Rural Home Defense

A cop's guide to protecting your rural home or property during

riots, civil war, or SHTF.
by Don Shift

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Introduction
Lessons from Rhodesia
Rural Threat Review
Self-Defense Legalities
Force Multiplying Technology
The Perimeter
Defensive Positions
Booby Traps
Hardening the Rural Home
Groups
Defensive Operations
Patrolling
CQB and Building Searches
Vehicles
Roads
Crop and Stock Defense in a Famine
Ideal rural living
Postures and Procedures
In Terms of Catastrophic Events
Dealing With Fear
4473: A Short Story
About the Author
 Introduction
Note: This book is best read as a part of a series. Despite the
titles, concepts presented in Suburban Defense and Suburban
Warfare are applicable to rural living. Much beneficial knowledge for
the rural resident can be taken from those works.

In the hard times coming soon to the western world, there is no

place better to survive it than away from large concentrations of
people. For years now, those in the preparedness and survival
communities have been saying “get out of cities” if you aren’t a rural
resident already. This means a rural retreat or relocation to a small
town. Self-sufficiency is possible outside of the suburbs, politics and
demographics are more in-line with traditional values, and there are
fewer people to compete for resources.
Smaller communities have an advantage in that lower population
density lowers the potential reward for any raiders. There are fewer
resources and a much larger area to gather them over, making the
effort intensive in terms of time and energy. Getting to the area is
problematic for the same reasons. This creates a disadvantage in
that lower population means fewer people to interfere or resist. Raids
can be made across the areas without alerting too many people to
what’s going on if conducted stealthily enough.
You might be saying “But Don, didn’t you just write all about the
suburbs?” That is true, however I'm not a stranger to life outside the
land of tract homes and chain restaurants. Half of my family were
actual pioneers, so that runs in my blood. I’ve spent summers and
winters on what’s left of the family farm in a part of Idaho so remote
there isn’t even a Walmart.
Unfortunately I don’t live in a rural community now although I
have plenty of experience working in such places, visiting relatives
that did, and lived in one for a while as a young man. My experience
has been purely middle class. We didn’t run a ranch operation or
anything like that; at best, ten acres and a couple of horses. Yet I do
know the kind of community where houses are a quarter-mile apart
or more.
The thing is, simply based on the urbanization of America,
most people don’t live in truly rural communities. Five miles outside
the city limits is rural to a lot of people. That is still way better than
being in a city, but what I’ll term unincorporated life shares a lot with
living in the suburbs. Chances are, you are close enough to a large
enough population that you will need to make preparations like in my
first two books on this subject.
Working for a sheriff’s office in the United States, California in
particular, is a mix of urban and rural policing. This has given me a
perspective of what rural defense in the US may be like. My area,
Ventura County, is largely wild or agricultural land with islands of
cities in them. Most of the cities are physically isolated from each
other by a buffer zone of farmland or brushy hills. Search and rescue
is a big deal for us. Backup can sometimes be ten or twenty minutes
away. Here’s what I’ve observed:

Burglaries still happen, although to a lesser degree

because the houses tend to be more concealed (harder to
find and case), and the distance isn’t worth the criminals’
efforts.
Agricultural crime (crop, fuel, and equipment theft) is
common and the largest criminal threat. Ag thieves can be
very sophisticated at times or necessitate more effort to
catch them. Distance, concealment, and the practically
right-in-the-open nature of a lot of stealable things in farm
country makes it easy for them.
Accidents tend to be more catastrophic and help is further
away.
Responding to incidents can be difficult due to distance,
terrain, and conditions. Our two resident mountain deputies
frequently get backup via helicopter. Once one of our
county deputies got his Crown Vic stuck in the mud and
then slid down an embankment ten feet to the slough,
 making whatever police work ill-relevant as we went into
rescue mode instead.
Violent crimes may happen without being noticed by police
or neighbors, meaning you are on your own. In places like
Rhodesia and South Africa, this was/is a major problem.

I have no real advice on how to select an area or a site to live.

As I write this, the window for relocation is closing fast. If you have
not relocated, you probably aren’t going to be able to. The
apocalypse will be come-as-you-are. All we can do at this point is
talk about risks and strategies to mitigate them.
Unlike the survivalist movement of the 1980s-1990s, it is not a
totalitarian government civil war that I’m focusing on. Yes, that is a
possibility but not in the same way that the older generations of
preppers thought. A homestead, no matter how well equipped or
prepared, is not going to stand up against a government goon
squad. Whether it’s an A-Team repelling from a MH-60 Blackhawk or
the local SWAT team, they have firepower and resources that you
don’t, namely they can send all the manpower they need after you.
This book is not about being a guerilla. However the 2020s
shake out, that might be needed, but that is not what I’m writing
about or who I’m writing to. No, I’m writing to average people who
want to survive a lawless world. Specifically:

Farmers who are going to be facing intimidation from

organized crime.
Homeowners who don’t want to fall prey to criminals who
believe rural isolation will work in their favor to facilitate their
crimes.
Country neighborhoods that need to band together against
marauders.
Keeping remote homes that thugs want to turn into their
retreat in the hands of their owners.

In the “Rural Threat Review” chapter we look at a lot of the

dangers that could come in a rural area because just being out of the
city doesn’t mean you’re gonna be safe.
 A word about relocating

If you are living an urban life and are thinking of moving to a rural
area, stop and consider why. Are you moving just because it “seems”
safer? Not necessarily so. Real experience from countries that
experienced an economic collapse has been that as long as cities
weren’t engaged in open warfare, cities were actually better from a
security standpoint.
Why? Safety in numbers. Suburban neighborhoods had more
people to engage in security duties than in rural areas. Security
guards could be hired by the neighbors in a pool to protect the area.
Supplies were also more plentiful in the city as the bulk of deliveries
went there. On the contrary, self-sufficiency was harder and in a
worst-case scenario, like the Siege of Sarajevo, cities were
deathtraps.
Running away to an isolated retreat is not wise if you don’t
have the friends or relatives to man it. Someone living way out in the
sticks must be fairly independent and should be able to handle minor
repairs. Self-sufficient living, even semi-self sufficient, is difficult.
Isolation can be a huge factor and being so far away from friends
and families put a strain on a relative’s marriage.
Leaving the city doesn’t work out like a fantasy. I would
suggest to any city slickers that instead of finding a cabin in the
woods they look at semi-rural areas on the outskirts of town
(unincorporated areas). These are larger lots more suited to
gardening and making defensive changes than a suburb. The
developments are often large neighborhoods in layout but with
country charm and greenery instead of cookie-cutter houses as far
as the eye can see.

What is “rural?”

What exactly are we talking about when we say “rural?” I’ve

lived in the unincorporated fringes of town that was city in every way
except we had septic tanks. Then there was the house that was
outside of cell coverage. Rural is always hard to define because the
meaning can go from areas outside of cities and towns to tiny specks
of human habitation hours from even a Dollar General. “Rural” here
means people who live away from dense, centralized settlements
with focused centers of economic activity. It’s just homes and land,
for the most part.
Rural areas are not suburban in character. Homes are on
larger lots and further away from their neighbors. Face-to-face
interaction with neighbors is less because of this distance. Municipal
services and utilities will be minimal or absent. Building codes are
permissive. Personal agriculture is supported to various degrees.
The surrounding land is often farmland, rangeland, or wilderness.
First of all, if you live in an incorporated city or town, that’s not
rural. Your municipality may be remotely located from a major
metropolitan area and surrounded by nothing, but you still live in a
city. You have neighbors and all the issues that come with urban life.
There is a statue, some sort of rallying point not far away that
activists could congregate around, or a Walmart that might be looted.
Perhaps an unpopular police chief or politician lives near you.
These small towns or cities are generally an hour from a
major city. Examples are (large) Pahrump, NV; Montpelier, Idaho
(medium) or (small) Andover, Ohio. No neighboring towns or cities
that are any larger border them. Retail activity is not robust.
Employment opportunities are often limited and the modern socio-
economic strata is lower income.
There is typically a mix of suburban tract homes, older (pre-
tract home) style dense neighborhoods, and larger lots towards the
outskirts of town. The Suburban books are more applicable to these
“rural adjacent” homes as the character of the population is more
suburban than rural.
Another community type may have once had a small town
decades or a century ago. Probably farmers began subdividing land
to people who were willing to commute into the city but live in a rural
setting. This next level is independent on the size of the city, be it a
small town or a metro area (example: northern fringes of Eagle,
Idaho).
These rural areas are proximate to a city or town, usually ten
miles or less; “urban adjacent.” A major city is within an hour’s drive.
Lot size is 10 acres or less. It is basically a large neighborhood
composed of single family dwellings on large, open or wooded lots.
Typically this is former agricultural land that has been subdivided.
Foot traffic is unusual. Part of the area is located on a main traveled
road or numbered highway. Often it is surrounded by agricultural
land (farms). It could be termed as “horse country.”
These are the type of places that have some breathing room
and land to garden but have all the comforts of civilization nearby.
The person that can’t run a farm or live way out in the wilderness has
probably already chosen this area because they can have a shop,
maybe a couple horses, and have a stand of trees on either side of
the house so they can’t see the neighbors.
Most people will live in the above rural or urban adjacent
zones simply because of demographics; these areas have greater
population density. They will have the greatest potential for raiding
because targets are concentrated and are close to where urban
raiders will be coming from.
Then you have semi-remote areas, far from any city or town,
though a general store or a gas station may exist. People tend to
travel farther and less frequently for high-order services. Large
multiacre lots are common and may have single family dwellings,
multiple dwellings, and small home agricultural operations or
livestock present. Surrounding land is either woods, wilderness, or
totally agricultural in nature.
Though distance to “civilization” may vary, there is farm or
agricultural land. A city may be close by, but for several miles or
more in each direction there is basically nothing but ranches and
farms on huge tracts. In the Midwest, this would be farm country
where there are typically several neighbors within a mile.
At the end of the classifications are the remote homesteads. No
grid and are no immediate neighbors. Any city, town, or other
conglomeration of residences are far away. Cities are a long way
away and metropolitan areas are very distant. This is typically an off-
grid cabin, ranch, or homestead way out in the tules; maybe farm
country where it’s square miles per person, not people per square
mile.
I’ve included a few terms and definitions I might use in this book.
 Exurban neighborhood: Basically a clump of houses outside a
city or town but organized in much the same way as tract homes or
an older-style residential neighborhood. Often surrounded by
undeveloped or agricultural land and commonly on subdivided
former agricultural land.

Rural-adjacent municipality: A small city or town surrounded by

wilderness or agricultural land.

Rural-adjacent neighborhood: large lots, on the fringe of a

small city or town. Not a planned development but on land that was
subdivided and built up over time.

Edge of town: Located on the outskirts of a small city or town

where lots can be bigger than in a suburb and more rustic. Not a
planned community like a subdivision. Density is less than in town
but homes are still clustered and organized into loose
neighborhoods. Commercial services are <10 minutes away.

Unincorporated area: Located away from towns or cities though

there may be the remnants of an earlier, small settlement and a few
mom-and-pop type commercial establishments. A mix of agricultural,
light industrial, and residential use can be found. Density can vary
widely and clusters of homes may approximate the shape and
pattern of a neighborhood. Services are within 30 minutes. The
county is the basic unit of government.

Ranchette: A home in an unincorporated area on a large lot,

usually 2-40 acres in size that can support some level of minor
agriculture or livestock, often with outbuildings. Similar lots may form
relatively dense grid-like developments, dense but loosely organized
clusters of properties, or organic growth of early settlements.
Generally on the outskirts of a large city/metro area or within its
sphere of influence.

Frontier and remote: Remote homestead. No grid. There are no

immediate neighbors. Not less than an hour from any city and
several hours from a major metro area.
 You could live in a small, older town with large lots. You may live
on the outskirts of an exurban city or town in an area where the lots
are large and you back up to farmland or wild lands. Your home
might be on 40 acres, backing up to forest land, and a quarter mile
down the valley from the nearest neighbor. You might live on a farm
house on your own square mile plot or in a cabin so far out into the
boonies you could write a manifesto.
Don’t get hung up on the terms. The point is, you know if
where you live is rural. You know if the suburban neighborhood
advice is helpful or not and can apply the relevant parts to your
situation.
If you don't have any close neighbors, you don't have any
neighbors. Isolated properties that are not part of a development or
built up area are at most risk, not the guy who at the dead end of the
road. Community is built on proximity and the mortar is interaction.
Without interaction or a reminder that you exist, you become more of
a stranger than an insider. Comradery and relationships can be built
if you do run into people, perhaps stopping to chat on the road or at
the mailboxes. Yet an isolated ranch or something should be
prepared to go it alone and be self-sufficient on manpower.
The best compromise is to be on a multi-acre "ranchette" on
the edge of town or surrounded by similar lots. There would be
enough land to grow food, keep some domestic livestock (goats,
chickens, a milk cow) and have defensive space. The neighbors help
keep watch and protect each other. Water should be supplied by a
well-on property whenever possible.

How far away is far enough?

The major metropolitan areas are going to be the worst off in

a grid-down situation. In an Argentinian or Venezuelan style
economic collapse cities might have an advantage from a safety
standpoint (see above), but it will be much harder or impossible to
grow one’s own food. There is a tipping point where one would want
to get out of the cities. The worse the collapse is, the worse off those
cities will be.
 Metro populations consist of people who are going to be
unprepared to survive on their own and who are dependent on the
modern infrastructure and commerce of a large city. The political
orientation of the residents is often diametrically opposed to self-
reliance and self-governance. Demographics in large cities will
include high crime populations that are at the highest risk of
victimizing others in times of crisis.
For specific examples, I mean major cities like Los Angeles,
Portland (OR), St. Louis, Miami, and New York City. Any smaller
urban area with a local metro population of 250,000 or more will be
similarly problematic but on a lesser scale. Examples are Fresno and
Bakersfield, CA, Amarillo, TX, and Asheville, NC. Exurban cities are
those medium size cities within the sphere of influence of a major
metro area but are well geographically isolated otherwise. I’d put
Ventura County, CA, in this category.
Unless you live in a town that has a population of a few
thousand and you’re an hour away from a place with 100,000 or
more people in it, your town is probably big enough to be somewhat
of a concern. You will have to plan on raids by urban groups, the
ability for city-based activist/agitator groups to stage riots, or
interference from totalitarian forces. When it comes to the “golden
horde,” or a large group of refugees following lines of drift away from
chaotic, violent, and unsurvivable urban areas, distance is your
friend.
If you figure the average person has half a tank of gas in their
car, and most cars can go 400 miles, that’s 200 miles away. That’s a
bit unrealistic unless you want to live in the Great Basin or on the
northern prairies. One hour’s drive, or about 60 miles, is best. An
hour into the hinterlands and people start to feel like they’ve fallen off
the face of the Earth. Many people are generally unfamiliar with parts
of a metro area ten miles away. Out in the country this will be more
pronounced and exacerbated even further by a lack of GPS
mapping.
I have a relative in the Pacific Northwest who is about 45
minutes from Olympia, WA, and about an hour and a half from
Seattle. The nearest city of any note is thirty minutes away. What
that means is that no one on foot is going to be making casual forays
from the big cities, only vehicular traffic. Vacation traffic in summer
tells me that the big city people are familiar with taking their holiday
out there, so it is easily within reach of the ones who have cars.
Vacationer behavior is comparable to what to expect from an
early stage evacuee. They will seek communities within easy driving
distance that they are familiar with and have many of the same
comforts as home. On the plus side, by the time the situation gets so
bad that city dwellers may be branching out into the sticks to do evil
things, they may not have the gas to travel 60-80 miles while
probably lost. The golden horde might be a trickle instead of a
stampede.
When you get into what many people term “rural” living—
twenty minutes or more to get to a grocery store, houses on lots
measured in multiple acres, etc.—it becomes a little easier. Twenty
minutes by car into town is outside of walking distance for most
Americans. One would have to be really desperate to walk ten or
more miles one way. Where I’m from, many people have never done
more than drive through much of the rural areas. A ranch fifteen
minutes out of town, or five as the crow flies, might as well not exist
to someone who didn’t grow up here.
Even so, some will stumble onto your retreat. Others will find
it through meticulous searching or from prior knowledge. Getting out
of the cities isn’t crawling in a hole and pulling the hole in after you.
Rather it’s about increasing your odds of survival and decreasing the
potential pool of competitors for survival.

Exodus

In a riot or disaster, people will seek comfort. Friends, family, or

hotels are their desired refuges. Proper campgrounds for those with
trailers will be secondary destinations. The rest will just stop
wherever they run out of gas or find some kind of temporary
accommodation and provisions.
In a civil war type situation, people will flee for wherever they
won’t die. This is a refugee situation. Red Cross shelters,
campgrounds, or ad hoc refugee camps will be where people will go.
The more prepared types may seek public land to setup camp on. As
things break down and those of lesser means seek anywhere that
they aren’t in danger, random encampments may popup anywhere.
For those within driving distance of a big city, this is a problem.
Further towards unlikely possibilities, a total collapse situation
where food has run out will see anyone who is not self-sufficient
moving from any city or town into the countryside. This will be a
problem for those who are within walking distance from any city or
town. Not so much further out especially as the gas supply dwindles.
This is the most dangerous type of exodus: hungry and desperate
people who may victimize the “better off” rural types; the so-called
“golden horde.”
The “golden horde” danger seems to be exaggerated and more
of a fear than reality. In the Ukrainian Holodomor, the countryside
didn’t empty out into the better-off cities. People certainly headed to
the cities to find work and food, but not en mass. Without an army
herding panicked people before them (or a volcano or something),
mass evacuations at once are uncommon.
In Argentina, their economic troubles brought looters and
truck hijackers to the country, not starving masses. For a Syrian
refugee crisis, it took active work by military forces and a brutal war
to drive people out. This was more of politics than spontaneous
pressure. The millions that left did so over months and years. As bad
as things got in the Middle East during the mid-2010s crisis, many
people stayed in war-torn cities. The fall of Afghanistan in 2021 was
dramatic but most Afghans stayed.
In your personal case, friends and relatives may seek to come
live with you. Obligations may be strong but choose wisely. Those
you invite in may not be an asset but a liability. Lazy relatives who
can’t assist with the chores and who will be cowards when fighting
starts are worth nothing to you. You may also have those in your life
who say, “When things get rough, I’m coming to stay with you!” If
you’re inclined to let them, make sure they know they had better
show up with their own food, guns, and ammo.
Purposefully building a retreat group may be a better idea.
Judiciously choose among your family and friends who is invited.
These need to be people that you can get along with in close
quarters for a long time and that you can count on to perform when
the chips are down. Individual skills like having a nurse or doctor in
the family is great, but even a hard worker who is willing to pick up a
rifle is a good human asset.
 Lessons from Rhodesia
The 1970s Rhodesian Bush War was a revolution of sorts led
by communist Black guerillas against the white majority government
and population of the country that is now called Zimbabwe. This war
was both a civil war/revolution and an insurgency/genocide. The
rebels held communist ideologies and sought to overthrow the post-
colonial white government. A large element of the actions of the
rebel groups, ZANU-PF and ZIPRA, engaged in frank terrorist tactics
against the rural populations earning them the apropos sobriquet of
terrorist or “terrs.”
The terrorists engaged in genocidal tactics against the
population, both Black and white. Africans were terrorized for
perceived support for the government. Being a teacher or
government employee could be a death sentence. Mothers were
killed because their sons were black policemen or soldiers. Mere
suspicion of being too closely aligned with the government or
working for a white employer got people killed. Blacks suffered much
of the same depredations as whites.
As related to this book, many attacks were carried out against
white owned farms in order to push white farmers off the land. To do
so, every tactic in the arsenal of a revolutionary was used. Farms
were sniped at. Coordinated attacks with supporting fire from
mortars and RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) were common.
Black employees as well as the whites themselves were shot or
kidnapped. Roadside ambushes and anti-vehicle mines (IEDs)[1],
often in combination with each other, took many lives.
While thefts from homes did occur, these were usually in
combination with the taking of a farm. Home-invasion robberies in a
strictly criminal sense were unusual. When terrorists did defeat the
defenses of a farm, the inhabitants were generally killed and other
outrages committed against the person. A few missionary schools
saw their white missionaries brutally killed. The goal of these attacks
was to terrorize the whites off the land, not to conquer and possess
the farm or a means to effect larceny. Racist killing and terror were
the goal.
While I doubt that Americans will see a similar guerilla war as
Rhodesia did, many of the lessons will carry over. I believe that
attackers in America’s troubled times ahead will want to capture and
possess isolated properties that can sustain them. Theft of valuables
or food and kidnapping will also be common. To achieve these goals,
the same methods that the “terrs” used will not be effective as they
tend to be too destructive. However, should military arsenals fall into
the wrong hands, defenders who do put up a resistance may face
heavy weaponry and explosives.

Lessons

Every home had an Agric-Alert radio system that linked the

farms and police. The radios included panic alarms and would
automatically identify the farm transmitting. Informational broadcasts
would be made if terrorists were operating in an area. Roll calls
happened two or three times a day. Often this was how many
nighttime attacks were discovered as farms not answering at roll call
were investigated. After an attack, neighbors would check on each
other for accountability. Multiple antennas were used in case one
was destroyed and concealed antennas were also installed.
Depending on the severity of an incident, police or army
forces would be dispatched to an attack. Forces would often arrive
by helicopter or by parachute. Air support was available. The
responding forces would then counter-attack and often engage in a
search and destroy mission.
Particularly vulnerable farms received military assistance from
small “sticks” of soldiers who rotated through guard duty at night.
Others employed former or off-duty soldiers as body guards. Militias
were formed under government auspices to act as guards. Black
militias were trained by police and had good success suppressing
cattle rustling.
Police/military forces would brief farmers in full regarding
terrorist activity in the area and procedures to be taken to counter
the threat. Police training for civilians in general combat tactics was
also offered and taken by both men and women.
Weapons must be carried at all times; a pistol holstered and a
rifle at hand. “Always go to bed with your weapons accessible” was
the practice. It was felt it better for children (old enough to physically
handle them) to have access to and knowledge how to use guns
rather than lock them away. Children were also drilled on how to take
cover and what to do during an attack. Every night farmers would set
out a first aid kit and layout an aid station in the event of a night
attack resulting in serious casualties.
Attacks usually came at night. Curfews from shortly before
dusk to after dawn were instituted as twilights were still vulnerable
times. To quote Ranger Robert Rogers: “Dawn’s when the French
and Indians attack.”[2] Early afternoon/evening attacks were
preferred because the terrorists could escape into the darkness.
Workers would often sleep on the job in barns, etc. rather than try to
return home. Floodlights were setup around the perimeter to blind
potential attackers.
At night, all the curtains were drawn and the doors were
closed and locked. All the lights were left on in the house and then
all turned off at bedtime. This was done so that terrorists couldn’t tell
by a light which rooms were occupied or not. Everyone went to bed
at the same time due to the lights being put out simultaneously.
Fires were often deliberately set to draw farmers out to either
fight the fire or evacuate. Terrorists would then ambush the farmers
as they ran or fought the fire. Attacks often began unannounced until
the first gunshot. The immediate reaction was to hit the floor and
crawl to safety.
Beds were sometimes surrounded by walls within the room for
the protection of sleepers. Bedrooms were often protected with a two
or three foot line of sandbags along the exterior (or interior) walls to
provide additional protection for those sheltering on the floor.
Bunkers or forts (interior redoubt) eventually had sandbags replaced
with permanent concrete or stone walls. Homes were purposefully
built or modified to have a windowless area suited to become the
bunker. Non-combatants took shelter in these bunkers.
 Windows were blocked with sandbags to prevent RPGs or
mortar fragments from penetrating. Some were outright bricked up.
Grenade screens were installed on windows and porches. Other
windows had security bars installed.
Farmers would frequently displace their residences from their
rural homes and move into urban areas for safety. The cities were
not subject to the same level of terrorist attacks. As the country
emptied out, so did the available mutual aid from neighbors.
Abandoned homes then were at risk for looting and vandalism.
Fences were wired with intrusion detection systems to
pinpoint breaches. Microphones were used to listen for and locate
suspicious noises. Some farmers used very thin wood for the walls
of their outbuildings. When terrorists would fire from inside or around
the corners of the buildings, the farmer could return fire by shooting
through the wood that offered no protection.
Building layouts were adjusted so that they were closer
together and more defensible. Arrangements were such that one
building could offer interlocking fire to the others. Protected or hidden
walkways and entrances allowed movement behind cover. Walls and
other visual shields were erected to prevent terrorists from getting
lines of sight or clear shots into the farm compounds.
Some farms were not fenced in the concern that if a fence
kept the terrorists out, they would keep a family in if they needed to
escape. The lesson learned from captured farms was to leave
yourself a route to escape. However, chainlink fences could detonate
an RPG before it hit the house. High-voltage electric fences were
also used.
Gates were favorite places for attack by terrorists and robbers
because the vehicle had to stop and someone had to get out of the
car. Attacks would often happen immediately at this point. Tall or
thick plants obscuring the area around the gates were used as hiding
places and had to be cut down.
Terrorists operated by sewing discord and corrupting local
workers and tribesmen. Villagers were coerced into providing food
and shelter. Those they couldn’t convert they intimidated or killed.
Workers frequently passed information to terrorists or cooperated
with attacks and thefts.
 Poorly trained terrorists made the mistakes amateurs seem to
do the world over. During firefights, they clumped up too close
together, probably for reasons of comfort and perceived safety.
Terrorists often fired on fully automatic with sights that were not
zeroed. Some set the sights to the maximum range under the
impression that this made the gun more powerful.
Any clump of plants capable of hiding a terrorist was fired on
regardless of whether or not a terrorist was spotted there out of an
overabundance of caution. This “cover shooting” was articulated as
“kill the concealment, kill the terrorist.” It was felt that this was safer
and faster than waiting for a sign that a terrorist was there which may
be too late and cost a soldier’s life. Riflemen often shot low to throw
debris up into the faces of terrorists behind cover.
Explosives were often wired along the perimeter or in places
terrorists may take cover. One farmer planted bushes or made
rockpiles that seemed like enticing places to hide. These had
explosives concealed within them and the farmer would command
detonate them once a terrorist started shooting from that place. This
method was used multiple times by that farmer. Remotely fired
shotguns were also buried strategically.
Anyone traveling away from home had someone housesit.
House guards were often hired who were also capable of fighting
should the property be attacked while the owner was away. Off-duty
soldiers or retirees were used for this. Visiting friends casually for an
evening was uncommon due to curfews, the danger of traveling at
night, and the need to stay overnight because of the foregoing.
Perimeters were checked every morning for signs of intrusion
or booby traps. Roads and driveways were also examined for mines
that may have been planted. Landmines and ambushes of civilian
vehicles were laid on roads. The front passenger typically scanned
the roadway for signs of mines or an ambush. Often specially
protected vehicles would drive in front of convoys to safely detonate
mines.
On the road when ambushes were expected, rifles were
routinely pointed out the window during the journey. Vehicles
typically traveled in convoys for protection against attack. Eventually
travel was done in mine-resistant vehicles (MRAPs).
 Due mainly to fuel rationing, trips would need to be carefully
planned in terms of mileage and fuel consumption. Day visits would
also need to be timed to ensure all travel was done in daylight.
Overnight visits would be required if there wasn’t enough time to
return safely. Intelligence would be obtained from the police/military
on the current dangers along the route.
 Rural Threat Review
In the Suburban books, the major concern I dealt with were
riots and mobs. 2020 showed us that this will be a part of urban
unrest in the future. Large numbers of dangerous and disaffected
people in trying political times is not a new phenomenon. However, it
is distinctly related to population density, which cities have and the
rural areas do not. I simply do not see mobs and riots presenting the
same threat in the country as they do in the suburbs.
The number one threat rural homeowners are going to face
are raids. The isolation will be exploited by raiders, both rural and
urban, to target the countryside. Isolation will be to their advantage
because help from neighbors or a police response will be harder to
get. No one may know what’s going on for days, all while the
intruders do evil things. Those who are depraved enough to steal
and kill will want resources and safety too. If they cannot find that in
the city, they will come to the country.
I do not see rioting or traditional communist insurgent
behavior happening in rural areas. These mainly conservative areas
have a low tolerance for BS and for geographic and logistical
reasons, on top of the political, they would be hard to control.
American communism is an urban phenomenon, not a rural one.
Inciting incidents that get a protest or revenge mob out to your town
cannot be discounted, however.
As the security and economic situation devolves into a
collapse, the threats and targets grow. The central theme will be
resources and control over means of production. The later stages
will trend towards looting or controlling industrial and agricultural
sources. Example of targets in rural areas are:

Food warehouses and distribution centers

Grain silos and on-farm food storage
Livestock
Field crops and orchards
Farm equipment
 Farm fuel storage
Isolated, unsecured homes
Roadblocks for kidnapping or extortion
Transportation sabotage of roadways, interchanges, and
railways
Sabotage of infrastructure: pipelines, aqueducts,
power/communications lines, and communications towers
(cell sites)
Delivery truck and convoys
Amazon, FedEx, Postal Service, UPS
Food transportation; either small deliveries to local
markets or commercial deliveries to cities,
distributors, etc.

What can make your home a target:

Large, known fuel stock

Owning useful draft animals or livestock
That you are a “prepper” and are known to have supplies
Freshly harvested produce on site (so the adversary can
just take the containers of food instead of picking it)
You are or look like a weak target
Visible and conspicuous signs of abundance exceeding the
norm
Lights at night, generator noise, or running machinery when
this is unusual
Remote residences and properties with few/no neighbors
Living alone, especially single women (mothers) and the
elderly

Military grade weaponry

I do not believe that things like artillery, grenades, or IEDs will be

the risk in the US as it was in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other domestic
conflicts overseas. Military control is too tight over those weapons
and there is no easy way to get them into the country at this point.
No doubt some exist and servicemen will leak some out, but nobody
has an RPG just sitting in their closet.
 Assuming the US military remains largely intact or at a
minimum maintains control over the Ammunition Supply Points,
military grade munitions will not make it into civilian hands. Our
violence will be mostly via firearms since access to explosives is
strictly controlled. Explosives will have to be homemade and this will
limit their prevalence. Another source is imported munitions from
international sources, either from criminal smugglers or foreign
intelligence agents.
In a civil war, expect foreign powers to get involved and
supply heavy weaponry or technology. Dark money is already here
funding leftist groups. Both China and Russia have a vested interest
in an unstable, fractious America that is too busy fighting at home to
interfere overseas. Canada and Europe may be stabilizing
influences. International interference is probable and more so if the
federal government/military falls.
Factions that align more closely with international interests
may get better supplies or funding from X country. Conversely,
imports may be strictly controlled or limited. For instance, China
might refuse to sell consumer drones because they are being
modified into UCAVs[3] or Europe may place sanctions on Serbian
ammo being exported to the USA.
Foreign military aid may include training and intelligence on
top of weapons. The US Army Special Forces (Green Berets)
specializes in this kind of activity. Should the US fall into another civil
war, you can bet that insurgency and guerilla training camps
sponsored by foreign nations will pop up. You may be tempted to
accept weapons or training from a country that supports your “side.”
Be cautious that there is no such thing as a free lunch, your enemies
may be doing the same thing, and what you are doing could be
considered treason if the criminal justice system is functioning.

Crime threats

Logistics

Produce deliveries into the city (or from the city) are prime
targets. Semi-trucks making deliveries to cities and
 distribution centers may need heavy armed (and armored)
convoys with police/military escorts to avoid hijacking.

Delivery vehicles will be hijacked and robbed, making

things like Amazon home delivery a thing of the past in
remote areas. You may be reduced to picking packages up
at a central location (Post Office) or buying things from
stores as security of delivery cannot be guaranteed.
Warehouses, silos, and distribution centers are at risk for
looting.
Vehicular convoys into cities and towns for supplies may be
ambushed.

It’s long been predicted that when cities become unsafe truckers
won’t accept shipments or pickups there. It may be too perilous to
transport anything into your rural area too. Forget about mobs for a
second and think of Wild West stagecoach robbery or Indian raids on
wagon trains. Country roads can be narrow, full of curves, and may
have concealment growing right up the shoulders. Trucks will be
robbed, stolen, and hijacked.
Home delivery is going to go by the wayside as conditions
deteriorate. Fuel alone may preclude the level of service we expect
from Amazon, FedEx, and UPS. Even special deliveries at exorbitant
costs might not be made due to the risk of hijacking. Are these
delivery companies really going to let their drivers be armed or
employ security for them? Armed guards for armored cars are
trained to give up the money rather than fight, so why would the guys
in the brown shorts be any different?
Business or centralized location delivery will become the norm.
You’ll have to pickup at a store, shipping office, or the Post Office.
The trucks that bring goods to these locations may be at risk as well.
We will certainly see an increased incidence of truck hijackings by
bandits and lonely roads in the country would be vulnerable areas to
operate.
The third-order effects of this are increased costs of goods in
your area or none at all. Suppliers will go to cities and towns that are
safer, forcing you to drive to them. Shortages will be more acute.
Your effective price for goods will climb, regardless of what the price
tag says, due to fuel costs and the wasting of your time. Wide
selection and availability of products will dwindle without the
abundant and quick ecommerce of today that the delivery guys make
possible.
For those in farm country, in a famine food storage locations
will be the new heist targets. Perhaps whenever Grand Theft Auto VI
debuts one of the missions will be to steal a bunch of potatoes on
their way to McDonalds instead of gold. What could once be left
unguarded in the middle of nowhere will turn into a criminal’s
potential cash cow overnight. Grain silos are going to have to be
guarded.
As with everything else, security costs will go up. Farmers,
companies, co-ops, and associations will have to hire security
guards to defend their facilities. These costs will be passed on to the
customer.

Terrorism

Seeks to drive the owner off the land and not necessarily to
possess it.
May be political or racially motivated in a spirit of revenge,
i.e. ethnic cleansing.
Low probability of destroying production capacity for
destruction’s sake, though crop sabotage may occur, like
burning grain fields.
Sniper attacks from outside the perimeter to harass or kill
with little risk to the attacker.
Intimidation of farm workers to harm the property owners or
provide intelligence.

Terrorism or sabotage is likely to be the method if the goal is

to drive the owner off their land or to reduce/stop production. Less
likely are harassing attacks to degrade the performance of the ranch
or property and probably attacks on the residents/employees to
eliminate any resistance to a takeover attempt or raid. Conquerors
don’t want to burn a place they intend to occupy themselves.
 Terror can be combined with plundering as well if the property
is taken over. Indian raids on pioneers and settlers often combined
goals such as killing the white man, driving him off the land, using
fear of attacks to terrorize other pioneers/settlers, and allowing the
raiders to profit from looting the goods and livestock of their victim.
Laborers may be deliberately targeted or intimidated by
criminal elements to hamper agricultural operations or accomplish
other goals. Terrorists in Rhodesia used this tactic against white
farmers to either gather intelligence for later attacks or to encourage
sabotage. Livestock may be killed or crops burned as an intimidation
tactic or in competition.
In Rhodesia, the goal of terrorists was to force white farmers
off of the land. This was done by destruction of property and killing.
Rape and theft were incidental parts of successful takeovers. South
African farm murders are rooted in class/race envy and have a
financial angle as well as a genocidal and terrorism one. While
robbers may financially gain from stealing valuables from farms, the
attacks are fueled by more than just avarice but decades of anti-
white sentiment.
Intimidation and political retaliation are less likely in the
country than in cities. Rural communities are traditionally
conservative and far more homogenous than urban areas and the
residents even of different views are less reactionary. At the bad end
of the possibilities, the Left gets enough power to purge or suppress
the Right in rural communities, though the end result would probably
be a disastrous guerilla campaign for the invaders.
The second worst scenario is some sort of communist
scheme to take over the farms, but as America doesn’t have the
issues of land ownership that many communist countries did. Nor is
the USA a mainly agrarian economy anymore, so I don’t see
ideological land distribution as a major threat. Urban people don’t
want to own farms. Collective farms like Soviet Russia are not in the
interest of modern American communists.

Raids

The Marine Corps defines raids, and the purposes, as follows:

 “A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift
penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the
enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned
withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. Raids may
be conducted as separate operations or in support of other
operations. Examples of separate operations include raids for
psychological purposes, destroying enemy assets not
susceptible to other action, harassment, to gain combat
information, as spoiling attacks to keep enemy forces off
balance, and to recover or rescue friendly personnel and
equipment.”[4]

Raids will be for three main purposes:

Sustenance: stealing foodstuffs or other necessities to

survive.
Financial gain: stealing things for resale or personal gain;
i.e. burglary and robbery displaced from the city.
Usurping properties: subduing or killing property owners to
take over their homes and land to survive.

They could be classified in two ways:

Incidental or unorganized

Selected randomly or on the basis of ease of attack, not on

knowledge of specific items being there
Not unlike today’s burglaries or home invasion robberies
Financial gain will still be a motive
Steal food and supplies from people

Intentional or organized

Intelligence based, either research/surveillance or inside

knowledge
This particular place has something specifically wanted

Upon farms and ranches to steal produce or stock

 Kidnap hostages, women, or slaves
Likely larger to be in scale and intensity than incidental
crimes
Use of rams or dynamic entry tools to aid forced entry
Ruses, disguises, or diversions (stolen delivery truck)

I separate incidental from intentional though the two may not

appear to be very distinct. In ordinary residential burglaries, homes
are often selected on superficial characteristics, such as a well-
maintained or large home that “looks” like it may have high value
items to steal. Or homes may be targeted because they are easy
targets, such as a fake solicitor trying for unlocked knobs when no
one is home. Though some level of reconnaissance is usually done,
it’s unsophisticated casing. “Oh, no car in the driveway and a cheap
front door? Let’s do it.”
Incidental raids will be quick and from often ill-prepared
attackers. Early on, look for burglary and robbery crews from cities to
branch out from suburbia deeper into the country. Many of these
suspects will not be well armed or skilled in fighting, usually used to
no one being home or finding compliant, unarmed victims. However,
as time goes by, successful suspects will improve with experience.
Better prepared criminal groups can certainly use the tactic of
quick raids on superficially selected homes. While this presents the
risk of anyone being in danger of facing off with robbers at or near
parity, this tactic is a chancy one for the suspects. They are taking a
chance that their raid will pay off and not hit a house where the
occupants have sold all their valuables and are eating grass.
Amateurs do that kind of thing; prepared raiders go for targets where
there is a more certain, high value gain for the effort and risk
required.
Extensions of the normal burglaries and home invasion
robberies will happen and with more violence as criminals are likely
to be more desperate or bolder with limited/no law enforcement. The
kind of criminals who extend their normal times tactics to the country
post-SHTF are likely the type who do not conduct thorough
reconnaissance and will run away if presented with credible
opposition.
 On the intentional level criminals will have inside knowledge of
what a property possesses or conduct thorough reconnaissance, not
just a drive by or cheap ruse, on the target. For instance, suspects
would be the people who show off their guns and loudly proclaim
“I’m not prepping, I’m just gonna come and take your supplies.” Then
they proceed to hit homes of those too careless with OPSEC for
showing off their buckets of freeze-dried food, etc. Strangers may go
after ranches to rustle cattle or know they can kidnap people from a
poorly defended home.
I would classify large area cordon and search operations as
intentional. Shutting down and controlling a whole neighborhood in
order to break in and search homes takes organization and
manpower. If a raider didn’t know what he was going to get, it would
benefit him to have his men control a small area and go through
several homes during one operation. On the small scale this could
be just a few houses next to each other to massive, cartel level
groups taking and looting an entire town (a central plot point in
James Wesley Rawles’ Survivors).

Takeovers

The aggressor seeks to establish his own retreat or base of

operations.
Isolated farms, ranches, or homesteads will be at risk for
this.
Advertised survival communities or visible, known preppers
will be prime targets.
Self-sufficiency and isolation are attractive factors.

Now what if the person attacking your property isn’t there to

steal food but wants to live there himself? Country living will sudden
appear attractive to the criminally inclined from the city. At greatest
risk of this will be the more self-sufficient properties. The more self-
sustaining the property, the greater attractiveness to criminals.
Isolation is another factor in target selection. This could be the work
of a small group or a much larger effort.
 Organized crime may want both a safe place to survive the
collapse and a way to make money. Conquering farms and ranches
may be an ideal way for them to do this. They have no compunctions
about using force to take a farm or ranch over, possibly even forcing
the owners into involuntary servitude. If the place isn’t taken over, it
will be extorted. I see this as a special risk in communities with a
high number of Hispanic farmworkers.
Latin American cartels in particular could take over the farm,
install a compliant manager or give it to a princeling and staff it with a
compliant peasantry. Farms and land may be subdivided or doled
out to complaint peons, usually farm workers from within the US or
from Mexico who are beholden to the cartels. These will either be
literal slaves or serfs. American landowners who would resist the
cartel would simply be killed so as not to be a bother.

Agricultural crimes

Horse thievery and cattle rustling

Surreptitious produce/grain theft
Organized picking crews to harvest crops under armed
guard to prevent farmers from resisting.
Small-scale picking crimes; i.e. “larcenous gleaning”
Mostly a danger nearer to cities/towns
Unorganized but could get very large
Resistance would probably be unpopular with a
desperate urban population who has no other way
of obtaining food.

Agricultural crime right now in semi-normal early 2022 is about

theft of equipment and fuel. Thieves want tools, vehicles, equipment,
and fuel; things they can use or sell. Actual theft of crops is less
common, as least now as food is relatively cheap and plentiful.
As Ventura County, CA, is a huge ag county, my department
has a Major Crimes detective dedicated to it. Avocado theft is
probably the most high-profile crime to the public, but it is high-effort
as the fruits must be picked from the trees. Avocados are stolen
because of their high retail price. Harvested crops don’t sit around in
fields as they are almost immediately transported to warehouses for
packing and distribution.
We can note a few things from ag crime trends which are
universal across the first world. A study out of Australia, cited by the
US DOJ, found that:

“Incidents of burglary and the theft of fuel, equipment, and

machinery were inversely related to the visibility of farm
buildings to the farm residence; stock theft was directly related
to the distance of a farm to a town and to farms with a hilly
terrain; malicious damage and illegal trespassing occurred more
often on farms near highways or close to towns; and illegal
dumping of trash was inversely associated with unoccupied
properties and those closer to town.”[5]

There are two big lessons here: 1. Visibility of your equipment

and outbuildings reduces crime as you can potentially see criminal
activity and react. 2. The closer you are to town (people), the more
likely they are to trash your stuff and land.
As it stands, unfenced fields and orchards are easy pickings
for someone who wants free produce. It happens all the time, but
due to space, darkness, the lack of witnesses, the volume of what’s
growing, and the small-scale of pilferage, it is hardly noticeable. Also
people just don’t do it. It is far easier to buy what you want at the
grocery store when it is ripe than get out to the fields, find the plant
you want, and physically pick it. The illicit reward isn’t worth the
trouble.
All of this will change when people starve to death. People will
walk from the cities into the fields to pick fruits and vegetables.
Gleaning after the harvest was allowed in my parents’ youth but not
anymore. In SHTF, outright theft will be commonplace and a real
problem for farmers. I term this “larcenous gleaning.”
On the small scale, people may sneak out after dark to pick
enough food for their family to eat. If farmers resist, or even if they
don’t, dozens or hundreds of people may descend like locusts to pick
together and benefit from strength in numbers. Some of these
desperate people may shoot back. What will certainly happen is
organized groups will turn up with a large work force and forcibly
harvest fields.
One solution to avoid larcenous gleaning is to allow anyone to
glean (after harvest) for personal use. Many will see this as a
benevolent compromise. I would also suggest making donations to
food banks, churches, or charities. If you do choose to stop people,
be armed, have backup, and be prepared to use the legally
permissible amount of force as necessary. Have an alternative for
the people turned away to appeal to their rationality so they don’t
retaliate or choose to fight. There is a fine line between being
charitable and allowing oneself to be taken for a sucker.

Organized crime

Extortion and protection rackets

Produce and livestock rustling
Existing crime syndicates (mainly cartel marijuana grows)
Large, violent raids on warehouses or distribution centers
Control of warehouses or distribution centers through
corrupt staff to enable skimming of food or other financial
gain.

Organized crime (OC), when it engages in lawful forms of

commerce, enforces business deals, discourages competition, or
encourages favorable behavior on its terms through criminal acts.
Whereas a legitimate business may file suit in a dispute, a mobster
will just break your kneecaps. Cartels, mobsters, or just criminals
who banded together will have no problem using violence, theft, or
arson to profit or survive.
Organized crime, after a fashion, was on the frontier. We look at it
as a game of bad cowboys and gunmen against the homesteading
rancher; range wars. Tactics that would be regarded as intimidation
and terrorism were used to force homesteaders off of their lawfully
possessed land. Cattle were stolen and not just by your stereotypical
outlaw rustler but large concerns that didn’t want the little guy’s
competition over rangeland or water.
 Northern California, long a haven for illicit marijuana grows,
has seen cartels move in and take over from the “hippies” of the
past. They steal water from farms and ranches or illegally divert
streams. Anyone who interferes with them can be threatened or
attacked. Hikers are in danger if they stumble across a grow in the
forest. Internal violence can spill over into the community. Children
and others are smuggled across the border to work as virtual slaves
servicing the grows.
These conditions exist now, under the radar, in many places
across the USA. It will only grow worse as law enforcement abilities
deteriorate. Currently, marijuana growers are mainly associated with
Mexican, Chinese, Hmong, or Russian organized crime. Any
organized crime group, from the traditional mafia to upstarts who
decide to band together after SHTF, can become a threat.
Marijuana grows are the danger now, but if the cash crop
shifts to food, organized crime will follow. Imagine you find that the
mysterious farm next door has tapped into your well or irrigation
system. You remove the hookup and replace the parts, only to find it
replaced the next week with a death threat note. After the second
time you remove everything, you are shot at by someone in the
woods. What do you do then?
In one of my hopefully upcoming EMP series novels, I wrote a
scene where a cartel crew shows up to harvest an orchard at night.
A force of hired hands or slaves does the labor while gunmen make
sure that farmers don’t resist. Since this is fiction and I gave my
characters every possible benefit that can be based in reality, it’s a
slaughter for the bad guys. Real world? Even odds that you can
even match the numbers of gunmen let alone prevail. A single
farmer or family will not last long against a depraved enemy that
outnumbers them.
OC elements may engage in extortion or protection rackets. If
you buy black market fertilizer, for example, the seller may demand
more money or barterable goods or he will turn you over to the ration
police. Perhaps if you stop buying from him at his inflated prices, bad
things will happen to you. Protection can be another form of extortion
where if one doesn't pay the bribe, the coercer may steer whoever
he was protecting you from to your property. Of course the protection
money could be just to protect you from him.
The best way of avoiding trouble with organized crime is to
have no dealings with it in the first place. If you dally with their world,
you become a part of it. Always use legitimate marketplaces and
sources of supply. Never pay extortion or protection money; defend
your life and your property instead. Do not do illegal things with
people who will blackmail you. Giving into their demands encourages
them and extortionists do not willingly stop.

Community level risks

Everybody is worried about wandering into a community
controlled by a tightfisted half-crazy dictator or a religious nut. No
one wants to live in Jonestown, next to the Branch Davidians, or the
town The Governor ran in The Walking Dead. There are also
manmade and natural hazards to be concerned about as
infrastructure crumbles and mitigation staff may leave.
Some examples of obvious physical hazards are:

Nuclear power plants, particularly downwind of them.

Prisons, work camps, or youth detention facilities.
In flood-prone areas or below dams that require intensive
maintenance to avoid failure.
Mines that may flood and/or leach toxic chemicals.
High fire danger area (do not expect the usual all-hands fire
response).
Summer camps, resorts, campgrounds, and RV parks that
will be flooded with past vacationers.

Refugees, lines of drift, and mass exodus

In a riot or disaster, people will seek comfort. Friends, family,
or hotels are their desired refuges. Proper campgrounds for those
with trailers will be secondary destinations. Once those options are
gone, the late comers and the desperate will set up camps or
shanties wherever they can find room. This is something I detail
more in Suburban Defense.
 I am not in the camp who expects cities to empty out once
SHTF. Cities are where the jobs, resources, and people are. Due to
the concentration of people, aid will be routed first to cities. People
will be reluctant to flee cities and their homes where they are familiar
for the strange countryside. Short of a wartime evacuation, “the
golden horde” of refugees heading for rural areas like locusts has not
occurred.
In a civil war type situation, people will flee for wherever they
won’t die. This becomes a refugee crisis. Red Cross shelters,
campgrounds, or ad hoc refugee camps will be where people will go.
The more prepared types may seek public land to setup camp on. As
things break down and those of lesser means seek anywhere that
they aren’t in danger, random encampments may popup anywhere.
For those within driving distance of a big city, this is a problem.
At the far end of the spectrum, a total collapse situation where
food has run out will see many who are not self-sufficient moving
from any city or town into the countryside. This will be a problem for
those who are within walking distance from any city or town. Not so
much further out especially as the gas supply dwindles. This is the
most dangerous type of exodus: hungry and desperate people who
may victimize the “better off” rural types; the so-called “golden
horde.”
The “golden horde” danger seems to be exaggerated and more
of a fear than reality. In the Ukrainian Holodomor (famine), the
countryside didn’t empty out into the better-off cities. People certainly
headed to the cities to find work and food, but not en mass.
In Argentina, their economic troubles brought looters and
truck hijackers to the country, not starving masses. For a Syrian
refugee crisis, it took active work by military forces and a brutal war
to drive people out. This was more politics than spontaneous
pressure. As bad as things got in the Middle East during the mid-
2010s crisis, many people stayed in war-torn cities.
As the Siege of Sarajevo shows, many people will stay in the
city until its too late (see Hurricane Katrina). Using COVID as an
example, people were too stupid to see what was coming and ended
up fighting over toilet paper in the grocery store. Most people have
zero ability to think through the second and third order effects of a
crisis to reach a conclusion like “we should evacuate the city.” The
Superdome wouldn’t have happened if that was the case.
Famine is not an overnight event. Critical utilities, supply
chains, and civil order breakdown over time, not instantly. Refugees
are likely to trickle out of the city over time or in distinct waves.
Failing a widespread war or city-leveling disaster, hundreds of
thousands of people will not willingly uproot themselves at once,
even in dire circumstances.
Rather, I expect that the numbers of refugees will steadily but
slowly increase until one day a critical mass is noticed. Clay Martin’s
three phases of a refugee crisis are a good thesis on this idea.[6]
Most will probably settle in the first area that promises some level of
safety and sustainment rather than endlessly continue on, plundering
as they go.
Using the Hurricane Katrina example, once a city becomes totally
uninhabitable and unsustainable, those who remain will leave. These
people will be bedraggled and come out at their own pace unless
they are being chased out. I say this because everyone’s endurance
level is different. What might prompt a prepared person to finally
leave is different from an unprepared and desperate person.
A line of drift is any path that people travel on; roads, Interstates,
trails, or other features that facilitate movement. These are paths of
least resistance. Most commonly this will be smaller roadways and
freeways/Interstates. Major roads and highways leading directly from
metropolitan or exurban areas are the greatest risk. Evacuating
hordes, roving scavengers, or bandits will stick to these routes for
the ease of travel they provide. The further you are from a major line
of drift, the better.
A nuclear war probably would drive many out of a city ahead of
the exchange and generate a tsunami of refugees after the attack.
Imagine a hurricane evacuation but more chaotic and condensed
into hours instead of 1-2 days. It is believed that the Russian and
Chinese strategies are to target cities (counter-value) rather than
missile silos or strictly military targets. Otherwise, disasters happen
gradually.
Like the 1930s mass migration out of the Dust Bowl, large
numbers of emigrants from cities may arrive in rural areas.
Spreading this movement over time allows the community to absorb
or mitigate the effects of the newcomers and gives some a chance to
move on. In any case, local resources will be under strain and
camps may need to be setup. The character, desperation, and
increased number of persons will naturally lead to an uptick in crime.
So rather than taking an approach like flood control to refugees, I
recommend looking at managing them and buffering their impact on
your community. Many lessons can be learned from the various
refugee crises in the world. Why should we expect that the American
urban refugee experience will be somehow different than any other
place in the world? (For more information on handling refugees,
please see that chapter in Suburban Defense.)

Hispanics and Mexican cartels

Before we talk about demographics, we need to talk about land.

Mexican drug cartels often launder money through American
agricultural companies. By using cutouts or proxy owners of produce
companies drug money is used as investment capitol in these
businesses. This means that the land of a large fruit company right
next to your rural home could actually be owned by a drug cartel
vicariously. Nevermind an illegal marijuana grow in greenhouses.
Major growing/packing/shipping companies in your grocery store are
in this situation.
In my EMP novel, Hard Favored Rage, one of the central plot
points and the climax revolves around a Mexican drug cartel that is
creating a forward operating base on the outskirts of a predominately
Hispanic community. This was Oxnard, California, which in reality is
an exurban community, surrounded by farms, and dedicated to
agricultural and light industrial activity. In 2020, 66.2% of the
population identified as Hispanic or Latino of any race. I don't have
the figures, but a large portion is foreign-born and speaks limited to
no English.
Oxnard is nearly half a million people in size, so I don’t expect it
to be entirely taken over by cartel elements. Yet as gangs have
“control” over some neighborhoods, in the absence of police I would
expect cartels, or something like them, to establish hegemony over a
part of the city. Smaller towns are certainly at risk.
Agricultural towns with a high population of Hispanics who are
primarily engaged in low-wage agricultural work typically come from
a similar background in Mexico or Central/South America. Their
families likely lived in a similar state for centuries. Until the late 20th
century, this was peonage. In many respects—culturally, politically,
and economically—these people are peasants. A peasantry is
beholden to their employers and those that can protect them.
Without the safety net of police and a welfare state, there is a major
danger of the labor class reverting to strong-man rule.
Many of these people have few skills or resources. Spanish, or
even native Mexican dialects, may be their only language. They do
not have the same tradition of freedom, rugged individualism, and
independence that Americans do. In times of hardship, these groups
are at the greatest risk of siding with whoever will protect and feed
them. Terrorism is another option.
I fully expect cartels to be the nucleus of organized criminal
activity post-SHTF in the Southwest. In Mexico they’ve already
branched out from drugs into other legitimate business ventures.
Most notably the avocado shortage of early 2022 was caused by
cartels threatening USDA inspectors. In a famine, food will become
the largest commodity and naturally the criminals will latch on to it for
profit.
The field-level American agriculture has been taken over by
Hispanics in many places for the most part. The Grapes of Wrath is
now history. The areas and communities most at risk for cartel
domination are those with a lot of Hispanics in agriculture especially
if the worker population is resident and not migrant. Areas near the
Mexican border or near majority-Hispanic communities are also at
risk for spillover effects.
I would predict that a power base would be established by a
cartel in a small city or town that is predominately low-class
Hispanic. The labor force would then be used for agriculture and the
produce exported. A degree of serfdom or even slavery may be
expected. More vicious elements may begin to raid, extort, conquer,
or dominate nearby non-Hispanic communities.
 I don’t wish to pick on Hispanics. I’ve found that their culture is
one of honor and respect in a lot of cases, far more so than inner city
cultures. Middle-class Hispanics are a lot like generational
Americans and in many cases they have integrated nearly
completely. The lower classes tend to have more issues stemming
from poverty and violence as almost any impoverished class would
be. It’s nothing to do with race; it’s all about culture.

