Resch UtopiaDystopiaMiddle 1997
Resch UtopiaDystopiaMiddle 1997
Resch UtopiaDystopiaMiddle 1997
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boundary 2
Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has b
written directly or indirectly against totalitarianism and for demo
socialism, as I understand it.
-George Orwell, "Why I Write"
The collapse of Stalinism and Fordism, the end of the cold war
the brutal Gleichschaltung being imposed on humanity by a now un
meled capitalist world order underscore the need for a return to
Orwell's famous dystopian novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four. Such an eff
particularly timely for a Marxist tradition heretofore so engaged in
cal polemics with Orwell's cold war appropriators that it has hardly
the task of providing a Marxist theoretical analysis of the novel itsel
cold war polemics have focused on the empirical validity and histori
plicability of the concept of totalitarianism or on the personal integ
Orwell and his credentials as an honest witness to the important eve
his time. Both admirers and detractors alike have tended to assume Orwell's
ticular theoretical reflection.1 Both sides also seem to have fallen under the
spell of Orwell's persona and a narrative prose style aiming at the clarity of
a windowpane.2
I propose a different strategy. Utilizing concepts of ideology, liter-
ary production, and utopian discourse developed by Pierre Macherey, Terry
Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, and Louis Marin, I will investigate the ideologi-
cal "deep structure" beneath the surface narrative of Nineteen Eighty-Four.3
I will be concerned, in other words, with Orwell's "democratic socialism"-
specifically with the binary opposition of socialism and totalitarianism that
constitutes its utopian and dystopian poles4-and with the absolutely cru-
cial, yet curiously unrepresentable, place and function of the middle class
within his political ideology. I argue two theses. The first, minor thesis is
that because Orwell's democratic socialism is explicitly and militantly anti-
capitalist, his concept of totalitarianism must be distinguished clearly from
1. For example, the classic opposition of Irving Howe, "1984: History as Nightmare," and
Isaac Deutscher," 1984-The Mysticism of Cruelty," both in Samuel Hynes, ed., Twentieth-
Century Interpretations of "1984" (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 29-40 and
41-53. Howe defends Orwell's vision as a reasonable projection of existing tendencies;
Deutscher dismisses it as quasi-mystical pessimism. The confrontation continues in Irving
Howe, ed., "1984" Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century (New York: Harper and Row,
1983), and Christopher Norris, ed., Inside the Myth: Orwell: Views from the Left (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1984). For the rest, see John Rodden's encyclopedic Politics of
Literary Reputation: The Making and Claiming of "St. George" Orwell (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989). Over a hundred reviews and evaluations from throughout Orwell's
entire career are collected in Jeffrey Meyers, ed., George Orwell: The Critical Heritage
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).
2. For examples, see Lionel Trilling's gushing "George Orwell and the Politics of Truth,"
in Harold Bloom, ed., George Orwell: Modern Critical Views (New York: Chelsea House,
1987), 29-44, and George Woodcock, "Prose Like a Windowpane," in The Crystal Spirit
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), 263-79. For a provocative contrast emphasizing Orwell's
"modernist" appropriation and rewriting of previous political novels, see Michael Wilding,
"Nineteen Eighty-Four: Rewriting the Future," in Political Fictions (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1980), 216-46.
3. Pierre Macherey, Theory of Literary Production (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978); Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology (London: New Left Books, 1976); Fredric
Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1981); and Louis Marin, Utopics (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities
Press, 1984).
4. For an interesting contrast opposing totalitarianism to the Enlightenment tradition, see
Sheldon Wolin, "Counter-Enlightenment: Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four," in Robert Mulvi-
hill, ed., Reflections on America, "1984": An Orwell Symposium (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1986), 98-113.
that of his cold war appropriators. Clarifying this difference allows us to see
the literary figuration of totalitarian Oceania as more complex and politically
radical than is commonly supposed: what is conventionally reduced to a
narrative of the destruction of a middle-class individual by totalitarianism
is, in fact, an impassioned representation of totalitarianism as the historical
destiny of middle-class individualism.
