Oup Accepted Manuscript 2016

Journal of Islamic Studies Advance Access published January 4, 2017
Journal of Islamic Studies (2017) pp. 1 of 29 doi:10.1093/jis/etw057
POWER VS. AUTHORITY: AL-JUWAYN>’S

INTERVENTION IN PRAGMATIC POLITICAL
THOUGHT
SOHAIRA SIDDIQUI
Georgetown University, Qatar
Downloaded from http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Newcastle on January 15, 2017

In her article, ‘What is Authority?’, Hannah Arendt draws a distinction
between authority and power, arguing that scholars have either conflated
the two terms, or worse, disregarded the importance of the former.
According to her, authority gives ‘the world permanence and durability
which human beings need precisely because they are mortals—the most
unstable and futile beings we know of’.1 It exists apart from and beyond
power because while power gives order and is intended to create
obedience through coercion or persuasion in the present, authority
extends into the past, rooting the present and endowing it with a sense of
permanence, durability and continuity. To this extent she states, ‘[t]he
authority of the living was always derivative, depending upon. . .the
authority of the founders, who were no longer among the living.
Authority, in contradistinction to power (potestas), had its roots in the
past, but this past was no less present in the actual life of the city than the
power and strength of the living’.2 Because authority is rooted in the
past, Arendt argues that it relies upon the preservation of tradition ‘by
handing down from one generation to the next the testimony of the
ancestors, who first had witnessed and created the sacred founding and
then augmented it by their authority through centuries. As long as this
tradition was uninterrupted, authority was inviolate; and to act without
authority and tradition. . ..was inconceivable’.3 Thus, tradition and
authority become more important than brute power which she believes
to be limited both in longevity and persuasive ability. The strength of
authority, however, is also bound to religion, as traditions, to the extent
that they are past-looking, return to a sacred moment or a sacred
beginning. The archetypical case of this trinity of tradition, religion and
1
Hannah Arendt, ‘What is Authority’ in Between Past and Future: Six
Exercises in Political Thought (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), 95.
2
Ibid, 122.
3
Ibid, 124.
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2 of 29 sohaira siddiqui
authority for Arendt is the Roman Empire, whose sacred myth enables it
to survive many transformations, the most important being from
republic to Christian empire. The secularization of the empire, coupled
with the loss of religion, destabilized this trinity and jeopardized
tradition and authority, eventually bringing about what Arendt charac-
terizes as the modern crisis of authority in which power and authority
are conflated, and the importance of tradition, religion and authority is
neglected. Luckily, however, ‘the loss of worldly permanence and
reliability—which politically is identical with the loss of authority—
does not entail, at least not necessarily, the loss of the human capacity for
building, preserving and caring for a world’4 and societies can continue

to progress and flourish despite the absence and crisis of authority.
Arendt’s critique of the conflation of power and authority in Western
political thought can similarly be extended to Islamic political thought,
where a pragmatic strain focusing on physical power is present. And
while political thought is far from uniform in Islamic intellectual history,
most juridical treatises emphasize the necessity of a powerful Caliph to
ensure order within the Empire. The sacred beginning in the Islamic
context was the Prophet himself, whose legislative, judicial, political and
religious actions made him the perfect prism though which all authori-
tative duties could be understood. His death, thus, ushered in a series of
practical problems for the Muslim community as these duties could no
longer be undertaken by any single individual.5 Nevertheless, to ensure
continuity of the Prophet’s message, the locus of the community’s efforts
turned towards understanding, conveying and enacting his political
precedence.
The question initially focused on who was the most fitting, or
legitimate, to succeed the Prophet in his worldly-political affairs. Ab<
Bakr, the Prophet’s closest companion, undertook this obligation with
little resistance, particularly as he was regarded highly in the nascent
Muslim community and possessed the requisite qualities and criteria to
be accepted by the Madinan and Makkan polities. Ab< Bakr understood
his position as a successor to the Prophet and a maintainer of his legacy,
an ideal also shared by Ab< Bakr’s successors. However, following the
assassination of 6Uthm:n, controversy surrounded the question of
leadership leading to tribulations (fitnas) for the fledgling Muslim
4
Ibid, 95.
5
This was the conclusion reached by the Sunni community whereas the Shi6i
community eventually articulated the doctrine of the im:mate in which the im:m
was seen as an infallible spiritual and legal leader. For the development of this
early doctrine see Heinz Halm, Shi6ism (New York: Columbia University Press,
2nd edn., 2004).
POWER, AUTHORITY AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 3 of 29
community.6 At the heart of the disagreement between parties was the
question of who was to be considered a Muslim,7 and also a legitimate
ruler over the Muslim community. The most prominent articulations
regarding legitimate leadership were promulgated by the Kh:rij;s,8
proto-Shi6is, and the Umayyads. All three groups grappled with the
question of authority and power and emphasized them to varying
degrees. It is important to note that authority in these early conversations
was most intimately tied to what Arendt has noted as tradition, namely
that which connects one back to a sacred authority. However, the groups
emphasized different elements of tradition; for the Umayyads and the

proto-Shi6is it was their familial ties which made them heirs to
the Prophet’s legacy, and for Kh:rij;s, strident emphasis was placed on
the supremacy of the text and its injunctions. What connected all three
6
The overall issue of the Caliphate, referred to in kal:m treatises as a
discussion on the Im:mate, was first and foremost a theological issue which
established the basic conceptualization and defence of the Sunni doctrine of the
Im:mate. In the texts these discussions usually came last and focused on four
primary issues: (1) the necessity of the Caliphate, (2) whether this necessity is
established via reason or revelation, (3) the fallibility of the im:m (which was in
response to the Sh;6; doctrine of infallibility), and (4) the order of the im:ms or
Caliphs after the death of the Prophet (also in response to the Sh;6; belief that 6Al;
was the only true successor). Later juridical discussions built upon the
foundations erected by the kal:m texts.
7
In the debate of who was considered to be a Muslim, in addition to the
Kh:rij;s and proto-Shi6is, the Murji8a also played a crucial role. Standing in
contrast to the Kh:rij;s, the Murji8a understood faith (;m:n)—to the exclusion of
action—as the decisive criterion and deferred judgment on the faith of individual
believers, arguing that only God could adequately pass judgment. Their doctrine
of postponed judgment (irj:’) meant that to the extent that leaders proclaimed
themselves to be Muslim, they were legitimate. Early polemics between the
Kh:rij;s, Murji8a and proto-Shi6is can be found in Wilfred Madelung, ‘Early
Sunn; Doctrine concerning Faith as reflected in the Kit:b al-;m:n of Ab< 6Ubayd
al-Q:sim b. Sall:m (d. 224/839)’, in Studia Islamica, 32 (1970), 233–54; Joseph
van Ess, Das Kit:b al-Irǧ:8 des Easan b. MuAammad b. al-Eanafiyya, in
Arabica, 21 (1974): 20–52; and Patricia Crone and Fritz Zimmermann, The
Epistle of S:lim ibn Dhakw:n (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
8
The Kh:rij;s espoused the most stringent criteria for legitimate leadership
constructed upon their rejection of faith without works, which entailed the
apostasy of a sinner. If the leader was a known sinner the Kh:rij;s averred that his
immediate removal was obligatory, by force if necessary, and also their
excommunication from the community. When the Kh:rij;s split later into the
Najdis and Azraqis, the former would only excommunicate individuals if they
committed a grave sin, though they maintained the overall puritanistic doctrine
with regard to legitimate leadership.
was their recognition that physical power was essential to create and
maintain a pious polity.
Eventually when hereditary succession became the norm under the
Ummayad dynasty, and new areas, cultures, and peoples came under the
purview of the Caliph in Damascus, the emphasis on Arendt’s notion of
authority as tradition waned and was replaced by discussion of physical
power in order to address the complexities of governing a vast and
diverse empire.9 From the fifth/eleventh century onward, jurists and
philosophers contributed to the growing theorization of the Caliphate,
each writing with a unique set of influences and concerns.10 Issues
addressed within these treatises ranged from the selection of a legitimate