Company towns

In a similar vein, company towns may fall prey to actual or

effective control by the dominant industry. To keep a business afloat
in a fully collapsed economy, checks may be replaced by barterable
goods from the major employer. If this is agriculture, this may be
food, which would then be a powerful mechanism of control. A
similar level of control may be exerted by financiers who acquire
failing farms or businesses that then are beholden to the new owner.
Powerful businessmen, companies, or other organizations with the
resources could leverage their influence on the local economy or
work force to dictate as they see fit.
In James Wesley Rawles novel Survivors, an independent New
Mexican refinery rather benevolently assists with defensive
arrangements. It’s clear that although the owner is a good guy, his
corner on the fuel market gives him tremendous leverage over the
community. The nearby Indian reservation is in a lesser, but similar
situation.
Serfdom is another real possibility. Many people may be forced
into a situation right out of history where they have no other option to
survive than trade their labor for food and protection to a landowner.
This can be a mutually beneficial relationship, labor/security duties
for food and protection, in the short term but can metastasize in the
long run. Such conditions should be regarded as temporary, not
generational, or else survivors may find themselves in the same trap
their ancestors did.

Unlikely threats
 I don’t regard an organized civil war like the first one was as
something probable. Training, equipping, and organizing men is way
too hard. Existing military forces (Army, Marines, and National
Guard) would have to be mobilized and they would fracture if forced
to take a side in a domestic conflict. Besides, if actual armies are
forming up with proper organization, the only way you are surviving
is though your own army or luck; not this book.
The same goes for an invasion by China or Russia (unlikely). A
foreign invasion all the way across the Pacific would require such
effort and resources that it would be nearly impossible. Even then,
even a decimated US Navy could render the invasion fleet toothless.
The only way foreign troops are entering the US is through an
invitation from, say, a communist California.
The “rifle behind every blade of grass” statement would be
true as Americans would fight a guerilla war that would make the
invasion unpalatable at home. Instead, a destabilized and
domestically devastated America would probably be stripped for
resources, by Americans, eager to take foreign money.
Now a guerilla war against a tyrannical government is more
possible than the other two. things might get bad enough that while
the country is no longer governable, the authorities can still wield
elements of traditional military power against their political
opponents. However, this is a defense series so you’ll have to get
your guerilla warfare stuff from somewhere else.
I don’t see a communist uprising that targets the rural land
owner as likely, but that doesn’t mean that political killings won’t
occur. Whatever the reason, there still could be assassinations and
terror killings over X cause, which could be anything divisive from
politics to race. This would include retaliation, directly for a wrong or
indirectly, such as class envy. Or, to encourage the others: foster
forced compliance through killing over minor offenses to set an
example that “you could be next” if you step out of line with the
demands of the dominant group.

Enclaves
 An enclave is a community that is either physically closed to entry
by outsiders or actively excludes them from entry. In normal times,
only private property and gated communities can legally do this.
Social exclusion is another factor but it is not legal to prohibit
someone who is not like you from buying private property and
moving in. Note that ostracization of outsiders or those that don’t fit
in are a real problem for those looking to relocate.
Small towns may be great places if you are a native or have
integrated, but as a newcomer you may not be trusted. Some
examples of places that are or will become quite restrictive to
commerce, passage through, or any association with non-members
are:

Military bases.
Predominately Hispanic agricultural communities (see
above).
Areas with high densities of a single, fringe religious group
(Mormon fundamentalists, Mennonites, cults).
Indian reservations may exclude outsiders from even
passing through on public highways.
Prepper communities like the million-dollar bunker facilities.
Resort or gated communities.
Organic: those in an easily closed-off area united by
geography may choose to exclude outsiders for their
defense.

Risky people

The best indicators as to what neighbors are going to be a threat

during SHTF is probably socioeconomic. Low class people have less
cushion to absorb deprivations and may also be in a low class
position due to lifestyle choices that lead to poverty. An example
would be low-income welfare recipients who exhibit little care for
their property, owned or rented. People can be poor and on welfare
but still have personal pride and respect. “Whoever can be trusted
with very little can also be trusted with much.” Poverty used to mean
resourcefulness and self-reliance. That’s been bred out of a lot of
folks.
Also beware of neighbors with poor social behavior. These
people are often rude, foul mouthed, and have interpersonal
relationship problems. Often the police are frequently over to deal
with domestic, drug, or mental health issues. Look for residents who
openly display gang and cartel death cult (Santa Muerta) symbology.
If you have had problems with neighbors before beware of old
grudges flaring up. Privation and envy may exacerbate old wounds.
No law and order to stop things is another hazard. Someone may
decide that the end of the world as we know it is the perfect time to
settle scores.
 Self-Defense Legalities
SHTF: Shit Hits the Fan.[7] Any emergency event that deviates
from our normal condition of civil order beyond a limited disaster and
implies a partial or total collapse of law and order.

WROL: Without the Rule of Law. This is a situation where police

and courts are non-existent; a total collapse of law and order.
Criminals will not be arrested and prosecuted. It is the law of the
jungle; kill or be killed; only the fittest survive. This situation is
essentially lawless and resembles war more than a disaster.

Grid down: A disaster or situation where nationally or across

your region the utility and communications systems collapse totally,
along with the supply chain. There is no electricity, city water,
Internet, phones, nor distribution of groceries, fuel, or other
essentials. You must be self-sufficient to survive.

Self-defense and justifiable homicide laws govern when you can

use force and what kind. The key is proportionality; was the force
you used reasonable to stop the offense? That is what a judge and
jury will look at. What might seem like the end of the world to you
might not actually be, so any extreme circumstances you find
yourself in may not be “weapons free” for kinetic solutions.
This chapter is merely a general introduction to broad
concepts. I am not an attorney nor qualified to speak expertly on any
state’s laws. I caution everyone to have a thorough understanding of
their local self-defense laws and take a class on them from an
attorney or licensed concealed carry instructor.
If you are in a true without the rule of law (WROL) situation,
there is nothing but force to stop you from doing what you need to
do. Conversely, this is true for other defenders who may mistake you
for an aggressor. Criminals who were previously restrained by fear of
the law or being caught will be more aggressive without that
controlling influence.
 Rural defense will be a gradual and gray-area blend of military
tactics and regular self-defense laws. Acting in the most prudent, but
restrained, manner and guided by morality is the best way to go. If
you can spare lives, do so, but take no chances. Weigh your plans in
both the eye of the law and from the historical/moral perspective of
survival. Do not kill because you can nor be afraid of defending
yourself because of the consequences. You must be alive to be
indicted.

Note: Portions of this chapter are excerpted from the same titled
chapter from Suburban Defense. Please see that chapter in full. The
material here as been condensed and revised for a rural context.

Justifiable (or excusable) homicide is killing when it is

necessary to do so for a greater good; i.e. in self-defense, rather
than maliciously (murder) or negligently (manslaughter). Most states
define it as: “the killing of a human being in necessary self-defense.”
This includes use of deadly force, even if the person does not die.
The killing must be necessary to prevent an immediate
danger of death or serious injury against you, a family member, or a
third person in your presence. What constitutes immediate risk of
death or serious injury? Examples are:

Shot at or a weapon is aimed at you.

Violent, tumultuous, or surreptitious entry or attempted
entry to your home.
A weapon is brandished with other factors to make you fear
it will be used.
Immediate, actionable threats to inflict death or great bodily
injury.
Weapons are openly visible, concealed weapons are
"flashed" (shirt lifted exposing the butt of a pistol), or
statements/actions indicate the aggressors are armed ("I
have a gun" or a gun-shape in a coat pocket).
The aggressor has no legal authority to use force.

Merely claiming a bare fear is not enough to justify killing. You

must have actually been afraid and the circumstances and evidence
must support this. Credible threats with immediate danger of them
being carried out are also generally justifiable. Future harm is
generally not considered justifiable no matter how great the threat of
harm is.
You cannot create a situation where it becomes necessary to
exercise self-defense. This could be an issue at say a roadblock
where you attempt resist allowing something through and the
situation escalates to violence.
Public roads are considered open to anyone and detaining or
blocking the way of a traveler is illegal. Only authorities are allowed
to do this and then only under specific circumstances as checkpoints
and roadblocks are governed by statutes and case law. Using any
physical force to compel compliance would be totally illegal. Even if
fired upon, without legal standing to stop people, shooting back
could be considered murder. Roadblocks are a WROL situation only.
Warning shots in a rural area have been used frequently in
the past and abroad but are legally risky if someone is hit. The
danger of an errant shot needs to be considered, even if shooting on
one’s own property is legal. A warning shot may be considered
provocation or a threat. Methods such as “shoot the cover” or
confirmation shots may not be considered legally justified under self-
defense laws.
Disproportionate force is frowned upon if not prohibited. The
principle is that you will only use that force which is necessary to
resist the offense. Reasonable force to protect property would be like
grabbing someone and escorting them away or restraining them so
they can’t do any more damage. Someone who is trying to hurt you,
but not kill you, could receive more force, such as being hit, kicked,
or shot with a Taser.
Recon by fire, which is shooting into a suspected hiding place,
is not legal. Shooting fireworks or some other potentially injurious
thing into an enemy position could also be construed as criminal.
You may wish to consider using hand-thrown OC (pepper spray),
flashbangs, or smoke grenades. That way should injuries occur, you
can argue that you attempted to use reasonable force.
There is a time and a place for aggressive violence and
pulling out all the stops to kill bad guys. It is a tactical and a legal
consideration where the realities of life must be judged before the
incident occurs. A rancher on the Southern Border may have
problems with the cartel but he can’t go out hunting smugglers on his
ranch as long as the federal government is extant and has any kind
of powers.

No trespassing

In the premiere episode of The Walking Dead there is a notable

scene where Rick is sheltering in a house and zombies are milling
around on the lawn. The undead wife of a fellow survivor keeps
coming to the door. Rick could shoot the zombies on the lawn; on the
contrary, even in a full-on Mad Max world you can’t blast suspicious
people for crossing the property line.
It can be argued that a person has the right to innocently
come up to your door even for a “stupid” reason like just wanting to
tell the owner they had a nice house. Generally going to a front door
and knocking isn’t seen as trespassing or legally as anything
nefarious. However, your argument that the intruder was just that is
strengthened by the “visitor” jumping a locked gate. Crossing a fence
line or two cross makes it look even worse for someone who ignored
both just to come to your door uninvited.
Put up no trespassing signs, even if you live on a small
property, to help your argument that an intruder was trespassing,
should you need to use force. The warning sign and a good lawyer
may sway a jury into agreeing that the intruder had no lawful
business there and was forewarned. “Well ladies and gentlemen, the
alleged victim climbed a five-strand barbed wire fence and then
jumped a four-foot chainlink fence, bypassing two locked gates and
two ‘no trespassing’ signs. He does not live in the area and the
reason he claimed he was going to the door was unsubstantiated.”
Very few, if any, states have statutes allowing justifiable homicide
against trespassers. Most states have “castle doctrines” that allow
you to use force against someone who unlawfully enters, or is trying
to enter, your home and you can reasonably apprehend they want to
do you some violence. We are about 150 years removed from the
days when an Indian or bandit creeping over a fence could simply be
shot on sight with zero repercussions.
Trespassing is ultimately a property crime and is considered a
non-violent offense. The situation in America hasn’t devolved to the
point where we can use preemptive justifiable homicide. Preemptive
justifiable homicide would be shooting a man dressed in all black, at
night, who is sneaking around your barn. You would argue you had
to shoot him because if he stole your cow and your food, you would
starve. Nope, not in semi-normal America.
WROL, no one is going to be able to stop you from shooting
someone trespassing who looks suspicious. With the rule of law, you
can’t do that. Morally you shouldn’t necessarily shoot first and ask
questions later. It makes perfect tactical sense to engage from a
distance, but in a real defensive situation you will need to
investigate. This might mean getting close to the person, but not too
close, and challenging them.
In any use of force situation you will be required to explain
why you felt that the other person was a threat. Under current law,
you can’t shoot a trespasser. After SHTF, that person might be just
passing through, he could be stealing, or he could be coming to kill
you. You don’t know and that’s why the law doesn’t allow you to
presume things from someone’s behavior.
Regardless of the rule of law at the moment, you need to be
able to positively identify your target. You don’t want to accidentally
shoot the neighbor’s kid crossing your back field as he’s dropping off
some homemade jam just because you saw him climb a fence with a
slung rifle. A totally unidentified person crossing your perimeter with
a gun is another matter. Perhaps he is sneaking through the bushes,
trying to go unseen, or there is half a dozen of them doing the same
thing at once. Justifiable homicide is about what you can articulate
about the danger posed.

WROL

Most post-apocalyptic fantasies take place after the world as we

know it has ended (TEOTWAWKI). With no law enforcement or
justice system, no one can stop you or punish you from doing
whatever you want. If someone wants to stop you, they must
physically prevent you, restrain you, or kill you. The protagonists
always use this for good, even if their methods may be a bit
unorthodox and contrary to the law today. What happens in fiction
doesn’t translate to normal life.
What is Without the rule of law (WROL)? Law enforcement and
the criminal justice system have completely failed and are totally
absent. Individual citizens are responsible for their defense and the
law serves as no deterrent. Crimes go unpunished by the traditional
governmental systems and those acting in self-defense may utilize
means generally illegal during normal times.
What is more likely is a combination of ineffective policing or
temporary chaos. These two situations share the very real possibility
that excesses were discovered, investigated, and prosecuted once
things stabilized. Many war criminals committed their acts on the
assumption their side would win; don’t assume that you can shoot or
whatever without consequences and nothing will ever happen. To
stay out of trouble, use existing self-defense laws and your morality
to guide your responses.
Remember that which is permissible WROL is far different
from when there is a functioning justice system. Always weigh your
actions carefully in how reasonable they are at the time and how
they will be viewed after the fact. If you go too far, even without the
law, you may be lynched for excesses.

Best practices

Before using force, consider the following:

Could I use force if things were normal?
Is the person actually presenting a threat that I can
explain to other people?
Is there another way to get this person to leave me
alone?

Self-defense and justifiable homicide laws should be

obeyed as much as possible.
 Only use force in a direct response to a use of force against
you or the imminent, threatened use of force.
On any attempt to break into a house or set it on fire.
Lethal force should only be used when death or serious
injury would result.

Force should be proportionate to the threat and used

sparingly as a last resort.
Aimed weapons should be used directly against specific
persons who are engaged in actions that pose an
immediate threat of death or serious injury.
In WROL, this could be expanded to agitators and
serious property damage.
Aimed weapons (lethal or not) can be used judiciously to
discourage certain individuals from crossing perimeters or
engaging in actions that may escalate the risk of death or
injury.
Firearms used indiscriminately should only be used against
crowds as a last resort.
Area weapons should be used to disperse crowds, stop
rushes against barricades, defenders, and victims, or in
concentrations of aggressors who are presenting the
greatest threat.

Are We Without the Rule of Law (WROL) Yet?

WROL is the absence of government authority and a

reversion to an uncivilized world; a total collapse of law and order.
Criminals will not be arrested and prosecuted. It is the law of the
jungle; kill or be killed; only the fittest survive. This situation is
essentially lawless and resembles war more than a disaster.
We are not there yet. While some groups can get away with
criminal activity due to social and political pressures, the law abiding
cannot yet resort to measures that the law does not frown upon.
Take for instance Antifa vandalizing businesses or a home of
someone that offended the woke mob. You can’t just shoot them or
even use civilian-available riot control agents. In most jurisdictions if
you act in anything other than immediate self-defense, you will be
prosecuted. We saw Kyle Rittenhouse, who was in actual mortal
danger, prosecuted and persecuted by a woke DA.
Store owners facing organized snatch-and-grab operations or
flash looting mobs can’t shoot the criminals. Yet police don’t arrive in
time and might only catch a fraction of suspects. Prosecutors in
some sick “restorative justice” scheme may not even press charges,
reduce the charges, or offer weak plea bargains.
We live in a society where we’ve determined that using lethal
force or certain methods are inappropriate for defending property
alone. None of us want to see shoplifter’s hands chopped off, as
effective as it might be. Being civilized gives us the advantage of not
taking drastic measures against criminals. We revere the justice
system, where a dumb kid can get a book thrown at him instead of
lead. A lot of adult criminals eventually get it together after some
time in jail, even though it might take a couple of trips to Graybar
University before they shape up. Old England’s “everything’s a
felony” where the death penalty was possible for something like 200
crimes is what this country moved away from.
This “soft” approach to crime requires a civilized society
where police are expected to enforce the law, catch criminals, and
the criminal justice system actually prosecute and punish crooks.
Until this century, our country did a pretty good job of this. The three
strikes law really did cut down on crime, but we’ve forgotten all the
lessons we learned in two hundred years and threw them out in favor
of squishiness.
Squishy police, courts, and laws have brought us to where we
are. Poor masses are antagonized into this behavior by those with a
political agenda. It is us, the law abiding, who suffer for it. We must
standby and be victims. We are told the courts will handle it, but they
don’t. If we attempt to deal with it ourselves, we risk legal
persecution and being turned into a pariah by the Jacobian media
and political elements.
Some call this condition without the rule of law because equal
application of the law is being deprived namely to the law abiding. I
disagree with this assertion. What we are seeing is the early stages
of the rule of law breaking down, not living in WROL scenario. I
wouldn’t even say criminals are living WROL because they have
always operated outside the law; for most of them legal
consequences are a cost of doing business and jail inconvenience
no greater than being broken is to the rest of us.
While effective punishment might be off the table, police still
provide enough of dissuading force to discourage the worst
excesses. People will do what they feel they can get away with and
habitual criminals will offend anyway. Until police go away, crime is
somewhat restrained. When the restraining influence of police is
gone, then we will see the violence and breadth of crime escalate.
A time is coming when police will desert because they aren’t
getting paid and conditions are too dangerous, physically or legally,
for them to do their job. The police are the enforcement arm for the
criminal justice system. Until they are off the job, there isn’t a WROL
scenario. The law abiding citizen will then feel free to respond to
crime as he sees fit (there will be excesses). When both sides no
longer have any restraint and the criminal justice system is
functionally, not just morally, ineffective, then we are WROL.
A lot of this is nitpicking in conversation. The rule of law is
breaking down; we are not without it. This in between stage, which
will get worse, is the hardest part. Law abiding citizens will be
subjected to terror and loss with little recourse, either by their own
hands or under the law. But in every revolt, revolution, or collapse, a
point comes when the law can neither restrain the criminal nor the
citizen. That day will be a terrible one. Unfortunately, we must learn
hard lessons through experience before we can return to peaceful
times.
 Force Multiplying Technology
Technology is a force multiplier. Manpower will be your
dearest resource and leveraging technology to spread your men
where they are most effective is critical. For instance, rather than
burning people out on OP/LP[8] (watch) duty, use sensors and
cameras to keep watch.

Communications

Radios are more important in a rural area than in an urban one.

The lower density and greater distances mean that it is not practical
to send a runner or easily figure out what’s going on. Neighbors will
have to alert each other and coordinate via radio if cell phones are
not viable (and even then radios are better for urgent situations).
Tactical communications are obvious but ordinary communications
and even limited broadcasting will take the place of what is usually
done via texts and social media for general information exchange.

Radio band types

UHF: Usually in the 400 MHz range and often found in the non-
ham radios commonly available in stores (GMRS and FRS). For
hams, this includes the 70cm AKA 440 MHz band (Technician-level
amateur operator license required at minimum). GMRS requires a
$35 license without a test. Some GMRS radio models are also
somewhat customizable. This is for short range (<5 miles)
communication.

VHF: Usually in the 30-200 MHz range for civilian radios. The 2m
band requires a Technician-level amateur operator license at a
minimum. MURS (Multi-Use Radio Service) is unlicensed. This is for
short range (<5 miles) communication.
 HF/shortwave: Usually 26.965-27.405 MHz for CB (unlicensed)
and 28.000-29.700 for the 10m amateur band. You will need a
General or Amateur Extra-level amateur license for this generally or
use CB. This is for medium range (10-30 mile) communication.
Maximum legal wattage is 4 watts, which won’t reach far, but if you
buy illegal amplifiers, you can increase power to a CB radio base
station to reach out around 30 miles or so under the right conditions.

As recommended in Suburban Defense, I recommend dual-band

ham radios or GMRS for any rural defenders. They are common,
easily sourced, and fairly easy to use. The licenses are easy to get
as well. Vehicle radios would be best for mobile communications as
they are higher wattage units with larger and higher mounted
antennas.
CB radio is a second choice because they offer less tactical
accessories and have generally been a dumping ground for trashy
and profane users since they have been so cheap and widely
available. Find out what is common in your community because CB
radio may already be in common use.
Long distance radio communication will be impossible for most.
The most common types of radios that civilians will be using are
VHF/UHF ham and GMRS radios. Business band radios also fall into
this category. With portable HTs (handheld transceivers) running at
about 5W (watts) and vehicle radios at 50W, communications will be
short range. At ground level, in moderately hilly terrain, expect 1-2
mile range for HTs and about 10 for vehicle units.
These radios are all line of sight and terrain dependent. You
can get really lucky and hit someone further away or you might be
well within range and yet blocked by a high bluff or something.
VHF/UHF communications are poor at ground level over large
operating areas for these reasons. Flat terrain will not have the same
issues, nor will persons who have altitude on their side with no
obstructions, but in the varied topography that makes up a lot of the
nation, line of sight communication of more than a few miles will be
tough.
I recommend a home GMRS 50Wbase station and at least
one car with a 50W mobile radio. This would replace a cell phone
when driving around town when the grid is down. Each family
member would have a GMRS walkie-talkie; the older folks would get
the more expensive models with longer antennas and the kids would
get the bubble pack ones when they go play down the street. To talk
to friends or relatives across the county, this would be done with a
CB radio mounted on the house.
As mentioned in the previous books, CB radio or 10m ham
radio is a more viable alternative for medium distance contacts. The
frequency range (band) that these radios operate in works better
over longer distances and hilly terrain. They are not magic and
cannot overcome all obstructions but could reach out over 20 miles
with the right antenna, a powerful base unit, and cooperative terrain.
A drawback is that to get this kind of range the radio must be vehicle
mounted or in a home base unit.
If you cannot have an antenna tower, install a high-gain full
wavelength VHF/UHF antenna on the top of the house (usually
about seven feet tall). The higher an antenna is placed, the better
reception it will get. I’ve communicated over a 12-mile radius (appx.
500sqm) in fairly level urban terrain using such an antenna with a
50W UHF radio.

Repeaters

Repeaters are what enable easy communication in bad

terrain. I’ve helped setup repeaters for drug interdiction teams
searching the mountains for hidden marijuana grows that permit the
teams to communicate with each other and dispatch. When officers
might be ambushed by automatic rifle toting cartel guards, being
able to call for help and communicate with your teammates is vital.
Those with the technical ability, the funds, and most importantly
the terrain can and should consider installing a repeater. Repeaters
for ham bands, business bands, and GMRS frequencies are all
available. Currently FCC licensing is needed, but that is not a
particular burden to an experienced radio hobbyist. There will always
be someone who can help get one set up if you get involved with the
local amateur radio community.
 What precludes a lot of repeater installations is real estate.
Repeater and antenna locations on mountain peaks can be quite
lucrative. This puts a lot of repeaters beyond the financial reach of
most people. Now if you have land on hilly terrain, own a small hilltop
or peak, or even have something like a silo, you can put in a
repeater.
Even small repeaters can have great effects on local
communications. The higher an antenna is, the greater range and
propagation the radio or repeater will get. Economical models with
unobtrusive antennas may be what allows you and your neighbors to
effectively radio each other. If you think a repeater may be beneficial
and you have the place for it, connect with your local ham radio
community to see what can be done. Someone may pay for the
equipment, installation, and power just to be allowed to put one in on
your property.

Distress calls

In a world where phones are down and your neighbors aren’t

right next door, calling for help in an emergency will be difficult. This
is partially why raiders will be drawn to the country; help is long in
coming and isolated properties might be attacked with the aftermath
going undiscovered for days. Even with landline and cellular phones,
lines may be cut, signals may be jammed (a real threat in rural South
Africa), and cell towers may be sabotaged.
A radio plan, not just for ordinary communication and operations
among neighbors, has to be created. Specifically a designated “help”
frequency that anyone can get on and use. This should be monitored
24/7 in each home and especially by members of your rapid reaction
force. Your 911 call will be a “mayday” on the radio help channel. In
aviation, this is known as the “guard” channel or CB channels 9/19
and Marine VHF Channel 16. For amateur radio, this would be the
common calling channels[9] though local repeaters may be more
popular choices for hams.
A “mayday” call consists of starting with the proword “Mayday”
three to six times, followed by the location, nature of emergency,
persons in danger, and help needed. Anyone hearing a mayday
should answer the call (until a more competent authority can take
over coordination), record the information, and either get help started
or provide aid themselves.
An alternative in a denser area would be some sort of siren or
bell. Sets of three closely spaced sounds are a universal emergency
signal. Airhorns would be ideal, with bells, or hammering on a piece
of pipe that resonates like a bell as alternatives. Three gunshots 1-3
seconds apart in a set of three is also recognized. A community
rapid reaction force could be summoned by a local volunteer fire
department siren.

Jamming (against you)

Cell phone and radio jammers (already in use in South African

farm attacks). Use of these requires sophistication and coordination.
Multi-spectrum jammers are very difficult to obtain in the US but
could be seen if the federal government collapses, allowing imports
from China. Cartels and organized crime already use these.
A low-tech version of this would be listening to a scanner to
determine what frequency you are using and then mashing the key
of a more powerful radio to overpower your transmission. In
Suburban Warfare we discuss some methods of mitigating the
effects of jamming but a quick and easy way of signaling help is a
flare or firework.

Night vision

Author’s note: see Suburban Defense for a detailed and

description of night vision devices and employment.

The first and most common type of night vision device is the
infrared image intensification unit. This is the traditional green tube
which uses light sensitive tubes to brighten up what you are seeing.
A variation of this is digital intensification which is far cheaper, but
also inferior. These are basically digital camera sensors with a
screen. I wouldn’t waste the money on these and a better solution for
similar money to top of the line digital sensors (Sionyx brand) exist;
see below.
 You can’t wear a PVS-14 monocular and put your head
behind the “night vision compatible” red dot scope. If you are using
worn night vision devices like goggles or a monocular, mount a
laser/illuminator on your weapon to aim with. In rural areas, the
ambient lighting will be lower and a quality long-distance illuminator
is required for proper target illumination at a distance in a way that a
separate IR flashlight can’t do. I specifically mean buy the civilian
PEQ-15 (EoTech ATPIAL-C), B.E Meyers MAWL-C, or Steiner DBAL
with IR illuminator.
Buy once, cry once. Someone I know made the mistake of
buying a laser only unit and while it’s adequate for neighborhood
use, they can’t use it to throw an IR spotlight on stuff. Having an
additional dual mode visible/IR flashlight on a rifle is great, but they
created a buy twice/cry twice trap for themselves. Live and learn.
Adversaries equipped with night vision will be more common in
rural areas because the extra effort required to get there and attack
there will tend to self-select the more prepared thugs. You may not
be facing raiders, but groups who prepared just enough to target
your rural property and take it over as their base. I wrote just such a
scenario in Hard Favored Rage.
There are several countermeasures for this. The first is thermal
imaging (sometimes called FLIR, a brand name) which also can be
cheaper. Thermal imaging also operates in the infrared spectrum of
light but is not a light intensifier. Instead it displays heat signatures,
which can make it easier to identify someone moving behind
concealment like tree cover. In wooded country I would have one of
these. You see identifiable shapes instead of having to figure out if
the green shadow is just a trick of the light or actually is a bad guy.
Various models exist from pocket sized imagers to weapon
sights and worn googles/monoculars. For a cheap option, a small
imager can be had for less than $1,000 and can tell you if someone
is creeping around in the dark. I’d buy these over a cheap image
intensifier if I was on a budget. At least you can tell if someone is out
there or not.
If you want to be able to shoot in the dark passively, a thermal
rifle sight is great and probably better than a night vision monocular
mounted on a rail in-line with a NV compatible sight. Image
intensifiers have to be focused for whatever range you intend to
shoot at if you are shooting passively. Neither type of weapon sight
can be used to navigate with; holding up a rifle and looking through it
just to see where you are going doesn’t work.
Personally I would recommend using a PVS-14 monocular, a
weapon mounted IR laser/illuminator, and a small thermal scope for
area scanning. If you have the money, use a thermal scope on your
rifle or set up a second gun for that just in case bad guys with night
vision goggles are running around out there.
Returning to countermeasures for adversaries who are at
parity with you, minimalization of infrared emissions is paramount.
They can see the IR lasers and spotlights from your weapon and
target you. You can do the same to them. Using passive modes (just
the scope part) for observation is the answer. If you must shoot with
the laser, the laser should be activated using the momentary mode
on the remote switch only when you are ready to fire. After the shot,
the switch needs to be immediately released and move your position
to evade return fire. They may not see the IR beam but they will see
the muzzle flash.
Drones

I cover drones extensively in Suburban Warfare. For a rural

property owner with a lot of land, having a personal “eye in the sky”
is a game changing force multiplier. Drones can be used to patrol the
perimeter of large properties, although owners may wish to be
judicious in their use to not allow the drone itself to give away
operational security. Drones should not be deployed at fixed times or
patrol in a predictable manner.
Drones have the ability to look straight down and see around
visual obstructions versus line-of-sight only for a static observer.
They can maneuver around terrain, structures, trees, or other visual
obstructions affecting your line of sight. Drones are not restricted to
observations from an aerial static location, as an observer in a high
tower or on a hill is. Nor are they bound to a five to six foot high view
from the ground that a person is. They can go behind obstacles, fly
over buildings, and fly very low to inspect things behind obstacles
like fences. They can easily inspect dangerous or denied areas.
 Some models can be programmed to fly a geofenced path.
Though it would be predictable, regular programmed patrols filming
property may allow for time comparisons to past flights to monitor for
any changes, such as intrusion attempts or a sniper’s hide. I feature
the use of drones being used to the advantage of good guys post-
SHTF in my EMP series of novels.
Not being fixed in space like a high point observation post is
another advantage. A drone can fly around trees or terrain obstacles
to get a better view and even track suspicious persons. Distant
residences or intersections could be scouted in safety from home
without the need to deploy a recon mission.

Awareness

Motion sensors/alarms

Wouldn’t you love to know if a bunch of raiders just turned down

your driveway or a suspicious person is lurking in the blind spot
behind your shed? Dakota Alert™ (a brand name) sensors are just
motion sensors that communicate wirelessly to alert property owners
of driveway traffic or other movement. Long driveways that may not
be visible are the original need that spurred the creation of the
device and are still the primary use for them.
Motion sensors are not a new technology and their
implementation is nothing special. Wireless alert, via radio signals to
a base station, is what distinguishes them (besides outdoor use)
from wired indoor home security systems. Dakota Alert is the brand
name of the eponymous company. Their products are highly
regarded by many in the rural, agricultural, and prepper
communities. Homemade and off-brand alternatives exist.
Motion sensors work in two modes; breaking an infrared light
beam or passive detection. Breaking the light beam is similar to the
“dodge the laser” trope of heist movies but actually the same tech as
in your garage door safety sensor. Passive detection has an infrared
“eye” that “sees” changes in the passive environment, based on
temperature in the infrared spectrum. Both can detect humans on
foot. Magnetic detection (for vehicles) is also an available technology
but it will not alert if a human walks past.
The first use of these devices was to send a chime to the house
when a vehicle entered a rural driveway. A non-security usage was
to announce the arrival of the newspaper, mail, or deliveries. The
security use is obvious. Even short driveways could benefit from a
chime when a vehicle passes. This might wake someone at night or
warn someone who isn’t paying attention.
Certain models can also be installed to watch areas for
movement. Due to the potential for false alarms, I wouldn’t install
these in wooded, highly vegetated, or high-animal traffic areas. They
are ideal for unobstructed areas like yards or choke points where
humans must pass. Range is variable depending on model, terrain,
and placement but 1,000 yards to one mile is possible. There is a lot
of information online how to extend range, use custom antennas,
and alternative power sources.
The devices use radio signals to communicate. The basic
models use an allocated UHF frequency that set off a specific
receiver. MURS models use the VHF Multi-Use Radio Service which
(MURS) you would be familiar with from your bubble pack family
radios. The tones can then be heard on a MURS compatible portable
radio which you may be using to communicate with family on your
property, making the alert receiver easily mobile and does not
require a specialized receiver. MURS band devices are only
available in the United States as radio frequency allocations differ
even in Canada.
Common problems are battery life. Solar models can overcome
this. Another issue is false alarms from stock or wildlife. Family or
employees may also trip the sensors as well. Radio interference is
possible from nearby systems or poorly sited transmitter/receiver
antennas can be troublesome. A proper radio frequency survey of
the intended frequencies should be done in your area and directional
antennas installed as appropriate.
For deployment, get inventive with these things. Nothing says
you can’t stick a sensor alongside a public highway. An electronics
wizard might rig up a sensor suite that can distinguish between the
various locations and illuminate a light on a map for the exact
location that just triggered.

Motion alarms at the end of a short driveway or near the

house itself are last minute warnings.
Set motion alarms at choke points, entry points, along your
perimeter, and throughout your property.
Ensure that siting and sensitivity is such that you do not
generate excessive false alarms as false alarms can induce
alert fatigue so a real alarm goes ignored.

Note: Low-tech versions of trip alerts are covered in the “Booby

Trap” chapter.

Cameras

Weatherproof, infrared capable cameras are a no-brainer.

Wireless models that don’t rely on the Internet also exist and these
can be configured to work over long ranges. A home security system
covering all the angles and entrances to a home is vitally important
as a starting point. You want to be able to see what’s going on
outside your home without having to open a door or stick your head
out a window. A record of the events is important if the criminal
justice system is still functioning.
Cameras should ideally cover not just the exterior of the home,
but film into the yards, driveways, and approaches. Likewise,
perimeter cameras should cover not just the driveway but the
road/street outside as well. See what traffic is like or be able to
identify if the same strange car goes by several times. Consider a
camera at license plate height to clearly identify any vehicles in the
driveway.
Place cameras to cover dead zones or potential avenues of
approach. See who is moving through the back gate or at the weak
point in your perimeter fence. Areas behind buildings or screened by
vegetation can have cameras put in place on poles or something to
watch that area.
 All cameras should record and the recordings should be saved to
a local server within the home. Servers should be locked up in
locked closets or cabinets so burglars can’t just steal the video
evidence of their crimes. While the Internet should never be relied
upon, integrated alert or remote viewing apps should be used and
remote, off-site backup can be used as long as the storage provider
and Internet is available.
Two-way communication devices with integrated video can be
used at gates to visually identify the caller. Specialized devices are
great but not necessary. A remote video camera can cover the gate
and a walkie-talkie could be in a box. Old fashioned field phones
from military surplus retailers can be wired up to ring the house.
Cameras should both be overt and covert. Have a few obvious
cameras out to let any intruders know that you are watching, they
are being recorded, and hopefully deter them. Beyond this, put
redundant cameras out of sight to avoid vandalism. The first thing
any competent and determined attacker would do is blind and
disable any cameras so wireless ones that are not easy to detect are
a good idea.
Infrared cameras often have their own integrated lights but these
are short-range and don’t offer much illumination for large areas.
They can be supplemented with purposeful infrared floodlights or
putting infrared bulbs in motion activated floodlights. These will
illuminate large, open areas and penetrate into vegetation. Keep in
mind that all infrared lights, dim or bright, will be visible to night
vision devices. A cheap night vision detector is a point-and-shoot
camera with an IR lens that anyone can use to see who is not only
using IR cameras but may be using active night vision scopes or IR
lasers.

Game cameras

At first, game cameras seem like an ideal way to keep watch over
property. They are camouflaged, weatherproof, easily mounted, and
motion triggered. First understand that traditional game cameras are
static devices and you must recover the SD card to see what was
captured. This will not provide any real time warning.
 Cellular models that do provide real time alerts direct to your
smartphone are dependent upon the cellular network. These are all
well and good for deer season but useless in a grid-down event. By
the way, who hunts where there is cell coverage? Maybe it’s
expanded a lot where you are or maybe you people on the East
Coast are just used to hunting close to civilization. In the hunting
grounds I know you’re lucky to get enough signal to make an old
fashioned call while standing on top of your truck.
Wi-Fi models are not dependent on the cellular network and
would only require access to your home Wi-Fi network. The problem
is that an Internet connection may be required to route the email or
data to a server. You can power your home Wi-Fi network grid-down,
but there will be no Internet to connect to unless your internet
provider is operating.
You would need to find a model that comes with a screened
device (tablet) that can receive images and video directly from the
camera itself with no Internet intermediary, preferably to a
smartphone app via your own local network with no Internet relay.
The drawback is poor Wi-Fi reception without boosters and special
antennas and high power draws.

Lights

Lights are partially for identification and partially for denying the
concealment that darkness offers. Naturally intruders will want to use
darkness and shadow to hide their approach. Lights take this
advantage away and can create a dead zone or canalize the bad
guy to where you want them. Even if the lights do not deter the
intruder, an illuminated intruder offers a great target.
Not all lights deter criminals. Many of them know that motion
lights are often ignored because of false alarms. Cameras linked to
the lights have changed this somewhat. In addition to the preceding
purposes, lights can serve as an alert as cameras do at a fraction of
the cost but you must be willing to investigate the activation.
Bright light can also be used to blind and disorient attackers.
Night adjusted eyes looking into bright spotlights shining from all
around a house will sting and have trouble picking up targets within
the light. Cops use spotlights and takedown lights to blind you.
These “trouble” lights should be extremely powerful and activated in
all directions at the flip of a switch. If possible, aim them into the tree
line or spots where people may be hiding to both illuminate that area
and shine directly into the eyes of an intruder.
In Rhodesia, the lights were mounted behind bulletproof
enclosures or a simple reflector was made. The lamp itself was
placed behind sandbags or some other bulletproof shielding. It was
then aimed at a stainless steel reflector, polished like a mirror, which
would then angle the light beam out. The light couldn’t be shot out
easily and the steel would remain reflective even after being shot.
Handheld spotlights can be used to identify and intimidate
individuals, but the light can be fired upon, so it becomes a liability.
Area lighting may be considered instead but each item is a different
tool available in one’s tool box.

Motion lights should be placed not just around the house,

but along the perimeter or the treeline to illuminate any
avenues of approach or firing positions.
Cameras and lights increase your observational abilities.
Consider using very bright perimeter lighting to blind
attackers in an emergency (not all the time, your neighbors
will hate you).
Install motion lights to alert you and light up areas where
there is movement.
Light dark areas to deny the concealment of shadows to
bad guys.
Cameras are a force multiplier allowing you to monitor blind
spots and more area than just your eyes alone from one
static location. Motion activated cameras with real time
alerts are even better if you aren't actively watching.
Lighting can give away that you have electricity, so you may
consider only lighting things up when under attack.
If you have night vision capabilities, consider installing IR
floodlights to illuminate the yard in infrared so you can
easily see using your NODs but the bad guy thinks you
can’t see him.
If you are using worn night vision devices like goggles or
monocular, mount a laser/illuminator on your weapon to aim
with. In rural areas, the ambient lighting will be lower and a
quality long-distance illuminator is required for proper target
illumination at a distance in a way that a separate IR
flashlight can’t do.
 The Perimeter
Rural homes often have many advantages over suburban ones.
Larger properties allow for more defensible, stand-off space from the
roadway and other homes. The property tends to be more
landscaped and offer greater resistance to vehicles coming off the
roadway (accidentally or deliberately). Space in a defensive situation
often means increased time in favor of the defense.
The prepper’s dream property in the countryside is
surrounded by a five-foot fence of barbed wire and has a ditch deep
and wide enough to stop vehicles. A heavy gate bars the driveway.
Hundreds of feet of open ground between the property line and
house makes for a perfect field of fire. Hidden avenues of approach
are filled in with dense, thorny plants, like a blackberry patch. The
increased distance and sightlines allow the homeowner to have
plenty of warning of an intrusion and there are many things an
attacker has to contend with before reaching the house.
Rural areas are different because often the defensive line is at
the property itself, not the neighborhood. Rural neighborhoods, in
contrast with suburban tracts, are much larger, less dense, and do
not have the maze-like atmosphere of walls and fences that the city
does. Intruders can generally move on foot through open land and
woods rather than having to contend with many fenced yards or
contained streets before getting to you. Locking down a rural area is
much harder than a cul-de-sac in the center of a development.
This makes your perimeter security and hardening
paramount. The perimeter can be considered several things; the
property line, the natural boundary of the commonly used area
surrounding the house (yard), or a more suitable natural boundary
such as the edge of the woods. Depending on the legalities or
extremis of the situation, this may be more than just your land.
Several lots might combine to create a defensive perimeter.
A perimeter is a boundary that you can defend. Legally
speaking, this should be on your own property. Perimeters should
visually be distinguishable and whenever possible hardened. An
obvious break in the terrain, even just a cleared lot among scrub
brush, is a mental stop in the human mind and physical barriers
speak for themselves.
Outside your perimeter is the periphery you don’t own, but
you can monitor it and control it if necessary. In times of trouble, if
there is no law to stop you, take control of it and incorporate it into
your defensive bubble. A bad guy prowling around just outside your
property line is just as much of a threat as the bad guy coming over
the fence.

Make your perimeter uninviting to cross.

Make your perimeter hard to penetrate.
Make your home difficult to enter.
Make your house and property easy to defend.

Treat your perimeter like an onion. Defenses should be layers

with a different response level for each one. For the outside world off
your property, the defense is surveillance and the goal is early
warning. Little can be done for people who are not posing an
imminent threat off your property in most situations. Moving closer to
the house and on to your property, the threat level increases and so
should your willingness to engage. Once hostile intent is detected
and bad guys are on your property, your legal and moral options
increase as does the imperative in stopping them before they reach
the house.

Off-property

Intelligence collection
Talking to neighbors
Listening to radio/scanner traffic
Sending out recon patrols
Observation including by drone
Identify potential warning indicators
Identify potential approaching threats
Monitor the movements of hostile actors
 Perimeter (on-property)

Exclusion via fences or walls

Distance to isolate the home from the outside
Clearings (yard) to serve as a stand-off area and fighting
space
Controlled by visual observation, physical control, and fields
of fire

Men

On a defensive line, individuals should be no more than 200

yards from each other. That is a minute’s run at a mile per ten
minutes pace; a light jog. Preferably the distance should be 100
yards (easier to shout and hear) down to being able to actually see
each other and the terrain in between. Direct visual surveillance
between sentries on an unfenced perimeter is necessary to detect
intruders crossing the boundary line. Each position should be close
enough and overlap to provide supporting fire.

Physical defenses

Constructing defenses and fighting positions is something

someone living on a large lot or property can do that a suburbanite
can’t. Code enforcement gets touchy about fences being over a
certain height or employing barbed wire. Unincorporated area folks
get more slack from the county or, shudder, “township,” but usually
can’t go all Fort Knox. Up in the mountains near where our house
(then) was, someone fenced in a 10 acre lot of pinon pines with six
foot chainlink topped by barbed wire. The county didn’t care, but it
has always stood out as very unusual.
Fencing is a passive defense as it can only complicate an
intrusion, not prevent it. Passive defense is anything that makes it
difficult or less desirable to enter your property. Examples:

No trespassing signs;
Video cameras;
Lights;
 A barking dog;
Fences; and,
Sharp or thorny landscaping.

Canalize

Everyone wants to take the path of least resistance. Hasty or

stupid intruders will take this to be the approach with the minimum
amount of obstacles in the way. Your job is to canalize (or
channelize) them into a position where you have the advantage to
detect, identify, and potentially ambush them. For instance, have
attackers come up the driveway rather than the woods because you
have a parking circle with no cover that you can open fire on from
behind a stone wall.

Ditches

In rural life, ditches are extremely common along the roadside.

Ditches very rarely look out of place in a rural community. These are
almost always for flood control purposes to provide drainage for the
roadway and property edges. Size and depth can vary widely.
A ditch along a driveway or road, if of sufficient depth and width,
can stop vehicles from crossing. Automobiles self-bridge poorly as
soon as the first set of wheels are unsupported. The idea is that a
vehicle gets high-centered if it tries to cross or simply drops and
slams into the other side. Generally a ditch should be at least six feet
wide and three feet deep, with steep sides, to serve as an anti-
vehicle barrier. Shallow sides will only allow a vehicle that
approaches at an oblique angle to travel longitudinally down the
ditch until it can mount the other side.
The deeper the ditch and the steeper the sides, the narrower it
can be. Ensure that any ditches still accomplish their purposes of
drainage and are reinforced properly to avoid erosion. Don’t do
anything that the county or state highway engineers would
disapprove of or that would compromise the roadbed. In a total
collapse, no one is fixing a damaged road for you.

Anti-vehicle barriers
 In addition to ditches, popular anti-vehicle barriers are boulders.
The easiest solution is rocks about six inches to a foot high weighing
more than a hundred pounds. They may not stop a vehicle at high
speed, but they will damage it. Enough damage can be caused to
deter someone who doesn’t want to hurt their car or give a good shot
at ripping out vital underbody components, like the oil pan. These
are often called “sump busters” in Europe when used as an
intentional feature.
To severely damage most vehicles, including heavy pickup
trucks, larger boulders need to be used. These will be two feet in
diameter or larger. Any rock that has to be moved by equipment will
do, but obviously the bigger the better. Boulders should be placed no
more than six feet apart and five would be the best. Smaller ones
can be placed against each other or in layers, perhaps in a
staggered pattern, to increase their effectiveness.
Rocks and walls can be “crawled” by properly set up Jeeps and
trucks driven by skilled drivers. The anti-vehicle barricade will slow
these vehicles down and give you an opportunity to shoot at the
vehicle. Remember, an obstacle is removeable or negotiable by the
enemy if you can’t enforce it by fire.
Other options are poured concrete “dragon’s teeth” that are
basically just pyramids or squares of concrete set at an angle. These
should be set into the ground and spaced as above. Concrete
barriers have the additional benefit of being able to mount hasps into
the pour and link very heavy chain between them. Concrete median
barrier sections, K-rail or Jersey barriers are an option but much
more expensive.
The classic Czech hedgehog of intersecting steel beams like
a three-dimensional X work against tanks. This is an option if you
have access to girders or railroad track and can weld. Some have
set steel beams or pipes deep into concrete. Please note that any
barrier you install could potentially be a liability if a vehicle collides
with it, so consult an attorney regarding homeowner’s liability before
engaging in any installation.
A strong steel cable can be stretched across a roadway at
radiator height to stop vehicles. This needs to be mounted or
wrapped in such a way that a vehicle traveling at whatever speed is
possible down a driveway won’t easily rip it free. A field of rocks that
can’t be driven over can be spread across a driveway too. Scullies,
or small concrete blocks with rebar sticking out of the top can wreck
or jam up a vehicle’s undercarriage.[10]
Strong, metal netting with something sharp entwined like
claws to grab tires can wrap around wheels and axles. Homemade
tire deflating spikes can be cut from steel and welded into a girder.
This can then be buried or laid in the road. I argue against caltrops
because these can be easily forgotten and cause damage later on or
be stumbled upon by friendlies.

Berms and moats

Berms can be built around the house or property. This creates

a vehicle barrier, bullet stop, or fighting position. A disadvantage of a
berm is that the opposite side can be used for cover by any attacker,
however, earthworks can be built to overcome this problem.
Berms should be compacted and preferably planted with
grass to limit erosion. Construction should be carefully done to
ensure that the berm is stable and that drainage does not become a
problem. You do not want to create a dam around your house that
keeps the water in. Retaining walls may need to be added. A berm
can be planted with a garden or additional shrubbery to create
concealment.
Who wouldn’t love a moat? Pull up the drawbridge across the
driveway and watch the burglars drown. Unless you live in Florida
and don’t mind if an alligator takes up residence, a moat is not
realistic. A dry moat is quite possible. It won’t stop anyone from
getting across but they might stumble into it, slowing them down.
This is basically going to be a ditch, deep enough to provide cover
when fighting and wide enough to keep vehicles from crossing it, so
say three feet deep by six feet wide.
Dry moats can be easily excavated like ditches. Their walls may
require shoring up and drainage to keep them dry. In areas without
too much rainfall, a gravel bottom and French drain may be
sufficient. In very wet areas, the moat may need to be open and
sloped to allow for drainage or else you’ll get a stagnant wet moat
after all. Dry moats were often filled with sharpened sticks set in the
ground at an angle, known as abatis.

