2

when do people believe

conspiracy theories?

“How do you explain the fact that conspiracy theories are on the rise
nowadays?” This is a question that I get exceptionally often – from
students, from members of an audience after giving a talk, or from
journalists who are writing a newspaper article on conspiracy theo-
ries. The answer often surprises people: I don’t think that conspiracy
theories are on the rise. Surely there is some waxing and waning
of conspiracy theories throughout the decades. In that respect I am
perfectly open to the possibility that in 2016 – with Donald Trump
spreading conspiracy theories during the entire US election and the
UK voting in favor of a “Brexit” – conspiracy theories have received
more attention than in, say, 2006. But I dispute the assertion that there
is a stable trend towards more conspiracy theories in the long run. On
average, the current population is not more or less conspiratorial than
30, or even 100, years ago. Scientific evidence offers little support
for the idea that people have become more conspiratorial over time.
In what I regard as one of the most important, and certainly one of
the most labor-intensive, studies on conspiracy theories that has been
conducted so far, two political scientists from the University of Miami
(helped by a team of trained research assistants) analyzed published
letters that US citizens had sent to the Chicago Tribune and the New York
Times.1 The letters spanned a time period of 120 years, ranging from
20 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

1890 to 2010. Each year was about equally represented in the sample
of letters, and the letters to be analyzed were randomly selected out
of all the letters that were published during this period. Of primary
interest to the researchers was the extent to which these letters con-
tained conspiracy theories. In the end, these researchers read, and
coded for conspiratorial content, a total of 104,803 published letters.
As might be expected, there is variation across the years in the
extent to which the letters contain conspiratorial content; further-
more, in different time periods people wrote about different con-
spiracy theories. But over time, there was no trend upwards in the
proportion of letters that contained conspiracy theories. In fact, there
were two time periods that seemed to stand out in frequency of con-
spiratorial content, but both were not in the new millennium. The
first time period when there was evidence for increased conspiratorial
content was around the year 1900, during the peak of the Second
Industrial Revolution. The second time period when there was evi-
dence for increased conspiratorial content was in the late 1940s–early
1950s: at the start of the Cold War. These data clearly speak against
assertions that conspiracy theories are on the rise.
Necessarily there are minor imperfections of this study that people
could seize on to discredit its importance. For instance, one might
reason that the letters that were actually published in these newspa-
pers were selected by an editor and hence were not random. Some
editors may have been more likely to publish conspiratorial letters
than others. These are unavoidable limitations of a project like this.
But we should also be realistic: This is an enormous number of letters,
published in two different newspapers, selected by many different
editors, over a range of a full 120 years. If there is any merit to the
statement that conspiracy theories are on the rise in our modern age,
there should be some trace of this visible in these data. For instance,
if digital communication technologies make citizens more susceptible
to conspiracy theories, the letters should show an increase in con-
spiratorial content starting somewhere in the early ’90s and gradually
increasing until the last year of measurement (2010). The data show
none of this.
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 21

Also other data contradict the idea that people nowadays are more
suspicious of power holders than they were about 30 years go. One
study looked at the extent to which people trust and are satisfied with
politicians in various EU countries over time using yearly data of the
Eurobarometer.2 Particularly the data on satisfaction are of interest,
as they range from well before regular citizens had Internet, social
media, and smartphones (1974) until a time when these technolo-
gies were a normal part of everyday life (2012) (the data on trust are
less telling, as these ranged from 1997 to 2012 – although it is worth
noting that also in these data no trend emerged suggesting a decline
in trust over time). Although admittedly dissatisfaction with politi-
cians is not the same as believing in a political conspiracy theory, one
is highly likely to be diagnostic for the other: People are dissatisfied
with politicians if they believe that these politicians are conspiring
(and vice versa). Again, the results revealed fluctuation in the extent
to which citizens were satisfied or dissatisfied with politicians, but
there was no trend suggesting a drop in satisfaction levels as time pro-
gressed. Furthermore, throughout the years the average satisfaction
level that citizens expressed about politicians was quite low. It would
thus be a mistake to think that citizens nowadays are less satisfied with
politicians than ever before. Back in the 1970s, citizens were also very
much dissatisfied with politicians and, apparently, to about an equal
extent as nowadays.
All of this may seem counterintuitive. After all, conspiracy theories
are everywhere on the Internet and on Social Media, and these mod-
ern tools are primary means through which people learn about con-
spiracy theories or get into contact with other conspiracy theorists.
Note that I am not saying that modern information technologies have
no impact. But there is a difference between speed of dissemination
and the proportion of citizens who believe conspiracy theories. My
prediction would be that these modern communication technolo-
gies increase the speed through which people learn about conspiracy
theories but do not increase the proportion of citizens who believe
them. In a time when citizens did not have Internet or social media
at their disposal, conspiracy theories were likely to spread through
22 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

