Informe Del FMI

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
EXTERNAL
SECTOR
REPORT
External Rebalancing in
Turbulent Times
2023
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
EXTERNAL
SECTOR
REPORT
External Rebalancing in
Turbulent Times
2023
©2023 International Monetary Fund
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.

Title: External sector report (International Monetary Fund).
Other titles: ESR
Description: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012- | Annual | Some issues also have thematic
titles. | Began in 2012. | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISSN 2617-3832 (print) | ISSN 2617-3840 (online)
Subjects: LCSH: Balance of payments—Periodicals. | Debts, External—Periodicals. | Investments, Foreign—
Periodicals. | International finance—Periodicals.
Classification: LCC HG3882.I58
ISBN: 979-8-40024-568-8 (Paper)

979-8-40024-921-1 (ePub)
979-8-40024-923-5 (PDF)
The External Sector Report (ESR) is a survey by the IMF staff published once a year, in the summer.
The ESR is prepared by the IMF staff and has benefited from comments and suggestions by Executive
Directors following their discussion of the report on July 13, 2023. The views expressed in this pub-
lication are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive
Directors or their national authorities.
Recommended citation: International Monetary Fund. 2023. External Sector Report: External Rebalancing
in Turbulent Times. Washington, DC, July.
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CONTENTS
Further Information vii
Preface viii
Executive Summary ix
IMF Executive Board Discussion Summary x
Chapter 1. External Positions and Policies 1

Recovery, War, and Policy Shocks 1
Recent Developments in Current Account Balances 1
Currencies, Financial Flows, and Balance Sheets 4
Assessment of External Positions in 2022 11
Outlook for Current Account Balances and Risks 14
Policy Priorities for Promoting External Rebalancing 18
Box 1.1. The Financial Side of Global Imbalances 21
Box 1.2. Trends in Currency Exposures of External Balance Sheets 26
Box 1.3. Trade Costs and Current Account Imbalances 27
References 36
Online Annex 1.1. Forecasting Net International Investment Positions
Chapter 2. External Sector Implications of the Global Dollar Cycle 39

Introduction 39
Characterizing the Global Dollar Cycle 41
Empirical Analysis: Spillovers from the Global Dollar Cycle 44
Model Simulations: FSGM 52
Conclusion 55
Box 2.1. The 2021–22 Strong-Dollar Episode and Spillovers to Commodity Exporters 57
References 59
Online Annex 2.1. Data
Chapter 3. 2022 Individual Economy Assessments 61

Methodology and Process 61
Selection of Economies 61
Box 3.1. Assessing Imbalances: The Role of Policies—An Example 62
Abbreviations and Acronyms 63
Technical Endnotes by Economy 94
References 97
Figures
Figure 1.1. Global Current Account Balances, REER, and Capital Flows, 1990–2022 2
Figure 1.2. The COVID-19 Crisis and the War in Ukraine 2
Figure 1.3. Movements in Oil Trade Balance and Current Account for Oil Exporters and Importers 3
Figure 1.4. Trade in Goods and Services Compared with Pre-pandemic Trends 3
International Monetary Fund | 2023 iii

2023 EXTERNAL SECTOR REPORT
Figure 1.5. Global Current Account Balances, with the Contributions from Cyclical and
COVID-19 Factors 4
Figure 1.6. Average Fiscal Policy Changes, 2021–22 4
Figure 1.7. Current Account Decomposition 5
Figure 1.8. Currency Movements 5
Figure 1.9. Exchange Market Pressure and Its Components 6
Figure 1.10. Exchange Market Pressure and Inflation, 2022 7
Figure 1.11. Cross-Currency Basis Swap against US Dollar 7
Figure 1.12. Capital Flows to Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8
Figure 1.13. Incidence of Extreme Capital Flows: Number of Surges, Stops, Flights, and
Retrenchments 8
Figure 1.14. Cumulative High-Frequency Portfolio Flows to EMDEs January 2022–April 2023 9
Figure 1.15. Net International Investment Positions, 1990–2022 10
Figure 1.16. Sum of Cross-Border Assets and Liabilities 10
Figure 1.17. International Investment Position Valuation Change and Net International
Investment Position, 2022 11
Figure 1.18. The Evolution of Global Financial Safety Net, 1995–2021 11
Figure 1.19. External Balance Assessment Current Account Norms, 2022 12
Figure 1.20. Evolution of External Sector Assessments, 2012–22 13
Figure 1.21. Evolution of Headline Current Account Balances and IMF Staff Gaps 13
Figure 1.22. IMF Staff Current Account and Real Effective Exchange Rate Gaps 14
Figure 1.23. Change in 2023 Current Account Balances 17
Figure 1.24. Number of Trade Restrictions, 2009–22 18
Figure 1.25 Exchange Market Pressure and REER Gaps 19
Figure 1.1.1. China: Current Account Surplus and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter Trailing Sums 21
Figure 1.1.2. Saudi Arabia: Current Account Surplus and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter
Trailing Sums 21
Figure 1.1.3. Russia: Current Account Surplus and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter Trailing Sums 22
Figure 1.1.4. Bank for International Settlements Reporting Banks’ Cross-Border Positions on
Residents of Russia 22
Figure 1.1.5. United States: Current Account Surplus and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter
Trailing Sums 22
Figure 1.1.6. Net Foreign Purchases of US Securities 23
Figure 1.1.7. US Incurrence of Portfolio Investment Liabilities 23
Figure 1.1.8. Net Foreign Purchases of US Securities 24
Figure 1.1.9. Total Foreign Holdings of US Treasury Securities 25
Figure 1.1.10. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves 25
Figure 1.1.11. China: Incurrence of Portfolio Investment Assets 25
Figure 1.2.1. Cumulative Distribution of Foreign Currency Exposures 26
Figure 1.3.1. Trade Openness and Current Account Balances since 1870 27
Figure 1.3.2. Effect of a Labor Productivity Shock on a Representative EMDE:
Baseline and Higher Trade Cost 28
Figure 2.1. Nominal US Dollar Trade-Weighted Index against Major Advanced Economies 41
Figure 2.2. The US Dollar Index and the Global Dollar Cycle 42
Figure 2.3. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation: Macro Aggregates 45
Figure 2.4. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation: External Sector Variables 46
Figure 2.5. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation: Financial Variables 47
Figure 2.6. Country Characteristics 49
iv International Monetary Fund | 2023

Contents
Figure 2.7. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation by Degree of Anchoring of

Inflation Expectations 50
Figure 2.8. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation by Net Commodity Exporter Status 51
Figure 2.9. Impact of a US Dollar Appreciation on Global Balances 52
Figure 2.10. Impulse Responses to a Global Risk Premium Shock in the Flexible System of
Global Models 54
Figure 2.1.1. US Dollar Index and Commodity Prices 57
Figure 2.1.2. Real GDP Growth Revisions for Two Large US Dollar Appreciation Episodes 58
Tables
Table 1.1. Selected Economies: Current Account Balance, 2020–23 15
Table 1.2. Selected Economies: Net International Investment Position, 2019–22 16
Annex Table 1.1.1. Selected Economies: Foreign Reserves, 2019–22 29
Annex Table 1.1.2. External Sector Report Economies: Summary of External Assessment
Indicators, 2022 30
Annex Table 1.1.3. External Sector Report Economies: Summary of IMF Staff–Assessed Current
Account Gaps and IMF Staff Adjustments, 2022 31
Annex Table 1.1.4. External Sector Report Economies: Summary of IMF Staff–Assessed Real
Effective Exchange Rate and External Balance Assessment Model Gaps, 2022 32
Annex Table 1.1.5. Selected External Sector Report Economies: External Balance Assessment
Current Account Regression Policy Gap Contributions, 2022 33
Annex Table 1.1.6. 2022 Individual Economy Assessments: Summary of Policy Recommendations 34
Table 2.1. Correlates of the Global Dollar Cycle 43
Table 2.2. Categorization of Countries by Policy Regimes and Structural Characteristics 48
Table 3.A. Description in External Sector Report Overall Assessment 62
Table 3.B. Economies Covered in the External Sector Report 62
Table 3.1. Argentina: Economy Assessment 64
Table 3.2. Australia: Economy Assessment 65
Table 3.3. Belgium: Economy Assessment 66
Table 3.4. Brazil: Economy Assessment 67
Table 3.5. Canada: Economy Assessment 68
Table 3.6. China: Economy Assessment 69
Table 3.7. Euro Area: Economy Assessment 70
Table 3.8. France: Economy Assessment 71
Table 3.9. Germany: Economy Assessment 72
Table 3.10. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Economy Assessment 73
Table 3.11. India: Economy Assessment 74
Table 3.12. Indonesia: Economy Assessment 75
Table 3.13. Italy: Economy Assessment 76
Table 3.14. Japan: Economy Assessment 77
Table 3.15. Korea: Economy Assessment 78
Table 3.16. Malaysia: Economy Assessment 79
Table 3.17. Mexico: Economy Assessment 80
Table 3.18. The Netherlands: Economy Assessment 81
Table 3.19. Poland: Economy Assessment 82
Table 3.20. Russia: Economy Assessment 83
Table 3.21. Saudi Arabia: Economy Assessment 84
Table 3.22. Singapore: Economy Assessment 85
International Monetary Fund | 2023 v

Table 3.23. South Africa: Economy Assessment 86

Table 3.24. Spain: Economy Assessment 87
Table 3.25. Sweden: Economy Assessment 88
Table 3.26. Switzerland: Economy Assessment 89
Table 3.27. Thailand: Economy Assessment 90
Table 3.28. Türkiye: Economy Assessment 91
Table 3.29. United Kingdom: Economy Assessment 92
Table 3.30. United States: Economy Assessment 93
vi International Monetary Fund | 2023

FURTHER INFORMATION
Corrections and Revisions

The data and analysis appearing in the External Sector Report are compiled by the IMF staff at the time of pub-
lication. Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness, accuracy, and completeness. When errors are discovered,
corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and on the IMF
eLibrary. All substantive changes are listed in the online table of contents.
Print and Digital Editions
Print
Print copies of this External Sector Report can be ordered from the IMF Bookstore at http://IMF.org/external/
terms.htm
Digital
Multiple digital editions of the External Sector Report, including ePub, enhanced PDF, Mobi, and HTML, are
available on the IMF eLibrary at www.elibrary.IMF.org/ESR23
Download a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the charts therein from the IMF website at
imf.org/en/Publications/ESR or scan the QR code below to access the External Sector Report web page directly:
Copyright and Reuse

Information on the terms and conditions for reusing the contents of this publication is at
http://IMF.org/external/terms.htm
International Monetary Fund | 2023 vii

PREFACE
Produced since 2012, the IMF’s annual External Sector Report analyzes global external developments and pro-
vides multilaterally consistent assessments of external positions of the world’s largest economies representing more
than 90 percent of global GDP, which include current accounts, real exchange rates, external balance sheets, capital
flows, and international reserves. Together with the World Economic Outlook and Article IV consultations, this
report is part of a continuous effort to assess and address the possible effects of spillovers from members’ policies
on global stability and to monitor the stability of members’ external positions in a comprehensive manner.
Chapter 1, “External Positions and Policies,” discusses the evolution of global external positions in 2022, exter-
nal developments through the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and policy priorities for
reducing excess imbalances over the medium term. Chapter 2, “External Sector Implications of the Global Dollar
Cycle,” analyzes cross-border spillovers from US dollar appreciations. It finds large negative spillovers on emerging
markets, accompanied by increased current account balances. More flexible exchange rates and better anchored
inflation expectations can mitigate the negative spillovers. Chapter 3, “2022 Individual Economy Assessments,”
provides details on various aspects of the overall external assessment and associated policy recommendations for
30 economies. This year’s report and associated external assessments are based on the latest version of the IMF’s
External Balance Assessment methodology, external sector data as of May 31, 2023, and IMF staff projections in
the April 2023 World Economic Outlook.
This report was prepared under the overall guidance of Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, IMF Economic Counsellor
and Director of Research, and under the direction of the External Sector Coordinating Group, comprising staff
from the IMF’s area departments (African, Asia and Pacific, European, Middle East and Central Asia, and Western
Hemisphere) and several functional departments (Fiscal Affairs; Statistics; Strategy, Policy, and Review; Monetary
and Capital Markets; and Research): Ali Jawad Al-Eyd, Rudolfs Bems, Maria Borga, Emine Boz, Nigel Chalk,
Jiaqian Chen, Mariana Colacelli, Borys Cotto, Christopher Erceg, Kevin Fletcher, Kenneth Henry Kang, Purva
Khera, Nir Klein, Vitaliy Kramarenko, Jaewoo Lee (Chair), Amine Mati, Paulo Medas, Paolo Mauro, Papa M.
Bagnick N’Diaye, Marcos Poplawski Ribeiro, Lev Ratnovski, Umang Rawat, Christian Saborowski, Rani Salgado,
Mika Saito, Carlos Sánchez-Muñoz, Martin Sommer, and Anita Tuladhar.
Rudolfs Bems, Jiaqian Chen, and Giovanni Ganelli led the preparation of the report, which draws on contributions
from Cian Allen, Lukas Boer, Camila Casas, Allan Dizioli, Luciana Juvenal, Racha Moussa, Cyril Rebillard, and
Robert Zymek. Important input was provided by country teams as well as David Florián Hoyle, Adam Jakubik, Parisa
Kamali, Robin Koepke, Svitlana Maslova, Dimitre Milkov, Faezeh Raei, Marco Rodriguez Waldo, Silvia Sgherri, and
Hui Tong. Excellent research and editorial assistance were provided by Mariela Caycho Arce, Anna Konopatskaya,
Jane Haizel, Abreshmi Nowar, Jair Rodriguez, Xiaohan Shao, and Emelie Stewart.
Cheryl Toksoz from the Communications Department led the editorial team for the report, with production
and editorial support from Absolute Services and the Grauel Group.
The analysis benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from other IMF departments, as well
as by the IMF’s Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on July 13, 2023. However, both pro-
jections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or
to their national authorities.
viii International Monetary Fund | 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
G
lobal current account balances (defined Over the medium term, global current account
as the sum of absolute values of current balances are expected to narrow as the impacts of the
account deficits and surpluses) increased pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine recede. However,
for the third consecutive year in 2022 and several risks surround this outlook, including a renewed
are projected to narrow in 2023. This widening over increase in commodity prices, a slower-than-expected
the three years reflects several factors, including the recovery in China, or a slower fiscal consolidation in
unequal impact of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020–21 economies with current account deficits. While the
and the increase in commodity prices fueled by the impact of geoeconomic fragmentation on global current
economic recovery in 2021 and later by supply con- account balances is unclear, it would unambiguously
cerns following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. reduce global welfare.
The absence of widespread sudden stops during the The excess global current account balances (defined
pandemic has enabled deficit economies to avoid an as the sum of absolute values of current account
abrupt contraction of their current account deficits. surpluses and deficits in excess of their norms) have
Currency markets exhibited significant fluctuations remained unchanged since 2021, after being on a
in 2022, driven by changes in the terms of trade declining trend for several years. While the widening
and monetary tightening. The US dollar appreciated of global current account balances is not necessarily a
by about 8 percent in real effective terms, reaching negative development, excess global current account
its strongest level since 2002. Emerging market and balances can fuel trade tensions and protectionist
developing economies with preexisting vulnerabili- measures or increase the risk of disruptive currency
ties such as high inflation and misaligned external and capital flow movements. Narrowing excess global
positions experienced greater depreciation pressures, current account balances would reduce the risk of
while commodity-exporting economies benefited financial crisis and improve welfare.
from the increase in commodity prices. Historically, Policy efforts, in both excess surplus and deficit
US dollar appreciations have had large negative economies, are required to promote external rebalanc-
cross-border spillovers, disproportionately affecting. Where excess current account deficits in 2022
ing emerging markets, and have increased current partly reflected larger-than-desired fiscal deficits, fiscal
account balances, as the investment rate falls (see consolidation will help stabilize debt-to-GDP ratios and
Chapter 2). close current account gaps. In economies where excess
The uphill capital flows from emerging market current account surpluses persist, higher fiscal spend-
and developing economies to advanced economies ing in targeted areas will help them to meet their goals
reemerged in 2022. The net flows of capital from in climate, digital, and energy security, while reducing
emerging market and developing economies were their excess surpluses. Economies with lingering com-
mostly driven by China and commodity-exporting petitiveness challenges will need to address structural
economies, which have funded some large current bottlenecks. Multilateral cooperation will help counter
account deficits in advanced economies. In contrast risks of geoeconomic fragmentation, including efforts
to past episodes, however, an accumulation of official to strengthen the current rule-based trading system, and
foreign exchange reserves played a limited role in net facilitate the green transition. Successfully completing
capital outflows from emerging market and developing the 16th General Review of Quota would ensure that
economies. Meanwhile, net creditor and debtor posi- the IMF is adequately resourced to serve as an anchor of
tions remained at historically high levels. the global financial safety net.
International Monetary Fund | 2023 ix

IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION SUMMARY
The following remarks were made by the Acting Chair at the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion
of the External Sector Report on July 13, 2023.
E
xecutive Directors broadly agreed with the Directors observed that capital has moved from
findings of the 2023 External Sector Report emerging market and developing economies to
(ESR) and its policy recommendations. They advanced economies in 2022, in the context of
noted that global current account balances increased risk aversion triggered by the war in Ukraine
widened for the third consecutive year in 2022. Direc- and tighter monetary policy in advanced economies.
tors observed that the trend decline in excess current They noted that the net flows of capital from emerg-
account balances had stalled and that currency markets ing market and developing economies, mostly driven
exhibited significant fluctuations, driven by changes in by China and commodity-exporting economies, have
the terms of trade and monetary tightening. Concur- funded large current account deficits in some advanced
rently, stocks of foreign assets and liabilities remained economies.
at historically high levels in 2022. Directors noted that global current account bal-
Directors observed that elevated commodity prices, ances are expected to narrow over the medium term as
amid supply concerns following Russia’s invasion of the impact of pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine
Ukraine, significantly contributed to the widening of recede. They cautioned that significant risks surround
global balances in 2022. They noted that the pandemic this outlook, including tightening global financial
has continued to unevenly affect current account bal- conditions, renewed increase in commodity prices, or
ances, albeit to a lesser extent relative to prior years, slower fiscal consolidation in economies with current
as travel services remained subdued and high trans- account deficits.
portation costs persisted in some economies. Directors Directors reiterated that excess global current
observed that the US dollar appreciated substantially, account balances, which remained unchanged since
reflecting a rapid tightening of monetary policy and 2021, can fuel trade tensions and protectionist mea-
more favorable terms of trade. They noted that emerg- sures or increase the risk of disruptive currency and
ing market and developing economies with preexisting capital flow movements. They consequently encour-
vulnerabilities experienced greater depreciation pres- aged both excess surplus and deficit economies to take
sures, while commodity exporting economies benefited steps to promote external rebalancing.
from the higher commodity prices. Directors underscored that cooperation is key to
Directors generally welcomed the analysis of the addressing the complex challenges facing the global
external sector implications of the global dollar cycle. economy and preserving the benefits of global integra-
They highlighted that, in contrast to the historical tion and multilateralism. Noting that geoeconomic
trend, the recent strong dollar episode was accompa- fragmentation would unambiguously reduce global
nied by surging commodity prices. Directors noted welfare, Directors highlighted that coordinated policy
that US dollar appreciations have increased current efforts will be needed to counter the related risks,
account balances and have had large negative cross- including by strengthening the current rules-based
border spillovers, disproportionally affecting emerging trading system. Moreover, Directors noted that while
markets. They underscored that more flexible exchange industrial policy could be pursued to address well-
rates and more anchored inflation expectations can established market failures, they should not introduce
mitigate negative spillovers to emerging market distortions and should be consistent with interna-
economies. tional agreements and WTO rules. Directors stressed
x International Monetary Fund | 2023

IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION SUMMARY
that ensuring an adequate global financial safety net, and inclusive growth while boosting productivity. In
with the Fund at its core, remains critical at a time of economies where excess current account surpluses per-
heightened vulnerabilities in emerging markets with sist, prioritizing reforms that encourage investment and
high external liabilities. In this regard, Directors under- discourage excessive private saving, while also pursuing
scored the importance of successfully completing the domestic objectives, is warranted.
16th General Review of Quotas. Directors reiterated the need to ensure transpar-
Directors underscored that policies to promote ency, consistency, and evenhandedness of external
external rebalancing differ with positions and needs assessments across countries. They stressed the
of individual economies. They considered that in importance of continued caution in interpreting and
economies in which excess current account deficits communicating the assessment results. Directors
reflect excessive fiscal deficits, fiscal consolidation that encouraged further exploration of possible improve-
preserves space for critical infrastructure and well- ments to enhance the EBA methodologies, given
targeted social spending will be critical to supporting model limitations, and continued efforts to ensure
external rebalancing. Directors stressed that economies consistency across work streams. They called for
with lingering competitiveness challenges will need to greater analysis of vulnerabilities associated with large
address structural challenges to promote green, digital, external stock positions.
International Monetary Fund | 2023 xi

1
CHAPTER
EXTERNAL POSITIONS AND POLICIES
Recovery, War, and Policy Shocks balances—those beyond what can be explained by
Global current account balances widened further medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies—
in a third consecutive year in 2022 (Figure 1.1). One albeit gradually and over the medium term (see
prominent contributor to the widening in 2022 was 2022 External Sector Report, Box 1.2). However,
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which elevated com- there is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding
modity prices amid supply concerns. The uneven this outlook. Risks include a renewed increase in
recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic—across commodity prices and a slower-than-expected pace
countries and sectors—and the rapid tightening of of China’s recovery or of fiscal consolidation in
US monetary policy also contributed to the widen- economies with current account deficits. In addi-
ing of global balances, offsetting the impact from tion, a severe tightening of global financial con-
unwinding of pandemic-induced fiscal measures. ditions could trigger broad-based capital outflows
Concurrently, the US dollar appreciated substan- from vulnerable EMDEs, and further geoeconomic
tially, and the uphill capital flow—capital flowing fragmentation could potentially lead to large welfare
from faster-growing emerging market and developing losses, including through its effects on trade barriers
economies (EMDEs) to slower-growing advanced and foreign direct investment.
economies—reappeared.
China’s reopening and the US banking sector tur- Recent Developments in Current
moil were the new forces that could have important Account Balances
implications on global balances in early 2023. The
reopening of the Chinese economy led to a tempo- Elevated Commodity Prices and the War in Ukraine
rary rebound in exports in the first quarter of 2023 Commodity prices increased in 2022, enlarging
as supply chain conditions improved, contributing to the differences in current account balances between
a widening of global trade balances. The unexpected commodity importers and exporters (Figures 1.2 and
failures of two large regional banks in the United 1.3). In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,
States and a systemically important global bank in commodity prices soared amid concerns about a
Europe have had limited impact on cross border shortfall in global supplies from Russia and Ukraine
capital flows and currency volatility so far, owing to and trade disruptions caused by the war itself. Oil
forceful policy actions undertaken to reassure markets prices then started falling from their peak in mid-
and shore up the banking sector. However, as bank- 2022, as demand growth from major economies,
ing sector turmoil has tightened credit conditions and such as China, slowed and trade diversion enabled
curtailed lending, market participants now expect a steady supply of Russian crude oil to the global
a shallower monetary policy path in the United market. European gas prices had risen to a strato-
States, which has provided some support to EMDE spheric level amid supply disruptions but declined,
currencies. owing to substitution efforts and an exceptionally
The widening of global current account balances mild winter that reduced demand. Food prices also
is expected to reverse in 2023, as the impacts of began to fall around the same period as supply and
the pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine recede. demand reacted to higher prices, including through
Policy actions will also help narrow excess global the reopening of the Black Sea corridor, increased
wheat production in Europe and India, and lower
The authors of this chapter are Cian Allen, Lukas Boer, Camila demand for price-elastic items. Despite the decline
Casas, Jiaqian Chen (co-lead), Giovanni Ganelli (co-lead), Luciana since mid-year, average commodity prices in 2022
Juvenal, and Cyril Rebillard, in collaboration with Robert Zymek,
under the guidance of Jaewoo Lee. Jair Rodriguez, Xiaohan Shao, were higher than those in 2021 and well above their
and Abreshmi Nowar provided excellent research support. pre-pandemic levels.
International Monetary Fund | 2023 1

Figure 1.1. Global Current Account Balances, REER, and Figure 1.2. The COVID-19 Crisis and the War in Ukraine
Capital Flows, 1990–2022
1. International Cereal Prices 2. Oil Inventory Built and Price
1. Global Current Account Balance1 (Index, Jan. 2020 = 100) Oil price, US dollars
(Percent of world GDP) Corn Sorghum a barrel
8 Wheat Oil inventory built,
Deficits
260 140 millions of barrel 6
7 Surpluses
per day (right scale)
Global current account balance 120 5
6
210 100 4
5
3
4 80
160 2
3 60
1
2
110 40
0
1
20 –1
0
60 0
1990
94
98
2002
06
14
18
10
22
–2
Jan. Jan. Jan. Apr. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Apr.
2020 21 22 23 2019 20 21 22 23
2. United States: Real Effective Exchange Rate
(Index, 1990 = 100) 3. Economic Activity and 4. Supply Chain
120 Commodity Prices (Index, Jan. 2017 = 100)
(Index, 2019 average = 100) Harper Petersen
115
All metals price index Charter Rates Index
110 Energy prices Baltic Dry Index
Industrial production Pressure Index
105 300 110 2,500 5
(right scale) (std. dev. pts.,
106 right scale) 4
100 254 2,000
95 101 3
208
97 1,500 2
90
163
85 93 1,000 1
117
1990
94
98
2002
06
14
18
10
22
89 0
71 500
84 –1
3. Emerging Market and Developing Economies: Net Financial Inflows
(Percent of world GDP) 25 80 0 –2
Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Apr. Jan. Jan. Jan. Apr.
1.5 2019 20 21 22 23 2017 19 21 23
1.0
0.5
Sources: CEIC Global Economic Data; Haver Analytics; IMF, Primary Commodity
0.0
Price System; Joint Organisations Data Initiative; and US Energy Information
–0.5 Administration.
–1.0 Note: In panel 2, oil inventory built is calculated as the six-month moving average
–1.5 of total world petroleum production minus total world petroleum consumption, and
–2.0 oil price refers to crude oil (petroleum), West Texas Intermediate 40 American
–2.5 Nonreserve flows Petroleum Institute (API), in US dollars a barrel.
–3.0 Reserve flows
–3.5 Total net inflows (including reserves)
–4.0
1990
94
98
2002
06
14
18
10
22
An Uneven Recovery from the COVID-19 Pandemic

Sources: IMF, Information Notice System; IMF, April 2023 World Economic
As health conditions improve across the globe, the
Outlook; and IMF staff calculations. impact of some critical pandemic factors on current
Note: REER = real effective exchange rate. account balances has been waning. These factors
1
Global current account balance is defined as the sum of absolute values of
current account balances. include medical trade, as demand for medical products
and personal protective equipment has declined. The
impact on trade balances from a shift in household
consumption away from services toward goods appears
to have approached a new normal, as the services trade
balance is projected to expand at its pre-pandemic
2 International Monetary Fund | 2023

CHAPTER 1 External Positions and Policies
Figure 1.3. Movements in Oil Trade Balance and Current Figure 1.4. Trade in Goods and Services Compared with
Account for Oil Exporters and Importers Pre-Pandemic Trends
(Average of balances in percent of GDP)
1. Global Goods Imports 2. Global Services Imports
15 (Index, 2019 = 100) (Index, 2019 = 100)
Oil trade balance of importers
130 130
Oil trade balance of exporters Jan. 2020 WEO
Current account of importers 125 Jun. 2020 WEO 125
Current account of exporters Jan. 2022 WEO
120 Apr. 2023 WEO 120
10
115 115
110 110
5 105 105
100 100
95 95
0
90 90
Jan. 2020 WEO
85 Jun. 2020 WEO 85
Jan. 2022 WEO
80 80
–5 Apr. 2023 WEO
2011 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 75 75
2019 20 21 22 23 24 25 2019 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sources: IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Countries are defined as exporters or importers by their oil trade balance in Sources: IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO); and IMF staff
2021. Figure includes External Balance Assessment countries: Hong Kong SAR, calculations.
Saudi Arabia, and Singapore. Importer countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Note: Global imports are in volumes.
Belgium, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, the United Contribution of Cyclical Factors
Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Exporter countries are Brazil, Canada,
Colombia, Malaysia, Norway, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
Cyclical factors played a more important role in the
widening of the global balances in 2022 compared
with previous years (Figure 1.5). The contribution
of cyclical factors to the global balances reflected the
growth rate, though remaining below its pre-pandemic
(temporary part of ) elevated commodity prices, which
level (Figure 1.4).1
pushed the terms of trade for commodity-exporting
Nonetheless, the emergence of especially contagious,
and -importing countries in opposite directions. It also
but less lethal, COVID-19 variants continued to mate-
reflects the impact from output gaps as economies were
rially affect some economies’ external balances in 2022
in different phases of recovery: weak domestic demand
(Figure 1.5). The resulting travel shock is estimated to
led to a stronger current account balance, via factors
have materially lowered the travel services and current
including lower investment, and vice versa for econo-
account balances of a few tourism-exporting countries
mies with stronger domestic demand.
such as Thailand. While shipping costs abated in the
second half of 2022, the yearly average remained high
compared with the historical average (Figure 1.2, panel Policy Actions
4). As a result, they continued to increase the current
Fiscal policies in 2022 likely moderated the increase
account balances of economies with large presences of
in global current account balances. On average,
shipping companies (for example, France).
economies with current account deficits consolidated
their fiscal policies in 2022 relative to 2021, while
economies with current account surpluses loosened
1Given those developments in pandemic-related factors, the
their stances (Figure 1.6). Among deficit countries,
medical and consumption shift adjustors have been discontinued for
2022, while the transportation and travel adjustors have continued Canada, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the
to be applied in the 2023 External Sector Report. United States reduced their (cyclically adjusted) fiscal

Figure 1.5. Global Current Account Balances, with the Figure 1.6. Average Fiscal Policy Changes, 2021–22
Contributions from Cyclical and COVID-19 Factors (Percentage points)
(Percent of world GDP)
Current account deficit economies
4.5 3.0 Current account surplus economies
4.0
2.5
3.5
2.0
3.0
2.5 1.5
Global current account balance

2.0 1.0
Contribution of cyclical factors
Contribution of COVID-19 factors
1.5
0.5
1.0
0.0
0.5
0.0 –0.5
2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sources: CEIC Data, Global Database; IMF, Primary Commodity Price System; Note: Figure shows the GDP-weighted average change in fiscal stance, measured
Refinitiv Datastream; UN, Comtrade; UN Conference on Trade and Development; as cyclically adjusted general government overall balance as percent of potential
and IMF staff calculations. GDP. An increase (decrease) denotes tighter (looser) fiscal policy relative to 2021.
Note: Global current account balance is the sum of absolute values of current Economies are grouped according to current account balances in 2021.
account; COVID-19 factors are the sum of absolute values of transportation and
travel COVID-19 adjustors for External Sector Report countries only; and cyclical
factors are the sum of absolute values of the contribution of cyclical factors to
current accounts of External Sector Report countries only. Data from 2023 onward
are projections, based on the April 2023 World Economic Outlook.
In the early months of 2023, trade data suggest that
global trade balances widened compared with their
levels at the end of 2022, driven by the reopening of
deficits; among surplus economies, China, Japan, China offsetting the impact from falling commodity
Korea, and The Netherlands increased theirs. How- prices. China’s exports temporarily improved in the
ever, the strengthening of the US dollar widened the first quarter of the year against the backdrop of relaxed
US current account deficit. testing and quarantine requirements and normalization
Government and household saving in advanced of supply chains; imports also increased from the pre-
economies moved in opposite directions, while vious quarter, but less than exports, reflecting subdued
corporate saving remained above pre-pandemic levels imports of intermediate goods amid growth led by
(Figure 1.7). Despite the budgetary support deployed private consumption that is less import intensive. The
(about 1.3 percent of GDP in the case of the Euro- improvement in China’s trade surplus has so far more
pean Union) to help households and firms weather than offset the narrowing of the surplus in commod-
the energy crisis, public sector saving improved in ity-exporting economies, but China’s trade surplus
2022 relative to 2021 in many economies, mostly is expected to shrink with a significant anticipated
reflecting the unwinding of temporary support pickup in tourism travel in the remainder of 2023.
measures deployed during the pandemic. Against
this background, household saving declined, nota-
Currencies, Financial Flows, and Balance Sheets
bly in the United States, where the saving rate fell
below pre-pandemic levels. On the other hand, since Exchange Rates
mid-2020, corporate saving has remained high in the In the past year and a half, the currency market
United States and several other advanced economies has experienced significant fluctuations (Figure 1.8,
compared with pre-pandemic levels. panel 1). The US dollar, in real effective terms, was

Figure 1.7. Current Account Decomposition Figure 1.8. Currency Movements

(Percent of GDP)
1. Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
Household saving Corporate saving Government saving (Percent change)
Investment Current account 40
30
1. United States
20
10
10
8 0
6 –10
4 –20 Jan. 3, 2022–Feb. 23, 2022
2 –30 Feb. 24, 2022–Oct. 31, 2022
–40 Nov. 1, 2022–Mar. 9, 2023
0
–50 Mar. 10, 2023–May 12, 2023
–2 –60 Since the war began in Ukraine
–4 –70
–6 –80
MEX
SAU
SGP
CHE
HKG
IDN
POL
MYS
AUS
CHN
GBR
IND
SWE
KOR
CAN
JPN
ZAF
TUR
RUS
ARG
BRA
USA
EA
THA
–8
–10
2019 20 21 22
2. US Dollar Real Effective Exchange Rate1
(Index, Jan. 2019 = 100)
2. Euro Area 120
8 With respect to advanced economies
With respect to emerging markets
6 115
4
2 110
0
105
–2
–4 100
–6
95
–8
2019:M01
19:M04
19:M07
19:M10
20:M01
20:M04
20:M07
20:M10
21:M01
21:M04
21:M07
21:M10
22:M01
22:M04
22:M07
22:M10
23:M01
23:M04
2019 20 21 22
3. Other Advanced Economies

20
Sources: Federal Reserve Board; and IMF staff calculations.
15 Note: EA = euro area. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) country code.
1
10 Constructed as a weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the US dollar
against the currencies of a group of major US trading partners that are advanced
5 economies and emerging market economies. An increase in the real effective
exchange rate index corresponds to an appreciation of the US dollar.
0
–5
–10 to less favorable terms of trade in advanced economies

2019 20 21 22 relative to those in EMDEs.2
Sources: IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations. •• By October 2022, in real effective terms, the US
Note: Investment is displayed as a negative value. Euro area countries comprise dollar had appreciated by about 14 percent relative
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. Other advanced economies comprise Australia, Canada, to its 2021 average, reflecting economic fundamen-
Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. tals such as rapid tightening of monetary policy in
the United States, as well as more favorable terms
about 7 percent stronger in April 2023 compared with of trade. However, it has since depreciated by about
its 2021 average, while some EMDE currencies have
weakened considerably. Between 2022 and March 2023, 2As discussed in Chapter 2, historically there has been a strong
the US dollar appreciated more with respect to advanced negative link between the US dollar and commodity prices.
However, the 2021–22 US dollar appreciation coincided with a
economy currencies, on average, than with respect to significant upswing in commodity prices, linked to recovery from the
EMDE currencies (Figure 1.8, panel 2), in part due COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

6 percent on a real trade-weighted basis, reflecting a Figure 1.9. Exchange Market Pressure and Its Components
change in expectations of US monetary policy and
Exchange Market Pressure Index
improved risk sentiment. Despite this, the dollar (Percent change)
remains stronger than it has been since 2000. URY
•• By contrast, as of April 2023, other major curren- RUS FXIs
MEX Interest rate
cies have either remained broadly unchanged (such BRA Nominal exchange rate
as the euro and the pound sterling) or depreciated, HKG Total exchange market pressure
CHE Exchange market pressure in 2021
including the Japanese yen by 15.3 percent and SGP
the renminbi by 7.6 percent, in real effective terms MYS
compared with their 2021 averages. The deprecia- CAN
EA
tions were driven by interest rate differentials, high KOR
energy prices and different speeds of economic ZAF
AUS
recovery. CHN
•• In EMDEs, currency movements have been more THA
POL
heterogeneous. While currencies in some economies, PER
such as Brazil and Mexico, appreciated in nomi- ISR
CHL
nal effective terms in 2022 and early 2023, those NZL
in other economies—including Argentina, South GBR
DNK
Africa, and Türkiye—depreciated significantly. The NOR
monetary tightening in advanced economies has IND
SWE
put depreciation pressure on all EMDE currencies; JPN
however, country-specific factors such as earlier MAR
CZE
monetary tightening (than in advanced economies), TUN
preexisting vulnerabilities (such as lower perceived HUN
ROU
institutional quality), and commodity exposure have COL
led to these different currency movements. The –0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Russian ruble appreciated significantly in the second
quarter of 2022 under restrictions on imports and Sources: Adler and others (2021); Goldberg and Krogstrup (2023); IMF,
International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff calculations.
capital outflows, but it has since depreciated against Note: Positive values correspond to exchange market pressure that would
the US dollar, largely owing to weaker terms of depreciate the nominal exchange rate. A country’s total exchange market pressure
in 2022 is the sum of scaled and weighted observed foreign exchange
trade and a sharp increase in parallel imports. interventions (FXIs), short-term interest rate changes, and nominal exchange rate
movements. Values of FXIs and interest rate changes are expressed in terms of
The widespread depreciation pressure of 2022 was counterfactual exchange rate adjustments that would have occurred if no FXI or
policy rate changes had been conducted. FXIs are spot interventions from an
evident in a more comprehensive measure of market updated data set of Adler and others (2021). EA = euro area. Data labels in the
pressure. The realized change in exchange rates may figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
only be a partial measure of external pressure, as
economies can resort to foreign exchange interven-
tion or interest rate changes to cushion such pres- In 2022, many economies let their currencies adjust
sure. Figure 1.9 plots the Exchange Market Pressure fully (for example, Australia, Sweden), whereas many
Index and its components for 2022, incorporating others undertook foreign exchange intervention
both realized exchange rate movement and policy (for example, Czech Republic, Singapore) or raised
intervention (purchases and sales of foreign exchange the policy rate (for example, Colombia, Romania),
reserves and policy rate changes) by central banks.3 dampening depreciation pressures as a consequence.4
Compared with those in 2021, external pressures in
3The Exchange Market Pressure Index is based on Goldberg and
2022 were much larger, with many economies hiking
Krogstrup (2023). It is defined as the weighted and scaled sums
of exchange rate depreciation, foreign exchange intervention, and interest rates and offsetting depreciation pressures.
policy rate changes. It combines pressures observed in exchange
rate adjustments with model-based estimates of incipient pressures
that are absorbed by foreign exchange interventions and policy rate 4Singapore uses foreign exchange intervention as a monetary
adjustments. instrument.

Figure 1.10. Exchange Market Pressure and Inflation, 2022 Figure 1.11. Cross-Currency Basis Swap against US Dollar
(Percent) (Basis points)
0.8 0
Linear
trend line COL
–20
0.6
–40
Exchange market pressure index
ROU
–60
0.4
TUN
CZE
HUN –80
JPN MAR
0.2 NOR PER THA DNK
IND ISR GBR –100
SWE
CHN NZL
POL
KOR EA CHL –120 Japanese yen Mar. 10
0.0 MYS AUS Swiss franc Silicon Valley
ZAF Euro Bank Collapse
BRA MEX –140
URY CAN British pound sterling
CHE Korean won
–0.2 –160
–10 –5 0 5 10 15 20 Jan. 2022 Apr. 22 July 22 Oct. 22 Jan. 23 Apr. 23
Change in inflation
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.
Sources: Goldberg and Krogstrup (2023); and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Figure plots the cumulative Exchange Market Pressure Index for 2022 and
the change in inflation between 2021 and 2022. Russia is excluded. If policy rate
changes are excluded from the Exchange Market Pressure Index, the correlation
goes from 0.6 to 0.5. EA = euro area. Data labels in the figure use International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. External Sector Report Online Annex 1.2).6 However, in
2022, net capital outflows from EMDEs, and particu-
larly from China, took place not via an accumulation
of official foreign exchange reserves, but via other types
Over the year, countries with larger increases in of flows. Consistent with this pattern, private holdings
inflation tended to experience more external pressure of US assets increased (Box 1.1). This net flow of cap-
(Figure 1.10).5 ital from EMDEs, as a whole, is expected to diminish
The March 2023 turmoil in the banking sector in 2023.
had only limited impact on currency volatility, Turning to subcomponents of the financial account
thanks to the forceful policy responses. In particular, (Figure 1.12), a large share of overall net outflows
after a brief period of tightening, international dol- from EMDEs has been through net portfolio flows,
lar funding conditions eased, with the cross-currency which declined substantially in 2022. This decline
basis of advanced economy currencies with respect likely reflects monetary tightening in advanced
to the US dollar narrowing back to pre-March levels economies. Other investment inflows, and in partic-
(Figure 1.11). ular global cross border bank flows to EMDEs, have
also declined since 2021. The bulk of the decline was
inflows into China, which has experienced higher
Global Financial Flows funding costs amid dollar strength. Net foreign
In 2022, uphill capital flows from EMDEs to direct investment (FDI) inflows, which remained
advanced economies reemerged. This resembles a relatively stable in 2020 and 2021, also fell in 2022.
pattern of capital flowing from lower-income to high-
er-income economies that occurred in the lead-up to
6Standard economic models suggest that capital is expected to
the global financial crisis (Figure 1.1; see also the 2021
flow from slower-growing, capital-abundant richer economies to
faster-growing capital-scarce ones in search of higher returns (see
Boz, Cubeddu, and Obstfeld 2017). This is commonly referred to
5Nonetheless, the Exchange Market Pressure Index does not cap- as a downhill flow of capital, whereas the reverse is called uphill
ture the effect of capital flow management measures that were used (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2013; Lucas 1990; Prasad, Rajan, and
by some economies as part of the policy mix. Subramanian 2007).

Figure 1.12. Capital Flows to Emerging Market and Figure 1.13. Incidence of Extreme Capital Flows: Number of
Developing Economies Surges, Stops, Flights, and Retrenchments
(Percent of country group GDP)
Advanced economies Emerging markets
Emerging Europe Russia 1. Surges 2. Stops
China India 30 30
Saudi Arabia Emerging Asia excluding China and India
Latin America Total
1. Net Portfolio Inflows 2. Net FDI Inflows
4 4 20 20
3 3
2 2
10 10
1 1
0 0
0 0
–1 –1
1990:Q1
2000:Q1
10:Q1
20:Q1
1990:Q1
2000:Q1
10:Q1
20:Q1
–2 –2
–3 –3
2018:Q1
18:Q3
19:Q1
19:Q3
20:Q1
20:Q3
21:Q1
21:Q3
22:Q1
2018:Q1
18:Q3
19:Q1
19:Q3
20:Q1
20:Q3
21:Q1
21:Q3
22:Q1
22:Q3
22:Q3
3. Flights 4. Retrenchment
30 30
3. Net Other Investment Inflows 4. Reserve Accumulation

4 4 20 20
3 3
2 2 10 10
1 1
0 0
0 0
–1 –1
1990:Q1
2000:Q1
10:Q1
20:Q1
1990:Q1
2000:Q1
10:Q1
20:Q1
–2 –2
–3 –3
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments; and IMF, International Financial Statistics.
2018:Q1
18:Q3
19:Q1
19:Q3
20:Q1
20:Q3
21:Q1
21:Q3
22:Q1
2018:Q1
18:Q3
19:Q1
19:Q3
20:Q1
20:Q3
21:Q1
21:Q3
22:Q1
22:Q3
22:Q3
Note: Capital flows are defined as gross inflows and outflows (excluding reserves).
Episodes are based on flows in billions of US dollars. Sample is External Balance
Assessment countries. Last observation is fourth quarter of 2022. A surge is a
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Institute of International Finance; sharp increase in gross capital inflows from foreign investors, a stop is a sharp
and IMF staff calculations. decrease in gross capital inflows from those investors, a flight is a sharp increase
Note: Group GDP is the total GDP of all economies considered in the figure, which in gross capital outflows from domestic investors, and a retrenchment is a sharp
include Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, decrease in gross capital outflows from domestic investors.
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Türkiye. For
panels 1–3, positive numbers represent net inflows of capital. FDI = foreign direct
investment.
war in Ukraine and tightening of monetary policy

Finally, reserves accumulation slowed from a large in advanced economies. In another notable develop-
accumulation in 2021 and had turned into a net sale ment, the level of US-dollar-denominated credit in
of reserves in the second quarter of 2022 (see also cross-border banking flows declined, especially in the
Annex Table 1.1.1). second half of 2022 (BIS 2023).
While China accounted for a large share of the The return of uphill capital flows follows an
net capital outflows from EMDEs, the phenome- increase in the volatility of capital flows since the
non was broad based across other EMDEs. These beginning of the pandemic. Figure 1.13 illustrates
outflows potentially reflect several global factors at the occurrence of extreme capital flow movements
work, such as increased risk aversion triggered by the by foreigners and domestic investors in and out of

individual economies.7 The results suggest that after a Figure 1.14. Cumulative High-Frequency Portfolio Flows to
period of relative stability, characterized by “ripples” EMDEs January 2022–April 2023
(Billions of US dollars)
rather than “waves” (Forbes and Warnock 2021),
the frequency of extreme capital flow movements 250
China India
has increased since the onset of the pandemic, with Latin America Emerging Europe
200 Middle East and Africa Other
a notable rebound in gross flows from both foreign
Total
(surges) and domestic (flights) investors occurring 150
during the recovery from the pandemic in 2021,
likely fueled by mounting optimism in financial 100
markets. The COVID-19 crisis did not lead to many 50

sudden stops, as policymakers reacted forcefully to
maintain investor confidence.8 0
After a year of net outflows in 2022, short-run net cap- –50
ital inflows to EMDEs resumed in the first few months of
2023. While global financial tightening was the key driver –100
of net outflows in 2022, easing financial conditions (see
–150
the April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report) brought
net inflows back into EMDEs in early 2023, helped by –200
Jan. 2022
Feb. 22
Mar. 22
Apr. 22
May 22
June 22
July 22
Aug. 22
Sep. 22
Oct. 22
Nov. 22
Dec. 22
Jan. 23
Feb. 23
Mar. 23
Apr. 23
the reopening of China and a shallower expected mon-
etary policy rate path in the United States. In particular,
there was a strong rebound in nonresident—and mostly
debt—flows to EMDEs (Figure 1.14). The banking sector Sources: Institute of International Finance; and IMF staff calculations.
turmoil in March 2023, while so far having had a limited
impact on short-term capital flows, calls for caution and
raises the risk of a potential risk-off episode, with decreas- declining asset prices (Figure 1.15). The largest debtor
ing inflows to EMDEs. economy remains the United States, though its net
international investment position improved from
–18.1 percent of world GDP in 2021 to –16.4 percent
International Balance Sheets and the Global Financial in 2022. Other large debtor economies include the
Safety Net euro area (excluding Germany and The Netherlands),
Creditor and debtor stock positions remained while the largest creditor economies remain, in
elevated in 2022, reflecting the offsetting effects descending order, Japan, Germany, and China.
of widening current account balances, the dollar’s Financial centers play an outsized role in global bal-
strength—which caused valuation gains in countries ance sheets, representing 36 percent of global holdings
with long positions in the dollar (Box 1.2)—and but only 7 percent of global GDP (see also Box 1.1).9
Stock positions remain even more elevated in gross
7Capital flow episodes are defined based on Forbes and Warnock terms (Figure 1.16).
(2012, 2021), a definition that is also used in David and Gonçalves Valuation changes, which induce wealth transfer
(2021). They are events in which the year-over-year changes in across countries, were more muted in 2022 compared
four-quarter flows are more than two standard deviations away from
the historical average (based on 20 quarters) during at least one with 2021 for all External Sector Report (ESR) econo-
quarter of the event. The event lasts for all consecutive quarters for mies. In 2022, creditor economies tended to have more
which the change in annual capital flows is more than one standard valuation losses, while debtors tended to experience
deviation away from the historical average. A surge is a sharp increase
in gross capital inflows by foreigners; a stop is a sharp decrease in
more valuation gains (Figure 1.17), dampening global
gross capital inflows by foreigners; a flight is a sharp increase in gross stock imbalances. For instance, in the United States,
capital outflows by domestic investors; and a retrenchment is a sharp declining asset prices led to (positive) valuation gains
decrease in gross capital outflows by domestic investors.
8Typically, global current account balances tend to widen when
in its external balance sheet, more than offsetting the
many economies recover from a sudden stop. This pattern was
not observed in the 2022 widening of global balances, reflecting
the absence of widespread sudden stops in EMDEs during the 9The list of financial centers is based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
pandemic. (2018), along with data availability.