Hedgerow/defensive landscaping

Try driving through a thick hedge; it doesn’t work. You need a

lot of velocity and often vehicles become uncontrollable after impact.
With a berm or alone, thick hedges or bushes can create a nearly
impenetrable hedgerow. French style hedgerows were a nightmare
for Americans during the 1944 Normandy campaign but would be a
wonderful defensive barrier. Hedgerows are known as “live fences”
because the density, height, and often thorny nature of the plants
make penetration difficult. These are the original form of defensive
landscaping.
Holly, due to its sharp leaves and being an evergreen is a
popular choice. Osage orange is a traditional choice in Texas and
the Midwest. Any dense shrubbery closely planted can form a
barricade. In the neighborhood I grew up in, low juniper hedges were
popular in yards and I can tell you those things, when mature, are
impenetrable without being a champion jumper.
Hedgerows often have a support system for vines to grow on.
This can be a trellis like for grape vines and relying on the natural
defenses of the plant to prevent penetration. More stout supports like
a palisade can be installed as well. One can start with a fence, plant
their desired hedge plants along it, and let it grow until the desired
height, thickness, and density is achieved.
Thorny plants, particularly fast growing species of vines, make
excellent natural fence material. Personally I’d grow berries on a
barbed wire fence. The barbed wire would serve as the trellis for the
vines and eventually be buried deep inside. Bears would struggle
with it and the wire would not be cut by a machete wielding intruder
hacking his way through as the vines alone would. Plus you can eat
the fruit.
In the Pacific Northwest, blackberry bushes are everywhere. I
personally think this is great and see it as both a defensive asset and
a potential food source. My PNW relative sees the blackberry vines
as a personal enemy to his yardwork, on the other hand. The vines
can be as bad as kudzu is in the south, creating impenetrable
thickets. I’ve seen abandoned houses claimed by the vines and
pastures turned into a thorn patch that looked to me like a cactus
patch that no man could get into.
Speaking of cactus, prickly pear cactus is an excellent way of
creating a denied area in arid country. Lots of desert plants are
spiny, spiky, or pointy. These can be planted and “let go” along a
perimeter or in a gap to close it off. Prickly pear (opuntia) has an
edible red fruit and the green pads can be eaten as well, known as
nopales in Mexican cuisine. These cacti grow fast and can be so
invasive that in Australia they became an invasive plant called “the
green hell.”
Tall hedges can help screen the house. These should be located
close to the roadway or the perimeter of choice (where someone
whose view you wish to obstruct) and allowed to grow six feet high
or more. One popular choice in Southern California was juniper and
cypress trees because they grow tall and fast. These are sold as
popular windbreak and privacy trees.
Trees are also an obvious vehicle barrier (if their trunks are thick
enough), however, given the time needed to grow them to a
sufficient size only mature ones already in place are viable. An
expedient alternative would be burying vertical railroad ties or
telephone pole sections. Trees 8-10” thick, spaced five yards apart
are considered an obstacle for tanks. Similar trees with spacing no
more than two yards apart and in depth would make it hard for an
auto to navigate a densely wooded area. Dense clusters of fast
growing trees may work as a hedgerow.
As far as other plants, poison ivy/oak/sumac is not suggested
because its dermatitis effect doesn’t act right away. It’s great for area
denial if people see it and know what it is but worthless if they don’t.
Locally native species of plants are best, but in addition to the
aforementioned, here are some other popular defensive landscaping
plants:

Pyracantha (firethorn)

Needs little care after planting

 Berries can be made into an edible jelly

Bamboo

For warm climates only with adequate rainfall/irrigation

Fast growing and extremely dense
Good for screening as well
Can become an invasive species
Not spiky/thorny

Bougainvillea

Pretty, often purple flowers

Weak thorns

Roses

Thorny varieties that can go feral are best

Wire obstacles/fences

You’re definitely going to need a fence of some kind. Unfenced

yards are an attacker’s friend and a homeowner’s nightmare. Yes, it
has been great living in an unfenced world since whenever your area
was settled (after the Indians were defeated) but you can’t afford that
luxury anymore. Up until the Renaissance period many Europeans
lived in small walled or fenced hamlets to avoid barbarian or bandit
raids exclusive of the walled cities (more of a traditional warfare
thing).
Many semi-rural residents in neighborhoods don’t have fences
that separate the backyards. This is a mistake. Gardens will need to
be fenced in for privacy and security. No matter how trustworthy your
neighbors seem now, if you must grow food to survive, it has to be
secured against people and hungry animals. Desperate, hungry
people will steal from your garden. Fenced yards also make traveling
through yards much more difficult for intruders. Trust me, foot
pursuits over fences suck and even suspects on the run hate fence-
hopping.
 Fences are obviously necessary if you have livestock or
animals you need to keep fenced in. When we lived up in the
mountains, the immediate yards were fenced in. This kept in children
and the dogs. It worked to keep bears and coyotes out (we never
had a determined animal attempt to penetrate it). The barnyard was
fully fenced with a six foot chainlink fence. The perimeter fencing
was only open at the driveway and near the garage. These could be
easily gated in an emergency.
So first of all, your house itself should be fenced off with all
approaches gated. Fences are about keeping people away and
serve as the last psychological reminder that strangers are not
wanted. Fences should be not less than six feet high or not easily
climbable, like barbed wire. Make the bad guys force their way
through. Slow them down so you can neutralize them.
The second layer should be perimeter fencing. Keep them off
your property and at a good distance away. The purpose of the
perimeter fence should be to keep them off the property in the first
place, or failing that, slow them down with negotiating the fence that
you can enforce the fence by fire. It is easier to shoot bad guys at a
distance than it is when they are danger close to the house (or in the
process of breaking in).
For large properties, huge runs of chainlink will be cost prohibitive
and probably far too ugly. Six foot chainlink fences are good for
creating an inner perimeter. You can run this in a way that it is
partially hidden by terrain or trees. Such a fence can be used in
combination with other fencing and features, such as a decorative
wooden fence, hedging, or barbed wire.
You would obviously use the tallest fencing in the most
vulnerable areas to canalize an enemy into a breach point that you
can control. Good quality chainlink fences with concrete set poles
and a top rail can be remarkably resistant to ramming attempts. It’s
doable, but not like in the movies. Properly mounted stout gates with
cane bolts and a quality lock will trash many cars and make the
rammer regret it. Reinforcement also makes a huge difference in
resistance.
Barbed wire fencing is also common in the country.
Psychologically, it says “stay out” in a way that only razor wire is
superior to. It is lower and does not visually stand out the same way
a shiny, tall chainlink fence does. I would recommend that the
exterior fence be barbed wire for this reason. Bulk rolls can be stored
indefinitely and deployed in a crisis. It can even be strung from trees.
Perimeter fences should be chest high or taller with gaps
between strands no greater than one foot. My personal favorite is a
four foot fence, five stranded, with vertical wires running between the
horizontal ones. These are used by highway departments to keep
animals off of freeways. In fact, I highly recommend looking at state
DOT fencing guideline documents.
With barbed wire, the imagination is the limit. It can be added to
hedges, strung up as a trip wire or eye-level “clothes line,” strung
randomly between posts to create three-dimensional obstacles, or
used to top other fences. Use it like broken glass set into the top of a
wall to deter jumpers. It is an incredibly versatile tool to use on a
farm or rural property.
Razor and concertina/Dannert wire, stamped sharpened wire,
can be used similarly. Razor wire is more commercially available in
the US than concertina and both are far less user friendly than
barbed wire. They are sharper, harder to handle, and very unfriendly
looking. Whether it is topping a fence or strung up into a three roll
obstacle, razor wire could draw unwanted attention from law
enforcement, the planning authorities, or your neighbors.
It can say “I have something worth protecting” more than
barbed wire. I would only recommend using razor wire on very high
value targets, out of casual observation from public property (roads),
and/or reserving it for dire circumstances. Note that if you are
working with concertina/razor wire, you will need elbow length gloves
with short metal strips that look like embedded staples. The blades
will slice right through even leather gloves. These are “staple gloves”
and can be found from specialty retailers, military surplus houses,
and snake removal supply retailers.
All wire fencing can be easily cut in a few minutes. The whole
point of it is to make an unprepared intruder divert his course or stop
him entirely. Anyone cutting their way through or otherwise
breaching the obstacle has to be slowed down. This delay is
intended to allow you to react. If you’re lucky, barbed wire or
whatever catches them like a net for you. Fences aren’t magic; you
must physically interdict the intruder if he does not give up and
leave.
A gap can be filled with a barbed wire obstacle. A free-
standing structure made of wood is built and wire wrapped around it
(knife rest). One versions is called a hedgehog and is basically a
free-standing 3D X shape with wire stretched from point to point like
an artificial cactus. Two X stands and a board in the middle with wire
strung all around becomes a barbed wire cheval-de-frise.[11]
Consider trenching and burying sections of wire netting
beneath a fence to deter digging. A popular tactic for agricultural
thieves in South Africa to get around electrified fences is to just dig
and go under them.

Electric fences

Electrified fences are great, but easily dealt with by prepared

attackers. Let’s face it, a lot of products sold in farm supply stores
are not for stopping people. In the US, you will only find electrified
fences at the highest security facilities because of the danger they
present. Most consumer models are more of an annoyance and pain
compliance than a true manstopper. They won’t even catch and tear
clothing like barbed/razor wire.
They are also dependent on electricity to work and large runs
may require mains power in order to adequately deter a human.
Spare parts may not be available in a collapse. Additionally, to stop a
person, you can’t simply run a few strands that are intended to
remind animals to mind the perimeter. Remember that if a tree limb
or something breaks the fence, the circuit is broken and the fence is
just wire. Barbed wire doesn’t require juice. Electric fences should
only be used as an adjunct to other fences.
Voltage is not the determining factor in an electrified fence’s
deterrent value. Ever hear the saying "It's not the voltage that kills
you, it's the amperage"? Higher energy output fences are more
effective than simply having more volts passing through. Energy
release is measured in joules. It takes .5 to .7 joules to deliver a
"punch" that is effective to bears, more than livestock needs. A
human will need a similar jolt to be deterred. This means bear-level
fencing would be required for SHTF usage.
There will be a huge temptation to get a pair of jumper cables,
do a little garage surgery, and attach the other end to an electrical
source. Yes, a little irresponsible electronics work will make any
metal fence electric, but this poses huge risks. Homebrewed fences
might start fires or be dangerously overpowered.

Wooden fences

For ordinary post and slat type yard fencing, see Suburban
Defense “Hardening the Home.” Your rural backyard will be a lot like
suburban backyards. For perimeters, you may be using or want to
use a wooden fence. These look good and totally normal.
The nice thing about wood fences is that if done right, they can
be very tough barriers. Thick posts set in concrete and with rails that
are bolted in place, not nailed, can stop some cars, or at least
seriously mess them up. Such a fence will not be cheap. It can be
further hardened with thorny plants or have barbed wire added in an
emergency.
Fun fact: those picturesque white wooden fences that you see
in countless commercials as a car drives through a rural, hilly
community with oak trees? Yeah, that’s almost certainly filmed on
Potrero Road in Hidden Valley, just south of Thousand Oaks,
California. It’s a millionaire’s and billionaire’s ranch playground less
than thirty miles from Hollywood and ten miles from Malibu.
It’s not Texas or wherever they’re playing it off of. I’ve been
stuck responding to emergency calls and CHP has had the road
closed for some filming on more than one occasion. Some people
grew up in Hollywood. I grew up in commercial country.
Note: Whether you have a fence or a wall, cut down any trees
within 15-30 feet of the fence/wall so no one can climb them and
jump over. Also cut off any branches that extend over the fence line
as well.

Stone or concrete walls

 A low stone wall (often called a “fence”) or a concrete wall is an
excellent anti-vehicle barrier. When made of reinforced concrete,
stone, or filled and reinforced hollow block, they are quite stout. Very
few vehicles are getting through those. The problem with low walls is
that they can be easily climbed over by man. Tall walls are not the
kind of thing people want around their perimeter but may be possible
close to the house or enclosing some other element on the property.
Low walls need to be hardened with barbed wire, razor wire, or
thorny plants.

Specialty barriers

If you have the money, specialty barriers are a possibility. These

would include post-tensioned cable vehicle barriers (guardrails),
concrete mounted bollards, super heavy “flowerpots,” rising or pop-
up driveway barriers, or man-portable vehicle entrapment
barricades. In my novels Hard Favored Rage and Blood Dimmed
Tide I wrote about a raid gone bad as a raiding vehicle hits and L-
shaped barrier made from welded materials. If you have scrap steel
and can weld, the stuff you can make is limited only by ability and
imagination.

Approach angles

Momentum is what gets vehicles crashing through stuff.

Momentum, and the consequent ability to penetrate a barrier, is
mass x velocity. The heavier the vehicle and the faster it is going, the
better it will tear through things (or jump ditches, etc.). The way you
can mitigate this is choosing a property or siting X feature (gate,
fence, etc.) in a way that a straight shot is denied to any vehicle
attempting to breach. Curves, turns, and angles slow vehicles down.
Having to turn 90° at the last second will eat up a lot of velocity and
hitting say a fence at an oblique angle transfers the momentum
along the fence line rather than concentrating it at a single breach
point.
If you can, make turns in your driveway. Install barriers that
create a serpentine to slow vehicles down and force them to make
two oblique turns, rather than coming straight through. For
vulnerable points, such as a fence line where a road meets it at 90°,
consider putting in a heavy barrier like a boulder.

Gates

This should go without saying but get a strong gate for your
driveway. It must be mounted on stout supports because a gate is
only as strong as what holds it up. These supports shouldn’t be so
large that a person can hide behind it. Decorative gate walls or
pillars are perfect hiding places for people to lie in wait for you.
Gates should not be easily bent or broken. They should absorb
some impact energy and the weak points should be any locking or
hinge mechanisms, rather than the gate posts or the material itself.
The metal should fail before anything supports are knocked out of
the ground. Potentially weak posts can be reinforced by placing
concrete or stone barriers (or buried bollards) in front of them to
deter ramming. When possible, gates should be secured into the
ground with cane bolts or something similar, creating an additional
point of resistance.
A gate is also worthless if it can be easily gotten around. For
vehicle defense, a gate alone that closes off a driveway may be
sufficient if a car can’t otherwise negotiate the entry, such as
crossing a deep ditch. Against foot borne intruders, there must be a
credible fence capable of stopping a man from easily getting
over/through or else why bother having a gate?
Portable anti-vehicle barricades can be placed in front of or
behind the gate. Gates should be closed immediately after use and
kept closed at all times. Gates should be motorized, remotely
activated, and open and close quickly. You should be able to get the
gate opening as you approach the last few yards to minimize time
spent waiting. The less time you wait, the less time you are a target
or that a bad guy has to sneak in.
If your driveway crosses a culvert, ensure that the ditch has
no grass or weeds that could hide a person there. Preferably the
ditch should be wide and shallow for better visibility. The pipe itself
should be as small as possible so a human can’t fit in there to hide.
Instead of one larger pipe, try multiple smaller ones. Bar large
openings and clean any accumulated debris frequently.

Layered defense

A layered defensive perimeter is always best. For instance, let’s

start from the road and work inward. There is a steep ditch that will
catch most vehicles. Beyond that and along the driveway, or in spots
with no ditch that vehicles can still get through, you’ve lined those
spots with boulders. The road in front of the house is faced with a
large overgrown split-rail fence covered by blackberries and other
local fauna. You’ve also spiced it up with some barbed wire inside.
The sides of your house that face the woods and pasture are
fenced with barbed wire. The equipment yard beside your barn is
surrounded by a chainlink fence, six feet tall, and protects the part of
the barn you can’t see from the house, as well as your well house.
Your barn yard has a traditional corral with a low fence the horses
can’t get over, but you’ve also bisected most of the property with an
inner barbed wire fence.
The house itself is set on a low rise. You can see down to the
front fence, partially screened with trees you can wrap more barbed
wire around when things get sketchy. You’ve carved a setback into
your front yard in a way to preserve an unobstructed view of your
two-acre front lawn, but also have a two-foot defensive firing position
in front of the house.
Your front yard has a nice white picket fence that is made of
quality wood and concrete mounted posts. You’ve planned to tack
some barbed wire on top if you suspect raids are going to become
problematic. In the back, your garden is protected by a fence that
deer can’t jump, so neither can men easily scale it.
Your property was not built with defense against outside attacks
in mind. I know this because if it was recently constructed to resist
an attack, you aren’t reading this book. It has been over 130 years
since the frontier was deemed closed. No one in America needs to
worry about Indian raids. Your home, farm, or ranch was built to be
convenient not fortified. There also probably will not be enough time
for many people to rearrange their property or build proper defensive
works.

SADFAR
Stealth: Be entirely unseen, go unnoticed, or appear
unremarkable. Do not arouse any interest in your existence.
Awareness: Monitor suspicious activities, detect intrusions, and
observe adversaries’ actions to better coordinate your defensive
response. Get alerts of an incursion so you are not taken by
surprise.
Deterrence: Make it too difficult to assault, too uninviting to
infiltrate, and too costly to bother with.
Fortification: Construct your physical perimeter and facilities so
that they can delay attackers, withstand weapons fire, and keep
them out of your home.
Assistance: Friends or neighbors can provide backup or
counter-attack any assailants, or, failing that, the ability to conduct
retaliatory reprisals against the adversary.
Resistance: Have a credible capability to fight for your home and
your family; skills, weapons, and the will to prevail.

Outer ring
The outer ring is the most important. This is what keeps
people out in the first place or puts your response at the advantage.

Keep them off the property

Deny snipers a shot from outside the property
Rifle fighting distance
Concealment is to your advantage and they have to cross
open ground to reach you
Perimeter barriers are to deter and slow down attackers

One issue I want to talk about in detail is concealing the

property. You can’t really hide a house. People can see signs of
human development and figure it out. What you can do is make it
less obvious so that someone has to really look, instead of being
able to see a tempting house while passing by at 55 MPH on the
highway. A screen of trees also can help shield things like lights at
night when that is uncommon.
Rural homes with excellent sightlines from surrounding terrain
are going to be vulnerable to long-range attacks. Thus having a
home that is below high ground is a bad idea. Snipers can sit far
from the house and pick off people as they work or come and go.
Defenders would be bottled up in the house. In fact, if hitting a house
(especially in a wooded area) this is the tactic I would use. Cover
each entry and pop people as they become visible. Unless there is a
concealed exit, there is nothing that can be done.
Fast growing trees, if you don’t have some already, can help
screen a home. My personal preference would be along the
perimeter. That screens the house from the road and surrounding
land but leaves an open “dead zone” approaching the house. Once
they get close to the house the trouble begins.

Inner ring

Keep them away from/out of the house

Short range fighting distance (pistol/shotgun as an analogy)
Concealment works both ways
Barriers are to slow an advance and give you a buffer of
fighting space away from the house
You have fighting positions outside

Cops and many concealed carriers all know about the 21 foot
rule and Tueller Drill. Many of us have been horrified by the “Survive
the Streets” videos talking about the dangers of knife attacks. It’s like
“Red Asphalt” but for cops. Infantrymen know that close air support
and artillery can’t be used if the enemy gets closer than 200 yards,
“danger close.” What I’m getting at is that close range fighting is
dangerous.
Close Quarters Battle in defense of your home means that
you screwed up in the earlier stages of defense. Hopefully you were
bested by a better adversary and not just asleep or negligent. Close
in, it’s easier for the enemy to make his shots count. If your
defenders are all neutralized, there is less time for the innocents
inside to escape or prepare for a last stand. Concealment and cover
work for and against both of you.
Fighting here is a matter of skill and luck. What you can do
ahead of time is limit the hiding places near the house. Trim
shrubbery and keep fencing to something that can be seen through
like chainlink. Any hiding places should be very close in and work
only for someone on the house side (so someone inside the house
can kill an attacker who takes that position).

Escape

One Rhodesian remarked on his experiences as a boy and

included a story asking his father why they didn’t have a six foot
chainlink fence surrounding the house. The answer was that the
fence would keep the family in as well as any terrorists out. It was
easier to escape through the three-strand barbed wire fence than
over a chainlink one. Farmers were caught and died on their farms
when they were unable to escape their own defenses.
Leave yourself a way out. It is better to take your chances and
escape than to stay in your home and either be burned alive or
captured. Suburban Defense covers this well but it bears repeating
that even in a rural area or the wilderness, being alive and on the run
is better than being dead or worse. Have bug-out-bags ready to go,
the escape drill practiced, the route known to all, and have some
innate wilderness survival skills.
 Defensive Positions
Terrain
Before you start constructing defensive positions and
fortifications, take a look around your property. What are the weak
points and what are the naturally strong points? Terrain can work in
your favor and it can work against you. Smart thinking about the land
and vegetation cover will help you maximize your defensive plans.
Perform a devil’s advocate examination of your terrain. How
could a bad guy use the terrain to attack? Is there a treeline bad
guys can hide in? Do you have flammable brush that a tossed road
flare could ignite and burn down your house? Is there a secluded
avenue of approach like an alley or brushy gully behind you? Maybe
there is a hill where people can shoot down on you.
Dead space[12] is anywhere that you cannot see and cover by
fire. In warfare, this would be a trench or the backside of a hill. On
your property this may be a ditch, behind a hillock, a boulder, or the
area that an outbuilding shields from view. Control dead space and
make it work in your favor. Fence it off or use defensive landscaping
to make it a denied zone. Failing that, place lights, motion sensors,
or cameras to deny large areas or hidden avenues of approach to an
attacker.
Dead space can be mitigated by staggering defensive positions
so that another position can cover the dead space of the other
position with interlocking fields of fire. Roving sentries are a good
tactic. An elevated position (height) is also a good remedy but this
can also expose the defender. The area below a window is usually
dead ground and a defender sticking his head and torso out the
window to get a shot down is very dangerous. A drone or camera
can serve as a sort of remote sentry to watch the area.
Force intruders to take a difficult, circuitous route in. Design
fencing to follow the contours of terrain features to incorporate or
exclude them from the perimeter if the feature would otherwise allow
the fence to be bypassed (like inside of the ditch instead of over it,
where they could crawl under).
 Consider establishing a kill zone (engagement zone). These are
generally clear areas with no cover, like an open lawn or field, where
the enemy is funneled so you can shoot him most easily. A kill zone:

Is a trap that channels enemy movement but is designed so

that it doesn’t look like a trap?
Takes advantage of existing geography and provides no
cover or concealment to the enemy.
Reduces (not eliminates) the need to defend in force an
entire perimeter.
Can be protected by you from covered positions.

Everyone’s situation is going to be different but if you can figure

out a way to canalize the enemy into a kill zone, that’s great. A large
clearing around the home is also good. Wait until an enemy has
entered open ground before opening fire. Not only do you have a
better shot, but they have to turn and run for cover/concealment.

Fortifications

Fighting positions

In the Civil War, a direct precursor to the trench fighting seen

in WWI, it was found that it took a ratio of three attackers to one
defender to assault a fortified position.[13] Though other sources
dispute this, keep this 3:1 rule in mind when staffing such positions
or assaulting one. Force multiplication through ballistic protection is
real no matter how it scientifically breaks down. This effect can be
increased by adding more defenders, strengthening the position, or
increasing the firepower of the weapons inside (machine gun v.
rifles). More men or better “bunker busting” weapons are needed to
defeat the position.
Use the existing landscape or elements to your advantage or
maximize them. Dig into that low rise at the edge of the lawn to
command the slope down to the woods (defilade). Minimize effort by
using an existing wall.
Holes and trenches are the oldest, most common, and
simplest of artificial fighting positions. There isn’t much to say about
them other than they can collapse or fill up with water if not shored
and drained. But in a pinch they will do. For advanced holes, military
field manuals are the go-to source.[14] There are a few things to keep
in mind if you’re digging in your yard.
Holes and trenches are tripping hazards in the dark. Consider
some sort of low-key flagging system to remind people or something
like a curb to catch unsuspecting feet before they go over. Any
excavation can be used against you. If you can, dig out the back so
that it is open to the house to deny any cover for a bad guy who
takes that position.
Deep trenches will require shoring against collapse, especially
as they age and erosion sets in. All excavations will degrade over
time. Consider a way to drain trenches and holes when they get full
of water. In all but the driest of regions this will be a problem. Being
crotch-deep in muddy water while fighting for your life is no fun. Fetid
water will also breed mosquitos and disease.
Firing positions should be around the house and closer to it
than further away. This makes it easier to reach them in an
emergency and since the house is probably your fallback anyway, it
makes sense to fight from there. If you have a large clearing around
the house, this also helps maximize the distance from the attacker,
making them cross dead space to reach you. The goal is to fight and
kill the enemy from as far away as possible.
Fighting positions need to be sited so that they can offer
covering fire to each other, that is shoot the bad guys shooting at
your buddy from another interlocking angle of fire. Two positions
should be able to fire on any one attacker. Imagine drawing an
equilateral triangle, with the two base points being the defender’s
holes and the apex the enemy.
Be sure to mark limits of fire. No-shoot areas would endanger
friendlies, such as neighboring homes, other positions, etc. Flags,
stakes, and paint are all common markings. Markers can be placed
to delineate fields of fire as well. Draw up range cards that show the
firing limits, range to various features on the landscape, and sectors
of fire for each position.
Conceal your positions. Don’t make it look like you dug a
foxhole on the front lawn and laid a small mound of sandbags to fire
from behind. How about a flowerbox instead? Any concealment
should not block your view, such as uncut, long grass. Locate your
fighting positions so that they have excellent lines of sight towards
avenues of approach and can cover the most ground effectively.
Keep the field of fire cleared by cutting grass, clearing brush,
etc. This needs to appear natural, like proper lawn maintenance and
not highlight your position by mowing out an arc of fire. Remove
plants that could conceal and attacker or thin them so they can’t hide
behind the vegetation. Property owners have more time and better
opportunities to make clearance look natural instead of deliberate
and hasty.
Consider leaving mannequins or “scarecrows” in fighting
positions when unoccupied to give the appearance of them being
manned. A variant of this is, if you have more positions then men, to
rotate the empty positions. Even if the enemy catches on to the fact
that you’re doing this he has to wonder when he attacks if someone
will really be there or not.
Think vertically. Put someone on top of a water tower, a silo,
or in a high barn and arm them with a scoped rifle. These “high
hides” should be chosen for some level of concealment, some
protection from the elements, and the ability to move around freely. A
wide area view (360º) is better than a partial view.
Note that a person in an elevated position for observation
purposes alone is a poor use of resources. Leverage technology to
free up that person for other work and to keep them from becoming
an easy target. Utilize drones, install a panoramic suite of cameras,
or mount a steerable camera. Any elevated fighting position should
be protected against small arms fire.

Berms

Build a berm around the house, not just the perimeter. This
creates a vehicle barrier, bullet stop, or fighting position. Tall walls
around farmhouses in Rhodesia were popular. Not only could they
stop bullets but RPGs as well. A six foot wall may be a bit much, but
even three feet of earth over ground level can provide protection for
people ducking on the floor inside or fighters outside the house.
 A quick berm can be mounded up by excavating the
surrounding terrain with even just a Bobcat in lieu of heavier
earthmovers. Any excavations should be done on the house side so
you can fight from them. Lacking barbed wire to string? Line the
outer side of the berm with sharpened sticks set at an angle, known
as an abatis, to discourage anyone from trying to get up the slope
unless they want to be stabbed.
A disadvantage of a berm is that the opposite side can be
used for cover by any attacker. With any kind of excavated fighting
position, the low point where someone could hide behind, called the
scarp or reverse slope side, should be closest to the house so you
can use it for cover, not the enemy. You want a clear shot against an
enemy who has nothing to take cover behind.
One feature is known as a ha-ha or a sunken fence. It is a
retaining wall where on one side the ground slopes down to the wall
(or is excavated) and on the other the ground (the forward slope)
reaches to the top of the wall at a level height. In landscape
architecture, this creates a visual effect of there being no wall until
you reach it, sort of like an infinity pool. From inside the house or
from the perimeter, one might never know there is a fighting position
there until they arrive at the obstacle. Earthworks can be built to
overcome this problem.
A short berm can be closer to the house, ideally three to four
feet high. Average counter height in the US is 3’6” or a little more
than a meter high. This is a good height to take cover and fight
behind. Anyone sleeping or ducking inside the house should be
shielded from incoming fire from the perimeter as the bullets cannot
go lower than the berm top. The taller a berm is, the further away
from the house it should be. The base will be wider, occupying more
space, and the taller berm will block light and the view. You should
be able to see as far as possible from the house while someone on
the outside can’t easily see in.
Berms should be compacted and preferably planted with
grass to limit erosion. Construction should be carefully done to
ensure that the berm is stable and that drainage does not become a
problem. You do not want to create a dam around your house that
keeps the water in. Retaining walls may need to be added. A berm
can be planted with a garden or additional shrubbery to create
concealment.

Sandbags and gabions

For well over one hundred years, sandbags have formed the
cornerstone of fighting positions. Sandbags are portable dirt when
you need it somewhere a hole won’t do. The bag is a container and
a frame that keeps the dirt or sand compressed into a useful shape
and somewhat dense to aid ballistic resistance. They are cheap: as
of this writing, Uline sells standard 14" x 26" bags for $39 per 100.
Sandbags are commonly found in polypropylene (plastic) and
burlap (cloth). Polypropylene is broken down by the UV radiation in
sunlight and outdoors the bags will degrade in three to six months of
heat and sun. Indoors at room temperature they will have an
indefinite lifespan and are more likely to fail from accidental
punctures than the material "rotting" away. If the bags are protected
from sunlight, such as being indoors or covered, they can last
indefinitely.
The bag is not filled up to the top. The top end needs to be left
unfilled and loose because it will be cinched up and tied closed. The
typical fill is one-half to 2/3rds full. A sandbag that is 2/3rds full will
weigh about 30-40 pounds, depending on your exact fill, and the
density and moisture content of the earth used. 30 bags will weigh
about a half ton. Fill with soil or sand; it will hurt less to be hit in the
face with a spray of sand/dirt than a face full of high-speed gravel.
Sandbags are slow to fill with a rate of 20 bags per hour by an
average person using old-fashioned methods. This needs to be
planned upon and a two-man team (one to shovel, one to hold the
bag open) is best. Sandbags can always be pre-filled and staged
somewhere until they are actually needed to stack up.
A quick fill idea involves a ladder and traffic cones. The ladder
is supported horizontally on blocks a few feet from the ground. Traffic
cones are then inserted upside down through the rungs of the ladder
to form a funnel. Turn the base of the cone around to form a
diagonal shape to be supported by the ladder. Place the empty
sandbag around the cone-funnel and shovel sand into the cone,
which will then neatly fall into the bag.
Sandbags do not need to be tied but can have the open end
folded over. Keep in mind that tied bags are easier to handle
because they are less likely to spill. You may need to make a time
verses easy or tidiness decision when building sandbag shelters. A
tied bag may be preferable if you are building indoors.
You will need approximately 60 standard sandbags for every
10 linear feet and one vertical foot. Note that walls will taper as they
climb and must be thicker at the base to support the weight. Stack
them in an interlocking manner like bricks, overlapping as you go
around corners and up levels, but always laid on their long ends.
Note that if sandbags are stacked vertically, they will need to
have a triangular cross-section with a base that is wider than the top.
The stack should be twice as wide as it is tall. This is to support the
weight of the bags without them toppling over. Wooden frames or
support from a building wall can be used if you need to cheat but
ensure something prevents the bags from toppling onto anyone
taking shelter. Temporary indoor shelters only need to have walls
high enough to protect those who are lying, sitting, or crouching
behind them—not full-height walls.
The preferred ratio per the Army Corps of Engineers is 1:3; for
each vertical foot there is three feet of width. Three feet is the
maximum preferred height with five being their absolute safety
maximum. In this case, this is for flood defense and you will probably
need to cheat on the exact dimensions, which is doable as long as
the bags are braced and supported against collapse.
Alternatives to sandbags are containers filled with earth, sand,
and rocks. These are known as gabions. Gabions can be
constructed out of anything that can make a box which is then filled
in. Pre-modern militaries used large woven baskets. Today we use
HESCO barriers which are large wire frame cages with a durable
fabric liner.
Homemade gabions can be constructed using rock or bricks
in a frame of strong wire mesh as is used in fencing or as concrete
reinforcement. The sections of mesh can be wired or welded into an
open topped box and then filled with rock or bricks that are larger
than the mesh openings. This basically takes a pile of rocks or
rubble and holds it in a useful shape.
Gabion material can often be found in rural construction
supply stores. Farms and ranches also have lots of useful things that
can be used to make them, like barrels. Anything that won’t shatter
and spill its contents when hit with gunfire can be used. Another
alternative is building a wooden mold, inserting wire reinforcement,
and pouring concrete.

Inside the house

Inside the house, a sandbag wall against a window is a quick

and effective expedient fighting position. The bags can be stacked
against a wall high enough to kneel and shoot from behind. A
maximum of three feet would be more than sufficient for this position.
Indoors, the current practice is to set them up so that they are not
physically touching the wall.
One idea (that I cannot personally vouch for) is to pour
concrete into the wall. The studs and drywall are used as a form. A
small hole is made in the drywall and concrete is slowly poured in,
over time, to harden. It must be poured in incremental pours and
allowed to harden before the next batch is added as the weight of
the wet concrete may break through the drywall. Like with the sand
bags only two to three feet high would be necessary. I’m not sure
that three to four inches of unreinforced concrete will provide the
same protection as a purpose-made wall.
If you have the manpower and the space to setup a command
post (CP), do so. This is where you will monitor camera feeds from,
listen to scanners, and run radio communications. It will also operate
as a map room and battle tracking area. Your CP needs to be in a
safe place, preferably in a basement or in the interior of a building. It
doesn’t need to be manned 24/7 but during times of heightened
threats. Someone should be monitoring your community radio
frequency constantly, however.
 Booby Traps
The purpose of booby traps is to delay and demoralize an
intruder, alert you to their presence, and hinder their ability to wage
offensive operations on you. Trips and falls, alarms, and explosions
will produce confusion and hopefully disorient your attackers. You
want attackers to be distracted by additional stress and forced to
slow down and be cautious rather than aggressively plowing ahead
into the attack.

Emplacement

Use terrain or other modifications to funnel adversaries into

the trap but don’t make it obvious what you are doing. Conceal or
camouflage traps as necessary. A good eye for detail is required so
that traps blend in. Know the area that you are working in. Be
familiar with the plants and the lay of the land. Know what traps will
look like when winter comes and all the grass dries up.
Cut foliage will dry out and die. Dead grass, brown branches,
or obviously freshly cut foliage are dead giveaways because they are
unnatural. Anything you cut to use as camouflage has to be
replaced. Dead branches, etc. can be used but need to be naturally
arranged or look like a pile of cleared debris, not that it is hiding
something. Clean up the area when finished or restore it to a natural
appearing state. Don’t give away any signs that something has been
emplaced there.
Record the location and nature of the trap, including
photographing it and the area around it so others can find it.
Measure the distance from a fixed point. Inform all family, friends,
and friendly neighbors of the trap.

Lethal booby traps

Expressly lethal booby traps will not be mentioned here. IEDs

and repurposing explosives or homebrewing your own are off the
table. They are too dangerous for the unskilled to mess around with,
potentially harmful to innocents moving through the land, and if
forgotten, remain as dangerous as a land mine. I also extend this to
things like punji pits and caltrops that can accidentally injure children
or remain harmful for years, even if the rule of law is dead and gone.
Additionally, repurposed animal traps should not be used.
This includes bear traps, deadfalls, snares, and pits. Using a
mousetrap to build a triggering device is one thing but maiming
someone’s foot with a foothold jaw is entirely another. Actual
mantraps have been illegal for a long time in most jurisdictions.
Legal liability is also another concern. Spring guns and other
kinds of lethal traps have been outlawed for well over a hundred
years for a good reason; lethal traps don’t discriminate and only
target bad guys. Typically deadly or seriously injurious force is
criminalized to protect property versus human life.
Harassing devices like plain trip lines that unintentionally
result in injury are in more of a gray area but can certainly create civil
liability. Consider the fact that if you start a wildfire with your trap that
you can be on the hook for a lot of money or even jail time. The end
of the world is a bad time to be behind bars or on probation. On the
plus side, personal injury attorneys will probably start committing
suicide once insurance companies go insolvent.
Disclaimer: The purpose of traps in this chapter is not to
maim or kill intruders. Deliberately injuring or killing someone can be
from battery to manslaughter to murder. I am not an attorney and
you should consult with one prior to employing anything other than a
purely warning trip alarm system. Be sure to adequately post your
property with “No Trespassing” signs.

Trip alarms

Trip alarms serve two purposes: an alert to you and a hindrance

to your attacker; a good one can do both. Mechanical models are
made that when tripped, spring a firing pin that detonates either a
blank cartridge or primer. Electronic models can have motion
detectors, actual trip wire pulls, and audio/visual alert modes.
 Low tech, you can get bells on a string/wire or put pebbles in
a tin can. In Rhodesia, farmers used sections of coiled wire, not so
much as a barrier or trip wire, but as an alarm system. The wire had
cans with stones in them tied on so that when the wire was disturbed
in the dark, the noise would alert the watchdogs who would then
bark at the noise.
A wide variety of electronic models exist. The simplest ones
let out a loud electronic screech (120dB+) when the trigger is pulled
from the body. These are often sold as personal alarms with lanyard
pull functions. Emplacement of these devices is endless, from trip
lines to cheaply alarming gates. A variety of these with different
tones can be used to signal intrusion in other locations Prices in
early 2022 are around $20 for small, simple models. Durability and
weatherproofing are probably on the poor side so buy extras.

Light

Glow stick (Cyalume) surface trip flares are easily available. This
is a frame with a glow stick mounted so that when tripped, it is
broken. They are reusable once the glow stick is replaced. The light
then alerts the sentinel of intrusion without too obviously giving away
what just happened.
The glow stick could be positioned in concealment, such as in
a can with the opening facing away from the path of intrusion, so at
first only the sentinel sees the light. The visible light glow stick could
be replaced with an infrared stick so that even if the intruder turns
around or looks for the light, they fail to see it without night vision.
More difficult to source are pyrotechnic trip flares that burn
brightly at ground level for about a minute. These present a major
fire hazard and glow sticks or strobe lights are better. Pen flare
launchers, or even flare guns, can be modified to fire vertically upon
a trigger wire pull to send visual signals over a long distance. Rocket
or parachute flares would then be visible as they ascend and then
fall from several hundred feet. Some models for ground
emplacement do exist, but they are hard to come by, so modification
of other devices maybe necessary. Traditional road flares are a poor
choice because they need friction to strike the tip for ignition, plus
the inherent fire hazard.

Things that go bang

Commercially available “bear banger” devices intended for

protecting campsites from aggressive bears make excellent alerting
devices. Ordinarily fired from pen flare launchers, static adaptors are
sold that can take these cartridges. From bangs to whistles, they will
definitely get attention.
12ga shotgun blank models are very popular. Live cartridges
should never be used with these devices as the pressure of the
powder detonating will likely cause the device to explode and send
shrapnel out. Primer fired devices are not recommended due to
supply shortages having made primers hard to find and very
expensive. Blanks were plentiful even during the Spring 2020 ammo
shortage because they have no ballistic value.
12ga models can be adapted to use a variety of shotgun
shells but are primarily intended for blanks. Pepper blast shells could
be used to deploy cayenne pepper into a small area (with probably
lackluster effect). Powder and the shell itself often go flying. The
flash, noise, and puff of smoke could be mistaken for an explosive
and this could be exploited by a defender. Flashbang (“thunder
grenade”) shotgun shells would be excellent in this role. Dragon’s
Breath and incendiary rounds should not be used. Although visually
intimidating, the risk of burns, injury, and fire is too great.
I suppose even an ordinary birdshot shell could have the wad
and load pulled before re-crimping so just the primer (or powder)
fires. Lethal shells should not be used. These are generally not
contained within a chamber of any kind so shot won’t generate any
significant velocity but a fragmenting case may be dangerous. These
would probably be classified as spring guns in some areas and
would be illegal, not to mention probably ineffective.
Bang and electronic alarms can be added to give physical
tripwires an additional psychological punch and warning for you. If an
intruder just tripped and heard a bang, they may assume they got
lucky in some kind of explosion or stay down to avoid the next “shot.”
It might not be enough to stop bad guys but if they just defecated in
their pants and lost the advantage of surprise you might be able to
turn the tables on them.
Firebird Targets are disc shaped pyrotechnic reactive
detonating targets. Imagine something the size of a clay pigeon or a
can of shoe polish that detonates with smoke and a boom when hit
with a bullet. They do not require mixing like Tannerite. These could
be emplaced as pseudo explosive devices that shouldn't seriously
harm or kill anyone but would scare them.
A Firebird target could be emplaced where it could be easily
shot by a defender or command detonated via some sort of
contraption in a place an attacker might attempt to use as a fighting
position. The manufacturer states that these will work with high-
velocity pellet guns, so they would probably work with some sort of
percussive striker system that can generate enough force. Weather
resistance is unknown. Experimentation may be required.
Of course repurposing Firebird Targets or anything of that
nature should only be used in a WROL situation. Some jurisdictions
may regard anti-personnel use, even if no injuries are caused, as a
bomb. They can cause injury, death, or fire if improperly used. It is
recommended by the manufacturer that they be emplaced with
adhesives. Attempting to drive a nail or screw through them will
probably cause them to detonate.

Airsoft grenades

As mentioned, deadly booby traps are not discussed here,

however your enemy doesn’t need to know that you don’t have
access to explosives. Many of these grenades can be used similarly
to the real thing using “grenade in a can” type devices. Get some
airsoft flashbang or stinger grenades. These will detonate with either
a very loud bang (and flash if you’ve chosen a pyrotechnic model
flashbang) or enough of a noise from the CO2 cartridge firing to
startle the intruder.
Another passive grenade type that can be used alone as an
alerting device or in combination for psychological effects is a smoke
grenade. These often have pull releases on them that can be easily
rigged up to trip lines. Colored smoke can mark different positions.
At night their effectiveness will be significantly to totally reduced.
Trip wires and tanglefoots

Trip wires are just that; pieces of taught wire that when
tugging at a foot make a person fall down and go boom. Hopefully
the person makes a lot of noise falling, grunts, or swears. It is also a
psychological deterrent that the property is defended/prepared or to
lower morale because falling sucks and is embarrassing in front of
your friends.
Tanglefoot obstacles are collections of usually wire strung in
patterns like a net to catch feet. They trip people and wrap up their
foot/feet. It takes more time to unravel one’s foot from tanglefoot
than just standing up after a spill due to the multiple strands that
often become tangled on each other or the foot. Caution should be
used around animals because they are not intelligent enough to
escape the trap and instead just panic and pull, often injuring
themselves.
These obstacles are best employed in chokepoints, densely
vegetated areas, or wooded areas. Long stretches of approach
avenues, like lawns or paths, could have these strung up to trip an
attacker who might be running through a dead zone. If they fall, it not
only slows them down but makes them a better target for defenders.
Eye, chest, or head level lines are called “clotheslines” or “trail
wires.” Strong enough wire or cable lines that are taught can
decapitate a motorcyclist or snowmobiler who are moving fast
enough. Slack lines tend to pull or knock people down as they have
some give to them. Taught lines are more like hitting a fixed edge.
These are not advised as they can cause death or serious injury and
incur the landowner serious penalties.
Green paddle wire, often used by florists, is relatively strong,
cheap, and unobtrusive amongst green florae. Commo wire,
paracord, and high tensile fishing line are other popular choices.
Netting large enough to allow legs or parts of feet to get through
could also be used to ensnare intruders.
Remember to install multiple trip wires. Just imagine how
embarrassing and frustrating it would be to fall over again after being
tripped once. Morale aside, slowing down and checking for trip lines
and booby traps is a proven tactic to delay the enemy.
A wire entanglement is a section of barbed wire or razor wire
that an enemy gets caught in or has to cut his way across. Think of
the spools of concertina wire in no-man’s land that tore up clothes
and skin. The wire was placed where it was to enable easy killing of
the enemy who was caught in the open. Consider placing any wire
entanglements in a place where you have a clear field of fire to them
from your defensive positions, such as the edge of the woods as an
enemy would reach your cleared yard.

Command traps

Rhodesian farmers used to create what appeared to be favorable

firing positions that guerillas would take up. Feeling safe in a
depression, behind a log, etc. they would suddenly be killed when an
explosive was command detonated. Now you don’t have access to
these kind of weapons and the odds you have access to explosives
is almost as low, but you can get the same effect. However, you want
to avoid creating spots that can inadvertently be used against you.
For places that provide cover or concealment that you cannot
effectively turn into a denied area, consider command detonated
traps. Consider pull wire flashbang, smoke grenades, or a Firebird
Targets contraption. A flashbang going off in a position an attacker
thinks is a good one will disorient or terrify him. A smoke grenade,
day or night, will obscure his vision and for a time hinder his ability to
deliver accurate fire from that position.
A really cheap option would be to stick high pressure
sprinklers (like off of central pivot irrigation) in certain positions.
Suddenly being drenched by a fire hose will certainly be disruptive. If
you can startle someone into jumping up or moving, you can shoot
him.
A booby trap known as South African wire whip is a section of
barbed wire that uses a heavily weighted object to pull a length of
wire to catch people. A variation of this could be pulled very quickly
(probably by mechanical means) on command across a field or gap
like a moving rake. It then catches at the clothing or into the skin of
the people, injuring them or pulling them down.
Pepper spray (OC) canisters can also be rigged to spray a
given area (usually enclosed spaces), although the mechanisms are
often ill-suited to triggering by non-human hands. Throwable OC
“grenades” are a basically the same technology as bug bombs. One
such product is the Burglar Bomb that is intended to fill a confined
space with OC. This could be repurposed to spray in the direction an
intruder may be facing in a hasty firing position. Traditional OC
grenades with a spoon and ring are generally only sold to law
enforcement. The same goes for “sting” grenades and tear (CS) gas.

Psychological
Nothing says you can’t make a sign that says “Danger—
Mines,” not that it would really be believable. Random “danger” signs
or an unconcealed or non-functional trap might get the attention of
intruders who spend time looking for things that aren’t there. Fake
alarm signs and “beware of dog” signs are all used in the suburbs.
They aren’t guarantees but can’t hurt anything.
Motion activated deer sprinklers are a nice surprise. They can
startle people and do no harm whatsoever. It’s activation may alert
you as well. I highly recommend these for gardens to not only get rid
of deer but to surprise pilfering humans.
Remove all street signs, directional signs, and house numbers
from the streets in your area. Let the bad guys get lost. Of course
this only works in a total collapse situation because everyone will get
mad as deliveries get lost and the government freaks out. Leave up
warning and traffic control signs though. Stop signs save lives.
 Hardening the Rural Home
Start by going back to Suburban Defense and reading the
“Hardening the Home” chapter. The basic security advice like using
security screen doors, etc. applies for the rural home as well. There’s
no need to completely rehash what’s already been written.

Outside the house

Whenever possible, build your house as far back from the

perimeter as possible. Open ground (dead space) surrounding the
house should be maximal. If your house is already built, attempt to
modify the terrain. Regardless of landscaping choices, there should
be observation and firing positions all around the house with clear
views of the property.
Keep the yard and landscaping neat to provide clear lanes of
fire and eliminate concealment. Foliage needs to be cut away from
gates or other access points to ensure no one can hide behind them.
Trim any bushes taller than knee height whenever possible. If you
can’t, look into the Rhodesian “shoot the cover” method (see
Chapter 2).
Even with dead space and a cleaned up landscape, a shot
from a distance could be a problem. This doesn’t have to be a sniper
but someone concealed nearby with even a handgun can be a
danger. Criminals may be waiting in ambush to shoot you and steal
your keys. Anyone tending animals or the property needs to be
armed and have a second person with them in case one is disabled
or pinned down.
When arriving at the front gate, look around and make sure
that no one is hiding. If a vehicle is following you or parked outside,
keep moving. If the gate must be physically opened, that person
should be armed. In addition to the driver, a third person from the
property should come down or exit the vehicle to provide cover in the
event of an attack. The defense here is speed, awareness, and
firepower. Automatic gate openers and fast opening/closing gates
should be used as well.
Before engaging in a chore, walk the area and inspect it first.
Is someone hiding in the grass or behind the junk around the barn?
Pay attention as you work, or have a designated armed watchman,
to ensure that no one sneaks up on you while you are working.
Lone persons are easy targets for kidnappings. Many times
over a lone person going about their property or returning home has
been taken hostage and threatened to gain access to the home.
Whether one is leaving the house to go shopping or working on the
property, no one can be alone. One person watches over the other
and two adults should be watching over children.
Dogs make excellent guards as long as they are trained to
bark at suspicious activity. Even small dogs can hear things better
than a human and barking is a good warning if not actually
intimidating to an intruder. Dogs are not foolproof, however. Dogs
roaming the perimeter are vulnerable to men with suppressed
firearms and suppressors are quite common now. Dogs can also be
poisoned or befriended over time.

Family

Your family needs to be prepared with its own version of an

immediate action drill. Imagine this: a series of gunshots sound and
bullets impact the house. A battering ram starts in on the front door.
You roll out of bed and grab your rifle. Your wife screams, stand up,
looks around the bedroom and asked, “What was that?” Next door,
your teenage daughter is screaming and wants to know what’s going
on. Your teenage son comes into the room and starts asking “Dad,
can I get my gun?”
When the balloon goes up, your family shouldn’t be wondering
what’s going on or what to do anymore than they would if they woke
up the smoke detector blaring and flames licking under the bedroom
door. Everyone needs to know what to do and where to go without
asking. Following a default plan is better than taking precious
seconds that could be used to react to order your family around.
 Before even starting to discuss your family’s immediate action
drill, you need to discuss the reality of the situation and get them to
understand it. They must be made to comprehend and believe that
things are not normal anymore and freezing when an attack starts
may get them killed. This will be hard for some people to apprehend
as they will be fighting their normalcy bias or in willful denial. It will
also help to practice with them so that they don’t become paralyzed
during danger.
In tornado country, your kids may be trained to put on shoes and
run for the basement. In California, an earthquake means shoes on
and in the doorway or under a table. For those of us who have been
through such a situation, there is no time to ask, “what’s going on” or
“what do I do.” When a perimeter alarm goes off, shooting starts, etc.
everyone better be ready to start moving without being told.
For instance, in the above example, everyone should be sliding
out of bed, low to the floor and putting on shoes. If you have to run,
being barefoot sucks. Grab clothes and weapons (as applicable) and
move to safety. For non-combatants in your family, they should be
moving to their safe haven where the adults are armed to protect the
kids. All fighters should be kitting up rapidly like firemen stepping into
their boots and moving to defensive positions. Rapid developments
may mean you are going to fight in your underpants.
Beyond the initial response, your family must know what to do if
they never hear from you again. You could be dead in a minute or
two. Do they evacuate? Do they fight to the death? Discuss various
scenarios and what they should do. More importantly, go over how
they should do it and practice. Ingrain these responses so they are
automatic so that fear and confusion does not get your family killed.

Discuss the dangers and reality of the current threat

situation. Educate your family so they can use knowledge to
overcome fear while appreciating the danger of the
situation.
Like “stop, drop, and roll” teach your family members to
duck when shots are fired and move by low walking or
crawling to the home bunker.
 Know who is responsible for closing and locking doors and
windows (if not already closed and locked).
Go over the radio alert (mayday) procedures so anyone can
call for help.
Know who is responsible for gathering the children or
helping younger ones to safety.
Know under what circumstances to flee the house and
escape and evade. Most importantly, practice doing this
and travel the routes day and night so everyone is familiar
with the escape plan.
Practice everything until it becomes second nature.

Hardening the home

The vast majority of crimes that are visited upon rural defenders
will be burglaries and violent forced entry robberies like today.
Sleeping families will be surprised when a burglar wakes them. The
front door will be shattered open with no warning because the TV
was up too loud. All of this can be prevented or slowed down by
using traditional means to reinforce entry points to the home or
technology to alert/discourage attackers.
Hardening a rural home is not much different than hardening a
suburban home as I outlined in Suburban Defense. The further a
rural resident is from a town, the more uncommon mobs, protests,
and riots will be so in that respect much of the advice on keeping
people off a postage stamp sized lawn is unnecessary. Fences and
other psychological measures to delineate private from public space
can be replaced with physical barriers.
Keeping unwanted people from approaching the house is still
important. Most readers will be living on a few acres with neighbors
nearby. Visitors and solicitors are not uncommon. The wooded
couple acres type neighborhoods are still neighborhoods and the
white picket fence in the front yard might be the best equivalent of
the two hours from civilization guy’s barbed wire fence.
The immediate yard surrounding the house should be fenced
in (discussed in more detail in the “Perimeter” chapter). In Rhodesia
this was often a six-foot chainlink fence which probably is not
practical or desirable for most people. You may want to fence your
backyard to keep the kids or dogs in or exclude deer from the
garden. In neighborhoods where there are no yard fences, yards
should be divided up to prevent interlopers from simply trudging
across lawns to bypass roads.
Outbuildings and tool sheds have to be secured as well as the
house. This means lights over entrances, locking the doors, and
reinforcing windows. A thief should not be able to get into an
outbuilding except through destructive entry and preferably setting
off an alarm in the process. Cars, whether parked in a garage or
outside, should always be locked. Consider removing the batteries
from cars that aren’t needed to prevent auto theft.
Rural residents have more land so having tools around is more
common than in the suburbs. Remove any ladders or tools from
outdoors and store those items indoors. I don’t care if you live so far
away from people that no one is going to steal the ax sitting in the
wood chopping stump. Don’t give bad guys any help getting in.
Doorways should have motion lights to identify anyone who
comes to the door at night. A constantly burning light at the door may
be contra-indicated by energy conservation or OPSEC/stealth
needs. Utilize cameras and automated doorbells while these
products are useable.
For window protection, suburban homes are limited by HOAs,
code enforcement, and what the neighbors might think, so while 3M
security film is great for everybody and attractive too, you can do
better. Security film will stop people from breaking windows easily. It
will not stop an intended intrusion (or bullets). Use bricks, plywood,
or sheet steel if you have it.
Chicken wire and chainlink over windows, screwed or tacked into
the frame, prevents blunt objects from going through provided it is
done right. There has to be some give to the mesh but not enough
for the baseball bat, rock, etc. to make contact with the glass. If hand
grenades become a danger, this kind of protection will be necessary
to keep frag grenades from landing inside the house.
Specialty bullet-resistant curtains (“bulletproof blinds”) exist
that can be hung inside a window unobtrusively. Steel shutters are
an option but usually have to be pre-hung from outside. Plywood has
to be nailed up and is not light permeable. Window bars are ugly but
will provide the greatest intrusion resistance and can be made
grenade resistant.

Habits and procedures

Lock the doors and windows to the house. Screen doors

should be locked and only used in daylight hours when the threat
level is low. Do not be in the habit of leaving doors unlocked, even
when home, because you live in a heretofore ultra-low crime area.
If used for ventilation, windows should be screened at a
minimum or ideally only opened on the second floor. Ground floor
windows should never be opened at night except when an awake
and competent person is on guard to detect intrusion attempts. A
dog is helpful but not a substitute for a human. Ground floor windows
should also have defensive landscaping beneath to discourage
entry.
Someone capable of self-defense should always be home.
The house should never be unoccupied. A trusted neighbor who has
a direct line of sight to the home and is within shouting distance
could be considered an emergency substitute for short trips as long
as that neighbor doesn’t leave too.
Do not let anyone who is uninvited into the home. Trusted
friends and relatives showing up uninvited may be one thing, but
never allow any other person you didn’t call over in. This goes for
repairmen; unless the house is on fire, don’t allow even the most
credible looking representative from Maytag, the gas company, or
the electrical company in the house. The same goes for salesmen;
make them all stay outside, even if it’s legitimate.
When defending a house, even if there are hostages or some
threat to burn you out, never let a criminal in. Fight to the death. In
too many cases, criminals or terrorists were let in as some sort of
bargaining attempt that didn’t work out the way the homeowner
planned. Do not put yourself in a position to be tortured to death, etc.
Consider leaving a tempting decoy stash for burglars to grab
and go. Perhaps you have a broken gun, some small amount of
cash, costume jewelry, and expired food they can easily find. They
may see this as an easy steal and leave, assuming this is all you
had. If it is convincing enough, they won’t go looking harder or start
tearing into walls looking for hiding spots.
In Rhodesia, all lights were kept on in a house at night in
order to confuse any observers as to which rooms were occupied as
the lights went on and off with sleep patterns. At the end of the night,
all the lights were cut at once. Blackout curtains and shutters are a
better idea.

Safe rooms

In this section, we will focus almost entirely on expedient or

low-budget modifications to harden the interior of a home or create
saferooms. Many readers will not be in a position to make costly
renovations or build a home from scratch. If you do have the
finances, consulting with a contractor or architect is best.

