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Article

Comparative Political Studies

2015, Vol. 48(l) 3-34
Lost Autonomy, @ The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions:
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DOI: 10.1177/0010414013516927
Separatism cps.sagepub.com
OSAGE

David S. Sirokyl and John Cuffe 2

Abstract
Case studies suggest that ethnic groups with autonomous institutional
arrangements are more prone to secede, but other evidence indicates
that autonomy reduces the likelihood of secession. To address this debate,
we disaggregate their autonomy status into three categories-currently
autonomous, never autonomous, and lost autonomy-and then unpack
how each shapes the logic of collective action. We argue groups that were
never autonomous are unlikely to mobilize due to a lack of collective action
capacity, whereas currently autonomous groups may have the capacity but
often lack the motivation. Most important, groups that have lost autonomy
often possess both strong incentives and the capacity to pursue secession,
which facilitates collective action. Moreover, autonomy retraction weakens
the government's ability to make future credible commitments to redress
grievances. We test these conjectures with data on the autonomous status
and separatist behavior of 324 groups in more than 100 countries from
I960 to 2000. Our analysis shows clear empirical results regarding the
relationship between autonomy status and separatism. Most notably, we
find that formerly autonomous groups are the most likely to secede, and
that both currently autonomous and never autonomous groups are much
less likely.

'Arizona State University, Tempe, USA

2
University of California, Irvine, USA

Corresponding Author:
David S. Siroky, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, P.O. Box
873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902, USA.
Email: [email protected]
4 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

Keywords
nationalism, separatism, decentralization, autonomy

Does autonomy satisfy the demand for more self-determination, or instead

foster the capacity and whet the appetite for independence? Is political decen-
tralization a viable solution for multiethnic states, or a slippery slope? Some
scholars and policymakers see autonomy as the main mechanism to resolve
tensions and redistributive issues between the central government and spa-
tially concentrated, culturally distinct groups (Bermeo, 2002; Bermeo

&
Amoretti, 2003; L. Diamond, 1999; Stepan, 1999). Others studies, however,
show that autonomy can actually exacerbate relations between the state and
ethnic groups, for it cultivates the capacity for collective action and self-rule
without significantly reducing desire for more of it (Brancati, 2009; Bunce,
1999; Coppieters, 2001; Comell, 2002; Roeder, 1991).
This article posits that the theoretical and empirical disagreement over the
effect of autonomy is partly due to conflating two distinct situations in the
implicit reference category-groups that are not autonomous. This binary
classification compares groups that are currently autonomous to a baseline
that is comprised of both groups that have never been autonomous, and those
that once had autonomy, but lost it. Groups that have never been autonomous
and those that have lost autonomy are distinct in their motivation and their
capacity for collective action. Whereas never autonomous groups may be
unlikely to mobilize due to a lack of collective action capacity, currently
autonomous groups may have such capacity, but should find the cost of
attempting to alter the status quo too high compared with the benefits they
currently enjoy from being autonomous. Most important, we argue that
groups which have lost autonomy possess both powerful incentives in the
form of grievances and often also have the capacity for collective action
capacity, which leads us to expect such groups to be more likely to pursue
secession.
Following previous studies, we define autonomy as a form of intemal self-
determination that provides a group with actual powers and resources for
self-govemance within a state (Brancati, 2009; Wolff, 2013; Zinn, 2006).1
Specifically, we build on Wolff's (2013) definition of "territorial self-gover-
nance," which he describes as "legally entrenched power of territorially-
delimited entities within the intemationally recognized boundaries of existing
states to exercise public policy functions independently of other sources of
authority in this state, but subject to its overall legal order" (p. 5). To this defi-
nition, we add Stepan's (1999) of asymmetric arrangements, meaning that the
powers devolved to a group must not apply for all of the groups within the
Siroky and Cuffe 5

state. For example, the United States has symmetric federal arrangements-
in theory, states are all treated equally relative to the central government. In
other countries, such as Spain, Indonesia, and Canada, particular regions are
granted asymmetric autonomous arrangements above and beyond what other
regions within the state possess. For example, the government in Catalonia in
Spain, currently headed by a regionalist-nationalist party (the Converg~ncia
Democritica de Catalunya, [CDC]), possesses high levels of formal auton-
omy through the constitution and high levels of control over the day-to-day
affairs within the province.2 As a result, Catalonia is coded as currently
autonomous.
We do not blindly follow formal laws, however, but also consider the
degree of de facto autonomy (especially in autocracies) in determining
whether to code a case as autonomous. For example, although Tibet is offi-
cially as an autonomous region in China, the Chinese government exerts con-
siderable control over the Tibetan government, appoints administrators from
foreign regions and directly selects its own Dalai Lama as an attempt to con-
trol Tibetan religious organizations, a key consideration considering the role
of Monks in Tibetan society. We therefore code Tibet as having lost auton-
omy in 1949.3
We argue that groups which have recently lost autonomy should be more
likely to engage in separatism than groups that are currently autonomous or
groups that were never autonomous, ceteris paribus. We hypothesize that lost
autonomy increases the likelihood of separatism through four main mecha-
nisms. First, it fosters ethnic resentment as a result of diminished status,
which engenders grievances that are increasingly hard to appease (e.g.,
Petersen, 2002). Second, it weakens the central government's ability to make
credible commitments, which reduces the viability of conciliatory political
strategies (e.g., Hale, 2008a; Hale, 2008b).
Third, retracting autonomy does not necessarily curb the group's collec-
tive action capacity, which was gained and developed under autonomy, as
leadership loss, generational replacement, and assimilation are relatively
slow processes (Siroky & Aprasdize, 2011). Finally, while the free rider prob-
lem is widely recognized, we suggest that the cost of free riding within a
group that recently lost autonomy may be higher than joining forces with
those who seek separation (Hechter, 2000; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007), thus
making lost autonomy a particularly powerful basis for secession. Currently
autonomous groups must weigh the potential loss of their current status
against their unrealized desire for full independence, and we therefore predict
that they should be less prone to secession than those that recently lost
autonomy.
6 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

We develop this logic and derive several key empirical implications in the
next section. Using a data set that builds on the latest data sources on ethnic
politics and conflict, and covers roughly 330 ethnically distinct groups in
more than 110 states over a 40-year period, our analysis indicates that for-
merly autonomous groups are the most likely to secede, whereas currently
autonomous and never autonomous groups were significantly less likely to
do so. These results provide strong evidence regarding the impact of lost
autonomy on separatism, and are robust to matching on covariates, instru-
mental variables, different estimators, and confounding variables. 4 We also
find, in most models, that currently autonomous have a higher propensity for
separatism than groups that have never been autonomous. The results shed
new light on existing empirical results, and contribute to the long-standing
debate regarding the relationship between autonomy and separatism. The
final section discusses potential implications of this study for the design of
institutions in multiethnic countries and proposes several directions for future
research.