However, and this is my second, major thesis, Orwell's critique of
middle-class individualism and his vision of a progressive, antitotalitarian
alternative are deeply compromised from within by what I will call, fol-
lowing Jameson, the "political unconscious" of his ideology of democratic
socialism. Orwell's representation of Oceania is incoherent, and its self-
contradictions cluster, symptomatically, around its figuration of the middle-
class Outer Party and the struggle for freedom of its middle-class protago-
nist, Winston Smith. The ultimate source of the novel's incoherence is an
irreducible tension between Orwell's conscious commitment to an egalitar-
ian, populist alliance of the middle and working classes, and his uncon-
scious identification with elitism and the will to power of innately superior
individuals. Superficially masked by a Manichaean contrast of socialism
and totalitarianism, the determining presence of Orwell's unconscious elit-
ism is revealed when he tries to put this ideology of Good versus Evil to
work in the form of fictional institutions, individuals, and events-when he
attempts, that is, to represent the middle class of Oceania as both the agent
and victim of totalitarianism, and therefore as both enemy and ally of the
working-class proles. Ultimately, as I will show, the political unconscious of
Orwell's socialism demands the impossible, a "middle-class hero" who will
be both innately superior to the working class and morally superior to the
ruling class. This is a standard to which neither Winston Smith nor the capi-
talist middle class measures up-hence the failure of Winston's rebellion
and the depiction of capitalist individualism as the origin of Oceania-but,
insofar as such moral elitism bears an uncanny, and for Orwell, intolerable,
resemblance to totalitarianism itself, it is also a standard that cannot be
represented at all, one that must be repressed from the narrative altogether.
The novel's deep structure of democratic socialism, the place and
function of the middle class within it, and the contradictions between its
dystopian and utopian moments-Oceania is portrayed as invulnerable to
progressive change, yet the "author" of Winston's story writes from a post-
totalitarian, socialist future-are all virtually unexplored topics. However,
I also believe a critical reexamination of Orwell's populism is particularly
relevant to contemporary politics given the reemergence of middle-class
S
(Truth)
S1 S2
(Being) (Seeming)
A B
(Secret) (Lie)
not-s2 not-sl
(Not-Seeming) (Not-Being)
not-S
(Falsehood)
ization of the national idea rather than from the divisive mechanisms of
electoral politics.8 During the thirties, however, Orwell, along with Franz
Borkenau, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, and a few other writers on the
Left, began using the term totalitarianism to denote the perversion of social-
ist ideals under Stalin and the paradoxical similarity between Stalinism and
the political style and methods by which Hitler had "resolved" the contradic-
tions of capitalism. As a self-proclaimed antifascist and democratic social-
ist, Orwell was profoundly disturbed by the "inhumane collectivism" of the
Soviet Union, in particular, by what he perceived as the ruthless "ends-over-
means" mentality of the Communist Party dictatorship and by the "total"
control over society systematically exercised by the bureaucratic apparatus
of the Soviet state. For Orwell, this conjunction of party dictatorship and
state power constitutes the essence of totalitarianism, and, therefore, he
does not hesitate to identify Russian communism with Italian fascism and
German Nazism despite the otherwise profound, class-based differences
between them.
8. For a useful survey of the usages of the term totalitarianism and a trenchant critique of
its social scientific pretensions, see Benjamin Barber, "Conceptual Foundations of Totali-
tarianism," in Carl J. Friedrich et al., Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views (New
York: Praeger, 1969), 3-52. See also Michael Walzer, "On 'Failed Totalitarianism,'" in
Irving Howe, ed. "1984" Revisited, 103-21.
9. See Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structure of Myths," in Structural Anthropology (New
York: Basic Books, 1963), 206-32.
Totalitarianism
(communism, fascism, Nazism)
10. Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: New Left Books, 1969), 233, and "Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1971), 164-65). See also, Michel P6cheux, Language, Semantics, and Ideology
(New York: St. Martin's, 1982), and G6ren Therborn, The Ideology of Power and the Power
of Ideology (London: Verso, 1980). For an extended discussion of these works, see chaps.