Bedrooms

Home designs don’t necessarily help defensibility of sleeping

areas. In larger homes, bedrooms may be separated by floors or the
master suite may be isolated from the other bedrooms. The further
rooms are from each other, and the better insulated the home, the
harder it will be to hear an intrusion attempt or cries for help. When
possible, everyone should be sleeping close to each other.
In Rhodesia, farmhouses often had gates barring the hallway
that went to the bedrooms. It is also common in South Africa.
Intruders inside the house couldn’t easily walk into the bedrooms or
isolate them from each other if they had their own security doors. If
your home has a design amenable to such a modification, it might
not be a bad idea to install a gate or security door. This would lower
the cost of installing security doors on each bedroom.
Any metal security gate that will fit the space would work or
one could be welded. It needs to be very stoutly mounted in a heavy,
preferably metal, frame that will withstand sledgehammer, prybar,
and angle grinder attacks. The base should be bolted into the
concrete or floor joists and reinforced wood frames on each side. In
an emergency, a plywood door with proper reinforcement could help.
It wouldn’t hurt to back the hall drywall with plywood on either side so
the wall can’t be ripped open.
Any bedrooms that back common spaces like unsecured halls
or a living area should have their walls reinforced. Breaking through
the drywall is trivial for an intruder who wants to get through. Again,
back walls with plywood on one side at a minimum. Plywood sheets
can be cut to fit between the studs and nailed in place between
drywall sheets when building for a clean look.
In an emergency, simply put the plywood up over the drywall
using long nails to attach the sheets to the studs. If done on the
intruder side, they can’t penetrate the drywall without removing or
breaking the plywood. If done on the other side, the nails can’t be
pulled or the panel pried, but the sheet may be kicked loose. Doors
that have cheap, hollow cores can be reinforced with a plywood
sheet added on.
Bedroom doors should all have keyed locks. Special tool non-
keyed locks (think of the little dingus that you use to open bathroom
doors when a kid locks themselves in) should be replaced. A real
key makes it easier to open the door and requires a semi-skilled
person to use lockpicks or kick down the door. You may consider
installing a deadbolt (keyed or non-keyed) to the master bedroom or
the room where you plan to shelter. Most intruders will simply use
brute strength or demolition tools to get in.
A proper door kick will usually cause the door jamb to splinter
as the lock bolt concentrates force in that one area, which is usually
just a 2x4. Distributing locks also distributes the force of any impact
so consider sliding bolts at the top and bottom of the door. Strike
plates also help with distribution of force that would otherwise be
focused on the handle/lock.
Treat bedroom doors like the home’s front door. Cheap
bedroom doors should be replaced with heavier models. Security
models aren’t strictly necessary if going with the gate model from
above. Use anti-kick plates on the jamb, which is high-gauge steel
secured into the studs with long screws that prevents the frame from
splitting under the impact of kicks. Hinges need to be on the inside or
unavoidably on the outside, use hinge pins.
 Other anti-kick mechanisms can be installed, like hinged
doorstops that prevent the door from opening. For traditional chains
and hotel style bars, remember these are only as strong as the
screws securing them. Horizontal door barricade bars or the leaning
floor style bars can and should be used.
Windows should be secured as well, even on the second
floor. All windows need security film at a minimum to prevent
shattering. Ground floor windows should be barred but upper story
windows could probably be okay with just film if there is no easy way
to climb up. Consider allowing an escape path directly to the outside.
One bedroom should have no burglar bars or bars with a quick
release system should be used to allow escape. 25 people a year
are injured or killed when they can’t escape burning homes due to
non-removeable window security bars.
Do not place beds against the exterior walls. While most non-
masonry walls have poor bullet resistance, the more physical
barriers (wall layers) and air a bullet has to travel through can reduce
its velocity or deflect it.

Keep bedroom doors shut and locked at night for security

with young children sleeping with parents or an
adult/responsible teen who can take charge of them in an
emergency.
In case of arson fires, sleep with the bedroom door closed
as this limits the oxygen flow to feed the fire and slows the
spread of the fire, heat, and smoke into the bedroom.
Install smoke alarms in every room and hallway.
Bed should not be placed against exterior walls.
All curtains should be drawn at dusk and windows blacked
out.
During times of heightened danger basements can be slept
in.

Safe havens

A safe haven (interior redoubt) is a room or a part of the house

that non-combatants can take shelter in during an intrusion or gun
fight. The haven needs to be secured against forcible entry as its
purpose is mainly to keep residents separated from intruders who
may kidnap or otherwise harm them. It is not necessarily to protect
from gunfire, though it will likely be more protected than other parts
of the house.
A safe haven is more than just a safe room. It’s a part of the
house where you can move freely. You have flexibility for extended
stays or defending yourself. A basement is an excellent choice.
Being below grade takes care of much of the ballistic protection
angle by removing people to under the line of fire. The house can
provide a lot of deflection for bullets that do penetrate or stand-off
space to absorb the blast of say a drone-dropped explosive on the
roof.
A Rhodesian or South African safe haven would consist of the
bedroom hall gate as above, plus barred windows in all the
bedrooms. The family could then move to a panic room, a safer
bedroom, or stay in the central hall.
Consider purchasing ballistic blankets to provide limited
bulletproof protection for family members. These pistol-resistant
Level IIIA flexible shields are made of bullet resistant material in a
segmented fashion and are available up to six feet squared. The 6x6
blankets are quite expensive at over $3,000 but are an option for
those like small children who cannot wear body armor.

Safe room/panic room

A safe room is your family’s refuge of last resort. Should an

intruder breach your perimeter and get into the house, this is where
they stay while you defend the home or they wait until the intruder
leaves. Simply hiding in a closet, crying, hoping, and praying that
you aren’t found isn’t a plan. More than once this has been tried, the
residents killed and the women raped. Any hiding place should be
tough enough that most intruders don’t want to bother.
Safe rooms should have no windows and one door. It should be
in the center of the house to have as much wall and air space as
possible. Otherwise, should be built from an interior room. it needs to
be readily accessible from the most-used living spaces in the home,
such as co-located with the bedrooms, to minimize the time needed
to get to it. The ground floor is better than upstairs. Basements are
good too.
One of the most popular ways of creating a safe room is to
refit a small interior (does not border an exterior wall) walk-in closet
and reinforcing it. A large interior bathroom can also be used. A
reinforced steel security door should be used. Walls should be
reinforced with plywood. Sandbags can be stacked to provide
resistance against gunfire and explosive fragments. To save interior
space, the bags may be placed outside the safe room. Bags stacked
three feet high will allow shelterees to take low cover behind them.
A solid core door is the minimum requirement, though special
purpose security or steel doors should be used. Doors should open
inwards as they can still be barred to prevent kick-ins and can’t be
barred from opening by intruders on the other side. All the previous
section’s advice regarding doors applies. You may wish to disguise,
create a moveable façade to hide the doorway, or even make a
secret passage.
If you are building a custom home, install a purpose built safe
room. This may be a steel box purchased and shipped to your home
site or it could be a concrete/cinder block room. Your living situation
and budget will be the determining factor. New builders without the
budget for a bulletproof shelter have made do with lesser methods
as remodeling home owners will. Note that pre-made tornado
shelters may not lock or be particularly bullet resistant.
Be prepared to shoot through the walls and doors. This should be
a last resort as it may draw return fire from the attackers that could
injure or kill you and your family. Note the likely hiding places and
angles of fire before the emergency in case you need to shoot
through barriers. Understand the barrier penetration of the weapon
and caliber you are using and know the materials you expect to
shoot through.[15] Shots fired in a closet will be deafening.

Existing space will likely determine refuge capacity, not the

other way around. This is not a long-term place to stay.
 If you are using cinder block, fill the hollows with concrete,
sand, or gravel to increase bullet resistance and anchor
them all with rebar.
Ensure that any all brick, concrete or all steel construction
has adequate ventilation.
Safe rooms will be vulnerable to fire. In the event of a fire, it
is best to evacuate the home.
Basement safe rooms may have poor emergency exit
options and old-style windows should be retrofitted with
egress windows.

Explosive resistant shelters

Note: This section contains excerpts from Suburban Warfare:

“Surviving Artillery, Drone, and Mortar Attacks.” See that book for the
full chapter.

The average suburban American home is the worst type of

home to shelter in. Wood frame construction is relatively resilient to
impact but it is flammable and high velocity projectiles easily
penetrate it. Basements are the obvious place to shelter in during
any type of event where exposure to firearms or indirect fire (artillery)
is expected.
For homes with no below-ground shelter, a hasty above
ground indoor shelter can be built out of common materials. I would
recommend having sandbags on hand as a general prep as they will
probably be difficult to find after a crisis begins. Your indoor shelter
will need to be in the interior of the building and on the lowest floor.
This gives the maximum protection that the construction of the
building can offer. Let the roof and walls absorb and deflect what
blast and shrapnel they can.[16]
An ideal shelter is taking a small room and placing sandbags
to create a “redoubt” of sandbags in the middle of the room or
against an interior wall. This will be a small bullet and shrapnel
resistant hideout that utilizes the outer shell of the house to help
redirect and slow down any shots that might injure or kill someone.
Your family won’t live here, but will take cover during any gun battles,
aerial attacks, or drive-by shootings.
For situations where explosive rockets, mortars, artillery,
grenades, or aerial bombs are expected, overhead cover will be
necessary. Indoor shelters should be beneath a stout table or
purpose-built reinforced structure nearest the center of the structure
on a ground floor. Where possible construct this in the strongest part
of the structure. The shelter table/frame should have a single layer of
sandbags on top to stop any shrapnel. This should be strong enough
to support a portion of the structure’s weight in case of a collapse.
Six-foot tall chainlink or wire fencing along the perimeter of
the house may offer some ability to stop or pre-detonate RPGs or
other rockets from reaching the house as the fence may act as a net.
A tall wall around the house is better. This would only benefit the
lower portion of the house and will not stop hand thrown or rifle
launched grenades. Grenades are often launched in an indirect
arching trajectory. You probably will not have to deal with this threat
and almost certainly not in the early stage of a crisis.

Interior defense

Bad guys need to be stopped before they get into the house.
Once the fight is indoors, odds are it is probably already lost. A home
invasion robbery or a burglary can be successfully repelled by a
prepared armed resident but a determined enemy unit probably
won’t run the same way two thugs from the ghetto will when faced by
resistance.

Fight to prevent entry to the home.

If the exterior fight is lost, stop the intruders at the
entrances. Direct as much fire as possible upon the
intruders as they make entry. They are in a fatal funnel at
this point.
Stay behind cover inside the home. This may be in
makeshift fighting position, firing around a corner, or over a
low wall, counter, or piece of furniture. If “cover” inside the
home can’t be found, concealment will do.
 Bullets will easily penetrate the interior of modern homes
especially if fired from inside. Use any available walls or
furniture to help deflect, slow, or fragment the bullet. Any
stout object can shield from bullet or jacket fragments.
Consider deploying flashbangs inside but be aware you
may be as severely affected by them as the bad guys.
Smoke and fire hazard is a risk of using these devices.
If you are repulsed from the entry defense, fall back
towards your safe/bunker area. Protect that and the
innocents in it at all costs. At this time, it is probably best if
the innocents escape while you cover their flight with your
life.
In the event of a successful repulse of intruders,
immediately counter-attack and drive them away from the
house. You do not want them up close to burn the house
down around you or to attempt another entry.

Will a bad guy burn the house down with you inside? Probably
not; let’s consider their goals. In almost every case you will be
attacked because the bad guy wants to live there or wants the stuff
you have inside. Burning the house down makes as much sense as
a bank robber throwing the money bags in an incinerator. Even
vindictive enemies would probably try and wait you out rather than
lose the prize. This calculus changes somewhat if the attacker is on
a homicidal mission as a part of terror tactics, warfare, or genocide.

Immediate action drill (example)

Inciting event (alarm, burglary attempt, shots fired)

If shots fired, family immediately takes cover and crawls to
interior bunker.
For general suspicious activity, everyone should be
informed and family members prepared to take shelter
inside.
Defenders all arm and equip themselves and move into
defensive positions or in low-threat suspicious
circumstances stage for deployment.
Should the order to evacuate happen, everyone needs to
already be dressed, shod, and ready to grab their bug-out-
bags.
 Groups
Note: A prerequisite to this chapter is “Neighbors and Defenders”
from Suburban Defense. I am of the opinion that the vast majority of
people will not have any real interest in forming any sort of defensive
group until the wolf is at the door. I go into great detail on this point
and how to organize a neighborhood in Suburban Defense. I discuss
the average person who is willing to fight in the chapter “Neighbors
and Defenders” in Suburban Defense. I won’t recapitulate that here.

Forming rural defense organizations

Organizing in a rural area will be different than in a suburb.

With houses further apart, it is much more difficult to go next door or
run into people on the street to have a conversation that naturally
turns towards defense. You may not even know many of your
neighbors by name. Rural organizing has to be deliberate and works
best within existing structures.
These existing structures will probably be offshoots of either
government entities (sheriff’s posse), fraternal orders, or churches. I
would definitely expect the Mormons to form defensive groups, if not
on advice from Salt Lake, spontaneously at the local level. Don’t
doubt that the regulars at gun stores or the local gun club forming up
based on conversations from likeminded patrons.
Readers of my previous books will know that I do not believe
most people will have any real interest in organizing before an
emergency occurs. It is too difficult, too expensive, too time
consuming, and “weird.” The current state of affairs has normalized
preparedness to a degree leaving laziness as the main excuse.
People may understand the need for defensive preparations and
desire to have some, but there is little motivation to make the
sacrifices necessary for it. County folk are not much different than
city folk.
I believe that community action in rural areas will be better
than in urban areas once it gets going. Rural communities tend to be
more homogenous politically and have a greater sense of communal
self than a big city. The “us versus them” insider/outsider attitude will
be greatly beneficial for generating a felt need for community action.
Sealing off and protecting the community from outside danger seems
to be a universal theme throughout human history and across
civilizations.
As the situation deteriorates, the desire for solutions will
increase. In Northwest California, long a hotbed for clandestine
marijuana grows, residents are beginning to agitate for the sheriff
and county supervisors to start taking serious action against
growers. Some residents rashly are threatening to take matters into
their own hands. These people probably aren’t serious…yet. Similar
problems with drug cartels in Mexico led locals to form autodefensas
or independent self-defense groups. Future exigencies will lead to
such things here.
How self-organization begins will be different everywhere. The
“Second Amendment Sanctuary” county movement is a possible
model where individual counties resolve to investigate unorthodox
solutions to problems a societal collapse brings. You can help when
the time comes by gaining skills and contributing to your
community’s well-being in some way.
In community meetings, your goal shouldn’t be to take charge
and seek a position of leadership. It is statistically improbable that
you, the reader, will be a charismatic and influential member of
society who has the skills, experience, and training to lead a city or
county level defensive force. Initial organization will focus on existing
power structures, such as the police or sheriff’s department. The
local council or board may form something as well.
What you should do is join any sort of volunteer or advisory
group. Be a vocal and active participant, willing to take on
assignments and excel at them. It will help if you are a known
quantity, so consider participating in existing organizations, like
police volunteers or a Community Emergency Response Team
(CERT). Succeed at being an Indian and then you can move towards
being a chief. If you come in as an unknown person with nothing to
offer than “I read this book” people are going to think you are weird
and freeze you out.
 Being an outsider

Relocatees, those that sold their houses in California and

moved out-of-state to rural communities, need to understand that
they are outsiders. Until they are well and truly integrated into the
society and accepted as part of it they cannot seek to dominate local
politics and affairs. Become involved and having something positive
to offer but don’t assume that residency alone confers upon you the
same acceptance that a decade or more living there does.
On the micro level, get to know your neighbors. You don’t
need to door-knock beyond a couple houses necessarily, but wave
and stop to talk when you get the chance. Talk people up at the Post
Office or in the local stores. Before we had TV, the Internet, and low-
cost telecommunications this was our only way of getting social
interaction.
Even without a friendship developing, these encounters build
familiarity. Familiarity breeds trust. Trust becomes bonds. It is
relationships that permit us to function as groups because without
some level of personal care for one another we’re all just strangers.
Camaraderie creates an emotional obligation for people to help each
other. Empathy can be seen as a form of self-interest because “but
for the grace of God there go I.” If someone’s only reason for helping
you is “I might be next,” take it.
Social trust covers more than just information and fighting
together. If the economy is toast, who is going to trade with you if
cash is worthless? Who is going to hire a man that he knows nothing
about and has never seen before? Without personal connections
and social obligations, all interactions are transaction based. That
invisible social capitol, honor, is replaced by things of value. The
wealth of honor is much easier to stockpile than gold, silver, or cash.

Benefits of organization

Survivalism and prepping tend to focus on surviving the

apocalypse alone but as John Donne said, “No man is an island.”
We talk about community relations and maintaining good
relationships with our neighbors in terms of mutual support, meaning
we have people who can come running when we call, but what can
you provide? Sending men and guns into an attack is one thing but
gunfights are rare compared to all the downtime. What moral support
do you offer?
A ranch full of special forces guys is a wonderful thing and a hard
target to hit but does little for their community if they never go
beyond the wire. If you have a competent armed group that can
affect positive change in the area yet they remain entirely self-
interested, a moral failing has occurred. Strategic opportunities are
also lost.
Not everything has to be a quid-pro-quo; “I shot up those bandits
last night in your driveway so I need you to guard my cows.” Too
often we forget about the intangible things that make communities.
You cannot look down on weaker neighbors nor leave them to their
fate. You have a part to play beyond being the loudest, meanest dog
on the block.
The sheepdogs watching out for the sheep is more than just a
one-sided transaction. A big brother who beats up the bully might
have otherwise won the fight engenders his little brother’s love and
admiration. That act by the big brother builds confidence in the little
brother so he doesn’t have to take being bullied and will one day
step into the role of the protector himself. A kid who is left alone to
be harassed faces a much better risk of being ground down by the
experience than sharpened up.
Beyond the pragmatic effect of killing enemies who might
threaten you, fighting on behalf of the community can have the
following intangible benefits:

Galvanizes the community to action by serving as an

example.
Increases morale and the will to resist depredations.
Encourages others to resist and improve their capabilities.
Victories can create or enhance a sense of camaraderie.
Places your group in a superior position of leadership,
direction, and strategy.
 If you are seeking control and influence, in this case you are
doing it through action.

Rural Defense Group

I suggest two groups: one, a general force of all locals who are
willing and able to fight; the second a more experienced and
specialized force. This first group I will call the response group. The
second is the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) or Quick Reaction Force
(QRF). Both will operate a lot like volunteer firefighters.

Selection

You, the reader, are clearly interested in this topic so you and
the people you do find like you will serve as the nucleus of any
group. Like how the Green Berets go to guerilla movements and
train people, you can do something similar.
Your nucleus will be the training and organizing cadre of the
latecomers. Everyone should be well-read on the topic of SHTF
defense and have some tactical or technical ability to bring to the
table. For instance, in my group I’m intelligence oriented. Another
three guys are very into radios so our communication expertise is
there. One is an ex-Army Ranger and we have an EMT as well to
cover the medical angle. All of us are avid shooters and practice in
dynamic events like IDPA.
Rural areas will likely have more people with military
experience than in the city, although the concentration of them will
be smaller. You also aren’t going to meet these people during normal
interactions in the neighborhood unless you have years to do it
simply because lower home density means lower interactions. You
will have to seek comrades in arms out in places where likeminded
people will gather.
For all of us organization will be a use what you’ve got
situation. As time goes by and the need and desire for banding
together goes up, so will your available pool of resources. It will be
increasingly easy to find ex-servicemen, technicians, and medical
types with the skills you need. Some may even have abilities
superseding yours, so it’s important you view that as a good thing
not as a deprecation of yourself or your efforts. Survival is the goal,
not self-appointing yourself as Colonel of the Mayberry Militia.
Not everyone is going to be a leader or specialist. Nor is
everyone suited to be tip of the spear trigger pullers. Every army
needs privates to fight the battles that win wars. Most of the people
you will recruit into your defensive force will be ordinary trigger
pullers. Some men will be more able and eager to fight. Your able
and eager fighters will be fewer than regular Joes willing to take the
field. I’ll call the former veterans and the latter Joes.
For Joes, no experience is necessary as long as they are
reasonably fit enough to fight, can competently handle a rifle, and
are willing to shoot bad guys. There will be time for training and
learning tactics. They will be the ones manning roadblocks, standing
watch, reinforcing perimeters, and fighting bad guys. Since quality,
bravery, and dedication may vary, I would not send these people into
delicate or very violent situations as a first choice. Just because
somebody’s dad bought a plate carrier and looks the part doesn’t
mean he’s ready to be the tip of the spear.

Force makeup

Veterans will make up your more aggressive fighting forces.

These people will be competent and comfortable under fire, already
experienced in fire and maneuver. While the Joes hold down a
perimeter, the veterans may pursue attackers or outflank them. In
time, a Joe may grow in competency and graduate to veteran status.
When you can get enough men with infantry or such
experience together, you can create an advanced tactical team.
SWAT team members are a good choice as well. Hopefully these
guys have fought in Afghanistan or Iraq. If you can’t find such guys,
it’s time to start playing airsoft or paintball and see who naturally the
better warrior is. Develop those guys.
For creating veteran teams, preferably of ex-servicemen and
current/former law enforcement, I recommend Concrete Jungle and
Prairie Fire by Clay Martin, a veteran of US Army Special Forces.
While I don’t think that everyone can or should setup a team that is a
variation of a Special Forces A-Team, the advice is applicable to a
rural defensive force with a suitable selection of veterans to pick
from. It is not necessary to mimic that approach but a good place to
start from.
Let any able-bodied man who wants to and can fight into the
group. This is about bodies, remember? Even though some persons
may be better warriors than other, every man you can get has a
place. Veterans and skilled civilians can make up your assault troops
or RRF/QRF and the slower, fatter, older guys who aren’t so good
with guns can serve as second line troops.
This second line of guys can be placed to guard things.
Perhaps a grain silo needs a couple guys to make sure no infiltrators
hit it while the main fighting force is elsewhere. Or they could be
guarding a freshly attacked house while the RRF/QRF is chasing
down the assailants. These are the guys who are good for roadblock
and checkpoint duty, not running through the hills.

Women

Women shouldn’t be employed in combat roles. Yes, I am a

traditionalist. You are protecting your women from men who would
probably rape and enslave them. Why get the ones you are trying to
protect killed unnecessarily? Second, as I discussed in Suburban
Defense, men are physically better suited for combat than a woman
of similar physical fitness. I won’t rehash the argument here.
Women by all means should be skilled with weapons, defend
the interior, and provide auxiliary gunfighters. Women in Rhodesia
did some incredible things, as did our female frontier ancestors
against the Indians. Ladies need to be capable of looking out for
their own welfare when alone and supporting the fighters as
necessary, but not the primary fighting capacity.
The fighting Ukrainian grandmother is a great meme, but not
the best use of her abilities as tactical guru Joe Dolio has repeatedly
pointed out. Women and children should be caring for the wounded
and watching cameras or monitoring radios to spare fighters who
would be otherwise diverted.

RRF/QRF
 The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF/QRF[17]), should be a more
committed group of defenders who have the ability, willingness, and
skills to act as a “SWAT team” for your neighborhood defenders.
These men should be able to respond rapidly when called like
Revolutionary War minutemen; they should not have to waste time
convincing their wife that they are leaving or are the types who will
only go if their friends are fighting. They will have to deal with the
tougher challenges and fights.
Ideally this is where you’d put your infantry and special forces
veterans because they would have the best fighting skills and be
sent to the hottest situations. The RRF/QRF would be the tip of the
spear, followed by less-capable defenders, and finally by the second
line of guys. In your case, your QRF might be your only real fighting
force. Sure, the old men of the neighborhood might bring their rifles
out and keep watch over the road, but they aren’t going to be able to
wheedle the bad guys out of the barn where they holed up.
Select only military veterans or SWAT cops for your
RRF/QRF. Studies have shown high numbers of soldiers will not
actually fire to hit enemy troops. This number will probably be borne
out or even increase in the case of random civilians. Your neighbors
might fire in direct self-defense only. You can’t expect that if you get
100 good ol’ boys with rifles turned out that 100 men will actually try
to kill bad guys. At least with vets and cops, the higher level of
training, experience, and familiarity with potentially killing will ensure
that they do actually fight.

Duties

Here are some examples of duties your rural defense group

might undertake:

Responding to assaults and counter-attacking.

Hasty ambushes of arriving or fleeing bad guys.
Security patrols and reconnaissance.
Establishing and manning checkpoints and roadblocks.
Providing extra manpower to properties or places with
special threats.
 Training homeowners and farmers/ranchers in defensive
tactics.
Serving as a law enforcement auxiliary.
Patrol lines of drift or areas that enemies could be hiding
within your area of operations.

Personnel

Job roles

First of all, most people are going to be trigger pullers. You

need more Indians than you do chiefs, though there are some
important areas that you may specifically want specially skilled or
talented people in. With enough people, the ability to diversify and
specialize is possible. A large enough defensive group allows a
community to leverage its members’ skills and experience. Folks
have a lot to bring to the table that can add value and capabilities to
your group. Roles should be dictated by needs, not the other way
around. I recommend finding various needs and filling them such as:

Intelligence and warning: have someone who closely

follows the news and social media? Is this person able to
organize information and apply critical thinking to create a
useful intelligence product?
Medical: everyone knows doctors, nurses, paramedics,
and EMTs. Some will be combat medics who go along to
the fight and others who stay behind in a field hospital.
Having a physician is great but nurses and paramedics are
just as good for the most part.
Communications: you want preferably an experienced
ham radio operator with technical/electrical experience
bleed over. Additionally you’ll want competent fighters who
can run radio communications in the field—your RTOs.
Marksman: he’s your best shot. Some call this the
weapons expert. Since we won’t have access to
demolitions or heavy weapons (yet), get yourself a very
competent, fit shooter. This person’s job is long range
 shooting or running your civilian light support weapon
(LSW).
Negotiator: find someone with the gift of gab that can
seemingly make friends with everyone and can always
deescalate a tense situation. He is your public relations
officer, the hostage negotiator, and the guy who can make a
deal with difficult people. He talks your way out of trouble.
Logistics: this person isn’t tasked with cataloging the
goods of the neighborhood but is willing to do the thankless
job of managing the group’s equipment-in-common. In my
fraternal order we have one guy that takes charge of the
outing equipment and delegates tasks getting stuff ready.
Defensive coordination: this person will act in a
leadership role. He is someone who is able to make friends
and maintain good relationships. His job is to get everyone
working on the same page and keep everyone on track.
This person is more of a diplomat, seeking cooperation,
rather than a boss. A successful leader of a local
association may be an excellent choice if they have tactical
experience.

Some of these roles can be combined or broken up. It all

depends on manpower. Fewer people (qualified people) means that
an individual shoulders more of the load. This list is not inclusive, but
illustrative of what you’re trying to accomplish.
If you can, reach out to interested businesses and
professionals. Perhaps a mechanic will donate his time to work on
group vehicles. A welder or fabrication shop might volunteer to weld
hadji armor to your technicals. A machine shop might make useful
firearms accessories. An electronics shop can do all kinds of
wonders. Adding people to your cadre like firearms trainers who do
that as a job can be useful tactics instructors.

General staff

You may be the one starting and organizing all of this, but you
aren’t necessarily the leader type. If a natural leader emerges, let
them be boss as long as they are not incompetent or evil. A good
leader should be knowledgeable, worthy of respect, have
organizational skills, and capable of gaining consensus. A dash of
charisma doesn’t hurt either.
Qualifications are secondary to qualities. Your Navy SEAL
neighbor may have been a jerk of an officer whereas the 35 year old
former PFC 11B (that’s a basic US Army infantryman) grew up to be
an admirable leader. Be wary of the people who want to be in
charge.
Note that a civilian leader is more of a director than a military
commander. You can’t order people around and treat them as
subordinates without the weight of official military discipline. Playing
Patton with the neighbors is a sure way to get cooperation to die and
people to refuse orders, just like a director who might yell at an actor.
You don’t want your fellow defenders to walk off the set. Orders are
for winning battles, not getting your way.

Note: I talk more about leadership in “Suburban Defense.”

Battle coordinator
This person is responsible for tracking the incident,
coordinating responders, processing information into intelligence,
and given direction as needed. This would be an ideal position for an
experienced radio operator who cannot go in the field anymore. The
candidate would need to have excellent listening skills and reading
comprehension, be familiar with the area, possess good radio
operating habits, and have working tactical knowledge.
The battle coordinator can work the radio himself or have a
dispatcher (see below) do that. He can and should employ helpers
as manpower allows, such as a tactical intelligence section.

Tactical intelligence section

A tactical intelligence section can monitor radio scanners,
social media, cameras, etc. They free up the battle coordinator and
dispatcher to work the radios and run the operation. A person can
only listen to about two radio feeds at once to properly monitor them
with any effectiveness. So the more bands or frequencies that need
monitored, the more ears you’ll need. If you have an effective way to
communicate, such as over a secure comms app if the Internet is up
or via secure radio, this can be done remotely.
Older folks who have good technical and organizational skills,
plus some military experience, are a great fit for this position. You
can also use trigger pullers who have good heads for intelligence
when there is no fighting going on. When the security situation isn’t
acute, this will become a regular intelligence section.

Dispatcher
A dispatcher who can optionally monitor radio traffic, send out
emergency muster calls, and coordinate the response is a good
asset to have. Volunteers can fill this role with the right equipment,
namely quality, high-powered radios, an external antenna, and 1-2
scanners. See “Radio system” below for further information.

Should you involve local law enforcement?

You do not need official sanction and if things are bad enough
you won’t bother with it. Unless your community is organically
moving in that direction with a cooperative chief/sheriff, I wouldn’t
involve law enforcement at all. Police are subject to politics and legal
pressures that may preclude full participation from them or force
them to take actions against you.
Some individuals in law enforcement will come around as the
situation deteriorates and the rule of law collapses. By then, mass
deputization is moot. Everyone has the power to make an arrest or
use force to defend another. Posses under official cover are helpful,
but not necessary. Law enforcement should be regarded as a
potential asset, not a savior. Your best bet is to befriend deputies
and officers on a personal level. Read more in Suburban Defense
and Suburban Warfare on how police may react during SHTF.
I don’t buy this “constitutional sheriff” nonsense. A sheriff is
not mentioned in the US Constitution and probably not in many, if
any, state constitutions. That’s great if he says he’s going to abide by
the constitution, but I will guarantee you he does what the Supreme
Court says is constitutional rather than what the black letter law in
the Bill of Rights says. Also how many of these so-called
constitutional sheriffs have arrested federal agents or supported
citizens against Antifa? Never put your faith in politicians.
Small towns don’t make better cops. Unfortunately, a lot of
rural areas don’t pay well so they attract less than stellar candidates
to do the job. Your small town police department may be full of
retirees from other agencies, guys who couldn’t hack it anywhere, or
mall ninjas who write tickets to pump revenue for the city. All the
while Podunk can brag that it has its own police department.
My observation of small town/county cops is that their
departments can be beholden to local interests, such as wealthy
business owners or influential citizens more than in more populous
jurisdictions. This can backfire if a malevolent influence is present
within local law enforcement. “Plata or plomo”[18] (money or a bullet),
is a powerful incentive for official interference or ignorance in the
third world. If things go pear shaped don’t assume your local cops
are above playing dirty or being deliberately incompetent.
While I wrote a couple novels as encouragement to police to
take on a citizen-centric, old fashioned approach should SHTF
happen, I’m not optimistic. Without being paid, cops aren’t coming to
work. They are also human and many aren’t warriors. In the best
case scenario, a sheriff and his department could serve as the
nucleus of defense efforts. They have the ability to dispatch people,
coordinate responses, train, and mediate. They may be able to staff
a “tip of the spear” response group with SWAT qualified officers.

Equipment

Communications
If the grid is up, everyone in a defensive group should be on an
encrypted app like Signal for messaging. No confidential information
would be passed on this group; it would be simply for coordination.
Grid down, as outlined in the “Communications” section, a radio
band needs to be agreed upon. For the basic group members, it is
probably best if this is GMRS. For the more advanced RRF/QRF, this
can be VHF/UHF bands. Since all of these radios are unencrypted
and GMRS is especially vulnerable, radio discipline and
communications security (COMSEC) have to be maintained.
Movement orders and plans should always be passed face-to-face,
via runner, or in code when done over the air.

Weaponry
Rifles will be the primary means of defense in any rural area.
On a rural lot, shots can range from 100 yards to the effective range
of most weapons and shooters, 800-1,000 yards. Pistols are only
effective to about 50 yards and much of that depends on the
accuracy of the shooter. Rifles in this day and age need to have
sights, even a red dot sight helps. Your eyes aren’t getting younger.
Low-power magnification is great in areas with sightlines over 200
yards.
In an urban environment, shots within 100 yards are common
and over 300 yards are uncommon. In rural and natural
environments, shots out to the effective distance of the rifle are
possible (most likely 800-1000 yards). Minimal magnification will
make distant targets more visible and increase the hit probability.
The venerable ACOG x4 is a viable choice but 1-6x variable power
scopes are increasingly affordable choices.
A semi-automatic magazine fed rifle is mandatory. Shotguns
become ineffective at 75 yards or more. Bolt action rifles, except for
snipers, are obsolete. As for caliber, that’s up to you. I do
recommend sticking with common calibers, so 5.56mm or 7.62mm
NATO for ease of purchase and standardization.[19] You may want
7.62mm if you are going to be taking longer shots.
One weapon discussed in Suburban Warfare is the Civilian Light
Support Weapon. This would be a long barreled AR-15 equipped
with a variable power optic that can serve as a marksman’s rifle or
an ersatz squad automatic. If you have a bumpfire stock that you
didn’t turn in/destroy or a binary/rapid fire trigger, this is the weapon
for it. Or perhaps after the rule of law totally collapses you obtain full-
auto capabilities.
Full-auto/bumpfire could provide an analogue to a machine
gun that may provide a huge advantage against massed groups in
dire circumstances. Concentrated, rapid fire may discourage an
enemy who is not expecting heavy firepower. Likewise,
unsuppressed shots are psychologically more intimidating than
suppressed ones. If you can afford the five figure costs of a real
machine gun, buy one and apply for the tax stamp ASAP.
Grenade launchers are not viable. Yes, they can be
purchased and NFA registered but manufacturers won’t sell you the
ammunition for them. Various flare and smoke shells can be used
with these grenade or similar flare launchers; see the Suburban
books. It’s the same story with Claymore mines and hand grenades;
legal with the right steps but practically impossible for civilians to
purchase.

Gear
Uniforms may be hard to standardize on once a supply chain
crisis or black swan collapse happens, but you can decide on
general color schemes. Dark or earth tones are suitable for blending
in with the environment. Camouflage would be more useful and
standout less in the country than the city, however. Everyone should
be identified with colored armbands or something that can be easily
seen in a fight.[20]
Load bearing equipment (LBE) is necessary. You can’t run
into a fight with only one magazine jammed into a pocket. Even an
old fashioned LC-2 harness with pouches will work. High-speed
chest rigs and plate carriers are unnecessary. Body armor may be
contraindicated because it’s hot and heavy. Moving and fighting even
in a soft vest sucks. Many out-of-shape defenders will be unable to
move on foot wearing body armor, so this may be something not
worn on patrol to increase endurance and mobility.

Activation

Some situations when defensive forces should be activated are:

Planned routine patrols (times, routes, and areas vary);

To setup roadblocks or checkpoints;
When a property is under attack;
When a property is under imminent threat of attack;
When threat indicators are present to indicate a heightened
general risk of attack; or,
 To pursue bandits.

In most cases, the majority of the force will be called up to

respond to an attack in progress. Like volunteer firefighters, whoever
can respond should.
Especially during an in-progress attack, individual or small groups
should not rush into battle alone unless there is no other alternative.
Responders should stage in a safe location not far away until a
sufficient number of responders can pool and coordinate an attack.
Should everyone just rush in, forces will be divided, the counter-
attack uncoordinated and ineffective, and the potential for friendly
fire (blue-on-blue) goes up.
A battle coordinator is indispensable for this. He can give the
responders a location to stage and pass along intelligence. Either he
or the on-ground leader can formulate a response plan. It would be
the responsibility of the persons under attack to pass on timely
intelligence so that the responders aren’t counter-attacking blindly.

Radio system

Rhodesia’s Bush War of the 1970s saw farm communities

ravaged by communist guerilla attacks. In this rural territory,
communication was done by radio. Agric-Alert was a radio network
used by farmers under police auspices to communicate and
coordinate when under attack and responding. Originally started with
cobbled together hardware, it became capable of indicating when
individual stations were calling and sending out an alarm signal.
Rural defense groups need to utilize a similar system. Law
enforcement uses a pre-recorded broadcast over a portable radio
that can be activated with a panic switch. This is called a VARDA
alarm[21]. One use was at a prosecutor’s home as he took a cartel
leader to trial. If there was an attack on him or his family, a button
could be pushed on the machine and a detective’s pre-recorded
message would summon help.
While it would be wonderful to have a little desktop box that
can page selective farms or just the dispatcher, that’s out of the
question for the ad hoc defenses that will spring up. There’s no out-
of-the-box solution for average people at this time. At a minimum,
using commonly available radios you will need:

A common radio frequency to monitor for calls, “guard”

frequency.
Everyone always must have their radio on at an audible
volume 24/7 to listen.
A 24/7 dispatcher to monitor the radio.
Social discipline to not misuse the frequency for idle chatter.

A ham radio enthusiast lives in practically every community and

they would be the best resource to create a radio plan. This is a
table of frequencies that everyone uses. Based on the availability of
radios and what people already own, really it is the bands that need
decided on. In an SHTF situation ham or business reserved
frequencies could be used without a license to open up the
bandwidth. In reality this looks like “Are we using VHF/UHF, just one
or the other, CB, or GMRS?”
Various brands of radios that can communicate on the same
frequencies will all talk to each other, power and antenna factors
aside. A Baofeng will talk to a Yaesu. Yet while a Baofeng can hear
and talk on GMRS frequencies, the GMRS cannot hear the ham
frequencies a Baofeng can transmit on. And to be honest, most
people will be using the ubiquitous Baofeng UV-5R portable radios.
To make this work, radios will need to be on all the time. The
radios most will have access to are not like cell phones that can be
selectively activated. It would be great if the radio system had a way
for everyone to generate an audible emergency alarm tone, but
perhaps a dispatcher with a base station can do that. Or someone
could key the mic next to some cheap little alarm device that then
plays over the air. The idea being if someone doesn’t hear the
mayday call they hear the shrieking coming from the radio.
Everyone must always have their radio on at an audible
volume 24/7. The more ears that are listening, the faster word can
spread for more help. This could get pretty annoying at times with
always having background noise that can start chattering any time of
the day and night but it has to be thought of as a TV or talk station
on all the time. Lives will depend on these radios. Volume has to be
up loud enough to wake sleepers or be heard in a normal living
arrangement.
To all the hams and cottage industry people out there, how
about creating a Raspberry Pi device that can work with a Baofeng
or GMRS radio to enable selective calling, a push-button duress
alarm, and an all-call system? I’m sure things like this will popup
once SHTF happens. There are other solutions out there for tech
savvy hams but they’re not the kind of plug and play devices that
everyone can just buy.
All locals will need to have an agreement not to clutter the
guard frequency with idle conversation. People should have a
secondary calling channel and hail each other on that frequency, not
the guard channel. If someone is burning up the guard channel,
other parties need to break in and tell them to “shut up” if they don’t
switch frequencies. This won’t work for disrespectful outsiders but
neighbors can be ostracized for poor radio discipline.
If you do not have a separate common calling channel (for
instance many homes will have but one radio), any routine calls on
the guard channel should be limited to raising the wanted party and
switching to another channel.
Example: “Gonzalez calling Smith.”
“Smith here.”
“Smith, go to Channel 5 for Gonzalez.”
“Roger, 5, out.”
This is the minimum amount of traffic necessary to facilitate
communication with the other party and get off the guard channel. In
reality, there will probably be several calls until the parties connect or
it may take multiple tries over a period of time before the caller gets
the callee’s attention. After the side conversation is done, both
parties switch back to the guard channel.
Other procedures will have to be implemented, such as:

Morning and evening roll call to make sure no one has been
attacked.
Pre-arranged duress codes to signal a hostage situation.
 Arranged communications plans to shift bands/frequencies
if there is jamming.

Dispatcher/control

Unless your radio net consists of a small number of users, you

will need dedicated volunteers to act as dispatchers or net control
operators. The dispatchers can then sound a general alarm over the
radio, make calls, or sound a physical aural alarm. Their duties are
very simple:

1. Pass on alarms;
2. Share emergency information;
3. Coordinate the emergency response; and
4. Tell people who are chattering on the guard frequency to
change channels.

That’s it. The basic skill of being able to pay attention, quickly
write down information, and speak clearly and calmly are good
qualifications. Anyone who can do that can do the job and lots of
people are capable. A pool of volunteers who are scheduled is the
best way to avoid fatigue and burnout; the larger the pool and the
shorter the shifts the better.
For major incidents, there should be an experienced and
dedicated net controller. This person should have experience using
radios and perhaps is/was a real dispatcher at one point in their life.
An experienced amateur operator (ham) is another good choice.
They need to be able to do more than just pass information but think
on their feet and perhaps even battle track a little. This person could
also be the battle coordinator.
Dedicated net control will keep track of unit movements,
assignments, and needs. They can then allocate resources based on
this information. By listening to the radio traffic, scanner feeds, and
utilizing other information, they can paint an intelligence big picture
that the guys in the fight may not have time to do.
As for alerting others, this can be done via broadcasting alarm
tones or repeating the mayday call until enough responders hear
what’s going on. The muster calls, in addition to being over the radio,
could be using the local volunteer firefighter/tornado siren or
someone could install something similar. Range of an outdoor alarm
would be limited to just a few miles in a noisy environment, however.
Phone calls should utilize a phone tree as long as the
telephone system is working. For instance, the dispatcher calls two
specific people, like patrol leaders. Those leaders each call two
designated people and the two people they call ring up two more
people that they’ve been assigned to call. This way, the dispatcher
doesn’t need to call each person individually and the word can
spread fast.

Distress calls

The proword for an emergency is “Mayday,” usually repeated

three to six times. Information that follows should be location, nature
of emergency, persons in danger, help needed, and callsign (or
identity). Remember to speak slowly enough to be understood. In an
emergency situation, you are likely to talk fast, stumble over words,
and speak in a higher pitch than normal.
Anyone under attack needs to update the responding help with
continuing movements so that a counter-assault can be coordinated
properly. Information should include:

A count of the attackers, as accurately as possible;

Physical descriptions of the attackers, or the basics like
their ethnicity, clothing and vehicles;
The direction from which they are attacking, what positions
they are firing from/hiding in, or which way they retreated;
and,
Weapons and equipment used.

Mayday response
If a “mayday” is transmitted:

1. Do not transmit. The mayday/emergency traffic takes

precedence over everything else. Only those transmissions
related to resolving the emergency are permitted. The person in
distress has priority over any helpers.
 2. Record the details, either with a recorder or by writing it down.
If you record the audio, write down the information anyway. This
includes callsigns, frequencies, locations, the nature of the
emergency, and who is involved.
1. Saving information makes it easier to understand what
is said and pass it on later.
2. Writing down the information allows you to accurately
pass it on and verify information.
3. Written records of the emergency can help rescue
efforts or later investigations.
3. Provide what help you can. If you are in a remote area or if this
is SHTF, there may be no calling 9-1-1. You may be the rescuer
or the only lifeline to someone capable of providing aid. The
golden rule applies here.
1. For many operators, summoning help or coordinating a
response is all that they will be able to do.
2. In a potentially violent environment, be aware that
distress calls could be hoaxes to trap responders.
4. Monitor the frequency until you are no longer able to, someone
else who can handle the emergency assumes control, or the
emergency is over.

A net control station working the emergency can request radio

silence. Example: “All stations [your callsign], emergency traffic this
frequency. Impose radio silence.” Periodic reminders need to be
broadcast periodically. You may wish to give an update to anyone
who is listening but hasn’t heard all the emergency traffic. Once the
emergency is over, transmit something to the effect of: “Emergency
radio silence ended. Normal traffic may resume.” There are no strict
guidelines on imposing radio silence or what needs to be said on the
amateur or GMRS bands.
Net control passing an emergency alert should say something
like “All stations: emergency, emergency, emergency. Combat action
123 Fake Street, Jones residence.” Periodically, further information,
details, and direction can be given.
Note that emergency management should be the only traffic on
a channel when there is an emergency. Only those who are in
danger, responding, or coordinating the efforts should be
transmitting. If you want to listen, fine, but don’t ask for updates.

Response procedures

Rapidly respond to the general area of the incident. Do not

arrive directly at the scene, unless that is tactically
necessary, until you can appraise the situation.
Park and dismount from vehicles around the corner, down
the block, a few houses down, or a ways away from the
actual incident. Cops don’t pull up in front of the house
where the domestic or the murder, etc. is going on because
that makes the officer a target as he gets out of his car. The
RRF/QRF troops should move into position on foot after
dismounting behind cover or concealment, approaching
using all of the same to their advantage.
Gun trucks and technicals should maneuver so they can
provide fire support to dismounted elements. Armored
vehicles should be used to deliver troops closer to the fight
or act as cover for dismounted fighters.
Initial responding personnel should move towards the fray
and engage the enemy in the best way they can based on
any information from the person under attack or incident
commander. Immediate action should be undertaken to
disrupt the attack. As more personnel arrive and information
is gathered, an organized counter-attack can be hastily
planned and made.
Once a counter-attack is underway, more responders
should setup a perimeter (cordon) and contain the area.
This is both to catch any enemies who may be fleeing the
fight and to prevent any reinforcements from infiltrating or
attacking the “rear” of the responding defenders.
Watch any cross-fire and be careful not to fire on the
residence or any neighboring structures. Evacuate any
nearby residences that are in danger. Remember that
routed enemies may try to take cover and fight from a
neighboring home or building.
Patrols will need to be coordinated with neighboring
residents. You don’t want a bunch of armed men skulking
around and freaking everybody out. Blue-on-blue (friendly
fire) accidents happen this way.
 Defensive Operations
The first lines of defense are passive; deterrence and
awareness. Being a hard target that is never attacked is the goal.
Awareness of intrusion attempts and an attack before or as it begins
denies the enemy the upper hand of surprise. Once an attack has
begun, victory comes down to resources, skill, and luck.
As said elsewhere, most criminals will just try to stealthily
break in or go for a quick, low effort, but violent, forced entry. More
rarely will more than a handful of attackers stage a paramilitary style
raid on the property. In either case, the goal of your defense is to
fight so aggressively—more so than your attacker—that they
abandon their attack. Most enemies you will face are not suicidal and
don’t want to die. Very few attackers will return against a target that
has repulsed them.
Many criminals are highly interested in self-preservation and
will flee when faced with real resistance, like a firearm. Time after
time, we see burglars and robbers turn and run away when an
employee or homeowner pulls his gun. That doesn’t mean that the
criminals won’t shoot or fight, but the preponderance of evidence
shows that they prefer unarmed, compliant victims.
As time goes by, expect this to change. There will be some
who are more brazen because they have gained experience and fear
inoculation after countless crimes. They may utilize tactics on a
rudimentary level. You aren’t always going to be fighting ninjas but
neither will you always be facing idiots. Time and experience are
wonderful teachers while desperation is a terrific motivator. In either
case, fight; you might turn the tables.

Resources
Victorious armies often succeed with few resources, but many
battles and wars were lost for a deficit of them. A defense, especially
your defense, will be about resource allocation so be smart about
using what you have to maximum effect. What resources win fights?
 Men: the more men you have, the more enemies you can
fight and the greater share of land you can control. Most importantly
with more men you can sustain more casualties as there is someone
to replace a fallen warrior. Having reinforcements that can counter-
assault will probably turn the tide in any rural defense.
Land: space can equal time. The more ground an enemy has
to cross or subdue between their jumping off point and you, the
longer it will take him to get to you, giving you time to wear him down
or prepare your defense. However, this can come at a great cost as
Russian experience shows.
Supplies (or logistics): the food, ammo, and fuel you have
to fight with literally sustains fighters and fights. If you can’t sustain
men or their guns, the fight is over. A better prepared enemy with the
manpower can wait out and grind down a poorly supplied enemy.

Skill
In combat, the human body is going through a fight or flight
response. Adrenaline trashes your fine motor skills and the brain is
focusing on survival at any cost, not winning the fight. It takes
experience in dangerous spots to overcome that natural,
subconscious reaction.
Perhaps you heard your CCW/shooting instructor tell you that
in a fight, you will default to the lowest level of your training. That’s
entirely correct. The more experienced, better trained side will win
with the tables of luck turning in the other direction. Hopefully you
and your friends are a bunch of veterans, cops, and civilian shooters
against idiots with guns. For those who have not learned how to
gunfight, get yourself some training courses. Civilian training courses
far exceed what is the standard curriculum for military and law
enforcement.

Luck
What more can be said about luck? You can do everything right
and still fail. Often survival in combat is more of a situation
approximating luck rather than planning or skill. Superior preparation
and planning only maximizes the opportunity for luck. If you are in
the position of everything going wrong that can go wrong, you will
have to lean deeply upon your skills and resources to overcome that.
Likewise, those same skills and resources, properly utilized, can
make hell for your enemy who is having his unlucky day.

Defenders

No matter how good you are, a single man doesn’t stand a

chance against a team of even halfway competent attackers.
Attackers who use any sort of organization, preparation, or training
will likely have enough discipline to not run when you shoot at them.
You also can’t shift fire and hit accurately enough before one of them
can draw a bead on you. A second man can cover the first’s
movements.
If you want to see what a total grid down, without rule of law
(WROL) situation may be like in a rural area, check out my EMP
novel Hard Favored Rage. It’s based on the same area I described
in the introduction. In my novel’s case, it’s an idealized situation, but
given the size of the land and the magnitude of the threat, there
aren’t enough men.
One of the take-aways from this book should be that a rural
retreat is not the solution to the end of the world as we know it. While
life will probably be better on the farm than the city, a lone family on
a remote, secluded property is not automatically safe. Isolation is
also in the favor of attackers who can do their deeds unnoticed by
neighbors and with minor risk of interference. The same distance
you are counting on to keep you away from the daily riff-raff is what
the bolder and badder bad guys are looking to exploit.
There has always been safety in numbers. That’s why all over the
world small, fortified communities have sprung up, from the acacia
thorn protected kraals of Africa to the walled villages of Europe.
Neighbors in close proximity can aid each other; in the middle of
nowhere it’s just you and whatever men you have on site to defend
against the world. Maybe there are still stories in your family of
frontier ancestors whose lonesome homestead was attacked by
Indians. In the 2020-2030s, there may be no cavalry to call.
Simply by population density, rural readers will probably live in a
residential area outside a city/town on expansive lots with room for
agriculture. This is probably the best place to live because there are
other people who can band together. The worst place is an isolated
place with perhaps 1-2 people to defend it. Whether you are near or
far, passive defenses can only do so much. More bodies are the key
to survival.

Manpower

One person cannot defend a property alone. Two men

minimum, like a father and teenage son, will be needed and that’s
like erecting a speed bump to stop a tank. For a barely credible
defense, a single house would want to have four men and then the
women and older children who can provide axillary firepower. Four
men is one man per side of the defensive “square.”
This is the absolute bare minimum. The more, the better. If
just one of the four defenders is killed, that’s one side of the house
that isn’t protected. Three defenders, even in a triangular defensive
position, have more area to cover and more “work” to do.
For one person on “watch” 24/7, this would require three
people standing 8 hour watches, four people standing 6 hour
watches, six people standing 4 hour watches, or 8 people standing 2
hour watches. Very quickly this becomes exhausting, even with
day/night shift rotation. In what might be termed “peacetime” corners
can be cut, such as having the dayshift be whoever is up and
working, but armed and alert overwatch may be necessary as the
danger grows.
Shifts need to be carefully managed to keep from burning
people out. Two-hour shifts are the best for maintaining the alertness
of someone on watch. Sentry duty should last no longer than four
hours as their performance will begin to degrade after that. Eight to
twelve hours sitting in the same place doing nothing is an awfully
hard thing to ask. Imagine trying to stay awake at your desk for an
entire day with nothing to do, except that you might die if you fall
asleep. Rotate sentries frequently and try to employ roving guards
rather than static observers.
Absent any pressing threat, technology can be relied upon to
provide an alert and lower, not replace, the manpower needs. The
first warning, however, might be shots at the house or the warble of
an alarm. Community watches can also reduce the need for constant
observation, but roving (or static) watchmen need to be capable,
alert, observant, and actually out there to do some good. Even then,
bad guys can work around the patrol. Neighbors need to get into the
mindset of “see something, say something,” sort of like when local
social media goes nuts because a bear was seen wandering the
streets.
Multiple homes that are close together or on the same
property, a family lot, can more easily divide up the roles. Packing
four families into one home is a lot, though it may come to that
depending on how bad things get. If you can build accessory
dwelling units (granny flats) or park trailers on your property, do it.
In my novel, I have the ex-Navy SEAL character invite a large
number of veterans and deputy sheriff’s to his property to stay there
and help guard the place. It’s a large farm, so there’s room. An even
wealthier landowner has a larger and better equipped force of his
own. You might want to invite your trusted veteran and cop friends,
as long as there is enough room to house them and food available.
It is the lack of proximity that is the Achilles’ heel for rural
defense. Watching out for each other is more than just peeking
through the blinds. Neighbors need to get together into
neighborhood teams as in the Suburban series. The one difference
is that folks may be responding in vehicles or ATVs rather than just
walking down the street.

Assaults

My family’s country homes have always been the type that

are practically on the road. No matter how far from town they are, the
driveway has always been less than a hundred feet from blacktop.
Anyone who is close to the roadway and doesn’t have a long,
preferably obstructed driveway, is going to have to deal with rapid
vehicular assaults.
A rapid vehicular assault is when the bad guys arrive at or in
front of the residence in a vehicle, quickly dismounting to begin their
raid. Think of a SWAT team pulling up in front of someone’s house
and kicking in the front door. A passing car can slow and turn into the
driveway to disgorge passengers in less than a minute. Imagine this
happens at night when you are asleep and the first thing you hear
are the doors shutting.
This is not a sophisticated attack. It may involve elements of a
drive-by shooting. Its features are rapid arrival and deployment using
surprise and violence of action to overwhelm you. The advantage to
the attacker is the speed in which it occurs and the proximity of
delivery to the target lessens the time you have to prepare and
respond.
This is a form of direct attack. The enemy comes right in, relying
on surprise, speed, and force/firepower to win. For the unprepared,
this will be a devastating tactic as many will be woken in their beds.
Fighting unknown numbers of attackers inside your house at pistol
range is a bad scene. In SHTF, the bad guys may choose to
continue to press their attack since police won’t necessarily be
responding.
While you may have visions of being a pioneer shooting at
Indians or a Rhodesian farmer under siege from terrorists in the
bush, a line of bad guys coming out of the woods is a more
dangerous assault than from a vehicle. First the intruders are spread
out more which means your aim has to traverse more ground. They
can scatter faster if they aren’t bunched up. You also won’t get the
same warning as from a car arriving.
More complicated attacks are ones that require stealth. The
average criminal isn’t going to do that; he’s going to export his home-
invasion robbery techniques to the countryside. As time goes by and
intruders grow more sophisticated and ruthless, their attacks will
diversify. Not every attack will be a form of fire and maneuver.
Attackers will do what is safest for them and most dangerous for you,
like a sniper siege or kidnappings.

