Prahaar 2024 - Indian Polity and Constitution
Prahaar 2024 - Indian Polity and Constitution
Prahaar 2024 - Indian Polity and Constitution
Table of Contents
Unit-I: Indian constitution—historical underpinnings, evolution, features, amendments, significant
provisions, and basic structure
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND....................................... 1 Cultural And Educational Rights (Article 29 -30)18
Remedies For Enforcement Of Rights (Article 32)
Evolution Of Indian Constitution: A Journey ......................................................................... 19
Through Key Acts And Reforms........................... 1 Writs................................................................. 19
Constituent Assembly Of India ........................... 2 Armed Forces And Fundamental Rights ............ 20
Critiques Of The Indian Constitution .................. 2 Martial Laws And Fundamental Rights.............. 20
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN INDIA ......... 4 Right To Property .............................................. 20
Exceptions To Fundamental Rights ................... 21
Types Of Amendments ........................................ 4 Issues And Challenges Pertaining To Fundamental
Informal Amendments ........................................ 4 Rights ............................................................... 21
The Necessity Of Constitutional Amendments ..... 4 Issues In News .................................................. 22
Issues With Constitutional Amendments ............ 5 Conclusion ....................................................... 23
Criticism Of The Amendment Procedure ............. 5
Way Forward ...................................................... 5 5. DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY
106th Constitutional Amendment, 2023 ............. 6 (DPSPs) (PART IV, ARTICLE 36-51) ...................... 24
Basic Structure Of The Constitution ................... 6 Conflict Between DPSP And FR ......................... 24
3. SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS IN THE INDIAN Uniform Civil Code: Quest For A Uniform Civil
CONSTITUTION .............................................................. 8 Code - A Path Towards A Unified Nation ............ 25
Right To Health ................................................. 26
Significant Provisions: An In- Depth Analysis ...... 8
Preamble ............................................................ 9 6. FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES (PART IV A, ARTICLE
Significance Of Preamble .................................... 9 51A) ................................................................................ 27
Amendability Of Preamble................................... 9 Rights And Duties ............................................. 27
4. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (PART III, ARTICLE 12- 7. CITIZENSHIP (PART II, ARTICLE 5-11) ................ 29
35) ...................................................................................12
Citizenship Act 1955 ......................................... 29
Classification Of Fundamental Rights ............... 12
Distinctive Features Of Fundamental Rights ..... 12 8. SCHEDULED AND TRIBAL AREAS (PART X,
Article 12 .......................................................... 12 ARTICLE 244 -244 A) ................................................. 31
Article 13 .......................................................... 12 Fifth Schedule .................................................. 31
Right To Equality (Article 14 -18) ...................... 13 Key Features Of Scheduled Areas Administration
Right To Freedom (Artilce 19 – 22) ................... 15 ......................................................................... 31
Right Against Exploitation (Article 23 -24) ......... 17 Sixth Schedule .................................................. 32
Right To Freedom Of Religion (Article 25 – 28) ... 18
Unit-III:
10. SEPARATION OF POWER AND FUNCTIONAL Functional Overlap Between Executive And
OVERLAPPING ..............................................................42 Legislature ........................................................ 42
Functional Overlap Between Judiciary And
Constitutional Provisions And The Separation Of Legislature ........................................................ 43
Powers .............................................................. 42 Functional Overlap Between Judiciary And
Different Models Of Separation Of Powers ......... 42 Executive .......................................................... 43
Doctrine Of Checks And Balances ..................... 45
i
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Unit-IV:— ǡ ǡ ǡƬ
11. PARLIAMENT AND STATE LEGISLATURES - Suggested Parliamentary Reforms ..................... 47
STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONING, CONDUCT OF Parliamentary Privileges .................................... 48
Role Of Opposition ............................................ 49
BUSINESS, POWERS & PRIVILEGES, AND ISSUES
Low Participation Of Women In Politics ............. 49
ARISING OUT OF THESE ............................................46 Anti-Defection Law ............................................ 51
Features Of Parliamentary Form Of Government 46 Role Of The Presiding Officer ............................. 52
Functions Of The Parliament ............................ 46 Parliamentary Scrutiny ..................................... 54
Issues Faced By Indian Legislature ................... 46
Productivity In The Parliament .......................... 47
14. LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT (PART IX, PART IX-A) Government Efforts For Empowering PRI .......... 78
..........................................................................................77 Steps To Be Taken ............................................ 78
Role Of Women In Panchayati Raj Institution .... 78
The Panchayats ................................................ 77 The Municipalities ............................................ 79
Issues And Challenges Faced By Panchayati Raj
Government ...................................................... 77
ii
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
About AGI........................................................106 Introduction.................................................... 109
Conclusion ..................................................... 109
21. NATIONAL AND STATE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION ............................................................. 107 23. CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION (CVC) ....... 110
Introduction ....................................................107 Independence Of CVC ..................................... 110
Way Forward ...................................................108 Way Forward .................................................. 110
Conclusion ......................................................108 Conclusion ..................................................... 110
22. CENTRAL AND STATE INFORMATION
COMMISSION ............................................................. 109
31. COMPARISON OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL India And Britain ............................................ 140
SCHEME WITH OTHER COUNTRIES .................... 137 India And France ............................................ 141
India And Japan ............................................. 142
India And USA .................................................137 India And South Africa .................................... 143
iii
UPSC COURSES
Live/Recorded CSAT
FOUNDATION
1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Indian Constitution serves as a lasting testament to India's successful transformation from a colony to a sovereign
republic. This dynamic document guides the democratic operation of the world's most populous nation. It embodies an
inclusive vision that has steered India's immense diversity towards a unified national identity.
EVOLUTION OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION: A JOURNEY THROUGH KEY ACTS AND REFORMS
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1919/MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS
• Indian Members in Executive Councilǣ ̵
Ǥ
• Bicameral LegislatureǣǦ– Ǥ
• Decentralizationǣ
Ǥ
• Dyarchy at Provincesǣ ǡ
Ǥ
• Central Public Service Commissionǣ ǡ
ͳͻʹǤ
• Significance
o Increased Indian Participation: Ǥ
ǦǤ
o Legislative Reforms: ǡ
Ǥ
o Role of Dyarchy: Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT OF 1935
• ͳͻ͵ͷ
Ǥ ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Salient Features of the Act
o All-India Federationǣǡ
̵ǡǤ
o Provincial Autonomy (1937-1939): Ǧ
Ǥ
o Dyarchy at Center (Not Implemented): ǡ
Ǥ
o Bicameral Legislatures (Limited): Ǥ
o Expanded Representation: ȋͳͲΨȌ
Ǥ
o Restructured Administration: ǡ ǡ
ȋ ǡ ǡ ȌǤ
o Federal Courtǣ
Ǥ
• Significance of the Actǣ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT OF 1947
• ǣ
o End of British Ruleǣ ͳͷǡͳͻͶǤ
o Power to the Constituent Assembliesǣ
Ǥ
o Partition of Indiaǣ Ǥ
1
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Significance:
o ͳͻͶ
Ǥ
2
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o Counterargument:ǡ
Ǥ ̵
Ǥ
• Federalism with a Unitarian Bias:
o Critiqueǣ ǡ
ǤǤ
o Counterargumentǣ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Too Rigid or Too Flexible:
o Critiqueǣǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
o Counterargumentǣ ̵
Ǥ Ǥ
Recent Developments
ETHICS DISCUSSION IN THEME WISE COVERAGE OF 150+ ETHICS 2 ETHICS AND 2 ESSAY FULL
QUESTION-ANSWER FORMAT ESSAY COVERAGE AND 50+ ESSAY QUESTIONS LENGTH TESTS WITH EVALUATION
3
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
4
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o GST (Goods and Services Tax): ͳͲͳ ǡ
Ǥ
ISSUES WITH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
• Frequency of Amendments: ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
ǦǤ
• Shift of Power: ǡ
ǡǡǤ
• Lack of Public Deliberation: ǡ
Ǥ ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
• Potential for Majoritarianism:
Ǥ
̵Ǥ
• The "Basic Structure Doctrine" Debate: ̵
̵̶ ̶ȋ ȌǤ
̶ ̶ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
CRITICISM OF THE AMENDMENT PROCEDURE
• Centralized Control: ǡ
Ǥ
• Limited Public Participation: ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Absence of a Dedicated Body: ǡ ̵
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Similar to Ordinary Bills: ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• State Ratification Ambiguity: ̵
ǡ Ǥ
• Silent on Withdrawal:̵
Ǥ
• No Deadlock Resolution:
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Dedicated Committee/Body:
Ǥ Ǥ
• Setting Up a Joint Parliamentary Committee: ȋ Ȍ Ǧ
Ǥ
ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Deadlock Resolution Mechanism:
Ǥ ǡ ǡǤ
• Involve State Legislatures:
Ǥ
• Defining Amendment Procedure:
Ǥ
• Time-bound Ratification:ǡǤ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
5
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Ǥ
Ǥ
• Ǧ ǡ ͳ͵Ǥ
• ǡ ͳͻ͵
ǡʹͲʹͲǤ
6
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
SIGNIFICANCE OF BASIC STRUCTURE
• Protects the Core Identity:
̵ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Limits Arbitrary Amendments:
̵ Ǥ ǡ ̵ Ǥ
• Maintains Supremacy of the Constitution: ǡ
ǡǤ
• Promotes Judicial Review:
Ǥ Kesavananda Bharati case (1973)
Ǥ
• Independence of Judiciary:
Ǥ
o For instance, the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act 2014, which proposed the National Judicial
Appointments Commission (NJAC)ǡ Ǥ
CRITICISM OF BASIC STRUCTURE
• Judicial Activism: ǡ
̶ ̶Ǥ
• Vagueness: ̶ ̶ ǡ
Ǥ
• Legislative Supremacy Challenged: ̵ ǦǤ
• Amending Power Curtailed: ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
• No Textual Basis: ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
̵ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Safeguard Against Overreach: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
• Preserving Core Values: ̵
ǡǤ
7
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Significant Provisions of the Indian Constitution:
ǡ –
Ǣ Ǣ Ǣ
Ǣ Ǣ Ǣ
Ǥ
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS: AN IN- DEPTH ANALYSIS
• Preamble
o Ǥ ̵ Features of Indian Constitution
̵ Ǥ
o ̵̶ ǡ̶̵–
ǡǡǤ ̵
Ǥ
o ǡ
̵ ̵̵ ̵
Ǥ
• Universal Adult Franchise:
o ̶ ǡ
ǡ̶ Ǥ
• Single Citizenship:
o
Ǥ
o
Core Values of Preamble
ȋȌǡ Ǥ
• Fundamental Rights:
o ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ
o ȋȌ
Ǥ
• Directive Principles of State Policy:
o Ǧ ǡ Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ
o ǡ ͶͶǡ
Ǥ
• Fundamental Duties:
o ǡ ǡ Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ
o Ǥ
• Separation of Powers
o ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
o Ǥ
O ̵ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
8
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
PREAMBLE
̵ Ǥǡ
̶̶ ̵ ̵
Ǥ
Removal of Socialist and Secular Words from Preamble
• Context:The Supreme Court was hearing a pair of petitions that sought deletion of words “secular” and “socialist”
Ǥ
• Recently, the Supreme Court (SC) agreed to examine whether the words “socialist” and “secular” could have been
ͳͻ
ǤǤʹǡͳͻͶͻǤ
Arguments in Favor of Retaining "Socialist" and "Secular" in the Preamble:
• Reinforces Core Values: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Continuity and Stability: ̵
Ǥ
• Addresses Historical Context: Ǧ
ǡ ̵Ǥ
• Flexibility in Interpretation: ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̵
ǤǤ
• Secular Identity:̶ ̶ ̵
Ǥ
Ǥ
Arguments Against Retaining "Socialist" and "Secular" in the Preamble:
• Historical Imposition: ȋͳͻͷȌǡ
ǡ̵ Ǥ
• Redundancy: ǡǡǤ
Ǥ
• Economic Model Debate: ̶ ̶
Ǥ
• Secular Misinterpretation: ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Political Agendaǣ
Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ ǡǡ
Ǥ
SIGNIFICANCE OF PREAMBLE
• Source of Authority: ̵̶ǡ ǡ̶
Ǥ
• Defines the Nation: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Sets Goals: ȋ ǡ ǡ Ȍǡǡ
Ǥ
• Guiding Light for Interpretation:̵
Ǥ
• Reflection of Ideals: ̵ Ǥ
AMENDABILITY OF PREAMBLE
• Ǥ
• Limited Amendment View (Berubari Case, 1960): ǡǡȋͳͻͲȌǡ
̵ ̵Ǥ
9
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Preamble as Amendable (Kesavananda Bharati Case, 1973): ǡ
ȋͳͻ͵ȌǤ ǡ
ǡ̵̶ ̶Ǥ
• Recent Proposals: ǡ ̶ ̶
̶̶ǡ Ǥ
ISSUES IN NEWS
Laicite: French Principle of Secularism
Context
• ȋȌ ǡ
Ǥ
• ̶ ǡ̶ ̵
Ǥ
About Laicite
• ͳͻ ǡ Ǥ
• ̵ ǡ
ǡǡǤ
Differences between Indian and French Secularism
ǣ
• Religious Freedom: Ǥ
• Equality for All: Ǥ
• State Neutrality: Ǥ
• Minority Rights: Ǥ
• Freedom of Expression: Ǥ
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIAN AND FRENCH SECULARISM
Basis India France
Core Principle ̶ ̶ Ǧ Ã ± Ǧ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ
Personal Laws
ǡ ǡ ȋǤǤǡ
ȌǤ
State ǡ
Involvement
Ǥ Ǥ
10
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
̵ ̵ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǦǦǦ Ǥ ̵
Ǥ
Set of Integrated
14 Booklets PYQs
9920613613 pwonlyias.com
11
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Fundamental Rights are enshrined in Part III (Articles 12-35) of the Indian Constitution. These are basic human rights
guaranteed to all Indian citizens, essential for a life of dignity and freedom. They act as limitations on the power of the
government, ensuring it cannot arbitrarily deny these rights to individuals. These rights are guaranteed to all Indian
citizens, irrespective of caste, religion, gender, or social status.
CLASSIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
• The Constitution of India provides six Fundamental Rights, which are:
Ǥ ȋ ͳͶ–ͳͺȌ
Ǥ ȋ ͳͻ–ʹʹȌ
Ǥ ȋ ʹ͵–ʹͶȌ
Ǥ ȋ ʹͷ–ʹͺȌ
Ǥ ȋ ʹͻ–͵ͲȌ
Ǥ ȋ ͵ʹȌ
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
• Justiciable: ȋ Ȍǡ Ǥ
ȋȌ Ǥ
• Not Absolute: ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
• Can be Expanded:ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Positive Rights: ȋ Ȍǡ
ȋ ʹͳȌǤ
• Suspension during Emergencies: ǡ
ȋ ʹͲʹͳȌǤ ǡ Ǥ
ARTICLE 12
• Definition of State: ͳʹ̶̶ǡ ǣ
o ȋ Ȍ
o ȋ Ȍ
o ȋǤǤǡ Ȍ
o ȋȌ
• Judiciary and Definition of State:
ȋǤǤǡȌǤ ǡ ̵ ȋǤǤǡȌ
ȋ ʹʹȌǤ
• Exceptions: Ǥǡǡ
̶̶ ͳʹǤ ʹʹǤ
ARTICLE 13
• Article 13: ͳ͵ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Power of Judicial Review:ȋ ͵ʹȌ ȋ ʹʹȌ
Ǥ Ǥ
• What Can Be Challenged?̶̶Ǥ ̵
ǣ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ȋ Ȍ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
12
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o Ǧ Ǥ
• Exceptions to Judicial Review: ̶̶
Ǥ ǡ ȋͳͻ͵Ȍ
̵
̶ Ǥ̶
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ
13
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
EXCEPTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 14
• Affirmative Action:
ǡ ǡ ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ
ȋȌ ȋͳ ǡͳͻͷͳȌǤ
• Reservations in Education: ǡ ȋ
Ȍǡ ǡ ǡ ȋͻ͵
ǡʹͲͲͷȌǤ
• Economically Weaker Sections (EWS): ǡ
ǡ ȋȌ ȋͳͲ͵
ǡʹͲͳͻȌǤ
• Immunities of High Offices: ͵ͳ
Ǥ
• Parliamentary Privileges:ȋȌ
ȋ ͳͲͷͳͻͶ Ȍ
Ǥ
ARTICLE 15: PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION
• Prohibition of Discrimination: ͳͷȋȌ
ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ
• Access to Public Places and Amenities: ǡǡǡ
ǡǡǡǡǡ Ǥ
• Exception for Women and Children:
Ǥ
Ǥ
ARTICLE 16: EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
• Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment:
Ǥ
• Non-Discrimination: ǡ ǡ ǡǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡǤ
• Exceptions: ǣ
o Residential Requirements:
Ǥ
o Reservation Policy: ȋ ǡ
Ȍ Ǥ
o Reservation for Economically Weaker Sections: ͳͲΨ
Ǥ
• Significance: ͳ Ǥ
• Challenges: ǡ Ǧ Ǥ
14
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Examples:
• Haryana:ʹͲʹͲͷΨ ǡ
Ǥ
• Maharashtra: ͺͲΨǡǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ARTICLE 17: ABOLITION OF UNTOUCHABILITY
• Abolishes Untouchability: ͳ Ǥ
• Discrimination Forbidden: Ǥ
ǡǡ Ǥ
• Punishable Offense: Ǥ ǡ
ͳͻͷͷȋȌ Ǥ
• Significanceǣ ͳ Ǥ
• Ongoing Challenge: ͳǡ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
ARTICLE 18: ABOLITION OF TITLES
• ȋǤǤǡǡ
ȌǤ ǡǤ
• Ǥ
• Shreya Singhal Case (2015): ǡʹͲͲͲǤ
̶̶̶ ̶Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
15
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Kedar Nath Singh Case (1962): Ǥ
ǡ
16
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Right to Quality Education: ʹͳǡ
ȋ ȌʹͲͲͻ Ǥ
• Impact: ǡ
Ǥ
• Recent Updations: The National Education Policy 2020 expanded the age bracket for compulsory education
to 3-18 years,
Ǥ
ARTICLE 22 (PROTECTION AGAINST ARREST AND DETENTION IN CERTAIN CASES)
ʹʹ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• Ordinary Law Conditions:
o Protection from Uninformed Detention:
Ǥ
o Right to Legal Counsel:
Ǥ
o Magisterial Production: ʹͶ
ȋ ȌǤ
o Right to be released after 24 hours unless authorised by a magistrateǣ
Ǥ
• Preventive Detention Conditions:
o ǣ
Ǥ
o ǣ
Ǥ
17
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
ʹͶ Ǥ
Ǥ
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION (ARTICLE 25 – 28)
ARTICLE 25:
ʹͷ ̵ ǡǤ
• Freedoms Guaranteed: ǣ
o Freedom of conscience:Ǥ
o Freedom to profess: Ǥ
o Freedom to practice: Ǥ
o Freedom to propagate:ǡ Ǥ
• Equality for All: ǡ Ǥ
• Reasonable Restrictions: ̶ ǡ̶
Ǥ
ǦǤ
• State and Religion: Ǥ
• Significance: ʹͷ ǡǡ Ǥ
ARTICLE 26:
• Rights Granted: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Different from Article 25ǣ ʹͷ ʹ ǣ ʹͷ
ǡ ʹ Ǥ
• Not Absolute: ǡǡǤ
Ǥ
• Significance:
o Ǥ
o ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Examples:ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
ARTICLE 27:
• Rights Granted: ʹ
Ǥ
• No Bias: ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
o Example: ǡ
ʹ Ǥ
ARTICLE 28:
o Rights Granted:
Ǥ
o Exceptionǣ ̵
Ǥ
o
Ǥ
CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS (ARTICLE 29 -30)
ǡ ̵ ǡ
ʹͻ͵ͲǡǤ
ARTICLE 29:
ʹͻ ̵ Ǥ
ǡ ̵ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Right to conserve culture:
o ǡ ǡ Ǥ
o Ǥ
18
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Non-discriminatory education:
o ǦǦ ǡ
ǡ ǡǡǤ
o ǡ
ʹͻ Ǥ
ARTICLE 30:
͵Ͳ ǡ Ǥ
• Establishment and Administration:
Ǥ
• Education in Mother Tongue: Ǥ
• Regulation for Quality: Ǥ
Ǥ
• Non-discrimination in Funding: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Fair Acquisition of Property: ͵ͲȋͳȌ
Ǥ
19
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Prohibition:
o
Ǥ
• Certiorari:
o
Ǥ
o Ǥ
• Quo-Warranto:
o Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ
SIGNIFICANCE OF WRITS
• Protection of Fundamental Rights:
Ǥ
• Judicial Review: ǡ
Ǥ
• Speedy and Effective Remedy:
Ǥ
• Ensuring Accountability:
Ǥ
• Maintaining Rule of Law: ǡ
ǡǤ
ARMED FORCES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
• Purpose: ͵͵
ǡ ǡ ȋ ȌǤ
• Justification:
Ǥ
• Rights Potentially Affected: ǡ
͵͵ǡǤ ǡ
Ǥ
o Example: ȋ ͳͻȌ
Ǥ
MARTIAL LAWS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
• Martial Law: ͵Ͷ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Restriction on Rights: ǡ
Ǥ
• Protection for Actions: ȋ Ȍ
̶ ̶
Ǥ
• Significance: ͵Ͷ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
Significance of Above Provisions
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
•
Ǥ
RIGHT TO PROPERTY
ͶͶȋͳͻͺȌ Ǥ
20
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• From Fundamental Right to Legal Right:ǡ
͵ͳǤ ǡ
Ǥ ͵ͲͲǤ
• Easier Land Acquisition: Ǥ
Ǥ
• Judicial Scrutiny Remains:ǡ ͵ͲͲ̶ ̶
Ǥ Ǥ ǡ
̶̶ ͵ͲͲ Ǥ
• Right to Compensationǣ Ǧ
o ȋ ͵ͲȌ
o
ȋ ͵ͳȌǤ
ǡͶͶ ̵Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
21
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Violations During Emergencyǣ ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Online Privacy and Surveillanceǣ ǡ
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Awareness and Educationǣ
Ǥ
• Legal Reforms: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Safeguarding During Emergencies:
ǡ
Ǥ
• Privacy Legislationǣ
ǡ Ǥ
• Judicial Training and Capacity Buildingǣ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Community Engagementǣ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
22
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
The Way Forward
• Comprehensive Survey: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Economic Growth:ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Creamy Layer Exclusion:
Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
PERSONALITY RIGHTS
Context
• Ǧ
Ǥ
• ̵
Ǥ
What is Personality Rights?
• ̵ ̵Ǥ
• ǡǡǡ Ǥ
ȋǣ ȌǤ
Significance of Personality Rights:
• Control over Identityǣ ̵ Ǥ
• Protection from Exploitationǣ ̵Ǥ
• Preserves Reputationǣ Ǥ
• Incentivizes Achievementsǣ Ǥ
Way Forward:
• Comprehensive Legislation: Ǥ
• Balancing Interestsǣ Ǥ
• Public Awarenessǣ Ǥ
• International Harmonizationǣ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
CONCLUSION
Ǥ an individual can rise from the status of subject to
that of ‘citizen’Ǥ
23
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
̵ Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) set of guidelines
̵ social and economic justice Ǥ
Irish ConstitutionǤ ǡ justiciableȋ Ȍǡ
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
FEATURES/SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DPSPs:
• Social, Economic, and Political Justice: Ǧ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Non-Justiciable: ǡ Ǥ
• Directive in Nature:
Ǥ
• Grounded in Socialist Ideals:ǡ
ǡǤ
• Framework for Governance: Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
• Bridge the Gap: Ǥ
̵ǡ Ǥ
CONFLICT BETWEEN DPSP AND FR
ȋ Ȍ
ȋȌǤ ǡǤ
ǣ
Champakam • Court's Ruling: ͵ǡ
Dorairajan Case Ǥ
1951 • Fundamental Rights Take Priority:
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Precedence Established:
ȋȌ
Ǥ
Golak Nath Case • Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged/ diluted
1967 .
Kesavananda • Basic Structure Doctrine:
Bharati Case ȋ Ȍ ǡ ̶ ̶
1973 ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
Minerva Mills • Balance Between FR and DPSP:
Case 1980 balance of Part III and Part IVǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• After the Minerva Mills Caseǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
̵ Ǥ
ǡ ̵ Ǥ
Ǥ
24
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
UNIFORM CIVIL CODE: QUEST FOR A UNIFORM CIVIL CODE - A PATH TOWARDS A UNIFIED NATION
• common set of laws
governing personal matters ǡǤ
• ǣǡ ǡ ǡ
• ǡ Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND LEGISLATION
Pre-Independence:
• Lex Loci Report (1840): ǡ
Ǥ
• Queen's 1859 Proclamation: Ǧ Ǥ
• BN Rau Committee (1941): Ǥ
Post-Independence:
• ȋ Ȍǣ Ǥ
• ͳͻͷǣ ǡǡ ǡǤ
• ͳͻͷͶǣ Ǥ
Supreme Court Verdicts:
• Shah Bano Case (1985): Ǥ
• Sarla Mudgal Case (1995):
Ǥ
• Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India Case (2017):
Ǥ
25
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Minority Apprehensions: Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
• Threat to Diversity: ̵
Ǥ
• Drafting Difficulties:
Ǥ
• Law Commission's Stance: ʹͲͳͺ
Ǥ
• Potential Constitutional Conflict: ȋ ͳͶȌ
ȋ ʹͷȌǤ
WAY FORWARD
• Piecemeal Approach:
Ǥ
• Equality at the Forefront: ǡ
Ǥ
• Open Discussion:
Ǥ
• Involving Experts:
Ǥ
• Establishing Universal Principles:
Ǥ
ȋȌ ǡǡ
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
̵ Ǥǡ
̵ ǡǡ Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ Ǧ ǡ ǡ Ǣ
Ǣ ǡ Ǥ
RIGHT TO HEALTH
• ͵ͺǡ͵ͻǡͶʹǡͶ͵ǡƬͶ
Ǥ
Efforts towards right to health in recent times:
• ǡ
ǡ
ȋ ȌǤ
• Govt efforts to ensure Right to health:
o ʹͲʹͳǦʹʹ ǡ
ǦǦ Ǥ
o Ǧ
Ǥ
o ǡ‘One Nation One Ration Card’
͵ʹȀ ͻͲ Ǥ
o Allocations for water, sanitation, nutrition and clean air: ȋ ȌǡʹͲͳǡ
ǡǤ
o Pneumococcal vaccine : Budget 2021 was the government’s decision to expand the coverage of the
Ǥ
o Ǥ ǡ
ͷͲǡͲͲͲǤ
Previous Year Question
ͳǤ ʹͲͳͷ
Ǥ
26
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
The Indian Constitution, while outlining fundamental rights for citizens, also emphasizes their corresponding duties.
These duties, enshrined in Part IV-A (Article 51A), are not enforceable by law but serve as moral and ethical guidelines
for responsible citizenship.
Features of Fundamental Duties:
• Introduced in 1976:ǡͶʹ
ͳͻǤ
• Promoting Patriotism and Social Values: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Respecting Institutions: ǡ ǡ
̵ Ǥ
• Social Harmony and Environmental Protection:
Ǥ
• Individual and Collective Striving: ǡ
̵Ǥ
27
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Promoting Social Capital: ȋ Ȍ
Ǥǡ Ǥ
• Supporting State Goals and Voluntary Service:
Ǥǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Ensuring Peace and Harmony:
Ǥ
Challenges in Balancing Rights and Duties
ǡ ǣ
• Justiciability vs. Enforcementǣ ȋ ȌǡǤ
Ǥ
• Nature of Rights and Duties: Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• Vagueness and Subjectivity: ǡ
Ǥ
• Rights as Preconditions: Ǥ ǡ̵
Ǥ
Criticisms of Fundamental Duties:
• Incomplete List: Ǥ
Ǥ
• Unclear Wording:ǡ Ǥ
• Questionable Inclusion: ǡ
Ǥ
• Limited Weight: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
Enforcement through Legislations:
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
ǣ
• Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971:
Ǥ
• The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955: ǡ ǡ ǡǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Indian Penal Code, 1860: ǡǡ
Ǥ
• Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972: ǡ
Ǥ
• Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980: ǡ
Ǥ
KEY WORDS: Ǣ Ǣ Ǣ
28
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Ǥ
ǡǡǡǤ
ǡ ͷǦͳͳ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
CITIZENSHIP ACT 1955
• ǣǡ
ǡǡǡ Ǥ ͳͻͺǡʹͲͲ͵
ʹͲͳͻǤ
The Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI):
• ȋȌ ǡʹͲͲͷǤ
•
Ǥ
ISSUES IN NEWS
108 Migrants from Pakistan Granted Indian Citizenship in Gujarat
Context
• 2021 Ministry of Home Affairs Order ǡ
ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• ǡǡǤ
Acquisition of Indian Citizenship
ǣ
• By Birthǣ ʹǡ ͳͻͷͲǡ
̵ Ǥ
• By Descentǣ ʹǡͳͻͷͲǡ
Ǥ
• By Registration:
Ǥ
• By Naturalisationǣ ̵
Ǥ ǡ ǡ
ǡͳͻͷͷǤ
CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) RULES, 2024
Context
• ȋ Ȍ
ȋȌʹͲͳͻǤ ǡǡʹͲͲͻǡȋȌ
ǡʹͲʹͶǤ
• ʹͲͳͻ ͳͳǡ̵
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
Highlights of Rules 2024
• Who Can Apply?ǦȋȌǡʹͲʹͶ
ǡ ǣ
o
o
o
o
• Additional Requirements: ǣ
o
29
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o ͺ
• Simplified Proof: Ǥ
ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Renouncing Prior Citizenship: ǡ Ǥ
• Application Process:
Ǥ
The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019:
• Objective: ̵ Ǥ
• Beneficiary: ǡǡǡ ǡǡ
ǡǡ ͵ͳǡʹͲͳͶǡ
Ǥ
• Exemptions:
ǦǤ
• Reduced Residency Requirements:
ͳͳͷǤ
Arguments In Favour of the Act:
• Humanitarian Reliefǣ
ǡǡǤ
• Distinguishing Immigrants:
Ǥ
Concerns and Criticisms:
• Date of Entry: Ǧȋ ͵ͳǡʹͲͳͶȌǤ
• Potential Discrimination: ̵ ̵ Ǥ
• Proof of Persecution: Ǥ
• Unequal Treatment:
Ǥ
• International Relations: Ǥ
Way Forward:
ǡ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥǡ Ǧ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
30
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
ǡ ʹͶͶǡ
̶ ̶ ̶ Ǥ̶
ǣ
ͳǤ Scheduled Areasǣ Ǥ Ǧ
Fifth ScheduleǤ
ʹǤ Tribal Areasǣǡ ǡǡǡǡ
ǤSixth Schedule
FIFTH SCHEDULE
• ̵ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• Ǥǡ
Ǥ
ǦǤ
KEY FEATURES OF SCHEDULED AREAS ADMINISTRATION
• Identifying Scheduled Areas: ̶ ̶
ǣ
o High Tribal Population: Ǥ
o Geographical Considerations: Ǥ
o Administrative Unit: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
o Economic Disparity: Ǥ
• Shared Governance:
o State Administration: Ǥ
o Central Oversight:
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Tribal Advisory Council: Ǥ ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Legal Framework
o Adapting Existing Laws:
Ǥ
o Creating Custom Regulations: ǡ ̵ ǡ
Ǥǣ
▪ Ǣ Ǣ
Ǣ ȋ
Ȍ
• PESA, 1996ǣ ȋ Ȍ ǡͳͻͻ
Ǥ
• Appointment of commission: ǡ
appoint a Commission
ȋArticle 339Ȍ
• Amendment to 5th & 6th scheduleǣ ͵ͺ
Ǥ
Challenges to PESA Implementation
• Limited Resources: ̶͵ ̶ ȋ ǡ ǡ Ȍ
Ǥ
31
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Bureaucratic Hurdles: ǡ ǦǤ
• Public Awareness Gap:
Ǥ
• Ignoring Tribal Rights: ǡ Ǥ
• State Laws in Conflict: Ǥ
• Duplication of Efforts: ǡ ʹͲͳ͵ǡǡ
Ǥ
Way Forward
• Empowering Representativesǣ
Ǥ
• Building Awareness: ǡ ǡ
̵Ǥ
• Supporting Tribal Rights: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Implementing PESA:
ȋ Ȍ ȋȌǤ
• Resource Management:
ǡǡ
Ǥ
Government Initiatives
• Forest Rights Act, 2006ǣ Ǧ Ǥ
• Vanbandhu Kalyan Yojanaǣ
students’ education.
