2020-09!15!02-09-MCIB MT Varkan Ege - Medi Mode Report
2020-09!15!02-09-MCIB MT Varkan Ege - Medi Mode Report
2020-09!15!02-09-MCIB MT Varkan Ege - Medi Mode Report
COLLISION BETWEEN
A TANKER ‘VARKAN EGE’
AND
A SAILING VESSEL ‘MEDI MODE’
23rd AUGUST 2019
The MCIB objective in investigating a marine casualty is to determine its circumstances and its
causes with a view to making recommendations to the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport
for the avoidance of similar marine casualties in the future, thereby improving the safety of life
at sea and inland waterways.
The MCIB is a non-prosecutorial body. We do not enforce laws or carry out prosecutions. It is not
the purpose of an investigation carried out by the MCIB to apportion blame or fault.
The legislative framework for the operation of the MCIB, the reporting and investigating of
marine casualties and the powers of MCIB investigators is set out in the Merchant Shipping
(Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.
In carrying out its functions the MCIB complies with the provisions of the International Maritime
Organisation’s Casualty Investigation Code and EU Directive 2009/18/EC governing the
investigation of accidents in the maritime transport sector.
Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
email: [email protected]
www.mcib.ie
2
CONTENTS
PAGE
1. Summary 4
2. Factual Information 5
3. Narrative 9
4. Analysis 12
5. Conclusions 25
6. Safety Recommendations 26
7. Appendices 27
3
SUMMARY
1. SUMMARY
1.1 On Saturday the 22nd August 2019 at 10.45 hrs the sailing vessel ‘Medi Mode’
departed from Arklow and was on route to Kilmore Quay. A decision was made to
change the destination from Kilmore Quay to Howth as the weather had
deteriorated, and due to an impending night arrival in Kilmore Quay. At 17.45 hrs
on the 22nd August, abeam of Rosslare, a course was set for the home port of
Howth. The vessel was motor sailing on autopilot with navigation lights and
steaming light showing from sunset. At approximately 02.10 hrs on the 23rd
August, a southbound vessel appeared off the starboard bow. It’s steaming white
lights and a green side light were observed by the watchkeeper on the yacht.
1.2 On Sunday the 23rd August at 01.00 hrs the tanker ‘Varkan Ege’ commenced its
sea passage after leaving Dublin Port. The destination was Falmouth and a course
was set of 161 degrees with a speed of 7.5 knots.
1.3 At 02.15 the officer on watch (OOW) of the ‘Varkan Ege’ observed a red light on
the starboard bow and he went to check for an echo on the radar. He found a
small echo and realised that it was an echo from a sailing vessel. The closest
point of approach (CPA) was 0 nautical miles (NM).
4
FACTUAL INFORMATION
2. FACTUAL INFORMATION
Breath: 13.5 m.
Depth: 6.5 m.
There is no Voyage Data Recorder as the vessel is less than 3,000 Tonnes.
5
FACTUAL INFORMATION Cont.
Displacement: 18,150lbs.
2.2.1 Tanker ‘Varkan Ege’: On the bridge at the time of the incident the Master was
doing paperwork and the second officer was on watch. The Master’s report does
not mention a lookout until after the event when he orders the lookout to “follow
the sailing vessel continuously”. We do not know how long these crew members
were doing cargo operations prior to departure. The MCIB investigation was not
able to determine further details as the vessel has not returned to this
jurisdiction since the incident.
2.2.2 The ‘Medi Mode’ had two persons on board the vessel. They were working a two
hour on/off watch system, one person keeping watch and one person was below
deck sleeping. They had thirty plus years’ experience in the aviation industry and
fifty years’ sailing experience. They had taken part in many round the world
voyages and competitions. Neither crew had formal marine navigational
qualifications which would have included knowledge of light identification and
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs).
The ‘Varkan Ege’ was on a voyage from Dublin to Falmouth. It was on a course of
161 degrees.
The ‘Medi Mode’ was on a voyage from Arklow to Kilmore Quay. It changed course
off Rosslare and set course for its home port of Howth. It was motor sailing a
course of 000 degrees on autopilot.
This was a serious marine casualty involving a collision between two vessels
leading to serious damage to the yacht ‘Medi Mode’.