Attack types
Indirect: Snipers can shoot from outside the perimeter or
mortars/artillery/drones (UCAVs) can be used to attack you without
sending someone forward. This may also include sabotage or killing
of animals. RPG attacks from a distance were popular in Rhodesia.
A sniper can bottle you up, which suppresses you, allowing other
forces to approach closer. Harassing fires from snipers can also be
timed to keep you from engaging in chores as the sniper threat has
to be addressed first. Hours could elapse before it is “safe” again
while the sniper is long gone.

Multi-polar: From more than one direction. An example is a

diversionary raid at the front gate, while the main force moves in
from the woods to the east, while a third small harassing team
moves in from the rear. A two-axis attack may include the main
thrust and a diversionary feint. The larger the property, the more
complex the attack pattern can be.

Diversionary: This could be a feint, where the battle isn’t to

defeat you, but to test you or occupy you while something else
nefarious is going on. A diversion may be part of a larger attack or
may be used to draw a response force in before the real attack is
launched elsewhere. It could simply be a probe for a later offensive.

Traps: A trap is any deliberately allowed perception of enemy

weakness that draws you into an enemy’s ambush. Such an attack
might include a feint to draw you out side or even a deliberate retreat
to cause you to enter an area of concentrated attackers. The “fire
sack” concept is one popular with Russians and it puts the defender
in an area where they are being fired on from three sides. Traps can
also allow for kidnappings or hostage takings.

Ruses: The FedEx truck that innocuously turns out to be full of

armed attackers, a staged car accident, or an attractive woman in
distress is the bait to lure defenders in to an ambush. A variation
would be a kidnapping and hostage extortion situation.

Ambush: Self-explanatory. Ambushes could occur around your

property or on the road. The distinction from traps and ruses is that
enemies are lying in wait for you to approach. Ruses and traps can
be used to setup an ambush. A stealthy enemy could infiltrate your
perimeter and hide undetected until you leave the house.
 Siege: The enemy establishes a cordon around your home and
fires on anyone who emerges to fight and kills anyone who tries to
escape. You don’t live in a fort. They force your surrender over time
or burn you out. Any protracted defense where the enemy can get up
to the house is unlikely to result in a siege if a Molotov cocktail can
just flush you out or finish you off. The antidote to this is having
friends and neighbors counter-attack.

Surveillance: This is not so much as an attack but a possible

precursor. An enemy may take up a camouflaged position and
observe your routine, strength, defenses, etc. to plan an assault. He
may penetrate and inspect your perimeter on foot. This is why
routines should be varied and patrols mounted to inspect not just
your perimeter and property, but the periphery beyond for suspicious
activity.

Arson: Molotov cocktails on the roof or through a window are the

most obvious attacks. Others are setting deliberate wildfires or
burning crops (particularly grain crops).

Avenues of attack

Most criminals will use driveways to attack, some arriving directly

at the parking area or house by vehicle. Humans naturally like paths
and open areas so those with no tactical skills will cross your lawn,
come up the walk, or follow the driveway. More savvy attackers will
come through the woods using cover and concealment often in the
dark.

Driveways, especially for vehicles.

Gates and openings in fence lines or natural barriers.
Paths and places that look like paths (known as “desire
lines”).
Dry washes, shallow watercourses, ditches or culverts.
Passable natural areas, like open woods, empty lots,
cultivated fields, unfenced lawns, etc.
 Remote areas like the backside of a mountain far away
from any road (because it is not expected an adversary will
go that much out of the way).
Docks, riverbanks, beaches, or creeks (watercraft borne
arrival).
Adjoining properties, roadways, railways, and utility rights-
of-way.
Ruses: Disguised vehicles, fake accidents, a person in
distress, playing dead, a fake retreat, etc.
Remember that time of day and weather can also facilitate
avenues of approach.

House fighting considerations

Single family homes on large lots in rural neighborhoods (say 2-

10 acre lots), will have a lot of the same problems as suburban
homes. The most likely forms of attack will be a direct assault right
off the road or street or infiltration from neighboring properties.
Unfenced yards are a bane for defenders. A fenced property line and
fenced inner yard is a great defense, followed by a dog outside for
warning.
You will probably be fighting from inside the house until the
enemy flees. A hardened home will slow down the attack and
mitigate the damage penetrating bullets do. In case an enemy only
hides and waits for you to come outside, you should call a rapid
reaction force and have them clear your property. The last thing you
want to do is come out the backdoor directly into a sniper’s
crosshairs.
Windows and doors are the obvious places to shoot out from
inside and an enemy will expect that. If you can’t avoid this, shoot
from deep inside the room rather than putting the muzzle out the
window. This will better hide you in the shadows within. Stay low and
change positions/rooms frequently. Do not silhouette yourself in front
of a door or window.
Try and fight from outside the house whenever possible. You will
have much greater mobility and fields of fire outside rather than in.
By being outside, you can also direct any incoming gunfire away
from where your family is. If the house is acting as concealment, try
to stay on the sides of the house and fire from around the corners.
Residential terrain, though not dense and probably with a lot of
concealment, will not be conducive to long attacks as the
surroundings of a more remote property. Attackers are vulnerable to
angry neighbors or a counter-attack. Escape straight into the brush
may not be direct. Roads within can be easily closed for counter-
ambushes. Victims can flee through open yards and lots to safety
more readily than the fences of suburbia.

Defensive fighting

Immediately counter-attack as soon as you can feasibly do so

as aggressively as possible. Most criminals flee in a panic as soon
as resistance is encountered and even more daring attackers may
retreat if intense resistance is given. Even wounded enemies,
instead of killed enemies, may be helpful as they prove to be a
burden to their comrades.
One group of defenders should keep the enemy under
constant suppressive fire, while the other attempts to close and
engage them directly. Always keep their heads down and keep them
in a panicked state. If you have the manpower, do not stay in static
defensive positions to prevent the enemy from keeping you pinned
down. Move and counter-attack the enemy from his flanks.
Wait as long as you can for attackers to bleed out, tire, or give
up and leave; overnight is best if you can. Any parties sent to
investigate dead attackers or suspicious circumstances should be
supported by shooters in covered positions ready to offer covering
fire if it turns out they are playing possum. A dog can always be sent
out to sniff for enemies. More aggressive dogs can also attack
intruders. You do risk losing the dog if the enemy can kill it.
If there is a kidnapping, immediately attempt a rescue. You
and the hostages might as well die rather than attempt to negotiate
with scumbags doing it in bad faith that will probably kill the hostages
anyway. Do not negotiate with kidnappers, but if you do so
successfully, counter-attack immediately after you recover the
hostages so as not to encourage anyone else to try it. Never allow
yourself or a hostage to be taken elsewhere as they will probably die
or never be recovered.
Recon by fire: shoot into likely hiding places to kill an enemy
or induce him to fire. Rhodesians knew this as “shoot the cover,”
where they shot into dense clusters of foliage that could hide a
terrorist.
Less-than-lethal recon by fire may be required depending on
the legal circumstances. Consider using a bright spotlight to examine
dark spaces, spray a firehose, 37mm launched pyrotechnics, or
traditional fireworks. Don’t shoot at shadows just to reassure
yourself, only at deliberate targets. Some undisciplined troops have
been known to fire indiscreetly to make noise in a superstitious way
to “scare” enemies and feel like they are effective.
During an attack, pay special attention to any motorcyclists
that are involved. They may be carrying incendiaries or explosives.
Keep people dispersed in fighting positions when possible so that a
single grenade, burst, or Molotov cocktail doesn’t take out more than
one or two people.
Target any obvious leaders. Poorly trained and disciplined
groups may be under the control and direction of one person.
Elimination of the leader may destroy any morale or
command/control abilities of the group.
If you are shooting in hilly terrain, bullets tend to hit high when
shooting either up or down, contrary to the folk notion that bullets hit
high when shooting up and low when shooting down. The generic
advice is to “aim low because the shot will hit high” is true for either
uphill or downhill shots. (See “High Angle Shooting” in Suburban
Warfare).
Use smoke to screen yourself. At ground level, smoke will
work to both hide you from the enemy and hide the enemy from you.
It may be a good tactic to lob many smoke grenades into a wooded
or hazardous area an enemy is trying to navigate in order to slow
him down. If you must evacuate or are concerned about being
overrun, consider a smoke screen.
If you are about to be overrun, those who can escape should
escape. Some defenders may need to fight to the death to allow
non-combatants and others to get away. Any and every weapon
should be used to stop or slow the final assault. In military parlance,
this is known as FPF or Final Protective Fire. Machine guns are fired
on fully automatic; rifles are mag dumped, and explosives are fired
off in a frenzy.
A smart ambusher will use his deadliest, most frightening and
casualty inflicting weapons, such as machine guns or explosives.
Machine guns have a huge psychological advantage based on the
noise and volume of fire they can lay down. Thompson Submachine
Guns were marketed as riot weapons partially on this account and
many gun manufacturers have suggested that patrol officers carry
full auto guns to intimidate violent suspects in a gun fight through
superior firepower. Use what you have so as to be as daunting as
possible.
Fire and maneuver for defenders

Your home is attacked in the middle of the night. Gunfire is

coming from a few men shooting towards the house while taking
cover in the front ditch. The defenders rush outside and start
returning fire from their sandbag positions, ducking behind cover as
necessary. Two things happen; first the bad guys see you aren’t
moving and concentrate fire on your static positions. Second,
another group of bad guys approach from the woods to your right
and shoot around your cover from just a few dozen yards. You were
just outflanked by an enemy using fire and maneuver.
Fire and maneuver will be a necessary element of a defense.
Fire and maneuver are where one group provides support or
covering fire while another element moves on the enemy. The
moving element can be flanking or advancing on the enemy. You
may have heard this called “bounding overwatch.” The point is that
one doesn’t just stay still and exchange shots from behind cover. If
nobody moves at this point, it’s just two boxers dancing around each
other throwing punches.
Suppressive fire is intended to force you to keep your head
down. For instance, if you pop your head over the top of the trench, it
gets shot off. Anyone who tries to move or advance does so at the
risk of being shot, making it hard for the enemy to return fire or
maneuver himself. Your enemy will try to keep you from moving
while his buddies close in for the kill.
The first reason to maneuver is that cover can create the
illusion of safety. As you hide, the enemy is moving towards you. He
uses cover and concealment or a distraction to get into a position
where he can kill you. If he is smart he is using the supporting
element you’re exchanging pot shots with in between ducking behind
your rock or whatever to distract you while he approaches you at a
90° angle.
Assuming you aren’t being flanked, sitting still is dangerously
predictable. Staying in a static position allows an enemy to draw a
bead on you and if he’s composed enough, wait until you expose
yourself to fire for him to take his shot. Moving firing positions is
important to prevent an adversary from homing in on your position.
This is more important if grenades or launched explosives are being
used.
A second team, say your RRF/QRF or a second team of
defenders, flanks or advances on the enemy. This gets them into
better positions, angles, or just closer to the enemy to finish them off.
If movement is needed, the second team can take over suppression
duties while the first unit moves. Eventually you should be in a
superior position to engage and destroy the enemy.
Military units try to trade off suppression/maneuver roles to
keep the enemy reeling and reacting instead of executing his own
plans. Counter-attacking is best done whenever an enemy is in
retreat, regrouping, or the fighting slackens off. Hit him when he is
weak or occupied. You probably will not have the numbers to do that.
If you’re lucky, neighbors or the RRF/QRF will attack the enemy’s
flank.
In a homestead defense situation where there is the
manpower to do it, one team will probably be static and defending
the home itself. These folks need to be the suppressing element. A
second team will then move in parallel to or at an angle to the line of
fire and close with the enemy. It would be great if there was a third
element that was providing overwatch from another position on any
enemies who tried to move towards the defender.
 If you don’t have the manpower, remember to change firing
positions often. Don’t get caught shooting from the same spot.
Another tip is to never run through the line of fire. Charging the
enemy shooting at you may be one thing but running into your
buddies’ line of fire or shooting at them is a terrible idea. Never cross
into the line of fire or shoot in the direction of your friends.
Remember, whatever your plans are and no matter how well
they are executed, the enemy gets a vote. A smart attacker will react
to your defense to create confusion and frustrate your response.
This is a chess game where the enemy doesn’t have to move the
piece you want him to move into the square that best suits your play.
Flexibility is the remedy for an adversary shifting his methods,
speed, or direction of attack.

Use fire superiority to suppress the enemy (keep heads

down) and allow your mobile force to move to attack on the
enemy’s flanks. He should be forced to sit still under fire,
not you.
Shift firing positions to avoid being in predictable spots for
the enemy to suppress.
During enemy retreats and regroupings, use the lull to
counter-attack. Prevent the enemy from outflanking you or
hitting you from behind. If you aren’t defending, counter-
attack.
When using fire and maneuver tactics, be mindful of cross-
fire and the positions of friendly forces. Approach parallel to
your static positions’ lines of fire and shoot perpendicular to
that line of fire.

Shooting and fighting at night

Note: Excerpt from Suburban Defense.

When shooting at night, the tendency is to aim high, sending

shots harmlessly over the head of your target. Hold low. Low shots
are much more likely to hit than missing high. Even a leg shot can be
disabling. The “snap” sound of bullets hitting the ground add an
additional psychological impact which is greater than the “whizz” of a
miss.
Your shots will be seen as bright muzzle flashes by your
enemy. This will cause your enemy to shoot at the flash, so move
after taking a shot.[22] Invest in a quality flash suppressor for your
weapon. Many variations exist and some do a better job than others,
for instance the flash being the size of a cigarette cherry versus a
flaming basketball. This will help preserve your night vision from
flash blindness. Muzzle brakes are not flash suppressors. You can
also use a suppressor (silencer) to get the same effect.
If one man has night vision, he can fire exclusively tracers
from his rifle to designate targets. Everyone shoots at where the
tracers are aiming. Some tracers do not illuminate at close range but
need 50-100 yards to begin to burn. This is so that soldiers using
them do not give away their firing point. Tracers can also have a
psychological effect to bolster morale on your side and weaken your
enemy. Tracers work both ways and can give your position away.
Be aware that at night you will be silhouetted against any
lighter backdrop. At ground level, this would be standing out as a
dark shape in front of a light colored wall, fence, or building. Stick to
the shadows and dark backgrounds when standing or moving. When
an observer below you looks up and sees your dark figure against a
lighter sky (the sky is always lighter than the ground), this is called
sky-lining.
Often at night, you can see someone moving around because
of the contrast of their shadowy figure on the lighter background, or if
against the sky, stars or lights disappearing and reappearing. If you
are elevated above a potential observer, be careful that you don’t
skyline yourself. Cross ridgetops or hills below the crest so your
backdrop is the ground and not the sky. On rooftops one may have
to crouch or crawl.
Be familiar with what your area looks like at night. Don’t just
drive the area, walk it. Practice walking in the darkness, using only
ambient light to navigate (more on this in the “Night Vision” chapter).
Do not leave the house at night to check enemy dead. Wait
until daylight and for several hours so any wounded who might
attempt to fight have bled out. Anyone who is hiding waiting for you
to investigate is tired or has left. This should also be a daylight
practice so avoid the same risks but at night it is doubly more
important.

Around the house

Planning and practice

Perhaps you’ve heard of the OODA loop: observing, orient,

decide, act. In other words, you notice that something is going on
(observe). Your brain processes the observation and formulates a
thought to tell you what’s going on (orient). You decide you need to
act and how. You act. Driving a car, if you see brake lights, the
reaction time to hitting the brake can be three seconds. At 65 MPH,
that’s just under 300 feet before your car begins braking.
You cannot afford a delay when an attack starts. The defender
is naturally behind in the footrace of survival because the enemy is
typically attacking at a time and in a manner of his choosing. All the
defender can do is try to regain the initiative and bend the attacker to
his will.
You need to discuss the various attack scenarios and wargame
how you are to respond. Armed people with no plan are going to lose
the initiative trying to figure out what to do. “What’s going on?”
should not be uttered when a shot is fired or an alarm sounds. “What
should we do?” is a conversation around the dinner table or living
room long before things deteriorate.
Immediate reaction (contact) drills need to be practiced and
timed. Each person should know where to go, what to do, and the
steps after that. Different scenarios have to be practiced. What
happens if the intruders breach the house? How does one react to a
surprise burglary at night? Where does each defender go? Various
scenarios should be rehearsed so that time is not wasted on figuring
out how to react to an enemy’s movements but training can be fallen
back on.

Engagement
 Determining intent is difficult but important. In rural areas
legitimate foot-borne home visitors tend to be less but no one except
the crazy wants to accidentally light up a missionary. Here are some
indicators of potential hostile intent:

Weapon in evidence;
Not familiar to the area and no indications of a legitimate
purpose;
Not walking up obvious pathways (sidewalks, driveways, or
through open space);
Attempting to hide or move behind concealment;
Does not respond to your challenges or runs away when
confronted; and,
Making verbal threats.

Threat progression

From least threatening to most threatening:

One alarm sounds without any other indication of human

presence.
Single person passing the property, no interest towards
homes seen.
Single person approaching home, no weapons seen.
Multiple persons passing the property.
Single person approaching home, weapons seen.
Small group of people approaching home.
Single, unknown vehicle.
Any number of unknown vehicles.
Persons moving concealed around the property.
Multiple persons, with weapons, moving rapidly or tactically
towards the premises.

The level of aggression and violence increases and

circumspection about the person(s) decreases as the list progresses.

Rules of engagement
 Call law enforcement if possible.
Move family to safety and activate immediate
action drill.
Challenge the intruder from behind cover.
"Stop and identify yourself! What is your business
here?"
"Stop or I'll shoot."
If they fail to respond, utilize warning devices to get their
attention.
Call for mutual assistance from neighbors.
Consider use of less-lethal weapons.
Open fire when:
Violence is initiated.
Hostile intent can be articulated.
Entry to the residence is attempted.

Fight until the danger is past or you are unable to continue.

Massive, instant retaliation has ended ambushes
early.
Stiff, unceasing resistance often results in a victory
when the other side withdraws.
Retaliatory offensive operations need to begin as
soon as possible after an attack.

Always alert your family/friends when suspicious activity is

occurring. Get defensive plans moving early so that you are ahead of
the power curve if things go sideways. Pass the word over the radio.
Better to have help show up over a false alarm than be discovered
dead two days later. Your alert for suspicious activity that moves past
you could save someone else’s life.
Generally violence should not be initiated by you without a
warning/challenge. Do not issue challenges unarmed or in the open;
remain behind cover. If hostile intent is evident and you can
articulate it, opening fire first may be the better option. However, do
not be so afraid of the circumstances around you that you get trigger
happy and shoot a squirrel hunter in your woods.
 When challenging someone, avoid doing things that give
away your strengths. Any incident could be a test of your defenses
or casing for a later attack. Your entire defensive team shouldn't turn
out in full view of this person. This could provide a scout on a
probing mission with a headcount. You may want to consider the
impression that the weapons you carry convey. Appear like the tough
and prepared target you should be but save some surprises. Even if
you are attacked, assume it was a probe and that they will be back.
 Patrolling
Patrolling one’s property should be an obvious security
precaution. An intrusion attempt isn’t going to find itself, that is until
the intruders start shooting at you or kick down your front door. Even
small property owners need to walk their perimeters, check their
fences, trim bushes, and repair any damaged defenses. Getting off
the property has to be done as well otherwise it is like sitting in your
bedroom, hearing a noise in the hall, and assuming everything will
be fine because the bedroom door is shut.
Staying on your compound or your property and never going
out to see what’s going on is as much of a recipe for disaster as is
trying to be a lone wolf. The Internet, radio reports, and listening to a
scanner is no substitute for what your own senses can observe. On
the micro level, if you rely on your sensors to tell you about an
intrusion attempt you may never know that someone has been
tampering with them.
Walk your perimeter and your property. Talk to the neighbors.
Go further afield and see how others are getting on. Perhaps
handcarts have replaced the traffic on the Interstate and a horde of
refugees is coming right towards you. If you just hunker down, you
will never know what’s going on.
The Marines state the purpose of patrolling as[23]:

Gathering information on the enemy, on the terrain, or on

the populace.
Engaging the enemy in combat to destroy him or inflict
losses.
Reassuring or gaining the trust of a local population and
preventing public disorder
Deterring and disrupting insurgent or criminal activity.
Providing security and protecting key infrastructure or
property.
 In short, patrolling is proactive instead of sitting around and
waiting for an attack. It is a part of security and community building.
Patrols will need to be coordinated with neighboring residents
to avoid blue-on-blue (friendly fire) accidents.

What this chapter is not

Defensive patrols at the core are about awareness and

deterrence. Know what’s going on so that you can react to it and
ultimately prevent having to engage in a battle at your home,
preferably without shedding any blood. A battle averted is a battle
won.
This chapter is not about how to engage in warfare-like activities.
This is a defensive book, not an offensive one for would-be
American insurgents against the forces of evil. While there is a role
for guerilla warfare and advanced combat topics, I’m not the teacher
for that nor do I think much of the audience should be attempting that
stuff.
Community-level patrol groups should be run by veterans who
have experience doing this in the military. A civilian shouldn’t be
trying to run large-scale security operations that are better suited for
military trained personnel. On the smaller level, a homesteader might
want to patrol everything within a mile radius of him as that is of the
most critical concern for him. Wasting time across the valley looking
to see if someone has disturbed the grass on the old wagon trail 20
miles away is no good if bad guys are already inside that distance.
Rural patrols will need to focus by necessity on security and
intelligence gathering in a grid-down situation. There will be no social
media or telecommunications to gather information for you. Even if
there is, the reliability and timeliness of the information may not help.
Grid up, some things can only be found out by physically observing
an area or talking to people face to face.
For example, as times become more desperate, predators will
become bolder and resort to infiltration tactics in response to stiffer
defenses. Your town may have roadblocks at both ends of the
highway so no cars can make it in without shooting their way
through, but how about foot mobile raiders walking down out of the
hills? Are you patrolling popular trails and passable lands to look for
signs of refugees or bandits? In Afghanistan ISAF troops didn’t only
have checkpoints on roadways but went into the mountains to
interdict the Taliban.
As the situation evolves you may need to set ambushes on
the trail approaching your residence. Patrolling with the intent to
meet an enemy and fight it out before they get to your home might
become necessary. Though you may need to take aggressive,
proactive steps to initiate decisive engagements with the enemy
rather than waiting for him to make an attack, I want to avoid giving
the impression that this should be your primary goal.

Note: Patrolling theory and an urban take for inexperienced

individuals is covered in Suburban Warfare in detail. Rather than
rehash that, I’d refer you to those chapters. Take what is applicable
from them in your environment and employ it. For rural areas, rather
than make a poor attempt at teaching things I wasn’t trained in, I
need to refer you to two other authors I highly regard.
For specifics on “how to” conduct a rural patrol and basic
infantryman’s skills, I highly recommend USMC veteran Joe Dolio’s
Tactical Wisdom series of books, specifically TW-02 Fieldcraft.
Second is Clay Martin’s Prairie Fire[24]; Martin is ex-US Army Special
Forces. In addition to these two, the US Army Ranger Handbook is
an indispensable source of tactics with a minimum of fluff.

Types of patrols

Combat patrol: you know bad guys are out there and you want
to find and engage them.
Reconnaissance patrol: you want to gather information on the
enemy, on the terrain, or on the populace.
Security patrol: you want to detect any enemy activity or confirm
there is none. If you encounter enemies you deal with them.
Presence patrol: you want to be visible as reassurance to your
neighbors and a deterrent to any bad guys who may see you (also
called “show of force”). These can also be static, as at a checkpoint.
 Combat patrols are offensive in nature and not within the
preview of my work. There will be times that men qualified for this
kind of thing need to go out and break stuff, however, that is beyond
my skillset to share and this is a defense series, after all. These kind
of operations should be left to your local military veterans who have
done this thing for real.
Reconnaissance is low-key expeditions to see what’s going
on. These are intelligence gathering operations. You could do this as
a “gray man” blending in with other people or traffic, not just
sneaking through the woods with your buddies wearing camo.
Recons can be more than gathering intelligence on events, activities,
and life outside your perimeter.
Reconnaissance and security patrols meld a bit. For instance,
a patrol down the valley to check to see if the local pumping station
has been looted for copper wire gives you the opportunity to see
what’s happening in the valley. Both patrol types will bring back
information about what’s happening and could result in contact with
an enemy. These patrols do need to be treated like combat patrols.
Security patrols help establish and maintain control and
dominance of an area. Territorial dominance is maintaining the
integrity and security of your area through a visible presence as well
as challenging troublemakers operating in your area of influence.
Failure to control your own surroundings will allow any interlopers or
challengers to depredate the area unmolested.
Intrusion attempts, hostile surveillance, or impending attacks
have to be detected and you need to be in a position to do
something about it. On the small scale, this could be checking your
property line or the terrain that surrounds your immediate area. A
perimeter inspection would check for intrusion attempts, booby traps,
or other enemy activity, such as surveillance or sniper hides.
On a larger scale, this could be sending out vehicle patrols to
outlying areas to make sure no bandits have captured isolated
homes. Lines of drift will also need to be examined up close for signs
of covert infiltration. Maybe there is a good hiding spot used by cattle
rustlers in the 1880s and you think someone could use that little
hollow again today for the same purpose. Check it out and don’t be
taken by surprise.
 All patrols of whatever type need to be prepared for enemy
contact. Go out equipped for, and expecting, the worst. You cannot
expect that you will find the spoor of some nefarious activity and then
the director orders a quick cut to a debate at the town hall. You must
be prepared to actually stumble upon armed men who will kill you or
to be able to initiate contact and prevail.
Patrols can discourage clandestine movement or occupation
of your land or area of operations (AO) without direct confrontations.
Bad guys can see you and scatter. Word also gets around. Modern
policing is a combination of security and presence patrols. Police
look for crime and try to disrupt it. Failing that, they want to be visible
to the public as reassurance and a reminder to criminals that the
police are watching. It doesn't always work but you can never
quantify the crimes that don't occur because a criminal knew he
couldn't get away with it.

Fun things for your patrol to do

The following are just some ideas on what a patrol can do

besides walk around the countryside. Patrols should mix things up to
deny the enemy an opportunity to ambush or sneak through but so
that the members can become familiar with different routes,
locations, and times of day. Vary the location, time, and route of
patrols. Don’t be predictable; not just to screw with the enemy but for
your benefit too.
Spreading out patrols over the area can create an illusion there
are more defenders than there really are. The downside to this is
that a patrol still has to have the ability to collect information and
accomplish its tasks which it can’t do if it is busy just being seen.
Be your own “red cell” that performs penetration tests of local
defenses (with the knowledge of neighbors and property owners).
Check for hiding places or hidden passageways. Modifications
should be undertaken to correct security deficiencies or deny the use
of terrain to an enemy. Approach your property by foot and try to
sneak up on it so that an observer can’t see you.
Check on isolated residences to ensure they have not been
captured. Perform “vacation checks” frequently on any neighbors
who have gone out of town without leaving a house sitter. Go by
shared critical infrastructure to ensure that it is not being tampered
with or that no one faction has seize control of it.
Patrols may want to secure abandoned buildings to prevent
their use or occupation of unwanted persons after conducting a
security sweep. One should never assume a derelict or unoccupied
building is empty and holds no hazard.
 CQB and Building Searches
Disclaimer: The information in this section is not a substitute for
proper professional training. It is only the tip of the iceberg; an
introduction to the topic and a compilation of procedures.

It’s been a year since the apocalypse started. Things have been
blessedly calm in your rural valley, an hour from a medium size city.
One morning before dawn the neighbor’s daughter runs to your door,
barefoot and only in her nightgown. Raiders broke into her house,
killed her father, and are beating up her mother to find out where the
valuables are hidden. You have no law enforcement and even in
normal times the sheriff’s deputies were half an hour away. It’s up to
you to rescue your neighbors.
Situations like this will happen and that means that citizen
defenders will have to engage in Close Quarters Battle (CQB). CQB
is almost always fighting done indoors. It is a specialty of SWAT
teams and Tier 1 military forces the world over. It is a highly
dangerous way to fight and demands special tactics be used. Speed,
surprise, dynamic entry, and violence of action are hallmarks of
CQB.
Some examples of when you may need to employ it post-SHTF
would be:

Hostage rescue/kidnapping;
Barricaded subject (no hostages) such as recapturing a
house;
Sniper inside a building; and,
Active shooter.

Probably the most common situation would be when bandits take

over a home and/or hold a family hostage. Such a situation can be
very delicate.
One of the old school tactics in getting barricaded suspects
out is tossing a gas can on the roof, shooting holes in it with a
shotgun, then tossing a lit road flare up to drive out the suspect,
literally burning them out. That doesn’t work if you can’t destroy the
building or there are innocent people inside. We’ve evolved past
that. You generally have a few courses of action:

Negotiate;
Smoke them out;
Siege and snipe them; and/or,
Direct assault.

The discussion in this chapter may help you in dealing with these
situations.

Equipment

Breaching shotgun
Prybars (crow bar, Halligan tool)
Axe
Sledgehammer
Bolt cutters
Bullhorn
Ladders and short ladder/stools
Flashbang, smoke, pepper spray, and sting grenades

Flashbangs are distraction/diversionary devices that are

intended to deafen, temporarily blind, and even physically disorient
suspects through the blast’s pressure wave affecting their balance.
Flashbangs are generally legal to own, though the ATF may define
particular variants as “destructive devices.” None are sold to the
general public. Airsoft versions are commercially available. These
are either CO2 or pyrotechnic based.
The CO2 models are basically a small BB gun CO2 cylinder in
a grenade body. The gas expands a plastic “balloon” that pops very
loudly. The pyrotechnic versions are basically firecrackers in a
grenade shaped cardboard carton. These are louder and do produce
something of a flash and also blow apart the carboard container. I
would highly recommend this latter version though military/LE
versions are vastly superior.[25]
Radios are not necessary among the individual stack
members. They should be close enough that members can talk or
shout to each other. Different stacks should each have a radio to
communicate when out of sight (for instance on the other side of a
building) or to the command post and one stack member can serve
as the RTO. For hostage situations or negotiations, consider having
a radio in a brightly colored and marked box you can use like a
“throw phone.” A wired field phone is even better.
The CQB team needs to standardize on calibers and
magazines because this simplifies resupply or sharing in an intense,
prolonged gunfight. Everyone might have a different flavor of AR-15
but can swap magazines at will. Pistols are less important but should
be standardized when possible.
AR-15s are viable close-quarters weapons. Their rounds tend
to penetrate less than ball pistol rounds or even some shotgun
projectiles. They can be reloaded and fired faster than shotguns.
That’s not to say that a shotgun doesn’t have a place in a CQB team,
it’s just that all members shouldn’t have one. Should shotguns be
used, indoor birdshot makes an ideal CQB load because it has low
penetration capability, is lethal at short ranges, and does not
disperse very much at indoor distances. 9mm carbines are also
viable.
Unless you have purpose made shields or ballistic blankets, I
suggest avoiding homemade shields because they will be too heavy.
Less-lethal weapons are nice to have but shouldn’t be a primary
weapon. If things are so bad that civilians have to do CQB, arresting
people or using less-lethal force first is not necessary because there
is no rule of law. Civilian CQB teams should just shoot the bad guys
unless they completely surrender and present no threat.
Finally everyone should have a similar uniform. Operating in
small spaces in the intense environment that is CQB can cause
confusion with a bunch of armed dudes running around. Pick one
color to standardize on, such as green BDUs or all-black clothing.
Top this off with a colored ribbon or something. That way, at a glance
anyone can tell who their teammates are.
 Team

A five to six man team is ideal; these are called “stacks.” Any
smaller and you won’t have enough people to be effective and safe.
Too large and you will be unwieldy. Split larger groups into multiple
stacks. Stack composition would be:

Team leader
1-3 shooters and arrest/control men
Breacher
Less-lethal

Optionally you could have a medic or radio operator (both able to

fight). Command and support elements would be separate from the
CQB men themselves.
Team members would be selected for their qualifications and
skills. Only the best of the best would go here because CQB is
incredibly dangerous. Personally, I would only put SWAT cops and
infantrymen on such a team. You may not have that luxury so only
your most competent, fit, and best shooting men who have
undertaken professional training should be attempting this kind of
thing.
Stuff and ideas don’t make a tactical team. Reading this
chapter, playing Call of Duty, and having a winner’s attitude won’t
make you and your friends into Delta Force or LAPD SWAT just
because you bought all the Gucci gear. A large element is physical
and mental aptitude on top of a whole bunch of training. If you are
going to make a hillbilly SWAT team, get professional commercial
training from a reputable instructor and play airsoft with each other
on weekends to practice.
Many ex-military and law enforcement personnel offer CQB
fighting classes to civilians. They are worth the time, money, and
effort. Anyone who seeks to do this kind of thing for real must get
professional training. Beyond that, regular refreshers and force-on-
force training (paintball/airsoft) is necessary to keep current. When in
doubt, leave this to actual SWAT teams or infantrymen.
 Training from a qualified instructor is absolutely vital and there
is no substitute for this. If you are not trained, if you do not practice,
and if your group is not cohesive you will be either lucky or
ineffective…and luck runs out fast. Men tested under fire who have a
training-built comfort level will do way better than amateurs.

Breaching

Manual entry

Before breaching, always check to see if the door is unlocked

first or obtain a spare key. When checking to see if a door is
unlocked or to turn the knob, get down low below the level of the
knob. Don’t stand in front of the door but stay off to the side to be
afforded whatever protection the wall can offer. Reach out with your
hand and try the knob.
If the door is unlocked or already open, swing it open hard so
that it opens all the way. Smacking the door into the wall is one way
of eliminating the possibility that someone is hiding behind the door.
Push open doors further open with a stick or something instead of
your hand. For doors that are partially open already, immediately
check behind the door after making your initial scan of the room.
Manual entry is simply breaking open a door. Doors can be pried
open or hacked to bits with an axe. Sledgehammers and rams can
batter the frames apart until the lock gives. Windows can be broken
out and blinds/drapes ripped down. If windows are broken out, be
sure to use a tool to rake any broken glass away from the frame
before entering. The best preparation for learning how to make
manual entries is studying how fire departments open doors.
Training information is freely and widely available.
Note that manual entry takes the most time which can allow bad
guys to escape or counter-attack. Never stand directly in front of a
door to break it open. Rams are poor tools because they often
require being in the line of fire through a closed door.

Breaching shotgun
 A breaching shotgun is a valuable tool that can provide faster
entry than manually prying or beating down a door. These typically
are stockless and short-barreled weapons with a special crenelated
muzzle device to ensure proper standoff of the muzzle from the door.
Only pump-action weapons are used because many breaching
rounds lack the power to properly cycle a semi-automatic action.
Until recently, many of these weapons were legally Short
Barreled Shotguns (SBS) under the National Firearms Act (NFA) and
required a lengthy background check and an extra tax for barrels
under 18”. These new “firearms” that are manufactured in a way to
take advantage of loopholes in federal laws to essentially create
pistol-gripped shotguns with 14” barrels. These are known as the
Mossberg Shockwave and Remington TAC-14. Currently they are
available the same way as any other firearm is in most states.
Should they be legally registered as a SBS or in a WROL situation,
they can be fitted with stocks.
Note that muzzle devices have to be added by a gunsmith in
some cases. Choke style devices are also available but they may not
fit all guns. Purpose made 18” barrel shotguns with these devices
with and without pistol grips are fairly common. These devices can
also help with flash suppression to preserve night vision and help
control recoil.
A special shotgun for breaching purposes should be used
rather than mixing shells in a shotgun meant to shoot humans. Note
that ordinary birdshot and buckshot rounds should not be used;
death or injury could occur. Breaching rounds are specially made to
be fired at close range. The most common variant is powdered steel
with a wax binder. These are commercially available. Other types are
made of copper or other frangible materials and a soft binder.
Note that while frangible shells are intended to not be lethal or
even particularly injurious a few feet away, this is after they’ve
disintegrated against a barrier. Without hitting a barrier, many of
these payloads essentially act like slugs as they haven’t hit anything
to break them apart. In some respects, this is similar to a birdshot
cut-shell slug. Breaching rounds need to be treated the same as
lethal shot.
 The shot is designed to physically break the door material and
the latch mechanism. Unlike the movies, shooting at the knob or lock
itself does not work and can cause ricochets. Once the frangible
shell material hits the door, it breaks up and tears through the wood
or steel. The intent is to so severely weaken the door material that
the latch bolt is no longer capable of resisting any force or that the
bolt itself is blown away. Note that some doors are hardened and
may take extra shots.

Before

All stack members, and especially the breacher, need to be

wearing ballistically rated eye protection. The breacher
should be wearing gloves, pants, and long sleeves.
Breachers should always have a main long gun in addition
to their breaching shotgun and handgun. Breaching guns
should be carried on a sling to stay out of the way. Rounds
should only be chambered from a full tube magazine
immediately prior to being fired. This will permit carrying the
shotgun with the safety off so there is one less step prior to
breaching which must be done rapidly.
The breacher should only be breaching the door; not
providing cover with his gun nor throwing in grenades.
Other stack members handle lethal cover with their guns
and someone else can toss in flashbangs, smoke, etc.
Check that the door is actually locked before breaching.
Shots should not be taken if there is someone up against
the door or very close as they could be injured by the
projectile or debris.

The breach

Press the muzzle against the material of the door. A

purpose-made breaching muzzle device helps to “bite” in to
the door for correct positioning.
Fire at halfway between the frame and the knob/deadbolt
(or about an inch to the side of the hinge) on the door itself.
 Never attempt to fire at the lock/knob itself. Do not fire at
the frame side.
Lock/latch firing is usually done on doors that open inwards.
Outwardly opening doors should be manually opened when
possible with prying tools or by knocking out the hinge pins.
If shooting at the hinge, standard procedure is to fire three
shots at each hinge. Usually there are two to three hinges
per doorframe. Firing at the latching mechanism is
preferred because it takes less shots.
Wood/composite doors: fire at a 45° angle both
horizontally and vertically, aiming up or down as is
appropriate for the location of the hardware and safety (see
below).
Steel doors: fire at a 90° degree angle horizontally to the
door and not more than 20° degrees vertically. This is
because oblique shots may cause the steel to deform,
instead of being penetrated, and the deformation may
impinge upon moving parts to jam the door closed.
Generally one wants to aim away from anyone being hit by
the shot or debris, so it is recommended that one aim
downwards for any hardware above arm/chest height and
upwards for anything higher than that.
The breacher should always stand to the side of the door
when possible, either at an angle or holding the shotgun out
to the side (it does look awkward). Standing in front of
doors allows the bad guys to shoot at you through the door
so stay behind a wall.

After the breach

After the initial breach is fired, attempt to open the door.

Some manual force may be needed even if the breach is
successful. A forward kick (versus a donkey kick
backwards) is okay. Repeat shots as necessary.
When the door is open and the entry is to be made, the
breacher steps aside and lets the stack enter. He should
not cycle the empty shell out of the chamber for the
 forgoing safety reasons. He is typically last through the door
because he has to sling his breaching gun and bring up his
primary weapon.

Failed breach

A failed breach is any time a breaching attempt is

unsuccessful; not just the first shot or first swing, but the first
attempt. It may take several shotgun shells and multiple tries with a
tool to get a door open. Breaches can also fail for other reasons.
Someone could fall down or be wounded. When you’ve made a
reasonable attempt to get the door open and all element of surprise
is gone, the breach has failed.
In the event of a failed door breach, be extra alert for return
fire as the bad guys know you are there for sure. You may want to
relocate to another entrance. Plan for this eventuality and what you
will do beforehand. If entry must be made, attempt to breach
manually. Supporting elements need to have their weapons up and
ready to deal with gunfire through the door or from windows. Don’t
be afraid to retreat to cover.
Once you do get the door open or are proceeding through a
secondary entrance, you will need to deploy diversionary devices
like smoke, flashbangs, or stun grenades. There may be no surprise,
but hopefully you’ve disturbed the bad guys’ reaction. If you still can’t
gain entry, it may be time to consider other tactics such as a siege or
deploying pepper spray grenades (as CS/tear gas is not
commercially available to civilians).

Procedures

Contain the scene upon arrival. Exclude family, friends, and

bystanders. Illuminate the building at night and establish
communications with barricaded subjects. Cutoff any utilities to make
the bad guy uncomfortable, disoriented, and to help deprive him of
intelligence. Monitor scanners for any radio traffic from or to the bad
guy(s). Obtain a detailed description of the suspects, their behavior,
weapons, and tactics, and get a diagram of the area.
 When possible, have photos or quality descriptions of bad
guys and hostages. Make sure the team is familiar with the
headcounts, descriptions, and possible weapons and motives of the
bad guys. If you can get a floorplan or map, even better.
Place the location under surveillance as soon as containment
is set up. Observers should be watching the windows, doors, and
surroundings of the objective. When possible, photos and video
should be taken of suspects for dissemination. All movements and
descriptions should be reported and recorded.
In the event of an active shooter, assault immediately and
attempt to end the situation. Since the Columbine school shooting,
philosophy has changed from stage for SWAT to “go go go.” Many
mass shooters commit suicide as soon as police arrive, and even if
not, responders should get in and end the situation as possible, even
if alone. The only delay that is reasonable is to put on additional,
mission-enhancing gear (body armor).
In no circumstances should defenders take up a defensive
position and wait things out. Defenders should continue to assault
against an active shooter until the shooter is confirmed dead or the
defender is wounded and unable to continue. There have been too
many incidents where a shooter was allowed to live, where he did or
could, keep killing while officers stood by. Get in there, even at the
risk of your life, and bring the bad guy down.
One element is to make entry, while another element handles
outside security, and a third element is your perimeter overwatch.
The security team is about keeping bystanders away and preventing
reinforcements from infiltrating your lines to help the bad guys. Your
standard neighborhood defense group would be good for outer
security duties (similar to beat cops’ role in a SWAT situation).
The more skilled individuals would form the perimeter security
team as they may be called upon to take shots of opportunity or join
the fight. The perimeter element can include snipers and their job is
to handle anyone shooting from the objective or dealing with people
who run away (squirters). Your snipers/perimeter people also act as
scouts and surveillance. Perimeter elements should stay in place
and not join the entry stack(s) unless the situation is dire.
 Any command post should be away from the objective and
under cover or out of the line of fire. Stage any medical or other
rescue personnel here until the scene is secure. Any negotiators or
drone operators (if using one for reconnaissance) should be on the
perimeter but behind cover.
Evacuate any surrounding residences or buildings within the
line of fire. Make sure there are no bystanders who could be
wounded by errant shots. Have perimeter and security elements
under cover where possible.
If there are no hostages and no external threat, take your
time. With a contained perimeter and no one in danger, the bad guys
can be waited out. Let them agonize and suffer without the need to
put your people in harm’s way. Do not let impatience get the best of
you and influence your decision to “to something” which is
gratuitously hazardous.
On the other hand, cops have a bad habit of freezing and
taking cover when shooting starts. I think that more dynamic training
is changing that but hiding is a part of human nature. Don’t let fear
overwhelm you. Freezing may allow an adversary to outflank you.
Do something to throw him off and regain the initiative like tossing a
flashbang.
Consider scare tactics like breaking windows or deploying
flashbangs outside near the objective to intimidate weak adversaries.
This can be effective in combination with calls to surrender. Don’t
attempt to move or disarm IEDs. Evacuate and contain the area until
the device detonates. If you must detonate it, do so remotely using a
sniper.

Active shooter vs. barricaded subject

An active shooter is one or more persons actively engaged in

killing people in a systemic or methodical manner generally to kill as
many as possible in as short as time as possible until they are
confronted by police. Locations are chosen to maximize the
concentration of people or for some other significance to the killer.
Active shooters generally commit suicide, flee, or target the
responders when confronted.
 A barricaded subject is a person who confines themselves to
a single location, and although they may have hostages, may have
killed or attempted to kill someone, or may continue to present a
threat, they are not actively presenting a deadly threat. An active
shooter may take hostages or become a barricaded subject after
their initial killing spree, such as a murderer who has shot everyone
in a classroom.
With an active shooter, time is of the essence. The sooner the
killer is neutralized, the sooner the killing is stopped and the more
people that live. The guidance for such situations post-Columbine is
for any responding officer to immediately head to the source of the
gunfire and engage the suspect. Post-Uvalde, the consensus seems
to be developing in the direction of officers proceeding in and
ensuring that the suspect is dead, not stopping if the shooting stops.
With a barricaded subject (usually a hostage taker), the goal
is to get the person to peacefully surrender without hurting any
hostages. While killing hostages is much less common in reality than
is show in film, a sloppy assault can incentivize a suspect to begin
murdering his captives. This is why patrol officers usually wait and
handover the situation to SWAT. Generally if there is no gunfire
heard, police will transition the response to a barricaded subject
situation.
The problem with the reasoning behind “no gunshots =
barricaded subject” is that the suspect could start killing again at any
time and wounded persons may be bleeding out. The sooner the
shooter is neutralized the sooner medical aid can get to victims.
Even so, assaults shouldn’t be made rashly or foolishly. An armed
responder who gets wounded or killed can’t save any lives. Speed
and violence of action has to be balanced with alertness and smart
use of cover/concealment on the approach.

Active shooter procedures

Stop the killing: Immediately assault and confront the attacker.

Restrain, kill, or incapacitate them. Do not attempt “containment.”
Stop the bleeding: Provide immediate first aid to the wounded.
Conduct triage. Utilize appropriate trauma supplies (tourniquets, etc.)
to stop major bleeding. Do not wait for medical personnel to arrive or
for the building to be totally cleared and secured. Once everything is
secured and it is safe for medical personnel to come in, have them
enter, stabilize the wounded, and evacuate them.

Move fast, but smartly so that you arrive in condition to

fight.
Follow the sounds of gunfire or screaming. Briefly ask
victims as you pass for the location, description, and
number of the attacker(s).
Don’t search every room; proceed to where the suspect is
or believed to be. This is not a building search.
Utilize multiple avenues of attack to increase the perceived
pressure on the suspect and multiple “threats” he has to
deal with. Be careful to avoid crossfire.
Carefully identify anyone you see who is armed. Don’t focus
on the weapon but evaluate their description and behavior.
They may be another armed citizen, not the bad guy.
Be aware of the fact that there may be multiple shooters,
especially in a criminal or post-SHTF attack.
Do everything you reasonably can to neutralize or capture
the suspect. Keep persevering until they are no longer a
threat.
If you choose to be a “sheepdog” and confront an active
shooter, understand that you may lose your life. Don’t waste
your life but do not be afraid to sacrifice it.

Should police arrive and you are armed:

Immediately drop your weapon.

Raise your hands and move only when told to.
Immediately comply with all orders and move slowly.
Identify yourself as a “good guy” and provide information on
the suspect to officers.
Once you have given any lifesaving information, do not
make statements to police without an attorney present.
 Chemical weapons

Unless police or military armories break open, the only

chemical weapon that is available commercially to civilians is pepper
spray. Grenades that operate like bug bombs are sold openly. These
could be tossed into a confined space where they work best.
These grenades (also known as “foggers”) have locking tops
that can continuously discharge fully in seconds while spinning in a
circle. Duration of discharge and the area they can affect varies by
canister capacity, but a 5oz canister can fog a few thousand square
feet in less than a minute. A 3oz canister has 10-12 seconds of
discharge time.
Unlike tear gas, pepper spray does not tend to disperse
throughout a structure the same way as CS gas does. Pepper spray,
when aerosolized, likes to hang in the air. I’ve actually accidentally
got affected myself because of this effect when emptying out dozens
of expired canisters. An entire room could be contaminated which
might have the effect of denying that room to anyone who enters it
unprotected for a short time. The residue will settle and remain
effective on the surfaces for quite some time without
decontamination.
To simulate tear gas and use psychology to your advantage,
consider deploying pepper spray grenades with smoke grenades.
Call it “tear gas” to the suspect and let the sting of pepper spray and
the smoke work in his mind to trick him.
Smoke alone can be used, although it generally will not
incapacitate anyone. Large concentrations of smoke can cause
irritation or displace oxygen. Some smoke grenade models may
cause fires if in contact with flammable materials.

Regardless of the agent used, gas masks with eye

protection should be used. If deploying CS/tear gas, use a
mask that is rated for such a contaminant. A respirator with
a full, sealed face mask should be sufficient for pepper
spray alone.
 Note that OC in confined space sucks and can affect you
too, even if a spray is used against the suspect rather than
an aerosol. OC will contaminate shoes, clothing, and masks
if it comes in contact with a team member.
You may threaten the use of chemical weapons during
negotiations, but never announce that you are actually
going to do it. Let surprise be to your advantage.
Don’t attempt to throw grenades through windows; break
the glass out first. You may want to toss the smoke/OC
grenade in combination with a flashbang to discourage
return fire or throwing the grenade back.
Always stand upwind of any smoke or OC deployment.
Allow several minutes for the chemical weapons to
permeate the room/building before attempting entry.
Consider deploying multiple devices in the same room or in
multiple rooms for enhanced effect. Re-deploy again as
necessary or desired.

Negotiations

Negotiation is about offering a safe way out for the bad guy
and convincing him that whatever he seeks to gain is now pointless.
Assure the bad guy that you will not hurt him if he surrenders. Your
goal is to convince him that he needs to talk his way out of this
because that is his only way to survive unharmed. Raider-types who
are cornered probably want to survive and escape rather than just
die in place, so allow them the hope of getting out alive.
A negotiator should be someone who has the gift of gab,
tends to make friends easily, and can usually diffuse a tense
situation. We all have a friend who is likeable, funny, and quick
witted. These people often make good negotiators as long as they
stay calm and a negotiator should always stay calm. A negotiator
should never be a friend or relative of the adversary or any hostages
but yet still able to empathize somewhat with the suspect.
Only one person should be talking to the suspect and never
negotiate face-to-face. Given the circumstances civilians may be
facing, you might have to yell but don’t walk up and have a
conversation. Always stay behind cover and a safe distance away.
Establish a rapport with the suspect. Give him your first name
and use his first name often. Steer the conversation to gain
additional information on him, his motives, any plans, and
information your tactical elements may need.
Take your time. Usually time is on the side of the negotiator.
Use time, hunger, and sleep deprivation to wear down the bad guy’s
resolve. Keep him talking so he is unable to plot, reflect, or rest and
remains distracted. Don’t allow him to set deadlines for you.
Never make trades with a suspect unless it benefits you (i.e.
you’ll send in food if he releases a hostage). Good guys should not
be traded for hostages even as noble as it seems. Don’t make
promises you can’t keep, such as not actually being able to deliver
on that pizza you promised for a hostage. Any lies should be
carefully crafted and recorded so the suspect doesn’t catch you in a
lie.
Do not place importance on a hostage (in your negotiations)
because then the suspect will attempt to use leverage through his
hostage. Always make the situation about the hostage taker and how
you are trying to work things out safely for him. If the suspect makes
demands, don’t directly refuse it but stall and delay.
Killing hostages is usually a movie thing because it takes
away leverage from the suspect. Most suspects who are not suicidal
choose to fight things out. You may hear shots fired. This, in
combination with threats to kill hostages, can be done in an attempt
to affect you or the hostages. Should a hostage be killed, continue
negotiations as a distraction while an assault begins immediately.
If the suspect surrenders, make them throw away any
weapons that they have. Hostages should be sent out next. Only
then, when they are disarmed and any hostages are safe, should the
suspect be ordered out. Suspects should be ordered to come out
backwards, one at a time, hands in the air. They should have to lift
up their shirts and turn in a circle to show they have no weapons.
They move to the arrest team, not the other way around. When one
suspect is in custody, he is taken away before the next suspect is
told to come out.
 Once the decision to assault has been made, stop calling for
the enemy to surrender. Don’t issue demands/instructions that
conflict with your intents. Once the operation begins, see it through.
If there is a spontaneous surrender, accept it and restrain all
suspects.

Entry and movement

Approach indirectly and from an unexpected direction. Do not

go up the front path; use cars, shrubbery, or any objects as cover
and concealment as you move. Always assume you are under
observation and never assume that if you can’t see him, he can’t see
you. Anyone looking outside can see far more through a small hole
than someone looking in. Make entry at unexpected points, i.e. not
the front door. Consider the backdoor, through a basement, or on the
second floor.
If you peek through a window, expose as little of your head as
possible. When peeking around a corner, get low to the ground and
only expose as far as your eyes. Never peek from the same place or
level twice. Use a periscope, inspection mirror, or inspection camera
to look around corners without exposing yourself. Crawl under most
windows and try to climb over basement windows.
Stay close to the building when stacking but don't physically
hug the walls. This helps obscure you from someone looking out a
window and rounds may ricochet along the wall. With typical
residential construction, the noise from bodies and gear banging
against a wall could indicate where the team is stacking up.
A major shift in the CQB paradigm has been to move slowly
and quietly versus the fast-and-loud high speed approach often seen
in Hollywood. Once the bad guys know you are there, rushing
typically doesn’t make sense as it can lead to mistakes. Stealth
should be maintained in any case for as long as possible until the
enemy knows you are there.
Move slowly and efficiently. Stop, look, and listen as you go.
Keep your weapon up and look over/through the sights as you clear
a room to minimize the amount of time necessary to get on target if a
threat arises. When one person moves, his partner or teammates
should be covering him and be the primary shooter should it be
necessary. It is more difficult for a person on the move to shoot.
Clear each room and area as you move throughout the
building (see below). Work main areas first on each level, holding
stairs to other floors, basements, or attics until the main areas are
dealt with. Hallways and narrow entrances (U-shaped front
courtyards) are known as fatal funnels. These put you in an area
with nowhere to run or hide making target acquisition by an
adversary quite easy. If you can’t avoid these areas, move low along
the wall, not in the middle of the space.
Be sure to search any place that is physically large enough for
a person to hide. Do not give up the search or relax until the entire
premises has been searched. Lock doors of cleared rooms that you
cannot physically guard (“hold”). When coming out of a room or
building, in order not to take anyone by surprise, yell “Coming out!”
Consider leaving an exit for your bad guys so they run away
instead of getting into a confrontation with you. Make sure you have
a perimeter/arrest team waiting in ambush for them.
Bad guys and potential suspects who are captured or
surrender should be cuffed up or otherwise restrained. Search them
for weapons. Hostages and suspects should be taken to separate
rooms and guarded until the building is cleared.
If you need to climb indoors, but don’t have a ladder, you can
kick foot-sized holes into drywall and stand on the exposed edge.
Consider making entry through walls themselves if doors can’t be
used, such as cutting open a wall with a chainsaw.
Confirmation shots may be called for if the body cannot be
secured and the stack needs to keep moving. Confirmation shots are
bullets fired into a wounded or possibly dead suspect to ensure that
they are killed and will present no threat. This is a WROL technique
only. Alternatively, gently tap their eye with a muzzle or something.
This is called an “eye thump” and anyone who isn’t dead will
involuntarily react.

