AIGD Edition 15.0

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND
OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ASIA AND PACIFIC OFFICE
ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND

OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
Edition 15.0 - September 2022

ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
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Edition 15.0 - September 2022 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 7
1.1 Arrangement of the AIGD .................................................................................................. 7

1.2 Document History and Management .................................................................................. 7
1.3 Copies ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4 Changes to the AIGD .......................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Editing conventions ............................................................................................................ 8
1.6 AIGD Request for Change Form ........................................................................................ 9
1.7 Amendment Record .......................................................................................................... 10
2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS ............................................................ 15
2.1 Acronym List .................................................................................................................... 15

2.2 Glossary of Terms ............................................................................................................. 16
3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS………………………………………………………... 17
4. ADS-B DATA .................................................................................................................. 19
5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 20
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 20
5.1.1 Planning ................................................................................................................... 20

5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination ...................................... 20
5.1.3 System compatibility ............................................................................................... 20
5.1.4 Integration ................................................................................................................ 21
5.1.5 Coverage Predictions ............................................................................................... 24
5.2 Implementation checklist .................................................................................................. 25
5.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 25

5.2.2 Activity Sequence .................................................................................................... 25
5.2.3 Concept Phase .......................................................................................................... 25
5.2.4 Design Phase ............................................................................................................ 25
5.2.5 Implementation Phase .............................................................................................. 26
6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 28
6.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 28

6.2 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation .............................. 29
7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING ............................................................ 32
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 32

7.2 Personnel Licensing and Training .................................................................................... 32
7.3 System Performance Criteria for an ATC separation service ........................................... 32
7.4 ATC system validation ..................................................................................................... 33
7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines ............................................................................. 33

7.4.2 System safety assessment .................................................................................... 33

7.4.3 Integration test ..................................................................................................... 34
7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals ...................................................................................... 34
7.4.5 ATS System Integrity .......................................................................................... 34
7.5 System Monitoring ........................................................................................................... 35
7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS) ....................................................................... 35

7.5.2 The monitoring process ....................................................................................... 35
7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information .............................................................. 36
7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports ....................................................................................... 36
7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report ............................................................................... 36
7.5.6 Processing of Reports .......................................................................................... 37
7.6 APANPIRG ...................................................................................................................... 37
7.7 Local Data Recording and Analysis ................................................................................. 37
7.7.1 Data recording...................................................................................................... 37

7.7.2 Local data collection ............................................................................................ 38
7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction................................................... 38
7.8 ADS-B Problem Report .................................................................................................... 39
7.8.1 Report Form ......................................................................................................... 39

7.8.2 Description of Fields ............................................................................................ 40
7.9 ADS-B Performance Report Form .................................................................................... 41
8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ........................................ 42
8.1 Reliability.......................................................................................................................... 42
8.2 Availability ....................................................................................................................... 42
8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems ................................. 43
A: System design ......................................................................................................... 43
B: Logistics strategy ................................................................................................... 44
C: Configuration Management .................................................................................... 45
D: Training & Competency plans ................................................................................ 46
E: Data collection & Review ....................................................................................... 46
9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES .......................................................... 47
9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 47

9.2 ADS-B Regulations .......................................................................................................... 47
9.3 Factors to be considered when using ADS-B ................................................................... 48
9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data..................................................................................... 48

9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance .......................................................................... 48
9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service ...................................................................... 49
9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data........................................................................................ 49
9.3.5 Synergy between GNSS and ADS-B ................................................................... 50
9.3.6 Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement..................................................... 51
9.3.7 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue With Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) ................................................................................................................... 52

9.3.8 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce 1090 MHz Congestion ................................ 52
9.4 Reporting Rates................................................................................................................. 53
9.4.1 General ................................................................................................................ 53
9.5 Separation ......................................................................................................................... 53
9.5.1 General ................................................................................................................. 53

9.5.2 Identification Methods ......................................................................................... 53
9.5.3 ADS-B Separation ................................................................................................ 53
9.5.4 Vertical Separation ............................................................................................... 53
9.6 Air Traffic Control Clearance Monitoring ........................................................................ 55
9.6.1 General ................................................................................................................. 55

9.6.2 Deviation from ATC clearances ........................................................................... 55
9.7 Alerting service ................................................................................................................. 54
9.8 Position Reporting ............................................................................................................ 55
9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage................................... 55

9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirement in ADS-B airspace .................................. 55
9.9 Phraseology ....................................................................................................................... 55
9.9.1 Phraseology standard ........................................................................................... 55

9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B ................................................. 56
9.10 Flight Planning .................................................................................................................. 57
9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity........................................ 57

9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements ................................................................. 58
9.10.3 Setting Flight Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits ............................................ 59
9.11 Procedures to Handle Non-compliant ADS-B Aircraft or

Mis-leading ADS-B Transmissions .................................................................................. 60
9.12 Emergency Procedures ..................................................................................................... 63
9.13 Procedures to Handle GPS Time and Week Counter Rollover......................................... 64
10. Security Issues Associated with ADS-B ........................................................................ 65
10.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 65

10.2 Considerations .................................................................................................................. 65
10.3 Measures for Enhancing the Security of ADS-B .............................................................. 66
10.3.1 Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) Based Position Verification Method ......... 66
10.3.2 Appropriate Implementation of a Decoding Method of CPR .............................. 67

Appendix 1 – An Example of Commissioning Checklist
Appendix 2 – Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis of ADS-B Avionics

Performance
Appendix 3 – A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics
Appendix 4 – An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency between

ADS-B Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability
Appendix 5 – Checklist of Common Items or Parameters for the Monitoring of ADS-B

System
Appendix 6 – Baseline ADS-B Service Performance Parameters
Appendix 7 – Guidance Material on Generation, Processing and Sharing of ASTERIX

Category 21 ADS-B Messages
Appendix 8 – ICAO Guidance Material on 1 090 Mhz Spectrum Issues and Proper
Management of 24-Bit Aircraft Addresses Assoicated with Unmanned
Aircraft

1. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2003 recommended that States recognize
ADS-B as an enabler of the global ATM concept bringing substantial safety and capacity benefits;
support the cost-effective early implementation of it; and ensuring it is harmonized, compatible and
interoperable with operational procedures, data linking and ATM applications.
The Twelve ICAO Air Navigation Conference held in 2012 endorsed the Aviation System Block
Upgrades (ASBU) to provide a framework for global harmonization and interoperability of seamless
ATM systems. Among the Block Upgrades, the Block 0 module “Initial Capability for Ground
Surveillance” recommends States to implement ADS-B which provides an economical alternative to
acquire surveillance capabilities especially for areas where it is technically infeasible or commercially
unviable to install radars.
This ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document (AIGD) provides guidance material
for the planning, implementation and operational application of ADS-B technology in the Asia and
Pacific Regions.
The procedures and requirements for ADS-B operations are detailed in the relevant States’ AIP. The
AIGD is intended to provide key information on ADS-B performance, integration, principles, procedures
and collaboration mechanisms.
The content is based upon the work to date of the APANPIRG ADS-B Study and Implementation Task
Force (SITF), the Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group (SURICG) and various ANC Panels
developing provisions for the operational use of ADS-B. Amendment to the guidance material will be
required as new/revised SARPs and PANS are published.
1.1 ARRANGEMENT OF THE AIGD
The AIGD consists of the following Parts:
Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Acronyms and Glossary of Terms
Section 3 Reference Documents
Section 4 ADS-B Data
Section 5 ADS-B Implementation
Section 6 Template of Harmonization Framework for ADS-B
Implementation
Section 7 System Integrity and Monitoring
Section 8 Reliability and Availability Considerations
Section 9 ADS-B Regulations and Procedures
Section 10 Security Issues Associated with ADS-B
1.2 DOCUMENT HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT
This document is managed by the APANPIRG. It was introduced as draft to the first Working Group
meeting of the ADS-B SITF in Singapore in October 2004, at which it was agreed to develop the draft to
an approved working document that provides implementation guidance for States. The first edition was
presented to APANPIRG for adoption in August 2005. It is intended to supplement SARPs, PANS and
relevant provisions contained in ICAO documentation and it will be regularly updated to reflect evolving
provisions.

1.3 COPIES
Paper copies of this AIGD are not distributed. Controlled and endorsed copies can be found at the
following web site: http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx
Copy may be freely downloaded from the web site, or by emailing APANPIRG through the ICAO Asia
and Pacific Regional Office who will send a copy by return email.
1.4 CHANGES TO THE AIGD
Whenever a user identifies a need for a change to this document, a Request for Change (RFC) Form (see
Section 1.6 below) should be completed and submitted to the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office.
The Regional Office will collate RFCs for consideration by the Surveillance Implementation
Coordination Group.
When an amendment has been agreed by a meeting of the Surveillance Implementation Coordination
Group then a new version of the AIGD will be prepared, with the changes marked by an “|” in the
margin, and an endnote indicating the relevant RFC, so a reader can see the origin of the change. If the
change is in a table cell, the outside edges of the table will be highlighted; e.g.:
Final approval for publication of an amendment to the AIGD will be the responsibility of APANPIRG.
1.5 EDITING CONVENTIONS

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1.6 AIGD REQUEST FOR CHANGE FORM

RFC Nr:
Please use this form when requesting a change to any part of this AIGD. This form may be photocopied
as required, emailed, faxed or e-mailed to ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Office
+66 (2) 537-8199 or [email protected]
1. SUBJECT:
2. REASON FOR CHANGE:
3. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL: [expand / attach additional pages if necessary]
4. REFERENCE(S):
5. PERSON INITIATING: DATE:
ORGANISATION:
TEL/FA/X/E-MAIL:
6. CONSULTATION RESPONSE DUE BY DATE:

Organization Name Agree/Disagree Date
7. ACTION REQUIRE :
8. AIGD EDITOR DATE REC’D :
9. FEEDBACK PASSED DATE :

1.7 AMENDMENT RECORD
Amendment Date Amended by Comments

Number
0.1 24 December 2004 W. Blythe Modified draft following contributions
H. Anderson from ADS-B SITF Working Group
members. Incorporated to TF/3 Working
Paper #3.
0.2 (1.0) 24 March 2005 H. Anderson Final draft prepared at ADS-B SITF WG/3
0.3 (1.1) 03 June 2005 Nick King Amendments following SASP WG/WHL
meeting of May 2005
0.4 15 July 2005 CNS/MET SG/9 Editorial changes made
1.0 26 August 2005 APANPIRG/16 Adopted as the first Edition
2.0 25 August 2006 Proposed by Adopted as the second Edition

ADS-B SITF/5
and adopted by
APANPIRG/17
3.0 7 September 2007 Proposed by Adopted as the second amendment (3rd
ADS-B SITF/6 edition)
and adopted by
APANPIRG/18
4.0 5 September 2011 Proposed by Adopted amendment on consequential
ADS-B SITF/10 change to the Flight Plan and additional
and adopted by material on the reliability and availability
APANPIRG/22 for ADS-B ground system
5.0 14 September 2012 Proposed by Included sample template on harmonization
ADS-B SITF/11 framework
and adopted by
APANPIRG/23
6.0 June 2013 Proposed by Revamped to include the latest ADS-B
ADS-B SITF/12 developments and references to guidance
and adopted by materials on ADS-B implementation
APANPIRG/24
7.0 September 2014 Proposed by (i) Included guidance materials on
ADS-B SITF/13 monitoring and analysis of ADS-B
and adopted by equipped aircraft
APANPIRG/25 (ii) Included guidance materials on
synergy between GNSS and ADS-B
(iii) Revised ATC Phraseology
(iv) Included clarification on Flight
Planning
8.0 September 2015 Proposed by (i) Updated the guidance materials on
ADS-B SITF/14 monitoring and analysis of ADS-B
and adopted by equipped aircraft
APANPIRG/26 (ii) Updated the categories of reported
ADS-B avionics problems
(iii) Updated the guidance materials on
ADS-B flight plan
(iv) Updated the guidance materials on
disabling ADS-B transmissions
(v) Remove reference to operational

approval for use of ADS-B Out by

ATC
9.0 September 2016 Proposed by (i) Included a list of additional functional

ADS-B SITF/15 requirements for ADS-B integration
and adopted by (ii) Addition of a checklist of common
APANPIRG/27 items or parameters for monitoring of
ADS-B System
(iii) Amendment to emphasize the issue on
potential incorrect processing of DO-
260B downlinks by ADS-B ground
stations during upgrade
(iv) Updated the list of known ADS-B
avionics problems
(v) Included a general recommendation of
technical solution on acquisition of
Mode 3/A code information via Mode
S downlink for DO-260 aircraft in
ADS-B implementation with Mode
A/C SSR environment
10.0 June 2017 Proposed by (i) Updated “B787 position error with
SURICG/2 good NUC” in the list of known ADS-
B avionics problems.
(ii) Included new problem type “Incorrect
Ground Bit Setting in ADS-B
Avionics Downlink Data” and “A350
ADS-B on-ground performance” in
the list of known ADS-B avionics
problems.
(iii) Amendment to the template for ADS-
B Mandate / Regulations for Aircraft
Avionics.
(iv) Included a general recommendation to
use ADS-B in overcoming the
limitations of Mode A/C radar
technology.
(v) Included a general recommendation on
carrying out ICAO Aircraft Address
Monitoring
(vi) Aligned to replace NACp for NAC
throughout the document
(vii) Aligned to use ICAO Aircraft Address
throughout the document
11.0 April 2018 Proposed by (i) Editorial Updates – including

SURICG/3 /replacing ADS-B SITF with SURICG
(Sections 1, 1.4, 2.1, 7.5.1, 7.5.5,
7.5.6, 7.6, 7.8.2)
(ii) Correction of HPL Definition (Section
2.2)
(iii) Update of reference documents as in
Attachment 2 of WP/02
(iv) Include reference to APRD (Section

7.5.1)
(v) Update of sample regulations (Section
9.2)
(vi) Update in Position Reporting
Performance (Section 9.3.2)
(vii) Update in GNSS Integrity Prediction
Service (Section 9.3.3)
(viii) Update name of RASMAG in
Sharing of ADS-B Data (Section
9.3.4)
(ix) Clarification of reporting rate
requirements (Section 9.4.1)
(x) Use of Ident during ADS-B
emergencies.(Section 9.12)
(xi) Appendix 1 missing from Version 10
– reinstate.
(xii) Appendix 2 – update for available
APRD.
(xiii) Update to B787 service bulletin
status. (Attachment A in Appendix 2)
(xiv) replace "Date UTC" to "Start
Time/Date UTC", replace "Time
UTC" to "End Time/Date UTC" and
related contents in the Report Form
(Section 7.8.1)
(xv) replace description of "Date UTC" as
"UTC Time/Date when the event
occurred", replace description of
"Time UTC" as "UTC Time/Date
when the event ended" as sometimes
the problem will lasts across mid-
night. (Section 7.8.2)
(xvi) In Remote Control & Monitoring
(RCMS) part, suggest to replace
"ASTERIX Output Load" to
"ASTERIX Output Load and Link
Status" (Appendix 5)
(xvii) Update on DO260A EMG issue
(Section 9.12)
(xviii) Update the link to the Guidance
Material on generation, processing and
sharing of ASTERIX (Section 4)
(xix) Reference to Space based ADS-B
and ATC automation as in WP12 is
added under 5.1.4.4.6
(xx) Updated Section 4Managing the
Problem in Appendix 2 to incorporate
the General mechanism and procedure
for blacklisting aircraft
(xxi) Updated the Attachment A to
Appendix 2 – List of known ADS-B
avionics problems
(xxii) Added Appendix 6 – Baseline
ADS-B Service Performance

Parameters
(xxiii) Added Appendix 7 – Guidance
Material on Generation, Processing
and Sharing of ASTERIX Category 21
ADS-B Messages
12.0 April 2019 Proposed by (i) Added procedures on handling GPS

SURICG/4 time and week counters rollover
(Section 9.13)
(ii) Added two new problem types to

Attachment A of Appendix 2 “List of
known ADS-B avionics problems”,
including:
o Rockwell TSS-4100 Geometric

Altitude Reporting as Pressure
Altitude
o Improper NACv reporting
(iii) Updated the status of known ADS-B

avionics problems in Attachment A of
Appendix 2 “List of known ADS-B
avionics problems”, including:
o B787 position error with good NIC

o Rockwell TSS-4100 track
extrapolation issue
o Embraer 170 track jumping issue
o Airbus Single Aisle production
wiring issue
o Boeing 777-300ER production
wiring issue
13.0 September 2020 Proposed by (i) Updated the status of known ADS-B
SURICG/5 avionics problems in Attachment A of
Appendix 2 “List of known ADS-B
avionics problems”, including B787
NACv = 0 Issue
(ii) Updated Section 5.1.4.5.1 on ICAO

Aircraft Address Monitoring
(iii) Added the following new sections:
o Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface

Movement (Section 9.3.6)
o 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit

Aircraft Address Issue with
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
(Section 9.3.7)
o Measures for Enhancing the

Security of ADS-B (Section 10.3)

o Time Difference of Arrival

(TDOA) Based Position
Verification Method (Section
10.3.1)
14.0 August 2021 Proposed by (i) Added the following new issue to the
SURICG/6 “List of known ADS-B avionics
problems” in Attachment A of
Appendix 2
o Honeywell Primus II RCZ Issue
15.0 May 2022 Proposed by (i) Added Section 9.3.8 on

SURICG/7 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce
1090 MHz Congestion
(ii) Added Section 10.3.2 on Appropriate

Implementation of a Decoding Method
of CPR

2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS
2.1 ACRONYM LIST
ACID Aircraft Identification

ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
AIGD ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
AIT ADS-B Implementation Team
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
APANPIRG Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
APRD ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database
ARINC Aeronautical Radio Incorporate
ATC Air Traffic Control (or Air Traffic Controller)
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
ATSP ATS Provider
ATSU ATS unit
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CDTI Cockpit Display Traffic Information
DAIW Danger Area Infringement Warning
FIR Flight Information Region
FLTID Flight Identification
FMS Flight Management System
FOM Figure of Merit used in ASTERIX messaging
GPS Global Positioning System (USA)
HPL Horizontal Protection Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTCA Medium Term Conflict Alert
MTTR Mean Time To Restore
NACp Navigation Accuracy Category
NIC Navigation Integrity Category
PRS Problem Reporting System
RAI Restricted Area Intrusion
RAM Route Adherence Monitoring
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
RFC Request for Change
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SIL Source Integrity Level
SITF Study and Implementation Task Force
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
SURICG Surveillance Implementation Coordination Group

2.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ADS-B In An ADS-B system feature that enables the display of

real time ADS-B tracks on a situation display in the
aircraft cockpit.
ADS-B Out An ADS-B system feature that enables the frequent
broadcast of accurate aircraft position and vector
data together with other information.
Asterix 21 Eurocontrol standard format for data message
exchange
FOM (Figure of Merit) A numeric value that is used to determine the
accuracy and integrity of associated position data.
HPL (Horizontal Position Limit) The containment radius within which the true
position of the aircraft will be found for 99.999% of
the time, or the probability indicated by the reported
SIL value (DO-260A/B).
NACp (Navigational Accuracy Category) Subfield used to announce the 95% accuracy limits
for the horizontal position data being broadcast.
NIC (Navigational Integrity Category) Subfield used to specify the containment radius
integrity associated with horizontal position data.
NUCp ( Navigation Uncertainty Category) A numeric value that announces the integrity of the
associated horizontal position data being broadcast.
SIL (Source Integrity Level) Subfield used to specify the probability of the true
position lying outside the containment radius defined
by NIC without being alerted.

3. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Id Name of the document Reference Date Origin Domain

1 Annex 2: Rules of the Air Tenth Edition July 2005 ICAO
Including
Amendment 43
dated 10/11/16
2 Annex 4: Aeronautical Chart Eleventh Edition July 2009 ICAO
including
Amendment 59
dated 10/11/16
3 Annex 10: Aeronautical Fifth Edition July 2014 ICAO
Telecommunications, Vol. IV –
Surveillance Radar and Collision
Avoidance Systems
4 Annex 11: Air Traffic Services Fourteenth Edition July 2016 ICAO
5 Annex 15: Aeronautical Fifteenth Edition July 2016 ICAO

Information Services
6 PAN-ATM (Doc 4444/ATM501) Sixteenth Edition November ICAO
2016
7 Air Traffic Services Planning First Edition 1984 ICAO
Manual (Doc 9426/AN924) including
Amendment 4
30/12/92
8 Manual on Airspace Planning First Edition 1998 ICAO
Methodology for the Determination including
of Separation Minima (Doc Amendment 1
9689/AN953) dated 30/8/02
9 Doc 9859 Safety Management Third Edition 2013 ICAO
Manual (SMM)
10 Technical Provisions for Mode S Second Edition 2012 ICAO

Services and Extended Squitter including
(Doc 9871/AN460) Amendment 1
dated 09/01/17
11 Aeronautical Surveillance Manual Second Edition 2017 ICAO
(Doc 9924)
12 ICAO Circular 326 AN/188 First Edition 2012 ICAO

“Assessment of ADS-B and
Multilateration Surveillance to
Support Air Traffic Services and
Guidelines for Implementation”.
13 Regional Supplementary Procedures Fifth Edition 2008 ICAO
(Doc 7030) including
Amendment 9
dated 25/04/14
14 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260 2000 RTCA
Standards (MOPS) for 1090 MHz September 13,
Automatic Dependent Surveillance 2000
– Broadcast (ADS-B) – including
Change 1 Change 1 to 2006

RTCA DO-260
June 27, 2006
15 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2003 RTCA

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended April 10, 2003
Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B)
Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2006

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Change 1
Squitter Automatic Dependent June 27, 2006
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Change 1
Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260A 2006

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Change 2
Squitter Automatic Dependent December 13,
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 2006
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Change 2
16 Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260B 2009 RTCA
Standards for 1090 MHz Extended December 2, 2009
Squitter Automatic Dependent
and Traffic Information Services
(TIS-B)
Minimum Operational Performance RTCA DO-260B 2011

Standards for 1090 MHz Extended December 13,
Squitter Automatic Dependent 2011
Broadcast (TIS-B) – Corrigendum 1

4. ADS-B DATA
APANPIRG has decided to use 1090MHz Extended Squitter data link for ADS-B data exchange in the
Asia and Pacific Regions. In the longer term an additional link type may be required.
To ensure interoperability of ADS-B ground stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC) Regions, during
the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 version 0.23 (V0.23)
which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B ground stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At this
time, DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.
This baselined version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services, including
aircraft separation, can be provided. V0.23 can be used with DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B
avionics/ground stations to provide basic ATC operational services. However, V0.23 cannot fully
support the more advanced capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.
As the avionics standards changed through the different versions of DO260, the ADS-B ground station
processing also needed to change, so that downlinks received from aircraft would be correctly
interpreted in construction of the ASTERIX Category 21 messages. It is important that States with
“older generation” ADS-B ground stations designed to support DO260 or DO260A, take action to
upgrade to support the latest ADS-B avionics standard as well as the older standards. DO260B avionics
will become more common in the Asia Pacific region as the FAA and European ADS-B mandates for
2020 require this version.
States intending to implement ADS-B surveillance and share ADS-B data with others might consider to
adopt a more updated version of ASTERIX in order to make use of the advanced capabilities offered by
DO260A and DO260B compliant avionics.
A guidance material on generation, processing and sharing of ASTERIX Cat. 21 ADS-B messages is
provided at Appendix 7 for reference by States.
In this guidance material, the ADS-B data contained inside ASTERIX Cat 21 are classified as Group 1
(mandatory), Group 2 (Desirable) and Group 3 (Optional). It is required to transmit all data that are
operationally desirable (Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data
that are mandatory (Group 1) in ASTERIX messages. Whether Group 3 optional data will need to be
transmitted or not should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B ground station
depending on specific operational needs.
It is considered necessary that all data that are mandatory in ASTERIX messages (i.e. Group 1 data
items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received from aircraft,
should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of optional data
items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement between the two
data sharing parties concerned.