6
Cont. FACTUAL INFORMATION
2.4.1 At 02.27 hrs August 23nd, the tanker ‘Varkan Ege’ contacted Dublin Port VTS
and informed them that it had been in a collision with a sailing vessel. Dublin
Port VTS advised it to contact Dublin Coast Guard radio on Channel (Ch.) 16.
The Coast Guard instructed it to stay on-scene and the Coast Guard in
Greystones was alerted.
2.4.2 The crewman off-watch on the ‘Medi Mode’ pressed the DSC button on his VHF
transceiver but no response was received. This should have transmitted a
Mayday call giving the vessel’s identification and position on VHF Ch. 16. He
also made a Mayday transmission on VHF Ch. 16 but no response was received.
VHF contact was made with the ‘Varkan Ege’ by the on-watch crewmember,
following a change in helm, and it relayed the information to Dublin Coast
Guard radio. It relayed the message that ‘Medi Mode’ had no injuries and no
water ingress. It also reported that the ‘Medi Mode’ was making way to
Greystones Harbour which was 3 miles west of the collision location.
2.5 Weather
The weather over the period, according to the Met Éireann Weather Report,
was reasonably good with wind from the south west force 4 to 5 (see Appendix
7.8. Met Éireann Weather Report).
Visibility was good. For the ‘Medi Mode’ the wind was on its stern.
2.6 Damage
- the stem head fitting was torn away, the pulpit, toe rail and surrounding
area was severely deformed;
- rudder control was restricted by damage and was unable to use the full
range;
- there was damage to the aft bulkhead and door to the aft cabin; and
- the starboard sheet winch was driven down through the cockpit coaming.
2.7 Equipment
The ‘Medi Mode’ had two radar reflectors, a diamond radar reflector and a
tube radar reflector. Both were hoisted in position at the time of the collision.
7
FACTUAL INFORMATION Cont.
The tube radar reflector was 3/4 ways up the backstay and the diamond radar
reflector was about 20 feet up from the deck on the mast spreaders. The ‘Medi
Mode’ had recently had its radio communications equipment and aerial system
rewired.
8
NARRATIVE
3. NARRATIVE
3.1 In the Irish Sea, 3 miles east of Greystones in position 53° 09.864’N 005° 57.596’W,
two vessels collided, resulting in one vessel sustaining significant damage. No
injuries were sustained. There was no pollution caused.
3.2 It has not been possible for the MCIB to interview the crew of the ‘Varkan Ege’ as
it has not returned to the jurisdiction since the event. The Master’s report has
been taken into consideration in the following narrative.
3.3 Timeline
10.45 hrs: The sailing vessel ‘Medi Mode’ left Arklow for Kilmore Quay.
17.45 hrs: The ‘Medi Mode’ was off Rosslare Harbour and changed its desti-
nation due to impending adverse weather and possible night arrival
at Kilmore Quay, which would be difficult. Its new destination was its
home port of Howth. Its new course was set at 000°. It was motor
sailing on autopilot for some hours before and up to the collision.
Navigation lights and steaming light were switched on before sunset.
01.00 hrs: According to the Master’s report the ‘Varkan Ege’ commenced sea
passage after leaving Dublin port with a destination of Falmouth. The
Master’s report states its engine was set at 50% and its speed was 7.5
knots. The Master was on the bridge. The Second Mate was on watch
on the bridge. Reports indicate that there was also a crewmember on
the bridge as a lookout/observer.
02.10 hrs: The watchkeeper on the ‘Medi Mode’ saw the vessel ‘Varkan Ege’
ahead and on its starboard side. The watchkeeper in his report stated
a port green light was seen on its starboard bow (this is an error as a
port side light is red). In his interview he stated that it was green to
green at all times with the ‘Varkan Ege’. There was no radar on ‘Medi
Mode’. Its speed was 7.9 knots.
02.12 hrs: The crew on the ‘Medi Mode’ believed that the situation was green
to green i.e. each vessel had the other clear on its starboard side and
that it would pass well clear of the tanker ‘Varkan Ege’. The
watchkeeper did not take any compass bearing on the ‘Varkan Ege’.
9
NARRATIVE Cont.
02.15 hrs: The watchkeeper on the ‘Varkan Ege’ reported a red light on the
starboard bow. This indicated that the vessel being observed had its
port side towards the ‘Varkan Ege’, and was most likely in a crossing
situation.