A Theory of Lost Autonomy

We situate our contribution within the context of debates over the effect of
decentralized institutions-specifically, the effect of regional autonomy-on
nationalist mobilization and separatism (Bunce, 1999; Hale, 2000; Hechter

&
Okamoto, 2001; Horowitz, 1985; Kymlicka, 2008; Miodownik & Cartrite,
2010; Rogowski, 1985; Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Treisman, 1997). Proponents
of autonomous institutional arrangements argue that political decentraliza-
tion is the primary means by which a large multiethnic state can relieve
ethno-regional tensions on its periphery and preserve a unified polity (Brass,
1991; Gurr, 2000; Kaufman, 1996; Lijphart, 1977; McGarry & O'Leary,
1993; Stepan, 1999; Tsebelis, 1990). The language of self-determination and
minority rights, which was originally used by the Great Powers to redraw
boundaries after World War I, and later used to justify the process of decolo-
nization, has been increasingly utilized by ethnic minority groups, which
have wielded it effectively to extract concessions from the central govern-
ment (Jenne, 2007; Jenne, 2010).
Most recently, decentralization of power to ethnic regions has been touted
as a potential solution to tensions with ethnic minority groups in Iraq and
Afghanistan (O'Hanlon & Joseph, 2007), and has been discussed in many
other hot spot regions around the world, including the Balkans (Guss
&

Siroky, 2012), Ethiopia (Ghai, 2000), and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa
(Forrest, 2004). Many studies have shown that autonomy bears a strong rela-
tionship to peace in the developed world (e.g., Spain, Germany, the United
Siroky and Cuffe 7

States, Switzerland, Australia) and in the developing world (e.g., Nigeria,

India, Mexico, Ethiopia). Autonomy "has done more to relieve or contain
secessionist pressures," wrote Larry Diamond (1999), "than to stimulate
them" (p. 156). Stepan (1999) reinforces this point when he notes that "every
single longstanding democracy in a multilingual and multinational polity is a
federal state" (p. 19).
Decentralization as an approach to ethnic conflict management is certainly
not without its detractors, who argue that centrifugal concessions to ethnic
groups create a "slippery slope" of increasing demands for self-determina-
tion. Autonomy is unlikely to satisfy a group's demands for self-rule, in this
view, and is much more likely to reinforce ethnic particularism and preju-
dices by providing group leaders with the symbolic and material resources
needed to mobilize co-ethnics against the state (Ghai, 2000). This form of
minority concession may also engender a strong political backlash (Bustikova,
2014). In short, scholars have argued that autonomy serves as the basis for
secessionism by sharpening borders, "constructing" nations, and fostering
centrifugal incentives among regional elites (Cornell, 2002; Slezkine, 1994;
Streat-Bartlett, 2009).
If there is a consensus in this literature, then it can only be that the net
impact of autonomy is mixed, contingent on other factors, for example, the
strength of regional parties, the existence of prior conflicts, the level of devel-
opment, the wider geopolitical environment, and so on (Brancati, 2009;
Jenne, 2010). It would appear that autonomy has no consistent empirical rela-
tionship with separatist activity, even though there is case study evidence to
support arguments both in favor and against it (Cornell, 2002; Roeder, 1991;
Stepan, 1999). In short, the empirical record remains "murky" (Hechter
&

Okamoto, 2001), and we aim to provide some conceptual and empirical clar-
ity regarding the relationship between autonomy and separatism.
We suggest that to advance this debate it is crucial to disaggregate the
implicit baseline of comparison-"non-autonomous status." A binary (auton-
omous or not) framing of the debate over the effect of autonomy masks two
distinct scenarios: one in which an ethnic group has never been autonomous,
and another in which an ethnic group lost their autonomy. Although both are
technically not autonomous, we predict that one group (lost autonomy) is
highly prone to separatism, whereas the other group (never autonomous) is
very unlikely to pursue secession, because on average they lack both the lead-
ership and grievances required for collective action (Saxton, 2005).
By contrast, currently autonomous groups are more likely to have the
capacity to overcome collective action problems. The capacity for separatism
is largely irrelevant, however, if autonomous groups lack the desire for seces-
sion, either because the status quo satisfies their demand for self-determina-
tion or the potential risks associated with rebellion are excessively great.
8 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

Most important, we predict the greatest amount of separatist activity from

groups that were recently deprived of autonomy-those groups that experi-
enced a shift from indirect rule to direct rule (Hechter, 2013; Siroky

&
Aprasdize, 2011; Siroky, Dzutsev, & Hechter, 2013). Retracted or lost auton-
omy provides a strong motive and need not significantly diminish the group's
collective action capacity. Moreover, it considerably weakens the govern-
ment's ability to make credible commitments that might otherwise prevent
tensions from escalating, making "voice" seem less likely to yield positive
results than exit, thereby increasing the probability of secession (Hirschman,
1970; North & Weingast, 1989; Siroky & Aprasdize, 2011).
Lost autonomy is not a new idea in political science. Gurr (1993) and Gurr
and Moore (1997), for example, both emphasized the impact of lost auton-
omy on rebellion. Our approach builds on this earlier literature and extends it
in two key ways. First, rather than comparing groups that have lost autonomy
to all other groups, we distinguish and disaggregate between groups that have
never been autonomous, groups that are currently autonomous and groups
that have lost autonomy. This conceptualization, we suggest, offers better
traction on the relationship between autonomy and separatism than a binary
classification. Second, we hypothesize that lost autonomy engenders resent-
ment, which increases the group's grievances, reduces the government's
capacity to make future credible commitments that might bring cooler heads
and calmer voices to the fore, and does not necessarily reduce the collective
action capacities and advantages that groups gained during autonomy (i.e.,
leaders, elite networks, and administrative experience). Autonomy retraction
may also decrease a group's collective action problems by increasing the cost
of free riding relative to participation (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007).s In sum, we
argue that lost autonomy enhances both the motives and the capacities for
collective action, and reduces the government's ability to extend incentives
and attract moderates. This makes such groups (in the grey shaded box, Table
1) more likely to pursue secession than those groups with no history of auton-
omy and those that are currently autonomous (in the unshaded boxes, Table
1). This leads us to derive two main hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Groups that have lost autonomy are more likely to pursue
separatism than currently autonomous groups.
Hypothesis 2: Currently autonomous groups are more likely to pursue
separatism than groups with no history of autonomy.

Before we test these hypotheses more rigorously, we first explore their

plausibility with four cases from distinct regions-Eastern Europe, East Asia,
South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrative vignettes highlight the
Siroky and Cuffe 9

Table I. Theoretical Expectations.

