:Q4 2024:Q4 2025:Q4
Real GDP
Advanced Economies 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.3 1.9 –4.0 6.0 2.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7
United States 1.6 1.8 2.5 3.0 2.6 –2.2 6.1 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.1 3.2 2.5 1.9
Euro Area 0.8 1.8 2.6 1.8 1.6 –6.1 6.2 3.3 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.2 1.2 1.3
Germany 1.4 2.3 2.7 1.1 1.0 –4.1 3.7 1.4 –0.3 0.0 0.8 0.7 –0.2 0.3 1.3
France 1.0 0.7 2.3 1.6 2.1 –7.6 6.8 2.6 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.5
Italy –0.5 1.2 1.6 0.8 0.4 –8.9 8.9 4.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.6
Spain 0.5 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.0 –10.9 6.7 6.2 2.7 2.9 2.1 1.6 2.3 2.9 2.0
The Netherlands 1.1 2.4 2.8 2.3 2.3 –3.9 6.3 5.0 0.1 0.6 1.6 1.4 –0.6 1.4 1.6
Belgium 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.2 –5.3 6.9 3.0 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.3
Ireland 3.7 1.2 10.0 7.5 5.0 7.2 16.3 8.6 –5.5 –0.2 2.2 2.3 –9.9 7.0 –3.2
Austria 1.2 2.0 2.3 2.4 1.5 –6.6 4.2 4.8 –0.8 –0.6 1.1 0.9 –1.3 –0.2 1.4
Portugal –0.1 2.0 3.5 2.8 2.7 –8.3 5.7 6.8 2.3 1.9 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.3
Greece –2.2 –0.5 1.1 1.7 1.9 –9.3 8.4 5.6 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.3 2.4 2.1
Finland 0.4 2.6 3.3 1.2 1.3 –2.5 2.7 1.5 –1.2 –0.2 2.0 1.5 –1.5 1.6 1.8
Slovak Republic 3.8 1.9 2.9 4.0 2.5 –3.3 4.8 1.9 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.7
Croatia 0.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 3.4 –8.5 13.0 7.0 3.1 3.4 2.9 2.6 4.4 1.6 5.1
Lithuania 2.5 2.6 4.3 4.0 4.6 0.1 6.2 2.4 –0.3 2.4 2.6 2.2 0.1 3.5 2.0
Slovenia 1.1 3.0 5.2 4.4 3.5 –4.1 8.4 2.7 2.1 1.5 2.6 2.5 2.8 1.7 2.4
Luxembourg 2.5 5.0 1.3 1.2 2.9 –0.9 7.2 1.4 –1.1 1.3 2.7 2.3 –0.6 2.6 2.7
Latvia 1.5 2.4 3.3 4.0 0.6 –3.5 6.7 3.0 –0.3 1.2 2.3 2.5 –0.2 2.6 1.4
Estonia 1.6 3.1 5.6 3.7 3.7 –2.9 7.1 0.1 –3.0 –0.9 1.6 2.0 –2.4 0.0 2.3
Cyprus 0.5 6.6 5.7 5.6 5.5 –3.4 9.9 5.1 2.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.2 3.1 3.1
Malta 4.5 4.1 13.0 7.2 4.1 –3.5 13.5 4.1 7.5 5.0 4.0 3.5 6.7 5.4 5.2
Japan 0.5 0.8 1.7 0.6 –0.4 –4.2 2.7 1.2 1.7 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.9 1.8 0.2
United Kingdom 1.2 1.9 2.7 1.4 1.6 –10.3 8.6 4.8 0.3 1.1 1.5 1.3 –0.3 2.1 1.1
Korea 3.7 3.2 3.4 3.2 2.3 –0.7 4.6 2.7 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.9
Canada 1.6 1.0 3.0 2.7 1.9 –5.0 5.3 3.8 1.2 1.3 2.4 1.6 1.0 2.3 2.1
Australia 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.8 1.8 –2.1 5.5 3.9 2.0 1.2 2.1 2.3 1.6 1.5 2.2
Taiwan Province of China 3.6 2.2 3.3 2.8 3.1 3.4 6.6 2.6 1.3 3.7 2.7 2.1 5.1 1.1 2.6
Singapore 5.6 3.6 4.5 3.5 1.3 –3.9 9.7 3.8 1.1 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.4
Switzerland 2.0 2.1 1.4 2.9 1.2 –2.3 5.6 3.1 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.6 1.4 1.9
Sweden 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.5 –2.0 5.9 1.5 –0.2 0.9 2.4 2.1 0.1 1.6 3.0
Czech Republic 2.0 2.6 5.2 2.8 3.6 –5.3 4.0 2.8 –0.1 1.1 2.3 2.0 0.0 1.7 2.5
Norway 1.3 1.2 2.5 0.8 1.1 –1.3 3.9 3.0 0.5 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.0 1.3 2.0
Hong Kong SAR 3.4 2.2 3.8 2.8 –1.7 –6.5 6.5 –3.7 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.4 4.5 2.5 5.7
Israel3 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.8 –1.5 9.5 6.4 2.0 0.7 2.7 3.4 –4.0 6.3 3.0
Denmark 0.7 3.1 3.1 1.9 1.7 –1.8 7.4 1.5 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.4 4.9 0.9 1.3
New Zealand 2.0 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.1 –1.4 5.6 2.4 0.6 0.0 1.9 2.4 –0.2 0.1 2.8
Puerto Rico –1.0 –1.3 –2.9 –4.4 1.7 –4.2 0.4 3.6 0.6 1.0 –0.8 0.8 ... ... ...
Macao SAR 6.8 –0.7 9.9 6.4 –2.6 –54.3 23.5 –21.4 80.5 10.6 7.3 3.0 ... ... ...
Iceland 1.9 6.3 4.2 4.9 1.9 –6.9 5.3 9.0 5.0 0.6 2.4 2.4 1.4 2.0 –0.4
Andorra –1.2 3.7 0.3 1.6 2.0 –11.2 8.3 9.6 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 ... ... ...
San Marino –2.1 2.3 0.3 1.5 2.0 –6.8 14.2 7.9 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.3 ... ... ...
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 1.2 1.6 2.4 2.1 1.7 –4.2 5.8 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.5
Real Total Domestic Demand
Advanced Economies 1.3 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.1 –3.9 6.0 3.4 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.3 2.2 1.2
United States 1.4 1.9 2.6 3.1 2.6 –1.9 7.1 2.8 2.3 3.0 2.1 1.9 3.1 2.8 1.7
Euro Area 0.5 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.4 –5.7 5.0 3.5 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.3
Germany 1.2 3.0 2.6 2.0 1.6 –3.2 3.0 2.8 –0.4 –0.4 0.8 0.8 –1.0 0.4 1.3
France 1.2 1.3 2.3 1.4 2.0 –6.3 6.0 2.9 0.6 0.0 0.7 1.2 –0.1 0.2 1.1
Italy –0.8 1.6 1.6 1.0 –0.2 –8.3 9.2 5.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 –0.5 3.1 –1.8
Spain –0.3 2.0 3.1 3.2 1.6 –9.0 7.0 3.9 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.8 1.5 2.6
Japan 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.0 –3.3 1.7 1.7 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.5 –0.6 2.2 0.1
United Kingdom 1.3 3.1 2.2 0.9 1.9 –11.5 9.1 5.1 –0.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.8 1.0 2.7
Canada 2.2 0.4 4.1 2.7 1.1 –6.1 6.5 5.1 –0.3 1.3 2.8 2.0 0.2 2.4 2.3
Other Advanced Economies4 2.7 3.0 3.6 2.7 1.7 –2.5 6.1 3.6 0.7 1.3 2.0 2.0 –0.5 2.6 2.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 1.1 1.8 2.3 2.2 1.8 –3.9 6.2 3.1 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.3
1 Inthis and other tables, when countries are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size.
2 From the fourth quarter of the preceding year.
3 See the country-specific note for Israel in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Table A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP

Averages Projections
2006–15 2016–25 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Private Consumer Expenditure
Advanced Economies 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.6 –5.4 6.1 4.1 1.7 1.7 1.6
United States 1.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.1 –2.5 8.8 3.0 2.5 2.6 1.8
Euro Area 0.5 1.1 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 –7.9 4.7 4.9 0.7 0.9 1.3
Germany 0.8 0.9 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 –6.8 2.3 5.6 –0.4 0.6 1.4
France 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.7 –6.5 5.3 3.2 0.9 0.7 1.0
Italy –0.3 0.4 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.0 –10.6 5.8 5.0 1.0 0.5 1.0
Spain 0.0 1.3 2.7 3.1 1.7 1.1 –12.1 7.1 4.8 1.8 2.2 2.0
Japan 0.5 0.0 –0.4 1.1 0.2 –0.6 –4.4 0.8 2.2 0.6 –0.1 0.8
United Kingdom 1.2 1.1 3.7 1.8 2.0 1.1 –13.1 7.2 7.4 0.7 0.4 1.3
Canada 2.7 2.2 2.1 3.7 2.6 1.6 –6.3 5.1 5.1 1.7 2.9 3.7
Other Advanced Economies1 2.7 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.9 1.9 –5.3 4.7 4.3 2.4 1.8 2.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.5 –5.0 6.3 3.8 1.6 1.6 1.6
Public Consumption
Advanced Economies 1.2 1.9 2.0 0.8 1.6 3.0 2.2 3.4 0.7 1.9 2.2 1.4
United States 0.4 1.6 1.8 –0.1 1.4 3.9 3.0 0.4 –1.1 2.9 2.1 1.6
Euro Area 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.2 4.3 1.1 1.2 1.7 0.9
Germany 2.0 2.1 4.0 1.6 1.0 2.9 4.9 3.4 0.1 –0.1 1.9 1.0
France 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.7 0.8 1.1 –4.3 6.6 2.6 0.8 1.4 0.7
Italy –0.5 0.5 1.3 0.3 0.0 –0.4 0.3 2.3 0.6 1.9 –0.3 –1.3
Spain 1.4 2.5 0.9 1.0 2.1 2.2 3.5 3.6 0.6 5.2 3.8 2.2
Japan 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.1 1.0 1.9 2.4 3.4 1.7 0.0 1.7 1.7
United Kingdom 1.2 1.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 4.0 –6.8 14.3 0.6 0.6 2.3 1.6
Canada 1.7 2.3 1.8 2.1 3.1 1.1 1.3 5.4 3.2 1.6 2.5 1.6
Other Advanced Economies1 2.9 3.1 3.4 2.4 3.5 3.8 4.7 4.6 2.7 1.5 3.0 1.5
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 0.8 1.6 1.9 0.4 1.2 2.9 1.6 3.0 0.1 1.8 1.9 1.3
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
United States 1.2 3.3 2.9 4.3 5.0 2.9 –0.8 5.4 2.0 3.2 4.5 3.1
Euro Area –0.1 1.7 3.7 3.9 3.2 7.1 –5.8 3.5 1.9 0.9 –1.6 1.3
Germany 1.9 0.6 3.8 2.6 3.6 2.0 –3.0 0.6 –0.2 –1.2 –2.7 0.4
France 0.4 1.7 2.6 4.1 3.4 4.2 –6.2 9.6 0.1 0.8 –1.3 0.2
Italy –2.9 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.3 1.6 –7.1 21.5 7.5 8.5 –0.9 0.8
Spain –2.6 2.4 2.0 6.8 6.5 4.9 –8.9 2.6 3.3 2.1 2.1 3.1
Japan –0.4 0.4 1.2 1.6 0.6 0.5 –3.7 0.4 –0.5 1.8 0.8 0.9
United Kingdom 1.4 1.3 5.1 3.5 –0.5 2.1 –9.7 7.6 5.1 –0.1 0.1 0.5
Canada 1.7 0.7 –4.7 3.3 2.4 0.8 –3.8 9.3 –2.4 –3.2 1.3 4.3
Other Advanced Economies1 2.7 2.3 3.2 4.7 2.2 0.9 –1.1 9.2 2.5 0.3 –0.8 2.3
Memorandum

Table A3. Advanced Economies: Components of Real GDP (continued)

2006–15 2016–25 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Final Domestic Demand
United States 1.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 3.0 2.5 –1.4 6.9 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.1
Euro Area 0.5 1.3 2.3 2.1 1.8 2.7 –5.5 4.3 3.4 0.9 0.5 1.2
Germany 1.3 1.1 3.0 1.8 1.8 2.0 –3.4 2.2 3.0 –0.5 0.2 1.1
France 1.1 1.2 1.7 2.2 1.5 2.1 –5.9 6.6 2.3 0.9 0.4 0.7
Italy –0.8 1.1 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.2 –7.8 8.0 4.6 2.8 0.0 0.5
Spain –0.3 1.8 2.2 3.4 2.7 2.1 –8.4 5.4 3.6 2.6 2.5 2.2
Japan 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.5 0.2 –2.9 1.3 1.4 0.8 0.7 1.2
United Kingdom 1.2 1.3 3.3 1.9 1.3 1.8 –11.3 8.7 5.5 0.5 0.8 1.2
Canada 2.2 1.7 0.5 3.3 2.7 1.3 –4.1 6.1 2.8 0.5 1.9 2.8
Other Advanced Economies1 2.7 2.2 3.0 3.4 2.4 1.9 –2.3 5.8 3.4 1.6 1.4 1.9
Memorandum
Stock Building2
Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 –0.3 0.2 0.1 –0.1 –0.3 0.4 0.5 –0.6 –0.1 0.0
United States 0.1 0.0 –0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 –0.5 0.3 0.6 –0.3 0.1 0.0
Euro Area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 –0.3 –0.3 0.6 0.2 –0.6 –0.3 –0.1
Germany –0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 –0.4 0.1 0.7 –0.1 0.1 –0.5 –0.2
France 0.1 –0.2 –0.5 0.2 –0.1 0.0 –0.4 –0.6 0.5 –0.3 –0.4 0.0
Italy 0.0 –0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 –0.4 –0.5 1.1 0.8 –2.4 0.2 0.1
Spain 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.2 0.4 –0.4 –0.6 1.7 0.4 –0.9 –0.5 –0.2
Japan 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.1 0.2 –0.1 –0.5 0.5 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 0.0
United Kingdom 0.1 –0.1 –0.3 0.4 –0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 –0.9 –0.2 0.1
Canada –0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 –0.2 –0.7 0.8 1.2 –0.7 –0.4 0.0
Other Advanced Economies1 0.0 0.0 –0.2 0.2 0.3 –0.1 –0.1 0.3 0.4 –0.8 –0.2 0.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 0.0 0.0 –0.3 0.2 0.1 –0.1 –0.4 0.3 0.5 –0.4 –0.1 0.0
Foreign Balance2
Advanced Economies 0.2 0.0 –0.1 0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.2 0.0 –0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1
United States 0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.1 –0.2 –1.3 –0.5 0.6 –0.4 0.0
Euro Area 0.3 0.1 –0.3 0.4 –0.1 –0.7 –0.5 1.4 –0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Germany 0.4 –0.2 –0.4 0.3 –0.6 –0.4 –1.1 0.9 –1.2 0.1 0.3 0.0
France –0.1 0.1 –0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 –1.3 0.7 –0.3 0.5 1.1 0.3
Italy 0.3 0.0 –0.3 0.1 –0.1 0.7 –0.9 0.0 –0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2
Spain 0.8 0.3 1.0 –0.1 –0.6 0.4 –2.2 –0.3 2.3 1.0 0.9 0.2
Japan 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.0 –0.5 –0.9 1.1 –0.5 0.9 0.0 0.1
United Kingdom –0.2 0.1 –0.5 1.0 –0.1 –0.3 1.8 –0.9 –0.3 0.5 –0.4 0.1
Canada –0.5 –0.2 0.4 –1.1 0.0 0.8 0.3 –1.8 –1.4 1.5 0.0 –0.4
Other Advanced Economies1 0.5 0.4 0.0 –0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 –0.7 1.2 0.8 0.5
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.6 0.6 –0.1 0.1
2 Changes expressed as percent of GDP in the preceding period.

Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP

Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Emerging and Developing Asia 7.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 5.3 –0.5 7.7 4.4 5.7 5.3 5.0 4.5
Bangladesh 6.2 7.1 6.6 7.3 7.9 3.4 6.9 7.1 5.8 5.4 4.5 6.5
Bhutan 7.3 7.5 5.9 3.5 4.6 –2.5 –3.3 4.8 5.0 5.2 7.2 7.2
Brunei Darussalam 0.3 –2.5 1.3 0.1 3.9 1.1 –1.6 –1.6 1.4 2.4 2.5 3.1
Cambodia 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.8 7.9 –3.6 3.1 5.1 5.0 5.5 5.8 6.0
China 9.6 6.8 6.9 6.7 6.0 2.2 8.4 3.0 5.2 4.8 4.5 3.3
Fiji 2.2 2.4 5.4 3.8 –0.6 –17.0 –4.9 19.8 7.5 3.0 3.4 3.1
India1 6.8 8.3 6.8 6.5 3.9 –5.8 9.7 7.0 8.2 7.0 6.5 6.5
Indonesia 5.8 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.0 –2.1 3.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1
Kiribati 3.6 7.1 3.7 3.5 3.3 –0.6 8.5 3.9 4.1 5.8 4.1 2.1
Lao P.D.R. 7.9 7.0 6.9 6.2 4.7 –0.4 2.1 2.3 3.7 4.1 3.5 2.5
Malaysia 4.9 4.4 5.8 4.8 4.4 –5.5 3.3 8.9 3.6 4.8 4.4 4.0
Maldives 6.6 6.6 7.1 8.7 7.3 –32.9 37.7 13.9 4.0 4.7 4.7 4.5
Marshall Islands 0.7 2.5 3.6 5.5 10.5 –2.8 1.2 –1.1 –3.9 5.0 3.5 2.0
Micronesia –0.1 0.9 2.3 0.1 3.8 –1.9 3.0 –0.9 0.8 1.1 1.7 0.7
Mongolia 8.0 1.5 5.6 7.7 5.6 –4.6 1.6 5.0 7.4 5.5 7.0 5.0
Myanmar 7.8 6.4 5.8 6.4 6.8 –1.2 –10.5 –4.0 2.5 1.0 1.1 1.8
Nauru 5.4 4.4 –6.0 –1.2 8.5 2.0 7.2 3.0 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.8
Nepal 4.4 0.4 9.0 7.6 6.7 –2.4 4.8 5.6 2.0 3.1 4.9 5.0
Palau 0.5 1.5 –3.5 0.3 1.5 –6.0 –11.6 –1.7 0.9 8.1 8.5 1.7
Papua New Guinea 5.6 5.5 3.5 –0.3 4.5 –3.2 –0.8 5.2 2.9 4.6 3.7 3.1
Philippines 5.5 7.1 6.9 6.3 6.1 –9.5 5.7 7.6 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.3
Samoa 1.3 8.0 1.4 –0.6 4.5 –3.1 –7.1 –5.3 8.0 9.7 4.2 2.0
Solomon Islands 4.3 5.6 3.1 2.7 1.7 –3.4 2.6 2.4 3.1 2.3 2.5 3.0
Sri Lanka1 6.4 5.1 6.5 2.3 –0.2 –4.6 4.2 –7.3 ... ... ... ...
Thailand 3.3 3.4 4.2 4.2 2.1 –6.1 1.6 2.5 1.9 2.8 3.0 2.7
Timor-Leste1 5.7 3.4 –3.1 –0.7 2.1 –7.2 1.6 4.0 2.3 3.0 3.1 3.0
Tonga 0.8 6.8 3.4 0.9 –0.2 1.3 –1.3 0.0 2.0 1.8 2.4 1.2
Tuvalu 2.5 4.8 3.3 1.4 13.9 –3.3 0.2 0.4 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.0
Vanuatu 2.9 4.7 6.3 2.9 3.2 –5.0 –1.6 1.9 2.2 0.9 1.5 2.0
Vietnam 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.5 7.4 2.9 2.6 8.1 5.0 6.1 6.1 5.6
Emerging and Developing Europe 3.1 1.7 4.2 3.6 2.5 –1.8 7.1 0.6 3.3 3.2 2.2 2.5
Albania 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.0 2.1 –3.3 8.9 4.9 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.5
Belarus 4.2 –2.5 2.5 3.1 1.4 –0.7 2.4 –4.7 3.9 3.6 2.3 0.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.5 3.2 3.2 3.8 2.9 –3.0 7.4 4.2 1.7 2.5 3.0 3.0
Bulgaria 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.7 4.0 –4.0 7.7 3.9 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.6
Hungary 1.0 2.2 4.3 5.4 4.9 –4.5 7.1 4.6 –0.9 1.5 2.9 3.2
Kosovo 4.6 5.6 4.8 3.4 4.8 –5.3 10.7 4.3 3.3 3.8 4.0 3.8
Moldova 3.5 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.6 –8.3 13.9 –5.0 0.7 2.6 3.7 5.0
Montenegro 2.8 2.9 4.7 5.1 4.1 –15.3 13.0 6.4 6.0 3.7 3.7 3.0
North Macedonia 3.2 2.8 1.1 2.9 3.9 –4.7 4.5 2.2 1.0 2.2 3.6 3.5
Poland 3.9 3.0 5.1 5.9 4.4 –2.0 6.9 5.6 0.2 3.0 3.5 2.9
Romania 2.8 2.9 8.2 6.0 3.9 –3.7 5.7 4.1 2.1 1.9 3.3 3.5
Russia 2.6 0.2 1.8 2.8 2.2 –2.7 5.9 –1.2 3.6 3.6 1.3 1.2
Serbia 1.9 3.3 2.1 4.5 4.3 –0.9 7.7 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.1 4.0
Türkiye 5.1 3.3 7.5 3.0 0.8 1.9 11.4 5.5 5.1 3.0 2.7 3.9
Ukraine1 –0.6 2.4 2.4 3.5 3.2 –3.8 3.4 –28.8 5.3 3.0 2.5 4.2
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.0 –0.8 1.4 1.1 0.2 –6.9 7.4 4.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.6
Antigua and Barbuda 0.4 4.1 2.5 7.0 3.1 –18.9 8.2 9.5 4.2 5.8 3.5 2.8
Argentina 3.2 –2.1 2.8 –2.6 –2.0 –9.9 10.4 5.3 –1.6 –3.5 5.0 2.4
Aruba –0.3 1.7 7.0 2.4 –2.3 –24.0 27.6 10.5 5.3 5.5 2.0 1.4
The Bahamas 0.2 –1.0 2.8 2.6 –1.4 –21.4 15.4 10.8 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.5
Barbados –0.2 1.8 0.1 –1.2 0.7 –15.1 –0.3 17.8 4.1 3.9 3.0 2.0
Belize 2.2 0.0 –1.8 1.1 4.2 –13.7 17.9 9.8 1.1 5.4 2.5 2.0
Bolivia 5.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.2 –8.7 6.1 3.6 3.1 1.6 2.2 2.3
Brazil 2.8 –3.3 1.3 1.8 1.2 –3.3 4.8 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.2 2.5
Chile 3.9 1.8 1.4 4.0 0.6 –6.1 11.3 2.1 0.2 2.5 2.4 2.3
Colombia 4.6 2.1 1.4 2.6 3.2 –7.2 10.8 7.3 0.6 1.6 2.5 3.0

Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP (continued)
Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Latin America and the
Caribbean (continued) 3.0 –0.8 1.4 1.1 0.2 –6.9 7.4 4.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.6
Costa Rica 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.6 2.4 –4.3 7.9 4.6 5.1 4.0 3.5 3.5
Dominica 1.7 2.8 –6.6 3.5 5.5 –16.6 6.9 5.6 4.7 4.6 4.2 2.4
Dominican Republic 5.3 6.7 4.7 7.0 5.1 –6.7 12.3 4.9 2.4 5.1 5.0 5.0
Ecuador 4.3 –0.7 6.0 1.0 0.2 –9.2 9.8 6.2 2.4 0.3 1.2 2.5
El Salvador 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.4 –7.9 11.9 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.8
Grenada 1.1 3.7 4.4 4.4 0.7 –13.8 4.7 7.3 4.7 3.0 3.9 2.7
Guatemala 3.8 2.7 3.1 3.4 4.0 –1.8 8.0 4.2 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8
Guyana 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.4 5.4 43.5 20.1 62.3 33.0 43.8 14.4 11.9
Haiti 2.3 1.8 2.5 1.7 –1.7 –3.3 –1.8 –1.7 –1.9 –4.0 1.0 1.5
Honduras 3.6 3.9 4.8 3.8 2.6 –9.0 12.6 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.8
Jamaica 0.1 1.5 0.7 1.8 1.0 –9.9 4.6 5.2 2.6 1.3 2.1 1.6
Mexico 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 –0.4 –8.4 6.0 3.7 3.2 1.5 1.3 2.1
Nicaragua 4.0 4.6 4.6 –3.4 –2.9 –1.8 10.3 3.8 4.6 4.0 3.8 3.5
Panama 7.6 5.0 5.6 3.7 3.3 –17.7 15.8 10.8 7.3 2.5 3.0 4.0
Paraguay 4.7 4.3 4.8 3.2 –0.4 –0.8 4.0 0.2 4.7 3.8 3.8 3.5
Peru 5.8 4.0 2.5 4.0 2.2 –10.9 13.4 2.7 –0.6 3.0 2.6 2.3
St. Kitts and Nevis 2.6 3.9 0.0 2.1 4.1 –14.6 –1.7 10.5 2.3 4.4 4.3 2.9
St. Lucia 1.5 3.8 3.4 2.9 –0.7 –24.4 11.6 20.4 2.2 3.9 2.6 1.5
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.1 4.1 1.5 3.2 0.7 –4.3 2.1 3.1 5.8 4.5 4.0 2.7
Suriname 3.1 –4.9 1.6 4.9 1.2 –16.0 –2.4 2.4 2.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
Trinidad and Tobago 3.1 –7.5 –4.8 –0.6 0.4 –9.1 –1.0 1.5 1.1 1.6 2.4 2.8
Uruguay1 4.7 1.7 1.7 0.2 0.9 –7.4 5.6 4.7 0.4 3.2 3.0 2.2
Venezuela1 1.9 –17.0 –15.7 –19.7 –27.7 –30.0 1.0 8.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 ...
Middle East and Central Asia 4.2 4.3 2.6 2.7 1.9 –2.2 4.4 5.5 2.1 2.4 3.9 3.8
Afghanistan1 8.0 2.2 2.6 1.2 3.9 –2.4 –14.5 –6.2 2.7 ... ... ...
Algeria 3.0 3.9 1.5 1.4 0.9 –5.0 3.8 3.6 4.1 3.8 3.0 2.1
Armenia 4.1 0.2 7.5 5.2 7.6 –7.1 5.8 12.6 8.3 6.0 4.9 4.5
Azerbaijan 9.2 –3.1 0.2 1.5 2.5 –4.2 5.6 4.7 1.1 3.2 2.5 2.4
Bahrain 4.6 3.8 5.0 2.1 2.1 –5.9 4.4 6.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.9
Djibouti 5.3 7.1 5.5 4.8 5.5 1.3 4.5 3.9 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5
Egypt 4.5 4.3 4.2 5.3 5.5 3.6 3.3 6.7 3.8 2.7 4.1 5.7
Georgia 5.4 3.4 5.2 6.1 5.4 –6.3 10.6 11.0 7.5 7.6 6.0 5.0
Iran 2.1 8.8 2.8 –1.8 –3.1 3.3 4.7 3.8 5.0 3.7 3.1 2.0
Iraq 5.7 16.2 –1.5 2.6 5.6 –12.4 1.4 7.7 –2.9 0.1 4.1 4.2
Jordan 4.5 2.0 2.5 1.9 1.8 –1.1 3.7 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.9 3.0
Kazakhstan 5.5 0.9 3.9 4.1 4.5 –2.6 4.1 3.3 5.1 3.5 4.6 3.0
Kuwait 2.4 2.9 –4.7 2.7 2.3 –4.8 2.3 5.9 –3.6 –2.7 3.3 2.6
Kyrgyz Republic 4.6 4.3 4.7 3.5 4.6 –7.1 5.5 9.0 6.2 6.5 5.0 4.1
Lebanon1 4.8 1.6 0.9 –1.9 –6.8 –24.6 2.0 1.0 –0.7 ... ... ...
Libya –4.7 –1.5 32.5 7.9 –11.2 –29.5 28.3 –8.3 10.2 2.4 13.7 2.3
Mauritania 4.0 1.3 6.3 4.8 3.1 –0.4 0.7 6.8 6.5 4.4 4.2 4.5
Morocco 4.4 0.5 5.1 3.1 2.9 –7.2 8.2 1.5 3.4 2.8 3.6 3.4
Oman 5.0 5.0 0.3 1.3 –1.1 –3.4 2.6 9.6 1.3 1.0 3.1 3.6
Pakistan 3.6 4.1 4.6 6.1 3.1 –0.9 5.8 6.2 –0.2 2.4 3.2 4.5
Qatar 12.4 3.1 –1.5 1.2 0.7 –3.6 1.6 4.2 1.2 1.5 1.9 1.6
Saudi Arabia 4.3 1.9 0.9 3.2 1.1 –3.6 5.1 7.5 –0.8 1.5 4.6 3.5
Somalia ... –1.3 9.5 1.4 2.8 –2.8 3.5 2.7 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.5
Sudan1 0.6 4.7 0.8 –2.3 –2.5 –3.6 0.5 –2.5 –18.3 –20.3 8.3 4.5
Syria1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tajikistan 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.6 7.4 4.4 9.4 8.0 8.3 6.8 4.5 4.5
Tunisia 3.1 1.1 2.3 2.6 1.6 –9.0 4.7 2.7 0.0 1.6 1.6 1.2
Turkmenistan1 8.1 –0.5 2.1 1.7 –3.7 –2.1 –0.3 5.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
United Arab Emirates 4.0 5.6 0.7 1.3 1.1 –5.0 4.4 7.5 3.6 4.0 5.1 4.3
Uzbekistan 7.7 5.9 4.4 5.6 6.8 1.6 8.0 6.0 6.3 5.6 5.7 5.7
West Bank and Gaza1 4.8 8.9 1.4 1.2 1.4 –11.3 7.0 4.1 –5.4 ... ... ...
Yemen –1.8 –9.4 –5.1 0.8 2.1 –8.5 –1.0 1.5 –2.0 –1.0 1.5 5.5

Table A4. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Real GDP (continued)
Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.2 1.5 3.0 3.3 3.2 –1.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.4
Angola 6.5 –1.7 –0.1 –0.6 –0.2 –4.0 2.1 4.2 1.0 2.4 2.8 3.4
Benin 4.2 3.3 5.7 6.7 6.9 3.8 7.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.0
Botswana 2.7 7.2 4.1 4.2 3.0 –8.7 11.9 5.5 2.7 1.0 5.2 4.0
Burkina Faso 5.5 6.0 6.2 6.6 5.5 1.9 6.9 1.8 3.1 5.5 5.8 5.0
Burundi 3.6 –0.6 0.5 1.6 1.8 0.3 3.1 1.8 2.7 2.2 3.5 5.0
Cabo Verde 3.8 4.3 4.6 3.7 6.9 –20.8 7.0 17.4 5.1 4.7 4.7 4.5
Cameroon 4.0 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.4 0.5 3.0 3.7 3.2 3.9 4.2 4.8
Central African Republic –1.3 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.4 2.9 3.5
Chad 4.4 –6.3 –2.0 5.9 6.6 –2.1 –0.9 3.6 4.9 3.2 3.8 3.1
Comoros 2.5 3.3 3.8 3.6 1.8 –0.2 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.8
Democratic Republic of the Congo 6.9 0.4 3.7 4.8 4.5 1.7 5.9 8.8 8.4 4.7 5.0 4.3
Republic of Congo 4.2 –5.0 –5.6 –2.3 1.1 –6.3 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.8 3.7 3.8
Côte d’Ivoire 4.3 7.2 7.4 4.8 6.7 0.7 7.1 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.2
Equatorial Guinea 3.0 –8.8 –5.7 –6.2 –5.5 –4.8 0.9 3.7 –6.2 5.8 –4.8 2.9
Eritrea1 1.8 7.4 –10.0 13.0 3.8 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eswatini 3.1 1.1 2.0 2.4 2.7 –1.6 10.7 0.5 4.9 4.6 4.2 2.6
Ethiopia 10.6 8.0 10.2 7.7 9.0 6.1 6.3 6.4 7.2 6.1 6.5 7.8
Gabon 3.6 2.1 0.5 0.9 3.8 –1.8 1.5 3.0 2.4 3.1 2.6 2.6
The Gambia 2.3 1.9 4.8 7.2 6.2 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.0
Ghana 6.6 3.4 8.1 6.2 6.5 0.5 5.1 3.8 2.9 3.1 4.4 5.0
Guinea 3.9 10.8 10.3 6.4 5.6 4.7 5.6 4.0 5.7 4.1 5.7 5.6
Guinea-Bissau 3.4 5.3 4.8 3.8 4.5 1.5 6.2 4.6 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.5
Kenya 4.8 4.2 3.8 5.7 5.1 –0.3 7.6 4.9 5.6 5.0 5.0 5.0
Lesotho 3.5 1.9 –2.7 –1.5 –2.9 –5.3 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.8 2.3 2.1
Liberia 6.4 –1.6 2.5 1.2 –2.5 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.1 5.8 6.0
Madagascar 2.7 4.0 3.9 3.2 4.4 –7.1 5.7 4.0 3.8 4.5 4.6 5.0
Malawi 5.7 2.3 4.0 4.4 5.4 1.0 4.6 0.9 1.5 1.8 4.0 4.6
Mali 4.1 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.8 –1.2 3.1 3.5 4.4 3.8 4.4 4.9
Mauritius 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.0 2.9 –14.5 3.4 8.9 7.0 6.1 4.0 4.0
Mozambique 7.4 4.7 2.6 3.5 2.3 –1.2 2.4 4.4 5.4 4.3 4.3 10.0
Namibia 4.3 0.0 –1.0 1.1 –0.8 –8.1 3.6 5.3 4.2 3.1 4.2 2.6
Niger 5.6 5.7 5.0 7.0 6.1 3.5 1.4 11.9 2.4 9.9 7.3 6.0
Nigeria 6.4 –1.6 0.8 1.9 2.2 –1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.3
Rwanda 7.8 6.0 3.9 8.5 9.4 –3.4 10.9 8.2 8.2 7.0 6.5 7.3
São Tomé and Príncipe 4.2 5.2 4.1 4.4 2.0 2.6 1.9 0.2 0.4 1.1 3.3 3.5
Senegal 3.5 6.4 7.4 6.2 4.6 1.3 6.5 4.0 4.6 6.0 9.3 4.1
Seychelles 5.2 12.1 7.0 4.9 5.5 –11.7 0.6 15.0 3.2 3.1 3.9 3.5
Sierra Leone 4.2 4.7 3.9 3.4 5.5 –1.3 5.9 5.3 5.7 4.0 4.5 4.6
South Africa 2.6 0.7 1.2 1.6 0.3 –6.2 5.0 1.9 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.5
South Sudan ... –13.3 –5.8 –2.1 0.9 –6.5 5.3 –5.2 2.5 –26.4 27.2 4.9
Tanzania 6.3 6.9 6.7 7.0 6.9 4.5 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.4 6.0 6.5
Togo 4.8 5.7 4.0 4.8 4.9 2.0 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.5
Uganda 6.9 0.2 6.8 5.6 7.6 –1.1 5.5 6.3 4.6 5.9 7.5 5.9
Zambia 6.9 3.8 3.5 4.0 1.4 –2.8 6.2 5.2 5.4 2.3 6.6 4.9
Zimbabwe1 3.6 0.8 5.2 5.0 –6.3 –7.8 8.5 6.1 5.3 2.0 6.0 3.5
1 See the country-specific notes for Afghanistan, Eritrea, India, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, West Bank and Gaza, and Zimbabwe
in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Table A5. Summary of Inflation

(Percent)
Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
GDP Deflators
United States 1.8 1.0 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.3 4.6 7.1 3.6 2.4 1.8 1.8
Euro Area 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.2 5.1 5.8 2.8 2.3 2.0
Japan –0.4 0.4 –0.1 0.0 0.6 0.9 –0.2 0.4 3.8 2.6 2.1 1.9
Consumer Prices
United States 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.4 1.8 1.2 4.7 8.0 4.1 3.0 1.9 2.1
Euro Area2 1.7 0.2 1.5 1.8 1.2 0.3 2.6 8.4 5.4 2.4 2.0 2.0
Japan 0.3 –0.1 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 –0.2 2.5 3.3 2.2 2.0 2.0
Emerging Market and Developing 6.0 4.3 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.8 9.6 8.1 7.9 5.9 4.0
Economies3
Regional Groups
Emerging and Developing Asia 4.7 2.8 2.4 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.3 3.9 2.4 2.1 2.7 2.8
Emerging and Developing Europe 8.1 5.6 5.6 6.3 6.5 5.1 9.0 25.2 17.1 16.9 11.1 6.2
Latin America and the Caribbean3 4.8 5.4 6.3 6.7 7.6 6.5 9.9 14.2 14.8 16.8 8.5 3.6
Middle East and Central Asia 8.4 5.3 7.0 9.6 7.4 10.3 11.9 13.4 15.6 14.6 10.7 6.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.1 10.0 10.6 8.4 8.7 11.2 11.6 15.2 17.6 18.1 12.3 7.6
Analytical Groups
Fuel 8.1 7.1 6.3 8.3 6.5 9.4 11.6 13.5 12.5 11.9 10.5 7.7
Nonfuel 5.7 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.9 4.7 5.2 9.2 7.6 7.5 5.4 3.6
Of which, Primary Products4 6.7 6.4 11.6 14.2 17.9 20.5 22.7 29.1 38.1 48.8 19.8 5.6
Net Debtor Economies 6.9 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.7 6.3 7.6 12.9 11.8 10.6 7.6 4.8
during 2019–23 10.5 10.2 15.1 14.3 11.9 14.1 15.8 20.8 23.4 24.3 15.7 6.2
Other Groups
European Union 1.8 0.1 1.6 1.9 1.4 0.7 2.9 9.3 6.3 2.6 2.3 2.1
Middle East and North Africa 8.2 5.0 7.0 10.6 7.7 10.9 12.9 13.6 15.0 14.8 11.6 6.5
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 5.8 3.9 4.0 4.6 4.8 4.6 5.2 9.1 7.4 7.2 5.3 3.7
Low-Income Developing Countries 9.0 8.9 10.0 9.7 9.5 13.4 14.3 16.0 17.4 18.1 13.3 7.2
Memorandum
Median Inflation Rate
Emerging Market and Developing Economies3 4.9 2.7 3.3 3.1 2.6 2.7 3.9 7.9 5.9 4.1 3.8 3.0
1 Excludes the United States, euro area countries, and Japan.
2 Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.
3 Excludes Venezuela but includes Argentina from 2017 onward. See the country-specific notes for Argentina and Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.
4 Includes Argentina from 2017 onward. See the country-specific note for Argentina in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Table A6. Advanced Economies: Consumer Prices1

End of Period2
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029 2023 2024 2025
Advanced Economies 1.7 0.7 1.7 2.0 1.4 0.7 3.1 7.3 4.6 2.6 2.0 2.0 3.1 2.2 2.0
United States 2.0 1.3 2.1 2.4 1.8 1.2 4.7 8.0 4.1 3.0 1.9 2.1 3.2 2.3 1.9
Euro Area3 1.7 0.2 1.5 1.8 1.2 0.3 2.6 8.4 5.4 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 2.0 2.0
Germany 1.6 0.4 1.7 1.9 1.4 0.4 3.2 8.7 6.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.1
France 1.5 0.3 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.5 2.1 5.9 5.7 2.3 1.6 1.8 4.1 1.5 1.8
Italy 1.8 –0.1 1.3 1.2 0.6 –0.1 1.9 8.7 5.9 1.3 2.1 2.0 0.5 2.1 1.8
Spain 1.8 –0.3 2.0 1.7 0.8 –0.3 3.0 8.3 3.4 2.8 1.9 2.0 3.3 1.9 1.8
The Netherlands 1.6 0.1 1.3 1.6 2.7 1.1 2.8 11.6 4.1 3.2 2.3 2.0 1.0 3.3 1.8
Belgium 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.2 0.4 3.2 10.3 2.3 4.3 2.1 1.9 0.5 2.7 2.1
Ireland 0.9 –0.2 0.3 0.7 0.9 –0.4 2.4 8.0 5.2 1.7 1.8 2.0 3.2 1.5 1.4
Austria 2.0 1.0 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.4 2.8 8.6 7.7 3.0 2.5 2.1 5.7 1.9 2.6
Portugal 1.6 0.6 1.6 1.2 0.3 –0.1 0.9 8.1 5.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.0
Greece 1.7 0.0 1.1 0.8 0.5 –1.3 0.6 9.3 4.2 2.9 2.1 2.0 3.7 2.8 2.0
Finland 2.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.4 2.1 7.2 4.3 1.2 1.9 2.0 1.3 2.1 1.7
Slovak Republic 2.0 –0.5 1.4 2.5 2.8 2.0 2.8 12.1 11.0 2.8 5.1 2.0 6.6 2.4 4.8
Croatia 2.3 –0.6 1.3 1.6 0.8 0.0 2.7 10.7 8.4 4.0 2.8 2.2 5.4 3.3 2.2
Lithuania 3.4 0.7 3.7 2.5 2.2 1.1 4.6 18.9 8.7 0.9 2.4 2.4 0.6 1.9 2.4
Slovenia 2.0 –0.1 1.4 1.7 1.6 –0.1 1.9 8.8 7.4 2.0 2.7 2.1 4.2 1.7 2.7
Luxembourg 2.1 0.0 2.1 2.0 1.7 0.0 3.5 8.2 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.1 3.2 1.9 2.7
Latvia 4.0 0.1 2.9 2.6 2.7 0.1 3.2 17.2 9.1 1.4 2.2 2.2 0.9 2.9 1.6
Estonia 3.7 0.8 3.7 3.4 2.3 –0.6 4.5 19.4 9.1 3.4 2.0 2.2 4.3 2.5 2.0
Cyprus 1.7 –1.2 0.7 0.8 0.5 –1.1 2.2 8.1 3.9 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Malta 2.0 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.5 0.8 0.7 6.1 5.6 2.7 2.5 2.0 3.7 2.6 2.2
Japan 0.3 –0.1 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 –0.2 2.5 3.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.9 1.8 1.8
United Kingdom 2.5 0.7 2.7 2.5 1.8 0.9 2.6 9.1 7.3 2.6 2.1 2.0 4.0 2.5 2.0
Korea 2.5 1.0 1.9 1.5 0.4 0.5 2.5 5.1 3.6 2.5 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.1 2.0
Canada 1.7 1.4 1.6 2.3 1.9 0.7 3.4 6.8 3.9 2.4 1.9 2.0 3.2 2.0 1.9
Australia 2.6 1.3 2.0 1.9 1.6 0.9 2.8 6.6 5.6 3.3 3.3 2.5 4.0 3.0 3.6
Taiwan Province of China 1.1 1.4 0.6 1.4 0.6 –0.2 2.0 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.5 2.7 2.3 1.9
Singapore 2.6 –0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 –0.2 2.3 6.1 4.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 3.7 2.2 2.1
Switzerland 0.3 –0.4 0.5 0.9 0.4 –0.7 0.6 2.8 2.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.0
Sweden 1.4 1.1 1.9 2.0 1.7 0.7 2.7 8.1 5.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 3.0 1.6 2.0
Czech Republic 2.1 0.7 2.5 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.8 15.1 10.7 2.3 2.0 2.0 6.9 2.5 1.9
Norway 2.0 3.6 1.9 2.8 2.2 1.3 3.5 5.8 5.5 3.3 2.4 2.0 4.8 2.7 2.2
Hong Kong SAR 3.2 2.4 1.5 2.4 2.9 0.3 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4
Israel4 2.0 –0.5 0.2 0.8 0.8 –0.6 1.5 4.4 4.2 3.1 3.0 2.1 3.0 3.4 2.6
Denmark 1.6 0.0 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.3 1.9 8.5 3.4 1.8 2.2 2.0 0.5 2.3 2.0
New Zealand 2.2 0.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 3.9 7.2 5.7 2.7 2.2 2.0 4.7 1.9 2.2
Puerto Rico 2.2 –0.3 1.8 1.3 0.1 –0.5 2.4 6.0 3.5 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.2 1.6
Macao SAR 5.1 2.4 1.2 3.0 2.8 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 2.0 2.2 1.4 1.5 2.0
Iceland 5.8 1.7 1.8 2.7 3.0 2.8 4.5 8.3 8.7 6.0 3.3 2.5 7.8 5.2 2.6
Andorra 1.4 –0.4 2.6 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.7 6.2 5.6 3.6 2.5 1.7 4.6 3.2 2.0
San Marino 2.1 0.6 1.0 1.2 0.5 –0.1 2.1 5.3 5.9 1.3 2.0 2.0 5.9 1.3 2.0
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies 1.7 0.8 1.8 2.1 1.5 0.8 3.3 7.3 4.7 2.6 1.9 2.1 3.1 2.1 1.9
1 Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.
2 Monthly year-over-year changes and, for several countries, on a quarterly basis.
3 Based on Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices.

Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1

End of Period2
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029 2023 2024 2025
Emerging and Developing Asia 4.7 2.8 2.4 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.3 3.9 2.4 2.1 2.7 2.8 1.8 2.4 2.9
Bangladesh 7.6 5.9 5.4 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.6 6.1 9.0 9.7 10.7 5.5 9.7 9.7 9.7
Bhutan 7.1 3.3 4.3 3.7 2.8 3.0 8.2 5.9 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.0 3.9 4.8 4.7
Brunei Darussalam 0.5 –0.3 –1.3 1.0 –0.4 1.9 1.7 3.7 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.0
Cambodia 5.7 3.0 2.9 2.5 1.9 2.9 2.9 5.3 2.1 0.7 2.1 3.0 2.7 2.0 2.1
China 2.9 2.0 1.6 2.1 2.9 2.5 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.4 1.7 2.0 –0.3 1.0 2.0
Fiji 3.8 3.9 3.3 4.1 1.8 –2.6 0.2 4.3 2.3 5.2 3.2 2.8 5.1 4.0 3.1
India 8.0 4.5 3.6 3.4 4.8 6.2 5.5 6.7 5.4 4.4 4.1 4.0 5.0 4.2 4.2
Indonesia 6.7 3.5 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.0 1.6 4.1 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.5
Kiribati 2.0 1.9 0.4 0.6 –1.8 2.6 2.1 5.3 9.3 4.1 3.0 1.8 –2.1 4.6 2.5
Lao P.D.R. 4.8 1.6 0.8 2.0 3.3 5.1 3.8 23.0 31.2 22.0 23.7 31.4 24.4 16.2 37.7
Malaysia 2.6 2.1 3.8 1.0 0.7 –1.1 2.5 3.4 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.8 2.5
Maldives 6.2 0.8 2.3 1.4 1.3 –1.6 0.2 2.6 2.6 1.5 4.5 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.4
Marshall Islands 3.4 –1.5 0.1 0.8 –0.1 –0.7 2.2 2.8 7.4 4.6 3.2 2.5 6.1 4.5 2.0
Micronesia 3.9 –0.9 0.1 1.0 2.2 1.0 1.8 5.0 6.2 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.6 3.0 3.0
Mongolia 10.9 0.8 4.3 6.8 7.3 3.7 7.4 15.2 10.3 6.5 9.0 6.6 7.9 7.5 9.5
Myanmar 10.4 9.1 4.6 5.9 8.6 5.7 3.6 18.4 27.1 22.0 14.2 7.8 25.0 20.0 12.0
Nauru 4.9 8.1 4.5 1.1 4.1 0.9 2.0 1.1 4.8 4.0 4.4 2.4 3.0 5.2 4.0
Nepal 8.7 9.9 4.5 4.1 4.6 6.1 3.6 6.3 7.8 5.6 5.2 5.4 7.4 5.0 5.4
Palau 4.0 –1.3 1.1 2.4 0.4 0.7 –0.5 13.2 12.4 4.0 2.8 2.5 9.0 3.7 1.1
Papua New Guinea 5.1 6.7 5.4 4.4 3.9 4.9 4.5 5.3 2.3 4.4 4.8 4.5 3.9 5.0 4.8
Philippines 3.9 1.2 2.9 5.3 2.4 2.4 3.9 5.8 6.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.9 3.2 2.8
Samoa 3.7 0.1 1.3 3.7 2.2 1.5 –3.0 8.7 12.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 10.7 2.0 2.2
Solomon Islands 6.7 0.5 0.5 3.6 2.2 2.9 0.2 5.4 5.1 2.9 3.0 3.3 4.3 2.8 2.8
Sri Lanka3 8.2 4.0 6.6 4.3 4.3 4.6 6.0 45.2 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 2.5 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.7 –0.8 1.2 6.1 1.2 0.5 1.2 2.0 –0.8 1.1 1.7
Timor-Leste 6.0 –1.5 0.5 2.3 0.9 0.5 3.8 7.0 8.4 3.3 2.2 2.0 8.7 2.8 2.0
Tonga 4.1 –0.6 7.2 6.8 3.3 0.4 1.4 8.5 10.2 4.6 3.2 3.0 7.4 5.4 2.9
Tuvalu 2.3 3.5 4.1 2.2 3.5 1.9 6.2 11.5 7.5 3.9 3.3 3.0 13.6 3.9 3.3
Vanuatu 2.5 0.8 3.1 2.4 2.7 5.3 2.3 6.7 11.2 4.2 2.8 2.0 7.0 3.2 2.3
Vietnam 9.3 2.7 3.5 3.5 2.8 3.2 1.8 3.2 3.3 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.5
Emerging and Developing Europe 8.1 5.6 5.6 6.3 6.5 5.1 9.0 25.2 17.1 16.9 11.1 6.2 17.8 13.8 8.6
Albania 2.5 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.6 2.0 6.7 4.8 2.2 2.4 3.0 3.9 2.1 2.6
Belarus 20.2 11.8 6.0 4.9 5.6 5.5 9.5 15.2 5.0 6.0 6.4 5.3 5.8 6.4 6.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.0 –1.6 0.8 1.4 0.6 –1.1 2.0 14.0 6.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.9 1.6
Bulgaria 3.5 –1.3 1.2 2.6 2.5 1.2 2.8 13.0 8.6 2.8 2.6 2.0 5.0 2.7 2.5
Hungary 3.8 0.4 2.4 2.8 3.4 3.3 5.1 14.6 17.1 3.8 3.5 3.0 5.5 4.1 3.3
Kosovo 2.6 0.2 1.5 1.1 2.7 0.2 3.3 11.6 4.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.9
Moldova 7.6 6.4 6.5 3.6 4.8 3.8 5.1 28.6 13.4 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.2 5.0 5.0
Montenegro 2.9 –0.3 2.4 2.6 0.4 –0.2 2.4 13.0 8.6 4.2 3.7 1.9 4.3 4.1 4.1
North Macedonia 2.4 –0.2 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.2 3.2 14.2 9.4 3.3 2.3 2.0 3.6 3.0 2.0
Poland 2.2 –0.7 2.0 1.8 2.2 3.4 5.1 14.4 11.4 3.9 4.5 2.5 6.2 5.1 3.5
Romania 4.4 –1.6 1.3 4.6 3.8 2.6 5.0 13.8 10.4 5.3 3.6 3.0 6.6 4.2 3.4
Russia 9.4 7.0 3.7 2.9 4.5 3.4 6.7 13.7 5.9 7.9 5.9 4.0 7.4 7.4 4.8
Serbia 7.2 1.1 3.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 4.1 12.0 12.4 4.5 3.6 3.0 7.6 3.9 3.4
Türkiye 8.3 7.8 11.1 16.3 15.2 12.3 19.6 72.3 53.9 60.9 33.0 15.0 64.8 43.0 24.0
Ukraine 13.4 13.9 14.4 10.9 7.9 2.7 9.4 20.2 12.9 5.8 9.0 5.0 5.1 9.0 7.5
Latin America and the Caribbean4 4.8 5.4 6.3 6.7 7.6 6.5 9.9 14.2 14.8 16.8 8.5 3.6 17.2 13.2 6.9
Antigua and Barbuda 2.1 –0.5 2.4 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.6 7.5 5.1 6.0 2.8 2.0 3.3 5.4 2.0
Argentina3 ... ... 25.7 34.3 53.5 42.0 48.4 72.4 133.5 229.8 62.7 8.9 211.4 139.7 45.0
Aruba 2.1 –0.9 –1.0 3.6 3.9 –1.3 0.7 5.5 3.4 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.1
The Bahamas 2.1 –0.3 1.5 2.3 2.5 0.0 2.9 5.6 3.1 1.1 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.2 1.7
Barbados 4.5 1.5 4.4 3.0 1.7 0.6 1.4 4.5 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.0 2.4
Belize 1.6 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 3.2 6.3 4.4 3.3 1.8 1.3 3.7 2.6 1.3
Bolivia 6.2 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.8 0.9 0.7 1.7 2.6 4.3 4.2 3.8 2.1 6.0 4.0
Brazil 5.7 8.7 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.2 8.3 9.3 4.6 4.3 3.6 3.0 4.6 4.3 3.3
Chile 3.6 3.8 2.2 2.3 2.2 3.0 4.5 11.6 7.6 3.9 4.2 3.0 3.9 4.5 3.5
Colombia 4.0 7.5 4.3 3.2 3.5 2.5 3.5 10.2 11.7 6.7 4.5 3.0 9.3 5.7 3.5

Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1 (continued)
End of Period2
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029 2023 2024 2025
Caribbean (continued) 4 4.8 5.4 6.3 6.7 7.6 6.5 9.9 14.2 14.8 16.8 8.5 3.6 17.2 13.2 6.9
Costa Rica 6.7 0.0 1.6 2.2 2.1 0.7 1.7 8.3 0.5 –0.3 2.0 3.0 –1.8 0.9 2.6
Dominica 1.7 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.5 –0.7 1.6 7.7 3.5 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0
Dominican Republic 5.3 1.6 3.3 3.6 1.8 3.8 8.2 8.8 4.8 3.4 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.7 4.0
Ecuador 4.2 1.7 0.4 –0.2 0.3 –0.3 0.1 3.5 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.5 1.3 2.8 1.7
El Salvador 2.5 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.1 –0.4 3.5 7.2 4.0 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.2 2.0 1.8
Grenada 2.3 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 –0.7 1.2 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.8 1.8
Guatemala 5.0 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.2 4.3 6.9 6.2 3.6 4.2 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0
Guyana 4.2 0.8 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.2 3.3 6.5 4.5 2.7 4.5 5.7 2.0 3.5 5.5
Haiti 6.5 11.4 10.6 11.4 17.3 22.9 15.9 27.6 44.1 26.0 20.7 7.4 31.8 29.0 18.7
Honduras 6.0 2.7 3.9 4.3 4.4 3.5 4.5 9.1 6.7 4.6 4.6 4.0 5.2 4.7 4.5
Jamaica 9.7 2.3 4.4 3.7 3.9 5.2 5.9 10.3 6.5 5.8 5.0 5.0 6.9 5.3 5.0
Mexico 4.0 2.8 6.0 4.9 3.6 3.4 5.7 7.9 5.5 4.7 3.8 3.0 4.7 4.5 3.2
Nicaragua 8.1 3.5 3.9 4.9 5.4 3.7 4.9 10.5 8.4 5.0 4.0 4.0 5.6 4.8 4.0
Panama 3.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 –0.4 –1.6 1.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.3 2.0
Paraguay 5.8 4.1 3.6 4.0 2.8 1.8 4.8 9.8 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.0
Peru 3.1 3.6 2.8 1.3 2.1 1.8 4.0 7.9 6.3 2.5 1.9 2.0 3.2 2.4 2.0
St. Kitts and Nevis 2.6 –0.7 0.7 –1.0 –0.3 –1.2 1.2 2.7 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.6 2.3 2.0
St. Lucia 2.6 –3.1 0.1 2.6 0.5 –1.8 2.4 6.4 4.1 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.1 0.6 1.4
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines 2.6 –0.2 2.2 2.3 0.9 –0.6 1.6 5.7 4.6 3.8 2.1 2.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
Suriname 7.3 55.5 22.0 6.9 4.4 34.9 59.1 52.4 51.6 19.1 12.8 5.0 32.6 12.7 11.3
Trinidad and Tobago 7.5 3.1 1.9 1.0 1.0 0.6 2.1 5.8 4.6 1.3 1.9 1.8 0.7 1.8 2.0
Uruguay 7.8 9.6 6.2 7.6 7.9 9.8 7.7 9.1 5.9 4.9 5.4 4.5 5.1 5.4 5.3
Venezuela3 36.3 254.9 438.1 65,374.1 19,906.0 2,355.1 1,588.5 186.5 337.5 59.6 71.7 ... 190.0 60.0 60.1
Middle East and
Central Asia 8.4 5.3 7.0 9.6 7.4 10.3 11.9 13.4 15.6 14.6 10.7 6.3 15.4 12.7 9.3
Afghanistan3 6.4 4.4 5.0 0.6 2.3 5.6 7.8 10.6 –7.7 ... ... ... –9.0 ... ...
Algeria 4.5 6.4 5.6 4.3 2.0 2.4 7.2 9.3 9.3 5.3 5.2 4.4 7.8 5.9 4.1
Armenia 5.0 –1.4 0.9 2.5 1.5 1.2 7.2 8.7 2.0 0.2 3.1 4.0 –0.6 1.0 3.9
Azerbaijan 6.8 12.4 12.9 2.3 2.6 2.8 6.7 13.9 8.8 2.1 4.8 4.0 2.1 4.6 5.0
Bahrain 2.4 2.8 1.4 2.1 1.0 –2.3 –0.6 3.6 0.1 1.4 1.8 2.0 –0.3 1.4 1.8
Djibouti 3.7 2.4 0.6 0.1 3.3 1.8 1.2 5.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.0 3.7 1.4 1.6
Egypt 10.2 10.2 23.5 20.9 13.9 5.7 4.5 8.5 24.4 33.3 21.2 5.3 35.7 27.5 16.0
Georgia 5.1 2.1 6.0 2.6 4.9 5.2 9.6 11.9 2.5 1.1 2.6 3.0 0.4 1.3 3.0
Iran 18.9 6.8 8.2 26.9 34.8 36.5 40.2 45.8 40.7 31.7 29.5 25.0 32.2 30.0 28.0
Iraq 9.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 –0.2 0.6 6.0 5.0 4.4 3.2 3.5 3.0 4.0 3.7 3.5
Jordan 4.4 –0.8 3.3 4.5 0.8 0.3 1.3 4.2 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.4
Kazakhstan 8.3 14.6 7.4 6.0 5.2 6.8 8.0 15.0 14.6 8.6 7.2 5.0 9.8 8.0 6.6
Kuwait ... 2.9 1.6 0.6 1.1 2.1 3.4 4.0 3.6 3.0 2.4 1.7 3.4 2.9 2.3
Kyrgyz Republic 9.4 0.4 3.2 1.5 1.1 6.3 11.9 13.9 10.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 7.3 5.0 5.0
Lebanon3 3.8 –0.8 4.5 6.1 2.9 84.9 154.8 171.2 221.3 ... ... ... 192.3 ... ...
Libya 5.9 25.9 25.8 14.0 –2.9 1.5 2.9 4.5 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.3
Mauritania 4.8 1.5 2.3 3.1 2.3 2.4 3.6 9.6 4.9 2.7 4.0 4.0 1.6 4.0 4.0
Morocco 1.6 1.5 0.8 1.6 0.2 0.7 1.4 6.6 6.1 1.7 2.3 2.0 3.4 2.2 2.1
Oman 3.8 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.5 –0.4 1.7 2.5 0.9 1.3 1.5 2.0 0.6 1.0 1.5
Pakistan 10.2 2.9 4.8 4.7 6.8 10.7 8.9 12.2 29.2 23.4 9.5 6.5 29.4 12.6 10.6
Qatar 4.3 2.7 0.6 0.1 –0.9 –2.5 2.3 5.0 3.1 1.0 1.4 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.4
Saudi Arabia 3.4 2.1 –0.8 2.5 –2.1 3.4 3.1 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 0.4 1.7 1.9
Somalia ... 0.0 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.1 4.6 6.8 6.2 5.0 4.2 3.0 6.6 4.5 3.9
Sudan3 20.0 17.8 32.4 63.3 51.0 163.3 359.1 138.8 77.2 200.1 118.9 8.4 113.3 242.2 50.9
Syria3 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tajikistan 9.1 5.9 7.3 3.8 7.8 8.6 9.0 6.6 3.7 4.5 5.9 6.5 3.8 5.3 6.5
Tunisia 4.3 3.6 5.3 7.3 6.7 5.6 5.7 8.3 9.3 7.1 6.7 9.1 8.1 6.7 6.4
Turkmenistan 6.1 3.6 8.0 13.3 5.1 6.1 19.5 11.2 –1.6 6.3 8.0 8.0 1.4 8.1 8.0
United Arab Emirates 3.7 1.6 2.0 3.1 –1.9 –2.1 –0.1 4.8 1.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.6 2.3 2.1
Uzbekistan 11.5 8.8 13.9 17.5 14.5 12.9 10.8 11.4 10.0 10.0 9.4 5.0 8.8 10.4 7.9
West Bank and Gaza3 3.2 –0.2 0.2 –0.2 1.6 –0.7 1.2 3.7 5.9 ... ... ... 15.2 ... ...
Yemen 12.2 21.3 30.4 33.6 15.7 21.7 31.5 29.5 0.9 16.3 20.7 10.0 –1.5 28.0 15.0

Table A7. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Consumer Prices1 (continued)
End of Period2
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029 2023 2024 2025
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.1 10.0 10.6 8.4 8.7 11.2 11.6 15.2 17.6 18.1 12.3 7.6 18.1 16.3 9.8
Angola 11.5 30.7 29.8 19.6 17.1 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.6 28.4 21.3 10.0 20.0 28.0 18.9
Benin 2.6 –0.8 1.8 0.8 –0.9 3.0 1.7 1.4 2.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.4 2.0 2.0
Botswana 7.5 2.8 3.3 3.2 2.7 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.1 3.8 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.4 4.5
Burkina Faso 2.1 0.4 1.5 2.0 –3.2 1.9 3.9 14.1 0.7 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.6 2.0
Burundi 9.7 5.5 16.6 –2.8 –0.7 7.3 8.3 18.9 27.0 20.0 25.0 8.0 20.1 20.4 28.7
Cabo Verde 2.7 –1.4 0.8 1.3 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.0
Cameroon 2.8 0.9 0.6 1.1 2.5 2.5 2.3 6.3 7.4 4.4 3.5 2.5 5.9 3.7 3.4
Central African Republic 5.1 4.9 4.2 1.6 2.8 0.9 4.3 5.6 3.0 4.7 4.6 3.0 2.3 5.0 4.2
Chad 2.6 –1.6 –0.9 4.0 –1.0 4.5 –0.8 5.8 4.1 4.9 3.7 3.0 4.2 4.3 3.2
Comoros 3.1 0.8 0.1 1.7 3.7 0.8 0.0 12.4 8.5 4.0 1.5 1.9 –2.0 3.5 3.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo 12.8 3.2 35.7 29.3 4.7 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.9 17.8 9.2 7.0 23.8 13.0 7.0
Republic of Congo 3.3 3.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.0 5.6 4.0 3.6
Côte d’Ivoire 1.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 2.5
Equatorial Guinea 4.0 1.4 0.7 1.3 1.2 4.8 –0.1 4.9 2.5 4.0 2.8 2.1 3.9 3.6 2.2
Eritrea3 13.4 –5.6 –13.3 –14.4 1.3 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eswatini 6.9 7.8 6.2 4.8 2.6 3.9 3.7 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.2 4.3 4.8 4.7
Ethiopia 16.8 6.6 10.7 13.8 15.8 20.4 26.8 33.9 30.2 23.9 23.3 13.3 28.7 25.3 15.0
Gabon 1.5 2.1 2.7 4.8 2.0 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.6 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2
The Gambia 4.9 7.2 8.0 6.5 7.1 5.9 7.4 11.5 17.0 14.4 9.8 5.0 17.3 11.5 8.1
Ghana 11.7 17.5 12.4 9.8 7.2 9.9 10.0 31.9 39.2 19.5 11.5 8.0 23.2 15.0 8.0
Guinea 16.0 8.2 8.9 9.8 9.5 10.6 12.6 10.5 7.8 11.0 10.2 8.1 9.3 11.5 10.8
Guinea-Bissau 2.4 2.7 –0.2 0.4 0.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.2 4.2 2.0 2.0 3.1 6.0 2.0
Kenya 8.2 6.3 8.0 4.7 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 5.1 5.2 5.0 6.6 4.5 5.3
Lesotho 6.0 6.6 4.4 4.8 5.2 5.0 6.0 8.3 6.3 6.7 6.1 5.0 7.4 6.0 5.6
Liberia 9.3 8.8 12.4 23.5 27.0 17.0 7.8 7.6 10.1 7.7 6.0 4.8 10.0 6.6 5.7
Madagascar 8.3 6.1 8.6 8.6 5.6 4.2 5.8 8.2 9.9 7.4 7.1 6.0 7.5 8.3 7.4
Malawi 14.7 21.7 11.5 9.2 9.4 8.6 9.3 20.8 28.8 30.6 15.3 6.5 34.5 21.9 10.1
Mali 2.5 –1.8 2.4 1.9 –3.0 0.5 3.8 9.7 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.0 –0.5 2.5 2.0
Mauritius 5.1 1.0 3.7 3.2 0.5 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.8 3.5
Mozambique 7.8 18.4 15.8 3.2 5.7 0.9 6.6 10.4 7.0 3.5 4.3 5.5 4.3 3.6 5.0
Namibia 6.1 6.7 6.1 4.3 3.7 2.2 3.6 6.1 5.9 4.6 4.5 4.5 5.3 3.9 4.5
Niger 1.8 0.2 0.2 2.8 –2.5 2.9 3.8 4.2 3.7 7.8 3.6 2.0 7.2 5.0 4.7
Nigeria 10.0 15.7 16.5 12.1 11.4 13.2 17.0 18.8 24.7 32.5 25.0 14.0 28.9 29.0 21.0
Rwanda 6.6 5.7 4.8 1.4 2.4 7.7 0.8 13.9 14.0 4.9 5.1 5.0 6.4 5.0 5.0
São Tomé and Príncipe 14.8 5.4 5.7 7.9 7.7 9.8 8.1 18.0 21.2 17.1 10.8 5.0 17.1 15.7 10.0
Senegal 1.8 1.2 1.1 0.5 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 5.9 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.8 8.0 –13.4
Seychelles 8.2 –1.0 2.9 3.7 1.8 1.2 9.8 2.6 –1.0 0.8 2.5 3.3 –2.7 1.4 2.8
Sierra Leone 8.0 10.9 18.2 16.0 14.8 13.4 11.9 27.2 47.7 36.6 18.0 7.5 52.2 21.0 14.9
South Africa 6.1 6.3 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.9 4.7 4.5 4.5 5.5 3.9 4.5
South Sudan ... 346.1 213.0 83.4 49.3 24.0 30.2 –3.2 40.2 120.6 79.3 8.0 70.3 216.4 17.6
Tanzania 9.2 5.2 5.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.4 3.8 3.2 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.7 4.0
Togo 2.3 0.9 –0.2 0.9 0.7 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.3 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.2 1.8
Uganda 8.7 5.2 5.6 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.2 7.2 5.4 3.5 4.4 5.0 2.6 3.5 5.1
Zambia 9.4 17.9 6.6 7.5 9.2 15.7 22.0 11.0 10.9 14.6 12.1 7.0 13.1 15.0 7.9
Zimbabwe 0.8 –1.6 0.9 10.6 255.3 557.2 98.5 193.4 667.4 635.3 23.6 5.1 778.8 407.8 9.7
1 Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.
2 Monthly year-over-year changes and, for several countries, on a quarterly basis.
3 See the country-specific notes for Afghanistan, Argentina, Eritrea, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and West Bank and Gaza in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical
Appendix.
4 Excludes Venezuela but includes Argentina from 2017 onward. See the country-specific notes for Argentina and Venezuela in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical Appendix.