02.16 hrs: The ‘Varkan Ege’ watchkeeper checked his radar where he found a
weak echo which he identified as a sailing vessel. No mention is
made of the steaming light on the ‘Medi Mode’ which would have
identified it as a vessel under power (Rule 3(b), (c)). No compass
bearings were taken on the approaching vessel to assist in
establishing the risk of collision.
02.17 hrs: The ‘Varkan Ege’ watchkeeper called the sailing vessel on VHF but
he received no reply.
02.18 hrs: The ‘Varkan Ege’ watchkeeper switched the vessel’s steering gear
from automatic to manual. He informed the master that he was
altering course to starboard to avoid collision with the other vessel.
02.22 hrs: ‘Varkan Ege’ and sailing vessel ‘Medi Mode’ collided. The sailing
vessel made contact with the tanker on its port side. ‘Medi Mode’
collided head on and damaged its bow. It then swung to port, then
swung to starboard and damaged its starboard side. The ‘Varkan Ege’
immediately stopped its engine. The VHF, DSC button was pressed on
the ‘Medi Mode’ but no response was received. Mayday transmission
was made by ‘Medi Mode’ but again no response was received.
02.22 hrs: ‘Varkan Ege’ contacted Dublin Port VTS and informed it that they had
been in a collision with a sailing vessel. It reported that there
10
Cont. NARRATIVE
02.24 hr: Dublin Port VTS instructed ‘Varkan Ege’ to contact Dublin Coast
Guard radio on VHF Ch. 16 or Ch.12.
02.27 hrs: The ‘Varkan Ege’ was in contact with Dublin Coast Guard radio and
information was exchanged. ‘Medi Mode’ was unable to transmit or
receive messages from Dublin Coast Guard radio. The tanker ‘Varkan
Ege’ was able to relay any messages from ‘Medi Mode’. ‘Medi Mode’
proceeded to Greystones Harbour.
02.37 hrs: VHF contact was lost between ‘Varkan Ege’ and ‘Medi Mode’.
However, ‘Medi Mode’ which was heading in the direction of
Greystones was visible to the tanker ‘Varkan Ege’.
03.45 hrs: ‘Medi Mode’ arrived at a pontoon in Greystones Harbour and was met
by the Deputy Chief Officer in charge of Greystones Coast Guard. The
Coast Guard interviewed the crewmembers of the ‘Medi Mode’ and
contact details were exchanged. The Coast Guard spoke to the
Master of the ‘Varkan Ege’ over the VHF and took his details.
03.48 hrs Dublin Coast Guard informed the ‘Varkan Ege’ that it was free to
resume its passage to Falmouth.
11
ANALYSIS
4. ANALYSIS
• Human Factors.
4.1 The application and implementation, in this case, of the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs).
Any skipper should have a sound working knowledge of these regulations so that
he can apply them almost instinctively. It is also necessary to be able to recognize
lights, shapes and other signals which are prescribed for different types of vessels
under various conditions.
From the analysis of the circumstances the following rules of the COLREGs are
considered to apply to this event. Relevant sections of each rule are underlined
and their application to the collision is considered.
Rule 1. States that the rules apply to all vessels upon the high seas and all
waters connected to the high seas and navigable by seagoing vessels.
Rule 2. Covers the responsibility of the master, owner and crew to comply with
the rules.
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and
hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing
circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation
and of the risk of collision.
__________________________________________________________________
The event occurred in the Irish Sea, 3 miles east of Greystones Harbour. The
weather was good. It happened at night time and the visibility was good. Both
vessels should have observed each other and avoided a close quarters situation
developing. A close quarters situation means a situation at which vessels are
dangerously approaching each other and the action of one vessel alone may not
be enough to avoid a collision. The ‘Medi Mode’ should have seen the ‘Varkan
Ege’ lights at a range of 6 miles and the ‘Varkan Ege’ should have observed the
‘Medi Mode’ lights at a range of 1 mile. The ‘Varkan Ege’ Master’s report does not
12
Cont. ANALYSIS
indicate that at the time of the collision that there was a lookout on the bridge.
However, it is stated in the Master’s report that ‘the lookout kept an eye on the
sailing vessel’. If the lookout saw the sailing vessel at a range of 1 NM he would
have approximately 4 minutes to make an alteration of course to try to avoid
collision.
(a). Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing
circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If
there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist.
(b). Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational,
including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision
and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected
objects.