Low capacity High capacity

Weak Never autonomous, included Currently autonomous groups
motives groups
Strong Never autonomous, excluded Historically autonomous groups
motives groups (Separatism most likely)

process of secession following the loss of autonomy, which we contrast

against the group's behavior during and before autonomy, as a means to
examine how well the causal mechanisms operate across several geographi-
cally diverse settings, and to complement the quantitative analysis that
follows.

Four Vignettes
Kosovo's Secession
Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were granted special considerations under the
1946 Constitution, and were later granted full autonomy as a province
(Autonomna Pokrajina) in 1974 (Kubo, 2011). However, this situation was
quickly reversed in 1990, when the region effectively returned to its pre-1974
status. Slobodan Milosevic's increasing power within the quickly fragment-
ing Yugoslavia, along with the local government's discriminatory policies
toward ethnic Serbians (McGwire, 2000), led to public resentment over the
perceived "extremity" of Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia (Petersen,
2002), and soon resulted in the formal revocation of Kosovo's autonomy in
1990 through constitutional changes (Silber, Little, & British Broadcast
Corporation, 1996; Zimmermann, 1999). These changes included abolishing
Kosovo's official public media, transferring control over state-owned compa-
nies to Belgrade, and replacing Albanian educational textbooks and educa-
tion in the Albanian language at Pristina University. Not surprisingly, the
revocation of autonomy led to reciprocal resentment among the ethnic
Albanians within Kosovo. Grievances escalated on both sides, and so did col-
lective action. On the Albanian side, the organizational structures developed
during their period of autonomy were still largely in tact, and played a crucial
role in their subsequent mobilization and eventual militarization.
Two factions emerged to represent the Kosovar Albanian case: Ibrahim
Rugova led the first group highlighting Kosovo's distinct ethnic identity and
heritage in ancient Dardania, a once independent kingdom and later a Roman
10 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

province, through nonviolent means, especially in schools and cultural cen-

ters (Pula, 2004). The second faction, which came to be known as the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA or U(QK), pursued a more radical approach, and
launched attacks against Yugoslav officials and police stations (Agence
France Presse, 1995). Tired of Rugova's approach, the KLA argued that
negotiations had failed, and that a more aggressive line of attack would prove
more effective. The KLA's approach gained popularity among Kosovars, and
the recruitment of volunteers as well as funding from abroad for the "national
cause" increased between 1996 (the KLA's first formal attack against
Yugoslav authorities) and 1999 (the year of NATO's intervention through
Operation Allied Force; Judah, 2002, p. 805; Pula, 2004).
While revoking autonomy may have quelled discontent among Serbs in
Kosovo, it increased grievances among the majority ofAlbanians in Kosovo.
Even those individuals not directly demoted or replaced joined others in soli-
darity by engaging in civil disobedience (Clark, 2000). The structures, includ-
ing many of the top leaders and key organizations, carried over from the
period of autonomy and played a crucial role in Rugova's nonviolent move-
ment for self-rule, and the KLA's ability to recruit and mobilize for indepen-
dence. Although the full story of Kosovo's drive for secession is beyond the
scope of this narrative, the key elements highlighted here-the increased
salience of grievances, the leadership, and the collective action capacity-
were a direct result of the decision to revoke Kosovo's autonomy in 1990.
NATO's intervention and other foreign support played a crucial role in the
ultimate success of the KLA, but the initial impetus was largely internal. Lost
autonomy stimulated popular discontent and served to make secession, which
had led to outright war in Bosnia and Croatia and was thus risky, into an
increasingly attractive alternative to continued negotiations with Belgrade
(Costalli & Moro, 2012).

South Sudanese Separatism

The impact oflost autonomy on separatism is also evident in Sudan. Culturally
distinct Southerners resented the Arabic North for the slave trade (Deng,
2006), "political marginalization, economic neglect, and cultural domina-
tion" (Lado, 2002, p. 159). The Addis Abba Accords ended the first Sudanese
Civil War and granted regional autonomy to the South in 1974 (Beshir,
Mohammad-Salih, & Abdul-Jalil, 1984; Eprile, 1974), which initially showed
some promise of reducing tensions. Over time, however, increasingly Islamic
policies in the North resulted in a new Constitution in 1983, which severely
reduced the South's autonomy, both politically by fragmenting the South into
subunits (Salih, 1994) and culturally by instituting Islamic policies (Beshir et
Siroky and Cuffe II

al., 1984). Between 1980 and 1983, the North seized several oil fields in the
South, which exacerbated tensions and increased the South's incentives to
pursue its own independence.6
The combination of political, economic, and cultural grievances let to the
formation of an opposition Southern People's Liberation Movement/Army
under the leadership of former national cabinet member John Garang. The
organization initially had the support of several international organizations
(Adar, 1998) and of Ethiopia (Kebbede, 1997b). The removal of Northern
President Nimeiri, due to backlash over drought, provided hope for a peace-
ful solution. In 1989, however, the National Islamic Front gained power in
the North (Kebbede, 1997b), rescinding many of the promises made to the
South and intensifying the conflict.
Despite several internal divisions, the Sudan People's Liberation Army
maintained an almost 30-year long separatist movement, which eventually
led to secession (Kebbede, 1997a). The movement for Southern Sudan used
the retraction of autonomy to powerful effect. While heterogeneous and
sometimes rival ethnic groups vied for power within the movement, its focal
point-a sense of cultural imperialism-sustained it. Moreover, leadership
experience gained during the period of autonomy, along with experience
gained from the regional legislative assembly, served the movement well in
overcoming the collective action problem required for the secessionist move-
ment to survive and ultimately to become the newest member of the United
Nations.

Tibetan Separatism in China

Chinese forces invaded Tibet following the Communist takeover of mainland
China. Although officially listed as an autonomous region, this autonomy
exists largely as a faqade. Beijing maintains strict control over Tibet and
retains the right to "approve" the next Dalai Lama as well as repeatedly
attempting to monitor the activities of Tibetan monks (Teufel, 2005, p. 71).
Despite an overwhelming military defeat, the Tibetan Government in Exile
(TGE) that subsequently formed in India has successfully served as a rallying
point for the independence of Tibet (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010; Fuller,
Morrison, Murphy, & Ridley, 2002). For over half a century, since Tibet lost
its autonomy, the TGE has facilitated collective action and provided Tibetans
with a unified political voice to pursue greater autonomy and independence.
Formally and informally, Tibet lost its autonomy in 1949. Tibet subse-
quently launched and has maintained for more than 60 years a strong separat-
ist movement (Sautman, 2005), even being characterized as China's "most
rebellious" territory (Karmel, 1995). Although Tibet may have trouble
12 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

