Moore 1985
Moore 1985
Moore 1985
Dennis Moore
To cite this article: Dennis Moore (1985) Writing, Blocking, and Cognitive Science, The Review
of Education, 11:1, 29-32, DOI: 10.1080/0098559850110109
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well, for Rose employs an information-processing assigned task, comments Rose elicits and interprets
model of the mind, of a sort developed in "cogni- with the model in mind—rules, plans, frames, atti-
tive science" (or "neocognitivism," or whatever tudes and all. The circularity, if unavoidable, is
one chooses to call the interdisciplinary combina- nevertheless noteworthy: is not this the critical point
tion of psychology, linguistics, philosophy, etc., about " a way of seeing"?
centered on artificial intelligence research). Indeed, Insofar as Rose's interpretation shows that rigid
Rose speaks of Writer's Block as "a kind of intro- rules, premature editing, mistaken ideas about com-
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duction to this particular way of thinking about posing, and other cognitive factors can cause block-
thinking" (p. xvi). Among earlier composition re- ing, it contributes to our understanding of writing.
searchers, he acknowledges an especially strong How much it contributes depends on two consider-
debt to Linda Flower and John Hayes, and readers ations. First, taking Rose's findings in general
familiar with their work will observe that Rose's terms, he seems to overestimate their originality to
boxes-and-arrows scheme of the writing process a truly surprising degree. To trace blocking to most
resembles theirs, while his stimulated-recall proce- of the causes he identifies is not an innovation but an
dure bears close kinship to their use of speaking- easily documented commonplace. To be fair on this
aloud protocols. first point, though, it may be wise to raise the
Admitting that the perspective of cognitive sci- second. To accept Rose's observations in such gen-
ence has limitations, Rose explains that he adopts it eral terms is to take "cognitive" in its wider sense,
simply because it seems to fit his subject and not out as opposed to "affective," thus depriving his con-
of dogmatic commitment (in his words, "not out of clusions of their true substance, grounded as they
evangelical zeal"). Even so, he seems to take for are in cognitive science and dependent upon its
granted that a cognitivist approach is only natural concepts for their meaning. In other words, their
once one has decided to study thinking: the limita- originality may lie less in the factors Rose identifies
tions and the fit receive no serious examination, than in the way he conceives of them, for an infor-
making the book a very partial introduction. Al- mation-processing model of the human mind leads
though he quotes approvingly Kenneth Burke's ob- one to see all this in a certain way.
servation that " a way of seeing is also a way of not To characterize that way of seeing fully and
seeing," for Rose this maxim is nothing more than adequately, let alone to present a full-fledged cri-
a reminder of the obvious point that his study ex- tique of it, is certainly beyond the scope of the
cludes whole realms of inquiry (sociological issues, present essay: I can only refer readers to the sub-
for example). Less obvious and far more significant stantial literature dedicated to the subject and note
is a difficult question he never addresses: How does that Hubert Dreyfus's controversial classic What
his chosen framework shape his findings? Computers Can't Do still provides the best starting
For instance, a central component of Rose's hy- point for the critique. Keeping to the case at hand,
pothetical scheme of the composing process is a set then, how does Rose's model lead one to see writ-
of "composing subprocesses": "These are linguis- ing? The rules, plans, and other "subprocesses" are
tic, stylistic, rhetorical, sociolinguistic, and process conceived as entities somehow present in the writ-
rules, interpretive as well as intersentence to dis- er's mind, their preexistence a necessary condition
course-level writing plans, discourse frames, and for composing, their quasi-mechanical interaction
attitudes, all of which select, shape, organize, and with one another and with other components (e.g.,
evaluate domain knowledge" (p. 10). The stimu- the task environment) the essence of the process
lated-recall procedure elicits a writer's comments itself. New forms are merely adaptations of old ones
about a videotape of his or her performance on the already stored in memory. Rose's cognitivism leads
MOORE / Writing, Blocking, and Cognitive Science 31
him to attribute primacy to these formal structures— (pp. 96-97). The plausibility of this instructional
wholly abstracted, for instance, from the writer's strategy, its internal coherence and its consistency
ideas about the topic, which the model parcels off in with what we know about language development, is
a box labeled "Domain Knowledge." To discover certainly open to doubt. Here again, a vast literature
the form of writing through unplanned exploration is relevant, though one might well begin by con-
of what one has to say would be to create a new form trasting Rose's position with that developed in the
without a prior form: "creation ab nihilo, a risky works of Frank Smith (1983).