leader, to usurpation, to the selection of judges, to the granting of land;
and although all emphasized the importance of religion, pragmatic
political concerns remained the driving force. Of these early treatises, al-
Ahk k:m al-sul3:niyya by Ab< al-H k asan al-M:ward; (d. 450/1058),
emerged as the most lauded as it fused together the doctrinal concern of
legitimate leadership, the practical concerns of governing, and the legal
ramifications of both.11
9
The difficulty of governing a vast empire can be noted in legal texts which
quickly began to address the issue of non-Muslims under Muslim rule (dhimm;
rules). Anver Emon argues that, as opposed to being seen as rules of exclusion or
oppression, they should be seen as resulting from the challenge of governing a
diverse polity. The rules, as such, cannot be read as being ‘constitutive of an
Islamic ethos’, but they do point towards deeper questions with regards to
governance and the rule of law. For more, see Anver Emon, Religious Pluralism
and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, [2012] 2014).
10
For the most recent account of the development of Islamic political thought
see Ovamir Anjum, Politics, Law and Community: The Taymiyyan Moment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [2012] 2014), chs. 2 and 3.
11
al-M:ward;’s treatise represents the genre of political thought written by
jurists, i.e., it was concerned with addressing the realities of political power
through the legal reasoning of the jurist. Other genres of political thought existed
such as the mirror for princes in which the overwhelming concern was to ensure
the survival of the ruling elite. Representative of this genre is Ibn al-Muqaffa6’s (d.
139/756) Kal;la wa-Dimna. Finally, there was political thought influenced by the
Greek philosophical tradition which was predominantly eudaemonistic in
nature: al-F:r:b;’s al-Mad;na al-f:dk ila most aptly captures this trend. In addition
to noting these three genres, Ovamir Anjum argues that four dimensions must be
analysed when looking at any political thought: the sociopolitical context in
which it is penned, the location of the text within a larger discursive tradition, its
stance towards elements of political life and its underlying moral vision. Thus the
distinction between these three strands of political thought represents deeper
fissures both in terms of theory and content. See Anjum, Politics, 19.
Ovamir Anjum’s recent account of the history of Islamic political
thought aptly highlights the developmental shift from authority to
power, and in doing so demonstrates both the florescence and
polarization of Islamic political thought. He argues that following
the death of the Prophet until about a century and a half later there
were two competing visions of political rule. The first, a community-
centred vision,12 emphasized the centrality of the umma in any
conversation regarding authority; and the second, a rule-centred
vision, emphasized the power of the Caliph.13 While the former had
the ideological edge, the latter was practically exigent and thus by the

second/eighth and third/ninth century, Anjum argues, the rule-centred
vision became dominant and the texts penned after this period
captured this stance. Adopting the rule-centred vision had far-reaching
consequences and, as Anjum explains, it eventually came to thwart the
community’s claim to any meaningful political involvement. This shift
is noticeable in political treatises where a discussion of the community
is largely absent and the focus is predominantly on matters of
statecraft.14 According to Anjum, the articulation of a rule-centred
vision first appears in the works of Ab< Bakr Muhammad ibn al-
Tayyib al-B:qill:n; (d. 403/1013)15 and Ab< Mans<r 6Abd _ al-Q:hir al-
_ 16 _
Baghd:d; (d. 429/1037) and is carried through by al-M:ward;, 6Abd
al-M:lik ibn Y<suf al-Juwayn; (d. 478/1085), Ab< H:mid al-Ghaz:l;
(d. 505/1111)17 until a shift is finally advocated for_ by Taq; al-D;n
12
Anjum (Politics, 61–2) Polargues that the community-centred vision had
five central elements: ‘(1) It places the umma, the community of all believers, as
the recipient of the Prophet’s mission to humankind. . ..(2) It requires rendering
qualified obedience to authorities from among themselves. (3) It requires sh<r:,
the practice of participation and consultation in collective affairs and, (4) by
corollary, considers the Community’s collective affairs in need of rational human
management. Finally, . . .(5) This vision considers the caliph answerable to those
he rules, the Community’.
13
In explicating the rule-centred vision, Anjum states (ibid, 71), ‘In this new
vision, we find subjects of the caliph as passive recipients of his guidance and
discipline. Their obligation is to obey God and hence the caliph appointed by
God, whose job it is to establish God’s Shari6a—obedience to the caliph is
tantamount to obedience to God’.
14
Anjum, Politics, 85–107.
15
On al-Baqill:n;’s political thought see Yusuf Ibish, The Political Doctrine of
al-Baqillani (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1966).
16
See Ab< Mansk <r 6Abd al-Q:hir b. F:hir al-Baghd:d;, Kit:b Us k <l al-d;n,
(Istanbul: Ma3ba6at al-Dawla, 1928).
17
There are a variety of places where al-Ghaz:l; discusses his political
thought. The primary one is Fad k :’ihk al-b:3inyya (ed. 6Abd al-Rahm:n Badaw;;
Ahk mad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328).18 Ibn Taymiyya, for Anjum,
champions a return to the community-centred vision which is the only
legitimate and authentic model when measured against Prophetic
practice.19 Placing Anjum’s arguments within the framework of
authority and power as argued by Arendt, the early community-
centred vision would reflect a focus on authority, tradition and
religion, while the later rule-centred vision would primarily be centred
on power.
While I largely agree with the astute observations made by Anjum, in
focusing on Ibn Taymiyya he does not fully evince the thought of other

scholars he mentions. In this article, I will add another layer to the
discussion by explaining the ideas of al-Juwayn; whose political thought
has important ramifications on the way authority and power are
constructed and understood in Islamic political thought. I will demon-
strate that al-Juwayn; did not altogether abandon the community-
centred vision in his political thought and while it is correct to say that in
his primary text on political thought Ghiy:th al-umam f; iltiy:th
al-Culam (the Saviour of the Nations Shrouded in Darkness)20 al-Juwayn;
Cairo: al-D:r al-Qawmiyya li-l-Fiba6a wa-l-Nashr, 1964). For a full discussion of

the various texts in which he discusses his political thought see Carole
Hillenbrand, ‘Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? al-Ghaz:l;’s Views on
Government’, Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, 26 (1988):
81–94; and Leonard Binder, ‘al-Ghaz:l;’s Theory of Islamic Government’, The
Muslim World, 45/3 (1955): 229–41.
18
See Taq; al-D;n Ibn Taymiyya, Kit:b al-Siy:sa al-shar6;yya f; iBl:h al-r:6; wa-
l-r:6iyya (Beirut: D:r al-Af:q al-Jad;da, 1983).
19
Anjum, (Politics, 168–9) argues that the shift away from a community-
centred vision was not just about politics, but most fundamentally about law and
theology, and more specifically epistemology: ‘The foundations of the classical
caliphate theory, namely a ritualistic understanding of the caliphate and
depoliticization of the community, were underpinned by theological cynicism
toward reason in post-revelational life on the one hand and elitism on the other,
both of which deepened as the Sunni kal:m doctrine matured in the classical
period. Both elitism and cynicism toward reason militated against the other
option, that of resurrecting and reimagining a community-centred vision of
Islam. A politically vibrant society requires grounding political practice and
theory in the normative apparatus of society, which the sociopolitical trends of
the classical period had made difficult to attain and the intellectual commitments
of the age had rendered impossible to imagine.’ Therefore what Ibn Taymiyya
advocates is not merely a political shift, but a paradigmatic one.
20
Hereafter referred to as the Ghiy:th;. All translations and references to the
text are based on the following critical edition: al-Juwayn;, Ghiy:th al-umam (ed
6Abd al-6AC;m al-D;b; Beirut: D:r al-Minh:j, 2011).
devotes an extensive amount of time to issues of basic statecraft and
power, his treatise is unique among his peers and predecessors because he
moves beyond theorizing about the Caliphate to theorizing about its
absence. This is crucially important as al-Juwayn; does not make the
continuation of the Shari6a contingent on the presence of the Caliphate;
instead, with the collapse of the Caliphate and the absence of a legitimate
im:m, al-Juwayn; argues that society will continue vis-à-vis a newfound
reliance on mujtahids coupled with the legal knowledge of Shari6a norms
which have become imbricated in the practice of smaller believing
communities. The ability of the Shari6a to obviate social crisis and ensure
the continuity of law displaces the centrality and power of the im:m (i.e.,

a rule-centred vision) and postulates that stability and continuity rest on
the people’s adherence to Shari6a norms and the legal scholars who
safeguard them (i.e. a community-centred vision). Implicit within this
argument is the notion that it is the Shari6a, and its practice by
individuals, which provides a source of authority and governance in lieu
of formal government.
By emphasizing the role of the community in the absence of the im:m
al-Juwayn; recognizes the distinction between authority and power, and
the foundational nature of the former in relation to the continuity of
society. Furthermore, he also recognizes that authority cannot be
confined to a single individual or institution, nor can it be due to
overwhelming or totalizing power. Rather, authority is placed in the
Shari6a and in communal homage to it, so that, in the absence of formal
power in the form of the Caliphate, the authority of Shari6a can facilitate
order. On this basis I argue that al-Juwayn; differentiates between power
proper, which is inextricably tied to the presence of government, and
authority, which can eclipse governmental structures and provide social
order. As such, al-Juwayn; grudgingly accepts the absence of the im:m
only, because he believes that the Shari6a will continue to provide
stability and continuity, even if only to limited form. This dualism in al-
Juwayn;’s thought envisages a political system contingent on both power
in the form of government, and authority, in the form of the Shari6a. It
allows him to think beyond the institution of the Caliphate to construct a
symbiotic system in which the power of the Caliphate is reliant upon the
authority of the Shari6a, which is diffused in society and is both prior to,
and exists well after, any formal manifestation of power. This distinction
shows al-Juwayn;’s ‘awareness that the source of authority transcends
power and those who are in power’,21 and enables a political philosophy
better situated to transcend temporal situations and adapt to the
contours of novel or changed historical situations.
21
Arendt, Between Past and Future, 141.
THE STRUCTURE OF GHIY2TH AL-UMAM AND