Slicing the pie

 Slicing the pie is a method of movement around corners or
doorways to get a clear view without stepping out in the open and
exposing oneself. The name of this movement technique comes
from illustrations that describe each angle and sector of the room
cleared cut up like pieces of a pie.

Move back away from the doorway; you don't want to be

peeking around the edge as this makes it harder for you to
see and easier for adversaries to get a target picture. You
should be a full arm's length away to allow for full weapon
extension.
Slowly move so that your view around the corner with your
weapon pointing in the direction you are looking. You may
want to keep your weapon lowered just slightly so it doesn't
block part of your view.
Move continuously until the arc is complete so that you do
not present a still target for the bad guy.
Carefully scan the portion of the room you have in view for
a person, parts of a body (like a foot sticking out from under
a bed), or an exposed weapon.
Don't silhouette yourself against a light background if you
can help it.

Room clearing basics

The basic method is as follows:

Only two to four people should enter most rooms. On a six-

man stack, the other two should secure the doorway/hall.
Someone should always be securing both directions of a
hallway so no one can escape or stick his head out to take
pot shots at your backs.
Decide who moves where before entering the building.
Room clearers should know who goes first (point) and what
sectors of each room they clear. Standing outside the
doorway is not the time to start arguing "No, YOU go right!"
Slice the pie around the doorway. If you can see someone
while slicing the pie, take the shot as appropriate. Always
 attempt to fight aggressors before entering when possible.
Optionally employ a flashbang before entering.
Enter the room rapidly but one at a time. Keep moving but
don't move so fast that you can't shoot accurately. "Smooth
is fast and fast is smooth.”
Each person entering should have a quarter (corner) of the
room they are responsible for clearing. For instance, the
first person goes in and clears the far left corner while the
second guy clears the far right. The third does the near right
and the fourth the near left. Muzzle and trigger discipline
are key safety measures.
Everyone should scan their field of fire (sector) with their
weapon up and ready to get on target if a threat presents
itself. Be sure to check behind doors. Search the room,
checking anywhere a human could fit.
The buttonhook technique is perfect for two men entering a
room but four men can use it. Starting with one man on
each side of the doorway, one at a time they go through the
doorway turning 180° to their right or left (same side as they
started on). It’s fast and easy to learn with a minimum of
crossfire concerns. The corners of the room should be
cleared by slicing the pie, peeking, or using a mirror first.
If you are going up stairs, have one man cover the upper
landing while the other team members ascend, weapons
up.

Newer methods focus on safety before speed. Hostage rescue

tactics as above focus on the rapid entry of the room clearers to
distract the terrorists and divert their gunfire away from any
hostages. Speed and surprise help. Rescuers can get shot this way,
so if you don't have to worry about drawing fire off of hostages, why
rush?
Once you get inside the building and start making noise the
suspects know you are there and can have a rough idea of where
you are. For cops, building searches are done quietly to conceal
their location and movements while they carefully and methodically
clear the building. In either case, your team probably won't have the
skills or practice to make a lightning assault, so care, stealth, and
accuracy matter more.
In the event you know where an enemy is, go directly to them,
such as following the shots of an active shooter. This is known as
"direct to threat" and it involves bypassing rooms. This can be risky
but rear stack members can scan open doorways for threats as you
pass. If this isn't the case, go slow and check the rooms one by one.
Don't expect barricaded subjects or hostage takers to be
spread around the house. They may have someone covering the
expected entrance, but they are probably all hiding as a group in the
most defensible part of the house. There is safety in numbers. Note
that average burglars tend to hide, hoping they don't get caught and
can sneak away. More aggressive bandits may be lying in wait to
ambush you or are willing to fight it out.

Lights

Light can work for and against you. Generally clearing an

illuminated interior is better than working in the dark, but keep in
mind that turning on a light makes you visible to any suspects.
Activate light switches from a crouch as if you’re standing when you
flip it, your position is predictable. Consider using darkness as
concealment and flashlights just for search and identification, not
constant illumination.
Flashlights should always be activated momentarily to
illuminate rooms briefly or to check especially dark corners. Shine
the light on a white ceiling to reflect light all around the room.
Leaving a flashlight on all the time gives away your position and
movements to the bad guy. Additionally, searching should be done
with handheld flashlights whenever possible, preferably by another
person in concert with a primary weapon person who can shoot.
Weapon-mounted lights are great but if a suspect aims at the
light, he will generally be aiming at the center of mass of the
searcher. These should only be used for momentary identification or
disorienting a suspect. Strobe mode shouldn’t always be on during a
search. Otherwise, hold flashlights at arm’s length so any shots
taken by a suspect go away from the body. Don’t silhouette fellow
teammates by getting behind them with the flashlight.

Flashbangs

Flashbangs generally shouldn’t be used in small rooms as

the blast may be heavily amplified or someone hurt. Ear
and eye protection needs to be used especially around
flashbangs. Electronic earmuffs are better than earplugs.
The spoon AKA safety lever needs to be against the palm;
the hand strength is better than the fingers alone. This may
require the grenade to be inverted depending on which
hand is used.
Use the non-dominant hand to pull the pin. Do not allow the
grenade to “cook off” in the hand or hold anything but the
grenade in either hand.
Yell “Bang out!” when throwing a flashbang. Call out “Bang
up!” if you are requesting someone to hand you a
flashbang. Make sure the stack knows a flashbang is being
deployed before you throw it.
Toss the device about five feet away from anyone. Focus
on where you want the device to land, not on the suspect,
otherwise you may unintentionally pitch it to them. Throw
underhand whenever possible.
Do not throw a flashbang “blind” as it may cause burns, fire,
or injuries. Always have an idea of who is in the room and
where it will land before throwing, absent a situation where
someone will die unless you just go now. The same thing
goes for smoke grenades.
Close your eyes and look away when a flashbang
detonates to avoid being temporarily flash blinded (though
this is less of a risk with airsoft devices). You should already
be wearing ear protection that automatically cuts out loud
noises like gunshots.
Immediately make entry after the device(s) have detonated
to make the most of the diversionary effect.
 Vehicles
Convoys

Traveling in convoys for what was an ordinary trip to Walmart

may become a sad necessity post-SHTF. A convoy is simply a group
of vehicles traveling together to a shared destination. Evacuees may
also travel together to safety through hostile territory. The security
situation may vary from an increased probability of ordinary travel
related crime to full-on roadside ambushes.
A car convoy is strength in numbers. Ambushers and
carjackers may be reluctant to hit a convoy whereas they’d
unhesitatingly go after a solo vehicle. Additional vehicles can recover
one that goes off the road, can transport the passengers from a
disabled vehicle, or provide fire support in an attack.
Please note this section is intended for average folks, not
those who are intending to fight the forces of evil. We’re looking at
how average, tactically minded people can setup a convoy of
basically amateurs. The advice here is for average people that will
probably be going to town to buy things. While some of the
information here can be applied to say a vehicular security patrol,
that is not the purpose of this section.

Before you go

To conserve fuel and provide the most defensive firepower

available, vehicles should consolidate trips and pack as many adults
as will reasonably fit in a vehicle. Children and those incapable of
fighting should be left at home whenever possible. The driver needs
to be a good driver and navigator who won’t get lost or lose his head
in an emergency. Everyone needs to be awake and alert.
Plan your trips deliberately. Moving at night will attract
attention, even blacked out. Bad guys travel at night and your stealth
behavior will be mimicking what the bad guys do on a raid. Night
travel should not be used for routine movements. Agree on a pre-set
speed to travel and do not pass other members of the convoy.
Consider using identifying marks on the vehicles to allow for
rapid identification. Don’t number them so that if one is spotted, the
total number could be guessed. Use a simple symbol like a letter, the
same on all vehicles. Think of the backwards Z Russia used to
identify its vehicles during the Ukrainian invasion. Antenna flags of
the same color can also be used.
Keep your convoys small enough that you don’t need to
number vehicles or specially mark the lead or rear vehicles to know
who’s who. About six vehicles is enough to provide mutual defense
and not create a long train that is unmanageable.
Map out the route and alternate routes with small maps or
directional notes for all drivers. Note potential chokepoints,
roadblocks, and ambush areas. Where could there be natural
hazards like a rockslide from an unmaintained road cut? All drivers
should be briefed on their routes, be familiar with the area, and have
a mental map in their head. If separated or attacked, they should
know what to do. Designate rendezvous points.
Think about distance; how far are you going and what is the
likelihood you might be stranded? If you are going more than fifteen
miles from home (a day’s reasonable walking distance), consider
overnight gear. A basic survival kit with food, water, and shelter
should be in the vehicle already, even if it is minimal.
Every vehicle should be equipped with a radio, preferably a
mounted 50 watt VHF/UHF radio and external antenna. Failing this,
keep everyone in contact with handheld transceivers. Radios should
always be on and monitored with the front passenger serving as the
operator. Information should be passed on over the radio and any
concerning situations not ignored; “see something, say something.”
Stereos need to be off. Pay attention to your surroundings.
If you have a family or a group that you plan on convoying with
regularly or for a major trip, take some time to plan it out. Find a safe
area with little traffic and practice things like making U-turns and
rapid three-point turns to simulate doing it in a line while under fire.
Practice driving in reverse at high speed, which can be tricky to do.
Practice rapid stops as well.
 Travel procedures

Wear a seatbelt. Remove it only before arriving at a

destination. In law enforcement, it is standard practice to take off our
seatbelts 30 seconds before going “10-97” or on-scene just in case
we have to bail out of the vehicle.
On multiple lane roads (in each direction), stay in the middle
lane of three or more lanes or the far right lane of two lanes.
Maintain a travel interval of five vehicle lengths. Do not bunch up.
Proximity makes it easier for ambushers to concentrate their fire, for
a single explosive to damage multiple vehicles, and makes collisions
more likely.
You are trying to stay close enough together not to lose sight
of each other or allow other vehicles in your convoy. Don’t let other
vehicles enter your convoy as they may be doing so to shoot you,
force a stop, or break up the convoy intentionally. Close the gap, but
don’t play bumper cars or get caught up in road rage. In heavy traffic
with a low threat of attack (such as an emergency evacuation), a
closer distance may be necessary than when ambushes are more
likely.
Rendezvous or rally points for vehicles to rejoin each other if
separated need to be planned. Whenever possible, vehicles should
coordinate rejoining while on the move. Stopping should only be
done when radio contact is lost. A lost/ambushed vehicle search
procedure should be decided on before you depart.
In the event a vehicle becomes mechanically disabled or has
a flat tire, if the convoy is large enough, one vehicle should stop to
assist while the others continue on. Should the vehicle be unable to
be repaired on the road, it should be immediately towed. A disabled
vehicle should not be left unattended as this may present an
opportunity for thieves to strip it or steal it.

Roadblocks and obstacles

Consider sending a single, well armed 4x4 vehicle a few

minutes ahead to conduct reconnaissance. Four wheel drive permits
greater maneuverability across varied terrain should it be necessary
to depart from paved surfaces. A passenger could also be controlling
a drone that flies ahead to check out the route or provide overhead
surveillance.
The only roadblocks you should stop for are ones that you
know to be friendly or allied checkpoints that will let you through. Any
unexpected checkpoints or random road blockages should be
avoided. Never submit to an unknown checkpoint; turn around
instead.
Driving up on car accidents requires judicious examination of
the situation. If you are the only person who may come to help (i.e.
there is no Highway Patrol or fire department), you may need to
decide to stay and help or continue on for your safety. Beware of
staged collisions. As with IEDs below, look for unusual conditions
that could indicate some sort of trap. Always look up for snipers or
observers on buildings, overpasses, and hills.
If you must hit a vehicle blocking the road, hit the rear of the
vehicle. The rear end is usually lighter than the front where the
engine is. The rear of the vehicle will pivot around the center of
gravity up front.
Avoid when possible:

Routes with dense growth on either side of the road that

could conceal attackers.
Routes with narrow choke points like tight turns on
mountain roads, hill cuts, or narrow bridges.
Roads with ditches, walls, or barriers on either side.
Travel through known hostile territory.

Ambush

Don’t be predictable; never travel at the same time and on the

same route. Vary departure times, mix up the order of any stops, and
take different routes (as far as is possible) on both return and
departure.
Convoys are most vulnerable when stopped. All security
personnel should dismount at stops and take cover while watching
the surroundings in case of attack. At secure stopping points, one
person (driver) at a minimum should stay with each vehicle. The next
most vulnerable time is when people are getting in an out of a
vehicle. Don’t stop for any reason if an attack is likely. If you must
stop, only do so when absolutely necessary and wisely.
Don’t drive through an ambush if you detect one before
passing through; stop and back up or turn around. Un-ambushed
vehicles should retreat to safety to dismount fighters or pickup
survivors. If caught in an ambush, move through the kill zone; don’t
stop and fight unless you have no other way out. For lone snipers,
keep driving. Your best defense in a gunfight in or near a vehicle
is to drive away or use the vehicle itself as a weapon.
To escape an ambush:

Make a right-angle turn and use any road, alley, or trail that
can accommodate your vehicle. Put a building between you
and the ambushers. This is best when ambushed from an
oblique angle or approximately 90°. Turn in the opposite
direction from the ambush. Note that any obvious turn-off
might have a secondary ambush waiting.
Stop and reverse out of the kill zone or make an immediate
U-turn and speed away.
If you must accelerate through the kill zone, duck. Get low
and go through as fast as possible.

Disabled or stopped vehicles should pull off to the side and

not block the road. In an attack, disabled vehicles should be
abandoned after their occupants have gotten into running vehicles. It
may be necessary for running vehicles to withdraw before picking up
the people from the stranded vehicle. Have the stranded fight and
get to cover, then run for safety and pickup in a safe place by the
running vehicles.
When you must exit a vehicle, get out on the opposite side
from which the gunfire is coming from. Use the vehicle as
cover/concealment. Fighters should lay down a base of fire while
non-combatants get to safety. Use smoke grenades to cover any
withdrawals on foot, for instance if a vehicle has to be abandoned. In
a downed-person rescue, the rescuers get the body into the vehicle
using its protection between them and the ambushers.
If gunfire is to be returned from a vehicle, every non-driver
should maintain a high volume of fire at the ambushers taking care
not to shoot other friendly vehicles or point their muzzle at fellow
occupants.
Keep in mind that during any crash, seatbelts could
automatically tension, the airbags could deploy, or the fuel sensor
could shutoff. The latter two will instantly render any modern vehicle
totally inoperable and not field restorable. Doors may be jammed
shut by body panel damage.
Reconning the road when possible is the best defense. Any
manned roadblocks or checkpoints should simply be avoided, but
incidental roadblocks may need to be bypassed. DOT crews won’t
be cutting up trees or clearing landslides. A recon vehicle can scout
the area from a distance (use a drone or binoculars) to see if there is
anything suspicious, like movement in the foliage, or if the fallen tree
or earth, etc. looks unnatural.
When bypassing a possible ambush site like this, one vehicle
at a time should cross it. Vehicles on either side should stop out of
any potential line of fire. If you have the manpower, a group can
advance on foot and check out the area or provide security as the
convoy passes. Keep in mind that a blockage of the paved or main
traveled portion of the road may be a way to force you onto the
shoulder where there is a booby trap of some kind.

Note: See the “Vehicles” chapter of Suburban Defense for more

information on convoys (intended for urban, heavy traffic
environments) and driving through roadblocks/protests. See also the
chapters “Vehicular Gunfighting” and “Avoiding Victimization in or
Near Cars” from Suburban Warfare.

Armor

Civilian vehicles are remarkably not bullet resistant. I devoted

a whole chapter of Suburban Warfare to gunfights around vehicles.
Door skins are thin and while automotive glass (especially the
windshield) can deflect bullets, that deflection is minimal and almost
all bullets will penetrate.
Purchasing an armored vehicle may be common in the future,
but it isn’t now. Pretty much any vehicle can be retrofitted with
concealed armor and bulletproof glass for the right price. For
someone who wants a properly bulletproofed vehicle, a used Ford
Explorer Police Interceptor is a good choice as long as the door
panels have ballistic inserts. The windows, however, are not
bulletproof.
If you aren’t rich or have the skills to seriously modify a
vehicle yourself, there isn’t much that can be done by the average
person. There is some good news. Chance bullet terminations
against a dense component or a bullet that passes through without
hitting anyone happens more often than one would think. The most
practical and economical defense is to take advantage of luck and
add some other armor, so that in combination between the normal
frame and panels, bullets are stopped, slowed down, or deflected.
A shot-up vehicle probably will not just stop in its tracks. Even
if the engine block is hit with .50 caliber bullets, it has momentum
and will take time to stop. A damaged radiator is not an instant kill
and a vehicle can be driven for a while before it overheats and fails.
In a gunfight, the last thing you should be worried about is damage
caused by a dangerously overheated engine, although the computer
may shut it down sooner.
The most vital component in a vehicle is the driver and that’s
where protection should be focused. Secondarily are the
passengers. Who cares about the car if everyone inside is dead?
With serious modifications and weight penalties, creating an armored
cage around a vehicle with a welding machine in a garage is not
practical for most people or family vehicles.
The best option is to armor the occupants. That is less
expensive than a retrofit to the vehicle and body armor can be worn
outside. If any one person is going to wear armor, it should be the
driver. An incapacitated driver cannot escape the attack nor control
the vehicle.
Let’s look at bulletproofing levels really quick. Level IIA protects
against low-velocity pistol rounds, such as 9mm, .40, and .45 ACP.
Level II will do the same but for high velocity (+P) defensive rounds
up to .357 Magnum; Level IIIA is required for higher velocity pistol
and revolver rounds like .44 Magnum.
Level III is spec’d to stop 5.56mm and 7.62mm rifle rounds. It
should be noted that armor penetrating bullets and multiple hits on
Level III rounds may penetrate the body armor. Level IV should stop
armor piercing .30 caliber bullets and is the highest standard. Level
IV plates are what you want if you think you are going into harm’s
way in a vehicle. The nice thing about traveling by vehicle is that you
don’t have to walk miles in 15lbs of armor.
There are two kinds of armor plating: soft armor, which are
flexible panels of materials like Kevlar and hard plates, which are
steel or special ceramics. Soft armor is lighter, but less resistant,
where hard plates are heavy, more expensive, and very bullet
resistant. Some carriers are also made up of ballistic material as
well, increasing the coverage and bullet protection beyond the
armored panels themselves.
Typical police concealable body armor is only Level II or IIA,
or protection against common pistol calibers. Military style vests
generally come with pockets for inserting Level III or Level IV plates.
Note that lower levels of armor don’t slow bullets down to any
worthwhile degree before they enter your body, so a Level II soft
plate will do little to stop a rifle round.
Keep in mind that gunfire will likely come from the sides at an
oblique or right angle, meaning the torso will be hit in the side. Most
plate carriers are set up for front or rear shots, only putting plates on
the back or chest. Carriers with side plates are vital. Side plates and
ballistic material are usually only rated up to Level III. Protection to
the pelvis and legs is nil from body armor and hits there are just as
deadly and incapacitating as to the torso.
Ballistic blankets, which can stop most pistol rounds and are
sold for just less than $1,000 for a door sized model. These could be
draped somehow over a door to protect the lower body and mid-
torso of a driver (or a whole ducking body). I’d personally put one
over my lower body. A larger model could also be used by
passengers to hide under.
 So-called DIY or “hadji” armor that consists of welded steel
plate was common overseas during the GWOT has also been seen
in the Mexican drug wars. Steel is the cheapest and most common
material to use. If used, it must be not less than half-an-inch to an
inch thick to stop rifle rounds. A mounting system could be
constructed to place a panel between the door and the seat though
this would hinder exiting the vehicle.
Steel is heavy. A 2.5x2.5ft half-inch plate of AR500 weighs
approximately 120lbs. In addition to the weight penalty, steel must
also be coated so that it does not spall. Spalling is when bits of steel
shrapnel are broken off the deforming metal on the other side of the
impact. Some manufacturers of steel armor use a coating similar to
the popular “Rhino Liner” pickup bed coating.
Sandbags are useful for absorbing the force from an IED
detonating under the vehicle. They can also be placed on the hood
in front of the windshield for a modicum of protection from forward
threats. Sandbags have to be secured so as not to slide and fall off
and they can’t be stacked up or used for lateral protection. They also
have a weight penalty. Additional weight will affect handling, braking,
and acceleration.
Some DIYers are making experimental plates out of
sandwiched fiberglass attached to the vehicle body, but that would
be at your own risk and is not for the unskilled. One idea would be to
take Level III soft plates and place them along or on the doors. They
would have to be mounted or attached in such a way that a
penetrating bullet’s impact doesn’t cause them to slip and fall out, so
duct tape is probably out.
For the vulnerable tires, all that can be done is purchase run-
flat models and fill them with tire foam (which the tire store will hate)
when you stop them. A vehicle can be driven on a blown tire for a
short distance, such as to get out of an ambush. Prolonged driving
will destroy the wheel and brakes; the friction and sparks potentially
leading to a fire. The biggest danger from a tire being shot out is the
sudden loss of control it can induce.
As for the glass, there isn’t much you can do without replacing
it with ballistic glass. I recommend against window films because
while they can offer shatter protection, they aren’t bulletproof. 3M
type security films are more of a force distribution product and
concentrating a few hundred foot-lbs of energy in a spot a few
millimeters across defeats them. Filmed windows are also harder to
break out in an emergency. If arsonists hit your vehicle and you can’t
get out because the doors are jammed and the windows won’t break,
burning alive is a terrible way to die.

IEDs

In a domestic conflict or where military-grade weaponry

becomes commonly used by criminal and ill-regular forces, IEDs
may be a threat to vehicles. An IED is an Improvised Explosive
Device. These are amateur built explosives typically made from non-
military components. A pipe bomb is an example of an IED. Mines
are generally military weapons (landmines) planted in the ground to
detonate when stepped on or driven over. An IED placed in a road
could be described as a mine but an IED does not need to be
planted near roads. In this section, we are looking at explosives
planted on roadways to disable vehicles.
The USMC states that the best means of detecting an IED
site is through observation and noticing objects or situations that are
abnormal. This can include strange markings, unusual human
behavior, or roadway conditions/debris that could conceal a device.
[26] The US Army says:

Some indicators that have proven effective in identifying the

location of potential mines are:

Damaged vehicles.
Signs of digging, holes in the road, potholes, concrete
removal, or puddles.
Boxes along the roadside.
Wires on the road surface.
Evidence of vegetation disturbance.
Disturbances in previous tire tracks.
Differences in plant growth, such as wilting or dead foliage.
Irregularities in color or texture of the ground.
Signs warning local populace.
 Brush and other traffic obstructions placed on roadways.[27]

Some basic tips to avoid IEDs are:

When traveling primarily off paved roads, follow in the track

of lead vehicles. Note however that ruts in dirt roads are
often favorite hiding places for devices.
Be suspicious of any obstacles that force you to divert,
particularly from a paved road to a soft shoulder or dirt road
as devices may be buried there. Obstacles are often used
to channel vehicles to what works best for the bomber.
Do not run over items in the road, such as natural debris,
trash, or freshly disturbed ground.
Especially avoid potholes and puddles. A buried IED may
cause the ground to subside so divots in the road or
disturbed earth should be swerved around.
Do not drive on the soft shoulder (verge) of the road as it
may be booby trapped. The main portion of the road may
be blocked to get you to divert.
Never stop at/near a suspected IED site and do not
approach suspected IEDs. Clear the area.
An IED, even after detonating, may be only one part of the
attack.

If IEDs are a concern, place sandbags or thick rubber/fibrous

mats on the floor to help absorb the blast and shrapnel that
penetrates the floor. Be sure that anything put on the floor will not get
jammed under the pedals. Sandbags should be covered with a
durable cover to avoid loose sand being blasted all over the cabin.
Loose items should be stored so they do not become projectiles in a
crash.

See the Appendix of Suburban Warfare: “USMC Improvised

Explosive Device (IED) guide.”

Homebrew technical
 Armored vehicles, armed vehicles, and gun buggies would be
wonderful things to have at the end of the world. Mobility and
firepower are things that win battles. In much of the world, ill-regular
and even regular military forces can’t obtain purpose-made fighting
vehicles, so they have to modify civilian ones. We’ve all seen the
images of a Toyota in Africa with a gun in the bed; these are
technicals. A technical is different from a gun truck as the technical is
more about the weapon than men, though both are a variation of the
same idea.
Actually constructing a technical is not difficult; the main task
is welding a weapon mount to the truck itself. The problem is that
there are precious little proper machine guns to use and it is even
harder to source the proper mounts. While welding weapon mounts
and bed rails so the gunner doesn’t go flying out isn’t hard, the
pieces of specialty equipment will become hard to source if we go
grid-down or Ebay ceases to exist. One can’t count on National
Guard armories to empty out either.
Here are a few of the main problems:

1. Where are you going to find a machine gun?

2. Failing a machine gun, what readily available civilian
weapon is suitable for a pintle mount?
3. Pintle and platform mounts, along with proper tripods or
vehicle mounts/sockets are hard to fabricate. Guys who can
assemble and weld might not be able to use, or have
access to, machine tools.
4. You’ll need additional accessories like ammo belts, ammo
feed boxes, and spare barrels.
5. You can’t count on looting everything. It’s a lot easier to
detach and run off with a captured machine gun than it is to
remove a pedestal and bracket from the vehicle. Plus a lot
of modern military patrol vehicles are getting high-tech
turrets like CROWS. This isn’t 1946 where a million surplus
Jeeps have a pipe with a socket and pintle welded on it for
a M1919 medium machine gun.
 I have some terrible half-baked ideas that might solve those
problems.
First, buy what you can now. Order that M60 gooseneck pintle or
a MK 64 cradle mount. KNS sells a Picatinny rail adapter that can
attach to quad rails or whatever. Are you going to make one yourself
out of some steel and ball joints? Better order those carefully
machined parts now while you can still go to specialty hardware
stores or order online. If you have a future need for a machine gun
mount, there is no harm in laying it by early. A vintage tripod might
be a good collectable for the corner.
Next, buy the gun accessories. Are you adapting an AR-15
because everyone has a dozen in their safes already? Buy a spade
grip adaptor, which seems uncomplicated enough to fabricate in a
garage. Need taller sights to shoot when standing up? Buy those.
Note that AR-15s are terrible sustained fire weapons. You’ll blow the
gas tube after about 300 rounds of sustained fire, so you’ll need a
quick change barrel adaptor, or like three, which will get expensive.
Or an extreme duty gas tube. A heavy barrel is less of a concern
than an exploding gas tube that will turn your rifle into a straight-pull
single shot.
How is it going to fire fully automatically? Well, in one of my half-
written novels a 3D printed lightning link is used. The AR-style open
bolt conversions, as used in the M231 firing port weapon, have a
tendency to batter and walk out pins, I am told. Yes, in fiction I could
have my character just fit a full-auto parts kit in as he did to some
rifles, but like in reality, he didn’t have that many to begin with. You’ll
probably have zero.
If you think you may capture a weapon, have your own ammo
supply. There is no harm in buying linked 7.62mm or 5.56mm ammo
to feed that ex-government M240 or whatever. You can always
unlink it and shoot it or reuse the links. Buy tracers while you still
can. If you’re shooting a machine gun, especially one from a vehicle,
you’ll want the goodies. Beta Mags and Magpul D60s could get
banned too, if they haven’t been by the time this goes to print.

Gun trucks
 A gun truck is a dragoon (soldiers that arrive via horse and
fight on foot) whereas technicals are the cavalry (fight from the
horse). A gun truck does two things; provides an armored platform
for fighters to shoot from (on the move, if necessary) and serves as a
delivery vehicle for your troops. What differentiates a gun truck from
a technical is that a gun truck is carrying men, who will fight from the
truck bed or on foot, using rifles. As said earlier, the problem will be
sourcing weapons that can be mounted, so we’re using the humans
as the gun mounts.
The easiest way of making a gun truck is putting several guys
in the bed of a pickup truck. They can shoot from there and then
jump out to fight. An unmodified pickup bed will require your men to
be seated so they don’t fall out. This limits their arcs of fire and the
number of men who can safely fit. Three men should be sufficient to
cover both sides and the rear of the vehicle.
With a heavy-duty truck, some steel, and fabricators the
possibilities increase. Probably the best vehicle to have to break up
an ambush or provide serious fire support against a bad guy’s attack
would be an armored vehicle. One of those roaring out of the
darkness and opening fire with machine guns, grenade launchers,
and even cannons would be a gamechanger. It is a mobile defensive
position that can go where help is needed.
Like as a technical is a substitute for a military fighting vehicle, a
gun truck is a substitute for an armored personnel carrier. Obtaining
an APC is not going to happen for most. What you can do is create a
gun truck to not just transport a number of shooters but allow them to
fire on the move and with relative safety.
Gun trucks are non-passenger vehicles filled with guns and
shooters used to provide a base of fire and increase the firepower
available to defenders. Being a truck, it’s mobile and can move from
locations quickly while shooters are firing or it can participate in a
convoy. Gun trucks are usually flatbed vehicles modified to support
shooters in the cargo area. In a civilian context, shooters firing rifles
in the truck bed are going to be more common than mounted crew-
served weapons.
These really took off in Vietnam when supply convoys were
ambushed. Modified 2.5-ton or 5-ton cargo trucks could quickly
advance down a convoy column and return fire into the thick of it.
These trucks had armored plating added on. Many farm trucks can
be similarly modified to provide light armor protection and a good
platform for shooting out of the cargo area. Mexican cartels do this to
make their own improvised APCs and gun trucks, called
“Monstrosos” or monsters.

Start with a 4x4, high clearance flatbed heavy-duty (1 ton or

greater) truck. More armor means a greater payload
capacity is required. Note that as the weight limit increases,
the wheelbase also goes up and maneuverability
decreases.
A pintle mounted semi-automatic weapon isn’t viable. You
will need high volumes of fire. Multiple men in the back of
the truck firing rapidly are a better idea and all it requires is
dudes getting in a truck bed. Their arms will provide greater
range of motion to traverse targets than a rifle mount will.
Some sort of frame is necessary to keep people from falling
out and to permit bracing. A stakebed truck can be used,
but the sides will probably need to be reinforced as they
usually have some flex to them. Otherwise, a rail or two can
be welded in place. I’d recommend one high enough so that
shooters can rest their arms on it for greater accuracy be
added.
At least one shooter is necessary for each side of the
vehicle, so four minimum to cover the front, rear, and each
side. More men equal more fire power that can be brought
to bear.
Steel plating can be welded in place to shield the lower
bodies of the shooters. Upper body protecting gun shields
can be added as well but firing from a gunport limits
traverse, hinders visibility, and may make shooting up-close
targets difficult.
Drivers and engine compartment armor should be added,
as well as run-flat tires, because a gun truck will tend to
draw return fire.
 All the shooters should be restrained somehow. Consider
installing grommets or cleats. The hands will be busy
holding weapons (which should be on one-point slings to
avoid falling overboard), so during turns or heavy
acceleration/deceleration a waist restraint can help the feet
balance. While it would be ideal that everyone has a
rigger’s belt and a short length of cord with carabiners on
each end to keep them from flying everywhere, rope loops
can be made to create an additional point of contact so
during maneuver’s bodies aren’t sloshing around.
Crash helmets with buckles and body armor should be
worn.
If using sandbags in the bed of a homemade gun-truck to
absorb IED blasts, note that for payload weight concerns a
single, dry standard sandbag weighs approximately 40lbs.
Cover sandbags with firm, yet flexible matting (like rubber)
to prevent a sandblast effect.
Use diesel vehicles when possible to reduce the risk of fire
should a fuel tank be punctured. Gun trucks will be
vulnerable to IEDs, so overhead threats from overpasses or
buildings need to be carefully monitored. Fire extinguishers,
fire blankets, and flame retardant clothing can all help
mitigate these threats. Note that roofs or mesh tops will
allow the flaming liquid to drip under.

Tactics

Dragoons are mounted troops that got off their horses to fight,
unlike the cavalry that fought from horseback. Pretty much all your
fighters will be on foot. Whether people arrive via auto, ATV, or
horseback, they will have to park their cars somewhere. This place
should be behind cover and you will need someone to guard the
vehicles. For example, cops always have vehicle guards at riots and
when breaking up large parties. An unguarded vehicle is theft,
vandalism, or sabotage waiting to happen.
If gun trucks or technicals are used in a convoy, deploy them
where their firepower makes the most sense. This may be the
center, the front, or the rear depending on variable factors. These
are the ideal vehicles to stop and provide overwatch at a potential
ambush point as the rest pass.
Up close, armored vehicles have poor visibility and weapons
traverse. While this is a problem with traditional military vehicles, it is
not so much for civilian vehicles unless they are so armored that
visibility and firing angles are impaired. Typically, tanks and such are
always accompanied by dismounted soldiers who can protect
against enemies getting too close and deploying mines, “sticky
bombs,” or rocket launchers.
 Roads
For roads passing through your area of operations, there are
many concerns that have to be examined to make traffic safe on it
and avoid the highways being exploited to attack you. one thing that
is important is regular traffic. A constant passing stream of cars
denies anonymity and the chance to do nefarious deeds unseen.
True, many drivers aren’t paying attention as they drive, but many
criminals don’t want to take the chance that they are being seen.
Whenever possible, maintain regular vehicle traffic or have local
security elements patrol the roads.

Facilitation of travel

Freeways/Interstates; they are high-speed avenues of approach

that allow long distance travel semi-anonymously. The closer you are
to an off-ramp, the greater the chances of being victimized by groups
traveling on them to plunder other communities.

Arterial roads and highways; these permit the movement of

large groups of people, like riot mobs, and also have the same
disadvantages of freeways.

Intersections and major road junctions: it may be important to

control this area because of the reasons above. Is it practical to
control them and who is likely to take control? Will the public, both
local and commuter, resist local traffic restrictions?

If bad guys can see your house, it is a target (it’s a potential

target anyway simply for existing). Concealment is “out of sight, out
of mind.” The first thing to do is get off the beaten path. Those
looking to relocate should choose a home as far away as possible
from any interstate, freeway, or major highway (numbered route).
This will reduce the amount of visibility of your home by anyone
passing by. Try for a mile away.
 Don’t live on main thoroughfares as well, although this can be
difficult in some terrain as there may only be one road through the
holler, etc. The less traffic that passes by, the less the chance some
ill-intentioned stranger will see your home and choose to target it.
Being further back into the country also makes any approaches and
escapes more difficult as the attacker has to come off the high speed
roadways where they can blend in.
Interstates and freeways allow high volumes of traffic to travel
long distances in relative anonymity at high speed. Raiders might
leave Big City, travel an hour, and hit Small Town, then bug out,
blending into the long-haul traffic. In my experience, this makes it
great for organized criminal gangs to come from LA into the
surrounding communities, make their hits, and disappear into traffic.
Cul-de-sacs are great, but these are a suburban phenomenon. A
mile long dead end road does not provide the same security as in a
residential tract. A similar protection is living deep within farmland or
a rural residential area. There are many potential targets, spreading
the risks around, more people to see/hear/fight whatever happens,
and greater defense in depth because the bad guy has to travel
deeper into hostile territory.
Now if you do live close to a road, there are things you can do to
make your house a harder target. First, consider making your house
look run down (not abandoned). Put any valuable equipment or
vehicles away in barns, sheds, or garages. Fence off gardens. Put
up a stout perimeter fence and gate your driveway. Plant trees,
bushes, or a hedgerow to shield the house from the roadway.

Roadsides

Clear the edges of roadways of thick growth, undergrowth,

trees, and obstacles that could be used to conceal ambushers.
Romans adopted this tactic when building their famous paved roads
as clear sightlines made it difficult to set an ambush by bandits or
enemy soldiers, although most fights in antiquity were hand-to-hand.
Property owners should clear their driveways and the foliage around
their gates for the same reason.
 Abandoned vehicles should be removed or pushed far off the
roadway. They could conceal car bombs (VBIEDs) or attackers. At
night the vehicles could be a collision hazard for anyone driving with
their lights off.
Roadside structures (i.e. fruit stands) should be cleared and
demolished. Derelict and abandoned buildings could also be
demolished or burned. Unoccupied buildings can be secured by
locking or boarding them up. This is done to deny hiding places near
roads to bandits.

Bridges

Bridges are natural chokepoints that can be used to deny a

crossing to an enemy. They should be leveraged for this purpose
and controlled so that even if not utilized in the defense, the bridges
don’t fall into enemy hands.
If you are guarding a bridge, imagine the water splits things in
two. The direction the threat is expected to come from is “their” side.
The side that you don’t want bad guys crossing to is “your” side. Your
main force, or your entire force, should be on “your” side of the
bridge.
It may seem that you want to keep the bad guy from crossing,
period, but the real danger is being cutoff. What if the bad guy
infiltrates across and hits you from the rear? You are then unable to
withdraw because bridges have no cover. Force the bad guy to cross
the bridge in the open and keep your rear/flanks secure. This is more
of a danger where there are many crossings or the watercourse is
narrow.
If you have the men, a smaller force could man a checkpoint
or OP/LP on the far side. The main force will then need to provide
covering fire if the smaller force has to withdraw. Note that anyone
withdrawing across the bridge will probably have no cover, so a
vehicle may be helpful for escape.
Bridge defense can be accomplished by anti-material rifles
(usually .50 caliber) disabling vehicles that attempt to cross or
snipers targeting foot mobile crossers. These rifles are best
employed at a distance as they can’t be traversed and aimed as
quickly as an AR-15. Anti-material snipers should be in an elevated
position with a clear view of the bridge kill zone.
When approaching a bridge crossing in a vehicle, have a
scout get out and approach on foot. Especially look under the bridge
for any ambushers in hiding or any concealed explosives.

Checkpoints

Totally blockading roads is not going to be popular. Even if the

government and law enforcement are feckless, it is not feasible to
start dropping telephone poles and making your own artificial
landslides. Your neighbors get a vote and anyone with the means to
clear the blockage has veto power. Unmanned options are
mentioned below, but checkpoints allow for closure to the
unwelcome and passage for locals.
A checkpoint, like any obstacle, is only effective if it is
enforced. A defensive obstacle has to be observed and covered with
weapons to shoot enemies attempting to bypass it. A checkpoint
needs men to stop vehicles, question the drivers, and use force if
necessary.
Physical methods of closure vary from heavy vehicles like
snowplows to abandoned vehicles racked against each other to
more portable measures like K-rail. K-rail sections are available from
most highway and public works department. They can be lifted
manually by several men if necessary. Steel hedgehogs and wooden
cheval de fries made out of telephone poles or railroad ties will mess
up most cars that try and bash through.[28]
Remember that a civilian checkpoint is completely illegal on
public property. Even official, government sanctioned ones are
regulated by local and case law. Legally any person can drive down
a public road, even a California-plated car in a West Virginia holler.
Security checkpoints, as long as some semblance of the law exists,
will need some form of sanction from local law enforcement to exist.
Sheriffs or the local highway patrol commanders may turn a blind
eye to it. Otherwise they will clear it and may arrest the participants.
Challenge strangers; if they claim to live in the area, make
them identify themselves to your satisfaction. If they cannot prove
they belong there, send them on their way. Should they be invited in
or have other business, verify this with their local acquaintance.
Consider having someone snap a photo of them for later
identification if necessary.
Never stand in front of a vehicle that is speeding towards you,
even if you have a gun. Move out of the way to behind cover that can
stop a vehicle. Remember that parked cars can move quite a lot
when hit by another vehicle traveling at speed. Very few civilian
firearms are capable of stopping a moving vehicle quickly. Stand
behind actual physical cover when possible, such as K-rail or
concrete road constructions to protect against bullets and IED.

Place stop or warning signs out and designate a stopping

place.
Stop vehicles away from the barricade with room to back up
or turn around.
Keep the anti-vehicle barricades in place until it is clear to
let the vehicle in; an easy to move low vehicle stop or tire
flattening device can be used in lieu of moving heavier
obstacles.

Only one person should be the point of contact and should

speak primarily to the driver. Be polite and do not raise your
voice unnecessarily.
Remember a negative encounter while on patrol or
manning your checkpoint could turn a neutral person into
an enemy or give someone who doesn’t like you a reason
to become violent.
Supporting elements should be off the roadway a ways and
able to provide oblique covering fire.

Never setup a checkpoint for taxing or extorting people. This will

probably get you killed and make enemies all over. This was the kind
of thing that robber knights did in the Middle Ages across Europe
and it hurt commerce. Should you be faced with such a checkpoint,
avoid it. Do what you can to withdraw and never come back. If it is
within the scope of your ability, end the illicit “toll” station.
 Roadblocks

Should it become necessary to barricade your local road or

group driveway, do it in consultation with, and with the approval of,
your neighbors. A barricade will exclude any vehicles that can’t move
the obstacle and delay those that can. To just delay/slow vehicles,
full barricades may not be necessary. Perhaps some obstacles that
can cut down on high-speed approaches, like chicanes, can be put
out to serve the same effect.
A chicane (or serpentine) is an artificial S-shaped curve that a
vehicle has to negotiate. They are often narrow and require tight
steering. Traffic can still pass but will not be able to race through.
Many cities are incorporating such features into neighborhoods to
slow down traffic without using horrible speed bumps. Ambushes
can be set at these points as appropriate and necessary.
If every 100 feet to 300 yards a vehicle has to really slow
down and maneuver to avoid something, it isn’t going to be able to
travel at a high speed. These traffic calming measures don’t restrict
traffic at all but unless an attacker wants to hit a 55-gallon trash can
filled to the brim with rocks, they will have to slow down. Smaller
obstacles can be doubled up to make a larger obstruction.
Three sets of obstacles are placed centered in the travel
lanes in a triangular pattern—two in one lane and one in the other
lane to create the serpentine. Each obstacle should be equidistant
from each other as measured in the direction of travel. The obstacles
have to be placed close enough together to prevent high-speed
weaving but far enough apart to permit large or long vehicles to pass
through. Approximately 20-30 feet from each barrier to the next
should allow long vehicles and trailers to pass, but experimentation
may be needed.
Obstacles can be anything that are heavy enough not to be
moved by high winds and will obviously cause damage to a vehicle,
such as a metal barrel filled with rocks, concrete, or sand. Paint the
obstacles in white, yellow, or orange paint for visibility. Add reflective
tape or prism reflectors. Put out cones and delineators to increase
visibility and reinforce the chicane pattern.
 Use terrain to your favor. Place “slow downs” or roadblocks on
curves or at the crest of a grade where vehicles naturally have to
slow down. Advance warning will be limited as the topography limits
the view.

Bypasses

Telling people “no” often makes them angrier than anything else.
Roadblocks, bypasses, and diversions have to be carefully
managed. For someone accustomed to driving where they please,
shutting down a road and totally denying them entry could cause
friction. Tempers may flare when a bunch of locals tell a commuter,
refugee, or someone with legitimate business they can’t come
through.
To diffuse this, your area should have not less than two through
roads; i.e. one that goes directly through town and another that goes
around. Make the bypass the more desirable route to take for
anyone who doesn’t need to go down the main route.
The idea is to setup a cone pattern to force traffic to take the
alternate route that bypasses the area you want to exclude people
from. This could be a “soft” closure that just has signs and cones or
delineators out or a hard closure with physical barricades. Detour
signs should be installed so to an uncritical mind the diversion
doesn’t arouse too much suspicion.
A second option is to create an artificial terrain hazard like
dumping rocks and earth to simulate a landslide. Trees could be
pushed over to look like they fell in the wind or something. In any
case, if someone goes around the closure and meets the “hard”
closure with K-rails and armed men, it’s a little harder to get angry
when the proverbial or literal warning signs were there.

Demolition

Whether you do it or someone else does, demolition of roadways,

bridges, and earthworks will be done. A retired deputy friend of mine
lives in St. George, Utah. I-15 crosses the northwest tip of Arizona
going through the narrow Virgin River Gorge. It’s a trip I’ve made
dozens of times since I was a kid, traveling to visit relatives in the
“Jell-O Belt.” This picturesque piece of scenery—the first decent
thing to see on the entire trip up from LA—is in reality a huge
obstacle in waiting.
Growing up in a half-Mormon family means you get to hear all the
stories of the religion, including persecution by the US government.
I’m not particularly sympathetic to the mid-19th century rebels of any
stripe but knowing that the early Mormons did fight a limited guerilla
war against the US Army is a good thing to know. It explains their
skeptical and slightly distrusting of government, though patriotic,
culture.
The stories went that lots of National Guard and Army weapons,
like explosives and rocket launchers, went missing from various
armories over the years. According to one relative, the Utah State
Guard was practically disbanded because of fears of weapon
hoarding, among other things. Even if this is just the kind of lies that
men swap it does lend credence to the idea that there are men
thinking far ahead about contingencies.
In the case of St. George, it sits about two hours outside of Las
Vegas. If the urban bowl that Sin City sits in empties out because of
an emergency, lots of folks are coming up to Southern Utah. St.
George will be in a bad way if tens of thousands of totally
unprepared people, probably on the lower-class spectrum of things,
turn up. So according to town gossip and the old Mormon legends,
the many bridges through the gorge would be blown up to keep
people out.
Denying Interstate access to St. George wouldn’t be difficult.
Only one or two bridges through the gorge would have to be
demolished. I doubt the kind of people who would drive to Utah like
the Mongol horde would be able to improvise a crossing. All the
defenders would have to do is blow multiple bridges (there’s
probably a dozen of them) and drop a few cliffsides on the highway
and the road is closed.
Traffic would have to divert up the two-lane old Route 91 which I
doubt many Las Vegans could find without a map. Heck, they
probably couldn’t find it even with a map. And the old highway could
be sabotaged or blockaded just the same way. Unless you’ve got
high-clearance and four-wheel drive, closing a road in the desert can
be a pretty effective way at cutting the majority of traffic.
This is not far out of the possibility of things. It doesn’t take
paranoid elderly weekend warriors who are hiding Carter-era C4 in
their basement. A construction or demolition company could very
easily and expertly do it. No matter who does it, it will probably
happen somewhere (West Virginia I’m looking at you).
For the residents of St. George, they are suddenly safe from
thousands upon thousands of refugees teeming into their streets.
However this means that no truck traffic is coming north from Los
Angeles. Exports from Utah aren’t going into Vegas markets. I-15 as
a major western commercial corridor is shut probably until the
restoration of order nationally. Permanently closing roads through
demolition is an extreme thing.
While you, the reader, probably aren’t going to be dynamiting
bridges or embankments, you may be tempted to cut down
telephone poles or trees to block the roadway. Just keep in mind, in
addition to the cautions about roadblocks above, that whatever mess
you make will have to be cleaned up. Destruction affects all users of
the road equally.
 Crop and Stock Defense in a
Famine
When the advice in this book becomes necessary for survival,
gardens will be keeping people alive. Farms will be critical industry.
Even small-scale agriculture and self-sufficiency will put the rural
person ahead of urban dwellers. Rural areas are better suited for
home agriculture. More land, fewer restrictions, and better soil are
the obvious advantages over suburban backyard gardens. Farms
and large, rural gardens will have an unfortunate draw.
Starvation will be an ugly thing. Hungry people will do
anything to survive and the tales of desperation in famines is legion
throughout history. Farmers and self-sufficient homesteads will be in
the line of fire, so to speak, of starving people. People will go where
the food is. Unique challenges will spring up that will require
unorthodox methods and thinking to avoid catastrophes.
Cities can afford to send more people out to “poach” crops
because city folk aren’t tending the flocks or working the fields all
day long. Needing bodies to grow food is the reason why farmers
were given draft deferments. A Rawlesian total collapse is a better
situation than a partial economic collapse because once the fuel
runs out, drives into the countryside for raids will be uncommon and
everyone will be too busy starving to death to plunder.

Organized crime

As discussed in the “Threats” chapter, rural areas will be a

prime target for crime because that’s where the food comes from.
Cartels and organized crime are in prime spots to move into the
country and make agriculture their business. This already happens in
Mexico where the drug money has diversified into the fields and
orchards (and indirectly in the US).
Growers will be blackmailed and extorted into giving up part
or all of their crops. Cattle rustling will come back into vogue. Fields
will probably be harvested early by near-slave labor under the
watchful eyes of gunmen making sure no one interferes. Small-scale
family type operations will be the easiest to target as they won’t have
the resources of a large association or company.
Limited things can be done to prevent crop theft. There is too
much land, too many hours of darkness, and too few defenders to
hold off armed and determined criminals. Things like fencing and
secure storage of harvested produce (or livestock) are the best
defenses. Beyond that, defensive organizations or security guards
who can fight off sicarios will have to be hired.
Employees and laborers can and will be exploited. If there is
cartel activity in an area, one should expect that Hispanic workers
will at least unintentionally be providing intelligence to the cartel.
Experiences have shown that some “loyal” employees may be
turned by pressure and work for the enemy.
Stolen food is probably going to be transported for distribution
and sale in cities as transport to the county is likely going to be
limited. Illegal roadside “hawkers” in South Africa setup illicit
roadside stands to sell stolen produce. These often compete with
legitimate “fruit stands” selling non-stolen produce.

Defenses

Livestock will have to be watched after. If they cannot be

secured in a locked and alarmed barn that can be covered with
gunfire from the house, someone will need to stay up at night to
protect them. During the day, you will need armed cowboys guarding
the herd. Unguarded cattle and horses (in particular) will be rustled.
The presence of livestock can only be concealed, not hidden.
Their sounds and smells will defeat any walls or vegetation. What
you can do is camouflage their corrals, pens, and coops. Don’t make
it obvious that the area is an animal enclosure. Plant trees to screen
things and erect fences and walls. Whenever possible, they should
be grazed in areas that are not visible to the general public (i.e.
within sight of a road or town).
Children are often sent to steal because people are reluctant
to use force against them, there is more sympathy to children,
children are punished less, and kids are a lot nimbler than adults.

Fence in your crops. Five-strand barbed wire is probably

the easiest to go with.
Patrol the fields day and night.
Home gardens should have some sort of motion detection
alarm. Deer sprinklers are a cheap option that work on
humans and animals.
Use easily startled animal “guards” that will give an audible
warning of intruders.
Argentinian farmers fired warning shots with .22 rifles or
birdshot from shotguns.
For large crowds that are relying on numbers and the
reluctance to shoot everyone, look at the riot control
techniques from Suburban Defense and Suburban Warfare.
Develop an alternative food distribution network. The truly
hungry can go there. This might be a charity, through a
church, or simply a box placed by the side of the road.
Consider alternative strategies like organized gleaning,
food-for-labor schemes, or charitable food donations
backed up by the use of force if your charity is abused.

Cattle rustling/stock theft prevention

Graze animals only at night.

Corral or graze animals out of sight of roads and public
areas. Move the corrals if necessary.
Drovers, cowboys, and shepherds should always be armed
and watching over the animals when not corralled in not
less than two-man groups.
Use sheep and cattle dogs.
Challenge any non-residents or employees on the property.
Full moons, for additional natural lighting, or new moons, for
the cover of darkness, are times to be alert for nighttime
stock raids.
If theft occurs, immediately share this information with
neighbors, buyers, and slaughterhouses.
 Increase security near harvest times.
Brand animals if you don’t already. Count them regularly.
Lock up or block loading ramps so that cattle can’t be easily
loaded on to a truck using your facilities.
Do not discuss your animals or farm arrangements with
strangers.

Sacrifices

Make a determination on what kind of small-scale theft and

gleaning you may allow. Up until about the late ‘70s, it was possible
to glean the harvested fields of Southern California openly. All the
left behind and discarded produce after a harvest that isn’t fit for sale
is better off being picked by the hungry than left to rot or be plowed
under. Not interfering or even encouraging the public to come post-
harvest could engender a lot of good will or prevent bad blood.
In the 1920s, a Ventura County deputy[29] told a story of when
he was a guard on the Rindge Ranch (now Malibu) and he came
across some animal traps. The poor neighbors were poaching.
Dutifully he picked up the traps and hung them up as a warning to
their owners not to poach anymore.
The poachers were undeterred and even fired a few shots to
scare the guard. After the guard saw some rich friends of the
Rindge’s illegally spotlighting deer, he quit over the hypocrisy and
eventually became a deputy sheriff. Imagine how much worse it
could have been for everyone had he not used his judgement and
ignored the poor poachers, just trying to feed their families?
A little sacrifice here and there to avoid bigger troubles is a
common strategy. Construction workers or film crews in the third
world may pay a few dollars a day to locals simply to stand around
and “guard” the equipment. It’s really a bribe to keep these same
people from stealing but putting a few bucks on the street is better
than alienating everyone and having to maintain stricter security.
Whatever you choose to allow, draw a line in the sand on what is
and isn’t appropriate.

