Classic + Modern Liberalism

218 An Introduction to Political Theory
It is significant that the theory of the social contract was advanced at a juncture
when the system of feudal relations was giving way to the norms of market
society, which laid the foundations of the capitalist system. The relations of the
feudal society are determined by tradition; those of the capitalist society are
determined by contract. The doctrine of the social contract played a historical
role by providing for a theoretical justification for the new pattern of human
relations necessitated by the emergence of the capitalist society.
THEORY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDIVIDUALISM
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Theory of laissez-faire individualism was developed by classical liberalism—
which started taking shape in the eighteenth century and was systematically
formulated in the nineteenth century. It placed individual at the centre of its
philosophy. It sought to argue that individual is endowed with the faculty of
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'reason' which enables him to find what is most conducive to his interests.
Classical liberalism, therefore, advocated individual's right to freedom of trade,
freedom of contract, freedom to bargain and freedom of enterprise. It postulated
private property as the condition of progress, because property was viewed as a
product of individual's labour, ingenuity and enterprise. Since all freedoms of the
individual ensued from the element of 'reason', they were regarded valuable for
society. The profit motive of the individuals and their open competition were,
therefore, regarded as 'functional' and, hence, conducive to social progress. The
function of the government was to protect individual's freedom or liberty, to
enforce contracts, to guarantee peaceful employment of property and to provide
the external conditions of law and order.
With its emphasis on individual as the centre of importance, classical liberalism
advocated the policy of laissez-faire, a French term which means 'leave alone'.
It signified non-intervention by the state in the economic activities of individuals.
This phrase was in common usage in mercantile and industrial circles in nineteenth
century England, and in other parts of the world, to express a belief in the freedom
of industry and economic activity from state interference. Laissez-faire
individualism denotes an aspect of liberal political theory which regards property
rights of the individual as a necessary condition of liberty, and seeks to set definite
and circumscribed limits on the regulatory powers vested in the government
over social and economic processes. This theory dubs the state a 'necessary
evil': it is evil because it imposes regulations and restricts the freedom of the
individual, yet it is necessary because, without its regulation, the freedom of the
individual cannot be safeguarded.
Exponents of the Theory
The exponents of laissez-faire individualism include Adam Smith (1723-90),
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), James Mill (1773-1836) and Herbert Spencer
Diverse Perspectives on the State
219
(1820-1903), British economists and political thinkers. Besides, John Stuart