overcoming Chinese rule and gaining independence due to China's military

and economic superiority, Tibet has maintained its cohesion as a movement
for many decades, and this resilience stems in part from its ability to rally
supporters around the issue of its lost autonomy and the need for indepen-
dence as the only means to preserve its distinct cultural identity.
Leadership experience gained when Tibet was autonomous has served the
TGE in its difficult role of maintaining the movement over several decades
and against a determined and strong state. Now based in northern India, the
TGE as initially composed of former ministers who escaped the war and
provided the leadership capacity to form and foster a coherent movement for
independence. The Dalai Lama, a powerful cultural and spiritual symbol for
Tibetans, is a carryover from the period of Tibetan autonomy. Until his retire-
ment in 2011, he served as the head of state for the TGE after fleeing Tibet a
decade after the initial invasion. Although his stance has softened on the best
course of action for Tibet (He & Sautman, 2005), the Tibetan leadership still
insists Tibet and China do not share a common cultural identity, which serves
as the basis for its claims to autonomy (Karmel, 1995). Even though Tibet is
not economically-vital for China, holding firm demonstrates the regime's
ability to resist international pressures (Gladney, 2003; Sautman, 1999;
Walsh, 1993).

Assamese Separatism in India

A fully autonomous region during the first decades of Indian independence,
the Assamese began to engage in separatist activity in earnest in the late
1970s following India's campaign of "internal colonialism" (Darnell
&

Parikh, 1988; Hechter, 1975). The Indian central government had been pro-
gressively encroaching on the traditional homeland of the Assamese since the
1970s. Tensions between "Assamese regional patriotism and pan-Indianism"
(Baruah, 2009, p. 953) escalated throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Gurr,
2009), especially during the 1983 local elections (Baruah, 2009; Dasgupta
&

Guha, 1985), and came to a fountainhead following the formal retraction of

autonomy in 1991 and the subsequent military operations (Misra, 1995).
Indian expansion into Assam had, over many years, engendered strong
grievances toward the central government, and prompted some early signs of
collective action (e.g., protests, strikes) and later led to calls for independence
(Darnell & Parikh, 1988). While Indian authorities have been able to arrest
many individual operators of the United Front for the Liberation of Assam
(UFLA), they have not removed "the soil that germinates the rebels" (Kalita,
2009, p. 102). The "soil" has two components that help to overcome the col-
lective action problem: First, a strong sense of injustice at having their
Siroky and Cuffe I13

autonomy reduced and ultimately retracted, and second, the leadership and
political capabilities developed during autonomy, first with the Movement
for Assam in the late 1970s and then with the UFLA, and through ties to the
former regional legislative assembly (Baruah, 2009). Both of these factors
have combined to sustain the movement for an independent Assam, despite
the overwhelming economic and military superiority of the Indian state, and
continue to serve as the movement's focal point for mobilization.

Summary of Vignettes
Although these cases all take place at different times and on different conti-
nents, a key dynamic clearly emerges and illustrates how lost autonomy
increased separatism relative both to the period during and prior to autonomy.
The case studies also clearly establish that, after losing autonomy, the groups
were struggling to move beyond autonomy, which was no longer credible,
rather than to regain autonomous status. When the central authorities retracted
autonomy from each of these groups (or full independence, in the case of
Tibet), the ethnic groups all responded by mobilizing and engaging in sus-
tained collective action to separate and establish an independent state. This
mobilization was more sustained and significant than collective action during
and before autonomy.
In Kosovo, the central government in Belgrade limited regional powers
and replaced local leaders with Belgrade-backed candidates. This led to the
"decisive protests" by Albanian workers that soon spread throughout the
region (Pula, 2004, p. 803). In the Sudan, the government in Khartoum
redrew the administrative lines of the South's autonomous region to control
oil supplies (Bennett, 1987) and later abolished the local government
(Kebbede, 1997a). This led to the formation of the South Sudanese Liberation
Army and widespread violence that dwarfed the conflict during and before
the period of autonomy, and ultimately resulted in a new state that has been
universally recognized. In Assam, the central government in New Delhi first
interfered directly into the economic affairs in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
and then formally revoked the region's autonomy. This led to significant vio-
lence and collective action aimed at secession from India, whereas prior ten-
sions had only been fully within the framework of autonomy.
In each case, revoking autonomy triggered collective action. If this rela-
tionship was endogenous-autonomy drove separatist collective action,
which led to autonomy retraction, then groups that lost autonomy should be
less separatist than groups that are currently autonomous, because the group
has lost the capacity to secede that it enjoyed under autonomy. The evidence
in these cases does not support this causal ordering, and instead indicates that
14 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

the retraction of autonomy is what led to an increase in separatist activity

rather than the reverse; the time period prior to autonomy appears to be most
quiescent, and the period after lost autonomy the most likely to witness
separatism.
Between 1974 and 1990, Kosovo was relatively peaceful (Malcom, 1998).
Prior to Indian independence from Britain, Assam had no history of large-
scale rebellion (Sinha, 2007). Tibet was its own independent nation prior to
the Chinese takeover, and thus could not exhibit separatism (Shakya, 1999).
Although it is true that South Sudan was certainly not calm prior to gaining
autonomy, it is clear that the period after autonomy was revoked generated a
conflict of a different order, resulting in three times as many deaths and to the
demand for separation of the South from the North (Biel, 2003; Kebbede,
1997b). Analyzing these cases from the perspective of autonomy status indi-
cates that lost autonomy is significantly more likely to produce separatism
than autonomy, and that the period prior to autonomy is the least likely to
spawn separatism. While some of these cases exhibited disputes over status
prior to the loss of autonomy, in all cases the revocation of autonomy esca-
lated the group's demands, generated sustained separatist movements and
resulted in widespread violence.
The next section analyzes how well the findings from these four cases
generalize using newly disaggregated global data on autonomy and separatist
activity.