different, slower communication channels (e.g., word of mouth), but

major conspiracy theories would spread nevertheless and ultimately
reach most people anyway.
Certainly conspiracy theories spread fast nowadays. On 2 Decem-
ber 2015 the San Bernardino (California) shootings took place in the
late morning. A married couple killed 14 people and injured another
22 with semi-automatic rifles. After the shooting, a manhunt ensued
which lasted for about four hours, after which both perpetrators were
killed. As the event unfolded it was evening in Amsterdam, where I
was watching live coverage of this event on TV together with my wife.
About two hours after the start of the shooting (and hence, two hours
before the perpetrators were killed) I could not resist the temptation
and Googled something like “San Bernardino conspiracy”. Instantly
various conspiracy theories came up suggesting that the shooting was
a false-flag operation. We could read conspiracy theories about this
terrorist attack while it was still unfolding! Without modern com-
munication technology, however, these conspiracy theories may have
reached us too, eventually – or alternatively, in Amsterdam we might
not have heard about the San Bernardino shooting in the first place,
and we would instead have focused more on local distressing events
(leading to local conspiracy theories). Modern information technolo-
gies play a role in conspiracy theories, but when we seek answers to
the question why people believe or disbelieve them, these technolo-
gies are only a piece in a much bigger puzzle.
Instead of seeking an explanation in “zeitgeist” or technology, a
better and more comprehensive explanation for conspiracy beliefs
can be found in psychology. I propose that conspiracy theories are
rooted in a subjective psychological state that has been inherent to
the human condition since the start of humanity: Conspiracy theories
are a natural reaction to social situations that elicit feelings of fear and
uncertainty. Specifically, the more strongly people experience such
aversive emotions, the more likely it is that they assign blame for dis-
tressing events to different groups. As a consequence, we can expect
conspiracy theories particularly in the wake of distressing societal
events.
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 23

conspiracy theories and societal

crisis situations
People regularly are confronted with societal crisis situations – rapid
changes in society that could potentially threaten their well-being,
their way of life, or even their existence. Examples of such cri-
sis situations are terrorist attacks, natural disasters, wars, revolu-
tions, economic and financial crises, disease epidemics, and the like.
Such crisis situations almost invariably lead to conspiracy theories.
Two key examples of sudden, unexpected crises in modern his-
tory that inspired widespread conspiracy theories are the 9/11 ter-
rorist strikes and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Both were
events that shocked society, that installed strong feelings of fear
and uncertainty in people, and that gave people the feeling that the
world would never be the same again. Many people have “flashbulb
memories” about these events, as they still vividly recall what they
were doing when they first heard the news. Both events also initi-
ated conspiracy theories that are still being endorsed today by large
groups of citizens and that many people by now have internalized
as historical “facts”.
The two spikes that emerged in conspiratorial content within the
letters sent to the New York Times and Chicago Tribune can also be regarded
as crisis situations that formed the basis of feelings of uncertainty
and fear. The first spike with increased conspiracy beliefs was during
the Second Industrial Revolution. During this time period major
companies started to emerge, and power structures within society
changed dramatically. It was a time of rapid technological progress,
quick development of new infrastructure, and the efficient mass-
production of a wide range of goods. Although life conditions
improved for many citizens, regular laborers who were working in
factories had reason for concern: There was a continuous threat of
unemployment, as many jobs became obsolete after being replaced
by machines. It is quite likely that these workers – who constituted a
large portion of the population – experienced substantial uncertainty
about their future, producing a range of conspiracy theories. The
24 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