Mill (1806-73), the famous English economist and political thinker, made an
important contribution to the theory of laissez-faire individualism, but he
sought to transform it from negative liberalism into positive liberalism, and
thereby made a unique contribution to liberal theory.
Adam Smith
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Adam Smith was a Scotsman. He is regarded as the father of the science
of economics. His famous work Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations (1776), became the great source of the ideas and policies
concerning laissez-faire individualism.
Influence of Physiocrats
Smith was deeply influenced by the Physiocrats—a French school of
economic thought which flourished during the eighteenth century. The
Physiocrats held the view, deriving ultimately from Rousseau, of the
goodness and bounty of nature and the goodness of man 'as he came from
the bosom of naturer. The aim of government, therefore, should be to
conform to nature. So long as men do not interfere with each other's
liberty and do not combine among themselves in order to encroach upon
the liberty of others, governments should leave them free to find their own
salvation. Criminals, mad men, and monopolists should be eliminated.
The state should not interfere in the activities of normal and law-abiding
citizens. From this followed the doctrine of free trade between nations on
grounds of both justice and economy. For, the greater the competition, the
more will each strive to economize on the cost of his labour to the general
advantage.
Adam Smith learned much from the Physiocrats, but he sought to
eliminate their errors and developed their relevant ideas. He rejected the
leading idea of the Physiocrats that agriculture was the sole source of the
wealth produced. He held the view that commerce and industry, as well as
agriculture, were the source of wealth. His main objective was to find out
which policy of the state would be conducive to increasing the wealth of a
nation and to promoting national prosperity.
Concept of Economic Man
Smith asserted that everyone has a natural propensity to trade. If given a
free rein, this tendency would stimulate economic activity, resulting in an
increase in the production of goods. The profit motive is a natural instinct
which inspires every trader in his activity. The selfish motive of the
enterpriser is, nevertheless, conducive to promotion of the general good.
It harmonizes with national prosperity, thereby benefiting all—
government, business and labour.
Nineteenth century critics of orthodox economic theory have used the
term 220 An Introduction to Political Theory
'econo
mic nature of man by assuming that, in a capitalist system, virtually all economic activity must be
man' to motivated by purely selfish considerations, and thus giving prominence to baser motives at the
depreca expense of the higher values of life. The classical economists, including Adam Smith, no doubt
te this stressed on the importance of self-interest in the field of economic behaviour. But Adam Smith
view of never gave a blanket endorsement to the idea of beneficence of self-interest. Yet he was
human convinced that self-interest frequently played an essentially beneficent role in economic affairs,
nature. for in the pursuit of his own interests, man on occasion was 'led by an invisible hand to promote
They an end which was no part of his intention'. In other words, working within the framework of
have competition, the selfish individual would unwittingly promote the welfare of society despite his
accuse exclusive concern with furthering his own interests. It is significant that Smith's formulation in this
d respect came to occupy a central place in orthodox economic theory, and was soon refined
Adam through the instrumentality of hedonistic psychology which regarded considerations of pleasure and
Smith pain as the prime movers of human behaviour. Many prominent economists of the nineteenth
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and century, including the Utilitarians— Jeremy Bentham and his followers accepted this view of man.
other They regarded man as a highly rational creature who persistently endeavoured by means of the
classica hedonistic calculus, to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.
l
Concept of Natural Liberty
econo
mists In accordance with his concept of man, Adam Smith postulated a system of 'natural liberty'—
of implying perfect freedom of commerce and industry—in order to promote national prosperity. He
having emphasized the key role of the businessman in the economic life of a nation. He argued that the
grossly businessman knows his own interests far better than any government can tell him. In order to
distorte enable the businessman to pursue his interests most effectively, which would automatically
d the contribute to national prosperity, the only wise policy for a government to follow is laissez-faire.
true Thus, in his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith defined the system of 'natural liberty' as follows:
Everyman, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his
own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition
with those of any other man or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from ...
the duty of superintending the industry of the private people, and of directing it toward the
employments most suitable to the interest of the society.
Functions of Government
According to this system of 'natural liberty', the role of government is confined to three duties of
great importance: (a) the defence of the nation against foreign aggression; (b) the protection of
every member of society, as far as possible, from the injustice or oppression of every other
member of it, i.e. establishing an exact administration of justice; and (c) the erection and
maintenance of public
Diverse Perspectives on the State 221
works and running certain public institutions which could not be undertaken by
an individual or a small number of individuals because the profit accruing from
their maintenance would never repay the expenditure involved.
Adam Smith, therefore, advocated the abolition of restrictions imposed on
commerce and industry by the government in pursuance of the policy of
mercantilism. Likewise, he urged that all producers should be free to compete in
a free market: to sell their goods, their services and their labour at prices determined
by competition. In this 'obvious and simple system of natural liberty' there would
exist the freedom of enterprise, the freedom of trade between nations, the freedom
of contract between buyer and seller as well as between employer and worker.
Mercantilism
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An economic theory prevailing in seventeenth century and early eighteenth century
Europe which held that a nation's power was dependent on national prosperity. National
prosperity could be enhanced by maximizing exports and minimizing imports. A nation
should import cheap raw materials and export expensive finished goods. Mercantilism
upheld the state's intervention in economy for the protection of indigenous industries.
It recommended lowering of wages to keep the prices of its products quite low in the
world market.
Jeremy Bentham
Bentham made an important contribution to the theory of laissez-faire individualism
as the great exponent of Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism stands for the revival of the
classical hedonism of Epicurus. This implied that man's behaviour should be
governed by the consideration of advancement of pleasure and the avoidance of
pain. This theory was adapted by Bentham to the conditions of eighteenth and
nineteenth century Europe to prove its relevance.
Concept of Utility
Bentham and his followers argued that the concepts of absolute rights, absolute
sovereignty and absolute justice had no relevance to the realities of social life.
There was only one absolute standard of regulation of human affairs, viz. that of
absolute expediency. Political institutions and public policies should, therefore,
not be rated as good or bad in relation to some visionary and arbitrary concepts
of human rights and obligations; they should be judged by their fruits. These
thinkers held that the satisfaction of individual should furnish the yardstick of
utility, and when a decision is to be taken for the whole society, the controlling
principle should be the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'.
Bentham interpreted happiness by the crude word 'pleasure'. Thus he
postulated: 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure'. Taking it to be an incontrovertible fact of human
psychology, Bentham and his illustrious follower, James Mill, held that men always
desire only pleasure and are averse only to pain. If they desire any other thing, it
is only because they have learnt by experience that these things bring pleasure
and avert pain. They defined the utility of an action as its tendency to cause
pleasure and to avert pain. Accordingly, they defined right action as the one most
likely to give the greatest balance of pleasure over pain to the persons liable to be
affected by it. Thus, Bentham postulated that pleasure and pain were susceptible
to measurement. He repudiated any qualitative difference between different kinds
of pleasure, and emphasized their quantitative differences. This quantitative bias
is reflected in the famous saying: "Quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as
good as poetry." Bentham even laid down certain criteria for measuring pleasure
and pain, known as the 'hedonistic calculus' or 'felicific calculus'. The criteria
for measurement of pleasure included:
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1. intensity ( how strong is its freeling?);
2. duration (how long it lasts?);
3. certainty (how certain we feel to have it?);
4.proximity or propinquity (how near it is to us, i.e. how early we can have it?);
5. fecundity (does it also produce other types of pleasure?);
6. purity (no pain is mixed with it); and
7. extent (how far it extends to others?).
Of these the first six criteria are meant to judge the utility of a thing or action
for the individual while the seventh criterion (extent) is relevant to judging public
policy as expressed in the principle of 'greatest happiness of the greatest number.'
Principles of Legislation
Bentham rejected the ideology of natural rights and the social contract, yet he
subscribed to the sovereignty of 'reason' and proceeded to find a formula for the
application of reason to human affairs which should be free from the pitfalls of
metaphysical abstraction. He repudiated the theory of the general will as something
transcending the will of the individual, and defined the interest of the community
as the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. Thus, he
accorded a central place to the individual on questions relating to public policy or
legislation. He defined the interest of the individual as something which tends to
increase the sum total of his pleasures, or to diminish the sum total of his pains.
The interest of the community could likewise be discovered by adding the interests
of all individuals who composed it. Pleasure or happiness should not be taken as
a shadowy attribute of some super-person, called a social organism, but must
find actual expression in the lives and in the experience of definite individuals.
With this principle as the guiding star, the legislator is required but to calculate the
pleasurable or painful consequences of an action, actual or proposed, and he
would know whether it was right or wrong, sound or unsound. Bentham postulated
this principle as the sole criterion of determining the 'greatest happiness of the
greatest number' which would serve as a guide to all public policy and legislation.
Accordingly, Bentham argued that the business of government is to promote
the happiness of society by a system of punishments and rewards. It had no
other justification for its existence. A good government is the one that promotes
the happiness of its subjects. A government which employs ineffectual means in
this sphere, loses its title to authority.
Bentham insisted that in calculating pleasure and pain for the purpose of
determining public policy, each individual should be treated as one unit and that
none should be given special consideration: 'each to count as one, and no one for
more than one'. Thus he asserted the necessity of treating all men as equals. He
did not base his doctrine of equality on 'natural law'. Instead, he proceeded on
his original assumption: men were born to be happy—that is the plain dictate of
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experience. Since freedom is essential to happiness, men are entitled to freedom.
But equal freedom of each individual postulates 'equality'; therefore, man's liberty
must be limited and conditioned by the ultimate test of general welfare. Bentham
showed that 'equality' was a political good, because it was the only practical way
of dealing with large numbers of people. By placing equal importance on the
happiness of all individuals, Bentham sought to curb the legislator's tendency of
ignoring the happiness of the people in pursuance of their own moral standards
or in promoting the happiness of their choice.
Functions of Government
Bentham, of course, treated the state as an instrument devised by man for the
promotion of the happiness of the community, yet he did not contemplate any
wide scope of state activity. Believing that men are moved to act solely by the
desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and that each individual is the best
judge of his own interests, Bentham and his followers came to the conclusion
that the main function of the state is legislation, and that the chief objective of
legislation is to remove all institutional restrictions on the free actions of individuals.
Individual himself is capable of exercising moral judgment; the state cannot improve
character of the people. The state should restrict its sphere of activity to restraining
individuals from indulging in activities which affect the general happiness adversely.
Punishment of offenders is another main function of the state. The state should
not interfere in the activities of law-abiding citizens who are the best judges of
right and wrong, moral and immoral. In this way, Bentham also upheld the doctrine
of laissez-faire individualism.
James Mill
James Mill was a close associate and follower of Jeremy Bentham. He played an
important role in propagating Bentham's Utilitarianism as well as his principles of
law, administration, education and psychology. He founded his 'philosophical
radicalism' on the basis of Bentham's Utilitarianism, and led a radical-reformist