(ii). such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing
change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large
vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close range.
__________________________________________________________________
Look-out in this case is the activity of the watchkeeper or other person in looking
out for hazards or other events that may affect safe navigation. The person
carrying out this function can be the watchkeeper, or a dedicated person
appointed as the ‘lookout’.
Neither vessel took compass bearings of each other to determine if there was a
risk of collision. Both vessels contravened the express requirement of Rule 7 (d)(i)
Risk of Collision to take such bearings. If they had then this would have shown
that a risk of collision existed.
On Friday the 23rd August at 02.16 hrs the ‘Varkan Ege’ watchkeeper checked his
radar when he found a weak echo which he identified as a sailing vessel. This was
approximately 6 minutes before the collision occurred and would have been when
the vessels were roughly 1.5 NM distance from each other.
13
ANALYSIS Cont.
(a). Any action to avoid collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules
of this Part and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be
positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance of
good seamanship.
(b). Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if the
circumstances of the case admit, be large enough to be readily apparent
to another vessel observing visually or by radar; a succession of small
alterations of course and/or speed should be avoided.
(c). If there is sufficient sea-room, alteration of course alone may be the most
effective action to avoid a close-quarters situation provided that it is made
in good time, is substantial and does not result in another close-quarters
situation.
(d). Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such as to
result in passing at a safe distance. The effectiveness of the action shall
be carefully checked until the other vessel is finally past and clear.
(e). If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation,
a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or
reversing her means of propulsion.
(i). A vessel which, by any of these Rules, is required not to impede the
passage or safe passage of another vessel shall, when required by
the circumstances of the case, take early action to allow sufficient
sea-room for the safe passage of the other vessel.
The ‘Varkan Ege’ was on a course of 161° and the ‘Medi Mode’ was on a course
of 000°. The ‘Medi Mode’ reported that the situation was green to green. This
means that both vessels were showing green side navigation lights (starboard
light) to the other and that they could possibly clear each other Starboard side to
14
Cont. ANALYSIS
Starboard side. The matter is confused by the fact that the watchkeeper on the
‘Medi Mode’, in his statement, identified the green light as a Port light. (The Port
side light is red). The ‘Varkan Ege’ reported that the situation was red to green.
This is either a head on situation or a crossing situation. Either way it would have
led to a close quarter’s situation developing (see Appendix 7.7).
(b). Such a situation shall be deemed to exist when a vessel sees the other
ahead or nearly ahead and by night she could see the masthead lights of
the other in a line or nearly in a line and/or both sidelights and by day
she observes the corresponding aspect of the other vessel.
(c). When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether such a situation exists she
shall assume that it does exist and act accordingly.
‘Varkan Ege’ observed a red light on its starboard side and should have
determined that this was a crossing situation and accordingly should keep well
clear by making a large alteration of course to starboard in ample time. The
‘Varkan Ege’ was the give-way vessel. Given the circumstances that developed
and the lights which were apparent to each of the vessels the ‘Varkan Ege’ was
the give-way vessel and the ‘Medi Mode’ was the stand–on Vessel.
Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another vessel shall,
so far as possible, take early and substantial action to keep well clear.
__________________________________________________________________
15
ANALYSIS Cont.
In this case it became apparent to the OOW on the ‘Varkan Ege’ that there was a
collision risk.
The ‘Varkan Ege’’s speed was 7.5 knots and the ‘Medi Mode’ had a speed of 7.9
knots. This would give a closing speed of approximately 15.4 knots. This type of
closing speed would result in close quarter’s situation in 4 minutes from the time
‘Varkan Ege’ saw the lights on ‘Medi Mode’ as the lights of the ‘Medi Mode’ had
a minimum range of 1 NM. As the give-way vessel (a vessel directed to keep out
of the way of another vessel) under the COLREGs, the ‘Varkan Ege’ was required
to take early and substantial action by a large alteration of course to starboard,
to avoid collision. It did this, according to the Master’s statement, by altering
course to starboard.
Friday 23rd August 02.18 hrs: The OOW on ‘Varkan Ege’ switched the vessel’s
steering gear from automatic to manual. He informed the Master that he was
altering course to starboard to avoid collision with the other vessel. Automatic
identification surveillance (AIS) data indicates a course alteration of
approximately 60 degrees to starboard by the ‘Varkan Ege’. The course alteration
to starboard was stated to be large enough to pass astern of ‘Medi Mode’. He
stated that ‘Medi Mode’ altered its course to port prior to the collision.