second spike with increased conspiracy beliefs was at the start of the
Cold War. Shortly after the Second World War many citizens feared
the prospect of a new major war, and the threat of communism was
looming. As a consequence, many citizens were wary of the possibility
that specific people, institutions, or groups were somehow connected
to communism. This “McCarthyism” – named after senator Joseph
McCarthy who was a significant figure in fueling fear of communism –
was hence characterized by many (often unfounded) allegations of
communist conspiracies within society. These communist conspiracy
theories caused reputation damage, unemployment, and sometimes
even imprisonment of people who were accused of communist
sympathies.
But we do not need to restrict ourselves to the past century in
order to find a connection between crisis situations and conspiracy
theories. Also in the Middle Ages, examples abound of crisis situa-
tions that initiated widespread belief in conspiracy theories. Medical
science was not as advanced as our current generation is used to,
and it was common for young children to die of a range of dan-
gerous diseases that nowadays are easily prevented with vaccines.
Furthermore, there was no understanding of viruses or bacteria (or
the importance of personal hygiene for that matter), and antibiot-
ics were yet to be discovered. As a consequence, disease epidemics
were frequent and would kill many people, but people were unable
to fully understand how these diseases originated. People therefore
often blamed these epidemics on people or groups in society, and
such scapegoating regularly took the form of conspiracy theories.
One common belief was that many young women were actually
witches who conspired with the Devil to impose harm on the pop-
ulation such as epidemics or failed harvests. As a result of these
beliefs – which are both superstitious and conspiratorial – many
innocent women were burnt alive. Also the Jewish community was
a frequent target of conspiracy theories suggesting that they had a
causal role in crisis situations such as disease epidemics or setbacks
during the Crusades, stimulating widespread persecution of Jews
in Medieval Europe.3
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 25

These are just examples of a more general principle: In challenging

times that elicit fear and uncertainty among large groups of people,
conspiracy theories flourish. People start blaming people or groups
that they felt uncomfortable about to begin with and come up with
theories that explain the harm they experience through a malevolent
conspiracy. As a result, conspiracy theories will increase in the popu-
lation once there is widespread concern about a high-profile terror-
ist attack, a natural disaster, an economic or financial crisis, a war, a
revolution, and so on. Events that pose no direct threat to peoples’
own lives also can stimulate conspiracy theories, as long as it captures
the attention of a large audience and causes feelings of distress among
many citizens (e.g., the unexpected death of a celebrity).
In fact, even imaginary crisis situations can cause conspiracy
beliefs. A case in point is the conspiracy theory that the 1969 moon
landings were filmed in a TV studio. One might reason that these
conspiracy theories were not a reaction to an “objective” crisis
situation – it was a reaction to a positive event where humanity and
science reached a new level of accomplishment. But someone who
believes that the government continuously and willfully deceives
the nation subjectively experiences the nation as being in crisis. Put
differently, many people hold general conspiratorial beliefs about the
government, and these beliefs are distressing in and of themselves,
which causes further conspiracy theorizing. This is a general insight
that I will return to in other chapters: Belief in one conspiracy theory
stimulates belief in other conspiracy theories. In this case, citizens
who hold conspiracy theories about the government are likely to
approach any action of that government – including a monument to
scientific accomplishment like the moon landings – with skepticism,
and with additional conspiracy theories.

the role of fear and uncertainty

In order to understand why feelings of uncertainty and fear are asso-
ciated with conspiracy theories, we need to establish how people
cope with these negative emotions. The most common response to
26 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

fear and uncertainty is to become vigilant: People start paying close

attention to their environment, they start to ruminate, and they try
to establish the causes of their negative feelings. Fear and uncertainty
thus lead people to try to make sense of their physical and social envi-
ronment.4 Such increased sense making is an automatic response that
in all likelihood is rooted in an instinct for self-preservation. Feelings
of fear and uncertainty signal that there are imminent threats in the
environment. Paying close attention to this environment therefore
increases the chances of the organism to effectively cope with these
threats and survive.
As part of this self-preservation instinct, evolutionary psycholo-
gists have noted that people tend to be risk-averse in the face of
uncertain and possibly threatening situations.5 Imagine seeing a
long object in the grass, and it is unclear whether the object is a
stick or a snake. In such cases, it is a natural response for people to
be cautious and assume the object to be a snake. Mistakes do not
have equal consequences in this situation: Someone who picks up
the object assuming it to be a stick may die if it turns out to be a
venomous snake. But for someone who assumes the object to be
a snake and hence acts cautiously, it does not matter whether that
judgment is correct or not. If one is mistaken and the snake is in
fact a stick, one may take an unnecessary detour, but for the rest no
real harm is done.
Feelings of uncertainty lead people to make sense of the situation
that they find themselves in, and during this mental sense making it is
natural for them to assume the worst. This also pertains to how people
perceive others. One common finding in psychology is the “myth of
self-interest”. Just for clarification, this term does not mean that self-
interest is a myth; of course people can be selfish from time to time.
Instead, this term means that people overestimate the extent to which the
behavior of others is driven by self-interest. People can be selfish some-
times, but they can also be genuinely altruistic and caring – but when
trying to explain the behavior of others, people more often assume
selfishness and less often assume truly benevolent motivations than is
actually justified. (When Mark Zuckerberg decided to donate 99% of
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 27