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business likely to produce unacceptable results" (p. Moreover, like much else that appears in the final
82). Beyond that, Rose has little to say about do- chapter, Rose's vote for rote learning does not
main knowledge. clearly belong in a section labeled "Implications for
The section on implications for instruction best Instruction"—as if it were somehow implied, per-
illustrates another important quality of Rose's haps even warranted, by the experimental results.
model and suggests where such a model leads. How As Rose observed twenty pages earlier, "The stud-
does a writer's mind come to contain Rose's formal ies do not provide insight into how such flexibility
rules and patterns? Through explicit instruction, he is learned and operates" (p. 75). Readers must
says. Thus the other notable quality of his model is evaluate the grounds of each of Rose's conclusions
a naive empiricism that has much in common with with exceptional caution, for there is a gaping gulf
the type of pedagogy Janet Emig deplores as "mag- between the broad speculations of his theory and the
ical thinking." The writer's linguistic resources are limited results of his study.
assumed to be inadequate for the creative construc- Readers will also need to evaluate the research
tion of a rhetorical response; it is likewise assumed method by which those results are produced. For
that the higher-order processes in the box Rose example, the experimental situation seems designed
labels "Executive Operations" must work from a in effect to reward exactly the kind of pattern-based
repertoire of set patterns rather than shaping dis- composing Rose sees as normal and exemplary. In
course afresh. Rose provides support for neither of what Rose describes as " a typical [school] situa-
these powerful assumptions, and taken together they tion," subjects were given one hour to read a case
lead Rose to a deprivation theory of writer's block: history of depression and a Karl Jaspers passage
a blocked writer is one who has not been trained about alienation, then to write an analysis of the
how to use enough of the proper forms. Granted case history in Jaspers' terms. Rose admits that he
Rose's premises, his pedagogical conclusion seems sought not to create a context for the students to do
self-evident: " a vote in favor of teaching patterns, their best but rather to copy "the constricting reality
structures, and frameworks" (p. 94). of the undergraduate writing environment" (pp.
And ironically, although Rose's observations in- 28-29). However, even if the facts of participating
dicate that student writers may often block because in an experiment, being videotaped, and writing on
they conceive such taught forms too rigidly, he is a note pad fixed in place did not interfere with
content to assert flatly, without a hint of supporting students' performances, the experimental task itself
evidence or argument, that "people often need nar- seems far closer to a worst-case scenario than to a
row parameters and rote practice to master a partic- typical situation. Granted, for instance, that
ular technique." Rose recognizes the irony but re- "school-based assignments do not always offer
signs himself to it. How then to avoid blocking? choice of topic," one still hopes that they usually
"The answers lie in slow weaning, in gradual loos- concern topics familiar to students from their stud-
ening of structure and expanding of options, in ies. It is almost as if the students, like William
introducing new contexts, in careful monitoring" Perry's remarkable Mr. Metzger, are in the position
32 THE REVIEW OF EDUCATION / Winter 1985
of taking a course exam without the advantage of analysis of how well-meant instruction can hamper
having taken the course. How commonly must stu- them should be sobering for any teacher. More
dents write on a fixed and unfamiliar topic in an generally, the importance of the issues engaged in
extremely brief period of time? the book can hardly be questioned. Nevertheless,
Even if the task were typical of school, how safe however many details readers may find to admire in
would it be to draw conclusions about blocking in the edifice Rose has built, his information-
general? One can hardly be surprised at Rose's processing model of the mind has provided it with a
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