(a). (i). Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall
keep her course and speed.
(ii). The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her
manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the
vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate
action in compliance with these Rules.
(b). When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed
finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of
the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to
avoid collision.
(d). This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation to keep
out of the way.
__________________________________________________________________
There is a conflict of information in the reports of the Master of the ‘Varkan Ege’
and that of the watchkeeper of ‘Medi Mode’. The former indicates that ‘Medi
16
Cont. ANALYSIS
Mode’ did not hold its course and speed and instead turned to port in
contravention of Rule 17(c). The statement from ‘Medi Mode’ advises that it kept
its course and speed. The ‘Medi Mode’ crewman said that it was in a green to
green situation and presumed that it did not have to alter course and this is what
it did. If it had altered to starboard for a head-on situation then this collision
would not have occurred. It presumed it was showing a green light but due to
yawing from a following wind for a period it may have been showing a red, port
side light (see Appendix 7.7).
As a collision occurred it is clear that both vessels may not have taken sufficient
action to avoid the collision - ‘Varkan Ege’ under Rule16 and ‘Medi Mode’ under
Rule 17 (b) (c) and (d) above. There is evidence to support the assertion by
‘Varkan Ege’ that ‘Medi Mode’ turned to port before the collision as it collided
with the port side of the ‘Varkan Ege’ in a head on mode, in spite of the fact that
the AIS on the ‘Varkan Ege’ indicates that it turned to starboard approximately 60
degrees to avoid collision as per Rule 14(a).
4.1.10 Rule 18. Responsibilities between vessels. Except where Rules 9, 10 and 13
otherwise require:
(a). A power-driven vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:
(b). A sailing vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:
(c). A vessel engaged in fishing when underway shall, so far as possible, keep out
of the way of:
(d). (i). Any vessel other than a vessel not under command or a vessel restricted
in her ability to manoeuvre shall, if the circumstances of the case
17
ANALYSIS Cont.
(e). A seaplane on the water shall, in general, keep well clear of all vessels and
avoid impeding their navigation. In circumstances, however, where risk of
collision exists, she shall comply with the Rules of this part.
(f). (i). A WIG craft shall, when taking off, landing and in flight near the surface,
keep well clear of all other vessels and avoid impeding their navigation;
(ii). a WIG craft operating on the water surface shall comply with the Rules
of this Part as a power-driven vessel.
__________________________________________________________________
The application of this rule states that a power driven vessel shall keep out of the
way of a sailing vessel. In this case ‘Medi Mode’ was not a sailing vessel as both
engine and sails were being used for propulsion. Rule 18 (a) (iv) does not apply in
this case.
(b). The Rules concerning lights shall be complied with from sunset to
sunrise, and during such times no other lights shall be exhibited, except
such lights as cannot be mistaken for the lights specified in these Rules
or do not impair their visibility or distinctive character, or interfere
with the keeping of a proper look-out.
(c). The lights prescribed by these Rules shall, if carried, also be exhibited
from sunrise to sunset in restricted visibility and may be exhibited in all
other circumstances when it is deemed necessary.
(e). The lights and shapes specified in these Rules shall comply with the
provisions of Annex I to these Regulations.
__________________________________________________________________
From investigations both vessels have complied with this rule and there are no
issues arising that have contributed to the collision.
18
Cont. ANALYSIS
(a). “Masthead light” means a white light placed over the fore and aft
centreline of the vessel showing an unbroken light over an arc of the
horizon of 225 degrees and so fixed as to show the light from right ahead
to 22.5 degrees abaft the beam on either side of the vessel.
(b). “Sidelights” means a green light on the starboard side and a red light on
the port side each showing an unbroken light over an arc of the horizon
of 112.5 degrees and so fixed as to show the light from right ahead to
22.5 degrees abaft the beam on its respective side. In a vessel of less
than 20 metres in length the sidelights may be combined in one lantern
carried on the fore and aft centreline of the vessel.
(d). “Towing light” means a yellow light having the same characteristics as the
“sternlight” defined in paragraph (c) of this Rule.
(e). “All-round light” means a light showing an unbroken light over an arc of
the horizon of 360 degrees.