ITS RECEPTION
The Ghiy:th;, while commingling practical and theoretical situations, is

primarily a proleptic text best described as a philosophical thought
experiment with various strata cohering to form a cogent political
expression. It is neatly divided into three sections. The first focuses on the
establishment of the im:m, duties related to ideal government, and
questions of legitimacy more broadly; the second focuses on the collapse
of government in a manner that eliminates the possibility of returning to

any form of ideal government; and the third marks the apogee of al-
Juwayn;’s philosophical enquiry, with a discussion of an acephalous
society devoid of formal and informal structures of governance. While
his investigations are broadly theoretical, they are also married to his
own historical context, one in which the 6Abbasids were suffering great
political losses.22 This allows him to both hypothesize situations which
were largely unarticulated by his predecessors and to reach conclusions
which challenge previously accepted positions on the im:mate.23 To
22
Historically it is important to note that when al-Juwayn; was writing the
Ghiy:th; power politics in the region were anything but straightforward. In
Baghdad the 6Abbasid caliphate retained the formal seat of power, but actual
power had been transferred to dynastic rulers, the most important at the time
being the Seljuks. Niz:m al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), albeit just a vizier by title, was
_
at the zenith of his power. This power was expanded by the death of Alp Arslan
in 465/1072. The throne passed to his adolescent son Maliksh:h (d. 485/1092),
necessitating the continuation of Niz:m al-Mulk’s virtual control of power. Al-
Juwayn; was astutely cognisant of these _ political realities: the second section of
his book provides insight into al-Juwayn;’s opinion of the political situation
during the time of Alp Arslan (d. 465/1072) and Maliksh:h. It is also important
to note that the Ghiy:th; itself was written at the behest of Nizk :m al-Mulk
himself and, in the second section of the book, after discussing what is to be done
in the absence of a qualified individual for the im:mate, al-Juwayn; digresses
briefly to praise his patron directly: see Ghiy:th;, 532–6. In addition to providing
political guidance, Niz:m al-Mulk introduced policies directed at the social and
intellectual betterment _ of the Muslim Empire such as his creation of the
Niz:miyya madrasas. For a complete biography of Niz:m al-Mulk see H. Bowen
and_ C. E. Bosworth, art. ‘NiC:m al-Mulk’, EI2. http://referenceworks.brillonline.
_
com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nizam-al-mulk-SIM_5942; last accessed 21
February 2014. For a more extensive biography See Sajid Rizvi’s, Nizam al-Mulk
Tusi: His Contribution to Statecraft, Political Theory and the Art of Government
(Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1978).
23
Fu8:d 6Abd al-Mun6im AAmad and MuBtaf: Hilm; elaborate on the
differences between al-Juwayn; and al-M:ward;_ in the _ introduction of their
intellectually defend this position in the introduction to his book he
emphasizes his cardinal principle that matters pertaining to the im:mate
are lacking in certainty (mas:8il mazn<na), naturally opening them up
for contestation and reformulation.24_ Thus when al-Juwayn; veers from
previous positions on the im:mate, he invokes this principle, reminding
the reader that the majority of matters within Islamic political thought
are uncertain due to the scant mention of them in the Qur8:n or
Prophetic had;th. Also, he does not demarcate political thought as an
independent _ discipline apart, as wholly distinct from other disciplines.
On the contrary, he examines the various disciplines, exploring religious,

legal, theological, historical and philosophical enquiries as a means to
augment his study. The result is that al-Juwayn;’s political thought
intertwines various disciplines within Islamic thought while also high-
lighting the concentric issues which serve as the centrifugal element in his
interdisciplinary enquiry.
Despite al-Juwayn;’s savant manner of writing and the novel enquiries
he undertakes, he is virtually ignored or marginalized in scholarly studies
of Islamic political thought. Erwin Rosenthal, in Political Thought in
Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline (Cambridge, 1958), describes
the theories of al-M:ward;, al-Ghaz:l;, Ibn Jam:6a, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn
Khald<n, as well as those of philosophers influenced by the Greek
eudaemonistic tradition, but al-Juwayn; is overlooked despite his
immense influence on al-Ghaz:l; and Ibn Khald<n. In Ann Lambton’s
State and Government in Medieval Islam (1981), dedicates a chapter to
al-Juwayn; and al-Ghaz:l;, but al-Juwayn;’s thought is summarized in a
few pages, utilizing his theological texts more than his Ghiy:th;, and the
sparse pages then primarily as a transition to the thought of al-Ghaz:l;,
rather than an evaluation and elaboration of his doctrine
edition of the Ghiy:th;. See al-Juwayn;, Ghiy:th al-umam f; iltiy:th al-Culam

(eds. Fu8:d 6Abd al-Mun6im AAmad and MuBtaf: Hilm;; Alexandria: D:r al-
Da6wa, 1979). _ _
24
al-Juwayn; in his introduction argues that the only matter within the
discussion of the im:mate which has been decisively established is its necessity.
This necessity is established through consensus (ijm:6) which is absent in all other
subsidiary matters concerning the im:mate. The absence of decisive proofs for
other matters leaves them vulnerable to debate, allowing al-Juwayn; to later
contest many of them. For the full discussion see al-Juwayn;, Ghiy:th; 210–39,
for his conclusion see 239 and 244 and specifically paragraphs 62 and 72. There
are a couple editions of al-Juwayn;’s text, so to make it easier for those who want
to find his specific arguments in the remainder of the article I will note the
paragraph numbers as opposed to the page number.
independently.25 However, perhaps most surprising is Anthony Black’s
History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present
(Edinburgh, 2001), which does not even include al-Juwayn; in the
extensive timeline it provides in the opening pages. If one searches they
will find that the most space dedicated to al-Juwayn; is five pages in
Patricia Crone’s God’s Rule—Government and Islam: Six Centuries of
Medieval Islamic Political Thought26 and an article by Wael Hallaq
titled, ‘Caliphs, Jurists and the Salj<qs in the Political Thought of
Juwayn;’.27 However, both Crone and Hallaq focus more on the skeletal
outline of the book and reflect on al-Juwayn;’s views on the politics of his

time as opposed to presenting his overall political thought. This lacuna in
the study of al-Juwany; should not be understated. A potential reason for
the oversight of the Ghiy:th; can be attributed to a lack of awareness of
the text itself, or its relatively late publication in 1979.28 Paul E. Walker,
in the preface to his translation of al-Juwayn;’s Kit:b al-Irsh:d, laments
that the scholarly literature on al-Juwayn; and his work is ‘woefully
thin’, likely because the prominence of his student al-Ghaz:l; has
detracted from the study of al-Juwayn;.29 Scholars have also been
deterred from undertaking a comprehensive study of his work by al-
Juwayn;’s allusive metaphorical style.30 As for the Ghiy:th; itself,
because al-Juwayn; is most revered for his theological and legal works,
25
See Ann. K. S. Lambon, State and Government in Medieval Islam: An
Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981), ch. 7. Al-Juwayn;’s thought is summarized at
103–6, with the rest of the chapter to p. 129 being devoted to al-Ghaz:l;.
26
Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004), 234–7.
27
Wael Hallaq, ‘Caliphs, Jurists and Salj<qs in the Political Thought of
Juwayn;’, The Muslim World, 74 (1984): 26–41.
28
See n. 23, above.
29
Paul E. Walker (transl.), A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the Principles
of Belief: Kit:b al-Irsh:d il: qawati6 al-adilla f; uB<l al-i6tiq:d (Reading: Garnet
Publishing, 2000), Translator’s Introduction, xvii.
30
The most comprehensive study of al-Juwayn; in Western academia has been
Tilman Nagel’s, Die Festung des Glaubens: Triumph und Scheitern des
islamischen Rationalisms im 11. Jahrhundert (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988). In
it, Nagel investigates the notion of decline and destiny of religious thought vis-à-
vis the production of scholars, focusing on the ideas of al-Juwayn;. He examines
all facets of al-Juwayn;’s scholarship, but his most important contribution is
illuminating the ostensible connection between al-Juwayn;’s socio-political
context and his religious scholarship. Nagel argues that al-Juwayn; in his
kal:m is primarily concerned with achieving certainty such that theological
questions have definitive answers.
even scholars who undertake the study of al-Juwayn; himself often omit
the Ghiy:th; from consideration.
This article will attempt to address this lacuna but in assaying the text
the narrow focus will be on excavating his bifurcation between authority
and power, leaving future avenues for fruitful research open. To this
extent this article will be divided into two parts: the first will concentrate
on al-Juwayn;’s notion of power vis-à-vis his opinions on the selection of
the most legitimate candidate to lead the Muslim community, and the
second will concentrate on the location of authority in the absence of a
Caliphate.