3-5 of Robert Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992).
Totalitarianism
(communism, fascism, Nazism)
(inhumane collectivism)
Superior Inferior
Individuals Individuals
not-Totalitarianism
(Socialism)
(humane collectivism)
(national family, populism)
11. George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1958),
Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Signet, 1961), and "The Lion and the Unicorn," in The
Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell, 4 vols. (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and World, 1968), 2:56-109. Hereafter, references to the above works will be cited
parenthetically. Sources from The Collected Essays will be cited parenthetically as CEJL.
of the oppressed" united against "tyranny at home and abroad" (222) and for
"liberty and justice" (216). Orwell frequently refers to socialism as "humane"
collectivism,12 and in his most specific formulation, in "The Lion and the
Unicorn," he defines socialism as "political democracy" and "equality of in-
come" in the context of state ownership of the means of production (79). In-
corporating these characteristics into the square, we find the contradictories
of bureaucratic state power to be liberty, individual freedom, and political
democracy, and the contradictories of party dictatorship to be justice, moral
community, and social equality. Furthermore, those values associated with
not-state power may fairly be labeled libertarian, while those associated
with not-party dictatorship may be designated as egalitarian.
12. For example, Orwell approvingly cites Franz Borkenau's opposition of "a freer, more
humane form of collectivism to the purge and censorship variety." See "Review of Borke-
nau," CEJL, 2:26.
movement has been built, "then perhaps this misery of class-prejudice will
fade away" (231) and the middle class might come to reject its cultural pre-
tensions and to accept the reality of its proletarian status. "When we get
there," Orwell concludes, "it will not be so dreadful as we feared, for, after
all, we have nothing to lose but our aitches" (232). The use of the first-
person plural is important; while he defends socialism throughout The Road
to Wigan Pier, Orwell explicitly identifies himself with the middle class and
the values he ascribes to it. "Here I am with a bourgeois upbringing and a
working-class income. To which class do I belong? Economically I belong
to the working class, but it is almost impossible for me to think of myself as
anything but a member of the bourgeoisie" (225).
In "The Lion and the Unicorn," Orwell depicts socialism as a com-
bination of libertarian populism and state socialism. Under socialism, the
economy will be reduced to a technical and administrative problem no
longer complicated by class conflicts. "The state, representing the whole
nation, owns everything, and everyone is a state employee. ... In a Socialist
economy these problems [overproduction and unemployment] do not exist.
The state simply calculates what goods will be needed and does its best
to produce them. Production is only limited by the amount of labor and raw
materials" (79-80). In keeping with his essentially frictionless model, Orwell
envisions a socialist revolution based on an ideology of national community
and patriotism capable of uniting the middle and working classes against
the decadent aristocrats and imperialist plutocrats of the ruling class. Capi-
talist England is portrayed as a dysfunctional Victorian family: "It has rich
relations who have to be kow-towed to and poor relations who are horribly
sat upon, and there is a deep conspiracy of silence about the source of
the family income. It is a family in which . . . most of the power is in the
hands of irresponsible uncles and bedridden aunts. . . . A family with the
wrong members in control-that, perhaps, is as near as one can come to
describing England" (68). As he did earlier in The Road to Wigan Pier,
Orwell acknowledges class differences and continues to define them cul-
turally, as differences of accent, tastes, clothes, and lifestyle, rather than
economically.13 However, in "The Lion and the Unicorn," the middle class
13. My criticism of Orwell's "cultural materialism" is not a denial of the fact that "accent,
tastes, clothes, and lifestyle" have no class valence. Nor am I advocating a "vulgar" Marx-
ist reflection theory whereby class valences are conceived as logically deducible from,
or mechanically coordinated with, the dominant mode of production. Rather, I am con-
tending that the class valences of cultural production are only relatively autonomous with
respect to the forces and relations of production that set limits of correspondence and