Data Description
Our unit of analysis is the ethnic group-year within an individual state, mea-
sured every 5 years beginning in 1960 until 2000. This unit of analysis allows
us to analyze the differential mobilization of the same group in different
states. For example, using the research design, we are able to analyze why the
Kurds have mobilized in Turkey and Iraq much more than in Iran and Syria.
Moreover, the mechanisms that motivate the theoretical relationship between
lost autonomy and separatism focus on the relationship between the ethnic
group and the host state rather than on linkages across borders between
groups that are nominally the same. Common ethnic ancestry does not neces-
sarily imply cooperation across borders. Institutional differences between
states, for instance, can drastically alter perceptions of ethnicity, the salience
of cleavages and the demand for separatism.7 Most important, one state may
change the autonomous status of an ethnic minority, while the other state
does not, which would lead us to expect different group behavior and out-
comes. For instance, the retraction of autonomy in South Ossetia (in Georgia)
was not matched by the retraction of autonomy in North Ossetia (Russia), and
Siroky and Cuffe I15

the former mobilized for separatism, whereas the latter did not. The group-
year-state research design allows us to capture these crucial differences that
would be blurred if we were to use a more aggregated unit of analysis.
We built our data set drawing upon two primary sources. As our baseline,
we used the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set,8 and then added addi-
tional data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.9 For groups that were
omitted from the EPR and MAR data sets, or coded differently across the two
data sources, we conducted our search to sort out discrepancies. When groups
had the same name between MAR and EPR, the data were merged for every
group-year. For groups that were not in both MAR and EPR, we determined
whether one or the other data set: (1) had an exchangeable name for the same
group, (2) had aggregated distinct groups into a larger category, or (3) had no
equivalent in the other data set. In the case of (1), we simply renamed the
group to ensure a match. In cases of (2), we used the more disaggregated data,
and in cases of (3), we included the unmatched group in the new data set, and
coded missing covariates using secondary sources, if possible.
Our dependent variable is constructed on the basis of MAR's Separatism
Index, which we transformed from a 4-point unordered scale into a binary
indicator of a sustained political movement for separatism on behalf of an
ethnic group between 1960 and 2000.10 We also validated the coding of every
case in terms of its formal loss of autonomy and the timing of separatism
using qualitative data, and in most cases found that the coding from MAR
and EPR were accurate. When we could not identify clear separatist move-
ments, despite a civil war involving distinct ethnic groups, we adopted a con-
servative approach and coded the group as having no separatist movement.
This was especially relevant in cases of revolutionary conflict in which the
parties to the conflict could be distinguished by ethnicity (e.g., the Democratic
Republic of Congo), but none of the groups sought to separate from the cen-
tral state.
Our main independent variable is a trichotomous indicator of a group's
autonomy status. We utilize Wolff's criteria for "territorial self-governance"
with the qualification that the powers granted to groups must be asymmetric
within a state. To operationalize this concept, we relied on several sources. If
MAR's autonomy status indicator showed the group was autonomous in the
given year, we coded this as autonomous, unless it did not possess de facto
autonomy (e.g., Tibet). To distinguish between never autonomous groups and
those who lost their autonomy, we used MAR's AUTLOST index. This index
measures when, and to what degree, a group lost their autonomy. Any group
who's AUTLOST score was equal to or greater than "1" andwhere a specific
year of autonomy retraction was identified either through MAR's "autonend"
variable, the MAR Qualitative data on the group and EPR's "demoted"
16 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

variable-was coded as having lost autonomy." This triangulation of coding

enables us to guarantee that we do not conflate any level of participation by
the central state in a group's affairs as autonomy loss by supplementing the
level of autonomy loss with an identifiable event such as an invasion or con-
stitutional amendment.
In addition to the group's autonomy status, we also included data on sev-
eral other relevant covariates. First, to control for differences across regime
types, we include a trichotomous indicator of regime type (democracies,
autocracies, and hybrid regimes), drawing on the expanded Polity 4 project
data (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O'Halloran, 2006; K. S.
Gleditsch, 2008). Second, we account for the state's exclusion of noncore
ethnic groups from the political process using the EPR data (Cederman,
Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Wimmer, 2002), which has been shown to increase
the likelihood of conflict (Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman,

&
Gleditsch, 2012). We argue that a similar mechanism occurs in the more spe-
cific case of separatism. As the number of politically excluded or vulnerable
ethnic groups in a state increases, the likelihood of a group becoming separat-
ist also increases. Third, we also include a measure of the group's spatial
concentration based on MAR's 4-point ordinal scale GCON. If a group is
highly concentrated, it is more likely to provide in-group social and eco-
nomic services to its members, a key role that must be played by rebel orga-
nizations aiming at secession (Mampilly, 2011; Toft, 2003; Weidmann,
2009).12 We also account for the presence of oil on the group's territory as an
indicator of economic viability and of the state's material interest in the
region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Lujala, Rod, & Thieme, 2007). We include
a measure of external support for each ethnic group based data from Salehyan,
Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011).13 We also control for GDP per capita at
the country level, which has been widely used as a proxy for state capacity
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Finally, in several speci-
fications, we include random effects for region and time to account for cross-
regional and temporal heterogeneity that is not explicitly modeled. 14
Before estimating our full model, we explore the straightforward bivariate
evidence, with autonomy status lagged 5 years. Figure 1 shows the propor-
tion of cases that engaged in separatism, sorted by autonomy status. It indi-
cates that, not controlling for other facts, groups which lost autonomy were
75% more likely to lead to separatism than groups that had autonomous sta-
tus. Moreover, autonomous groups were almost twice as likely to lead to
separatism than groups with no history of autonomy.
Figure 1 does not account for the possible correlation across group-years,
however. To account for these correlations and to investigate these
 Siroky and Cuffe 17

Separatism by Autonomy Status

a

Separatist

co _ O.69 0.41 O2Not Separatist

a

(0

C)

CL a

C
20

Lost Autonomy Autonomous Never Autonomous

N = 787 N = 165 N=1 176

Figure I. Bar plot of separatism by autonomy status.

Note. Percentages show percentages of group years.

hypotheses further, we estimate a mixed-effects logistic regression model

using the group-level data. Our basic model in scalar form is

PAutonomy statuSikt
p(Separatism)ikt
P2 Regime Typekt P3 0 1 statuSikt
Autonomy
+P4 Region k P5 Excluded Group 5kt
P External Supportik ikt, +P6 LoggedGDPPCkt P70ilik 8

where i is the subscript for a given group in a country k in time period t. Such
a model allows us to control for correlation of observations both within each
country and across time. In the next section, we discuss the results of our
analysis of this model.