The Foundation: Electors, the Im:m and Power
Al-Juwayn; commences the Ghiy:th; with a discussion on the various
methods of appointing the im:m. The four methods are: appointment by
textual designation (nask ks ), appointment by ‘those who loosen and bind’
(ahl al-hall wa-l-6aqd),31 appointment by the existing im:m (tawliy:t al-
‘ahd) and_ appointment through usurpation. The first he rejects as
illegitimate,32 and the last he only accepts in dire circumstances, so his
31
In all Islamic political texts written from the perspective of Sunni jurists, ahl
al-hall wa-l-6aqd are mentioned as the body of individuals who appoint the
_ The method of appointing them, and the various functions which they can
im:m.
undertake, is not always addressed uniformly. For more see Muhammad Qasim
Zaman, ‘Ahl al-Aall wa-l-6aqd’, EI3: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/
entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/ahl-al-h-all-wa-l-aqd-COM_0027); last ac-
cessed 30 November 2014.
32
His rejection of textual designation for appointment is most likely an attack
on the Shi6i notion of designation of the im:m, which was of particular concern
to him after the establishment of the F:t k imid caliphate in Northern Africa. The
F:timids began their reign in North Africa and subsequently spread to Africa
_
where they ruled from 297/909 until 567/1171. The dynasty’s claim to legitimacy
was founded on Ism:6;lism which, in addition to being a theological articulation,
was also highly political. Without going into details about this dynasty, which is
beyond the scope of this article, the F:3imids were particularly important to Alp
Arslan and al-Juwayn; for two reasons. First, they established a counter-caliphate
to the 6Abbasids, resulting in the presence of two caliphates during the same time
period, and although this was also the case during the Umayyads with the
presence of the caliphate in Cordoba, the F:timid caliphate was particularly
_
troublesome because of their Shi6i beliefs. The strong presence of Ism:6;lism was
the second concern of Alp Arslan and others, and the desire to establish orthodox
belief, in contrast to what was deemed as the heretical beliefs of the F:timids,
grew increasingly important. For a more detailed history of the rise _of the
F:timids, their doctrinal beliefs and their institutions, see the in text citations and
_
bibliography of Canard’s article in the Encyclopedia of Islam. ‘F:3imids’, EI2:
two preferred methods are either electoral appointment or succession.
Because succession simply involves the designation of the new im:m by
the previous one, his most illuminating contribution is the discussion on
the appointment through those who loosen and bind. These individuals
are charged with appointing the im:m through a process of selection and
contracting (al-ikhtiy:r wa-l-6aqd), and hereon I will refer to them as the
electors.
A qualified elector according to al-Juwayn; must be: male, free,
Muslim, knowledgeable (6:lim), pious, and powerful. The requirement to
be male and free is to ensure that the electors are independent in their
decision making, precluding slaves and women who are perceived to be

reliant on their masters and menfolk respectively. As for being Muslim,
pious and knowledgeable, the gravity of the electors’ duty necessitates
that they be upright Muslims who are familiar with the duties of the
im:m and are able to discern those individuals who can best discharge
them. The last, and most important quality, is that the electors possess
power (shawka). Shawka for al-Juwayn; refers to the social and political
power of influence which the electors should possess such that their
selection of the im:m would naturally lead to general acceptance by the
masses. To illustrate this point he uses the example of ‘Umar b. al-
Kha33:b who was at first the sole individual to pledge allegiance to Ab<
Bakr, after which, the rest of the community followed. For al-Juwayn;
this occurred because of 6Umar’s shawka which naturally influenced the
actions of others.33 The emphasis on shawka indicates that the overall
objective of the electors is to secure the obedience of the masses and to
this extent he states, ‘For the objective [of the im:mate] is the attainment
of obedience (al-tk :6a)’.34 The electors, capitalizing on their public
influence, are able to attain the allegiance of the masses and facilitate the
creation of an obedient community. The obedience achieved by the
electors leads to stability35 and thus the two are interwoven; electors
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/fatimids-
COM_0218; last accessed: 30 November 2014. Also see, Marshall Hodgson,
‘The Ism:6;l; State’ in The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), v. 422–82.
33
Ghiy:th;, 82–96.
34
Ibid, 90.
35
al-Juwayn; utilizes numerous terms in the Ghiyath; to invoke the notion of
stability. The most frequently used are al-istiqr:r, al-ittis:q and al-intiz:m. And
though more than one term is utilized, all terms conceptually refer to the _ idea of
stable government which for al-Juwayn; entails no external threats, in the form
of foreign invaders, and no internal threats, in the form of rebels. Based on this,
security and orderliness are both inextricably connected to stability, which
explains why he uses different but related terms.
select a suitable im:m and by virtue of their selection, shawka, and
behaving in accordance with a delineated method of selection, obedience
and stability are guaranteed.
After concluding his discussion on the qualifications of the electors, al-
Juwayn; turns to the opinions of his predecessors on the minimum
number of electors required to legitimately choose the im:m. In both
discussions he argues that his predecessors constructed parochial systems
of election which were fixated simply upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions. As an example, al-Juwayn; argues that al-Qad; al-B:qill:n;36
_
required that the electors be independent jurists (mujtahids), which he
considers to be a superfluous condition as it alone cannot fulfill the

intended objective for selection—obedience; rather, it is only shawka
which can ensure the obedience of the masses.37 This means that the
religious stature of the electors, or their knowledge, is not as essential as
the influence they can command over the masses. Building upon this
conceptualization of the functionality of the electors, al-Juwayn; again
disagrees with his predecessors regarding the number of electors required
for appointment of the im:m. After mentioning the various opinions
present, ranging from those who require complete consensus (ijm:6) to
those who stipulate the minimum as two, four or even forty,38 al-
Juwayn; rejects them all, seeing the number as having no direct bearing
upon the results, and he remains fixed on the result of selection as
opposed to its conditions. In his opinion, even one elector can contract
the im:m as long as that elector possesses shawka. Taking this further, he
accepts the appointment of the im:m in secrecy as long as it is announced
post facto and accepted by the people. Resorting once again to the
precedent of 6Umar he argues that it establishes the permissibility of a
single elector. That being said, if a single individual does not possess
enough influence or power, then additional electors will be required until
the ultimate objective of obedience is achieved. As a principle then, al-
Juwayn;’s minimum is continuously subject to revision as it is contingent
upon creating the desired outcome.
The fluid conditions surrounding the selection of the im:m demon-
strate that the electors do not serve as the sole mechanism to legitimate
the im:m; they are merely facilitating and ensuring the obedience of the
people which is the true marker of legitimacy and the only way to
maintain a stable and cohesive polity. And while their position in society
36
al-B:qill:n; discusses his political thought in Kit:b al-Tamh;d (ed. and
comm. Ritshard Y<suf Mak:rth;; Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyya, 1957). Al-
Juwayn; responds to this condition in Ghiy:th;, 73–81.
37
Ibid, 89.
38
Ibid, 73–81.
prevents discomfiture, if obedience can be obtained without election,
their role is redundant. We thus see in the second section of the Ghiy:th;
that al-Juwayn; legitimizes the rule of im:m vis-à-vis the usurpation of
the seat of the im:m without any electoral input.39 Despite the stringent
parameters imposed upon this scenario, it evinces al-Juwayn;’s belief that
the legitimacy of the im:m is not solely restricted to appointment by
electors but the power he is able to manifest in front of the masses.
Upon completing the discussion on the method of electing the im:m
and the purpose of selection, al-Juwayn; provides a detailed account of
the ideal characteristics that the im:m should possess. In this investiga-