movement which aimed at extension of franchise and representation of the interests
of the working class in British Parliament. Besides Bentham's Utilitarianism, James
Mill undertook an intensive study of Hobbes's individualism and Adam Smith's
classical political economy. He is well-known for popularizing the views of his
favourite thinkers rather than for advancing an original view.
After analysing the prevailing institutions of England, particularly the aristocratic
government, legal system and mercantilist economy he came to the conclusion
that these institutions obstructed the way to 'the greatest happiness of the greatest
number'. In his Essays on Government (1825) he commended democratic
government as good government which sought to work for the benefit of the
citizens. He argued that aristocratic government is motivated by self-interest
which promotes corruption. This can be prevented by instituting a representative
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government based on universal suffrage, secret ballot and periodic elections.
James Mill particularly liked the middle rank, and hoped that when democratic
institutions are established, the people would follow their footsteps.
Herbert Spencer
The sociological foundation of laissez-faire individualism was provided by
Herbert Spencer, an English political thinker, in his works Social Statics (1850),
The Man versus the State (1884), and The Principles of Ethics (1892—93). Starting
from an idea of universal evolution, Spencer postulated the tendency of all things
to ultimate equilibrium and the consequent tendency of all things to transform
themselves by a process of evolution in order to attain this equilibrium. Accordingly,
individual tends to equilibriate himself with his social environment by adaptation,
and by inheritance of that adaptation, until he attains, in a perfect equilibrium, the
blessedness of final anarchy. In this process of evolution, the state has a very
limited role to play, and that is the function of protection—administration of the
law of equal freedom. Spencer treated the state as a 'joint-stock protection-
company for mutual assurance'. It should not assume any other function, nor
otherwise interfere with the process of natural evolution.
Thus Spencer argued that the state should not undertake public health, nor
give the poor any relief because that would defeat the operation of the law of
natural selection. Spencer subscribed to the principle of the 'struggle for existence'
and 'survival of the fittest' as a guiding principle of social evolution. He, therefore,
argued that if 'family ethics' was applied to the state, it would retard progress by
giving the weakling more than he deserved and perpetuating an undeserving life.
Thus, Spencer stretched the concept of negative liberty to such an extreme that
he considered elimination of the weak in the struggle for existence as part of the
process of social progress.
Recent Developments
In the past few decades, the theory of laissez-faire liberalism was revived with a
new vigour. It sought new grounds of keeping the state away from interference
in the market forces. It is variously described as neo-liberalism, neo-classical
liberalism, or libertarianism.
It is interesting to recall that towards the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth century, liberalism tended to accommodate some tenets
of socialist and idealist thought, which was responsible for the emergence of the
theory of 'welfare state'. Thus negative liberalism of the eighteenth century had
given way to positive liberalism by the first half of the twentieth century. The
liberalism of T.H. Green (1836-82), L.T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) and Harold J.
Laski (1893-1950) conceded positive role of the state in regulating economic
system in the interests of the poor and deprived sections of society. The principle
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of liberty was sought to accommodate the principles of equality and justice within
the liberal frame of thought.
However, during the second half of the twentieth century some thinkers in the
liberal tradition found the theory of 'welfare state' to be inimical to individual
liberty, and sought to revive the original concern of this tradition with laissez-
faire philosophy. Their thought is an important component of contemporary liberal
theory. It is described as 'libertarianism' in order to indicate its renewed concern
with 'liberty' and to distinguish it from the recent changes in the liberal outlook.
In a nutshell, libertarianism upholds full autonomy and freedom of the individual;
it seeks his 'liberation' from all institutions which tend to restrict his vision of the
world, including the institutions of religion, family and customs of social conformity
apart from political institutions. Philosophically it repudiates the deterministic
outlook of human life, and maintains that the human personality, character, thought
and actions cannot be construed as an outcome of his circumstances. In other
words, it treats man as maker of his destiny. It is, therefore, hostile to all social
and legal restrictions on an individual's freedom of action. In the political sphere,
libertarianism particularly insists that man's economic activity must be actively
liberated from all restrictions to enable him to achieve true progress and prosperity.
Drawing inspiration from the 'natural rights' theory of John Locke,
libertarianism holds that certain rights of the individual which precede his political
life, are indefeasible and these cannot be surrendered in favour of the collectivity.
It particularly defends the right to acquire and hold property and freedom of
contract. These rights are by no means the product of the state itself, hence the
state cannot be allowed to intervene for any artificial balancing of rights. It even
condemns taxation of the rich for the benefit of the poor. It argues that taxation
for welfare of certain sections of society involves the forced transfer of fruit of
one man's labour to another, which serves as a disincentive to individual. On the
contrary, if all individuals are free from state compulsion, they will put their best
into the system. In effect this means that laissez-faire capitalism is most conducive to
social progress.
An extreme form of libertarianism holds that all government is illegitimate;
hence it comes closer to 'anarchism'. However, while anarchists project a vision
of society wherein use of force would become redundant, extreme-libertarians
look forward to the establishment of a system in which function of protection
would be assigned to private protective agencies. On the other hand, moderate-
libertarians concede that government may legitimately engage in police protection
and enforcement of contracts for which civil as well as criminal courts might be
established. In addition, it may undertake national defence, but nothing beyond
these functions. Thus they uphold, at best, a 'nightwatchman state'. The amount
of taxation, they hold, should be restricted to serve these purposes only.
The chief exponents of libertarianism include F.A. Hayek (1899-1992), Isaiah
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Berlin (1909-97), Milton Friedman (1912-2006) and Robert Nozick (1938-2002).
Thus Robert Nozick, in his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), following Locke's
method argues that individuals do have certain rights in the state of nature. They
would hire protective agencies for their property holdings. The dominant protective
agency, having de facto monopoly of force in a given territory, would emerge
as a 'state-like entity'. Accordingly the state has no legitimate powers beyond
the functions of protection, justice and defence; it is not authorized to engage in
redistributive transfers among the citizens who were originally its clients. Hence,
'welfare state' is ruled out. Nozick holds that acquisition or transfer of property
without force or fraud is just. The right to property is derived from the fact that
an individual is 'entitled' to it. It is not necessary to prove that he morally deserves
it. He is 'entitled' to hold property either by virtue of just acquisition of an unowned
property or by receiving property from someone who has just initial title to it.
Legal rights are, therefore, the product of voluntary exchanges. Nozick argues
that inequalities at the level of production and voluntary transfers should not be
sought to be rectified at the level of distribution.However, if there is only one
source of water in a desert, nobody should be allowed to monopolize it.
Nozick attempts to demonstrate that a libertarian society, which allows all
individuals and groups to shape their life according to their wishes, fulfils the
most plausible definition of a Utopian social order.
TRANSITION TO POSITIVE LIBERALISM