his Facebook shares to charity, I was astonished to read one blog after
the other of people who believed him to do this out of self-interest.)
Interestingly, this myth of self-interest increases when people
feel uncertain. In an experiment, participants were informed that
a second participant would allocate valuable recourses between the
two of them. To a varying extent, however, participants experienced
uncertainty in the form of lacking information: They were not fully
informed about how the allocator distributed the resources. Results
showed that this informational uncertainty led participants to over-
estimate the valuable resources that the allocators had given to them-
selves and to underestimate the valuable resources that the allocators
had given to the participants. People expected the allocators to be
more selfish than they actually were, and this effect increased to the
extent that people had less information about the distributions. As
the authors conclude, when people lack information they “fill in the
blanks” with assumptions of selfishness.6
This myth of self-interest is about how negatively people view
other individuals, but through a similar process, feelings of fear and
uncertainty also influence how negatively people view other groups
in society. When making sense of the societal and political events that
people encounter in their daily life, people have a tendency to assume
the worst of groups that are powerful (and that could hence cause real
harm), that they perceive as “different”, and that they feel uncomfort-
able with – such as governmental institutions, major companies, or
distrusted minority groups. As a result, people come up with con-
spiracy theories about the malpractice of these groups, which answers
many unresolved questions that people have about the societal events
that they try to comprehend. Feelings of uncertainty and fear put
people in a suspicious, information-seeking state-of-mind, leading
them to perceive malevolent conspiracies as responsible for a range
of societal events.
Much psychological research has examined the relationship
between fearful, uncertain feelings and people’s tendency to believe
conspiracy theories. One study was conducted in the last three
months of 1999. During those months, many citizens around the
28 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

world feared a major shutdown of computer systems due to the

“millennium bug”. This was a major issue at the time. The possibil-
ity of a millennium bug received continuous news coverage, and
people feared major fallout of for instance power plants, banking
systems, water supplies, and the like. If these fears had been justi-
fied and the millennium bug had become a reality, it would have
had serious consequences for the economy, health care, and many
other domains that directly influence the life and well-being of
citizens: Anything that was run by computers would shut down. (In
the end, the year 2000 started without unusual problems.) Against
this background, over 1,200 US citizens responded to a question-
naire that not only asked how afraid they were for the millennium
bug but also to what extent they believed in a range of common
conspiracy theories. As it turned out, people who feared the millen-
nium bug by the end of 1999 were also more likely to believe that
President Kennedy was killed by a conspiracy; that the Air Force was
hiding evidence that the US has been visited by UFOs; that the US
government deliberately had put drugs in inner city communities;
and that the Japanese were conspiring to destroy the US economy.
Fear for the millennium bug was associated with belief in a range of
conspiracy theories, including theories that are conceptually uncon-
nected with the millennium bug.7
While these findings support the idea that feelings of fear are
related with belief in conspiracy theories, they do not establish
causality: We do not know whether fear of the millennium bug
increased conspiracy beliefs or, instead, people who happened to
believe these conspiracy theories were more likely to fear the mil-
lennium bug. In order to test for the causal order that fear and
uncertainty lead to conspiracy theories, it is necessary to conduct
a psychological experiment in which part of the research partici-
pants experience these distressing feelings and part of the research
participants do not – and then examine whether belief in conspir-
acy theories is stronger among the distressed participants. Various
studies tried to install these distressing feelings in participants by
reminding them of situations in which they experienced a lack of
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 29