Figure 1.15. Net International Investment Positions, Figure 1.16. Sum of Cross-Border Assets and Liabilities
1990–2022 (Percent of world GDP)
560 USA CHN DEU and NLD
30 Surplus AEs Oil exporters AE commodity exporters 520 JPN EA (other) GBR
Deficit EMDEs Other deficit Other surplus Creditor AEs Oil exporters AE commodity exporters
480 Debtor EMs ROW Total
USA CHN DEU and NLD
20 JPN EA (other) GBR 440
Discrepancy 400
360
10
320
280
0 240
200
–10 160
120
80
–20
40
0
1990
92
94
96
98
2000
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
–30
1990
92
94
96
98
2000
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Sources: External Wealth of Nations database; IMF, April 2023 World Economic
Sources: External Wealth of Nations database; IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.
Outlook; and IMF staff calculations. Note: AEs = advanced economies; EA = euro area; EMs = emerging markets;
Note: Advanced economy (AE) commodity exporters comprise Australia, Canada, ROW = rest of the world. Data labels in the figure use International Organization
and New Zealand; creditor AEs comprise Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan Province of China; deficit emerging market and
developing economies (EMDEs) comprise Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Peru, South Africa, and Türkiye; oil exporters comprise those classified as such in
the World Economic Outlook definition plus Norway. EA = euro area. Data labels in
the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. Figure 1.17. International Investment Position Valuation
Change and Net International Investment Position, 2022
(Percent of GDP)
deterioration due to its current account deficit.10 His- 30

torically, the stabilizing role of valuation changes has 25
DEU
primarily reflected the response of asset prices, rather
20
than exchange rates (Adler and Garcia-Macia 2018).
The global financial safety net (GFSN) was critical 15 USA SWE
IDN JPN
in softening dollar funding strains during the COVID- 10 TUR GBR ITA
Valuation change
19 crisis, with the Federal Reserve’s bilateral swap MEX MYS KOR
5 ESP
lines playing a key role in stabilizing global financial CHN BEL
FRA
0
markets and capital flows to EMDEs. Its goal is to POL
BRA IND CAN NLD
provide countries with insurance against (financial) –5 AUS
THA RUS
shocks, as well as financing and incentives for sound –10
ARG
macro-economic policies (Aiyar and others 2023). The –15
ZAF
SAU
GFSN is composed of four main layers (Figure 1.18):
–20 CHE
gross international reserves, central banks’ bilateral swap
lines (BSLs, limited and unlimited), Regional Financing –25
–150 –100 –50 0 50 100 150
Arrangements (RFAs), and the IMF (borrowed and NIIP, 2022
quota resources). As of the end of 2021, it represented
a combined firepower of about 19 percent of global Note: Valuation changes are calculated as the difference between changes in net
international investment position (NIIP) and current account. For some countries,
NIIPs are still projections. Bubble sizes are proportional to 2022 GDP in US dollars.
10Declining
domestic asset prices tend to improve the net interna- Hong Kong SAR and Singapore are excluded because of the size of their NIIPs.
tional investment position, as nonresidents hold some of these assets, Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
leading to a decline in foreign liabilities. country codes.

Figure 1.18. The Evolution of Global Financial Safety Net, multilaterally consistent analysis of current accounts
1995–2021 and real exchange rates. Annex Tables 1.1.2 and 1.1.3
summarize the IMF staff–assessed current account and
5 Gross international reserves (eop, right scale) 18 real effective exchange rate gaps and external sector
BSLs, advanced economies, unlimited1 assessments for these economies.
BSLs, limited2
RFAs3 15
4 IMF borrowed resources4
IMF quota resources5 Primer on Methodology
12
The primary numerical inputs for the IMF staff’s
3
assessments come from the models in the External
9 Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology.12 The models
2
produce medium-term current account and real
6 exchange rate benchmarks (or norms) that are consis-
tent with country fundamentals and desired policies
1 (Figure 1.19).13 The norms are compared with realized
3
current account and real exchange rate levels (after
adjusting for cyclical and other short-term factors) to
0 0 derive gaps, a measure of excess external balances. Posi-
1995
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
tive and negative gaps offset one another, ensuring that

the model results are multilaterally consistent—that is,
Sources: Central bank websites; Perks and others (2021); RFA annual reports; and that excess deficits are consistent with excess surpluses.
IMF staff estimates.
Note: BSLs = bilateral swap lines; eop = end of period; RFAs = regional financing The model inputs are then combined with other exter-
arrangements. Two-way arrangements are counted only once. nal indicators (such as net international investment
1
Permanent swap lines among major advanced economy central banks (Federal
Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Swiss National positions, capital flows, foreign exchange reserves, and
Bank, Bank of Canada). The estimated amount is based on known past usage or, if competitiveness indicators), analytically grounded
undrawn, on average past maximum drawings of the remaining central bank
members in the network, following the methodology in Denbee, Jung, and Paternò
adjustments, and country-specific insights to reach a
(2016). holistic IMF staff assessment of external sectors.
2
Limited-amount swap lines include all arrangements with an explicit amount limit IMF staff judgment plays a critical role in the
and exclude all the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization arrangements, which
are included under RFAs. assessments, as the models may not capture all
3
Based on explicit lending capacity or limit (where available), committed resources, relevant country characteristics and potential policy
or estimated lending capacity based on country access limits and paid-in capital.
4
After prudential balances. distortions. Specifically for 2022, the EBA model
5
Quota for countries in the financial transaction plan after deducting prudential estimates have been adjusted to strip out lingering
balance.
but temporary effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
on current accounts. These effects include remaining
GDP. More recently, in March 2023, the Federal travel restrictions and transportation cost shocks,
Reserve announced the enhancement of dollar funding which were prevalent in some economies. Reflecting
swap lines between itself and five other major advanced the dwindling effect of COVID-19-related shocks,
economy central banks, helping limit financial strains
following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank. 12See Allen and others (2023) for details on the current vintage of
the EBA methodology. A detailed description of the external assess-
ment process can also be found in an IMF blog entry, “Assessing
Global Imbalances: The Nuts and Bolts” (Obstfeld 2017).
Assessment of External Positions in 2022 13The EBA current account norms reflect fundamental features
This report presents individual assessments of affecting economies’ saving and investment decisions. Advanced
economies with higher incomes, older populations, and lower growth
external positions for 30 of the world’s largest econo-
prospects tend to have positive norms, while most EMDEs, which
mies, which represent 87.5 percent of global GDP.11 tend to be younger and are expected to import capital to invest and
The IMF staff’s assessment of external positions is a exploit their higher growth potential, have negative norms. Norms
also depend on desirable medium-term policies—that is, policies
deemed appropriate by IMF staff once cyclical factors are accounted
11Although the ESR presents assessments for 30 systemic econo- for. For instance, economies for which the staff recommends a
mies, the IMF staff conduct an assessment of the external sector of relatively loose fiscal policy will have lower norms than those that are
all members as part of bilateral surveillance. evaluated as needing fiscal consolidation.

Figure 1.19. External Balance Assessment Current Account economies with such positions were Germany,
Norms, 2022 Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, and Thailand,
(Percent of GDP)
along with India, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, which
7.5 entered the category in 2022.
EBA norm1 Net foreign assets
Demographics Oil
•• Moderately weaker, weaker, or substantially weaker
Other fundamentals2 Desirable policies2 than the level consistent with medium-term fundamen-
5.0 tals and desirable policies: The eight economies with
such positions were Argentina, Belgium, Canada,
South Africa, and the United States, along with
2.5
France, Italy, and Türkiye, which entered the cate-
gory in 2022, driven by decreases in their current
account balances that resulted in negative current
0.0
account gaps.
•• Broadly in line with the level consistent with medi-
–2.5 um-term fundamentals and desirable policies: The
13 economies with such positions were Brazil,
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
–5.0 Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the
CHE
KOR
NLD
RUS
JPN
DEU
BEL
ZAF
CAN
SWE
CHN
ARG
ESP
EA4
MYS
TUR
AUS
GBR
IDN
MEX
IND
POL
ITA
THA
FRA
USA
BRA
United Kingdom, along with Australia, The Nether-

lands, Poland, and the euro area, which entered this
Source: IMF, External Balance Assessment estimates.
Note: Figure excludes Hong Kong SAR, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, as they are category in 2022 after being assessed as being on the
not included in the EBA regression model. EA = euro area; EBA = External Balance stronger side in 2021.14
Assessment. Data labels use International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
country codes.
1
The EBA current account norm is multilaterally consistent and cyclically adjusted. Compared with those for 2021, assessments for
2
Other fundamentals include output per worker, expected GDP growth, and 2022 changed for nearly half of the 30 ESR econ-
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
3
Desirable policies include desirable credit gap, desirable fiscal balance, desirable omies (Figure 1.20). The assessments have moved
foreign exchange intervention, desirable health, and constant and multilaterally farther away from the “broadly in line” category for
consistent adjustment.
4
The current account norm is corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area nearly a third of the ESR economies. The majority of
transactions, since the current account of the entire euro area is about 2.0 percent assessment changes has been driven by lower current
of GDP less than the sum of the individual 11 countries’ balances (for which no
such correction is available). account balances in 2022, as in the case of Australia
and the euro area. In a notable contrast, the large
increase in Saudi Arabia’s current account balance
moved its assessment to a substantially stronger posi-
these factors explained a significantly lower share
tion. There are also economies for which the current
of current account balances in 2022 than in the
account gaps widened (such as China, Korea, and the
previous two years (Figure 1.5). Adjustments for
United Kingdom) or narrowed (such as Germany,
country-specific factors, such as measurement issues,
Japan, and Switzerland), but the changes were not
demographics, and net international investment
large enough to move them into a different category.
position considerations, have also been included.
At the aggregate level, the sum of the absolute values
Annex Table 1.1.3 reports the overall set of IMF staff
of IMF staff–assessed current account gaps remained
adjustments to reflect both COVID-19-related factors
unchanged with respect to 2021 at 0.9 percent of ESR
and other country-specific factors.
economy GDP in 2022.
Compared in terms of the sum of absolute values,
Assessment Results for 2022 headline current account balances changed more
External positions compared with the levels consis- 14Some economies may have small gaps and thus be assessed to
tent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable be broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies, if the
policies in 2022 were as follows: identified policy gaps offset each other or are offset by the model’s
•• Moderately stronger, stronger, or substantially stron- residual. This is the case, for instance, in regard to China, Indonesia,
and The Netherlands, whose IMF staff–assessed current account gap
ger than the level consistent with medium-term reflects offsetting policy gaps and factors outside the model, includ-
fundamentals and desirable policies: The nine ing structural distortions in China.

Figure 1.20. Evolution of External Sector Assessments, Figure 1.21. Evolution of Headline Current Account Balances
2012–22 and IMF Staff Gaps
2012 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1. Current Account Balances of ESR Countries1

(Percent of ESR economy GDP)
Stronger than Implied by Fundamentals 4.0 Headline current account
Singapore IMF staff–assessed CA gap
3.5
Saudi Arabia Headline current account minus COVID-19 and
Germany 3.0 cyclical factors
Sweden
2.5
Russia
Malaysia 2.0
Thailand
1.5
Mexico
India 1.0
Broadly in Line with Fundamentals 0.5
The Netherlands 0.0
Australia 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Poland
Euro Area 2. Change in IMF Staff CA Gaps, 2022–21
Switzerland (Percent of GDP)2
Korea 6
China SAU
5
Japan MEX
IMF staff–assessed CA gap

Hong Kong SAR 4
CHN
2022–21 change in
Indonesia 3 JPN MYS
ESP
Spain 2 CHE IND THA
Brazil 1 ZAF IDN
United Kingdom HKG RUS SWE SGP
0 USA
CAN BRA POL DEU
Weaker than Implied by Fundamentals –1
ITA GBR EA NLD
France –2 BEL
ARG KOR TUR
Türkiye –3 AUS
United States FRA
–4
South Africa –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Canada 2021 IMF staff–assesed CA gap
Italy
Argentina -- -- -- -- -- --
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Belgium
Note: CA = current account; EA = euro area; ESR = External Sector Report. Data
labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country
Moderately Substantially codes.
Stronger 1
The headline CA for 2023 is a projection.
Broadly in line 2
Bubble sizes are proportional to 2022 GDP in US dollars.
Weaker
Source: IMF staff assessments.

Note: Grouping and ordering are based on economies’ excess imbalance during
2022. Coverage of Argentina in the External Sector Report started in 2018. current account norms also widened to 1.6 percent of
GDP in 2022, from 1.4 percent of GDP in 2021.
Most of the excess balances in 2022 (measured
than IMF staff–assessed current account gaps, with by the sum of absolute values of IMF staff–assessed
the former driven by sizable cyclical factors and an current account gaps) pertained to advanced econo-
increase in current account norms. For the ESR sam- mies. The largest contributors to lower-than-warranted
ple, the sum of the absolute values of current account current account balances (that is, negative current
balances (akin to the global current account balance account gaps) as a share of ESR economy GDP were,
of Figure 1.5) increased by 0.2 percentage point to in descending order, the United States, France, and
about 3 percent of ESR GDP (Figure 1.21). Cyclical Italy. The largest contributors to larger-than-warranted
factors, in particular, large commodity price fluctua- current account balances as a share of ESR economy
tions, played a major role in the large headline current GDP were (again, in descending order) Germany,
account fluctuations.15 The summed absolute values of Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
IMF staff–assessed real effective exchange rate gaps
15Gaps are constructed once cyclical and short-term factors are
and current account gaps for 2022 were generally
factored in and incorporate staff adjustments for temporary factors, consistent. Economies with estimated excess current
and therefore are less volatile. account surpluses (deficits) were assessed to have had

Figure 1.22. IMF Staff Current Account and Real Effective the surplus is projected to increase, with the change
Exchange Rate Gaps driven by lower liquefied natural gas prices and stronger
20
demand from Asia, while Japan’s current account surplus
ARG is also projected to increase mainly driven by lower com-
15 modity prices and inbound tourism.
ITA USA The narrowing of global current account balances
10 CAN
BEL
FRA
BRA is expected to continue over the medium term, as the
Staff REER gap (percent)
5 TUR GBR EA impact of COVID-19 wanes and current account

ZAF
CHE
KOR AUS IDN gaps close. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is
0
JPN POL expected to dissipate as the pandemic moves into the
NLD ESP HKG MEX
–5 THA rear view mirror, and the impact from output gaps is
MYS
CHN expected to recede with the closing of output gaps over
–10 IND DEU
SWE SGP the medium term. Commodity prices are expected to
–15 RUS
fall, as demand and supply adjust to previously high
prices and the global economy slows, thereby reducing
–20 SAU the terms-of-trade gaps for commodity importers and
–25 exporters. Nonetheless, current accounts in some sur-
–6 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 plus economies, such as Japan and Korea, are expected
Staff CA gap (percent of GDP)
to widen over the medium term, driven by fundamen-
Source: IMF staff assessments. tal factors such as demographics in Korea and high rate
Note: Real effective exchange rate (REER) gap is based on 2022 External Sector of return on Japan’s net foreign assets.
Report. CA = current account; EA = euro area. Data labels in the figure use
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. Creditor and debtor stock positions are also
expected to narrow moderately over the medium
term. They reached historically high levels in 2022
an undervalued (overvalued) real effective exchange (Table 1.2); however, over the medium term, they
rate (Figure 1.22; Annex Table 1.1.4). are expected to moderate slightly as current account
balances gradually narrow. In a few debtor countries
(for example, Spain), the net foreign asset position is
Outlook for Current Account Balances and Risks expected to improve, driven by sustained projected
Outlook trade surpluses and positive returns on its net for-
Global current account balances are projected to eign assets (Online Annex 1.1). Nonetheless, in some
narrow in 2023 while changes in individual current economies, gross external liabilities remain large from
account balances exhibit substantial heterogeneity across a historical perspective, posing risks of external stress
economies (Table 1.1). China, the United States, and materializing (see Chapter 2 of the 2020 External
commodity-exporting countries, notably Norway and Sector Report).
Saudi Arabia, are expected to contribute to narrowing
global balances by about 0.5 percentage point of world Risks Surrounding the Outlook
GDP (more than half of the projected narrowing in
global balances), reflecting an increase in public saving in There are uncertainties around several key assump-
the United States,16 robust recovery in domestic demand tions on which the short- and medium-term outlook
and overseas travel in China, and falling commodity rests, including falling commodity prices, no further
prices. In contrast, Germany and Japan (along with escalation of geopolitical tensions, and contained
Korea) are expected to contribute to a widening of global financial sector turmoil.
balances by about 0.1 percentage point. In Germany, Severe tightening of global financial conditions:
The prospects of continued tightening of monetary
policies in major economies pose a challenge to the
16Household saving in the United States is expected to remain
global financial system (see Chapter 1 of the April
broadly unchanged in 2023 compared with that in 2022, as house-
holds have mostly unwound the savings accumulated from one-off 2023 Global Financial Stability Report). In a severe
fiscal stimulus during 2020–21. global financial stress scenario, broad-based capital

Table 1.1. Selected Economies: Current Account Balance, 2020–23

Billions of US Dollars Percent of World GDP Percent of GDP
2023 2023 2023
2020 2021 2022 Projection 2020 2021 2022 Projection 2020 2021 2022 Projection
Advanced Economies
Australia 30 50 20 24 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 2.2 3.0 1.2 1.4
Belgium 6 3 –20 –17 0.01 0.00 –0.02 –0.02 1.1 0.4 –3.5 –2.7
Canada –35 –5 –7 –29 –0.04 –0.01 –0.01 –0.03 –2.2 –0.3 –0.3 –1.4
France –47 11 –58 –36 –0.06 0.01 –0.06 –0.03 –1.8 0.4 –2.1 –1.2
Germany 274 330 171 201 0.32 0.34 0.17 0.19 7.1 7.7 4.2 4.7
Hong Kong SAR 24 44 38 31 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 7.0 11.8 10.5 8.0
Italy 73 64 –24 16 0.09 0.07 –0.02 0.02 3.9 3.0 –1.2 0.7
Japan 148 197 89 132 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.13 2.9 3.9 2.1 3.0
Korea 76 85 30 37 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.04 4.6 4.7 1.8 2.2
The Netherlands 47 74 43 68 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 5.1 7.3 4.4 6.3
Singapore 57 76 90 80 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 16.5 18.0 19.3 15.5
Spain 8 14 8 13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.9
Sweden 32 41 25 23 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 5.9 6.5 4.3 3.9
Switzerland 3 70 81 68 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.4 8.8 10.1 7.8
United Kingdom –87 –47 –116 –165 –0.10 –0.05 –0.12 –0.16 –3.2 –1.5 –3.8 –5.2
United States –620 –846 –944 –729 –0.73 –0.88 –0.94 –0.70 –2.9 –3.6 –3.7 –2.7
Emerging Market and
Developing Economies
Argentina 3 7 –4 6 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.8 1.4 –0.6 1.0
Brazil –28 –46 –57 –48 –0.03 –0.05 –0.06 –0.05 –1.9 –2.8 –3.0 –2.3
China 249 353 402 272 0.29 0.37 0.40 0.26 1.7 2.0 2.2 1.4
India1 24 –39 –68 –67 0.03 –0.04 –0.07 –0.06 0.9 –1.2 –2.0 –1.8
Indonesia –4 4 13 –4 –0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 –0.4 0.3 1.0 –0.3
Malaysia 14 14 13 12 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 4.2 3.8 3.1 2.6
Mexico 23 –8 –18 –17 0.03 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 2.1 –0.6 –1.3 –1.0
Poland 15 –9 –21 –18 0.02 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 2.5 –1.4 –3.0 –2.4
Russia 35 122 233 75 0.04 0.13 0.23 0.07 2.4 6.7 10.4 3.6
Saudi Arabia –23 44 151 66 –0.03 0.05 0.15 0.06 –3.1 5.1 13.6 6.2
South Africa 7 15 –2 –9 0.01 0.02 0.00 –0.01 2.0 3.7 –0.5 –2.3
Thailand 21 –11 –17 7 0.02 –0.01 –0.02 0.01 4.2 –2.1 –3.2 1.2
Türkiye –32 –7 –48 –41 –0.04 –0.01 –0.05 –0.04 –4.4 –0.9 –5.3 –4.0
Memorandum item:2
Euro Area 209 338 –141 83 0.2 0.4 –0.1 0.1 1.6 2.3 –1.0 0.6
Global Current Account 2,594 3,435 3,941 3,188 3.1 3.6 3.9 3.0 ... ... ... ...
Balance
Statistical Discrepancy 280 808 333 194 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 ... ... ... ...
Overall Surpluses 1,437 2,126 2,133 1,679 1.7 2.2 2.1 1.6 ... ... ... ...
Of which: Advanced 961 1,381 994 1,044 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.0 ... ... ... ...
Economies
Overall Deficits –1,157 –1,318 –1,800 –1,485 –1.4 –1.4 –1.8 –1.4 ... ... ... ...
Of which: Advanced –839 –941 –1,248 –1,040 –1.0 –1.0 –1.2 –1.0 ... ... ... ...
Economies
Note: “. . .” indicates that data are not available or not applicable; SAR = Special Administrative Region.
1For India, data are presented on a fiscal year basis.
2The global current account balance is the sum of absolute deficits and surpluses. Overall surpluses and deficits (and the “of which” advanced economies) include
non–External Sector Report economies.
International Monetary Fund | Publication Date 15

Table 1.2. Selected Economies: Net International Investment Position, 2019–22

Billions of US Dollars Percent of World GDP Percent of GDP
2019 2020 2021 2022 2019 2020 2021 2022 2019 2020 2021 2022
Advanced Economies
Australia –654 –744 –554 –579 –0.8 –0.9 –0.6 –0.6 –47.2 –54.7 –33.7 –34.0
Belgium 217 258 380 314 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 40.4 49.2 64.0 54.0
Canada 473 745 1,017 617 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.6 26.7 43.3 52.1 30.1
France –667 –863 –949 –657 –0.8 –1.0 –1.0 –0.7 –24.4 –32.7 –32.1 –23.6
Germany 2,260 2,658 2,984 2,894 2.6 3.1 3.1 2.9 58.1 68.4 70.0 71.0
Hong Kong SAR 1,579 2,122 2,118 1,754 1.8 2.5 2.2 1.8 434.9 615.2 574.0 486.0
Italy –23 27 164 78 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 –1.2 1.4 7.8 3.9
Japan 3,271 3,417 3,809 3,184 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.2 63.9 67.7 76.1 75.2
Korea 518 487 660 771 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 31.4 29.6 36.4 46.3
The Netherlands 729 900 797 707 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.7 89.6 113.0 93.2 75.1
Singapore 845 969 945 822 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 224.3 278.3 223.0 176.1
Spain –1,020 –1,165 –975 –850 –1.2 –1.4 –1.0 –0.8 –73.7 –85.7 –71.5 –60.5
Sweden 72 60 152 233 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 13.5 10.9 23.8 39.8
Switzerland 668 881 864 753 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 92.5 119.2 108.0 93.3
United Kingdom –306 –493 –478 –335 –0.4 –0.6 –0.5 –0.3 –10.7 –18.2 –15.3 –10.9
United States –11,653 –14,707 –17,346 –16,476 –13.4 –17.4 –18.1 –16.4 –54.5 –69.8 –74.4 –64.7
Emerging Market and Developing Economies

Argentina 113 122 122 116 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 25.0 31.3 25.1 18.4
Brazil –786 –552 –606 –777 –0.9 –0.7 –0.6 –0.8 –41.9 –37.4 –36.7 –40.4
China 2,300 2,287 2,186 2,531 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.5 16.0 15.4 12.3 14.0
India –375 –355 –362 –376 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –13.2 –13.3 –11.5 –11.1
Indonesia –338 –280 –278 –252 –0.4 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –30.2 –26.3 –23.4 –19.1
Malaysia –9 20 21 14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –2.6 5.9 5.5 3.5
Mexico –629 –549 –558 –593 –0.7 –0.6 –0.6 –0.6 –49.6 –50.3 –43.8 –42.0
Poland –294 –273 –256 –234 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –49.3 –45.5 –37.6 –34.0
Russia 359 517 485 762 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.8 21.2 34.7 26.4 34.4
Saudi Arabia 671 599 618 682 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 80.0 81.6 71.2 61.5
South Africa 31 112 110 70 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 8.0 33.3 26.3 17.2
Thailand –23 39 33 –16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –4.2 7.8 6.6 –3.0
Türkiye –309 –384 –253 –279 –0.4 –0.5 –0.3 –0.3 –40.7 –53.3 –30.9 –30.8
Memorandum item:
Euro Area –566 –433 62 283 –0.7 –0.5 0.1 0.3 –4.2 –3.3 0.4 2.0
Statistical Discrepancy –3,599 –4,706 –5,355 –5,197 –4.1 –5.6 –5.6 –5.2 ... ... ... ...
Overall Creditors1 17,367 19,634 21,125 20,004 20.0 23.2 22.0 20.0 ... ... ... ...
Of which: 13,532 15,602 17,184 15,392 15.5 18.4 17.9 15.4 ... ... ... ...
Advanced
Economies
Overall Debtors1 –20,966 –24,340 –26,481 –25,200 –24.1 –28.7 –27.6 –25.2 ... ... ... ...
Of which: –15,945 –19,696 –21,877 –20,413 –18.3 –23.3 –22.8 –20.4 ... ... ... ...
Advanced
Economies
Sources: IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: “. . .” indicates that data are not available or not applicable; SAR = Special Administrative Region.
1Overall creditors and debtors (and the “of which” advanced economies) include non–External Sector Report economies.
16 International Monetary Fund | Publication Date

Figure 1.23. Change in 2023 Current Account Balances material capital outflows and exchange rate adjust-
(Percent of baseline world GDP)
ments (see the April 2023 Global Financial Stability
0.12 Report). To the extent EMDE currencies—many of
which carry current account deficits—depreciate with
Deficit EMs
falling risk appetite, this would likely contribute to
0.08 narrowing global balances.
Rising commodity prices: Another surge in commod-
Change in CA balances
ity prices can be triggered by renewed supply disrup-

0.04 tions, due, for example, to an escalation of the war in
Ukraine, fallouts from extreme climate events (such as
El Niño), or demand increases in the event economic
0.00
growth is stronger or more resilient than expected
Deficit AEs
Surplus AEs in major economies. This surge could widen global
–0.04 current account balances in 2023 beyond the baseline
Surplus EMs projection and delay the adjustment in subsequent
years. A prolonged elevation in oil and gas prices
–0.08 would increase vulnerabilities in commodity-import-
–1.0 –0.8 –0.6 –0.4 –0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
CA balances in 2022 ing EMDEs, which in turn could result in significant
capital outflows, sizable fluctuations in exchange rates,
Sources: IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff estimates from greater borrowing costs, and increased fiscal pressures.
G20 Model simulations.
Note: AEs = advanced economies; CA = current account; EMs = emerging market The implication of these side effects for global balances
economies. is ambiguous.
Faltering growth in China: A weaker-than-expected
recovery in China would affect its trading partners
outflows from EMDEs could occur, causing currency directly, the largest of which are located in Asia and
depreciation and sharp swings in risk premiums exac- the Pacific. The slowdown would also have global
erbating the economic vulnerabilities of countries with repercussions beyond China’s major trading partners by
high levels of dollar-denominated external debt, and affecting commodities for which China accounts for a
dampening global trade (see Chapter 2). The IMF staff large share of global demand. Lower growth in China
estimates capital flows at risk at the 5 percent level to would likely expand global balances by reducing its
be 2.7 percent of GDP and the probability of outflows imports.
to be about 31 percent in May. In the severe downside Fiscal policy path: Additional fiscal spending financed
scenario presented in the April 2023 World Economic by borrowing in economies with current account
Outlook, in which the overall supply of credit, equity deficits or higher-than-expected fiscal consolidation in
prices, and confidence all weaken, while the US dollar surplus economies could slow the expected narrowing
strengthens due to higher risk aversion, the IMF’s of global balances. However, failures to implement
simulation implies a narrowing of global balances a credible fiscal consolidation strategy in economies
(Figure 1.23) and a 10 percent depreciation of EMDE with high debt and elevated levels of risk premiums
currencies on impact. could add pressures to financing their current account
Adjustments to Japan’s yield curve control policy: A deficits, thereby resulting in a narrowing of global
departure from yield curve control could have pro- balances.
found spillovers to international financial markets, Climate change: If climate change worsens, including
given the large presence of Japanese investors in due to lack of progress on mitigation policies, natural
overseas markets. Portfolio rebalancing by Japanese disasters could become more widespread and poten-
investors would put downward pressure on foreign tially affect large countries in the long term, with a
asset prices, with a larger effect likely in countries possible effect on global balances. Moreover, global bal-
with greater presence of Japanese investors, such as ances could widen due to unbalanced implementation
Australia, Ireland, and The Netherlands. Some emerg- of climate mitigation policies (see Chapter 2 of the
ing markets such as Indonesia and Malaysia could face 2022 External Sector Report).

Figure 1.24. Number of Trade Restrictions, 2009–22 Further fragmentation would also weaken international
policy coordination on vital global public goods, such
3,000
Goods as climate change mitigation and pandemic resilience
Services
Investment (see Chapter 2 of the 2022 External Sector Report).
2,500
2,000
Policy Priorities for Promoting
External Rebalancing
1,500
While current account surpluses and deficits are not
necessarily an undesirable phenomenon to the extent
that they reflect differences in countries’ fundamentals
1,000
and desirable medium-term policies, excess current
account balances should be reduced. Excess bal-
500 ances reflect an inefficient allocation of resources and
frictions in domestic economies, leading to welfare
0 losses in societies. Economies with excessively large
2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 current account deficits and negative net international
Sources: Global Trade Alert; and IMF staff calculations.
investment positions are associated with larger real
Note: Data as of April 26, 2023. effective exchange rate gaps and subject to greater
exchange market pressures and risks of sudden stops
(Figure 1.25), the risk of which has likely risen—other
things equal—for ESR economies that have moved
Geoeconomic fragmentation further hampering farther away from the “broadly in line” category in
global trade and other international flows: The risk of 2022 while debtor stock position remained elevated.
geoeconomic fragmentation has been aggravated by Moreover, excess balances could have real or perceived
the US–China trade tensions and the war in Ukraine. distributional effects, raising discontent with globaliza-
Trade barriers have been rising (Figure 1.24), and in tion and fueling trade tensions. Therefore, correcting
the extreme, the world economy could splinter into excess balances can improve welfare and reduce the risk
geoeconomic blocs. Geoeconomic fragmentation could of disruptive capital flow reversals.
affect the currency composition of foreign exchange Promoting external rebalancing requires both excess
reserves, reduce capital flows, complicate provision of current account surplus and deficit economies to act
the global safety net, and lead to a reorganization of collectively. As the April 2023 World Economic Outlook
the international monetary system (Aiyar and others emphasizes, policymakers will need to tread a narrow
2023). The impact on global current account balances path toward restoring financial sector stability, normal-
would depend on the specific scenario: while further izing fiscal policy, and avoiding recession while also
increase in trade costs across country blocs would durably reducing inflation and achieving sustainable
likely contribute to reducing global balances (Box 1.3), and inclusive growth. In addition to being consistent
trade costs within each bloc could fall and contribute with these objectives, the policy priorities set out in the
to increasing global balances. Moreover, the risk of April 2023 World Economic Outlook, including efforts
extreme fragmentation could increase the incentive for to normalize fiscal policy and steadily increase policy
self-insurance and potentially increase global balances rates, would also help to facilitate trade, rebalance
if countries with current account surpluses increase excess external positions, and contain risks to external
savings more than those with deficits. In any case, fur- balances.
ther geoeconomic fragmentation would unambiguously In the event of global financial distress, EMDEs
lead to lower welfare, including through its effect on should let their currencies adjust to help their econo-
FDIs, the diffusion of technology, and flows of labor, mies absorb external shocks. However, in specific cases
goods, and capital (Aiyar and others 2023; Chapter 4 in which shocks are large and countries face vulnera-
of the April 2023 World Economic Outlook; Chapter bilities from shallow foreign exchange markets, sizable
4 of the April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report). balance sheet mismatches, or poorly anchored inflation

Figure 1.25. Exchange Market Pressure and REER Gaps further strengthen the rule-based system. Policies
(Percent)
to preserve global economic integration would also
0.8 mitigate the risks related to fragmentation of FDI and
Linear trend line
COL other capital flows along geoeconomic fault lines (see
0.7
Chapter 4 of the April 2023 World Economic Outlook).
0.6 Supporting availability of climate financing is also
0.5 important, given that green infrastructure investment
ROU in developing economies could mitigate the external
0.4
sector impact of climate change mitigation and adapta-
EMP, 2022
HUN TUN
0.3 tion efforts (see Chapter 2 of the 2022 External Sector
CZE MAR
CHN JPN Report). Industrial policy could be pursued to address
0.2 SWE DNK IND
ISR POL GBR well-established market failures and if other policies are
0.1 THA NZL CHL
NOR not available. However, industrial policy should not
AUS KOR ZAF PER CAN
0.0 introduce distortions and should be consistent with
CHE BRA
MYS
URY
international agreements and WTO rules, minimize
–0.1 RUS MEX
adverse spillovers, and avoid creating barriers to tech-
–0.2 nology transfer. They should also be, well-structured,
–20 –10 0 10 20 30 40
REER gap, 2021 cost-effective, transparent and accountable, while not
undermining competition (Cherif and others 2022).
Sources: Goldberg and Krogstrup (2023); and IMF staff calculations. Maintaining liquidity in the global financial
Note: CA = current account; EMP = exchange market pressure index. Real
effective exchange rate (REER) gaps are current-account-implied REER gaps system, via, among other things, the GFSN, will be
based on EBA CA gaps for 2021. The REER gaps shown in this figure can deviate essential to helping economies manage risks related
from the CA-implied REER gap in the 2021 external sector assessment due to data
updates and country-specific adjustors. Data labels in the figure use International to the tightening of global financial conditions and
Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. financial system fragmentation due to geopolitical
tensions. The GFSN has played a vital role in safe-
guarding the stability of the global economy. How-
expectations, temporary foreign exchange interventions ever, the coverage of the various layers of the GFSN
may be appropriate. Capital flow management mea- is uneven, and global liquidity provision is limited
sures on outflows may be used if disruptive outflows (IMF 2016). To this end, the IMF is the only layer
lead to (imminent) crisis circumstances, but these mea- that provides universal coverage, where its lending
sures should not substitute for needed macroeconomic programs help provide a safety net for countries hit
policy adjustment. by balance-of-payments shocks. To perform this
Coordinated policy efforts will help deal with a host function effectively, the IMF should remain repre-
of complex challenges facing the world. Over the last sentative of its global membership and adequately
three decades, the sharp growth in global trade has resourced to serve as an anchor of the GFSN, which
gone hand in hand with billions of people moving crucially depends on the successful completion of the
out of poverty. With the world at increasing risk of 16th General Review of Quotas.
geoeconomic fragmentation, it is therefore of para- Policies to promote external rebalancing differ
mount importance to preserve the benefits of global based on individual economies’ positions and needs,
integration and multilateralism. To achieve this, the as detailed in the Individual Economy Assessments in
current rule-based trading system must be strengthened Chapter 3 (and summarized in Annex Table 1.1.6).
to adapt to a changing world. Advancing multilat- •• Economies with weaker-than-warranted external
eral trade rules may require focusing on reforms with positions should focus on policies that boost sav-
high impact in which preferences of countries are ing and competitiveness. Where current account
broadly aligned. The package agreed upon at the 12th deficits in 2022 partly reflected fiscal deficits
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organiza- above desirable levels (as in Italy and the United
tion (WTO) in June 2022 is a step in this direction. States), medium-term fiscal consolidation would
Fully restoring the WTO dispute settlement system help stabilize debt-to-GDP ratios and close current
and implementing new WTO-based agreements would account gaps. However, fiscal consolidation should

be implemented in a growth-friendly way, while widespread informality should help reduce precau-
providing space for critical infrastructure investment tionary saving and support consumption, thus also
and well-targeted social spending to help reduce helping with external rebalancing.
poverty and inequality (for example, in Argentina •• Economies with external positions broadly in line with
and South Africa). Countries with competitiveness fundamentals should continue to address domestic
challenges also need to address structural bottlenecks imbalances to prevent excessive external imbal-
through labor, product market, and other structural ances. Some economies (such as China) should
reforms to promote green, digital, and inclusive address offsetting policy distortions. Relevant
growth while boosting productivity. policies include accelerating market-based struc-
•• Economies with stronger-than-warranted external posi- tural reforms—including state-owned enterprise
tions should prioritize policies aimed at promoting reform—to promote growth and shifting fiscal
investment and diminishing excess saving to support policy support toward strengthening social protec-
external rebalancing while also pursuing domestic tion to reduce high household saving and stimulate
objectives. For example, in Germany, higher fiscal private consumption. In countries with negative net
deficits than currently planned are likely to be international investment positions (such as Brazil
required over the medium term to achieve domes- and Spain), keeping current account balances in
tic climate, digital, and energy security goals. In line with their norms will require a combination of
Sweden, higher investment in the green transition fiscal consolidation efforts and higher private saving
and the health sector, needed to attain the country’s to provide room for investment in education and
ambitious medium-term climate goals and prepare other reforms to encourage innovation and improve
for demographic transition, would also lower the competitiveness. Reforms to boost productivity
external balance. In some emerging markets (such would also create space for investment needed to
as Malaysia and Thailand), efforts to reform and advance green transition and reduce dependence on
expand social safety nets and measures to address foreign energy.

Box 1.1. The Financial Side of Global Imbalances

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased the risk of geo- Figure 1.1.2. Saudi Arabia: Current Account
economic fragmentation and sparked a debate around its Surplus and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter
ramifications on the global economy and policy architec- Trailing Sums
ture (Aiyar and others 2023). This box aims to shed light (Billions of US dollars)
on recent changes in the global constellation of current
Current account Portfolio investment
account imbalances, focusing on the financial recycling Foreign exchange Net errors and
of large current account surpluses and the funding of the reserves (–) omissions (–)
US current account deficit. The interdependence between Other investment (–) Direct investment
250 Capital account
large surplus and deficit economies remains largely intact, 200
while (offshore) financial centers play increasingly import-
150 Outflows
ant roles, making it more difficult to gauge the exposures
100
between countries.
50
How Do Current Account Surpluses Flow Out? 0
–50
Since the global financial crisis (GFC), there
–100 Inflows
appears to have been some changes in the conduits
for recycling two large current account surpluses of –150
2007
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
China and Saudi Arabia (Figures 1.1.1 and 1.1.2).
Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has played
Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Figure shows total cross-border total liabilities (amounts
outstanding) of reporting banks in all currencies. Last
Figure 1.1.1. China: Current Account Surplus observation: third quarter of 2022.
and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter Trailing Sums
Current account Portfolio debt (–) a much smaller role than before the GFC. Instead,
Foreign exchange Net errors and net portfolio investment (debt in China, equity in
reserves (–) omissions (–) Saudi Arabia) and net other investment (bank loans
Other investment (–)
Foreign direct investment and portfolio equity (–) in China, currency and deposits in China and Saudi
800 Capital account and financial derivatives (–) Arabia) have become more important channels of
600
recycling (that is, investing) the recent surpluses in
these economies.1 In Russia, net other investment is
400 Outflows the main channel for financial outflows, with a notable
200 portion of those outflows headed toward the euro area,
0 with Belgium being a prime destination (Figure 1.1.3).
Outside the euro area, Switzerland has been a recipient
–200 Inflows of a substantial share of Russia’s investment since 2008
–400 (Figure 1.1.4).
–600
Who Funds the US Current Account Deficit?
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
The US current account deficit, the largest defi-

Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; and IMF staff calculations. cit of all, is mainly financed via portfolio debt
Note: Figure shows total cross-border total liabilities (amounts flows (Figure 1.1.5). However, it has recently been
outstanding) of reporting banks in all currencies. Last increasingly financed by other types of financial
observation: fourth quarter of 2022.
1In China, net errors and omissions account for part of the
This box was prepared by Cian Allen and Cyril Rebillard. recycling of the surplus.

Box 1.1 (continued)

Figure 1.1.3. Russia: Current Account Surplus Figure 1.1.5. United States: Current Account
and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter Trailing Sums Surplus and Capital Flows, Four-Quarter
(Billions of US dollars) Trailing Sums
Current account Portfolio investment
Foreign exchange Net errors and Current account Portfolio debt assets
300 reserves (–) omissions (–) Portfolio debt liabilities Financial derivatives
250 Other investment (–) Direct investment Foreign exchange Net errors and
Capital account (–) Financial derivatives reserves (–) omissions (–)
200
150 1,500 Foreign direct investment and portfolio
Other investment (–) Capital account (–)
100 Outflows 1,000
50 Outflows
0 500
–50 0
–100 Inflows –500
–150
–200 –1,000
Inflows
1995
97
99
01
03
05
07
09
11
13
15
17
19
21
–1,500
–2,000
Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
observation: fourth quarter of 2022. Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.
observation: fourth quarter of 2022.
Figure 1.1.4. Bank for International Settlements

Reporting Banks’ Cross-Border Positions on
Residents of Russia flows, namely, net flows of other investment (mainly
(Billions of US dollars) currency and deposits, as well as bank loans). Since
early 2021, the net external purchase of US portfolio
Euro area Other US UK debt securities has shifted to US Treasury securities
300 Switzerland Japan Total
and away from corporate bonds, partly reflecting large
250 financing needs related to pandemic stimulus measures
(Figure 1.1.6).
200 Geographically, the financing of the US current
150 account deficit has become increasingly mediated by
financial centers in recent years.2 This contrasts with
100 the pre-GFC period, when the US current account
50 deficit was financed largely through reserve accumu-
lation from surplus countries. Balance-of-payments
0 data (Figure 1.1.7) show a declining role for China;
2000:Q1
00:Q4
01:Q3
02:Q2
03:Q1
03:Q4
04:Q3
05:Q2
06:Q1
06:Q4
07:Q3
08:Q2
09:Q1
09:Q4
10:Q3
11:Q2
12:Q1
12:Q4
13:Q3
14:Q2
15:Q1
15:Q4
16:Q3
17:Q2
18:Q1
18:Q4
19:Q3
20:Q2
21:Q1
21:Q4
22:Q4
however, to uncover the investment patterns by

Russia and offshore financial centers, this box turns
to information on holders of US government and
Sources: Bank for International Settlements locational banking
statistics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Figure shows total cross-border total liabilities (amounts 2This is in line with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018), who
outstanding) of reporting banks in all currencies. Last emphasize the financial centers’ role in intermediating foreign
observation: fourth quarter of 2022. direct investment flows.

Box 1.1 (continued)

Figure 1.1.6. Net Foreign Purchases of Figure 1.1.7. US Incurrence of Portfolio
US Securities Investment Liabilities
(Billions of US dollars, 12-month sum) (Billions of US dollars, unless noted otherwise)
1,200 Total Treasury Europe Belgium

1,000 Agency Corporate Luxembourg The Netherlands
Middle East Asia and Pacific
800 China Hong Kong SAR
600 14,000 Japan Singapore 16
400 Other All countries
12,000 Percent of GDP (right scale) 14
200 12
10,000
0
10
–200 8,000
8
–400 6,000
–600 6
4,000
2013:M1
13:M7
14:M1
14:M7
15:M1
15:M7
16:M1
16:M7
17:M1
17:M7
18:M1
18:M7
19:M1
19:M7
20:M1
20:M7
21:M1
21:M7
22:M1
22:M7
23:M1
4
2,000 2
0 0
2003:Q1
03:Q4
04:Q3
05:Q2
06:Q1
06:Q4
07:Q3
08:Q2
09:Q1
09:Q4
10:Q3
11:Q2
12:Q1
12:Q4
13:Q3
14:Q2
15:Q1
15:Q4
16:Q3
17:Q2
18:Q1
18:Q4
19:Q3
20:Q2
21:Q1
21:Q4
22:Q4
Sources: Federal Reserve; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Estimated flows are essentially constructed using changes
in foreign holdings of US Treasury securities adjusted for
valuation effects as discussed in Bertaut and Judson (2014).
Tabova and Warnock (2021) assess the different sources Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; and IMF staff
available for measuring foreign transactions in US Treasury calculations.
securities and support the use of holdings-based estimates of Note: “Other” includes Canada, Latin America and other Western
flows. “Corporate” includes bonds and stocks. Hemisphere, Africa, and international organizations.
corporate securities compiled by the Federal Reserve the share of gold in its reserves has increased since
(Figure 1.1.8)3: 2007, reaching 21 percent at the end of 2022.
•• In China, while the 2015–16 sale of US Treasur- •• On the other hand, two countries have signifi-
ies coincided with exchange rate depreciation, the cantly increased their holdings of US securities
2018–20 sale occurred with a modest net purchases and as a result accounted for the largest share
of US government agency bonds. Since late-2021, of the external portfolio debt financing of US
the purchase of agency bonds has increased, broadly current account deficits in the recent period. They
offsetting the decline in the purchase of Treasury were the United Kingdom, with a total of about
securities. US$600 billion, comparable to the pre-GFC peak,
•• Russia has been divesting away from US Trea- although the composition is now more tilted toward
sury bonds, especially since 2014, following the US Treasuries and away from corporate bonds;
annexation of Crimea and subsequent US and and the Cayman Islands, with a total of about
international sanctions. Its divestment of US US$500 billion, also tilted toward US Treasuries.
securities appears to have peaked about 2018, with In light of the United Kingdom’s current account
no significant transactions since mid-2019. Instead, deficit and the Cayman Islands’ small size, both
countries are likely to be only intermediaries provid-
ing financial and banking sector services.
3The patterns in these data can be distorted by “custodial
Echoing the increased role of financial centers in
bias,” where a foreign holder of the US liability chooses to use financing the US current account deficit, the share of
a custodian in a different country. This can be an issue in major
official holdings (among total holdings) of US Treasury
financial centers, such as Belgium, the Caribbean banking
centers, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (see securities has steadily decreased, from a peak of 76
Bertaut and Judson 2014). percent in mid-2009 to about 50 percent at the end

Box 1.1 (continued)

Figure 1.1.8. Net Foreign Purchases of US Securities
(Billions of US dollars, 12-month sum)
Total Treasury Agency Corporate

1. Russia 2. China
40 300
20 200
0 100
–20 0
–40 –100
–60 –200
–80 –300
–100 –400
2013:M1
14:M1
15:M1
16:M1
17:M1
18:M1
19:M1
20:M1
21:M1
22:M1
23:M1
2013:M1
14:M1
15:M1
16:M1
17:M1
18:M1
19:M1
20:M1
21:M1
22:M1
23:M1
3. Cayman Islands 4. UK
200 200
150 150
100 100
50 50
0 0
–50 –50
–100 –100
–150 –150
–200 –200
2013:M1
14:M1
15:M1
16:M1
17:M1
18:M1
19:M1
20:M1
21:M1
22:M1
23:M1
2013:M1
14:M1
15:M1
16:M1
17:M1
18:M1
19:M1
20:M1
21:M1
22:M1
23:M1
Sources: Federal Reserve, and IMF staff calculations.

Note: The estimated flows are essentially constructed using changes in foreign holdings of US Treasury securities
adjusted for valuation effects as discussed in Bertaut and Judson (2014). Tabova and Warnock (2021) assess the
different sources available for measuring foreign transactions in US Treasury securities and support the use of
holdings-based estimates of flows. “Corporate” includes bonds and stocks.
of 2022, while the share of private holdings exceeded The interdependence between large surplus and defi-
40 percent at the end of 2022 (Figure 1.1.9). However, cit economies appears to be largely intact. At the same
the currency composition of official foreign exchange time, the role of financial centers has increased, as
reserves has remained largely stable in recent years, with their rising share in financing the US current account
the US dollar still accounting for about 60 percent of deficit (Figure 1.1.8) or in China’s overseas portfolio
the total of (allocated) global reserves (Figure 1.1.10). investment (Figure 1.1.11) shows.

Box 1.1 (continued)

Figure 1.1.9. Total Foreign Holdings of Figure 1.1.10. Currency Composition of Official
US Treasury Securities Foreign Exchange Reserves
(Percent of allocated reserves)
Foreign holdings of US treasury securities
(billions of US dollars) 80
Of which: Official (percent, right scale)
8,000 80 70
7,000 75 60
US dollars Swiss francs
6,000 70 50 Australian dollars British pounds sterling
5,000 Euros Chinese yuan
65 40 Japanese yen Canadian dollars
4,000 Other
60 30
3,000
55 20
2,000
1,000 50 10
0 45 0
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
1999
2000
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; and US Department of the Source: IMF, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange
Treasury, Treasury International Capital System. Reserve (COFER).
Figure 1.1.11. China: Incurrence of Portfolio

Investment Assets
1,200
British Virgin Islands
United States
1,000
Hong Kong SAR
Cayman Islands
800
600
400
200
0
2015:H1
15:H2
16:H1
16:H2
17:H1
17:H2
18:H1
18:H2
19:H1
19:H2
20:H1
20:H2
21:H1
21:H2
22:H1
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.

Note: Legend only displays selected economies for clarity.