Table A8. Major Advanced Economies: General Government Fiscal Balances and Debt1
(Percent of GDP, unless noted otherwise)
Average Projections
2006–15 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Major Advanced Economies
Net Lending/Borrowing –5.2 –3.3 –3.4 –3.4 –3.8 –11.6 –8.6 –3.9 –5.9 –6.2 –5.6 –4.7
Output Gap2 –0.9 –1.0 –0.3 0.3 0.5 –3.2 –0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1
Structural Balance2 –4.6 –3.0 –3.2 –3.3 –3.9 –8.1 –7.7 –5.3 –6.1 –6.0 –5.6 –4.8
United States
Net Lending/Borrowing3 –6.6 –4.4 –4.8 –5.3 –5.8 –13.9 –11.0 –3.9 –7.1 –7.6 –7.3 –6.0
Output Gap2 –1.0 –0.8 –0.5 0.3 0.9 –2.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.1
Net Debt 67.3 81.9 80.1 80.8 82.7 97.8 97.3 93.2 95.7 98.8 101.7 109.2
Gross Debt 90.0 106.6 105.5 106.8 108.0 131.8 124.5 118.6 118.7 121.0 124.1 131.7
Euro Area
Output Gap2 –1.2 –1.8 –0.6 –0.2 0.0 –4.7 –1.7 0.5 –0.1 –0.4 –0.4 0.0
Net Debt 66.4 74.2 72.0 70.3 68.6 78.6 76.7 74.3 73.3 73.9 74.7 76.6
Gross Debt 82.3 89.8 87.5 85.6 83.6 96.6 94.0 89.9 87.8 88.1 88.4 89.0
Germany
Net Lending/Borrowing –0.9 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.3 –4.4 –3.2 –2.1 –2.6 –2.0 –1.7 –0.5
Output Gap2 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.8 0.4 –3.1 –1.1 0.5 –0.4 –1.2 –1.1 0.0
Structural Balance2 –0.6 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.1 –2.9 –2.6 –1.8 –2.4 –1.4 –1.1 –0.5
Net Debt 55.9 48.3 44.6 42.0 39.6 45.1 46.0 46.1 45.1 45.6 45.7 43.3
Gross Debt 72.4 67.6 64.0 60.7 58.6 67.9 67.9 64.8 62.7 62.7 62.1 57.8
France
Output Gap2 –0.9 –2.7 –1.5 –0.8 0.0 –4.5 –2.1 –0.9 –0.9 –0.6 –0.6 –0.1
Net Debt 74.8 89.9 89.5 89.5 89.0 101.6 100.5 101.0 101.7 104.1 107.1 115.9
Gross Debt 82.8 98.1 98.4 98.1 97.6 114.6 112.6 111.1 109.9 112.3 115.3 124.1
Italy
Output Gap2 –3.2 –4.0 –2.7 –2.1 –2.0 –6.5 –3.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4
Net Debt 108.7 121.0 120.8 121.4 121.2 140.8 133.4 126.9 124.1 126.6 128.7 133.4
Gross Debt 119.6 134.1 133.6 134.0 133.6 154.1 145.5 138.1 134.6 136.9 138.7 142.3
Japan
Output Gap2 0.1 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.7 –2.9 –1.6 –0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
Net Debt 125.8 149.5 148.1 151.1 151.7 162.0 156.3 149.8 154.1 155.8 153.9 151.1
Gross Debt4 206.9 232.4 231.3 232.4 236.4 258.4 253.7 256.3 249.7 251.2 248.7 245.0
United Kingdom
Output Gap2 –1.6 –1.3 –0.3 –0.3 0.0 –3.5 0.5 1.9 –0.1 –0.4 –0.4 0.0
Structural Balance2 –4.9 –2.3 –2.1 –2.1 –2.4 0.5 –3.3 –3.1 –4.7 –3.0 –3.4 –3.3
Net Debt 63.2 78.8 77.2 76.6 75.8 93.1 91.7 89.8 91.5 91.6 92.4 96.4
Gross Debt 70.3 87.8 86.7 86.3 85.7 105.8 105.1 99.6 100.0 101.8 103.8 108.3
Canada
Net Lending/Borrowing –1.2 –0.5 –0.1 0.4 0.0 –10.9 –2.9 0.1 –0.6 –2.0 –1.0 –0.6
Output Gap2 0.0 –0.9 0.4 0.6 0.4 –3.4 –1.4 0.8 0.0 –0.5 –0.1 0.1
Structural Balance2 –1.2 0.0 –0.3 0.0 –0.2 –8.2 –1.9 –0.4 –0.6 –1.0 –0.9 –0.7
Net Debt5 24.9 18.0 12.7 11.7 8.7 16.1 14.3 15.6 13.1 14.4 14.6 14.6
Gross Debt 81.0 92.4 90.9 90.8 90.2 118.2 113.5 107.4 107.5 106.1 103.2 96.3
Note: The methodology and specific assumptions for each country are discussed in Box A1. The country group composites for fiscal data are calculated as the sum of the US dollar values for the
relevant individual countries.
1 Debt data refer to the end of the year and are not always comparable across countries. Gross and net debt levels reported by national statistical agencies for countries that have adopted the Sys-
tem of National Accounts 2008 (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, United States) are adjusted to exclude unfunded pension liabilities of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.
2 Percent of potential GDP.
3 Figures reported by the national statistical agency are adjusted to exclude items related to the accrual-basis accounting of government employees’ defined-benefit pension plans.
4 Nonconsolidated basis.
5 Includes equity shares.

Table A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices

2006–15 2016–25 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Trade in Goods and Services
World Trade1
Volume 4.1 2.7 2.2 5.5 4.0 1.2 –8.5 10.8 5.7 0.8 3.1 3.4
Price Deflator
In US Dollars 1.0 1.9 –4.0 4.5 5.5 –2.5 –1.4 12.7 6.8 –2.6 1.1 0.6
In SDRs 1.5 2.4 –3.3 4.8 3.3 –0.1 –2.2 10.2 13.7 –2.4 1.3 –0.2
Volume of Trade
Exports
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 5.2 3.4 2.8 6.3 4.2 0.9 –6.9 13.1 4.6 0.6 4.6 4.6
Imports
Advanced Economies 3.0 2.5 2.5 4.9 3.8 2.0 –8.4 10.1 7.2 –0.7 2.1 2.4
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 6.7 3.1 1.4 7.1 5.1 –0.5 –9.5 12.0 4.2 3.0 4.6 4.9
Terms of Trade
Advanced Economies 0.0 0.2 1.1 –0.3 –0.3 0.2 1.0 1.0 –1.7 0.7 0.1 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.4 0.0 –1.5 1.4 1.1 –1.4 –0.7 0.9 1.5 –0.8 –0.7 0.0
Trade in Goods
World Trade1
Volume 3.9 2.5 2.0 5.6 3.8 0.2 –5.2 11.2 3.2 –0.8 2.6 3.3
Price Deflator
In US Dollars 0.9 1.9 –4.7 5.0 5.8 –3.0 –2.6 14.3 8.6 –4.0 0.8 0.4
In SDRs 1.4 2.3 –4.1 5.3 3.6 –0.6 –3.4 11.7 15.7 –3.8 1.0 –0.3
World Trade Prices in US Dollars2
Manufactures 1.2 1.1 –5.2 0.1 2.1 0.5 –3.2 6.6 10.3 –1.6 1.6 1.2
Oil –0.5 3.6 –15.0 22.5 29.4 –10.4 –32.0 65.8 39.2 –16.4 0.9 –10.4
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 3.4 4.3 –0.3 6.4 1.3 0.7 6.6 26.7 7.9 –5.7 2.9 –0.2
Food 2.6 2.4 1.5 3.8 –1.2 –3.1 1.7 27.0 14.8 –6.8 –5.2 –4.5
Beverages 5.2 6.0 –3.0 –3.8 –9.2 –5.7 2.4 22.4 14.1 4.0 65.5 –8.9
Agricultural Raw Materials 1.6 0.6 –0.2 5.4 2.0 –5.4 –3.4 15.5 5.7 –15.6 3.8 1.6
Metal 2.5 5.7 –5.3 22.2 6.6 3.9 3.5 46.7 –5.6 –2.8 –0.2 –1.9
World Trade Prices in SDRs2
Manufactures 1.7 1.6 –4.6 0.4 –0.1 3.0 –4.0 4.2 17.5 –1.4 1.8 0.5
Oil 0.0 4.1 –14.5 22.8 26.7 –8.2 –32.6 62.1 48.2 –16.2 1.1 –11.1
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 4.0 4.8 0.4 6.7 –0.8 3.2 5.7 23.9 14.9 –5.4 3.1 –0.9
Food 3.1 2.8 2.2 4.1 –3.3 –0.7 0.9 24.1 22.3 –6.5 –5.1 –5.2
Beverages 5.8 6.5 –2.3 –3.5 –11.1 –3.4 1.6 19.7 21.6 4.2 65.9 –9.6
Agricultural Raw Materials 2.1 1.1 0.5 5.7 –0.1 –3.1 –4.2 12.9 12.6 –15.4 4.0 0.9
Metal 3.0 6.2 –4.7 22.5 4.4 6.4 2.6 43.4 0.6 –2.5 0.0 –2.6
World Trade Prices in Euros2
Manufactures 2.4 1.3 –4.9 –1.9 –2.5 6.1 –5.0 2.8 23.8 –4.2 0.9 0.5
Oil 0.7 3.8 –14.8 20.0 23.6 –5.4 –33.3 59.9 56.3 –18.5 0.1 –11.0
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 4.6 4.4 0.0 4.3 –3.2 6.2 4.5 22.2 21.2 –8.1 2.1 –0.9
Food 3.8 2.5 1.8 1.7 –5.6 2.3 –0.2 22.4 29.0 –9.1 –5.9 –5.2
Beverages 6.5 6.1 –2.7 –5.7 –13.2 –0.5 0.5 18.1 28.2 1.3 64.3 –9.6
Agricultural Raw Materials 2.7 0.8 0.1 3.3 –2.5 –0.2 –5.2 11.3 18.8 –17.7 3.1 0.9
Metal 3.6 5.9 –5.0 19.7 1.9 9.6 1.5 41.5 6.0 –5.2 –1.0 –2.6

Table A9. Summary of World Trade Volumes and Prices (continued)

2006–15 2016–25 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Trade in Goods (continued)
Volume of Trade
Exports
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 5.0 3.2 2.6 6.6 3.8 –0.5 –1.4 12.2 0.9 –0.1 4.4 4.4
Fuel Exporters 2.6 0.9 1.1 1.7 –0.1 –3.3 –8.2 4.7 5.0 0.6 1.5 6.8
Nonfuel Exporters 5.6 3.6 2.9 7.5 4.6 0.0 –0.2 13.2 0.3 –0.2 5.0 4.0
Imports
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 6.4 3.2 1.9 7.4 5.0 –0.1 –5.6 11.9 2.3 1.4 3.6 4.5
Fuel Exporters 6.8 0.5 –7.8 –0.7 –3.2 2.8 –12.0 1.2 10.3 8.2 4.2 4.2
Nonfuel Exporters 6.3 3.6 3.6 8.7 6.1 –0.4 –4.7 13.2 1.5 0.7 3.6 4.6
Price Deflators in SDRs
Exports
Advanced Economies 0.8 2.2 –2.1 4.4 2.9 –1.3 –2.1 10.3 12.9 –2.4 1.2 0.0
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 2.8 2.4 –6.9 7.2 5.0 0.3 –5.6 15.2 19.4 –6.1 0.4 –1.1
Fuel Exporters 1.4 3.8 –10.5 16.1 14.8 –4.0 –20.8 38.0 38.1 –11.7 0.2 –5.4
Nonfuel Exporters 3.1 2.2 –6.2 5.6 3.1 1.2 –2.8 12.0 16.5 –5.0 0.4 –0.4
Imports
Advanced Economies 0.8 2.1 –3.4 4.7 3.3 –1.4 –3.3 9.3 15.4 –3.1 1.0 0.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 2.4 2.7 –5.5 5.7 3.8 0.6 –3.0 14.2 16.5 –4.3 1.7 –0.8
Fuel Exporters 2.9 3.5 –3.2 3.5 2.0 3.3 –0.9 11.6 16.1 –0.6 3.7 1.3
Nonfuel Exporters 2.3 2.5 –5.8 6.0 4.1 0.3 –3.3 14.6 16.6 –4.7 1.4 –1.1
Terms of Trade
Advanced Economies –0.1 0.1 1.3 –0.3 –0.4 0.1 1.2 0.9 –2.2 0.8 0.2 –0.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.4 –0.2 –1.6 1.4 1.1 –0.3 –2.7 0.8 2.4 –1.9 –1.3 –0.3
Regional Groups
Emerging and Developing Asia 0.6 –1.3 0.2 –3.4 –2.4 1.2 0.6 –7.0 0.6 –1.7 –2.1 1.5
Emerging and Developing Europe 0.5 0.8 –5.6 3.4 4.3 0.4 –4.3 7.8 3.6 –2.3 1.8 –0.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.5 1.1 0.9 4.5 –0.7 –0.7 2.3 4.8 –3.4 6.9 –1.7 –1.5
Middle East and Central Asia –1.5 0.4 –5.7 10.3 10.7 –5.5 –17.8 20.9 15.6 –9.0 –2.7 –5.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 1.5 –0.9 9.7 3.7 –1.8 0.8 9.2 –0.6 –6.7 2.4 0.8
Analytical Groups
Fuel –1.4 0.2 –7.6 12.1 12.5 –7.1 –20.1 23.7 19.0 –11.2 –3.4 –6.6
Nonfuel 0.8 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –0.9 0.9 0.5 –2.2 –0.1 –0.3 –1.0 0.8
Memorandum
World Exports in Billions of US Dollars
Goods and Services 20,040 27,273 20,838 23,012 25,209 24,819 22,413 28,119 31,552 30,963 32,263 33,542
Goods 15,796 20,611 15,748 17,477 19,132 18,564 17,192 21,846 24,287 23,133 23,922 24,810
Average Oil Price3 –0.5 3.6 –15.0 22.5 29.4 –10.4 –32.0 65.8 39.2 –16.4 0.9 –10.4
In US Dollars a Barrel 83.36 66.83 43.26 52.98 68.53 61.43 41.77 69.25 96.36 80.59 81.29 72.84
Export Unit Value of Manufactures4 1.2 1.1 –5.2 0.1 2.1 0.5 –3.2 6.6 10.3 –1.6 1.6 1.2
Note: SDRs = special drawing rights.
1 Average of annual percent change for world exports and imports.
2 As represented, respectively, by the export unit value index for manufactures of the advanced economies and accounting for approximately 83 percent of the advanced economies’ trade (export
of goods) weights; the average of UK Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices; and the average of world market prices for nonfuel primary commodities weighted by their
2014–16 shares in world commodity imports.
3 Percent change of average of UK Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices.
4 Percent change for manufactures exported by advanced economies.

Table A10. Summary of Current Account Balances

(Billions of US dollars)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Advanced Economies 366.9 466.3 383.5 387.3 135.7 456.8 –236.7 139.0 226.5 251.5 497.3
United States –396.2 –367.6 –439.8 –441.8 –601.2 –868.0 –1,012.1 –905.4 –948.6 –933.9 –746.5
Euro Area 360.2 400.3 389.1 321.5 219.5 367.7 –45.0 248.5 418.8 413.6 453.2
Germany 299.0 289.1 316.2 317.8 253.9 311.8 173.5 278.7 311.7 313.4 310.5
France –13.0 –14.2 –19.4 16.3 –54.3 8.2 –32.8 –30.4 2.9 –3.9 –4.5
Italy 46.4 48.1 52.5 63.8 71.7 45.8 –36.8 –0.3 25.7 35.0 68.3
Spain 39.1 36.9 26.9 29.9 10.2 11.3 5.1 43.0 58.2 58.7 47.3
Japan 197.8 203.5 177.8 176.3 149.9 196.2 90.0 150.0 154.0 158.7 156.8
United Kingdom –147.0 –93.7 –112.9 –76.7 –79.2 –13.7 –65.7 –66.3 –100.0 –105.5 –107.3
Canada –47.2 –46.2 –41.0 –34.1 –33.4 0.3 –7.9 –15.5 –21.2 –29.4 –73.0
Other Advanced Economies 1 323.9 325.6 327.9 339.7 377.1 590.8 589.3 531.7 553.2 557.4 621.3
Emerging Market and Developing Economies –110.3 –24.5 –52.4 0.1 146.6 385.4 706.3 278.8 173.4 126.9 –98.9
Regional Groups
Emerging and Developing Asia 209.4 164.1 –53.2 93.7 320.5 288.6 336.5 247.3 221.8 260.1 135.3
Emerging and Developing Europe –5.8 –20.2 68.3 53.5 2.8 70.5 130.6 –24.1 –15.8 –42.4 –56.0
Latin America and the Caribbean –108.5 –98.2 –145.0 –107.9 –9.3 –91.9 –126.0 –69.5 –60.6 –77.6 –98.6
Middle East and Central Asia –152.1 –37.7 112.6 15.5 –122.8 136.0 409.1 176.7 87.1 42.3 –18.9
Sub-Saharan Africa –53.3 –32.6 –35.1 –54.7 –44.6 –17.8 –43.9 –51.6 –58.9 –55.5 –60.7
Analytical Groups
Fuel –102.6 42.3 204.3 69.4 –101.0 194.8 509.7 236.9 170.0 114.2 57.5
Nonfuel –5.5 –64.7 –254.6 –67.6 249.6 192.4 198.7 44.8 7.0 15.9 –153.3
Of which, Primary Products –47.8 –60.2 –72.3 –44.8 –0.8 –13.9 –63.1 –55.9 –31.4 –33.5 –42.3
Net Debtor Economies –276.4 –307.3 –391.3 –306.0 –131.8 –302.4 –450.0 –264.5 –343.4 –395.9 –532.8
during 2019–23 –77.4 –64.2 –53.0 –52.6 –34.3 –38.9 –38.8 –48.6 –78.9 –85.2 –64.4
Memorandum
World 256.6 441.8 331.0 387.3 282.4 842.2 469.6 417.8 400.0 378.4 398.4
European Union 470.5 475.6 485.6 464.9 385.4 584.6 170.6 511.8 648.3 655.1 685.9
Middle East and North Africa –127.9 –18.6 129.4 34.4 –106.8 136.5 398.0 192.6 97.7 59.7 16.1
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies –66.4 8.0 7.1 67.6 211.1 454.2 810.1 360.6 253.7 204.7 –11.2
Low-Income Developing Countries –43.9 –32.5 –59.6 –67.6 –64.5 –68.7 –103.8 –81.7 –80.3 –77.9 –87.6

Table A10. Summary of Current Account Balances (continued)

(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
United States –2.1 –1.9 –2.1 –2.1 –2.8 –3.7 –3.9 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 –2.1
Euro Area 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.7 2.5 –0.3 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.3
Germany 8.5 7.7 7.8 8.0 6.5 7.2 4.2 6.2 6.6 6.4 5.6
France –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 0.6 –2.1 0.3 –1.2 –1.0 0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Italy 2.5 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.8 2.1 –1.7 0.0 1.1 1.4 2.5
Spain 3.1 2.8 1.9 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.4 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.2
Japan 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.9 2.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.1
United Kingdom –5.4 –3.5 –3.9 –2.7 –2.9 –0.4 –2.1 –2.0 –2.8 –2.8 –2.5
Canada –3.1 –2.8 –2.4 –2.0 –2.0 0.0 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 –1.3 –2.6
Emerging Market and Developing Economies –0.4 –0.1 –0.2 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 –0.2
Regional Groups
Analytical Groups
Fuel –3.1 1.2 5.5 1.9 –3.3 5.4 11.4 5.6 3.9 2.6 1.0
Nonfuel 0.0 –0.2 –0.8 –0.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.3
Of which, Primary Products –2.6 –3.0 –3.6 –2.4 0.0 –0.7 –2.9 –2.5 –1.4 –1.4 –1.5
Economies with Arrears and/or
Rescheduling during 2019–23 –5.7 –4.8 –3.8 –3.6 –2.4 –2.4 –2.2 –2.8 –4.5 –4.9 –2.7
Memorandum
World 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
European Union 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.5 3.3 1.0 2.8 3.3 3.2 2.9
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies –0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.2 2.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.0

Table A10. Summary of Current Account Balances (continued)