SIXTH SCHEDULE
Ǧ
Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
Why Special Arrangements for Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura & Mizoram?
• Distinct Cultural Identity: ȋǡ
ǡǡȌ Ǥ
• Different from Other Tribes:
ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Protecting Cultural Roots: Ǧ
ǡǤ
Features of administration in 6th schedule areas:
• Governor's Authority: ǣ
Ǥ
• Autonomous districtsǣ ǡ
͵Ͳȋʹ ͷǦͶ ȌǤ
ǦǤ
• District and Regional Councils: Ǥ
• Legislative Powers: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ ̵Ǥ
• Judicial Powers: ǡ
Ǥ
• Development Initiatives: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ ǦǤ
• Financial Autonomy: Ǥ
32
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Limited Application of Laws:
Ǥ
• Governor's Oversight:
Issues and Challenges in Sixth Schedule areas
• Limited Financial Autonomy:
Ǥ
• Governor's Overshadowing Authority:
ȋȌǤ
• Uneven Distribution of Power:
ǡ Ǥ
• Uncertain Governance:
Ǥ
• Departmental Handover Issues: Ǥ
• Underrepresentation:
Ǥ
Way Forward
• Funding: ȋȌ
Ǥ
• Timely Elections:
Ǥ
• Traditional Institutions: Ǧ
ǦǤ
• Women's Empowerment:
Ǥ
• Representation for All:
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ǡ ̵
Ǥ
33
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
34
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
While these features lean towards a strong Centre, it is also true that the Indian Constitution provides for
cooperative federalism, Ǥ The GST
Council, an example of cooperative federalism,
Ǥ
CHALLENGES TO INDIAN FEDERALISM
• New State Formation: Ǥ
• Governor's Role: ̵ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Rajya Sabha Representation:Ǧ
Ǥ
• All India Services: ǡ
ȋ ǡ ǤȌǤ
• Emergency Powers:̵ Ǥ
• Central Control Mechanisms: ǡǡ
Ǥ
Drawbacks in the existing structure:
Ǥ
• Inefficient Coordinationǣ
Ǥ
• Conflicting Jurisdictions:
Ǥ
• Centralized Planning: ǡǤ
• Financial Imbalance: ǡ
Ǥ
• Political Gridlock: Ǥ
̵ ǡ ǡ
ǡǤ ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥǡ
Ǥ
KEY WORDSǣ Ǣ Ǥ Ǣ Ǣ
Ǣ ǢǢǢ Ǣ Ǧ
Ǥ
35
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Preserves Culture: ͵ͳ ǡ
ǡǤ
• Empowers Minorities: ǡ
Ǥ
• Counters Radicalization:
Ǥ
̵ Ǥ
̵ Ǥ ǡ̵
ǦǤ
36
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• ǡǦǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡǤǡ
Ǥ
• recommendations Ǧ
̵Ǥ
Important Commissions and their Recommendations:
• First Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC):
o Ǧ ȋ ʹ͵ȌǤ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
• Sarkaria Commission:
o Ǧ Ǥ
o ̵ȋ ͵ͷȌǤ
o Ǧ Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• M.M. Punchhi Commission:
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ͳ͵Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
• National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC):
o Ǧ ȋ ͵ͲȌǤ
o ͵ͷǤ
In conclusionǡ Ǧ
ǤǤǤǤǡ̶
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ̶
NITI AAYOG - A TOOL TO PROMOTE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Established in 2015, the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) plays a critical role in India's
development. ǡ ǦǤ
Ǥ
Note: Prahaar Governance bookletǤǤ
INTER- STATE RIVER WATER DISPUTE
̵ ǡ Ǥ ǡ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
ǡ ǡǡǡǡ ǡǦǡ
Ǥ
Constitutional and statutory provisions related to Inter-state water disputes.
• Article 262(1)ǣ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Article 262(2)ǣ
ǦǤ
• River Board Act, 1956ǣ
Ǥ
37
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Inter-state River Water Disputes Act, 1956ǣ
Ǥ Ǥ
Reasons behind rising inter-state river water disputes.
• Political Interference: ǡ
ȋǤǤǡȌǤ
• State Bifurcation:ǡǡǦ
Ǥ
• Water Scarcity: ǡͶΨ ͳͺΨ
̵Ǥ
• Competing Interests:̵ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Deteriorating Quality: ǡ
Ǥ
Challenges in Resolving Inter-state water disputes.
• Historical and Geographic Confusion: ǡ
Ǥ
• Constitutional-Legal Ambiguityǣ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Institutional Uncertainty: ʹʹ ̵ǡ ͳ͵
Ǥ Ǥ
• Implementation Hurdles:
ǡ Ǥ
• Outdated Approach:
ǡǡ Ǥ
• Challenges with the Interstate Water Disputes Act, 1956
o Inefficient Dispute Resolutionǣ
Ǥ
o Weak Enforcementǣ Ǥ
o Protracted Appealsǣ Ǥ
Way Forward
• Robust Mechanismǣ Ǥ
• Legal Clarity:
Ǥ
• Holistic Basin Management: ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Sharing During Scarcity:
Ǥ
• Moving Beyond Politics: Ǥ
• Balancing Needs: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Enactment of the pending Bill: ǦȋȌǡʹͲͳͻ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥǡ
Ǥ
DEMAND FOR SMALLER STATES
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
38
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Why Smaller States are Demanded
• Underrepresented Regions: Ǥ
• Cultural Identity: ȋǤǤǡ
ȌǤ
• Administrative Neglect: ǡ
Ǥ
• Political Manipulation: Ǥ
• Unequal Development: ȋǤǤǡǡ
ȌǤ
Potential Benefits of Smaller States
• Efficient Administrationǣ Ǥ
• Stronger Fiscal Management: Ǥ
• Addressing Regional Needs: Ǥ
• Optimal Resource Use: Ǥ
• Inclusive Growth: ȋ
ǤǤǤȌǤ
Challenges of Creating Smaller States
• Mixed Performanceǣ̵ Ǥ
• Leadership Issues: Ǥ
• Financial Strain: Ǥ
• Central Dependence: Ǥ
• Infrastructure Gap: Ǧ Ǥ
Way Forward
• Objective Criteria: ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Comprehensive Needs Assessment: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Focus on Decentralization:
Ǥ Ǥ
• Fiscal Responsibility: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Inter-State Cooperation: ǡ
Ǥ
̵ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ ǡ
̵ Ǥ
Issues in News
ARTICLE 370
Contextǣ̵ ̵ʹͲͳͻ
̵ ͵ͲǤ
Key Observations and Directions by SC
• No Internal Sovereignty: Ƭ ͳͻͶǤ
ƬǤ
• Temporary Provision: ͵Ͳ
Ǥ
• Presidential Authority Upheld: ̵ʹͲͳͻ ͵Ͳ
̵ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
39
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Elections: Ƭ
͵ͲǡʹͲʹͶǤ
• Statehood Restoration: ƬǤ
• Truth and Reconciliation:
Ƭ Ǥ
Abrogation of Article 370
̵ ͵ͲǤ
ǡǡ Ǥ ͷǡ ʹͲͳͻǡ
͵Ͳǡ ̵Ǥ
ǣ ǡǤ
Changes in Governance:
• Representation: ƬǡǤ
• Administration: Ƭ Ǥ
• Legislative Power: ƬǤ
͵Ͳ ƬǤ
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ ̵ ǡ
ǡ ǡ
̵̵ǡ ǡ ̵Ǥ
GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI (AMENDMENT) ACT 2023
Contextǣ ȋȌ ʹͲʹ͵Ǥ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Unique Status: ȋȌ
ǦǤ
• Supreme Court's View:ʹͲʹ͵ ǡ
ǡǡ Ǥ
Key Provisions of the Act
• National Capital Civil Services Authority (NCCSA):ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• LG's Discretion: ̵
Ǥ
• Increased Central Control: ǡ
̶ ̶ȋǦǦ ȌǤ
• Reporting Requirements: Ǥ
Issues Raised
• Central Government Overreach: ̵
Ǥ
• Weakened Accountability: ̶ ̶̵ Ǥ
• Unclear Definitions: ̵̶ ̶ ̵ Ǥ
Looking Ahead
• Learning from Others: ȋ ǡ Ǧǡ
ǤȌ Ǥ
• Decentralization: Ǧ
ǦǤ
• Domain Demarcation: ǡ
Ǥ
• Enforcement Powers: ǡ
Ǥ
40
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Ǥ
Ǥ
9920613613 pwonlyias.com
41
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
̵ ǡ Ǥ
ǡ ǡǡ ǡ
Ǥ ̵
ǡ Ǥ
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
• Inherent Doctrine: Ǥ
ͷͲǡͳʹʹǡʹͳʹ Ǥ
• Article 50: Ǥ
• Articles 122 and 212: ǡ
Ǥ
DIFFERENT MODELS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Strict Separationǣ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Flexible Model: ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE
̵ ǡ
Ǥ
• Role of Presidentǣ &ŝŐ͗͘^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWŽǁĞƌƐ
Ǥ
• Ordinance Promulgation: ̵ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Council of Ministers: ǡǤ
• Delegated Legislation: Ǥ
• Party System: Ǧ
Ǥ
• No-confidence Motion: Ǧ Ǥ
• Whip System: ǡ
Ǥ
Way Forward
̵ ̵ǡ
ǣ
• Strengthening Independent Institutionsǣ
ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
• Parliamentary Committees: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Reduced Reliance on Delegated Legislation:
Ǥ
• Electoral Reforms: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Public Interest Groups (PIGs):
Ǥ
42
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Judicial Review:
Ǥ
• Principle of Constitutional Objectivity: ǡ Justice Chandrachud emphasized “constitutional
objectivity” as the core principle to balance legislature and executive interactions. It helps ensure that each branch
ǡ Ǥ
FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP BETWEEN JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATURE
ǡ
Ǥ ǣ
• Judicial Review vs. Legislative Powerǣ ǡ
̵ Ǥ ȋǣ
ʹͲͳͷȌ
• Public Interest Litigation (PIL): ǡ
Ǥȋǣ Ȍ
• Legislative Overreach: ̶ ̶
Ǥȋǣ ̵Ȍ
• Judicial overreach:
ǡ Ǥ
o Example: ʹ ǡ ̵
ǡ Ǥ
• Parliamentary Privileges: ǡ
̵Ǥ
Minimizing Overlap Between Judiciary and Legislature
ǡ
Ǥ ǣ
• Judicial Deferenceǣ ǡ
̵ǦǤ
• Evolving Standards for PILs: ǡ
Ǥ
• Independent Judicial Appointments:
Ǥ
• Respect for Judicial Review: ̵
Ǥ
• Defining Parliamentary Privileges:
̵Ǥ
43
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Independent Judiciary Appointments:
ǡ ̵Ǥ
• Specialization of Tribunals:
Ǥ
• Judicial Deference: ǡ̵
Ǥ
• Review of Immunity Provisions: Ȁ
̵Ǥ
• Clear Contempt Guidelines: Ǥ
44
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
DOCTRINE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Ǥ
Ǥ
Indian Constitutional Provisions:
Ǥ ǣ
• Judicial Review (Article 13):
Ǥ
• Judicial Limitations (Article 21): Ǥ
• Executive Appointments: ǡǤ
• Parliamentary System: ǡ
Ǥ
Examples of Checks and Balances:
• Legislative vs. Executiveǣ ǡȋȌǡ
ȋ ͺͷȌǤǡ ȋ ͳȌǤ
• Executive vs. Judiciary: ǡ ̵
ȋǤǤǡǤƬǤ ȌǤ
• Legislative vs. Judiciary: ǡ
ȋǤǤǡ ȌǤ
Examples in Action:
• Golaknath Case (1967): Ǥ
• Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973): ̶ ǡ̶̵
Ǥ
• Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain Case (1975):
Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ ̵
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Ǣ Ǣ ǡǡ Ǣ
Ǣ Ǣ Ǣ̵ȋȌǢ
Previous Year Question
ͳǤ ʹͲʹͲ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ʹǤ ʹͲͳͻ
based on the principle of ‘checks and balance’? Explain
͵Ǥ ʹͲͳͷ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
ǫ
ͶǤ Starting from inventing the ‘basic structure’ doctrine, the judiciary has played a highly proactive role ʹͲͳͶ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
ͷǤ ʹͲͳ͵
Ǥ Ǥ
45
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
̵
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
̵ ǡ ǡǦǡ
ǡǤ
FEATURES OF PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
• Nominal and Real Executives:
Ǥ
• Collective Responsibility: ǡ
ȋ ͷȌǤ
• Majority Party Rule: Ǥ
• Double Membership: Ǥ
• Leadership of the Prime Minister: Ǥ
• Political Homogeneity: ǡ
Ǥ
• Dissolution of Lower House: ̵
Ǥ
• Secrecy: ǡ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Reasons for Adoption
• Avoidance of Legislative-Executive Conflicts:
Ǥ
• Familiarity with the System:
Ǥ
• Representation: ǡǡ
Ǥ
• Preference for Responsibility: ǤǤǤ
Ǥ
FUNCTIONS OF THE PARLIAMENT
• Law-makingǣ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Control over executiveǣ Ǧ
ǡ ǡǤ
• Election functionǣ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• Management of financesǣ
̵ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Quasi-Judicial functionsǣ Ǧ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
ISSUES FACED BY INDIAN LEGISLATURE
• Decline in the number of sittingsǣͳͳǡ͵ͷͶǡ
ǦǤ
• Discipline and decorumǣ
Ǥ
• Low representation of womenǣ ǡ
Ǥ
46
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Resort to Money Bill routeǣ
ǡ Ǥ
• Inadequate Discussionǣ ǡ
Ǥ
• Reduced Scrutiny by Parliamentary Committeesǣ
ǤͲΨͳͶͳΨͳͷ
ǡ ʹͷΨͳǤ
• Uncodified Parliamentary Privilegesǣ
Ǥ
• Legislation through Ordinancesǣ
ǡ Ǥ
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE PARLIAMENT
ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǦǤ ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
ǣ
• Institutional decline:
ǡ Ǥ
• Increasing disruptions: ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Inadequate time for Opposition:
Ǥ
• Violation of parliamentary norms: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Insufficient time for unlisted discussion:
Ǥ
• Unresponsive government attitude: ʹ
Ǥ
• Absence of prompt disciplinary action:
Ǥ
Vital Stats on Functioning of the 17th Lok Sabha
ǣ
ͳȋȌ ʹͲͳͻ ʹͲʹͶǤǡ
• ʹͶͳͻȋ ȌǤ
• ͲΨ ͷʹΨǤ
• ǦʹͲ Ǥ
o ͷͷͳ͵ͷǤ
• ǡ Ǥ
• Article 93 of the Constitution requires that LS elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker ‘as soon as may be’.