tion he divides the qualities into four: sensory qualities, bodily qualities,
inherent qualities and acquired qualities.40 The qualities related to the
senses are the ability to hear, see and speak and for the bodily
qualifications he simply states that the loss of any limb which can
jeopardize sound governing renders the im:m illegitimate. Turning to
inherent qualifications, they are Quraysh; descent,41 maleness, free
39
The discussion of usurpation in the Ghiy:th; focuses on three unique cases
of usurpation, each one successively more problematic than the previous. The
first is by someone who fulfills the requisite conditions of the im:m; the second is
by one who only fulfills the condition of competence (kif:ya); and the final is by
one who does not fulfill either condition. In the first scenario al-Juwayn; assumes
that the person seeking the im:mate is the only qualified candidate at the time. At
the end of the section on usurpation, he provides two important statements
which summarize his guiding logic in permitting usurpation. In the first he states,
‘The completion of this discussion necessitates the establishment of a principle,
which is: If there is one candidate [suitable for the position of the im:m], there is
no need for selection or contracting. However, it is necessary that he demonstrate
power and vigour and call people to obedience. If he does that, then he is the
im:m of both those who consent and follow [his rule], and those who rebel and
reject [his rule];’ and in the second he argues, ‘. . .it is not permitted to give
allegiance [to the one who has usurped power]. [However], if one [ascends to the
office of the im:m] due to a reason, and the people coalesce to support him, if
one desires to dispose of him, it will not be possible [due to public support of
him], and will cause intolerable discord (fitna) and a dispute with far reaching
consequences. For [the sake of] stability, regularity and comfort for Muslims, it is
necessary to appoint him [as im:m], as previously stated’: ibid, 457, 471. As a
basic principle, then, al-Juwayn; opposes the usurpation of political power;
however, if the im:m in power is no longer the recipient of popular allegiance, or
is not competent to lead, then he permits usurpation by an individual who is.
40
He lays out this division at the beginning of the chapter on the required
qualifications of the im:m. Ibid, 97.
41
On the requirement that the im:m be from the tribe of Quraysh, al-Juwayn;
has a more extensive discussion. He argues that the h k ad;th most commonly cited
in support of this position, namely ‘the im:ms must be from Quraysh’, is not a
status, soundness of mind, maturity and Islam. As for acquired qualities
they are knowledge at the level of a mujtahid, piety, and the possession of
support and competence (dh< al-najda wa-l-kif:ya).42 Contrary to other
theorists, al-Juwayn; states that the intended objective for specifying
these characteristics is the attainment of independent leadership and,
although he acknowledges that the im:m will be supported by other
individuals or bodies functioning within the broader governing struc-
tures of the caliphate, the im:m must have the political power and
competency to lead independently. This opinion is grounded in the
trepidation al-Juwayn; harbours concerning a weak im:m—if the im:m

is reliant on others, he cannot command the obedience of the people, nor
will he be able to discharge his duties sufficiently. As a result, al-Juwayn;
becomes fixated upon the quality of competency (kif:ya),43 a preoccu-
pation which can be most vividly seen in his discussion on the
appointment of an inferior candidate (al-mafd<l).
The appointment of an inferior candidate for _ the im:mate is permitted
by al-Juwayn; only in extenuating circumstances, when either the
appointment of an ideal candidate is impossible or unfeasible as it would
mutaw:tir hk ad;th and therefore cannot afford enough knowledge to establish

this as a definitive requirement. Instead, he argues that the continuous acceptance
of scholars throughout the generations stands as the strongest proof of its
requirement as their continuous acceptance is the equivalent of consensus (ijm:6).
In fact, he notes that only one individual, D k ir:r b. 6Amr argued against this
position. See Ibid, 106–8.
42
Ibid, 90–1. These characteristics differ from those set out by his predeces-
sors, especially from al-M:ward;. Al-M:ward; states that there are seven
requirements for the im:m: justice (6adl), knowledge (6ilm), sound senses (sal:mat
al-haw:ss), sound body (sal:mat al-a6ad:8), prudence (r:8y), courage (shaj:6a)
and_ Quraysh; lineage (al-nasb). When _juxtaposing al-Juwayn;’s requirements
with al-M:ward;’s, aside from al-Juwayn;’s additional emphasis on piety (al-
wara6), the most important difference is that while al-Juwayn; is willing to renege
on almost all of his qualifications, al-M:ward; is not amenable to compromise.
43
Although al-Juwayn; isolates kif:ya as the most important requirement for
the im:mate he does not define it clearly in the Ghiy:th; or his smaller texts.
However, his student al-Ghaz:l; does, and it is likely based on how al-Juwayn;
employs the term in the Ghiy:th; that his student later uses it. Al-Ghaz:l; states,
‘it is the capacity to seek the correct way in difficult matters (mu6addal:t al-um<r)
and capacity to acquire information and make a correct decision when various
harmful outcomes are possible’. See al-Ghaz:l;, Fa@:8ih al-b:3iniyya, 185. Carole
Hillenbrand understands kif:ya to be a type of political competency, or more
specifically ‘competence to govern’. See Hillenbrand, ‘Islamic Orthodoxy or
Realpolitik?’, 84.
undoubtedly lead to chaos.44 In this scenario he is willing to forgo all
required qualities except competency. To this extent he states:
It was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter that the most qualified is the
most fit [for the im:mate]. If we are assigned to gather the prominent conditions,
on one side is utmost piety, and on the other, competence. We put the second,
competence, before it [piety], because it guides to the path of politics and
statesmanship, and piety cannot lead to this end. Therefore, competence is
highest in priority. . ... Knowledge comes after competence and after good
character, since knowledge is the best equipment and the strongest bond. With it,
the leader can handle matters by applying the rules of Islam. Lineage, though

considered when possible, does not fulfill an intelligible goal, but previous
consensus is the basis of its consideration.45
While al-Juwayn; continues to uphold the ideal qualifications of an

im:m, if circumstances do not permit that they are realized collectively,
he acquiesces and ranks the characteristics in order of importance. In the
above schematization, al-Juwayn; is most concerned with political
practicality and stability and therefore lineage emerges as of secondary
importance whereas the competency to lead independently is given
primacy. Elsewhere he acknowledges that coupling competency with
piety and knowledge is necessary to inhibit the rise of corruption.46 As
for the remaining characteristics after competency, despite being
arranged in a specific order above, further on it is evident that the
emphasis on any one characteristic is contingent upon the political
situation of the time. To illustrate this idea he juxtaposes two candidates,
one who is more apt in legal affairs and one who is astute in matters of
war. He argues that if the Islamic territories are secure from internal and
external enemies, but religious calamities are present leading to the
spread of heretical opinions, then a candidate more adept in religious
affairs is necessary. If on the other hand the internal affairs of the country
are well ordered but external threats are detected or present, then a
candidate versed in the art of warfare and statecraft is more suitable for
appointment.47 Evident from this is that all conditions with the
44
Here al-Juwayn; argues that if the appointment of an ideal candidate (al-
k il) will lead to chaos (ikhtib:3) and unruliness (fask :d) but the appointment of
f:d
the inferior candidate (al-mafdk <l) will lead to unity (irtib:3) and order (sad:d)
then the appointment of the inferior is preferred: Ghiy:th;, 246.
45
Ibid, 170–1.
46
To see his complete discussion on when an im:m becomes characterized by
corruptness (fisq), see 141–50. For his discussion on piety as a defence against
blameworthy characteristics, see 225.
47
Ibid, 170–1.
exception of competence are evaluated in accordance with what is most
congenial to the social and political needs of the polity at the time of
appointment.
Apparent from both al-Juwayn;’s exposition on the electors and the
qualifications of the im:m is his overwhelming political pragmatism. In
the case of the electors, while they initially seem to play an essential role
in ensuring the obedience of the masses, al-Juwayn;’s acceptance of the
powerful usurper demonstrates that the electors are indeed dispensable
and are primarily utilized to bolster the legitimacy of the im:m and the
stability of the appointment. As for the required qualifications of the

im:m, al-Juwayn; presents a similar goal-based logic; he puts forth a list
of ideal qualifications but recognizes that the overall objective in
delineating the exact requirements is to ensure that the im:m is able to
lead independently, which in turn fosters obedience from the populace.
Thus, when there is no ideal candidate al-Juwayn; accepts the appoint-
ment of an inferior (al-mafd<l) im:m as long as he is competent to lead
independently (kif:ya). This_ recurrent emphasis on power, the obedience
of the people and the competency to lead independently, becomes
ubiquitous as al-Juwayn; navigates through various political situations,
and is best exemplified in his discussion on the deposition of the im:m.
In the section on deposing the im:m al-Juwayn; discusses those
matters which necessitate it and the method of doing so. Al-Juwayn;
states:
[As for things which permit the deposing of the im:m, they are:] The inability to
provide sound judgment whose end is unlikely, the loss of allegiance, or illness
that affects judgment. [If the aforementioned] leads to clear disturbance and
unsettlement amongst us (i.e. the people), in the opinion of the electors, then his
deposition is necessary.48
Transitioning to the method of deposition itself, in all cases deposition
is executed by the electors who sever the contract with the im:m. If the
im:m resists, then it is permitted for the electors to treat him as a rebel
and undertake more drastic measures to ensure his complete removal.49
48
al-Juwayn;’s discussion on the deposition of the im:m is on pp. 138–64 with
his primary summary statement at 163.
49
In the case of deposition, the ideal for al-Juwayn; would be the removal of
the im:m by the electors and the simultaneous appointment of a qualified
candidate. If, however, the electors are unable to remove the im:m and his
continued presence leads to overall harm for the Muslim community, then he
allows for the people to rebel against the im:m in order to appoint a more
suitable leader. For more on al-Juwayn;’s position on rebellion see Ghiy:th;,
153–60; for an overview of the development of the Sunnii doctrine of rebellion
Extrapolating from the discussion on the appointment and deposition
of the im:m, it is clear that competency (kif:ya), obedience (t:8a), and
power are inextricably interrelated. Minimally, the im:m _ must be
competent because only a competent leader can guarantee the obedience
of individuals and establish stability. However, even though al-Juwayn;
primarily emphasizes the competency of the im:m, competency is a
manifestation of his political power, without which the obedience of the
people would be impossible. This focus is also seen in the section on the
electors where al-Juwayn; notes that their main qualifying trait is power
(shawka), and the only time the electors are superfluous is when the seat
of the im:m is usurped by another individual, who is arguably more

powerful than the im:m and therefore can secure obedience from the
masses without the intermediary of the electors. Thus, in both the case of
the qualifications of the im:m and the electors, while al-Juwayn; begins
by establishing a list of requirements, he eventually withdraws to the
emphasis of power in both scenarios as the only trait which is resistant to
any form of compromise. This continuous emphasis on power, however,
is not without consequence. With the heightened emphasis on power, and
the acceptance of an im:m who is powerful and competent, yet lacking
in other characteristics and qualifications, a difficulty emerges when the
im:m loses the one trait that truly legitimizes his rule.
THE LACUNA: THE ABSENCE OF

GOVERNMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF
JURISTIC AUTHORITY
The discussion on the absence of a competent im:m for the im:mate and
the subsequent dissolution of government marks a distinct transition in
al-Juwayn;’s political thought. In his earlier discussion of the im:m al-
Juwayn; divides the duties of the im:m between those pertaining to
worldly affairs (duny:), and those pertaining to religious affairs (d;n).50
With the loss of the im:m, a lacuna forms within the realm of worldly
affairs and al-Juwayn; is forced to confront the shortcomings of relying
solely on political power. Whereas previously al-Juwayn; was over-
whelmingly concerned with power and obedience, once political
see Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, [2001] 2002).
50
A discussion of the various duties of the im:m pertaining to worldly and
religious affairs is the focus for the first of the three sections of the Ghiy:th;. For
those related to d;n see 269–92 and for those related to duny: see 293–413.
leadership deteriorates, he turns to thinking about continuity and
authority in a more nuanced way. In fact, Arendt in her article ‘What is
Authority?’ argues similarly and states that power is essential for
stability, but for permanence, durability and continuity, authority is
essential. In the absence of the im:mate al-Juwayn; turns to mujtahids,
muftis and the Shari6a, which together become the central mechanism to
ensure the continuity and durability of society and can thus emerge as a
source of authority with the demise of political power.
In the absence of the im:mate the larger political community is broken
into smaller indigenous communities with traditional solidarities tying
them to independent jurists (mujtahids) and muftis,51 or their preserved

and transmitted rulings in the form of texts. Implicit within this new
order is al-Juwayn;’s belief that a large community must be governed by
a formal political apparatus in order to facilitate stability and order.
In the absence of such a governing body, stability and continuity are
brought about by allegiance to certain legal individuals and norms which
unite smaller communities, but are inadequate for larger ones. For al-
51
In al-Juwayn;’s Burh:n he does not distinguish between the mujtahid and
the mufti due to his understanding that every mufti must be capable of ijith:d.
However, here al-Juwayn; seems to be arguing that the mujtahid and the mufti
are two separate legal titles due to a difference in juristic capabilities. Thus,
whereas the mujtahid is capable of ijith:d and answering the novel legal queries
of individuals, the primary task of the mufti is the transmission of the mujtahids’
ideas, i.e., the mufti cannot independently exercise ijtih k :d. For this discussion see
al-Juwayn;, Burh:n f; us l <l al-fiqh (ed. ‘Abd al-Azl ;m al-D;b; Cairo: D:r al-AnB:r,
2nd edn., 2 vols., 1979), ii. 1333–7. There he argues that the main qualifications
of the mujtahid are mastery of the Arabic language, being well versed in the legal
verses of the Qur8:n, being familiar with the Sunna, and especially the rules of
h
k ad;th criticism, familiarity with orthodox theological tenets, and juridical
sagacity (fiqh al-nafs). Part of the reason al-Juwayn; may be using the terms
mujtahid and mufti in different ways is that he was living in a time when the
definitions of these terms were undergoing significant change. While early on, as
al-Juwayn; notes, a mufti must be a mujtahid, later on a vocational difference is
noted. For this historical development see Wael Hallaq, ‘Ifta8 and Ijtihad in Sunni
Legal Theory: A Developmental Account’ in Muhammad Khalid Masud et al.
(eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1996), 33–43, 336–7; id., A History of Islamic Legal
Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 117–18. To note the
development in the primary sources see Fakhr al-D;n al-R:z;, al-Mah k ks <l f; 6ilm
k <l ul-fiqh (ed. T
us k:ha J:bir Fayy:d al-6Alw:n;; Riyadh: J:mi6at al-Im:m
MuAammad b. Sa6<d al-Isl:miyya, 6 parts in 2 vols., 1979–81), iii. 30–36 and
Badr al-D;n al-Zarkash;, al-Bahk r al-muhk ;t k <l al-fiqh (ed. 6Abd al-Q:dir al-
k f; us
62n;; Kuwait: Wizar:t al-Awq:f wa-l-Shu8<n al-Islamiyya, 6 vols, ?1992), vi.
199–204.
Juwayn; these norms are found within the Shari6a itself and the universal
principles which it provides.52 In this sense, while al-Juwayn; concedes
the loss of political power, he sees that society is able to continue because
of the authority of the jurists, and more broadly the Shari6a. Maintaining
a sense of continuity is therefore in the purview of the mujtahids and they
do so by promulgating and preserving universal norms of the Shari6a.
A complete examination of this law-centred community is undertaken in
the third section of the Ghiy:th; which commences with the relationship
between individuals and mujtahids. Simply put, if mujtahids are present,

52
While the primary aim here is to focus on al-Juwayn;’s political thought, in
this section of the Ghiy:th; he is engaging in a larger legal-theological debate
regarding the fatigue of the Shari6a (fut<r al-shar;6a). This debate emerged in the
late third/ninth early fourth/tenth century and asked the fundamental question of
whether the world can be completely devoid of God’s guidance. There were two
primary answers to this question. The first, the Ash6ar; answer, was yes, a world
without any guidance and Shari6a is possible, as that is what happened to past
Prophets. In the context of the Shari6a, they equated the fatigue of the Shari6a
most often with the absence of mujtahids—once there were no longer any
individuals left to carry out ijtih:d, the death of the Shari6a in their opinion could
be pronounced. The second, the Hk anbal; and Mu6tazil; argument was that the
world can never be devoid of God’s guidance. The Mu6tazila based this on their
notion of divine justice, arguing that it would be unjust for God to abandon
humanity, and therefore it is impossible for it to occur, whereas the H k an:bila
argued that ijtih:d becomes a collective duty which safeguards the existence of
the Shari6a. One of the main reasons for their argument was the h k ad;th of the
Prophet which noted that the scholars were ‘the heirs of the prophets’, meaning
that while Prophetic access to the divine may cease to exist, scholarly access to
Prophetic knowledge would always continue. Against the Mu6tazil; and H k anbal;
notion of continuity, al-Juwayn; and other Sh:f;6is argued that not only is the
fatigue of the Shari6a a possibility, but the loss of mujtahids was already
underway. Al-Juwayn;’s assertion in this manner was accepted by his student al-
Ghaz:l; and also adopted by later Sh:f;6is such as Fakhr al-D;n al-R:z; (d. 606/
1209) and Sayf al-D;n al-2mid; (d. 631/1233). Other late scholars such as T:j al-
D;n al-Subk; (d. 771/1370) and Jal:l al-D;n al-Mahk all; (d. 864/1459) argued
that it is theoretically possible but it has not actually occurred in reality. For an
exhaustive overview of this discussion see Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Fatigue of the
Shar;6a (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). For more concise overviews see
Wael Hallaq, ‘On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of
Mujtahids and the Gate of Ijtihad’, Studia Islamica, 63 (1986): 129–41 and
Intisaar Rabb, ‘Islamic Legal Minimalism: Legal Maxims and Lawmaking when
Jurists Disappear’ in Michael Cook et al. (eds.), Law and Tradition in Classical
Islamic Thought: Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi (New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 145–66. For an overview of the various Sh:f;6i
arguments see al-Zarkash;, al-Bahk r al-muhk ;t k , vi. 205–10.
then legal rulings and all religious affairs should be delegated and
entrusted to them. The mujtahids in turn can exercise independent legal
judgment to ensure the continuous expansion and preservation of the
Shari6a. The authority which the mujtahids are endowed with rests on
their conveying religious tradition which, according to Arendt would be
achieved ‘by handing down from one generation to the next the
testimony of the ancestors, who first had witnessed and created the
sacred founding and then augmented it by their authority throughout
centuries. As long as this tradition was uninterrupted, authority was
inviolate; and to act without authority and tradition. . ..was inconceiv-
able’.53 The mujtahids are thus not merely legal guides, but serve to