Liberal theory which stood for negative liberalism in its early phase, was
transformed into positive liberalism in its later phase. Positive liberalism promoted
the idea of welfare state, as it pleaded for positive role of the state in securing
welfare of its citizens, particularly of their vulnerable sections.
Negative liberalism had sought to establish free-market society which promoted

capitalism. The success of capitalism in the nineteenth century demonstrated
that the free-market society created large inequalities among human beings and
promoted oppression of the vulnerable sections—workers, peasants, consumers,
etc. With the enormous growth of the labour force in industrial cities, freedom of
contract in practice meant freedom for factory-owners to hire and fire their
workers to maximize their profits with the consequent insecurity and suffering
of the workers. Freedom of trade was not restricted to commodities—labour
was also treated as a commodity. The result was inhumane conditions for the
workers, child labour, slum housing, and free sale of poisoned meat, bad gin and
other things injurious to health. When freedom of enterprise was interpreted as
the total absence of regulation on business and industry, it brought disastrous
consequences for the bulk of society, not the greatest happiness of the greatest
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number held so dear by the classical economists.
Classical liberals had sought to justify a free-market society on the basis of the
'equality' of individuals. Bentham had argued that in aggregating individual utilities,
each individual was to count as one. He had sought to justify the liberal state as
the state most calculated to maximize utilities—security of life, freedom of individual
movement, security of property, etc. He had also postulated that a free-market
society enabled each individual to maximize his own utility, and therefore brought
everyone into productive relations which would thus maximize the aggregate
utility of society. But in this process he was caught in a dilemma—to reconcile
theoretical equality with practical inequality. As C.B. Macpherson, in his
Democratic Theory—Essays in Retrieval (1973), has aptly illustrated:
Bentham was clear that the market must be left to determine the allocation
of the material product among the individuals who contributed to it by
their labour or land or capital, although he saw that this would mean
persistent inequality. He acknowledged, indeed, that there was a case for
equality of wealth or income. This followed from the principle of diminishing
utility—the principle that a second loaf of bread doesn't give a hungry
man as much satisfaction as the first loaf, or more generally that the more
you have of anything the less the utility to you of any increment. Given
this principle, and given that each individual's satisfaction was to count as
one, it followed that the aggregate utility of the whole society would be
greatest if everyone had equal amounts of wealth.
Bentham tried to escape from this dilemma by introducing another element—
the criterion of productivity—and decided the case in favour of inequality. As
Macpherson has further elucidated:
As soon as Bentham had thus demonstrated the case for equality he argued
that it had to yield to the case for productivity. Without security for unequal
property, there would be no incentive to capital accumulation, and without
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capital accumulation there would be practically no productivity. Besides,
without a large labour force whose incentive was fear of starvation, the
market could not maximize productivity, (ibid.)
However, subsequent liberal thinkers could not escape from this dilemma so
easily. The working class was not only increasing in size, its condition was also
deteriorating. Its voice could not be suppressed any longer. The socialists were
incessantly pressing for a solution of the problems of the working class. The
liberals were also forced to realize that their insistence on freedom and human
rights had created conditions of oppression in society. They must resolve the
contradictions of the liberal theory—as evidenced by the oppressive character
of the capitalist system—otherwise the whole edifice would tumble down. As a
result, the tenets of the liberal theory were revised toward the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and this process of revision went on during the twentieth century.
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EXPONENTS OF POSITIVE LIBERALISM
John Stuart Mill (1806-73), was the first prominent liberal thinker who started
with a defence of laissez-faire individualism, but on realizing its weaknesses in
the light of new socio-economic realities, he proceeded to modify it. In the event
he proved himself to be the chief exponent of positive liberalism. After Mill,
Thomas Hill Green (1836-82) and L.T. Hobhouse (1864-1929), both English
political thinkers, made important contributions to the theory of positive liberalism.
Green and Hobhouse insisted on a positive role of the state in removing social
inequalities, and they stated their case eloquently and convincingly. Subsequently
in early twentieth century Harold J. Laski (1893-1950), an English political thinker,
and Robert M. Maclver (1882-1970), an American Sociologist, sought to provide
new foundations for the liberal theory-a pluralistic base in lieu of its hitherto
individualistic base which was not found to be strong enough.
John Stuart Mill
J.S. Mill is the most brilliant of nineteenth-century liberal thinkers. He played an

important role in drawing a distinction between the political and economic spheres,
and in working out the implications of liberal theory in these spheres. Thus, while
in the political sphere he proved himself to be a strong supporter of constitutional
and representative government, in the economic sphere he showed socialist leanings
and laid the foundations of the 'welfare state'. In this way, Mill gave a positive
direction to liberal theory.
Revision of Utilitarianism
Mill was brought up in the Utilitarian tradition of Bentham; he was also the most
ardent champion of individualism. As C.E.M. Joad, in his introduction to Modern
Political Theory (1924), has elucidated:
Mill, in common with other Utilitarian thinkers . . . insists on regarding

every political question in terms of the happiness or unhappiness of human
beings, and not... in terms of an abstraction such as the General Will or
the personality of the State. While conceding, therefore, the contention of
the Absolutists that since the State is a natural growth or organism, it is
only in the State that the individual can enjoy the fullest happiness of
which his nature is capable, he goes on to point out that this admission
does not mean that the State does not exist for the happiness of individuals.
He then proceeds to draw the conclusion that it is the business of
Government actively to promote the happiness of individuals, and that, if
it fails in this respect, it must give way to some other form of social
organization that succeeds.
Mill agreed with Bentham in identifying happiness with pleasure and unhappiness
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with pain. But he disagreed with Bentham's view that happiness could be measured
by quantitative differences of pleasures, not by qualitative differences. Mill
maintained that some pleasures were qualitatively superior to others. This implied
a departure from Bentham's position on the method of aggregation and
maximization of pleasure, happiness or utility. As C.B. Macpherson, in his
Democratic Theory—Essays in Retrieval (1973), has noted:
Mill revolted against Bentham's material maximizing criterion of the social
good. He could not agree that all pleasures were equal, nor that the market
distributed them fairly. He held that men were capable of something better
than the money-grubbing and starvation-avoiding existence to which
Benthamism condemned them. He rejected the maximization of indifferent
utilities as the criterion of social good, and put in its place the maximum
development and use of human capacities—moral, intellectual, aesthetic,
as well as material productive capacities.
In Defence of Liberty
Mill is an ardent champion of liberty. He insists on liberty of thought and expression
as well as liberty of conduct. He defends liberty of thought and expression on
two important grounds. In the first place, he argues that it is useful to society. He
asserts that rational knowledge is the basis of social welfare, and the only way of
confirming and extending true knowledge is to submit all ideas, old and new, to
the test of free discussion and debate. As C.E.M. Joad, in his Introduction to
Modern Political Theory (1924), has observed:
Mill's essay On Liberty is perhaps the most famous vindication of freedom
of thought, and the most powerful plea for the toleration of opinions we
fail to understand, in the whole of literature. He insisted upon the extension
of this freedom to 'cranks', on the ground that, while nine cranks out of
ten are harmless idiots, the tenth is of greater value to mankind than all the
normal men who seek to suppress him.
In the second place, Mill advocates liberty of thought and expression on the
ground of human dignity. As Isaac Kramnick and F.M. Watkins, in The Age of
Ideology—Political Thought, 1750 to the Present (1979), have elaborated:
Quite apart from the question of social utility, he tried to show that individual
self-determination is a basic human right, indispensable to the development
of any sort of moral responsibility. No line of thought or action, objectively
true and useful though it may be, is morally significant unless it is followed,
freely and consciously, as a matter of personal conviction. Without liberty
to choose between conflicting claims, a human being loses his or her
rightful dignity as a moral and rational being.
On the liberty of conduct, Mill takes another line of argument. He draws a
distinction between two types of actions of men: 'self-regarding actions' and
ater als
'other-regarding actions'. Proceeding on these premises, Mill advocates complete
freedom of conduct for the individual in all matters not affecting the community,
i.e. in the case of'self-regarding actions'. However, in the case of'other-regarding
actions', i.e. in matters which do affect the community, Mill conceded the right
of the community to coerce the individual if his conduct is prejudicial to its
welfare. Thus, Mill defends complete freedom of conduct for the individual unless
it adversely affects the community. But the state could also interfere in the self-
regarding action if it was thought to be very injurious to individual himself. Thus
the state would be perfectly justified in preventing a man from crossing a bridge
which was known to be unsafe. Ernest Barker, in his Principles of Social and
Political Theory (1951), has severely criticized Mill for separating the conduct
of individual into two parts—one which concerns others, and the other which
merely concerns himself. Barker observes:
We cannot separate two different compartments of individual conduct;
but we can separate the sphere of Society from that of the State. Because
we cannot separate our individual conduct into two different compartments,
and because we are bound to regard the whole of our conduct as concerning
others no less than ourselves, we have to admit that the whole of our
conduct is controllable—so far as the criterion of its concerning others is
the criterion of judgment.
Barker suggests an alternative division of the conduct of individuals into 'the
sphere of voluntary action, proceeding by the method of free cooperation' which
should be left to society, and 'the sphere of uniform and regulated action, based,
in the last resort, on the method of compulsory enforcement', which should be
left to the state. Barker, in fact, has tried to shift liberal theory from an individualistic
to a pluralistic base.
Positive Role of the State