From investigations both vessels have complied with this rule and there are no
issues arising that have contributed to the collision
(b). In vessels of 12 metres or more in length but less than 50 metres in length;
a masthead light, 5 miles; except that where the length of the vessel is less
than 20 metres, 3 miles; a sidelight, 2 miles; a sternlight, 2 miles; a towing
light, 2 miles; a white, red, green or yellow all-round light, 2 miles.
19
ANALYSIS Cont.
(d). Inconspicuous, partly submerged vessels or objects being towed: a white all-
round light, 3 miles.
__________________________________________________________________
From investigations both vessels have complied with this rule and there are no
issues arising that have contributed to the collision.
(ii). a second masthead light abaft of and higher than the forward one;
except that a vessel of less than 50 metres in length shall not be
obliged to exhibit such light but may do so;
(iii). sidelights;
(iv). a sternlight.
(c). A WIG craft only when taking off, landing and in flight near the surface
shall, in addition to the lights prescribed in paragraph (a) of this Rule,
exhibit a high intensity all-round flashing red light.
20
Cont. ANALYSIS
‘Varkan Ege’ has complied with this rule and there are no issues arising that may
have contributed to the collision.
4.1.15 Rule 25. Sailing vessels underway and vessels under oars.
(i). sidelights;
(ii). sternlight.
(b). In a sailing vessel of less than 20 metres in length the lights prescribed
in paragraph (a) of this Rule may be combined in one lantern carried at
or near the top of the mast where it can best be seen.
(d). (i). A sailing vessel of less than 7 metres in length shall, if practicable,
exhibit the lights prescribed in paragraph (a) or (b) of this Rule, but if
she does not, she shall have ready at hand an electric torch or lighted
lantern showing a white light which shall be exhibited in sufficient
time to prevent collision.
(ii). A vessel under oars may exhibit the lights prescribed in this Rule for
sailing vessels, but if she does not, she shall have ready at hand an
electric torch or lighted lantern showing a white light which shall be
exhibited in sufficient time to prevent collision.
(e). A vessel proceeding under sail when also being propelled by machinery
shall exhibit forward where it can best be seen a conical shape, apex
downwards.
__________________________________________________________________
‘Medi Mode’ has not complied with section (e) of this rule but it is unlikely to
have contributed to the collision given the time and the conditions involved.
21
ANALYSIS Cont.
(a). The word “whistle” means any sound signalling appliance capable of
producing the prescribed blasts and which complies with the
specifications in Annex III to these Regulations.
(b). The term “short blast” means a blast of about one second’s duration.
(c). The term “prolonged blast” means a blast of from four to six seconds’
duration.
(a). When vessels are in sight of one another, a power-driven vessel underway,
when manoeuvring as authorized or required by these Rules, shall indicate
that manoeuvre by the following signals on her whistle: z one short blast to
mean “I am altering my course to starboard”; z two short blasts to mean “I
am altering my course to port”; z three short blasts to mean “I am operating
astern propulsion”. (b). Any vessel may supplement the whistle signals
prescribed in paragraph (a) of this Rule by light signals, repeated as
appropriate, whilst the manoeuvre is being carried out: (i). these light
signals shall have the following significance
(ii). the duration of each flash shall be about one second, the interval
between flashes shall be about one second, and the interval between
successive signals shall be not less than ten seconds;
(iii). the light used for this signal shall, if fitted, be an all-round white light,
visible at a minimum range of 5 miles, and shall comply with the
provisions of Annex I to these Regulations.
22
Cont. ANALYSIS
(ii). the vessel about to be overtaken when acting in accordance with Rule
9(e)(i) shall indicate her agreement by the following signal on her
whistle:
one prolonged, one short, one prolonged and one short blast, in that
order.
(d). When vessels in sight of one another are approaching each other and
from any cause either vessel fails to understand the intentions or actions
of the other, or is in doubt whether sufficient action is being taken by the
other to avoid collision, the vessel in doubt shall immediately indicate
such doubt by giving at least five short and rapid blasts on the whistle.
Such signal may be supplemented by a light signal of at least five short
and rapid flashes.
‘Varkan Ege’ utilised a sound signal of five short blasts on the whistle in
compliance with Rules 32 and 34 to try and establish the intentions of ‘Medi
Mode’. It does not appear to have had any effect that may have prevented the
collision. It is not clear from investigations if the crew of ‘Medi Mode’ understood
the signal being given, as its statement indicates the vessel held its course and
speed.