continuously connect society to a religiously sacred past. And it is
precisely this connection with the past and continuous transmission of it
which leads to the creation of authority according to Arendt. To this
extent she states, ‘[a]uthority, in contradistinction to power [potestas],
had its roots in the past, but this past was no less present in the actual life
of the city than the power and strength of the living’54 and it is because of
this distinction between power and authority that she notes ‘the most
conspicuous characteristic of those in authority is that they do not have
power’.55 Later on she underscores this point by arguing that the
durability of the Roman Empire was not due to power, but due to the
trinity of religion, authority and tradition—arguably it is these three
same elements which allow for the continuity of society after the absence
of the im:m for al-Juwayn;.
However, al-Juwayn; does not assume that mujtahids will always be
present, or that their knowledge will be sufficiently transmitted such that
a new generation of mujtahids can be created. To the contrary, he
postulates that legal knowledge will decrease leading to the absence of
mujtahids and the rise of muftis. The legal milieu during this time will
necessarily change as a result of the limited legal acumen of the muftis to
derive legal rulings. Elaborating on the absence of mujtahids al-Juwayn;
states:
That which summarizes the objective is that if we are devoid of independent
jurists (mujtahids), and we find jurists who are trained in analogical reasoning
(qiy:s), and we arrive at probable knowledge in matters for which there is no text
in the school which has been transmitted through texts, then referring to the
jurists on those [matters] is better than removing that matter from [the realm of]
obligation. And the concession is to those seeking [the answers] based on
53
Arendt, Between Past and Future, 124.
54
Ibid, 121–2.
55
Ibid, 122.
generalities and universal principles (um<r kulliyya),56 the depiction of which
will come in the following section, God willing.57
In this passage al-Juwayni makes clear that the primary reason for his
concern with legal continuity is the desire for continued legal respon-
sibility (takl;f) regardless of the presence or absence of mujtahids.
Therefore, although muftis are not intellectually or legally the equivalent
of mujtahids, they are sufficiently familiar with analogical reasoning
(qiy:s) and are conversant with the universal principles of the Shari6a
(um<r kulliyya) such that they can ensure legal knowledge and
continuity. Authority for the mufti is thus on the same basis as the

mujtahid—their knowledge of religion, and the legal tradition—despite
their not having the same legal acumen as mujtahids. The ability for
authority to pass from the mujtahids to muftis exemplifies that the true
locus of authority is not the person of the mujtahid, but the knowledge
that he/she possesses, which is in this case, knowledge of the Shari6a.
Thus, to the extent that universal principles of the Shari6a are preserved
in juristic discourse and conveyed to society the continuity of society is
possible. As a corollary, if there is a time in which there is a complete
absence of knowledge of the Shari6a, and thus any locus of authority, al-
Juwayn; would necessarily have to reconsider his position. It is for this
reason that the absence of universal principles is something he is highly
reticent to accept and in this vein he argues, ‘In order fully to ascertain
the matter, one must understand that such a time will not be devoid of
universal principles [al-mar:sim al-kulliiyya], or legal maxims of the
Shari6a [qaw:6id al-shar;6a]. Rather, the fundamental problem will be the
arduous nature of the exposition and derivation of legal matters, which
will be overcast by the inability of a jurist to rule in a matter with
complete precision’.58 The challenge faced in this scenario is the
vocational skill of the jurists and their ability to reach verdicts with
certainty; authority in the form of the Shari6a therefore remains, but
access to it is obfuscated due to the decline in legal knowledge. What this
also means is that up until the point that knowledge of the Shari6a is
completely inaccessible, there is always the presence of some form of
authority, even if truncated, and laws continue.
After asserting these foundational matters, al-Juwayn; expands upon
the universal principles of the Shari6a in the chapters on law (fiqh)59
56
al-Juwayn; uses a variety of terms throughout the third section to refer to
broad principles of the Shari6a such as 6um<r kulliyya, al-mar:sim al-kulliyya , al-
qaw:6id al-shar;6iyya.
57
al-Juwayn;, Ghiy:th;, 632.
58
Ibid, 637.
pertaining to the daily affairs of believers. Interestingly, in this section al-
Juwayn; only undertakes those matters related to worship (fiqh
al-6ib:d:t) and does not expand upon transactional matters (fiqh al-
mu6:mal:t), which occur between individuals, with the exception of
marriage. This absence may be due in part to al-Juwayn;’s belief that
cumbersome financial laws will quickly dissipate with the absence of
formalized political institutions overseeing them. Individual concerns
will therefore be directed inward and personal matters will be of primary
importance. And while the collective ethos generated by communal
adherence to universal norms of the Shari6a will sustain some connection
between individuals, social interaction will be strangulated as individuals

find less benefit in voluntary association.
After elaborating upon the universal norms of the Shari6a, and arguing for
their longevity despite persistent calamities, al-Juwayn; accepts that they too
will fade from individual memory. To this extent he sombrely states,
. . .if the derived and principle matters of the Shari6a (fur<6 al-shar;6a wa-usk <l) are
effaced, and there is nobody who preserved them to return to, or rely upon, legal
responsibility (takl;f) upon the worshippers is suspended and their state has
reached the state of those who did not receive the invitation [to faith] and the
Shari6a is not commissioned upon them’.60
As the continuity of the Shari6a is predicated on the transmission and

preservation of legal knowledge, its disappearance from the lives of
individuals removes the yoke of legal obligation and no form of authority
remains within society. This does not mean that individuals will cease to
act in ways which are beneficial for their existence; rather, their actions
will have no religious ramifications in the negative or positive, and there
will be no authoritative force around which they can coalesce.61
59
The matters which al-Juwayn; discusses are divided into: the book of purity
(kit:b al-tah:ra), the book of prayer (kit:b al-sal:h), the book of alms (kit:b al-
zak:h), the_ book of fasting (kit:b al-sawm) _ and investigations regarding
_
marriage (al-qawl f; al-mun:kah:t). See Ibid, 653–837.
60
Ibid, 844. _
61
Ibid, 838–44. Although al-Juwayn; does not explicitly invoke the Mu6tazal;
doctrine of tahs;n wa-taqb;h (the doctrine of distinguishing between good and
_
evil), al-Juwayn;’s understanding of the lack of religious consequences can be
understood to be set against the doctrine of the Mu6tazal;s, which states that
actions remain within the arena of reward and censure even in the absence of
divine law. For more see Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward and Dwi S.
Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to
Modern Symbol (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, [1997] 2003). More broadly, al-
Juwayn;’s arguments can be seen as drawing upon a larger discussion of those
individuals living in a time between two Prophets known as ahl al-fatra (people of
In following al-Juwayn;’s political thought from its nascent investiga-
tions regarding ideal government to the emergence of an acephalous
society it is evident that al-Juwayn; is not merely interested in matters of
statecraft or governance. His project in the Ghiy:th; is much more
expansive and invokes deeper theoretical questions regarding the
difference between power and authority which he continuously interlaces
within his discussion of non-ideal realities. This leads him to articulate
an ideal for the im:mate which he is willing to abandon due to the
the interval). The question regarding their moral responsibility was one undertaken
by theologians and involved a great deal of disagreement. A recent monograph by

Kevin Reinhart demonstrates the centrality of this discussion and the ramifications
it had upon notions of rationality, ethics and morality. The basic question
evaluated by Reinhart is the status of human actions before the arrival of divine
legislation. Should these acts be deemed permissible, prohibited, or should all
judgment upon them be reserved until God reveals His law? As a corollary to this
basic question, questions related to the nature of the human intellect and its ability
to reason independently of legislation naturally arose. Reinhart notes that in
answer to this basic question there were three distinct positions—the Proscribed,
the Permitted and No Assessment. For the first, namely the proscribers, most acts
were considered blameworthy until there was explicit permission granted by
revelation. For this narrow approach Reinhart could only identify a single Hanbal;
source. As for the Permitters, the stark opponents of the Proscribers, they held _ that
all actions were deemed permitted until the arrival of revelation. The last position,
namely that of No Assessment, argued that before revelation there can be no
assessment whatsoever of an act because revelation is the sole means of assessment.
Reinhart states that this was the view that eventually prevailed within theological
circles and became the official position of both the Ash6ar;s and the majority of the
Hanbal;s. Despite the seemingly neat division between these three different
_
positions, Reinhart notes that there was a great deal of fluidity and it is not possible
to state that one theological school only held one position over the course of its
history. As for al-Juwayn;, he holds, like other Ash6ar;s, the position of no
assessment, so individuals are allowed to act freely according to their desire
without any otherworldly consequence. See Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation:
The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1995). There have been numerous reviews of this book, both
favourable and unfavourable. As for the latter see Eric Ormsby’s in Islamic Law
and Society, 5/1 (1998): 118–23 and Wilfred Madelung’s in Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies, 60/1 (1997): 127–8. For a more favourable review
see that of Bernard Weiss in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 119/2
(1999): 317–18. It is possible that the starkly different assessments are due to the
fact that both Ormsby and Madelung are specialists in kal:m whereas Weiss
specializes in us<l al-fiqh, therefore the latter is focusing on theoretical questions
which have not_ been raised in Western academic discussions regarding law, while
the former are focusing on the more nuanced and technical matters that Reinhart
does not fully present.
turbulent reality of politics. When juxtaposing the matters which he
leaves open for compromise with those he remains fixed upon, the
underlying principles governing his political thought emerge, revealing
not only the rationale behind the text, but also al-Juwayn;’s unique
approach to politics and social reality.
AL-JUWAYN>’S BIFURCATION OF POWER AND