Mill's distinction between 'self-regarding actions' and 'other-regarding actions'
of the individual should, however, be appreciated in the historical perspective. It
meant a clear departure from the early laissez-faire individualism which had tried
to place most of the behaviour of the individual beyond regulation, in order to
vindicate the 'free market society'. Mill was making an attempt to define a sphere
where an individual's behaviour could be regulated in the interests of society.
Thus he was contemplating a positive role for the state in securing community
welfare even if it implied curbing the liberty of the individual to some extent. In
his mature years, Mill definitely moved beyond traditional liberalism. Indeed, it
was in pursuance of his liberal values that Mill sought to lay the foundations of a
more humane society as against the one provided by nineteenth century capitalism.
In the first edition of his Principles of Political Economy (1848), Mill had
ater als
attacked Socialism, but in its last edition (1866), he revised his views on the right
to property as he realized its implications as the basis of the capitalist system. He
argued that the right to property was not absolute or sacrosanct, and went to the
extent of advocating considerable restrictions on the rights of inheritance and
bequest. He maintained that the right to property in land was not sacrosanct
because no man made the land; it was the original inheritance of all mankind.
Rent was the effect of natural monopoly—not a product of an individual's effort:
it was a fit subject for taxation. He argued that incomes of landlords continued to
increase without any effort, risk or sacrifice on their part. Hence, if the state
appropriated the increase of their wealth or a part thereof for diverting it to the
use of the community it was no violation of the principles on which the right to
private property was founded or justified. The landlords had no claim to accession
of such riches on the general principle of social justice. Mill argued that these
additional riches should properly be diverted to the welfare of their real authors,
that is the working class who were the real producers of wealth from the land.
This approach to the problem of taxation and the limitation of the right to
property, heralded a new era of positive liberalism which was developed by later
liberal thinkers who thoroughly rejected the tenets of laissez-faire individualism.
L.T. Hobhouse, in his Liberalism (1911), presented a brilliant analysis of the
basis of property and the case for its taxation on these lines:
The basis of property is social . . . The prosperous businessman who
thinks that he has made his fortune entirely by self-help doses not pause
to consider what single step he could have taken on the road to his success
but for the ordered tranquility which has made commercial development
possible, the security by road, and rail, and sea, the masses of skilled
labour, and the sum of intelligence which civilization has placed at his
disposal, the very demand for the goods which he produces which the
general progress of the world has created, the inventions which he uses
as a matter of course and which have been built up by the collective effort
of generations of men of science and organizers of industry. If he dug to
the foundations of his fortune he would recognize that, as it is society that
maintains and guarantees his possessions, so also it is society which is an
indispensable partner in its original creation.
Recognizing this social basis of property, Hobhouse proceeds to discover the
true basis of the theory of taxation. Thus he observes:
The true function of taxation is to secure to society the element in wealth
that is of social origin, or more broadly, all that does not owe its origin to
the efforts of living individuals. When taxation, based on these principles,
is utilized to secure healthy conditions of existence to the mass of people
it is clear that, this is no case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, (ibid.)
ater als
Thus the idea of social origin of property and its corresponding responsibility
toward society, as originally conceived by Mill, served as the basis of positive
liberalism of the later era.
Thomas Hill Green

T.H. Green is another outstanding exponent of positive liberalism. He sought to
revise liberal theory of the state under the influence of idealist theory, derived
from the teachings of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel.
Concept of Moral Freedom
At the outset, Green recognizes 'moral freedom' as the distinctive quality of
man. He proceeds to distinguish between negative and positive freedom. Negative
freedom consists in the satisfaction of one's desires, acting according to one's
own choice or sweet will. It is the sphere where man enjoys being left alone. On
the other hand, positive freedom consists in acting according to reason, achieving
self-realization or self-perfection. True liberty or positive freedom of man,
therefore, consists in the act of 'good will', whereby man identifies himself with
his ideal self or character. Ernest Barker, in his Political Thought in England—
1848 to 1914 (1928), has elucidated Green's concept of liberty as follows:
Liberty can only be liberty for this good will: it can only be liberty for the
pursuit of the objects which such a will presents to itself. Liberty is therefore
no negative absence of restraint, any more than beauty is the absence of
ugliness. It is 'a positive power of doing or enjoying something worth
doing or enjoying'.
Theory of Rights
Exercise of true liberty, according to Green, postulates rights. Rights do not
emanate from any transcendental law as Locke had imagined, but they emanate
from the moral character of man himself. Under a system of rights, each individual
recognizes in his fellow, and each claims from his fellow, that he shall recognize
in him the power of pursuing ideal objects. Since each individual is a moral being,
and in this respect all individuals are alike, it follows that the ideal objects of all
are common objects. In other words, rights imply permission to pursue ideal
objects; and since these are the common objects of all men, theoretically there is
no question of a clash between the rights of different individuals.
Since rights exist within a social system, Green argues that there can be no
unrecognized rights. But recognition does not mean that all rights are legal rights
only. Green draws a clear distinction between the state and society and holds that
the recognizing authority in the matter of rights is not the state, but the moral
consciousness of the community. The consciousness of the community signifies
an eternal consciousness. Human consciousness or consciousness of the ideal
self is but a part of that eternal consciousness, not of the mechanical order of
ater als
nature. Therefore, man can pursue his moral end and attain self-realization only
in a social community, not in isolation. Thus, Green is concerned not with legal
rights, but with ideal rights. These rights can be realized in society when society
is properly organized on the basis of 'good will'. As Barker has observed with
regard to Green's concept of rights:
The rights of which Green speaks are relative to morality rather than law;
and the recognition of which he speaks is recognition by a common moral
consciousness rather than by a legislature. The rights are relative to morality,
in the sense that they are the conditions of the attainment of the moral
end; and the recognition is given by the moral consciousness, because it
knows that they are the necessary conditions of its own satisfaction.
{ibid.)
Role of the State