• ͺͲΨ Ǥ
47
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Enhance information supply for Membersǣ
ǦǤ
• Curbing Criminalization of Politics and Improve the quality of MembersǤ
• Improve the public image of Parliamentǣ
̵Ǥ
• Use of technology for virtual meetingsǣ
ǡ Ǧͳͻ Ǥ
• Introduction of Legislative Impact Assessment:
Ǥ
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES
Ǥ ȋʹͲʹͶȌǡǦ ͳͻͻͺ
Ǥ
Ȁǣ
Key highlights of Judgement:
• Bribery is not immuneǣȀ
ͳͲͷͳͻͶǤ
• Two-fold tesǣȀǣ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Jurisdiction of criminal court:
Ǥ
• Scope of parliamentary privileges: Purpose of parliamentary privilege to provide legislators platform to “speak”
and “vote” without fear is equally applicable to:
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
Parliamentary Privileges and Their Evolution:
• ǡ
Ǥ
• Origin at British Parliament:
Ǥ ǡǡ
• Adoption in Indian context: ̵ ͳǤ ǡ
ǡ ʹǤ ǡ
̵ Ǥ ͵Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ ͶǤ ǡ
• Power to Codify: ͷǤ
Ǥ ǡ ǡ
ǤǤǤǤ
Importance of Parliamentary Privileges:
• Ensuring Functionality:
Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Protection of Members:
ǡ ̵Ǥ
• Preventing External Interference:
Ǥ
48
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Provisions that grant legislators immunity from prosecution
• Article 105 Ǥ
ȋ ͳͻͶǦȌ
• Right to Prohibit Publication of Proceedingsǣ ͳͲͷȋʹȌ
ǡǡ Ǥ
ȋ ͳͻͶȋʹȌǦȌ
• Freedom from Arrest: ǡͳͻͲͺ
ͶͲǤ
o However, this privilege is limited to civil cases. An MP doesn’t enjoy any immunity against action in a criminal
ǡǤ
• Freedom of Speech in Parliament:Article 105(2) states that “No member is liable to any proceedings in any court
for anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or its committees”. This freedom is subject to the provisions
ǡ ͳͳͺǤ
o ǡ ͳʹͳ
Ǥ
• ǣ
ǡǡ ǡǡ
Ǥ
• ǣ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Also, as per the provisions of Article 122, the validity of any proceeding of Parliament can’t be inquired into by a
Ǥ
ROLE OF OPPOSITION
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
Role of Opposition in Indian Democracy:
• Act as the Voice of the Voicelessǣ ǡ
ǡǦ Ǥ
• Ensuring Accountabilityǣ
ǡ ʹͲͳʹ Ǥ
Issues with the Opposition in India:
• Electoral Strengthǣ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ
Ǥ
• United Effortsǣ ǡ
Ǥ
• Defectionǣ Ǧ ǡ
ǡʹͲͳͻ Ǥ
Needed Reforms:
• Legal Reformǣ ͷͷǡ
Ǥ
• Reforms in StatusǣͳͲΨ ̵
ǡͳͻ̵ǡ Ǥ
• National Interestǣ
Ǥ
• Strengthening Anti-Defection Lawǣ Ǧ
Ǥ
49
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• India's ranking is a concerning 141st among 185 countries according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(IPU),ͳͷǤʹΨ Ǥ
• State legislatures present an equally bleak picture, with an average of only 8% women representation.
Bihar and RajasthanͳͳΨͳʹΨǤ
Challenges Hindering Women's Participation in Parliament
• Patriarchal Influence: Ǧ
ǡ ̵ ̵Ǥ
• Work-Life Balance:
Ǥ
• Financial Constraints:
̵ Ǥ
• Identity Masking:
ǡ Ǥ
• Attitudinal Barriers: ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
Significance of Women in Decision-Making Bodies
• Gender-sensitive Approach: Ǧ ǡ
ǡǦǡ Ǥ
• Efficiency in Governance: ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Diversity of perspectives: ǡ
Ǧ
Ǥ
• Enhanced Responsiveness:
ǡ Ǥ
• International commitments and best practices:
ǡ ͷǡ
Ǥ
Suggested Measures for Improvement
• Implement Zipper System: Ǥ
• Challenge Stereotypes: Ǥ
• Promote Inner Party Democracy: Ǥ
• Elevate Women in Local Bodies:
Ǥ
The reservation of seats for women in the institutions of local self-government has had a positive impact in
several ways:
• Increased representation: ǡ
ǦǤ
• Empowerment: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Decision-making: Ǧ ǡ
ǡ ǡǤ
• UN Women (2012) report:
Ǥ
ǡǡ̵Ǥ
However, the reservation policy has faced limitations in addressing the patriarchal character of the Indian
political process:
• Proxy candidates: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Lack of resources and training: ǡǡ
ǡ Ǥ
50
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Entrenched gender stereotypes:
ǡ Ǥ
ͳ Ǥ
ǡ ʹͲʹͶǡ ͳͲ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ Ǧ ȋ Ȍ, ǡ Ǧ
ǡǡ
ANTI-DEFECTION LAW
• The 52nd amendment 1985
legislators may be disqualified on grounds of defection. The main intent of the law was to combat “the evil of political
defections”
• ǣ
51
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• No barrier for Wholesale Defectionǣ
Ǥ
• Issues with merger provisionsǣ ȋ
Ǧ Ȍ
Ǥ
Way forward:
• independent tribunal
Ǥ
• Time line Ǥ
• Ȁ
Ǥ
• ǡ
Ǥ
• Ǥ
52
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Fix the Agenda of the Houseǣǡ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Interpretation of Rules of Procedure:
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
Concerns relating to presiding officer.
• Non adherence to Standard Operating Procedure (SOP):
case of defection Ǥ
Ǥ
• In-appropriate use of money bill provisions: The Supreme Court has accepted a plea with respect to the Speaker’s
ǡʹͲͳǤ
ǡ ǡ ǤǤ
• Failure to maintain decorum:
Ǥ
• Review of the Speaker’s Decisions: ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Impartiality:
elected to the House on a political party’s ticket. In Britain, the Speaker is strictly a nonǦǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ
53
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o Best practicesǣUK’s model of appointing a committee
Ǥ ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
• Cooperation among govt and opposition: ǡ
Ǥ
• Democratic ethos: ǡdemocratic ethos
office and his actions must appear to be objective and neutral as “Justice should not only be done, it must also be
seen to be done”
• Question of disqualificationǣ
the Election commission of India.
• Need amendmentǣ
other democracies of the world such as the US, UK,
Australia, etc.
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
ǡ
Ǥ
Various methods of Parliamentary scrutiny of the government
• Discussion/debate: Ȁǡ
• Question Hour:
Ǥ
• Parliamentary committees:
Ǥ
• Finance Committees: Ǥ
Committee (PAC). The PAC may require the regulator’s officers Ǥ
• Ad-hoc Committees: Ǧ Ǥ
Reasons For Ineffective Parliamentary Scrutiny:
• Not referring bills to the Parliament committees: ͲΨͳͶͳΨ
ͳͷ ǡ ʹΨͳ
Ǥ
• Decline in the number of sittingsǣͳͳǡ͵ͷͶǡ
ǦǤ
• Disruptions during Question Hour: ͳǡ Ψ
ǡ ͶΨ
•
Importance Of Question Hour
Ǥǡ
Ǥǡǡǡ Ǥ
• Ensures Accountability & Transparency:
ǡ Ǥ
54
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Makes Government Accountable:
Ǥ
• Addressing of Questions:
• Extract Wider Debates:
issue. Answers provided at times have extracted wider debates and inquiries on the government’s performance
• Helps Government to Define their Stand:
Ǥ
Way forward:
• Ǥ
• 2nd ARC
Ǧ
• Periodically examined:
ȋȌǡ
Ǥ
• opposition should be proactive
• New parliamentary committees:
ǡ Ǥ
•
• Expert support Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ͳʹͶǡFree speech, Flirting with fascism, Vibrant Democracy, Ad-hoc Committees,
ǡǡ
Previous Year Questions
ͳǤ Ǥ ʹͲʹʹ
Ǧ
Ǥ
ʹǤ ǡ ʹͲʹͳ
Ǥ
͵Ǥ Rajya Sabha has been transformed from a ‘useless Stepney tyre’ to the most useful supporting organ ʹͲʹͲ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ͶǤ ̶ Ǧ ʹͲͳͻ
Ǥ̶Ǥ
ͷǤ Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has ʹͲͳͻ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ ǡͳͻͻ ʹͲͳͷ
Ordinance promulgated by the President? How far will it improve India’s dispute resolution
ǫ Ǥ
Ǥ The ‘Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its members’ as envisaged in Article 105 of ʹͲͳͶ
Ǧ
continue’. Assess the reasons for the absence of the legal cod Ǥ
ǫ
ͺǤ Ǥ ʹͲʹʹ
Ǧ
Ǥ
55
UPSC OFFLINE FOUNDATION COURSE
Based on CTR Model
₹ 47,200/- PWOIAS500
Our Offline Centres
INDIA-UK
Divergence India UK
Jury system
Judicial Ǥ Due process of lawǦε
review Maneka Gandhi case: ‘Due Process of law’.
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
Judicial Collegium systemǣ Judicial appointment Ǧε
appointment Ǥ Ǧε Ǥ
56
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Convergence:
• Independence of judiciaryǣ Ǥ
o Eg.
ͳͻ͵Ǥ
• Alternate dispute resolutionǣ Ǥ
o E.g. ʹͲͲǤǡ
Ǥ
• Accountability: Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Ǧ ǡ Independence of judiciary, ǡ ǡ
ǡǡDue process of law.
57
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Therefore, the founding fathers incorporated in the Constitution itself the provisions of judicial review. This enables
the judiciary to maintain the balance of federalism, to protect the Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
citizens.
IMPORTANT JUDICIAL CONCEPTS
Procedure established by Law Due process of Law
Borrowed British USA
from
•
Ǣ
Test to check
• Ǥ
the validity of
Ǣ
a law
•
Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
Relies upon
Ǥ
Ǥ
Judicial power Ǥ
Ǥ
Protection
against Ǥ Ǥ
PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE
ȋȌǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ
Maneka Gandhi vs. GOI, 1978ǣ ʹͳ Ǥ
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly, 1986:
ͳͶǤ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ protector of
Fundamental rights, ǡ ǡ Judicial review, Interpretation of constitution, doctrine of
separation of powers, ǡ
58
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
JUDICIAL PENDENCY
Average disposal time (Compared to Europe): ͶǤͶ Ǥ
Law commissionǣ ͶͶ ̵Ǥ
ͻǡͷͻͺ
ͷͻǡͺǡͳͶ
Infrastructure • ͳͷǡͷͶͲ ʹͲǡͷͷͺ
Ǥ
• ͲǤͲͻΨ Ǥ
• Ǥ
other • Delayed Investigations:
Ǥ
• ͶΨ Ǥ
59
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Legal Information Management and Briefing System (LIMBSȌ Ǧ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡǡǡǡ Ǥ
• Role of Mediaǣ Ͷ
ǤǤ
Ǥ
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
ǡͷ ȋ͵ʹ ͵ͶȌǡ
Ǥ
Constitutional provision related to appointment:
• Article 124 (2): Appointment of SC judges
o CJI- Ǥ
o Other JudgesǦ Ǥ
• Article 217: Appointment of HC judges
o Chief justice of HC: Ǥ
o Other Judges:
Ǥ
Collegium System:
ǡ
Ǥ
Three-Judge Cases
First Judges Case ( Consultation with CJI doesn’t mean concurrence and it only implies exchange of
Ȍͳͻͺͳ Ǥ Ǥ
Second Judges Case, 1993ǣ ǤǤ
Ǥ ǡ ǦǤ
60
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Permanent independent body: Adequate safeguards to preserve the judiciary’s independence, judicial primacy
Ǥ
• Collaborative process:
Ǥ ǡǡ
ǡǤ
• Objective eligibility criteria: ǦǤ
o
Ǥ
• Collegium must provide a panel of possible names to the President
Ǥ
• Law Commission: ǡ
Ǧε Ǥ
REMOVAL OF JUDGES
ǣ
• Article 124(4)ǣ Ǥ
• Ground: ‘proved misbehavior’ or ‘incapacity’ only after a motion to this effect is passed by both the Houses of
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Three-Judge Cases, Memorandum of Procedure, ǡ
ȋ Ȍ ͳͻͺǡ
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Ǥ
ǤǤ
Ǥ
Need of judicial accountability:
• To uphold public trust: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Judicial Appointmentǣ
Ǥ
61
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Conflict of Interest : ǤE.gǤ
Ǧ ǤǤ
• Conduct of judges: ǡ
Ǥ
• Opacity in operation: judicial independence judiciary restricts outside body’s involvement in
Ǧ Ǥ
• Information asymmetryǣ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Contempt of court: ǤE.g.
Ǥ
• Judicial overreach: ǤǤ
ǡ Ǥ
• Judicial Independence: ǡ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Steps taken to ensure judicial accountability:
• ‘Restatement of Values of Judicial Life’ ͳͻͻ Bangalore Principles
of Judicial Conduct in 2002.
• Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 Ǧ
ǡ Ǥ
• ȋȌǦ Ǥ
• Draft Memorandum of Procedure, 2016:
o Include “merit and integrity” as “prime criteria” for the appointment of judges.
o
• SC vs Subhash Chandra Agrawal caseǣ Ǥ
Steps required:
• Ǥ Ǥ
ǦArun Shourie
• Independent judicial Lokapal Ǥ
• Comprehensive code
• Two-level judicial discipline model Ǧͳǣ ȀǢʹǣǤ
• Awareness and sensitivity of the appointees to the country’s diversity ǦǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ
62
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Judicial reviewǣ
ǡ
• PILǣǡ
Ǥ
•
•
Benefits of Judicial activism:
• Checks and balance: ǤǤ
Ǥ
• Judges wisdom: E.gǤ ǤǤ
• locus standi to public interest litigation
Ǥ
• Complete delivery of justice: ͳͶʹͶͲ
Ǥ
• Speedy solution: ǤE.g Banning of old vehicles in Delhi.
Issues with Judicial Activism:
• Exceeding Power: ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Hampering Spirit of Constitutionǣ
Ǥ
• Tyranny of Unelectedǣ
Ǥ
• Personal Agendaǣ
Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Lack of expertise: Ǥ
ǤǣǦ ʹͲʹͲ
Ǥ
Concerns over Judicial overreach:
• Undermining the doctrine of SOP: ͳͶʹǤ
ǡ Ǥ
• Negligence of the challenges faced by legislature and Executive:
Ͷ ǤǤ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ
Ͷ ǤǤ
• Lack of accountability of the judiciary: Judiciary is not accountable to the people. Power of ‘Contempt of court’
Ǥ
• Selfish motives ǤǤǤ
• Uncertainty in laws - ǤǤ
• Knee jerk reaction:
Ǥ ǤǤ ͷͲͲ
Ǥ
ͶǤʹΨͶͶǤʹΨ ǦǤ
Way ahead:
•
• Ǧ Ǧ
• ͳͶʹ Ǥ
Ǧ
• Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
63
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ
Usage
Ǥ
Examples ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ
Famous Case ʹ ͳͻͻͶǡ Ǥ
ͳͻͻͺ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
CONTEMPT OF COURT
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines contempt of Court Civil contempt:
ǡ ǡ ǡǡǡ
Ǥ
Constitutional provision:
• Article 129 and 215ǣ
Ǥ
• Article 142(2):
Ǥ
Need of contempt power:
• Upheld court honour: Ǥ
Pritam Lal v. The High Court of M.P
ǡ
.
• Rule of Law: Disobedience of court’s order violates the principle of Rule of Law. Hence contempt power holds
Ǥ
• Equality before law: Ǥ
• Independence of the judiciary: Ǥ
• Reasonable restricts: ͳͻȋͳȌ
Ǥ
• Law Commission (274th report): ǤE.gǤ ͳ͵
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 : If the degree of harm is slight and beneath notice, the court won’t punish for contempt
• Interference in justice Administration: The High Court in Brahma Prakash Sharma v State of Uttar Pradesh
observed that it
Ǥ
Argument against:
• Free Speech and Expression
64
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Judicial accountability: Ǥ
should not be a matter of concern as long as it doesn’t obstruct Justice delivery.