Box 1.2. Trends in Currency Exposures of External Balance Sheets

The vulnerability of economies to external shocks Figure 1.2.1. Cumulative Distribution of Foreign
depends crucially on the currency composition of Currency Exposures
international investment positions. This box discusses
1. Aggregate Foreign Currency Exposures1
findings on the currency breakdown of these positions 1.0
for 50 major economies (building on Lane and Sham- EMDEs, 1990
AEs, 1990
baugh 2010).1 0.8 EMDEs, 2007
Cumulative probability
Long foreign currency positions. Aggregate foreign AEs, 2007
currency exposures, which measure net foreign assets 0.6 EMDEs, 2020
AEs, 2020
in foreign currency (as a percentage of total assets
and liabilities), have improved significantly since 0.4
1990, particularly in emerging market and devel-
0.2
oping economies (EMDEs). In fact, most EMDEs
have moved from a negative aggregate net position in 0.0
foreign currency (indicated by negative x-axis values in –0.8 –0.6 –0.4 –0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 1.2.1, panel 1) to a positive one, as evidenced Foreign currency exposure
(percent of total assets and liabilities)
by the rightward shift of the corresponding curve. This
transition took place mainly before the global financial 2. EMDEs: Aggregate 3. EMDEs: Portfolio Debt
crisis and is largely attributable to the currency com- Net Foreign Net Foreign Currency
position of other investments (mainly bank related) Currency Exposure2 Exposure2
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
and a greater reliance on portfolio equity financing. 0.4 0.00
Currency-induced valuation effects. Positive net
0.3
positions in foreign currency have reduced risks –0.02
0.2
associated with depreciations in domestic currency, –0.04
increasing the insurance role of national balance 0.1
sheets in response to negative shocks to economies. In 0.0 –0.06
1990, a 10 percent depreciation in domestic currency, –0.1
–0.08
all else equal, resulted in a median valuation loss of –0.2
1.6 percent of GDP for EMDEs. However, by 2020, –0.10
–0.3
this median effect had become positive, equivalent –0.4 –0.12
to 2.4 percent of GDP (as illustrated in Figure 1.2.1,
1990
95
2000
05
10
15
20
1990
95
2000
05
10
15
panel 2). Advanced economies also experienced a 20
similar trend, with a 10 percent depreciation leading Source: Allen, Gautam, and Juvenal (2023).
to a median valuation gain of 0.5 percent of GDP in Note: AEs = advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging market
1990 and a valuation gain of 9.2 percent of GDP in and developing economies.
1
Aggregate foreign currency exposure is defined as total net
2020. The proportion of EMDEs with net long posi- foreign assets denominated in foreign currency as a share of
tions in foreign currency increased significantly, from total assets and liabilities.
2
17 percent in 1990 to 75 percent in 2020. However, A 1 percent uniform shift in the value of the domestic currency
against all foreign currencies leads to a median valuation
92 percent of EMDEs were short on foreign currency change of x percent of GDP.
in portfolio debt in 2020, resulting in a median
valuation loss of 1 percent of GDP in portfolio debt
when there is a 10 percent depreciation in domestic
currency (Figure 1.2.1, panel 3). sectors, institutions, or more granular asset classes.
Risks. Aggregate positions may mask significant cur- For example, when debt and equity are examined
rency mismatches on the balance sheets of individual separately, currency-driven valuation effects in debt
and equity tend to offset each other for many econ-
omies. Nonetheless, the prevalence of short positions
This box was prepared by Cian Allen and Luciana Juvenal.
1These economies are included in either the External Balance in foreign currency for debt among EMDEs keeps
Assessment or the External Sector Report and taken together EMDEs with such positions vulnerable to depreciation
represent more than 85 percent of world GDP. pressures.

Box 1.3. Trade Costs and Current Account Imbalances

Quantitative studies surveyed in Aiyar and others Figure 1.3.1. Trade Openness and Current
(2023) suggest that geoeconomic fragmentation Account Balances since 1870
(GEF), a policy-driven reversal of integration often (Percent of GDP)
guided by strategic considerations, could result in
80 Trade openness 6
sizable welfare losses for the global economy, by raising 75 Current account
barriers to foreign direct investments, the diffusion of 70 (absolute value, right scale) 5
technology, and flows of labor, goods, and capital. This 65
60
box focuses on the implications for current account 55 4
imbalances of higher trade barriers, which are a con- 50
spicuous symptom of GEF.1 45 3
40
Historically, trade openness and the size of global 35
2
current account balances have tended to move in 30
lockstep: current account balances were large during 25
20 1
the first globalization era in the late 19th and early 1870 85 1900 15 30 45 60 75 90 2006 20
20th centuries, declined as global trade shrank
during the interwar period, and surged again during Sources: Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017); and IMF staff
calculations.
the long rise in trade openness following the end of Note: Figure shows the average for trade openness (exports plus
World War II (Figure 1.3.1). While several factors imports over GDP) and absolute-value current accounts for
have likely contributed to this association, there 18 economies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway,
appears to be a direct link between trade barriers and Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
global balances. the United States.
Using a dynamic quantitative trade model based on
Cuñat and Zymek (2023), this box analyzes the link
between trade barriers and global trade balances. The
model simulations show that trade barriers dampen to use the trade balance to smooth the effects of the
the effect of shocks on trade balances and international transitory shock (blue lines in Figure 1.3.2). The
risk sharing by magnifying the response of prices response of the price level and real interest rate is
and the real interest rate to shocks. As an illustrative larger the higher the country’s trade barriers. Although
example, the simulations consider the impact of a one- the model is calibrated to a representative emerging
time negative labor productivity shock in one country, market and developing economy (EMDE), the mech-
which would bring about a need to run current anism it illustrates is more general: by strengthening
account deficit through international borrowing.2 the response of prices and real rates to departures from
Figure 1.3.2 presents the simulation results. The balanced trade, higher trade barriers reduce current
decline in output triggers a trade and current account account imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000;
deficit on impact, which leads to a temporary rise in Eaton, Kortum, and Neiman 2016; Reyes-Heroles
the price level (given home bias resulting from trade 2017). Empirical studies have provided support for
barriers). As the rise in prices is short-lived, expected this mechanism, documenting that countries with
inflation declines, which raises the real interest rate high overall trade barriers tend to have smaller current
and dampens the incentives of consumers and firms account imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000; Joy
and others 2018; Boz, Li, and Zhang 2019).
Higher trade costs would thus be expected to
This box was prepared by Robert Zymek. cause a decline in global imbalances. The red lines in
1This box considers global (and uniform) increases in trade
costs, which is one aspect of GEF. But GEF could easily bring
Figure 1.3.2 show the response to the same productivity
about asymmetric changes in trade costs: were the world to be shock in a representative EMDE when the country’s
divided into several blocs, trades costs across blocs would rise trade barriers with the rest of the world are raised in line
to very high levels, but trade costs within each bloc would fall with the baseline GEF scenario in Bolhuis, Chen, and
significantly. GEF could also increase and alter frictions in inter- Kett (2023). As the figure shows, relative to the baseline
national transactions of all stripes, including financial market
transactions (see Aiyar and others 2023).
with lower trade costs, the trade and current account
2For details on modeling assumptions and calibration, see imbalances following the shock are smaller, while the
Cuñat and Zymek (2023). initial decline in consumption is larger. Simulating the

Box 1.3 (continued)

Figure 1.3.2. Effect of a Labor Productivity Shock on a Representative EMDE: Baseline and
Higher Trade Cost
Baseline GEF
1. Productivity 2. Price Level 3. Real Interest Rate
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
0.0 0.20 0.20
–0.2 0.15 0.15
–0.4 0.10 0.10
–0.6 0.05 0.05
–0.8 0.00 0.00
–1.0 –0.05 –0.05

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
4. Consumption 5. Net Exports 6. Current Account

(Percent) (Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
0.1 0.1 0.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
–0.1 –0.1 –0.1
–0.2 –0.2 –0.2
–0.3 –0.3 –0.3
–0.4 –0.4 –0.4
–0.5 –0.5 –0.5
–0.6 –0.6 –0.6
–0.7 –0.7 –0.7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Source: Simulations based on Cuñat and Zymek (2023).

Note: One unit of time on the horizontal axes corresponds to one year. The “Baseline” simulation is calibrated to the trade
openness of a representative country from the group of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). The “GEF”
simulation is calibrated to the (diminished relative to “Baseline”) trade openness resulting from a rise in trade barriers in
line with the main geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF) scenario in Bolhuis, Chen, and Kett (2023). In the scenario, countries
divide into a western and an eastern bloc based on their preexisting trade ties, with higher barriers between blocs leading
to a 3–4 percent real income loss for EMDEs on average.
model for the size, frequency, and persistence of pro- imbalances is a diminished capacity to smooth the
ductivity shocks experienced by the typical EMDE, the impact of shocks on consumption. In the model simula-
average absolute value of the trade balance is found to tions, the standard deviation of real aggregate consump-
be 10 percent lower after GEF, and the average absolute tion is 20 percent larger. Higher trade costs thus expose
value of the current account balance is found to be EMDEs to greater consumption volatility, even if the
8 percent lower—a small but noticeable decline. The frequency and magnitude of domestic economic shocks
flip side of the reduction in trade and current account remain unchanged.

Annex Table 1.1.1. Selected Economies: Foreign Reserves, 2019–221

IMF Staff–Estimated
Change in Official
Gross Official Reserves2 Reserves3 Gross Official
(Billions of US Dollars) (Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP) Reserves, 2022
(Percent of FXI Data
2019 2020 2021 2022 2019 2020 2021 2022 2019 2020 2021 2022 ARA metric)4 Publication
Advanced Economies
Australia 58 43 58 57 4.2 3.1 3.5 3.3 –0.1 –0.1 1.0 0.1 ... Yes, daily
Canada 85 90 107 107 4.9 5.5 5.3 5.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 ... Yes, monthly
Euro Area 914 1,078 1,196 1,185 6.8 8.2 8.2 8.4 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.2 ... Yes, quarterly
Hong Kong SAR 441 492 497 424 121.6 142.6 134.7 117.5 1.7 10.7 –0.3 –13.0 ... Yes, daily
Japan 1,322 1,391 1,406 1,228 25.8 27.5 28.1 29.0 0.5 –0.1 1.2 –0.5 ... Yes, monthly
Korea 409 443 463 423 24.8 27.0 25.6 25.4 0.1 0.9 0.4 –1.7 ... Yes, quarterly
Singapore 285 370 425 289 75.8 106.2 100.3 62.0 0.7 28.3 4.3 –27.9 ... Yes,
semiannually
Sweden 56 58 62 68 10.4 10.6 9.7 11.5 –1.4 –0.1 0.9 1.3 ... Yes, weekly
Switzerland 855 1,083 1,110 924 118.4 146.6 138.8 111.0 2.3 16.8 7.4 1.3 ... Yes, quarterly
United Kingdom 174 180 194 176 6.1 6.7 6.2 5.7 –0.1 –0.1 0.9 0.1 ... Yes, monthly
United States 517 628 716 707 2.4 3.0 3.1 2.8 0.0 –0.1 0.6 0.0 ... Yes, quarterly
Emerging Market and Developing Economies
Argentina 45 39 40 45 9.9 10.1 8.1 7.1 –8.3 –3.4 0.7 0.1 74 Yes, daily
Brazil 357 356 362 325 19.1 24.1 22.0 16.9 0.4 –2.4 –0.8 –1.2 136 Yes, daily
China 3,223 3,357 3,428 3,128 22.5 22.6 19.3 17.3 –0.1 0.2 1.1 0.6 110 No
India 463 590 638 567 16.3 22.1 20.3 16.8 2.5 3.8 1.6 –0.9 159 Yes, monthly
Indonesia 129 136 145 137 11.5 12.8 12.2 10.4 0.7 0.5 1.3 –0.1 118 No
Malaysia 104 108 117 115 28.4 31.9 31.3 28.1 2.5 0.9 2.4 1.5 110 No
Mexico 183 199 208 201 14.4 18.3 16.3 14.2 0.2 1.1 0.8 –0.1 119 Yes, monthly
Poland 128 154 166 167 21.5 25.7 24.4 24.2 1.7 3.1 2.8 1.9 157 No
Russia 555 597 632 582 32.7 40.1 34.4 26.3 3.9 –0.9 3.5 –2.2 300 Yes, quarterly
Saudi Arabia 515 473 474 478 61.4 64.4 54.6 43.2 0.4 –6.3 0.2 0.2 ... No
South Africa 55 55 58 61 14.2 16.3 13.7 14.9 0.4 –0.7 1.0 0.1 90 No
Thailand 224 258 246 217 41.2 51.6 48.7 40.4 2.7 1.3 –0.5 –0.8 203 No
Türkiye 106 94 110 129 13.9 13.0 13.4 14.2 –1.2 –10.8 2.7 0.7 95 No
Memorandum item:
Aggregate5 11,204 12,272 12,857 11,737 12.8 14.5 13.3 0.2 0.3 0.9 -0.2 ... ...
AEs 5,116 5,857 6,234 5,587 5.9 6.9 6.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.2 ... ...
EMDEs 6,088 6,416 6,623 6,150 7.0 7.6 6.9 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 ... ...
Sources: IMF, Assessing Reserve Adequacy data set; IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity; IMF, April 2023 World
Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: “. . .” indicates that data are not available or not applicable. AE = advanced economy; ARA = assessment of reserve adequacy; EMDE = emerging market and developing
economy; FX = foreign exchange; FXI = foreign exchange intervention; SAR = Special Administrative Region.
1 Sample includes External Sector Report economies excluding individual euro area economies. Euro area is reported as aggregate.
2 Total reserves from International Financial Statistics; includes gold reserves valued at market prices.
3 This item is not necessarily equal to actual FXI, but it is used as an FXI proxy in External Balance Assessment model estimates. The estimated change in official reserves
is equivalent to the change in reserve assets in the financial account series from the World Economic Outlook (which excludes valuation effects but includes interest
income on official reserves) plus the change in off-balance-sheet holdings (short and long FX derivative positions and other memorandum items) from International
Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity minus net credit and loans from the IMF.
4 The ARA metric reflects potential balance-of-payments FX liquidity needs in adverse circumstances and is used to assess the adequacy of FX reserves against potential
FX liquidity drains (see IMF 2015). The ARA metric is estimated for selected EMDEs and includes adjustments for capital controls for China. For Argentina, the adjusted
measure uses a four-year average to smooth the temporary effect of the sharp reductions in short-term debt and exports, and a collapse in the valuation of debt portfolio
investments in the wake of the sovereign debt restructuring. Additional adjusted figures are available in the individual country pages in Chapter 3.
5 The aggregate is calculated as the sum of External Sector Report economies only. The percent of GDP is calculated relative to total world GDP.

Annex Table 1.1.2. External Sector Report Economies: Summary of External Assessment Indicators, 2022
Current
Account International Investment
(Percent of IMF Staff CA Gap IMF Staff REER Position
GDP) (Percent of GDP) Gap (Percent) (Percent of GDP) CA NFA
Stabilizing SE of CA
Cycl. (Percent Norm
Economy Overall Assessment Actual Adj. Midpoint Range Midpoint Range Net Liabilities Assets of GDP) (Percent)
Argentina Weaker –0.6 –0.8 –1.8 ±1 17.5 ±2.5 18 49 67 1.0 0.5
Australia Broadly in line 1.2 –2.1 –0.5 ±0.8 2.6 ±4 –34 183 149 –1.9 0.8
Belgium Substantially weaker –3.5 –1.7 –4.6 ±0.4 6.3 ±0.6 54 365 419 2.6 0.4
Brazil Broadly in line –3.0 –3.3 –0.8 ±0.5 6.0 ±3.9 –40 90 49 –2.1 0.5
Canada Moderately weaker –0.3 –1.3 –1.8 ±0.5 6.8 ±1.7 30 235 265 2.3 0.5
China Broadly in line 2.2 2.2 0.8 ±0.6 –5.7 ±4.7 14 37 51 0.8 0.6
Euro Area1 Broadly in line –1.0 0.1 –0.1 ±0.6 0.2 ±1.8 2 249 251 0.1 0.6
France Moderately weaker –2.1 –1.5 –2.0 ±0.5 7.1 ±1.6 –24 326 302 –1.5 0.5
Germany Stronger 4.2 5.3 2.8 ±0.5 –7.8 ±1.4 71 239 310 4.3 0.5
Hong Kong SAR Broadly in line 10.5 10.3 0.6 ±1.5 –1.4 ±3.9 486 1,192 1,678 ... ...
India Moderately stronger –2.0 –0.9 1.5 ±0.7 –7.8 ±3.6 –11 37 26 –1.2 0.7
Indonesia Broadly in line 1.0 –1.5 0.3 ±0.6 –2.0 ±3.6 –19 53 34 –1.6 0.6
Italy Weaker –1.2 0.6 –2.5 ±0.7 9.3 ±2.7 4 171 174 0.3 0.7
Japan Broadly in line 2.1 3.2 0.0 ±1.1 0.0 ±6.6 75 165 240 3.2 1.1
Korea Broadly in line 1.8 4.2 –1.0 ±0.9 2.9 ±2.7 46 84 130 2.4 0.9
Malaysia Stronger 3.1 2.4 4.0 ±0.5 –8.0 ±1 4 121 125 0.8 0.5
Mexico Moderately stronger –1.3 –0.4 1.7 ±0.5 –4.9 ±1.3 –42 94 52 –2.0 0.5
The Netherlands Broadly in line 4.4 5.5 0.0 ±0.6 0.1 ±0.9 75 968 1,043 4.3 0.6
Poland Broadly in line –3.0 –1.8 0.9 ±0.5 –2.0 ±1 –34 91 57 –2.6 0.5
Russia Stronger 10.4 6.7 2.3 ±1.1 –13.6 ±6.5 34 38 72 1.2 1.1
Saudi Arabia Substantially stronger 13.6 12.5 4.7 ±2.5 –21.6 ±12.5 62 58 119 ... ...
Singapore Substantially stronger 19.3 21.8 5.1 ±1.8 –10.2 ±3.6 176 949 1,126 ... ...
South Africa Moderately weaker –0.5 –1.4 –1.3 ±0.7 5.0 ±2.9 17 114 131 0.6 0.7
Spain Broadly in line 0.6 1.4 0.7 ±0.8 –2.2 ±2.6 –61 259 199 –3.1 0.8
Sweden Stronger 4.3 5.0 3.8 ±0.4 –9.7 ±5.7 40 285 325 2.1 0.4
Switzerland Broadly in line 10.1 10.6 0.0 ±0.8 0.1 ±1.4 93 588 681 4.4 0.8
Thailand Stronger –3.2 –2.3 2.9 ±0.7 –6.2 ±1.6 –3 121 118 0.0 0.7
Türkiye Moderately weaker –5.3 –2.5 –1.9 ±0.7 6.5 ±2.5 –31 65 34 –1.9 0.7
United Kingdom Broadly in line –3.8 –2.2 –0.8 ±1 2.9 ±3.6 –11 574 563 –0.8 0.3
United States Moderately weaker –3.7 –3.5 –1.1 ±0.7 9.0 ±5.6 –65 176 112 –3.5 0.7
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, April 2023 World Economic Outlook; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; and IMF staff assessments.
Note: CA = current account; Cycl. Adj. = cyclically adjusted; NFA = net foreign assets; REER = real effective exchange rate; SAR = Special Administrative Region; SE = standard error.
1 The IMF staff–assessed euro area CA gap is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of IMF staff–assessed CA gaps for the 11 largest euro area economies.

Annex Table 1.1.3. External Sector Report Economies: Summary of IMF Staff–Assessed Current Account Gaps and IMF Staff
Adjustments, 2022
(Percent of GDP)
IMF Staff Adjustments3
IMF
Actual CA Cycl. Adj. EBA CA EBA CA Staff-Assessed Other
Balance CA Balance Norm Gap1 CA Gap2 Total COVID-19 CA Norm Comments on Non–COVID-19-related
Economy [A] [B] [C] [D=B–C] [E=D+F] [F=G+H-I] [G] [H] [I] Adjustments
Argentina –0.6 –0.8 0.3 –1.2 –1.8 –0.6 0.1 0.0 0.7 NIIP/financing risk considerations
Australia 1.2 –2.1 –1.0 –1.1 –0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0
Belgium –3.5 –1.7 2.8 –4.5 –4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil –3.0 –3.3 –2.2 –1.1 –0.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Canada –0.3 –1.3 2.2 –3.4 –1.8 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 Measurement biases
China 2.2 2.2 0.7 1.5 0.8 –0.7 –0.7 0.0 0.0
Euro Area4 –1.0 0.1 –0.3 0.5 –0.1 –0.5 0.1 –0.5 0.1 Country-specific adjustments
France –2.1 –1.5 –0.3 –1.1 –2.0 –0.9 –0.9 0.0 0.0
Germany 4.2 5.3 2.8 2.5 2.8 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
India –2.0 –0.9 –2.3 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 1.0 –1.5 –1.1 –0.4 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.0 –0.4 High mortality rate, norm
Italy –1.2 0.6 3.4 –2.9 –2.5 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
Japan 2.1 3.2 3.5 –0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Korea 1.8 4.2 4.8 –0.6 –1.0 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 3.1 2.4 –0.5 2.9 4.0 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
Mexico –1.3 –0.4 –1.6 1.2 1.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
The Netherlands 4.4 5.5 4.8 0.7 0.0 –0.7 –0.2 –0.5 0.0 Measurement biases
Poland –3.0 –1.8 –2.7 1.0 0.9 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Russia 10.4 6.7 4.0 2.7 2.3 –0.4 –0.4 0.0 0.0
South Africa –0.5 –1.4 2.2 –3.6 –1.3 2.3 0.2 1.5 –0.6 SACU transfers and measurement
biases (CA), demographics (high
mortality risk, norm)
Spain 0.6 1.4 –0.1 1.5 0.7 –0.8 0.2 0.0 1.1 NIIP/financing risk considerations
Sweden 4.3 5.0 0.8 4.2 3.8 –0.3 –0.3 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 10.1 10.6 6.5 4.1 0.0 –4.1 –0.1 –4.0 0.0 Measurement biases
Thailand –3.2 –2.3 0.9 –3.2 2.9 6.1 6.1 0.0 0.0
Türkiye –5.3 –2.5 –0.8 –1.7 –1.9 –0.2 –0.2 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom –3.8 –2.2 –1.0 –1.2 –0.8 0.4 –0.3 0.7 0.0 Measurement biases
United States –3.7 –3.5 –2.2 –1.2 –1.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Hong Kong SAR 10.5 10.3 ... ... 0.6 ... 0.9 ... ...
Singapore 19.3 21.8 ... ... 5.1 ... –3.1 ... ... Measurement biases, NFA
composition, health spending
Saudi Arabia 13.6 12.5 ... ... 4.7 ... 0.0 ... ...
Absolute sum ... ... ... 1.2 0.9 ... ... ... ...
of excess
surpluses and
deficits5
Discrepancy 6 ... ... ... ... –0.01 ... ... ... ...
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: “. . .” indicates that data are not available or not applicable; CA = current account; Cycl. Adj. = cyclically adjusted; EBA = External Balance Assessment; ESR = External Sector
Report; NIIP = net international investment position; SACU = Southern African Customs Union.
1 Minor discrepancies between constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
2 Refers to the midpoint of the IMF staff–assessed CA gap.
3 Total IMF staff adjustments include rounding in some cases. See Online Annex 1.1 for a description of COVID-19 adjustors. The last column explains country-specific adjustments
to the CA and norm.

4 The EBA euro area CA norm is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of norms for the 11 largest euro area economies, adjusted for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.
The IMF staff–assessed CA gap is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of IMF staff–assessed gaps for the 11 largest euro area economies.
5 Sum of absolute value of IMF staff–assessed CA gaps in percent of aggregate GDP for economies included in the ESR exercise.
6 Sum of IMF staff–assessed CA gaps in percent of aggregate GDP for economies included in the EBA and/or ESR exercise.

Annex Table 1.1.4. External Sector Report Economies: Summary of IMF Staff–Assessed Real Effective
Exchange Rate and External Balance Assessment Model Gaps, 2022
REER Gap Implied REER
IMF by IMF EBA EBA (Percent Change)
Staff-Assessed Staff-Assessed REER-Level REER-Index CA/REER Average 2022/ April 2023/
Economy REER Gap1 CA Gap2 Gap Gap Elasticity3 Average 2021 Average 2022
Argentina 17.5 15.2 10.8 25.0 0.12 21.0 1.4
Australia 2.6 2.6 23.4 –20.1 0.20 0.2 –1.5
Belgium 6.3 6.3 31.3 16.9 0.72 –0.4 0.8
Brazil 6.0 6.0 –14.4 –29.1 0.13 12.1 2.3
Canada 6.8 6.8 –10.5 1.9 0.27 –0.7 –4.3
China –5.7 –5.7 12.7 16.1 0.14 –1.2 –6.5
Euro Area 0.2 0.2 8.0 7.6 0.35 –4.1 5.0
France 7.1 7.1 5.3 –4.8 0.28 –4.6 2.3
Germany –7.8 –7.8 –9.5 6.7 0.37 –3.6 3.2
India –7.8 –7.8 10.6 12.5 0.19 0.9 –2.8
Indonesia –2.0 –2.0 –16.3 –2.7 0.16 2.5 0.4
Italy 9.3 9.3 15.4 12.3 0.27 –2.0 2.8
Japan 0.0 0.0 –31.4 –31.7 0.17 –13.7 –1.3
Korea 2.9 2.9 3.4 –1.9 0.34 –5.4 –1.4
Malaysia –8.0 –8.0 –29.3 –25.2 0.50 –1.5 –1.2
Mexico –4.9 –4.9 14.9 –3.8 0.34 5.3 12.9
The Netherlands 0.1 0.1 15.0 27.8 0.66 0.1 0.8
Poland –2.0 –2.0 –19.0 2.7 0.43 1.4 8.9
Russia –13.6 –13.6 –4.7 5.7 0.17 36.8 –7.1
South Africa 5.0 5.0 12.8 –3.5 0.25 –2.2 –9.1
Spain –2.2 –2.2 29.2 10.6 0.31 –1.1 0.2
Sweden –9.7 –10.3 –17.0 –15.9 0.37 –6.1 –0.8
Switzerland 0.1 0.1 17.6 11.9 0.55 0.3 2.1
Thailand –6.2 –6.2 –2.6 6.7 0.47 –1.1 1.6
Türkiye 6.5 6.5 –56.7 –46.3 0.29 –8.5 6.9
United Kingdom 2.9 2.9 2.3 –8.4 0.28 –1.4 1.1
United States 9.0 9.0 22.8 10.7 0.12 9.5 –0.5
Hong Kong SAR –1.4 –1.4 ... ... 0.39 3.7 0.5
Singapore –10.2 –10.2 ... ... 0.50 6.0 6.1
Saudi Arabia –21.6 –21.6 ... ... ... 4.1 –0.2
Discrepancy4 0.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...

Sources: IMF, Information Notice System; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: “. . .” indicates that data are not available or not applicable; CA = current account; EBA = External Balance Assessment; REER = real effective exchange rate.
1 Refers to the midpoint of the IMF staff–assessed REER gap.
2 Implied REER gap = –(IMF staff–assessed CA gap/CA-to-REER elasticity).
3 CA-to-REER semielasticity used by IMF country teams.
4 GDP-weighted average sum of IMF staff–assessed REER gaps.

Annex Table 1.1.5. Selected External Sector Report Economies: External Balance Assessment Current Account Regression Policy Gap Contributions, 2022
(Percent of GDP)
Public Health Foreign Exchange Intervention and
Fiscal Gap Expenditure Gap Private Credit Gap Capital Controls Gap
EBA Gap Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic
Economy Total1 Identified Dom2 Residual Total1 Dom3 Coeff P P* Total1 Dom3 Coeff P P* Total1 Dom3 Coeff P P* Total1 Dom3 Coeff FXI P FXI P* KC P KC P*
Argentina –1.2 –0.1 –0.9 –1.0 0.4 –0.7 0.3 –3.9 –1.5 0.0 0.0 –0.3 6.5 6.5 –0.1 0.3 –0.1 –3.5 0.0 –0.5 –0.5 0.6 0.1 3.0 0.7 0.3
Australia –1.1 –0.1 –0.9 –1.0 0.1 –1.0 0.3 –3.4 0.0 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 8.3 7.2 0.1 0.5 –0.1 –4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Belgium –4.5 1.5 0.7 –6.0 0.0 –1.1 0.3 –4.8 –1.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 8.6 7.9 1.7 2.1 –0.1 –21.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Brazil –1.1 –0.2 –1.0 –0.8 0.7 –0.5 0.3 –5.0 –3.5 0.2 0.2 –0.3 3.9 4.4 –0.8 –0.4 –0.1 3.8 0.0 –0.3 –0.3 0.6 –1.2 0.0 0.4 0.3
Canada –3.4 1.0 0.2 –4.4 0.9 –0.2 0.3 –1.0 –0.4 –0.8 –0.8 –0.3 9.6 7.0 0.8 1.2 –0.1 –12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
China 1.5 1.0 0.2 0.5 –0.4 –1.5 0.3 –6.8 –1.8 0.2 0.2 –0.3 3.3 4.0 0.9 1.3 –0.1 –13.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.3
Euro Area4 0.5 –0.2 –1.0 0.7 0.2 –0.9 0.3 –4.0 –0.9 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 9.1 8.4 –0.2 0.2 –0.1 –2.1 –0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
France –1.1 –0.8 –1.6 –0.3 0.1 –1.0 0.3 –4.4 –1.1 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 10.4 9.3 –0.6 –0.2 –0.1 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Germany 2.5 –0.6 –1.4 3.1 0.7 –0.5 0.3 –2.8 –1.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.3 11.0 9.6 –0.9 –0.5 –0.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3
India 1.5 0.1 –0.6 1.3 0.0 –1.2 0.3 –9.6 –5.8 0.2 0.1 –0.3 1.3 1.8 0.4 0.8 –0.1 –8.7 0.0 –0.4 –0.5 0.6 –0.9 0.0 0.8 0.3
Indonesia –0.4 1.1 0.3 –1.5 1.1 0.0 0.3 –2.2 –2.0 0.4 0.4 –0.3 1.6 3.0 –0.5 –0.1 –0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 –0.1 0.0 0.5 0.3
Italy –2.9 –1.0 –1.7 –1.9 –1.5 –2.6 0.3 –8.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 –0.3 6.8 6.8 0.5 0.9 –0.1 –9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan –0.3 –2.0 –2.8 1.7 –1.0 –2.1 0.3 –7.8 –1.0 0.0 0.0 –0.3 9.1 9.1 –1.1 –0.7 –0.1 16.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 –0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1
Korea –0.6 –0.6 –1.3 0.0 0.9 –0.3 0.3 –0.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 –0.3 5.6 5.8 –1.5 –1.1 –0.1 11.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1 0.6 –1.7 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malaysia 2.9 0.6 –0.2 2.3 0.2 –0.9 0.3 –5.5 –2.5 0.6 0.6 –0.3 2.0 4.1 –0.8 –0.4 –0.1 4.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.5 0.0 0.6 0.3
Mexico 1.2 0.4 –0.3 0.8 0.6 –0.5 0.3 –4.3 –2.7 0.1 0.1 –0.3 3.4 3.6 –0.3 0.1 –0.1 –1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 –0.1 0.0 0.4 0.3
The Netherlands 0.7 1.9 1.1 –1.2 0.8 –0.4 0.3 –2.1 –0.9 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 9.4 8.8 1.3 1.7 –0.1 –17.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 1.0 1.9 1.2 –1.0 0.2 –0.9 0.3 –4.1 –1.0 0.3 0.3 –0.3 5.6 6.6 0.9 1.3 –0.1 –13.8 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.9 0.0 0.4 0.3
Russia 2.7 –0.8 –1.6 3.5 –0.8 –2.0 0.3 –2.0 4.4 0.3 0.3 –0.3 4.6 5.5 0.5 0.9 –0.1 –9.1 0.0 –0.7 –0.7 0.6 –2.2 0.0 0.5 0.3
South Africa –3.6 –0.6 –1.3 –3.0 –0.1 –1.3 0.3 –5.5 –1.4 0.0 0.0 –0.3 4.0 4.1 0.0 0.4 –0.1 –4.6 0.0 –0.5 –0.5 0.6 0.1 3.0 0.6 0.3
Spain 1.5 –0.1 –0.8 1.6 0.5 –0.7 0.3 –4.2 –2.0 0.0 0.0 –0.3 6.5 6.5 –0.5 –0.1 –0.1 0.5 –1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Sweden 4.2 1.0 0.2 3.2 1.1 –0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 9.8 9.0 0.0 0.4 –0.1 –4.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.2
Switzerland 4.1 –0.2 –1.0 4.3 1.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 –1.0 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 8.4 7.5 –1.6 –1.2 –0.1 12.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.2
Thailand –3.2 –1.4 –2.2 –1.8 0.3 –0.9 0.3 –5.2 –2.3 0.1 0.1 –0.3 3.8 4.1 –1.5 –1.1 –0.1 12.0 0.0 –0.2 –0.3 0.6 –0.8 0.0 0.5 0.3
Türkiye –1.7 1.5 0.7 –3.2 1.8 0.6 0.3 –2.3 –4.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.3 5.0 3.6 0.2 0.6 –0.1 –6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.3
United Kingdom –1.2 1.2 0.5 –2.4 –0.3 –1.5 0.3 –7.2 –2.4 –0.6 –0.6 –0.3 9.9 7.9 2.1 2.5 –0.1 –26.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
United States –1.2 –0.6 –1.4 –0.6 –0.1 –1.3 0.3 –5.8 –1.7 0.0 0.0 –0.3 8.4 8.4 –0.5 –0.1 –0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Note: Coeff = coefficient; Dom = domestic; EBA = External Balance Assessment; FXI = foreign exchange intervention; KC = capital controls; P = actual level; P* = desired level.
1Total contribution after adjusting for multilateral consistency. Total foreign exchange intervention and capital controls contribution = Coeff * [(FXI x KC) - (desirable FXI x desirable KC)].
2Includes the contribution of domestic policy gaps to the identified gap. The total foreign policy gap contribution is constant and equal to 0.8 percent for all countries. Foreign contributions are estimated as follows (in percent of GDP):
International Monetary Fund | 2023

fiscal = 1.1; public health = 0.0; private credit = –0.4; foreign exchange intervention = 0.0.
3Total domestic contribution is equivalent to coefficient * (P − P*).
4The euro area EBA current account (CA) gap and policy gap contributions are calculated as the GDP-weighted averages of EBA CA gaps and policy gap contributions for the 11 largest euro area economies.
33
34
Annex Table 1.1.6. 2022 Individual Economy Assessments: Summary of Policy Recommendations
Economy Overall 2022 Assessment Policy Recommendations
Argentina Weaker Implement growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, combined with tight monetary policy and a streamlined FX regime to strengthen the trade balance,
rebuild international reserves, regain market access, and ensure debt sustainability; introduce reforms to boost export capacity and encourage FDI.
Australia Broadly in line Withdraw fiscal and monetary stimulus at an appropriate pace. Boost investment by executing planned infrastructure spending, streamlining product
market regulation, and promoting R&D and innovation.
Belgium Substantially weaker Strengthen competitiveness by addressing structural challenges, including labor and product market reforms, to foster green, digital, and inclusive
growth. Rebuild fiscal buffers through expenditure-led consolidation.
Brazil Broadly in line
Raise national saving including by implementing medium-term fiscal consolidation. Reduce the cost of doing business by fostering a skilled labor force
and implementing structural reforms to increase competitiveness.
Canada Moderately weaker Develop a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan; boost nonfuel exports through improved labor productivity, removal of nontariff trade barriers,

promotion of FDI, and investment in R&D, physical capital, and green transformation.
China Broadly in line Accelerate structural reforms (by further opening domestic markets, ensuring competitive neutrality between SOEs and private firms), reduce wasteful
and distorting industrial policy subsidies, reduce high household savings (by strengthening the social safety net), and promote green investment.
Further increase ER flexibility to help the economy adjust to absorb shocks.
Euro Area Broadly in line Step up efforts to facilitate the green transition; ensure that policies to protect the vulnerable from elevated energy prices are well targeted; avoid a
trade-distorting subsidy race; preserve the integrity of the European single market; see additional member country–specific recommendations on
reducing internal and external imbalances.
France Moderately weaker Enhance productivity through structural reforms and sustain higher private investment to facilitate the green transition and digitalization, while
rebuilding fiscal space once shock dissipates.
Germany Stronger Promote investment and diminish excess saving, including through an investment push to achieve climate, digital, and energy security goals.
Structural reforms to foster innovation, including development of the venture capital market and reducing the administrative steps needed to start a
business, would also stimulate investment.
Hong Kong SAR Broadly in line Ensure medium-term fiscal sustainability, given the rapidly aging population, and maintain policies that support wage and price flexibility to preserve
competitiveness.
India Moderately stronger Raise infrastructure spending to reduce CA gap. Over the medium term, implement gradual fiscal consolidation, develop export infrastructure,
negotiate free trade agreements, and liberalize investment regime. Structural reforms could deepen integration in global value chains and attract FDI.
ER flexibility should act as the main shock absorber, with intervention limited to addressing disorderly market conditions
Indonesia Broadly in line Enhance productivity and facilitate post-COVID-19 sectoral adjustment by increasing infrastructure and social spending and strengthening the social
safety net, reducing restrictions on inward FDI and trade, and improving labor market flexibility. Flexibility of the ER should continue to support
external stability.
Italy Weaker Raise productivity and improve the business climate through structural reforms, including by upskilling the workforce and increasing the quality of
infrastructure and the effectiveness of the judiciary and public administration. Reduce vulnerabilities associated with rollover of public debt by
improving budget efficiency, containing pension spending, undertaking comprehensive and progressive tax reform, and fully implementing the
National Recovery and Resilience Plan.
Japan Broadly in line Implement a more flexible monetary policy, bold structural reforms, and a credible and specific medium-term fiscal consolidation plan. Focus on
reforms that support private demand, raise potential growth, and promote digital and green investment.
Korea Broadly in line Continue fiscal consolidation and monetary policy tightening to contain domestic demand and import growth in the near term. Over the medium term,
reducing household debt and implementing policies to mitigate risks from geopolitical tensions would help maintain a sound external position. ER
should remain market determined, with intervention limited to preventing disorderly market conditions.
(Continued)
Annex Table 1.1.6 (continued)
Economy Overall 2022 Assessment Policy Recommendations
Malaysia Stronger Strengthen the social safety net, including through a reorientation of fiscal spending that should target a gradual and growth friendly consolidation;
implement structural policies to encourage private investment and boost productivity growth.
Mexico Moderately stronger Implement structural reforms to address investment obstacles, including tackling economic informality and governance gaps. Continue using floating
ER as the main shock absorber, with FXI used only to prevent disorderly market conditions.
The Netherlands Broadly in line Support investment in physical and human capital to foster robust potential growth, including through structural investment and reform plans to
safeguard energy security, allay housing market shortages, facilitate access to finance for SMEs, reinforce the education system, and advance the
climate transition and digitalization.
Poland Broadly in line Reduce fiscal deficit while boosting public investment by deploying Next Generation EU grants to tackle infrastructure gaps, digitalization, and climate
change; use structural policies to encourage corporate investment and productivity and incentivize credit allocation to the private sector.
Russia Stronger ...
Saudi Arabia Substantially stronger Implement structural reforms with an accompanying investment program to help diversify the economy, lift productivity and align the external position
in the medium term; avoid procyclical fiscal policy amid high hydrocarbon windfalls; minimize risks associated with industrial policies.
Singapore Substantially stronger Increase public investment, including spending on health care, green and other physical infrastructures, and human capital, to help reduce external
imbalances over the medium term by lowering net public saving.
South Africa Moderately weaker Implement structural reforms and stronger fiscal consolidation under a credible medium-term framework, while providing space for critical
infrastructure and social spending; improve governance, efficiency of key product markets (to promote private sector participation), and functioning
of labor markets; seize opportunities to build up reserves.
Spain Broadly in line Implement fiscal consolidation. Improve productivity to increase private saving by enhancing education outcomes, encouraging innovation, and
improve energy efficiency. Spain’s recovery plan foresees investments and reforms in these areas.
Sweden Stronger Once inflation recedes, increase private and public investment in the green transition and the health sector.
Switzerland Broadly in line Fiscal policy should remain in line with debt-brake rule framework in the near term. As inflation pressures ease, small deficits should support
necessary expenditures; consider targeted FXI to mitigate disruptive volatility.
Thailand Stronger Focus public spending on targeted social transfers as well as infrastructure investment to support a green recovery and reorientation of affected
sectors. Continue the effort to reform and expand social safety nets; implement measures to address widespread informality.
Türkiye Moderately weaker Strengthen the policy framework to help underpin external sustainability. Implement a tighter monetary and fiscal policy stance, and rebuild policy
credibility.
United Kingdom Broadly in line Implement gradual fiscal consolidation, while preserving the quality of key public services and protecting the vulnerable. Implement structural reforms
to boost competitiveness, including via upgrading the labor skill base to support labor reallocation to fast-growing sectors, bolstering national
savings to help finance investment, including in support of the climate transition.
United States Moderately weaker Implement fiscal consolidation over the medium term. Implement structural policies to increase competitiveness, including upgrading infrastructure;
enhancing schooling, training, and mobility of workers; supporting the working poor; and policies to increase growth in the labor force (including
skill-based immigration reform). Roll back tariff barriers and resolve trade and investment disagreements supporting an open, stable, and
transparent global trading system.
Source: 2022 Individual External Balance Assessments.

Note: CA = current account; ER = exchange rate; EU = European Union; FDI = foreign direct investment; FX = foreign exchange; FXI = foreign exchange intervention; R&D = research and development; SMEs = small and
medium-sized enterprises; SOE = state-owned enterprise; VAT = value-added tax.
35
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2
CHAPTER
EXTERNAL SECTOR IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL DOLLAR CYCLE
US dollar appreciations can inflict sizable negative spill- emerging markets. A large literature has highlighted
overs on emerging markets. Building on the methodology the impact of global financial cycles on economic
of Obstfeld and Zhou (2023), this chapter investigates activity and policy trade-offs and studied the channels
implications of the “global dollar cycle” for the current of transmission (see, for example, Rey 2013; Bruno
account balance and other external sector indicators. It and Shin 2015; and Kalemli-Özcan 2019). A more
finds that negative real sector spillovers from US dollar recent strand of this literature has put the US dollar at
appreciations fall disproportionately on emerging mar- the center of global financial market booms and busts
kets. In contrast, effects on advanced economies are small (see, for example, Druck, Magud, and Mariscal 2018;
and short-lived. Current account balances increase in Shin 2020; Shousha 2022; Akinci and others 2022;
both country groups, with larger and more persistent Obstfeld and Zhou 2023; and Fukui, Nakamura, and
effects on emerging markets, driven by a fall in invest- Steinsson 2023). In particular, Obstfeld and Zhou
ment. Emerging market commodity exporters historically (2023) find that the US dollar is closely related to
experienced larger negative spillovers than commodity global financial conditions even after established factors
importers, reflecting a strong negative link between such as US monetary policy and US domestic financial
the US dollar and commodity prices. More flexible conditions are controlled for, and they link the “global
exchange rates and more anchored inflation expectations dollar cycle” to large negative spillovers to economic
can mitigate negative spillovers to emerging markets. activity in emerging markets, through both financial
and trade channels. Given the US dollar’s dominant
role in global finance, the global dollar cycle is a
Introduction convenient barometer for studying the implications of
During the post–Bretton Woods era of flexible booms and busts in global financial markets, capturing
exchange rates, the US dollar has followed pronounced factors such as changes in investor risk appetite and
decade-long swings. The most recent sharp US dollar preference for liquidity.
appreciation in 2021–22 is part of these oscillations. Building on Obstfeld and Zhou (2023), this chapter
An extensive literature has studied determinants of zooms in on the external sector implications of the
US dollar fluctuations, including contributions from global dollar cycle for a sample of emerging markets
established macroeconomic factors and policies, albeit and small advanced economies. The chapter’s exter-
recognizing their limited explanatory power (see, for nal sector focus is motivated by the centrality of the
example, Frenkel 1976; Dornbusch 1976; Obstfeld and current account for exchange rate–induced macro-
Rogoff 1996; Engel and West 2005; and Gourinchas economic adjustment, capturing the propensity of
and Rey 2007). More recent research has focused on countries to buffer or magnify the impact of US dollar
the close association between the US dollar and global fluctuations. The chapter addresses three questions
financial conditions, with appreciations accompanied pertaining to the global dollar cycle:
by tightening financing constraints (see, for example, •• Are there systematic external sector spillovers from
Rey 2013; and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2022). the global dollar cycle?
Policymakers scrutinize strong US dollar episodes •• Do effects differ across countries, and if so, what
closely because of potential negative cross-border explains the heterogeneity?
spillovers and ensuing policy challenges, especially in •• What are the implications for global current account
balances?1
The authors of the chapter are Cian Allen, Rudolfs Bems (lead),
Lukas Boer, Allan Dizioli, and Racha Moussa, under the guidance of
Jaewoo Lee. Abreshmi Nowar and Xiaohan Shao provided research 1Global current account balances are defined as the sum of abso-
support and Jane Haizel editorial assistance. The chapter also ben- lute current account balances across all countries. It is a key metric
efited from comments by Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, internal seminar in the External Sector Report that can signal increasing financial
participants, and reviewers. vulnerabilities and rising trade tensions (see Chapter 1).

To answer these questions, the chapter studies cur- economic terms: a 10 percent US dollar appre-
rent account determinants, including the behavior of ciation decreases output by 1.9 percent after one
investment and saving, components of trade and capi- year, and the negative effect dissipates only after
tal flows, and foreign asset and liability positions. The 10 quarters. In contrast, the negative effects in
chapter further examines the heterogeneous impact of advanced economies are considerably smaller in
US dollar fluctuations based on countries’ policies and size and short-lived, peaking at 0.6 percent after
structural characteristics, which can shed light on the one quarter.
trade and financial channels of transmission. Given the •• Current account balances, as a share of GDP, increase
lagged nature of the current account response, both in both country groups, but the effect is again
short- and longer-term responses for variables of inter- larger, peaking at 1 percent of GDP for a 10 percent
est are examined. To benchmark findings, the chapter appreciation in the US dollar, and more persistent
contrasts emerging markets with smaller advanced for emerging markets. A depressed investment rate
economies. accompanying the negative spillovers is the main
The chapter estimates cross-border spillovers with a contributor to the current account increase. Exchange
state-dependent local projections (LP) methodology, rate depreciation and accommodative monetary
following Obstfeld and Zhou (2023). To isolate the policy facilitate the external sector adjustment for
role of the global dollar cycle, the analysis simultane- advanced economies, while “fear of floating” and less
ously controls for other established factors influencing accommodation limit the shock-absorbing contribu-
US dollar fluctuations, including monetary policy tion of exchange rates in emerging markets, where
developments, broader US financial conditions, and income compression dominates.
economic activity trends in the rest of the world. •• Among structural characteristics, the chapter finds
Estimated impulse responses are allowed to vary by commodity exposure to be a key contributor to
different characteristics of interest, with commodity spillovers from US dollar appreciations. Com-
exporter or importer status as a key exogenous struc- modity exporters exhibit larger negative spillovers
tural feature. owing to a pronounced deterioration in their terms
Leveraging the close correlation between the global of trade, reflecting a strong negative link between
dollar cycle and uncovered interest parity (UIP) devia- commodity prices and the US dollar, in which
tions, the chapter employs model-based simulations to most commodities are invoiced. The opposite holds
shed light on its empirical findings. Analyzing global for commodity importers. The ensuing economic
risk premium shocks in the Flexible System of Global adjustment has contrasting implications for current
Models (FSGM; Andrle and others 2015) helps disen- account changes: sizable surpluses for commodity
tangle some of the mechanisms behind the chapter’s importers, in contrast to broad balance or even
external sector findings. The model employed in this deficits for commodity exporters.
chapter also provides an interpretation for the link •• Policies can mitigate negative spillovers to emerging
between the global dollar cycle and other key global markets from US dollar appreciations. In line with
variables studied, including commodity prices and Obstfeld and Zhou (2023), the chapter finds that
global trade openness. monetary policy credibility facilitates accommodative
The chapter’s main findings confirm that US dollar policy responses to a US dollar appreciation, includ-
appreciations inflict negative spillovers on emerging through reduced policy rates and real effective
ing markets and expand on this result along several exchange rate (REER) depreciations. The result is a
dimensions: shallower initial negative spillover. Meanwhile, a more
•• Negative spillovers from US dollar appreciations flexible exchange rate regime systematically speeds up
fall disproportionately on emerging markets economic recovery. These mitigating policies moder-
when compared with smaller advanced econo- ate current account increases.
mies.2 Impacts on emerging markets are large in •• The chapter estimates that global current account
balances decline significantly in response to US
2The chapter uses terms such as “US dollar appreciation” and
dollar appreciations, with a 10 percent appreciation
“upswing in the global dollar cycle” interchangeably to refer to an
increase in the value of the US dollar against that of currencies in associated with a decline in global current account
other major advanced economies. balances by 0.4 percent of GDP after one year.