5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.1.1 Planning
There are a range of activities needed to progress ADS-B implementation from initial concept
level to operational use. This section addresses the issues of collaborative decision making,
system compatibility and integration, while the second section of this chapter provides a
checklist to assist States with the management of ADS-B implementation activities.
5.1.2 Implementation team to ensure international coordination
5.1.2.1 Any decision to implement ADS-B by a State should include consultation with the wider
ATM community. Moreover, where ADS-B procedures or requirements will affect
traffic transiting between states, the implementation should also be coordinated between
States and Regions, in order to achieve maximum benefits for airspace users and service
providers.
5.1.2.2 An effective means of coordinating the various demands of the affected organizations is
to establish an implementation team. Team composition may vary by State or Region,
but the core group responsible for ADS-B implementation planning should include
members with multidiscipline operational expertise from affected aviation disciplines,
with access to other specialists where required.
5.1.2.3 Ideally, such a team should comprise representatives from the ATS providers, regulators
and airspace users, as well as other stakeholders likely to be influenced by the
introduction of ADS-B, such as manufacturers and military authorities. All identified
stakeholders should participate as early as possible in this process so that their
requirements can be identified prior to the making of schedules or contracts.
5.1.2.4 The role of the implementation team is to consult widely with stakeholders, identify
operational needs, resolve conflicting demands and make recommendations to the
various stakeholders managing the implementation. To this end, the implementation
team should have appropriate access to the decision-makers.
5.1.3 System compatibility
5.1.3.1 ADS-B has potential use in almost all environments and operations and is likely to
become a mainstay of the future ATM system. In addition to traditional radar-like
services, it is likely that ADS-B will also be used for niche application where radar
surveillance is not available or possible. The isolated use of ADS-B has the potential to
foster a variety of standards and practices that, once expanded to a wider environment,
may prove to be incompatible with neighbouring areas.
5.1.3.2 Given the international nature of aviation, special efforts should be taken to ensure
harmonization though compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs). The choice of systems to support ADS-B should consider not only the
required performance of individual components, but also their compatibility with other
CNS systems and prevailing avionics standards.

5.1.3.3 The future concept of ATM encompasses the advantages of interoperable and seamless
transition across flight information region (FIR) boundaries and, where necessary, ADS-
B implementation teams should conduct simulations, trials and cost/benefit analysis to
support these objectives.
5.1.4 Integration
5.1.4.1 ADS-B implementation plans should include the development of both business and
safety cases. The adoption of any new CNS system has major implications for service
providers, regulators and airspace users and special planning should be considered for
the integration of ADS-B into the existing and foreseen CNS/ATM system. The
following briefly discusses each element.
5.1.4.2 Communication system
5.1.4.2.1 The communication system is an essential element within CNS. An air

traffic controller can now monitor an aircraft position in real time using
ADS-B where previously only voice position reports were available.
However, a communication system that will support the new services
that result from the improved surveillance may be necessary.
Consequently, there is an impact of the ongoing ADS-B related work on
the communication infrastructure developments.
5.1.4.3 Navigation system infrastructure
5.1.4.3.1 ADS-B is dependent upon the data obtained from a navigation system
(typically GNSS), in order to enable its functions and performance.
Therefore, the navigation infrastructure should fulfill the corresponding
requirements of the ADS-B application, in terms of:
a) Data items; and
b) Performance (e.g. accuracy, integrity, availability etc.).
5.1.4.3.2 This has an obvious impact on the navigation system development,

which evolves in parallel with the development of the surveillance
system.
5.1.4.4 Other surveillance infrastructure
5.1.4.4.1 ADS-B may be used to supplement existing surveillance systems or as the

principal source of surveillance data. Ideally, surveillance systems will
incorporate data from ADS-B and other sources to provide a coherent
picture that improves both the amount and utility of surveillance data to the
user. The choice of the optimal mix of data sources will be defined on the
basis of operational demands, available technology, safety and cost-benefit
considerations.
5.1.4.4.2 ADS-B is one of the cost-effective means in complementing and

overcoming limitations of Mode A/C radars, including false targets, aircraft
positions temporarily not displayed and split tracks, which could cause
aircraft display issues on radar screens for ATC irrespective of brands of Air
Traffic Management System being used. Within busy airspace, aircraft
could be managed at close lateral distance while vertically separated. In

such situation, Mode A/C radars sometimes provide garbled detection, in

the form of false targets due to overlapping replies from two or more aircraft.
In the case of ADS-B, ADS-B data are broadcast in an omni-directional,
random and periodic intervals without suffering from the same issue. In
addition, automatic data validation is usually done at ADS-B receivers to
ensure integrity of ADS-B information received from the aircraft.
5.1.4.4.3 A guidance material on issues to be considered in ATC multi-sensor fusion

processing including integration of ADS-B data is provided on the ICAO
website http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx for reference by
States.
5.1.4.4.4 Acquisition of Mode 3/A code for DO-260 aircraft through Mode S
downlink
There is a potential problem for some of the air traffic management systems
(ATMS) for fusion of ADS-B targets with Mode A/C SSR targets, because a
common identifier to the aircraft, Mode 3/A code, is not available through
ADS-B. Then ATMS can only rely on proximity analysis of aircraft
position and Mode C altitude to determine whether detections from two
distinct types of surveillance sources belong to the same aircraft. This
matching technique might introduce ambiguity in associating ADS-B with
Mode A/C SSR targets for fused display.
States may consider enhancing their ADS-B ground stations to listen to

Downlink Format 5 and 21 (DF 5 and 21) of Mode S interrogation replies
which carry the Mode 3/A code of the same aircraft. As a result, ADS-B
target reports of the same DO-260 aircraft can be filled with Mode 3/A code
acquired from Mode S downlink to facilitate matching with Mode A/C SSR
targets before transmitting to the ATMS.
The transmission of DF 5 and DF 21 messages from a Mode S aircraft

requires to be triggered by ground-based Mode S interrogators, either
through active or passive interrogation. For active interrogation, Mode S
interrogators can be installed alongside with ADS-B ground stations for
actively triggering DF 5 and DF 21 messages transmission from the aircraft.
The interrogators shall follow ICAO standard to perform periodic all-call
and roll-call to the aircraft in range. For passive interrogation, the ADS-B
ground stations will only passively listen to the DF messages from the
aircraft for acquiring the Mode 3/A code. It is required to ensure that Mode
S interrogations are performed by external systems, such as A-SMGCS,
MLAT system or Mode S radar under their coverage.
The above provides an interim solution during transition from Mode A/C
SSR to Mode S SSR. After upgrading to Mode S SSR, ATMS can have an
alternative means to make use of Flight ID or ICAO Aircraft Address to
perform association between ADS-B and Mode S radar targets without
ambiguity.
5.1.4.4.5 A guidance material on processing and displaying of ADS-B data at air

traffic controller positions is provided on the ICAO website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.

5.1.4.4.6 Most of the ATC automation systems that support terrestrial ADS-B will
also support space-based ADS-B without modifications. For more guidance,
reference can be made to WP/12 on "ATC Automation Requirement and
Space-based ADS-B" delivered during 3rd meeting of the SURICG.
5.1.4.5 Additional Functional Requirements for ADS-B Integration
5.1.4.5.1 The following list of functions could be considered by each individual

States to see whether they are suitable for their own operational needs or
applicable to local environment from ADS-B integration point of view:
 The priority of ADS-B sensor position data vs radar data could be

adaptable;
 For ADS-B aircraft, receipt of the Mode S conspicuity code could

trigger use of the Flight ID / ICAO Aircraft Address for flight plan
correlation;
 If, due to sensor or aircraft capability limitation, no SSR code is received

for an aircraft, the system could use Flight ID/ ICAO Aircraft Address
for track correlation;
 For correlation based on Flight ID, the received ID could exactly match
the ACID of the flight plan;
 For correlation based on ICAO Aircraft Address, the received address

could match the address entered in the flight plan item 18 CODE/
keyword;
 The system could generate an alert for a correlated flight for which the
Flight ID from the track does not match the flight plan ACID and/or the
ICAO Aircraft Address from the track does not match the code given in
the flight plan Item 18 CODE/ keyword;
 The system could allow the setting of ADS-B above or below the radar
sources within the Surveillance Data Processor Tile Set on a per-tile
basis;
 Priority could only apply to data received at or above the adapted NUCp,
NACp, NIC, and/or SIL thresholds;
 The system could be configurable to either discard ADS-B data or

display the track with an indication of ADS-B degradation if the
received NUCp, NACp, NIC, or SIL is below an adapted threshold;
 If the system is configured to display the degraded track, the degraded

position and status could only be displayed if there are no other
surveillance sources available;
 The system could allow the adaptation of ADS-B emergency codes to

map to special Mnemonics;

 The system could include an adaptable Downlinked Aircraft Parameters

(DAP) field that invokes a popup with the following information from
Mode-S and ADS-B aircraft:
- Magnetic Heading
- True Track Angle
- Indicated Airspeed/Mach Number
- Groundspeed
- Track Angle Rate
- True Airspeed
- Roll Angle
- Selected Altitude
- Vertical Rate
 The system could generate a conformance alert if the Selected Altitude

and the Cleared Flight Level do not match.
 The system could monitor 1 the ICAO Aircraft Address of individual

aircraft and generate alert for the following cases:
- ICAO Aircraft Address does not match with that specified in
flight planICAO Aircraft Address is all 0 or F (expressed in
hexadecimal)
- ICAO Aircraft Address is not defined in ICAO’s allocation
- Duplicate ICAO Aircraft Address detected within single sensor
in the same time-frame
- Duplicate ICAO Aircraft Address detected within multi-sensors
in the same time-frameICAO Aircraft Address changes during
the flight
- Aircrafts whose state identification number is not match with
the state information registered in its flight plan
- Aircrafts whose state identification number is not defined in
SARPs (Annex 10)
- Mode-S transponder of which P4 pulse was not detected
- Mode-A/C transponder replied to Mode-S all call
5.1.5 Coverage Predictions
5.1.5.1 Reliable and robust analysis and planning of ADS-B coverage to support seamless
ATM initiative requires accurate and reliable coverage modelling. States should ensure
that surveillance engineering/technical teams are provided with modelling tools to
provide accurate and reliable coverage predictions for ATM planning and analysis.
1
Monitoring could be done by ATM system or other systems of the States/Administration

5.2 IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST
5.2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this implementation checklist is to document the range of activities that needs to be
completed to bring an ADS-B application from an initial concept to operational use. This checklist may
form the basis of the terms of reference for an ADS-B implementation team, although some activities
may be specific to individual stakeholders. An example of the checklist used by AirServices Australia is
given at Appendix 1.
5.2.2 Activity Sequence
The activities are listed in an approximate sequential order. However, each activity does not have to be
completed prior to starting the next activity. In many cases, a parallel and iterative process should be
used to feed data and experience from one activity to another. It should be noted that not all activities
will be required for all applications.
5.2.3 Concept Phase
a) construct operational concept:
1) purpose;
2) operational environment;
3) ATM functions; and
4) infrastructure;
b) identify benefits:
1) safety enhancements;
2) efficiency;
3) capacity;
4) environmental;
5) cost reductions;
6) access; and
7) other metrics (e.g. predictability, flexibility, usefulness);
c) identify constraints:
1) pair-wise equipage;
2) compatibility with non-equipped aircraft;
3) need for exclusive airspace;
4) required ground infrastructure;
5) RF spectrum;
6) integration with existing technology; and
7) technology availability;
d) prepare business case:
1) cost benefit analysis; and

2) demand and justification.
5.2.4 Design Phase
a) identify operational requirements:

1) security; and
2) systems interoperability;
b) identify human factors issues:
1) human-machine interfaces;
2) training development and validation;
3) workload demands;
4) role of automation vs. role of human;
5) crew coordination/pilot decision-making interactions; and
6) ATM collaborative decision-making;
c) identify technical requirements:
1) standards development;
2) prevailing avionics standards;
3) data required;
4) functional processing;
5) functional performance; and
6) required certification levels;
d) equipment development, test, and evaluation:
1) prototype systems built to existing or draft standards/specifications;

2) developmental bench and flight tests; and
3) acceptance test parameters; and
4) select and procure technology;
e) develop procedures:
1) pilot and controller actions and responsibilities;

2) phraseologies;
3) separation/spacing criteria and requirements;
4) controller’s responsibility to maintain a monitoring function, if appropriate;
5) contingency procedures;
6) emergency procedures; and
7) develop AIP and Information documentation
f) prepare design phase safety case:

1) safety rationale;
2) safety budget and allocation; and
3) functional hazard assessment.
5.2.5 Implementation phase
a) prepare implementation phase safety case;
b) conduct operational test and evaluation:
1) flight deck and ATC validation simulations; and

2) flight tests and operational trials;

c) obtain systems certification:
1) aircraft equipment; and

2) ground systems;
d) obtain regulatory approvals:
1) air traffic certification of use;
e) implementation transition:
1) Promulgate procedures and deliver training

2) continue data collection and analysis;
3) resolve any unforeseen issues; and
4) continue feedback into standards development processes;
f) performance monitoring to ensure that the agreed performance is maintained.
5.2.5.1 Once the implementation project is complete, ongoing maintenance and upgrading of
both ADS-B operations and infrastructure should continue to be monitored, through
the appropriate forums.

6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION
6.1 BACKGROUND
6.1.1 It is obvious that full benefits of ADS-B will only be achieved by its harmonized
implementation and seamless operations. During the 6th meeting of ADS-B SEA/WG in
February 2011, Hong Kong, China initiated to strengthen collaboration among
concerned States/Administrations for harmonized ADS-B implementation and seamless
operations along two ATS routes L642 and M771 with major traffic flow (MTF). An
ad-hoc workgroup comprising concerned CAAs/ANSPs from Hong Kong, China,
Mainland China, Vietnam and Singapore was subsequently formed to elaborate and
agree on a framework regarding implementation timelines, avionics standards, optimal
flight levels, and ATC and engineering handling procedures. As a coherent effort, ADS-B
implementation along ATS routes L642 and M771 has been harmonized while Hong
Kong, China and Singapore have published respective Aeronautical Information
Circulars and Airworthiness Notices on ADS-B mandates for these two routes with effect
on 12 December 2013.
6.1.2 It is considered that the above implementation framework for ATS routes L642/M771
would serve as a useful template for extension to other high density routes to harmonize
ADS-B implementation. Paragraph 6.2 shows the detailed framework.

6.2 TEMPLATE OF HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION
Harmonization Framework for ADS-B Implementation along ATS Routes L642 and M771
No. What to harmonize What was agreed Issue / what needs to be further
discussed
1 Mandate Effective Singapore (SG), Hong Kong (HK), China (Sanya) :
12 Dec 2013
Vietnam (VN) : to be confirmed
2 ATC Operating Procedures No need to harmonize Refer to SEACG for consideration of the
impact of expanding ADS-B surveillance
on ATC Operating Procedures including
Large Scale Weather procedures.
3 Mandate Publish Date No need to harmonize To publish equipment requirements as

early as possible.

4 Flight Level SG, HK, CN :

- At or Above FL290 (ADS-B airspace)
- Below FL290 (Non-ADS-B airspace)
VN to be confirmed
5 Avionics Standard (CASA/AMC2024) SG - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 ADS-B Task Force agreed that DO260B
HK - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 will be accepted as well.
VN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165
CN - CASA or AMC2024 or FAA AC No. 20-165 SG, HK, and CN agreed their ADS-B GS
will accept DO260, DO260A and
DO260B by 1 July 2014 (Note 1)
6 Flight Planning Before 15 Nov 2012, as per AIGD

On or after 15 Nov 2012, as per new flight plan
format
7 Aircraft Equippage
7a) Procedures if Aircraft Not Equipped or SG, HK, CN : FL280 and Below
Aircraft without a Serviceable ADS-B VN to be confirmed
Transmitting Equipment before Flight

7b) Aircraft Equipped but Transmitting Bad For known aircraft, treat as non ADS-B aircraft. Share blacklisted aircraft among
Data (Blacklisted Aircraft) concerned States/Administration
8 Contingency Plan
8a) Systemic Failure such as Ground System Revert back to current procedure.
/ GPS Failure
8b) Avionics Failure or Equipped Aircraft Provide other form of separation, subject to bilateral Address the procedure for aircraft
Transmitting Bad Data in Flight agreement. transiting from radar to ADS-B airspace
From radar/ADS-B environment to ADS-B only and from ADS-B to ADS-B airspace.
environment, ATC coordination may be able to
provide early notification of ADS-B failure.
9 Commonly Agreed Route Spacing SEACG Need for commonly agreed minimal in-
trail spacing throughout.
Note 1: Also included two ADS-B GS supplied by Indonesia at Matak and Natuna
______________

7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) environment
is an integrated system including physical systems (hardware, software, and communication networks),
human elements (pilots, controllers and engineers), and the operational procedures for its applications.
ADS-B is a surveillance system that may be integrated with other surveillance technologies or may also
operate as an independent source for surveillance monitoring within the CNS/ATM system.
Because of the integrated nature of such system and the degree of interaction among its components,
comprehensive system monitoring is recommended. The procedures described in this section aim to
ensure system integrity by validation, identification, reporting and tracking of possible problems
revealed during system monitoring with appropriate follow-up actions.
These procedures do not replace the ATS incident reporting procedures and requirements, as specified in
PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), Appendix 4; ICAO’s Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426),
Chapter 3; or applicable State regulations, affecting the reporting responsibilities of parties directly
involved in a potential ATS incident.
7.2 PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING
Prior to operating any element of the ADS-B system, operational and technical personnel shall undertake
appropriate training as determined by the States, including compliance with the Convention on
International Civil Aviation where applicable.
Notwithstanding the above requirement and for the purposes of undertaking limited trials of the
ADS-B system, special arrangements may be agreed between the operator and an Air Traffic Services
Unit (ATSU).
7.3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR AN ATC SEPARATION SERVICE
A number of States have introduced ADS-B for the provision of Air Traffic Services, including for
surveillance separation. The ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel (SASP) has completed
assessment on the suitability of ADS-B for various applications including provision of aircraft separation
based on comparison of technical characteristics between ADS-B and monopulse secondary surveillance
radar. It is concluded that that ADS-B surveillance is better or at least no worse than the referenced
radar, and can be used to provide separation minima as described in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444) whether
ADS-B is used as a sole means of ATC surveillance or used together with radar, subject to certain
conditions to be met. The assessment result is detailed in the ICAO Circular 326 AN/188 “Assessment
of ADS-B and Multilateration Surveillance to Support Air Traffic Services and Guidelines for
Implementation”.
Regarding the use of ADS-B in complex airspace (as discussed in ICAO Circular 326), complex airspace
may be considered to be airspace with the following characteristics:
- Higher aircraft density

- Higher route crossing point density
- A higher mixture of different aircraft performance levels
- A higher rate of aircraft manoeuvring (as distinct from straight and level flight).
The following recommendations need to be considered:

