© Copyright, Princeton University Press.

No part of this book may be

rebellion

Although Razi did not compose a work on rulership or gover- See also Ash‘aris; caliph, caliphate; Central Asia; exegesis;
nance, he did address various political issues in his works on the- Ghurids (1009–1215); Ibn Sina, Abu ‘Ali (980–1037); imamate;
ology, philosophy, and Qur’an commentary. In so doing, he made jihad; jurisprudence; Mu‘tazilis; philosophy; Shi‘ism; theology
significant contributions to the development of Islamic political
thought. His views in this area were influenced by those of the Further Reading
Mu‘tazilis as well as of the philosopher Ibn Sina. Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam, 2004; Fathalla
The central concept of Razi’s political thought is prophecy. Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-­Din al-­Razi and His Controversies
Following the basic principles of Muslim theology, he held that in Transoxiana, 1966; Ann Lambton, State and Government in
prophets are human beings through whom God communicates with Medieval Islam, 1981.
humankind. Among these prophets are messengers who bring new
versions of God’s laws, and thus new religions. Razi wrote that the Tariq J affer
prophets who communicate God’s laws should be invested with
political authority. He also argued that prophets are infallible, al-
though he admitted that they could commit major sins before, and
unintentional sins after, their prophetic missions.
Razi’s political theory, which he discussed under the rubric of rebellion
“practical science,” was shaped by the philosophical tradition in
Islam. In accordance with Ibn Sina’s teaching on prophecy, he held Rebellion is action undertaken by a group aiming to replace the
that prophets are a sociopolitical necessity, since only prophets are government in a state or to secede from the state to form a new one.
capable of introducing laws that organize human life. Also follow- Direct references to rebellion are not found in the Qur’an, but there
ing Ibn Sina, he defined prophecy as a perfection of the human are numerous references to hypocrites (munāfiqūn) in Medina who
soul. According to this teaching, a prophetic soul is one that has publicly accepted Islam while continuing to oppose Muhammad,
developed its imaginative and intellective faculties such that it may more through subversion than in open revolt. The Qur’an (9:107)
receive intelligible forms from the higher heavenly souls. It is the alludes to a “mosque of dissension” (masjid al-­ḍirār) erected on the
prophet’s intellectual perfection that places him in a position to leg- outskirts of Medina “by way of mischief and infidelity—­to disunite
islate and direct the Muslim community. the believers.” This building was demolished on Muhammad’s
On the issue of the leadership of the Muslim community and orders before the plotters’ schemes could materialize. Rebellions
the political concept of the imamate, topics that he addressed in marked the caliphates of Abu Bakr, ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan, and ‘Ali b.
his Compendium and Book of Forty Questions, Razi polemicized Abi Talib. The Umayyad dynasty lasted barely 90 years before it
against the postulates of Twelver Shi‘i theologians. These theo- was overthrown by an Abbasid revolt, and the Abbasids themselves
logians have argued that the imamate is a logical consequence of had faced numerous rebellions already by the late ninth century.
God’s benevolence or grace, and it is incumbent upon God by vir- Rebellion was, therefore, a timely and troubling issue for clas-
tue of his benevolence to invest mankind with an imam, just as it sical political and legal theorists. With the goal of preventing civil
is incumbent upon God to send prophets to humankind. Follow- strife (fitna) and disorder or corruption (fasād), the theorists banned
ing his Ash‘ari colleagues as well as many Mu‘tazili scholars, Razi nearly all challenges to the established ruler. Qur’an 4:59, which
held that the imamate is necessary only as a matter of tradition and reads, “Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority
scripture. Also in opposition to Twelver Shi‘i ideas, Razi held that among you,” along with numerous hadith reports, was marshaled
it is incumbent upon the intellectuals of the Muslim community, not by scholars to prohibit revolt against the caliph or the sultan, re-
upon God, to designate an imam, by way of election. gardless of how he had come to power. Disobedience to a ruler’s
Razi addressed the issue of the moral status of jihad against non-­ commands was permitted only when the ruler contravened Islamic
Muslims in his commentary on the Qur’an. In his milieu, many law in accordance with the hadith that states, “No obedience to the
saw a tension between supporting jihad against non-­Muslims and created in opposition to the Creator.” An errant ruler should be ad-
maintaining the Qur’anic precept that “there is no compulsion in re- monished, counseled, and suffered patiently by his subjects rather
ligion” (2:256). The great majority of scholars interpreted this verse than challenged by force. Only in extreme circumstances, such as
to mean that, while compulsion in religion was valid at the politi- when a ruler abandoned Islamic law altogether or committed apos-
cal level, it was inappropriate and futile to attempt to compel inner tasy, should the Muslim subjects overthrow him. Ibn Taymiyya
conviction. Under the influence of the Mu‘tazilis, Razi interpreted (d. 1328), for example, declared jihad obligatory against the Mon-
the verse to mean that God intends that individuals have choice in gol conquerors of the Abbasid Empire, who, despite their conver-
religious belief. He argued that this world is an abode of trial or test- sion to Islam, ruled by the Yasa, the Mongol tribal law, rather than
ing and that compulsion in religion at the level of conviction would the shari‘a. He castigated rebellion, however, against Muslim rulers
nullify this idea. The use of compulsion in conversion, he argued, is over mainly political grievances.
incompatible with the moral responsibility that has been granted by Classical sources generally treat rebellion (baghy) as a type
God to human beings in this world. of criminal activity along with apostasy (ridda) and brigandage

459
 © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be
distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical
means without prior written permission of the publisher.