CHAPTER 2 External Sector Implications of the Global Dollar Cycle
The chapter’s empirical strategy puts some limits on Figure 2.1. Nominal US Dollar Trade-Weighted Index against
the interpretation of the global dollar cycle. The latter Major Advanced Economies
(Index, 100 = January 2006)
is estimated as a residual, potentially containing many
endogenous factors that the chapter does not attempt The US dollar exhibits pronounced decade-long swings, with the recent
to further disentangle. Instead, following established sharp appreciation constituting the most recent strong dollar episode.
practices in macroeconomics, the focus is on the 170
unexplained residuals, that is, the portion of US dollar 161
fluctuations that cannot be attributed to established
152
factors.3 The chapter estimates these residuals and
shows, with the help of model simulations, that global 143
financial market shocks—distinct from other funda-
134
mentals such as interest rate differentials—could con-
tribute to the global dollar cycle. However, the analysis 125
does not preclude other interpretations, which could 116
be made possible by further advances in analyzing the
107
drivers of US dollar fluctuations.
98
89
Characterizing the Global Dollar Cycle
This section links fluctuations in a US dol- 80
1973:Q1 81:Q1 89:Q1 97:Q1 2005:Q1 13:Q1 22:Q4
lar index4 to contributing factors, distinguishing
between established exchange rate determinants Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED); and Haver Analytics.
and a residual contribution from global financial Note: Series retrieved from Haver Analytics, based on the Nominal Advanced
factors. The latter contribution—the global dollar Foreign Economies US Dollar Index from FRED, using goods and services trade
weights. Values before 2006 are constructed with services trade data estimates
cycle—is then related to other financially motivated from the Federal Reserve Board. Index constructed as the trade-weighted average
indicators, including UIP deviations and the global against the currencies of seven major advanced economies: Australia, Canada,
financial cycle. euro area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The US dollar exhibits pronounced decade-long

swings. There have been three distinct upswings the US dollar index.6 A more direct link to exchange
since the 1970s (Figure 2.1). The sharp US dollar rate fluctuations motivates the focus on a nominal,
appreciation during 2021–22 constitutes the most as opposed to a real, index.
recent of these “strong-dollar” episodes.5 In the Established factors explain some of the cyclical
analysis of US dollar cycles, this chapter focuses pattern. To account for their roles in dollar move-
on a trade-weighted index of the US dollar against ments, the chapter relates the US dollar index to
currencies of major advanced economies, as such short- and long-term interest rate developments in
an index is plausibly more exogenous for a study of the US as well as differences with major advanced
spillovers to emerging markets. However, a similar economies, which capture the effect of a broad set of
cyclical pattern emerges for broader specifications of conventional macroeconomic shocks and policies on
the US dollar exchange rate. The aim is to account
for established exchange rate determinants, such as
3The approach is analogous to that involving Solow residuals,
which represent the portion of output fluctuations that cannot be

a US monetary tightening episode or an increase
attributed to established production factors and are commonly used in productivity that through interest rates lead to
to measure productivity. a US dollar appreciation. Quantitative easing or a
4“US dollar index” in this chapter refers to a nominal US dollar
change in public debt management policies, through
trade-weighted index against currencies of major advanced econo-
mies. See Figure 2.1 for details. its impact on short- and longer-term interest rates,
5The chapter defines exchange rates, including bilateral, nominal
effective, and real effective, in terms of foreign currency per US 6To boost the sample of advanced economies, those with weights
dollar, so that an increase represents an appreciation of the US dollar in the US dollar index smaller than 4 percent in 2020 are included
and a depreciation of the foreign currency (or a basket of currencies, in the sample for spillover estimates. Results are robust to excluding
in the case of an effective exchange rate). such countries from the sample (Online Annex 2.3).

would also be accounted for. The specific explanatory Figure 2.2. The US Dollar Index and the Global Dollar Cycle
(Index, 0 = 1999:Q4)
variables used to capture interest rate developments
are (1) policy rates, including shadow rates7; (2) dif- The global dollar cycle closely tracks movements in the US dollar
ferences between US policy rates and those of major trade-weighted index against the currencies of advanced economies.
advanced economies; and (3) an index for US finan- 20
US dollar index
cial conditions to capture longer-term interest rate Global dollar cycle
developments. The estimation further controls for 10
(4) a common component of economic activity in the
rest of the world and (5) the lagged change in the US
0
dollar index.8 Established factors are found to exhibit
expected relationships with the US dollar index. For
example, a tightening of measured financial condi- –10
tions is associated with a US dollar appreciation, as
is an increase in the policy rate differential in the –20
United States with respect to that in other advanced
economies. With the US financial conditions index
–30
and the lagged change in the US dollar index making
the largest contributions, established factors alto-
gether explain about one-fifth of US dollar fluctua- –40
2000:Q1 05:Q1 10:Q1 15:Q1 20:Q1
tions (see Online Annex Table 2.2.1).
However, a significant unexplained residual in Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data;
Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
the estimation—labeled “global dollar cycle” in this Note: Global dollar cycle constructed as cumulated residuals after established
chapter—remains. This unexplained residual accounts factors are controlled for (1) monetary policy, (2) policy rate differences with major
for the bulk of US dollar fluctuations over the last two advanced economies, (3) US financial conditions, and (4) an economic activity
factor.
decades (Figure 2.2). Its correlation with the US dollar
index is 84 percent. Zooming in on recent years, the
exchange rate movement attributable to established interest rates, and the addition of commodity market
factors, represented in Figure 2.2 by the difference developments.9
between the US dollar index and the residual global Recent literature views this residual as reflecting
dollar cycle, closely traces exchange rate fluctuations global financial market forces. With the rise of finan-
during the 2020–21 pandemic-related downturn and cial globalization, the literature has focused on the role
recovery, but the global dollar cycle accounts for a of global financial markets in driving and magnifying
sizable portion of the sharp US dollar appreciation in exchange rate fluctuations, as captured by, for example,
2022. Extensive robustness tests, results of which are
reported in Online Annex 2.4, show that the estimated 9However, the analysis refrains from directly including commodity
role of the global dollar cycle is broadly unchanged prices or the terms of trade as explanatory variables, as the global
under a wide variety of alternative specifications of dollar cycle (as proxied by risk premium shocks) can be an import-
ant driver of commodity prices and, hence, the terms of trade. This
explanatory variables, including alternative series channel is confirmed in the FSGM simulations. Furthermore, the
for monetary policy shocks, alternative horizons for focus on the US dollar index against currencies of major advanced
economies weakens the applicability of the commonly held assump-
tion that the terms of trade in a small open economy can be treated
as exogenous. To account for commodity market developments,
robustness tests instead consider global commodity supply shocks,
7Shadow rates used are the Wu-Xia shadow federal funds rate proxied with oil supply shocks (Baumeister and Hamilton 2019),
(Wu and Xia 2016) for the United States; the LJK Limited shadow as an additional explanatory variable. Results in Online Annex 2.4
rates for Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, Switzerland, and show that in historical data this variable has only a marginal explan-
the United Kingdom (Krippner 2015); and the shadow rate from atory power. However, this finding does not preclude the possibility
De Rezende and Ristiniemi (2023) for Sweden. that commodity price surges in 2021–22, linked to recovery from
8Online Annex 2.2 reports details on the empirical specification the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine, have contrib-
and regression results of this exercise. uted to the strong US dollar.

the portfolio-balance approach to capital flows and Table 2.1. Correlates of the Global Dollar Cycle
exchange rates (see, for example, Gabaix and Maggiori Comparison of the global dollar cycle with other global financial
indicators reveals the strongest correlation with uncovered interest
2015) and renewed interest in the exchange rate dis- parity deviations and the global financial cycle.
connect puzzle (Itskhoki and Mukhin 2021). The liter- Indicator Correlation
ature also emphasizes the unique role of the US dollar
Uncovered interest parity deviations from 0.69*
in global financial markets, linked to safe-haven and major advanced economy currencies
liquidity considerations. Financial markets can be a Global financial cycle −0.53*
key transmission channel through which conventional Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 0.04
macroeconomic shocks and policies (such as monetary Index (VIX)
tightening) affect the exchange rate (see, for example, Global uncertainty index 0.09
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2022; and Kalemli-Özcan Sources: Consensus Economics; Davis (2016); Federal Reserve Board;
2019). Perhaps more important, financial markets Haver Analytics; Miranda-Agrippino, Nenova, and Rey (2020); Refinitiv
Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.
can also be a source of financial shocks that trigger
Note: Quarterly correlations over 2000:Q1–22:Q4 depending on data availability
short- and longer-term exchange rate fluctuations. An (global financial cycle variable ends in 2019:Q2).
example would be a decrease in investor risk appetite “ * ” indicates the correlation is significant at the 1 percent level.
and resulting appreciation of a safe-haven currency,
such as the US dollar.10 A notable empirical challenge expected rate of exchange rate depreciation12; that is,
for studying the role of financial markets is that the US dollar appreciations coincide with expected dollar
underlying financial shocks that have an impact on depreciations, while cross-border interest rate dif-
the US dollar are not directly observable. The chap- ferentials vary relatively less.13 Zooming in on UIP
ter addresses this issue by resorting to identification deviations of individual advanced economy curren-
by exclusion, linking financial market forces to the cies reveals comparable positive correlations for all
residual not explained by established exchange rate currencies except the Japanese yen and Swiss franc,
determinants. which could reflect safe-haven considerations.
The global dollar cycle can be related to other finan- •• The global dollar cycle shows a strong negative cor-
cial indicators. The chapter examines several measures: relation with the global financial cycle, emphasized
•• An index of UIP deviations is found to be strongly by Bruno and Shin (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino
positively correlated (69 percent) with the global and Rey (2022) (Table 2.1). The global finan-
dollar cycle.11 During episodes of US dollar appre- cial cycle is the global common factor estimated
ciations, investments in currencies of other major from a worldwide cross-section of risky asset
advanced economies carry excess returns relative to prices, covering equity, bonds, and commodities
US dollar investments, stemming from decreased (Miranda-Agrippino, Nenova, and Rey 2020).
risk appetite for other advanced economies, and the Tightening of financial conditions, as captured by a
opposite is true when the US dollar depreciates. A downswing in the global financial cycle, accompa-
statistical decomposition reveals that most move- nies an upswing in the global dollar cycle.
ments in UIP deviations are associated with the
12UIP deviations, λi , for a foreign currency i against the US dollar,
t
10Examples of recent studies that examine financial market shocks capturing excess returns on the foreign currency, can be statistically
include Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021); Devereux, Engel, and Wu decomposed into changes in the interest rate differential between the
(2023); and Lilley and others (2022). yields on comparable assets (term in bold) and an expected exchange
11UIP is an arbitrage condition in international financial markets rate adjustment (bracketed term), expressed as
stating that the difference in interest rates between two countries will λti = iti − itUS − (ln(E(St+k
LC/$
)) − ln(StLC/$)),
equal the expected relative change in the exchange rates over the cor-
responding horizon. Deviations from UIP indicate excess returns in where iti is the interest rate in country i, ln denotes the natural
one market, which in the case of US dollar fluctuations could stem logarithm, StLC/$ the nominal exchange rate expressed in terms of local
from frictions in global financial markets. Online Annex 2.3 reports currency per US dollar, and E(St+k )
LC/$ the expectation of the exchange
UIP deviations for individual currencies, along with index construc- rate k periods out (the same horizon as the interest rate maturities).
tion details. Bilateral deviations of advanced economies included in 13See Online Annex Figure 2.3.2. This is in contrast to UIP devia-
the US dollar index are aggregated using trade weights to arrive at a tions in emerging markets, which are predominantly associated with
measure that can be directly compared with the global dollar cycle. changes in interest rates (Kalemli-Özcan 2019).

•• The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility of UIP deviations—in a general equilibrium model
(VIX) Index—a measure of US stock price volatility can help provide deeper understanding of the channels
and one of the components of the global finan- through which spillovers from the global dollar cycle
cial cycle—has been explored by the literature (di to emerging markets operate. Second, constructed UIP
Giovanni and others 2022; Obstfeld, Ostry, and deviations offer an alternative source of global financial
Qureshi 2019) as an indicator of global risk senti- market shocks whose spillovers to emerging markets
ment, but does not correlate significantly with the can be estimated (see Online Annex Figure 2.4.5 for
global dollar cycle for the period of investigation, details). The chapter explores both avenues.
although a somewhat stronger correlation is present
for subperiods. This is due to an already low cor-
relation of 0.2 between the VIX and the US dollar Empirical Analysis: Spillovers from the
index during our sample period and the fact that Global Dollar Cycle
the VIX is one among a large set of factors of the This section examines the differential impact of US
US financial conditions index for which the global dollar appreciations on emerging market and advanced
dollar cycle controls. economies, explores the contribution of policies and
•• Finally, the global uncertainty index from Davis structural features to negative spillovers to identify
(2016), which is another news-based indicator of potential channels of transmission, and examines the
global financial distress, shows only a weak positive impact of fluctuations in the US dollar index on global
correlation with the global dollar cycle. current account balances.
Overall, the correlation is the strongest with UIP

deviations and the global financial cycle. Empirical Framework
The chapter interprets underlying global dollar cycle Following Obstfeld and Zhou (2023), the empir-
shocks through a prism of UIP deviations that exhibit ical analysis uses an LP framework (Jordà 2005) to
the strongest correlation.14 If UIP held, as is the case in examine the impact of US dollar fluctuations on real,
standard macro models, the global dollar cycle would external sector, and financial variables for a sample
show no correlation with UIP deviations. Even when of countries included in the IMF’s External Balance
UIP does not hold, US dollar fluctuations need not be Assessment, subject to the availability of quarterly
systematically related to UIP deviations. Risk premium data. To limit the feedback from the External Balance
considerations could be one underlying driver of the Assessment sample economies to the US dollar, the
correlation. When risk appetite falls, the US dollar analysis uses the first difference of a trade-weighted US
appreciates, as it is a relatively safe asset. But reduced dollar index against currencies of major advanced econ-
risk appetite is expected to be temporary, so there is omies as the main regressor of interest and excludes
an expected depreciation of the dollar, which generates from the sample countries with a weight in the index
the correlation between UIP deviations and the global greater than 4 percent.15 The empirical framework
dollar cycle. Another explanation could be that, when controls for the established global variables listed in
faced with higher demand for US dollars, financial mar- the previous section, covering US policy rates and their
ket intermediaries demand a higher expected return for differences with those of other advanced economies,
supplying the dollars. Ultimate sources of financial-mar- US financial conditions, and an economic activity
ket-driven US dollar fluctuations remain an active area factor for the sample of spillover countries. Such
of research, beyond the scope of the current study. controls further improve the exogeneity of US dollar
Nevertheless, the chapter will leverage the strong fluctuations for the analysis of spillovers. In addition
correlation between UIP deviations and the global
dollar cycle through two concrete applications. First, 15The sample consists of 15 advanced and 19 emerging market
simulated risk premium shocks—a candidate source economies. It retains advanced economies with a weight in the index
of less than 4 percent in 2020 (that is, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Greece, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) to
14The link between US dollar fluctuations and the global finan- boost the size of the advanced economy sample. The chapter’s main
cial cycle has been explored in previous work (see, for example, findings regarding spillovers are robust to dropping from the sample
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2022 for a survey) and does not have to all economies included in the US dollar index. Online Annex 2.2
be mutually exclusive with UIP deviations. reports details on the country sample.

to these global controls, the specification includes a Figure 2.3. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation:
set of lagged country-specific controls—GDP growth, Macro Aggregates
(Percent change)
the policy rate, and the bilateral exchange rate against
the US dollar—as well as lags of the global control A US dollar appreciation affects emerging markets more adversely than
variables, the change in the US dollar index, and the advanced economies.
dependent variable. Lastly, as the sample of countries Advanced economies Emerging markets
includes potentially heterogeneous smaller advanced 1. Real GDP 2. Real Investment
10 10
and emerging market economies, the empirical frame-
work estimates state-dependent LP, following Ramey 5 5
and Zubairy (2018), allowing for differential responses
for sets of countries split by policy and structural char- 0 0
acteristics.16 Overall, this empirical specification makes
–5 –5
it possible to interpret the estimated impulse responses
as spillovers from the global dollar cycle discussed in –10 –10
the previous section.
–15 –15
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Quarter Quarter
Spillovers to Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
Negative spillovers from a US dollar appreciation are 3. Real Imports 4. Real Exports
10 10
concentrated in emerging markets. Emerging markets
experience a deeper and longer-lasting contraction 5 5
than advanced economies (Figure 2.3, panel 1). An
appreciation of the US dollar index by 10 percentage 0 0
points is associated with a decline in real output by
–5 –5
1.9 percent in emerging markets and 0.5 percent in
advanced economies 2 quarters after the initial appre- –10 –10
ciation. Output in advanced economies recovers 3
quarters after the appreciation, while emerging market –15 –15
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
output remains depressed 10 quarters out. An outsized Quarter Quarter
decline in real investment in emerging markets drives
the differential impact on output (Figure 2.3, panel 2). Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Impulse responses show a 10 percent appreciation in the nominal US dollar
Trade volumes decline disproportionately more than index with 90 percent confidence intervals. Macro aggregates are measured in
economic activity for both country groups, with the national currencies at constant prices. Advanced economies exclude countries
with weights in the US dollar index that are larger than 4 percent in 2020: Canada,
magnitude of the decline in imports roughly double France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
the decline in exports (Figure 2.3, panels 3 and 4).
The chapter’s estimated large negative real spillovers
for emerging markets confirm the findings in Obstfeld economic terms: a 10 percent appreciation in the
and Zhou (2023) and are consistent with results of US dollar increases the current account after five
several other recent studies, including Druck, Magud, quarters by about 1 percent of GDP in emerg-
and Mariscal (2018), Shousha (2022), and Fukui, ing markets and 0.7 percent of GDP in advanced
Nakamura, and Steinsson (2023). economies. Further analysis from the saving-invest-
In response to US dollar appreciations, the cur- ment perspective, linking the current account to
rent account, as a share of GDP, increases in both changes in investment and saving rates, all expressed
emerging markets and smaller advanced econo- in percent of GDP, reveals that a decline in invest-
mies. Mimicking output responses, the impact is ment drives the current account increases around
larger and more persistent for emerging markets one year out in both country groups (Figure 2.4,
(Figure 2.4, panel 3). The impact is sizable in panels 1 and 2). Investment is also the main driver
of the divergent longer-term current account
16Online Annex 2.2 reports details of the regression specification. response, recovering strongly in advanced economies

Figure 2.4. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation: group, the REER depreciates persistently on impact,
External Sector Variables allowing the expenditure switching channel to con-
When the US dollar appreciates, the current account increases in both
tribute to the external sector adjustment (Figure 2.4,
emerging market and advanced economies, but through distinct panel 4). Subsequent analysis of the role of exchange
channels, as investment is persistently depressed in emerging markets rate flexibility (see Online Annex Figure 2.4.2) further
but recovers quickly in advanced economies. Because of “fear of highlights the benefits stemming from the shock-ab-
floating,” in emerging markets income compression drives the fall in
imports and the external adjustment, while in advanced economies sorbing role that the exchange rate plays in response to
depreciation in the real effective exchange rate (REER) and the resultant US dollar appreciations. By contrast, in emerging mar-
expenditure switching facilitates the adjustment. kets the REER does not respond to a US dollar appreci-
Advanced economies Emerging markets ation on impact, consistent with well-documented fear
1. Saving 2. Investment of floating for this country group and depreciates only
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
1.5 1.5 gradually over subsequent quarters.17 In the absence of
an exchange rate adjustment, income compression plays
1.0 1.0
an outsized role, driving a large fall in imports.18
0.5 0.5 Net trade in goods and services contributes dif-
0.0 0.0 ferently to external sector adjustment in advanced
economies and emerging markets. Detailed gross
–0.5 –0.5
and net trade flow responses reveal that in advanced
–1.0 –1.0 economies, where (as noted) the REER depreciates on
impact, the current account increase is driven mainly
–1.5 –1.5
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 by an increase in the services trade balance and, in
Quarter Quarter particular, a boost to service exports, as a share of
3. Current Account 4. REER
GDP (see Online Annex Figure 2.4.1). In emerging
(Percent of GDP) (Percent change) markets, where (again, as noted) the REER does not
2 10 adjust on impact, the current account increase is
driven mainly by a fall in imports of goods, as a share
of GDP, consistent with the income compression
1 5
channel.19
Financial transmission channels magnify the adverse
0 0
spillovers in emerging markets. Contemporaneously
with the US dollar appreciation, capital inflows to
emerging markets, both private and public, decline (see
–1 –5 Figure 2.5, panels 1 and 2).20 There is also evidence
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
of systematic negative valuation effects impacting the
Quarter Quarter
net international investment position (NIIP) over the
Source: IMF staff calculations. examined horizon, as NIIP does not increase despite
index with 90 percent confidence intervals. An increase in the REER is a
17Fear of floating here, as well as in subsequent estimation results,
depreciation. Advanced economies exclude countries with weights in the US dollar
index that are larger than 4 percent in 2020: Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, is applied in a more expansive manner to refer to all non-floating
Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. exchange rate regimes. However, this emerging market REER
response is not driven by the sample’s limited number of pegged
exchange rate observations.
18The expenditure switching channel is further hindered by the
but remaining depressed for emerging markets. US dollar invoicing in trade, which is more prevalent in emerging
markets (see Online Annex Table 2.4.1 and Gopinath and others
Meanwhile, saving does not reveal a clear systematic
2020).
response or differences between the two country 19The fall in imports of goods is observed in all broad economic
groups, except for a contemporaneous significant categories, including capital goods, intermediate consumption goods,
but short-lived drop in emerging markets. and final consumption goods.
20Private and public inflows are normalized by lagged foreign
Exchange rate depreciation facilitates external sector liabilities to account for the differences in financial integration across
adjustment in advanced economies. For this country countries.

Figure 2.5. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation: Financial Variables
Advanced economies continue to borrow externally after US dollar appreciations and implement countercyclical monetary policy to mitigate
negative spillovers. Neither of these channels operates in emerging markets.
Advanced economies Emerging markets
1. Private Inflows 2. Public Inflows 3. Net International Investment Position
(Percent of lagged foreign liabilities) (Percent of lagged foreign liabilities) (Percent of GDP)
4 4 8
6
2 2 4
2
0 0
0
–2 –2 –2
–4
–4 –4 –6
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Quarter Quarter Quarter
4. Policy Rate 5. Domestic Credit 6. Stock Price Index

(Percentage point change) (Percent change) (Percent change)
1.0 4 20
2
0.5 10
0
0
0.0 –2
–4 –10
–0.5 –6
–20
–8
–1.0 –30
–10
–1.5 –12 –40
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Quarter Quarter Quarter

Note: Impulse responses show a 10 percent appreciation in the nominal US dollar index with 90 percent confidence intervals. Advanced economies exclude countries
with weights in the US dollar index that are larger than 4 percent in 2020: Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
persistent current account surpluses (see Figure 2.5, reveal no systematic pattern and are even procyclical
panel 3). These findings contrast with advanced econo- on impact.21 Domestic credit declines persistently,
mies, where the NIIP increases, driven by both current extending beyond the 12-quarter horizon. Stock prices
account surpluses as well as an initial positive valuation decline by more in emerging markets than in advanced
effect stemming from the US dollar appreciation. Fur- economies (see Figure 2.5, panel 6). These findings are
thermore, public capital inflows to advanced econ- broadly consistent with an extensive literature that has
omies increase, smoothing the impact of the global focused on financial transmission channels of global
dollar cycle. In terms of domestic financial conditions financial shocks to emerging markets (see, for example,
and policies, in advanced economies US dollar appre- Gourinchas 2018; di Giovanni and others 2022; and
ciations are systematically associated with accommo- Kearns and Patel 2016).
dative monetary policy, mitigating negative spillovers.
Accordingly, the decline in domestic credit is shallow
and short lived (see Figure 2.5, panels 4 and 5). In 21Using short-term interest rates instead of policy rates yields
contrast, policy rate responses in emerging markets similar findings (De Leo, Gopinath, and Kalemli-Özcan 2023).

Table 2.2. Categorization of Countries by Policy Regimes and Structural Characteristics

Policies and Structural Features Measure Threshold
Exchange rate regime The coarse classification from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019) Freely floating: 4;
other regime: 1, 2, or 3
Monetary policy credibility The country average of the measure in Bems and others (2021) Median
US dollar liability exposure The share of foreign liabilities in US dollars from Bénétrix and others (2019) 75th percentile
US dollar export invoicing The country average of the share of exports invoiced in US dollars from Boz 75 percent of exports
and others (2022)
Trade openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Median
Commodity exporter/importer The country median trade balance in all commodities from UN Comtrade 5 percent of GDP
Sources: Bems and others (2021); Bénétrix and others (2019); Boz and others (2022); Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019); IMF, Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics; IMF, Global Data Source; UN, Comtrade; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Coarse classification categories 5 and 6 are dropped. Countries with a coarse classification of 1, 2, or 3 that are anchored to a currency other than the
US dollar that is freely floating against the US dollar are classified as freely floating. Classification into freely floating and other exchange rate regimes is
extended through 2021 using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions as a guide (see Online Annex Table 2.1.1 for
details). The country average for the monetary policy credibility measure in Bems and others (2021) and the share of exports invoiced in US dollars from Boz
and others (2022) is used for the whole sample period. The US dollar liability exposure classification is kept constant after 2017, given the end date of the
measure in Bénétrix and others (2019). The classification of monetary policy credibility, US dollar export invoicing, and commodity exporter/importer do not
vary over the sample period. The classification of exchange rate regime, US dollar liability exposure, and trade openness does vary across the sample period.
The Role of Policy Regimes and Structural one another, making it difficult to identify individual
Characteristics impacts on spillovers. An instructive example is the
To investigate why emerging markets experience relation between exchange rate regimes and the extent
larger negative spillovers than advanced economies, this of US dollar invoicing of exports; countries with float-
section analyzes how US dollar appreciation differing exchange rate regimes disproportionately exhibit
entially affects economies based on their policies and low shares of US dollar invoicing, while countries with
structural characteristics. For each factor considered, less flexible exchange rate regimes exhibit high shares
the analysis estimates state-dependent responses based of US dollar invoicing (Figure 2.6, panel 2). Another
on a sample split into two corresponding subgroups, important example in this regard relates to commod-
mirroring the estimation procedure for the whole ity-exporting status. Categorization results reveal that
sample. The set of examined factors is motivated by commodity-exporting countries are disproportionately
the commonly studied policies at countries’ disposal associated with less flexible exchange rate regimes and
and structural characteristics impacted by US dollar lower trade openness, as well as higher shares of US
fluctuations, including commodity prices and financial dollar invoicing in exports and US dollar liabilities.22
and trade exposures to the US dollar (see Table 2.2). The chapter uses commodity exporter or importer
Identifying contributions to spillovers from individ- status as a key exogenous structural feature. Using
ual country characteristics presents several challenges. commodity exporter status avoids problems arising
First, the examined characteristics are closely correlated from the fact that most characteristics are endogenous,
with the split of the sample between emerging market collinear, or both, which complicates identification.
and advanced economies. The issue is most striking for Moreover, this status is slow moving over the study’s
the US dollar liability exposure and the extent of mon- time frame and should arguably not respond to poli-
etary policy anchoring, where, based on categorization cies and other structural features. The contribution of
in Table 2.2, all of the more exposed and less anchored other characteristics is then estimated, after the role
countries are found among emerging markets. Hence, of commodity exporter status is controlled for. Where
any identification of these characteristics’ contribution overlap with the split in the sample between advanced
to spillovers requires limiting the sample to emerging and emerging market economies is severe, estimation
markets. This issue is a concern for the other examined is limited to the emerging market sample. Monetary
characteristics as well, except commodity exporter policy credibility is found to be the least correlated
status, which is more evenly distributed within the
two country groups (Figure 2.6, panel 1). Second, 22Online Annex Table 2.4.1 details the country composition of
many of the characteristics are closely correlated with each examined policy and structural feature.

Figure 2.6. Country Characteristics
Country characteristics are closely correlated with the split in the sample between advanced economies and emerging markets, complicating the
identification of contributions to differential spillovers from a particular characteristic. Some country characteristics are closely correlated with each
other, further complicating the identification of the role of an individual characteristic.
1. Share of a Category in a Characteristic by Country Group 2. Sample Split Between Categories of Exchange Rate Regime and
(Percent) US Dollar Export Invoicing
80
Within emerging markets Within advanced economies US dollar export US dollar export
invoicing below invoicing above
70 75 percent of exports 75 percent of exports
60
Other ARG; CHL; COL;
50 exchange ISR; IDN; IND;
rate KOR; MYS; PAK;
40 regime PHL; RUS; THA
30
20
AUT; BEL; CZE;
Freely
DNK; ESP; FIN;
10 floating
GRC; HUN; NLD;
exchange AUS; BRA
NOR; NZL; POL;
rate
0 PRT; ROU; SWE;
regime
Other Less open Commodity Less- High High TUR; ZAF
exchange (trade) exporter anchored US dollar US dollar
rate regime inflation export liability
(not freely expectations invoicing exposure
floating)
Sources: Bems and others (2021); Bénétrix and others (2019); Boz and others (2022); Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2019); IMF, Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics; IMF, Global Data Source; UN, Comtrade; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Advanced economies exclude countries with weights in the US dollar index that are larger than 4 percent in 2020: Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Countries that are not freely floating that are anchored to a currency other than the US dollar, that is freely floating
against the US dollar, are classified as freely floating. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. In panel 2, a
country is in the freely floating exchange rate regime category if it spent any part of the sample period in that category.
with commodity-exporting or -importing status and is (Figure 2.7, panel 2). In contrast, policy rates increase
thus studied separately.23 in emerging markets with less anchored monetary pol-
Monetary policy anchoring mitigates negative icy, though with only marginal statistical significance,
spillovers from US dollar appreciations by facilitating and the REER appreciates, rather than depreciating
accommodative policy responses. Emerging markets on impact, thereby contributing to larger negative
with more anchored inflation expectations exhibit spillovers.
a shallower initial decline in output. The difference In response to US dollar appreciation, commodity
between emerging markets with more and those with exporters exhibit larger negative spillovers owing to
less anchored inflation expectations is statistically sig- concurrent deterioration in their terms of trade.24 The
nificant (Figure 2.7, panel 1). When inflation expec- magnitude of the terms-of-trade deterioration is sizable
tations are anchored, the REER depreciates, and the and persistent, with a 10 percent US dollar apprecia-
policy rate becomes more accommodative (Figure 2.7, tion decreasing the terms of trade by 10 percent after
panels 3 and 4). Credibility of monetary policy limits five quarters (Figure 2.8, panel 2). On the flip side,
imported inflation (not shown) and thus creates room the terms of trade improve for commodity import-
for these policy adjustments, which support investment ers. These contrasting terms-of-trade responses drive
rate in the aftermath of the US dollar appreciation the difference in spillovers between the two country
groups. Commodity exporters smooth the temporary
23Controlling for commodity-importing or -exporting status does
not change the chapter’s findings with respect to the role of mone- 24A country’s terms of trade are defined as the ratio of its export
tary policy credibility for spillovers from US dollar appreciations. prices to its import prices.

Figure 2.7. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation by among commodity exporters (Figure 2.8, panel 7).25
Degree of Anchoring of Inflation Expectations Overall, the strong negative link between the US dollar
In the aftermath of a US dollar appreciation, investment remains stable in
and commodity prices is an important cross-border
countries with more anchored monetary policy, contributing to a transmission channel for the negative spillovers. The
shallower decline in output. More accommodative exchange rate and importance of this channel is further highlighted by
interest rate responses contribute to more muted negative spillovers. the 2021–22 strong US dollar episode, which was
Above-median anchoring Below-median anchoring
accompanied by a commodity price surge, rather than
1. Real GDP 2. Investment
(Percent change) (Percent of GDP)
a decrease, driven by the unique nature of the pan-
4 1 demic recovery and commodity supply disruptions
stemming from Russia’s war in Ukraine. An event
2
0 study of this episode, presented in Box 2.1, reveals that
0 the commodity price surge significantly muted, or even
–2 –1 reversed, the negative spillovers from the US dollar
appreciation for commodity-exporting countries.
–4
–2 For commodity importers, the improvement in the
–6 terms of trade partially offsets the negative spillovers
–8 –3
from a US dollar appreciation. The decline in out-
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 put is shallower and the REER and monetary policy
Quarter Quarter
further buffer the impact of the negative shock. The
3. Real Effective Exchange Rate 4. Policy Rate current account increase is magnified, as the initial
(Percent change) (Percentage point change) fall in investment (not shown) is accompanied by a
15 2 significant increase in saving from the fifth quarter
1
onward, leading to a gradual improvement in the NIIP
10 (Figure 2.8, panel 5).
0 Among other examined country characteristics,
5 exchange rate flexibility is found to significantly
–1 impact output spillovers, after the influence of com-
0
–2
modity trade is accounted for. In support of the
shock-absorbing properties of flexible exchange rates,
–5 –3 emerging markets with freely floating exchange rate
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Quarter Quarter
regimes exhibit systematically faster recoveries in output
than emerging markets with less flexible exchange rates
Source: IMF staff calculations. (see Online Annex 2.4 and Online Annex Figure 2.4.2).
Note: Emerging markets sample only. Inflation expectations are anchored when
the country average of the measure in Bems and others (2021) is above the
Current account balances in the latter country group
sample median. Impulse responses show a 10 percent appreciation in the nominal show a larger increase, as both saving increases and
US dollar index with 90 percent confidence intervals. An increase in the real investment falls. However, a floating exchange rate
effective exchange rate is a depreciation.
25Within the advanced economy sample, accommodative policy

responses mitigate negative spillovers from US dollar appreciations
drop in income by reducing saving and decreasing to commodity-exporting countries. A more detailed examination
trade balances (Figure 2.8, panels 4 and 8). For this of commodity-exporting advanced economies shows more muted
negative spillovers, present in the real investment response but
country group, the current account does not increase absent from the response of output. In this case, the difference with
in response to the US dollar appreciation (Figure 2.8, emerging market commodity exporters can partly be explained
panel 3). Notably, there is no evidence that the REER with policies. Advanced economy commodity exporters exhibit
more anchored inflation expectations. Accordingly, after US dollar
depreciates disproportionately for commodity exporters
appreciations and the accompanying fall in commodity prices, these
to compensate for the fall in the price of commodity economies allow the REER to depreciate significantly more than
exports, consistent with fear of floating (Figure 2.8, commodity importers. Advanced economy commodity exporters
panel 6). The same holds for the bilateral exchange also pursue more accommodative monetary policy than commodity
importers. Analysis of this subsample provides evidence on how
rate against the US dollar (not shown). The results also accommodative policies can mitigate negative spillovers from US
reveal no evidence for accommodative monetary policy dollar appreciations.

Figure 2.8. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation by Net Commodity Exporter Status
Commodity exporters are hard hit by a US dollar appreciation as a result of a concurrent deterioration in their terms of trade. On the flip side, the
terms of trade improve in commodity importers, which helps counter the effect of the appreciation.
Commodity importers Commodity exporters
1. Real GDP 2. Terms of Trade 3. Current Account 4. Trade Balance: Goods
(Percent change) (Percent change) (Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
4 5 2 2
2
0 1 1
0
–5 0 0
–2
–10 –1 –1
–4
–6 –15 –2 –2
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
5. Net International Investment 6. Real Effective Exchange Rate 7. Policy Rate 8. Saving
Position (Percent change) (Percentage point change) (Percent of GDP)
(Percent of GDP)
10 12 1.5 2
10 1.0 1
5 8
0.5
6 0
0 0
4 –1
–0.5
–5 2
–1.0 –2
0
–10 –2 –1.5 –3
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter

Note: Full sample. A country is a commodity exporter if its median trade balance in commodities is larger than 5 percent of GDP (UN Comtrade). Impulse responses
show a 10 percent appreciation in the nominal US dollar index with 90 percent confidence intervals. An increase in the real effective exchange rate is a depreciation.
regime might not be an option readily available to all credibility is motivated by concerns about identifi-
countries. Emerging market economies with severe cation of conditional impulse responses to US dollar
financial frictions and balance sheet vulnerabilities fluctuations among sample countries of this chapter,
should resort to complementary policy tools, such as which examines aggregate data. It should not be
macroprudential measures and capital flow management interpreted as evidence that other policies or structural
measures, which can play a useful role in mitigating features do not affect spillovers from US dollar fluctua-
negative cross-border spillovers under limited exchange tions to emerging markets.
rate flexibility (see IMF 2020). For such emerging mar-
ket economies, adopting flexible exchange rate regimes
and benefiting from their shock-absorbing properties Implications for Global Balances
would have to wait until preexisting structural vulner- Beyond negative cross-border spillovers, US dol-
abilities are overcome, including by strengthening the lar appreciations are associated with a compression
domestic financial market and policy framework. of global balances. To estimate the impact on global
Finally, the focus of this section on commodity balances, a time-series LP exercise is applied, similar
exporter or importer status and monetary policy to the panel approach used in this section to estimate

Figure 2.9. Impact of a US Dollar Appreciation on of global balances resulting from US dollar appreci-
Global Balances ations is also consistent with Gopinath and others
(Percent of GDP)
(2020), who link a stronger US dollar with lower trade
An increase in the US dollar index leads to a sustained decrease in flows in the presence of dominant currency pricing.
global balances. This effect can be further amplified when US dollar
0.5 appreciation tightens collateral constraints for importers
that borrow in US dollars (Casas, Meleshchuk, and
Timmer 2022).
0.0
Model Simulations: FSGM

Many shocks hit the global economy continuously.
–0.5 The chapter’s estimated cross-border spillovers from
US dollar appreciations can result from a combina-
tion of shocks operating through different channels.
–1.0 This section uses a global general equilibrium model
to examine one candidate structural shock—a change
in global risk premiums—that may be driving the
spillovers. By isolating a specific shock, the model can
–1.5 illuminate the main channels that drive the empirically
0 4 8 12
Quarter estimated relationships.

index against advanced economies with 68 and 90 percent confidence intervals in Model Description
a time series local projections exercise. Controls are the US shadow policy rate,
policy rate differentials, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's adjusted National
FSGM (Andrle and others 2015) is a semistructural
Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI), the economic activity factor for the sample of multiregion general equilibrium model of the global
emerging markets and smaller advanced economies, and lagged US GDP, all in economy. The framework combines both micro-
changes and with four lags, including lags of the shock and the global balances
variable. founded and reduced-form formulations of various
economic sectors. The analysis presented in this
chapter uses the G20MOD module of FSGM, which
includes every Group of Twenty (G20) economy.
cross-border spillovers.26 Estimates suggest that a
Online Annex 2.5 presents further model details.
10 percent appreciation of the US dollar is associated
The following model features are particularly rele-
with a decrease in global balances of about 0.4 percent-
vant for the chapter’s analysis.
age points after one year (Figure 2.9). The magnitude of
•• Monetary authorities and interest rates: An interest
the decline is economically significant, as average global
rate reaction function represents the behavior of
balances in the period examined stand at 3.5 percent
monetary authorities. The standard form is an infla-
of GDP, with a standard deviation of 0.7 percent of
tion-forecast-based rule operating under a flexible
GDP. The decline in global balances is persistent, with
exchange rate, with a higher weight on exchange
a significant negative effect lasting for up to four years,
rate deviations for emerging markets, consistent with
but reversing thereafter. One possible channel through
fear of floating. The long-term (10-year) interest
which a stronger US dollar may reduce global balances
rate is based on the expectations theory of the term
is falling commodity prices, as chronic current account
structure, plus a term premium. Interest rates on
surpluses of commodity exporters and deficits of
consumption, investment, government debt, and net
importers are simultaneously reduced. The compression
foreign assets are weighted averages of the 1- and
26Online Annex 2.2 reports details of the estimation and the
10-year interest rates, reflecting their differing term
sample. The measure of global balances relies on an extended coun- structures and allowing for a meaningful role of the
try sample to account for global trends. term premium.

•• UIP: Deviations from UIP in the model are based on UIP deviations as the primitive exogenous shock in the
risk premiums.27 Different borrowers (households, FSGM and studies their implications for cross-border
firms, government) in the model face varying inter- spillovers and key global variables, drawing parallels
est rates depending on their time horizons and risk with empirical findings of the previous section. There
profiles. The UIP condition holds in the short term are different ways to introduce UIP deviations into the
only for the sovereign, and only if the sovereign risk model. The one that most closely links to the chapter’s
premium is set to zero. However, the calibrated model empirical findings is a global (excluding the United
has a nonzero exogenous sovereign risk premium and States) disturbance to sovereign spreads, so that the
a term premium on long-term bonds. More generally, direct effect of the disturbance is an increase in financ-
a UIP equation holds when all risk premiums are ing costs for firms and households.28
accounted for. The model includes an endogenous cor- Figure 2.10 plots impulse responses for key vari-
porate risk premium, which depends on the business ables of interest to this global persistent 1 percentage
cycle and on commodity prices. The sovereign risk point shock to the sovereign premium, reported in
premium affects all interest rates in the model, while the figure’s panel 1. To facilitate comparison with the
the corporate risk premium affects only those for the empirical findings, results for the G20 economies
private sector. Risk premiums vary across private sector distinguish between an aggregated region of advanced
borrowers because shocks affect the cost of financing economies, excluding the United States, and an
differently or can apply to different borrowers. aggregated region of emerging markets, with some
•• Commodity exposure: Data-driven calibration makes results further distinguishing between emerging market
the FSGM particularly well suited to examining the commodity exporters and importers.
differential impacts of economic disturbances on One of the direct effects of the sovereign premium
commodity exporters and importers. The FSGM shock is a US dollar appreciation. The shock increases
incorporates three types of commodities: oil, food, the demand for US dollars by reducing risk-free returns
and metals and their associated prices. The model is on foreign bonds (short-term interest rates do not
calibrated using countries’ commodities production, immediately change, and the risk premium increases)
consumption, and trade. Commodities are priced in and creating an incentive to invest in US bonds absent
the dominant currency: the US dollar. changes in the policy rate (Figure 2.10, panel 2).29
•• External sector: Foreign and domestic economic Another direct effect is an increase in financing costs,
activity and the exchange rate determine exports and which leads to a reduction in domestic consumption,
imports, with producer pricing assumed. Investment through the channel of intertemporal substitution, as it
decisions of firms, saving decisions of households, becomes more costly to borrow to smooth out con-
and fiscal policy determine the current account and sumption. The increase in financial costs also lowers
implied net-foreign-asset positions. investment, and the combined result is a fall in output
in the rest of the world (see Figure 2.10, panel 3).30
Thus, the modeled global risk premium shock generates
Simulation Setup and Model Results
The chapter’s analysis of the global dollar cycle 28Consistent with empirical literature (Kalemli-Özcan 2019)
documents its strong association with UIP deviations, and findings in Online Annex 2.3, FSGM simulations show that
suggesting that economic disturbances driving UIP exchange rate adjustment contributes more to UIP deviations in
advanced economies than in emerging markets; as in the latter coun-
deviations contribute to the cycle. This section takes the try group, the examined global risk premium shock endogenously
triggers other mechanisms that increase the cost of capital, including
27At the normative level, there are two distinct approaches for mod- through lower commodity prices tightening financing conditions.
eling UIP deviations, with differing implications for policy, one based 29To facilitate comparison with the empirical findings, the
on risk premiums and the other on intermediary frictions. The former figure reports US dollar index against currencies of other advanced
approach builds on nondiversifiable risk or reduced appetite for risk economies, but the US dollar appreciation is broad based. Central
but does not feature price distortions. By contrast, the latter approach banks in advanced economies react to the increase in financing cost
is based on market distortions, as intermediaries require rents to absorb by easing policy rates, which contributes to a further US dollar
risk (see, for example, Gabaix and Maggiori 2015), with a potential appreciation.
role for policy. The semistructural FSGM does not feature financial 30Fiscal automatic stabilizers are allowed to operate and partially
intermediaries, so that UIP deviations are a proxy for risk premiums. cushion the negative effects on activity.

Figure 2.10. Impulse Responses to a Global Risk Premium Shock in the Flexible System of Global Models
The Flexible System of Global Models’ response to a global sovereign risk premium shock reveals that a US dollar appreciation is accompanied by
(1) a fall in output in the rest of the world, with a more negative impact on emerging markets; (2) a fall in commodity prices; and (3) a contraction
in trade openness, while (4) the current account increases in commodity-importing countries. These model results are consistent with empirical
findings for spillovers from US dollar appreciations.
1. Sovereign Risk Premium in the Rest of 2. US Nominal Effective Exchange Rate against 3. Real GDP in the Rest of the World
the World Advanced Economies (Percent change)
(Percentage point difference) (Percent change)
1.2 1.6 0.0
1.4 Advanced economies
1.0
1.2 Emerging markets –0.2
0.8
1.0
0.6 0.8 –0.4
0.6
0.4
0.4 –0.6
0.2
0.2
0.0 0.0 –0.8
–1 0 1 2 –1 0 1 2 –1 0 1 2
Year Year Year
4. Global Real Oil Price 5. World Trade Openness 6. Current Account Balance in the Rest of
(Percent change) (Percentage point of GDP change) the World
(Percentage point of GDP change)
0.0 0.0 Advanced economies 0.2
–0.5 Emerging market commodity
importers
–1.0
–0.2 0.1
–1.5
–2.0
–2.5
–0.4 0.0
–3.0 Emerging market commodity
–3.5 exporters
–4.0 –0.6 –0.1
–1 0 1 2 –1 0 1 2 –1 0 1 2
Year Year Year

Note: Emerging market commodity importers include China, India, South Africa, and Türkiye; emerging market commodity exporters include Argentina, Brazil,
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Saudi Arabia; emerging markets include both of these country groups; advanced economies exclude the United States. In panel 2, an
increase equals appreciation.
the empirically observed negative real spillover, linking proportional fall in the commodity price is magnified by
US dollar appreciations with falling foreign economic the higher commodity intensity in the rest of the world,
activity. The fall is larger in emerging markets mainly compared to the United States, and the pricing of com-
because of their more limited exchange rate flexibility modities in terms of the appreciating US dollar.31
(see Figure 2.4, panel 4). As countries invest less, there is a large worldwide
Model simulations also generate a strong negative drop in imports due to the high import propensity of
link between US dollar and commodity prices through investment goods. The combined effect of less trade in
the demand channel. As global demand declines, the both commodities and investment goods lowers global
demand for commodities is depressed and the real trade openness (Figure 2.10, panel 5).
price of commodities falls (Figure 2.10, panel 4). For
the simulated shock, a 1 percent appreciation in the 31The model decomposition of the quantitative results shows that
US dollar is associated with a 2.3 percent decline in the US dollar pricing channel accounts for about 10 percent of the
commodity prices at a one-year horizon. The more than overall fall in the commodity price after one year.

The commodity-induced terms-of-trade adjustment as a share of GDP increases in both emerging market
benefits commodity importers. As their import values and advanced economies, with weak investment driving
temporarily fall, real income increases and households the increase, but the dynamics differ, with investment
increase saving to smooth out consumption, repre- rebounding in advanced economies but remaining per-
senting an income effect. A substitution effect also sistently negative in emerging markets. A depreciation
operates, whereby the temporary fall in commodity in the REER facilitates adjustment in advanced econo-
prices, by lowering the consumption-based real interest mies. Consistent with fear of floating, the REER does
rate households face, increases contemporaneous not adjust on impact in emerging markets and depre-
consumption, reducing saving. In the model calibra- ciates only gradually. Financial channels contribute
tion these two effects broadly offset one another, and to the adverse spillovers in emerging markets through
the fall in investment is the main driver of the current reduced capital inflows, both public and private, and a
account increase (Figure 2.10, panel 6). For commod- decline in domestic credit. More broadly, global current
ity exporters, two opposing forces are at work. On the account balances decline in response to a US dollar
one hand, the rise in the cost of capital and resultant appreciation, reflecting a broad-based contraction in
fall in investment increase the current account. On the trade, facilitated by a fall in commodity prices.
other hand, falling commodity prices make commodity Commodity exporter status magnifies spillovers
exporters temporarily worse off, as their export values from a US dollar appreciation. Given the histori-
decrease. This effect is buffered by reduced saving, cally negative relationship between commodity prices
which decreases the current account. In the model and the US dollar index, a US dollar appreciation
simulation, the investment response and the saving is accompanied by deteriorating terms of trade for
response broadly offset one another, leaving the current commodity exporters. In the absence of a real exchange
account unchanged. Overall, consistent with the rate depreciation that could buffer both shocks,
empirical findings of the previous section, the current emerging market commodity exporters smooth the
account increases only in commodity-importing coun- temporary drop in income through reduced saving
tries, more so in emerging market commodity import- and decreased current account balances. In contrast,
ers because of the larger fall in investment. commodity importers experience improved terms of
It is worth stressing that the model omits several trade, which partly offsets the negative spillovers from
potentially important factors. One relates to additional the US dollar appreciation. In 2021–22, in contrast to
financial vulnerabilities stemming from balance sheet the historical evidence, the simultaneous strengthening
mismatches and a more nuanced modeling of the of commodity prices and the US dollar mitigated the
degree of central bank credibility, both of which are impact to the US dollar appreciation on the vulnerable
not captured by FSGM, and could potentially mag- emerging market commodity exporters.
nify the negative spillovers. Another important caveat Policies can mitigate negative spillovers from
relates to the modeling of spillovers. In some models US dollar appreciation to emerging markets. More
(Georgiadis, Müller, and Schumann 2021), emerging anchored inflation expectations mitigate the negative
market economies are directly exposed to a fraction of effect on real output through accommodative policy
the shock imposed to the sovereign risk premium in an responses, as the real exchange rate depreciates and pol-
advanced economy. In the FSGM, this spillover is cap- icy rates decrease. A more flexible exchange rate regime
tured by an exogenous shock to financial conditions, systematically speeds up economic recovery. Imple-
representing a shortcut for incorporating financial spill- mentation of such policies should be supported by
overs not directly modeled but believed to be present complementary factors. Flexible exchange regimes can
in global risk-off episodes. be supported and facilitated by domestic financial mar-
ket development that helps deepen foreign exchange
markets and expand foreign exchange hedging options
Conclusion (IMF 2020). The anchoring of inflation expectations
Negative spillovers from US dollar appreciations are can be strengthened by a sustained longer-term com-
more pronounced in emerging market economies, with mitment to improving fiscal and monetary frame-
larger declines in output that are longer lived compared works, including through ensuring a well-balanced
with those in advanced economies. The current account mix of fiscal and monetary policies, consolidating and

enhancing central bank independence, and continuing could affect the global dollar cycle would require a
to strengthen the transparency and effectiveness of deeper understanding of UIP deviations, which this
communications (see Chapter 3 of the October 2018 chapter has uncovered as a key driver of the global
World Economic Outlook). More broadly, findings of dollar cycle. UIP deviations can be attributed to the
this chapter highlight the importance of precaution- market-wide risk appetite and variations in the risk
ary policy tools, such as global safety nets as well premia demanded by global financial intermediaries,
as Integrated Policy Framework-linked policy tools which in turn reflect intermediary frictions, including
(IMF 2020), in addressing global financial market spillover from financial regulation in other segments
cycles and their spillovers. In emerging markets with of the financial system. One indirect contribution of
severe financial frictions and balance sheet vulnerabil- the chapter is to bring attention to these issues that
ities, macroprudential and capital flow management warrant further research and would enrich policy anal-
measures could help mitigate negative cross-border ysis. Concrete avenues for such research would include
spillovers under the global dollar cycle. understanding the spillover of national and global reg-
Beyond these policy recommendations for emerg- ulation of financial intermediaries as well as examining
ing markets to manage the spillovers from the global sources of intrinsic fluctuations in the market-wide risk
dollar cycle, an analysis of multilateral policy that appetite.