The moral consciousness emanating from society—which impels men to pursue
ideal objects—is also responsible for the creation of the state. In other words, the
state is the product of moral consciousness. According to Green's line of argument,
human consciousness postulates liberty; liberty involves rights; rights demand
the state. The state is, therefore, an instrument of perfection as the liberal theory
holds; it is not an embodiment of perfection—as the idealist theory claims. The
state owes its origin to the social nature of men, genuine human personality is
essentially a social phenomenon. It is inconceivable that an isolated natural man
should be a moral agent. He exercises his moral freedom within the social
organization, for which he needs rights. But rights are.maintained by the state;
hence the state serves as an essential base for moral freedom.
It is important to note that Green favours subordinating individual to the
community as Rousseau and Hegel had maintained. He also insists on duty of the
citizen to follow the general will and devote himself to the common good. But he
does not treat the state and society as coterminous. This marks his departure
from the idealist tradition. Again, he adheres to the liberal tradition by insisting on
individual's rights. In his view, state recognizes and maintains rights but it is not
the source of rights. The real authority behind rights is the moral consciousness
of the community.The state must obey that authority. Thus positive law can be
criticized and improved upon in the light of the state's ideal purpose: the moral
perfection of men.
Green exalts society or the community as the primary and eternal source of
moral consciousness. The state is something secondary, a means or an instrument.
The state, therefore, cannot serve the end of moral freedom directly, but it can
create favourable conditions for the exercise of moral freedom. The state and its
law can regulate only the external order of society. As Barker has elucidated:
The supreme limitation on the State lies in its own essence. Its function is
essentially, Green conceives, a negative function. It is limited to the removal
ater als
of the obstructions that hamper human capacity when it seeks to do 'things
worth doing'. The state has no positive moral function of making its
members better: it has the negative moral function of removing the obstacles
which prevent them from making themselves better. (Political Thought
in England 1848 to 1914; 1928)
In other words, the function of government is to maintain conditions of life in
which morality shall be possible. Morality consists in the disinterested performance
of self-imposed duties, not in obeying the commands of the state.
Green tends to describe the function of the state as negative, only to distinguish
it from the positive function of the community as the source of moral
consciousness. He is by no means a champion of negative liberalism. When
compared to laissez-faire liberalism, Green is definitely an exponent of positive
liberalism. The state's function of removing obstacles in the way of men's pursuit
of ideal objects is & positive function. His conception of the state as an agent for
moral improvement led him to favour the intervention of the state to secure the
welfare of the citizens. That is why he argued that the state is entitled to make
education compulsory.
Right to Property
As a defender of rights, Green upholds the right to property as a means of
realizing a will potentially directed to the social good. On this ground he even
defends property in capital. Barker has summed up Green's views of 'property in
capital' as follows:
There is nothing in its essence which is anti-social. On the contrary, it is
constantly being distributed through the community in wages to labourers
and in profits to those who are engaged in exchange; nor is there anything
in the fact that labourers are hired in masses by capitalists to prevent them
from being, on a small scale, capitalists themselves. On the same ground
of potential social value Green also defends inequality of property, (ibid.)
Green argues that the freedom of the individual postulates freedom to acquire
and possess material goods according to one's potentiality to contribute to the
social good. The social good requires that different individuals should fill different
positions in the social whole. Hence, differences in property are 'functional'
from the point of view of the social good, which should be recognized by the
social conscience.
But on this point—the question of the inequality of property—Green is faced
with a dilemma. When the right to property creates conditions under which some
men take an unduly large share and others are prevented from acquiring property
as a means of their 'self-realization', this right becomes an obstacle in the exercise
of moral freedom by the many. Thus, Green proceeds to realize the malady of the
capitalist system which created such conditions. But he locates its origin in the
system of'landed property' as it existed in England, of which he disapproved. As
ater als
Barker has elucidated:
Such property, he held, is unique. It is unique in that it is limited: 'the
capital gained by one is not taken from another, but one man cannot
acquire more land without others having less'. It is unique in that it is the
basis on which the whole tower of modern society rests: 'from it alone
can be derived the materials necessary for any industry: on it men must
find house-room; over it they must pass in communicating with each
other', (ibid.)
Thus Green tends to blame the feudal system of the past for all the evils of the
present capitalist system—the plight of the proletariat and suppression of their
moral freedom. As Barker has noted: "It is thus to the system of landed property
that Green seems inclined to assign the creation of a proletariat, neither holding
nor acquiring property."
Green, of course, made a significant contribution to liberal political theory by
discovering the moral foundations of social life, and by subordinating the state to
the will of society which alone embodies moral consciousness. But he made a
great mistake in locating the ills of the capitalist system. As C.B. Macpherson, in
his Democratic Theory—Essays in Retrieval (1973), has observed:
Green recognized that the existence of a proletariat—his own word—was
inconsistent with the rationale of private property, which required that
everybody should have enough property, over and above a bare subsistence,
to enable him to develop and perfect himself. But he had so little insight
into the nature of capitalism that he could attribute the existence of a
proletariat not to the nature of capitalist enterprise but to the continuing
effect of an original forcible seizure of land in feudal times, and subsequent
'unrestricted landlordism'. By putting the blame on feudalism, and on the
continuing rights of unproductive landowners, he exempted capitalism
from responsibility for the condition of the bulk of the people.
Harold J. Laski
Laski has further developed the liberal theory of the state in the light of his
experience of the momentous events which shook the world in the first half of
the twentieth century. Laski witnessed the First World War (1914-18), the Socialist
Revolution in Russia (1917), the formation of the League of Nations (1920), the
rise of fascism in Italy (1919-20), the Great Depression in Europe (1929), etc.
which profoundly influenced his thinking. He was deeply concerned with the
crisis of capitalism, yet he saw no promise in the outcome of the socialist revolution.
In the event, he sought to achieve the socialist goal through the mechanism of
liberal democracy. He was so critical of the capitalist system and its underlying
principles that at times he advocated the abolition of the right to property which
was the mainstay of the capitalist system. But he was so deeply attached to
liberal democratic values that ultimately he compromised in favour of making
ater als
necessary changes in the capitalist system so as to make it an instrument of
securing social justice.
In his State in Theory and Practice (1935), Laski talks of the 'breakdown of
P'talism' under the conditions of mature capitalism. He observes: "the test of an
economic system is . . . the test of its capacity to exploit to the full all the
potentialities of its productive power. Judged by that test, it is surely not illegitimate
to speak of a 'breakdown' of capitalism both in England and the United States."
Illustrating his point from the conditions then prevailing in England, Laski notes
that "with two million unemployed; devastated economic areas like South Wales
and the North East Coast; the staple export trades, like cotton and coal, iron and
steel and shipping, announcing that they verge on bankruptcy;... a situation like
this, with a government in office which proclaims its faith in the necessity of
private enterprise, may fairly be described quite soberly as a breakdown."
Again, in his Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (1943), Laski strongly
deprecated the undemocratic control of industry and politics by the economic
overlords—an outcome of the capitalist system—as follows:
In modern society, large industrial corporations are controlled by a caste
of economic directors, mainly remarkable for their skill in financial
manipulation, who are masters alike of their shareholders and of the
consumer, and are not seldom in a position to hold even the states to
ransom. Their power is as massive in volume as it has largely been
irresponsible in operation. We have reached a stage in historical evolution
where either their power must be subordinated to the interest of the
community or the interest of the community will be a tragic pseudonym
for their power.
These and many other observations made by Laski demonstrate that he was
deeply concerned with the possibility of disaster for mankind unless the capitalist
system was suitably transformed.
Laski, however, did not approve of doctrinaire communism or the repetition