representation

(ḥirāba), yet they devote considerable attention to differentiating A number of Shi‘i theorists also figure prominently in contempo-
the way rebels are to be treated compared to apostates, highway rary debates on the legitimacy of rebellion. For centuries, Shi‘i ‘ulama’
robbers, or pirates. People were deemed rebels if they formally generally espoused dissimulation (taqiyya) and compliance with po-
withdrew from the Muslim community (khurūj) by disavowing litical authorities, tracing this policy back to the views of the sixth
allegiance to the ruler, provided a reasonable religious pretext for imam, Ja‘far al-­Sadiq. The views of Ayatollah Khomeini fundamen-
their disobedience (ta’wīl), and constituted a group with demon- tally challenged this legacy. Beginning in the 1940s with criticism
strated power to challenge the state (shawka). If they met these of the two Pahlavi shahs, Khomeini moved to open defiance and by
criteria, they were subject to treatment under the laws governing the late 1960s called for the regime to be overthrown. In Hukumat-­i
the suppression of rebels (aḥkām al-­bughāh). Because these laws Islami (Islamic government), published in 1970, Khomeini outlines
were based largely on precedents set by ‘Ali in dealing with his his theory of wilāyat al-­faqīh (guardianship of the jurist). At the end
enemies, especially the Kharijis, there was general agreement be- of the treatise, he calls for tyrannical rulers (ṭāghūt) to be overthrown
tween Sunni and Shi‘i legal schools on these matters. As Mawardi through civil disobedience and for the creation of parallel Islamic in-
writes in al-­Ahkam al-­Sultaniyya (The ordinances of govern- stitutions. Similarly, the most prominent lay intellectual of the revolu-
ment), fighting rebels differs from fighting infidels, apostates, and tion, ‘Ali Shari‘ati, focused on mobilizing a grassroots movement led
brigands in eight ways: the intent is to deter rather than kill rebels; by the youths. Shari‘ati criticized what he labeled “Safavi Shi‘ism,”
they should not be pursued when they are retreating; their injured after the Safavid dynasty, characterizing it as an ideology of quietism
may not be killed; captured rebels may not be killed; their prop- and political repression. True Shi‘ism, Shari‘ati argued, was “‘Alavi
erty may not be seized and their women and children may not be Shi‘ism,” after ‘Ali b. Abi Talib: a dynamic, politically active faith that
enslaved; the aid of dhimmīs (protected communities) cannot be required action to implement a just Islamic order.
sought in fighting rebels; the Muslim commander may not give See also coup d’état; dissent, opposition, resistance; quietism
them assurances of an indefinite truce or conclude a peace treaty and activism
in return for monetary payment; and their homes and farms may
not be despoiled. Clearly, the goal of these strictures was to reha- Further Reading
bilitate rebels back into the body politic as quickly and completely Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law,
as possible. 2001; J.J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s
The political quietism proposed in the classical theory was Assassins, 1986; Ruhallah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writ-
always in tension with more popular themes of renewal (tajdīd) ings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, translated by Hamid
and reform (iṣlāḥ), which led periodically to violent movements Algar, 1981; J. L. Kraemer, “Apostates, Rebels and Brigands,”
aimed not only at overthrowing corrupt rulers but also at puri- Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980); Fazlur Rahman, “The Law of
fying society. One such insurrection was the Wahhabi revolt in Rebellion in Islam,” in Islam in the Modern World, edited by Jill
19th-­century Arabia that in many ways laid the intellectual basis Raitt, 1983.
for the Muslim revivalist movements of the 20th century. To the
Wahhabi creed of purging Islam of internal, heretical innovations S o hail H . H ashmi
(bid‘a), 20th-­century activists added the goal of thwarting West-
ern political and cultural domination of Muslim countries. Thus
modern writers espouse not so much rebellion but revolution, in
the sense of a thoroughgoing sociopolitical change in norms and
institutions. representation
Sayyid Qutb, in his influential essay Ma‘alim fi al-­Tariq (Mile-
stones), never openly declares jihad against the Egyptian or any As a concept in political analysis, “representation” can refer to a va-
other Muslim government, but his argument that Muslim societies riety of forms of decisions, judgments, and actions made on behalf
are in a state of jāhiliyya (ignorance) akin to that against which of a larger group of persons by a smaller group (including a group
the Prophet fought has obvious revolutionary implications. ‘Abd al-­ of one). For the term “representation” to be appropriate, there must
Salam Faraj, the author of al-­Farida al-­Gha’iba (The absent duty), be some sense not only that the decisions of the smaller group are
the manifesto of Anwar Sadat’s assassins, took Qutb’s views to their binding on the larger group (a relationship better expressed by the
logical conclusion. Citing Ibn Taymiyya, Faraj declared the Egyp- idea of “authority”) but also that the smaller group is making deci-
tian government to be an apostate regime; thus rebellion against sions for the larger group by appointment or designation, or in the
it was a religious obligation. In responding to this document, the best interests of the larger group. Nonetheless, representation and
‘ulama’ (religious scholars) of Azhar University denounced Faraj’s authority are clearly companion concepts as long as the decisions of
justification of tyrannicide by resorting to classical arguments that representatives are enforced on the larger population as legitimate,
so long as a ruler was a Muslim and did not interfere with the per- binding rules.
formance of Islamic obligations in the country, rising up against In classical Sunni political thought, perhaps the predominant
him was prohibited. emphasis was on communal unity (ahl al-­sunna wa-­l-­jamā‘a) and

460