Box 2.1. The 2021–22 Strong-Dollar Episode and Spillovers to Commodity Exporters
Historically, US dollar appreciations have been Figure 2.1.1. US Dollar Index and
accompanied by significant declines in commod- Commodity Prices
ity prices, as captured by the negative comovement (Percent change, year-over-year)
between the two variables.1 The recent 2021–22 40 US dollar index Commodity prices
strong-dollar episode stands out in this context
because of the marked surge in commodity prices, 30
linked to recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and
to Russia’s war in Ukraine. 20
This box presents results of an event study contrast-
ing the most recent US dollar appreciation with the 10
only comparable year-over-year US dollar appreciation
0
in the post-2000 period, which took place during
2014–15 (Figure 2.1.1):
–10
•• 2014–15 episode: The US dollar index appreciated
by 16 percent, while commodity prices fell by
–20
32 percent, in line with the historical relationship
between the two variables (see Figure 2.1.1).2 –30
•• 2021–22 episode: The US dollar index appreciated
by 10 percent, while commodity prices increased by –40
34 percent. A comparable simultaneous large and 2015 2022
persistent positive comovement in the two variables
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal
has not been observed in recent decades. Reserve Economic Data (FRED); Haver Analytics; IMF,
How did cross-border real output spillovers from Global Data Source; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Percent change is calculated using the year
the US dollar appreciation differ for these two epi- average for monthly data between 2015 (2022) and 2014
sodes? The study proxies output spillovers with real (2021).
GDP forecast errors for each episode, constructed as
actual GDP for 2015 and 2022 minus the GDP fore-
In 2022, by contrast, the real GDP of emerging
cast prior to the US dollar appreciation (Figure 2.1.2).
market commodity exporters was systematically
Results reveal reversed spillovers to emerging market
revised upward following the US dollar appreciation,
commodity exporters for the recent strong-dollar
with the notable exception of Russia. Meanwhile,
episode. In 2015, the US dollar appreciation was
small downward revisions were observed for advanced
associated with systematic negative revisions to output
commodity-exporting economies.
for commodity exporters, more so for exporters with
Findings of this event study suggest that emerging
larger commodity trade surpluses (see Figure 2.1.2).
market vulnerabilities from the most recent US dollar
Notably, the negative spillovers were driven entirely
appreciation episode require a nuanced interpretation.
by emerging market commodity exporters, while there
The accompanying surge in commodity prices—
were no systematic negative GDP forecast errors for
uncharacteristic by historical standards and triggered by
advanced commodity-exporting economies. These
unique circumstances—mitigated the impact of the US
findings are broadly consistent with the outsized
dollar appreciation on the more vulnerable commodity-
negative spillovers for emerging market commodity
exporting emerging markets during 2022. Instead, the
exporters, compounded by less flexible exchange rate
negative spillovers fell disproportionately on emerging
regimes (see Figure 2.8).
market commodity importers. However, the vulnerabil-
ity of commodity importers was muted by their more
The authors of this box are Cian Allen, Rudolfs Bems, Lukas limited exposure to commodities, when compared to
Boer, and Racha Moussa. commodity exporters (see x-axis range in Figure 2.1.2),
1The correlation between the US dollar index and commodity
and their more flexible exchange rate regimes. A return
prices for the sample period is −0.38.
2Obstfeld (2022) reports a coefficient of −2.45 (standard error to the historically observed relationship between the US
of 0.42, R 2 = 0.15) for a simple ordinary least squares regression dollar and commodity prices could reverse the mitigating
of the oil-price change on dollar appreciation. role that commodity prices played in 2022.

Box 2.1 (continued)

Figure 2.1.2. Real GDP Growth Revisions for Two Large US Dollar Appreciation Episodes
Emerging market economies Advanced economies
1. 2015 2. 2022
4 4
CZE TUR MYS COL
ESP TUR GRC BRA
SWE
Real GDP growth forecast error, percentage points
Real GDP growth forecast error, percentage points

PAK ISR
2 HUN ARG 2
IND POL ARG POL NLD
PRT
BEL ROU NLD DNK PHL BEL DNK
PAK AUT ZAF PER CHL
PRT MYS NZL NOR
MEX
0 0
CHN PHL AUS HUN ESP IDN
THA MEX KOR ROU SWE NOR
FIN COL CZE AUS
KOR THA NZL
–2 ISR AUT IDN CHL CHN FIN –2
ZAF
GRC PER IND
–4 –4
RUS
RUS
BRA
–6 –6
Linear trend line: Linear trend line:
y = –0.16x + 0.17 y = 0.05x + 0.54
–8 –8
–15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15 20 25 –10 –5 0 5 10 15 20
Commodity trade balance, percent of GDP Commodity trade balance, percent of GDP
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The forecast error for real GDP growth in 2015 is calculated as actual minus the IMF World Economic Outlook data
for April 2014. The forecast error for real GDP growth in 2022 is calculated as the IMF World Economic Outlook data for
April 2023 minus that for January 2022. Commodity trade balance is defined as the ratio of commodity exports to GDP
minus the ratio of commodity imports to GDP. Trend line includes only emerging market economies. For 2015, the trend
line excludes Brazil, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For 2022, the trend line excludes
Russia. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.

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3
CHAPTER
2022 INDIVIDUAL ECONOMY ASSESSMENTS
Methodology and Process judgment in an objective, rigorous, and evenhanded

The individual economy assessments use a wide range manner, a process was developed for multilaterally con-
of methods to form an integrated and multilaterally sistent external assessments for the 30 largest economies,
consistent view of economies’ external sector positions. representing about 90 percent of global GDP. These
These methods are grounded in the latest vintage of the assessments are also discussed with the respective author-
External Balance Assessment (EBA), developed by the ities as part of bilateral surveillance.
IMF’s Research Department to estimate desired current External assessments are presented in ranges, in
account balances and real exchange rates.1 Model recognition of inherent uncertainties, and in different
estimates and associated discussions on policy distor- categories generally reflecting deviations of the overall
tions (see Box 3.1 for an example) are accompanied by external position from fundamentals and desired policies.
a holistic view of other external indicators, including As reported in Annex Table 1.1.2 (Chapter 1), the ranges
capital and financial account flows and measures, foreign of uncertainty for IMF staff–assessed current account
exchange intervention and reserves adequacy, and for- gaps are based on country-specific estimated measures.
eign asset or liability positions.2 The policy discussion in For the REER, the ranges of uncertainty vary by country,
the individual economy assessments highlights policies reflecting country-specific factors, including different
and reforms that contribute to supporting convergence exchange rate semi-elasticities applied to the staff-assessed
toward (or maintenance of) external balance, in the current account gaps. Overall external positions are
context of a summary of the overall policy advice. labeled as either “broadly in line,” “moderately weaker
The EBA models provide numerical inputs for the (stronger),” “weaker (stronger),” or “substantially weaker
identification of external imbalances but, in some cases, (stronger).” (See Table 3.A) The criteria for applying the
may not sufficiently capture all relevant economic char- labels to overall external positions are multidimensional.
acteristics and potential policy distortions. In such cases, Regarding the wording to describe the current
the individual economy assessments may need to be account and REER gaps, (1) when comparing the cycli-
complemented by analytically grounded judgment and cally adjusted current account with the current account
economy-specific insights in the form of adjustors. IMF norm, the wording “higher” or “lower” is used, corre-
staff members estimate an economy’s current account sponding to positive or negative current account gaps,
gap by combining the EBA model’s current account respectively; (2) a quantitative estimate of the IMF
gap estimate with adjustors. For the 2022 assessments, staff’s view of the REER gap is generally reported as
similar to the previous year, additional adjustors to (_) percent “over” or “under” valued. External positions
account for the lingering but temporary effects of the that are labeled as being “broadly in line” are consistent
COVID-19 crisis on external positions were included with current account gaps in the range of ±1 percent
(see Chapter 1, also the 2022 External Sector Report of GDP as well as REER gaps in a range that reflects
Online Annex 1.2). The IMF staff estimates the real the country-specific exchange rate semi-elasticity (for
effective exchange rate (REER) gap consistent with the example, ±5 percent based on an elasticity of –0.2).
staff current account gap by applying a country-specific
elasticity, although in some cases additional informa- Selection of Economies
tion is used, such as the EBA REER regression models The 30 systemic economies analyzed in detail in
and unit-labor-costs-based measures, to arrive at the this report and included in the individual economy
staff REER gap estimate. To integrate country-specific assessments are listed in Table 3.B. They were generally
chosen on the basis of a set of criteria, including each
1See Allen and others (2023) for a complete description of the EBA
economy’s global rank in terms of purchasing power
methodology and for a description of the most recent refinements.
2The individual economy assessments for 2022 are based on exter-
GDP, as reported in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook,
nal sector data as of May 31, 2023, and IMF staff projections in the and in terms of the level of nominal gross trade and
April 2023 World Economic Outlook. degree of financial integration.
Table 3.A. Description in External Sector Report Overall Assessment

CA Gap REER Gap (Using Elasticity of –0.2) Description in Overall Assessment
>4% <–20% . . . substantially stronger . . .
2%, 4% –20%, –10% . . . stronger . . .
1%, 2% –10%, –5% . . . moderately stronger . . .
–1%, 1% –5%, 5% The external position is broadly in line with
fundamentals and desirable policies.
–2%, –1% 5%, 10% . . . moderately weaker . . .
–4%, –2% 10%, 20% . . . weaker . . .
<–4% >20% . . . substantially weaker . . .
Table 3.B. Economies Covered in the External Sector Report

Argentina Euro area Italy Poland Sweden
Australia France Japan Russia Switzerland
Belgium Germany Korea Saudi Arabia Thailand
Brazil Hong Kong SAR Malaysia Singapore Türkiye
Canada India Mexico South Africa United Kingdom
China Indonesia The Netherlands Spain United States
Box 3.1. Assessing Imbalances: The Role of Policies—An Example

A two-country example: To clarify how to analyze economies in the world), the individual economy
policy distortions in a multilateral setting and how to assessments would identify the different issues and
distinguish between domestic policy distortions, which risks facing the two economies.
may require a country to take action to reduce its external •• In the case of Country A, the capital flows and
imbalance, and foreign policy distortions, which require foreign asset and liability position sections would
no action by the home country (but for which action note the vulnerabilities arising from international
by the other would help reduce the external imbalance), liabilities, and the potential policy response section
consider a stylized example of a two-country world. would focus on the need to rein in the fiscal deficit
•• Country A has a large current account deficit and and limit financial excesses.
a large fiscal deficit, as well as high public and •• For Country B, however, as there were no domestic
external debt. policy distortions, the write-up would find no fault
•• Country B has a current account surplus (matching with policies and would note that adjustment among
the deficit in Country A) and a large creditor posi- other economies would help reduce the imbalance.
tion but has no policy distortions. Implications: It remains critical to distinguish
Overall external assessment: The analysis would show between domestic and foreign fiscal policy gaps. The
that Country A has an external imbalance reflecting its elimination of the fiscal policy gap in a systemic
large fiscal deficit. Country B would have an equal and deficit economy would help reduce excessive surpluses
opposite surplus imbalance. Country A’s exchange rate in other systemic economies. More generally, policy
would look overvalued and Country B’s undervalued. actions that contribute to addressing external imbal-
Policy gaps: The analysis of policy gaps would show ances relate to the determinants of current account
that Country A has a domestic policy distortion that balances, namely the private and public saving-
needs adjustment. The analysis would also show that investment balances. Structural or policy distortions
there are no domestic policy gaps in Country B— can contribute to excessive or inadequate saving and
instead, adjustment by Country A would automati- investment, and the policy advice in the individual
cally eliminate the imbalance in Country B. economy assessments highlights reforms and policy
Individual economy write-ups: While the esti- changes that can contribute to addressing these gaps.
mates of the needed current account adjustment and Policy advice also seeks to address vulnerabilities asso-
associated real exchange rate change would be equal ciated with external stock positions, including reserves,
and opposite in both cases (given there are only two as well as foreign exchange intervention policies.

CHAPTER 3 2022 Individual Economy Assessments
Abbreviations and Acronyms

Adj. adjusted
ARA assessing reserve adequacy
CA current account
CFM capital flow management
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019
CPI consumer price index
Cycl. cyclically
EBA External Balance Assessment
ECB European Central Bank
EU European Union
FDI foreign direct investment
FX foreign exchange
GDP gross domestic product
IIP international investment position
Liab. liabilities
NEER nominal effective exchange rate
NIIP net international investment position
PIF Public Investment Fund
QFII Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor
REER real effective exchange rate
Res. residual
RQFII Renminbi Qualified Institutional Investor
SDR special drawing right
TARGET2 Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System
ULC unit labor cost
VAT value-added tax

Table 3.1. Argentina: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies, an assessment based
holistically on elevated external debt vulnerabilities, precariously low international reserves, and lack of access to international capital markets. It is critical to continue
to implement prudent macroeconomic policies that strengthen the external CA and reserve coverage to secure external sustainability.
Potential Policy Responses: Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, combined with tight monetary policy and a streamlined FX regime, remains essential to
moderate domestic demand growth, strengthen the trade balance, rebuild international reserves, regain market access, and ensure fiscal and external debt
sustainability. In addition, structural reforms to boost Argentina’s export capacity and encourage FDI are required. As stability and confidence are reestablished,
a gradual conditions-based easing of CFM measures will need to be considered and multiple currencies practices (MCP) and exchange restrictions should be
eliminated.
Foreign Asset Background. Argentina’s external gross liabilities stood at 49.0 percent of GDP at the end of 2022, below the level of 50 percent of GDP at
and Liability the end of 2017. That said, the NIIP remained positive, reaching 18.4 percent of GDP at end 2022 (up 16 percentage points since the end of
Position and 2017), driven by continued private capital outflows and deleveraging by firms, despite tight CFM measures.
Trajectory Assessment. In 2020, Argentina restructured $82 billion (21.4 percent of GDP) in domestic- and foreign-law sovereign FX debt held
by the private sector, with cash flow relief of $34 billion during 2020–30. Additional relief was secured during 2021, as provincial
governments restructured $13 billion of foreign-law FX debt obligations, with total cash flow savings estimated at about $6.5 billion for
2021–27. Gross debt and debt-service obligations remain substantial and meeting these obligations over the medium term will depend on
implementation of a strong economic reform plan that restores market access.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 18.4 Gross Assets: 67.5 Res. Assets: 7.1 Gross Liab.: 49.0 Debt Liab.: 31.8
Current Account Background. The CA reached a deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2022, down from a surplus of 1.4 percent in 2021, on account of a strong
expansion of goods import volumes and a widening services deficit. Terms of trade played a more minor role, as higher grain export
prices largely offset higher import prices on energy and intermediate goods. The CA balance is projected to reach a surplus in 2023,
despite drought conditions affecting agricultural exports, mainly on account of moderating domestic demand and imports, improving
commodity terms of trade, and higher interest income on private Argentine assets abroad. In the medium term, the CA is expected to
reach 1 percent of GDP, mainly on account of stronger energy and services trade balances.
Assessment. The cyclically adjusted CA balance is estimated to have reached a deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with an
EBA CA norm surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP. The estimated transitory impact of the COVID-19 crisis is –0.2 percent of GDP for travel
services (including tourism) and 0.2 percent of GDP for the transport sector, with a narrow net impact of 0.1 percent of GDP on the
cyclically adjusted CA. Furthermore, consistent with the need to bring down external debt service to more manageable levels and pave the
way for market access, the IMF staff judges the near- to medium-term CA norm to be closer to 1 percent of GDP, implying an adjustment
to the norm of 0.7 percent of GDP. As such, the IMF staff assesses the CA gap to be –1.8 ± 1 percent of GDP.1
2022 (% GDP) CA: –0.6 Cycl. Adj. CA: –0.8 EBA Norm: 0.3 EBA Gap: –1.2 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.1 Other Adj.: – 0.7 Staff Gap: –1.8
Real Exchange Background. The average REER, after depreciating by more than 35 percent between 2017 and 2019, appreciated by about 6 percent
Rate during 2020–21 and is estimated to have appreciated by additional 20 percent during 2022. This appreciation largely reflects the fact that
the rate crawl until recently has lagged headline inflation. As of April 2023, the REER was 1.4 percent above the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of about 15 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.12 applied). The
EBA REER index model suggests a REER gap of 25 percent, while the EBA REER level model estimates a gap of 10.8 percent, with the
estimate surrounded by significant uncertainty. Overall, the IMF staff assesses the 2022 REER gap to be in the range of 15 to 20 percent.
Capital and Background. Strict CFM and MCP measures were introduced in late 2019 to contain capital outflows. In the context of rising FX
Financial pressures (the gap between the parallel and official exchange rate remains around 90–100 percent) and challenges in accumulating
Accounts: Flows reserves, these measures have been intensified during 2022, including through (1) incentives to encourage the liquidation of soy exports,
and Policy (2) tax measures on tourism inflows and outflows to reduce the services deficit, and (3) financing requirements in regard to imports to
Measures limit short-term FX demand.
Assessment. CFM and MCP measures have generally helped to contain capital outflows yet have introduced distortions that discourage
trade and foreign investment. Importantly, these measures are not a substitute for sound macroeconomic policies. While CFMs are
needed in the near term as imbalances are being addressed, import controls and MCP measures should be eliminated and a conditions-
based easing is necessary, especially to encourage FDI.
FX Intervention Background. Gross international reserves reached $44.6 billion in 2022, $5 billion higher relative to 2021, yet close to the levels at the end of
and Reserves 2019. Meanwhile, its net international reserves, after excluding swap lines with other central banks, reserve requirements on domestic dollar
Level deposits, and deposit insurance, reached $8.8 billion. Despite CFM measures, reserve accumulation has been challenged by growing domestic
demand and continued capital flight.
Assessment. Gross international reserves are estimated to have stood at about 69 percent of the IMF’s composite metric in 2022. Tighter
fiscal and monetary policies are necessary to secure the projected trade surpluses and improve reserve coverage, which in turn is essential
to pave the way for market access and the easing of CFM measures over the medium term and the elimination of MCP measures. Given
reserve scarcity, FX sales (in the official or parallel market) should be consistent with reserve accumulation goals, while taking into account
variability arising from seasonal factors and temporary bouts of excessive volatility.

Table 3.2. Australia: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA surplus
declined from 3 percent of GDP in 2021 to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2022, as a lower primary income balance and larger service imports offset the impact of higher
prices for Australia’s commodity exports. In the medium term, the CA is projected to return to a slight deficit as commodity prices decline, savings return to historical
levels, and investment picks up.
Potential Policy Responses: Given Australia’s strong economic recovery and elevated inflation, withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus at an appropriate
pace is warranted. Closing the output gap will push the CA surplus higher, but private savings (elevated in part due to the previous pandemic-related fiscal
stimulus) will likely offset this increase. Furthermore, policies that boost investment (executing planned infrastructure investment, streamlining product
market regulation, and promoting investment in R&D and innovation) can also contribute to reducing the CA surplus. Australia’s commitment to a floating
exchange rate should help keep its external position in line with fundamentals.
Foreign Asset Background. Australia’s NIIP was broadly unchanged at –34 percent of GDP in 2022 (compared with –33.7 percent of GDP in 2021 and
and Liability an average of –49 percent over 2017–21). While about 40 percent of Australia’s gross liabilities are debt obligations, more than half of its
Position and debt liabilities are denominated in domestic currency, whereas its assets are largely denominated in foreign currency. Foreign liabilities
Trajectory are composed of about one-quarter FDI, one-half portfolio investment (principally banks’ borrowing abroad and foreign holdings of
government bonds), and one-quarter other investments and derivatives.
Assessment. The NIIP level and trajectory are sustainable. The structure of Australia’s external balance sheet reduces the vulnerability
associated with its negative NIIP. With a positive net foreign currency asset position, a nominal depreciation tends to strengthen the
external balance sheet, all else being equal. The banking sector’s net foreign currency liability position is mostly hedged, and the maturity
of banks’ external funding has lengthened since the global financial crisis. Despite the recent increase in debt, the government’s balance
sheet remains strong and can provide credible support in a tail risk event in which domestic banks suffer a major loss.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –34.0 Gross Assets: 148.5 Debt Assets: 36.3 Gross Liab.: 182.5 Debt Liab.: 76.1
Current Account Background. While Australia has historically run deficits, the CA balance has been in surplus since 2019. After peaking at 3 percent of
GDP in 2021, the CA balance declined to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2022. The merchandise trade balance increased further, from 5.3 percent
of GDP in 2021 to 6.6 percent of GDP in 2022, with high prices for Australian commodity exports, most notably thermal coal and liquefied
natural gas (even as iron ore prices came off their 2021 highs), driving the increase. The higher merchandise trade balance was offset by a
large primary income deficit of 4.5 percent of GDP, a 2.2 percent of GDP deterioration compared with 2021, with higher dividend payments
on Australia’s equity liabilities (including in the mining sector) driving the deterioration. The services balance also deteriorated, by
1.2 percent of GDP, owing to higher transport service costs and a return to lower tourism surpluses as tourism imports recovered. From
a savings-investment perspective, a decline in the savings rate from pandemic-era highs drove the decline in surplus in 2022. While there
is considerable uncertainty, the CA is expected to gradually return to a small deficit over the medium term as commodity prices decline,
investment picks up, and savings decline further from still-elevated levels.
Assessment. The EBA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA balance of –2.1 percent of GDP compared with a CA norm of –1.0 percent
of GDP, suggesting a model-based CA gap of –1.1 percent of GDP. However, in the IMF staff’s view, a net adjustment of 0.6 percent of GDP
to the cyclically adjusted primary balance is warranted to reflect temporary factors related to the COVID-19 shock, including changes to
the transport services balances due to high shipping costs. With this adjustment taken into consideration, the IMF staff-adjusted CA gap is
in the range of –1.3 to 0.3 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –0.5 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 1.2 Cycl. Adj. CA: –2.1 EBA Norm: –1.0 EBA Gap: –1.1 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.6 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –0.5
Real Exchange Background. As with most other currencies, the Australian dollar depreciated against the US dollar in 2022. However, Australia’s average
Rate REER in 2022 was broadly at the same level as its 2021 average and about 1.8 percent higher than its five-year average. As of April 2023,
the REER was 1.5 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of 2.6 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.2 applied). The EBA REER level
model points to an overvaluation of 23.4 percent, while the index model points to an undervaluation of 20.1 percent. Consistent with the
CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the REER gap to be in the range of –1.3 to 6.6 percent, with a midpoint of 2.6 percent.
Capital and Background. The financial account recorded net cumulative outflows in 2022, reflecting the CA surplus. While Australia has historically
Financial had net FDI inflows, it experienced large net FDI outflows in 2022 (3.2 percent of GDP) driven by asset purchases abroad by Australian
Accounts: Flows residents. Other investment outflows were also large (2.1 percent of GDP). Large net portfolio inflows (5 percent of GDP), reflecting
and Policy inflows into Australian equities as well as debt securities, partly offset FDI and other investment outflows. Net derivative flows were small.
Measures Assessment. Vulnerabilities related to the financial account remain contained, supported by a credible commitment to a floating exchange rate.
FX Intervention Background. The currency has been free floating since 1983. The central bank has not intervened in the FX market since the global
and Reserves financial crisis. Reserve assets remained stable in 2022.
Level Assessment. The authorities are strongly committed to a floating regime, which reduces the need for reserve holdings. Although domestic
banks’ external liabilities remain sizable, they are either in local currency or hedged, so reserve needs for prudential reasons are also
limited.

Table 3.3. Belgium: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was substantially weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
Belgium’s CA balance deteriorated to –3.5 percent of GDP in 2022, as the goods balance swung to deficit, largely due to higher fuel imports, reflecting price
surges, and lower vaccine exports. The outlook is highly uncertain, with the CA deficit remaining high in the near term before returning to a small deficit in the
medium term with easing of energy price pressures and improving wage competitiveness.
Potential Policy Responses: Outlays on energy bill support and other expenses related to spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine have delayed fiscal and
external adjustments. Given the elevated fiscal deficit and public debt and aging-related spending pressures, policies in the near and medium terms should
focus on rebuilding fiscal buffers through a credible, expenditure-led consolidation that also creates space to support green and digital transformation
through higher investment. Policies should also focus on strengthening competitiveness through structural reforms, including reforms of the wage indexation
system, social benefits, and the labor and product markets, as well as actions to foster green, digital, and inclusive growth. These steps are expected to bring
the external position closer in line with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policy settings.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP decreased to 54 percent of GDP in 2022 from 64 percent in 2021, as gross foreign assets went down 47 percentage
and Liability points of GDP from 2021, while gross foreign liabilities declined by 36 percentage points of GDP. Net portfolio investment, the main
Position and component of the positive NIIP, declined to 36 percent of GDP (down 8 percentage points of GDP from 2021), largely on account of
Trajectory valuation changes reflecting poorly performing equity markets and sharply lower bond prices from a rise in interest rates. Net direct
investment increased to 27 percent of GDP (up 5 percentage points of GDP), reflecting a larger decline in liabilities than in assets. Net
other investment liabilities almost doubled to a high of 15.7 percent of GDP in 2022, as cessation of payouts to the Bank of Russia as
a result of sanctions meant those payouts remained outstanding as interbank debt. Belgium’s large creditor position is underpinned by
sizable net household financial wealth. Gross foreign assets of the banking sector continued to decline, to 70 percent of GDP at the end
of 2022, well below the pre–global financial crisis peak of more than 200 percent following a decade of consolidation and deleveraging.
External public debt—mainly denominated in euros—also continued to decline in 2022, to 53 percent of GDP from 68 percent of GDP
in 2021, a reversal following a sharp increase to 75 percent of GDP in 2020 due to financing needs related to the fiscal response to the
pandemic and a decline in nominal GDP.
Assessment. Based on the projected CA deficit and growth paths, Belgium’s NIIP-to-GDP ratio is expected to decline. The large and
positive NIIP and its trajectory do not raise sustainability concerns. Belgium’s large gross international asset and liability positions are
elevated by the presence of corporate treasury units, which do not appear to create macro-relevant mismatches.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 54 Gross Assets: 419 Debt Assets: 147 Gross Liab.: 365 Debt Liab.: 155
Current Account Background. The CA balance averaged 0.3 percent of GDP over 2016–21 and has been declining since a post–global financial crisis peak of
1.4 percent of GDP in 2015. Volatility in the trade and primary income balances is driven in part by sizable operations of multinationals and
large revisions.1 In 2022, the CA balance swung to a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP from a surplus of 0.4 percent of GDP in 2021, with a sharp
deterioration in the trade balance driving the change. Net imports of fuels and related materials increased to 4.1 percent of GDP (€23 billion) in
2022, 1 percentage point higher than in 2021, reflecting surges in energy prices. Net exports of pharmaceutical products declined to 3.6 percent
of GDP in 2022 (from 4.4 percent of GDP in 2021), reflecting a slowdown in shipment of coronavirus vaccines. Income and current transfers
balances remained broadly stable at 1.5 percent and –1.2 percent of GDP, respectively, in 2022. The cyclically adjusted CA in 2022 is projected
at –1.7 percent of GDP, with a cyclical contribution of –1.8 percent of GDP, largely due to the deterioration in the commodity terms of trade
(–1.5 percent).
Assessment. EBA model estimates for 2022 yield a CA gap of –4.5 percent of GDP, based on a cyclically adjusted CA balance of
–1.7 percent of GDP, relative to an estimated norm of 2.8 percent of GDP. Adjustment for transitory COVID-19 effects on the CA is
0 percent of GDP: –0.2 percent of GDP for travel services (including tourism) and 0.1 percent of GDP for transport. This is within a range
estimated by the IMF staff for the CA gap between –5.0 and –4.1 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –4.6 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –3.5 Cycl. Adj. CA: –1.7 EBA Norm: 2.8 EBA Gap: –4.5 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.0 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –4.6
Real Exchange Background. After a cumulative appreciation by 7 percent between the end of 2015 and the end of 2021, Belgium’s CPI-based REER depreciated
Rate by 0.4 percent in 2022, with the decrease largely mirroring the depreciation of its NEER. In contrast, the ULC-based REER appreciated by
0.9 percent in 2022, or by 7.7 percent in December 2022 from its trough in February 2020, reflecting higher wage increases in Belgium. As of
April 2023, the CPI-based REER was 0.8 percent above the 2022 average.
Assessment. Based on the IMF staff–assessed CA gap range, Belgium’s REER is overvalued by 5.7 to 6.9 percent, with a midpoint of
6.3 percent (with an estimated elasticity of the CA balance to the REER of 0.72 applied). EBA model estimates point to a REER overvaluation
of 16.9 percent based on the CPI-based REER index and 31.3 percent by the REER level models.
Capital and Background. The balance-of-payments financial account was strongly negative in 2022, with flows of foreign liabilities exceeding flows of
Financial foreign assets by €19 billion: the portfolio investment balance was almost zero; the direct investment balance was €25 billion and was
Accounts: Flows offset by a large negative balance in other investment of €45 billion stemming from a sharp rise in foreign debts of commercial banks
and Policy to Russia. Short-term external debt increased marginally to 31 percent of gross external debt in 2022 (from an average of 27 percent in
Measures 2017–21). The capital account is open.
Assessment. Belgium remains exposed to financial market risks, but the structure of financial flows does not point to specific vulnerabilities.
The large positive NIIP reduces the vulnerabilities associated with high external public debt.
FX Intervention Background. The euro has the status of a global reserve currency.
and Reserves Assessment. Reserves held by the euro area are typically low relative to standard metrics, but the currency is free floating.
Level

Table 3.4. Brazil: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA deficit
is expected to gradually narrow to about 2.3 percent of GDP in 2023 and remain broadly stable over the medium term as growth converges to its potential rate and
net public savings improve. Risks to Brazil’s external position over the medium term relate to uncertainties to global financial conditions and insufficient progress on
domestic reforms.
Potential Policy Responses: Policies that would help keep the CA in line with its norm include efforts to raise national savings that are needed to provide
room for a sustainable expansion in investment, including medium-term fiscal consolidation that should contribute to increase net public savings. Fostering a
skilled labor force and implementing structural reforms to reduce the cost of doing business would also help strengthen competitiveness.
Foreign Asset Background. Brazil’s NIIP deteriorated to –40.4 percent of GDP at the end of 2022, from –36.7 percent of GDP in 2021, partly reflecting
and Liability negative valuation effects on international reserves due to increases in the US interest rates. The NIIP is projected to be around
Position and –42 percent of GDP over the medium term, with FDI accounting for more than half of all liabilities. At the end of 2022, estimated external
Trajectory debt declined to 35.4 percent of GDP and 200 percent of exports, compared with 40.7 percent of GDP and 236 percent of exports in 2021.
Assessment. Brazil’s NIIP has been negative since the series was first published in 2001. Short-term gross external financing needs are
moderate at 11 percent of GDP annually, but capital flows and the exchange rate are particularly sensitive to global financing conditions.
The CA deficit required to stabilize the NIIP at –41 percent is 2.1 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –40.4 Gross Assets: 49.2 Res Assets: 16.9 Gross Liab.: 89.6 Debt Liab.: 35.4
Current Account Background. Despite a sizable trade surplus in goods of 2.3 percent of GDP, the CA deficit reached 3 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with
2.8 percent in 2021, reflecting higher deficits in transport services and primary income related to profits and dividends. Exports and imports
were at record levels driven by high commodity prices. From a savings-investment perspective, the CA deficit reflects the savings-investment
deficit of the public sector partially offset by the savings-investment surplus of the private sector. After falling in the second half of 2021, the
terms of trade remained low in 2022 except for the commodity price spike following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The CA deficit is expected
to gradually narrow to about 2.3 percent of GDP this year and remain broadly stable over the medium term as growth converges to its
potential rate.
Assessment. In 2022, the cyclically adjusted CA balance was –3.3 percent of GDP. EBA estimates suggest a CA norm in 2022 of
–2.2 percent of GDP. This implies a CA gap of –1.1 percent of GDP, with an estimated contribution of identified policy gaps of –0.2 percent
of GDP. The identified policy gaps mainly reflect a positive total fiscal policy gap from the more expansionary fiscal policy stances in
trading partners relative to Brazil, offset by strong credit growth. After adjusting for the transitory impact of the COVID-19 crisis on travel
services (–0.2 percent of GDP) and transport (0.5 percent of GDP), IMF staff estimate the CA gap in the range of –1.3 and –0.3 percent of
GDP with a midpoint of –0.8 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –3.0 Cycl. Adj. CA: –3.3 EBA Norm: –2.2 EBA Gap: –1.1 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.3 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –0.8
Real Exchange Background. After remaining broadly stable in 2021, the REER appreciated sharply (18.8 percent) in the first four months of 2022 before
Rate a gradual and partial reversal in the remainder of the year. As of April 2023, the REER had appreciated by 2.3 percent relative to the 2022
average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of 6.0 percent in 2022 (applying an estimated elasticity of 0.13). The REER index and
level methodologies indicate a 29.1 percent and 14.4 percent undervaluation, respectively, for 2022. Consistent with the staff CA gap, staff
assess the REER gap to be in the range of 2.1 to 9.9 percent, with a midpoint of 6.0 percent.
Capital and Background. Brazil continues to attract sizable capital flows. Net FDI flows have continued to fully finance the CA deficit since 2015
Financial (averaging 2.9 percent of GDP during 2015–22, while CA deficits averaged 2.6 percent) and substantially increased in 2022 to 3.2 percent
Accounts: Flows of GDP, from 1.8 percent of GDP in 2021. Portfolio investment turned to net outflows of 0.2 percent of GDP with the narrowing of the
and Policy interest differential between Brazil and competitor economies amid global and domestic monetary policy tightening. To improve currency
Measures convertibility, under Law No. 14286, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) has taken initial steps to simplify and modernize foreign exchange
and capital regulation.
Assessment. The composition of capital flows is expected to have a favorable risk profile over the medium term, with positive net FDI inflows
(about 2 percent of GDP) outweighing negative portfolio outflows (about 0.1 percent of GDP). Nevertheless, uncertainties related to tighter
global financial conditions and insufficient progress on reforms pose downside risks to capital flows.
FX Intervention Background. Brazil has a floating exchange rate. FX interventions in 2022 continued to rely on spot, repo, and FX swap markets to
and Reserves dampen excess exchange rate volatility. The outstanding stock of the FX swap, a non-deliverable future settled in local currency, rose from
Level US$80 billion in 2021 to US$98.5 billion in 2022. International reserves fell markedly to US$325 billion at end-2022 (from US$362 billion
at end-2021), mostly owing to valuation effects, but recovered to US$345 billion in May 2023.
Assessment. The flexible exchange rate has been an important shock absorber. Reserves remain adequate relative to various criteria,
including the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric (136 percent as of end-2022) and serve as insurance against external shocks. Intervention
should be limited to alleviating disorderly FX market conditions.

Table 3.5. Canada: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was moderately weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA
balance remained marginally in deficit, with a decline in investment income and services more than offsetting the effect of stronger terms of trade—notably for
energy products—on goods exports. With commodity prices expected to be softer on average in 2023, the CA deficit is expected to widen to 1.4 percent of GDP in
2023 and remain in deficit over the medium term as export prices decline further and domestic demand continues to recover.
Potential Policy Responses: Policies should aim to boost Canada’s competitiveness in nonfuel goods exports and services exports and to diversify Canada’s
export markets. These policies should include (1) introducing measures to improve labor productivity, (2) removing nontariff trade barriers, (3) investing in R&D
and physical capital, (4) investing in the green transformation, and (5) promoting FDI. A medium-term fiscal consolidation plan would also help stabilize debt and
support external rebalancing.
Foreign Asset Background. After swelling to 52.1 percent of GDP in 2021 with the boom in global equities during the pandemic, Canada’s NIIP dropped
and Liability sharply in 2022 as stock markets fell, registering 30.1 percent of GDP, broadly in line with the 2017–19 average. At the same time, its
Position and gross external debt decreased to 128.5 percent of GDP, of which about 51.1 percent of GDP is short-term debt.
Trajectory Assessment. Canada’s foreign assets have a higher foreign currency component than do its liabilities, which provides a hedge against
currency depreciation. The NIIP level and trajectory are sustainable.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 30.1 Gross Assets: 264.9 Debt Assets: 87.3 Gross Liab.: 234.7 Debt Liab.: 128.5
Current Account Background. The estimated CA balance remained unchanged at –0.3 percent of GDP in 2022, reflecting the decline in investment income and
services which offset the effect of a stronger trade balance.
Assessment. The cyclically adjusted CA was –1.3 percent of GDP in 2022, as against the EBA’s CA norm for Canada of 2.2 percent of GDP,
implying a gap of –3.4 percent of GDP for 2022. Biases in measuring inflation and retained earnings explain part of this gap, however,
while COVID-19 adjustors for travel (including tourism) and transportation are assessed to have been immaterial.1 Taking these factors
into account, the IMF staff assesses the CA gap to be in the range between –2.3 and –1.3 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –1.8 percent
of GDP.
Real Exchange Background. The average REER for 2022 was broadly unchanged from the 2021 average (just 0.1 percent stronger). As of April 2023, the REER
Rate was 4.3 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The EBA REER index model points to an overvaluation of 1.9 percent in 2022, while the REER level model suggests an
undervaluation of 10.5 percent. Consistent with the staff CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the REER to be overvalued by between 5.1 and
8.5 percent, with a midpoint of 6.8 percent.2
Capital and Background. FDI saw net outflows of 1.3 percent of GDP in 2022 (comparable with levels in 2021 and 2020). Net portfolio inflows rose to
Financial 5.4 percent of GDP in 2022, up from 2.1 percent in 2021, while other investments moved from net inflows in 2021 of about 0.6 percent of
Accounts: Flows GDP to net outflows of 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022. Errors and omissions were small, at 0.1 percent of GDP.
and Policy Assessment. Canada has an open capital account. Vulnerabilities are limited by a credible commitment to a floating exchange rate.
Measures
FX Intervention Background. Canada has a free-floating exchange rate regime and has not intervened in the FX market since September 1998 (except
and Reserves for participating in joint interventions with other central banks). Canada has limited reserves, but its central bank has standing swap
Level arrangements with the US Federal Reserve and four other major central banks. (The Bank of Canada has not drawn on these swap lines.)
Assessment. Policies in this area are appropriate to the circumstances of Canada. The authorities are strongly committed to a floating
regime, which, together with the swap arrangements, reduces the need for reserve holdings.

Table 3.6. China: Economy Assessment

further widened to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2022 reflecting sluggish imports on the back of weak domestic demand, while the influence of transitory factors linked
to the global COVID-19 crisis continued. The CA surplus is expected to narrow and return to its downward trend as COVID-related factors unwind and rebalancing
toward private consumption resumes.
Potential Policy Responses: Policies to ensure that the external position remains broadly in line with fundamentals include (1) accelerating market-based
structural reforms—a further opening up of domestic markets, ensuring competitive neutrality between state-owned and private firms, reducing wasteful and
distorting industrial policy subsidies and increasing reliance on market forces to improve resource allocation, and promoting green investment—to boost potential
growth, (2) shifting fiscal policy support toward strengthening social protection to reduce high household savings and rebalance toward private consumption, and
(3) further increasing exchange rate flexibility to help the economy absorb external shocks.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP increased to 14.0 percent of GDP in 2022, from 12.3 percent in 2021, although it remained significantly below the peak
and Liability of 30.4 percent in 2008. The improvement largely reflected a higher CA surplus, although it was offset by a small valuation loss over the year.
Position and Assessment. The NIIP-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain positive, with a modest decline over the medium term in line with its narrowing
Trajectory CA surplus. Increasing portfolio investment, on the back of China’s gradual financial opening, is expected to diversify its foreign assets and
liabilities further. The NIIP is not a major source of risk, as its assets remain high—reflecting large foreign reserves ($3.3 trillion as of the
end of 2022, 18.3 percent of GDP)—and its liabilities are mostly FDI related.
Current Account Background. The CA surplus continued to increase to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2022, from 2.0 percent in 2021, reflecting a rising trade
balance and underpinned by a wider savings-investment balance (excessive high household savings due to COVID-19 restrictions and
precautionary motives). Although growth in merchandise exports slowed amid weak global demand and the unwinding of some pandemic-
related exports (e.g., medical goods and consumer durable goods), growth in merchandise imports dropped notably on account of weak
domestic demand, including a large decline in commodity imports arising from a real estate contraction that more than offset higher
energy and commodity prices following the war in Ukraine. While the services deficit remained low because of still-subdued outbound
tourism, the income balance deficit widened further, with the change driven by a higher investment income deficit owing to a faster drop
in investment income receipts (reflecting falling asset prices in 2022) than in investment income payments (reflecting declining foreign
investment profits). Over the medium term, the CA surplus is projected to narrow to below 0.5 percent of GDP as COVID-related factors
unwind and the economy resumes rebalancing toward higher-quality and more consumption-driven growth.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates the CA gap to be 1.5 percent of GDP. Considering that remaining pandemic-related temporary
factors raised the CA surplus by 0.7 percent of GDP (with contributions of 0.5 and 0.2 percentage point from the impact on the travel services
balance and the transport services balance, respectively), the CA gap is estimated to range from 0.1 to 1.4 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of
0.8 percent. EBA-identified policy gaps are estimated to be about 1.0 percent of GDP, driven by relatively low credit growth, and inadequate
social safety nets, partly offset by a larger fiscal expansion than in other countries.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 2.2 Cycl. Adj. CA: 2.2 EBA Norm: 0.7 EBA Gap: 1.5 COVID-19 Adj.: –0.7 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 0.8
Real Exchange Background. The REER depreciated in 2022 by 1.2 percent from the 2021 average, with part of the NEER appreciation (3.8 percent) offset by
Rate relatively low inflation in China. This depreciation reversed the REER appreciation in 2020–21 (by 5 percent) after a depreciation of 7 percent
during 2015–19. As of April 2023, the REER had depreciated by 6.5 percent from the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of –5.7 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.14 applied). The EBA REER index
regression estimates the REER gap in 2022 to have been 16.1 percent, and the EBA REER level regression estimates the REER gap to have
been 12.7 percent. Consistent with the IMF staff CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the REER gap to be in the range of –10.4 to –1.1 percent,
with a midpoint of –5.7 percent.
Capital and Background. Net capital outflows (including net errors and omissions) increased to $302 billion (1.7 percent of GDP) in 2022 from $165
Financial billion (0.9 percent of GDP) in 2021. The authorities reimposed the risk reserve requirement of 20 percent on FX forwards (an outflow
Accounts: Flows CFM measure) in September 2022 and raised the cross-border financing macroprudential adjustment parameter for financial institutions
and Policy and enterprises from 1 to 1.25 (relaxation of an inflow CFM measure) in October 2022. The reserve requirement ratio for FX deposits was
Measures lowered twice, by 1 and 2 percent, respectively, in May and September 2022. As of March 2023, the total Qualified Domestic Institutional
Investor quota stood at $162.7 billion.1
Assessment. Substantial net outflow pressures resurfaced with the divergence of China’s monetary policy from that in advanced economies.
Over the medium term, further capital account opening is likely to create substantially larger two-way gross flows. The sequence of capital
account opening consistent with exchange rate flexibility should carefully consider domestic financial stability, while addressing the faster
pace of private sector accumulation of foreign assets with respect to nonresident accumulation of Chinese assets. CFM should not be used to
actively manage the capital flow cycle or substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment and exchange rate flexibility. Over the medium
term, China should gradually phase out CFM measures in a sequence consistent with greater exchange rate flexibility and other supporting
reforms.
FX Intervention Background. FX reserves declined (by $122.5 billion) and reached $3.1 trillion as of the end of 2022, with the decline mainly reflecting
and Reserves valuation effects and no sign of large FX intervention.
Level Assessment. The level of reserves—68 percent of the IMF’s standard composite metric at the end of 2022 (68 percent in 2021) and
110 percent of the metric adjusted for capital controls (109 percent in 2021)—is assessed to be adequate.