15. For an overall assessment, see Alok Rai, Orwell and the Politics of Despair (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); for Orwell's doubts about socialism, see
Arthur M. Eckstein, "George Orwell's Second Thoughts on Capitalism," in Jonathan Rose,
ed., The Revised Orwell (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1992), 191-
205. Still essential are William Steinhoff, George Orwell and the Origins of "1984" (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975); Bernard Crick, George Orwell (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1980); Raymond Williams, George Orwell (New York: Viking, 1971); and George
Woodcock, The Crystal Spirit: A Study of George Orwell (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
the social division of labor, Orwell's populism evades the uncomfortable fact
of middle-class domination and exploitation of the working class by means
of the distinction between mental and manual labor and the monopoliza-
tion of educational qualifications, managerial skills, and bureaucratic posi-
tions.16 The structural-economic relation that allies the middle class with
the capitalist system and against the working class is simply eliminat
Furthermore, by unifying and transcending the contrary relationship b
tween liberty and equality under socialism, even the cultural-ideolog
differences that Orwell acknowledges as existing between the middle and
working classes are effectively neutralized. Their coexistence at a hig
level transforms the contrary relationship between middle- and working
class values into a complementary one, and their "natural" compatibil
is further reinforced by their common moral goodness and their commo
opposition to the evil of totalitarianism.
The combined effects of the opposition of socialism and totalitarian
ism are particularly satisfying for Orwell, insofar as they permit him to id
tify with the middle class and its values while, at the same time, committ
himself wholeheartedly to the cause of socialism and the values of the wor
ing class. However, as we can see from Figure 3, the existence of clas
and class-based values within the category of socialism reveals the specte
of an underlying elitism repressed by Orwell's morally principled oppositi
to totalitarianism. Figure 3 suggests that Orwell's political ideology is riv
by a tension between his conscious commitment to both libertarian a
egalitarian values and an unconscious impulse to valorize superior individ
als at the expense of the inferior masses. If this is the case, and I believe
it is, then the fact that Orwell is undeniably opposed to capitalist elitisms
wealth and totalitarian elitisms of power raises an important question: ju
what kind of an elitist can he possibly be? Finally, the introduction of c
and class-based values into the model creates an interesting asymmet
between socialist class relations, where the middle and working clas
are allied, and totalitarian relations, where party dictatorship is associate
with a ruling class of the leader and the party elite, and state power wit
a middle class of bureaucrats. If the middle class is allied with the work-
ing class under socialism, how can it be allied with the ruling class under
totalitarianism? These questions are of great significance for an analysis
16. See the classic analysis of Erik Olin Wright, Classes (London: Verso, 1985). Wright's
work is discussed by himself and his critics in Wright et al., The Debate on Classes
(London: Verso, 1989).
17. Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s," American His-
torical Review 75, no. 4 (1970): 1046-64. For a general survey of the political history of
the term, see Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Pluralism
(United States)
Socialism
(U.S.
Fascism(Orwell's
clients)
position)
not-Democracy not-Capitalism
(party dictatorship) (state ownership
of economic property)
Totalitarianism
(Soviet Union)
terms. Capitalism is defined in terms of "civil society" and "civil rights," while
private ownership of economic property is represented as a symbol of the
liberty of all citizens. The existence of class struggle and the economic ex-
ploitation of nonpropertied workers by a class of property owners is ignored.
Similarly, democracy is characterized by "representative government" and
"universal suffrage" in the context of "popular sovereignty" and competing
political parties, and not as a plebiscitary oligarchy, wherein political parties,
candidates, and issues are controlled by the wealthy with little or no active
political participation by the vast majority of citizens. Furthermore, the term
totalitarianism was used to discredit all forms of critical or utopian thinking
as inherently dangerous.