of the Russian Revolution for the emancipation of mankind. He insisted on the
unity of the working class, but hoped that they could achieve their goal within the
framework of a liberal democracy. In fact he saw no inherent contradiction
between the goals of Marxian socialism and the method of political democracy.
Laski, therefore, proceeded to identify certain positive characteristics and
tendencies of the 'modern state' which held some promise for the underprivileged
sections. Thus, in his State in Theory and Practice (1935), Laski observed:
There is hardly a function of social welfare undertaken by governments
today which is not an effort to provide the poor with some, at least, of the
amenities that the rich are able to provide for themselves ... The state ...
seeks to convince its citizens that its action is unbiased by organizing for
them the material conditions of an adequate life, and especially for those
ater als
of its citizens who cannot afford these conditions for themselves.
Illustrating the range of such services provided by the state since 1919, Laski
proceeds; "Health, education, housing, social insurance, the regulation of hours
and wages in industry, the control of factory conditions, the provision of meals
for poor school children, are only outstanding examples of the range.. . We may
say that it is the outcome of a profounder social conscience."
Laski is so deeply impressed by this softening attitude of the liberal state that
he refuses the Marxist interpretation of the state as a class-instrument. Thus, in
a subsequent paragraph, Laski records:
No modern state would subordinate human rights to the interests of
property; this is shown by the whole character of modern legislation.
When the state concerns itself with the quality of our food, the protection
of child welfare, the safeguarding of the unemployed against industrial
insecurity, the provision of educational opportunity—all of these services
provided at the expense of the taxpayers—it is rhetorical exaggeration to
regard it as a class-instrument.
It is precisely here that Laski looks for justification of the liberal state. He is
not fascinated by the Marxist vision of a 'stateless' society. He undoubtedly
insists on a clear distinction between the state and society and warns against
vesting society's authority in the agency of the state, which in actual practice is
represented by a band of officials—fallible human beings. Yet he pays rich tributes
to the institution of the state. In hisyl Grammar of Politics (1938), Laski remarks:
"The State is the keystone of the social arch. It moulds the form and substance
of the myriad human lives with whose destinies it is charged." As a true liberal,
however, Laski does not take the state as such to be an embodiment of perfection,
as the idealist theory of Hegel had held. On the contrary, Laski pins his faith on
the perfectibility of the state. In other words, he hopes that if the state is made to
fulfil certain functions, it can become an instrument of perfection of mankind. In