control. Specifically, people have a need to feel that they are in con-
trol of whatever they do, ranging from simple movements to more
complex actions such as driving a car. If people experience a lack
of control they feel helpless and therefore start feeling uncertain.
In a typical experiment, some of the research participants are asked
to write down a specific incident in their lives where they had no
control over the situation; other research participants are asked to
write down a specific incident in their lives where they were in
full control of the situation. After that, they are asked how plausible
they find certain conspiracy theories.
Various researchers have conducted experiments along these
lines, and these studies typically show that people believe in con-
spiracy theories more strongly when they feel distressed (e.g.,
because they were reminded of a situation where they lacked con-
trol) than when they do not feel distressed (e.g., because they were
reminded of a situation where they had control).8 Together with
psychologist Michele Acker and a group of research assistants, we
also conducted such an experiment in Amsterdam. The experi-
ment took place against the background of the construction of a
new and controversial metro line that would connect the north-
ern and southern part of the city. Although such a metro line is
likely to have many benefits once completed, it encountered severe
objections among Amsterdam residents, as it would imply major
construction works for years, right through the historical center.
In fact, a majority of residents had voted against this project in
a referendum, but the city council moved forward with it any-
way. Furthermore, the construction itself ran into many problems,
including being overbudget and behind schedule. Public hostility
against this project reached its peak in 2009, when the construc-
tion caused unforeseen problems that posed direct harm to city
residents: The underground construction had damaged the founda-
tions of several old houses, which then had to be evacuated, as the
houses literally were sinking into the ground.
When the “sinking houses” made continuous news headlines,
our team of research assistants went to university cafeterias in
30 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

Amsterdam with short questionnaires and asked residents to par-

ticipate in a short study in exchange for a candy bar. Participants
were asked to describe either a situation from their lives where they
lacked control or one where they had full control. A third group of
participants were asked to describe a neutral situation from their
lives, unrelated to feelings of fear or uncertainty. Then we asked par-
ticipants about their conspiracy theories of the North-South Metro
line: For instance, participants indicated whether they believed that
members of the city council were bribed by the construction com-
panies, whether they deliberately withheld information about the
project from the public to avoid hampering its construction, and
so on. In keeping with many other findings, results revealed that
participants who felt fearful and uncertain (after describing a situ-
ation where they lacked control) believed these conspiracy theories
more strongly than participants who felt confident (after describing
a situation where they had control).9
In sum, feelings of fear and uncertainty fuel belief in conspiracy
theories. Yet there are two complications to these effects that deserve
to be noted. A first complication is that these aversive emotions do
not lead to conspiracy theories among everyone and in every circum-
stance: Sometimes fear and uncertainty can actually increase support
for authorities. So far we have discussed the conspiracy theories that
emerged after 9/11, but we should also recognize the opposite: In
the months directly after 9/11, George W. Bush was among the most
positively endorsed presidents in history in terms of public approval
ratings. Apparently, 9/11 not only elicited widespread conspiracy the-
ories about the Bush administration; it also elicited massive support
for the Bush administration. How can we reconcile this discrepancy
with the present arguments?
The key here is that fear and uncertainty lead to conspiracy theo-
ries, but only if these theories involve powerful groups or institutions
that people distrusted to begin with. Fear and uncertainty may actu-
ally increase support for powerful groups or institutions that peo-
ple do trust. One study investigated whether or not the perception
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 31

of leaders being moral or immoral influences belief in conspiracy

theories. Naturally, people believe conspiracy theories more strongly
about leaders that they find immoral than about leaders that they find
moral. When people experience uncertainty, however, these effects
of morality on belief in conspiracy theories become more impactful.
Put differently, uncertainty makes people endorse conspiracy theories
more strongly for leaders that they find immoral but less strongly for
leaders that they find moral.10 Fear and uncertainty hence do not lead
to indiscriminate conspiracy theorizing; they lead people to place
blame on authorities, institutions, or groups that they felt uncomfort-
able with from the start.
The second complication is that, often, also the “official” expla-
nation of a crisis event entails a conspiracy. The official reading of
the 9/11 strikes is that there was a conspiracy of 19 Al Qaeda sui-
cide terrorists. Why did many citizens disbelieve this official read-
ing and instead perceived a different conspiracy of a malevolent
government performing a false-flag operation? Two interrelated
issues may answer this question. First, as noted previously, when
people experience fear and uncertainty, it is their natural response
to be cautious and assume the worst possible explanation. In that
sense, believing that 9/11 was a governmental conspiracy (and not
an Al Qaeda conspiracy) is a risk-averse response: It is a lot more
disturbing, frightening, and dangerous to assume that one’s own
government would be behind a major terrorist act, as compared
to a known foreign terrorist group that is being closely monitored
by secret service agencies. Second, and relatedly, a governmental
conspiracy is a more grandiose explanation for 9/11 than an Al
Qaeda terrorist cell: It would for instance mean that more people
were involved, the level of deception would be bigger, and the
scheme that was carried out would be more ingenious, and in
general a government has more power than a terrorist cell. The
9/11 terrorist strikes constituted a major event in modern his-
tory, and a governmental conspiracy would be a major explanation
for it. The tendency to believe a grandiose conspiracy theory may
32 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

be influenced by a basic heuristic of the human mind called the

proportionality bias: People have a tendency to assume that a big
consequence must have had a big cause.

big consequences, big causes?