• Vague grounds: ǦǤ
• Against the Principle of Natural justice: Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• International practices:
o USA:
Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Period of Limitationǣ
Ǥ
Way forward:
• Reduce discretion: Ǥ
• Identify the difference Ǥ
• Proportional Punishment: Ǥ
Ǥ
• NCRWC: ǤǤ
• Elements of ‘mens rea’ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
WOMEN IN JUDICIARY
ǡǦ Ǥ
Reasons for lower representation of women:
• Social Factor ǣǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Seniority Principleǣ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• Lack of judicial infrastructure: ǡ
Ǥ ͲͲͲ ǡ
ʹʹΨ Ǥ
• No Women Reservationǣ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Eligibility criteria for entrance exams: A major barrier to women’s recruitment as district judges is the eligibility
Ǥ
o ͵ͷǦͶͷǤ
• Low Representation of Women in Litigationǣ ǡ
Ǥ
• Frequent transfersǣǤ
Ǥ
• Patriarchal societyǣ ȋ Ȍ
Importance of women representation:
• Encourage more women to report casesǤǣ Ǧε
65
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Justice Quality:
Ǥ
• Public trust: ǡ ǡ
• Breaking Patriarchal Barrier Ǥ
• Global commitment: ͷ ͳ gender equality and women’s representation in public
Ǥ
• Diversity in Viewsǣ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Flip to Women empowermentǣ
Ǥ
Way forward:
• Effective long-term plan: ǡ
Ǥ
• Gender sensitization: “old school” “patriarchal” ǡshould be sensitized to prevent them
from Ǥ
• Retaining women in profession:
Ǥ
• Societal mindset: Ǥ
• Reservation:
Ǥ
FAST TRACK COURTS
• ǡ Ǧ ȋ Ȍ Ǧ
ȋ ȌǤ
•
Ǥ
• Article 247 Ǧ
Ǥ
Historical evolution:
• 11th finance commission (2000): ͳ͵Ͷ Ǧε
Ǥ
• ǡǡ
• ʹͲͲͷǣͳͷʹ Ǧε ʹͲͳͳǦεʹͲͳͳǣͳͳͻʹ Ǥ
• ǦʹͲͳͳǣ Ǥ
• 14th Finance CommissionǣͳͺͲͲ ȋǤͶͳͶͶǤͲͲ Ȍ
ȋͶʹΨȌǤ
• Ministry of Law and Justice Ǧ ͳͲʹ͵ ǡ
ȋȌǤ
• ǣʹȀͳͳ ǡ Ǥ
Advantages of FTC:
• Reducing pendency: Ǥ
• Judicial efficacy: Ǧε Ǧε Ǥ
• Promote specialization: Ǥ
Ǥ
• consistency and predictability: Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ
66
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Act as a deterrentǣ Ǥ
• Increase in effectivenessǣ ǡ
promoting people’s confidence in the justice delivery mechanism in India.
Issues faced:
• Systemic issues:
o ǤǤǤ
Ǥ
o Ad-Hocismǣ ǡ Ǥ
• Heavy workload: Ǧε
• No special or speedier procedure: ǤȋʹͲͳͺȌǣͺΨʹͺǡͲͲͲ
Ǥ
• Lack of infrastructureǣ
Ǧε
• Financial constraints: Brij Mohan Lal caseǦ ǤǤǤ
ȋ ʹͲͳͻȌͷΨ Ǥ
• Lack of Coordination: ǦεǤǦ Ǧε
ǡ Ǥ
Way Forward:
• Capacity building and improving infrastructure: ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
o ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Modern technologiesǣǡ
Ǥ
• Sensitizing State Governments: ǡ
Ǧε Ǥ
• Coordination: Ǧε Ǧε
Ǥ
• Holistic approach: ǡ Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
67
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o ǡ Ȁ ǡ
Ǥ
68
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Lack of motivation:
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Demand for money:
ǡ
Ǥ
• Inefficiency:
Ǥ
Ǥ
Way Forward:
• Encourage more lawyers
Ǥ
• The use of ICTǡ ǡ
ͳͳǤ
• Incentivising lawyer
• International experienceǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
as “essential services”.
Ǧͳ̶ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: C ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡǡǡǡ Ǥ
69
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Delay and Underutilisation of resourcesǣ
Ǥ
ǤǤ
• Judiciary’s dependence on the Executiveǣ ǡ ǡ
ȋȌǤ
Need for Reforms in Judicial Infrastructure:
• High Pendencyǣ ͶǤͶ Ǥ
ǡǡ20 years for a property ǡ
324 years just to clear the present backlog Ǥ
• Issues with enforcing Contractsǣ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Digitization of Judiciary: ͳͻ ǡ
Ǥǡ73% of courtrooms
Ǧ Ǥ
• Lack of accountabilityǣ
ǡ Ǥ
• Underutilisation of funds:Ǧjudicial purposes. Out of total ₹981.98
ʹͲͳͻǦ20 under CSS, only ₹84.9 crore was utilised by a combined five States, rendering the
ͻͳǤ͵ΨǤ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ President’s Rule,
ǡ Ȁ ǡ ǡ
70
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
71
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Promote as a careerǣ ǡǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Expand scope: Ǧ Ǥ
• Attitudinal change: Ǥ
• Other measures: ǡǡǤ
• Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill: ȋȌ ǡ
ʹͲʹͳ Ǥ
• Arbitration Council of IndiaǣȀ Ǣ Ǥ
o Ǥ
LOK ADALAT
• Philosophy: Lok Adalat is a unique system developed in India. It means people’s court and is based
Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ
o Ǧ ͳͻͺʹǤ
• Jurisdictionǣ ȋȌ Ǧȋ
ȌǤ
o Ȁ ǡȋ Ȍ ǡ
Ǥ
o Ǧ ȋȌǤ
• Present Statusǣ
ͳͻͺǤ
• Organising authorityǣȀ Ȁ Ȁ
Ǥ
• Membersǣ ȋȌǡȋ Ȍ Ǥ
• Power of civil courtǣ
o ȋͳͻͲͺȌǡ
ȋͳͻ͵Ȍ
o Ǥ
o
Ǥ
• Mobile Lok Adalat systems:
Ǥ
GRAM NYAYALAYAS
EVOLUTION OF GRAM NYAYALAYAS
Law Commission in the 114th report recommended establishing them with the following purpose:
•
• ͷͲΨ
• Ǥ
• Gram Nayalayas Act, 2008: ͷͲͲͲ
ǤͳͶͲͲ ȀǤ
• The uniqueness of Gram Nyayalayas:
o Mobile courts: ȋ
ȌǤ
o Appointed:
o Powers:
o Aim: Ǥ
o Not bound by the rules of evidence: ͳͺʹǡ
Ǥ
o Appeal: Ǥ
o Established:
72
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
REASON FOR POOR FUNCTIONING OF GRAM NYAYALAYA
• Overlapping jurisdiction:
Ǥ
• Lack of attention:ͳͶͲͲ Ǧ
Ǥ
o
Ǥ
• Lack of Human resources: ǡǦǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Lack of clarity:
ǡ Ǥ
• Lack of awareness: ǤǤǡǡ
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Mass awareness campaignsǣ
Ǥ
• Establishing permanent Gram Nyayalayaǣ
ǡ Ǥ
• A cadre of Gram Nyayadhikari:
Ǥ
• Change in Working: ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Other measures: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
73
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Undermining Judicial Authority: Ǥ
ǡ ǡǦ ǤȋL. Chandrakumar’s caseǣͳ Ȍ
• Lack of autonomy: Ǧε ǡ ǡ
Ǧ.
• Low transparency: ǡ Ǧǡ
ǡǤ
• Increasing Pendency: ͵Ǥͺȋ ͶǤ͵Ȍ
• Overlapping Jurisdiction:
Ǥǡ Ǥ
• Delayed awards: Cauvery Interstate water dispute tribunal ͳͻͻͲ ͳ
ʹͲͲǤ Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Law Commission:
• Qualification of judges: Ǧε Ǥ
• Appointment: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Vacancy: Ǥ
• Selection of the members: Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• Tenure: Ǧε͵ȀͲ ǦǦε͵ȀǤ
• Accessibilityǣ Ǥ
• Aligning with the basic structure:
Ǥ
TRIBUNAL REFORMS ACT 2021
ǡʹͲʹͳ ǡǤǡ
ʹǡʹͲʹͳǤ ǡǤ
FEATURES
• Qualifications of tribunal membersǣ
o ȋ ǡȌ Ǥ
• Search and selection committeesǣ
o
Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ǡ
Ǥ
• Eligibility and term of officeǣ Ǧ Ǥ
Ͳ Ǥ
o ͷͲǤ
• Uniform compensation and rulesǣ
Ǥ
• It also allows for the removal of tribunal members.
Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ
• Pay and allowancesǣ
̵
Ǥ
74
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
• Article 262: ǡ ǣ
o ǡ
ǡǡǦǤ
o
Ǥ
• Article 246: 7th Schedule Ǧ
o use ȏȐ
o regulating ȏȐ
• Parliament has enacted two laws
o River Boards Act, 1956: Central government
Ǥ
o Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956:
ǦǤ
ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
• Definition: ǡ particularly small- and medium-value casesǡ
ȋȌǡ ǡǡǤ
CURRENT STATUS
• Low ranking: ͳ͵ ǡͳͺʹͲͳͷͳ͵
ʹͲͳ Ǥ
• High Project Cost: ǡȋͶȌ ȋ
͵ͲΨ ȌǤ
• Srikrishna Committee: ̵ȋʹͲͳȌǡ
Ǥ
BENEFITS OF ODR
• Increased access to justice:
ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Improve legal health of the society:
Ǥ
• Convenient and quick dispute resolutions: Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• Cost effective:
Ǥ
• Removes unconscious bias: ǡ ̵ Ǥ
Ǧ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
75
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Digital infrastructureǣ ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ
o Ǥ
• Lack of awareness regarding ODRǣ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Privacy issuesǣǡ
ǡ Ȁ
ǦǤ
WAY AHEAD
• Improving digital connectivity and digital literacy:
Ǥ ̵
Ǥ
• Adoption of ODR for Government litigation mechanismǣ ǡ
government departments are a party to around ‘46 per cent’ of court cases.
• Capacity buildingǣ ǦǦ
Ǥ
• Augmenting archaic laws and regulation of the ODR mechanismǣ
̵Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
76
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
THE PANCHAYATS
Local self-government in India empowers local bodies to govern their jurisdictions, fostering democratic values and
grassroots development. It ensures effective governance, citizen participation, and delivery of essential services at the
local level.
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACED BY PANCHAYATI RAJ GOVERNMENT
Recently, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its report titled “Finances of Panchayati Raj Institutions”. The report
ʹͲʹͲǦʹͳʹͲʹʹǦʹ͵Ǥ
3Fs (Functions, Funds, and Functionaries) Ǥ
FUNDS:
• Inadequate Fundsǣǡ
ǦǤ
• Inadequate Powers To Generate Revenue: Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• State Finance Commission:
ʹͶ͵ȋ ȌǤ
o ͳͷ ʹͲʹͶ
Ǥ
• Reluctant To Tax Locals:
ǡǡǤ
FUNCTIONS:
• Poor Devolution Of Functions To Local Bodiesǣ ʹͶ͵ Ǥ
o Example: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥǡ Ǥ
• Unfunctional District Planning Committeeǣ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Women Have Token Representation:
ͷͲΨ
ǡ
Ǥ
FUNCTIONARIES:
• Low Manpower: ̵
Ǥǡ
ǡ Ǣǡ
Ǥ
77
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Missing Accountability Mechanismsǣ Ǥ
Ǥ
o ͳͷ
Ǧ Ǥ
• Delayed Electionsǣ
Ǥ ǡ ǡǤ
• Politicization of PRIsǣǡ ǡ
Ǥ
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS FOR EMPOWERING PRI
• Ensuring Property Rights: ̵ ̵
Ǥ
• Capacity Building of PRIs : ȋ Ȍ ͳʹͲͳͺǡ
Ǥ
• e-Gram Swaraj:
Ǥ
• Gram Panchayat Development Plan (GPDP):
ȋȌ Ǧ
in a participatory manner under people’s Plan Campaign.
• Capacity Building- Panchayat Sashaktikaran Abhiyan (CB-PSA): Ȁ
ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
STEPS TO BE TAKEN
• Fiscal Federalism in True Spiritǣʹ Ǧ
Ǥ ȋ ȌʹͲʹͲǦ
ʹͳʹͲʹͳǦʹͲʹ ͲͷͲ ʹ͵ͺͲͷ
Ǥ
• District Level Planning: ǡ
district levels through people’s participation in the gram and ward sabhas.
• Audit Committeesǣ
ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Financial Empowerment: ǡǡ ǡǡ Ǥǡ
Ǥ
• Separate Cadre:
ǡǤ
• Ǧ ȋ Ȍǡ Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
• Ǧ ȋ Ȍ– ʹͲͳͺ Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, 3Fs (Function, Fund, and Functionaries),
ǡ Ǥ
78
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
POSITIVE OUTCOMES AND EMPOWERMENT:
• ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Ǧ
Ǥ
• Ǥ
• ǡ ǡ ǡǤ
• ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
• ǡ Ǧǡ
Ǥ
CHALLENGES AND ISSUES:
• Panchayat pati raj sysytem: Ǧ
•
Ǥ
• ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Both visiting the gram panchayat office and managing and controlling the gram Sabha’s were prohibited for Dalit
Ǥǡ Ǥ
THE MUNICIPALITIES
ǡ ȋȌ
Ǥ
ǡǤǤǡ
• ȋȌ Ǥ
• ǤǤǡǡǡǡǡ
NEED FOR CAPACITY BULIDING FOR ULBS
• To cater the needs of increasing India’s urban Population ͶͲ
ȋʹͲͳͺȌͺʹͲͷͲǤ
• To deal with regional aspirations ǦǤ
• For successful and effective implementation ǡ Ǥ
IMPACT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
• Decentralization of Power: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Community Participation: ǡ
ǡǤ
• Effective Service Delivery: ǡ
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
• Grassroots Development: ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Empowerment of Marginalized Communities: ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
ISSUES IN MUNICIPALITIES
• Lesser Functional Autonomy Of ULBǣͳʹ Ͷǡͳͺ
Ǥ
o ǡ
Ǥ
• Low Revenue: Ǥ ǡ
ǡǡ Ǥ
• Concentration of Power: ȋ
ǡ ǡ ȌǤ
79
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Poor Link With Urban Citizens: Ǧǡ
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Leveraging City Economyǣ Ǥ ǡCity
Economic Councils
ǡ Ǥ
• Encourage Transfer Of FFFǣ ͳʹ ǡ
Ǥ
• Strengthening Finances Of ULB’s And Civic Agenciesǣ Ǧ ǡ
ǡ ǡǦ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• Citizen Participationǣ
ǡǡ Ǥ
o Ward Committees Ǧenabled ‘Open Cities Framework’ and
Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Panchayat pati raj system, ǡ ǡ
Decentralization of Power, Community Participatioǡ ǡ ǡ
Functional Autonomy, City Economic Councils, ǡǦ ǡ
Ǥ
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
Ǥ
Need for fair and timely Municipal Elections:
• The ‘First-mile’ Connect: Municipalities are critical since councilors serve as ‘first mile’ elected citizens’
Ǥ
• Tackle grassroots level issues: ʹͳǦ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Challenges in Municipal Elections
• Untimely electionsǣǦ ǤȋʹͲʹʹȌ
Ǥ
o ͳǡͷͲͲ ʹͲͳͷʹͲʹͳ Ǥ
• Delay in Council Formationǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Delimitation and reservation: ǡ
Ǥ
• Inconsistent Mayoral terms: ǡͳΨ
Ǥ
80
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o ǡ
Ǥ
• SECs lack power:
Ǥ
Way Forward
• The power of delimitation:
Ǥ
• Empowering SECsǣ
ǡǡ Ǥ
o ǣ Ǧ
Ǥ
Previous Year Questions
ͳǤ ǡǡ ʹͲʹͲ
ǫ
ʹǤ ʹͲʹͲ
‘Functions, Functionaries and Funds to the contemporary stage of ‘Functionality’. Highlight the
Ǥ
͵Ǥ “The reservation of seats for women in the institution of local selfǦ ʹͲͳͻ
impact on the patriarchal character of the Indian political process”. Comment.