1. Whether complex or not, States are urged to consider whether the current or required
surveillance system performance is better, equivalent or worse than the SASP reference.
2. If the current or required surveillance system used by a State is lower or equivalent in

performance than the reference MSSR used in Circular 326 Appendix A, then that State may use
the Appendix C performance criteria.
3. If the current or required surveillance system used by a State is higher performance than the
reference MSSR used in Circular 326 Appendix A, then the State must ensure that the ADS-B
system achieves the more demanding performance.
4. State should undertake, in all cases, a safety assessment that ensures that any additional risks
and safety requirements already identified for the airspace where ADSB or MLAT is to be
implemented, or any newly identified risks, are effectively controlled and risk is reduced to an
acceptable level.
States intending to introduce ADS-B separation minima shall comply with provisions of PANS-ATM,
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030) and Annex 11 paragraph 3.4.1. States should adopt the
guidelines contained in this document unless conformance with
PANS-ATM specifications requires change.
7.4 ATC SYSTEM VALIDATION
7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines
To meet system integrity requirements, States should conduct a validation process that confirms
the integrity of their equipment and procedures. Such processes shall include:
a) A system safety assessment for new implementations is the basis for definitions of
system performance requirements. Where existing systems are being modified to utilize
additional services, the assessment demonstrates that the ATS Provider’s system will
meet safety objectives;
b) Integration test results confirming interoperability for operational use of airborne and
ground systems; and
c) Confirmation that the ATS Operation Manuals are compatible with those of adjacent
providers where the system is used across a common boundary.
7.4.2 System safety assessment
The objective of the system safety assessment is to ensure the State that introduction and
operation of ADS-B is safe. This can be achieved through application of the provisions of Annex
11 paragraph 2.27 and PANS-ATM Chapter 2. The safety assessment should be conducted for
initial implementation as well as any future enhancements and should include:
a) Identifying failure conditions;
b) Assigning levels of criticality;
c) Determining risks/ probabilities for occurrence;
d) Identifying mitigating measures and fallback arrangements;

e) Categorising the degree of acceptability of risks; and
f) Operational hazard ID process.
Following the safety assessment, States should institute measures to offset any identified failure
conditions that are not already categorized as acceptable. This should be done to reduce the
probability of their occurrence to a level as low as reasonably practicable. This could be
accomplished through system automation or manual procedures.
Guidance material on building a safety case for delivery of an ADS-B separation service is
provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for
reference by States.
7.4.3 Integration test
States should conduct trials with suitably equipped aircraft to ensure they meet the operational
and technical requirements to provide an ATS. Alternatively, they may be satisfied by test
results and analysis conducted by another State or organization deemed competent to provide
such service. Where this process is followed, the tests conducted by another State or
organization should be comparable (i.e. using similar equipment under similar conditions). Refer
also to the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation
Minima (Doc9689).
7.4.4 ATS Operation Manuals
States should coordinate with adjacent States to confirm that their ATS Operation Manuals
contain standard operating procedures to ensure harmonization of procedures that impact across
common boundaries.
7.4.5 ATS System Integrity
With automated ATM systems, data changes, software upgrades, and system failures can affect
adjacent units. States shall ensure that:
a) A conservative approach is taken to manage any changes to the system;
b) Aircrew, aircraft operating companies and adjacent ATSU(s) are notified of any planned
system changes in advance, where that system is used across a common boundary;
c) ATSUs have verification procedures in place to ensure that following any system
changes, displayed data is both correct and accurate;
d) In cases of system failures or where upgrades (or downgrades) or other changes may
impact surrounding ATS units, ATSUs should have a procedure in place for timely
notification to adjacent units. Such notification procedures will normally be detailed in
Letters of Agreement between adjacent units; and
e) ADS-B surveillance data is provided with equal to or better level of protection and
security than existing surveillance radar data.
7.5 SYSTEM MONITORING

During the initial period of implementation of ADS-B technology, routine collection of data is necessary
in order to ensure that the system continues to meet or exceed its performance, safety and
interoperability requirements, and that operational service delivery and procedures are working as
intended. The monitoring program is a two-fold process. Firstly, summarised statistical data should be
produced periodically showing the performance of the system. This is accomplished through ADS-B
Periodic Status Reports. Secondly, as problems or abnormalities arise, they should be identified,
tracked, analyzed and corrected and information disseminated as required, utilizing the ADS-B Problem
Report.
Guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of ADS-B Avionics Performance are given at
Appendix 2. Checklist of common items or parameters that could be considered for monitoring is
summarized at Appendix 5 for reference.
7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS)
The Problem Reporting System is tasked with the collection, storage and regular dissemination
of data based on reports received from SURICG members. The PRS tracks problem reports and
publish information from those reports to SURICG members. Problem resolution is the
responsibility of the appropriate SURICG members.
The PRS Administrator shall:
a) prepare consolidated problem report summaries for each SURICG meeting;
b) collect and consolidate ADS-B Problem Reports; and
c) maintain a functional website (with controlled access) to manage the problem reporting
function.
The PRS is managed through the Asia Pacific ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting
Database (APRD) which is accessible to authorized users via
https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx.
7.5.2 The monitoring process
When problems or abnormalities are discovered, the initial analysis should be performed by the
organization(s) identifying the problem. In addition, a copy of the problem report should be
entered in to the PRS which will assign a tracking number. As some problems or abnormalities
may involve more than one organization, the originator should be responsible for follow-up
action to rectify the problem and forward the information to the PRS. It is essential that all
information relating to the problem is documented and recorded and resolved in a timely
manner.
The following groups should be involved in the monitoring process and problem tracking to
ensure a comprehensive review and analysis of the collected data:
a) ATS Providers;
b) Organizations responsible for ATS system maintenance (where different from the ATS
provider);

c) Relevant State regulatory authorities;
d) Communication Service Providers being used;
e) Aircraft operators; and
f) Aircraft and avionics manufacturers.
7.5.3 Distribution of confidential information
It is important that information that may have an operational impact on other parties be
distributed by the authorised investigator to all authorised groups that are likely to be affected, as
soon as possible. In this way, each party is made aware of problems already encountered by
others, and may be able to contribute further information to aid in the solution of these problems.
The default position is that all states agree to provide the data which will be de-identified for
reporting and record keeping purposes.
7.5.4 ADS-B problem reports
Problem reports may originate from many sources, but most will fall within two categories;
reports based on observation of one or more specific events, or reports generated from the
routine analysis of data. The user would document the problem, resolve it with the appropriate
party and forward a copy of the report to the PRS for tracking and distribution. While one
occurrence may appear to be an isolated case, the receipt of numerous similar reports by the PRS
could indicate that an area needs more detailed analysis.
To effectively resolve problems and track progress, the problem reports should be sent to the
nominated point of contact at the appropriate organization and the PRS. The resolution of the
identified problems may require:
a) Re-training of system operators, or revision of training procedures to ensure compliance

with existing procedures;
b) Change to operating procedures;
c) Change to system requirements, including performance and interoperability; or
d) Change to system design.
7.5.5 ADS-B periodic status report
The ATS Providers should complete the ADS-B Periodic Status Report annually and deliver the
report to the regional meeting of the SURICG. The Periodic Status Report should give an
indication of system performance and identify any trend in system deficiencies, the resultant
operational implications, and the proposed resolution, if applicable.
Communications Service Providers, if used, are also expected to submit Periodic Status Reports
on the performance of the networks carrying ADS-B data at the annual regional meeting of the
SURICG. These reports could also contain the details of planned or current upgrades to the
network.

7.5.6 Processing of Reports
Each group in the monitoring process should nominate a single point of contact for receipt of
problem reports and coordination with the other parties. This list will be distributed by the PRS
Administrator to all parties to the monitoring process.
Each State should establish mechanisms within its ATS Provider and regulatory authority to:
a) Assess problem reports and refer them to the appropriate technical or operational
expertise for investigation and resolution;
b) Coordinate with aircraft operators;
c) Develop interim operational procedures to mitigate the effects of problems until such
time as the problem is resolved;
d) Monitor the progress of problem resolution;
e) Prepare a report on problems encountered and their operational implications and forward
these to the PRS;
f) Prepare the ADS-B periodic status report at pre-determined times and forward these to
the Secretary of the annual meeting of the SURICG; and
g) Coordinate with any Communication Service Providers used.
7.6 APANPIRG
APANPIRG, with the assistance of its contributory bodies, shall oversee the monitoring process to
ensure the ADS-B system continues to meet its performance and safety requirements, and that
operational procedures are working as intended. The APANPIRG’S objectives are to:
a) review Periodic Status Reports and any significant Problem Reports;
b) highlight successful problem resolutions to SURICG members;
c) monitor the progress of outstanding problem resolutions;
d) prepare summaries of problems encountered and their operational implications; and
e) assess system performance based on information in the PRS and Periodic Status
Reports.
7.7 LOCAL DATA RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
7.7.1 Data recording
It is recommended that ATS Providers and Communication Service Providers retain the records
defined below for at least 30 days to allow for accident/incident investigation processes. These
records should be made available on request to the relevant State safety authority. Where data is
sought from an adjacent State, the usual State to State channels should be used.

These recordings shall be in a form that permits a replay of the situation and identification of the
messages that were received by the ATS system.
7.7.2 Local data collection
ATS providers and communications service providers should identify and record ADS-B system
component failures that have the potential to negatively impact the safety of controlled flights or
compromise service continuity.
7.7.3 Avionics problem identification and correction
ATS providers need to develop systems to:
a) detect ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults
b) advise the regulators and where appropriate the aircraft operators on the detected
ADS-B avionics anomalies and faults
c) devise mechanisms and procedures to address identified faults
Regulators need to develop and maintain systems to ensure that appropriate corrective actions
are taken to address identified faults.

7.8 ADS-B PROBLEM REPORT
7.8.1 Report Form

PRS #
Start Time/Date UTC End Time/Date UTC
Registration Aircraft ID
Flight ID ICAO Aircraft Address
Aircraft Type
Flight Sector/
Location
ATS Unit
Description / additional information
Originator Reference
Originator
number
Organization

7.8.2 Description of Fields
Field Meaning
Number A unique identification number assigned by the PRS
Administrator to this problem report. Organizations writing problem reports
are encouraged to maintain their own internal list of these problems for
tracking purposes. Once the problems have been reported to the PRS and
incorporated in the database, a number will be assigned by the PRS and used
for tracking by the SURICG.
Start Time/Date UTC time/date when the event occurred.
UTC
End Time/Date UTC time/date when the event ended.
UTC
Registration Registration number (tail number) of the aircraft involved.
Aircraft ID (ACID) Coded equivalent of voice call sign as entered in FPL Item 7.
ICAO Aircraft Unique ICAO Aircraft Address expressed in Hexadecimal form (e.g.
Address 7432DB)
Flight ID (FLTID) The identification transmitted by ADS-B for display on a controller situation
display or a CDTI.
Flight The departure airport and destination airport for the sector being flown by the
Sector/Location aircraft involved in the event. These should be the ICAO identifiers of those
airports. Or if more descriptive, the location of the aircraft during the event.
Originator Point of contact at the originating organization for this report (usually the
author).
Aircraft Type The aircraft model involved.
Organization The name of the organization (airline, ATS provider or communications
service provider) that created the report.
ATS Unit ICAO identifier of the ATC Center or Tower controlling the aircraft at the
time of the event.
Description This should provide as complete a description of the situation leading up to
the problem as is possible. Where the organization reporting the problem is
not able to provide all the information (e.g. the controller may not know
everything that happens on the aircraft), it would be helpful if they would
coordinate with the other parties to obtain the necessary information.
The description should include:
 A complete description of the problem that is being reported

 The route contained in the FMS and flight plan
 Any flight deck indications
 Any indications provided to the controller when the problem
occurred
 Any additional information that the originator of the problem report
considers might be helpful but is not included on the list above
If necessary to contain all the information, additional pages may be added. if

the originator considers it might be helpful, diagrams and other additional
information (such as printouts of message logs) may be appended to the
report.

7.9 ADS-B PERFORMANCE REPORT FORM

Originating Organization
Date of submission Originator
Report Period
TECHNICAL ISSUES
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
GENERAL COMMENTS

8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Reliability and Availability of ADS-B systems should normally be equivalent or better than the reliability
and availability of radar systems.
Guidance material on Reliability and Availability standards for ADS-B systems and supporting voice
communications systems are included in the document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance
Parameters” at Appendix 6.
The “Baseline ADS-B Performance Parameters” document contains three Tiers of service performance
parameters with different reliability and availability standards for each Tier. The appropriate Tier should
be selected for the type of ADS-B service intended:
(a) Tier 1 standards are for a high performance traffic separation service;
(b) Tier 2 standards are for a traffic situational awareness service with procedural separation; and
(c) Tier 3 standards are for a traffic advisory service (flight information service)
To achieve high operational availability of ADS-B systems to support aircraft separation services, it is
necessary to operate with duplicated/redundant systems. If one system fails, the service continues using
an unduplicated system. This is acceptable for a short period, whilst the faulty system is being repaired,
because the probability of a second failure during the short time window of repairing is low.
However, it is necessary to ensure that the repair does not take too long. A long repair time increases the
risk of an unexpected failure (loss of service continuity); which in turn, introduces potential loss of
service (low availability) and loss of aircraft operational efficiency and/or safety impacts.
Checklist of common items or parameters that could be considered for monitoring is summarized at
Appendix 5 for reference.
8.1 Reliability
8.1.1 Reliability is a measure of how often a system fails and is usually measured as Mean
Time Between Failure (MTBF) expressed in hours. Continuity is a measure equivalent
to reliability, but expressed as the probability of system failure over a defined period. In
the context of this document, failure means inability to deliver ADS-B data to the ATC
centre. Ie: Failure of the ADS-B system rather than an equipment or component failure.
8.1.2 Poor system MTBF has a safety impact because typically it causes unexpected transition
from one operating mode to another. For example, aircraft within surveillance coverage
that are safely separated by a surveillance standard distance (say, 5 NM) are
unexpectedly no longer separated by a procedural standard distance (say 15 mins), due
to an unplanned surveillance outage.
8.1.3 In general, reliability is determined by design (see para 8.3 B below)
8.2 Availability
8.2.1 Availability is a measure of how often the system is available for operational use. It is
usually expressed as a percentage of the time that the system is available.

8.2.2 Poor availability usually results in loss of economic benefit because efficiencies are not
available when the ATC system is operating in a degraded mode (eg using procedural
control instead of say 5 NM separation).
8.2.3 Planned outages are often included as outages because the efficiencies provided to the
Industry are lost, no matter what the cause of the outage. However, some organisations
do not include planned outages because it is assumed that planned outages only occur
when the facility is not required.
8.2.4 Availability is calculated as

Availability (Ao) = MTBF/(MTBF+MDT)
where MTBF= Mean Time Between SYSTEM Failure

MDT = Mean Down Time for the SYSTEM
The MDT includes Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), Turn Around Time (TAT) for
spares, and Mean Logistic Delay Time (MLDT)
NB: This relates to the failure of the system to provide a service, rather than the time
between individual equipment failures. Some organisations use Mean Time Between
Outage (MTBO) rather than MTBF.
8.2.5 Availability is directly a function of how quickly the SYSTEM can be repaired. Ie:
directly a function of MDT. Thus availability is highly dependent on the ability & speed
of the support organisation to get the system back on-line.
8.3 Recommendations for high reliability/availability ADS-B systems
A: System design can keep system failure rate low with long MTBF. Typical techniques are:
 to duplicate each element and minimise single points of failure. Automatic changeover or
parallel operation of both channels keeps system failure rates low. Ie: the system keeps
operating despite individual failures. Examples are :
o Separate communication channels between ADS-B ground station and ATC centre
preferably using different technologies or service providers eg one terrestrial and one
satellite
 Consideration of Human factors in design can reduce the number of system failures due to
human error. E.g. inadvertent switch off, incorrect software load, incorrect maintenance
operation.
 Take great care with earthing, cable runs and lightning protection to minimise the risks of
system damage
 Take great care to protect against water ingress to cables and systems
 Establish a system baseline that documents the achieved performance of the site that can be
later be used as a reference. This can shorten troubleshooting in future.
 System design can also improve the MDT by quickly identifying problems and alerting
maintenance staff. Eg Built in equipment test (BITE) can significantly contribute to lowering
MDT.

B: Logistics strategy aims to keep MDT very low. Low MDT depends on logistic support
providing short repair times. To achieve short repair times, ANSPs usually provide a range
of logistics, including the following, to ensure that the outage is less than a few days:
 ensure the procured system is designed to allow for quick replacement of faulty modules to
restore operations
 provide remote monitoring to allow maintainers to identify the faulty modules for transport
to site
 provide support tools to allow technicians to repair faulty modules or to configure/setup
replacement modules
 provide technicians training to identify & repair the faulty modules
 provide local maintenance depots to reduce the time it takes to access to the site
 provide documentation and procedures to “standardise” the process
 use an in-country spares pool to ensure that replacement modules are available within
reasonable times
 use a maintenance contract to repair faulty modules within a specified turnaround time. I.e.:
to replenish the spares pool quickly.
Whilst technical training and remote monitoring are usually considered by ANSPs, sometimes
there is less focus on spares support.
Difficulties can be experienced if States :
a) Fail to establish a spares pool – because procurement of spares at the time of failure can
bring extensive delays due to :
b) obtaining funds
c) obtaining approval to purchase overseas
d) obtaining approval to purchase from a “sole source”
e) difficulties and delays in obtaining a quotation
f) delays in delivery because the purchase was unexpected by the supplier
g) Fail to establish a module repair contract resulting in :
- long repair times
- unplanned expenditure
- inability for a supplier to repair modules because the supplier did not have adequate
certainty of funding of the work
Spares pool
ANSPs can establish, preferably as part of their acquisition purchase, adequate spares buffer
stock to support the required repair times. The prime objective is to reduce the time period that
the system operates un-duplicated. It allows decoupling of the restoration time from the module
repair time.
Module repair contract

ANSPs can also enter into a maintenance repair contract, preferably as part of their acquisition
purchase, to require the supplier to repair or replace and deliver failed modules within a
specified time – preferably with contractual incentives/penalties for compliance. Such support
contracts are best negotiated as part of the acquisition contract when competition between
vendors is at play to keep costs down. Sometimes it is appropriate to demand that the support
contractor also keep a certain level of buffer stock of spares “in country”.

It is strongly recommended that maintenance support is purchased under the same contract as the
acquisition contract.
The advantages of a module repair contract are:

- The price can be determined whilst in the competitive phase of acquisition –
hence avoids excessive costs
- The contract can include the supplier bearing all shipping costs
- Can be funded by a define amount per year, which support the budget
processes. If the costs are fixed, the supplier is encouraged to develop a
reliable system minimising module repairs.
- It avoids delays and funding issues at the time of the module failure
Other typical strategies are:
 Establish availability and reliability objectives that are agreed organization wide. In
particular agree System response times (SRT) for faults and system failure to ensure that
MDT is achieved. An agreed SRT can help organizations to decide on the required logistics
strategy including number, location and skills of staff to support the system.
 Establish baseline preventative maintenance regimes including procedures and performance

inspections in conjunction with manufacturer recommendations for all subsystems
 Use remote control & monitoring systems to identify faulty modules before travel to site.
This can avoid multiple trips to site and reduce the repair time
 Have handbooks, procedures, tools available at the site or a nearby depot so that travel time
does not adversely affect down time
 Have adequate spares and test equipment ready at a maintenance depot near the site or at the
site itself. Vendors can be required to perform analysis of the number of spares required to
achieve low probability of spare “stock out”
 Have appropriate plans to cope with system and component obsolescence. It is possible to
contractually require suppliers to regularly report on the ability to support the system and
supply components.
 Have ongoing training programs and competency testing to ensure that staff are able to
perform the required role
The detailed set of operational and technical arrangements in place and actions required to
maintain a system through the lifecycle are often documented in a Integrated Logistics Support
Plan.
C: Configuration Management aims to ensure that the configuration of the ground stations is
maintained with integrity. Erroneous configuration can cause unnecessary outages. Normally
configuration management is achieved by :
 Having clear organizational & individual responsibilities and accountabilities for system
configuration.
 Having clear procedures in place which define who has authority to change configuration
and records of the changes made including, inter alia
o The nature of the change including the reason

o Impact of the change & safety assessment

o An appropriate transition or cutover plan
o Who approved the change
o When the change was authorized and when the change was implemented
 Having appropriate test and analysis capabilities to confirm that new configurations are
acceptable before operational deployment.
 Having appropriate methods to deploy the approved configuration (Logistics of

configuration distribution). Suggested methods;
o Approved configuration published on intranet web pages

o Approved configuration distributed on approved media
D: Training & Competency plans aim to ensure that staff has the skills to safety repairs
Normally this is achieved by:
 Conduct of appropriate Training Needs Analysis (TNA) to identify the gap between trainee
skill/knowledge and the required skill/knowledge.
 Development and delivery of appropriate training to maintainers
 Competency based testing of trainees
 Ongoing refresher training to ensure that skills are maintained even when fault rates are low
E: Data collection & Review :
Regular and scheduled review should be undertaken to determine whether reliability/availability

objectives are being met. These reviews need to consider :
 Reports of actual achieved availability & reliability
 Data regarding system failures including “down time” needs to be captured and analysed so
the ANSP actually knows what is being (or not being) achieved.
 Any failure trends that need to be assessed. This requires data capture of the root cause of
failures
 Any environmental impacts on system performance, such coverage obstructions such as

trees, planned building developments, corrosion, RFI etc. Changes in infrastructure may also
be relevant including air conditioning (temperature/humidity etc.) and power system
changes.
 System problem reports especially those that relate to software deficiencies (design)
 System and component obsolescence
 Staff skills and need for refresher training

9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
9.1 INTRODUCTION
ADS-B involves the transmission of specific data messages from aircraft and vehicle systems. These
data messages are broadcast at approximately 0.5 second intervals and received at compatible ground
stations that relay these messages to ATSU(s) for presentation on ATS situation displays. The following
procedures relate to the use of ADS-B data in ATS ground surveillance applications.
The implementation of the ADS-B system will support the provision of high performance surveillance,
enhancing flight safety, facilitating the reduction of separation minima and supporting user demands
such as user-preferred trajectories.
9.2 ADS-B REGULATIONS
As agreed at APANPRIG 22/8, States intending to implement ADS-B based surveillance services may
designate portions of airspace within their area of responsibility by:
(a) mandating the carriage and use of ADS-B equipment; or
(b) providing priority for access to such airspace for aircraft with operative ADS-B equipment over
those aircraft not operating ADS-B equipment.
In publishing ADS-B mandate/regulations, States should consider to :
 define the ADS-B standards applicable to the State. For interoperability and harmonization, such
regulations need to define both the standards applicable for the aircraft ADS-B position source
and the ADS-B transmitter.
 define the airspace affected by the regulations and the category of aircraft that the regulation
applies to.
 define the timing of the regulations allowing sufficient time for operators to equip. Experience in
Asia Pacific Regions is that major international carriers are having high equippage rates of ADS-
B avionics. However the equippage rates of ADS-B avionics for some regional fleets, business
jets and general aviation are currently low and more time will be required to achieve high
equippage rates.
 establish the technical and operational standards for the ground stations and air traffic
management procedures used for ADS-B separation services, including the associated voice
communications services.
States may refer to Appendix 3 on the template for ADS-B mandate/regulations for aircraft avionics.
Some States listed below have published their ADS-B mandate/regulations on their web sites that could
also be used for reference.
(a) Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia

Civil Aviation Order 20.18 Compilation No. 4) 2014, Civil Aviation Order 82.1 (Compilation No. 13) ,
Civil Aviation Order 82.3 (No. 18), Civil Aviation Order 82.5 (No. 19)
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017C01115/Download”
(b) Civil Aviation Department (CAD) of Hong Kong, China

Aeronautical Information Publication Supplement No. A01/16 dated 1 February 2016
“https://www.ais.gov.hk/HK_AIP/supp/A01-16.pdf”

(c) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS)

Aeronautical Information Publication (eAIP) Part 2 ENR 1.8 – Regional Supplementary Procedures –
Section 7 – Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out exclusive airspace within parts
of the Singapore FIR
“https://fpl-1.caasaim.gov.sg/aip/2018-03-14/final/2018-03-14/html/index-en-GB.html”
(d) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

ADS–B Out Performance Requirements To Support Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service, Final Rule
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-28/pdf/2010-12645.pdf
States are encouraged to mandate forward fit for newly manufactured aircraft on and after 1
January 2020, having a maximum certified takeoff weight of 5700kg or greater, or having a
maximum cruising true airspeed capability of greater than 250 knots, with ADS-B avionics
compliant to Version 2 ES (equivalent to RTCA DO-260B) or later version 2.
9.3 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN USING ADS-B
9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data
The accuracy and integrity of pressure altitude derived level information provided by ADS-B are
equivalent to Mode C level data provided through an SSR sensor and subject to the same
operational procedures as those used in an SSR environment. Where the ATM system converts
ADS-B level data to display barometric equivalent level data, the displayed data should not be
used to determine vertical separation until the data is verified by comparison with a pilot
reported barometric level.
9.3.2 Position Reporting Performance
The ADS-B data from the aircraft will include a NUCp/NIC/SIL/NACp categorization of the
integrity and accuracy of the horizontal position data. This figure is determined from
NIC/ NACp/ SIL values for DO260A/B compliant avionics and NUC values for DO260/ED102
compliant avionics.
In general, for 5NM separation, if the HPL value used to generate ADS-B quality indicators
(NUC or NIC) is greater than 2 nautical miles the data is unlikely to be of comparable quality to
that provided by a single monopulse SSR. ADS-B data should not be used for separation unless
a suitable means of determining data integrity is used.
The key minimum performance requirements for an ADS-B system to enable the use of a 3 NM
or 5 NM separation minimum in the provision of air traffic control is provided in the ICAO
Circular 326 (especially Appendix C).
ADS-B reports with low integrity may be presented on situation displays, provided the controller
is alerted (e.g. by a change in symbology and/or visual alert) to the change and the implications
for the provision of separation. An ANS Provider may elect not to display
ADS-B tracks that fail to meet a given position reporting performance criterion.
9.3.3 GNSS Integrity Prediction Service
2
Subject to endorsement by CNS/SG/22 in July 2018

ADS-B uses GNSS for position determination. As such, availability of GNSS data has a direct
influence on the provision of a surveillance service.
ATS Providers may elect to use a GNSS integrity prediction service to assist in determining the
future availability of useable ADS-B data. The integrity prediction service alerts users to
potential future loss or degradation of the ADS-B service in defined areas. When these alerts are
displayed, the system is indicating to its users that at some time in the future the ADS-B
positional data may be inadequate to support the application of ADS-B separation. It is
recommended that the prediction service is made available to each ATSU that is employing
ADS-B to provide a separation service, to ensure that air traffic controllers are alerted in advance
of any predicted degradation of the GNSS service and the associated reduction in their ability to
provide ADS-B separation to flights that are within the affected area. This is similar to having
advance warning of a planned radar outage for maintenance.
ADS-B should not be used to provide separation between aircraft that will be affected by an
expected period of inadequate position reporting integrity.
If an unpredicted loss of integrity occurs (including a RAIM warning report from aircrew) then;
(a) ADS-B separation should not be applied by ATC to the particular aircraft reporting until
the integrity has been assured; and
(b) The controller should check with other aircraft in the vicinity of the aircraft reporting the
RAIM warning, to determine if they have also been affected and establish alternative
forms of separation if necessary.
9.3.4 Sharing of ADS-B Data
ADS-B Data-sharing for ATC Operations
Member States should consider the benefits of sharing ADS-B data received from aircraft
operating in the proximity of their international airspace boundaries with adjacent States that
have compatible technology in an effort to maximize the service benefits and promote
operational safety.
Data sharing may involve the use of the data to provide separation services if all the
requirements for delivery of separation services are satisfied. In some cases, States may choose
to use a lower standard that supports surveillance safety nets and situational awareness whilst
operations are conducted using procedural separation standards.
Any agreement on the sharing of surveillance data should be incorporated in Letters of

Agreement between the States concerned. Such agreements may also include the sharing of VHF
communication facilities.
A template for ADS-B data-sharing agreement is provided on the ICAO APAC website
“http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by States.
ADS-B Data-sharing for Safety Monitoring
With endorsement of the methodology by both the ICAO Separation and Airspace Safety Panel
(SASP) and the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG), ADS-B
data can be used for calculating the altimetry system error (ASE) which is a measure of the
height-keeping performance of an aircraft. It is an ICAO requirement that aircraft operating in
RVSM airspace must undergo periodic monitoring on height-keeping performance. The existing

methods to estimate aircraft ASE include use of a portable device, the Enhanced GPS
Monitoring Unit, and ground-based systems called Height Monitoring Unit/Aircraft Geometric
Height Measurement Element. The use of ADS-B data for height-keeping performance
monitoring, on top of providing enhanced and alternative means of surveillance, will provide a
cost-effective option for aircraft operators. States are encouraged to share ADS-B data to support
the height-keeping performance monitoring of airframe.
Civil/Military ADS-B Data-sharing
Civil/military data sharing arrangements, including aircraft surveillance, were a key part of
civil/military cooperation in terms of tactical operational responses and increasing trust between
civil and military units.
Aircraft operating ADS-B technology transmit their position, altitude and identity to all listeners,
conveying information from co-operative aircraft that have chosen to equip and publicly
broadcast ADS-B messages. Thus there should be no defence or national security issues with the
use and sharing of such data.
Some military transponders may support ADS-B using encrypted DF19 messages, but these data
are normally not decoded or used at all by civil systems. In most cases today, tactical military
aircraft are not ADS-B equipped or could choose to disable transmissions. In future, increasing
numbers of military aircraft will be ADS-B capable, with the ability to disable these
transmissions. ADS-B data sharing should not influence the decision by military authorities to
equip or not equip with ADS-B. Moreover, it is possible for States to install ADS-B filters that
prevent data from sensitive flights being shared. These filters can be based on a number of
criteria and typically use geographical parameters to only provide ADS-B data to an external
party if aircraft are near the boundary.
A guidance material on advice to military authorities regarding ADS-B data sharing is provided
on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” for reference by
States.
9.3.5 Synergy of ADS-B and GNSS
States intending to implement GNSS/PBN or ADS-B should consider the efficiency of

implementing the other technology at the same time due to the inherent efficiencies in doing so.
GNSS systems provide navigation solutions to IFR aircraft for the conduct of enroute, terminal
and non-precision approaches. The use of GNSS/PBN can provide higher performance and
higher safety. Transition to GNSS can avoid significant ground infrastructure costs.
ADS-B systems provide surveillance based upon GNSS position source. ADS-B provides high
performance and high update surveillance for both air-air and ATC surveillance. Transition to
ADS-B can avoid the costs associated with ground based radar infrastructure. ADS-B system
installations rely on acceptable GNSS equipment being installed in the aircraft to provide the
position source and integrity.
If the fleet is equipped with ADS-B, they will already have most of the requirements to use
GNSS for navigation satisfied. Similarly, if aircraft have suitable GNSS on board, they will have
a position source to support ADS-B. It is noted however, that some care is needed to ensure that
the requirements of GNSS/PBN and surveillance are both satisfied.
There is significantly less cost for these systems to be installed in an aircraft at the same time. A
single installation of GNSS & ADS-B will involve :
 a single design activity instead of two

 a single downtime instead of two

 installation of the connection between GPS and ADS-B transponder
 a single test, certification and aircraft flight test
For the affected aviation community (ANSP, regulator and operator), the lessons learnt and
issues faced in both GNSS and ADS-B have significant commonality. This can lead to
efficiencies in Industry education and training.
9.3.6 Use of ADS-B for Airport Surface Movement
Both DO321/ED-163 and the EUROCONTROL guidance for the provision of ATS using ADS-
B for Airport Surface Movement state the horizontal position accuracy needs to be ≤ 10 meters
at 95%, which translates into a positional accuracy of NACp = 10.
However, most of the currently deployed GNSS horizontal position sources provide values
leading to either a NACp = 9 (30 meters) or a NACp = 8 (92 meters), whilst the actual position
accuracy could reach 2 to 3 meters. Provided that the position source is GNSS-based, States can
consider to use the following ADS-B quality indicators to determine the horizontal positional
accuracy:
 DO260
 NUCp > 6
 DO260A
 NACp ≥ 8
 NIC > 0
 SIL = 2
 DO260B
 NACp ≥ 8
 NIC > 0
 SIL = 3
Guidance documents recommend implementing some form of horizontal positional accuracy

monitoring for using ADS-B positional data with accuracy down to NUCp > 6 or NACp ≥ 8 for
airport surface movement. Visual monitoring by controllers of vehicles on taxiways and runways
can be considered as an initial monitoring of the horizontal positional accuracy within the
airport. In addition, States can consider to evaluate the performance of ADS-B tracks against
reference tracks from proven surveillance systems, e.g. tracks from MLAT systems with
certified accuracy, to show that ADS-B data is suitable for ground surveillance and falls within
the requirements of international standards.
For ADS-B only tracks with quality indicators below the required accuracy, States are
encouraged to keep the display of the tracks in the surveillance display with due discrimination
on the track symbols in order to enhance the situation awareness of controllers.

9.3.7 1090 Mhz Spectrum and 24-bit Aircraft Address Issue with Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS)
Proper and efficient utilization of available bandwidth and capacity at 1 090 MHz is a key
element to ensure the safe and reliable operation of aeronautical surveillance systems, including
secondary surveillance radar (SSR), automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) and
airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS). Studies conducted by ICAO expert groups have
identified certain issues and potential technical concerns to the operation of these surveillance
systems in the presence of large numbers of unmanned aircraft (UA), if those UA are equipped
with an ADS-B OUT transmitter on 1 090 MHz and operating at very low levels.
Recognizing issues associated with those UA which may adversely affect safety for all aircraft in
the area, ICAO has developed guidance material (see Appendix 8) to assist States in validating
the utilization of 1 090 MHz and for withholding 24-bit aircraft addresses to UA unless certain
criteria have been met. States are encouraged to make use of the guidance material as well as any
other related provisions to ensure that the surveillance capabilities being provided by the
aforementioned surveillance systems.
9.3.8 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce 1090MHz Congestion
 Make periodic measurements, say every few years so that the environment status is known.
 Reduce the number of SSR radars, especially non Monopulse and Mode A/C radars if
operationally viable.
o Convert Mode A/C to either ADS-B or Mode S
o Some Secondary surveillance radars can be replaced by using ADS-B. e.g.: Australia
removed 2 radars in the last decade in favor of ADS-B.
o Complement existing coverage with Space based ADS-B
 Use Monopulse radars instead of old conventional radars so that the interrogation rate can be
reduced
 Minimise the interrogation rate from radars and active multilateration consistent with the
operational objective
 Decommission old Mode A/C radars because they allow multiple aircraft to reply to all
interrogations
 Implement radar interrogation patterns to only interrogate on azimuths where additional
surveillance is warranted.
 Minimise “all call” rate commensurate with operational needs
 Reduce interrogation transmit power to the minimum needed for the operational objective. Some
systems allow this to be changed on different azimuths
 Avoid or reduce active multilateration if possible, and minimize transmit power commensurate
with the operational objective
o Mandate ADS-B fitment in aircraft: Multilateration position can be determined using the DF17
ADS-B message if required, so no interrogation is required
o Gradually mandate Mode S in aircraft so that the need to interrogate Mode A/C transponders is
removed eventually. Multilateration position can be determined using the DF11 message if
required. A mode S interrogation still required for altitude and identity to be obtained. Mode S
interrogation only triggers a single aircraft to reply.
o Aircraft with mode A/C transponders (without Mode S require or ADS-B) require multiple
interrogations with typically an omni directional antenna which makes all such aircraft to reply.
 Replace or reduce any navaids (e.g. DME/TACAN, ICAO standard or non ICAO standard) that
impinge on the 1090 MHz channel.
 Close any illegal transmissions affecting the 1090MHhz band
 Take care with DAPS interrogation to ensure only wanted data is requested

9.4 Reporting Rates
9.4.1 General
The ADS-B system shall maintain a reporting rate that ensures at least an equivalent degree of
accuracy, integrity and availability as specified by the performance requirements of a radar
system that is used to provide a similar ATC service. The standard reporting rate is
approximately 0.5 second from the aircraft, but the rate of update provided to the ATM system
(for the situation display) may be less frequent (e.g. 5 seconds), provided performance
requirements for the service are achieved. Reporting rate requirements are included in the
document “Baseline ADS-B Service Performance Parameters” which is available at Appendix 6.
9.5 SEPARATION
9.5.1 General
ADS-B data may be used in combination with data obtained by other means of surveillance
(such as radar, flight plan track, ADS-C) for the application of separation provided appropriate
minima as determined by the State are applied. It should be noted that the quality of
communications will have a bearing on the determination of appropriate minima.
All safety net features (MSAW, STCA, MTCA, RAM and DAIW/ RAI etc) should possess the
same responsiveness as equivalent radar safety net features.
9.5.2 Identification Methods
Some of the methods approved by ICAO for establishing identification with radar, may be
employed with ADS-B (see PANS-ATM chapter 8). One or more of the following identification
procedures are suggested:
a) direct recognition of the aircraft identification in an ADS-B label on a

situation display;
b) transfer of ADS-B identification;
c) observation of compliance with an instruction to TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT.
Note: In automated systems, the “IDENT” feature may be presented in different ways,
e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and associated label.
9.5.3 ADS-B Separation
ADS-B Separation minima has been incorporated by ICAO in PANS-ATM (Doc 4444), and in
Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).
In a mixed surveillance environment, States should use the larger separation standard applicable
between aircraft in the conflict pair being considered.
9.5.4 Vertical separation
9.5.4.1 Introduction
The ADS-B level data presented on the controllers situation display shall normally be
derived from barometric pressure altitude. In the event that barometric altitude is

absent, geometric altitude shall not be displayed on displays used for provision of air
traffic services. Geometric altitude may be used in ATM systems for other purposes.
9.5.4.2 Vertical tolerance standard
The vertical tolerances for ADS-B level information should be consistent with those
applied to Mode C level information.
9.5.4.3 Verification of ADS-B level information
The verification procedures for ADS-B level information shall be the same as those
employed for the verification of Mode C level data in a radar environment.

9.6 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CLEARANCE MONITORING
9.6.1 General
ADS-B track data can be used to monitor flight path conformance with air traffic control
clearances.
9.6.2 Deviations from ATC clearances
The ATC requirements relating to monitoring of ADS-B traffic on the situation display should
be similar to those contained in PANS-ATM Ch.8.
9.7 ALERTING SERVICE
For ADS-B equipped aircraft, the provision of an alerting service should be based on the same criteria as
applied within a radar environment.
9.8 POSITION REPORTING
9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage
States should establish voice and/or CPDLC position reporting procedures consistent with those
applicable with radar for aircraft that have been identified by ATC.
9.8.2 Meteorological reporting requirements in ADS-B airspace
ATSUs may promulgate in the AIP meteorological reporting requirements that apply within the
nominated FIR. The meteorological reporting data required and the transmission methods to be
used by aircrew shall be specified in AIP.
9.9 PHRASEOLOGY
9.9.1 Phraseology Standard
States should use common phraseology for both ADS-B and radar where possible, and should
note the requirement for ADS-B specific phraseology in some instances. States shall refer to
PANS ATM Chapter 12 for ADS-B phraseology:
ADS-B EQUIPMENT DEGRADATION
ADS-B OUT OF SERVICE (appropriate information as necessary).
TO REQUEST THE CAPABILITY OF THE ADS-B EQUIPMENT
a) ADVISE ADS-B CAPABILITY;

*b) ADS-B TRANSMITTER (data link);
*c) ADS-B RECEIVER (data link);
*d) NEGATIVE ADS-B.
* Denotes pilot transmission.
Note: For (b) and (c) – the options are not available for aircraft that are not equipped.
TO REQUEST RESELECTION OF AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION

REENTER FLIGHT IDENTIFICATION.

Note: For some aircraft, this option is not available in-flight
TERMINATION OF RADAR AND/OR ADS-B SERVICE

IDENTIFICATION LOST [reasons] (instructions).
TO REQUEST THE OPERATION OF THE MODE S OR ADS-B IDENT FEATURE

SQUAWK IDENT.
Note: For some standalone ADS-B equipage affecting General Aviation, the option of
“TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT” may be available
TO REQUEST AIRCRAFT SWITCHING TO OTHER TRANSPONDER OR TERMINATION

OF ADS-B TRANSMITTER OPERATION
a) SWITCH TO OTHER TRANSPONDER
b) STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION. SQUAWK (code) ONLY.
Note:
a) In many cases the ADS-B transmitter cannot be operated independently of the SSR
transponder and switching off the ADS-B transmission would also switch off the SSR
transponder operation
b) “STOP ADS-B TRANSMISSION” applies only to aircraft that have the facility to
switch off the ADS-B transmission, while maintaining SSR operation.
9.9.2 Operations of Mode S Transponder and ADS-B
It should be noted that independent operations of Mode S transponder and ADS-B will not be possible in
many aircraft (e.g. where ADS-B is solely provided by 1090 MHz extended squitter emitted from the
transponder). Additionally, some desirable but optional features of ADS-B transmitters may not be fitted
in some aircraft. Controller training on this issue, as it relates to the following examples of radio
telephony and/or CPDLC phraseology is recommended.
9.9.2.1 STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION or STOP SQUAWK
Issue: In most commercial aircraft, a common “transponder control head” is used for SSR transponder,
ACAS and ADS-B functionality. In this case, a pilot who complies with the instruction to stop operation
of one system will also need to stop operation of the other systems – resulting in a loss of surveillance
not intended or expected by the controller.
ATC need to be aware that an instruction to “Stop ADS-B Transmission” may require the pilot to switch
off their transponder that will then stop all other functions associated with the transponder operations
(such as ACARs etc). Pilots need to be aware of their aircraft’s equipment limitations, the consequences
of complying with this ATC instruction, and be aware of their company policy in regard to this. As with
any ATC instruction issued, the pilot should advise ATC if they are unable to comply.
Recommendation: It is recommended that the concatenated phrases STOP ADSB TRANSMISSION,
SQUAWK (code) ONLY or STOP SQUAWK, TRANSMIT ADSB ONLY are used. It is recommended
that controller training highlights the possible consequences of issuing these instructions and that pilot
training highlights the consequences of complying with this instruction. It is also recommended that
aircraft operators have a clearly stated policy on procedures for this situation. Should a pilot respond
with UNABLE then the controller should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not
remove the safety defences of the other surveillance technologies. This might include manual changes to
flight data, coordination with other controllers and/or change of assigned codes or callsigns.