A president is a human being, and is therefore fragile enough to die
from accidents or sudden illnesses. It is perfectly possible for an oth-
erwise healthy president to die from a tiny flu virus, just like everyone
else. Now, imagine for a moment that this would actually happen to
a sitting US president or a UK prime minister. Would many citizens
believe that this event indeed was caused by a simple virus, or would
they believe a conspiracy theory? Although certainly the opinions
would differ among the public, and a lot would depend upon specific
details of the case, in general I am quite confident that many citizens
would come up with major conspiracy theories asserting that the
president was murdered (or was kidnapped, or staged his/her own
death). The explanation of an event as big as the death of a president
through a cause as small as a flu virus is just hard to swallow for many
people: It cannot possibly be this simple, there must be more to such
an impactful, world-changing event than that. This is the essence of
the proportionality bias: the assumption that a big consequence must
have had a big cause.
Naturally, the unexpected death of a president would elicit strong
feelings of fear and uncertainty among the population. But the pro-
portionality bias is also broader than regulating these aversive feel-
ings: It is a simple mental heuristic that can be seen across judgment
domains, also in areas unrelated to conspiracy theories that do not
elicit fear and uncertainty. Imagine two comparable students that both
experience a computer crash right before having to hand in an impor-
tant paper. For the first student, the consequences are disastrous: The
professor fails the student for the class and does not grant an exten-
sion for the paper; this leads the student to not graduate in time and
to therefore lose an attractive job offer. For the second student, the
consequences are relatively small: The professor allows the student an
 when do people believe conspiracy theories? 33

extension to hand in the paper. As a result the student does graduate

in time and can start with the attractive job. What may have caused
the computer crash for the first and second student?
In a research study, half of the participants read a hypothetical
scenario of the first student, and the other half read a scenario of
the second student. They then selected what they thought was the
most likely cause of the crash: a widespread computer virus (big
cause) or a malfunctioning computer cooling fan (small cause).
Research participants massively recognized a widespread computer
virus as a bigger computer problem than a malfunctioning fan. But
more importantly, when the consequences were big for the student,
research participants were more likely to believe that the computer
crash had a big cause – that is, a computer virus. These findings are
unlikely to be explained by fear and uncertainty: After all, these
were hypothetical scenarios of an unknown student. Instead, the
proportionality bias was at work here: Participants assumed a big
cause for a big consequence – in this case, a computer virus if the
crash caused the student to fail his studies.11
The proportionality bias similarly has been shown to influence
people’s tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Imagine that a presi-
dent of a small country gets assassinated. In one case, this assassina-
tion instigates an unforeseen chain of events ultimately leading to a
war. In the other case, the assassination may still be tragic, but does
not lead to a war. Put differently, the assassination has a big conse-
quence (a war) or not. Who assassinated the president – was it a lone
gunman, or was it a governmental conspiracy? A study revealed that
participants considered a conspiracy more likely if the assassination
led to a war than if it did not lead to a war. Again, people assumed
a big cause for a big consequence, which in this case fueled a con-
spiracy theory. Various other studies suggest a similar principle: The
more impactful and harmful a societal event is (including hypotheti-
cal ones), the more likely it is that people come up with a conspiracy
theory to explain it.
Besides fear and uncertainty, the proportionality bias constitutes
an additional explanation for the observation that we particularly can
34 w h e n d o p e o p l e b e l i e v e c o n s p i r a c y t h e o r i e s ?

expect conspiracy theories in the wake of impactful, harmful societal

events. Note that both the emotional explanation (fear and uncer-
tainty) as well as the cognitive explanation (the proportionality bias)
are rooted in people’s desire to understand and make sense of the
harmful events that they perceive in society. Sense making thus is
essential in the psychology of conspiracy theories. In the following
chapter, I will more precisely uncover the mental processes that are
at work when people make sense of societal events – and how these
may lead to conspiracy theories.