(Percent of exports of goods and services)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
United States –17.7 –15.4 –17.3 –17.3 –27.8 –33.8 –33.3 –29.5 –29.8 –28.2 –19.0
Euro Area 11.1 11.2 10.1 8.4 6.3 8.7 –1.0 5.4 ... ... ...
Germany 18.7 16.6 16.8 17.3 15.0 15.3 8.3 13.1 14.4 14.1 12.6
France –1.7 –1.7 –2.1 1.8 –7.3 0.9 –3.2 –2.9 0.3 –0.4 –0.4
Italy 8.5 8.1 8.1 10.2 13.1 6.7 –5.0 0.0 3.2 4.2 7.4
Spain 9.4 8.0 5.4 6.1 2.6 2.3 0.9 7.0 8.9 8.6 5.7
Japan 24.4 23.2 19.1 19.5 18.9 21.3 9.7 16.3 17.0 17.0 15.2
United Kingdom –18.8 –11.3 –12.4 –8.5 –9.9 –1.5 –6.3 –6.2 –9.1 –9.4 –8.6
Canada –9.8 –8.9 –7.4 –6.0 –6.8 0.0 –1.1 –2.2 –2.9 –3.9 –8.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies –1.4 –0.3 –0.7 –0.1 1.8 3.5 5.6 2.3 1.4 0.9 –0.7
Regional Groups
Analytical Groups
Fuel –8.7 2.9 12.5 4.5 –9.2 12.8 24.0 12.2 8.6 5.5 2.2
Nonfuel –0.1 –0.9 –3.3 –0.9 3.5 2.1 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 –1.2
Of which, Primary Products –11.9 –13.3 –14.9 –9.5 –0.2 –2.4 –10.1 –9.5 –5.0 –4.9 –5.1
Net Debtor Economies by Debt-Servicing
Experience
during 2019–23 –25.2 –18.2 –13.2 –13.0 –10.1 –9.1 –8.0 –10.5 –16.3 –16.7 –9.8
Memorandum
World 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 3.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
European Union 7.2 6.6 6.1 5.9 5.3 6.6 1.8 5.2 6.4 6.2 5.6
Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies –0.9 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.7 4.4 6.7 3.1 2.1 1.6 –0.1

Table A11. Advanced Economies: Current Account Balance

(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
United States –2.1 –1.9 –2.1 –2.1 –2.8 –3.7 –3.9 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 –2.1
Euro Area1 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.7 2.5 –0.3 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.3
Germany 8.5 7.7 7.8 8.0 6.5 7.2 4.2 6.2 6.6 6.4 5.6
France –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 0.6 –2.1 0.3 –1.2 –1.0 0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Italy 2.5 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.8 2.1 –1.7 0.0 1.1 1.4 2.5
Spain 3.1 2.8 1.9 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.4 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.2
The Netherlands 7.3 8.1 9.0 6.8 5.6 10.0 6.6 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.3
Belgium 0.6 0.7 –0.9 0.1 1.4 1.3 –1.0 –1.0 –0.3 0.0 0.8
Ireland –1.2 1.1 4.3 –20.7 –7.1 12.2 8.8 8.1 12.0 11.2 7.8
Austria 2.7 1.4 0.9 2.4 3.4 1.6 –0.3 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2
Portugal 1.2 1.3 0.6 0.4 –1.0 –0.8 –1.1 1.4 2.0 2.3 1.5
Greece –2.4 –2.6 –3.6 –2.2 –7.3 –7.1 –10.7 –6.9 –6.5 –5.3 –3.4
Finland –2.0 –0.8 –1.9 –0.3 0.5 0.4 –2.5 –1.1 –1.2 –1.2 –0.9
Slovak Republic –2.7 –1.9 –2.2 –3.3 0.6 –2.5 –8.1 –1.6 –1.7 –1.4 –0.4
Croatia 2.2 3.3 1.6 2.5 –1.0 1.0 –2.8 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.4
Lithuania –1.1 0.5 0.3 3.5 7.3 1.1 –5.5 1.9 2.8 2.9 2.8
Slovenia 5.3 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.7 3.8 –1.1 4.5 3.4 2.5 1.9
Luxembourg 4.7 4.5 6.5 8.9 8.6 7.9 7.6 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0
Latvia 1.6 1.2 –0.2 –0.6 2.9 –3.9 –4.8 –4.0 –3.8 –3.6 –3.2
Estonia 1.0 1.7 0.6 2.0 –2.5 –3.6 –3.9 –1.7 –3.4 –3.3 –2.9
Cyprus –4.2 –5.0 –4.0 –5.6 –10.0 –6.1 –7.9 –12.1 –10.1 –8.3 –7.8
Malta –0.6 5.6 5.4 8.8 –0.7 5.5 –3.8 0.9 1.2 2.3 2.5
Japan 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.9 2.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.1
United Kingdom –5.4 –3.5 –3.9 –2.7 –2.9 –0.4 –2.1 –2.0 –2.8 –2.8 –2.5
Korea 6.2 4.4 4.2 3.4 4.4 4.4 1.4 1.9 3.9 3.6 4.3
Canada –3.1 –2.8 –2.4 –2.0 –2.0 0.0 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 –1.3 –2.6
Australia –3.3 –2.6 –2.2 0.3 2.2 2.9 0.9 0.3 –0.9 –1.1 –1.3
Taiwan Province of China 13.1 14.1 11.6 10.7 14.5 15.3 13.3 13.8 14.8 14.6 17.8
Singapore 17.8 18.2 16.0 16.0 16.6 19.8 18.0 19.8 17.8 17.7 14.3
Switzerland 7.3 5.3 5.6 4.1 0.5 6.9 9.4 6.9 8.2 7.6 7.6
Sweden 1.9 2.1 2.2 5.3 5.8 6.9 5.0 6.5 6.6 6.1 4.2
Czech Republic 1.8 1.5 0.4 0.3 2.0 –2.7 –4.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7
Norway 5.2 6.3 9.0 3.8 1.1 14.9 30.2 17.9 14.5 12.5 6.6
Hong Kong SAR 4.0 4.6 3.7 5.9 7.0 11.8 10.2 9.2 9.8 9.2 8.5
Israel2 3.8 3.6 3.0 3.2 4.8 3.9 3.9 4.8 3.4 4.4 4.1
Denmark 7.1 7.3 6.3 7.4 7.2 8.7 11.7 9.8 9.0 9.3 8.3
New Zealand –2.0 –2.8 –4.2 –2.8 –1.0 –5.8 –8.8 –6.9 –6.3 –5.0 –3.6
Puerto Rico ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Macao SAR 26.5 30.8 32.9 33.5 14.0 8.7 11.6 36.0 33.2 33.3 31.0
Iceland 8.1 4.2 4.3 6.5 1.1 –2.6 –2.1 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.5
Andorra ... ... ... 18.0 15.5 14.1 17.3 17.0 17.2 17.3 17.6
San Marino ... –0.4 –1.9 2.0 2.8 5.4 15.5 13.9 6.2 4.2 1.6
Memorandum
Major Advanced Economies –0.2 0.1 –0.2 0.1 –0.7 –0.7 –2.0 –1.2 –1.2 –1.1 –0.7
Euro Area3 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.4 3.7 1.2 2.8 3.6 3.5 3.3
1 Data corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.
3 Data calculated as the sum of the balances of individual euro area countries.

Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Current Account Balance
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Bangladesh 1.6 –0.5 –3.0 –1.3 –1.5 –1.1 –4.0 –2.6 –1.4 –1.5 –1.4
Bhutan –29.4 –22.1 –17.4 –19.2 –14.8 –11.2 –28.1 –34.4 –17.7 –32.1 –14.1
Brunei Darussalam 12.9 16.4 6.9 6.6 4.3 11.2 19.6 12.9 15.9 17.0 12.2
Cambodia –6.4 –6.0 –8.7 –8.0 –2.5 –29.6 –18.8 1.3 –3.3 –3.6 –3.0
China 1.7 1.5 0.2 0.7 1.7 2.0 2.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.2
Fiji –3.5 –6.6 –8.4 –12.8 –13.7 –15.8 –17.2 –7.7 –7.6 –7.5 –7.6
India –0.6 –1.8 –2.1 –0.9 0.9 –1.2 –2.0 –0.7 –1.1 –1.3 –2.2
Indonesia –1.8 –1.6 –2.9 –2.7 –0.4 0.3 1.0 –0.2 –1.0 –1.2 –1.4
Kiribati 9.3 31.6 32.6 40.0 31.8 7.0 –2.4 10.3 9.8 9.7 8.8
Lao P.D.R. –8.7 –7.4 –9.1 –7.0 –1.6 2.3 –3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.6
Malaysia 2.4 2.8 2.2 3.5 4.2 3.9 3.2 1.5 2.6 2.8 3.0
Maldives –23.5 –20.7 –27.8 –26.1 –35.1 –8.7 –16.3 –21.3 –18.0 –11.9 –8.0
Marshall Islands 9.9 –0.9 –2.0 –31.2 14.9 22.7 10.0 16.8 2.0 2.8 –3.6
Micronesia 7.3 10.5 21.6 16.1 –5.9 2.2 8.5 3.3 2.7 0.8 –0.5
Mongolia –6.3 –10.1 –16.7 –15.2 –5.1 –13.8 –13.4 0.6 –6.9 –7.7 –9.3
Myanmar –4.2 –6.8 –4.7 –2.8 –3.5 –0.3 –4.6 –3.7 –3.9 –4.5 –4.3
Nauru 4.2 12.4 7.6 4.6 2.5 3.8 1.8 1.2 5.7 –2.4 1.9
Nepal 5.5 –0.3 –7.1 –6.9 –1.0 –7.7 –12.6 –1.4 3.2 –1.6 –3.6
Palau –16.1 –22.9 –18.6 –30.4 –43.9 –40.5 –45.6 –51.8 –30.9 –24.9 –14.1
Papua New Guinea 13.6 15.9 13.6 14.4 14.4 12.6 14.4 13.5 9.9 12.2 10.6
Philippines –0.4 –0.7 –2.6 –0.8 3.2 –1.5 –4.5 –2.6 –2.2 –1.8 –1.1
Samoa –4.2 –1.8 0.8 2.8 0.6 –14.5 –11.3 –3.3 –0.3 –1.6 –2.2
Solomon Islands –3.7 –4.3 –3.0 –9.5 –1.6 –5.1 –13.7 –10.8 –4.0 –8.4 –7.9
Sri Lanka1 –2.0 –2.4 –3.0 –2.1 –1.4 –3.7 –1.0 ... ... ... ...
Thailand 10.5 9.6 5.6 7.0 4.2 –2.1 –3.5 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.8
Timor-Leste1 –33.0 –17.5 –12.1 26.2 21.2 42.1 14.8 –0.7 –21.3 –24.4 –31.8
Tonga –8.2 –7.9 –7.3 –3.9 –6.5 –6.8 –6.8 –6.6 –7.4 –7.7 –7.3
Tuvalu 29.9 2.1 60.9 –22.1 16.1 23.3 4.3 10.7 4.0 –1.3 –6.3
Vanuatu –2.4 –10.7 4.8 10.2 –5.1 –6.0 –12.3 –2.2 –7.4 –6.5 –4.4
Vietnam 0.2 –0.6 1.9 3.8 4.3 –2.2 0.3 5.8 3.0 2.7 1.3
Albania –7.6 –7.5 –6.8 –7.6 –8.7 –7.7 –5.9 –1.2 –0.8 –1.0 –0.6
Belarus –3.4 –1.7 0.0 –1.9 –0.3 3.2 3.5 –1.8 –2.0 –2.4 –2.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina –4.7 –4.8 –3.2 –2.6 –2.8 –1.8 –4.3 –2.8 –4.8 –4.9 –3.8
Bulgaria 3.1 3.3 0.9 1.9 0.0 –1.7 –1.4 –0.3 –1.0 –1.7 –0.3
Hungary 4.5 2.0 0.2 –0.8 –1.1 –4.3 –8.4 0.2 1.6 0.6 1.5
Kosovo –8.0 –5.5 –7.6 –5.7 –7.0 –8.7 –10.3 –7.7 –10.0 –9.1 –7.2
Moldova –3.6 –5.8 –10.8 –9.4 –7.7 –12.4 –15.8 –11.9 –11.2 –10.7 –8.5
Montenegro –16.2 –16.1 –17.0 –14.3 –26.1 –9.2 –12.9 –11.6 –14.5 –14.0 –13.6
North Macedonia –2.6 –0.8 0.2 –3.0 –2.9 –2.8 –6.1 0.7 –2.1 –2.5 –2.5
Poland –1.0 –1.2 –1.9 –0.2 2.5 –1.2 –2.4 1.5 0.8 0.0 –1.0
Romania –1.6 –3.1 –4.6 –4.9 –4.9 –7.2 –9.2 –7.0 –7.5 –7.0 –5.9
Russia 1.9 2.0 7.0 3.9 2.4 6.8 10.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.7
Serbia –2.9 –5.2 –4.8 –6.9 –4.1 –4.3 –6.9 –2.6 –4.2 –4.8 –5.5
Türkiye –2.6 –4.1 –1.8 2.0 –4.3 –0.8 –5.1 –4.0 –2.2 –2.1 –1.9
Ukraine –1.5 –2.2 –3.3 –2.7 3.3 –1.9 5.0 –5.4 –8.1 –14.3 –4.3
Antigua and Barbuda –2.4 –7.7 –14.0 –6.5 –15.9 –18.0 –15.9 –12.8 –10.5 –9.8 –8.6
Argentina –2.7 –4.8 –5.2 –0.8 0.7 1.4 –0.6 –3.2 0.6 0.6 1.5
Aruba 4.6 1.0 –0.5 0.2 –16.6 –2.1 6.0 4.8 6.2 5.8 3.0
The Bahamas –12.5 –13.5 –9.5 –2.2 –22.9 –21.4 –9.1 –7.7 –7.9 –7.2 –6.8
Barbados –3.9 –3.4 –3.6 –1.6 –4.9 –10.3 –9.9 –8.6 –6.4 –6.1 –4.8
Belize –7.3 –7.0 –6.6 –7.7 –6.2 –6.5 –8.3 –0.6 –3.0 –2.6 –2.5
Bolivia –5.6 –5.0 –4.3 –3.3 0.0 3.9 2.1 –2.6 –5.4 –5.5 –6.1
Brazil –1.7 –1.2 –2.8 –3.5 –1.7 –2.4 –2.1 –1.0 –1.7 –1.8 –1.6
Chile –2.6 –2.8 –4.5 –5.2 –1.9 –7.3 –8.7 –3.5 –2.3 –2.7 –3.0
Colombia –4.5 –3.2 –4.2 –4.6 –3.4 –5.6 –6.1 –2.5 –2.5 –2.6 –3.5

Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Current Account Balance (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Caribbean (continued) –2.2 –1.8 –2.7 –2.1 –0.2 –1.8 –2.2 –1.1 –0.9 –1.1 –1.2
Costa Rica –2.1 –3.6 –3.0 –1.3 –1.0 –3.2 –3.2 –1.4 –2.2 –2.2 –1.4
Dominica –9.0 –11.0 –46.7 –38.1 –37.4 –32.9 –26.7 –33.9 –33.1 –30.7 –15.0
Dominican Republic –1.1 –0.2 –1.5 –1.3 –1.7 –2.8 –5.8 –3.6 –3.4 –3.4 –2.8
Ecuador 1.1 –0.2 –1.2 –0.1 2.3 2.9 1.8 1.9 2.8 2.4 2.5
El Salvador –2.3 –1.9 –3.3 –0.4 1.1 –4.3 –6.8 –1.4 –2.2 –2.4 –2.9
Grenada –8.8 –11.5 –12.8 –10.4 –16.1 –14.5 –11.0 –9.1 –11.3 –14.6 –8.5
Guatemala 1.0 1.2 0.9 2.4 5.0 2.2 1.3 3.1 2.4 1.8 0.1
Guyana 1.5 –4.9 –29.0 –68.8 –17.3 –26.0 26.2 10.3 36.9 12.6 25.9
Haiti –1.7 –2.2 –2.9 –1.1 0.4 0.4 –2.3 –3.5 –0.4 –0.9 –1.2
Honduras –3.2 –1.3 –6.6 –2.6 2.9 –5.5 –6.6 –3.9 –5.3 –5.1 –3.9
Jamaica –0.3 –2.7 –1.5 –1.9 –1.1 1.0 –0.8 2.9 1.6 0.5 –2.0
Mexico –2.3 –1.8 –2.1 –0.3 2.4 –0.3 –1.2 –0.3 –0.7 –0.9 –1.0
Nicaragua –8.5 –7.2 –1.8 5.9 3.7 –3.8 –2.4 7.7 6.8 6.1 0.7
Panama –7.5 –5.8 –7.9 –5.1 0.7 –1.2 –0.6 –4.5 –0.4 –0.5 –2.5
Paraguay 4.6 3.3 –0.2 –0.6 1.9 –0.9 –7.1 0.3 –0.6 –2.5 –0.2
Peru –2.2 –0.8 –1.1 –0.6 0.9 –2.1 –4.0 0.8 0.3 –0.1 –1.5
St. Kitts and Nevis –12.1 –10.2 –5.8 –4.8 –10.8 –5.1 –10.8 –13.6 –10.4 –12.4 –5.3
St. Lucia –6.5 –2.0 1.4 5.5 –18.9 –11.9 –2.9 –1.9 –1.5 –1.3 –0.4
St. Vincent and the Grenadines –13.1 –11.9 –10.3 –2.4 –15.9 –22.2 –18.9 –17.5 –18.9 –15.4 –8.9
Suriname –4.8 1.9 –3.0 –11.2 8.9 5.7 2.1 3.9 1.8 1.6 1.1
Trinidad and Tobago –3.3 5.9 6.6 4.3 –6.5 10.7 17.4 12.1 5.5 7.2 6.5
Uruguay 0.8 0.0 –0.5 1.2 –0.7 –2.5 –3.9 –3.8 –2.7 –2.6 –2.0
Venezuela1 –3.4 7.5 8.4 5.9 –3.5 –1.2 3.6 3.1 4.1 3.3 ...
Afghanistan1 9.0 7.6 12.1 11.7 14.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Algeria –14.6 –11.8 –8.7 –8.7 –11.3 –2.4 8.4 2.5 1.3 –0.8 –2.6
Armenia –1.0 –1.3 –7.2 –7.1 –4.0 –3.5 0.3 –2.3 –4.2 –4.8 –5.0
Azerbaijan –3.6 4.1 12.8 9.1 –0.5 15.1 29.8 11.5 6.1 5.9 0.4
Bahrain –4.4 –3.9 –6.2 –2.0 –9.1 6.4 14.6 5.9 5.3 4.5 2.9
Djibouti –1.0 –4.8 14.7 18.3 11.5 –6.6 17.6 22.4 6.2 4.9 6.1
Egypt –5.6 –5.8 –2.3 –3.4 –2.9 –4.4 –3.5 –1.2 –6.6 –6.4 –4.1
Georgia –12.2 –7.9 –6.7 –5.8 –12.4 –10.3 –4.5 –4.3 –5.8 –5.9 –5.8
Iran 2.9 3.1 7.9 –0.7 –1.9 3.9 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0
Iraq –10.7 –5.4 3.7 –0.8 –15.4 6.5 15.4 4.5 –1.9 –3.4 –6.4
Jordan –9.7 –10.6 –6.8 –1.7 –5.7 –8.0 –7.8 –3.5 –5.0 –4.0 –4.0
Kazakhstan –5.1 –2.1 –1.0 –3.9 –6.4 –1.4 3.1 –3.3 –1.5 –2.7 –3.4
Kuwait –4.6 8.0 14.3 12.7 4.4 25.2 34.3 31.4 28.2 23.7 13.9
Kyrgyz Republic –11.6 –6.2 –12.1 –11.5 4.5 –8.0 –41.9 –48.2 –21.7 –6.5 –5.8
Lebanon1 –23.5 –26.5 –28.9 –28.2 –15.8 –18.1 –27.7 –23.5 ... ... ...
Libya –9.4 6.6 14.7 6.7 –10.2 16.1 28.6 14.6 11.1 12.5 10.5
Mauritania –11.0 –10.0 –13.1 –10.5 –6.8 –8.6 –14.9 –8.8 –7.2 –8.7 –6.1
Morocco –3.8 –3.2 –4.9 –3.4 –1.2 –2.3 –3.6 –0.6 –2.0 –2.3 –3.0
Oman –16.6 –13.6 –4.9 –4.9 –16.5 –5.5 3.9 2.4 2.3 1.4 2.0
Pakistan –1.6 –3.6 –5.4 –4.2 –1.5 –0.8 –4.7 –1.0 –0.2 –0.9 –0.9
Qatar –5.5 4.0 9.1 2.4 –2.1 14.6 26.8 17.1 13.4 13.3 11.3
Saudi Arabia –3.7 1.7 8.6 4.6 –3.5 4.8 13.7 3.2 0.4 –1.8 –2.7
Somalia –5.5 1.7 0.0 –9.7 –4.7 –7.1 –8.2 –11.0 –8.7 –9.0 –10.5
Sudan1 –6.5 –9.4 –13.9 –15.2 –16.6 –7.5 –11.3 –3.6 –3.9 –8.6 –10.4
Syria1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tajikistan –4.2 2.1 –4.9 –2.2 4.3 8.2 15.6 4.9 0.3 –1.7 –2.8
Tunisia –9.7 –9.7 –10.8 –8.1 –6.0 –6.0 –9.0 –2.7 –3.5 –3.4 –4.0
Turkmenistan –22.6 –13.6 6.1 2.9 2.9 6.6 7.0 4.7 4.0 2.7 –1.4
United Arab Emirates 3.6 7.0 9.7 8.9 6.0 11.5 13.2 10.7 8.8 8.2 6.4
Uzbekistan 0.2 2.1 –6.1 –5.0 –4.6 –6.3 –3.2 –7.7 –6.3 –6.1 –4.9
West Bank and Gaza1 –13.9 –13.2 –13.2 –10.4 –12.3 –9.8 –10.6 –16.6 ... ... ...
Yemen –5.4 –1.5 –3.2 –4.2 –15.6 –14.2 –17.7 –20.3 –25.0 –25.7 –2.0