Very few aircraft provide the capability to turn off ADS-B without turning off TCAS. It is not
recommended to switch off ATC transponders (& remove TCAS protection). The only action for most
pilots of aircraft transmitting misleading ADS-B data in response to ATC requests is to recycle the
transponder, or switch to the alternate transponder as appropriate. Besides, aircraft that do not support
ADS-B OFF should have the details included in the flight manual including the undesirability of
disabling TCAS.
9.9.2.2 STOP ADSB ALTITUDE TRANSMISSION [WRONG INDICATION or reason] and

TRANSMIT ADSB ALTITUDE
Issue: Most aircraft will not have separate control of ADSB altitude transmission. In such cases
compliance with the instruction may require the pilot to stop transmission of all ADSB data and/or Mode
C altitude – resulting in a loss of surveillance not intended or expected by the controller.
Recommendation: It is recommended that, should the pilot respond with UNABLE, the controller
should consider alternative solutions to the problem that do not remove the safety defences of other
surveillance data. This might include a procedure that continues the display of incorrect level
information but uses pilot reported levels with manual changes to flight data and coordination with other
controllers.
9.9.2.3 TRANSMIT ADS-B IDENT
Issue: Some aircraft may not be capable or the ADSB SPI IDENT control may be shared with the SSR
SPI IDENT function.
Recommendation: It is recommended that controllers are made aware that some pilots are unable to
comply with this instruction. An alternative means of identification that does not rely on the ADSB SPI
IDENT function should be used.
9.10 FLIGHT PLANNING
9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity
The aircraft identification (ACID) must be accurately recorded in section 7 of the ICAO Flight
Plan form as per the following instructions:
Aircraft Identification, not exceeding 7 characters is to be entered both in item 7 of the flight
plan and replicated exactly when set in the aircraft (for transmission as Flight ID) as follows:
Either,
a) The ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operating agency followed by the
flight identification (e.g. KLM511, BAW213, JTR25), when:
in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the ICAO telephony designator for the
operating agency followed by the flight identification (e.g. KLM 511, SPEEDBIRD
213, HERBIE 25).
Or,
b) The registration marking of the aircraft (e.g. EIAKO, 4XBCD, OOTEK), when:

1) in radiotelephony the callsign used consists of the registration marking alone

(e.g. EIAKO), or preceded by the ICAO telephony designator for the operating
agency (e.g. SVENAIR EIAKO),
2) the aircraft is not equipped with radio.
Note 1: No zeros, hyphens, dashes or spaces are to be added when the Aircraft
Identification consists of less than 7 characters.
Note 2: Appendix 2 to PANS-ATM refers. ICAO designators and telephony designators

for aircraft operating agencies are contained in ICAO Doc 8585.
9.10.2 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirements
9.10.2.1 ICAO Flight Plan Item 10 – Surveillance Equipment and Capabilities
An appropriate ADS-B designator shall be entered in item 10 of the flight plan to indicate that the
flight is capable of transmitting ADS-B messages.
These are defined in ICAO DOC 4444 as follows:
B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability

B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4
During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the B1 and B2 descriptors
was recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may take
some time for formal adoption:
B1 ADS-B “out” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter

B2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using 1090 MHz extended squitter
States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.
9.10.2.2 ICAO Flight Plan Item 18 – Other Information

Where required by the appropriate authority the ICAO Aircraft Address (24 Bit Code) may be
recorded in Item 18 of the ICAO flight plan, in hexadecimal format as per the following example:
CODE/7C432B
States should note that use of hexadecimal code may be prone to human error and is
less flexible in regard to airframe changes for a notified flight.
9.10.2.3 Transponder Capabilities
When an aircraft is equipped with a mode S transponder, that transmits ADS-B messages, according
to ICAO Doc 4444, an appropriate Mode S designator should also be entered in item 10; i.e.: either
s

o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and extended

squitter (ADS-B) capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, extended squitter
(ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability.
During the ADS-B SITF/13 meeting held in April 2014, clarification of the E and L descriptors was
recommended as follows. This will be progressed for change to ICAO DOC 4444, but may take
some time for formal adoption:
o E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and ADS-B

capability, or
o L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude, ADS-B and
enhanced surveillance capability.
States should consider use of the revised descriptors in AIP.
9.10.2.4 Inconsistency between ADS-B Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability
Inconsistency between flight planning of ADS-B and surveillance capability of an aircraft can
impact on ATC planning and situational awareness. States are encouraged to monitor for
consistency between flight plan indicators and actual surveillance capability. Where discrepancies
are identified, aircraft operators should be contacted and instructed to correct flight plans, or general
advice (as appropriate to the operational environment and type of flight planning problems) should
be issued to aircraft operators. An example of such advice is provided at Appendix 4.
9.10.3 Setting Aircraft Identification (Flight ID) in Cockpits
(a) Flight ID Principles

The aircraft identification (sometimes called the flight identification or FLTID) is the equivalent
of the aircraft callsign and is used in both ADS-B and Mode S SSR technology. Up to seven
characters long, it is usually set in airline aircraft by the flight crew via a cockpit interface. It
enables air traffic controllers to identify and aircraft on a display and to correlate a radar or
ADS-B track with the flight plan date. Aircraft identification is critical, so it must be entered
carefully. Punching in the wrong characters can lead to ATC confusing once aircraft with
another.
It is important that the identification exactly matches the aircraft identification (ACID) entered
in the flight notification.
Intuitive correlation between an aircraft’s identification and radio callsign enhances situational
awareness and communication. Airline aircraft typically use a three letter ICAO airline code
used in flight plans, NOT the two letter IATA codes.
(b) Setting Flight ID

The callsign dictates the applicable option below for setting ADS-B or Mode S Flight ID:
(i) the flight number using the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator if a
flight number callsign is being used (e.g. QFA1 for Qantas 1, THA54 for Thai 54).
(ii) the nationality and registration mark (without hyphen) of the aircraft if the callsign is the
full version of the registration (e.g .VHABC for international operations).
(iii) The registration mark alone of the aircraft if the callsign is the abbreviated version of the

registration (eg ABC for domestic operations).
(iv) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign approved by the ANSP or regulator
(e.g. SPTR13 for firespotter 3).
(v) The designator corresponding to a particular callsign in accordance with the operations
manual of the relevant recreational aircraft administrative organization (e.g. G123 for
Gyroplane 123).
9.11 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE NON-COMPLANT ADS-B AIRCAFT OR MIS-LEADING

ADS-B TRANSMISSIONS
ADS-B technology is increasingly being adopted by States in the Asia/Pacific Region. Asia/Pacific
Region adopted 1090 extended squitter technology. Reliance on ADS-B transmissions can be expected
to increase over the coming years.
Currently a number of aircraft are transmitting ADS-B data which is misleading or non-compliant with
the ICAO standards specified in Annex 10. Examples include:
a) aircraft broadcasting incorrect message formats;
b) aircraft broadcasting inertial positional data and occasionally indicating in the messages that the
data has high integrity when it does not;
c) using GPS sources that do not generate correct integrity data, whilst indicating in the messages
that the data has high integrity;
d) transmitting ADS-B data with changing (and incorrect) flight identity; and
e) transmitting ADS-B data with incorrect flight identity continuously.
If the benefits of ADS-B are to flow to the aviation industry, misleading and non-compliant ADS-B
transmissions need to be curtailed to the extent possible.
The transmission of a value of zero for the NUCp or the NIC or the NACp or the SIL by an aircraft
indicates a navigational uncertainty related to the position of the aircraft or a navigation integrity issue
that is too significant to be used by air traffic controllers.
As such, the following procedure currently stipulated in the Regional Supplementary Procedures Doc
7030 3 , shall be applicable in the concerned FIRs on commencement of ADS-B based surveillance
services notified by AIP or NOTAM:
If an aircraft operates within an FIR where ADS-B-based ATS surveillance service is provided, and
a) carries 1090 extended squitter ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with one of the
following:
1) EASA AMC 20-24; or

2) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia; or
3
SURICG/2 recommended States/Administrations to update their ADS-B Avionics Equipage
Requirements to align with the template in Appendix 3

3) installation in accordance with the FAA AC No. 20-165 – Airworthiness Approval of ADS-B; or
b) the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;
then:
a) except when specifically authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, the aircraft shall not fly unless
the equipment is:
1) deactivated; or
2) transmits only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL
States may elect to implement a scheme to blacklist those non-compliant aircraft or aircraft consistently
transmitting mis-leading ADS-B information, so as to refrain the aircraft from being displayed to ATC.
Please refer Appendix 2 for guidance in implementing the blacklist scheme.
A sample template is given below for reference by States to publish the procedures to handle non-
compliant ADS-B aircraft or misleading ADS-B transmissions in their ADS-B mandate/regulations:
After <insert earliest date that ADS-B may be used for any relevant operational purpose> if an aircraft
carries ADS-B transmitting equipment which does not comply with :
(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in Non-
Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ Extended
Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
(b) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Subpart D —
Surveillance (SUR) (CS-ACNS.D.ADS-B), or
(c) Federal Aviation Administration – Advisory Circular No: 20-165A (or later versions)
Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Systems, or
(d) the equipment configuration standards in Appendix XI of Civil Aviation Order 20.18 of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia.
or the aircraft ADS-B transmitting equipment becomes unserviceable resulting in the aircraft
transmitting misleading information;
the aircraft must not fly unless equipment is:
(a) deactivated; or
(b) set to transmit only a value of zero for the NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL.
Note:
1. It is considered equivalent to deactivation if NUCp or NIC or NACp or SIL is set to continually

transmit only a value of zero.
2. Regulators should take appropriate action to ensure that such regulations are complied with.
3. ATC systems should discard ADS-B data when NUC or NIC or NACp or SIL =0.

9.12 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
ATC surveillance systems should provide for the display of safety-related alerts and warnings, including
conflict alert, minimum safe altitude warning, conflict prediction and unintentionally duplicated SSR
codes and aircraft identifications.
The ADS-B avionics may transmit emergency status messages to any ADS-B ground station within
coverage. The controller receiving these messages should determine the nature of the emergency,
acknowledge receipt if appropriate, and initiate any assistance required. An aircraft equipped with ADS-
B might operate the emergency and/or urgency mode as follows:
a) emergency;
b) no communications;
c) unlawful interference;
d) minimum fuel; and/or
e) medical.
Selection of an emergency transponder code (e.g. 7600) automatically generates an emergency

indication in the ADS-B message. However, some ADS-B transponders may only generate a generic
emergency indication. That means, the specific type of emergency, e.g., communication failure, is not
always conveyed to the controller in an ADS-B environment. The controller may only receive a generic
emergency indication irrespective of the emergency codes being selected by the pilot.
In some early ADS-B avionics configurations, when a generic emergency indication is being transmitted,
a request to “Transmit ADS-B Ident” or “Squawk Ident” may not result in the Ident indication being
displayed in the ATC System. This is because the emergency and ident flags share the same data
elements in the ADS-B downlink message.
Due to limitations of some ADS-B transponders, procedures should be developed for ATC to confirm
the types of emergency with pilots based on operational needs of States.
In contrast to DO260 avionics, for DO-260A avionics, the transmission of an Emergency/Priority status
message in the ADS-B message set will also include the original MODE A code allocated by ATC.
When the aircraft resets the MODE A code to the original allocated code the ground station can retain
the Emergency/Priority status in the Asterix message, for up to 100 seconds, even though the aircraft is
no longer squawking an emergency code. This situation can generate confusion as to the actual status of
the aircraft.
Executive control responsibility
The responsibility for control of the flight rests with the ATSU within whose airspace the aircraft is
operating. However, if the pilot takes action contrary to a clearance that has already been coordinated
with another sector or ATSU and further coordination is not possible in the time available, the
responsibility for this action would rest with the pilot in command, and performed under the pilot’s
emergency authority.
Emergency procedures
The various circumstances surrounding each emergency situation preclude the establishment of exact
detailed procedures to be followed. The procedures outlined in PANS-ATM Chapter 15 provide a
general guide to air traffic services personnel and where necessary, should be adapted for the use of
ADS-B.

9.13 PROCEDURES TO HANDLE GPS TIME AND WEEK COUNTER ROLLOVER
The GPS system is often used in the ATC environment, including:
- to time stamp surveillance data with the “time of applicability” of the data. This allows
positional data to be “extrapolated” to the time of display and allows old data to be discarded.
- to time synchronise ATC systems to the correct time, so that when it uses surveillance data, it
can determine the “age” of the data.
- to time stamp recorded data and maintenance data
Thus accurate time is important to minimise incorrect positional data being presented to ATC and to
ensure that valid data is not discarded – amongst other important technical roles in synchronising
various computer servers in a network.
9.13.1 GPS TIME – COUNTERS AND LEAP SECONDS
The GPS navigation message contains information about the current date and time in the form of a
sequential week counter (representing the number of weeks elapsed since the last time this counter
was reset to zero). This counter is 10 bits long and this resets to zero every 1024 weeks (19.6 years).
GPS week zero started at 00:00:00 UTC on January 6, 1980, and the week number became zero again
on August 21, 1999. A rollover event occurred on 6 April 2019.
ATC systems use UTC. The difference between GPS time and UTC changes whenever a “leap
second” is inserted in UTC. Wikipedia says that “one-second adjustment that is occasionally applied
to civil time Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) to keep it close to the mean solar time at Greenwich,
in spite of the Earth's rotation slowdown and irregularities”. This is done in coordination with the
international community.
The GPS messages sent by the satellites includes the difference between GPS time and UTC, thus
allowing the GPS receivers to calculate UTC.
9.13.2 GPS RECEIVER ISSUES
Each GPS receiver has firmware/software that computes UTC from the GPS time counters and from
the known offset. In the past some GPS receivers have not coped well with these changes. The
triggers occur very infrequently and in some cases they have not been adequately tested.
This can cause incorrect UTC time to be output following some events such as:
- Software deficiencies highlighted by the week number rollover. The rollover occurs each 19.6
years
- Deficiencies at leap second introductions (at intervals greater than 1 year)
- Loss of GPS-UTC time offset (sometimes at power off in devices not using non-volatile
storage). Typically this can result in up to 15 minutes of incorrect time data until the offset is
restored from the satellite messages.
Other problems such as receiver lock up (service failure) can occur when the GPS receiver is exposed
to rare real world events or stimuli.

9.13.3 ATC SYSTEM RISKS AND MITIGATION
ANSPs and regulators need to be aware of the potential issues that may arise from GPS receivers that
inadequately process events and stimuli.
Possible mitigations that could be considered include:
- Testing GPS receivers with a GPS test tool that simulates possible events/ stimuli
- Co-ordination with GPS receiver manufacturers
- Disconnect GPS receivers just before expected events – and check the output before
reconnecting the GPS receiver. (in this case the ANSP would be relying on the ability of the
ATC or surveillance system to operate for a period without the GPS synchronisation).

10. SECURITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ADS-B
10.1 INTRODUCTION
ADS-B technologies are currently “open systems” and the openness is an essential component of
successful use of ADS-B. It was also noted that ADS-B transmission from commercial aircraft is a
“fact of life” today. Many commercial aircraft are already equipped with ADS-B and have been
transmitting data for some time.
It was noted that there has been considerable alarmist publicity regarding ADS-B security. To a large
extent, this publicity has not considered the nature and complexity of ATC. Careful assessment of
security policies in use today for ADS-B and other technologies can provide a more balanced view.
10.2 CONSIDERATIONS
A list of ADS-B vulnerabilities categorised into threats to Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
has been reviewed and documented into the guidance material on security issues associated with
ADS-B provided on the ICAO APAC website “http://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/edocs.aspx” under
“Restricted Site” for reference by States. States could contact ICAO Regional Office to get access to
the guidance material. The following recommendations are made to States :
(a) While ADS-B is recognized as a key enabling technology for aviation with potential safety
benefits, it is recommended that States made aware of possible ADS-B security specific
issues;
(b) It is recommended that States note that much of the discussion of ADS-B issues in the Press
has not considered the complete picture regarding the ATC use of surveillance data;
(c) For current ADS-B technology implementation, security risk assessment studies should be
made in coordination with appropriate national organisations and ANSPs to address
appropriate mitigation applicable in each operational environment, in accordance with ATM
interoperability requirements; and
(d) Future development of ADS-B technology, as planned in the SESAR master plan for
example, should address security issues. Studies should be made to identify potential
encryption and authentication techniques, taking into consideration the operational need of air
to ground and air to air surveillance applications. Distribution of encryption keys to a large
number of ADS-B receivers is likely to be problematic and solutions in the near and medium
term are not considered likely to be deployed worldwide. Internet based encryption strategies
are not deployable when ground stations are pass receivers.
10.3 MEASURES FOR ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF ADS-B
10.3.1 TIME DIFFERENCE OF ARRIVAL (TDOA) BASED POSITION VERIFICATION

METHOD
One of the technologies for enhancing ADS-B security is TDOA-based position verifiation,
which is able to mitigate false targets caused by spoofing. In a case of spoofing, the position of the
emitter (attacker) is likely to differ from the position contained in the ADS-B signal. Such positional
difference can be detected by means of TDOA.
When an emitter (aircraft or spoofing emitter) transmits an ADS-B signal, (at least) two
receivers detect the signal and measure the time of arrival (TOA). The difference of the TOAs

between the two receivers is a TDOA. Next, decoding the ADS-B signal obtains the position
contained in the signal. A calculation using the ADS-B position and the known receiver positions
obtains the expected TDOA.
True position (unknown)
Measured
TDOA
Compare
ADS-B Position
Expected
TDOA
Figure 10.3.1.1 Illustration of the Procedures of TDOA method
The measured and expected TDOAs are compared. The TDOA difference is large in a case of
spoofing and small in a case of a legitimate aircraft, as illustrated in Figure 10.3.1.2 (a) and (b),
respectively. Therefore, a threshold can be used to make a decision; if the TDOA difference is smaller
than the threshold, the position is determined as valid. If the TDOA difference is larger than the
threshold, the position is determined as anomalous (spoofing).
Hyperbola of Emitter Hyperbola of Emitter

Hyperbola Emitter Hyperbola
of ADS-B Position of ADS-B Position
Emitter
ADS-B Position ADS-B Position
Deviation: Anomaly Position Agreement: Valid Position
(a) (b)
Figure 10.3.1.2 Illustration of (a) case of spoofing, and (b) case of legitimate aircraft

10.3.2 APPROPRIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DECODING METHOD OF CPR
CPR (Compact Position Reporting) is the format used to encode a latitude and longitude in the ADS-
B position report using 1090 Extended Squitter (DF = 17, BDS = 0,5 and 0,6). There are two ways of
decoding the encoded CPR:
a) globally unambiguous decoding, which requires two signals called “even” and “odd".
b) locally unambiguous decoding, which requires either even or odd signal plus a reference
position.
Appropriate implementation of a decoding method is important also for security aspect. In the
technical standards, there are techniques available for supporting correct decoding, for example, range
test and reasonableness test for CPR decoding in RTCA DO-260B. Although they are not originally
intended for security purpose, reduction of false position information is expected.
The CPR reasonableness test is a technique to verify the decoded position. The basic mechanism of
the reasonable test for locally unambiguous decoding is detecting a position jump from previous
decoding. The criteria is available in DO-260B. The basic mechanism of the reasonable test for
globally unambiguous decoding is decoding an additional pair of signal and use it for verifying the
previous decoding.
The CPR reasonableness test is included in the ADS-B message decoding logic in DO-260B together
with a range test, which checks whether the output of globally unambiguous decoding is within the
receiver’s operational coverage. The range test and CPR reasonableness test are included also in
EUROCAE ED-129B (Technical Specification for a 1090 MHz Extended Squitter ADS-B Ground
System).
_______________

Edition 15.0 - September 2022 Appendix 1 - 1



















Appendix 2
Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis
of ADS-B Avionics Performance
1 Introduction
1.1 The APANPIRG has endorsed the following Conclusion during its 24th Meeting to
encourage States/Administration to exchange their ADS-B performance monitoring
results and experience gained from the process :
Conclusion 24/45 - Exchange ADS-B Performance Monitoring Result

“That, States be encouraged to exchange findings/result of their ADS-B performance
monitoring including experience gained in conducting the required performance
monitoring.”
1.2 Since the ADS-B mandate for some airspace in the Region became effective in
December 2013, monitoring and analysis on avionics performance of ADS-B
equipped aircraft has become an increasingly important task for concerned States. The
fully functional ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database (APRD) was launched
on the 21 July 2017. The database is placed at ICAO APAC website in the restricted
area with name: APAC ADS-B Avionics Problem Reporting Database accessible via
https://applications.icao.int/ADSB-APRD/login.aspx. States are encouraged to make
full use of the APRD for reporting ADS-B avionics problems and sharing experience
as well as follow-up actions through the APRD web-page.
1.3 This document serves to provide guidance materials on monitoring and analysis of
avionics performance of ADS-B equipped aircraft, which is based on the experience
gained by States.
2 Problem Reporting and Feedback
2.1 For ADS-B avionics problems, it is critical that an appropriate reporting and feedback
mechanism be established. It is highly desirable that those discovering the problems
should report them to the appropriate parties to take action, such as study and analyse
the problems, identify the root causes, and rectify them. Those action parties
include :-
(a) Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) – upon detection of any unacceptable
ADS-B reports from an aircraft, report the observed problem to the performance
monitoring agent(s), if any, and the Aircraft Operators for investigation. In
addition, ANSPs should take all actions to avoid using the ADS-B reports from
the aircraft until the problem is rectified (e.g. black listing the aircraft), if usage of
such reports could compromise safety.
(b) Regulators – to initiate any appropriate regulatory action or enforcement.
Edition 15.0 September 2022 Appendix 2 - 1

(c) Aircraft Operators – to allow avionics specialists to examine the causes and as
customers of the avionics manufacturers ensure that corrective action will take
place.
(d) Avionics Manufacturers and Aircraft Manufacturers – to provide technical
evidence and knowledge about the problem and problem rectification
2.2 Incentives should be received by those parties acting on the problems including :-
(a) Regulations that require deficiencies to be rectified

(b) Regulatory enforcement
(c) Consequences if conduct of operations with problematic equipment (e.g. no
access to the airspace requiring healthy equipment)
2.3 When an ADS-B avionics problem is reported, it should come along with adequate
details about the problem nature to the action parties. In addition, the problem should
be properly categorised, so that appropriate parties could diagnose and rectify them
systematically.
3 Problem Categorisation
3.1 Regarding ADS-B avionics, their problems are quite diversified in the Region but can
be categorized to ensure they will be examined and tackled systematically.
3.2 Based on the experience gained from States, the common ADS-B avionics problems
in the Region are summarized under different categories in Attachment A. It is noted
that only a relatively minor portion of the aircraft population exhibits these problems.
It must be emphasized that aircraft transmitting incorrect positional data with NUC =
0 or NIC = 0 should not be considered a safety problem. The data transmitted have no
integrity and shall not be used by ATC. This situation exists for many aircraft when
their GNSS receivers are not connected to the transponders.
4 Managing the Problem
4.1 There are two major approaches to manage the problems :-
(a) Regulatory approach

Regulations which require non-approved avionics to disable ADS-B transmission
(or transmit “no integrity”), and the concerned operators to file flight plans to
indicate no ADS-B equipage. APANPIRG has endorsed this approach which is
reflected in the Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030).
(b) Blacklist approach

Filtering out (“black listing”) any airframes that do not comply with the
regulations or transmitting bad data, and advising the regulator of the non-

compliance. This approach is temporary which allows the ANSP to protect the
system whilst regulatory action is underway.
While deciding on whether an aircraft transmitting erroneous ADS-B data should

be added into the blacklist, the following factors will be critically assessed:
i. Impact and risk to ATC operational safety

Use of erroneous ADS-B data to maintain separation may potentially contribute
to loss of separation or ATC coordination error.
ii. Frequency of erroneous position
Whether it is occasional or frequently broadcast of erroneous position.
iii. Amount of deviation
This can be a track jumping problem which is of significant safety impact to
ATC or just an occasional small position jump which is not detectable in ATC
with insignificant impact.
iv. Others
Such as the ICAO aircraft address received from ADS-B being inconsistent
with the aircraft registration, Flight ID entered via cockpit interface
mismatched with aircraft callsign in the Flight Plan, etc.
After deciding to put an aircraft into the blacklist list, the following procedures will be
carried out:
i. Informing the concerned aircraft operator/regulatory authority