AUTHORITY

Early critiques of Islamic political thought often base their assertions on
the fact that Muslim theorists did not posit any ideal derived from the
Prophetic model and instead any normative articulation was merely a
pragmatic acceptance of political reality in the face of difficult historical
moments. Al-Juwayn;’s political thought, however, demonstrates that if
and when political situations change, ideal notions of power, in the form
of a formidable im:m, can be compromised, as a complex notion of
authority, stemming from religious traditions in the form of laws
continues to provide stability and continuity for the Muslim community.
If al-Juwayn;’s political thought is contextualized within his historical
moment it is clear that he is deeply concerned with the dilapidated state
of the 6Abb:sid caliphate and his sanguine early articulations of the
im:mate can be read as a mirror to the political situations of his own
time. But the Ghiy:th; can be read for his prediction for the future as
much as for his understanding of the past. What connects his various
investigations is his belief that political power presents a congenial way
of directing the various factors of social and political life so that they
support order and mitigate potential conflict. At the same time, his
arguments for political power are coloured by his belief that changing
situations will inevitably change political power—power is dynamic,
power is unstable, and for that reason, there must be something beyond
power that functions in society. This search for what is beyond political
power leads him to reflect on the objectives of power and for that reason
he is continuously willing to depart from his ideal, as we saw in the case
of election, usurpation, and the appointment of the non-ideal candidate,
to achieve the main objective of power, obedience and stability. However,
despite power achieving stability and obedience, it cannot always ensure
continuity, as continuity is highly dependent on authority and functions
outside of the confines of political power. As a result, al-Juwayn; posits
that the community is not merely held together by a powerful leader, but
is unified around Shari6a norms which enable the continuity of
community without formalized government. By arguing for stability in
the form of political power, and authority in the form of the Shari6a, al-
Juwayn; recognizes the importance of political power, the Shari6a and the
community in creating stability and ensuring the continuity of society.
This means that without the presence of all elements, the continuity and
durability of the entire polity is threatened.
In this vein the Ghiy:th; can be seen as al-Juwayn;’s struggle with the
lived reality of politics, historical precedent, and his belief that power
alone is not enough to ensure continuity. As a corollary, while a powerful
im:m may be legitimate, a position he shares with the majority of Sunni
theorists before him, power alone simply falls short in the long term. His
acceptance of the absence of the im:m and formalized political structures

is therefore not a vulgarization of politics because he maintains that
authority continues, in the form of the Shari6a, and its embodied form in
mujtahids, muftis, and individual practice. His acceptance of the loss of
formalized and institutionalized politics can therefore be characterized as
accepting the loss of political power, but not authority, as human beings
remain bound to the social authority of the Shari6a which facilitates the
transition from one saeculum to the next.
This bifurcation between power and authority, coupled with al-
Juwayn;’s socio-historic analysis highlights a series of underlying
arguments regarding political power which are important to note.
First, while the primary legitimizing characteristic of the im:m is power
and the competency to lead, that is not the ideal. In fact, the other
characteristics that al-Juwayn; states are important but not essential,
such as being a mujtahid and pious, are precisely those characteristics
which would give the im:m authority in addition to power. This means
that if a candidate fulfills all of the qualifications that al-Juwayn; lays
out, the im:m would possess both power and authority. It is only when
an ideal candidate is not found that the focus turns to finding a politically
competent candidate who possesses power, but not authority. Second,
political power is not the exclusive remit of the im:m, but is also
emphasized by al-Juwayn; when he speaks about the power (shawka) of
the electors. This means that even though the im:m is the primary source
of political power, he is not the only source, and the acceptance of his
rule is contingent upon his recognition by other powerful individuals
within society. It is also the power of the electors which enable them to
dispose of the im:m if he becomes unfit for rule. The presence of multiple
poles of power means that the political power which the im:m has is not
a totalizing power; rather is it a political power that is sanctioned by
others, and can also be removed. The result of this is that al-Juwayn;
understands both power and authority to be porous. Power is
possessed by the ideal and non-ideal im:m, the usurper and the electors,
while authority is possessed by the ideal im:m to some extent, but is
primarily located within the Shari6a, its conveyors, and those who act
according to it.
It is this understanding that makes classifying al-Juwayn;’s project as a
community-centred or rule-centred one difficult. On the basis of his
tripartite division in the book between the ideal caliphate, the weak
caliphate and the absent caliphate, he seems to emphasize different types
of authority and power in different contexts. In the case of the ideal
caliphate, al-Juwayn; adheres to the rule-centred model, with power and
authority being primarily with the im:m, though neither are exclusive to
him. This, however, changes with the transition to the weak im:m and
al-Juwayn; begins to move toward a joint community-centred and rule-

centered approach, with the authority of the Shari6a, jurists and
community becoming more important. Finally when the im:mate
completely collapses, al-Juwayn;’s model shifts completely to a law-
centred/community-centred mode of governance where power is absent,
but authority continues. Here it is important to emphasize that the
dominance of one type of power and/or authority in a certain period does
not preclude the presence of the others, meaning that even when the ideal
caliphate is realized, the community and law remain important, as they
are still secondary loci of authority. Articulating these points concur-
rently allows one to see that authority and power for al-Juwayn; will
take different forms depending on the political context and the
qualifications of the im:m.
The multifaceted ways in which al-Juwayn; envisions politics makes
him a practical political thinker who is able to envision a certain political
and institutional ideal, but is also willing to depart from that ideal when
necessary. It is precisely this acceptance of the transient nature of
perfection that causes him to reject an overly prescriptive and power
driven approach to the caliphate. And while he describes in detail certain
functional aspects of the caliphate, his willingness to forgo them is
testament to al-Juwayn;’s preoccupation with the porous nature of both
power and authority. This marks a distinct shift away from the
methodology adopted by his predecessors such as al-M:ward; and al-
B:qill:n; who set forth in meticulous detail a rule-centred and power
driven model of the caliphate without much compromise. By abandoning
the model of his predecessors he is able to probe into speculative future
political situations, exemplifying both his desire to create a holistic
political philosophy and his recognition that political power is not
sufficient to ensure the continuity and durability of society. Fortified by a
belief in both reason and revelation as the foundation and inspiration for
his text, al-Juwayn; explores the shortcomings and limitations of
political power, which allows him to recognize the importance of
alternate forms of authority embedded within religion and society. The
expansive nature of this dichotomy between power and authority
releases scholars from reducing Islamic political thought to an enquiry
into political power and opens up the space to investigate, in a more
nuanced way, the ways in which power and authority often commingle in
both theory and practice.

Abstract
This article explores Im:m al-Juwayn;’s notion of power and authority as
constructed through his text Ghiy:th al-Umam (Saviour of the Nation).
Unlike those who came before him and who focused on brute power and
an ideal Caliph, al-Juwayn; theorizes about the absence of the caliphate
and the continuity of society. Through his discussion on the absence of
an im:m, it becomes clear that al-Juwayn; does not understand authority
and power to be limited to the formal confines of government, in this
case the caliphate, but also locates it within the Shari6a in such a manner
that the Shari6a enables the continuity of society when political
institutions fail. The displacement of power and authority away from

the im:m in al-Juwayn;’s political thought forces scholars to question the
narrative that Sunni political thought remained focused on questions of
statecraft and realpolitik to the detriment of the community and rights of
individuals.

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Journal of Islamic Studies Advance Access published January 4, 2017

Journal of Islamic Studies (2017) pp. 1 of 29 doi:10.1093/jis/etw057

POWER VS. AUTHORITY: AL-JUWAYN>’S

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Cairo: al-D:r al-Qawmiyya li-l-Fiba6a wa-l-Nashr, 1964). For a full discussion of

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THE STRUCTURE OF GHIY2TH AL-UMAM AND

The Ghiy:th;, while commingling practical and theoretical situations, is

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edition of the Ghiy:th;. See al-Juwayn;, Ghiy:th al-umam f; iltiy:th al-Culam

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mutaw:tir hk ad;th and therefore cannot afford enough knowledge to establish

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While al-Juwayn; continues to uphold the ideal qualifications of an

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THE LACUNA: THE ABSENCE OF

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As the continuity of the Shari6a is predicated on the transmission and

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AL-JUWAYN>’S BIFURCATION OF POWER AND

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