Table 3.7. Euro Area: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA balance
decreased to –1.0 percent of GDP in 2022 from 2.3 percent of GDP in 2021, falling into deficit for the first time in more than a decade, largely on account of a sharp
increase in energy import prices and the associated deterioration in the goods balance. Over the medium term, the euro area’s CA balance is projected to recover
gradually to positive territory but remain below its historical average, as energy prices are projected to remain elevated. National external imbalances are expected to
remain sizable.
Potential Policy Responses: With energy prices projected to remain elevated over the medium term, policies aimed at protecting vulnerable households and
firms should become increasingly targeted, while efforts to facilitate the green transition should be stepped up. Avoiding a trade-distorting subsidy race and
other trade-distorting measures, which would undermine resource allocation and productivity, and preserving the integrity of the European single market are
critical. Trade and investment disagreements with other countries should be resolved in a manner that supports an open, stable, and transparent global trading
system. As historical policy gaps at the national level in the EU are projected to persist, countries with excess CA surpluses should increase investment, whereas
countries with weak external positions should undertake reforms to raise productivity, reduce structural and youth unemployment, and commence growth-friendly
fiscal consolidation. Euro area-wide initiatives to make the currency union more resilient (for example, completing the banking and capital markets unions and
establishing a central fiscal capacity for macroeconomic stabilization) would deepen public and private sector risk sharing, supporting high-debt countries’
external stability.
Foreign Asset Background. After falling to –20.5 percent of GDP in 2009, the euro area’s NIIP had risen substantially to 2.0 percent of GDP by the end of
and Liability 2022, reflecting accumulated CA surpluses. Relative to 2021, the NIIP increased in 2022 by 1.7 percentage points of GDP, primarily reflecting
Position and valuation effects from the weaker euro. Gross portfolio investment assets and liabilities have both declined sharply, reflecting further valuation
Trajectory effects from higher interest rates and financial market repricing. Direct investment assets and liabilities have similarly declined, but more
moderately. The gross values of derivative positions have increased, in line with higher financial market volatility. Gross foreign assets were
250.7 percent of GDP, and liabilities 248.7 percent of GDP, as of the end of 2022. Net external assets (including those with respect to other
euro area member states) remain elevated in external creditor countries such as Germany, whereas net external liabilities remain high in
countries such as Portugal and Spain.
Assessment. Projections of continued CA surpluses over the medium term suggest that the NIIP-to-GDP ratio will rise further, at a
moderate pace. While the region’s overall NIIP financing vulnerabilities appear low in aggregate, large net external debtor countries bear an
elevated risk of a sudden stop of gross inflows.
Current Account Background. The CA balance for the euro area decreased to –1.0 percent of GDP in 2022 from 2.3 percent of GDP in 2021, largely on account
of a sharp increase in energy import prices and an associated deterioration in the goods balance. The latter was also driven by a modest
decline in the net export of nonenergy goods on the back of continued supply-chain disruptions and COVID-19 restrictions in China. The
balances of services and secondary incomes remained broadly stable, but the primary income balance declined owing to lower investment
income. The compression of the euro area CA was the strongest in the second and especially the third quarters, with the balance returning to
surplus in the fourth quarter as energy prices and trade disruptions moderated. Although the surpluses are declining, large creditor countries,
such as Germany and The Netherlands, continued to have sizable surpluses, reflecting high corporate and household saving and weak
investment.
Assessment. The EBA model estimates a CA norm of –0.3 percent of GDP, against a cyclically adjusted CA of 0.1 percent of GDP. This implies
a gap of 0.5 percent of GDP. IMF staff analysis indicates a CA norm that is higher by 0.1 percent of GDP than that estimated by the EBA model,
reflecting policy commitments to reduce the large net external liability positions in Portugal and Spain. In addition, adjustments of –0.5 percent
of GDP have been made to the underlying CA, reflecting CA measurement issues in Ireland and The Netherlands. The country-level adjustments
for the transitory impact of the COVID-19 crisis on transportation and travel services (including tourism) have largely offset each other at the
euro area level. With these factors and uncertainties in the estimates, including the cyclical adjustment, taken into consideration, the IMF staff
assesses the CA gap to be –0.1 percent of GDP in 2021, with a range of –0.7 to 0.6 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –1.0 Cycl. Adj. CA: 0.1 EBA Norm: –0.3 EBA Gap: 0.5 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.1 Other Adj.: –0.6 Staff Gap: –0.1
Real Exchange Background. The euro area CPI-based REER appreciated by 4.5 percent between 2015 and 2021 following a depreciation of nearly
Rate 20 percent in the post–global financial crisis period. In 2022, the CPI-based REER depreciated by 3.0 percent compared with 2021,
reflecting a nominal depreciation of 4.2 percent and somewhat stronger euro area inflation relative to that of its trading partners. The ULC-
based REER depreciated by 5.3 percent. As of April 2023, the CPI-based REER was 5 percent above the 2022 average.
Assessment. Consistent with the IMF staff CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the euro area’s REER gap to be 0.2 percent in 2022, with a
range of –1.6 to 2.0 percent, based on the estimated CA-REER elasticity of 0.35.1 As with the CA gap, the aggregate REER gap masks a
large degree of heterogeneity in REER gaps across euro area member states, ranging from an undervaluation of 8 percent in Germany to
an overvaluation of about 10 percent in Finland and Italy. The EBA REER index and level models suggest overvaluations of 7.6 percent and
8.0 percent, respectively.
Capital and Background. The euro area experienced a capital account surplus of 1.0 percent of GDP and a financial account surplus of 0.1 percent of
Financial GDP in 2022, mirroring the CA deficit.
Accounts: Flows Assessment. Gross external indebtedness of euro area residents decreased by 11 percentage points of GDP in 2022 as lower external debt of
and Policy governments, the Eurosystem, and the nonfinancial sector offset higher debt of deposit-taking institutions.
Measures
and Reserves Assessment. Reserves held by euro area economies are typically low relative to standard metrics, but the currency is free floating.
Level

Table 3.8. France: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was moderately weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA
balance moved to a deficit in 2022, with the change driven by a large terms-of-trade shock and lower external demand from trading partners affected by the war in
Ukraine, as well as through supply-chain effects. Over the medium term, the CA deficit is expected to shrink as the effects of the war fade and fiscal consolidation and
structural reforms to improve the economy’s competitiveness are implemented.
Potential Policy Responses: In response to the recent energy crisis, France deployed significant fiscal resources to shield households from the impact of
high energy prices. Attaining consistency of the external position with medium-term fundamentals will require structural reforms to continue enhancing
productivity and sustain higher private investment to facilitate the green transition and digitalization, while rebuilding fiscal space once the shock dissipates.
While substantial prudential buffers mitigate financial sector risks, heightened market volatility and confidence risks call for enhanced vigilance.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP stood at –23.6 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2022, only slightly below the range observed during 2014–
and Liability 19 (between –16 and –23 percent of GDP). The NIIP had improved by 8.5 percent of GDP since the end of 2021, largely driven by an
Position and increase in portfolio and other investment. While the net position is moderately negative, gross positions are large. Gross assets stood at
Trajectory 302.2 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2022, of which banks’ non-FDI-related assets accounted for about 41 percent, reflecting their
global activities. Gross liabilities fell to 325.8 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2022, of which external debt was about 203 percent
of GDP (58 percent accounted for by banks and 23 percent by the public sector). About three-quarters of France’s external debt liabilities
are denominated in domestic currency. The average TARGET2 balance in 2022 was about €75.9 billion.
Assessment. The NIIP is negative, but its size and projected stable trajectory do not raise sustainability concerns. However, there are
vulnerabilities coming from large public external debt (46 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2022) and banks’ gross financing needs:
the stock of banks’ short-term debt securities was €96 billion in the second quarter of 2022 (3.5 percent of GDP), and financial derivatives
stood at about 40.5 percent of GDP.
Current Account Background. The CA balance moved to a deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2022 (from a surplus of 0.4 percent in 2021), driven by a large
terms-of-trade shock and lower external demand. Temporary COVID-19 factors have gradually normalized, including the services balance
(i.e., business and tourism travel) and aeronautics and automobile exports. The CA deficit is expected to shrink to about 1.2 percent of GDP
in 2023, driven by an improvement in nuclear energy production, which would lead to higher exports to the rest of Europe, as well as by
continued recovery in the aeronautics and automobile sectors, which would also boost exports. Over the medium term, the IMF staff projects
that the CA deficit will shrink by 2028 as the effects from Russia’s war in Ukraine fade and reforms to improve France’s competitiveness start
to pay off. Fiscal consolidation will help reduce the CA deficit over the medium term.
Assessment. The 2022 cyclically adjusted CA balance is estimated at –1.5 percent of GDP, compared with an EBA-estimated norm of
–0.3 percent. The IMF staff estimates CA net adjustments related to COVID-19 at –0.9 percent of GDP, with the adjustments driven by transport
(–1.1 percent of GDP) and exports of aeronautics (0.2 percent of GDP). On this basis, the IMF staff assesses that the CA gap in 2022 was
between –2.5 and –1.6 percent of GDP (compared with –0.5 to 0 percent of GDP in 2021), with a midpoint of –2.0 percent of GDP. Despite
an important domestic gap from looser fiscal policy of about –1.0 percent of GDP, the total fiscal policy gap was 0.1. Meanwhile, the main
contributors to the overall policy gap of –0.8 percent of GDP were health expenditure and credit gaps.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –2.1 Cycl. Adj. CA: –1.5 EBA Norm: –0.3 EBA Gap: –1.1 COVID-19 Adj.: –0.9 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –2.0
Real Exchange Background. Following an appreciation in 2020 of both the REER based on the ULC and that based on the CPI, the REER based on the
Rate ULC further appreciated by 1.3 percent in 2021, while that based on the CPI depreciated by 0.5 percent. In 2022, both REER measures
depreciated. The ULC-based REER depreciated by 3 percent with respect to the 2021 average, while the CPI-based REER depreciated by
4.6 percent. From a longer-term perspective, although both REER measures depreciated by about 11–14 percent between 2008 and 2022,
France has not managed to regain the loss of about one-third of its export market share registered in the early 2000s (while the export
market share of the euro area remained broadly stable between 2000 and 2020). As of April 2023, the CPI-based REER was 2.3 percent
above the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of 7.1 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.28 applied). The EBA REER
index model points to a REER gap of –4.8 percent, while the EBA REER level model points to a REER gap of 5.3 percent. Consistent with the
IMF staff CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the REER to be overvalued in the range of 5.5 to 8.7 percent, with a midpoint of 7.1 percent.
Capital and Background. Inward and outward FDI normalized in 2021–22 after decreasing significantly between 2019 and 2020. These flows increased
Financial from 0.7 to 3.4 percent, and from 0.5 to 3.1 percent, of GDP, respectively, between 2020 and 2022. The financial account is open.
Accounts: Flows Assessment. France remains exposed to financial market risks owing to the large refinancing needs of the sovereign and banking sectors.
and Policy
Measures
and Reserves Assessment. Reserves held by euro area economies are typically low relative to standard metrics, but the currency floats freely.
Level

Table 3.9. Germany: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. This assessment
accounts for temporary weakness in Germany’s CA due to the surge in energy import prices (through the cyclical adjustment) and, to a lesser extent, to
higher prices for transport service imports. In 2023, the CA is expected to strengthen as declines in wholesale liquefied natural gas prices are passed through
to import prices and as demand from Asia recovers.
Potential Policy Responses: Policies aimed at promoting investment and diminishing excess saving would support external rebalancing and a further
reduction of the CA balance toward its norm. Over the medium term, higher fiscal deficits than currently planned are likely to be required to achieve Germany’s
climate, digital, and energy security goals. Structural reforms to foster innovation, including development of the venture capital market and reducing the
administrative steps needed to start a business, would also stimulate investment. Training to enhance employability of older workers with outdated skills could
also extend working lives and reduce the need for excess saving.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP reached 71 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with 70 percent in 2021. The NIIP increased in 2022 less than
and Liability the year’s CA balance, suggesting valuation losses over the year. These valuation losses likely reflect the falls in international bond and
Position and equity prices in a rising-interest-rate environment, which are partly offset by valuation gains from the depreciation of the euro. Germany’s
Trajectory TARGET2 claims on the Eurosystem were €1.3 trillion at the end of 2022, the same as at the end of 2021. Between 2017 and 2022, the
NIIP increased by some 27 percent of GDP, lifting the primary income balance going forward.
Assessment. Germany’s exposure to the Eurosystem remains large, given the ECB’s quantitative easing through 2022.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 71 Gross Assets: 310 Debt Assets: 162 Gross Liab.: 239 Debt Liab.: 156
Current Account Background. The CA surplus came in at 4.2 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with 7.7 percent in 2021 and 8.0 percent on average over
2017–19. The weakening of the CA in 2022 was driven mainly by a surge in energy import costs following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
and an almost-complete recovery in travel imports after the pandemic also contributed. The goods trade balance fell significantly on energy
import costs, despite some alleviation of supply bottlenecks at the end of the year, which boosted motor vehicle exports. In addition to travel
imports, the services balance was also slightly weakened by an increase in transport services imports, linked to higher transport prices. The
fall in the CA surplus reflected a weaker CA balance for Germany in respect to Asia, given weak demand from China in particular. The savings-
investment surpluses of households and firms shrank, more than offsetting an increase in the government’s savings-investment balance.
Assessment. The cyclically adjusted CA balance is estimated by the EBA model to be 5.3 percent of GDP in 2022. The adjusted CA balance is
0.4 percentage point higher, at 5.7 percent of GDP, which accounts for the temporary increase in transport services imports after the pandemic,
while net travel services imports have recovered. The IMF staff assesses the CA norm to be between 2.3 and 3.3 percent of GDP, with a
midpoint of 2.8 percent of GDP, in line with the EBA model. The difference between the cyclically adjusted CA and the CA norm implies that the
CA gap in 2022 was in the range of 2.3 to 3.3 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of 2.8 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 4.2 Cycl. Adj. CA: 5.3 EBA Norm: 2.8 EBA Gap: 2.5 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.4 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 2.8
Real Exchange Background. The REER based on consumer prices appreciated by 0.4 percent in 2022, driven by real appreciations against China and
Rate Japan. This relative stability masks substantial volatility during the year, with a depreciation of 3.9 percent in the 12 months to August,
reflecting the largest 12-month terms-of-trade deterioration since German reunification, resulting from spiking energy import prices
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; this depreciation was followed by appreciation later in the year as energy import prices eased.
Between December 2022 and February 2023, the REER based on consumer prices appreciated a further 0.2 percent. As of April 2023, the
CPI-based REER was 3.2 percent above the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of –7.8 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.37 applied). The EBA REER
level and index models suggest an undervaluation of 9.5 percent and an overvaluation of 6.7 percent, respectively. Consistent with the staff CA
gap, the staff assesses the REER to be undervalued, with a midpoint of 7.8 percent and a range of uncertainty of ±1.4 percent.
Capital and Background. In 2022, Germany’s CA surplus largely financed direct investment abroad by German residents. Strong worldwide corporate
Financial profits seem to have played a role, given that reinvested earnings accounted for a large portion of this direct investment. The drop in net
Accounts: Flows foreign investment between 2021 and 2022, due to the fall in the CA surplus, was most evident in a reduction of portfolio investment
and Policy abroad by German residents.
Measures Assessment. Risks are limited, given Germany’s safe haven status and the strength of its external position.
and Reserves Assessment. Reserves held by euro area economies are typically low relative to standard metrics. The currency floats freely.
Level

Table 3.10. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Economy Assessment

(in percent of GDP) narrowed in 2022 as the goods balance turned into a deficit owing to weaker external demand and disruptions at the border with mainland China
amid large COVID-19 outbreaks, partly offset by continued recovery in the services surplus. The CA surplus is expected to gradually decline over the medium term
with the recovery in domestic demand. Under the Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS), short-term movements in the REER largely reflect dollar developments. The
credibility of the currency board arrangement has been ensured by a transparent set of rules governing the arrangement, large fiscal and FX reserves, strong financial
regulation and supervision, the flexible economy, and a prudent fiscal framework.
Potential Policy Responses: A gradual pace of fiscal consolidation in the near term to secure a balanced recovery, while taking measures to ensure fiscal
sustainability over the medium to long term given the rapidly aging population, would help ensure that the external position will remain broadly in line with
fundamentals. Maintaining policies that support wage and price flexibility is crucial to preserving competitiveness under the currency board arrangement.
Robust and proactive financial supervision and regulation, prudent fiscal management, flexible markets, and the LERS have worked well, and continuation of
these policies will help keep the external position broadly in line with fundamentals.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP decreased to 486 percent of GDP in 2022 from 572 percent in 2021. This was driven by a significant decrease in gross
and Liability assets (by 63 percentage points of GDP) and a large increase in gross liabilities (by 25 percentage points of GDP). Both gross assets and
Position and liabilities are high, reflecting Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s status as an international financial center. Valuation effects in 2022
Trajectory were sizable, as the change in the NIIP (–88 percentage points of GDP) far exceeded the financial account balance (–10 percent of GDP).
Assessment. Vulnerabilities are low given the positive and sizable NIIP and its favorable composition. FX reserves remain large
(117 percent of GDP at the end of 2022), and direct investments account for a large share of gross assets and liabilities (36 and
51 percent, respectively), while only 12 percent of gross liabilities are portfolio investments.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 486 Gross Assets: 1,678 Debt Assets: 596 Gross Liab.: 1,192 Debt Liab.: 420
Current Account Background. The CA surplus narrowed to 10.5 percent of GDP in 2022 from 11.8 percent in 2021. The goods balance turned into a deficit
driven by a sharp decline in exports due to declining external demand as well as customs delays and disruptions at the border with mainland
China amid large COVID-19 outbreaks in both economies, leading to a decline in the overall trade surplus despite a continued recovery in
the services surplus. The income balance remained broadly stable. The CA development in 2022 reversed a widening trend between 2015
and 2021, arising from a notable decline in private investment as the economy faced multiple domestic and external shocks including social
unrest, China-US tensions, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The CA balance is projected to continue to gradually decline over the medium term
with a recovery in domestic demand.
Assessment. After adjusting for cyclical factors and factoring in the transitory impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on the CA in relation to
travel services, including tourism, equivalent to 0.9 percent of GDP (the transport adjustor is 0 percent), the CA surplus is estimated to
be 11.2 percent of GDP in 2022, which is within the IMF staff–assessed CA norm range of 9.1–12.1 percent of GDP (with a midpoint of
10.6 percent). The IMF staff-assessed CA gap range is hence between –0.9 and 2.1 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of 0.6 percent. Since
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is not in the EBA sample, the CA norm was estimated by applying EBA-estimated coefficients to
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and was adjusted for measurement issues related to the large valuation effects in the NIIP and the
discrepancies between stocks and flows.1
2022 (% GDP) CA: 10.5 Cycl. Adj. CA: 10.3 EBA Norm: — EBA Gap: — COVID-19 Adj.: 0.9 Other Adj.: — Staff Gap: 0.6
Real Exchange Background. Under the currency board arrangement, REER dynamics are largely determined by U.S. dollar developments and inflation
Rate differentials between the United States and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The REER, which depreciated by about 5 percent
in 2021, appreciated by 3.2 percent in 2022 compared with its 2021 average. As of April 2023, the REER was 0.5 percent above the 2022
average.
Assessment. The IMF staff assesses the REER gap, based on the staff-assessed CA gap range, to be in the range of –5.3 to 2.4 percent, with
a midpoint of –1.4 percent (based on the average CA-REER elasticity of about 0.4).2
Capital and Background. As an international financial center, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has an open capital account. Nonreserve
Financial financial flows recorded a large net outflow of $84 billion in 2022, up from net outflows of $49 billion in 2021, driven by other investment
Accounts: Flows and portfolio investment outflows. The financial account is typically very volatile, reflecting financial conditions in Hong Kong Special
and Policy Administrative Region and mainland China (transmitted through growing cross-border financial linkages),3 shifting expectations of U.S.
Measures monetary policy, and related arbitraging in the FX and rates markets.
Assessment. Large financial resources, proactive financial supervision and regulation, and deep and liquid markets should help limit the
risks from potentially volatile capital flows and the war in Ukraine. The greater financial exposure to mainland China could also pose risks to
the financial sector through real sector linkages, particularly in trade and tourism; credit exposures of the banking sector; and fundraising by
Chinese firms in local financial markets. However, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s banking system, with its high capital buffers
and profitability, is assessed to be broadly resilient to macro-financial shocks.
FX Intervention Background. The Hong Kong dollar has continued to trade in a smooth and orderly manner within the Convertibility Zone during the
and Reserves COVID-19 crisis. As the Hong Kong dollar depreciated to the weak side of the Convertibility Undertaking several times in 2022, the Hong
Level Kong Monetary Authority conducted FX operations as part of the currency board operations, selling $30.8 billion. Total reserve assets had
decreased to 117 percent of GDP at the end of 2022 (or 1.7 times the monetary base) from 135 percent of GDP at the end of 2021.
Assessment. FX reserves are currently adequate for precautionary purposes and should continue to evolve in line with the automatic
adjustment inherent in the currency board system. Despite a large fiscal deficit in 2022, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region still
holds significant fiscal reserves (about 27.4 percent of GDP at the end of 2022), built up through strong fiscal discipline in previous years.

Table 3.11. India: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in fiscal year 2022/23 (ending in March 2023) was moderately stronger than the level implied by medium-term
fundamentals and desirable policies, suggesting that the CA deficit was somewhat smaller than implied by India’s level of per capita income, favorable growth
prospects, demographic trends, and development needs. External vulnerabilities stem from weakening demand in some partner countries and volatile global
financial conditions and commodity prices. In part reflecting buoyant services exports and declining oil prices, the CA deficit is projected to narrow in fiscal
year 2023/24 before converging to its estimated norm over the medium term. The authorities have made some progress in external trade promotion and the
liberalization of FDI and portfolio flows, but India’s trade and capital account regimes remain relatively restricted.
Potential Policy Responses: In the near term, government’s additional infrastructure spending will contribute to raising the CA deficit, thereby reducing the positive
CA gap. To facilitate external rebalancing over the medium term, fiscal consolidation, development of export infrastructure, and negotiation of free trade agreements
with main trading partners to provide a sustainable boost to exports of goods and services should be accompanied by further investment regime liberalization and a
reduction in tariffs, especially on intermediate goods. Structural reforms could deepen integration into global value chains and attract FDI, hence mitigating external
vulnerabilities. Exchange rate flexibility should act as the main shock absorber, with intervention limited to addressing disorderly market conditions.
Foreign Asset Background. As of the end of 2022, India’s NIIP had improved marginally to –11.1 percent of GDP from –11.5 percent of GDP at the end
and Liability of 2021, reflecting both valuation changes and a base effect of fast nominal GDP growth offsetting the CA deficit. Gross foreign assets were
Position and 25.9 percent of GDP (declining from 30.2 percent of GDP at the end of 2021), while gross foreign liabilities shrank to 37.0 percent of GDP from
Trajectory 41.7 percent of GDP at the end of previous year. The bulk of assets were in the form of official reserves and FDI, whereas liabilities included
mostly debt and FDI.
Assessment. With the CA deficit projected to narrow in 2023 and stabilize at a slightly higher level thereafter, the NIIP-to-GDP ratio is
expected to remain broadly unchanged over the medium term, as robust nominal GDP expansion will offset the nominal NIIP decline resulting
from projected CA deficits and valuation changes. India’s external debt liabilities are low compared with those of its peers, and short-term
rollover risks are limited. The moderate level of foreign liabilities reflects India’s incremental approach to capital account liberalization, which
has focused primarily on attracting FDI.
Current Account Background. In fiscal year 2022/23, the CA deficit widened to 2.0 percent of GDP, from 1.2 percent of GDP in the previous year, in the context
of a high fiscal deficit. As the pandemic restrictions were lifted, imports rebounded faster than exports on the back of pent-up domestic
demand, rising private investments, and a surge in prices of oil and some other commodities after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The CA deficit
is projected to narrow to about 1.8 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2023/24 largely reflecting the expected decline in oil import costs. Over the
medium term, the CA deficit is projected to converge to its norm of about 2.4 percent of GDP.
Assessment. The EBA cyclically adjusted CA balance stood at –0.9 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2022/23. The EBA CA regression estimates a
norm of –2.3 percent of GDP, with a standard error of 0.7 percent, thus implying a CA gap of 1.5 percent of GDP. In the IMF staff’s judgment, a
CA deficit of up to 2½ percent of GDP is financeable in the medium term by a combination of steady FDI inflows, more volatile portfolio flows
susceptible to changes in global risk appetite, and public and private external borrowings. Additional cyclical considerations factoring in the
transitory impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on travel and transport services are assessed to be near 0.1 Thus, the IMF staff assesses the
CA gap to be 1.5 percent of GDP, with a range of 0.8 to 2.1 percent of GDP. Positive policy contributions to the CA gap stem mostly from the
domestic credit gap, while negative contributions come from changes in FX reserves and capital controls.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –2.0 Cycl. Adj. CA: –0.9 EBA Norm: –2.3 EBA Gap: 1.5 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.0 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 1.5
Real Exchange Background. In the first half of 2022, widening CA deficit and portfolio investment outflows resulted in depreciation pressures on the
Rate rupee. These pressures abated and reversed when the CA deficit narrowed and investor sentiments improved in the second half of
2022 and early 2023. The average REER in 2022 appreciated by about 1 percent from its 2021 average. As of April 2023, the REER was
2.8 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of –7.8 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.19 applied). EBA REER index and
level models suggest an overvaluation of 12.5 percent and 10.6 percent, respectively. Consistent with the staff CA gap, however, the IMF staff
assesses the REER gap to be in the range of –11.4 to –4.2 percent, with a midpoint of –7.8 percent, for fiscal year 2022/23.
Capital and Background. Net FDI inflows remained stable at about 1 percent of GDP. Volatile portfolio investments recorded small net outflows of about
Financial 0.2 percent of GDP (compared with net outflows of about 0.5 percent of GDP in the prior year), while other investments, reflecting mostly
Accounts: Flows debt-creating inflows, moderated to 1.0 percent of GDP from about 2.2 percent of GDP in FY2021/22. During the year, the Indian authorities
and Policy made further steps toward capital account liberalization by further increasing limits on external borrowing and widening the scope of
Measures government bonds available for foreign investors, which could help moderate the interest costs associated with financing the CA deficit.
Assessment. While FDI inflows covered a part of the CA deficit in FY2022/23, further structural reforms and improvement of the investment
regime to promote FDI are needed. Volatile portfolio investments are very sensitive to changes in global financial conditions and country risk
premia. The expected inclusion of India in international bond indices could significantly increase foreign participation in India’s bond market
and support portfolio inflows to finance the CA deficit over the medium term.
FX Intervention Background. In the first half of 2022, official FX reserves decreased from historically high levels in 2021, reflecting a widening CA deficit,
and Reserves portfolio investment outflows, and valuation changes. The reserves increased in subsequent months as the CA deficit narrowed and investor
Level confidence improved. During this time, the Reserve Bank of India’s FX interventions aimed to smooth excessive market volatility and
contributed to the rupee’s exchange rate stability. Reserves stood at $562.7 billion at the end of 2022.
Assessment. Various criteria confirm that the official FX reserves are adequate for precautionary purposes. As of the end of 2022, they
represented about 198 percent of short-term debt (on residual maturity), 159 percent of the IMF’s composite metric, and about seven
months of import coverage. In view of moderately strong external position and adequate reserves level, FX interventions should be limited
to addressing disorderly market conditions.

Table 3.12. Indonesia: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. In the
medium term, exchange rate flexibility and structural policies should help contain the CA deficit, keeping it in line with its norm. Although external financing
needs appear sustainable, a strong reliance on foreign portfolio investment exposes the economy to fluctuations in global financial conditions.
Potential Policy Responses: Maintaining external balance will require structural reforms to enhance productivity and facilitate post-COVID-19 sectoral
adjustments. Reforms should include (1) higher infrastructure investment, (2) higher social spending to foster human capital development and strengthen
the social safety net, (3) a reduction in restrictions on inward FDI and external trade, including to consider phasing out export restrictions and not extending
the restrictions to other commodities, and (4) promotion of greater labor market flexibility. Flexibility of the exchange rate should continue to support external
stability with the ongoing structural transformation of the Indonesian economy.
Foreign Asset Background. At the end of 2022, Indonesia’s NIIP stood at –19.1 percent of GDP, improving from –23.4 percent in 2021. The improvement
and Liability was explained by a reduction of 6.4 percentage points in gross external liabilities, to 53.2 percent of GDP, reflecting reduced market values
Position and of Indonesian financial assets and substantial portfolio investment outflows, particularly in local currency government bonds. The decline
Trajectory in liabilities was partly offset by a decline of 2.2 percentage points in gross external assets to 34.1 percent of GDP, with more than half of
the decline explained by reserve assets. Indonesia’s gross external debt remained moderate at 30.1 percent of GDP at the end of 2022,
declining from 34.9 percent of GDP at the end of 2021. At the end of 2022, 16.8 percent of external debt (or 5.1 percent of GDP) had a
remaining maturity of less than one year.
Assessment. The level and composition of the NIIP and gross external debt indicate that Indonesia’s external position is sustainable
and subject to limited rollover risk. Although the share of nonresident holdings of rupiah-denominated government bonds has declined
substantially, the relatively large dependence on foreign portfolio investment makes Indonesia vulnerable to global financial volatility,
higher global interest rates, and a stronger dollar. The NIIP as a percent of GDP is projected to stabilize at current levels in the medium
term, with projected small CA deficits being offset by strong nominal GDP growth.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –19.1 Gross Assets: 34.1 Res. Assets: 10.4 Gross Liab.: 53.2 Debt Liab.: 30.1
Current Account Background. The CA surplus increased further in 2022 to 1.0 percent, from 0.3 percent in 2021. This increase was driven mainly by the
non-oil and gas trade balance, reflecting supportive commodity prices, notably coal and palm oil. Strong import growth due to resilient
domestic demand and higher oil prices mitigated the increase in the CA surplus. On the savings-investment side, the positive impact on
national savings of higher commodity terms of trade and related higher government revenue was sufficient to offset lower private savings
and investment. An expected downward correction in commodity prices in 2023 will lead to a small CA deficit from 2023 onward, although
structural policies will help maintain the CA balance at levels close to the norm.
Assessment. The IMF staff estimates a CA gap of 0.3 percent of GDP for 2022, consistent with an estimated cyclically adjusted CA deficit
of 1.5 percent of GDP, a staff-assessed norm of –1.1 percent of GDP, and adjustors for COVID-19 (0.4 percent of GDP, attributed to travel)
and demographics.1 Considering the uncertainty in the estimation of the norm, the CA gap for 2022 is in the range of –0.3 to 0.9 percent
of GDP.2
2022 (% GDP) CA: 1.0 Cycl. Adj. CA: –1.5 EBA Norm: –1.1 EBA Gap: –0.4 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.4 Other Adj.: 0.4 Staff Gap: 0.3
Real Exchange Background. The average REER appreciated by 3.3 percent in 2022 compared with the average level in 2021 (or 0.8 percent relative to
Rate the 2016–19 pre-COVID-19 average), despite the large depreciation of the rupiah relative to the dollar (10.3 percent). Stronger commodity
prices supported the rupiah against currencies of other major trading partners. As of April 2023, the REER was 0.4 percent above the 2022
average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap estimate of 0.3 percent of GDP implies a REER gap of –2.0 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.16
applied). The REER index and level models point to 2022 REER gaps of –2.7 percent and –16.3 percent, respectively. Consistent with the staff CA
gap, the staff assesses the REER gap in the range of –5.6 to 1.6 percent, with a midpoint of –2.0 percent.3
Capital and Background. 2022 marked the first year of negative net financial inflows since the GFC, amounting to –0.7 percent of GDP (after positive
Financial net financial inflows of 1.1 percent in 2021). This was driven mainly by local currency bond market outflows, partly offset by net equity
Accounts: Flows inflows. The share of nonresident holdings of rupiah government bonds declined from 19 percent in 2021 to 14.4 percent in 2022,
and Policy compared with a peak of 39 percent in 2019. These holdings accounted for almost 4 percent of GDP in 2022. Net FDI inflows declined to
Measures 1.1 percent of GDP in 2022, from 1.5 percent in 2021.
Assessment. The improvement in the CA in 2022 helped offset large portfolio investment outflows and ease the impact on the exchange
rate. The broadly contained CA balance and strengthened policy frameworks, including exchange rate flexibility, have helped reduce capital
flow volatility. But net and gross financial flows continue to be prone to periods of volatility. Continued strong policies, such as those focused
on safeguarding the fiscal position, curbing inflation, advancing financial deepening, and easing obstacles to investment, would help sustain
capital inflows in the medium term.
FX Intervention Background. Since mid-2013, Indonesia has had a more flexible exchange rate policy framework. Official foreign reserves declined to
and Reserves $137 billion in 2022, from $145 billion in 2021, reflecting FX intervention and some negative valuation effects from appreciation of the
Level dollar.
Assessment. The current level of reserves (10.4 percent of GDP, 118 percent of the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric, and 5.9 months of
prospective imports) should provide a sufficient buffer against external shocks, with predetermined drains also manageable. Exchange rate
flexibility should continue to help absorb shocks, with FX interventions limited to addressing disorderly market conditions triggered by
external pressures or risks of de-anchoring inflation expectations.

Table 3.13. Italy: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The degree
of uncertainty for the 2022 CA gap assessment is heightened by the lack of clarity about the perceived persistence of the very large negative energy
terms of trade shock. The current account balance declined, in large part due to a temporary increase in the gas import bill, that resulted in a decline in
private sector saving net of investment while government saving net of investment remained broadly unchanged. Tax credits for the superbonus program
promoted household investment, and while the government provided large energy-related transfers, households’ saving net of investment dropped by
about 4 percentage points of GDP as the saving rate normalized from its COVID-19-era high. While investment increased moderately in 2022, chronic weak
productivity, rapid population aging, and uncertain medium-term growth prospects could dampen investment once tax credits and other fiscal programs
under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan are completed.
Potential Policy Responses: Raising productivity and improving the business climate through structural reforms would encourage higher private investment
and normalization of the household saving rate while implementing high-quality fiscal consolidation measures would ensure the fiscal primary balance
returns firmly to surplus. In particular, upskilling the workforce and increasing the quality of infrastructure and the effectiveness of the judiciary and public
administration would boost productivity to help counteract workforce aging. Vulnerabilities associated with rollover of public debt would be reduced by
improving budget efficiency, containing pension spending, undertaking comprehensive and progressive tax reform, and fully implementing the National
Recovery and Resilience Plan.
Foreign Asset Background. Italy’s NIIP declined to 3.9 percent of GDP at the end of 2022 on account of net valuation losses (3.2 percent of GDP) and
and Liability the first CA deficit in a decade. Gross foreign assets and liabilities retreated to 174.3 and 170.5 percent of GDP, respectively, as losses
Position and on external equity positions outweighed dollar appreciation. Nevertheless, TARGET2 liabilities reached a record high of 36 percent of
Trajectory GDP. About half of gross external liabilities correspond to the general government and the Bank of Italy. Over the last decade, Italy has
seen continuous financial outflows by the resident private sector to acquire foreign assets, while the Bank of Italy has become the main
contributor to financial inflows. Steady accumulation of direct and portfolio investments in foreign equities and a net long dollar external
position have contributed to the net valuation gains on Italy’s NIIP during this period.
Assessment. Further strengthening public balance sheets and undertaking structural reforms would lessen vulnerabilities associated with
the high public debt, reinvigorate economic growth, and reduce the potential for negative feedback loops between the debt stock and debt-
servicing costs.
Current Account Background. Italy’s CA has experienced gradual increases, averaging 3.0 percent of GDP during 2016–21. This increase was underpinned
by rising private sector gross national saving and lower public and private sector gross domestic investment. More than half of the
increase in the CA balance is due to the trade surplus, with the rest reflecting strong dividend and interest income on the rising foreign
asset holdings of the nonfinancial private sector as well as declining interest payments on external liabilities owing to the ECB’s
accommodative monetary stance. In 2022, the CA dropped sharply, by 4.3 percentage points, to –1.2 percent of GDP, mainly on account
of a 3.3 percent of GDP increase in the energy trade deficit as the terms of trade worsened by 8.5 percent, despite a continued recovery
in exports of goods and services (on par with 2019 levels in real terms). The CA reduction was underpinned by a moderate increase in
investment and a large decrease in total saving, with declines in private saving mostly in the household sector and roughly unchanged
government saving. The effects of commodity price shocks on the current account began to unwind in late 2022. The medium-term CA
balance is likely to be lower than the pre-pandemic position due to permanently higher energy price levels.
Assessment. The cyclically adjusted CA is estimated at 0.6 percent of GDP for 2022, 2.9 percentage points below the EBA-estimated CA
norm of 3.4 percent of GDP. An Italy-specific COVID-19 adjustor of 0.4 percent of GDP is applied to account for a temporary decline in
travel (0.1 percent) and transport (0.3 percent) net receipts caused by the pandemic. Therefore, and taking into account uncertainty around
the estimate, the IMF staff assesses the CA gap to be in the range of –3.2 to –1.8 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –2.5 percent of GDP.
The fiscal policy gap (–1.5 percent of GDP) contributed substantially to the total policy gap (–1.0 percent of GDP), reflecting the sizable
fiscal deficit in 2022.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –1.2 Cycl. Adj. CA: 0.6 EBA Norm: 3.4 EBA Gap: –2.9 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.4 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –2.5
Real Exchange Background. During 2016–21, the CPI-based REER depreciated by 0.4 percent, while the ULC-based REER depreciated by 1.8 percent.
Rate During 2022, the CPI-based REER further depreciated by 2 percent relative to the 2021 average, as a weakening euro more than
compensated for Italy’s relatively higher inflation than its trading partners. As of April 2023, the CPI-based REER appreciated by
2.8 percent relative to the 2022 average as the euro strengthened against a basket of currencies while energy inflation started to decline.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of 9.3 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.27 applied). The level
and index CPI-based REER models suggest an overvaluation in 2022 of 15.4 percent and 12.3 percent, respectively, with an average of
13.9 percent. Based on the IMF staff CA gap, the staff assesses a REER gap to be in the range of 6.5 to 12.0 percent, with a midpoint of
9.3 percent.
Capital and Background. The capital account balance remained unchanged at 0.0 percent of GDP in 2022. The financial account posted net inflows of
Financial 0.8 percent of GDP in 2022, reflecting residents’ net acquisition of foreign liabilities. Large portfolio investment outflows were more than
Accounts: Flows offset by inflows of other investment, including a nearly €60 billion increase in Italy’s TARGET2 liabilities.
and Policy Assessment. Central banks’ monetary policy tightening has pushed up yields in the sovereign debt market. Large refinancing needs of
Measures the sovereign and the banking sector, elevated inflation, and exposures to geopolitical tensions and energy shocks suggest Italy remains
vulnerable to market volatility.
FX Intervention Background. The euro has the status of a global reserve currency. Italy’s reserves remained largely unchanged in 2022.
and Reserves Assessment. Reserves held by the euro area are typically low relative to standard metrics, but the currency is freely floating.
Level

Table 3.14. Japan: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA
surplus declined to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2022 from 3.9 percent in 2021. The impact of higher prices on commodity imports largely offset improvement in
Japan’s exports (as supply disruptions faded) and a larger primary income surplus. Japan’s CA surplus is expected to continue over the medium term, mainly
driven by its primary income surplus, arising from a large positive NIIP and a high rate of return on net foreign assets.
Potential Policy Responses: More flexibility in monetary policy, accompanied by bold structural reforms and a credible and specific medium-term fiscal
consolidation plan, is needed to maintain an external position consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. These “desirable” policies
will help avoid the risk of overheating the economy in the short-run and shift the drivers of the economy from an unsustainable public saving-investment
position to one driven by the private sector over the medium term. Priority should be given to labor market and fiscal reforms that support private demand,
raise potential growth, and promote digital and green investment. While fiscal consolidation will push the CA surplus higher, this would be offset by higher
investment and a decrease in private savings from pandemic-era highs and due to demographic-related declines. Japan’s global leadership role to promote
more open, stable, and transparent trade policies in regional/multilateral trade agreements should be prioritized.
Foreign Asset Background. Japan’s NIIP stood at 75.2 percent of GDP at the end of 2022, broadly unchanged from its level in 2021 of 76.1 percent,
and Liability but significantly higher than the pre-pandemic (2016–19) average of 61 percent. The increase in foreign assets related to outward FDI
Position and and foreign loans in 2022 has been offset by a decline in net portfolio outflows given global financial tightening. Japan holds the world’s
Trajectory largest stock of net foreign assets, valued at $3.1 trillion at the end of 2022.
Assessment. Japan’s foreign asset holdings are well diversified, both by geography and risk classes. At the end of 2022, gross foreign
assets largely comprised portfolio investment accounting for about 40 percent of the total, followed by FDI with 21 percent. Of that
portfolio investment, about 23 percent was yen denominated and 56.5 percent dollar denominated. In the event of yen appreciation against
the dollar, the risk of negative valuation effects could materialize. Vulnerabilities associated with liabilities are contained, given that equity
and direct investment account for about 30 percent of gross foreign liabilities. The NIIP is estimated to have generated a net annual
investment income return of 8.7 percent in 2022, significantly larger than the pre-pandemic (2016–19) average of 6.2 percent, owing to
a sharp depreciation of the yen. Japan’s large positive NIIP is partly related to the asset accumulation for old-age consumption; a gradual
decumulation of such assets is expected over the long term.
Current Account Background. Japan’s CA surplus reflects a sizable income balance, which reached a historic high at 6.4 percent of GDP in 2022, owing
to its large net foreign asset position. The CA surplus declined to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2022 from 3.9 percent in 2021. The merchandise
trade balance shifted from a surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP in 2021 to a deficit of 2.8 percent in 2022, driven by higher prices for
commodity imports. Offshoring of production over the years has limited the positive impact of yen depreciation on exports, which may
take time to materialize. The lower merchandise trade balance is estimated to have been offset by a 1.5 percent of GDP improvement in the
primary income balance. In the medium term, the CA balance is projected to stabilize at a level close to 3.8 percent of GDP.
Assessment. The 2022 estimated cyclically adjusted CA is 3.2 percent of GDP, and the cyclically adjusted CA norm is 3.5 percent of GDP
(with a range between 2.4 and 4.6 percent of GDP). After factoring in the transitory impacts of the COVID-19 crisis in relation to travel
services including tourism, equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP (transport adjustor is 0 percent), the 2022 CA gap midpoint is assessed at
0.0 percent of GDP, with a range between –1.1 and 1.1 percent of GDP. The EBA-identified policy gaps reflect relatively greater medium-
term fiscal consolidation needs, as well as a positive credit gap, in relation to medium-term desired policy.1 The unexplained residual of
the assessment potentially reflects structural impediments and country-specific factors not included in the model, such as investment
bottlenecks, including entrepreneurship entry barriers and corporate savings distortions.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 2.1 Cycl. Adj. CA: 3.2 EBA Norm: 3.5 EBA Gap: –0.3 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.3 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 0.0
Real Exchange Background. The REER depreciated sharply in 2022 by close to 14 percent, following a depreciation of 8.7 percent in 2021. This reflects a
Rate sharp rise in inflation in Japan’s major trading partners combined with the yen’s nominal depreciation against major currencies as a result of
widening interest rate differentials amid global monetary tightening. As of April 2023, the REER was 1.3 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of 0.0 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.17 applied). The EBA REER
level and index models deliver gaps of –31.4 and –31.7 percent, respectively, largely reflecting unexplained residuals. Consistent with the IMF
staff CA gap, the REER gap is assessed to be in the range of –6.7 to 6.6 percent, with a midpoint of 0.0 percent.
Capital and Background. The financial account recorded net outflows in 2022, mirroring the CA surplus, and declined to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2022
Financial from 3.1 percent in 2021. Net FDI outflows at 3.1 percent of GDP are primarily driven by outward FDI flows to Asia, Europe, and North
Accounts: Flows America. Net portfolio inflows recorded at 3.4 percent of GDP, lower than the 4 percent in 2021, reflect both lower demand for yen-
and Policy denominated assets due to divergence in monetary policy as well as lower net portfolio outflows amid increased global financial volatility.
Measures Assessment. Vulnerabilities are limited. Inward investment tends to be equity based, and the home bias of Japanese investors is strong.
So far, outward spillovers from Japan’s policies to financial conditions in other economies (interest rates, credit growth) are contained.
FX Intervention Background. Reflecting legacy accumulation, reserves stood at $1.4 trillion, or about 28 percent of GDP, at the end of 2021. They had
and Reserves declined to $1.2 trillion by the end of 2022 as FX intervention and valuation effects from rising foreign bond yields more than offset other
Level factors that would support reserves, such as income gains from foreign bond holdings.
Assessment. The exchange rate is free floating. The authorities intervened to support the yen in September and October for the first
time since 1998, with the size of the intervention equivalent to 5 percent of FX reserves at the end of August. FX interventions should be
isolated and limited to addressing disorderly market conditions.

Table 3.15. Korea: Economy Assessment

surplus narrowed in 2022, primarily due to cyclical factors, including relatively weak external demand in light of slowing growth of key trading partners, a
global semiconductor down cycle, and high commodity prices. The surplus is projected to strengthen in 2023, supported by an expected normalization of the
semiconductor cycle, recovery of demand in key trading partners, and lower commodity prices. In the medium term, the surplus is projected to increase further,
as commodity prices stabilize and cyclical factors recede, while risks of geopolitical tensions and geoeconomic fragmentation, if they materialized, could impede
trade and investment.
Potential Policy Responses: Continued fiscal consolidation and the tightening of monetary policy since mid-2021 are expected to contain domestic demand
and import growth, supporting Korea’s external position in the near term. Over the medium term, an increase in precautionary savings related to the fast
aging of society, orderly deleveraging of household debt, and strong policies to mitigate risks arising from geopolitical tensions would help to maintain a
sound external position. The exchange rate should remain market determined, with intervention limited to preventing disorderly market conditions.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP has been positive since 2014 and stood at 46.3 percent of GDP in 2022, with gross liabilities at 83.9 percent of
and Liability GDP, of which about 48 percent was gross external debt. The 2022 NIIP level marked an increase by about 8 percent of GDP compared
Position and with 2021, largely reflecting an increase of residents’ outbound direct investment and a decrease in foreigners’ portfolio investment. The
Trajectory NIIP is projected to rise further, to about 56 percent of GDP, in the medium term on the back of CA surpluses.
Assessment. The positive NIIP is an important factor supporting external resilience. Foreign asset holdings are diversified, with about
35 percent in equity or debt securities. About 60 percent of foreign assets are denominated in dollars, implying that depreciation of the won
can have large positive valuation effects in aggregate. The structure of liabilities further limits vulnerabilities, with direct investment and long-
term loans together accounting for 55 percent of liabilities and 70 percent of liabilities denominated in Korean won.
Current Account Background. The CA surplus was 1.8 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with 4.7 percent of GDP in 2021, relatively weak external demand
from key trading partners, the semiconductor down cycle, and high commodity import prices. The CA surplus has been trending down
from the peak of 7.2 percent of GDP in 2015, reflecting a fall in savings, particularly for the household sector, and an increase in the
investment-to-GDP ratio. The CA surplus is projected to increase gradually to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2023 and to about 3.5 percent of GDP
over the medium term, supported by an expected gradual normalization in the semiconductor cycle starting in the second half of the year,
economic recovery of key trading partners, and stabilizing commodity import prices. Risks related to geopolitical tensions, if materialized,
could impede trade and investment.
Assessment. The EBA model estimates the cyclically adjusted CA at 4.2 percent of GDP. The CA norm is estimated at 4.8 percent of GDP,
with a standard error of 0.9 percent of GDP. After accounting for transitory factors arising from the COVID-19 shock in transportation
(–0.3 percent of GDP) and travel services (–0.1 percent of GDP), the IMF staff estimates the 2022 CA gap midpoint at –1.0 percent of
GDP, with a range of –1.9 to –0.1 percent of GDP. The contribution of the relative policy gap is –0.6 percent of GDP, reflecting the positive
domestic credit gap, partly offset by a less expansionary fiscal stance compared to the rest of the world.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 1.8 Cycl. Adj. CA: 4.2 EBA Norm: 4.8 EBA Gap: –0.6 COVID-19 Adj.: –0.4 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –1.0
Real Exchange Background. The REER has been depreciating since 2019, reversing the sustained appreciation during 2013–18. In 2022, a marked
Rate depreciation through October was partly reversed by the end of the year, with an average depreciation of 5.4 percent from 2021. As of
April 2023, the REER was 1.4 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER overvaluation of 2.9 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.34 applied). The EBA
REER index model estimates a 1.9 percent undervaluation, while the EBA level model estimates a 3.4 percent overvaluation. Consistent
with the staff CA gap, the staff assesses the REER gap to be in the range of 0.2 to 5.6 percent, with a midpoint of 2.9 percent.
Capital and Background. Net capital outflows increased to 4.0 percent of GDP in 2022 from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2021, while they had been trending
Financial down from the peak at 6.2 percent of GDP in 2016. Net FDI and portfolio outflows made up the bulk of the 2022 financial account
Accounts: Flows (2.9 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP, respectively), whereas other investment recorded net inflows (0.9 percent of GDP). Net FDI outflows
and Policy increased from 2.4 percent of GDP in 2021 to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2022, driven by rising outbound direct investment, while inbound
Measures FDI moderated. Net portfolio outflows increased from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2021 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2022, reflecting foreigners’
continued equity sales and sharply decreased debt security purchases following a surge in 2021, partly offset by decreased outbound
portfolio investment.
Assessment. The present configuration of net and gross capital flows appears sustainable over the medium term: while capital outflows
were mainly driven by residents’ outbound direct and portfolio investment, reflecting the CA surplus and rising NIIP, inbound portfolio
investment remained positive. In recent years, including in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Federal Reserve’s interest
rate hike cycle, Korea has demonstrated ample capacity to absorb short-term capital flow volatility.
FX Intervention Background. Korea has a floating exchange rate. Based on IMF staff estimates and published data, FX intervention since 2015 is estimated to
and Reserves have been two-sided. FX intervention data released by the Bank of Korea show net sales of $45.9 billion (2.8 percent of GDP) in 2022, mostly
Level conducted in the second and third quarters of the year during periods of heightened exchange rate volatility. As of the end of 2022, reserves
stood at $423 billion (25 percent of GDP).
Assessment. Intervention has been limited to preventing disorderly market conditions. As of the end of 2022, FX reserves were about
25 percent of GDP, 2.5 times short-term debt, 6.2 months of imports, or 14 percent of M2. As such, reserves provided significant buffers
against external shocks and disorderly market conditions.

Table 3.16. Malaysia: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The CA surplus,
after strengthening due to pandemic-related exports, narrowed in 2022 because of a rebound in domestic demand, inventory accumulation by firms to
mitigate the risk of future supply-chain disruptions, and a widening primary income deficit. Over the medium term, the CA surplus is projected to widen as
pandemic-related travel restrictions are lifted, leading to an improvement in the services balance, and as imports moderate.
Potential Policy Responses: In the near term, flexibility of exchange rate should be preserved to facilitate external adjustments that are driven by fundamentals.
Over the medium term, policies should be implemented to strengthen social safety nets and public health care, including through a reorientation of fiscal
spending. Structural policies should be implemented to encourage private investment and improve productivity growth, including through a reduction in skills
mismatch, improvements in the quality of education, and measures to improve access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP has averaged about 1 percent of GDP over the last decade but increased to 5.5 percent at end-2021, supported by strong
and Liability CA surpluses during the pandemic that helped increase reserve assets. As of end-2022, NIIP had declined to 3.5 percent of GDP, primarily owing
Position and to a decline in reserve assets, even as the outflow of portfolio investment led to a decline in portfolio liabilities. Total external debt declined to
Trajectory 64 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with 70 percent at end-2021, and remains manageable. One-third of external debt is ringgit denominated
and hence not exposed to valuation risks. Short-term external debt, which accounts for 42.1 percent of external debt, is also manageable, as most
of it is either in the form of intragroup borrowing (among banks and corporations, and largely stable) or trade credits (backed by export earnings).
Assessment. Malaysia’s NIIP is expected to increase over the medium term, supported by projected CA surpluses. Malaysia’s balance sheet
strength, along with exchange rate flexibility and increased domestic investor participation, would help support resilience to a variety of
shocks, including outflows associated with external liabilities.
Current Account Background. After averaging about 12 percent of GDP in the first decade of this century, the CA surplus has narrowed in the last decade, driven by
strong domestic demand and a decline in national savings. In 2021, the surplus was 3.8 percent of GDP, bolstered by a strong goods surplus, due
to external demand for pandemic-related exports, which more than offset a large services deficit because of COVID-19-related travel restrictions.
The CA surplus declined to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2022, as the growth in imports exceeded the growth in exports, despite an improvement in the
services balance driven by the removal of travel restrictions. A rebound in domestic demand and firms’ building of inventories to mitigate the risk
of future supply-chain disruptions largely spurred the growth in imports. In addition, the income account registered a higher deficit, as investment
income of foreign investors in Malaysia exceeded that of Malaysian firms’ investments abroad and as outward remittances increased.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA balance of 2.4 percent of GDP and a norm of –0.5 percent, implying
a model-assessed CA gap of 2.9 percent. In addition, the IMF staff has adjusted for temporary COVID-19-related factors that amount
to 1.1 percent of GDP. These include the transitory effects of lower travel receipts (1.0 percent), higher transport costs (0.3 percent),
and lower outflow of remittances (–0.2 percent). The staff assess a CA gap in the range of 3.5–4.5 percent, with a midpoint estimate of
4.0 percent. Relative policy gaps partly explain the CA gap, with weaker social safety nets, proxied by health care expenditure, an increase
in reserve assets, and looser fiscal policies adopted by the rest of the world relative to Malaysia contributing positively (0.6 percent,
0.5 percent, and 0.2 percent, respectively) to the excess surplus and stronger credit growth contributing negatively (–0.8 percent). The CA
surplus is expected to grow over the medium term, as tourism recovers and improves the services balance.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 3.1 Cycl. Adj. CA: 2.4 EBA Norm: –0.5 EBA Gap: 2.9 COVID-19 Adj.: 1.1 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 4.0
Real Exchange Background. The ringgit witnessed strong external pressures following the war in Ukraine, but these pressures have moderated in recent
Rate months. Between the start of the war in Ukraine and end-October 2022, the ringgit depreciated about 12 percent against the dollar but
has strengthened since November, resulting in a depreciation of about 5 percent for the year. Over the year, the REER depreciated by
1.4 percent, even as the NEER appreciated by 0.5 percent, as inflation in Malaysia was lower compared with that in its major trading
partners. As of April 2023, the REER was 1.2 percent weaker than its 2022 average.
Assessment. With a semielasticity of 0.5 employed, the IMF staff–assessed CA gap implies a REER undervaluation of 8.0 percent in 2022.
The REER index and level models estimate Malaysia’s REER to be undervalued by 25.2 percent and 29.3 percent, respectively. This implies
that over the medium term, Malaysia’s REER needs to appreciate to narrow the CA gap. The staff assesses the REER to be undervalued in
the range of 7.0–9.0 percent, with a midpoint estimate of 8.0 percent.
Capital and Background. Since the global financial crisis, Malaysia has experienced periods of significant capital flow volatility, largely driven by
Financial portfolio flows in and out of the local currency debt market in response to both changes in global financial conditions and domestic
Accounts: Flows factors.
and Policy Assessment. Continued exchange rate flexibility and macroeconomic policy adjustments, such as those prescribed by the IMF’s Integrated
Measures Policy Framework, are necessary to manage capital flow volatility. CFM measures should be gradually phased out, with due regard for
market conditions.
FX Intervention Background. Gross international reserves, which had increased to $116.9 billion by end-2021, had declined to $114.7 billion by end-
and Reserves 2022. Against the backdrop of large external pressures, reserves decreased significantly following the beginning of the war in Ukraine but
Level recovered during the latter half of the year, as external pressures eased.
Assessment. Based on the IMF’s composite ARA metric, reserves declined to about 110 percent of the ARA metric at end-2022, above the
adequacy threshold of 100 percent but significantly lower than 121 percent of the ARA metric at the end of the previous year. An increase
in the short-term external debt partly drove this decline. The reserve coverage declined to five months of prospective imports, or about
85 percent of short-term debt. The IMF staff assesses that Bank Negara Malaysia engaged in largely two-sided FX interventions over the
course of the year. There is a role for FX intervention as needed to address disorderly market conditions (DMC) and to respond to large
and relevant shocks when well-identified and costly frictions are present, including as these dominate the economic benefits of letting the
exchange rate remain as the sole shock absorber and may themselves give rise to DMC.