ͶǤ Ǥ ʹͲͳͺ
ǡ ǫ
ͷǤ “The local selfǦ ʹͲͳ
governance”. Critically examine the statement and give your views to improve the situation.
Ǥ Ǧ level government system, `Panchayats’ and ʹͲͳͷ
‘Samitis’ have Ǥ
Ǥ
Comprehensive Answers
with Model Approach
9920613613 pwonlyias.com
81
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
IN INDIA IN BRITAIN
• India’s CAG is ̶ ̶ • Ǣ Ǥ
Ǥ •
• without CAG’s approval.
Ǥ ǤǤǦ Ǥ • Ǥ
• Ǥ
INDEPENDENCE OF CAG
• Security of tenure: Ǥ ͷ
Ǥ
82
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Removalǣ Ǥ
• Post-retirement officeǣ Ǥ Salary and other
service conditions:
ȀǤ
• Expenses: ǡǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Administrative powers:
ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
• No minister can represent the CAGǣȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
LIMITATION OF OFFICE OF CAG
• Appointment: • Discourage risk-taking:
the ‘wisdom, faithfulness, economy’ of policy, may
Ǥ Ǥ
• The auditor general and not comptroller: • Independence:
Ǧ ǡǤǤ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
• Limited usefulness: ǡ Ǥ
Ǣ • Secret expenditureǣ
Ǥ
• Shorter tenure: ͷ Ǥ
Ǥ • Intentional obstruction in auditsǣ
• Exceeding mandate:
Ǥ ǤǤ Ǥ
ʹ • No criteria for appointment:
Ǥ Ǣ
• Limited resources: Ǥ
• Lack of statutory recognition:
Ǥ Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ’ Connect, ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡǡ
ǡǡǡ Ǥ
Previous Year Question
ͳǤ “The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has a very vital role to play.” Explain how this is reflected ʹͲͳͺ
ǤȋʹͲͳͺȌ
ʹǤ Exercise of CAG’s powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and the States is derived from Article ʹͲͳ
149 of the Indian Constitution. Discuss whether an audit of the Government’s Policy implementation
ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
83
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
COMPOSITION
Composition: Chairman + Vice chairman + 3 members = Appointed by President.
GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF NCSC/NCST/NCBC
• Investigate and monitor ǡ
Ǥ
• Inquire into specific complaints ǡǤ
• Participate and advise Ǧ
Ǥ
• Send Annual reports ǡ Ǥ
• Recommend measures
ǡǡ Ǧ Ǥ
• Online complaintsǣ Ǥ
• Special courtsǣ
ǡͳͻͺͻǤ
• Collect Statisticsǣ ͳͻͷͷ
ͳͻͺͻǤ
• Law implementationǣ
ǡ Ǥ
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF NCST:
• Conferring ownership ȋ ȌǤ
• Measures for the development of tribals Ǥ
• Seek Cooperation and involvement Ǥ
• ǡ
• Safeguard the rights Ǧ ǡ
ǤǤ
• Improve the efficacy Ǥ
• Ǥ
LIMITATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL BODIES TO PROTECT VULNERABLE SECTIONS:
• ǡ Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Commission’s recommendations are not binding.
• Ǥ
• ǡǤ
102ND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT 2018
• It added a new Article 338-B, Ǥ
•
Ǥ
84
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Giving more teethǣ • Non-binding recommendationǣ
Ǥ
Ǥ • No power to defineǣ
• Greater objectivity: ͵Ͷʹ “backwardness”. Hence, it cannot address the demands
̵ Ǥ
• Compositionǣ
Ǥ
•
Ǥ Ǥ
• Annual reportǣ • Revision of BC listǣ ͵͵ͺ ȋͷȌ
Ǥ
Ǥ • Multi-dimensional challengesǣ
• Grievance redressalǣ status can’t solve diverse issues like skewed
Ǣ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ • No link with Art 340ǣ ͵ͶͲ
• Wider responsibilityǣ
ǡ ͵͵ͺǤ
Ǥ
85
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 312 • ȋ
ȌǢ Ǥ
• ǡ ǡ
Article 315 to 323 Ǥ
•
ǡ Ǥ
UPSC SPSC
• Compositionǣ • Compositionǣ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Strengthǣ Ǥͻ • Strengthǣ
ͳͳǤ Ǥ
• No qualifications • No qualifications
ͷͲΨ ͷͲΨ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Termǣ Ȁ ͷ Ǣ • TermǣȀʹǢ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Removal: • Removal:
ǡ
ǡǤ
Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ
INDEPENDENCE OF COMMISSION
• Conditions of service: ȋ Ȍ Ƭ
Ǥ
• Expenses: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Security of tenure:
Ǥ
• Post-retirement:
Ǥ
o ȀǤ
Ǥ
o ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
o ǢǤ
86
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
9920613613 pwonlyias.com
87
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INTRODUCTION
ȋ Ȍ
͵ʹͶǤ ǡ ǡ
ǡǡǡ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
APPOINTMENT PROCESS OF ECI UNDER QUESTION:
Election Commission: The Need for Evolution in the Appointment Process and Bolstering its Autonomy.
Background of the Judgement: ʹͲͳͷǡ
Ǥ
ǡ
“constitutional vacuum”.
Supreme Court (SC) on the Appointment of ECs:
Judgment: Ǧ ʹͲʹ͵ǡ
Ǧ ǣ
• ǡ
• ǡ
• Ǥ
The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service
and Term of Office) Act, 2023: ȋ
Ȍ ǡͳͻͻͳǤ
Novel Features of the Act:
• ǡ
Ǧǡǡȋ
ȌǤ
• Ǥ
Ǥ
• ǣǣȋȌǡȋȌ
ǡȋȌ ȋȌǤ
ǣ Ǥ
Key Issues and Challenges with the Act:
• Selection criteriaǣ ǡ Ǥ
• Selection Committee’s recommendations to be valid in spite of vacancy or defect in the Constitutionǣ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Reduced status: Making the CEC and EC’s salary equivalent to the Cabinet Secretary may lead to government
Ǥ ǡǦ
Ǥ
88
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o Registration:
Ǥ
o Code of conductǣƬ Ǥ
• Advisoryǣ
Ǥ
• Quasi-Judicialǣ
Ǥ
INDEPENDENCE
• Security of tenure:
Ǥ
o
Ǥ
• Condition of Service:
Ǥ
CONCERNS WITH ELECTION COMMISSIONERS
• Lack of fixed tenure:
Ǥ
• Potential for post-retirement appointments:
Ǥ
• Accountability and transparency:
̵ Ǧ Ǥ
• Conflict of interest:
Ǥ
• Lack of prescribed qualifications:
Ǥ
• Inadequate enforcement powers:
Ǥ
STEPS TO ADDRESS ISSUES IN APPOINTMENT:
• 2nd ARC: ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Supreme Court: Ǥ
• Constitutional Protection:
ǡǡ Ǥ
• Fair Elevation: Ǧ
ǡ Ǥ
ISSUES FACED BY ELECTION COMMISSION
• Allegation of Partisan Role: ǡ
ȋȌǦǤ
• Lack of Power: ͵ʹͶǡ
Ǧ Ǥ
• Lack of Proactive Use of Authority:
ǡ Ǥ
• Politicization: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Non-transparency:
ǡ Ǥ
• Criminalization of Politics:
Ǥ
89
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Other Challenges with the ECI:
• Use of EVM and VVPAT, an issue of transparencyǣ
ȋ ȌǤǡ ǡ
Ǧ Ǥ
• Challenges in ensuring intra-party democracyǣ ʹͻ ǡ
ǡ ǦǡƬ Ǧ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ
ǡ Ǧǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Lack of Parity in the removal of ECs and CECǣ
of judges of the Supreme Court (SC). The ECs can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation. There is a good case
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Enhance Independence and Impartiality:
ǡ Ǥ
• Strengthen Powers: ǡ
Ǥ
• Proactive Enforcement: Ǧ Ǥ
• Inner-Party Democracy and Financial Regulation:
Ǥ
• Post-Retirement Employment Restrictions: Ǧ
Ǥ
• EVM Security and Trust-Building: Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǧ ǡ
Ǧ ǡǡ Ǥ
90
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Expenditure: • Practical difficulties:
Ǥ Ǥ
• Policy Paralysis: • Constitutional hurdles:
Ǥ
Ǥ • Anti-federalism:
• Resource Savings: Ǥ
Ǥ • Reduces accountability:
• Social Harmony: Ǥ
Ǥ • Grassroots economy:
• ǣ Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ • False arguments related to MCC:
• Global Experiences: Ǥ
• Against multiparty democracy:
Ǥ Ǥ
• Invisible Socio-Economic Costs: • Inconsistent with Westminster democracy and
ǡ federalism:
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ • The disadvantage to regional parties:
• Engagement of Security Forces: Ǥ
• ǣ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
91
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
WAY FORWARD:
• Law Commission's recommendations to address hurdles:
o Amend the constitution and RPA, 1951: Ǧ
ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ
o Full house election of PM/CM: Ǥ
o Dilute anti-defection law: Ǥ
o Two-phase elections: ǡ
ǦǤ
o Scheduled bye-elections: Ǥ
• Election Commission recommendations:
o For Lok Sabha:
▪ Ǧ
Ǥ
▪ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
o For Legislative Assembly:
▪ Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
▪
̵Ǥ
ǡ ̵ ǡ̵
Ǥ
Ǥǡ Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ Ǧ ǡ Ǧ ǡ Ǧ ǡ
ǡ ǡ ǡǤ
92
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Transparency: • Lack of secrecy:
Ǧ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• The integrity of the election: • Storage and counting concerns:
̵ ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Cost-effective: • Lack of verifiability:
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• Deterrent to booth capturing: Ǥ
• Technological failures:
Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
Reduced human error: With EVMs, the chances of
human errors, such as invalid or wrongly marked ballot Ǥ
papers, are significantly reduced, ensuring a more Manipulation during transportation: EVMs are
accurate electoral process. transported from storage locations to polling stations,
creating opportunities for tampering or unauthorized
access. The security of EVMs during transit has been a
subject of concern, especially in regions with political
tensions or inadequate logistical arrangements.
INITIATIVES OF ECIS TO COUNTER THE CONCERNS:
• VVPAT alongside EVMs:
Ǥ
• Counting of VVPAT slips:
ǡ Ǥ
• EVM challenge:
ǡ Ǥ
• Inclusive participation:
ǡ Ȁǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• EVM prototype for migrants: ȋȌ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Voter education: ̵
ǡ
Ǥ
93
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
WAY FORWARD:
• Procedural change: Ǥ
• Manual counting: ͳͲΨ
Ǥ
• Supreme Court: Ǥ
• Totalizer Machines:
ǦǤ
• Safety demonstration: ǡʹͲͳǡ
Ǥ
• Human resources:
Ǥ
CONCLUSION:
• ǡ ̵
ǦǤ
Ǥ
ǡ ȋȌ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǦ ǡ
Ǥ
NOTA
Background:
ȋȌ ʹͲͳ͵
̵ȋȌǤ Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ
94
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Resource wastage:
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
ʹͲͳ͵
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT (MCC)
ȋȌ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
ͳͻͲǤ ͳͻʹǡ
Ǥ
ͳͻͻͳ Ǥ
EVOLUTION:
• 1960:
Ǥ
• 1962:
Ǥ
• 1991: ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
• 1993: Ǥ
• 2013: ̶̶ȋȌ
ȋȌǤ
• 2019:
Ǥ
CHALLENGES:
• Challenges of the Digital Age:
ǡ Ǥ
• Limited Enforcement Power: ǡ
Ǥ
• Lack of Clarity: ǡ
Ǥ
• Time-Bound Effectiveness: Ǧǡ
ǡǦ Ǥ
• Limited Scope:
ǡ Ǥ
• Loopholes: Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
95
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
WAY FORWARD:
• Strengthening penalties: ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ For exampleǡ ʹͲͳͻ ǡ
Ǥ
• Improved monitoring:
ǤFor exampleǡʹͲͳͻ ǡ
Ǥ
• Addressing loopholes:
ǤFor exampleǡʹͲͳͻ ǡ
Ǥ
• Awareness campaigns:
ǤFor exampleǡʹͲͳͻ ǡ
̶̶ Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ ǡͳͺͲǡ
ǡͳͻͷͳǡ ǡ Ǥ
ELECTION FUNDING
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
CHALLENGES WITH ELECTION FUNDING:
• Anonymity concerns with electoral bonds: ʹͲͳ
ǡ
Ǥ
• Opacity in funding sources: ȋȌǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Escalating campaign expenses: ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Transparency challenges: ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
• Limited public funding: Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
96
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
CONCERNS ADVANTAGES
• The Supreme Court • Enhanced Transparencyǣ
ͳͻȋͳȌȋȌǤ
• Selective Anonymity and Confidentiality: Ǥ
the scheme provides for “selective anonymity” and “selective • Preservation of Donor Anonymityǣ
confidentiality” as the details of electoral bonds are available
ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
Ǥ • Accountability Assuranceǣ
• Right to Know Source of Funding:
government’s contention that voters do not have the right to ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Need for a New Balanced Systemǣ • Discouragement of Cash Transactions:
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
Way Forward:
• National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001)ǣ
Ǧ Ǥ
o State Funding of Elections
Ǥ
• Chilean Experiment –ǣǡ
Ǥ
without revealing the donor’s identity.
State Funding of Elections: ǡ ǡ
ȀǤ
NEED CHALLENGES
Lack of Transparency in Political Funding: The burden on Taxpayers:
Ǥ Ǥ
Potential for Corruption: Potential Misuse of Public Funds:
ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ there’s a risk that public money could be wasted
Policy Capture: Ǥ
Ǥ Unfair to Non-Political Causes:
Ǥ
Unequal Playing Field: ǡǡ
ǡ Ǥ
ȋ No Guarantee of Fairness:
ȌǤ
Black Money and Illicit Funding: ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ Free Speech Concerns:
Frivolous Spending: ǡ
ǡ
ǡ Ǥǡ Ǥ Ǥ
97
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Voter Manipulation: ǡ Government Influence:
ǡ Ǥǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Criminal Nexus: Ǥ
ǡǡ Ǥ One-size-fits-all approach: ǡ
ǡ ǡ
ǦǦǦ
Ǥ
Committees:
• Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998):
Ǥ
• Law Commission Report on Electoral Reforms (1999):
Ǥ
• Second Administrative Reforms Commission Report (2008Ȍǣ
Ǥ
• National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001)ǣ
Ǧ Ǥ
WAY FORWARD:
• Digital transactions:
Ǥ
• Limiting anonymous donations: ʹͲΨ
Ǧ Ǥ
• Transparency through RTI: ȋ Ȍ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• National electoral fund: ǡ
Ǥ
• State funding of elections:
ȋʹȌ ǡ Ǥ
• Expenditure cap on political parties: ǡ
Ǥ
CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS
ǡ
ȋȌ
ȋȌǤ
• ʹͲͳͻ ǡ Ͷ͵Ψ Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ ȋȌ
Ǥ
• ʹͲʹʹǡ
ͷǡͲͲͲ ʹͲʹͳǤ
DEFINITION
•
ǡ ȋȌ
ȋȌǤ
98
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
REASON FOR THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS
Nexus between politicians Disqualification after conviction: Trust deficit:
and bureaucracy: ǡ
ͳͻͷͳ
Ȁ ǡ Ǥ
ǡ ̵ Lack of infrastructure: ǣ
ǡ Ǥǣ ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ ǡ ʹ
ǡ
Ǥ
ǡ Limited powers:
Ǥ ǡ ͺ
̵Ǥ Narrow interest: ǡ
Corruption: ǡ ̵ ǡ Ǥ
ǣ
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
Vote-buying: Lower conviction rate:
Ǥ ǡ
ʹͲͳͻ ǡ Ǥ ǣ
Ͷ͵Ψ
ǡ ǡ Ǥǣ
Ǥ ̵
ǡ Ψǡ
Ǥ
ͶΨ Ǥ
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS:
• Parliament's credibility undermined:
Ǥ
• Corruption breeding ground:
Ǥ
• Limited voter choice: Criminal ǡ Ǥ
• Poor governance impact: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Judicial faith in question: ̵ Ǥ
• Disrupting social harmony: ǡ Ǥ
STEPS TAKEN BY SUPREME COURT
JUDGEMENT IMPORTANCE
ͳͻͻ
ǡͳͻͺͺǤ
ǡʹͲͲʹ
ʹ
ǡʹͲͳ͵
Ǥ
People’s Union for Civil Liberties
ǡ
ǡʹͲͳͶ
ǡ
ͳ
ʹͲͳͶǤ
99
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
ʹͲͳͺ
Ǥ
Ƭ
ʹͲͳͺ Ǥ
ƬǤ
Ǥ ƬǤʹͲʹͲ Ƭ
100
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
POLITICS OF FREEBIE
A webinar titled ‘Freebies Culture and its Impact on Indian Politics & Democracy’ was organized by the Association
ȋȌ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
Freebies:
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in a bulletin in June 2022 defined ‘freebies’ as “a public welfare measure that is
Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡǤ
Concerns associated with excessive use of freebies:
• Heavy Tax Burden on Statesǣǡ
ǤPunjab’s electricity subsidy constitutes over 16 percent of its total revenues.