The concerned aircraft operator/regularity authority will be notified of the
decision and the rationale before putting the aircraft into the exclusion list.
ii. Pre-processing of flight plan concerned

As the blacklist mechanism involves filtering out the ADS-B data of the subject
aircraft, from operational perspective, air traffic controllers need to be aware in
advance that the concerned aircraft plans to operate in their FIR. A flight plan
pre-processing system may locate the flight plan by checking against the 24-bit
address or aircraft registration in the blacklist, and issue an alert to the air
traffic controllers if appropriate, such as automatically insert a remark in the
Item 18 of the concerned flight plan before feeding the flight plan into the ATC
Automation System, and the ATC Automation System may issue an alert to the
air traffic controllers with a specific label annotated in the corresponding
electronic flight strips.
iii. Coordinate with adjacent Area Control Centre (ACC)

Upon posting of pending inbound flights with corresponding electronic flight
strips indicating non-ADS-B equipage or in the blacklist, the air traffic
controllers shall inform the upstream ACC that transfer of that particular flight
will not be accepted at the ADS-B exclusive airspace. It is important to carry
out this coordination action as early as possible as the upstream sector may
have difficulty to adjust the flight route at the transfer stage.
iv. Handling of an aircraft for removal from the blacklist once rectification action
had taken place

Once notification from the aircraft operators/regulatory authorities is received

that the problem has been rectified, performance of the aircraft will be closely
monitored when it flies to the concerned FIR. If the aircraft shows the observed
problem has been resolved, the aircraft will be removed from the blacklist. The
aircraft operator/regulatory authority will also be notified accordingly.
5 Systematic Monitoring and Analysis of the Problem
States using ADS-B should have in place systematic ways to identify and manage
ADS-B deficiencies similar to that described below :-
5.1 Reporting Deficiencies
States using ADS-B should have in place systematic ways to identify ADS-B
deficiencies including :-
(a) Systematic capture of ATC reported events and engineering detected events into
a database; and
(b) Manual or automatic detection of anomalous avionics behavior independent from
controller reports
5.1.1 ATC Reported Deficiencies
ATC procedures should exist that allow services to continue to be provided safety, as
well as to capture relevant information for later analysis. This should include :-
(a) ATC request for the pilot to select the alternate transponder; and
(b) ATC to adequately record the circumstances including Flight ID, ICAO Aircraft
Address (if readily available) accurate time, Flight plan, and pilot provided
information.
5.1.2 Non ATC reported deficiencies
5.1.2.1 Where capability is available, States should also identify non ATC reported
deficiencies.
5.1.2.2 Without overlapping radar coverage: ADS-B data may be examined for the
following :-
(a) NUCp of each ADS-B reported position is smaller than required for service
delivery for more than 5% of total number of ADS-B updates;
(b) NIC, NACp, SIL are smaller than required for service delivery for more than 5%
of total number of ADS-B updates;

(c) ICAO Aircraft Address (i.e. I021/080) is inconsistent with the flight planned
registration (REG) based on each state’s ICAO Aircraft Address allocation
methodology;
(d) Flight ID entered via cockpit interface and downlinked in ADS-B data (i.e.
I021/170 in Asterix CAT 21) is a mismatch1 with aircraft callsign in the ATS
Flight Plan;
(e) Inconsistent vertical rate compared to flight level change; and
(f) Inconsistency of position reports and presence of "jumps.
5.1.2.3 Overlapping radar coverage: For States that have overlapping radar coverage, a
systematic means to monitor and analyze ADS-B could be considered in addition to
relying on ATC to report the problem, or utilising the evaluation criteria in 5.1.2.2
above.
This can be achieved by comparing radar information with ADS-B reported position,
velocity, flight level and vertical rate change data as well as examining the ADS-B
quality indicators and Flight Identification (FLTID) contained in the ADS-B reports.
For each ADS-B flight, its ADS-B data could be compared with its corresponding
radar information. For example, this would allow analysis to determine if the
following pre-defined criteria are met :-
(a) Deviation between ADS-B reported position and independent referenced radar
position is greater than 1NM2, with the indication of good positional quality in
the quality indicators for more than 5% of total number ADS-B updates. A
sample screen shot of a system performing the analysis automatically is given at
Attachment B for reference.
5.2 Managing and Processing Deficiencies
Whether detected by ATC or not, all deficiencies should trigger:
(a) Systematic recording of the details of each occurrence such as date/time of

occurrence, ICAO aircraft address and flight plan information should be obtained.
Graphical representations such as screen capture of radar and ADS-B history
1
A missing Flight ID, or a Flight ID with only “spaces” should not be considered a mismatch.
2
For example, the deviation between ADS-B and radar tracks could be set to 1NM in accordance with
ICAO Circular 326 defining position integrity (0.5NM < HPL < 1NM) for 3NM aircraft separation use,
on assumption that radar targets are close to actual aircraft position. The values of ADS-B quality
indicators (NUCp, NACp, SIL, NIC) could be chosen based on the definition in ICAO Circular 326 on
Position Accuracy and Position Integrity for 3NM aircraft separation minimum. A threshold of 5% is
initially set to exclude aircraft only exhibiting occasional problems during their flight journey. The
above criteria should be made configurable to allow fine-turning in future. Evaluation of ADS-B vs
radar may alternatively expose radar calibration issues requiring further investigation.

tracks, graphs of NUCp/NIC value changes versus time and deviation between
radar and ADS-B tracks along the flight journey would be desirable. Examples of
typical graphical representations are shown below :-
(b) Systematic technical analysis of each detected issue using ADS-B recorded data,
to ensure that all detected issues are examined and addressed. Typically this will
need:
 systems to record ADS-B data, replay ADS-B data and analyze ADS-B data
 staff and procedures to analyze each report
 A database system to manage the status of each event and to store the results
of each analysis
(c) Procedures to support engagement with operators (domestic & foreign),

regulators, other ANSPs, Airframe OEMs and avionics vendors to ensure that
each issue is investigated adequately and maximize the probability that the root
cause of the event is determined. The procedures could include :-

 Data collection procedures;

 Telephone & email contact details; and
 Mechanisms for reporting, as appropriate, to the Asia Pacific ADS-B Avionics
Problem Reporting Database (APRD)
********

Attachment A – List of known ADS-B avionics problems
Ref. Problem Cause Safety Implications to ATC Recommendations

(Yes / No)
1. Track Jumping problem Software issue with TPR901 Yes. Rockwell Collins has successfully
with Rockwell Collins transponder initially only introduced a Service Bulletin that
TPR901 affecting Boeing aircraft. Will present as a few wild/large solves the problem in Boeing aircraft.
(See Figure1) Does not occur in all aircraft positional jumps. Nearly all reports
with this transponder. are tagged as low quality (NUC=0) The problem is known to exist on
and are discarded, however, some Airbus aircraft. Rockwell has advised
Subsequent investigation by occasional non zero reports get that a solution is available in their
Rockwell Collins has found through. DO260B upgrade.
that the particular
transponder, common to all Problem is very “obvious”. Could Rockwell Collins may not have a fix
of the aircraft where the result in incorrect longitudinal for some time. Workaround solutions
position jumps had been position of Flight Data Record are being examined by Airbus,
observed, had an issue when track. Can trigger RAM alerts. Operators and Airservices Australia.
crossing ±180 degrees
longitude. The only workaround identified at
this time is to power down the
On some crossings (10% transponders before flight to states
probability), errors are using ADS-B – after crossing
introduced into the position longitude 180. It can be noted that in
longitude before encoding. Airbus aircraft it is not possible to
These errors are not self- safely power down the transponder in
correcting and can only be flight.
removed by a power reset of
the transponder. The Airbus have prepared a procedure to
problem, once triggered can support power down before flight.
last days, since many Airservices Australia have negotiated
transponders are not with 2 airlines to enact this procedure
routinely powered down. prior to flights to Australia.
An additional partial workaround is :


(Yes / No)
to ensure that procedures exist for

ATC to ask the pilot to changeover
transponders if the problem is
observed. Since there is a 10%
chance of the problem occurring on
each crossing of ±180 degrees
longitude, the chance that both
transponders being affected is 1%.
There is no complete workaround

available for flights that operate
across 180 degrees longitude directly
to destination without replacing the
transponder. Airbus advised that a
new TPR901 transponder compliant
with DO260B is available from
December 2015. This new
transponder does not have such
problem.
2. Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old software typically before Yes. Problem well known. Particularly
Old version. version -108. The design was affects Gulfstream aircraft which
completed before the ADS-BWill present as a few wild unfortunately leave the factory with
The pattern of erroneous standards were establishedpositional jumps. Nearly all reports ADS-B enabled from this
positional data is very are tagged as low quality (NUC=0) transponder model.
and the message definitions
distinctive of the are different to the current
and are discarded, however, some
problem. DO260. occasional non zero reports get Rockwell has issued a service
(See Figure 2) through. Also causes incorrect bulletin recommending that ADS-B
Rockwell has recommended altitude reports. be disabled for aircraft with this
that ADS-B be disabled on transponder software. See Service
these models. Problem is very “obvious”. Information Letter 1-05 July 19,
2005. It is easy to disable the
transmission.


(Yes / No)
If a new case is discovered, an entry

needs to be made to the black list
until rectification has been effected.
3. Litton GPS with proper Litton GNSSU (GPS) Mark No. This GPS is installed in some older,
RAIM processing 1 design problem. (Does not typically Airbus, fleets.
apply to Litton Mark II). Perceived GPS integrity changes
GPS does not output correct seemingly randomly. With the GPS Data appears “Correct” but integrity
messages to transponder. satellite constellation working value can vary. Performance under
properly, the position data is good. “bad” satellite conditions is a
However the reported integrity is problem.
inconsistent and hence the data is
sometimes/often discarded by the Correction involves replacing the
ATC system. The effected is GNSSU (GPS) which is expensive.
perceived extremely poor
“coverage”. The data is not If a new case is discovered, an entry
properly “protected” against needs to be made to the black list
erroneous satellite ranging signals – until rectification has been effected.
although this cannot be “seen” by
ATC unless there is a rare satellite
problem.
4. SIL programming error Installers of ADS-B avionics No. Would NOT be included in a “black
for DO260A avionics using the newer DO260A list”.
standard mis program “SIL”. First report of detection appears
good (and is good), all subsequent Aircraft with “Dynon avionics”
a) This problem appears for reports not displayed because the exhibit this behavior. They do not
DO260A transponders, with data quality is perceived as “bad” have a certified GPS and hence
SIL incorrectly set to 0 or 1 by the ATC system. Operational always set SIL = 0. This is actually
(instead of 2 or 3) effect is effectively no ADS-B data. correct but hence they do not get
Hence no risk. treated as ADS-B equipped.
b) As the aircraft enters


(Yes / No)
coverage, the ADS-B ground

station correctly assumes
DO260 until it receives the
version number.
c) The transmitted NIC

(DO260A) is interpreted as a
good NUC (DO260) value,
because no SIL message has
yet been received. The data
is presented to ATC.
5. Garmin “N” Flight ID Installers of Garmin Yes. Can be corrected by installer

problem transponder incorrectly set manipulation of front panel. Does not
(See Figure 3) “Callsign”/Flight ID. This is Flight ID appears as “N”. Inhibits warrant “black list” activity.
caused by poor human proper coupling.
factors and design that
assumes that GA aircraft are
US registered.
6. Flight ID corruption issue TPR901 software problem Yes. Affects mainly B747 aircraft. Boeing
1 – trailing “U” interfacing with Flight ID SB is available for Rockwell
Flight ID’s received : source. Results in constantly Flight ID changes during flight transponders and B744 aircraft.
GT615, T615U ,NEB033, changing Flight ID with inhibits proper coupling or causes
NEB033U, QF7550, some reports having an extra decoupling. Rockwell Collins have SB 503 which
QF7550U, QF7583, “U” character. upgrades faulty -003 transponder to -
QF7583U, QF7585, 005 standard.
QF7585, QF7585U,
QF7594, QFA7521, If a new case is discovered, an entry
QFA7531, QFA7531, needs to be made to the black list
QFA7531U, QFA7532, until rectification has been effected.
QFA7532U, QFA7532W,
QFA7550, QFA7552,


(Yes / No)
QFA7581
7. Flight ID corruption issue ACSS software problem Yes. Software upgrade available.
2 results in constantly
changing Flight ID. Flight ID changes during flight If a new case is discovered, an entry
inhibits proper coupling or causes needs to be made to the black list
Applies to ACSS XS950 decoupling. until rectification has been effected.
transponder Pn 7517800-
110006 and Honeywell FMC
(pn 4052508 952). ACSS fix
was available in Sept 2007.
8. No Flight ID transmitted Various causes No. Aircraft could “fail to couple with
Flight Data Record”. Not strictly
Flight ID not available. Inhibits misleading – but could cause
proper coupling. controller distraction.
9. ACSS Transponder Yes. Not approved and hence not

10005/6 without Mod A compliant with CASA regulations.
reports NUC based on Appears good in all respects until
HFOM. there is a satellite constellation If known could be added to black list.
problem (not normally detectable Configuration is not permitted by
by ground systems). regulation.
10. Occasional small position For some older Airbus No. ATC ground system processing can
jump backwards aircraft, an occasional report eliminate these.
(See Figure 4) may exhibit a small “jump Not detectable in ATC due to
back” of less than 0.1 nm extrapolation, use of latest data and
screen ranges used.
Root cause not known
11. Older ACSS transponders Design error reports integrity No. Can be treated in the same manner as
report integrity too one value worse than reality a loss of transponder capability.
conservatively In poor GPS geometry cases the


(Yes / No)
ATC system could discard the data

when the data is in fact useable.
Will be perceived as loss of ADS-B
data.
12. Intermittent wiring GPS ADS-B transmissions switch Yes. If a new case is discovered, an entry
transponder intermittently between INS needs to be made to the black list
position and GPS position. Normally the integrity data goes to until rectification has been effected.
zero when INS is broadcast, but
sometimes during transition
between INS and GPS, an INS
position or two can be broadcast
with “good” NUC value.
Disturbing small positional jump.
13. Wrong ICAO Aircraft Installation error No. This is not a direct ADS-B problem,
Address but relates to a Mode S transponder
No direct ATC impact unless a rare issue that can put TCAS at risk.
duplicate is detected.
Cannot be fixed by black list entry.
Needs to be passed to regulator for
resolution.
14. Toggling between high Faulty GPS receiver/ADS-B No. While it is normal for NUC value to
and low NUC transponder switch between a high and low figure
(See Figure 5) ATC will see tracks appear and based on the geometry of GPS
disappear discretely. No safety satellites available, it is of the view
implications to ATC. that more should be done to examine
this phenomenon. It is observed that
such switching between high and low
NUC occurs on certain airframe and


(Yes / No)
not on others. The issue was raised to

the airlines so as to get a better
understanding. On one occasion, the
airline replied that a module on their
GPS receiver was faulty. On another
occasion, the airline replied that one
of the ADS-B transponder was
faulty. Good NUC was transmitted
when the working transponder was in
use and poor NUC was transmitted
when the faulty ADS-B transponder
was in use.
15. Consistent Low NUC GNSS receivers are not No. Not considered a safety problem but
(See Figure 6) connected to the ADS-B a common phenomenon in the
transponders. Data shall be filtered out by the Region – the concerned aircraft will
system and not detectable in ATC be treated equivalent to “aircraft not
equipped with ADS-B”.
While it is normal for aircraft to

transmit low NUC, it is of the view
that “consistent low NUC’ could be
due to the avionics problem (e.g.
GNSS receiver is not connected to
the ADS-B transponder).
It is recognised that operators may

not be aware that their aircraft are
transmitting unexpected low NUC
/ NIC values, due to equipment
malfunction. Hence, it is desirable
for States to inform the operators


(Yes / No)
when unexpected low NUC

values are transmitted, where
practicable.
Concerned airline operators are

required to take early remedial
actions. Otherwise, their aircraft will
be treated as if non-ADS-B equipped
which will be requested to fly outside
the ADS-B airspace after the ADS-B
mandate becomes effective.
16. ADS-B position report Faulty ADS-B avionics Yes. The problem should be immediately
with good integrity (i.e. reported to the concerned
NUC >= “4”) but ADS-B As the ground system could not CAA/operators for problem diagnosis
position data are actually "automatically" discard ADS-B including digging out the root causes,
bad as compared with data with good integrity (i.e. NUC avionics/GPS types etc., and ensure
radar (met criteria 5.2(a)) value >=4), there could be safety problem rectification before the
implications to ATC. ADS-B data could be used by ATC.
Consider to “blacklist” the aircraft

before the problem is rectified.
17. FLTID transmitted by Human errors Yes. Issue regulations/letters to concerned

ADS-B aircraft does not operators urging them to set FLTID
match with callsign in Could lead to screen clutter - two exactly match with callsign in flight
flight plan target labels with different IDs (one plan.
(see Figures 7a – 7d) for radar and another for ADS-B)
being displayed, causing potential
confusion and safety implications
to ATC.


(Yes / No)
18 B787 position error with Issue 1: Yes. Boeing performed a change to the
good NIC Software issue - surveillance B787 Type Certificate for
system inappropriately Misleading position presentation incorporation of the upgraded ISS
“coasts” the position when which is typically detected by ATC software in March of 2017. All B787
data received by the observing aircraft “off track” when aircraft delivered after Line number
transponder is split across in fact it is “on-track”. 541 have the upgraded ISS software
multiple messages. which corrects this issue.
System seems to self correct Boeing released Service Bulletin

after some time. Can be B787-81205-SB340036-00 on 30
corrected by surveillance June 2017. Note that this Service
system power off. Bulletin is available at no cost to the
operator, and includes the concurrent
Issue 2: requirement to implement Boeing
Data packets were not being Service Bulletin B787-81205-
distributed to the transponder SB340005-00.
when the internal timing
between different elements of On 5 Nov 2018, FAA issued
the Integrated Surveillance Airworthiness Directive 2017-NM-
System became 118-AD, effective 10 Dec 2018,
synchronized. which requires application of Boeing
SB B787-81205-SB340036-00 by 10
Dec 2019. EASA has invoked this
AD for States under its jurisdiction.
States and Operators are urged to
implement the service bulletin
immediately and report to FAA or
ICAO APAC Office.
As of 9 Sep 2020, 32 B787 aircraft

were on the NSAL; 18 of these
aircraft have been detected within


(Yes / No)
U.S. ADS-B coverage during 2020.

The FAA is coordinating with State
Regulators who have operators with
B787 aircraft on the NSAL.
19 A number of airlines have Being actively investigated. No. Aircraft must be managed
reported or experienced One airline has implemented procedurally if outside radar
ADS-B outages for on-board recording which Equivalent to a failed transponder. coverage.
complete flight sectors in confirms that the MMRs are
A330 aircraft. Appears as not providing HIL/HPL to
low reliability ADS-B and the transponder whilst
has afflicted both A & B continuing to provide
side at same time. HFOM, GPS alt etc
20 A380 flight ID lost after For the A380 fleet, it has No. The correction to this logic is
landing been confirmed that for some planned for next AESS standard
seconds after landing, the release; planned for 2017.” Only a
flight ID is set as invalid by problem for arriving aircraft on
FMS to AESS. surface surveillance systems.
Consequently, the current
AESS design uses, as per
design, the Aircraft
Registration Number as a
back-up source for A/C flight
identification field in ADS-B
broadcast messages.
21 A350 ADS-B On-ground On departure, A350 aircraft Yes. where ADS-B is used for Airbus is in discussion with FAA and
Performance will initially use INS derived surface movement display EUROCONTROL about this issue.
position for ADS-B reports
when taxying and only use
GNSS when entering the
runway. INS positions can
drift leading to inaccurate


(Yes / No)
position reports.
22 Incorrect Ground Bit Occasionally, some airborne Yes. Misleading information States/Administrations contact the
Setting (GBS) in both aircraft will incorrectly set shown on ATC system. Aircraft concerned airline operators for
Mode S Interrogation ground bit as “1” meaning not visible to TCAS and will not remedial actions.
Reply and ADS-B they are on ground, while reply to all-call interrogations.
Downlink some landed aircraft
incorrectly set ground bit as
“0” meaning they are
airborne. This could confuse
the ATC system, by not
showing the airborne targets
as the system thought they
are on ground, or forming
tracks for landed targets
triggering alarms against
other taking-off aircraft.
23 Rockwell TSS-4100 track The TSS-4100 shares Yes. Misleading position FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD)
extrapolation issue. software with the Rockwell presentation which is typically 2017-22-14 was issued on 20 Dec
Collins ISS transponder in shown on ATC system. 2017.
the B787, and the software The compliance date for this AD is
defect in the B787 ISS 20 Dec 2018 (or 750 hours in service,
reported at SURICG/2 also whichever occurs first).
exists in the TSS-4100.
FAA has not detected any aircraft
with this issue since the AD
compliance date and will not further
report on it, as it is considered
resolved.


(Yes / No)
24 Embraer 170 track Unknown as being a random, Yes. Misleading position In all of the cases of this issue to
jumping issue occasional issue with no presentation which is typically date, removing and replacing the
clear fault diagnosis available shown on ATC system. transponders cleared whatever the
from Honeywell. FAA has issue was. This issue has never
decided that when the next recurred on the same aircraft. Bench
E170 aircraft is detected with testing by Honeywell avionics
this issue, it will be engineering of the removed
immediately placed on the transponders has revealed no faults
FAA’s No Services Aircraft or anomalies. As such,
List (NSAL). States/Administrations to consider
Simultaneously, FAA will removing and replacing the
notify Embraer and transponders concerned if issue
Honeywell of the affected observed.
aircraft and request that
appropriate engineering The FAA has since learned from
personnel be sent to inspect discussions with the OEM that most
and test the affected aircraft. recent events detected by FAA
generated an “ADS-B NOT AVAIL”
Crew Alerting System (CAS)
message. When flight crews report
this message, airline maintenance
replaces the transponder(s), which
resolves the problem. To date, this
has consistently occurred before
FAA monitoring detected the
problem and engaged with the
airline. The root cause for this issue
remains unknown.
25 Airbus Single Aisle FAA has observed 17 Airbus No. Airbus released three Service
production wiring issue Single Aisle aircraft from Bulletins to correct this issue, which
two airlines with missing existed in 128 Airbus Single Aisle
Length-Width Codes (LWC aircraft.