Table A12. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Current Account Balance (continued)
(Percent of GDP)
Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2029
Angola –2.7 –0.5 6.5 5.4 1.3 10.0 8.3 3.8 3.3 1.5 1.1
Benin –3.0 –4.2 –4.6 –4.0 –1.7 –4.2 –6.1 –5.9 –6.0 –6.0 –4.5
Botswana 8.0 5.6 0.4 –6.9 –10.3 –1.3 –1.2 –0.6 –2.0 1.5 0.2
Burkina Faso –6.1 –5.0 –4.2 –3.3 4.2 0.4 –7.4 –8.0 –3.8 –1.2 1.4
Burundi –11.1 –11.8 –12.8 –11.6 –11.2 –11.9 –15.9 –13.8 –15.1 –21.8 –18.9
Cabo Verde –3.4 –7.0 –4.8 0.2 –15.3 –11.9 –3.6 –3.1 –5.2 –5.3 –3.2
Cameroon –3.1 –2.6 –3.5 –4.3 –3.7 –4.0 –3.4 –3.9 –2.8 –3.5 –3.1
Central African Republic –5.4 –7.8 –8.0 –4.9 –8.2 –11.2 –12.9 –8.8 –8.6 –6.9 –3.9
Chad –4.6 –6.0 –4.2 –3.3 –2.8 –1.8 5.5 –0.9 –1.7 –2.5 –1.3
Comoros –4.4 –2.2 –3.0 –3.5 –1.8 –0.3 –0.6 –2.5 –3.2 –3.9 –4.8
Democratic Republic of the Congo –3.9 –3.1 –3.5 –3.2 –2.1 –1.0 –4.9 –6.3 –4.0 –2.0 –3.0
Republic of Congo –45.3 –3.9 18.5 11.7 12.6 12.8 17.7 6.4 2.5 2.1 –1.1
Côte d’Ivoire –0.9 –2.0 –3.9 –2.2 –3.1 –3.9 –7.7 –8.0 –5.4 –1.3 –2.3
Equatorial Guinea –26.0 –7.8 –2.7 –7.5 –0.8 4.2 2.1 –0.8 –0.4 –2.7 –4.1
Eritrea1 13.4 24.8 15.5 13.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eswatini 7.9 6.2 1.3 3.9 7.1 2.6 –2.7 2.2 3.8 1.7 1.0
Ethiopia –10.9 –8.5 –6.5 –5.3 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –2.9 –3.4 –4.8 –1.9
Gabon –5.4 –0.7 7.1 4.6 –0.5 3.5 10.9 5.4 5.1 3.1 –0.3
The Gambia –9.2 –7.4 –9.5 –6.2 –3.0 –4.2 –4.2 –8.6 –4.4 –2.8 –0.9
Ghana –5.1 –3.3 –3.0 –2.2 –2.5 –2.7 –2.3 –1.4 –2.5 –2.0 –2.1
Guinea –30.7 –6.7 –18.5 –15.5 –16.2 –2.5 –8.6 –8.8 –9.5 –8.8 –7.3
Guinea-Bissau 1.4 0.3 –3.5 –8.5 –2.6 –0.8 –8.6 –8.7 –6.1 –4.4 –4.0
Kenya –5.4 –7.0 –5.4 –5.2 –4.7 –5.2 –5.0 –4.0 –4.1 –4.1 –4.0
Lesotho –10.2 –7.0 –7.0 –6.1 –5.7 –9.0 –13.8 –0.2 –0.7 –2.2 –2.1
Liberia –23.0 –22.3 –21.3 –19.6 –16.4 –17.8 –19.0 –26.4 –22.6 –21.9 –16.6
Madagascar 0.5 –0.4 0.7 –2.3 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –4.5 –6.8 –6.0 –4.8
Malawi –13.1 –15.5 –12.0 –12.6 –13.8 –15.4 –16.7 –16.3 –13.9 –13.8 –11.0
Mali –7.2 –7.3 –4.9 –7.5 –2.2 –7.4 –10.8 –7.1 –5.5 –3.5 –4.7
Mauritius –3.9 –4.5 –3.8 –5.0 –8.8 –13.0 –11.1 –3.3 –5.5 –4.6 –4.1
Mozambique –31.9 –19.5 –29.5 –16.1 –26.5 –21.3 –36.4 –10.6 –29.9 –30.0 –11.8
Namibia –16.5 –4.4 –3.6 –1.8 3.0 –11.4 –13.0 –14.8 –15.9 –17.0 –11.2
Niger –11.4 –11.4 –12.7 –12.2 –13.2 –14.1 –16.2 –14.4 –4.6 –4.3 –4.8
Nigeria 1.3 3.6 1.7 –2.9 –3.7 –0.7 0.2 1.7 –0.5 –0.7 –2.0
Rwanda –15.3 –9.5 –10.1 –11.9 –12.1 –10.9 –9.4 –11.7 –12.0 –11.0 –7.5
São Tomé and Príncipe –7.2 –15.3 –13.0 –12.8 –11.2 –13.1 –14.4 –12.3 –7.2 –5.7 –4.9
Senegal –4.2 –7.3 –8.8 –7.9 –10.9 –12.1 –20.0 –18.8 –12.7 –8.3 –4.5
Seychelles –18.7 –16.2 –2.4 –2.8 –12.3 –8.7 –7.4 –7.2 –10.1 –10.1 –9.2
Sierra Leone –4.9 –11.7 –10.9 –12.2 –4.8 –5.7 –2.2 –6.0 –5.5 –5.7 –4.5
South Africa –2.7 –2.4 –2.9 –2.6 2.0 3.7 –0.5 –1.6 –1.6 –1.9 –2.2
South Sudan 19.6 9.6 11.0 2.1 –18.9 –9.4 9.2 2.9 3.3 2.4 –1.1
Tanzania –4.2 –2.8 –3.5 –3.0 –2.5 –3.9 –5.7 –5.3 –3.9 –3.4 –2.5
Togo –7.2 –1.5 –2.6 –0.8 –0.3 –2.2 –3.5 –2.9 –3.0 –2.9 –2.0
Uganda –2.6 –4.8 –6.1 –6.9 –9.5 –8.4 –8.6 –7.4 –6.6 –6.6 –2.6
Zambia –3.3 –1.7 –1.3 0.6 11.8 11.9 3.8 –1.9 –0.2 6.9 6.2
Zimbabwe –3.4 –1.2 –3.7 3.5 2.5 1.0 0.9 0.4 –0.3 0.4 1.1
1 See the country-specific notes for Afghanistan, Eritrea, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Venezuela, and West Bank and Gaza in the “Country Notes” section of the Statistical
Appendix.

Table A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances

Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Advanced Economies
Financial Account Balance 440.0 391.8 456.9 152.1 –38.6 442.5 –37.6 132.7 326.6 275.0
Direct Investment, Net –209.3 243.5 –174.8 18.0 82.5 699.5 545.4 571.8 284.4 251.9
Portfolio Investment, Net 519.4 26.7 517.4 66.6 110.0 262.1 –740.8 –366.3 –397.2 –156.5
Financial Derivatives, Net 21.3 33.6 57.6 8.6 73.6 37.8 12.7 25.0 119.3 108.7
Other Investment, Net –70.0 –161.6 –72.9 –9.1 –660.7 –1,194.2 353.8 –59.2 247.2 –96.3
Change in Reserves 190.2 247.6 129.5 68.0 358.2 636.2 –211.5 –49.0 72.2 166.5
United States
Financial Account Balance –362.4 –373.2 –302.9 –558.4 –672.0 –823.6 –869.1 –924.1 –895.4 –936.6
Direct Investment, Net –174.6 28.6 –345.4 –201.1 145.3 –133.8 –20.5 105.3 –15.1 –81.2
Portfolio Investment, Net –193.8 –250.1 78.8 –244.9 –540.2 97.4 –437.7 –1,149.5 –530.4 –354.3
Financial Derivatives, Net 7.8 24.0 –20.4 –41.7 –5.1 –39.0 –80.7 –15.6 –24.2 –29.4
Other Investment, Net –4.0 –174.1 –20.8 –75.4 –280.9 –862.2 –336.1 135.7 –328.2 –471.6
Change in Reserves 2.1 –1.7 5.0 4.7 9.0 114.0 5.8 0.0 2.5 0.0
Euro Area
Financial Account Balance 316.8 373.7 353.0 266.9 219.5 437.7 54.9 351.4 ... ...
Direct Investment, Net 124.3 35.5 104.7 118.6 –198.2 498.3 305.5 6.6 ... ...
Portfolio Investment, Net 530.4 402.4 273.7 –95.6 607.9 286.2 –263.0 –100.5 ... ...
Financial Derivatives, Net 21.7 10.4 46.8 7.0 20.8 66.6 70.3 18.8 ... ...
Other Investment, Net –376.9 –73.5 –102.1 230.2 –225.9 –567.7 –76.6 439.9 ... ...
Change in Reserves 17.3 –1.2 29.8 6.7 15.0 154.3 18.8 –13.5 ... ...
Germany
Financial Account Balance 286.5 303.0 287.0 224.3 192.6 247.3 208.9 259.3 311.7 313.4
Direct Investment, Net 48.1 37.7 25.1 98.4 –31.2 96.4 118.2 64.6 101.7 105.4
Portfolio Investment, Net 217.9 220.7 177.4 82.9 19.7 233.4 11.3 1.2 100.7 45.2
Financial Derivatives, Net 31.7 12.6 26.8 23.0 106.3 56.7 43.8 43.2 58.0 55.6
Other Investment, Net –13.0 33.5 57.2 20.6 97.9 –176.9 30.9 149.3 51.2 107.3
Change in Reserves 1.9 –1.4 0.5 –0.6 –0.1 37.7 4.7 1.0 0.0 0.0
France
Financial Account Balance –2.7 –30.5 –9.5 11.4 –70.0 1.8 –38.2 –34.0 10.6 3.8
Direct Investment, Net 37.2 2.8 61.0 31.0 10.5 21.0 –23.2 30.3 34.5 37.2
Portfolio Investment, Net 50.1 9.9 11.6 –64.1 –30.9 9.8 –92.6 –145.6 –31.5 –1.5
Financial Derivatives, Net –17.6 –1.4 –30.5 4.1 –27.2 21.0 –41.4 –18.0 –12.9 –10.4
Other Investment, Net –75.3 –40.3 –63.8 37.1 –24.7 –78.2 114.2 121.0 29.1 –19.9
Change in Reserves 2.5 –3.4 12.3 3.2 4.6 27.0 2.0 –21.7 –8.6 –1.6
Italy
Financial Account Balance 38.1 63.5 44.6 61.6 85.6 53.5 –8.3 34.0 34.0 43.6
Direct Investment, Net –12.3 2.9 –3.6 4.0 23.9 31.2 –14.3 –11.5 1.2 1.6
Portfolio Investment, Net 157.8 103.1 157.1 –55.7 133.5 148.8 178.5 –26.9 –57.3 –45.2
Financial Derivatives, Net –3.6 –8.4 –3.3 3.0 –2.9 –0.2 12.2 –5.0 –2.3 –0.9
Other Investment, Net –102.5 –37.1 –108.7 106.7 –73.4 –150.7 –186.8 74.5 92.4 88.2
Change in Reserves –1.3 3.0 3.1 3.6 4.6 24.5 2.1 3.0 0.0 0.0
Spain
Direct Investment, Net 15.4 14.9 –21.2 10.4 18.8 –13.7 4.2 –3.2 –4.1 –4.6
Portfolio Investment, Net 64.5 36.9 28.3 –56.7 87.8 44.5 36.9 –18.0 33.1 42.3
Financial Derivatives, Net 2.9 8.7 –1.1 –6.2 –8.1 1.0 2.4 –4.5 0.0 0.0
Other Investment, Net –54.5 –24.5 28.1 81.7 –86.0 –13.4 –25.1 83.8 45.6 37.3
Change in Reserves 9.1 4.1 2.6 0.8 –0.4 12.2 4.7 6.5 0.0 0.0

Table A13. Summary of Financial Account Balances (continued)

Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Japan
Direct Investment, Net 137.5 155.0 134.6 218.9 87.5 174.7 126.8 162.9 122.4 120.6
Portfolio Investment, Net 276.3 –50.6 92.2 87.4 38.5 –198.3 –142.6 197.7 –27.6 –42.6
Financial Derivatives, Net –16.1 30.4 0.9 3.2 7.8 19.9 38.0 44.6 44.6 44.6
Other Investment, Net –125.6 10.0 –67.9 –106.7 –12.4 94.1 78.4 –267.5 99.6 22.2
Change in Reserves –5.7 23.6 24.0 25.5 10.9 62.8 –47.4 29.8 –87.5 11.5
United Kingdom
Direct Investment, Net –297.4 46.1 –4.9 –42.2 –140.4 156.8 80.7 154.3 7.2 7.5
Portfolio Investment, Net –160.1 –92.8 –354.9 34.9 36.5 –261.9 –44.9 226.5 –194.6 –202.4
Financial Derivatives, Net 15.6 19.3 10.3 2.5 33.1 –37.5 –59.8 0.8 6.2 6.5
Other Investment, Net 273.2 –83.7 200.7 –92.5 –19.7 104.0 –53.2 –436.8 76.6 77.6
Change in Reserves 8.8 8.8 24.8 –1.1 –3.3 24.4 –1.3 –4.6 0.0 0.0
Canada
Financial Account Balance –45.4 –44.2 –35.8 –37.9 –34.3 8.3 –2.4 –11.6 –12.7 –29.4
Direct Investment, Net 33.5 53.4 20.4 26.9 18.1 44.5 36.8 35.3 35.0 50.6
Portfolio Investment, Net –103.6 –74.9 3.4 –1.6 –67.7 –44.7 –114.6 15.4 –47.6 –27.5
Financial Derivatives, Net ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Other Investment, Net 19.1 –23.5 –58.2 –63.3 14.0 –11.8 64.7 –69.3 –0.2 –52.5
Change in Reserves 5.6 0.8 –1.5 0.1 1.3 20.2 10.6 7.0 0.0 0.0
Other Advanced Economies1
Direct Investment, Net –77.3 –156.9 42.6 –26.6 65.8 –51.6 –15.5 14.8 –84.6 –72.7
Portfolio Investment, Net 245.2 151.2 367.4 309.6 265.3 499.9 312.2 394.2 291.2 350.6
Financial Derivatives, Net 3.3 –5.6 31.8 20.0 –13.3 –15.5 36.3 –3.6 47.9 41.4
Other Investment, Net 1.0 105.5 –131.2 –0.4 –258.2 –84.5 367.9 152.0 135.5 88.1
Change in Reserves 162.0 213.1 49.5 30.3 322.6 257.2 –197.6 –64.8 164.7 152.2
Emerging Market and Developing
Economies
Financial Account Balance –396.0 –276.3 –264.1 –149.2 42.4 212.0 551.1 175.6 183.5 131.9
Direct Investment, Net –271.4 –306.5 –375.9 –355.5 –319.8 –483.6 –250.5 –155.9 –185.7 –276.4
Portfolio Investment, Net –50.2 –210.3 –105.8 –74.3 –13.9 115.2 502.8 150.3 –30.3 –39.7
Other Investment, Net 405.1 57.2 96.8 108.1 265.6 74.7 168.2 –30.6 –108.8 –50.6


Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Regional Groups
Financial Account Balance –29.9 –59.2 –263.2 –52.1 155.1 143.1 207.0 188.3 222.1 265.9
Direct Investment, Net –25.8 –108.3 –170.3 –144.7 –162.5 –258.6 –63.7 88.7 53.0 –7.8
Portfolio Investment, Net 31.1 –70.1 –100.4 –72.0 –106.8 –20.7 309.8 41.4 –74.6 –72.5
Financial Derivatives, Net –4.6 2.3 4.7 –2.5 15.8 –2.3 18.3 21.2 20.8 21.0
Other Investment, Net 353.8 –82.3 –18.9 70.4 244.5 146.9 –106.0 –34.2 –62.5 –52.7
Emerging and Developing Europe
Financial Account Balance 10.9 –25.4 106.2 60.2 8.7 85.5 162.2 –28.5 –4.7 –33.8
Portfolio Investment, Net –10.8 –34.9 9.8 –2.8 21.1 40.4 26.8 –19.2 –17.2 –1.7
Financial Derivatives, Net 0.5 –2.2 –3.0 1.4 0.3 –4.6 –5.6 4.9 –0.9 –0.8
Other Investment, Net 28.3 26.0 79.6 19.7 30.1 –37.4 144.6 –31.8 –15.5 –14.9
Change in Reserves 35.7 13.4 45.6 92.2 –4.4 127.2 31.6 48.7 70.0 34.4
Portfolio Investment, Net –53.2 –45.7 –16.5 –2.4 –8.9 –16.4 11.9 25.0 –0.5 0.5
Financial Derivatives, Net –2.9 3.9 4.0 4.9 5.7 2.0 2.1 –6.5 0.1 –0.4
Other Investment, Net 46.5 34.1 –16.7 19.8 70.7 –41.1 –23.0 13.7 –4.5 1.3
Change in Reserves 21.0 17.3 11.1 –32.6 16.2 50.3 –17.5 21.8 38.4 26.8
Financial Account Balance –198.6 –37.5 96.0 21.0 –92.6 107.0 380.8 164.1 86.0 36.6
Portfolio Investment, Net –0.4 –35.7 6.7 21.5 78.5 66.7 153.3 102.5 60.7 31.3
Other Investment, Net –13.9 79.4 75.9 11.8 –72.2 20.0 177.9 41.0 –13.3 23.3
Change in Reserves –148.0 –59.6 39.3 4.5 –87.9 43.9 66.0 60.7 85.4 33.6
Sub-Saharan Africa
Portfolio Investment, Net –17.0 –24.0 –5.4 –18.6 2.2 45.3 1.0 0.7 1.2 2.7
Financial Derivatives, Net 0.5 0.3 –0.6 0.3 –0.1 –0.5 1.6 –2.1 –1.5 –1.4
Other Investment, Net –9.6 0.0 –23.2 –13.6 –7.5 –13.7 –25.4 –19.4 –13.0 –7.7
Change in Reserves –5.2 16.1 4.9 6.3 –4.4 13.7 –9.4 –5.2 8.7 7.1


Projections
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Analytical Groups
Fuel
Financial Account Balance –160.5 17.7 165.8 54.6 –56.1 165.0 465.4 194.4 159.2 103.6
Direct Investment, Net –33.9 13.7 9.6 –4.2 –1.4 –6.8 18.0 –20.6 4.8 –29.0
Portfolio Investment, Net 2.9 –30.3 6.2 19.0 79.5 84.3 120.2 93.9 74.8 38.7
Other Investment, Net 25.5 108.0 107.5 30.2 –52.4 44.9 244.1 68.3 13.1 64.3
Change in Reserves –164.0 –66.8 48.9 8.0 –88.7 43.5 87.5 55.7 64.2 28.6
Nonfuel
Financial Account Balance –235.5 –294.0 –429.8 –203.8 98.5 47.1 85.8 –18.8 24.3 28.3
Portfolio Investment, Net –53.1 –180.0 –112.0 –93.3 –93.3 30.9 382.6 56.4 –105.1 –78.5
Financial Derivatives, Net –6.5 4.4 5.1 4.0 21.7 –5.4 16.3 17.6 18.4 18.3
Other Investment, Net 379.6 –50.8 –10.7 77.9 318.0 29.8 –76.0 –98.8 –121.9 –115.0
Net Debtor Economies
Portfolio Investment, Net –67.4 –128.7 –37.1 –35.8 –57.1 –27.3 68.7 –38.1 –95.7 –60.5
Other Investment, Net 15.8 –25.7 –29.4 –64.6 36.3 –201.2 –159.5 –133.0 –117.6 –141.5
Change in Reserves 66.9 77.7 –3.0 80.9 128.2 204.1 –46.6 146.8 191.9 132.8
Economies with Arrears
and/or Rescheduling
during 2019–23
Portfolio Investment, Net –12.1 –36.7 –21.2 –17.9 4.2 –18.5 32.5 8.8 –13.8 –3.1
Other Investment, Net –35.2 –10.7 –4.4 2.9 10.7 8.4 –24.8 –25.8 –13.9 –44.5
Change in Reserves 1.8 15.9 4.5 0.7 –17.9 5.1 –20.9 10.3 26.3 13.3
Memorandum
World
Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries’ national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum of the US dollar
values for the relevant individual countries. Some group aggregates for the financial derivatives are not shown because of incomplete data. Projections for the euro area are not available
because of data constraints.