Table 3.17. Mexico: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was moderately stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
Although Mexico’s CA deficit widened to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2022, its adjusted external position strengthened owing to the impact of the more
accommodative fiscal stance in other economies. The CA deficit is expected to hover around 1 percent of GDP in the medium term.
Potential Policy Responses: Further structural reforms to address investment obstacles are critical to boost investment and growth in the medium and
long terms and to maintain external sustainability. The reforms should include tackling economic informality and governance gaps, renewing private sector
participation in energy, and reforming Pemex’s business strategy and governance. The floating exchange rate should continue to serve as a shock absorber,
with FX interventions employed only to prevent disorderly market conditions. The IMF’s Flexible Credit Line with Mexico continues to provide an added buffer
against global tail risks.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP is projected to improve from –42 percent of GDP in 2022 to about –33 percent of GDP over the medium term,
and Liability driven mainly by a decline in foreign liabilities. Foreign assets in 2022 were mostly direct investment (18 percent of GDP) and international
Position and reserves (14 percent of GDP). Foreign liabilities were mostly direct investment (50 percent of GDP) and portfolio investment (34 percent of
Trajectory GDP).
Assessment. While the NIIP is sustainable and the relatively high share of local currency denomination in its foreign public liabilities reduces
FX risks, the large gross foreign portfolio liabilities could be a source of vulnerability in case of global financial volatility. Vulnerabilities from
exchange rate volatility are moderate, as most Mexican firms with FX debt have natural hedges and actively manage their FX exposures.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –42 Gross Assets: 52 Debt Assets: 17 Gross Liab.: 94 Debt Liab.: 33
Current Account Background. The CA deficit was 1.3 percent of GDP in 2022, up from 0.6 percent in 2021, mainly reflecting a lower (by 1.1 percent of
GDP) trade balance partly offset by a higher (by 0.3 percent of GDP) primary income balance. The trade balance declined as both higher
oil- and non-oil imports more than offset higher exports. The decline in the CA reflected lower public savings, while the private sector
showed higher savings, partly offset by higher investment. Over the medium term, the CA balance is projected to hover around a deficit of
1 percent of GDP.
Assessment. The EBA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA balance of –0.4 percent of GDP and a cyclically adjusted CA norm of
–1.6 percent of GDP. This implies an EBA model CA gap of 1.2 percent of GDP, reflecting policy gaps (0.4 percent of GDP, mostly driven by
the fiscal gap of 0.6 percent of GDP) and an unidentified residual (0.8 percent of GDP). The estimated fiscal gap of 0.6 percent of GDP reflects
a relatively tighter fiscal stance than in the rest of the world. IMF staff adjustments have been made to account for the transitory impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on tourism and travel services (–0.2 percent of GDP) and the transport balance (0.7 percent of GDP). In other words,
the CA would have been stronger if it were not for the impact of higher transport costs on the transport services balance. Including these
adjustments, the staff assesses the midpoint CA gap at 1.7 percent of GDP, with a range of 1.2 to 2.1 percent of GDP. The estimated standard
error of the CA norm is 0.5 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –1.3 Cycl. Adj. CA: –0.4 EBA Norm: –1.6 EBA Gap: 1.2 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.4 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 1.7
Real Exchange Background. In 2022, the peso fluctuated in a relatively narrow range of about 19 to 21 pesos per dollar. Average REER in 2022
Rate appreciated by about 5 percent compared with the 2021 average, mostly driven by a nominal appreciation, reflected in an average NEER
appreciation of 4 percent in 2022 compared with the average 2021 NEER. As of April 2023, the REER was 12.9 percent above the 2022
average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER undervaluation of about 4.9 percent (with a semielasticity of 0.34 applied). The EBA
REER index and level models estimate an undervaluation of 3.8 percent and an overvaluation of 14.9 percent, respectively, in 2022. The
staff’s overall assessment, based on the CA gap approach, is a REER undervaluation in the range of 3.6 to 6.3 percent, with a midpoint of
4.9 percent. This assessment is subject to high uncertainty, including due to large unidentified CA model residuals.
Capital and Background. In 2022, Mexico recorded net financial account inflows to the tune of 0.9 percent of GDP, compared with 0.1 percent of GDP
Financial in 2021. This reflected mainly net inflows of FDI of 1.6 percent of GDP, which portfolio outflows offset somewhat. The net portfolio balance
Accounts: Flows registered an outflow (0.4 percent of GDP), though lower than in the previous year (3.3 percent of GDP).
and Policy Assessment. The long maturity of sovereign debt and the relatively high share of local-currency-denominated debt reduce the exposure of
Measures government finances to FX depreciation and refinancing risks. The banking sector is resilient, and FX risks of nonfinancial corporate debt
are generally covered by natural and financial hedges. However, the strong presence of foreign investors leaves Mexico exposed to capital
flow reversals and risk premium increases.
FX Intervention Background. The central bank remains committed to a free-floating exchange rate and uses discretionary FX intervention to prevent
and Reserves disorderly market conditions. At the end of 2022, gross international reserves were $201 billion (14 percent of GDP), down from
Level $208 billion at the end of 2021. In 2022, no FX intervention was conducted.
Assessment. At 119 percent of the ARA metric and 257 percent of short-term debt (at remaining maturity), the level of Mexico’s foreign
reserves at the end of 2022 remains adequate. The IMF staff recommends that the authorities continue to maintain reserves at an adequate
level over the medium term. The Flexible Credit Line arrangement continues to provide an additional buffer.

Table 3.18. The Netherlands: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The
Netherlands’ status as a base for multinational corporations and as a trading hub and financial center makes the external assessment particularly challenging.
After a considerable contraction in 2022, the CA surplus is expected to rebound in 2023 before shrinking moderately in the medium term as population aging and
fiscal loosening reduce domestic saving.
Potential Policy Responses: To keep the external balance in line with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies, fostering investment in physical and
human capital, also by facilitating access to finance, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises, should take priority. Against this background, the
government’s structural investment and reform plans to safeguard energy security, allay housing market shortages, reinforce the education system, advance
the climate transition, and further promote the digitalization of the economy are welcome.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP reached 75.1 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with 93.2 percent in 2021, primarily reflecting denominator effects
and Liability from a 10 percent increase in nominal GDP and a rise in the net stock of other investment, which was more than offset by declines in FDI,
Position and portfolio investment, and derivatives positions. FDI remains the largest component of the IIP, accounting for more than half of external assets
Trajectory and liabilities, also reflecting The Netherlands’ role as the seat for multinational corporations and its importance as a financial center. The
relocation of Shell’s headquarters to the United Kingdom in 2022 may dampen NIIP fluctuations by substituting less volatile FDI liabilities
(Shell’s ownership of its Dutch operations) for portfolio investment liabilities (Shell’s foreign shareholders).
Assessment. The Netherlands’ safe haven status and its sizable foreign assets limit risks from its large foreign liabilities.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 75.1 Gross Assets: 1,042.8 Debt Assets: 242.6 Gross Liab.: 967.7 Debt Liab.: 259.5
Current Account Background. Statistical refinements by Statistics Netherlands applied over the period 2015–21 resulted in a downward revision of the CA
surplus from 9.0 percent to 7.3 percent of GDP in 2021, primarily reflecting a better alignment of earnings between corporate and national/
external accounting frameworks as well as a more appropriate classification of Dutch subsidiaries of foreign companies. In 2022, the CA
surplus shrank to 4.4 percent of GDP (5.5 percent cyclically adjusted) as private savings declined from a deterioration in the terms of
trade, chiefly related to a surge in global inflation aggravated by Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as widespread price and cost pressures
on households and corporations, while domestic demand remained strong as the economy continued to rebound from the pandemic.
Moreover, the primary income balance worsened on the back of a strong rise in corporate earnings reinvested in The Netherlands and
higher payouts of interest to foreign holders of debt securities. Finally, Shell’s relocation of its headquarters to London is estimated to have
lowered the CA surplus by an additional 0.2 percentage point. The Netherlands’ role as a trading hub and financial center contributes to
a structurally strong headline external position. Specifically, multinationals based in The Netherlands are recording profits at their Dutch
headquarters while channeling a large part of their investment abroad in the form of FDI, keeping nonfinancial corporate saving high.
Relatedly, measurement biases of portfolio equity retained earnings in official statistics may also contribute to an overstatement of the net
accumulation of wealth that is attributed to Dutch residents, an issue of particular relevance for a country where the foreign ownership of
publicly listed corporations has remained consistently above 85 percent. In 2023, the CA is projected to rebound to 6.3 percent of GDP,
primarily reflecting easing international price pressures and weakening domestic demand.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates a CA norm of 4.8 percent of GDP. Based on a cyclically adjusted CA surplus of 5.5 percent of
GDP in 2022, the EBA CA gap is assessed at 0.7 percent of GDP. The CA gap is attributable to policy gaps amounting to 1.9 percent of GDP,
primarily reflecting a relatively tighter fiscal stance and a negative credit gap that remains wider than those abroad. Adjustors to correct for
the (temporary) effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are assessed to amount to –0.2 percent of GDP, chiefly resulting from its lingering impact
on transportation services. The portfolio retained earnings bias is assessed to be –0.5 percent based on the provision of granular data by the
Dutch central bank that allowed for the translation of the balance-of-payments revisions performed by Statistics Netherlands to the net savings
of different segments of the corporate sector. Taking these factors into consideration, and against a norm in the range of 4.3 to 5.3 percent of
GDP, the IMF staff assesses the CA gap to be in the range of –0.6 to 0.5 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 4.4 Cycl. Adj. CA: 5.5 EBA Norm: 4.8 EBA Gap: 0.7 COVID-19 Adj.: –0.2 Other Adj.: –0.5 Staff Gap: 0.0
Real Exchange Background. In 2022, the annual average CPI-based REER remained broadly stable, weakening by 0.1 percent when compared with its
Rate 2021 average. At the same time, the average ULC-based REER depreciated by 3.7 percent as corresponding labor cost increases only
partly reflected elevated rates of consumer price inflation, resulting in some gains in external competitiveness. As of April 2023, the CPI-
based REER was 0.8 percent above its 2022 average.
Assessment. Assuming a semi-elasticity of 0.66, the IMF staff CA gap of 0.0 percent of GDP implies a REER gap within a range of
–0.8 percent (undervaluation) to 1.0 percent (overvaluation) and a midpoint of 0.1 percent. EBA REER model estimates for 2022 indicate
overvaluation in a range from 15.0 percent (level model) to 27.8 percent (index model), largely reflecting unexplained residuals.
Capital and Background. A considerable share of gross foreign assets and liabilities are attributable to special-purpose entities, financial vehicles with
Financial marginal operational footprints in The Netherlands that contribute to substantial yet hard-to-interpret capital flow volatility. A notable part
Accounts: Flows of capital outflows represents the channeling of corporate profits by multinationals abroad as FDI.
and Policy Assessment. The strong external position limits vulnerabilities to capital outflows. The financial account deficit is primarily the flip side of
Measures a CA recording sustained—and structural—surpluses.
and Reserves Assessment. Reserves held by euro area economies are typically low relative to standard metrics, but the currency floats freely.
Level

Table 3.19. Poland: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The
CA deficit widened in 2022 on account of an adverse terms-of-trade shock and a decline in saving as the fiscal deficit increased and real wages declined.
Escalation of the war in Ukraine, weaker external demand, and a persistently elevated inflation outlook are the main near-term risks.
Policy Responses: In the medium term, the fiscal deficit should be reduced while increasing investment by deploying NextGenerationEU (NGEU) grants to
tackle challenges related to infrastructure gaps, digitalization, and climate change. Structural policies should (1) encourage corporate investment and improve
productivity, including through initiatives to increase the availability of clean energy and supply of labor; and (2) safeguard banking sector soundness and
incentivize credit allocation to the private sector by redesigning the bank asset tax.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP strengthened to –34 percent of GDP in 2022, from –38 percent in 2021. Gross assets, liabilities, and reserves
and Liability reached about 57, 91, and 24 percent of GDP, respectively. The stock of net FDI, equivalent to 38 percent of gross external liabilities,
Position and remains diversified across sectors and source countries. Gross external debt remained stable at about 54 percent of GDP; 31 percent of
Trajectory debt was intercompany lending, and 70 percent was of long maturity. In 2022, short-term debt (excluding intercompany debt) amounted
to 18 percent of total debt and was mainly owed by banks (currency and deposits) and the nonfinancial private sector (trade credit).
Automatic debt dynamics, helped by NGEU grants, along with GDP growth, are projected to strengthen the NIIP in the medium term.
Assessment. The level of external debt is moderate, and rollover risk is mitigated by the large share of long-term debt and intercompany
lending that tends to be automatically rolled over. The NIIP has improved markedly over the last decade, in both size and structure, indicating
less reliance on volatile flows (portfolio and short-term financing) and more on FDI, a more stable source of financing. The level of gross
reserves as a percentage of short-term debt (156 percent) is adequate and reduces residual rollover risk.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –34 Gross Assets: 57 Reserve Assets: 24 Gross Liab.: 91 Gross External Debt: 54
Current Account Background. The CA deficit widened to 3.0 percent of GDP in 2022 from a deficit of 1.4 percent in 2021. The external balance in 2022 was
characterized by (1) an increasing trade deficit due to terms-of-trade shocks; (2) a continued solid services surplus; (3) a stable primary
income deficit, which attests to the profitability of foreign firms and strong reinvested earnings; (4) consumption by refugees, driving
domestic demand; and (5) strong FDI inflows. In the near term, the CA deficit is set to narrow as adverse shocks fade and domestic
demand slows. Over the medium term, the CA deficit is projected to decline to 2 percent as terms-of-trade shocks fade, with the continued
CA deficit driven by EU fund inflows and higher military spending, which will increase imports. Sectoral savings-investment balances are
projected to increase as the fiscal deficit declines, household saving increases as real wages recover, and corporate investment moderates
as inventories normalize.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA of –1.8 percent of GDP measured against a CA norm of –2.7 percent of
GDP, with a standard error of 0.5 percent of GDP. An adjustment of –0.1 percent of GDP to the cyclically adjusted CA balance has been made for
the transport COVID-19 adjustor. The resulting staff CA gap of 0.9 (±0.5) percent of GDP includes identified policy gaps of 1.9 percent of GDP
and an unexplained residual of –1.0 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –3.0 Cycl. Adj. CA: –1.8 EBA Norm: –2.7 EBA Gap: 1.0 COVID-19 Adj: –0.1 Other Adj.: 0 Staff Gap: 0.9
Real Exchange Background. The annual average of the NEER depreciated by 3.6 percent in 2022, while the REER appreciated by 1.1 percent compared with
Rate the 2021 average, as inflation in Poland was higher than in its trading partners. In 2022, the zloty depreciated by 15.4 and 2.6 percent against
the dollar and euro, respectively, compared with the 2021 average. As of April 2023, the REER was 8.9 percent above the 2022 average.
Assessment. The EBA REER index and level models estimate an REER gap of 2.7 and –19.0 percent, respectively. Consistent with the
staff CA gap, the 2022 REER gap is assessed in a range from –3.1 to –1.0 percent, with a midpoint of –2.0 percent (when an estimated
elasticity of 0.43 is used).
Capital and Background. The capital account surplus declined to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2022 from 0.7 percent in 2021. Over the medium term, the
Financial capital account surplus is projected to stabilize around 0.5 percent of GDP, supported by EU inflows. FDI inflows have almost doubled
Accounts: Flows since 2019, reaching 4.0 percent of GDP on a net basis in 2022. The largest sources of the inward FDI stock have been France, Germany,
and Policy Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Financial account inflows amounted to 4.4 percent of GDP in 2022. Foreign holdings of domestic
Measures government securities have declined continuously and significantly since 2016—reducing vulnerability to capital outflows—and by the end
of 2022 represented 16.9 percent of the total (4.8 percent of GDP).
Assessment. The capital account is projected to remain a strong source of support for investment, reflecting EU cooperation frameworks.
The diversified foreign investor base is also a mitigating factor, and the central bank has the tools to manage bouts of volatility.
FX Intervention Background. FX reserves increased by about $645 million in 2022 to $167 billion. Net reserves, which net out the central bank’s repo operations
and Reserves (part of its reserve management strategy) and government FX deposits, stood at about $146 billion at the end of 2022, reflecting in part the
Level central bank’s conversion of a portion of EU funds received by the government to zloty. While the central bank briefly intervened in FX markets in
March 2022 in the context of disorderly market conditions at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the zloty is free floating.
Assessment. At about 157 percent of the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric, Poland’s level of gross reserves is adequate to guard against
external shocks and disorderly market conditions.

Table 3.20. Russia: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. However,
the models do not account for Russia’s idiosyncratic situation. In particular, (1) because of sanctions, large CA surpluses may not translate easily into an
accumulation of readily accessible foreign assets in reserve currencies; and (2) on a forward-looking basis, the sanctions may lead to a permanent decline in
the CA surplus relative to a nonsanctions scenario. Moreover, the range of uncertainty surrounding the estimates is exceptionally large.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP stood at $762 billion or 34.4 percent of GDP at the end of 2022, which is slightly below its peak of 34.7 percent of
and Liability GDP in 2020 but remained well above its 2018 level (23 percent of GDP). In 2022, both gross assets and gross liabilities fell sharply to
Position and 72 and 37.6 percent of GDP, respectively, from their 2021 levels (90 and 64 percent of GDP, respectively). External debt declined sharply as
Trajectory well, reaching 17 percent of GDP at end-2022, down from 27 percent of GDP at end-2021. As of end-2022, about one-third of the external
debt was in domestic currency, and there were no obvious maturity mismatches between its gross asset and liability positions. The share of
nonresidents’ holdings of domestic government debt has fallen sharply, from 32.2 percent at the end of 2019 to 9.7 percent in February 2023.
Assessment. Before Russia’s war in Ukraine, projected CA surpluses helped maintain Russia’s positive NIIP, lowering risks to external
stability, while the sizable official external assets accumulated since the introduction of the new fiscal rule provided an important buffer. It
should be noted, however, that an unknown share of international reserves is currently frozen due to sanctions; sanctions also likely explain
why last year’s record CA surplus did not translate into higher reserves.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 34.4 Gross Assets: 72 Res. Assets: 26.0 Gross Liab.: 37.6 Debt Liab.: 17
Current Account Background. In 2022, the CA surplus reached a record $233 billion (10.4 percent of GDP) versus $122 billion (6.9 percent of GDP) in
2021, reflecting highly favorable terms of trade, resilient oil export volumes, and lower imports reflecting the sanctions and recession. This
year, the surplus is projected to decline sharply to $75.1 billion (3.6 percent of GDP), owing to lower effective oil prices and much lower
gas prices, as well as a recovery of imports. The range of uncertainty surrounding the projections is exceptionally large, however.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates a norm of 4.0 percent of GDP for 2022 and a cyclically adjusted CA surplus of 6.7 percent of GDP.
After a multilateral COVID-19 adjustment of –0.4 percent of GDP, reflecting a temporary adjustment for tourism service imports (–0.6 percent
of GDP) and transportation services (0.2 percent of GDP), the IMF staff assesses the CA gap at 2.3 percent of GDP, with a range from
1.2 to 3.4 percent of GDP. Identified policies contributed –0.8 percent of GDP to the gap. However, the models do not account for Russia’s
idiosyncratic situation. In particular, (1) because of sanctions, large CA surpluses may not easily translate into an accumulation of readily
accessible foreign assets in reserve currencies; and (2) on a forward-looking basis, the sanctions may lead to a permanent decline in the CA
surplus relative to a nonsanctions scenario. Moreover, the range of uncertainty surrounding the CA gap estimates is exceptionally large.
Real Exchange Background. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the ruble has been very volatile: at first, it depreciated by some 50 percent against
Rate the dollar, amid a selloff in Russian assets, but then it appreciated sharply in the face of sharp CA inflows, retracing all its losses and
exceeding the value that prevailed before the war in Ukraine. As a result, the REER appreciated in 2022 by 31 percent (average) and
53 percent (at the end of the period). In 2023, the ruble has reversed some of its previous gains. As a result, the REER depreciated by
about 20 percent between December 2022 and April 2023. As of April 2023, the REER was 7.1 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER undervaluation of 13.6 percent (midpoint) in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of
0.17 applied). The EBA REER index model points to a REER overvaluation of 5.7 percent, while the EBA REER level model points to a
REER undervaluation of 4.7 percent. Consistent with the staff CA gap, the staff assesses the REER as undervalued in 2022 in the range of
7.1 to 20.2 percent, with a midpoint of 13.6 percent. However, as indicated above, the models do not account for Russia’s idiosyncratic
situation.
Capital and Background. In 2022, the Central Bank of Russia increased the interest rate to 20 percent and introduced broad capital flow measures to
Financial stave off capital outflows, including, among other things, a ban on selling securities by nonresidents, a ban on FX lending to nonresidents,
Accounts: Flows and restrictions on the ability of nonresidents to transfer money abroad. It has since reversed most of these measures. Net private capital
and Policy outflows reached $240 billion (10.6 percent of GDP) in 2022, well above their levels during crises in 1998, 2008, and 2014 (7.5–9 percent
Measures of GDP). Outflows were mostly concentrated in the first half of the year and were on a declining trend in the second half of the year.
Notably, a meaningful part of these outflows appears to have gone toward a repayment of foreign liabilities by Russian firms.
Assessment. In recent years, large FX reserves and the floating exchange rate regime have provided substantial buffers to help absorb
shocks. Last year saw large capital outflows despite capital flow measures, but a meaningful part of these outflows appears to have been
in the form of repayment of FX liabilities as a way of retaining buffers in the face of sanctions.
FX Intervention Background. In 2022, reserves fell by $48.6 billion to $582.0 billion from their end-2021 level despite a very large CA surplus, likely
and Reserves reflecting constrained reserves accumulation under sanctions. The fiscal rule was also abandoned and later replaced with a new rule,
Level reducing budget-related FX operations. The decline in the stock of reserves in 2022 reflects the central bank’s sales of foreign currency
to support the ruble ($10.6 billion in the first quarter, partly offset by FX purchases of $3 billion for the rest of the year) and valuation
changes.
Assessment. As of end-2022, international reserves stood at 299.9 percent of the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric. Considering Russia’s
vulnerability to oil price shocks, an additional commodity buffer of $96 billion is appropriate, translating into a ratio of reserves to the
buffer-augmented ARA metric of 200.4 percent. While published reserves are considerably above this level, it should be noted again that
because of sanctions, a share of these international reserves has been frozen, complicating any assessment of reserve adequacy.

Table 3.21. Saudi Arabia: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
The external balance sheet remains strong. Reserves remain adequate according to standard IMF metrics. Under the current fiscal balance path, the central
government’s non-oil primary balance is expected to be on an improving trend. Given the economy’s structure, the pegged exchange rate continues to provide
Saudi Arabia with a credible policy anchor.
Potential Policy Responses: With the projected normalization of oil exports, the gap is expected to diminish. The ambitious structural reform agenda, as part
of Vision 2030, to help diversify the economy, lift productivity, and boost the non-oil tradable sector, will be accompanied by a sizeable investment program,
including by the Public Investment Fund (PIF), Saudi Arabia’s SWF. These factors will reduce the current gap and help align the external position in the
medium term. Continued fiscal reforms to avoid procyclical fiscal policy amid high hydrocarbon windfalls will be important, which includes delinking spending
decisions from international oil price fluctuations while implementing a medium-term fiscal framework. Important structural fiscal reforms have been initiated
over the past few years, including non-oil revenue mobilization, broad-based improvement of public financial management, and energy price reform. Risks
associated with industrial policies should be minimized, while discriminatory policies should be avoided as they could create distortions in the allocation of
resources and elicit retaliatory actions by trade partners.
Foreign Asset Background. Net external assets are estimated at 61.5 percent of GDP at the end of 2022, down from 71.2 percent of GDP in 2021. While
and Liability net external assets increased from US$618 billion to US$682 billion, nominal GDP expanded by a larger magnitude due to high oil prices. In
Position and the medium term, the NIIP is expected to stabilize at 63.8 percent of GDP. Only broad categories are available on the composition of external
Trajectory assets. Portfolio and other investments, reserves, and FDI, respectively, account for 53 percent, 35 percent, and 13 percent of total external
assets.
Assessment. The external balance sheet remains very strong. Substantial accumulated assets represent both protection against vulnerabilities
from oil price volatility and savings of exhaustible resource revenues for future generations.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 61.5 Gross Assets: 119.3 Res. Assets: 41.5 Gross Liab.: 57.8 Debt Liab.: 24.2
Current Account Background. The CA balance registered a surplus of 13.6 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with a surplus of 5.1 percent in 2021. The
trade balance improved by 9.1 percent of GDP as the price and volume of oil exports increased in 2022. The terms of trade improved by
28.9 percent during the year. For the projections, oil production is assumed to follow the OPEC+ (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, including Russia and other non-OPEC oil exporters) agreement, with a decline in 2023. The CA is expected to register a surplus
in 2023 (around 6 percent of GDP) as oil export revenues decline relative to 2022, in part because of lower oil price projections (the terms
of trade are projected to deteriorate by around 22 percent) in 2023.
Assessment. The IMF staff assesses a CA gap of 4.7 percent of GDP using the EBA-Lite CA model, although the overall assessment is
subject to significant model uncertainty due to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Saudi Arabian economy. Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil
complicates the application of standard external assessment methodologies, given the wide swings of oil prices between 2020 and 2022.
Oil prices increased substantially, in part due to the war in Ukraine, thus rendering a large surplus. This increase is partially captured in the
cyclical adjustment component (1.1 percent of GDP). Additional cyclical considerations factoring in the transitory impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic on travel and transport services are assessed to be near 0. The Consumption Allocation Rules suggest a CA gap of 0.3 percent of
GDP for constant real annuity rules and –2.6 percent of GDP for constant real per capita annuity allocation rules. The Investment Needs Model
suggests a CA gap of 14.4 percent of GDP. The estimated CA gap of 4.7 percent of GDP has an estimated range from 2.2 to 7.2 percent of
GDP.1
2022 (% GDP) CA: 13.6 Cycl. Adj. CA: 12.5 EBA Norm: — EBA Gap: — COVID-19 Adj.: 0.0 Other Adj.: — Staff Gap: 4.7
Real Exchange Background. The riyal has been pegged to the US dollar at a rate of 3.75 since 1986. On average, the REER appreciated by 4.1 percent in
Rate 2022 and was 5 percent above its 10-year average, while the NEER appreciated by 8.7 percent in 2022. The NEER appreciation was mainly
driven by the appreciation of the US dollar versus third currencies and with inflation less than in its trading partners, Saudi Arabia’s REER
appreciation was less than that of its NEER. As of April 2023, the REER was 0.2 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. Exchange rate movements have a limited impact on Saudi Arabia’s competitiveness in the short term, as most of its
exports are oil or oil-related products that are denominated in dollars. There is limited substitutability between imports and domestically
produced products, which in turn have significant imported labor and intermediate-input content. The EBA-Lite REER model suggests an
overvaluation of 11.2 percent. Consistent with the IMF staff CA gap and based on an elasticity of 0.2, the staff assesses the REER to be
undervalued by 21.6 percent, with a range of –9.1 to –34.1 percent.
Capital and Background. Net financial outflows continued in 2022 as the PIF and other entities invested abroad.
Financial Assessment. A lack of detailed information on the nature of financial flows in Saudi Arabia complicates analysis of its financial account.
Accounts: Flows The strong reserves position, including the sizable assets of the PIF, limits risks and vulnerabilities to capital flows.
and Policy
Measures
FX Intervention Background. The PIF’s investments abroad are increasing, although most of the government’s foreign assets are still held at the central
and Reserves bank within international reserves. Net foreign assets increased to $440.5 billion (39.7 percent of GDP, 19.4 months of imports, and
Level 231 percent of the ARA metric) at the end of 2022, down from $438.2 billion at the end of 2021 (and from $730 billion in 2014). This
trend was, in part, driven by financial outflows. Reserves are expected to stabilize at about 14 months of imports in the medium term.
Assessment. Reserves play a dual role: they are savings for both precautionary motives and future generations. Reserves are adequate
for precautionary purposes (measured by the IMF’s metrics). Buffers are also provided by external assets held by the PIF and national oil
company. Nevertheless, fiscal prudence is needed over the medium term to strengthen the CA and increase savings for future generations.

Table 3.22. Singapore: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
This assessment is subject to a wide range of uncertainty, however, reflecting Singapore’s very open economy and status as a global trading and financial
center. Over the medium term, the CA surplus is projected to narrow gradually alongside an increase in household consumption as the share of the prime
working-age population that is actively saving for retirement declines, a recovery of capital-related imports, and higher public spending.
Potential Policy Responses: The planned execution of major green infrastructure projects and provision of assistance to vulnerable households should help
reduce external imbalances in the near term. Over the medium term, Singapore’s economy will be undergoing structural transformation in light of a rapidly
aging population and a transition to a green and digital economy. Higher public investment to address these matters, including spending on health care, green
and other physical infrastructures, and human capital, would help reduce external imbalances over the medium term by lowering net public saving.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP stood at 176.1 percent of GDP in 2022, down from 223 percent of GDP in 2021 and below the average level of
and Liability 237.1 percent of GDP in 2017–21. Gross assets and liabilities are high, reflecting Singapore’s status as a financial center. About half of
Position and foreign liabilities are in FDI, and about one-fifth are in the form of currency and deposits. The CA surplus has been the main driver of the
Trajectory NIIP since the global financial crisis, but valuation effects have been material in some years, driven mainly by the appreciation in S$ NEER
as the Monetary Authority of Singapore tightened its exchange rate-based monetary policy. CA and growth projections imply that the
NIIP will rise over the medium term. The large positive NIIP in part reflects the accumulation of assets for old-age consumption, which is
expected to be gradually unwound over the long term.
Assessment. Large gross non-FDI liabilities (442 percent of GDP in 2022)—predominantly cross-border deposit taking by foreign bank
branches—present some risks, but these are mitigated by large gross asset positions, banks’ large short-term external assets, and the
authorities’ close monitoring of banks’ liquidity risk profiles. Singapore has large official reserves and other official liquid assets.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 176.1 Gross Assets: 1,125.5 Res. Assets: 62 Gross Liab.: 949.4 Debt Liab.: 332.2
Current Account Background. The CA surplus was 19.3 percent of GDP in 2022, up from 18 percent in 2021. This increase mainly reflects a larger surplus
in the services balance, in particular transport services, owing to significant hikes in freight rates arising from COVID-19 led disruptions
in supply chains. The 2022 CA balance is higher than the average of 17.3 percent since 2017 and slightly lower than the post–global
financial crisis peak of 22.9 percent in 2010. Singapore’s large CA balance reflects a strong goods balance and a small surplus in the
services balance that is partly offset by a deficit in the income account balance.1 Structural factors and policies that boost savings, such
as Singapore’s status as a financial center, consecutive fiscal surpluses in most years, and the rapid pace of aging—combined with a
mandatory defined-contribution pension program (whose assets were about 84.7 percent of GDP in 2022)—are the main drivers of
Singapore’s strong external position. The CA surplus is projected to narrow over the medium term on the back of increased infrastructure
and social spending. In 2022, public saving increased as the fiscal deficit narrowed further, following an unprecedented COVID-related
stimulus, while private saving decreased slightly.
Assessment. Guided by the EBA framework, the IMF staff assesses the 2022 CA gap to be in the range of 3.3–6.9 percent of GDP, with a
midpoint of 5.1 percent.2 The identified policy gaps remained close to zero in 2022, reflecting a more contractionary fiscal policy adopted in
2022 in Singapore compared with the rest of the world and low but efficient public health care expenditure.
2022 (% GDP) CA: 19.3 Cycl. Adj. CA: 21.8 EBA Norm: — EBA Gap: — COVID-19 Adj.: –3.1 Other Adj.: — Staff Gap: 5.1
Real Exchange Background. The REER appreciated by 6 percent in 2022, reflecting the appreciation of the NEER by 4.3 percent. This appreciation
Rate followed a cumulative depreciation of the REER by 3 percent and a cumulative depreciation of the NEER by 1.8 percent between 2019 and
2021. As of April 2023, the REER had appreciated by 6.1 percent relative to its 2022 average.
Assessment. Consistent with the staff CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the REER to be undervalued in a range from 6.6 to 13.8 percent,
with a midpoint of 10.2 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.5 applied).3
Capital and Background. Singapore has an open capital account. As it is a trade and financial center in Asia, changes in market sentiment can affect
Financial Singapore significantly. Increased risk aversion in the region, for instance, may lead to inflows to Singapore given its status as a regional
Accounts: Flows safe haven, whereas global stress may lead to outflows. The financial account balance reflects in part reinvestment abroad of income
and Policy from official foreign assets, as well as sizable net inward FDI and smaller but more volatile net bank-related flows. In 2022, the capital and
Measures financial account featured large outflows of 43.4 percent of GDP, up from 2 percent in 2021 (outflows ranged from 2 to 19.1 percent in
2017–21).
Assessment. The financial account is likely to remain in deficit as long as the trade surplus remains large.
FX Intervention Background. With the NEER as the intermediate monetary policy target, intervention is undertaken to achieve inflation and output
and Reserves objectives. As Singapore is a financial center, prudential motives call for a larger NIIP buffer. Official reserves held by the Monetary
Level Authority of Singapore reached $289.5 billion (62 percent of GDP) in 2022.4 Aggregate data on FX intervention operations have been
published (with a six-month lag) since April 2020.
Assessment. In addition to FX reserves held by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore also has access to other official foreign
assets managed by Temasek and GIC.5 The current level of official external assets appears adequate, even after considering prudential
motives, and there is no clear case for further accumulation for precautionary purposes.

Table 3.23. South Africa: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was moderately weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
After the exceptional CA surplus in 2021 (3.7 percent of GDP) thanks to high commodity prices and a number of temporary pandemic-related factors, the
CA declined sharply to a small deficit in 2022. The CA deficit is expected to sizably worsen in 2023 on the back of softer commodity prices, weaker external
demand, and higher energy-related capital imports.
Potential Policy Responses: Tackling external imbalances will require a combination of bold implementation of structural reforms and stronger fiscal
consolidation under a credible medium-term framework, while providing space for critical infrastructure investment and well-targeted social spending to
help reduce poverty and inequality. Reform efforts should focus on improving governance, the efficiency of key product markets (to promote private sector
participation), and the functioning of labor markets. These reforms are expected to help attract less volatile and longer-term capital inflows, such as FDI, and
to further boost exports. Seizing opportunities to accumulate international reserves, should they arise, would strengthen the country’s ability to deal with
shocks. A flexible rand exchange rate should remain the main shock absorber.
Foreign Asset Background. With large gross external assets and liabilities (131.4 and 114.2 percent of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2022), South
and Liability Africa is highly integrated into international capital markets. Its NIIP fell from 26.3 percent of GDP in 2021 to 17.2 percent of GDP in 2022,
Position and mainly due to valuation adjustments from lower share prices in foreign assets and despite nonresident capital outflows, which reduce
Trajectory NIIP liabilities. The NIIP surplus is expected to continue falling over the medium term, as the CA balance is projected to return to a deficit
in 2023 and beyond. Gross external debt declined sharply, from 50.5 percent of GDP in 2020 to 38.3 percent of GDP in 2021 (as GDP
recovered), and increased slightly to 40.6 percent of GDP in 2022. Short-term external debt (on a residual-maturity basis) rose from about
10 percent of GDP in 2021 to 12.2 percent of GDP in 2022.
Assessment. Risks from large gross external liabilities are mitigated by a large external asset position and the composition of its liabilities
(mostly in equities, and with a significant share of external debt in rand).
Current Account Background. The CA deficit turned into a surplus for the first time in nearly two decades in 2020, reaching 2 percent of GDP, owing to
pandemic-related factors. The CA surplus then further increased to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2021, as continued buoyancy in terms of trade
and commodity exports more than offset higher imports from a recovery in domestic demand. However, the CA sharply declined in 2022,
to –0.5 percent of GDP, as commodity prices sizably fell from their peak (except coal prices), export supply bottlenecks (domestic ports
and railways) worsened, external demand softened, and import demand stayed strong. In addition, private investment remained subdued
in 2022. The CA is projected to move to a sizable deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2023 and to deteriorate slightly further in 2024, on the
back of softer commodity prices, weaker external demand, and higher energy-related capital imports. The deficit is expected to improve to
about 2 percent of GDP over the medium term as these factors dissipate and logistical constraints are alleviated.
Assessment. The IMF staff estimates a CA gap in the range of –2.0 to –0.5 percent of GDP in 2022 (the point estimate is –1.3 percent
of GDP). The staff’s cyclically adjusted CA is estimated at –1.4 percent of GDP in 2022. The assessment accounts for COVID-19-related
adjustors of 0.2 percent of GDP, which capture the lingering impact of the pandemic on exports of precious minerals (–0.6 percent), travel
services (including tourism) (0.5 percent), transportation (0.5 percent), and the income balance (which remains below pre-pandemic levels)
(–0.2 percent),1 as well as the statistical treatment of transfers and income accounts.2 The adjusted CA norm for 2022 (1.6 percent of GDP)
is obtained by subtracting 0.6 percentage point from the EBA CA norm (2.2 percent of GDP) to reflect lower life expectancy relative to other
countries in the regression sample.3
Real Exchange Background. After depreciating during 2019–21, the CPI-REER appreciated by 3.4 percent overall during 2022, but it depreciated about
Rate 5.3 percent during the second half of 2022, mainly driven by nominal depreciation from a worsening external environment. As of April
2023, the REER was 9.1 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies an overvalued REER with a midpoint of 5.0 percent, for 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of
0.25 applied). The REER-based regression points to overvaluation of 12.8 percent (level approach) but to a marginal undervaluation of
3.5 percent (index approach). Based on the CA approach, the staff assesses the REER to be overvalued by 5.0 percent, with a range of
2.1 to 7.9 percent.
Capital and Background. Net FDI inflows decreased significantly in 2022 (from 9.8 percent of GDP in 2021 to 1.6 percent in 2022), while net portfolio
Financial investment recorded substantially smaller outflows in the same period (–1.0 percent of GDP compared with –13 percent in 2021).4 Gross
Accounts: Flows external financing needs stood at 12.5 percent of GDP in 2022, up somewhat from 10.3 percent in 2021.
and Policy Assessment. In 2022, financial market volatility in emerging markets persisted due to the war in Ukraine and tighter global financial
Measures conditions. South Africa witnessed capital outflows and a depreciation of the rand against the US dollar of 6.4 percent. Risks from a
traditionally large reliance on non-FDI inflows for external financing and still-sizable nonresident holdings of local financial assets are
mitigated by relatively small currency mismatches in the economy, a large equity liability composition of the NIIP, and a large domestic
institutional investor base. The last of these tends to reduce asset price volatility during periods of market stress.
FX Intervention Background. South Africa’s exchange rate regime is classified as floating. Central bank intervention in the FX market is rare. At the end of
and Reserves 2022, international reserves were about 14.9 percent of GDP, 117.3 percent of gross external financing needs, and 4.9 months of imports.
Level International reserves stand below the threshold suggested by the IMF’s composite adequacy metric (89.5 percent of the metric, without
existing CFM measures considered, and 99.5 percent of the metric with those measures considered).
Assessment. If conditions allow, international reserve accumulation would be desirable over the medium term to strengthen the external
liquidity buffer, subject to maintaining the primacy of the inflation objective.

Table 3.24. Spain: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. IMF staff
assesses Spain’s CA norm to be relatively high owing to external sustainability risks from a still-large negative NIIP. Even though the NIIP continued to
improve in 2022, strengthening it further will require sustaining a relatively high CA surplus in coming years. In the baseline, the CA balance is projected to
recover to 1.6 percent of GDP in the medium term, supported by a rebound of external demand, further easing of manufacturing supply bottlenecks, and
recent and prospective declines in energy prices.
Potential Policy Responses: Sustained fiscal consolidation efforts and higher private savings (relative to the pre-COVID-19 average) in the medium term will
increase the likelihood that Spain will keep its CA balance in line with its norm. The increase in income to boost private saving could be achieved through
productivity gains, which will require actions to enhance education outcomes, encourage innovation, and improve energy efficiency. Spain’s recovery
plan foresees investments and reforms in these areas, as well as specific measures to diversify and improve the quality of tourism services, but adequate
implementation and ex post evaluation remain critical for success.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP continued to improve in 2022 and reached –60.5 percent of GDP by the end of the year. This trajectory reflects a
and Liability larger decrease in gross liabilities than in assets (as a percentage of GDP). Gross liabilities—of which nearly 70 percent correspond to
Position and external debt—had declined to 259.3 percent of GDP by the end of 2022. The negative NIIP is largely attributed to the general government
Trajectory and the central bank, with TARGET2 liabilities amounting to 35.6 percent of GDP by December 2022.
Assessment. Despite its projected decline, the large negative NIIP comes with external vulnerabilities, including those from large gross
financing needs, which could be affected by the pace of tightening of global financial conditions and policy responses. Mitigating factors
include the favorable maturity structure of outstanding sovereign debt (averaging almost eight years) and the limited share of debt
denominated in foreign currency (10.9 percent of total external debt).
Current Account Background. The CA surplus deteriorated from 1.0 percent of GDP in 2021 to 0.6 percent of GDP in 2022. A strong recovery in
services trade, notably tourism, was not enough to offset a surge in energy import prices. Higher public savings and a decline in private
investment—including due to higher uncertainty and tighter financial conditions—were not enough to counterbalance the rise in public
investment and a drawdown of excess private savings generated during the pandemic. Looking forward, slow export growth due to
subdued growth prospects among trading partners, still-high (albeit declining) energy prices, and sustained nonenergy imports associated
with NextGenerationEU investments will likely keep the trade balance subdued through 2024. In the medium term, the CA is projected
to gradually recover, supported by a rebound of external demand, further easing of manufacturing supply bottlenecks, and recent and
prospective declines in energy prices.
Assessment. The 2022 cyclically adjusted CA balance is 1.4 percent of GDP. COVID-19 adjustors are estimated to be 0.05 for transport and
0.18 for travel services on account of tourism receipts remaining below precrisis levels despite their strong recovery in 2022. When these
adjustments are incorporated, the 2022 cyclically adjusted CA balance is 1.7 percent of GDP, which is larger than the norm suggested by the
EBA CA model. Given external sustainability considerations, including risks of adverse NIIP valuation effects, the IMF staff assesses the CA
norm to be 1.0 percent of GDP, with a range of 0.2 to 1.8 percent of GDP. This yields a CA gap range of –0.1 to 1.5 percent of GDP, with a
midpoint of 0.7 percent of GDP.1
2022 (% GDP) CA: 0.6 Cycl. Adj. CA: 1.4 EBA Norm: –0.1 EBA Gap: 1.5 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.2 Other Adj.: –1.1 Staff Gap: 0.7
Real Exchange Background. In 2022, Spain’s CPI- and ULC-based REERs depreciated by 1.1 and 4.2 percent, respectively, offsetting some of the
Rate appreciation that had occurred in recent years. This depreciation adds to the overall depreciation trend observed since 2009, which
has almost fully reversed the large appreciation in 1999–2008. As of April 2023, the CPI-based REER was 0.2 percent above the 2022
average.
Assessment. The EBA REER models estimate an overvaluation of 10.6 percent (index) to 29.2 percent (level) for 2022. Based on the IMF
staff CA gap range and using an elasticity of 0.31, the staff assesses the REER gap range to be –4.7 to 0.4 percent, with a midpoint of
–2.2 percent.2
Capital and Background. The capital account surplus has remained high as a result of flows associated with NextGenerationEU funds. The financial
Financial account balance remained broadly unchanged at 1.8 percent of GDP in 2022 (it was 1.9 percent of GDP in 2021). Net outflows in other
Accounts: Flows investment offset net inflows in portfolio investment, with limited impact from direct investment and financial derivatives. The behavior of
and Policy other investment was largely driven by one-off repo operations by banks.
Measures Assessment. Large external financing needs leave Spain vulnerable to sustained market volatility, especially in a context of tighter global
financial conditions.
and Reserves Assessment. Euro area economies typically hold low reserves relative to standard metrics, but the currency is free floating.
Level

Table 3.25. Sweden: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. This is despite
a drop in the CA surplus by 2.2 percentage points to 4.3 percent of GDP. A projected downswing in 2023 and subsequent recovery are expected to bring the
surplus further down before stabilizing at its long-term average of about 4 percent.
Potential Policy Responses: As inflation recedes, Sweden will have scope to increase private and public investment in the green transition and the health
sector. This would lower the external balance besides helping meet Sweden’s ambitious climate goals and prepare it for demographic challenges.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP reached 39.8 percent of GDP in 2022, an increase of 16 percentage points, helped by net valuation gains (about
and Liability 11.5 percent of GDP) and a CA surplus. Gross liabilities decreased to 284.8 percent of GDP in 2022, with more than half being gross
Position and external debt (172 percent of GDP). Other financial institutions (71.5 percent of GDP) hold the bulk of Sweden’s net foreign assets,
Trajectory followed by its social security funds (20.1 percent of GDP), households (17 percent of GDP), and the Riksbank (7 percent of GDP),
while nonfinancial corporations (31 percent of GDP), monetary financial institutions (42 percent of GDP), and the general government
(2.4 percent of GDP) are net external debtors. Fifty percent of the NIIP is in foreign currency.
Assessment. The NIIP is expected to firm further in the medium term, reflecting an outlook for continued CA surpluses. Sweden’s foreign
currency assets are almost three times as high as its foreign currency liabilities, providing a hedge against currency valuation changes. These
estimates are subject to uncertainty, however, as IIP data typically include errors and omissions that have averaged greater than 2 percent
of GDP in the past decade. Although rollovers of external debt (which include banks’ covered bonds) introduce some vulnerability, risks are
moderated by banks’ ample liquidity and large capital buffers. The NIIP level and trajectory do not raise sustainability concerns.
Current Account Background. The CA dropped to 4.3 percent of GDP in 2022 from 6.5 percent of GDP in 2021, on the back of slightly lower net exports
of goods and high recovery-driven imports of services. In 2022 gross savings increased by 0.1 percentage point to stand at 32.4 percent
of GDP, while gross investment increased by 2.3 percentage points to 28.1 percent of GDP, with the private sector mainly driving the
slowdown in gross savings growth. Sweden continues to be a net oil importer, with the oil deficit remaining at –1 percent of GDP. Over the
medium term, the CA is projected to return to its long-term average.
Assessment. The cyclically adjusted CA is estimated at 5 percent of GDP in 2022, 4.2 percentage points above the cyclically adjusted EBA
norm of 0.8 percent of GDP. However, the estimated EBA norm is low and continues to be below the actual CA outcome for the past two
decades, suggesting that factors not captured by the model, such as Sweden’s mandatory contributions to fully funded pension schemes and
an older labor force, may also be driving Sweden’s savings-investment balances. Considering temporary COVID-19 adjustment for travel of
–0.3 percent of GDP (transport adjustor is 0 percent of GDP), the staff assesses the CA gap to be 3.8 percent of GDP in 2022, with a model-
estimated range of 3.4 to 4.3 percent of GDP (using the model’s standard error of ± 0.4 percent of GDP). Policies that would explain this gap
make up 1 percentage point, with fiscal policy, which was more contractionary compared to the rest of the world, accounting for 1.1 percent,
while the contributions of health, reserves, and credit gaps accounted for –0.2, 0.2 and 0 percent, respectively. Complementary EBA tools
suggest that Sweden’s pension system could explain about 1 percentage point of the gap.
Real Exchange Background. In 2022, the krona depreciated by about 6.7 percentage points in real effective terms (Organisation for Economic Co-
Rate operation and Development (OECD)–ULC based) relative to its 2021 average. As of April 2023, the CPI-based REER was 0.8 percent
below its 2022 average.
Assessment. The staff CA gap implies a REER gap of –10.3 percent (with an estimated elasticity of 0.37 applied). The REER index and
level models suggest a gap of –15.9 percent and –17.0 percent, respectively, for 2022. The ULC-based REER index using OECD data
depreciated and was about 9.7 percent below its 30-year average (since the krona was floated in 1993) over the course of 2022. Because
this indicator has fluctuated around a broadly stable level, it provides a useful indication of valuation. Overall, the staff assesses the krona
to be undervalued by between –4.0 to –15.4 percent, with a midpoint of –9.7 percent, as guided by the ULC-based REER index.1
Capital and Background. The financial account fell by 5.0 percentage points in 2022 to 3.1 percent of GDP. The change in net outflows was mainly
Financial driven by a drop in portfolio investments from 10.3 to –1.7 percent of GDP (caused by a decrease in long-term debt securities) while
Accounts: Flows direct investments improved from 1.1 to 2.5 percent of GDP.
and Policy Assessment. Large changes in capital flows are common in countries with large financial sectors such as Sweden, where the banking
Measures sector is nearly three times GDP. Strong financial regulation, supervision, and a sound financial sector can mitigate risk. According to the
recent Financial System Stability Assessment for Sweden, the banking system is expected to be resilient to large liquidity shocks despite
its substantial share of wholesale funding.
FX Intervention Background. The exchange rate has been freely floating since 1993, and there have not been any interventions since 2002. Foreign
and Reserves currency reserves increased slightly to $67.5 billion in 2022 (reflecting increases in the IMF reserve position and loans to nonbank
Level residents), approximately equivalent to 15 percent of the short-term external debt of monetary and financial institutions, about
11.4 percent of GDP, and three months of imports.
Assessment. Despite having a floating exchange rate regime, it is important to maintain adequate foreign reserves in view of the high
dependence of its commercial banks on wholesale funding in foreign currency and disruptions in such funding during global financial
distress. As seen during the pandemic, the Riksbank can quickly establish swap facilities when necessary.2