his State in Theory and Practice (1935), Laski spells out the criterion for testing
the state as follows:
The claim of the state to obedience . . . rests upon its will and ability to
secure to its citizens the maximum satisfaction of their wants. To present
this claim as valid there must be an absence of bias in the performance of
this function. Where the effort of the state is seriously perverted to the
interest of some special group within the society it controls, sooner or
later revolution is likely to occur.
Thus Laski postulates that the state is not essentially an instrument of class
power or class domination or class exploitation. If any such state exists in the
real world, it represents a perverted form of the state. Any state can be made to
serve the interests of humanity, and if that is secured, revolution can be averted.
ater als
In his A Grammar of Politics (1938), Laski has presented an elaborate scheme
for transforming the political and economic organization of society, with special
reference to England. In the political sphere, he attempts at a refinement of the
mechanism of liberal democracy; in the economic sphere he pleads to tone down
the rigours of the capitalist system by making it welfare-oriented. He does not
advocate total abolition of the capitalist system, probably because he thinks that
retention of liberal democracy must imply some features of the capitalist system.
He does not envisage 'anything like the disappearance of private enterprise'. Yet
he hopes to eliminate the 'enormous economic disparities of the present system'.
Thus he proceeds: ^
Men will still be able to make fortunes; but, especially in the period of
transition, they will be subject to heavy taxation upon income, and still
heavier duties upon their estates at death. For it must be emphasized that
to establish a system of rights involves expenditure by the State; and,
particularly in the epoch of change, the wealth devoted to that purpose
must largely be derived from the taxation of wealthy men. That is one of
the unavoidable privileges of the rich.
In short, Laski seeks to transform the capitalist state by the democratization
of economic power, that is, by ensuring larger public control over vital instruments
of production and distribution, reducing enormous economic disparities by a
progressive system of taxation and establishing a democratic state increasingly
concerned with the welfare of its citizens.
Robert M, Maclver
R.M. Maclver is another twentieth century exponent of positive liberalism. With
a strong sociological background, Maclver traces the evolution of the state from
primitive social structures to its fuller development as a modern democratic state.
As regards the origin and nature of the state, Maclver rejects the social contract
theory formulated by the early exponents of the liberal theory. He tends to agree
with T.H. Green who made a careful distinction between the sphere of law and
that of morality, although Maclver differs from Green in making all rights, ethical
as well as political, depend on social recognition. However, he approves of Green's
distinction between the state and society. Thus, in his The Modem State (1926),
Maclver observes:
Green made a careful distinction between the sphere of law and that of
morality . . . Political obligations can and should be enforced, whereas
moral duties cannot: unless the latter express the free will of a moral being
they lose their character. Political law therefore exists simply for the removal
of obstacles in the way of free moral activity within society. It creates the
order within which that freedom can exist. Hence the state has a limited
ater als
sphere and cannot be identified with the whole activity of society.
It is society which meets all the needs of human personality. Men seek to
serve their varied interests through several associations. The state is only one of
such associations.
A number of associations have existed in society even before the formation of
the state. Many activities of the present-day associations do not fall within the
sphere of state-regulation. The state is not superior to all other associations in the
moral sense, although it may claim superior authority as an instrument of law.
Law itself exists above the state, but it is declared and enforced by the state.
In Maclver's own words: "The government has power as the guardian of the
constitution, as the executor of law, not in its own right." The state does not
create law of its own will; law exists prior to the state; the state grasps it and
gives it a definite shape. But since law is bound to act through external sanction,
the state should refrain from touching those activities of the associations which
are not to be judged by the external conduct of men, but by the spirit behind their
conduct. Thus, according to Maclver, "the whole creative side of human thought
and endeavour, including religion and morality in its proper sense, are outside the
sphere of the state. Its place is determined by the fact that law is an instrument of
limited range. The state should only, if it is true to its own nature, enforce those
acts the doing of which, from whatever motive, is necessary for the good life
within society."
Maclver, therefore, holds that the state does not regulate the internal affairs of
other human associations. It cannot determine their purpose, nor their methods
for the most part. The state comes into the picture only when the interests of one
group encroach upon another. The state acts only in order to resolve the conflicting
claims of different social groups. The state is not entitled to impose its own will
on any human association for the protection of the 'common interest'. It can
only harmonize different social interests originally expressed through human
associations. In his Web of Government (1965) Maclver argues that the state
should not undertake regulation of those organizations which are formed to serve
the emotional and cultural interests of men, but those serving economic interests
of different groups cannot be left to make mutual adjustment, even if there is no
visible conflict between them. Thus, the relations between employer and employee,
trader and consumer, etc. essentially come within the purview of state regulation,
whereas religious, artistic and cultural activities must remain beyond the jurisdiction
of the state.
Maclver has sought to base the authority of the state on the functions it
performs. The state is subservient to society; it derives its authority from society
for which it fulfils certain conditions. The state neither serves all interests of men
in society, nor does it command their undivided loyalty. The sphere of the state is
not coextensive with that of society. Society is an all-comprehensive institution
ater als
which serves all the interests of individuals—material, intellectual, emotional,
moral, spiritual, etc.—through its network of associations. The state is only one
of such associations, meant to serve definite interests—its authority is limited
like its obligations. The powers and prerogatives of the state are dependent on the
services rendered by it. Maclver has, therefore, advanced the theory of the 'service
state'. He tends to keep its authority within definite limits. As he observes in The
Modem State (1926):
The state . . . commands only because it serves; it owns only because it
owes. It creates rights not as the lordly dispenser of gifts, but as the agent
of society for the creation of rights. The servant is not greater than his
master. As other rights are relative to function and are recognized as
limited by it, so too the rights of the state should be. It has the function of
guaranteeing rights.
The society or community thrives on the unity or solidarity of men. This unity
is derived from the feeling and experience of the common interest. It is upheld by
the common ways which serve them all. When the 'community of interests' is
stronger than the 'division' or clash of interests, social solidarity and social
organizations are highly developed. Perfection of the social organization is reflected
in the perfection of the state. Accordingly, the state plays a crucial role in the
social life of men. As Maclver himself points out:
All the business of life is rendered possible by its aid, and all who live
along it must contribute to its upkeep. It is the basis of all social
communications. Therefore, whatever else a man may be, he must be a
member, or at least a subject, of the state.
The state is a symbol of the great achievement of civilization. It can prove to
be an effective organ of attaining social unity and solidarity, and this particular
function distinguishes it from all other human associations. In the words of
Maclver, although the state is but one among the great associations, yet its own
peculiar function is no other than that of giving a form of unity to the whole
system of social relationships. It can achieve this end, as successfully as other
associations achieve their ends, without arrogating to itself again that
omnicompetence which it has vainly sought to establish.
Maclver is convinced that only a democratic state can perform the unifying
function most effectively. He argues that the modern democratic state has
distinguished itself from its earlier forms. Thus he observes:
The state can act... as a unifying agent, but only in so far as it has itself
undergone evolution towards democracy. For this reason we regard
democracy as the form of the state proper, for only under democratic
conditions can it achieve this proper function, this function, in other words,
which it and it alone is capable of performing.
ater als
The evolution of the democratic state—the state as an instrument of
reconciliation of interests and resolution of conflicts, the state as an agent of
social solidarity—is a unique achievement of modern civilization which marks a
departure from its historical forms. Historically, the interest of the state has been
identified with that of the ruling class—military or landed oligarchy, or later
plutocracy. The modern democratic state, on the contrary, stands not for the
interests of a particular class, but to serve the interests of all society. That is
precisely the true function of the liberal state.
This line of argument shows that Maclver has no apprehension of the evils of
the capitalist system as long as democratic mechanism of the state is kept intact!
Some recent champions of the liberal state have even tried to demonstrate that
under the capitalist system of production actual power has shifted from the
hands of the capitalist class to some other groups, such as a 'managerial class'
as James Burnham (1907-87) has maintained, or to a variety of power elites, as
C. Wright Mills (1916-62) has pointed out.
The great merit of the liberal theory of the state lies in evolving institutions and
procedures for a constitutional government. Its tragedy is that it is often invoked
in order to justify the capitalist system, with its inherent contradictions—the
conditions of dominance and dependence it creates in the economic sphere, in
spite of its policy of social welfare and incremental change. The needs of social
justice demand a thorough transformation of the economic system as well. It is
for the genius of the present-day world to evolve more effective structures to
secure social justice.
Class perspective on the state is associated with Marxism. It is different from the
mechanistic theory as well as from the organic theory. It treats the state neither

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218 An Introduction to Political Theory

THEORY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDIVIDUALISM

(1820-1903), British economists and political thinkers. Besides, John Stuart

radicalism' on the basis of Bentham's Utilitarianism, and led a radical-reformist

TRANSITION TO POSITIVE LIBERALISM

Negative liberalism had sought to establish free-market society which promoted

John Stuart Mill

J.S. Mill is the most brilliant of nineteenth-century liberal thinkers. He played an

Mill, in common with other Utilitarian thinkers . . . insists on regarding

Positive Role of the State

Thomas Hill Green

Role of the State

Laski, however, did not approve of doctrinaire communism or the repetition

fulfil certain functions, it can become an instrument of perfection of mankind. In

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