Table A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing

(Percent of GDP)
Projections
Averages Average
2006–15 2010–17 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026–29
Advanced Economies
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.8 –0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5
Current Account Balance –0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.8 –0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5
Savings 21.7 22.0 23.1 23.3 22.6 23.5 23.2 22.4 22.3 22.4 22.9
Investment 21.9 21.5 22.5 22.7 22.4 22.7 23.4 22.6 22.2 22.3 22.6
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
United States
Net Lending and Borrowing –3.3 –2.4 –2.1 –2.1 –2.8 –3.7 –3.9 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 –2.4
Current Account Balance –3.3 –2.3 –2.1 –2.1 –2.8 –3.7 –3.9 –3.3 –3.3 –3.1 –2.4
Savings 17.3 18.1 19.1 19.3 18.2 17.6 18.3 17.4 17.9 18.2 19.3
Investment 20.5 20.3 21.6 21.7 21.4 21.3 21.9 21.5 21.8 22.0 22.3
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Euro Area
Net Lending and Borrowing 0.6 1.7 2.5 2.2 1.7 2.9 0.8 1.8 ... ... ...
Current Account Balance 0.5 1.7 2.8 2.4 1.7 2.5 –0.3 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.3
Savings 22.5 22.8 24.9 25.5 24.5 26.5 25.4 25.5 25.0 24.9 24.9
Investment 21.1 20.3 21.5 22.3 21.9 22.7 23.5 21.9 20.6 20.6 20.8
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.1 –0.3 –0.2 0.0 0.4 1.1 0.3 ... ... ...
Germany
Net Lending and Borrowing 6.4 7.1 7.8 7.9 6.2 7.1 3.6 5.5 6.6 6.4 5.7
Current Account Balance 6.4 7.1 7.8 8.0 6.5 7.2 4.2 6.2 6.6 6.4 5.7
Savings 26.4 27.1 29.3 29.3 28.1 29.6 27.2 27.8 27.2 26.9 26.8
Investment 19.9 20.0 21.5 21.3 21.7 22.5 23.0 21.7 20.6 20.5 21.1
Capital Account Balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.3 –0.1 –0.5 –0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
France
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.6 –0.8 –0.6 0.7 –2.0 0.6 –0.8 –0.7 0.3 0.1 –0.1
Current Account Balance –0.7 –0.8 –0.7 0.6 –2.1 0.3 –1.2 –1.0 0.1 –0.1 –0.3
Savings 21.5 21.0 21.9 23.6 20.8 23.7 24.6 23.9 22.3 21.8 21.3
Investment 22.1 21.8 22.6 23.0 22.8 23.4 25.8 24.9 22.3 21.9 21.6
Italy
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.9 0.4 2.5 3.1 3.8 2.2 –1.2 0.7 1.4 1.8 2.2
Current Account Balance –0.9 0.3 2.5 3.2 3.8 2.1 –1.7 0.0 1.1 1.4 2.1
Savings 18.8 18.7 21.2 21.5 21.7 24.1 23.0 22.7 23.1 23.6 24.7
Investment 19.8 18.3 18.7 18.4 17.9 22.0 24.8 22.8 22.1 22.2 22.6
Spain
Net Lending and Borrowing –2.7 1.1 2.4 2.5 1.2 1.6 1.3 3.7 4.3 4.1 2.9
Current Account Balance –3.1 0.7 1.9 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.4 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.6
Savings 19.8 20.1 22.6 23.0 21.4 22.6 23.0 23.7 23.8 23.8 23.3
Investment 23.0 19.4 20.7 20.9 20.6 21.9 22.7 21.0 20.4 20.6 20.7
Japan
Savings 27.1 26.8 29.2 29.2 28.2 29.7 28.9 30.0 30.4 30.3 29.7
Investment 24.5 24.4 25.6 25.8 25.2 25.8 26.8 26.4 26.6 26.6 26.4
Capital Account Balance –0.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
United Kingdom
Savings 13.3 13.1 14.1 15.6 14.6 17.2 16.6 15.8 14.3 14.3 14.7
Investment 16.9 17.0 18.1 18.2 17.6 17.7 18.7 17.7 17.1 17.1 17.3
Capital Account Balance –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1

Table A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing (continued)

(Percent of GDP)
Projections
Averages Average
2006–15 2010–17 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026–29
Canada
Net Lending and Borrowing –1.9 –3.1 –2.4 –2.0 –2.0 0.0 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 –1.3 –2.1
Current Account Balance –1.9 –3.1 –2.4 –2.0 –2.0 0.0 –0.4 –0.7 –1.0 –1.3 –2.1
Savings 22.0 21.0 21.0 21.1 20.7 24.3 25.0 23.3 22.4 22.2 21.3
Investment 24.0 24.1 23.4 23.0 22.7 24.3 25.4 24.0 23.4 23.4 23.4
Other Advanced Economies1
Savings 30.5 30.6 30.3 30.1 31.3 33.3 33.3 31.9 31.2 31.1 31.4
Investment 26.2 25.8 25.8 25.5 25.9 26.2 26.3 25.6 25.1 25.2 25.6
Capital Account Balance –0.1 –0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 –0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Net Lending and Borrowing 1.9 0.6 –0.1 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.0
Current Account Balance 1.8 0.5 –0.2 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.0
Savings 32.6 32.4 32.5 32.1 32.8 34.3 34.5 32.5 32.3 32.3 32.4
Investment 31.0 31.9 32.7 32.2 32.4 33.5 33.1 32.0 32.0 32.2 32.5
Regional Groups
Net Lending and Borrowing 3.0 1.4 –0.3 0.5 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.5
Current Account Balance 2.9 1.3 –0.3 0.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.5
Savings 43.0 42.1 40.0 39.5 40.3 41.0 41.1 39.3 39.4 39.3 38.9
Investment 40.2 40.8 40.2 39.1 38.7 39.8 39.7 38.3 38.6 38.4 38.3
Emerging and Developing Europe
Net Lending and Borrowing –0.4 –0.1 2.2 1.8 0.6 2.0 2.9 –0.2 –0.2 –0.6 –0.5
Current Account Balance –0.6 –0.4 1.8 1.4 0.1 1.6 2.7 –0.5 –0.3 –0.7 –0.7
Savings 23.5 23.7 25.7 24.3 24.0 26.2 28.2 24.5 23.1 23.1 24.0
Investment 24.0 24.1 23.8 23.0 23.9 24.5 25.4 24.8 23.4 23.8 24.7
Savings 20.1 18.6 16.4 16.7 17.8 18.6 18.1 18.6 18.7 18.6 18.9
Investment 21.8 21.2 19.1 18.8 18.1 20.5 20.4 19.7 19.6 19.8 20.1
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Net Lending and Borrowing 7.5 4.2 2.5 0.2 –3.5 3.1 8.1 3.5 1.7 0.7 0.1
Current Account Balance 7.6 4.1 2.9 0.4 –3.6 3.4 8.4 3.7 1.7 0.8 0.2
Savings 35.3 31.6 28.6 27.0 22.1 27.8 32.8 29.6 28.1 27.4 26.9
Investment 27.8 27.2 26.0 26.7 25.7 24.7 25.0 26.5 26.6 27.0 27.3
Capital Account Balance 0.2 0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Savings 20.3 19.1 20.0 20.1 20.3 22.0 20.0 19.5 19.0 19.7 21.2
Investment 21.4 21.4 21.6 23.0 22.8 22.8 21.8 22.0 21.8 22.1 23.4

Table A14. Summary of Net Lending and Borrowing (continued)

(Percent of GDP)
Projections
Averages Average
2006–15 2010–17 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026–29
Analytical Groups
Fuel
Net Lending and Borrowing 9.5 5.5 5.2 1.7 –3.4 5.1 11.1 5.2 3.7 2.3 1.5
Current Account Balance 9.6 5.5 5.5 1.9 –3.3 5.4 11.4 5.6 3.9 2.6 1.7
Savings 37.1 33.0 31.3 29.7 24.9 32.0 36.8 33.1 32.3 31.0 30.2
Investment 27.6 27.1 25.8 27.7 28.3 27.1 25.9 28.1 28.8 29.1 29.4
Capital Account Balance 0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.2 –0.3 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
Nonfuel
Net Lending and Borrowing 0.6 –0.2 –0.7 –0.1 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 –0.1
Current Account Balance 0.4 –0.3 –0.8 –0.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.2
Savings 31.9 32.2 32.6 32.4 33.6 34.5 34.3 32.5 32.3 32.5 32.6
Investment 31.5 32.6 33.4 32.7 32.8 34.0 33.8 32.4 32.3 32.5 32.8
Net Debtor Economies
Savings 23.4 22.8 22.7 22.5 22.9 23.7 23.2 23.6 22.8 22.9 23.5
Investment 25.9 25.5 25.4 24.7 23.9 25.7 25.9 25.0 24.6 24.9 25.6
Economies with Arrears and/or
Rescheduling during 2019–23
Savings 20.9 19.3 20.4 18.9 17.3 18.1 18.1 16.3 14.7 15.1 18.0
Investment 24.9 24.1 24.2 23.3 20.1 20.7 20.3 19.5 19.1 19.8 21.0
Memorandum
World
Savings 25.4 25.9 26.8 26.8 26.6 27.9 27.9 26.6 26.4 26.5 26.9
Investment 25.1 25.4 26.5 26.5 26.4 27.1 27.4 26.4 26.2 26.4 26.8
Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries’ national accounts and balance of payments statistics. Country group composites are calculated as the sum of the US dollar
values for the relevant individual countries. This differs from the calculations in the April 2005 and earlier issues of the World Economic Outlook, in which the composites were weighted
by GDP valued at purchasing power parities as a share of total world GDP. The estimates of gross national savings and investment (or gross capital formation) are from individual countries’
national accounts statistics. The estimates of the current account balance, the capital account balance, and the financial account balance (or net lending/net borrowing) are from the balance of
payments statistics. The link between domestic transactions and transactions with the rest of the world can be expressed as accounting identities. Savings (S) minus investment (I) is equal to
the current account balance (CAB) (S – I = CAB). Also, net lending/net borrowing (NLB) is the sum of the current account balance and the capital account balance (KAB) (NLB = CAB + KAB). In
practice, these identities do not hold exactly; imbalances result from imperfections in source data and compilation as well as from asymmetries in group composition due to data availability.

Table A15. Summary of World Medium-Term Baseline Scenario

Projections
Averages Averages
2006–15 2016–25 2022 2023 2024 2025 2022–25 2026–29
Annual Percent Change
World Real GDP 3.6 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2
Advanced Economies 1.5 1.9 2.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.7
Memorandum
Potential Output
Major Advanced Economies 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.6
World Trade, Volume1 4.1 2.7 5.7 0.8 3.1 3.4 3.2 3.3
Imports
Advanced Economies 3.0 2.5 7.2 –0.7 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.6
Exports
Terms of Trade
Advanced Economies 0.0 0.2 –1.7 0.7 0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 0.4 0.0 1.5 –0.8 –0.7 0.0 0.0 –0.2
World Prices in US Dollars
Manufactures 1.2 1.1 10.3 –1.6 1.6 1.2 2.8 1.3
Oil –0.5 3.6 39.2 –16.4 0.9 –10.4 1.3 –2.1
Nonfuel Primary Commodities 3.4 4.3 7.9 –5.7 2.9 –0.2 1.1 0.6
Consumer Prices
Interest Rates Percent
World Real Long-Term Interest Rate2 1.2 –0.7 –5.0 –1.3 0.8 1.4 –1.0 1.2
Current Account Balances Percent of GDP
Advanced Economies –0.2 0.5 –0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.5
Total External Debt
Debt Service
1 Data refer to trade in goods and services.
2 GDP-weighted average of 10-year (or nearest-maturity) government bond rates for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.

WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
SELECTED TOPICS
World Economic Outlook Archives

World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Realities, Risks April 2013
World Economic Outlook: Transitions and Tensions October 2013
World Economic Outlook: Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven April 2014
World Economic Outlook: Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties October 2014
World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth—Short- and Long-Term Factors April 2015
World Economic Outlook: Adjusting to Lower Commodity Prices October 2015
World Economic Outlook: Too Slow for Too Long April 2016
World Economic Outlook: Subdued Demand—Symptoms and Remedies October 2016
World Economic Outlook: Gaining Momentum? April 2017
World Economic Outlook: Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-Term Recovery,
Long-Term Challenges October 2017
World Economic Outlook: Cyclical Upswing, Structural Change April 2018
World Economic Outlook: Challenges to Steady Growth October 2018
World Economic Outlook: Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery April 2019
World Economic Outlook: Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers October 2019
World Economic Outlook: The Great Lockdown April 2020
World Economic Outlook: A Long and Difficult Ascent October 2020
World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries April 2021
World Economic Outlook: Uncharted Territory: Recovery during a Pandemic October 2021
World Economic Outlook: War Sets Back the Global Recovery April 2022
World Economic Outlook: Countering the Cost-of-Living Crisis October 2022
World Economic Outlook: A Rocky Recovery April 2023
World Economic Outlook: Growing Global Divergences October 2023
World Economic Outlook: Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence April 2024
World Economic Outlook: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats October 2024
I. Methodology—Aggregation, Modeling, and Forecasting

Fiscal Balance Sheets: The Significance of Nonfinancial Assets and October 2014, Box 3.3
Their Measurement
Tariff Scenarios October 2016, Scenario Box
World Growth Projections over the Medium Term October 2016, Box 1.1
Global Growth Forecast: Assumptions on Policies, Financial Conditions, and April 2019, Box 1.2
Commodity Prices
On the Underlying Source of Changes in Capital Goods Prices: April 2019, Box 3.3
A Model-Based Analysis
Global Growth Forecast: Assumptions on Policies, Financial Conditions, and October 2019, Box 1.3
Commodity Prices

Alternative Evolutions in the Fight against COVID-19 April 2020, Scenario Box
Alternative Scenarios October 2020, Scenario Box
Revised World Economic Outlook Purchasing-Power-Parity Weights October 2020, Box 1.1
Scenario Box April 2021
Downside Scenarios October 2021, Scenario Box
Scenario Box April 2022, Scenario Box
Risk Assessment around the World Economic Outlook Baseline Projection October 2022, Box 1.3
Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook Baseline Projections April 2023, Box 1.3
Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s Baseline Projections October 2023, Box 1.2
Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s Baseline Projections April 2024, Box 1.2
Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook’s Baseline Projections October 2024, Box 1.2
II. Historical Surveys

What Is the Effect of Recessions? October 2015, Box 1.1
Commodity Market Fragmentation in History: Many Shades of Gray October 2023, Box 3.2
III. Economic Growth—Sources and Patterns

Spillovers from Policy Uncertainty in the United States and Europe April 2013, Chapter 2,
Spillover Feature
Breaking through the Frontier: Can Today’s Dynamic Low-Income Countries Make It? April 2013, Chapter 4
What Explains the Slowdown in the BRICS? October 2013, Box 1.2
Dancing Together? Spillovers, Common Shocks, and the Role of Financial and Trade Linkages October 2013, Chapter 3
Output Synchronicity in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and in the October 2013, Box 3.1
Caucasus and Central Asia
Spillovers from Changes in U.S. Monetary Policy October 2013, Box 3.2
Saving and Economic Growth April 2014, Box 3.1
On the Receiving End? External Conditions and Emerging Market Growth before, during, April 2014, Chapter 4
and after the Global Financial Crisis
The Impact of External Conditions on Medium-Term Growth in Emerging Market Economies April 2014, Box 4.1
The Origins of IMF Growth Forecast Revisions since 2011 October 2014, Box 1.2
Underlying Drivers of U.S. Yields Matter for Spillovers October 2014, Chapter 2,
Spillover Feature
Is It Time for an Infrastructure Push? The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment October 2014, Chapter 3
The Macroeconomic Effects of Scaling Up Public Investment in Developing Economies October 2014, Box 3.4
Where Are We Headed? Perspectives on Potential Output April 2015, Chapter 3
Steady as She Goes—Estimating Sustainable Output April 2015, Box 3.1
Macroeconomic Developments and Outlook in Low-Income Developing Countries— April 2016, Box 1.2
The Role of External Factors
Time for a Supply-Side Boost? Macroeconomic Effects of Labor and Product Market April 2016, Chapter 3
Reforms in Advanced Economies
Road Less Traveled: Growth in Emerging Market and Developing Economies in a April 2017, Chapter 3
Complicated External Environment
Growing with Flows: Evidence from Industry-Level Data April 2017, Box 2.2
Emerging Market and Developing Economy Growth: Heterogeneity and Income Convergence October 2017, Box 1.3
over the Forecast Horizon
Manufacturing Jobs: Implications for Productivity and Inequality April 2018, Chapter 3

SELECTED TOPICS
Is Productivity Growth Shared in a Globalized Economy? April 2018, Chapter 4

Recent Dynamics of Potential Growth April 2018, Box 1.3
Growth Outlook: Advanced Economies October 2018, Box 1.2
Growth Outlook: Emerging Market and Developing Economies October 2018, Box 1.3
The Global Recovery 10 Years after the 2008 Financial Meltdown October 2018, Chapter 2
The Plucking Theory of the Business Cycle October 2019, Box 1.4
Reigniting Growth in Low-Income and Emerging Market Economies: What Role Can October 2019, Chapter 3
Structural Reforms Play?
Countering Future Recessions in Advanced Economies: Cyclical Policies in an April 2020, Chapter 2
Era of Low Rates and High Debt
The Great Lockdown: Dissecting the Economic Effects October 2020, Chapter 2
An Overview of the Literature on the Economic Impact of Lockdowns October 2020, Box 2.1
Global Manufacturing: V-Shaped Recovery and Implications for the Global Outlook April 2021, Box 1.1
After-Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Prospects for Medium-Term Economic Damage April 2021, Chapter 2
A Perfect Storm Hits the Hotel and Restaurant Sector April 2021, Box 2.1
Research and Innovation: Fighting the Pandemic and Boosting Long-Term Growth October 2021, Chapter 3
Dimming Growth Prospects: A Longer Path to Convergence October 2023, Box 1.1
The Uneven Economic Effects of Commodity Market Fragmentation October 2023, Box 3.3
Slowdown in Global Medium-Term Growth: What Will It Take to Turn the Tide? April 2024, Chapter 3
Allocative Efficiency: Concept, Examples, and Measurement April 2024, Box 3.1
The Potential Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Global Productivity and April 2024, Box 3.3
Labor Markets
IV. Inflation and Deflation and Commodity Markets

Commodity Market Review April 2013, Chapter 1,
Special Feature
The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Has Inflation Been Muzzled or Was It Just Sleeping? April 2013, Chapter 3
Does Inflation Targeting Still Make Sense with a Flatter Phillips Curve? April 2013, Box 3.1
Commodity Market Review October 2013, Chapter 1,
Special Feature
Energy Booms and the Current Account: Cross-Country Experience October 2013, Box 1.SF.1
Oil Price Drivers and the Narrowing WTI-Brent Spread October 2013, Box 1.SF.2
Anchoring Inflation Expectations When Inflation Is Undershooting April 2014, Box 1.3
Commodity Prices and Forecasts April 2014, Chapter 1,
Special Feature
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on Natural Gas October 2014, Chapter 1,
in the World Economy Special Feature
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on Investment April 2015, Chapter 1,
in an Era of Low Oil Prices Special Feature
The Oil Price Collapse: Demand or Supply? April 2015, Box 1.1
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on Metals in the October 2015, Chapter 1,
World Economy Special Feature
The New Frontiers of Metal Extraction: The North-to-South Shift October 2015, Chapter 1,
Special Feature Box 1.SF.1
Where Are Commodity Exporters Headed? Output Growth in the Aftermath October 2015, Chapter 2
of the Commodity Boom
The Not-So-Sick Patient: Commodity Booms and the Dutch Disease Phenomenon October 2015, Box 2.1
Do Commodity Exporters’ Economies Overheat during Commodity Booms? October 2015, Box 2.4

Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on the April 2016, Chapter 1,
Energy Transition in an Era of Low Fossil Fuel Prices Special Feature
Global Disinflation in an Era of Constrained Monetary Policy October 2016, Chapter 3
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on Food Security and October 2016, Chapter 1,
Markets in the World Economy Special Feature
How Much Do Global Prices Matter for Food Inflation? October 2016, Box 3.3
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on the Role of Technology and April 2017, Chapter 1,
Unconventional Sources in the Global Oil Market Special Feature
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts October 2017, Chapter 1,
Special Feature
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts April 2018, Chapter 1,
Special Feature
What Has Held Core Inflation Back in Advanced Economies? April 2018, Box 1.2
The Role of Metals in the Economics of Electric Vehicles April 2018, Box 1.SF.1
Inflation Outlook: Regions and Countries October 2018, Box 1.4
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts, with a Focus on Recent Trends in October 2018, Chapter 1,
Energy Demand Special Feature
The Demand and Supply of Renewable Energy October 2018, Box 1.SF.1
Challenges for Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets as Global Financial Conditions Normalize October 2018, Chapter 3
Inflation Dynamics in a Wider Group of Emerging Market and Developing Economies October 2018, Box 3.1
Commodity Special Feature April 2019, Chapter 1,
Special Feature
Special Feature
Special Feature
Special Feature
What Is Happening with Global Carbon Emissions in 2019? October 2020, Chapter 1,
Special Feature Box 1.SF.1
Special Feature
House Prices and Consumer Price Inflation October 2021, Box 1.1
Special Feature
Inflation Scares October 2021, Chapter 2
Core Inflation in the COVID-19 Crisis October 2021, Box 2.2
Market Developments and the Pace of Fossil Fuel Divestment April 2022, Special Feature
Dissecting Recent WEO Inflation Forecast Errors October 2022, Box 1.1
Market Power and Inflation during COVID-19 October 2022, Box 1.2
Commodity Market Developments and Food Inflation Drivers October 2022, Special Feature
Commodity Market Developments and the Macroeconomic Impact of Declines in April 2023, Chapter 1,
Fossil Fuel Extraction Special Feature
Commodity Prices and Monetary Policy: High Frequency Analysis October 2023, Commodity
Special Feature
Online Annex 1.1
Firms’ Inflation Expectations, Attention, and Monetary Policy Effectiveness October 2023, Box 2.1
Energy Subsidies, Inflation, and Expectations: Unpacking Euro Area Measures October 2023, Box 2.3
Fragmentation and Commodity Markets: Vulnerabilities and Risks October 2023, Chapter 3
Commodity Trade Tensions: Evidence from Tanker Traffic Data October 2023, Box 3.1

SELECTED TOPICS
Market Developments and the Inflationary Effects of Metals Supply Shocks October 2024, Commodity
Special Feature
The Great Tightening: Insights from the Recent Inflation Episode October 2024, Chapter 2
V. Fiscal Policy
The Great Divergence of Policies April 2013, Box 1.1
Public Debt Overhang and Private Sector Performance April 2013, Box 1.2
Is It Time for an Infrastructure Push? The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment October 2014, Chapter 3
Improving the Efficiency of Public Investment October 2014, Box 3.2
The Macroeconomic Effects of Scaling Up Public Investment in Developing Economies October 2014, Box 3.4
Fiscal Institutions, Rules, and Public Investment October 2014, Box 3.5
Commodity Booms and Public Investment October 2015, Box 2.2
Cross-Border Impacts of Fiscal Policy: Still Relevant October 2017, Chapter 4
The Spillover Impact of U.S. Government Spending Shocks on External Positions October 2017, Box 4.1
Macroeconomic Impact of Corporate Tax Policy Changes April 2018, Box 1.5
Place-Based Policies: Rethinking Fiscal Policies to Tackle Inequalities within Countries October 2019, Box 2.4
Coming Down to Earth: How to Tackle Soaring Public Debt April 2023, Chapter 3
Market Reforms to Promote Growth and Debt Sustainability April 2023, Box 3.1
Fiscal Imprudence and Inflation Expectations: The Role of Monetary Policy Frameworks October 2023, Box 2.1
Industrial Policies in Emerging Markets: Old and New April 2024, Box 4.1
The Role of Price-Suppressing Policies October 2024, Box 2.2
VI. Monetary Policy, Financial Markets, and Flow of Funds

The Great Divergence of Policies April 2013, Box 1.1
Taper Talks: What to Expect When the United States Is Tightening October 2013, Box 1.1
Credit Supply and Economic Growth April 2014, Box 1.1
Should Advanced Economies Worry about Growth Shocks in Emerging Market Economies? April 2014, Chapter 2,
Spillover Feature
Perspectives on Global Real Interest Rates April 2014, Chapter 3
Housing Markets across the Globe: An Update October 2014, Box 1.1
U.S. Monetary Policy and Capital Flows to Emerging Markets April 2016, Box 2.2
A Transparent Risk-Management Approach to Monetary Policy October 2016, Box 3.5
Will the Revival in Capital Flows to Emerging Markets Be Sustained? October 2017, Box 1.2
The Role of Financial Sector Repair in the Speed of the Recovery October 2018, Box 2.3
Clarity of Central Bank Communications and the Extent of Anchoring of Inflation Expectations October 2018, Box 3.2
Can Negative Policy Rates Stimulate the Economy? April 2020, Box 2.1
Dampening Global Financial Shocks in Emerging Markets: Can Macroprudential Regulation Help? April 2020, Chapter 3
Macroprudential Policies and Credit: A Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Findings April 2020, Box 3.1
Do Emerging Markets Adjust Macroprudential Regulation in Response to Global Financial Shocks? April 2020, Box 3.2
Rising Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Bankruptcy and Insolvency Risks: April 2020, Box 1.3
Assessment and Policy Options
Shifting Gears: Monetary Policy Spillovers during the Recovery from COVID-19 April 2021, Chapter 4
Emerging Market Asset Purchase Programs: Rationale and Effectiveness April 2021, Box 4.1
Monetary Expansions and Inflationary Risks October 2021, Box 1.3
Policy Responses and Expectations in Inflation Acceleration Episodes October 2021, Box 2.3