• Against Constitutional Principlesǣ
Ǥ
• Shrinkage of fiscal spaceǣǡ
Ǥ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
• Violation of the principle of a level-playing fieldǣ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡǡ Ǥ
• Social Impact: Despite receiving more resources, the RBI’s study reveals a decline in social sector spending by
ǡ Ǥ
• Environmental concernsǣ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ ͳͳΨ
ͳ͵ͶΨͳΨ Ǥ
Challenges in curtailing Freebie Culture:
• Lack of regulatory powers with ECIǣ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• No assessment of financial viability of populist policiesǣ
Ǥ
• Lack of Information to the Votersǣ They don’t delve into the financial aspects of freebies, prompting political
Ǥ
Supreme Court response on Freebies:
• ǡ
Ǥ
• ǡǡ ǡ
ǡ
• The reference is a shift from the court’s own stand in the S. Subramaniam Balaji vs Tamil Nadu judgment of 2013.
• S. Subramaniam Balaji vs Tamil Nadu judgment of 2013:
manifestos does not amount to a ‘corrupt practice’ under Section 123 of the Representation of PeopleȋȌ ǡ
ͳͻͷͳǤ
Way Forward:
• Responsibility of votersǣ
Ǥ
• Empowering the ECI with greater authorityǣ
Ǥ
• Model Manifestoǣ
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Fixing limit of welfare schemes: ͳΨ ͳΨ
Ǥ
101
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Tracking social sector budgetary allocations:
needed. India’s spending on health and education, at 4.7%, lags behind that of other developing countries, such as
Ǧ ǡ ΨǤ
Pronab Sen,economist and former chief statistician of Indiaǡ
Ǥ
“The actual impact of freebies on the Indian economy is still limited because some promises remain unfulfilled,” The
legacy subsidies are the real problem. “At times voters don’t mind if a promise is not fully implemented. But once a
is given, no political party will dare to withdraw it, fearing a backlash,”. (Economics Times)
AI AND ELECTIONS
ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL OF AI IN ELECTIONS
• Increased and Effective Voter Engagementǣ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Promoting Inclusivenessǣ Ǧǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Election Transparency and Securityǣ ǡ
ǡ Ǧ Ǥ
• Ǧ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Strengthened Democracyǣ
registration and releasing the voter’s list on the website. They can use AI and Social Media to create awareness and
Ǥ
CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF AI IN ELECTIONS
• Misinformation & Disinformationǣ Ǧ Ǧ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Social Media Amplificationǣ
ǡ Ǧ Ǥ
• Microtargetingǣ Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
• Privacy Concernsǣ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Erosion of Trust: Ǧ ǡ
people question the authenticity of all information. This phenomenon is known as the liar’s dividend.
• No Specific Lawǣ Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
o Example: ǡʹͲͲͲȋ Ȍ
that involve the capture, publication, or transmission of a person’s images in mass media, thereby violating their
Ǥ
o Such an offense is punishable with up to 3 years of imprisonment or a fine of ₹2 lakh.
ACTIONS TAKEN BY INDIA
• Issuance of Advisory to Digital Platforms: T
Ǥ
• Ǥ
The government also said companies should not generate illegal responses under Indian laws or “threaten the
”.
102
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Google-ECI Partnershipǣ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Regulation Frameworkǣ
ǡ ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Collaborationǣ
Ǥ
• Public Awarenessǣ Ǧ
Ǥ
• Technological Solutionsǣ
Ǥ
CONCLUSION
Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǧ
Ǥ
ENCORE:
ȋ Ȍ 'ENCORE' (Enabling Communications on Real-time
Environment)ǡ Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ
̵ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
politics, MCC, 2ND ARC, Misinformation, microtargeting, Systematic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation
ȋȌǡƬǤ
Previous Year Questions
ͳǤ ȋȌǡ ʹͲͳͺ
ǫ
ʹǤ ʹͲͳ
money spent in electioneering but it will reduce the government’s accountability to the people’ Discuss.
͵Ǥ ʹͲͳ
ʹͲͳǤ
ǫ
103
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
19 DELIMITATION COMMISSION
BACKGROUND
• statutory body
Ǥ
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 81:
Ǥ
Article 82:
Ǥ
Article 170: Ǥ
84th Constitutional amendment act: ʹͲʹǤ
o Reasons: Ǥ
o Implications: ͺͳ Ǥ
DELIMITATION COMMISSION
• Appointment:
ȋ ȌǤ
• Composition: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Authority: Ǧ Ǥ
• Reporting: ̵ ǡ
Ǥ
FUNCTIONS OF THE DELIMITATION COMMISSION
• Boundary Determination: ǡ
Ǥ
• Seat Allocation for SC/ST: ȋȌ ȋȌ
Ȁȋ ͵͵Ͳ͵͵ʹȌǤ
• Readjusting the representation of territorial constituencies:
ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
• Recommendations and Public Participation: ǡ
ǡǤ ǡ
Ǥ
• Majority Decision: Ǥ
84TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT (2002)
• Delimitation Freeze: ͺͶ
ʹͲʹǤ
• Objective and reasonsǣ
o For Population Stabilization:
ǡ ǡ ǡ
ʹͲʹ
Ǥ
International Practices:
• In a federation like the U.S, ȋ
Ȍ Ͷ͵ͷ ͳͻͳ͵Ǥ
104
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
105
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INTRODUCTION
The Attorney General of India (AGI) is the highest legal officer and chief legal advisor to the government of India.
Appointed by the President of India, the Attorney General represents the government in legal matters, provides legal
advice, and represents the government in the Supreme Court of India.
ABOUT AGI
DUTIES
• Advising the Government:
Ǥ Ǥ
• Performing Assigned Legal Duties: Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Discharging Constitutional and Legal Functions:
Ǥ Ǥ
• Representation in Presidential References:
ͳͶ͵Ǥ
̵ Ǥ
• Representation in the Supreme Court:
Ǥ ̵
Ǥ
• Representation in High Courts: ǡ
Ǥ
LIMITATIONS
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ȁ ȀȀ
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡǤ
106
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INTRODUCTION
• statutory body established in 1993 ǡProtection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
watchdog of human rights Ǥ ȋͳͻͻͳȌ
Ǥ
FUNCTIONS CHALLENGES
107
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
WAY FORWARD
• Enforceable Powers: Ǥ
• Commission's compositionǣ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Ahmadi commission recommendationsǣǦ Ǥǡ
Ǥ
• Independent staff: Ǥ
• Coordination mechanism: Ǥ
• Diversify the role of NHRC: ǡǡ
ǡ Ǥ
CONCLUSION
• Ǥͳͷ
ͳͲͲ Ǥ
•
Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Enforceable Powers, Coordination mechanism, investigation mechanism, ǡ
ǡ ȋ ȌǤ
108
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INTRODUCTION
• Ǧ ǡ
ǡǡ Ǥ Ǥ
Functions Challenges
• • Removal of the fixed term: ͷ
ǣ ǡ
o Ǥ
Ǧ •
o ȋ Ȍ
ȋ ȌǤ
Ǥ • Delayed appointments: ǡ ʹͲͳͶ
o
o ǡ ͶͲͲ
ǡǤ ͶǤ
• Suo-moto powerǣ • Pendency:
͵Ǥʹ ʹ
• Powers of a civil court Ǥ Ǥ
• Examine any record: • Delayed case disposal:
Ǥ ͵ͺͺ
•
Ǥ Ǥ
• Promote good governance: • Poor judgments: ʹǤʹΨ
Ǥ ͷͻΨǤ
CONCLUSION
• RTI has been termed as historic legislation in India’s democratic history. To give teeth to RTI we need strong CIC
Ǥ Ǥ
109
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Functions Challenges
• Inquiry or investigation • Executive dependenceǣ
ǡ
ǡͳͻͺͺȋȌǤ Ǥ
• Superintendence over the functioning of CBI • Advisory and non-binding recommendations
Ǥ
Ǥ • Delay in case handling:
• Superintendence over the vigilance administration ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Doing preliminary inquiry • Duplication of efforts:
ǡǡƬǤ ǡǡǤ
• Working as Competent Authority: • Limitation on CVC:
Ǧ ǡʹͲͳͶ Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Sensitization of citizens: ǡ • Pending Cases: Lack of funds and human resources
Ǥ
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• ǣ Ǥ
• ǡ Ǥ
• ǡ Ǥ
CONCLUSION
• ǡǡ ǡ
Ǥ
•
ǡ Ǥ
KEYWORDS: ǡǡ ǡ .
110
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INTRODUCTION
Ǥǡ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Comparison of Union executive and State executive:
Union Executive State Executive
ͷʹͺ ͳͷ͵ͳ
Ǥ Ǥ
ǡ ǡ
Ǧ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥǡ
Ǥ ǡ ȋ
ȌǤ Ǥ
ǡ
officer’s officer’s
ȋ ͷ͵ȌǤ ȋ ͳͷͶȌǤ
ǡ
ȋ ͶȌǤ ȋ ͳ͵ȌǤ
111
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Initiation
Examples ͳͺͺǡ ǡ
ͳͻͻͺƬʹͲͳͻǡ
Ǥ
112
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
POWERS & FUNCTIONS OF VICE- PRESIDENT
Ex-officio Chairman of Rajya Sabha: Right of the Chairman to interpret the Constitution
Ǧ Ǥ and Rules:
ǣ
• As Presiding Officer of the House:
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ • Maintenance of Order in the House:
•
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• References by the Chairman:
Ǥ
ǣ
ǤǤǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ ǡǡ Ǥ
• Casting of Vote by the Chairman: • Powers relating to Bills passed in Rajya Sabha:
ǡ
• Powers and Duties of the Chairman, as laid
down by the Constitution of India: Ǥ
• Powers relating to the Rajya Sabha Secretariat and
Ǥ Precincts of Rajya Sabha:
Role in the Deliberations of the House: Ǥ
• ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ • Duties conferred on the Chairman:
• ǡ Ǥ ǡ
ǡ ǡ
ǡ ͳͻͷͶǡ
Ǥ
• Powers Conferred on the Chairman under Acting President:
the Rules of Procedure of the Rajya Sabha: •
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
ǡ •
Ǥ
ǡ ǡ ǡ • ǡ Ǧǡ
ǡǡ
ǡǡǡ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
ELECTIONS OF PRESIDENT & VICE-PRESIDENT
Comparison of election of president & vice president:
Election of President Election of Vice-President
Ϊ Ϊ Ϊ ΪǤ
ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
113
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
TERM, QUALIFICATION & REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT
ǡ ǡ ͵ͷ
Qualification ͵ͷǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Conditions of office
Ǥ Ǥ
Term ͷ ͷ
Resignation
114
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• ȋȌǡ •
Ǥ
Ǥ • Ǥ
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
Ǥ Ƭ Ǥ
•
Ǥ ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
POWERS OF PRESIDENT & GOVERNOR
EXECUTIVE POWERS:
President Governor
Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ
ǡ
ǡǤ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ
ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ
– Ǥ Ǧ
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
LEGISLATIVE POWERS:
President Governor
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
ͳʹ Ǧ
ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
Ǧ
Ǧ ȋ Ǥȋ
ȌǤ Ȍ
115
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
ȋ
ȌǤ
ǡ
Ǥ ȋ
ǡ ǡ ȌǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ
ǡ ǡ
ǡǡ Ǧ ǡ
Ǥ
NOTE: In January 2020, The Anglo-Indian Reserved Seats In The Parliament And State Legislatures Of India
Were Discontinued By The 126th Constitutional Amendment Bill Of 2019, When Enacted As The 104th
Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019.
FINANCIAL POWERS
President Governor
Ǥ Ǥ
ȋ
ȋȌǤ ȌǤ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
JUDICIAL POWERS
President Governor
Ǥ
ǡǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡǡ Ȁ
Ǥ
OTHER POWERS OF PRESIDENT:
Diplomatic Powers Military Powers Emergency Powers
• • •
Ǥ
Ǥ ǡ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• ǣ
116
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
ǡ • o
ǡǤ ǡ ȋ ͵ͷʹȌǢ
Ǥ o President’s ȋ
͵ͷƬ͵ͷȌǢ
o
ȋ ͵ͲȌǤ
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ENJOYED BY PRESIDENT & GOVERNOR (ARTICLE 361)
• Art. 361 (1): ǡ ǡ
ǡ
ǤͳǤ
• Art. 361 (2):
• Art. 361 (3):
Ǥ
• Art. 361 (4):
can be done only with a previous 2 months’ notice.
COMPARISON OF VETO POWER OF PRESIDENT & GOVERNOR
President Governor
• • ǡȀ
Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ
Ȁ
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
ǡ ǡ
Ȁ Ȁ Ǥ
Ǥ •
• ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǤǤǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
• ǡ • ǡ
Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
ǡ ǡ
Ȁ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
• •
Bills He Can only ratify. He can’t reject or Ǥ
Ǥ
ORDINANCE MAKING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT & GOVERNOR
• ǦǤ
• Article 123 Ǥ
• Ǥʹͳ͵
Ǥͳʹ͵ȌǤ
• Why conferred?
o
Ǥ
117
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o
Ǥ
Characteristics of Ordinance:
• Ǥ
• ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ
• Ȁǡ
Ǥ
• ǡ ǦȀ
ȀǤ
• Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
President Governor
• •
ȋ Ȍ
ȋ Ǧ Ȍ
Ǥ Ȁ
Ǥ
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• Ǧ Ǧ • Ǧ Ǧ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• Ǥ • Ǥ
• Ǧ • Ǧ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
•
Ǥ ȋ Ȍ
Ǥ
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ •
ȋ Ȍ
• Ǥ •
ǣ
118
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
119
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• ͳͻͺͲǡͳͻͻͶǡ
Ǥ
• Epuru Sudhakar & Another vs Andhra Pradesh (2006)
o ʹͳͳ Ǥ
o ǣ
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪ Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
Discretionary powers of Governor:
• Governor has constitutional discretion in the following cases:
o Ǥ
o Recommendation for the imposition of the President’s Rule in the state.
120
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o ȋ ȌǤ
o ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
o Ǥ
Recent examples:
• The Governor refused to read some parts of the Governor’s address which was prepared by the State govt in
Tamil Nadu.
• In Maharashtra, The Governor removed the Governor’s rule and administered oath to a
Ǥ
• WB Assembly passed a Bill
Ǥ
• Kerala, similar issue is in Telangana as
well.
121
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
▪ ǡ
Ǥ
▪ Ǧ Ǥ
▪ Ǧ
• Others:
o ǡ
Ǥ
o
Ǥ
o
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡǡǡǡ Ǥ
CSAT PITARA
(G AMIFIED PRACTICE APPROACH FOR FLOW-B ASED LEARNING )
SCAN THE QR CODE
Information Nuggets followed by
practice questions.