(Yes / No)
is a message element in DO- As of 1-Dec-2018, all of the aircraft

260B/ED-102A that is which operate at US airports with
required by both the US and ADS-B surface surveillance were
European mandates). FAA corrected. The FAA will not further
believes that this was a report on this issue.
production line wiring issue.
26 Boeing 777-300ER FAA has observed at least 10 No. On 7 July 2017, Boeing released
production wiring issue Boeing B777-300ER aircraft Service Bulletin SB 777-34-0281 to
with missing or improper correct this issue. Boeing has
NACv/SDA/eCat/LWC informed FAA that all affected B777
message elements (these are operators have been notified. The
message elements in DO- FAA will not further report on this
260B/ED-102A that are issue.
required by both the US and
European mandates (eCat is
FAA shorthand for Emitter
Category). After notification,
Boeing reported to FAA that
this was a production line
parity pin wiring issue.
27 Rockwell TSS-4100 This issue exists in any TSS- Yes. At present, the FAA regulator has
Geometric Altitude 4100 installed with TSSA- determined that this issue occurs too
Reporting as Pressure 4100 software RCPN 810- rarely to warrant issuing an
Altitude 0052-100, RCPN 810-0052- Airworthiness Directive or a Special
101, or RCPN 810-0052-102. Airworthiness Information Bulletin
All of the following must be (SAIB).
true for the issue to occur:
Rockwell Collins has released
(1) TSS is the selected updated software, RCPN 810-0052-
transponder; 110, to address this issue. Refer to
(2) TSS is receiving valid SIL TSSA-4100-10-1 titled, "TSSA-


(Yes / No)
pressure altitude; 4100 Field Loadable Software",

(3) TSS is receiving valid RCPN 523-0818785.
GPS data with an
integrity of NIC 9 or
better; and
(4) The mode of operation
for the transponder must
be "ALT OFF".
Note that in an SBAS service

area, only condition (4)
would be considered
uncommon.
When the issue exists, the

TSS will insert geometric
altitude information into the
ADS-B Airborne Position
Squitter, but this altitude will
be encoded as if it were
pressure altitude. The net
effect is that, when this issue
occurs, the TSS-4100 reports
geometric altitude
information as if it were
pressure altitude. In many
cases, this will be incorrect
altitude information.
28 NACv reporting greater The FAA has detected a No. While there is no known urgent issue
than 2 number of aircraft which with these findings, as no known


(Yes / No)
consistently report NACv = 3 ATC or airborne application requires

and NACv = 4. NACv values exceeding two, FAA
does have long-term intentions of
Per FAA AC 20-165B deploying surveillance tracking and
section 3.3.3.7.3, “A NACv alerting prediction algorithms in
= 3 or NACv = 4 should not ATC automation which will use real-
be set based on GNSS time NACv values. ICAO States
velocity accuracy unless you planning to make similar
can demonstrate to the FAA improvements should be aware of
that the velocity accuracy this situation.
actually meets the
requirement.” EASA CS-
ACNS states that “There is
currently no established
guidance on establishing a
NACv performance of ‘three’
or better.” Therefore, it
appears that there are
improperly configured ADS-
B installations operating in
the U.S.
29 B787 NACv = 0 Issue FAA noted certain B787s No. The erroneous NACv=0 condition
exhibiting a relatively high clears at the next power up of the
percentage of NACv =0 ISSPU.
reports.
Boeing has issued guidance urging
Starting with line number B787 operators to not intermix INR
442 (June 2016), Honeywell P/N 940-2001-002 or -004 (which do
Integrated Navigation not output HFOMv) with INR P/N
Receiver (INR) P/N 940- 940-2001-008 (which does output
2001-008 was introduced, HFOMv) until the ISSPU software


(Yes / No)
which has an HFOMv has been updated per an available

output. Boeing investigations Boeing Service Bulletin. This
revealed a software flaw in guidance was provided in Boeing
the ISSPU that causes an Fleet Team Digest 787-FTD-34-
erroneous NACv=0 reporting 19005 (dated 21 Dec 2019).
condition on B787s equipped
with a mixed set of As of 9-Aug-2020, FAA has
Honeywell INR part observed no significant occurrences
numbers. This condition of this issue within U.S. ADS-B
occurs when the ISSPU coverage during the prior two
switches between an INR months.
with an HFOMv output and
an INR without an HFOMv
output.
30 Honeywell Primus II RCZ FAA observed that a number No In October 2015, Honeywell released
issue of operators equipped with a Service Information Letter
the Honeywell Primus II (Publication Number
integrated system were filing D201507000061) to notify customers
flight plans as ADS-B of these power up conditions, the
equipped, but not effect it would have on the Primus II
transmitting ADS-B. equipment, and a potential work
around to address the problem.
Honeywell had identified an
issue where the ADS-B Out In December 2019, Honeywell
capable RCZ transponder released Service Bulletin (SB)
and Radio Management Unit (Publication Number A21-2254-148)
(RMU) components of the providing required modifications for
Primus II system will not the RMU to correct the ON/OFF
broadcast ADS-B data if logic for the ADS-B Out
powered on under specific functionality.
conditions. Also, the Radio
Management Unit (RMU) The FAA has been working in


(Yes / No)
will fail to notify the flight collaboration with Honeywell to

crew that ADS-B Out update the existing Service
functionality is disabled. Information Letter to emphasize the
importance of updating the RMU
with the latest SB, to include
implementing the option of
configuring the ADS-B Out
installation through a strap setting to
provide indication of the ON/OFF
control of ADS-B to the flight crew.
The latest revision of the Service
Information Letter will be referenced
as part of the FAA issued Special
Airworthiness Information Bulletin
(SAIB) expected to be released
before the end of December 2021.

Figure 1 - Track Jumping problem with TPR901 Figure 3 - Garmin “N” Flight ID problem
Figure 2 - Rockwell Collins TDR94 Old version. The pattern of Figure 4 - Occasional small position jump backwards

erroneous positional data is very distinctive of the problem
NUC always 0
Figure 5 - NUC value toggling Figure 6 – Consistent low NUC

ADS-B
ADS-B
Radar
NUC always 0 Radar
Figure 7a - Additional zero inserted Figure 7b - ICAO Airline Designator Code dropped
ADS-B
ADS-B
Radar
Radar
Figure 7c - Wrong numerical codes entered Figure 7d - IATA Airline Designator Code used

Attachment B - Sample screen shot of a system to monitor and analyse performance of ADS-B avionics

Appendix 3
A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics
(1) On and after dd/mm/yyyy, if an aircraft carries 1090MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B
transmitting equipment for operational use in xxxxxxxx territory, the equipment must have been
certificated as meeting :1
(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ
Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
Systems, or
(2) On and after dd/mm/yyyy, if an aircraft operates on airways (insert routes)…………at or above
FLXXX………(or in defined airspace boundaries ……………. at or above FLXXX):2
The aircraft must carry serviceable 1090MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B transmitting
equipment that has been certificated as meeting :-
(a) European Aviation Safety Agency - Certification Considerations for the Enhanced ATS in
Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance (ADS-B-NRA) Application via 1090 MHZ
Extended Squitter (AMC 20-24), or
Systems, or
(3) An aircraft carrying 1 090 MHz extended squitter (1090ES) ADS-B equipment shall disable
ADS-B transmission unless:
(a) the aircraft emits position information of an accuracy and integrity consistent with the
transmitted value of the position quality indicator; or
(b) the aircraft always transmits a value of 0 (zero) for one or more of the position quality
indicators (NUCp, NIC, NACp or SIL); or
1
This paragraph ensures all aircraft operating in the airspace, if equipped with ADS‐B, are compliant
to standards.
2
This paragraph provides mandate requirements within certain parts of the airspace

(c) the operator has received an exemption granted by the appropriate ATS authority.
Note: States are urged to include at least the standards stated in the template. States may include other
standards allowed by the State’s regulations.

Appendix 4
An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency Between ADS-B

Flight Planning and Surveillance Capability
1 Background
Newer technologies for aircraft surveillance are now available – such as Mode S and
ADS-B – which in many aircraft are installed as replacements for older Mode A/C
transponders.
Air Traffic Control makes use of these new capabilities, and uses the Flight Plan
information as a decision support tool – to allow the Air Traffic Controller to predict
the surveillance capability of a particular aircraft before it enters radar or ADS-B
coverage.
Requirements for ADS-B and Mode S (insert local reference document if

applicable) may mean that if flight planning does not accurately reflect the aircraft
capability, services may be withheld (for example if ADS-B is mandatory, but not
indicated on the flight plan – this section to be modified for local requirements).
2 Flight Planning Requirements for Transponder and ADS-B
The flight planning requirements for aircraft are described in (local document
reference or ICAO DOC 4444 Appendix 2) and repeated below.
Surveillance Equipment
N if no surveillance equipment for the route to be flown is carried, or the equipment is
unserviceable
OR
INSERT one or more of the following descriptors, to a maximum of 20 characters, to
describe the serviceable surveillance equipment and/or capabilities on board:
SSR Modes A and C

A Transponder — Mode A (4 digits — 4 096 codes)
C Transponder — Mode A (4 digits — 4 096 codes) and Mode C
SSR Mode S
E Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and
extended squitter (ADS-B) capability
H Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude and
enhanced surveillance capability

I Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, but no pressure-altitude

capability
L Transponder — Mode S, including aircraft identification, pressure-altitude,
extended squitter (ADS-B) and enhanced surveillance capability
P Transponder — Mode S, including pressure-altitude, but no aircraft identification
capability
S Transponder — Mode S, including both pressure altitude and aircraft identification
capability
X Transponder — Mode S with neither aircraft identification nor pressure-altitude
capability
Note : Enhanced surveillance capability is the ability of the aircraft to down-link
aircraft derived data via a Mode S transponder.
ADS-B
B1 ADS-B with dedicated 1 090 MHz ADS-B “out” capability1
B2 ADS-B with dedicated 1 090 MHz ADS-B “out” and “in” capability1
U1 ADS-B “out” capability using UAT
U2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using UAT
V1 ADS-B “out” capability using VDL Mode 4
V2 ADS-B “out” and “in” capability using VDL Mode 4
3 Additional information
The capability of your aircraft transponder, and ADS-B capability, will typically be
available in the transponder manual, or in the aircraft flight manual for the aircraft.
For General Aviation aircraft, the most common configurations for filing in the flight
plan item10b will be (listed in order of capability).
EB1 – An ADS-B equipped aircraft would typically file this to indicate the Mode S
transponder capability with ADS-B out.
S – The majority of Mode S transponders (without ADS-B) will support pressure

altitude information and Flight ID transmission.
C – For aircraft with an older Mode A/C transponder – most of which provide
pressure altitude capability.
Less common configurations in General Aviation will include:
1
Based on current version of ICAO Doc 4444

H, LB1 or LB2 – Enhanced surveillance capability is more usually associated with

higher end aircraft. ADS-B IN (B2) is relatively rare at this time, but may be
available for some aircraft.
I, P or X – Most Mode S transponders will support Flight ID and pressure altitude, so

these configurations are not common.
A – some low end GA aircraft may not provide pressure altitude information.
U1 or U2 – these ADS-B technologies are only authorized in a limited number of

countries in the Asia Pacific Region.
Planning designations not to be used in Asia Pacific:
V1 or V2 – these ADS-B technologies are not authorised for use in Asia Pacific
Region.
Remember:
Always flight plan the correct surveillance capability for your aircraft. If in doubt,
consult the transponder manual, aircraft flight manual, or your Licenced Aircraft
Maintenance Engineer.

Appendix 5
Checklist of Common Items or Parameters for the Monitoring of ADS-B System
1 ADS-B Ground Station
Site Monitoring
 Receiver Sensitivity
 Antenna Cable
 GPS Health
 Coverage Check
 Probability of Detection
 Station Service Availability
 Receiver Status
Remote Control & Monitoring (RCMS)

 CPU Process Operation
 Temperature
 ASTERIX Output Load and Link Status
 Time Synchronization
 GPS Status
 Power Status
 Site Monitor Status
 Memory Usage
 Software Version (Operating System and RCMS Application)
Logistic Support Monitoring

 Record all failures, service outage and repair/return to service times
2 ADS-B Equipage Monitoring
 Update and maintain list of ADS-B equipped airframe details database

 Identify aircraft non-compliant to regional mandate
3 ADS-B Avionics Monitoring
 Track Consistency
 Valid Flight ID
 Presence of NACp/NIC/NUC Values
 Presence of Geometric Altitude
 Correctness of ICAO Aircraft Address

 Avionics Configuration and Connections

 Update and maintain list of aircraft with faulty avionics
4 ADS-B Performance Monitoring
 Percentage of aircraft with good integrity reports

 Accuracy of ADS-B Horizontal Position (Based on a reference sensor)
 Deviation between Geometric and Barometric Height
 Monitor the number of position jumps
 Message interval rate
5 ADS-B Display on ATC Display
 Split Track – ADS-B reported position might be off

 Coupling Failure – Wrong aircraft ID
 Duplicated ICAO Aircraft Address
 Display of data block

Appendix 6
BASELINE ADS-B SERVICE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
The following table provides guidelines for various performance requirements of ADS-B Category (Tier) 1, 2 or 3 services that States may consider when acquisition of an ADS-B managed service
agreement with a service provider:
Service Parameter Guidance Category 1 (Tier 1) Category 2 (Tier 2) Category 3 (Tier 3)

5Nm separation capable commensurate with Situational awareness similar to ADS-C Position Reporting with Enhanced Flight
Radars (safety-net alerts, SAR, supports Operation
(separation/vectoring/high performance procedural separation without voice, not
with reliability, integrity & latency) 5nm separation)
Aircraft Recommended 0.5 second < Interval < 5 0.5 second < Interval < 20 0.5 second < Interval < 60
Updates seconds as Operationally seconds as Operationally seconds as Operationally
required required required
Maximum 0.5 second < Interval < 10
seconds as Operationally
required
Network Recommended 95%: < 2 seconds of 95%: < 15 seconds of 95%: < 60 seconds of
Latency receiver-station output receiver-station output receiver-station output
Reliability 1 Recommended 2 autonomous receiver-stations including 1 unduplicated receiver-station including 1 unduplicated receiver-station including
antenna, each providing data, no common point antenna antenna
of failure
Reliability 2 - Recommended Each receiver-station Each receiver-station Each receiver-station
MTBF including antenna to have including antenna to have including antenna to
MTBF >10,000 hrs MTBF >10,000 hrs have MTBF >10,000 hrs
Reliability – Recommended Completely duplicated, no common point of Unduplicated, MTBF > 400 hrs Unduplicated, MTBF> 200 hrs
Communications failure
Infrastructure
Reliability – Recommended Total Service MTBF >50,000 hrs Total Service MTBF > 400hrs Total Service MTBF> 200 hrs
Total ADS-B
Service
Availability – Recommended Total Service Availability > .999 Total Service Availability >.95 Total Service Availability >.90
Total ADS-B
Service

Service Parameter Guidance Category 1 (Tier 1) Category 2 (Tier 2) Category 3 (Tier 3)

5Nm separation capable commensurate with Situational awareness similar to ADS-C Position Reporting with Enhanced Flight
Radars (safety-net alerts, SAR, supports Operation
(separation/vectoring/high performance procedural separation without voice, not
with reliability, integrity & latency) 5nm separation)
Integrity – Recommended Site monitor Site monitor System Monitoring
Ground Station System Monitoring System Monitoring
Minimum System Monitoring Not required Not required
Integrity – Data Recommended All systems up to ATM system, All systems up to ATM system, errors < 1 x All systems up to ATM system,
Communications & errors < 1 x 10E-6 10E-6 errors < 1 x 10E-6
Processing
The choice of category (tier) could be based upon a number of factors including the following,
a) The desired service

b) The available budget
c) The available ATC automation system & its capabilities and/or interim display systems
d) ATC training and ratings
e) Availability of appropriately tailored ATC procedures
States could initially choose one level and transition to another at a later time. For example, Category (Tier) 2 could be used to add additional safety nets/situational awareness and gain operational
experience during the initial stage, moving later to a full separation service using Category (Tier) 1.
Note: The Performance Based Surveillance Sub Group of the ICAO Surveillance Panel is reviewing performance standards for surveillance systems generally. A future update to the requirements
in the above table may be based on the outcomes of that panel.

Appendix 7
GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON
GENERATION, PROCESSING & SHARING of ASTERIX
CATEGORY 21 ADS-B MESSAGES
(Including Attachments A, B, C & D)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The “All Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance Information Exchange”

(ASTERIX) Category 21 is a data format standard globally accepted by the Air Traffic Management
(ATM) system manufacturing industry for sharing of ADS-B data with ATM automation system.8
Asterix Category 21 data is used to convey ADS-B data from ADS-B receiver stations to ATC
processing and display system. This guidance material discusses various aspects of this process. Since
the ASTERIX Category 21 edition 0.23 was issued in November 2003, it has undergone continuous
revisions with some 19 subsequent editions. The focus of this guidance material is to concentrate on
1090ES ADS-B data using:
a) RTCA DO-260 (Version 0);

b) RTCA DO-260A (Version 1); and
c) RTCA DO-260B (Version 2)
1.2 The ASTERIX Category 21 edition 1.0 issued in August 2008 fully incorporated the
DO260A standard while edition 2.1 issued in May 2011 fully incorporated the latest DO260B
standard. The latest edition (as at April 2018) is edition 2.4.
2. ASTERIX CAT 21 IN ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONS
2.1 To ensure interoperability of ADS-B receiver stations in the Asia Pacific (ASIA/PAC)
Regions, during the 16th APANPIRG Meeting held in August 2005, the ASTERIX Category 21 edition
0.23 which had incorporated DO260 standard was adopted as the baselined ADS-B data format for
deployment of ADS-B receiver stations and sharing of ADS-B data in the ASIA/PAC Regions. At that
time DO260A and DO260B standards were not defined.
3. CHOICE OF ASTERIX VERSION NUMBER
3.1 The Asterix standard has been developed over many years. Stability in the standard is
desirable so that ADS-B receiver station designers and ATM automation designers and manufacturers
can build interoperable systems with confidence. Because ADS-B technology has been evolving over
the years, and will continue to do so, it is not surprising that the Asterix standard has also developed
along with the ADS-B link technology standards to grasp the best benefits of its intended design.
3.2 During 2005, Asia Pacific decided to use Ed0.23 as the edition for sharing ADS-B data
between states. This version provides adequate information so that useful ATC operational services can
be provided including ATC 3 nautical mile and 5 nautical mile separation services. Ed0.23 can be used
with DO260, DO260A and DO260B ADS-B avionics/receiver stations to provide basic ATC operational

services. However, Ed0.23 cannot fully support all the capabilities offered by DO260A and DO260B.
3.3 Nearly all Ed0.23 data items can be “re-constructed” from a received Ed2.1 data
stream. However, most of the special DO260A/B data items cannot be “re-constructed” from an
Ed0.23 data stream. In terms of domestic use and data sharing with other ANSPs concerning ADS-B
data, several options exist for ANSPs as follows:
Option Domestic use Data sharing
1 Ed0.23 Ed0.23. This is the default and basic standard.
2 Ed2.1 Ed0.23. This will require some conversions to occur, probably

through an ADS-B format conversion and filter system (see
Paragraph 11), between a domestic system and a foreign system.
Difficulties may exist if the domestic ATM system requires
special DO260A/B data items, since they cannot all be re-
constructed from the external foreign Ed0.23 data stream.
3 Ed2.1 Ed2.1. Must negotiate bilaterally with data sharing partner regarding
exact version to be used to achieve the intended functions.
Note: In this table, Ed2.1, a later DO260B compliant Asterix Cat 21 edition, is chosen as a representation of an
Asterix Cat 21 edition after Ed0.23. There exists other Asterix CAT 21 editions (e.g. 0.26, 1.3, 2.4 etc.) after
Ed0.23 that could be used by ANSPs for domestic and data sharing use.
4. SPECIFICATION OF ASTERIX MESSAGE PROCESSING
4.1 Care is needed to understand the difference in specifications :
4.2 Asterix Cat 21: Defines the characteristics of the data ON the interface including
fields that are mandatory on the interface.
4.3 ADS-B receiver station specifications: To define the Asterix standard, the ANSP
must also define which optional Asterix data items are required to be delivered on the Asterix
interface, when the appropriate data is received from the aircraft. It is desirable that suppliers be
required to:
a) indicate how the receiver station processes and outputs every received DO260,
DO260A and DO260B data element into an Asterix data element/field; and
b) indicate which and how each Asterix data element and field presented at the output are
populated.
4.4 ATM automation system specifications: Defines which received Asterix data
element and fields are processed and how they are processed. Also defines which Asterix optional
data fields are required by the ATM automation systems (if any). ANSPs that specify ADS-B receiver
stations and ATM automation systems need to consider carefully and clearly about what they desire to
achieve. Specifications which simply require compliance with a particular Asterix edition will be
8
FAA utilise Asterix Cat 33 for ADS‐B message distribution.

inadequate in most circumstances. In particular ANSPs, together with their suppliers should :
a) Specify the Asterix standard edition to be used. This defines the message formats that
are placed on the link between ADS-B receiver station and downstream systems like
ATM automation, recording & analysis systems, bypass ATC systems and foreign
ANSPs. The edition will define which messages elements are mandatory in each
message (very few fields) and a large number of optional fields. The optional fields
can only be filled if relevant data is received from the aircraft. The optional fields will
only be filled if the receiver station specification requires them to be filled.
b) Specify the ADS-B receiver station behaviour so that when data is received from the
aircraft, the receiver station is required to fill appropriate optional Asterix data fields.
c) Specify the ATM automation system behaviour including appropriate semantic and
syntax checks applied to the Asterix data, including any triggers for the system to
discard data. The processing applied to each received Asterix data field should be
specified. The ATC system should discard any messages with unexpected Asterix
categories without discarding messages with known and defined Asterix categories.
5. MANDATORY FIELDS : ASTERIX AND 1090ES ADS-B
5.1 Asterix Cat 21 has been designed to support multiple datalinks. It has been defined to
support data fields which are not available in the 1090ES standards. Therefore some data items and
fields are not relevant when 1090ES is used.
5.2 The standard itself defines various items as optional or mandatory. This is defining
what is ON the interface. It does NOT specify the behaviour of the transmitting receiver station nor the
behaviour of the receiving ATM automation system.
5.3 When a single link technology has been chosen it may be sensible to diverge from the
formal Ed0.23 standard to reduce the required Asterix datalink bandwidth. E.g.: in an environment with
only 1090ES, it is unnecessary to transmit “Link Technology Indicator”. Asterix Cat 21 Ed 2.1 allows
this selection.