Determinants of Neutral Interest Rates and Uncertain Prospects April 2022, Box 1.2
Private Sector Debt and the Global Recovery April 2022, Chapter 2
Rising Household Indebtedness, the Global Saving Glut of the Rich, and the Natural Interest Rate April 2022, Box 2.2
House Prices: Coming Off the Boil April 2023, Box 1.1
Monetary Policy: Speed of Transmission, Heterogeneity, and Asymmetries April 2023, Box 1.2
The Natural Rate of Interest: Drivers and Implications for Policy April 2023, Chapter 2
Spillovers to Emerging Market and Developing Economies April 2023, Box 2.3
Monetary and Fiscal Interactions April 2023, Box 3.2
Managing Expectations: Inflation and Monetary Policy October 2023, Chapter 2
Feeling the Pinch? Tracing the Effects of Monetary Policy through Housing Markets April 2024, Chapter 2
Weakening Interest Rate Pass-Through in Europe April 2024, Box 2.1
The Great Tightening: Insights from the Recent Inflation Episode October 2024, Chapter 2
The Role of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies October 2024, Box 2.1
VII. Labor Markets, Poverty, and Inequality

Reforming Collective-Bargaining Systems to Achieve High and Stable Employment April 2016, Box 3.2
Understanding the Downward Trend in Labor Shares April 2017, Chapter 3
Labor Force Participation Rates in Advanced Economies October 2017, Box 1.1
Recent Wage Dynamics in Advanced Economies: Drivers and Implications October 2017, Chapter 2
Labor Market Dynamics by Skill Level October 2017, Box 2.1
Worker Contracts and Nominal Wage Rigidities in Europe: Firm-Level Evidence October 2017, Box 2.2
Wage and Employment Adjustment after the Global Financial Crisis: Firm-Level Evidence October 2017, Box 2.3
Labor Force Participation in Advanced Economies: Drivers and Prospects April 2018, Chapter 2
Youth Labor Force Participation in Emerging Market and Developing Economies versus April 2018, Box 2.1
Advanced Economies
Storm Clouds Ahead? Migration and Labor Force Participation Rates April 2018, Box 2.4
Are Manufacturing Jobs Better Paid? Worker-Level Evidence from Brazil April 2018, Box 3.3
The Global Financial Crisis, Migration, and Fertility October 2018, Box 2.1
The Employment Impact of Automation Following the Global Financial Crisis: October 2018, Box 2.2
The Case of Industrial Robots
Labor Market Dynamics in Select Advanced Economies April 2019, Box 1.1
Worlds Apart? Within-Country Regional Disparities April 2019, Box 1.3
Closer Together or Further Apart? Within-Country Regional Disparities and Adjustment in October 2019, Chapter 2
Advanced Economies
Climate Change and Subnational Regional Disparities October 2019, Box 2.2
The Macroeconomic Effects of Global Migration April 2020, Chapter 4
Immigration: Labor Market Effects and the Role of Automation April 2020, Box 4.1
Inclusiveness in Emerging Market and Developing Economies and the Impact of COVID-19 October 2020, Box 1.2
Recessions and Recoveries in Labor Markets: Patterns, Policies, and Responses to the April 2021, Chapter 3
COVID-19 Shock
Jobs and the Green Economy October 2021, Box 1.2
The Puzzle of Tight Labor Markets: US and UK Examples April 2022, Box 1.1
Inequality and Public Debt Sustainability April 2022, Box 2.1
A Greener Labor Market: Employment, Policies, and Economic Transformation April 2022, Chapter 3
The Geography of Green- and Pollution-Intensive Jobs: Evidence from the United States April 2022, Box 3.1
A Greener Post-COVID Job Market? April 2022, Box 3.2

SELECTED TOPICS
Wage Dynamics Post–COVID-19 and Wage Price Spiral Risks October 2022, Chapter 2
Pass-Through from Wages to Prices: Estimates from the United States October 2022, Box 2.1
Distributional Implications of Medium-Term Growth Prospects April 2024, Box 3.2
Understanding the Social Acceptability of Structural Reforms October 2024, Chapter 3
Policies to Facilitate the Integration of Ukrainian Refugees into the European Labor Market: October 2024, Box 3.1
Early Evidence
VIII. Exchange Rate Issues

Exchange Rate Regimes and Crisis Susceptibility in Emerging Markets April 2014, Box 1.4
Exchange Rates and Trade Flows: Disconnected? October 2015, Chapter 3
The Relationship between Exchange Rates and Global-Value-Chain-Related Trade October 2015, Box 3.1
Measuring Real Effective Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: The Role of Global Value Chains October 2015, Box 3.2
Labor Force Participation Rates in Advanced Economies October 2017, Box 1.1
Recent Wage Dynamics in Advanced Economies: Drivers and Implications October 2017, Chapter 2
Labor Market Dynamics by Skill Level October 2017, Box 2.1
Worker Contracts and Nominal Wage Rigidities in Europe: Firm-Level Evidence October 2017, Box 2.2
Wage and Employment Adjustment after the Global Financial Crisis: Firm-Level Evidence October 2017, Box 2.3
IX. External Payments, Trade, Capital Movements, and Foreign Debt

The Evolution of Current Account Deficits in the Euro Area April 2013, Box 1.3
External Rebalancing in the Euro Area October 2013, Box 1.3
The Yin and Yang of Capital Flow Management: Balancing Capital Inflows with Capital Outflows October 2013, Chapter 4
Simulating Vulnerability to International Capital Market Conditions October 2013, Box 4.1
The Trade Implications of the U.S. Shale Gas Boom October 2014, Box 1.SF.1
Are Global Imbalances at a Turning Point? October 2014, Chapter 4
Switching Gears: The 1986 External Adjustment October 2014, Box 4.1
A Tale of Two Adjustments: East Asia and the Euro Area October 2014, Box 4.2
Understanding the Role of Cyclical and Structural Factors in the Global Trade Slowdown April 2015, Box 1.2
Small Economies, Large Current Account Deficits October 2015, Box 1.2
Capital Flows and Financial Deepening in Developing Economies October 2015, Box 1.3
Dissecting the Global Trade Slowdown April 2016, Box 1.1
Understanding the Slowdown in Capital Flows to Emerging Markets April 2016, Chapter 2
Capital Flows to Low-Income Developing Countries April 2016, Box 2.1
The Potential Productivity Gains from Further Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization April 2016, Box 3.3
Global Trade: What’s behind the Slowdown? October 2016, Chapter 2
The Evolution of Emerging Market and Developing Economies’ Trade Integration with April 2017, Box 2.3
China’s Final Demand
Shifts in the Global Allocation of Capital: Implications for Emerging Market and April 2017, Box 2.4
Developing Economies
Macroeconomic Adjustment in Emerging Market Commodity Exporters October 2017, Box 1.4
Remittances and Consumption Smoothing October 2017, Box 1.5
A Multidimensional Approach to Trade Policy Indicators April 2018, Box 1.6
The Rise of Services Trade April 2018, Box 3.2
Role of Foreign Aid in Improving Productivity in Low-Income Developing Countries April 2018, Box 4.3
Global Trade Tensions October 2018, Scenario Box

The Price of Capital Goods: A Driver of Investment under Threat? April 2019, Chapter 3
Evidence from Big Data: Capital Goods Prices across Countries April 2019, Box 3.2
Capital Goods Tariffs and Investment: Firm-Level Evidence from Colombia April 2019, Box 3.4
The Drivers of Bilateral Trade and the Spillovers from Tariffs April 2019, Chapter 4
Gross versus Value-Added Trade April 2019, Box 4.1
Bilateral and Aggregate Trade Balances April 2019, Box 4.2
Understanding Trade Deficit Adjustments: Does Bilateral Trade Play a Special Role? April 2019, Box 4.3
The Global Macro and Micro Effects of a U.S.–China Trade Dispute: Insights from Three Models April 2019, Box 4.4
A No-Deal Brexit April 2019, Scenario Box
Implications of Advanced Economies Reshoring Some Production October 2019,
Scenario Box 1.1
Trade Tensions: Updated Scenario October 2019,
Scenario Box 1.2
The Decline in World Foreign Direct Investment in 2018 October 2019, Box 1.2
Global Trade and Value Chains during the Pandemic April 2022, Chapter 4
Effects of Global Supply Disruptions during the Pandemic April 2022, Box 4.1
The Impact of Lockdowns on Trade: Evidence from Shipping Data April 2022, Box 4.2
Firm-Level Trade Adjustment to the COVID-19 Pandemic in France April 2022, Box 4.3
Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Natural Interest Rate April 2023, Box 2.2
Geoeconomic Fragmentation and Foreign Direct Investment April 2023, Chapter 4
Rising Trade Tensions April 2023, Box 4.1
Balance Sheet Exposure to Fragmentation Risk April 2023, Box 4.2
Geopolitical Tensions, Supply Chains, and Trade April 2023, Box 4.3
Fragmentation Is Already Affecting International Trade April 2024, Box 1.1
Trading Places: Real Spillovers from G20 Emerging Markets April 2024, Chapter 4
Capital Flows to G20 Emerging Markets and the Allocation Puzzle April 2024, Box 4.2
The Global Automotive Industry and the Shift to Electric Vehicles October 2024, Box 1.1
X. Regional Issues
The Evolution of Current Account Deficits in the Euro Area April 2013, Box 1.3
Still Attached? Labor Force Participation Trends in European Regions April 2018, Box 2.3
XI. Country-Specific Analyses

Abenomics: Risks after Early Success? October 2013, Box 1.4
Is China’s Spending Pattern Shifting (away from Commodities)? April 2014, Box 1.2
Public Investment in Japan during the Lost Decade October 2014, Box 3.1
Japanese Exports: What’s the Holdup? October 2015, Box 3.3
The Japanese Experience with Deflation October 2016, Box 3.2
Permanently Displaced? Labor Force Participation in U.S. States and Metropolitan Areas April 2018, Box 2.2
Immigration and Wages in Germany April 2020, Box 4.2
The Impact of Migration from Venezuela on Latin America and the Caribbean April 2020, Box 4.3
Pass-Through from Wages to Prices: Estimates from the United States October 2022, Box 2.1
Political Economy of Carbon Pricing: Experiences from South Africa, Sweden, and Uruguay October 2022, Box 3.2
China’s Monetary Policy and the Housing Market April 2024, Box 2.2

SELECTED TOPICS
XII. Climate Change Issues

The Effects of Weather Shocks on Economic Activity: How Can Low-Income Countries Cope? October 2017, Chapter 3
The Growth Impact of Tropical Cyclones October 2017, Box 3.1
The Role of Policies in Coping with Weather Shocks: A Model-Based Analysis October 2017, Box 3.2
Strategies for Coping with Weather Shocks and Climate Change: Selected Case Studies October 2017, Box 3.3
Coping with Weather Shocks: The Role of Financial Markets October 2017, Box 3.4
Historical Climate, Economic Development, and the World Income Distribution October 2017, Box 3.5
Mitigating Climate Change October 2017, Box 3.6
The Price of Manufactured Low-Carbon Energy Technologies April 2019, Box 3.1
What’s Happening with Global Carbon Emissions? October 2019, Box 1.SF.1
Mitigating Climate Change—Growth and Distribution-Friendly Strategies October 2020, Chapter 3
Glossary October 2020, Box 3.1
Zooming in on the Electricity Sector: The First Step toward Decarbonization October 2020, Box 3.2
Who Suffers Most from Climate Change? The Case of Natural Disasters April 2021, Box 1.2
Jobs and the Green Economy October 2021, Box 1.2
Clean Tech and the Role of Basic Scientific Research October 2021, Box 3.2
Commodity Market Developments and Forecasts October 2021, Chapter 1
Special Feature
A Greener Labor Market: Employment, Policies, and Economic Transformation April 2022, Chapter 3
The Geography of Green- and Pollution-Intensive Jobs: Evidence from the United States April 2022, Box 3.1
A Greener Post-COVID Job Market? April 2022, Box 3.2
Near-Term Macroeconomic Impact of Decarbonization Policies October 2022, Chapter 3
Near-Term Implications of Carbon Pricing: A Review of the Literature October 2022, Box 3.1
Political Economy of Carbon Pricing: Experiences from South Africa, Sweden, and Uruguay October 2022, Box 3.2
Decarbonizing the Power Sector While Managing Renewables’ Intermittence October 2022, Box 3.3
The Natural Rate of Interest and the Green Transition April 2023, Box 2.1
The Global Automotive Industry and the Shift to Electric Vehicles October 2024, Box 1.1
XIII. Special Topics

Getting By with a Little Help from a Boom: Do Commodity Windfalls Speed Up October 2015, Box 2.3
Human Development?
Breaking the Deadlock: Identifying the Political Economy Drivers of Structural Reforms April 2016, Box 3.1
Can Reform Waves Turn the Tide? Some Case Studies Using the Synthetic Control Method April 2016, Box 3.4
A Global Rush for Land October 2016, Box 1.SF.1
Conflict, Growth, and Migration April 2017, Box 1.1
Tackling Measurement Challenges of Irish Economic Activity April 2017, Box 1.2
Within-Country Trends in Income per Capita: The Cases of Brazil, Russia, India, April 2017, Box 2.1
China, and South Africa
Technological Progress and Labor Shares: A Historical Overview April 2017, Box 3.1
The Elasticity of Substitution between Capital and Labor: Concept and Estimation April 2017, Box 3.2
Routine Tasks, Automation, and Economic Dislocation around the World April 2017, Box 3.3
Adjustments to the Labor Share of Income April 2017, Box 3.4
Smartphones and Global Trade April 2018, Box 1.1
Has Mismeasurement of the Digital Economy Affected Productivity Statistics? April 2018, Box 1.4
The Changing Service Content of Manufactures April 2018, Box 3.1

Patent Data and Concepts April 2018, Box 4.1

International Technology Sourcing and Knowledge Spillovers April 2018, Box 4.2
Relationship between Competition, Concentration, and Innovation April 2018, Box 4.4
Increasing Market Power October 2018, Box 1.1
Sharp GDP Declines: Some Stylized Facts October 2018, Box 1.5
Predicting Recessions and Slowdowns: A Daunting Task October 2018, Box 1.6
The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects April 2019, Chapter 2
The Comovement between Industry Concentration and Corporate Saving April 2019, Box 2.1
Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on Market Power April 2019, Box 2.2
The Global Automobile Industry: Recent Developments, and Implications for the Global Outlook October 2019, Box 1.1
Measuring Subnational Regional Economic Activity and Welfare October 2019, Box 2.1
The Persistent Effects of Local Shocks: The Case of Automotive Manufacturing Plant Closures October 2019, Box 2.3
The Political Effects of Structural Reforms October 2019, Box 3.1
The Impact of Crises on Structural Reforms October 2019, Box 3.2
The Persistence and Drivers of the Common Component of Interest Rate–Growth Differentials in April 2020, Box 2.2
Advanced Economies
Social Unrest during COVID-19 October 2020, Box 1.4
The Role of Information Technology Adoption during the Pandemic: Evidence from the October 2020, Box 2.2
United States
Education Losses during the Pandemic and the Role of Infrastructure April 2021, Box 2.2
Food Insecurity and the Business Cycle April 2021, Chapter 1,
Annex 1.SF.1
Food Insecurity and Prices during COVID-19 October 2021, Box 2.1
mRNA Vaccines and the Role of Basic Scientific Research October 2021, Box 3.1
Intellectual Property, Competition, and Innovation October 2021, Box 3.3
The Role of Price-Suppressing Policies October 2024, Box 2.2
Understanding the Social Acceptability of Structural Reforms October 2024, Chapter 3
Policies to Facilitate the Integration of Ukrainian Refugees into the European Labor Market: October 2024, Box 3.1
Early Evidence

IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION OF THE OUTLOOK,
OCTOBER 2024
The following remarks were made by the Chair at the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion of the
Fiscal Monitor, Global Financial Stability Report, and World Economic Outlook on October 8, 2024.
E
xecutive Directors broadly agreed with staff ’s investment and growth, especially in emerging market
assessment of the global economic outlook, and developing economies heavily reliant on external
risks, and policy priorities. They welcomed financing. Directors also noted still-acute pressures on
the continued growth resilience of the global commercial real estate sectors and ongoing property
economy in the face of recurring shocks. Directors sector adjustments in some countries. Some Directors
highlighted that monetary policy has managed to bring highlighted upside risks to the outlook, including
about disinflation with so‑far limited cost to output a stronger recovery in investment in advanced
and employment, increasing the likelihood of a smooth economies, better performance in some emerging
landing. They noted, however, that the recovery market economies, and economic benefits from
remains uneven and that growth, while steady, remains artificial intelligence.
underwhelming, reflecting weak productivity growth. Directors called on central banks to carefully
They noted that mediocre medium‑term growth and calibrate monetary policy to restore price stability,
rising debt trajectories increase the risk that the global avoiding a tighter-than-necessary stance that could
economy will become entrenched in a low-growth, weaken growth and employment. They emphasized
high-debt environment. Against this backdrop, they the importance of remaining data dependent and
agreed that, as monetary policy becomes less restrictive, clearly communicating policy decisions. Directors
a renewed emphasis on gradual and sustained fiscal stressed that, in economies where core inflation persists
consolidation, coupled with ambitious structural at above-target levels, policy rates should remain in
reforms, is needed, with due regard for country‑specific restrictive territory until underlying inflation shows
conditions. clear signs of moving toward target. They agreed that
While most Directors agreed that risks to the moving to a more neutral stance is appropriate in
outlook are now tilted to the downside, a number economies where inflation is unambiguously abating,
of Directors also cautioned against overstating the long-term inflation expectations remain anchored, and
deterioration in the balance of risks. Directors output gaps are closing. Given elevated economic and
noted, in particular, risks from potentially more policy uncertainty, Directors called on central banks
persistent underlying inflation, increased geopolitical to stand ready to mitigate the potential disruptive
conflicts and tensions in different regions, and the impacts of foreign exchange volatility and capital
intensification of protectionist policies that could flows, including by leveraging, where appropriate,
weigh down on medium-term growth. Directors the country-specific guidance provided by the IMF’s
noted that while the monetary easing underway has Integrated Policy Framework.
helped keep financial conditions accommodative and Directors welcomed that the global banking sector
near-term financial stability risks at bay, this may in has remained resilient and emphasized that further
turn facilitate the buildup of financial vulnerabilities. progress on adopting and implementing frameworks for
They stressed that the widening disconnect between recovery and resolution is critical for addressing weak
subdued financial market volatility, relative to elevated or failing banks. They concurred that full, timely, and
economic and geopolitical uncertainty, increases the consistent implementation of international standards,
chances of sharp disorderly repricing. Further volatility including Basel III, remains important to enhance
surges could impair financial stability as well as prudential frameworks. Directors stressed the need

to improve non-bank financial institutions’ liquidity Directors stressed the importance of advancing
preparedness, implement the Financial Stability Board’s structural reforms to boost growth and accelerate
agreed-upon standards, close data gaps, and enhance the green transition, noting the need to enhance the
stress testing for non-banks to reduce systemic risks. social acceptability of these reforms through enhanced
Directors generally called for sustained, gradual, communication and trust-building mechanisms.
and carefully designed fiscal adjustments amid They emphasized that targeted reforms are needed
elevated public debt and associated risks. They noted to boost productivity, enhance competition, improve
that larger adjustments than currently envisaged human capital, and increase labor force participation.
in many countries are needed to stabilize debt Directors reiterated the need to advance with climate
and build necessary buffers against adverse shocks. mitigation and adaptation reforms. In this context,
Directors stressed that the pace of adjustment some Directors emphasized the need to strengthen
should be calibrated to country-specific economic efforts to increase climate finance for adaptation,
conditions, should ensure continuous support to especially for vulnerable countries exposed to
the most vulnerable and protect public investment, significant climate risks.
and should be well communicated and anchored in Directors underscored that stronger multilateral
credible medium-term frameworks. They stressed cooperation is essential to facilitate debt restructuring
that strengthening fiscal governance should be a processes, mitigate risks from geoeconomic
priority and would help reduce the debt buildup from fragmentation, and accelerate the green transition in a
contingent liabilities and arrears. manner consistent with World Trade Organization rules.

Timely.
Topical.
Free.
Global economics at your fingertips
IMF.org/pubs | bookstore.IMF.org | eLibrary.IMF.org
IN THIS ISSUE:
CHAPTER 1
Global Prospects and Policies
CHAPTER 2
The Great Tightening: Insights from
the Recent Inflation Episode
CHAPTER 3
Understanding the Social Acceptability
of Structural Reforms
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OCTOBER 2024

World Economic Outlook: Policy Pivot, Rising Threats

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Cover and Design: IMF CSF Creative Solutions Division

Names: International Monetary Fund.

ISBN 979-8-40028-115-0 (English Paper)

Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund. 2024. World Economic Outlook:

Publication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:

Assumptions and Conventions vii

Executive Summary xiv

Chapter 1. Global Prospects and Policies 1

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 iii

IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook, October 2024 155

iv International Monetary Fund | October 2024

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 v

Figure 1.15. Current Account and International Investment Positions 15

vi International Monetary Fund | October 2024

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 vii

In the tables and figures, the following conventions apply:

viii International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Corrections and Revisions

Print and Digital Editions

Copyright and Reuse

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 ix

x International Monetary Fund | October 2024

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 xi

xii International Monetary Fund | October 2024

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 xiii

xiv International Monetary Fund | October 2024

GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 1

(deviation from Jan. 2020 WEO Update)

Source: IMF staff calculations. Source: IMF staff calculations.

prepandemic trends. Even as labor market pressure has

2 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

20:Q1 2.5 2. Vacancy to Unemployment

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 3

back private credit growth and investment, moderating 0

space has constrained their ability to tackle energy and 0.0

4 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Figure 1.6. Fiscal Policy Stance Returning Financial Market Volatility

historical average. However, vulnerabilities that contrib-

Rising Geopolitical Tensions but Limited Impact

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 5

have started to emerge, with increasingly more trade

6 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

1.0 1. Trade between Blocs 100

0.0 Euro area

−1.5 60 2. Recent PMI trends

0.5 2. Trade with Nonaligned Countries 50

0.0 45 Developed markets: Manufacturing

Emerging markets: Manufacturing

−1.5 Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 7

8 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 9

Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections

10 International Monetary Fund | October 2024

Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections (continued)

International Monetary Fund | October 2024 11

12 International Monetary Fund | October 2024