Includes ten year's PYQs and 1200
FOR ACCESS practice Questions.
122
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
77 166
78 167
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Important Judgements:
• Delhi HC (1980):
Ǥ
Ǥȋ
ȌǤ
• The Supreme Court (1997):
ǡ
ǤȋȌǤ
Power & Functions of PM w.r.t. Parliament Power & Functions of CM w.r.t. State Legislature
ȋȌ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ
Power & Functions of PM w.r.t President Power & Functions of CM w.r.t. Governor
• ȋǤ • ȋǤ
ͺȌ ͳȌǤ
It is the duty of the PM: It is the duty of the CM:
• ȋǤ • ȋǤ
ͺȌǤ ͳȌǡ
• •
Ǥ • ǡ
• ǡ
123
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Ǥ Ǥ
• •
ǡ
ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡ ǡǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
In relation to council of ministers:
o Ȁ Ȁ Ǥ
o Ȁ Ȁ
o Ǥ
o Ȁ
Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ǡ ǡ Ǥ
o Ǥ
Other power & functions of PM: Other power & functions of CM:
o Ƭ ǤǤǤǣ • Ƭ ǤǤǤ
o Ǥ
o o
Ǥ Ǥ
o It is the PM’s privilege to consult any person on any matter he o
Ǥ Ǥ
• Ƭ ǤǤǤǣ •
o ǦǦ o Ǧ
Ǥ
o Ǥ ȋ
• Ƭ ǤǤǤ ǣ ȌǤ
o o
Ǥ Ǥ
o Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (Known as “SuperǦCabinet”) o Ǧ
–
o – ǡ
o – Ǥ
• Ƭ ǤǤǤǣ o ǦǦ
o Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ o
o
Ǥ ȋȌ
KEYWORDS: ǡ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ ǡ
ǡȋȌǡ
124
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
26 COUNCIL OF MINISTER
• Ǥ
• ǡ ǤͶͷ ͳ͵ͳͶ
ǡ Ǥ
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
CENTRAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (COM) STATE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (COM)
• Art. 74: • Art. 163:
Ǥ Ͷʹ ͶͶ functions, except governor’s discretionary power.
• SC Judgement (1971):
Ǥ ǡ
• SC Judgement (1971):
ǡ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
• SC Judgement (1974): W • SC Judgement (1974):
ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ • Art. 164ǣ
• Art. 75: Ǥ
Ǥ • 91st Amendment Act of 2003: ǡ
• 91st Amendment Act of 2003 Ǧ ǡ ͳͷΨ
ǡ ǡ ͳͷ ͳʹǤ
ΨǤ • 91st Amendment Act of 2003:
• 91stAmendment Act of 2003 Ǧ
Ȁ
Ǥ
Ǥ • Term:
• Term Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ • Collective Responsibility:
• Collective Responsibility Ǧ
Ǥ
Ǥ • Oath:
• Oath Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ • Disqualification:
• Disqualification Ǧ
ȋȌ Ǥ
•
Ǥ Ǥ
• • Art 177:
Ǥ Ȁ
• Art 88ǣ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥ
125
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
RESPONSIBILITY OF MINISTERS
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
ͷƬ ͳͶ •
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
ǡ Ȁ • wim or sink together.
ȀǤ Ǧ
ǡ
ǡȀ
Ǥ
Ǥ • ͷ
Ǥ
ͳͶ
Ǥ
• ǡ
ȀȀ
•
ȋ
Ȍ Ǥ
ǡǤ ǡ
ͳͻͷ͵Ǥ
KEYWORDS: Swim or sink together, ǡǡ ͳͻͷ͵ǡ
Ǧ ǡʹͲͲ͵Ǥ
UPSC COURSES
Live/Recorded CSAT
FOUNDATION
126
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Ǥ Ǥ
CABINET COMMITTEES
• ǤȀ
Ǥ ǡǡ
Ǥ
• Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ
Features of Cabinet Committees:
• Ǧ ǤǤǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
• — Ǥ
Ǥ
Advantages Disadvantages
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• Ǧ •
Ǥ
• Ǥ
Ǥ
127
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Ǥ • ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
• Ǥ
Ǥ
• Ǥ Ǥ
128
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
28 MINISTRIES OF GOVERNMENT
Ǥ
ǡǡ ǦǤ
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 74 Ǥ
Ǥ
Article 75 Ǥ
ǣͳͷΨǤȋͻͳ ʹͲͲ͵Ȍ
Ǥ
Article 77 Ǥ
HIERARCHY OF MINISTERS IN INDIA
• ǡǡ ǡǡ
Ǥ ǡǡ Ǥ
PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARIES
• Ǥǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Article 75 and 164: ͷ • Against Separation of Powersǣ
ͳͶǡ Ȁ Ǥ
• Misuse of Article 102:
Ǥ
Ǥ
• Increased workload: ǡ
ǡ • Violation of Constitutional spiritǣ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Constitutional power: ͳͷΨ ǤȋͳͲΨ
ȌǤ
Ǥ • Political motiveǣ
• No independent charge: ̵
Ǣ Ǥ
Ǥ
CONCLUSION
• Ǥ
ǡǡ
Ǥ
129
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
29 PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
INTRODUCTION
It means a committee that is elected by the house or nominated by Speaker/chairman, works under and submits
reports to the speaker/chairman, and has a secretariat provided by the Lok Sabha/ Rajya Sabha.
ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
• Specialized jobs: Ǧ
Ǥ
• Financial prudence:
Ǥ
• Engaging stakeholders: ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǤǤ Ǥ
• In-depth scrutiny: Ǧ ̵
Ǥ
• Resolving issues in Bills: Ǧ Ǧ
ǤǤǤ
Ǥ
• Forum for consensus-building: Ǧ Ǥ
Ǥ
ISSUES FACED BY COMMITTEES
• Dip in the number of Bills referred: ȋʹͲͳͻȌǡ ȋʹͲͳͻȌ
Ǥ
• Absenteeism of Members: ͷͲΨ ʹͲͳͶǦͳͷ
Ǥ
• Lack of expertiseǣ
Ǥ
• The politicization of meetings:
Ǥ
• Short tenureǣ
Ǥ Ex. the IT panel could not complete deliberations on “Safeguarding citizens”
Ȁ ̵
Ǥ
• Non-binding recommendations:
Ǥ
WAY FORWARD
The NCRWC ǣ
• Increase in tenure: ʹ
Ǥ
• Adopt Best Practicesǣ
ǡ ǡ Ǥ
• Institutional Research Support:
Ǥ
• Periodic review: Objective criteria for a regular assessment of the committee’s performance and making a required
Ǥ
CONCLUSION
Considering the steadily declining sittings of Parliament from 100-150 (1950s) to 60-70 in 2021-22, strengthening the
committee system can go a long way in improving the quality of laws drafted and minimizing potential implementation
challenges.
130
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INTRODUCTION
• Representation of Peoples’ Act, 1950
͵ʹǤ
ǡ
ǡ ǡǤ
• Representation of Peoples’ Act, 1951
Ǥ
KEY FEATURES OF THE ACT
• Ǧ Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
Significance Challenges
• Implementation of democracy: • Ruling party advantage:
Ǥ ǤǤ
Ǥ ͻͷΨ
• Ensuring equality: Ǥ
ǡ • Stopping criminal elements:
Ͷ͵Ψ
Ǥ Ǥ
• Decriminalization: • Social mediaǣ
Ǧ
Ǥ
Ǥ • Power to de-register parties:
• Transparency: Ǧ
ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ • Bureaucratisation of politics:
Ǥ
• Free and fair elections: ǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ
131
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
ǡ
Ǥ
8 (2): ǣ
Ǣ Ǥ
Ǣ ǡǡ
ǡͳͻͳǤ
8 (3): ȋ Ȍ
ȏ ʹͷΨǤ
ȋͳȌȋʹȌȐ
Ǥ
Ǥ
Judgements
The Supreme Court overturned a fourth subsection, 8 (4), in 2013 (Lily Thomas case):
Ǥ
Lily Thomas v. Union of India case, 2013
ǡ
Ǥ
ʹͲͳ͵ǡPatna High Court Ǥ
244th report of the Law Commission ǡǤǤ
Ǥ
132
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
RIGHT TO KNOW
Right to Information: ǡǣ
• ǡ
Ǣ
• Ǥ
SUPREME COURT RULING ON RIGHT TO INFORMATION OF ELECTORS
Case Supreme Court Ruling
Association for ǡ
Democratic Reforms v. Ǥ
Union of India, 2002
People’s Union for
Civil Liberties v. ǡ Ǥ
Union of India, 2003 ǡ ͵͵ ǡ ͳͻͷͳǡ
ǡ Ǥ
Resurgence India Case,
2013 ȀǤ
Krishnamurthy v. ̵ ȋ
Sivakumar & Ors, 2015 Ȍ ǡ
Ǥ
Lok Prahari v. Election
Commission, 2018
Ǥ
• Declaration of Assets and Liabilities: ͷͳͻͷͳ
Ȁǣ
133
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
o ǡǡ
Ǣ
o ǡǤ
• Speaker & Chairman have the power to make rules: Ȁ
Ǥ
• Account of Election Expenses: ͳͻͷͳ
Ǥ ̵ Ǥ
Ǥ
CORRUPT PRACTICES
Provisions regarding corrupt practices in RPA, 1951: Section 123 of the Act defines corrupt practices -
• Promotion of enmity or hatred:
ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǤ
• Commission of sati or its glorification:
Ǥ
• Briberyǣǡ
Ǥ
• Undue influenceǣ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Religious appealǣǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ
ǡ Ǥ
• Obtaining assistance from any government official: ȋ Ȍ ǡ
ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǤ
• Booth capturing: In the 2019 general elections, a polling agent in Faridabad was arrested over video of ‘booth
capture’.
• False publicationǣ
Ǥ
• Contravention of authorizing expenditure:
‘Account of election expenses and maximum limit’ prescribed under Section 77 of RPA, 1951.
• Use of any vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any elector: ȋ ǡ
ȌǤ
̵ ǡ ʹͲͳ
during elections on the basis of religion, caste, race, community or language amounts to a ‘corrupt practice’.
ELECTORAL OFFENSES
Electoral listed in RPA, 1951ǣChapter III of RPA, 1951 provide the following electoral -
• Disturbances at public meetings: Ǥ
• Publication of results of exit polls: ǡ
• Printing material: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
• Promoting hatred between classes: ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡǤ
• Providing false information: ǣ
• Holding public meetings exceeding authorized time: Ǧ
• Ǥ
• ǡǡǡ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
134
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• Ǥ
• ǡ Ǥǡ Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Other :
o Ǥ
o ǡ Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ǡǡ Ǥ
o Ǥ
o Ǥ
o ǡǡǡǤ
PAID NEWS
• ȋƬ Ȍ Ǥȋ
ȌǤ
Negative impacts of paid news:
• Reflection of money power:
Ǥ
• Hits the bottom of democracyǣ
̵ Ǥ
Ǥ
• Affects peoples’ thinking and opinionǣ
Ǥ
• Affects free and fair elections
Ǥ
• Affects independence of media: Ǥ
Implications of Paid news not being an electoral :
• Lacunae in paid NEWS:
Ǥ
• Ȁ Ǥ
• Bias & False News: ǡ
Ǥ
Way forward:
• According to the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology:
o ǡ Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• Ǥ
• ͳͻͷͳ̵̵ Ǥ
• ̵ Ǥ
•
ǡ Ǥ
• ʹͷͷ̵
ǡ̵ ʹͲͳͷǤ
135
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
VOTING RIGHTS TO NON-RESIDENT INDIANS THROUGH POSTAL BALLOT
• ȋ ȋȌ ̵
Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
• ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ Ǥ
Ǥ
• ʹͲͳͶ ǡͳʹǦ
ǣǡ ǡǤ ǡʹͲͳͷǡ
̶Ǧ̶
Ǥ
Existing process for NRIs -
• Voting rights introduced in 2011: ʹͲͳͳǡ
ͳͻͷͲǤ
• NRI can vote in his constituency: Ȁ ǡ
Ǥ
• Can vote only in person: Ȁ
Ǥ
Challenges:
• Identification of voters:
Ǥ
• Policing and security:
Ǥ
• Model Code of Conduct: ǡ
Ǥ
Way forward:
• Need to address logistical challenges: As per the Ministry of External Affairs, “huge logistical challenges” need to
be addressed and “a realistic assessment of requirements” needs to be made before Ǥ
• Voting facilitation at embassies are insufficient: ǡ ǡ
Ǥ
Previous Year Questions
1. ʹͲʹʹ
ǡͳͻͷͳǤ
ǫ
ǫ Ǥ
2. “There is a need for simplification of procedure for disqualification of persons found guilty of ʹͲʹͲ
corrupt practices under the Representation of Peoples Act” Comment. (Answer in 150 words)
136
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• • ̵ ̵
Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ
Nature of the
• Ǧ • ͶͲ ʹͷǡͳʹ
Constitution
ǡ ǡͷ Ǥ
Ǥ
• unbreakable union of •
unbreakable nations. Ǥ
• ǡ
̵Ǥ
• ǣ Ǥ
• ǣ
Ǥ ̵ ǡ
• ǡ
Ǥ ̵Ǥ
Nature of
ǡ • ǣ
federalism
Ǥ
Ǥ
•
• Ǥ
Ǥ
137
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Impeachment of • ǡ ǡ • ǡ
the Ǥ
President Ǥ
• • ǡ ǡ
ǣ
Citizenship Ǥ
Ǥ
• ǣ •
Ǥ
• House of Representatives: ǡ
o Ǥ
Ǥ • ǡ
o Ͷ͵ͷǤ Ǥ
o •
Ǥ Ǥ ǡ
• Senate:
o ǡ
o ̵Ǥ
Legislature o ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ
o ǦǤ
ǡ Ǧ
ȀǤ
o
Ǥ
o
Ǥ
138
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
• •
Ǥ
•
Checks and ǡ Ǥ
Balances Ǥ
• • ̵
ǣ Ǥ
ͳǤ • ǡ
ǣ
▪ ʹȀ͵ ǡ
Ǥ Ǥ
▪ •
͵ȀͶ ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
Amendment of ʹǤ
the Constitution ǣ Ǥ
▪ ʹȀ͵
Ǥ
▪
Ǥ
Ǥ
▪ ǡ
͵ȀͶǤ
139
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
INDIA AND BRITAIN
• ǡ •
Ǥ Ǥ
• ǡ ǡboth
Ǥ flexible as well as rigid.
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• flexible o ǡ
Nature constitutional structure. ̵ ǡ
• Ǥ
o
ǡ ǡ ǡ
Simple Majority ȋͷͲΨ ǡ
Ȍ Ǥ
Ǥ •
ǡ
ǡǦǤ
• ǡ sovereign • Ǥ Powers are shared
Nature of state body, ̵ Ǥ
Ǥ
• • ǡ
̵
Sovereignty of Ǥ
Parliament ǡǡǤ Ǥ
• •
Ǥ Ǥ
• • idea of 'Basic Structure'
ǡserious
Judiciary
Ǥ ̵ Ǥ
• For removal, • Other provisions
̵
Ǥ Ǥ
140
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
141
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
142
PRAHAAR 2024: Indian Polity and Constitution
Attributes About
• democratic and independent
Nature of the South nation in Section 1 Ǥ
African Constitution • ǡǡǡ
Ǧ ǡ ǡǦǤ
Ǧǡǡ Ǥ
• amendments Ǧ
Borrowed from SA Ǥ
Constitution • Rajya
Sabha's members.
• ̶ ̶ ̶̶
ǡ
Ǥ
• ǡ ǡ
Similarities
Ǥ
•
Ǥ
• ǡ Ǧ
Ǥ
• ǡright to voteǡ ǡ
ȀǢ
Ǥ
Differences • ͶͶ right to propertyǡ
ǡ ͵ͲͲǡ
Ǥ
• Bill of Rights'
Ǥ
143