23
ANALYSIS Cont.
4.2.1 The MCIB was unable to examine the possibility of fatigue and tiredness on the
crew of the ‘Varkan Ege’ due to the fact that it had left the jurisdiction and has
not returned since to enable examination of the working hours of crew. It may
have been a factor as the vessel had spent time in Dublin Port involved in cargo
operations and subsequently sailed. Collision occurred approximately 2 hours
after sailing from Dublin. Tiredness and fatigue cannot be completely ruled out as
a contributing factor in the collision.
4.2.2 On board the ‘Medi Mode’, given the two hours on and two hours off watch
system, with only 2 crew, both could have been fatigued and tired due to being
at sea since 10.45 on the 22nd August and due to the limited and disturbed sleep
patterns imposed by time and vessel motion. Such tiredness can lead to poor
concentration and decision making. This is somewhat borne out by the error in
sidelight identification by the ‘Medi Mode’ helmsman/watchkeeper who
identified a Port side light as being green instead of red. Such error may have
resulted in an incorrect assessment of the ‘Medi Mode’’s position in relation to
the position of the ‘Varkan Ege’ and the resulting action or inaction taken.
Tiredness and fatigue of the crew of the ‘Medi Mode’ cannot be ruled out as a
contributing factor to the collision.
4.2.3 The lack of any formal marine navigation qualifications by the crew of the ‘Medi
Mode’ may also have contributed to the understanding of actions required by the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972.
4.2.4 Efforts by the ‘Varkan Ege’ to communicate by VHF with the ‘Medi Mode’ prior to
the collision were not responded to. It is not clear why no response was received
from the ‘Medi Mode’. There is the possibility of failure of the ‘Medi Mode’’s
antenna system which was recently overhauled, particularly as inter vessel
communication was poor, even at a close distance following the collision. This
effort at communication delayed action by ‘Varkan Ege’ to manoeuvre to avoid
collision.
24
CONCLUSIONS
5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 The ‘Medi Mode’ believed that no risk of collision existed because the lights were
green to green. However, due to yawing from a following wind they were actually
showing a red, port side light to the ‘Varkan Ege’ when the lookout observed the
vessel. Having taken no compass bearings and also that they had no radar, this
could not be definitively determined. Even though ‘Medi Mode’ saw the ‘Varkan
Ege’ in plenty of time, it believed it was the stand on vessel and kept its course
and speed in the belief that the ‘Varkan Ege’ would either alter course or would
pass clear on their starboard side. This led to a close quarters situation and
subsequent collision.
5.2 The ‘Varkan Ege’ reported seeing the red light with a CPA of zero at 02.16 hrs and
the collision occurred at 02.22 hrs. This gave it 6 minutes to take proper action to
avoid collision. A lookout would have detected this at 4 minutes. (Closing speed
15.5k - Range of light 1 NM) It had six minutes to make a large alteration of course
to starboard, as it observed the ‘Medi Mode’ light at a range of 1.5 NM. A course
alteration was made at 02.18 hrs, approximately 4 minutes before the collision. As
per COLREGs the ‘Varkan Ege’ complied with efforts to avoid collision when it
became apparent that collision was possible. It altered course to starboard, it
reduced speed and requested ‘Medi Mode’ by sound signal to indicate its
intentions.
5.3 The ‘Varkan Ege’ should not have attempted to communicate via VHF with the
sailing vessel when it was so close. This is not recommended, and was not
successful. This wasted valuable time when an immediate alteration of course to
starboard may have been sufficient to avoid collision.
5.4 The two crewmembers of the ‘Medi Mode’ had many years’ experience of sailing,
however, they had no formal marine navigation training. They had no recognised
course on the COLREGs. This was a contributory factor particularly in relation to
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 Rule 7: Taking
Compass bearings and Rule 17(b) and (d) Action of stand-on vessel.
5.5 The ‘Varkan Ege’ states in its report that it observed the ‘Medi Mode’ altering its
course to port just before the collision. ‘Medi Mode’ states in its report that it kept
its course. This cannot be determined definitively as the ‘Medi Mode’ does not
have the technology to record this. However, the two vessels were on a collision
course before this happened. The collision occurred with the prow of the ‘Medi
Mode’ striking the port bow of the ‘Varkan Ege’.