Data Description Mandatory (M) or Optional (O) items as

Items per ASTERIX Category 21
Version 0.23 Version 2.1
Specification Specification
I021/010 Data Source Identification M M
I021/030 Time of Day M N/A
I021/071 Time of Applicability of N/A One of these is must be
or I021/073 Position or transmitted
Time of Message
reception for position
I021/040 Target Report Descriptor M M
I021/080 Target Address M M

I021/210 Link Technology Indicator/ M O
MOPS version
6. GENERATION OF ASTERIX AT AN ADS-B RECEIVER STATION
6.1 The following general principles should be adopted:
6.2 Commensurate with link bandwidth availability, transmit all mandatory Asterix data
items and also transmit those Asterix data items that are operationally desirable. That is, when the
appropriate aircraft transmission is received by the ADS-B receiver station, the data should be
transmitted to the ATC system for operational use or for technical recording and analysis use. If no
aircraft transmission data is received to fill an Asterix data item during any update cycle, the data item
should not be included in the Asterix data stream to reduce bandwidth requirements.
6.3 Group 1 (Mandatory Data Items): An Asterix Cat21 message should not be
transmitted unless the mandatory data items defined in Appendix A are all present.
6.4 Group 2 (Desirable Data Items) : The data items defined in Appendix B are
operationally desirable which should always be transmitted in the Asterix Cat 21 messages whenever
the data are received by the 1090ES receiver station from aircraft (if allowed by the relevant Asterix
standard chosen).
6.5 Group 3 (Optional Data Items) : The data items defined in Appendix C are
considered optional and may or may not need to be transmitted depending on availability of such data
from aircraft and/or other specific operational needs.
6.6. Group 4 (Future Data Items): The following data are defined in the DO260A and
DO260B standards but are not yet defined in the Asterix standard. This group is provided for
information only. It illustrates the need for system designers to provide for future adaptability when
possible and when cost effective to do so. Not only will the Asterix standard continue to evolve, but
changes to DO260 can also be anticipated within the decade.
a) Target heading: Information from DO260A/B Target state and status

messages (On condition messages). These could be used for detection of pilot
errors in selection of heading/altitude; and
b) GPS Offset: Could be used to more accurately display aircraft position on an

airport surface, or better detect that an aircraft has passed an airport hold
point.
6.7 When developing a specification for an ADS-B receiver station, it is considered

necessary that the specification requires the transmission of all data items that are operationally
desirable (Group 2), when such data are received from the aircraft, in addition to the data items that are
mandatory (Group 1) in Asterix messages. Whether Group 3 optional data items will need to be
transmitted or not should be configurable on item-by-item basis within the ADS-B receiver station
depending on specific operational needs.
7. PROCESSING OF ASTERIX ADS-B DATA AT THE ATC SYSTEM
7.1 An Asterix Cat21 message should not be accepted by the ATC system for processing
unless it includes at least all the Group 1 data items.
7.2 The ATC system should process all received Asterix Cat21 message data items that
bring operational benefits (i.e. Group 2 data items). An ATM automation specification should require
that the system appropriately process those Group 2 data items depending on specific operational need.
Whether the ATC system will process Group 3 optional data items will depend on specific operational
needs.
8. DATA SHARING OF ASTERIX ADS-B DATA
8.1 In principle, all data receiving from the shared ADS-B receiver station should be delivered to
the receiving party as far as practicable without filtering, unless owing to technical reasons such as the
need to convert the data from one ASTERIX format to another, or it is requested by the receiving party
of the data.
8.2 It is considered necessary that all data items that are mandatory in Asterix messages (i.e.
Group 1 data items) and operationally desirable (i.e. Group 2 data items) when such data are received
from aircraft, should be included in data sharing. In the event that the data have to be filtered, the list of
optional data items (i.e. Group 3 data items) needs to be shared will be subject to mutual agreement
between the two data sharing parties concerned.
9. ISSUE RELATED TO DO260A
9.1 Support of DO260A using Asterix Cat 21 Ed0.23
a) DO260A was developed after Ed0.23 of Asterix was defined. Therefore,

Ed0.23 does not directly support DO260A. However, receiver station
software can generate useful Ed0.23 Asterix data from DO260A reports
through use of the following techniques;

b) A useful I021/090 Figure of Merit can be generated from DO260A messages.

Some implementations have a table, which defines the FOM/PA to be
generated for each combination of SIL, NIC and NAC. The contents of the
table can be offline defined to generate the appropriate FOM/PA values. The
downstream ATC system can then process DO260A reports as if they were
DO260 reports; and
c) If there is a particular need for the ATC system to have access to the
NIC/NAC or SIL or other data item that exist in DO260A (but not in DO260),
then users may need to consider a more recent version of Cat 21.
9.2 Support of DO260A using Asterix Cat 21 Ed 1.0 or Ed2.1 (or later versions)
a) When DO260A is used, then the ANSP could decide to use Asterix Cat 21
Ed1.0 (or later versions) or Ed2.1 (or later versions); and
b) Readers are invited to carefully examine the DO260A fields (see Appendix D)
to determine if the benefits of additional DO260A fields are large enough to
warrant adoption of Asterix Cat 21 Ed1.0 (or later versions) or Ed2.1 (or later
versions).
10. ISSUE RELATED TO DO260B
10.1 Support of DO260B using Asterix Cat 21 Ed0.23
a) DO260B was developed some years after DO260A. Therefore, Asterix Cat
21, Ed0.23 does not directly support DO260B;
b) The same techniques used for processing DO260A can be used for processing
DO260B, however, the table used must account for NIC supplement B &
NIC supplement C, and may also wish to account for SDA; and
c) If there is a particular need for the ATC system to have access to the new data
items offered by DO260B, then users may need to consider a more recent
version of Cat 21 (e.g. Ed2.1 or later versions).
10.2 Support of DO260B using Asterix Cat 21 Ed2.1 or later versions
a) If DO260B is used, then the ANSP could decide to use Asterix Cat 21 Ed2.1
or later; and
b) Readers are invited to carefully examine the DO260B data items (see
Appendix D) to determine if the benefits of additional DO260B data items
are large enough to warrant adoption of Asterix Cat 21 Version 2.1 or later.

11. ADS-B FORMAT CONVERSION AND FILTER SYSTEM
11.1 It is clear that the evolution of 1090ES ADS-B transmission will continue. Avionics
software will be upgraded to provide additional or changed functionality. As a result Asterix standards
will also continue to evolve, and ATC systems will need to be adaptable to be able to cope with new
functionality requirements and new message standards.
11.2 The use of an ADS-B format conversion & filter (ADS-B FC&F) system between
domestic ADS-B systems and data shared with other states is a cost-effective way to provide the
necessary protection and flexibility in this evolution. Such a system provides ADS-B format
conversion between domestic and foreign ADS-B systems. While decoupling one ADS-B Asterix
environment from another, the system allows information that meets specific sharing criteria to be
passed through for data sharing. By doing so, loading on the ATM automation systems to process
ADS-B data and bandwidth requires to transmit the ADS-B data could then be reduced. The system
also allows independent domestic format changes without disruption to the foreign environment. A
typical structure could be as shown below:

7 Attachment A - Group 1 (Mandatory Data Items)
Data Items Description Ed Ed Remarks

0.23 2.1
I021/010 Data Source Identification X X Identifies source of data. Important if validity checks
are performed as an anti spoofing capability.
Validation that the data is received from an
approved ADS-B receiverstation. Data received
from a receiver station should not be processed if the
position of the reported aircraft is an unreasonable
distance away from the known location of the ADS-
B receiver
station. Where space based ADS-B is used and a
nominal station location is defined, such range
processing limits will need to account for the
coverage supplied.
I021/030 Time of Day X Necessary to extrapolate the ADS-B data to time of
display. Data received with a Time of Day too far in
the past should be
discarded. This data is too old.
I021/071 Time of Applicability of X Necessary to extrapolate the ADS-B data to time of
or I021/073 Position or display. Data received with a Time of Day too far in
Time of Message the past should be
reception for position discarded. This data is too old.
I021/040 Target Report Descriptor X X Indicates if report is a duplicate, on the receiver, is a
simulated target, is a test target. This needs to be
checked by ATC system prior to processing. If the
data indicates that the report is a test target or a
simulated target, it is normally processed differently
to “real” targets.
I021/080 Target Address X X Included in all 1090ES downlink messages, so

always available. Used for report/report
linkage in ATC tracking.
I021/090 Figure of Merit/Quality X X Position cannot be used without quality indicator. If
Indicators the quality of the positional data does not meet the
requirements the data
should be discarded.
I021/130 Position in WGS-84 X X Report cannot be used without position
co-ordinates

Attachment B - Group 2 (Desirable Data Items)

0.23 2.1
I021/008 Aircraft operational status X TCAS capability, Target state reporting

capability, CDTI capability, Single/dual
aircraft antenna.
It is desirable to have immediate
knowledge of RA event.
I021/020 Emitter Category X X Aircraft or vehicle type
I021/140 Geometric Altitude/Height X X Useful for RVSM monitoring. Not normally
used for ATC application. Could perhaps be
used as an indicator of
correct QNH setting in aircraft.
I021/145 Flight Level X X Flight level is an important information
to ATC
I021/155 Barometric Vertical Rate X X Used for predictive tools and safety nets. Either
I021/157 Geometric Vertical Rate X X Barometric vertical rate or Geometric vertical
rate is provided by the aircraft – not both.
However, the ATC system can calculate

vertical rate from multiple flight level reports if
these data items are not
available.
I021/160 Ground Vector X X Provides excellent vector to support

extrapolation of positional data to time of
display.
However, the ATC system can calculate the

velocity vector (ground vector) from multiple
position reports. I021/160 however, is normally
far superior that
ATC system calculation.
I021/170 Target Identification X X This is the callsign/Flight ID is extremely
useful for ATC and matching to the flight plan
(if any).
Target identification is only sent once per 5

seconds. Some receiver stations designs attach
the target identification (if known from previous
recent downlinks) even if not received in the last
5 seconds.
The field can be missing at the edge of

ADS-B coverage – for flights inbound to
coverage.

I021/200 Target Status X X This is the emergency type and is highly

desirable.

Attachment C - Group 3 (Optional Data Items)

0.23 2.1
I021/077 Time of report transmission X Time of applicability is relevant for

ATC system processing. Time of
transmission is less relevant.
I021/032 Time of Day Accuracy X Maximum error in Time of day.
Normally the maximum value is
known by the ANSP because of
station design.
I021/095 Velocity Accuracy X If using GPS, velocity accuracy will be
adequate if the Position quality is
accurate.
I021/072 Time of applicability of X Can be managed by a velocity data
velocity time out in receiver station.
I021/075 Time of message reception of X Normally velocity is in the same Asterix
velocity message as position. Velocity
data time out in receiver station.
I021/161 Track number X Tracking can be performed by ATC
system. Also the 24 bit code (aircraft
address) could be used as a pseudo
track number.
I021/110 Trajectory Intent X X Defined in DO260 but not transmitted by
any known product. Not defined in
DO260A or DO260B
I021/146 (Intermediate) Selected X X Target altitude :
Altitude Information from DO260A/B Target state
I021/148 Final State Selected Altitude X X and status messages (On condition
messages). These could be used for
detection of pilot errors in
selection of heading/altitude.
I021/015 Service identification X Type of Service (VDL4, Ext Squitter, UAT,
TIS-B VDL4, TIS-B Ext Squitter, TIS-B
UAT, FIS-B VDL4,
GRAS VDL4, MLT). Not useful to
most ATC systems.
I021/016 Service management X Update rate or whether data driven
output from GS. Normally known by
receiver.


0.23 2.1
I021/074 Time of message reception of X High resolution is designed to support

position – high resolution MLAT system processing by receiver.
Not required for pure ADS-B.
I021/076 Time of message reception of X High resolution is designed to support
velocity – high resolution MLAT system processing by receiver. Not
required for pure ADS-B.
I021/210 MOPS version/ Link Technology X X Maybe useful for statistics about equipage.
Indicator Not operationally relevant
I021/070 Mode 3/A code X Could be used for legacy ATC system
that do not use Flight ID
I021/165 Rate of Turn/Track Angle rate X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/271 Surface capabilities and X
characteristics
I021/132 Message amplitude X Useful for technical analysis. Not
operationally relevant
I021/250 Mode S MB data X
I021/260 ACAS resolution advisory X
report
I021/400 Receiver ID X
I021/295 Data ages X
I021/150 Air Speed X X Defined in standards but only sent in
I021/151 True Air Speed X X absence Ground vector information. Can’t
be used for extrapolation unless wind speed
known.
I021/152 Magnetic Heading X X Defined in standards but only sent in

absence Ground vector information.
I021/220 Met Report X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/230 Roll Angle X X Not transmitted in DO260, DO260A
or DO260B messages
I021/131 Position in WGS-84 X
coordinates, high resolution

Attachment D - Differences among DO260, DO260A, DO260B

DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Potential uses of additional information
Asterix CAT 21
Introduction of NUCP is used. NIC is used to More levels of NIC is shown in Ed1.0 The additional quantum levels of NIC would
Navigation Integrity replace NUCP. NIC available. and above. More levels allow the ANSP more flexibility in deciding
Category (NIC) to Vertical of NIC (shown as PIC) whether the NIC is considered as ‘good’ (if
replace Navigation component are available in v2.1. required)
Uncertainty Category removed.
(NUCP) However, for 3 NM & 5 NM separation with
HPL 1Nm and 2 Nm respectively, this additional
quantum is not useful.
Quality Indicator for NUCR is used. Replaced with Vertical Available in Ed0.23 Vertical component is not available for DO260B.
Velocity (NUCR and NACV. component and above.
NACV) Definition removed.
remains the
same.
Surveillance Integrity Not available. Surveillance Renamed as Available in Ed1.0 and The SIL will allow the user to further assess the
Level and Source Integrity Level Source Integrity above. integrity of the reported position (if required).
Integrity Level (SIL) is used. Level. Definition
is changed to NB: An implied SIL exists for DO260 aircraft if
exclude avionics they always use GPS. However DO260 aircraft
fault. do not provide SIL.
System Design Not available. Not available. To address Available in Ed2.1. The SDA will indicate the robustness of the
Assurance (SDA) probability of system. ANSPs may decide on a minimum SDA
avionics fault. for ADS-B services.
If this action is taken then DO260 and DO260A
aircraft will be unable to meet the criteria.


Asterix CAT 21
Navigation Accuracy Not available. Derived from Relies only on Available in Ed1.0 and A reported accuracy is not provided by DO260.
Category (NACP) HFOM and HFOM. above. However, an estimated accuracy can be derived
VFOM. from NUC – assuming that NUC is HPL based.
Geometric Vertical Not available. Not available. Derived from Available in Ed2.1. Geometric altitude accuracy is not normally
Accuracy (GVA) VFOM. required for operational purposes.
Barometric Altitude Not available. To indicate Same as Available in Ed1.0 and The NICBARO indicates the integrity of the
Integrity Code integrity of DO-260A above. barometric height.
(NICBARO) barometric
altitude. ANSPs could indicate to the controller that
Barometric data has not been verified, however,
aircraft without dual barometric systems/air data
computers may be unable to provide a non zero
NICBARO as data could be unnecessarily
discarded.
Length / Width of Not available. Provide an Same as Available in Ed1.0 and The width / length indicate the size of the
Aircraft indication of DO-260A above. aircraft. This information may be used as an
aircraft size. input for generating alerts on airport surface
movement control.


Asterix CAT 21
Indication of Only show More Additional Available in Ed1.0 and Indication on the availability of 1090ES in /
capabilities status of information information on above, except UAT in may allow the controller to anticipate a
TCAS and available type of ADS-B in availability of potential request for in-trail procedure clearance.
CDTI. including (i.e. 1090ES in or 1090ES/UAT in and NB: ITP requires decision support aids which are
capability to UAT in). information on GPS more complex than ADS-B IN alone.
send Air antenna offset.
Reference
Velocity, Target
State and
Trajectory
Change reports.
Status of
Identity
Switch.
Status of Resolution Not available. Information on Same as Available in Ed1.0 and Indication of the resolution advisory status
Advisory whether DO-260A above, allows the controller to know whether the pilots
Resolution were alerted about the potential conflict.
Advisory is
active.
GPS offset Not available. Indication on Information on GPS offset status is Indication on GPS offset may be one of the
whether GPS GPS antenna available in Ed1.0 and inputs for generating alerts on airport surface
offset is offset is above. Information on movement control.
applied. provided. GPS offset is not
available in ASTERIX
Intention Not available. Able to Same as Intended altitude is The intended heading and flight level can be
indicate DO-260A available in Ed0.23. used as an input to the trajectory prediction
intended Intended heading is not algorithm in the Short-Term Conflict Alert.
altitude and available in ASTERIX.
heading.


Asterix CAT 21
Target Status Not available. Not available. Indication of Vertical Navigation The target status allows the controller to know
Autopilot mode, mode, Altitude Hold the mode that the aircraft is in. i.e.: It could be
Vertical mode and Approach presented to ATC.
Navigation mode, Mode are available in
Altitude Hold Ed
mode, Approach 0.23 and above
Mode and LNAV
Mode. LNAV Mode is
available in Ed2.1
Resolution Advisory Not available. Not available. Availability of Available in Ed1.0 and The Resolution Advisory will help the controller
Active above. know the advisories that are provided to the
Resolution pilots by the ACAS. This helps prevent the
Advisories; controller from giving instructions that are in
Resolution conflict with the ACAS.
Advisory
complement
record,
Resolution
Terminated;
Multiple Threat
encounter; Threat
Type indicator;
and Threat
Identity data.


Asterix CAT 21
Mode A DO260 Broadcasted Broadcasted Available in Ed0.26 and The Mode A allows flight plans to be coupled
change 1, using test worldwide as a above. with the ADS-B tracks (supports legacy ATM
allows this message in regular message. automation system).
using test USA only.
message in
USA only.
This was not
implemented
in actual
products.

Appendix 8


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ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND

OPERATIONS GUIDANCE DOCUMENT

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION AND

Edition 15.0 - September 2022

Intentionally left blank

Edition 15.0 - September 2022 2

1.1 Arrangement of the AIGD .................................................................................................. 7

2. ACRONYM LIST & GLOSSARY OF TERMS ............................................................ 15

2.1 Acronym List .................................................................................................................... 15

4. ADS-B DATA .................................................................................................................. 19

5. ADS-B IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................................... 20

5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 20

5.1.1 Planning ................................................................................................................... 20

5.2 Implementation checklist .................................................................................................. 25

5.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 25

6. HARMONIZATION FRAMEWORK FOR

6.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 28

7. SYSTEM INTEGRITY AND MONITORING ............................................................ 32

7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 32

7.4.1 Safety Assessment Guidelines ............................................................................. 33

Edition 15.0 - September 2022 3

7.4.2 System safety assessment .................................................................................... 33

7.5 System Monitoring ........................................................................................................... 35

7.5.1 Problem Reporting System (PRS) ....................................................................... 35

7.6 APANPIRG ...................................................................................................................... 37

7.7 Local Data Recording and Analysis ................................................................................. 37

7.7.1 Data recording...................................................................................................... 37

7.8 ADS-B Problem Report .................................................................................................... 39

7.8.1 Report Form ......................................................................................................... 39

7.9 ADS-B Performance Report Form .................................................................................... 41

8. RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ........................................ 42

9. ADS-B REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES .......................................................... 47

9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 47

9.3.1 Use of ADS-B Level data..................................................................................... 48

Edition 15.0 - September 2022 4

9.3.8 Methodologies to Avoid or Reduce 1090 MHz Congestion ................................ 52

9.4 Reporting Rates................................................................................................................. 53

9.4.1 General ................................................................................................................ 53

9.5 Separation ......................................................................................................................... 53

9.5.1 General ................................................................................................................. 53

9.6 Air Traffic Control Clearance Monitoring ........................................................................ 55

9.6.1 General ................................................................................................................. 55

9.7 Alerting service ................................................................................................................. 54

9.8 Position Reporting ............................................................................................................ 55

9.8.1 Pilot position reporting requirements in ADS-B coverage................................... 55

9.9 Phraseology ....................................................................................................................... 55

9.9.1 Phraseology standard ........................................................................................... 55

9.10 Flight Planning .................................................................................................................. 57

9.10.1 ADS-B Flight Planning Requirement – Flight Identity........................................ 57

9.11 Procedures to Handle Non-compliant ADS-B Aircraft or

9.12 Emergency Procedures ..................................................................................................... 63

9.13 Procedures to Handle GPS Time and Week Counter Rollover......................................... 64

10. Security Issues Associated with ADS-B ........................................................................ 65

10.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 65

Edition 15.0 - September 2022 5

Appendix 1 – An Example of Commissioning Checklist

Appendix 2 – Guidance Materials on Monitoring and Analysis of ADS-B Avionics

Appendix 3 – A Template for ADS-B Mandate/Regulations for Aircraft Avionics

Appendix 4 – An Example of Advice to Operators Concerning Inconsistency between