Starvation
 There are three phases of starvation. First, the body produces
glycogen by breaking down fat and muscles. The second phase is
ketosis, which takes about a week, and the body begins to burn fat in
earnest while muscle breakdown is slowed. The length of the fat
burning stage depends on how fat someone is to begin with. When
all the stored body fat has been burned, muscles are then rapidly
broken down.
Death occurs because of imbalances in the body produced by
malnutrition. For instance fatal heart rhythm disorders can occur. A
weakened immune system can lead to a fatal infection. Organs
themselves begin to breakdown as cells are starved of the protein
they need to function. In the late stages, recovery may be
impossible. Eventually the stomach will be unable to digest food.
Without careful medical observation of refeeding using special, easy
to digest foods, a late-stage starving person will die from trying to
eat.
Malnutrition isn’t just starvation. It can be from a deficiency of
proper foods. Scurvy, or Vitamin C deficiency, is the most well-known
form. Bizarre diseases like kwashiorkor and marasmus can occur.
Kwashiorkor is the characteristic belly-swelling condition seen in
famous famine photographs that is caused by a lack of protein, but
otherwise adequate consumption of food. Marasmus is a severe
wasting caused by inadequate calorie intake. It is recognized by
severe emaciation and is what happened to concentration camp
survivors.
Severe hunger weakens the body and makes it more susceptible
to infection and disease than when healthy. Other common
symptoms are severe temperature intolerance, anemia, heart rhythm
disorders, and exhaustion. Exhaustion is physical and mental. Many
famine survivors report having few memories about their experience
or little to no emotions while hungry. Mental states may be degraded
or altered, ranging from depressed to euphoric. Many late stage
starving people will lose all motivation to survive and lay down to die.
Desperation drives criminal behavior beyond normal morality.
Parents murdered their children instead of watching them starve to
death. Emotional intemperance brought on by hunger caused some
to kill their children when they cried from hunger pains. Resentment,
anger, and violent fear needs to be respected as a major danger the
starving can present. Deprivations bordering on evil, beyond just
theft and robbery, can occur as a person’s humanity is impaired by
hunger.
During the Holodomor, food theft among Ukrainians was
widespread. The starving condoned it. Starvation straps strength,
mental fitness, and emotion. Normal morality went out the window as
the only thing that mattered was survival. There wasn’t enough
energy to feel things like guilt. It was everyman for himself; if one’s
actions meant someone else starved, so be it. Parents would refuse
to feed their children and children refuse to give food they found to
their parents.
Starving Irish tenants who were evicted during the Great
Famine shot (and sometimes killed) their landlords. Starving people
have killed farmers for resisting crop thefts to say nothing of thieves
who will murder farmers willingly to profit. Ukrainian food guards
would shoot anyone who tried to glean the fields. Neighbors
murdered each other for stealing food from gardens. Vigilantism and
retaliation were common.
Famines will turn people into animals. The Bible has stories of
starvation. Remember the mothers that killed and ate one’s baby the
first day but on the second the other mother hid her surviving child?
In Ukraine, during the 1930s Holodomor, Soviet authorities had to
remind people not to eat their children. During the siege of
Leningrad, black market sale of meat was banned to prevent human
carrion from being sold. Cannibalism is real.
Ukrainian peasants found themselves subjected to intrusive
food searches and sadistic missions to not just confiscate but
deprive them of food. Communist searchers were often drafted by
force to join the searches. Others volunteered because they
themselves were starving. Friends and neighbors turned each other
in for “hoarding” because in many cases it meant the informer would
receive some of the food. Hunger was used as a weapon.
In some areas, whether led by gangs or “police,” food hunts for
“hoarders” will happen. Any government agency or other group
coming to “search” or confiscate food under some legal or political
pre-text must be violently resisted. There is no use in attempting to
comply; they simply will come back. If they take your food, you will
starve. It is better to die on your feet than to get down on your knees
to live just to starve to death another day.
Do not under estimate what starving people will do. Women
selling themselves (or their children) for food is at the tame end of
what is possible. Imagine starving people willing to commit horrible
crimes on different political classes or property owners in exchange
for food. Entities with power and the ability to supply food will use
this as leverage to get what they want done. On the individual level,
people will do whatever it takes, regardless of the cost to others, to
survive. Trust no one who is starving.
Bury caches of food, weapons, and ammunition on your
property. Ukrainian communist units literally tore homes apart in
search of hidden food. Search teams would return up to three times
to ensure nothing was brought out of hiding. Your house is not safe.
No building is, so burying food and things is probably the only way to
keep it totally undiscovered.
Anything buried needs to be in a purpose made container that
is water and animal resistant. It has to be crushproof as well.
Whatever you bury, dig it up after a year as an experiment to see
that it’s still okay. Take the time to research underground caching
methods and ways of sealing things against the elements.

Wildfire defense

Hay, wheat, other grasses, and corn are susceptible to fires

occurring naturally or deliberately set. Be prepared for
sniper or harassing fire when fighting any fire as bad guys
may want it to spread.
Prepare your home to evacuate should the fire spread. Use
fire retardant products like PHOS-CHEK Home Defense on
the home and outbuildings.
Move flammable materials like firewood or hay away from
buildings.
Attack from the black; be behind the moving fire front. Fire
moves more rapidly uphill than down hill. Valleys, gullies,
gulches, and dales can be extremely hot as the sides of the
depression reflect heat. Always have an escape route and
quit fighting if you are about to be cutoff.
Put water on the fastest moving section of the fire first. If
you can get a farm water truck or something over to a spot
fire, suppress it with water before it spreads. Focus on
hotspots firsts to limit the spread of the fire front.
If the fire is not moving fast, plow a line of crops or grass
continually widening the strip until a firebreak is made.
Bulldozers can be used as well. This will require you to be
downwind of the fire so do not attempt this against a fast
moving fire. Surround the fire with a containment line.
Suppress the fire by wetting it, smothering it with dirt, or the
old fashioned wet burlap sack method. Once the fire is
contained and no longer spreading, move in to extinguish
hotspots within the perimeter (mop-up).
Usually durable natural fabric clothing (cotton, wool)
clothing can be used for low intensity fires. Specialized
flame retardant Nomex clothing and fire shelters are
recommended for high intensity fires.
 Ideal rural living
The compound idea for rural defense is timeless. Many
veterans of the Global War on Terror are familiar with family
compounds in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some are constructed to be
more defensive than others. Whether the compound is protected,
fortified, or built to allow multiple multi-generational dwellings on the
same property, it works.
To any new building folks I would suggest getting together
with family and trusted friends to design and build a purpose built
compound. This doesn’t have to be a walled affair that looks like the
Alamo or a qalat. Just put up a fence, build homes, and perhaps a
barn/shop/garage. Several houses can be built in a geometric
arrangement that maximizes overlapping fields of fire.
The intent of several people I know who are pursuing this
concept is that they would start with one large home. Generally the
older parents buy the land and the large home (or build one). Their
children and relatives will in time build their own residences, small or
large, on the property.
One is having an accessory dwelling unit, or granny flat, built
for their grandmother so she can have some privacy and
independence. In the meantime, the main house is used by
everyone if things go south faster than anticipated or as things are
built. The main house also serves as additional living space should
the outlying residences be lost or more people move in. A cheaper
variation is bringing trailers or RVs as either temporary, emergency,
or permanent housing.
In this time of inflation, the generational property reverts to
older traditions that keep the family unit together for practical and
more intangible purposes. It preserves wealth and property within
the family. This may be the only way that younger generations will be
able to afford their own homes without crippling mortgages or rents.
Not all of this has to be done at once, either. Start with a
house. Then build the barn/shop/garage. After that, build residences
as needed. In between, grow a garden and work on the self-reliant
infrastructure such as solar power and a well. Defenses like
hardened fence lines and berms can be built at leisure (though we
do seem to be running out of time to some sort of conflict as I write
this).
While a part of me wants to die inside giving up my
independent life and privacy to live next door to my folks, living on
some rural land not far from a small city would be a prudent idea. For
a survival standpoint, I have family assistance right next door. As my
parents age, I’m two minutes away. We would have land that is
easier to defend and easier to be self-sufficient upon than even two
or three tract homes right next to one another.

An example from fiction

In describing my ideal retreat, I’m going to talk about one of

the settings from my EMP series of novels. In Hard Favored Rage,
character Kyle Sibley owns a large agricultural property in the Las
Posas Valley, which is situated east of Somis, CA, and north of
Camarillo, CA. This is based on an actual property and real
geography.
The valley is about six miles long and 2.5 miles wide,
bounded by an 800 foot ridge to the south and foothills to the north
that culminates in a peak over 2,000 feet tall. The hills are often
cultivated on their lower reaches generally with avocado orchards.
Draws have often been graded and are used for orchards or ground
crops. Cereal and hay crops are not found. Uncultivated land is
either grassy hillsides or thick sagebrush and chaparral. Oak
savannah may be found in a very few spots. Rangeland is incidental
but typically not used for that purpose.
The valley is mainly avocado and citrus orchards with some
row crops and this is typical of Ventura County agricultural areas.
While some portions of the valley are denser, homes are typically
interspersed within the orchards of 1/8 of a mile to less than a mile
apart. Denser residential developments, often on large lots or around
golf courses, are on the flanks of the valley. Watercourses are
arroyos that typically only flow with runoff or during storms.
 A numbered state highway (two lanes) passes through the
valley and a railroad line passes through the eastern part. Roads in
the areas are in a grid pattern roughly one mile apart. Except for the
state highway, traffic flow is low, especially at night. Except from the
north, there are no physical barriers against entry to the valley, but
there are chokepoints. The east, west, and southeast approaches
are essentially flat, open (but cultivated) ground fed by two-lane
roads. Numerous farm roads and fire roads are accessible.
Just to the south on the other side of the ridge is a city of
approximately 70,000. To the east approximately eight miles from the
property is a city of about 40,000. Within half an hour’s drive are
approximately 500,000 people. The Los Angeles metro area is about
45 minutes or 25 miles to the east. There is essentially no industry in
the valley of note to speak of.
The “ranch”[30] itself is located in the approximate center of
the valley centrally located on 640 acres. Mr. Sibley grows a mixture
of citrus, avocado, and strawberries. He maintains only one
residential employee who is not present when the EMP happens. All
other workers commute or are seasonal.
Crime in the area is minimal and usually domestic type
incidents or farm theft. The economic demographic is mostly upper
middle class to upper class. Working class and low class residences
are mixed in throughout the area and especially on the urban fringes
but are in the minority. The ethnic demographic is almost entirely
either traditional American or Hispanic.
I based the layout on several real places. The main house is
surrounded by an avocado orchard and is elevated on the edge of a
slight bluff above an orchard of citrus crops. The house cannot be
seen by the roadway which is about 300 yards to the west. The main
living area also includes field worker (campesino) quarters and a
large shop/garage.
The entire property is self-sufficient. Water for both irrigation
and domestic use is drawn from on-site wells. Large solar fields and
batteries supply electrical needs. Propane fuel is used instead of
natural gas. Though the produce grown is highly commercialized,
there is plenty of space for an expansive garden large enough to
support many people.
 For manpower, there are eight adult males and six adult
females. At night, one man is expected to patrol the property as
another person keeps watch at a command post inside the house.
Night shifts are four hours long. Contact with, and support from,
neighbors is minimal. Visitors are rare and only highly trusted
individuals with living arrangements elsewhere are permitted beyond
the gates.
The outer perimeter fencing is six-foot chainlink topped with
triple strand barbed wire. Due to crop theft, mostly avocados, this is
not uncommon in the area. The chainlink runs along the roads and
along the shared property line for a distance until it becomes a four-
foot five strand barbed wire fence. Part of the shared property line is
a barranca, or a narrow, dry streambed impassibly choked with
brush and trees. The barranca also splits the Sibley land in half. It is
crossed with a vehicle bridge and a pedestrian bridge several
hundred yards apart.
The house itself is protected by another low barbed wire fence
and more decorative elements that serve mostly to isolate the house
from the working orchard areas. Driveways are all gated. Anti-vehicle
barricades are installed near the house to prevent rapid vehicular
assaults or ramming attempts. Defensive fighting positions that can
provide cover of the inner driveway have been installed.

Strengths:

Self-sufficient in every aspect, even if some areas

(manpower) are weak.
Relative isolation: the mid-size city to the south is a five to
six mile walk for the majority of the residents and many
other farms and orchards are closer.
A defense force of almost exclusively military and law
enforcement veterans.
The ability to use space for a defense. Defense of the
property is intended to be largely fire and maneuver. The
enemy should be met near the perimeter as he infiltrates
 and the defenses collapsed back to the house as a
strongpoint.
No nearby terrain offers a vantage point onto the land.
Additionally most of the property is concealed from public or
adjoining land by the trees. Navigation by intruders
unfamiliar with the layout inside the orchards is extremely
difficult in the trees.
A perimeter that concentrates all vehicular access to a
limited number of gates and a tall fence that does not look
out of place.

Weak points:

The interior roads and driveways. While the cultivated lands

are impassible to vehicles, once inside intruder vehicles can
move freely and are only stopped by physical barricades.
These obstacles are only defended when an emergency
exists.
A long perimeter not under direct observation. The exterior
fence line for much of the property line directly abuts a
public road. None of it can be seen from the house and
requires a foot patrol to check for intrusion attempts or
investigate suspicious activity.
Size of the property. At a square mile, the number of men to
defend it is inadequate. All male residents are needed to
respond to an intrusion. There aren’t enough people to
repel a two-pronged assault (main and diversionary forces)
as well as maintain general perimeter security and hold the
house. One fire team could easily be pinned down as a
second force hits at another point. There is no manpower
reserve for casualties.
In the initial stages of the crisis, the focus is to “keep heads
down” and attempt to go unnoticed and unmolested. This
allows criminal elements in the area to engage in their
activities without notice until after the fact.
 Two similar groups composed of law enforcement/veterans
with sizeable resources and defensible properties are very
close nearby but cooperation is minimal early on.
The property is so large that any kind of farm work requires
dedicated employees to manage the orchards. This entails
inviting in outsiders or recruiting a local work force.

Defensive preparations

My character Mr. Sibley is a moderately successful man. To

explain the character’s wealth, eccentricities, and access to helpful
things I made him an ex-Navy SEAL, a reserve deputy sheriff, and
the owner of both a pyrotechnics/blasting company and a Hollywood
firearms company. Virtually everything in the novel is possible if
improbable. I wanted to give as much realism I could while still
writing the fantasy kind of survivalist fiction that everybody enjoys.
While there is a case for a scrappy survivor who makes do with what
he has, I wanted to write one of the old school of survival fiction
books that is kind of a fantasy.
But being a slave to verisimilitude, I had to make everything
possible in reality. A real person with similar experience,
connections, and money could do it. An ex-Navy SEAL and a
demolition expert can make a homemade Claymore if he has the
explosives, which if the world ended he could just take from his
company’s magazine.
As for the machine guns, California does actually allow them
under Dangerous Weapon Permits which are extremely rare and
nearly impossible to get. The only exceptions I’ve heard of are
Hollywood armorer companies like Independent Studio Services
(ISS). In the past, a few rental gun ranges have been able to get
them for machine guns or usually suppressors, but that was many
years ago. If I wrote this taking place outside of California, Sibley
would have just bought whatever he wanted.
On the other hand, a skilled machinist can make suppressors
or full-auto parts. There’s no reason why my character couldn’t also
run a lathe and CNC machine. There are plenty of polymath type
guys like Mr. Sibley out there. So I had him do a little illegal
modifications post-EMP to make a few items at the cost of burning
irreplaceable diesel fuel in his generator.
Other things are possible for the right people with money or
technical skill. Small user customizable computers like Raspberry Pi
allow sophisticated devices to be built by a proficient amateur. A
millionaire can buy a lot of force multiplying devices. So with a little
writer’s magic, I made it work. Here are some of the more easily
obtainable things Sibley has.
Wireless motion sensors around the property detect movement in
certain chokepoints. This is transmitted to the command post where
they light up an indicator on a map. Such an idea is not beyond the
realm of possibility; commercial alert devices already exist and
similar ones can be made with analog technology. The radio signal
from an activated sensor is transmitted to a receiver. That signal is
then processed by a small motherboard and illuminated a light on a
map drawn on a board with a hole drilled to accommodate the LED.
A fence tamper sensor is installed on the entire chainlink
fence. This is a commercial product that uses a fiber optic line to
detect minute movements characteristic of someone climbing the
fence or cutting it. These systems send an alert to a central monitor
that indicates both the location of the motion and the suspected
nature of the attack.
Tamper/cut sensors are commonly found at prisons and other
high-security facilities. Fence alert systems have been in use for a
long time and began as a light electrical current conducted through a
metal fence. If the fence or the sensor wire was cut, the circuit broke
and an alarm went off. These could easily short out on such a large
perimeter.
A drone is used to serve as an eye in the sky. There is no
high point on the ranch or near it, which is a safe way to avoid
snipers, but prevents good guys from having an aerial lookout. No
water tower or silos either (nearly unheard of in that area). I suppose
a hydraulic lift could be used as a high-hide but that’s very obvious to
any shooter and takes time to launch. The drone also helps deal with
other problems.
Avocado and lemon orchards may seem like it’s hard to hide
in them, but the way the orchards are often laid out the trees can
conspire against you. When looking down long rows, especially
when moving, the trees can appear to converge in the distance.
When rows in other plots are perpendicular to the one you’re looking
down, you see a wall of trees at the end. And if someone running
through one aisle between the trees wants to disappear, all they
have to do is run at an angle and the trees will obscure them.
The drone can get the necessary altitude and look straight
down as in satellite photos of an orchard. Someone would have to
crawl underneath a dense tree and hide to avoid being seen. A
stealthy drone can also be flown high enough that it is nearly
impossible to be seen and heard as well (see Suburban Warfare).
The loitering and pursuit capabilities of a drone are also put to very
good use by my characters. I invite you to read my novels and see
more about the ranch in action.
Postures and Procedures
 Basic posture
I don’t think Antifa-style rioters will be much of a problem in
remote areas. 2020’s riots were almost exclusively a major city and
suburban phenomenon. No one is coming all the way out to the
sticks just to be obnoxious. Maybe in a world with cheap gas prices
but not when gas is expensive, rationed, and people are going
hungry.
It is uneconomical to get dozens, hundreds, or thousands of
people up from say Portland, OR, to a comic book shop in Aberdeen,
WA. Those coming out to rural areas will be doing so for a purpose,
mainly theft and robbery. Unlike in Suburban Defense, we’re looking
at defending against small-unit raids on homes and farms.
Due to being more remotely located from the denser and
more numerous urban population, living in a slightly more relaxed
manner may be possible. Maybe your ground-floor windows aren’t
boarded up all the time. Your hard outer perimeter and the size of
your property (hopefully) gives you a little more time to react than a
suburbanite will have. This all changes when local incidents or
intelligence shows the danger is changing.

Hide in plain sight

The initial response is passive, which is non-verbally telling

antagonists to “go somewhere else.”
Consider making your property look run down. Allow the
weeds, trees, brush, and shrubbery facing the roadway get
overgrown like no one has driving through that gate in
years.
Instead of using new, bright and shiny “no trespassing
signs” get used ones.
Board up the front windows of a house and let the
decorative landscaping get overgrown. Let your lawn grow
to a few inches to go unkempt or let it brown out.
 Move all vehicles, equipment, and livestock to out of view of
public areas.
Consider allowing any cultivated fields to lie fallow and
overgrown or deliberately allow some of the crops to wither.
Plant fast growing trees to create a dense wall of foliage to
hide things.
Dress as a “gray man.” Carry your weapon concealed (if
you don’t usually/can’t legally). Carry spare magazines or
replace your pocket gun with a larger one.

Hard target

Reinforce the perimeter with anti-vehicle barriers and

respectable fencing.
Barricade any driveways.
If nocturnal lighting is common, light up the exterior at night.
Openly carry (if legal or no one cares anymore), carry a
long gun, and wear tactical gear as necessary.

As things fall apart

Fuel all vehicles to “Full” and store spare fuel. Stock up on

any food or supplies you need.
Have your fighting gear prepped and ready to go. Maintain
and ready your weapons.

Either you or a trusted neighbor needs to monitor the area,

social media, the mainstream news, and any radio
scanners for advance warning of trouble. Talk to your
neighbors/self-defense group to make sure everyone is
alert and aware.

Keep all doors and windows closed and locked at all times,
even when just going outside "for a second” to get in the
security mindset and develop good habits.
Check the function of all lights, cameras, and detectors.
 Attack expected (elevated threat)

It’s wise to always be ready for the worst to happen, nevertheless

people aren’t going to be living on Red Alert 24/7 forever. Once
intelligence indicates that there is an attack expected, move to a
more serious posture. Using the “taco” tornado warning analogy, the
elevated threat is in two categories. When bad guys first rob a
neighbor or the Mongol horde hits the next town over, it’s a taco
watch; all the ingredients are necessary to make tacos. Your shields
better start going up at that point.

All but the most dire travel off-property is prohibited.

Children and non-combatants do not leave the house.
Outside chores are limited to only those which are
absolutely necessary to maintain the property or animals or
shore up defenses.
Firearms should be carried at all times; pistols inside the
house, with the rifle in the room and rifles slung or stacked
at hand outside. A rifle should never be more than a few
steps away if set down and always under visual
observation.
Vehicles should be parked in garages or barns when
possible. Non-escape vehicles should have their batteries
removed to prevent theft.
All doors, windows, and gates should be closed, locked,
and barred or boarded up. Shutters and grenade screens
should be up.
All windows should have their blinds, drapes, or curtains
drawn at dusk. No interior lights should be visible from
outside the house, but exterior lighting should be turned on
as appropriate.
Fire extinguishers and other response equipment should be
staged. Bug out bags should be ready to go and everyone
briefed on their escape and evasion plan.
Everyone should be sleeping in the safest part of the
house, preferably in a basement.
Day or night, someone should always be on watch in the
home. Look out the windows and patrol the exterior of the
house, but not too far from it. Don’t just sit inside and watch
cameras. Perimeter/property patrols need to be more than
just one person whenever possible.
Place any “perishable” perimeter alarms or defenses at this
time. Check any previously deployed ones for serviceability.

Secure any outbuildings, outdoor furniture or objects, and

anything that could be stolen, damaged, or thrown/used
against you.

Make sure all neighbors are aware of the threat, briefed,

and ready to go.
The RFF should be on alert and radios with an active
listener in each household at all times. Dispatchers and
coordinators should be ready to go.

Never leave children, the sick, disabled, or elderly persons

alone. If women are unable or unprepared to defend
themselves, do not leave them alone. In times of mass
rapes or kidnappings, women and children may need to
remain in doors or in fenced backyards at all times.
 Rules of engagement
Note: See the chapter on self-defense legalities.

Legal system functioning

Extreme measures that may be legally questionable

generally are not appropriate.
Call 911 to report suspicious circumstances or trespassing.
This may help establish your reasonability if a defensive
force situation develops.
Use a bullhorn to call out to the intruders. “Stop! No
trespassing. Go back!” Should you be able to articulate a
continuing threat, but no life-threatening action is taken or
weapons are not evident, use less-lethal means to deter
them, such as flashbang 12ga shells or paintballs.
Challenges should always be done from defensive positions
(behind cover) and with an armed person covering you. Be
prepared for any of your less-lethal measures to be
returned with gunfire.
Only use lethal force to stop an imminent threat of death or
severe injury. Do not shoot people who are fleeing. Do not
take preemptive shots until you are in immediate and
pressing danger.
If a window is broken, monitor the room for anyone
attempting entry or throwing an incendiary device. Handle
such an escalation appropriately. If you are able, barricade
the broken window and secure the room from the rest of the
house.

WROL

Understand that you may need to do things that violate our

innate Western sense of charity and fair play. Only do
things that you are morally prepared to accept having done
when the situation normalizes. Don’t be evil; if in war it
would be a war crime, don’t do it. History does not look well
upon atrocities, even if it seems necessary or proper at the
time.
Loosen the rules of engagement to handle threats
preemptively.
Shoot intruders as soon as they can be identified as hostile
(i.e. not a lost neighbor). Do not try to warn them or
question them. If they are on a secured property and acting
in a suspicious manner, are armed, or moving towards the
house, don’t take chances.
Do not let intruders reach the immediate vicinity of the
house. Ideally, you would want to fire on them as they get
several yards into a clearing so they have no cover or
concealment.
Fire at any target that presents a threat. If there truly is no
rule of law, you may shoot them in the back under the same
general principle of the “fleeing felon” doctrine. (They were
presenting a threat to you, there is the possibility they may
return, and based on their behavior they could harm
someone else.) Each person should do what is legally
permissible and act according to their own conscience.
Consider barricading your local road or group driveway. Do
this in consultation with, and with the approval of, your
neighbors. Full barricades are necessary but perhaps some
obstacles that can cut down on high-speed approaches, like
chicanes, can be put out.
Have an area defense group being to send out security
patrols and patrol your own perimeter. These should be a
mix of visible deterrence and clandestine reconnaissance.
If you have the tactical ability and skills, counter-assault any
enemies who take over a property or set up camp. Eject
them as soon as possible so they cannot establish a
foothold.
 Postures
Defense posture 1: elevated threat

Description: Police are spread thin, but “the system” is still

functioning. Unrest is generally confined to urban areas.
Threat: There is an elevated chance of theft or violent crime in
your area beyond the normal baseline. Urban deprivation of rural
areas is still unusual.
Criminal status: Displaced urban criminally inclined persons
may have relocated to your area and brought their existing behavior
with them.
Watch status: All interested parties should be discussing
defensive group and RRF/QRF formation.
Guard status: Be more alert to what’s going on around your
home, any persons/vehicles arriving, and incidents in your area.
Barricade status: No road modifications.
Weapons: Rifles not necessary but extra magazines, larger
handguns, and trauma kits should be carried regularly.
Rules of engagement: Normal rule of law.

Defense posture 2: low threat

Description: Urban areas are in chaos and there is some

refugee outflow. Shortages/famine may be placing pressure on rural
supply chains leading to criminal opportunism. Local police may be
sent to cities on mutual aid and rural responses degraded.
Threat: Low to medium chance of theft, home invasion, or
robbery. Businesses are at greater risk for robbery, theft, or looting
as local and urban desperation increases.
Criminal status: Desperation drives much theft and bolder
criminals are looking to commit mainly opportunistic crimes in less-
well prepared rural areas that have fewer police.
Watch status: Intelligence on outsiders, suspicious activity, and
crimes should be shared, investigated, and analyzed by defenders.
All suspicious activity should be reported to police.
Guard status: As above, but neighbors may want to check on
each other, patrol discreetly, and check vulnerable local businesses.
Barricade status: No road modifications.
Weapons: As above.
Rules of engagement: Normal rule of law.

Defensive posture 3: medium threat

Description: Domestic order and the economy are collapsing;

urban areas are experiencing serious unrest and violence, often
without police intervention (i.e. Hurricane Katrina New Orleans but
everywhere). Rural areas are facing pressure from urban refugees
who are depredating local residents and businesses out of
desperation. Criminal attacks are now widespread opportunism with
occasional intentional, organized raids.
Threat: Theft is common but actual violence less so. Certain
areas may be experiencing a higher threat but random incidents can
be expected anywhere.
Criminal status: Crimes are very common as police are
overtaxed and this is being exploited by criminals. Most crimes are
borne from desperation and are unsophisticated but organized crime
may be involved with thefts. Home invasion type raids are not
widespread but not rare any longer.
Watch status: As above.
Guard status: As above with greater coverage, geographically
and around the clock, and with greater vigilance.
Barricade status: As above. Driveways and gates should be
closed when not in use.
Weapons: Long guns in the home are readily accessible and it
may be prudent to travel with them in a vehicle.
Rules of engagement: Standard justifiable homicide but more
individual/group challenges of wrongdoers.

Defensive posture 3.5: high threat, non-WROL

Description: As above, but worse, and police can really only

make arrests after the fact.
 Threat: Urban areas are near-warzones, refugee pressure is
high, and rural criminal activity is high.
Criminal status: Professional criminals, gangs, cartels, and
organized predatory groups are attacking easy targets.
Unsophisticated criminals are engaging in opportunistic violence or
theft freely.
Watch status: Common radio frequencies that coordinated
criminal groups may be using are monitored. Someone at home is
always on watch. Homeowners should ensure that no one enters
their yard uninvited or unverified.
Guard status: Patrols monitor the neighborhood and
surrounding areas as above. Defensive groups and the RRF/QRF
exist and are ready for call-outs.
Barricade status: As above.
Weapons carry: All adults carry weapons at home; pistols
holsters and long guns at hand. Rifles and tactical gear are brought
when traveling.
Rules of engagement: Standard justifiable homicide but with
freer use of less-lethal weapons to discourage attack or deescalate a
situation before it turns violent.
Offensive: A hard target is presented as a deterrent.
Shelter in place: Anyone leaving the home should travel in a
well-armed group only when necessary (shopping, medical, church,
etc.). Children should play within fenced yards under adult
supervision. If you don’t need to go out, don’t. Do not travel far from
home or leave the home unattended.

Defensive posture 4: high threat, WROL

Description: Police and government have collapsed and a

restoration of order will not occur in the near future. Prosecution for
crimes is unlikely and criminality is rampant. The situation is “survival
of the fittest.”
Threat: Rural areas are experiencing theft, robbery, and looting
generally. Elevated risk of home invasions, carjackings, and
robberies in public. Genocide and warfare may be a risk.
 Criminal status: Professional criminals, gangs, cartels, and
organized predatory groups are attacking even hard targets. Regular
persons who are otherwise law-abiding are preying on others to
survive.
Watch status: Someone is always on watch, awake and alert.
Patrols monitor the immediate vicinity and the wider area.
Homeowners should ensure that no one enters their yard to steal
food or enter homes. Intelligence is regularly shared and collected.
Guard status: As above, but the defensive force and RRF/QRF
are on their highest alert (other than standing by for an incident in
progress). Any unexpected visitation or human activity is scrutinized.
Barricade status: Residential roadways may be barricaded or
have speed obstacles installed. Community-level decisions may be
made to close certain strategic roadways or guard them.
Weapons carry: As above. Tactical gear and long-guns are
carried on patrol, guard duty, or watch. Outside the “wire,” everyone
moves in a heavily armed group or as “gray” men with discreet
backup and long guns.
Rules of engagement: Preemptive force (lethal or otherwise) is
used as is morally and ethically justified. Actual or highly suspected
threats are engaged with lethal force immediately.
Defensive: All defenses are deployed in full and defensive plans
are implemented (actually in-action).
Offensive: A hard target is presented as a deterrent. Very little
leeway is given to actual or suspected threats. Preemptive
engagement of future threats may be reasonable. Doing what is
necessary to survive is done.
Shelter in place: As above. All non-essential activities cease.
During heightened threats: consolidation to one or a few specially
hardened homes may be warranted; and no one should be leaving
home except in large, well-armed groups, and only when absolutely
necessary. Non-combatants are briefed on evacuation criteria and
routes.
 Procedures for various scenarios
City folk

City dwellers evading rationing (or avoiding shortages) will

come to country to buy directly from the farmers.
Be wary of trading with strangers at your residence. You
could be a target for a hostage situation or robbery even if
you meet buyers at your gate.
To control both the amount of people coming in and reduce
the number of outsiders crawling all over the place,
centralize them at a market. Perhaps everyone knows to
come to the town square in the county seat every
Wednesday. Or maybe right outside your big roadblock
people can meet and trade.
A central location provides security for buyers and sellers. I
touched on this idea in Suburban Warfare and in my novel
Blood Dimmed Tide.
Police or defenders can provide security to guard against
extortion, theft, and robbery. A neutral public market will
also cut down on the risk of organized crime coopting the
event.

Disaster

Disasters can be manmade (nuclear contamination) or

natural (flood/tornado).
Have a bug-out-bag ready to go. This should cover
primarily shelter, fire, first aid, additional clothing, water
purification, and lastly food.
Tailor your bug-out-bag and evacuation plan to the likely
scenarios you face and where you plan to go.
 If you will have some time and will drive to a friend’s or
relative’s place, you can take more things with you. If
traveling by foot, you will need to prepare like a
backpacking trip.
Pack according to the weather and whether things are grid-
up or grid-down. For instance, a coastal Oregonian
stranded on foot after a tsunami grid down in winter will
want a cold weather sleeping bag and waterproof clothing.
Plan to mitigate the disaster on your own, such as
sandbagging your home or fighting a wildfire yourself.
Try to always have a friend’s or family’s home elsewhere
you can go to.

Golden horde (mass exodus)

Lock all gates and string up barbed wire if it is not already

done. Secure all outbuildings.
Remove road signs that can be used to navigate by or that
advertise the presence of a town or services off the
highway.
Do not display any lights on your property. Camouflage your
home and driveway if you can. Do not try to look
abandoned (vs. run down) as parties may seek shelter
there.
Under no circumstances should you give handouts
Do not accommodate any refugees or allow them to stay on
your property. If possible, confront them from a distance
with lethal cover under concealment. Give them an
alternative place to go.
Should a conflict develop, utilize crowd control and riot
suppression methods as outlined in the Suburban series.
At the community level, attempt to divert the crowd around
your area using unmanned roadblocks and diversions.
Do not allow refugee camps to spring up in your area. Move
the camps or encourage their formation far from towns.
 Only under the direst circumstances (i.e. a hostile mob)
should lethal force or mass fire into crowds be used.

Prison break

Depending on the severity of the general situation (i.e. grid

down, no phones, no cars) escapees may be traveling on
foot and forced to seek refuge in local homes. After SHTF it
will probably be easier for an escapee to break into a home
and either hide or steal a vehicle.
Lock all doors and windows of the home. Check and secure
all outbuildings and lock those as well. Move vehicles into
garages or within sight of the home. If you do not need the
vehicle, disconnect the battery or take other similar steps to
temporarily disable it.
Stay inside your home for the first 24-72 hours as much as
possible. This allows for any escapees to bypass you as
they flee and avoid creating an opportunity for them to take
you hostage.
After the initial lockdown, search (in groups) all outbuildings
and potential hiding places carefully. Check your land as
well. Escapees may attempt to hide and wait out the initial
search. Continue this process for 1-2 weeks until all parties
have been recaptured, killed, or likely otherwise left the
area.
Under no circumstances should you open the door to any
stranger nor assist strangers on your property, on the road,
etc.

.
 In Terms of Catastrophic Events
End-of-the-world scenarios are far from the actual end.
Only with the Dark Ages following the Fall of Rome (a vast
oversimplification of facts and time) did we see a relatively stable
Europe fall into a dystopian nightmare and much of that is through
the compressing lens of history. We even recovered from the Black
Death. Overnight catastrophes that ruin the whole world is stuff of
the Bible and our fertile imaginations.
Rome was a slow-motion collapse that eventually ended
when the Ottomans invaded the Byzantine capital of Constantinople
in 1453. I’m sure that many of the people in what had been the
Eastern Roman Empire weren’t happy about becoming slaves of the
Turks; their daughters sold to harems and their sons taken as
Janissary soldier-slaves. Even the conquering of North America
didn’t spell total disaster for the Native American tribes, though over
the centuries it took millions died, their nations fell, and most of them
interbred or assumed into other populations.
These events were large scale, long duration events.
Relatively small scale, short duration events are things like disasters,
as rough as they may be in the short term. The nuclear bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed over 120,000 people and destroyed
the cities. Today, both have been rebuilt and repopulated. Hurricane
Katrina was the largest scale long-term disaster the United States
has seen in recent memory and was as near as an “SHTF” event as
has happened, yet New Orleans has been reoccupied.
Disasters are often localized. Pompeii was wiped off the map
for the better part of two millennia, but the rest of Italy was fine. In
Japan, the tsunami killed thousands and destroyed cities and
suburbs, but Japan was not written off, even after the nuclear
disaster at Fukushima. Chernobyl did not depopulate all of Ukraine
or Belarus as horrible as that was.
Even if it isn’t local, it takes a lot to end the world. The
Spanish Flu killed 50 million people, a third of the world’s population,
but you and I are alive today because our ancestors survived. Our
favorite fiction about the end of the world shows a complete disaster
in which almost everyone dies or there is a total collapse of
normality. It’s not very entertaining if the drama is waiting an
additional 10 minutes for a police car to show up to take a burglary
report. Hollywood rarely takes us to the darkest places, so
its disasters and end-of-the-world isn’t. We see human reactions
degenerate during a massive region-wide blackout over several
days, but the power comes back on. The hero diverts the flood,
convinces the town to evacuate before the volcano kills everyone,
and the nuclear crisis is averted at the last minute. We want to leave
the theater happy, so the director usually gives us a happy ending of
sorts. Happy endings are not necessities in real-life.
Clean-cut resolutions to emergencies are rare too. After the
huge blackout, the lights don’t just come back on and the air
conditioner starts humming merrily away. No, the food is rotting in
the fridge, the shelves in the pantry are still empty, your neighbors
are still hungry and dangerous. After the flood waters retreated in
New Orleans, the city was still uninhabitable and chaotic.
What kind of disasters are we going to face?

The short term, low-impact, localized event

Disruption to daily life is minimal and does not last long

The physical effects are highly localized
Damage is either minimal and repaired quickly, or it is
limited in scope
The residual effects of the event are not prolonged

These kinds of events are ones that are devastating to the

affected individuals, but not to many others. This would include
moderate earthquakes (in earthquake country), tornados, flooding,
and brush fires.
When I was a child, I lived through the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake. This 6.7 magnitude quake left our city, about twenty
miles from the epicenter, unscathed. Only the power went out and
that came on later in the evening. Our biggest family loss was a
candy dish that had to be thrown out because of glass shards. We
couldn’t watch TV or play the Nintendo game we rented that was due
back the next day (a personal tragedy). I went to school the next day
and my parents went back to work.
In LA, it was different. Some areas had no water, gas, or
electricity. Major interchanges were damaged and traffic was more
than the usual nightmare. Yet life went on. Even in the hardest hit
areas of the San Fernando Valley, one could drive a few miles and
get whatever they needed. Unless your home was damaged due to
poor construction, life was back to normal within a week (not
counting the commute).
Most severe damage was limited to the San Fernando Valley.
Inside this area, much was undamaged due to good construction
standards. In 1971, the Sylmar Earthquake in the same general area
caused worse damage, but it too was localized. For those who lost a
home or had a loved one killed in a collapse, the quake was no
doubt devastating. However, for the vast majority of Angelenos, the
impact was a power outage and traffic congestion.
A tornado is similar. A mile-wide swath of damage looks horrible
and certainly is for the community, but the overall disruption is minor
to the region as a whole. Large cities function after a tornado goes
through; the Oklahoma City metro area does not fall into chaos even
after an EF5 tornado like what struck the city of Moore in 2013. This
can also be landslides, floods, and brush fires.
Damage is not widespread. Even if there is damage over a large
area, within that area the actual damage is spotty. Areas nearest to
the event may have a lot of damage, but that area does not extend
over the region. Any impacts from that damage are limited to the
area of damage itself, be it a neighborhood, a small city, or a block or
two. The second order effects of the damage are small ones, like
traffic problems routing around damage.
Utilities and services are still operational, even if locally they are
down. Linemen can come out and get the power back on. The water
main can be repaired quickly. Detours can route around a fallen
bridge. Stores get deliveries and businesses reopen. If this isn’t
possible locally, you don’t have to go very far to find alternatives.
If you lost your house, you could go to a hotel or a shelter. You
are not forced to live in your car, go to the Superdome, or have no
choice but to live in a camping tent. Emergency and relief services in
your area are adequate to handle the event or regular mutual aid can
provide excess response capacity. Rebuilding your home is a matter
of time and insurance checks, or if you can’t do that, you have the
ability to move and start over somewhere nearby.
All effects are short-term in nature. Disabled utilities are restored
quickly enough that any outage is an inconvenience, rather than
rendering a home uninhabitable. Business, school, and work in the
area is able to resume as soon as roads are clear and utilities are
operational.

Disruption to daily life is minimal and does not last long

If the event does not require you to evacuate, renders you

homeless, or causes you or your family death or injury, your
personal disruption is not serious.
The secondary effects of the event (power outage, unable
to travel) do not affect your ability to survive.
Coping with secondary effects requires minimal effort (using
candles and flashlights, cooking outside).
Disrupted utilities or other services are quickly brought back
online (the power comes back on and the grocery store re-
opens).

Damage is either minimal and repaired quickly, or major

damage is limited in scope

The physical effects are highly localized.

Areas outside of places with major damage or disruption
are minimally affected.
Long-term destruction of infrastructure does not occur.
Catastrophic damage in localized areas does not cause
disruption far beyond that area.
Emergency and relief services are able to assist those in
affected areas.

The residual effects of the event are not prolonged

 Disruption of daily life is short-term.
Infrastructure is quickly restored in short order.
Those within heavily affected areas can return and rebuild
or move on with their lives elsewhere fairly easily.

The medium term, moderate-impact, semi-localized event

For a moderate impact event, the magnitude of the event is

necessarily larger increasing the scale, the duration, and the area
affected. This would include smaller hurricanes and tsunamis.
Examples are Hurricanes Andrew and Sandy and the tsunami in
Japan (the Fukushima disaster notwithstanding).
Individual impact in these events differs from short term, low
impact events in that more people are directly affected. Loss of a
home is a much larger possibility and for those who do not evacuate
must be self-reliant for daily living, although rarely is an unprepared
person facing an existential survival emergency. You may be forced
to evacuate, and if not, living will not be easy or pleasant and it will
take some time for normality to be restored.
Though it seems odd to put these disasters here, both the
Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear disasters were moderate-impact,
semi-localized events. Depending on your perspective, these were
either medium or long term events. Medium term for those who had
to evacuate and relocate from the contaminated zones because
starting life over as a refugee in a new area is not an easy transition.
Long-term if you consider that the exclusions zones will be
uninhabitable in our lifetime. The danger itself was short-term,
because bureaucratic ineptitude aside, everyone was evacuated in
relatively short order.
To prepare for a disaster like those, packing up your house and
leaving is the plan. The impact is not an existential matter of survival
(the radiation in the urban areas wasn’t going to kill you in the short
term). In disasters where you can return and rebuilt, your
preparations are going to substitute for normal life, i.e. creating your
own infrastructure and supplying your own needs. If you are totally
unprepared, the government can and will evacuate you and provide
for your needs, however, in the immediate aftermath, you might be
on your own for a short time.

Hurricanes create different areas of damage. There are places

that are simply devastated by storm surge or winds. Often total
rebuilding is necessary before the area can be re-inhabited. Further
out, areas of lesser damage require repairs in order to prevent
structures and utilities from decaying and to maintain a safe,
comfortable habitation. Peripheral areas struggle with second order
effects like power outages and closed stores.
For those who can safely inhabit their homes, post-hurricane
survival is about providing one’s infrastructure needs and mitigating
discomfort. Generators provide electricity. Stored water and food
replace tap water and grocery shopping. Police may not respond, so
individuals or neighbors must provide their own security.
The after effects of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami are another
example of a medium term, moderate-impact, semi-localized event.
What we are looking at here is the second order effect of the
tsunami, the destruction of urban areas. Survivors of the tsunami
were now homeless, their hometowns destroyed. Yet as far as
survival, once they made it to shelter after the waters receded, the
existential threat was gone.
Those who remained in areas unaffected by the water, say on
high ground, had to deal with the aftermath that included blocked or
washed away roads, no utilities, and having to travel longer
distances to shop. If one had a way to keep warm and stored food
and water, a homeowner who survived the wave could keep living at
home until some level of normality returned.
In these cases, the question is not can a prepared person survive
the aftermath at home, it’s a question of if they want to. In Florida,
with no air conditioning the muggy days after a hurricane passes can
be insufferable. Excluding hardy souls, or those with the fuel to run
the generator enough to cool off the house, only those with no place
to go or a need to protect their property would choose to remain
more than a few days. Hundreds of thousands prefer to evacuate to
hotels in other parts of the state or Georgia rather that deal with
temporary privation.
Some disasters allow us to evacuate in order to be comfortable
(aside from safety/survival considerations). Disasters like
earthquakes don’t, even so, you can still drive from affected Los
Angeles to Bakersfield and get a hotel room and watch the recovery
on cable TV. A more catastrophic quake or other disaster might force
those who would evacuate to stay home. Most disasters in the
United States are of this kind; if it’s bad where you are, you can go to
where it isn’t.
However, many choose to stay at home rather than evacuate.
Many do this because of cost or other considerations. Those
sheltering in place need to plan for more than just survival. If an
earthquake disables utilities in the LA area for two weeks, you don’t
want to be sitting in 90 degree heat eating rice and beans while
drinking bottled water. Basic preps mean a basic standard of living
until normality returns. Up your game so you can be comfortable if
you are stuck or choose to remain home.
Localization is another consideration. Like a tornado can spare
downtown while the suburbs are trashed, events can affect areas in
varying degrees of magnitude. You might be just fine while your
friends across town are homeless. Earlier I talked about hurricanes.
Places well-inland from a storm usually escape with slight damage,
while coastal areas face devastation. This localization can get even
smaller than the state/regional level.
On a macro level, areas of Christchurch, New Zealand, dealt
with medium term, moderate impact damage. Damage was
widespread throughout the city, but it was not so widespread as to
disrupt daily life universally (compare to the Port au Prince 2010
earthquake). Major buildings were so damaged they needed to be
demolished and debris-strewn roadways were impassable for
damage. Whole neighborhoods along the river subsided so much as
to cause flooding and require the demolition.
In Christchurch, there was no long-term disruption of utility
service and stores were open. If you lived in an affected area, you
evacuated and went on with life and the earthquakes were a short
term, limited impact event. The flooding in Houston after Hurricane
Harvey was similar. The event stretched resources thin, impacted
many, and rendered many homes uninhabitable, but outside the
flood zones, life went on. The interruption was a short term, low
impact event.
Long-term effects may be that the economy never recovers in
an area or the land is never reinhabited. Outside the affected area,
once the follow-on effects are resolved, normalcy returns. A localized
example of long-term effects of a moderate impact event are the
1992 LA riots where many businesses never returned to the
neighborhoods where there was much looting and arson. Relative
safety may have returned, but even to this day many Angelinos live
in “food deserts” where they must travel longer distances to find
groceries.

Daily routines are disrupted and endure long enough to

impact personal lives

The secondary effects of the event do not affect your ability

to survive but require emergency supplies/equipment to
maintain daily life activities (eating stored food).
Coping with secondary effects requires special efforts
(running a generator, hauling water).
Utilities are absent and infrastructure is unable to support
basic needs (no rapid repair of utilities, stores are closed).
Families may be separated as evacuation becomes
necessary for comfort (the kids need running water).
There is an impact to finances due to loss of business or
being unable to work.

Damage is widespread enough to hinder recovery

Disruptive damage occurs over a wide area in close

concentration, overwhelming recovery resources.
The size and scope of damage, particularly to
infrastructure, precludes quick repair due to the large
amount of equipment and manpower demands.
Additional emergency/recovery services must come from
far outside the affected areas; local and regional resources
 cannot cope with the effects.
Areas outside the catastrophically affected places have
their own, lesser damage that impact their abilities to
recover, or spillover effects hinder normal activities.

The effects are prolonged but not permanent

Daily life is affected for several weeks or months.

Infrastructure is not restored quickly and often subject to
work-arounds, partial restoration, or restoration in stages.
Those within heavily affected areas cannot return until
significant improvements to basic infrastructure are made.
Damage is ultimately rebuilt or repaired over months or
years, due to the scale of the event.
Permanent evacuation is not required.

The long term, high-impact event

Hurricane Katrina was the closest thing to an end-of-the-world

scenario as America has seen in recent times. For those in affected
areas, it was grid-down nearly without rule of law (WROL).
Individuals had to ensure their own safety. While the disaster was
localized mainly to Louisiana and Mississippi, the effects there were
long term and high impact. Ripple effects were felt across the nation
and changed the way disaster responses are handled for the better.
Long term, high impact events are ones that fill the pages of
post-apocalyptic novels and make up our worst nightmares. These
are nuclear war, EMP, a civil war, or zombies. Follow-on effects tend
to be negative but can result in some positives The Black Death not
only killed 75-200 million people but led to an agricultural revolution.
Serfdom began to die off in Western Europe. Agricultural technology
led to increased output that not only enabled the population to
rebound but diverted labor into what would become the Industrial
Revolution.
The key here is that everything changes. Take the loss of
electricity; modern life would be impossible. It would take an
exceptionally long time to modify our cities and lifestyles to a non-
electric one. Such a serious event is unusual in human history. Major
wars share some aspects with both this and the previous category;
though their destruction was limited in scope, no one can claim that
the World Wars didn’t change the whole world order.

Daily life is permanently disrupted and new ways of life are

established

Large portion of the population is killed off either rapidly or

over time; lifespans can be shortened.
Fundamental alterations to daily life of nearly all citizens
occurs to some degree.
Emergency preparations are short-term survival methods
and new solutions must be found for continued, long-term
survival.
Lifestyles are reduced in comfort, hardships are increased,
and some professions become anachronisms.

Damage is widespread and intractable

Damage does not have to be physical; can be digital or

social.
While the actual scope of the damage may vary from
locality, in the global scope it is considerable.
Full recovery is generational but often the status quo is
never realized again.
Success of short-term recovery is a matter of localized
resilience, mitigation techniques, and luck.

The follow-on effects are permanent and world changing

Repairs and work-arounds are made but the damage

cannot be fully repaired.
Devastated areas are not inhabitable for generations.
Effects on social, government, or commercial systems are
fundamental alterations.
Technological and social development is setback.

.
 Dealing With Fear
Exploring fear through fiction

Disasters and the apocalypse have always been subjects of

intense interest to me. I wanted to do my thesis on post-apocalyptic
literature and examine how fiction deals with the end of the world.
Fiction is an excellent way to explore the various aspects of
catastrophes and unique situations we’re not likely to encounter in
our lives…until we do. We don’t have much of an opportunity to
wonder how we will handle defending our homes from a violent mob
that wants to loot our precious supply of bottled water and freeze
dried food. An evacuation just ahead of the “golden horde” or a
lockdown is a thought exercise, not something we can practice.
Fiction is the best simulation of extraordinary scenarios we
have come up with yet. We find such things entertaining, but tabletop
and field exercises by government and military forces are based on
the same research and informed assumptions these authors made. I
don’t profess to have any special knowledge other than practical
education and experience. You too can think outside the box.
All it takes is knowledge, research, and imagination to spin a
tale that one day in the future seems like a prediction. Fertile
imaginations “predicted” the Titanic disaster (Morgan Robertson’s
“Wreck of the Titan;” he also “predicted” the Pearl Harbor attack) and
the Wuhan coronavirus (Dean Koontz’s The Eyes of Darkness).
Heck, Tom Clancy wrote about an airliner crashing into the Capitol
building in 1996. Were these guys evil masterminds? No, they were
just intelligent.
In my EMP series of novels, I’ve painted an extremely bleak
scenario. In the pioneering novel of the genre, William Forstchen’s
One Second After has such personal tragedy in it that it should
motivate anyone to action to mitigate the risks of a catastrophic
event. People don’t like that I killed off one of my main characters,
but in a realistic scenario, not everyone lives. As much as a reader
wants a happy ending, sometimes it’s the distressing things that
motivate us.
Fear is a motivator. Fear leads us to do things to mitigate risks.
We install a smoke alarm because we don’t want to die in bed of
smoke inhalation. A health scare leads us to make positive changes
to our exercise habits and diets. What isn’t so obvious is that fear in
the proper environment, the world of make-believe, helps us
psychologically prepare for awful things.
Disaster movies, TV shows, and books can be quite frightening.
The Walking Dead is not a TV show that’s easy to watch if you are
squeamish or like seeing bad things happen to likable characters.
Horror movies are amazingly popular, despite people not wanting to
be scared. Very few people would stay in a situation portrayed on the
silver screen if they can help it, yet millions voluntarily see things that
frighten them. Why?
Psychologically, it’s known as a “constrained risk.” Horror
movies give us a way to experience fear in a safe environment. We
know that nothing bad is going to happen to us and all the fear goes
away when the lights go up (until we recall the movie in the middle of
the night). It’s a way to experience negative emotions—fear, tension,
and terror—without actually being exposed to a life-threatening
situation.
It’s a little like eating spicy food. Humans are the only
creatures that eat spicy foods because we like it. Normally, the
capsaicin contained in hot peppers is intended to dissuade mammals
from eating the fruits. The fruit and the seeds within are supposed to
be consumed by birds, which are immune to the pungency of
capsaicin. Birds cannot taste the heat and can distribute the seeds in
their droppings. We get to experience a burning sensation, normally
a warning of poison, but with relatively few consequences
(depending on your sensitivity, of course).
When it comes back to emotions, normally we think that the
feelings we want to experience are good ones; love, happiness, and
joy. No. Sometimes we enjoy listening to a sad song and feeling
blue. We get a kind of catharsis from it. We have all these emotions
for a reason and only experiencing positive ones all the time would
give us no benefit. So just like writing for me, or reading for you,
about a disaster or emergency situation allows us to think through
what we might do and how we might feel, the safe stimulation of
these “unpleasant” emotions is good for us.
I personally used to enjoy films and programs that had big
emergencies or disasters in them. Because of my experiences in law
enforcement, I can experience intense anxiety to the point of
discomfort. Take the opening scenes of World Trade Center, Oliver
Stone’s 9/11 movie; immediately before the crash sequence starts. I
know what’s going to happen and I’m leaning in towards the TV. I
didn’t understand it at first, but then I realized I was anticipating the
emergency.
Actual emergency situations don’t leave you time to think
much. You simply go and get to work. In the middle of an evacuation
where a brush fire is bearing down on you, you have no time to feel
the thought “am I going to be burned alive?” The thought is with you,
but you aren’t feeling that almost paralyzing sensation and seriously
pondering if this “it.” You’re too busy. As a teen, I was robbed at
gunpoint and when you’re just standing there helpless, you have
plenty of time to think. Not so on the streets.
The difference between movies and the real world is that
Hollywood is predictable. We’re watching to experience tension,
right? The music and foreshadowing clues us in to what’s going to
happen. One moment I was sitting next to my partner chatting
casually waiting for our shifts to end and the next we heard “Shots
fire, we need SWAT!” on the radio. We rolled immediately without
thinking about our safety. If you ask some combat vets, they’ll tell
you they weren’t scared until after the battle was over.
Not being distracted by a mental checklist of “look for person
in burning car,” or “move from solid cover to solid cover and duck
when you hear shots” allows you to feel. Can’t imagine the
distraction? Think of a loved one’s funeral or your wedding; you may
have been so busy that you didn’t have time to be sad or so excited
you couldn’t breathe. In emergencies, survival instincts override
emotions for many, though others become helpless.
Part of overcoming fear is conditioning. As one is exposed to
stressful situations, the stressor becomes less powerful. A runner will
expand their lung capacity, lower their heart rate, and strengthen
their endurance by running harder and longer. For some people,
those you find in high-risk jobs like first responders and front-line
servicemembers, emergencies and combat teach them to deal with
the natural reactions that keep them from being effective. I’m the guy
who once drove into a really bad, dangerous brushfire flare up
without protective gear because people might need me. I wasn’t
thinking about the future or feeling stressed out at all. I was excited
and count that day as one of the best of my life (no one was hurt and
no homes were lost, despite the fire being a huge, multi-day event).
Thrill seeking is a reason why we choose to do frightening
things, like watch those scary movies, bungee jump, or go on roller
coasters. We’re safely experiencing those fears. For those with small
children, kids often like playing monster. They’re scared a little when
their mom or dad chase them around with “the claw” and growling,
but if they’re like the kids in my family, they’ll ask to be chased. As a
kid, my sister and I enjoyed it when our mother pretended to be
Frankenstein’s monster. In the games of monster-play, children are
learning to confront and manage their fear, often initiating the game
as an adult might choose to watch a slasher movie.
Exploration of fear, uncertainty, and doubt through fiction
allows us to find out what we’re really afraid of and dig deeper into
that fear. Is it something worth being afraid of? Should we be afraid
of something else? What is the best way to confront that fear and
neutralize it? As I said earlier, only through fiction can we explore
certain events. It is a way for us to explore our strengths and fears.