Discussion of Results

The core result shows that the loss of autonomy significantly increases the
likelihood of separatism. Table 2 depicts this result using a nonlinear mixed
model (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core Team,
 V: 1fl Il V: q~ OR qm l . .
~~~~~~~,
0 ~,~
'- ~

.
-0 4GMW~t~mgmm$9 "o o6~

O m- --oN OOcO ~ V -o
I I I I I I I I

,-- c- co c
- m m '0 ' m W 00 IO 0~ 0 '04
E m cp c -m m ,r 0 Nc0'0
0

-
0

E
0
E rN 0 -- ' - ccmc
0

m'0 c
-666666666 .--.
. .m. U
.

ccccc 6 --- c-66

I ~ ~ ~ l I I II

E
u
_0

0 E
0
z
-

0 0
0 0 o0 o E U0 0

0 L
> 2 o*
E Cv
CU >- U -J< coU (5
0 no L
a
(

0*O -

18
Siroky and Cuffe I19

Dichotomous Autonomy Classification

Trichotomous Autonomy Classification

Figure 2. Separation plots of dichotomous and trichotomous model specifications.

2012). In all specifications, groups that lost autonomy were significantly

more likely to be separatist than autonomous groups, and in most models
groups which were never autonomous were less likely to become separatist
than currently autonomous groups." The results also show that highly spa-
tially concentration groups are more likely to become separatist, and external
support for an ethnic group appears to have consistently increased the likeli-
hood a group becomes separatist. However, other factors thought to influence
civil war, such as GDP per capita, the number of excluded groups and Oil, do
not appear to be associated with more separatism.
We also ran models with a random effect for groups within each state to
control for the possibility that groups which launched multiple or constant
separatist campaigns during this time period were not unduly biasing our
data. While some interpretations change, lost autonomy is almost always sig-
nificant at the .05 level, and never less than the .10 level. For example, a
replication of our full model displayed in Table A2 yields identical results in
terms of significance for the main variables of interest, available in the online
appendix.
In addition to examining how our covariates relate to the propensity of a
group to engage in separatism, we are also interested in the predictive perfor-
mance of our model specification relative to reasonable alternatives. 16 At the
level of predictive accuracy, all models using the trichotomous autonomy
indicator out-performed the model using a dichotomous classification by a
substantively significant margin (Figures 2 and 3). Figure 2 shows a separa-
tion plot (Greenhill, Ward, & Sacks, 2011), which graphically illustrates the
classification accuracy using gray bars to indicate incorrect predictions of
separatism, and black bars to predict correct ones. The thin black
20 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

C9
0

Area Under Curve

- Tnichotomous Model 834
0 - Dichotomnous Model 784
0

00 02 04 06 083 10
False Alarm Rate

Figure 3. ROC plot of dichotomous and trichotomous model specifications.

line indicates the predicted probability of each observation. A model with

perfect classification accuracy would show all black bars to the right and
gray ones to the left, whereas a model no better than a coin flip would show
equal numbers of black and gray bars on the right and the left side of the
spectrum.
Figure 3 shows a traditional Receiver or Relative Operating Characteristic
(ROC) plot (NCAR: Research Application Program, 2012), which also illus-
trates the predictive accuracy. When the curve is closer to the northwest cor-
ner of the plot, the model provides more predictive accuracy. It reinforces the
fact that models using the trichotomous indicator of autonomy out-perform
models using a dichotomous indicator of autonomy.
The proposed model demonstrates some of the important conceptual and
empirical advantages to disaggregation, and out-perform models using a
dichotomous indicator of autonomy in terms of precision. Figure 4 shows a
coefficient plot for the full model, which underscores the clear positive effect
of lost autonomy on the likelihood of secession.17
Siroky and Cuffe 21I

-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

Lost Autonomy ---

Non-Autonomous

-
Hybrid Regime

-
Democracy
Group Concentration -
-
Excluded Groups
-

Logged GDPPC -4--

Oil -- 0-
External Support --

-
Europe and (former) USSR -

$
Latin America 0
North Africa and ME
-

Sub-Saharan Africa -
-

Western Dems.
-

Year (Fixed)

Figure 4. Coefficient plot for the full model specification in Table 2.

Robustness
As groups are not randomly assigned to their respective autonomy categories,
and researchers are unable to manipulate the assignment to groups, care must
be taken in making causal statements.
Autonomy is retracted and lost through disparate causal processes, which
fall outside the scope of our argument concerning its effect. Access to
resources may encourage a state to expand into its periphery, and thus to
encroach on an ethnic group's traditional territory. Or the motives may be less
economic and more political: A borderland inhabited by "ethnic others" is
deprived of its autonomous status for fear that it may become a fifth column
in an interstate dispute. This analysis is agnostic on which of these reasons
best accounts for a region's loss of autonomy, yet we would agree that further
disaggregation along these lines could result in the discovery of important
theoretical distinctions between economically motivated versus politically
driven autonomy retraction and status reversal.
Our primary concern is to address the possibility that the model is endog-
enous-separatist activity leads to the retraction of autonomy. Although we
22 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

are careful to ensure that we code autonomy prior to separatism, it is impos-

sible to know with certainty in every case that the group did not display signs
of separatism prior to being annexed or having its status demoted. In addition
to examining the timing of all cases that were coded as having lost autonomy,
we also pursued more formal techniques to ensure the robustness of the
results, including pre-processing the data using genetic matching, instrumen-
tal variables regression and a Bayesian approach to generalized mixed
models.
Genetic Matching is a method that seeks to make results less dependent
upon modeling assumptions. By balancing data using "treatment" and "con-
trol" groups, the goal is to break any potential link between the treatment
variable and the other covariates by ensuring that both treatment and control
groups have similar distributions of covariates other than the key treatment
(A. Diamond & Sekhon, 2006; Sekhon, 2004). As our "treatment" is trichoto-
mous, we follow the recommendation of Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007)
and dichotomize our variable to ensure that all comparisons are made." After
generating matched data based on three combinations of autonomy status, we
estimated Bayesian nonlinear mixed-effects models (Hadfield, 2010), shown
in Table 3.
Although we are unable to conduct comparisons with our full model due
to insufficient matches when including external support, we show that the
posited relationship between autonomy status and separatism holds when
using matched data on a reduced model without external support: Autonomy
loss significantly increases the likelihood of a group becoming separatist
compared with both autonomous and never autonomous groups, and cur-
rently autonomous groups are generally more likely to become separatist
than groups who were never autonomous. Although the robustness of these
results to matching on covariates provides additional empirical support for
our primary hypotheses, we recognize that it does not rule out other threats to
valid inference. As matching only pushes the dependence back to the choice
of criteria (variables, model) for defining the matches, there is still the pos-