Table 3.26. Switzerland: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. However,
complex measurement issues and data lags complicate the assessment.1
Potential Policy Responses: To maintain a broadly balanced external position, fiscal policy should remain in line with the authorities’ debt-brake rule
framework in the near term, while accommodating additional spending related to Russia’s war in Ukraine (e.g., support for refugees). In the medium term,
as inflation pressures ease, small fiscal deficits would help expand spending space to support necessary expenditures. Under the current inflation and
liquidity conditions, if facing depreciation pressures, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) could continue to reduce FX holdings; it should refrain from using
FX interventions to curb franc appreciation, unless excess market volatility makes them necessary. Macroprudential policies should continue to focus on
safeguarding financial stability, taking into consideration the current cyclical position of the economy. Medium-term policies should be geared to ensuring
balanced domestic and external contributions to growth.
Foreign Asset Background. Switzerland is a major financial center with a large positive NIIP of 93.3 percent of GDP and large gross foreign asset
and Liability and liability positions of 680.8 and 587.5 percent of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2022. The NIIP reflects both a history of large CA
Position and surpluses and valuation changes.2 Compared with 2021, the NIIP declined in 2022 by 14.7 percentage points of GDP, mainly driven by
Trajectory negative valuation effects due both to exchange rate movements and price changes. Projections of the NIIP in 2023 and beyond are
complicated by Switzerland’s large gross positions and compositional differences among its assets and liabilities.
Assessment. Switzerland’s large gross liability position and the volatility of financial flows and investment returns present some risk, but
its large gross asset position and the denomination of about two-thirds of its external liabilities in Swiss francs mitigate this risk.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: 93.3 Gross Assets: 680.8 Reserve Assets: 110.6 Gross Liab.: 587.5 Debt Liab.: 198.5
Current Account Background. Switzerland’s CA surpluses averaged 6.6 percent of GDP during 2012–21. The CA surplus increased in 2022 to 10.1 percent
of GDP, from 8.8 percent in 2021. This was driven by strong merchanting and a narrowed services trade deficit, more than offsetting
a larger (by 0.8 percent of GDP) trade deficit in fuels and gas due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The CA surplus is expected to moderate
to 7.8 percent of GDP in 2023 and remain near this level in the medium term as lower inflation and strength in key sectors (e.g.,
pharmaceutical, commodity trading) preserve competitiveness.
Assessment. The EBA CA norm of 6.5 percent of GDP is close to last year’s norm. Based on a cyclically adjusted CA surplus of
10.6 percent and the norm, the overall EBA-estimated CA gap equaled 4.1 percent of GDP in 2022.3 Domestic policy gaps account for
–1.0 percentage point and include excessive private sector credit (–1.2 percentage points) and fiscal underspending (0.3 percentage
point); policy gaps in the rest of the world also contribute (0.8 percentage point). Adjustments for (1) specific factors relevant for
Switzerland that are not treated appropriately in the income account—namely, valuation losses on fixed-income securities arising from
inflation (–3.6 percentage points) and retained earnings on portfolio equity investment (–0.4 percentage point) and (2) transitory impacts
of the COVID-19 pandemic (–0.1 percentage point) reduced the gap to 0.0 percent of GDP (±0.8 percentage point).4
2022 (% GDP) CA: 10.1 Cycl. Adj. CA: 10.6 EBA Norm: 6.5 EBA Gap: 4.1 COVID-19 Adj.: –0.1 Other Adj.: –4.0 Staff Gap: 0.0
Real Exchange Background. Relative to its 2021 level, the average NEER appreciated by 4.4 percent in 2022, while the CPI- and PPI-based REERs
Rate depreciated by 0.9 and 11.2 percent, respectively.5 In the first quarter of 2023, whereas the NEER and CPI-based REER appreciated by
0.9 and 0.7 percent, respectively, the PPI-based REER depreciated by 1.2 percent. It appears that the UBS–Credit Suisse merger has
not had a significant impact on the franc exchange rate thus far. From a long-term perspective, the NEER has appreciated by 44 percent
since 2010, while the CPI- and PPI-based REERs have appreciated by 5.3 percent and depreciated by 12.9 percent, respectively. As of
April 2023, the CPI-based REER was 2.1 percent above the 2022 average.
Assessment. The staff CA gap implies REER overvaluation of 0.1 percent in 2022 (with an elasticity of 0.55 applied). The EBA REER
index and level models suggest that the average REER in 2022 was overvalued by 11.9 and 17.6 percent, respectively, with policy gaps
accounting for a small amount of the total gap. This finding largely reflects a reversion-to-trend property of the empirical model in the
context of prior rapid appreciation episodes. However, because of measurement issues, the results may not fully capture a secular
improvement in productivity. Consistent with the staff CA gap, the staff assesses the REER gap for 2022 to be in the range of –1.3 percent
(undervalued) to 1.5 percent (overvalued), with a midpoint of 0.1 percent.
Capital and Background. Net financial outflows from Switzerland totaled 4.5 percent of GDP in 2022, including private outflows of 7.2 percent of GDP
Financial and a decrease in SNB reserve assets of 2.7 percent of GDP. During 2009–21, net private inflows averaged 2.2 percent of GDP, while the
Accounts: Flows average annual increase in SNB reserves was 10.3 percent of GDP.
and Policy Assessment. Financial flows are large and volatile, reflecting Switzerland’s status as a financial center and safe haven. From a long-term
Measures perspective, sizable net private financial outflows prior to the global financial crisis declined and, on average, turned into net capital inflows
between 2009 and 2020, adding to appreciation pressures. In 2022, partly driven by widened differentials between foreign and domestic
interest rates, net private outflows increased from 4.6 percent of GDP in 2021 to 7.2 percent, while the SNB reduced reserve assets on a
net basis through transactions for the first time since 2005.
FX Intervention Background. Official reserve assets (including gold) amounted to Sw F 852 billion (or $924 billion, 111 percent of GDP) at the end of
and Reserves 2022, down Sw F 162 billion (or $186 billion) from the end of 2021, mostly driven by valuation changes due both to investment losses
Level (Sw F 131 billion) and exchange rate movements. The SNB sold Sw F 22.3 billion of FX (net) through FX interventions in 2022, against net
purchases of Sw F 110 billion and Sw F 21 billion in 2020 and 2021, respectively.
Assessment. Reserves are large relative to GDP but more moderate in comparison with short-term foreign liabilities. If the reserve
currency status of the franc is taken into consideration, the adequacy of its FX reserves is not a pressing concern for Switzerland. On the
other hand, the large financial loss incurred by the SNB in 2022 and the volatility of its income indicate a high level of risk associated with
its vast balance sheet.

Table 3.27. Thailand: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The goods trade
balance worsened on account of both an increase in import bill with the surge in oil prices and a slowdown in goods exports as external demand weakened in
the second half of the year. Whereas the services balance improved with a partial recovery of tourism and a decline in shipping costs, the overall CA balance
deteriorated. The CA balance is expected to improve to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2023 as tourism receipts recover further and to return to a surplus of about
3 percent of GDP in the medium term.
Potential Policy Responses: Policies aimed at promoting investment, diminishing precautionary savings, and supporting domestic demand would bring
the CA balance more in line with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. Public expenditures should be focused on targeted social transfers to
continue to support the most vulnerable, as well as infrastructure investment to support a green recovery and reorientation of affected sectors. Efforts to
reform and expand social safety nets, notably the fragmented pension schemes, should continue, and measures to address widespread informality should
help reduce precautionary savings and support consumption.
Foreign Asset Background. Thailand’s NIIP weakened in 2022 to –3.0 percent of GDP (from 6.6 percent in 2021). Its gross assets declined from 120 to
and Liability 118 percent of GDP (with 44 percent of GDP being reserve assets), while its gross liabilities increased from 114 to 121 percent of GDP,
Position and dominated by direct (about half) and portfolio (about one-third) investment. Net direct and portfolio investment assets declined by 2 and
Trajectory 3 percentage points of GDP, respectively, while net other investment assets increased by 1 percentage point of GDP.
Assessment. The NIIP is projected to remain in a small creditor position over the medium term given CA surpluses. External debt rose
slightly to 40 percent of GDP, of which short-term debt (on a remaining-maturity basis) amounted to 16 percent of GDP. External debt stability
and liquidity risks are limited.
Current Account Background. Thailand’s CA balance declined from –2.1 percent of GDP in 2021 to –3.2 percent of GDP in 2022, reflecting the impact of
an increase in food and oil prices due to the war in Ukraine and slowdown in external demand in the second half of the year. A surge in
import costs weakened the trade balance by 4.2 percent of GDP. A decline in shipping costs and post-pandemic tourism recovery, albeit
still partial, improved the services account by 1.9 percent of GDP. From a savings-investment perspective, the recent CA deficits reflect a
decline in private savings due to the COVID-19 shock and war in Ukraine as well as increased public dissaving from the generous fiscal
support in response to the shock. The CA balance in 2023 is projected to improve to 1.2 percent of GDP as tourism strengthens further.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA of –2.3 percent of GDP and a CA norm of 0.9 percent of GDP for 2022.
The CA gap of –3.2 percent of GDP consists of an identified policy gap of –1.4 percent of GDP and an unexplained residual of –1.8 percent of
GDP, which partly reflects structural factors the EBA model does not capture. As the standard EBA cyclical adjustment does not account for the
large COVID-19-related shocks to the travel and transport sectors, adjustors of 4.8 percent and 1.3 percent of GDP, respectively, are applied.1
Overall, the IMF staff assesses the CA gap to be in the range of 2.2 to 3.6 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of 2.9 percent of GDP. This CA gap
is expected to narrow over the medium term as domestic demand recovers and steps are taken to reform the social protection system.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –3.2 Cycl. Adj. CA: –2.3 EBA Norm: 0.9 EBA Gap: –3.2 COVID-19 Adj.: 6.1 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: 2.9
Real Exchange Background. The baht has been on a gradual real appreciation trend since the mid-2000s, despite occasional bouts of volatility. However,
Rate the REER depreciated by 7.6 percent in 2021 on account of tightened global financial conditions alongside weak recovery in Thailand. The
REER appreciated until June 2022, relative to the end of December 2021, supported by a strong recovery in Thailand, before depreciating
over July–October as a result of high global volatility amid advanced economies’ monetary policy normalization. The REER then resumed
its appreciation in November, ending the year about 1 percent higher than the 2021 average. As of April 2023, the REER was 1.6 percent
above the 2022 average.
Assessment. Using an elasticity of 0.47 and based on the staff CA gap, the IMF staff assesses the REER to be undervalued in the 4.7 to
7.8 percent range, with a midpoint of –6.2 percent. The EBA index REER gap in 2022 is estimated at 6.7 percent, and the EBA level REER
gap is estimated at –2.6 percent.
Capital and Background. In 2022, the capital and financial account balance (excluding change in reserves) strengthened to 0.5 percent of GDP from
Financial –1.2 percent in 2021, driven by a recovery in portfolio investment (from –2.4 percent in 2021 to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2022) and a decline
Accounts: Flows in outward FDI (from 3.8 percent in 2021 to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2022). Other net investments declined from 2.3 to –1.1 percent of GDP.
and Policy FX reserves declined by 2.1 percent of GDP.
Measures Assessment. Since 2013, Thailand has experienced episodes of volatility reflecting external financial conditions, political uncertainty, and
most recently, shocks related to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Thailand has been able to weather such episodes well,
given strong external buffers and fundamentals. The IMF staff welcomes the Bank of Thailand’s removal of limits on nonresident baht
accounts for qualifying nonresident firms to facilitate baht liquidity management and recommends additional phasing out of remaining
CFM measures on nonresident baht accounts. A comprehensive package of macroeconomic, financial, and structural policies should be
pursued to address volatile capital flows, complemented with gradual and prudent financial account liberalization.
FX Intervention Background. The exchange rate regime is classified as (de jure and de facto) floating. International reserves (including the net forward
and Reserves position) declined from 55.2 percent in 2021 to 49.6 percent of GDP in 2022, which is about 2.5 times the short-term debt, 11 months of
Level imports, and 203 percent of the IMF’s standard ARA metric. The exchange rate has been allowed to adjust, with some FX interventions in
periods of large volatility.
Assessment. While official intervention data are not published, estimates suggest two-sided intervention for the year. Reserves are higher
than the range of the IMF’s reserve adequacy metrics, and there continues to be no need to build up reserves for precautionary purposes.
The exchange rate should move flexibly to act as a shock absorber, with FX intervention limited to avoiding disorderly market conditions or
addressing risks of de-anchoring inflation expectations and FX market dysfunction, especially during periods of elevated global volatility.

Table 3.28. Türkiye: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 is assessed to be moderately weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable
policies. The assessment is supported by the low level of reserves, large external financing needs, and the size and composition of the NIIP, all of which
contribute to external vulnerabilities. The CA deficit widened significantly in 2022, reflecting the sharp increase in imported energy prices. Türkiye’s negative
NIIP, while remaining large, narrowed significantly in 2021 as a result of a steep decline in equity liabilities due to valuation effects. Türkiye’s vulnerability
to shocks remains high amid still-elevated gross external financing needs. Over the medium term, the CA deficit is projected to narrow as commodity price
pressures ease.
Potential Policy Responses: Strengthening the policy framework would help Türkiye underpin its external sustainability going forward. Tightening of its monetary
and fiscal policy stance and rebuilding policy credibility would help contain demand and reduce imports, thus improving the CA. They would also help support capital
inflows and liraization and allow for a needed buildup of reserves over time.
Foreign Asset Background. Türkiye’s NIIP averaged –40 percent of GDP over 2018–22. At the end of 2022, the NIIP remained constant year over year, at about
and Liability –31 percent of GDP, despite a slight increase during the first three quarters largely driven by a marked decrease in equity liabilities in dollar terms.
Position and External debt declined from 54 percent of GDP in 2021 to 52 percent of GDP in 2022. The private sector holds almost 53 percent of Türkiye’s
Trajectory external debt, while the public sector (general government and central bank) holds the remaining 47 percent, and about one-third of the external
debt is short term (on a remaining-maturity basis).
Assessment. The size and composition of its gross external liabilities, coupled with low reserves, increase Türkiye’s vulnerability to
liquidity shocks, sudden shifts in investor sentiment, and any global upswing in interest rates. While the FX exposure of Türkiye’s
nonfinancial corporations is high, it has improved in recent years, and the short-term net FX position is positive, providing some liquidity
buffer. The NIIP is expected to stabilize over the medium term because of a projected improvement in the CA balance and to hover around
–33 percent of GDP through 2028, but unwinding of recent valuation effects could negatively affect the NIIP trajectory. External debt is
sustainable over the medium term but is subject to risks, particularly from a large depreciation in the REER.
Current Account Background. The CA deficit averaged 2.4 percent of GDP over 2018–22. Higher commodity prices resulting from the war in Ukraine
significantly weakened the energy CA balance in 2022 and substantially contributed to widening the CA deficit from 0.9 percent of GDP in
2021 to 5.3 percent of GDP in 2022. In contrast, the non-oil CA surplus underwent a more contained deterioration, declining from 4.3 percent
of GDP in 2021 to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2022.
Assessment. The EBA CA model norm for Türkiye is estimated at –0.8 percent of GDP, with an estimated standard error of ±0.7 percent of
GDP. The CA deficit of 5.3 percent of GDP in 2022 narrows to a deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP after cyclical and terms-of-trade adjustments
are made, with a resulting EBA CA gap of –1.7 percent of GDP. Adjusting for temporary pandemic-related shocks (transport: –0.2 percent)
results in an IMF staff–assessed CA gap in the range of –2.6 percent to –1.2 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –1.9 percent of GDP.
Real Exchange Background. The REER depreciated by an annual average of 9.5 percent over 2018–22, and the average REER depreciated by 10 percent
Rate in 2022. In contrast, since PPI inflation has been much higher than CPI inflation recently, the average PPI-based REER appreciated by
about 9 percent in 2022. As of April 2023, the CPI-based REER had appreciated by 6.9 percent relative to the 2022 average.
Assessment. Based on the IMF staff’s estimates of the CA model and taking uncertainties into consideration, the staff assesses the REER
to be overvalued, with a range of 4.0 percent to 9.0 percent and a midpoint of 6.5 percent (applying an estimated REER elasticity of 0.29).
The EBA REER index and level models suggest the REER was undervalued in 2022 by 46.3 and 56.7 percent, respectively, although the
models’ residuals are very large for Türkiye. Given higher PPI inflation, a PPI-based REER measure would likely yield lower undervaluation.
Capital and Background. Net capital inflows rebounded in 2022, mainly on account of one-off flows, including large positive net errors and omissions
Financial of $25.1 billion. Positive net inflows were also driven by FDI, whereas net portfolio inflows weakened further over the year. In January 2022,
Accounts: Flows a new requirement for exporters to convert 25 percent of their export earnings within 180 days was introduced, which was increased to
and Policy 40 percent in April 2022.
Measures Assessment. While net capital inflows continued to rebound in 2022, much of these inflows was of unknown origin. With annual gross
external financing needs projected at about 23 percent of GDP on average over 2023–28 (they amounted to 24 percent of GDP in 2022),
Türkiye remains vulnerable to adverse shifts in global investor sentiment. CFMs should be phased out as conditions improve to increase
market liquidity and support dedollarization.
FX Intervention Background. The de jure exchange rate is classified as free floating. Following the sudden depreciation of the lira in the fourth quarter
and Reserves of 2021, gross reserves decreased sharply, falling to about $100 billion in the second quarter of 2022. Gross reserves recovered during
Level the second half of 2022 and were at about $129 billion at the end of December 2022. Pressures on the lira were relieved by large foreign
exchange interventions and the introduction of a scheme protecting lira term deposits against currency depreciation in December 2021.
Assessment. Gross reserves were at 95 percent of the IMF’s ARA metric as of the end of December 2022, still below the floor of the
recommended 100–150 percent range. In addition, the quality of reserves remains an issue, with non–SDR basket currencies continuing
to account for a large share (about 15 percent) of the central bank’s FX reserves. Once monetary policy tightening is firmly underway,
significant nonborrowed accumulation of reserves is needed over time. FX intervention to support the lira should also be limited to the
most extreme cases of exchange rate volatility, undertaken only by the central bank itself (not state-owned banks).

Table 3.29. United Kingdom: Economy Assessment

deficit deteriorated in 2022, reflecting a sharp terms-of-trade shock triggered by the war in Ukraine. The CA deficit would temporarily stay high in 2023–24,
owing to an adjustment of income flows, before gradually narrowing over the medium term as the trade balance improves. Uncertainty surrounding this
assessment remains significant, on account of measurement issues, the evolving effects of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and the impact on
capital flows of any final agreement between the EU and the UK on financial services.1
Potential Policy Responses: Gradual fiscal consolidation, while preserving the quality of key public services and protecting the vulnerable, should improve
net public savings and help offset the decline in net private savings as private investment slowly recovers. This will help maintain the CA broadly in line with
fundamentals and desirable policies. Over the medium term, implementing structural reforms to boost the UK’s international competitiveness (including via
upgrading the labor skills base to support labor reallocation to fast-growing sectors) would bolster national savings, which, in turn, would help finance the
increased investment needs, including in support of climate transition.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP improved to –11 percent of GDP in 2022 from –15 percent of GDP in 2021. A positive valuation effect led to an
and Liability improvement in the NIIP despite the CA deficit.2 About three-fifth of gross assets and liabilities is accounted for by other investment
Position and (221 percent of GDP in assets and 207 percent in liabilities) and portfolio investment (128 percent of GDP in assets and 132 percent in
Trajectory liabilities). Similarly, three-fourth of gross assets and liabilities are accounted for by the United States, other European countries, and
Japan. External liabilities have a larger share denominated in pounds than do external assets.3 The IMF staff projects that the NIIP will
moderately decrease over the medium term, in line with projected (small) CA deficits. However, large and volatile valuation effects make
these estimates particularly uncertain.
Assessment. Since 2016, CA flows (which were negative) have been unable to explain changes in the NIIP (which have been largely
positive), mainly on account of valuation gains from the pound’s depreciation and two positive flows not recorded in the income balance of
the CA: retained earnings on portfolio equity and inflation compensation on debt interest. Fluctuations in large gross stock positions could
be a potential source of vulnerability (both gross assets and gross liabilities exceed 500 percent of GDP). Also, large short-term debt liability
positions are sensitive to changes in market sentiment. However, the combination of the UK’s exchange rate flexibility and its net liability
position in domestic currency offer some insurance against external crises.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –11 Gross Assets: 563 Debt Assets: 283 Gross Liab.: 574 Debt Liab.: 293
Current Account Background. The CA deficit deteriorated from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2021 to 3.8 percent in 2022, reflecting a widening in the trade
deficit due to a negative terms-of-trade shock from surging energy prices following the war in Ukraine. Net private savings declined from
6.8 percent in 2021 to 2.5 percent in 2022, more than offsetting lower net public borrowing, which declined from 8.3 percent in 2021 to
6.2 percent in 2022; gross savings also declined, while investment increased. The IMF staff projects that CA will moderately decrease to
–3.5 percent of GDP over the medium term.
Assessment. The EBA CA model estimates a norm of –1.0 percent of GDP and a CA gap of –1.2 percent of GDP. Adjustments to the EBA
estimates include those for the lingering COVID-19 impact, totaling –0.3 percent of GDP: travel services (–0.4 percent of GDP) and transport
balances (0.1 percent of GDP). As in previous years, unrecorded income—retained earnings on portfolio equity (0.2 percent of GDP) and
inflation compensation on debt interest (0.5 percent of GDP)—contributed to an underestimation of the underlying CA. Overall, the IMF staff
assesses the CA gap to be in the range of –1.8 to 0.2 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –0.8 percent of GDP.
Real Exchange Background. The pound, on average, depreciated in real effective terms in 2022 by 1.4 percent relative to its average level in 2021,
Rate driven entirely by nominal depreciation, largely due to the surge in the dollar. Overall, the pound has depreciated in real terms by about
3.4 percentage points since mid-2016, reflecting market expectations of more restricted access to the EU market under post-Brexit
trade arrangements. As of the end of April 2023, the REER had appreciated by 1.1 percent compared with its 2022 average.
Assessment. The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of about 2.9 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.28 applied). The EBA
REER level and index approaches suggest a gap of 2.3 and –8.4 percent, respectively, for 2022. Consistent with the staff CA gap, the staff
assess the REER gap to be about 2.9 percent, in a range of –0.7 to 6.4 percent.
Capital and Background. Given the UK’s role as an international financial center, portfolio investment and other investment are the key components of
Financial its financial account. In 2022, the CA deficit of 3.8 percent of GDP was financed by net portfolio investment of 3.5 percent of GDP, financial
Accounts: Flows derivatives and other investment of 2.8 percent of GDP, net FDI of –3.8 percent of GDP, and errors and omissions of 1.3 percent of GDP.
and Policy Assessment. Large fluctuations in capital flows are inherent in countries with large financial sectors. Such volatility is a potential source
Measures of vulnerability for the UK, although sound financial regulation and supervision and a healthy financial sector mitigate this vulnerability. An
additional risk is that financial account flows may decelerate, driven by changes in the UK’s trade relationship with the EU and the shift of
some financial services to the EU.
FX Intervention Background. The pound has the status of a global reserve currency. Sterling’s share of global reserves has not changed materially since
and Reserves 2015 and stands at about 4.6 percent.
Level Assessment. The United Kingdom typically holds low reserves relative to standard metrics, but the currency is free floating.

Table 3.30. United States: Economy Assessment

Overall Assessment: The external position in 2022 was moderately weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
A marginal decline in the trade balance was led by a small deterioration in the services balance, resulting in a CA deficit of 3.7 percent of GDP (versus
3.6 percent of GDP in 2021). Although uncertainty and terms-of-trade changes caused by the war in Ukraine may continue to affect the near term, the CA
deficit is projected to decline to about 2½ percent of GDP over the medium term based on an increase in public saving due to gradual fiscal consolidation,
reflected in a lower trade deficit.
Potential Policy Responses: Over the medium term, suggested fiscal consolidation aimed at a medium-term general government primary surplus of about
1 percent of GDP should broadly stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and address the CA gap. Structural policies to increase productivity and competitiveness
include upgrading infrastructure; enhancing the schooling, training, apprenticeship, and mobility of workers; supporting the working poor; and implementing
policies to increase growth in the labor force (including skill-based immigration reform). Tariff barriers and other trade distortions should be rolled back,
and trade and investment disagreements with other countries should be resolved in a manner that supports an open, stable, and transparent global trading
system.
Foreign Asset Background. The NIIP, which averaged about –46 percent of GDP during 2016–19, deteriorated slightly from –67.8 percent of GDP in
and Liability 2020 to –74.4 percent of GDP in 2021, before strengthening slightly again to –64.7 percent of GDP in 2022. Declines in the ratios of both
Position and assets and liabilities to GDP in 2022 can be imputed to declines in the value of assets and liabilities, as well as to increases in nominal
Trajectory GDP, to a lesser extent. Under the IMF staff’s baseline scenario, the NIIP is projected to remain broadly unchanged through the medium
term on the back of developments in portfolio assets and liabilities as the CA balance reverts to its pre-COVID-19 average.
Assessment. Financial stability risks could surface in the form of an unexpected decline in foreign demand for US fixed-income securities,
which are a main component of the country’s external liabilities. This risk, which could materialize, for example, as a result of a failure to
reestablish fiscal sustainability, remains moderate given the dominant status of the US dollar as a reserve currency. About 60 percent of US
assets are in the form of FDI and portfolio equity claims.
2022 (% GDP) NIIP: –64.7 Gross Assets: 112 Debt Assets: 18.8 Gross Liab: 176 Debt Liab.: 54.5
Current Account Background. The CA deficit was 3.7 percent of GDP in 2022, close to the 2021 level of 3.6 percent of GDP (moving from 3.2 to 3.5 percent
of GDP in cyclically adjusted terms), compared with a pre-pandemic deficit of about 2 percent of GDP. On the trade side, its evolution
since 2016 is explained mostly by a deterioration in the non-oil goods and services balance. In 2022, the trade balance remained broadly
stable relative to 2021 (–3.7 versus –3.6 percent of GDP). Both national savings and investment increased as a percentage of GDP from
2016 to 2021 (with a massive increase in public dissaving due to the pandemic), after which the trend started to revert in 2022, with both
national savings and investment converging back toward pre-pandemic levels. Based on an increase in public saving due to gradual fiscal
consolidation (and unwinding of the extraordinary fiscal support), reflected in a lower trade deficit, the CA deficit is expected to decline
slightly, to about 2.5 percent of GDP, over the medium term.
Assessment. The EBA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA balance of –3.5 percent of GDP and a cyclically adjusted CA norm of
–2.2 percent of GDP. The EBA model CA gap is –1.2 percent of GDP for 2022, reflecting policy gaps (–0.6 percent of GDP, mostly driven by
the private credit gap1) and an unidentified residual (about –0.6 percent of GDP) that may reflect structural factors not included in the model.
On balance, the IMF staff assesses the 2022 cyclically adjusted CA to be lower by 1.1 percent of GDP than the level implied by medium-
term fundamentals and desirable policies, with a range between –1.7 and –0.4 percent of GDP. This assessment includes a staff adjustor of
0.2 percent GDP to account for the temporary effects of COVID-19 on the travel and transport balances. The estimated standard error of the
CA norm is 0.7 percent of GDP.
2022 (% GDP) CA: –3.7 Cycl. Adj. CA: –3.5 EBA Norm: –2.2 EBA Gap: –1.2 COVID-19 Adj.: 0.2 Other Adj.: 0.0 Staff Gap: –1.1
Real Exchange Background. After depreciating by 2.3 percent in 2021, the REER appreciated by 8.3 percent in 2022 (when yearly averages are
Rate compared). As of April 2023, the REER was 0.5 percent below the 2022 average.
Assessment. Indirect estimates of the REER gap (based on the IMF staff’s CA assessment) imply that the exchange rate was
overvalued by 9.0 percent in 2022 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.12 applied). The EBA REER index model suggests an overvaluation
of 10.7 percent, and the EBA REER level model suggests an overvaluation of 22.8 percent. Considering all the estimates and their
uncertainties, the staff assesses the 2022 midpoint REER overvaluation to be 9.0 percent, with a range of 3.5 to 14.6 percent, where the
range is obtained from the CA standard error and the corresponding CA elasticity.
Capital and Background. The financial account balance was about –2.7 percent of GDP in 2022, compared with –3.2 percent of GDP in 2021. This was
Financial mainly due to an increase in both net other investment and (to a lesser extent) net direct investment, partly offset by a reduction in net
Accounts: Flows portfolio investment.
and Policy Assessment. The US has an open capital account. Vulnerabilities are limited by the dollar’s status as a reserve currency, with foreign
Measures demand for US Treasury securities supported by the status of the dollar as a reserve currency and possibly by safe haven flows.
FX Intervention Assessment. The dollar has the status of a global reserve currency. Reserves held by the United States are typically low relative to
and Reserves standard metrics. The currency is free floating.
Level

Technical Endnotes by Economy of GDP to 10.6 percent (midpoint of the IMF staff–assessed
norm range). First, a deduction of 5.7 percentage points of GDP
Argentina
(midpoint of an estimated 4.7–6.7 percentage point range) is
1A band of ±1 percent of GDP (two standard errors of the CA made to the EBA model’s implied contribution of the NIIP. This
norm) is applied to account for elevated country-specific uncer- deduction is made because the positive NIIP contribution in EBA
tainty in the context of external vulnerabilities. captures average income effects that are less relevant for Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, since the income balance
relative to its NIIP is systematically lower than that in other peer
Belgium economies, due to a persistently higher share of debt instruments
1Methodological and source data changes in September 2019 on the asset side than on the liability side. Second, a deduction
led to major revisions of balance-of-payments data from 2015 of 4¼ percentage points of GDP (midpoint of an estimated
onward, causing a break in the data series. 4–4½ percentage point range) is made to account for a decline
in the gold trade balance that reflects not changes in wealth but
rather the increased physical settlement of gold futures contracts
Canada resulting from the opening of a precious metals depository. Third,
1The statistical treatments of retained earnings on portfolio a deduction of 1¼ percentage points of GDP (midpoint of an
equity and of net interest outflows (which are recorded in estimated 1–1½ percentage point range) is made to account for
nominal terms and thus artificially boosted by currently high China’s increased onshoring, which led to a decline in logistics
inflation) are estimated to have generated a downward bias in and trading activities in Hong Kong Special Administrative
the income balance of 0.6 and 1 percent of GDP, respectively, Region but did not result in lower consumption because it is
totaling 1.6 percent of GDP. viewed as temporary and to be replaced with increased provision
2The semielasticity of the CA with respect to the REER is set of high-value-added services as Hong Kong SAR’s own economy
to 0.27. rebalances in response to demand in China. See “People’s Republic
of China—Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Selected
Issues” (Country Report No. 17/12) for more details.
2The range is calculated by applying the average semielastici-
China
ties of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and similar
1See the IMF’s 2021 Taxonomy of Capital Flow Management
economies.
Measures for a list of China’s existing CFM measures and related 3The financial linkages with the Mainland have deepened in
policy advice.
recent years with the increase in cross-border bank lending, cap-
ital market financing, and the internationalization of the RMB.
As of end-2022, banking system claims on Mainland non-bank
Euro Area
entities amounted to HK$6.4 trillion, or about 225 percent of
1The export and import elasticities are obtained as the average GDP, down by about 9 percentage points from end-2021.
of estimates from Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues–
inspired export and import equations using REERs relevant for the
euro area with an autoregressive distributive lag (2,2,2) model on India
quarterly data 2000–19. The trade balance elasticity is calculated 1The cyclical adjustment and COVID-19 adjustors have been
using the share of exports and imports in extra-EU trade in GDP.
computed based on the fiscal year (as opposed to the calendar
year) to take into account the quarterly dynamics of commod-
ity prices and travel and transport services between the second
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
quarter of 2022 and the first quarter of 2023.
1Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is not in the EBA
sample, as it is an outlier along many dimensions of EBA analysis,
thus one possibility—though with obvious drawbacks—is to use Indonesia
EBA-estimated coefficients and apply them to Hong Kong Special 1Indonesia is among the few countries with low life expec-
Administrative Region. Following this approach, the CA norm
tancy at prime age, and demographic indicators are adjusted to
in 2022 is estimated to have been about 21.8 percent of GDP,
account for this. As a result, the model-estimated CA norm is
implying a CA gap of –11.3 percent, which the model residuals
adjusted by subtracting 0.4 percentage point.
explain almost entirely. The EBA CA gap is overstated, as it does 2The standard error of the EBA norm is 0.6 percent of GDP.
not properly reflect the measurement issues that are relevant for 3The width of the range for the REER gap takes the standard
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, so three adjustments
±3.6 percent interval applied to the midpoint of –2.0 percent,
are made that reduce the CA norm by 11.2 percentage points
leading to a range of –5.6 to 1.6.

Japan 2022 (including the multilateral consistency adjustor). How-

1Consistent ever, using this approach overstates the CA gap. Accounting
with the 2022 External Sector Report, the IMF
for Singapore’s specificities requires several adjustments. First, a
staff recommends allowing the estimated credit-to-GDP gap to
downward adjustment of 1.1 percentage points is made to the
decline gradually over the medium term from its currently esti-
EBA’s implied contribution of public health expenditures to the
mated level of 25 percent (16 percent net of corporate savings),
norm to account for the fact that Singapore’s health expenditure
with a corresponding policy setting (P*) for the credit-to-GDP
is appropriate given its high efficiency, even though its desirable,
gap in five years of 9 percent of GDP.
as well as current, public health expenditure is significantly lower
than in other EBA countries. Second, the EBA model does not
Saudi Arabia include the impact of the COVID-19 shock on the CA; thus a
total adjustment of –3.1 percent of GDP is applied to account
1EBA models do not include Saudi Arabia. The IMF staff for this transitory impact, including (1) a travel adjustor of
has considered three approaches in the EBA-Lite methodol- –0.8 percent of GDP and (2) a transport adjustor of –2.3 per-
ogy, including two that incorporate the special intertemporal cent of GDP. Third, a downward adjustment of 3.8 percentage
considerations that are dominant in economies in which exports points to the norm is made to better account for the effect of
of nonrenewable resources are a very high share of output NFA composition and component-specific return differentials on
and exports. Using the CA regression approach, the cyclically the CA. Fourth, notwithstanding possible partial double-count-
adjusted CA norm is estimated at 7.7 percent of GDP (slightly ing with the NFA components adjustor, a downward adjustment
higher than the CA norm of 7.5 percent of GDP in 2021). The of –2.9 percentage points of GDP is applied to the underlying
Consumption Allocation Rules assume that the sustainability of CA to account for measurement biases due to inflation and
the CA trajectory requires that the net present value (NPV) of portfolio equity retained earnings (–5.8 and 2.9 percent of GDP,
all future oil and financial and investment income (wealth) be respectively). Adjusted for these factors, the staff–estimated
equal to the NPV of imports of goods and services net of non- CA gap is about 5.1 percent of GDP, to which the fiscal gap
oil exports. Estimated CA norms from the Consumption Alloca- contributes about 0.3 percent of GDP, the credit gap about
tion Rules were 13.3 percent of GDP and 16.2 percent of GDP –0.6 percent of GDP, public health spending about –0.1 percent
for the constant real annuity and constant real per capita annuity of GDP, and reserves about 0.0 percent of GDP.
allocation rules, respectively. The Investment Needs Model takes 3The IMF staff applies the maximum range of ±1.8 percent
account of the possibility that it might be desirable to allocate in the EBA sample for the CA gap, reflecting the uncertainty
part of the resource wealth to finance investment, which was surrounding Singapore’s assessment.
not explicitly considered by the consumption-based model and 4Since March 2022, MAS has been transferring official foreign
produced a CA gap of 14.4 percent over the medium term. The reserves that are not needed for the conduct of monetary policy
reliance of the consumption and investment models on projected and financial stability to the government, for long-term invest-
oil prices beyond the medium-term macro framework subjects ment (Reserves Management Government Securities – RMGS).
the results to a high degree of uncertainty. The CA gap in 2022 As of end-2022, MAS’ outstanding holdings of RMGS was
of 4.7 percent of GDP represents the staff’s overall assessment, S$237.6 billion (36.9 percent of GDP).
which is anchored on the EBA-Lite CA model. The range for the 5The reserves-to-GDP ratio is also larger than in most other
gap is calculated using the estimates for Norway, a comparable financial centers, but this may reflect in part that most other
oil-rich economy in the EBA sample. financial centers are in reserve currency countries or currency
unions. External assets managed by the government’s investment
corporation and wealth fund (GIC and Temasek) amount to at
Singapore least 100 percent of GDP.
1Singapore has a negative income balance despite its large
positive NIIP, reflecting lower rates of return on its foreign assets
relative to returns on its foreign liabilities, possibly because the South Africa
composition of Singapore’s assets is tilted toward safer assets with 1The South Africa–specific COVID-19 adjustors for 2022 of
lower returns. 0.2 percent of GDP are composed of adjustments for travel
2Nonstandard factors make a quantitative assessment of
services (including tourism exports) (0.5 percent of GDP), trans-
Singapore’s external position difficult and subject to signifi- portation (0.5 percent of GDP), mineral exports (–0.6 percent
cant uncertainty. Singapore is not included in the EBA sample of GDP), and an improved income balance (–0.2 percent of
because it is an outlier along several dimensions. One possibility, GDP). The mineral-exports adjustor reflects a temporary surge
though with drawbacks, is to use EBA estimated coefficients in mineral export prices and volumes, which are still above
and apply them to Singapore. Following that approach, the CA pre-pandemic averages, and the importance for South Africa
norm is estimated to have been about 15.6 percent of GDP in of some mineral exports (for instance, palladium, platinum,

and rhodium), which are not included in the IMF EBA model Switzerland
(terms-of-trade adjustment). 1Because of large revisions to historical balance-of-payments and
2Net current transfers related to the Southern African Customs
IIP data, particular caution is needed when the ESA results for
Union (SACU) in 2022 are assessed to have had a net nega-
different periods are compared. For example, after the initial
tive impact on the CA, are not accounted for in the regression
release in March 2022, the 2021 financial account net balance
model, and warrant an adjustment to the cyclically adjusted
was subsequently revised upward, from Sw F 27.5 billion to
CA by 0.7 percent of GDP. In addition, measurement issues
Sw F 79.2 billion (a revision of 7.1 percent of 2021 GDP),
pertaining to the income balance are likely to have contributed
driven by sizable revisions to both net acquisition of financial
to an underestimation of the CA by 0.8 percent of GDP in
assets and net incurrence of liabilities.
2022 overall. 2Valuation changes reflect fluctuations of exchange rates and prices
3Because South Africa is among the few countries with relatively
of securities and precious metals that interact with differences
high adult mortality rates, the demographic indicators have
among assets and liabilities in terms of currencies and instruments.
been adjusted to account for the younger average prime age
As a result, an appreciation (depreciation) of the Swiss franc has a
and exit age from the workforce. This results in an adjustor of
negative (positive) effect on the NIIP. Other stock-flow adjust-
–0.6 percent of GDP to the model-based CA norm for 2022.
ments include changes in statistical sources, such as changes in the
Overall, important positive contributors for the norm include
number of entities surveyed and items covered.
demographics (even after downward adjustment to account for 3Part of the positive EBA CA gap may reflect institutional
the aforementioned lower life expectancy), net foreign assets, and
pension features, such as replacement and coverage rates, in
a desirable policy stance, especially in regard to reserves.
Switzerland rather than other economic policy gaps.
4These significant flows in 2021 can largely be attributed to
4The underlying CA is adjusted for Switzerland-specific factors
Prosus N.V. acquiring about 45 percent of Naspers Ltd N
in the income account: (1) retained earnings on portfolio equity
ordinary shares from existing Naspers Ltd shareholders (direct
investment that are not recorded in the income balance of the
investment inflows) and to both resident and nonresident inves-
CA (or, the PE RE bias) under the sixth edition of the IMF
tors exchanging Naspers Ltd N ordinary shares for Prosus N.V.
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual
ordinary shares (portfolio investment outflows).
(BPM6) and (2) recording of nominal interest on fixed-income
securities under the BPM framework, which compensates for
expected valuation losses (due to inflation and/or nominal
Spain
exchange rate movements), even though this stream compen-
1The EBA model suggests a cyclically adjusted CA norm of sates for the (anticipated) erosion in the real value of debt assets
–0.1 percent of GDP, with a standard error of 0.8 percent of and liabilities. The PE RE bias was estimated using the “stock
GDP. However, given external risks from a large and negative method” and “flow method” as explained in Adler and others
NIIP, the IMF staff’s assessment puts more weight on external (2019), and it is similar in size to estimates based on the Swiss
sustainability and is guided by the objective of raising the NIIP National Bank’s pilot BPM7 data.
to at least –50 percent over the medium term. Under current In addition, the CA balance is also adjusted for transitory
policies, the NIIP is projected to reach this target, though with impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade of goods and ser-
high uncertainty, as valuation effects are assumed to be zero over vices, including adjustors for tourism (0.0 percentage point) and
the projection horizon. Allowing for a safety margin, the staff transport (–0.1 percentage point). Adjusted for these COVID-19
therefore considers the CA norm to be 1.0 percent of GDP, with related effects, the underlying CA would need to be reduced by
a range of 0.2 to 1.8 percent of GDP. about 0.1 percent of GDP.
2The range of the REER gap is ±2.6 percent, which is computed 5Prices of energy products, especially gas prices, were a main
based on Spain’s estimated standard error of the EBA CA norm driver underlying the PPI inflation differentials between
(0.8 percent of GDP) and a semielasticity of the CA to the Switzerland and other advanced economies such as the euro area
REER of 0.31. and the US. If core PPIs excluding energy products were used,
the depreciation of the PPI-based franc REER in 2021 and 2022
would be smaller.
Sweden
1The upper and lower bounds are derived by adding/subtracting
the standard deviation (5.7) from the average outcome (midpoint) Thailand
to reflect uncertainty surrounding the EBA estimated norm. 1For Thailand, the change in the transport services balance
2A $60 billion swap facility was agreed with the Federal
between 2019 and 2022 was –2.1 percent of GDP. In the IMF
Reserve to address dollar funding risks related to the pandemic. staff’s view, this change is too large relative to Thailand’s net
Although it was not utilized, it provided an important back- imports of global transportation services. Using an average of
stop function. percentage change in transport balances of comparable countries,

the staff estimates the impact of high freight costs on Thailand’s References
transport service balance and CA to be a worsening of about
Adler, Gustavo, Daniel Garcia-Macia, and Signe Krogstrup.
60 percent (1.3 percent of GDP). Therefore, the staff proposes a
2019. “The Measurement of External Accounts.” IMF Work-
transportation adjustor of 1.3 percent.
ing Paper 19/132, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
DC.
Allen, Cian, Camila Casas, Giovanni Ganelli, Luciana Juvenal,
United Kingdom
Daniel Leigh, Pau Rabanal, Cyril Rebillard, Jair
1For example, long-term access of EU clearing members (such as Rodriguez, and João Tovar Jalles. 2023. “2022 Update of the
banks and asset managers) to UK central counterparties (CCPs) External Balance Assessment Methodology.” IMF Working
remains uncertain. The EU has extended the equivalence for UK Paper 23/47, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
CCPs only until the end of June 2025. Bank of England. 2022. “Financial Stability Report,” Box A
2The official NIIP data may understate the true position: estimates
(December), London.
of FDI stocks at market values imply a much higher NIIP, close to Bénétrix, Agustin S., Deepali Gautam, Luciana Juvenal, and
100 percent of GDP, as reported in Bank of England (2022). Martin Schmitz. 2019. “Cross-Border Currency Exposures.”
3Estimates in Bénétrix and others (2019) suggest that in 2017,
IMF Working Paper 19/299, International Monetary Fund,
about 94 percent of external assets were denominated in foreign Washington, DC.
currency, compared with 56 percent for external liabilities. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2017. “People’s Republic of
China—Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Selected
Issues.” Country Report No.17/12, Washington, DC.
United States
1While the fiscal policy gap is estimated to be rather small, at
–0.1 percent of GDP, the domestic fiscal policy gap is estimated
to amount to about –1.3 percent of GDP.

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IN THIS ISSUE:
CHAPTER 1
External Positions and Policies
CHAPTER 2
External Sector Implications of the
Global Dollar Cycle
CHAPTER 3
2022 Individual Economy Assessments
EXTERNAL SECTOR REPORT 2023

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.

ISBN: 979-8-40024-568-8 (Paper)

Publication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:

Further Information vii

IMF Executive Board Discussion Summary x

Chapter 1. External Positions and Policies 1

Chapter 2. External Sector Implications of the Global Dollar Cycle 39

Chapter 3. 2022 Individual Economy Assessments 61

International Monetary Fund | 2023 iii

iv International Monetary Fund | 2023

Figure 2.7. Spillovers from a US Dollar Appreciation by Degree of Anchoring of

International Monetary Fund | 2023 v

Table 3.23. South Africa: Economy Assessment 86

vi International Monetary Fund | 2023

Corrections and Revisions

Print and Digital Editions

Copyright and Reuse

International Monetary Fund | 2023 vii

viii International Monetary Fund | 2023

International Monetary Fund | 2023 ix

x International Monetary Fund | 2023

International Monetary Fund | 2023 xi

EXTERNAL POSITIONS AND POLICIES

International Monetary Fund | 2023 1

An Uneven Recovery from the COVID-19 Pandemic

2 International Monetary Fund | 2023

International Monetary Fund | 2023 3

Global current account balance

4 International Monetary Fund | 2023

Figure 1.7. Current Account Decomposition Figure 1.8. Currency Movements

3. Other Advanced Economies

–10 to less favorable terms of trade in advanced economies

International Monetary Fund | 2023 5

6 International Monetary Fund | 2023

International Monetary Fund | 2023 7

3. Net Other Investment Inﬂows 4. Reserve Accumulation

war in Ukraine and tightening of monetary policy

8 International Monetary Fund | 2023

markets. The COVID-19 crisis did not lead to many 50

pandemic. (2018), along with data availability.

International Monetary Fund | 2023 9

deterioration due to its current account deficit.10 His- 30

10 International Monetary Fund | 2023

tive and negative gaps offset one another, ensuring that

International Monetary Fund | 2023 11

United Kingdom, along with Australia, The Nether-

12 International Monetary Fund | 2023

2012 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1. Current Account Balances of ESR Countries1

IMF staff–assessed CA gap

Source: IMF staff assessments.

International Monetary Fund | 2023 13

5 TUR GBR EA impact of COVID-19 wanes and current account

14 International Monetary Fund | 2023

Table 1.1. Selected Economies: Current Account Balance, 2020–23

non–External Sector Report economies.

International Monetary Fund | Publication Date 15

Table 1.2. Selected Economies: Net International Investment Position, 2019–22