Training and rehearsal

Training is the best way to overcome fear without actually being

in danger. Fear inoculation is something that comes over time to
anyone who is in a dangerous profession. Deep-sea fishermen don’t
freeze up in big waves, combat soldiers don’t duck when they hear
distant artillery, and veteran cops don’t shy away from fights. Fights
are a good example of conquering fear; someone with physical
combative skills (boxing, punching, martial arts, wrestling) knows
their abilities and has confidence in themselves to put up resistance.
 I would recommend to anyone who wants to toughen themselves
up to get any sort of physical combative training; this includes
shooting courses where you shoot and move (preferably run).
Physical and mental stress can be effectively simulated by exercise
and competition, even against the clock. Nothing is going to replicate
what actual danger does, but you are giving yourself exposure to two
of the major elements of an emergency; physical exertion and time
pressure.
In IDPA shooting and many other competitive disciplines, you are
shooting against the clock, have to be accurate, and have to move,
just like you would if it were a real defensive situation. In a real-life
shooting, you have to be accurate, fast enough, and manage the
pressures that this is putting on your mind and body. Good physical
endurance will always be the best way to handle the physiological
effects of life-or-death stress, but at least an introduction will help.
Mentally rehearsing various situations will do wonders for your
own preparedness. You’re basically exposing yourself to the scary
stimuli without seeing danger, giving you a chance to examine how
things would go and how you might react. In a shooting match or
even golf, this is called “walking the course.” Consider it as a thought
exercise. Most of my writing has its basis in these kind of thought
experiments.
Start with simple things, like how would you pack up the house in
an hour? What would you grab, and in what order, in five minutes?
Next how about a home invasion, a prowler or a burglary; how would
you react? If you were the bad guy, how would you attack? Don’t be
afraid to think about succeeding as a bad guy. Getting in their heads
is how you learn to stay one or two moves ahead of them.

Willful ignorance of fear

On the other side of the spectrum, we have cognitive

dissonance. This is where someone will actively try to avoid a
negative idea despite an overwhelming input of contradictory
evidence. Normally, the mind tries to reconcile a difference between
our internal beliefs or thoughts and reality. When we can’t reconcile
them (or more often don’t), this creates stress. One example is
captured by a meme comic where a dog sits in a burning building,
calmly sipping coffee, saying “this is fine.”
People who don’t want to believe something will experience
intense stress and engage in all kinds of ridiculous juggling to avoid
confronting “the bad thing.” For instance, “I can’t have cancer. The
doctor must be wrong. I feel fine!” The patient doesn’t want to have
cancer and does not have symptoms that cannot be dismissed, so
they use their feeling of health to rationalize incorrectly that the
medical professional is wrong.
Rationalization is a tool that is used to control fear. As adults,
we know there are no monsters under the bed, but a child simply
cannot be convinced of this fact. The child wants to be comforted by
their parent because their desire for comfort is greater than their
desire to overcome the fear. In adults, this rationalization is usually to
our benefit, but cognitive dissonance is where rationalization is
abused.
For a lot of us, this is mostly insignificant and manifests itself
as procrastination. “I’m fat, maybe I should eat less during the
holidays. Nah, I’ll start on New Year’s Day.” More negatively, we take
the “Fox and the Grapes” approach, where we dismiss a failure as a
fault other than ours. It is a hard thing to admit that we were in the
wrong or incapable of achieving the desired outcome. Again, a lot of
the time the damage done is relatively harmless. It can be a lot more
negative.
A woman I know is terrified of fireworks, guns, and anything
loud. She was never traumatized as far as she can remember but
hates those things to the point that even thinking about them in detail
frightens her. A psychiatrist would prescribe desensitization therapy,
like watching a fireworks show from a distance or shooting a small-
caliber gun at a range, but this woman won’t have it. Her phobia is
so great, that to consider overcoming it creates such anxiety that an
honest contemplation of confronting her fear is impossible.
People like this become paralyzed in emergency situations. I
was four years old when I got my fire safety lesson. I remember
being astounded at that age that anyone could be afraid of a
firefighter or that children would hide under their bed in a fire. Yet
firefighters still check underbeds and in closets to see if anyone is
hiding. In mass shootings, instead of trying to fight or get away,
people curl up into balls and prepare to die.
These people are not able to help themselves. We all have
our weaknesses and their resilience and ability to confront fear is
very low. But that’s okay; for everyday emergencies that’s why
hundreds of thousands of people put on a uniform everyday. In some
of the situations we’ve looked at, this “deer in the headlights”
behavior will get you killed. If you’re reading this book, that’s
probably not you.
There are some warning signs that one should watch out for.
The first is wishful thinking. “Everything is going to be alright,” we say
and think to reassure ourselves. A happy outcome is much
preferable to a bad one. We all want to imagine the rescue ship is
just over the horizon. This form of cognitive dissonance is a battle
between what we desire versus our observations.
Wishful thinking often leads us to make bad decisions. For
instance, we all want our marriages to succeed. Part of being
married is overlooking the insignificant annoyances of our better half.
But when you see a pant-less man jump out the bathroom window,
there is a problem if you think “Huh, my wife must have let the
mailman use the bathroom, he probably clogged the toilet, and is
embarrassed.” Ignoring the obvious infidelity will make your life
worse.
Ripping the bandage off never feels good, but we never want
to be so desperate to avoid pain that we ignore obvious truths.
Confirmation bias is for looking facts that support what we already
believe or are trying to convince ourselves of. Take the real estate
market prior to the 2008 crash for instance. How many people saw
everything going up, up, and up and bought in at the top, oblivious to
the fact a bubble was forming? It’s easy to see in hindsight
everything that was going wrong, but so much was literally invested
in the inflated market that bad news and the truth about poor lending
practices was suppressed and ignored.
In disasters, people look for evidence to support their belief
that things will turn out fine. The hurricane won’t be that bad, the
levees will not fail, and the water will stop rising. Suddenly you’re in
trouble. Telling yourself that the system won’t fail and the
government will fix everything in three days is a recipe for disaster.
The unsinkable Titanic sunk. Captain Stanley Lord, a craven
coward, was the master of a cargo steamer that stopped, rationally,
because of ice on that fateful night in 1912. After the Titanic’s
wireless operator rebuked the one on Lord’s Californian, the latter
shut off his radio and went to bed. Not long after, the Titanic struck
the iceberg and began launching rescue flares.
Most of the crew that night saw what was going on. They
rationalized the flares as “company signals” or fireworks. They had a
pretty good idea the ship was the Titanic and saw that it was turning
and listing strangely in the water, yet they justified it during the
inquiries as anything but a sinking ship. Captain Lord, when called to
account for his cowardice, consistently and deliberately
overestimated the distance between the ships.
Modern examinations of the incident place the Californian
within an easy rescue distance, far closer than the up to 40 miles
Lord proposed. In reality, the men on the Californian failed. Lord
dismissed reports about the strange ship and slept on. His ship was
surrounded by loose ice and it was hazardous, but not impossible, to
get to the Titanic. He was afraid.
The crew was afraid of their captain, who had a reputation for
being harsh. They were afraid to confront and challenge him.
Probably they too feared the ice. No one woke Cyril Evans, the
wireless operator, possibly out of fear he might pickup a distress
signal and then the ship would be obligated to respond.
Instead, the ship passed the night while 1,517 people
drowned or died of hypothermia. Had Lord taken action, the
Californian could have arrived in time to save more lives (though
likely not in time to save everyone). Fear and cognitive dissonance
reigned that night, and not just on the Californian. The designers
justified fewer lifeboats because, in theory, the boats could make
multiple trips between a rescue ship and the “unsinkable” Titanic.
Captain Lord couldn’t deal with his fear of the ice to save
lives. Instead, he and the crew pretended they didn’t understand
what was happening to avoid risking the ship and their lives. This
kind of cognitive dissonance is the worst kind because it killed
people out of cowardice. The White Star Line’s wanted to keep costs
down and keep the ship beautiful, so they justified cutting lifeboats
by over-relying on “modern” technology that would keep the Titanic
afloat long enough for rescue. This cognitive dissonance is hubris.
Cognitive dissonance has to be overcome. It’s not always
possible to do it directly. I have a relative who doesn’t like to talk
about earthquakes because he is afraid of them. This would be bad
if he ignored danger altogether but deals with preparation for an
emergency in the context of a bad winter storm. Though he can
directly confront his fear, he has chosen an outlet where he can
confront that fear obliquely by addressing another danger with
similar repercussions.
 4473: A Short Story
A Fictional Speculative Future of Gun Registration
Note: This story is based in fact. Recent records indicate that the
ATF may already have a scanned and searchable partially digitized
database. What has not happened yet is the rounding up of records
or making this database available to law enforcement at large. NICS
is available for use to any law enforcement agency and officer where
the proper teletype accounts have been setup. I have used NICS
before in an investigation.

Few people know that the United States already had gun
registration, but because of one of the few true victories of the NRA,
that registry was stuck in the 1970s. Millions of records were held on
paper and microfilm in a fenced and guarded building on the grounds
of a VA facility in Martinsburg, West Virginia. It held the records of
every gun dealer (FFL) in the country who had gone out of business,
retired, or simply no longer wanted to store the forms.
Federal law prohibited a digital gun registration database, so
all gun tracing had to be done manually, which was incredibly time
consuming considering the volumes of paper records that had to be
flipped through and the microfilms that had to be read. Decades ago
no one would have complained but since the 1990s ATF officials had
been quietly nudging “somebody” to “do something.”
Trace requests came to the National Tracing Center (NTC)
from all over the country and the world. Many of the requested were
routine law enforcement queries. Murder weapons found at crime
scenes were traced to try and identify the shooter. Staff would comb
through the records like a page flipping through a card catalog to find
out where a gun originated from and what others hands it might have
been in, as long as it went through a dealer.
To accommodate all the requests, the ATF had a bunch of old
ladies who were into genealogy working out of the West Virginia
warehouse working these ancient microfilm machines because
younger people these days thought they were props from the original
Star Trek series. The best job qualification for the civilian staff was
“librarian.”
This analog collection of files was a lot of trouble and the
powers that be at the NTC were finally rejoicing at finally completing
the puzzle. In the year 202_, a bipartisan Congress, with a couple of
squishy GOP crossovers and the Democrats, finally modernized
America’s gun registry and brought it into the digital age. The
Firearm Acquisition, Sale, or Transfer Security Audit Filing Enterprise
(FAST-SAFE) Act was just what a growing ATF needed.
When the project was complete, agents across the country
could instantly identify and track the sale and transfer of a gun, the
buyers, or the sellers. Law enforcement loved it because there would
be no delay or waits on traces. Detectives had visions of arresting
suspects the same day based on gun traces. Dispatchers could run
individuals through the database to see if they ever bought a gun
and advise officers before they ever arrived.
Digitalization, for all its benefits, would not be without its
hurdles. Middle management's consumption of antacids and anti-
anxiety medication, the pill or liquid forms, skyrocketed in
anticipation of the herculean task of scanning and data entry that
was coming. The little old ladies were already stretched thin and now
they needed who knows how many people to run the scanning
machines. At least the FBI would handle the temporary employee’s
background checks.
Preparations were made as soon as the legislation was
proposed. Advanced Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software
had been written to scan the 4473 forms and translate the
handwriting. Women who worked at the NTC told their friends and
family to expect jobs to be posted. An ugly tilt-up building was placed
on an empty lot in front of the VA water-tower and surrounded by an
even uglier chainlink fence. West Virginia National Guardsmen had
already been deployed outside the center at the VA complex
because of threats to burn down the heavily secured building.
The Act allowed the ATF to dispose of the paper records—it
was dubbed a “paperwork reduction measure”—as long as they
uploaded them to a secure database. All of the benefits were sold to
the public and the news media dutifully reported it along. Who could
say no to safer police officers and faster criminal investigations?
Besides, millions of precious tax dollars would be saved!
Everyone ignored the “gun nuts” who were saying it was a
registration database and the gun control advocates got the media to
simply hit on the paperwork reduction thing. They filmed a scene of
the agent in charge of the warehouse tripping over a fallen stack of
forms. That segued into a few minutes about the 1973 National
Personnel Records Center fire that destroyed everyone’s
grandfather’s military records.
The morning the Act went into effect, the center was ready to
go. Cart loads of microfilm and forms were wheeled across a rough
asphalt path to the new building. Inside, it was a cold, drab affair
where boxes were unpacked and forms fed into scanners in batches.
These batches were verified for correctness, shredded, then stuffed
into a trash compactor to be recycled. An average laborer’s day
consisted of stuffing forms or film into a scanner, moving it to the
“shred” pile, then swapping out with some hauling files from the old
building.
For the most part, files could be fed into a scanner which
would send the file to a computer program. The program would then
use Optical Character Recognition (OCR) of the most sophisticated
variety to recognize the handwriting on the forms. It was the same
type of software that the optical system at the post office used to
decipher handwritten addresses, but vastly more powerful. The only
human interaction would be checking forms that the computer
flagged as difficult to read or possibly erroneous.
Manually reading forms and entering each entry would make
the task impossible. Using 100 of the sophisticated scanners, it was
estimated that feeding the machines an unknown amount of forms
would take up to two years. At least an additional 250 employees
were hired to work two shifts, but the cost was well worth it. In eight
months’ time, virtually every gun sold or transferred by a dealer in
the last few decades would be in an instantly searchable database.
Trucks from all over the country started to roll in. FedEx and
UPS arranged special shipments directly from regional centers to
West Virginia. Residents at the veterans’ home complained about
the traffic that lasted from about five in the morning to ten at night.
Physical therapy clinics in the area began seeing an uptick in carpal
tunnel syndrome. Those weren’t the only “side effects.” Gun dealers
around the country were getting arrested for non-compliance or
destroying their records.
The goal wasn’t to identify who owned what…yet. No, the
guns probably changed hands too often over the years. People died.
It was estimated that crime guns were swapped among criminals too
many times after two years for that kind of registration to really be
useful. In fact, in earlier times all the center could really do was give
an investigation into a gun’s origin a start.
Field agents would have to track down the original buyer,
anyone he might remember selling it to, and perhaps get lucky if the
suspect bought it themselves. It was all a process that started with
an idea in the 1930s of tracking what dealers broke their gentleman’s
agreement with Colt and Thompson not to sell machine guns to
gangsters. All tracing really did was identify what, if any, crimes were
committed in transferring the gun into the hands of the criminal. One
homicide cop compared it to tracking a DUI driver’s used car back
down to the original car lot.
What the FAST-SAFE Act did was give police and federal
agents a way to identify gun owners. More software would compare
various state and local databases to give the identified owners a
notice that they were to comply with the new gun regulations. It was
a veiled threat that the government knew they owned guns and had
a pretty good idea of exactly what they owned. It was also a good
way to start the tracking process of a privately sold gun, if the sellers
kept a record of who they sold it to. By this tracking of transfers,
maybe in another 30 years they would have a working real-time
database of all the guns and their owners in the country.
One could no longer simply claim that they had sold the gun.
Proof was needed. Many people dimed out their friends, family
members, co-workers, neighbors, and gun club buddies. Others
turned over bills of sale, photos of IDs and CCWs, and emails from
the buyers. Sometimes the proof was thin, but it put the necessary
fear of God in people. The ATF could never prove a case against a
guy who sold a gun anonymously face-to-face at a gun show if a
house search came up empty, but that guy would know the ATF had
his name and number. If that gun turned up in his hands again, there
would be hell to pay.
More accurately an indictment for perjury, making false
statements to a federal agent, and violation of the Act. It was the
same way for so-called “lost” or “stolen” guns. Reports of unverified
boating accidents surged, as did burglaries and vehicle thefts (often
of entire collections). All it took was one burglar or looter to be
ventilated by that “lost” shotgun for federal time to apply. Guilty pleas
were easy as long as the fines were kept low. No jail time, probation,
a couple grand taken in easy monthly payments, and a lifetime ban
on gun ownership. Lots of guns dug up from the yard that way.
People said that registration would lead to confiscation. They
never talked about registration being part of confiscation. Once
again, the hoplophobes out flanked the gun nuts. Too many people
dreamt up ways to save their hides rather than pour time, money,
and effort into politics. “I don’t own any assault weapons,” only works
when there is no record of you ever purchasing one. It wasn’t a
flawless plan, but it was a pretty good idea, nonetheless. One of the
few, small complications were the recalcitrant liberty-minded dealers.
One of those recalcitrant types was Ned Ferguson. He looked
carefully at the Banker's Boxes lined up along the back wall. Each
box was labeled with a date, the first one, in the lower left hand
corner marked July 1998. Nineteen boxes in all, stacked seven deep
and three high, marked his nearly twenty years as an FFL. All in all,
close to 50,000 ATF Form 4473s sat in those boxes. It had been a
long career and it would soon be over.
The Form 4473 was properly called the Firearm Transaction
Record—Over the Counter, intended to track each sale or transfer of
a firearm that a dealer made to a customer. Industry sales,
wholesale or off to another dealer, were done separately. For anyone
who has bought a gun from a dealer, they have filled out a 4473,
detailing all the relevant personal information to identify them. Buying
two or more handguns in a five-day period from the same dealer will
result in a Form 3310.4 reporting the sale, including the particulars of
the gun. Even more odious, copies of the form were required to be
sent to state or local law enforcement.
 In theory, that information was only used by the government
once to run the initial Brady Background Check. Then poof! the date
disappears off the computer screen and into the virtual wasteland to
be recycled into other bits and bytes. Ferguson told anyone who
bought a gun through a dealer to assume that the government knew
about the purchase. Even if the person only bought one gun through
a dealer, it was a safe assumption that the person had bought
another privately or had more that the Feds didn't know about.
Federal law mandated that FFLs maintain their copy of the
4473 for twenty years, ostensibly in case the ATF needs to trace a
firearm and to prove that the dealer is complying with the
background check requirement. At the end of the twenty years since
the sale the dealer may destroy the records, but if he goes out of
business before then, the dealer must turn the forms over to the ATF.
Computers and the Internet eventually brought electronic
forms. The data could be saved electronically to avoid storage
problems like Ned had. Big box stores like Walmart loved it. Even
with electronic reporting, millions of forms remained uncollected and
un-scanned, sitting under counters, in filing cabinets, or stacked in
the backroom of a gun store. Plenty of dealers just plain refused to
join the e-form crowd for one reason or another.
Over the years, FFL conventions featured the equivalent of
campfire stories where one dealer or another complained about an
ATF Industry Operations Investigator scanning files or 'borrowing'
them for a few days during a 'routine' compliance check. The dealers
knew that if they objected to the investigator removing the files or
scanning them, which they could not ordinarily do, the dealer's
license would be in jeopardy.
Ferguson's 4473 boxes sat on a thick base of cinderblock and
2x4s to bear the weight of the paper. Security and fireproofing were
not his concern. If the files were stolen, well, then space along the
wall would be freed up. If the forms accidentally burned, so much the
better. Water damage was his only worry, hence the cinderblock and
wood platform. Heavy, wet boxes filled with soggy paper was not
something he wanted to deal with. He could care less if the forms
somehow became useless to the ATF.
 But what to do with the boxes? He’d be damned if he would
pay the shipping bill just to rat out his customers to the feds.
Ferguson had gotten past the point of rage. Getting angry rarely led
to productive thinking. The dealer bit off the tip of his cigar and spat it
into his wastebasket before lighting the end. Stupid city code
inspector had smelled the cigar smoke in his office and made a
smart-ass comment about smoking indoors not being worth the fine
or the potential fire damage.
He would miss his little office, he reflected as he leaned back
into his chair. The small room, hardly 40 feet square, was his cigar-
smoke filled fortress of solitude. The tiny quarters, if not the smell of
two decades of smoking, kept most guests out. Some nights he
stayed late, claiming to be catching up on gunsmithing or paperwork,
when in reality the man wanted an evening away from his wife to
smoke cigars, drink bourbon, and eat greasy food in peace.
Photos and technical bulletins hung from the occasional free
spots on the wall. The rest was cabinets and bookshelves, filled with
obscure publications, technical manuals, and binders of tediously
kept data and records. A few nights he had caught himself dozing off
in his chair with his still burning cigar drooping from his lips. The
beer-bellied retailer woke with a start each time, feeling foolish for
having drifted off like that. Usually, he took the cue to go home then.
How badly would a fire in here screw me? He chuckled at the
thought of himself snoring away in his recliner chair, flames climbing
the wall and turning years of research into ash. The thought struck
him like a thunderbolt.
No, it wasn't to burn his records. He had thought of that years
ago. Leave the back door unlocked, turn off the camera, and apply a
match. Undoubtedly the Feds would drag him into court, but if he did
things right, he might get off on reasonable doubt. Better to do it in a
way that would keep him from going to trial altogether. The ATF
would investigate anyway, but he could hardly help that.
Acting on the impulse, he rose from his chair and got to work
before he came to his senses and chickened out. Standing
backwards on the top rungs of a latter, his head almost twenty feet
above the concrete floor, Ferguson knew he would have to be
careful. That was an understatement. Looking down or around gave
a slight feeling of vertigo due to the awkward way he stood,
supported only by his free hand.
The work had to be done just right too, or else he would get a
sprinkler head in the face along with a lot of rusty water. The wrench
had to be lifted slowly and cautiously into position. If he accidentally
hit the head with it too hard, the glass bulb inside might shatter and
start the water works. Same thing with twisting it too hard and
causing it to slip off the fitting and go banging around. He found that
he could not work the adjustment knob on the pipe wrench and had
to use his 'free' hand.
Ferguson tightened the wrench to the fitting and balanced on
just his feet. It was tight enough to hang on the pipe by itself. He was
grateful to grab back on to the rafter. With his right hand, he slowly
started turning the wrench. It took a lot of pressure, far more than he
felt comfortable applying.
Ever so slowly, the fitting gave, partially due to the pre-
soaking of WD-40 he had given it. Within half a turn, he was able to
twist the head freely around the fitting. He kept turning the wrench
slowly until water began to seep out. He stopped, waited a moment,
then kept turning incrementally, then waiting, until enough water
leaked to form a steady drip. Perfect.
Once the ladder was back in its place Ferguson poured himself a
drink. He chuckled thinking about all the hell he was going to get
from his wife for this. Can’t tell her the truth, neither. Oh well, it’s for a
good cause. With a raise of the Styrofoam cup, he toasted his
success.
Despite being heavily intoxicated, Ferguson still felt
apprehensive about his plan. Dropping a lit cigar into a basket full of
oil and gunpowder soaked rags? It was inherently dangerous and his
stomach, full of fatty fast food and alcohol, rebelled at the thought.
Around 11:30 PM, he let the almost extinguished cigar fall into the
pile of rags. After smoldering for a minute, the whole bundle began
to combust. Soon the flames were licking upward, following the trail
of ATF technical bulletins and dealer memo's scotch taped to the
wall.
He began to cough from the acrid smoke composed of fabric,
paper, gun oil, and burned smokeless powder. A faint haze was
already collecting at the ceiling. Once the rags really got going, the
heat was intense. His skin felt like it had been scalded. Just a little bit
longer, a little bit longer. Sweat was beading up on his forehead and
under his arms. The smell was terrible!
The drywall was black now. The years of paper on the wall
was almost all burned up, fire now starting in on the mounds of other
papers and books stacked haphazardly on the shelves and
cabinetry. The fire was spreading. A few surprises, like a bottle of
highly flammable solvent, purchased in the late 1990s, sat tucked
into a corner. Hopefully that would explode before the fire
department arrived.
Now the ceiling was obscured by black smoke. Ferguson
coughed incessantly, feeling like his lungs were filling with sand.
Now, he thought. He rose from his chair and turned the knob, not
burning his hand on the metal, but feeling the heat it had absorbed
from the fire. Blackness attacked the fringes of his vision as he
stumbled towards the door towards the show floor. No, wait. He
remembered that the security grate was down and he had to go out
through the emergency exit.
His last view of inside the building came as he saw flames
shooting out the door of his office in a spray of exploding solvent. He
collapsed on a grass strip in the parking lot, alternatively coughing
and sucking in the cool night air. It took him a minute before he could
recover sufficiently to dial 911 on his cellphone. By then, the fire
alarm had already sounded.
The temperature inside the warehouse area rose quickly
immediately after Ferguson opened the office door. The solvent
explosion was all it took to set the entire office ablaze, causing all the
paper goods, gunpowder, and ammunition to quickly ignite. Flames
began to attack the drywall and the drop ceiling tiles. The
temperature sensors of the fire alarm system triggered notifying the
fire department and also activating the fire sprinklers.
Contrary to popular belief, most sprinkler systems only
activate the sprinklers immediately above the fire, not the entire
room. However, since this was a multi-tenant commercial building,
local fire regulations for a gun store holding significant quantities of
ammunition required a deluge system that activated all sprinklers in
the warehouse area.
The intent was to soak any ammunition and prevent it from
exploding in a fire. Exploding cartridges don’t have the ability to
propel a bullet, but the flying shrapnel from the brass cases can
cause injuries. Firefighters will generally not enter any structure
where ammunition is cooking off for that reason, often causing a total
loss of the building.
Safety wasn’t the only reason that Ferguson was required to
install a deluge system. Fires in gun stores are very rare things,
considering that modern smokeless powders and cartridges are
incredibly stable. A congressman who signed the 1994 Assault
Weapons Ban did not want gun stores to open in his town, so he
convinced a councilman to amend the municipal and fire codes to
make it expensive and difficult to open a gun store. Ferguson
persisted mainly out of spite and ate the cost of the requirements,
considering it the price of self-satisfaction.
When the sprinkler system went off, it was as if a downpour
began inside. In mere seconds, an inch of water was on the floor.
The loosened sprinkler head, under 75 pounds of pressure, blew off
the fitting and left a dent in the cinderblock wall. 250 gallons per
minute began pouring down, directly on to the boxes containing
years of Form 4473s.
There was no sprinkler head in the office, which was still
blazing merrily, even though the sprinklers had kept the fire from
extending much further. Eight minutes after receiving the alarm at
dispatch, the first fire engine arrived. The paramedic found Ned lying
semi-conscious in the grass. A paramedic began administering
oxygen while the captain and two firefighters made ready to attack
the fire.
It took another five minutes for the popcorn sound of the
ammunition Ferguson had stashed in the office to stop. By the time
Ferguson left in the ambulance, the sprinkler system flooded the
boxes and back room. When the firefighters finally went in, they
made quick work of what was left of the flames. The office was a
wet, charred remnant of its former self. Smoke and water damage
affected the rest of the backroom area. Only a small hole had to be
cut in the showroom ceiling to confirm no extension into the ceiling
there.
An arson inspector was sent over in the morning and called
the ATF, surprised that a dispatcher hadn’t done it overnight. The
agent knew that Ferguson somehow sabotaged his records but
faced the age old police dilemma—he couldn't prove it yet. If only a
cop's instinct could be distilled down to something quantifiable he
would be in business. While Ned’s story was sound, the sheer
coincidence and the totality of destruction pointed to it being
deliberate.
Poor rehabilitation work by the fire crew damaged the records
further. Concerned with fire, they had spread the pile of soggy boxes
and papers on the floor to soak in the water while any hotspots were
managed. Evidence protection has never been a defining quality of
fire-fighting. The building manager dewatered the building with the
help of a restoration company, who only made more of a mess by
piling the records back up after the pulpy remains clogged the de-
watering hose intakes.
The ATF agent was stumped on what to do with the records, and
so was his supervisor. The weekend came and still the records sat.
No one wanted to deal with them. In the National Personnel Records
Center fire, a specialized military decompression chamber was used
to freeze-dry all the service records, but the ATF had no access to
such a facility. In the end, dithering, apathy, and the actions of
several people to personally avoid having to try to salvage the forms
cost the investigation dearly. The restoration company had no
problem shoveling the sodden mess into wheelbarrows to a
dumpster. West Virginia saw not a single form that had been through
Ned’s gun shop.
 Indian Raid and American Frontier
Lessons for SHTF
Note: Many of the individual accounts this analysis is based on
are taken from the raids of the Comanche and Kiowa tribes and the
observations made from them (and others) generalized.

Rural homes in SHTF will suffer from isolation and potentially

lack of communication. A situation not unlike that of homesteads that
fell to Indians in (mainly) the 19th century will be faced by many rural
properties. Rapid raids, not by horse but by vehicle, by criminals and
not natives, will share some overlapping elements of what our
frontier ancestors faced.
I believe that Native American warfare on our frontier is a
better idea of what rural Americans will face post-SHTF than
Rhodesians did during the 1970s Bush War. Both the Zimbabwean
communist terrorists and the Native American tribes fought guerilla
wars; one successfully and the other unsuccessfully.
The Indian population was small and easily reduced by
warfare, famine, and disease. In Rhodesia, the European population
was outnumbered by the Africans and white population flight
eventually doomed the minority government. All the African guerillas
had to do was bide their time and keep the pressure up. Native
Americans were fighting a losing war against a technologically and
numerically superior enemy and could only inflict painful stings.
When Indians couldn’t win a decisive engagement over the
Army, they sought to hinder, delay, and demoralize the soldiers the
best they could. Undefended homesteads were easier to wipe out
than a cavalry troop. Atrocities perpetrated upon pioneers had the
effect of frightening and driving some of them away. The population
imbalance was always in the settlers’ favor so no matter how brutal
the Indians were, they couldn’t out kill the overflowing European
population.
 Raids sought to steal goods for material gain and were
conducted by small groups. This would in turn have the effect of
requiring taking revenge on the raiding tribe, which could spawn
open warfare. War parties would go out with the objective to kill and
take captives to avenge wrongs. Many engagements were blood
feuds intended to avenge the death of relatives or tribe members.
This tended to produce a never-ending conflict that was self-
perpetuating as each new retaliation must be punished.
Modern criminals will target properties for hit-and-run attacks
to gather supplies or valuables. The “Indians” may be desperate
criminals coming out of big cities or roving groups of bandits. If
political or racial strife is interjected into a struggle for resources,
atrocities to shock and demoralize may be perpetrated on victims.
We have seen inter-tribal warfare in many countries get very ugly.
Whether it is Native Americans vs. pioneer Americans or ISIS vs. the
Kurds, awful things done to “others” is an ugly part of human nature.

Wagon trains

Wagons traveling alone was a bad idea. Indians deliberately

separated parties or took advantage of separation to more easily kill
or capture their victims. Trains of wagons provided additional
security, more provisions in case some were lost/spoiled, and help
should anyone get stuck or find some other kind of trouble.
Wagon trains had mounted advance and rear guards who
scouted for Indian ambushes. Wayward trains would blunder over
the horizon without the use of scouts riding ahead or on the flanks to
look for signs of approaching Indians. The Indians could surely see
and hear the wagons long before the opposite occurred. Failure to
scout resulted in ambushes.
Scouts also had the duty of looking for a suitable and
defensible campsite. When setting up camp, doing so in the bend of
a river was recommended as the water would form a defensive
perimeter on roughly three sides. Areas with dense brush that could
conceal Indian raiders were to be avoided as the Indians would use
the cover of the brush to their advantage. Camping on the high
ground for the ability to survey the terrain was also recommended.
 Picket guards were stationed at night 200-300 yards away
from the camp between the most likely avenue of approach by
Indians and the wagons. These guards stayed on low ground when
possible to allow Indians to skyline, that is silhouette, themselves
against the horizon as they came over the crest of the terrain. In
daylight, guards moved to any high terrain for greater observational
distance.
At night, travelers were confined to the camp. Wagons were
loosely circled to help corral the animals and provide a defensible
formation against attack. Corralling livestock helped prevent
stampedes which might be incidental or provoked as part of a raid.
Horses were to be always kept ready to stop a stampede and herd
the animals back in lest they get away and scatter over the
countryside. Stampedes could be a way to rustle the animals or part
of a distraction during an attack.
Some horsemen carried their pistols in holsters attached to
the saddle which left them handy while mounted, but if they
dismounted, they would have to draw the guns before getting off the
horse. This left men without their guns if they had to quickly quit the
saddle in an attack. The prairie guide’s advice to always keep pistols
holstered about the waist is similar to advice in my books to keep
guns in the car holstered on your body at all times in case you have
to abandon the vehicle in a hurry.

Terrorism

Indian tactics were not suited for campaign/occupation style

warfare as Europeans were accustomed to. Indians used their
knowledge of the terrain and living off the land to survive and evade.
Raids and ambushes, where the attack was sudden and followed by
a withdrawal, were suited to the form of warfare Indians were
accustomed to. They could melt back into the wilderness where the
settlers were at a disadvantage.
Generally Indians fought short wars or engaged in reprisal
attacks. The inability to store large quantities of food made
supporting a long campaign difficult. Indians who farmed were
required to tend their crops so they could not make extended
deployments. Militia troops in New England would burn or trample
crops and block areas where Indians hunted, fished, or foraged.
Out west, Indian logistics were attacked including the
infamous buffalo hunts that were intended to deprive the Indians of
this resource. Raids on the hunting, fishing, and foraging grounds
tended to discourage activity there and displace the Indians,
resulting in hunger and famine. Even the choice of settlements on
prime hunting, foraging, or gardening land could be weaponized
against the natives.
Capture of territory in the European sense, where it was held
and occupied, was uncommon among the Indians. Sedentary tribes,
particularly in the desert, fought over land as water and arable land
were scarce resources. Warfare could generally be regarded as
competition over limited resources as represented by control of the
land. Whites inadvertently or deliberately scared off game. Good
farming areas or reliable water sources would be homesteaded and
denied that area to the Indians.
As a result, Indian raids were intended to force the white man
to leave the land. Obviously this was not successful but you can’t
blame them for trying. Terroristic attacks with atrocious horrors have
universally been a feature of inter-tribal/racial warfare historically. As
mentioned above, the worse an attack was, the more likely it was
believed to have an influence in causing whites to flee. In many
cases, homesteads were abandoned for a time but the whites
always came back. Without a large-scale picture of migration trends
and the sheer size of the American-European population, Indians
can’t be blamed for assuming these methods would work as they did
on Mexicans and rival tribes.
Comanches, in particular, were notorious for carrying out
horrible depredations on their victims. With a poor command
structure they were likened to “street gangs.” The most probable
motivation was to make warfare so unpleasant that no whites would
want to risk an Indian attack and thus avoid their territory.
Scalping as mutilation, for instance, could be considered
psychological warfare; nobody wants to get scalped. Wounded men
and captives were routinely tortured to death. This is why the saying
“Save the last bullet for yourself,” became popular.
 Quarter and mercy was rarely given. Indians treated their
victims and captives in the same way that they expected to be
treated, and were treated, by other tribes. Like the Japanese during
WWII, surrender in the face of overwhelming odds was considered a
weakness. Resistance might deter or stop an attack. Even
brandishing a firearm in some cases was enough to stop an attack.
While part of the reason this worked may have been wise judgement
and self-preservation, in other cases Indian warriors respected a
courageous fighter.
Rape was almost always perpetrated against female victims,
white, black, or Hispanic. In some cases, women were raped after
being mortally wounded. Rapes occurred in the presence of
husbands who were dying or killed shortly thereafter. Girls and
children were often kidnapped and taken into concubinage. Infants
were regularly beaten to death in front of their mothers. It was
savagery to a degree that many tribes disapproved of.
Attacks on settlers may also have been retaliation for settler
depredations on Indians or for Army attacks (hitting a soft target).
Excesses occurred on both sides, usually an over-zealous retaliation
for an attack or offense. One side would do something atrocious and
the other side might seek to do something worse in revenge.
Vengeance was a deep theme among the Indians and a part of tribal
warfare from before the arrival of Europeans.

Raids

Raids on homesteads and wagon trains had multifaced

purposes that combined elements of terrorism, to drive off settlers,
and result in material gain. Raids upon multiple locations or even
feints were possible. Indians might attack one homestead, and as
neighbors pursued the Indians or rode to the defense, another group
(or the original group circling around), would attack a second,
undefended location.
Indians stole livestock (cattle and horses) in raids. Entire
herds could be stolen and driven into Indian controlled land. Often
they were traded locally or driven into Mexico for sale. Animals that
weren’t stolen or killed were set loose. Any livestock they could not
take with them, like chickens, were slaughtered and they trampled
young crops into the ground. Fleeing settlers often set their own
animals free so they wouldn’t starve in their pens, and if they
returned home, often faced dead crops upon their return.
Once the homesteaders were dead, unable to resist, or driven
off, Indians would tear the houses apart. Homes were looted of
anything valuable or of use to the Indians including food. Vandalism
of houses and cabins was common. After looting and vandalizing
homes, they were often set on fire.
Indians were hard enemies to fight because attack parties
could form up from different camps at an initial point or ambush site
due to their familiarity with the terrain. European warfare had moved
away from this kind of small unit engagements. Likewise, natives
could disappear after an action and it would be difficult for white
scouts to track them and navigate through often foreign terrain.
Being able to break camp or abandon villages while living off the
land was an advantage that the plains tribes had over settlers who
could not easily afford to abandon their cabins and farms to flee.

Poor situational awareness

Indians could approach farms and houses undetected mainly

because there were too few people living there to keep proper
watch. Countless stories, good and bad, start with an Indian showing
up at the door. Literally like: “Ma was cooking and suddenly the local
chief was standing in the doorway.” In one case, a little girl peeping
out the cracks of a schoolhouse saw Indians approaching and was
able to escape through a window before the attack began. Alert
fatigue is a factor so get more eyes on your homestead to share the
burden.
Another mistake was knowing Indians were likely to be about
and yet going outside, at night, unarmed and without escort. Men
would go out to tend the animals, sans gun, only to be sprung on by
an Indian. One woman left at dusk to draw some water near a spring
that was noted as a prime ambush site due to thick foliage and was
shot with an arrow by an Indian hiding in concealment.
 Ambushes from deep brush was common. In the preceding
account, it was known that the brush around the spring was too deep
and could hide ambushers, but it was not cleared away. Romans
were known for clearing the verges of their famous roads so legions
and travelers could pass in relative safety. Had basic military
engineering measures to deny the enemy concealment been taken
the tragedy may have been averted or at least mitigated.
Indians often attacked while settlers were away from the
house to separate the victims from their shelter. Any distance that
separated one from the home or others could result in ambush; two
little girls were killed by Indians when they went to draw water a
hundred yards from the house. This could have been prevented had
“Pa” checked out the area or escorted the girls. In modern terms
armed overwatch with a shooter capable of hitting targets at that
distance might have made a difference.
Too few men/defenders

A recurring theme is that attacks happened when the men

weren’t home. Indians knew this and that more than likely the
women would be unable to successfully defend the home and
attacked. The husband went into a town or trading post and Indians
watching the home knew it was unguarded by a man. Or the
husband was ambushed by Indians hiding in the brush while cutting
wood, traveling, working, etc. With no other men, there was no one
to protect the women and children.
In many cases, only the man of the house was armed or there
was a long gun inside the house that never got to be used. Women
did not usually carry pistols but many had access to firearms inside
the house. While many women put up a credible defense and there
were plenty of heroines, a single woman was seldom a match for
multiple Indian warriors. The Indians would also not fear or respect a
woman in the same way they would a man. Sexist yes, but history is.
Not enough guns was also a problem. Homesteaders were
likely to be operating on shoestring budgets and might have one
long-gun mainly for hunting. A man with a brace of pistols, a rifle, a
shotgun, and a pistol for his wife would have been a rare thing
indeed. One small Texas settlement was entered by a band of hostile
Indians. There was less than half-a-dozen men and no guns; the
town only being saved by the proximity of Texas Rangers whose
response caused the Indians to leave.
Many fights were turned because of the effective use of
firearms by whites. Whites tended to be more accurate shooters,
have better weapons, and more ammunition than their native
enemies. Indians succeeded at hand-to-hand attacks. This is a
lesson in that a better armed and skilled defender can utilize his
firepower to overcome the numerical advantage of a more poorly
armed or trained enemy.

Settler defenses

A barricaded home and a defender who was willing to, or did,

shoot discouraged some assaults. A shuttered up home might mean
someone was armed inside and ready to fire. Some built strong
houses with loopholes and protected enclosures for the horses.
Iroquois and other Indians surrounded their villages with palisade
fencing made of thin, sharpened stakes of wood. Entrances were
staggered to deny a straight entry and were barricaded in times of
siege.
A successful defense was for all the neighbors to “fort up” in
the largest and well-protected house if there was time. Men would
stand guard outside while the women and children stayed inside the
house. If they could not be protected by the house or were driven
out, women and children often hid away from the house, such as in
tall grass, deep brush, or caves.
The Army was tasked with “frontier defense,” which was
essentially counter-insurgency warfare. The responses to attacks,
raids, and reprisals looked like a horse-borne version of what
happened in Rhodesia during the 1970s Bush War. Prairie guides
criticized small, widely scattered Army garrisons as too ineffective to
provide protection of the frontier. Generally this was the case.
Often the only help was from neighbors who joined the fray at
the risk of their own lives. In the northeast, settlers formed local
militias and small garrisons were present in many communities.
Settlements were surrounded by a stockade. Any field work was
done under the protection of armed men. Life around 1700 was
described as near siege-like. Some eastern colonies required men to
carry arms to church. A century and a half later, in the Southwest,
“Minuteman” type companies were organized for similar reasons.
On the other hand, not everyone cooperated with their neighbors
during Indian attacks. French-Canadian settlers had strong ties with
native peoples, unlike the British. During Pontiac’s Rebellion, many
French refused to offer shelter or aid to British victims who were the
primary target of Indian attacks.

Mistakes made by settlers

Indians usually selected an isolated and under-defended

home for attack.
Settlers didn’t keep watch outside their homes and were
taken by surprise.
Settlers didn’t clear foliage from obvious hiding places often
after acknowledging the danger the concealment provided.
Individuals would become separated from each other or go
out alone only to be attacked and then wounded, captured,
or killed.
Persons would be attacked while outside, alone, and
unarmed.
The father/husband would often be absent (hunting,
working, or in town) when raids happened.
The family didn’t have enough firearms to adequately arm
all the adults, often leaving wives alone without a gun.
Neighbors were distant and were not able to mutually
support each other to ward off the attack.
Recovery/reprisal parties chasing after the Indians were
often outnumbered and lacked flank security or scouts.

Discussion

Settlers did not set themselves up for success. Their

farms/ranches were isolated, in poor defensive locations, had few
capable defenders, and their situational awareness sucked. If your
house is in a poor physical defensive position (or design), you have
to overcome this with technology or manpower. Remember that
barricades and obstacles can only delay an attack; manpower can
defeat an enemy and turn that obstacle into a force multiplier. More
men allows for more area to be defended and casualties to be
absorbed. Lastly, if you aren’t paying attention and get surprised
you’ve lost the advantage.
I get that everybody wants their own land and that scarcity of
resources like grazing land and water made it necessary to spread
out, but it was stupid from a defensive standpoint. Houses that were
widely separated could not rely on each other for mutual support.
Given that many of these frontier families were a nuclear family with
one adult male, maybe some older boys, there wasn’t the manpower
to defend them.
When help was needed, anyone who could escape and
manage to evade the Indians faced a desperate run, ride, or walk to
neighbors that could be miles away. Even a one mile jog might take
10 minutes for someone in average shape. Up to half an hour might
pass before help arrives and God only knows what horrors may have
transpired in the balance.
The houses should have been built much closer to each other,
like 100-200 yards maximum; an easy rifle shot. With a clear view,
each house could offer supporting fire to the others. Neighbors
would be in close proximity for refuge and defense. More eyes could
more easily keep watch. Modern building practices where homes are
on smaller lots now naturally accommodate this kind of thing, though
the homes weren’t laid out and built to maximize defensive fire.
Today, homeowners will probably have to clear brush and
trees to improve sightlines for natural surveillance and for supporting
angles of fire. Radio communication and cameras can supplement
human lookouts. Vehicles conquer the tyranny of distance.
Technology and development patterns change some of the risks, but
there are plenty of rural properties that are just as isolated and
undermanned as in the frontier days.
One repeatedly losing tactic was for a settler to chase after
raiders by himself. Pursuing Indians alone or in pairs was a recipe
for disaster as the Indians almost always outnumbered the settlers.
In many cases “Pa” was ambushed or routed and killed when he
went rushing off alone to recover the stolen horses or try to get some
parting shots in. If the family was lucky, they were able to defend
alone from inside but often the house fell anyway.
It might seem natural to try and recover a stolen vehicle or
livestock as the enemy flees, but this is like swimming out into shark
infested waters. As you leave the house, you deprive it of a capable
defender, lose the benefit of any defensive works (fencing/covered
positions), and are more easily flanked by the enemy. Going out
alone is stupid.
A smart enemy who is being pursued would setup a hasty
ambush or just circle back and engage their pursuer. Perhaps they
were content to “live and let live” until you decided to chase after
them. Too many victims of robberies, etc. have been killed because
they decided to go after their attacker, usually unarmed. If you are in
a weak position, don’t do things that make yourself more vulnerable.
You could be running into a trap.
You cannot afford to let ego or revenge blind you to tactical
realities. If your family is alone, if the enemies are withdrawing, and if
you are outnumbered, let them go. I understand that things might be
different if a family member is kidnapped, but act smartly. In today’s
world, a vehicle could be identified or followed from a distance while
you radio for help. There may be moments of necessary self-
sacrifice, like if a family member is a captive, but don’t potentially
sacrifice your life for “stuff.”

Tips for today

Don’t be lured outside by anger or indignation. Curses and

taunts are provocations intended to get you to forget
yourself long enough to make mistakes.
Do not chase after raiders to recover property or for
revenge unless you can do it in force with competent
fighters and you have both greater numbers and more
firepower.
In the event of a kidnapping, you may need to put yourself
in harm’s way to recover your loved one. Make sure that
whoever you leave behind is well protected when you are
gone and accept that you may not survive.
If your numbers are small and your defensive abilities are
low, fight from within the home as much as possible. The
structure keeps bad guys away from you and makes it
much more difficult for them to see you, shoot you, and
physically get to you. Remove this this protection and you
become more vulnerable.
On the contrary, being outside to fight allows more freedom
of movement, draws fire away from the house where others
may be sheltering, and allows better visual/aural
observation. People fighting outside should be in prepared
positions, well armed, and capable.
Build or buy a house that is close to other neighbors. Ideally
shooters should be able to support each other from each
home or property with interlocking fields of fire. In
Rhodesia, farmers went so far as to tear down or move
buildings for better angles of fire.
Strong homes kept Indians from battering down the doors
or breaking through windows and walls. Fortified homes
can provide both ballistic and forced entry resistance. Bullet
resistant walls or sandbagged positions can help.
Have as many people living with you as possible. More
people gives you more eyes and ears to keep watch as well
as fight back. Neighbors may want to move in together or
spend the night in the best prepared home.
Setup a robust communications network with your
neighbors. If the phone network goes down, you don’t want
to be running through danger so you can pound on the
neighbor’s door.
Have a rapid/quick reaction force that can come to your aid,
especially for homes with just a few residents. A family
might be able to hold off the bad guys for a few minutes
while ten armed neighbors show up.
Whenever you are pursuing someone, be alert and
prepared to walk into an ambush. Protect your flanks and
utilize scouts. If you do not need to immediately recover a
kidnapping victim, it is better to discreetly track the enemy
and hit them at a time and place of your choosing where
you hold the advantage.
Arm everyone who can safely handle a gun and make sure
they can shoot well enough to protect themselves. Women
don’t necessarily need to be soldiers but they should
always be able to protect themselves and the family. If Dad
gets killed, Mom should be able to hold her own until help
arrives.
Women are seen as weaker. Individually they may not be a
pushover but even if a woman is an above average fighter,
she is physically at a disadvantage against men. Without
men around, an enemy will be emboldened even if he finds
out he targeted the wrong ladies. A man around the house
can be a deterrent the same way a woman walking a large
dog can intimidate creeps on the street.
Any adults going outside should be armed at all times.
“Stay strapped or get clapped.”
Site a house in a defensible location when possible or
modify the terrain/property to be more defensible. Clear out
brush or remove features that could hide ambushers. In
South Africa, large decorative gate supporters (walls or
pillars) are favorite hiding places for thugs.
Be prepared to escape and evade should the house be
captured. Having hiding places and concealed escape
routes mapped out. Practice getting to these places and
escaping undetected. Have bug-out-bags so that you don’t
run empty handed. Also consider hidden stashes of
supplies on your property, along your escape route, or in
selected hiding places.
Always fight and fight hard. Bad guys may not withdraw
from the field out of honor for your warriorship but they may
decide that you are too hard of a target to continue pressing
the issue. Make the cost of the attack too high for the
enemy to pursue.
Be prepared for attacks at multiple locations or diversionary
actions.
Modern Americans may a lack of cooperation of neighbors
across fractured religious, political, or ethnic lines. A
Republican may refuse to help a Democrat or vise versa.
This has been seen in various 20th and 21st century ethnic
conflicts elsewhere.
 About the Author
Don Shift is a veteran of the Ventura County Sheriff's Office and
an avid fan of post-apocalyptic literature and film. He is a student of
disasters, history, current events, and holds several FEMA
emergency management certifications. You can email him at
[email protected] or visit www.donshift.com.

Fiction works include the Ventura Sheriff EMP series, Hard

Favored Rage and Blood Dimmed Tide, where deputies must
survive after a devastating electromagnetic pulse destroys the
electric grid. Late For Doomsday and Limited Exchange (1 & 2) are
novels of surviving and evacuating after a nuclear attack.

All works explore the realities of emergency planning and

personal survival in the face of low probability, high impact events
that highlight the shortcomings of a technology and infrastructure
dependent nation. Non-fiction titles include Nuclear Survival in the
Suburbs and the Suburban Defense/Suburban Warfare guides.

[1] Improvised Explosive Device

[2] Rogers was a British officer in the French-Indian War and ancestral progenitor of the
modern US Army Rangers.
[3] Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle or an armed drone
[4] "Raid Operations," MCWP 3-43.1 p. 9
[5] "Crime and Security on Agricultural Operations," Security Journal, Volume: 24 Issue:
1, February 2011 pp. 1-18
[6] See Prairie Fire. Phase 1: strategic relocation; i.e. moving from CA to ID or TX.
Phase 2: moving because you are seeing things actually deteriorate before your are forced
out. Phase 3: fleeing to survive.
[7] I’m not bowdlerizing this initialism explanation, but elsewhere it is just SHTF.
[8] Observation Post/Listening Post
[9] For example, UHF ham 70cm band is 446.000 MHz.
[10] See FM 5-15 Field Fortifications (1968), p. 8-4
[11] War Department, FM 5-15 Engineer Field Manual-Field Fortifications, 1940, pp. 42-
43
[12] Note that a “dead zone” is the area where bullets impact, such as long-range fire
from a heavy machine gun.
[13] James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 1988, pp. 475-632
[14] FM 5-15 Field Fortifications (1968) is one such source.
[15] Bullet penetration of American homes is covered in Suburban Defense.
[16] This home artillery shelter or interior redoubt is covered in Suburban Warfare in
detail.
[17] Quick Reaction Force
[18] Literally “silver or lead.”
[19] See the firearms chapter in Suburban Defense.
[20] See “Neighbors and Defenders” in Suburban Defense.
[21] Voice-activated radio-dispatched alarm
[22] Conversely you should fire at muzzle flashes for a higher probability of a hit or at
least to provide suppressing fire.
[23] USMC FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 9-1, 9-2
[24] Martin’s writing style is very frank and down to earth. If you are easily offended by
profanity or honest discussions of the political situation in America, his work may not be for
you, although in the former case I suggest you just read over the offensive language.
[25] See “Riot and Crowd Control” from Suburban Defense for more information on
civilian legal grenades.
[26] MCCS IED 1001/1002, Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
[27] US Army Transportation School, Tactical Convoy Handbook, p.22
[28] See the chapter “Barricades” in Suburban Defense for further discussion of
barricades.
[29] Leslie T. White
[30] Ranch is a term used interchangeably in this area to describe a farm, orchard,
ranch, or large residential plot with a small orchard. Actual ranching is extremely uncommon
anymore. The term is probably a holdover from days long past when the uncultivated valley
was used for rangeland.