sibility of omitted variables that could drive the matches, which in turn could
influence the reported results.
Next, we examine whether the results are robust to modifying the coding
of the dependent variable from a dichotomous indicator of separatism to an
ordered measure of the separatism. Using data from the Peace Research
Institute Oslo's conflict intensity data (N. P. Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson,
Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), combined with our indicator of separatism, we
code for four levels of separatism: nonseparatist, separatist but peaceful,
minor separatist conflict (<25 battle deaths per year), and major separatist
conflict (>25 battle deaths per year). The ordered model shows that groups
Siroky and Cuffe 23

Table 3. Models Using Matched Data.

Baseline: Baseline: Baseline:

Never Never
Autonomous Autonomous Autonomous

Intercept 0.70 (4.76) -3.24 (1.91)* 1.80 (2.87)

Lost Autonomy - 3.87 (0.41)* 1.81 (0.44)*
Autonomous 1.06 (0.56) -

-
Democracy 0.82 (1.47) -0.17 (0.68) -0.19 (0.96)
Partial Democracy 1.50 (1.21) -0.36 (0.49) 0.14 (0.61)
Group Concentration -1.02 (99) 1.15 (0.22)* 0.20 (0.25)
E. Europe and (fmr) USSR 1.93 (3.07) -3.54 (1.5 1)* -7.64 (2.3 1)*
Latin America -2.68 (2.22) -2.97 (1.97) -6.08 (3.40)*
North Africa and ME 3.25 (1.95) 0.26 (1.95) -0.32 (3.00)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.86 (1.41) -2.93 (1.38)* -3.61 (2.16)*
Western Democracies 4.25 (3.23) 0.63 (2.10) 1.85 (4.02)
Excluded Groups -0.05 (0.07) -0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Logged GDPPC -0.10 (0.74) -0.14 (0.30) 0.12 (0.42)
Oil 0.77 (0.52) 0.11 (0.41) 0.53 (0.37)
Year (Fixed) -0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03)

Random Effects
Country 1.58 (1.26)* 12.17 (3.48)* 20.75 (4.55)*
Log-Likelihood -23.39 -264.74 -214.61
Deviance 46.77 529.49 459.23
AIC 214.01 559.49 523.96
BIC 264.57 628.34 452.83
N 77 730 475
Groups 21 86 66

Standard errors in parentheses. Observations were weighted according to matched data. AIC = Akaike
information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. *p < 0.05.

that have lost autonomy are likely to engage in more intense separatism than
both currently autonomous and never autonomous groups.19
These results are displayed in Table 4.20 Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the pos-
terior densities and trace plots for groups that lost their autonomy and then for
21
groups which were never autonomous.

Conclusion
In his Second Treatise, John Locke observed that men are unlikely to cause
revolutions for trivial reasons. This analysis shows that a tangible loss of
autonomy is a nontrivial issue, and is robustly associated with separatism.
The retraction of autonomy provides a strong motive by invariably increasing
24 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

Table 4. Posterior Means for Bayesian Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Models.

Mean Credible

(Std. Dev) Intervals

Autonomous 0.41 (0.47) [-0.52, 1.34]

Lost Autonomy 1.91 (0.17)* [1.59, 2.25]
Partial Democracy -0.07 (0.24) [-0.54, 0.40]
Democracy -0.15 (0.29) [-0.73, 0.42]
Group Concentration 0.53 (0.09) [0.37, 0.70]

*
External Support 1.02 (0.24) [0.55, 1.50]

*
Excluded Groups 0.01 (0.02) [-0.02, 0.44]
GDPPC (Logged) -0. 1 (0.15)* [-0.42, -0.19]
E. Europe/former USSR -0.43 (0.71) [-1.71, 1.00]
Latin America -2.5 I (0.42) [-2.99, -1.57]
Middle East and North Africa 0.00 (.82) [-1.62, 1.57]
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.05 (0.64) [-2.13, 0.29]
Western Democracies 0.20 (0.95) [-1.52, 0.20]
Year 0.01 (0.31) [-0.02, 0.04]
Post-Cold War 0.16 (0.01) [-0.45, 0.76]
Cut-points
No Separatism: Peaceful Separatism - 1.98 (0.02)* [-1.99, -1.93]
Peaceful Separatism: Minor Conflict 0.35 (0.08) [0.16, 0.52]
*

Minor Conflict: Major Conflict 1.98 (0.02) [1.93, 2.00]

*

Countries 100
Groups 324
Group-Years 1 198

Standard deviations are in parentheses, 95% credible intervals in brackets. Minor conflict if
less than 20 battle deaths per year, and major conflict if more than 20 battle deaths per year.
*Indicates the probability of the coefficient being <.05.

grievances against the central state while not necessarily decreasing the
group's collective action capacity. By disaggregating the omitted category in
research on the institutional determinants of conflict, and showing that lost
autonomy represents a conceptually distinct class of group status, our find-
ings go some way toward explaining the "empirical murkiness" within the
academic literature on the relationship between institutional arrangements,
such as ethno-federalism, and separatism.
Taking concept formation seriously can yield new insights and can high-
light important theoretical and empirical distinctions. By separating groups
that have lost autonomy from groups who have never been autonomous-
which were previously lumped together as "non-autonomous" in many
Siroky and Cuffe 25

-1 0 1 2 1.5 2.0 2.5

N = 50000 Bandwidth = 0.05665 N = 50000 Bandwidth= 0.01975

Figure 5. Posterior density plot for autonomous (L) and lost autonomy (R).

0 50000 100000 15000 0 50000 100000 150600

iterbonsIterations

Figure 6. Trace plot for autonomous (L) and lost autonomy (R).

analyses-this article contributes to the literature on decentralization and on

secessionist collective action. Whether autonomy whets the appetite of ethnic
groups to seek independence, or saps their desire by providing indirect rule,
and some degree of control over their own affairs and fate, depends on the
group's beliefs about the credibility of the government's commitment to
guaranteeing its status. The results suggest that autonomous groups are not
significantly more likely than groups that have never been autonomous to
become separatists, but groups that lost autonomy are twice as likely to pur-
sue secession, compared with currently autonomous and never autonomous
groups.
We are not unaware that this finding may have some implications for the
rational design of institutional arrangements for peripheral regions.
Containing nationalism is certainly possible. However, any state that
26 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

is motivated to revoke autonomy on the basis of anticipated economic or

political benefits for the state must weigh these potential benefits against the
increase in the probability that the group will pursue separatism. Future
research should unpack the circumstances under which different states are
going to find the costs to outweigh the benefits. From Asia to Europe and
Africa, states that have elected to retract autonomy as a means to rally politi-
cal support for elections, to secure economic benefits from lootable resources
or transit fees, or to remove a potential fifth column, have found that the costs
often exceed the benefits, for groups frequently reply to a diminution of their
status by mobilizing for separatism. The Albanian Kosovars in Serbia, the
Abkhaz in Georgia, the Tibetans and Uighurs in China, or the South Sudanese
and Biafrans in Africa all illustrate this state-group dynamic.
While these qualifications highlight the need for further research into the
causal mechanisms responsible for the mobilization of ethnic groups and the
intensity of separatist campaigns, we believe this article represents a signifi-
cant contribution to our understanding of autonomy and separatism. Using
newly disaggregated empirical evidence on the loss of autonomous status and
data on separatism, the analysis indicates that retracted autonomy increases
grievances against the central state while often failing to reduce the group's
collective action capacity. These results address an important debate with a
new conceptual angle and new data, while suggesting new directions for
future research.