25
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 The Minister for Transport, Tourism & Sport should issue a Marine Notice
highlighting the requirements set out in Chapter 2 of the Code of Practice (CoP):
The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft.
1.2.1 Compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(1972).
26
APPENDICES
7. APPENDICES
PAGE
7.1 Photographs 28
27
APPENDIX 7.1
28
APPENDIX 7.1
29
APPENDIX 7.1 Cont.
30
APPENDIX 7.2
31
APPENDIX 7.3
32
APPENDIX 7.4
33
APPENDIX 7.5
As ‘Varkan Ege’ was altered course to Starboard ‘Medi Mode’ altered to Port.
34
APPENDIX 7.6
35
APPENDIX 7.6 Cont.
36
APPENDIX 7.7
37
APPENDIX 7.8
38
MSA 2000 SECTION 36
SECTION 36 PROCESS
(1) Before publishing a report, the Board shall send a draft of the report or sections of
the draft report to any person who, in its opinion, is likely to be adversely affected
by the publishing of the report or sections or, if that person be deceased, then such
person as appears to the Board best to represent that person’s interest.
(2) A person to whom the Board sends a draft in accordance with subsection (1) may,
within a period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the draft is sent to the
person, or such further period not exceeding 28 days, as the Board in its absolute
discretion thinks fit, submit to the Board in writing his or her observations on the
draft.
(3) A person to whom a draft has been sent in accordance with subsection (1) may apply
to the Board for an extension, in accordance with subsection (2), of the period in
which to submit his or her observations on the draft.
(4) Observations submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2) shall be
included in an appendix to the published report, unless the person submitting the
observations requests in writing that the observations be not published.
(5) Where observations are submitted to the Board in accordance with subsection (2),
the Board may, at its discretion -
(b) include in the published report such comments on the observations as it thinks
fit.’
The Board reviews and considers all observations received whether published or not
published in the final report. When the Board considers an observation requires
amendments to the report that is stated beside the relevant observation. When the Board
is satisfied that the report has adequately addressed the issue in the observation, then
the observation is ‘Noted’ without comment or amendment. The Board may make further
amendments or observations in light of the responses under Section 36. ‘Noted’ does not
mean that the Board either agrees or disagrees with the observation.
Within the Section 36 process clarifications were needed in order to produce a robust
report which required the draft report to issue for a second time. Some correspondence
received by the MCIB in response to the first draft report make reference to paragraph
numbers as they appear in that draft. It should be noted that some paragraph numbers
in this final report are different to the first draft. Where necessary the MCIB comment
inserted in each submission makes reference to any change in paragraph order.
39
CORRESPONDENCE
PAGE
Note: The names and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured
for privacy reasons.
40
CORRESPONDENCE 8.1
Harbour Master
Dublin Port Company
Port Centre
Alexandra Road
Dublin 1
Chairperson
MCIB
Reference: Draft confidential report into a collision between MT Varkan Ege & Medi Mode
off Greystones Harbour 23 August 2019.
The report on a number of occasions correctly states that the vessel MT Varkan Ege called Dublin
VTS on VHF Channel 12. I would like to clarify that the collision in position 53°09.864’N,
005°57.596’W is 8.5 nautical miles from the closest point to the jurisdiction of Dublin Port MCIB RESPONSE:
Company. Noted.
As the vessel is reported to have been making way at 7.5 knots the vessel had left the Dublin Port
Company jurisdiction approximately 1 hour and 8 minutes prior to the collision.
Yours Sincerely
Harbour Master
Dublin Port Company
41
CORRESPONDENCE 8.2
MCIB RESPONSE:
Observed by ‘Varkan
Ege’.
42
CORRESPONDENCE 8.2 Cont.
Correspondence 8.2 ‘Medi Mode’ Crewmember 1 and MCIB response MCIB RESPONSE:
Lookout in COLREGs
refers to the act of
observing not an
individual.
MCIB RESPONSE:
Specific instruction to
track ‘Medi Mode’.
43
CORRESPONDENCE 8.3
44
CORRESPONDENCE 8.3 Cont.
MCIB RESPONSE:
Paragraph amended.
45
Cont. CORRESPONDENCE 8.3
MCIB RESPONSE:
Tracked by equipment
on the ‘Varkan Ege’.
46
NOTES
47
Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
email: [email protected]
www.mcib.ie