Acknowledgments
This article and early musings on the subject benefited from helpful comments and
encouragement that we would like to recognize: Roy Allison, David Aprasidze, Yael
Aronoff, Mark Axelrod, Galia Benitez, Lenka Bustikova, Dennis Dafflon, Alexis
Diamond, Alexander Downes, Ross Emmett, Sherman Garnett, Norm Graham,
Bernard Grofman, Giorgi Gvalia, Henry Hale, Michael Hechter, Courtney Hillebrecht,
Donald Horowitz, Erin Jenne, Elene Jibladze, Alice Kang, Nam Kyu Kim, Matthew
Kocher, Ari Kohen, Hrant Kostanyan, Adria Lawrence, Levente Littvay, Jason Lyall,
Anthony McGann, Patrice McMahon, Ross Miller, Emily Molfino, Harris Mylonas,
Nino Pavlenishvili, Natalia Peral, Linda Racioppi, Wolfgang Reinicke, Nicholas
Sambanis, Tariel Sikharulidze, Erik Wibbels, and Matt Zierler. We are also grateful
for anonymous feedback from the review process, and for suggestions from audience
members at Arizona State University, Academic Swiss Caucasus Net, Association for
the Study of Nationalities, Central European University, Michigan State University,
University of California-Irvine, and University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Siroky and Cuffe 27

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.

Notes
1. For a case to satisfy the definition of autonomy adopted here, this arrangement
must be institutionalized, yet we recognize that the extent of institutionalization
varies by country and context. For example, in relatively strong states, such as
Spain, the formal limits of autonomy (e.g., for Catalonia) may be very well spec-
ified, whereas in weaker states, autonomy may be less formalized, but nonethe-
less widely recognized and acknowledged (e.g., Westerners in Cameroon prior to
1975).
2. Artur Mas I Gavarro of the CDC.
3. We are cognizant that the meaning of autonomy is contextual, and may vary
not only from place to place but also over time. This is especially an issue for
autonomies in autocracies, where the degree of self-rule is often pro forma. In
China, for instance, formal autonomy is mainly a fiction-formally autonomous
Xinjiang and Tibet are arguably less autonomous than Shanghai or Guangdong,
which are not formally autonomous. In our coding of such cases, we are careful
to account for this contextual difference across countries. We also conduct the
analysis controlling for regime type, and with separate samples for each regime
type, to examine whether the main results are robust.
4. We are cognizant that separatism is often ill-defined. Some (Treisman, 1997)
argue separatism is a "spectrum" from demands to increased local powers
through full separation from the state (p. 214). Here, we follow Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min (2010) in defining separatism as the pursuit of independence
from the central government-not necessarily the achievement of independence.
5. Although we focus on the pursuit of secession, rather than on rebellion in this
article, this disaggregated approach may also shed light on the findings in Gurr
(1993) and Gurr and Moore (1997); in the former, lost autonomy was a signifi-
cant predictor of rebellion, but it was not in the latter.
6. These events have led some scholars to describe the ensuing conflict as one based
on contestation of resources, rather than ethnic differences (Suliman, 1997). Our
position is that seizing oil fields, and instituting Islamic policies, were both part
of the process of reducing the South's autonomy, and is therefore consistent with
our argument.
7. While not directly related to separatism, see Posner's (2004) discussion of how
the ethnic makeup within different states alters the salience of ethnic cleavages.
8. http://www.epr.ucla.edu/
9. www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar
10. The original coding is unordered with four levels: No Separatism, Latent
Separatism, Historical (1940-1980) Separatism, and Active (1980-2000)
Separatism. As our main interest here is on the presence of separatism, we
28 Comparative Political Studies 48(1)

coded a group-year as "1" if it met either the condition of Historical or Active

Separatism for that year. We then checked these findings against Ethnic Power
Relations' (EPR) Secessionist Autonomy indicator as well as the Minorities at
Risk (MAR) Qualitative data to ensure there was an active separatist movement
for the group in the given period. The results from an ordered model produce
similar results (Table 4) and thus we focus on discussing the more straightfor-
ward findings using a dichotomous dependent variable in our main analyses
(Table 2).
11. The AUTLOST index is calculated by adding the values of the group's prior sta-
tus and the magnitude of autonomy change, subtracting 1, and then dividing by a
factor indicating the decade of autonomy retraction. We also cross-examined the
results with MAR qualitative data and EPR's "auton" variable.
12. This variable measures percentage of an ethnic group living within a particular
region of the state. Groups not in the MAR data were assigned according to these
criteria.
13. For example, to measure support in 1980, we took values from 1975 to 1980 and
took the mean.
14. We estimated a Bayesian Hierarchical Logistic regression model using the JAGS
statistical software. See Table 4 in the main text.
15. See Table Al in the online appendix for a pooled analysis of the data that treats
the pre- and post-Cold War periods as distinct.
16. Or compared with a monkey throwing darts, to use a recently publicized exam-
ple. See "Political Scientists Are Terrible Predictors," The New York Times, June
24, 2012.
17. In the plot, the horizontal lines represent 12 standard errors, while the points
represent the estimated coefficient.
18. Matching therefore encompasses comparisons between groups who were never
autonomous and groups who lost their autonomy, and groups who were never
autonomous and groups who are currently autonomous.
19. It also shows that there is no statistically significant difference between autono-
mous groups and groups which have never had autonomy in terms of the likeli-
hood to engage in intense separatism.
20. We adopt a Bayesian approach for this model and allowed the model 500,000
iterations, with a bum-in of 200,000 iterations.
21. As an additional check, reported in the supplementary online appendix, we
divide the autonomy lost indicator further into autonomy lost more or less than
50 years prior to the year t. If a group lost autonomy in 1930, it was classified
as having autonomy lost within 50 years until 1980, and then as having lost
autonomy more than 50 years ago. It shows that both more recent and more dis-
tant losses of autonomy lead to separatism more often than among autonomous
groups and never autonomous groups (the baseline category).

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Author Biographies
David S. Siroky is an assistant professor of political science in the School of Politics
and Global Studies at Arizona State University, where he is a core faculty member of
the Center for Social Dynamics and Complexity and a faculty affiliate of the Center
for the Study of Religion and Conflict and the Melikian Center for Russian, Eurasian
and East European Studies. He received his PhD in political science and MA in eco-
nomics from Duke University and was a postdoctoral fellow at Yale University. His
research has appeared or is forthcoming in Comparative Sociology, Defence and
Peace Economics, Democratization, Ethnopolitics, International Organization,
Nationalities Papers, Polity, Post-Soviet Affairs, Security Studies, and Statistics
Surveys.

John Cuffe is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at University of

California-Irvine. His research focuses on political parties, voting behavior, collec-
tive action, institutional design, and political methodology.