Totalitarianism became dystopia, or rather a dystopian parody of
utopia itself, while American pluralism was transformed into the highest
form of good that could be "realistically" expected from a human society. In
response to the changing needs of American imperialism, the Soviet Union
was gradually identified as the archetypical form of totalitarianism, while
fascism, uncomfortably similar to a growing number of American-supported
dictatorships throughout the Third World, was quietly dropped from the cold
warrior lexicon. The possibility of a not-capitalist democratic society, demo-
cratic socialism, was repressed from the model, much as fascism had been,
and those socialists who had earlier opposed both Stalinism and capital-
ism proved either unable or unwilling to resist the extreme pressure toward
political conformity generated by the condemnation of Soviet totalitarianism.
It was but a short step to an identification of the actually existing democ-
racy of capitalist America with the very principle of goodness, a move that
rendered any dissenting view totalitarian by implication.
The cold war conception of totalitarianism fundamentally differs from
Orwell's. Most obviously, Orwell's political ideology is radical, anticapitalist
as well as antitotalitarian, while the cold warriors are conservatives who
define any form of anticapitalism as totalitarian. Orwell defends a social-
ist (democratic not-capitalism) negation of totalitarianism, while the cold
war model completely excludes democratic socialism from representation.
Orwell's conception of totalitarianism emphasizes the conjunction of the will
to power of a ruling class and the imposition of bureaucratic control over
the whole of society-characteristics that apply not only to Russian com-
munism and European fascism but to monopoly capitalism as well18--while
the cold war model represses any connection between fascism and capi-
talism and represents pluralism as uncontaminated by either a ruling class
or bureaucratic organization.
These important differences notwithstanding, American cold war-
riors were able to appropriate Orwell with great enthusiasm and little diffi-
culty. Orwell's socialism has, of course, undeniable affinities with American
pluralism, which also valorizes the "common" man and national community,
defines class on the basis of income and lifestyle, and reduces social to
moral problems. More importantly, Orwell and the cold warriors are linked by
their common opposition to Stalinism and by their mutual antipathy toward
Marxist theoretical principles of economic determination and class struggle.
Orwell often ridicules the crudeness with which certain Marxists espoused
their faith in the "historical necessity" of socialism and the politically disas-
trous effects of such simpleminded views on the struggle against fascism.19
18. On the "Orwellian" aspects of contemporary capitalism, science and technology, and
mass culture and media control, see Peter Stansky, ed., On "Nineteen Eighty-Four" (New
York: W. H. Freeman, 1983), and Mulvihill, ed., Reflections on America. Herbert Mar-
cuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon, 1964) remains particularly instructive; see
also Erich Fromm's afterword to George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, and Stuart Hall,
"Conjuring Leviathan: Orwell on the State," in Christopher Norris, ed., Inside the Myth,
242-62.
19. For a discussion of Orwell's knowledge of Marx, see Zwerdling, Orwell and t
13-37. For the British context, see Neal Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), and Samuel Hynes, The Auden Generation:
Literature and Politics in England in the 1930s (New York: Viking, 1977).
Superior Inferior
Individuals Masses
Oceania
(totalitarian society of 1984)
tarianism. Thus, Oceania is not just a satire on the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany, or merely a warning of a global tendency toward totalitarianism,
or, finally, simply a piece of antitotalitarian propaganda designed to scare
people out of their complacency20 Oceania is all of these things, but before
it is any of them, it is a parodic inversion of Orwell's own populist socialism,
and, therefore, the opposition of totalitarianism and socialism may be said
to constitute the novel's deep structure.
However, by giving literary form to his ideology of totalitarianism,
Orwell activates its latent contradictions and antagonisms. As the narrative
figuration of Oceania develops, a subtle and disruptive shift of emphasis
takes place-a shift away from the intended, straightforward opposition of
good and evil toward an excluded, subversive opposition of superior indi-
viduals and inferior masses. Orwell's text produces something unexpected:
a world organized not, as we would expect, on the basis of good and evil
social relations but rather on the basis of classes of superior and inferior
individuals, an opposition that is formally excluded from the representation
of Oceania as it is from Orwell's political ideology. Rather than uniting "good"
with "good" (middle-class dissident Winston with the working-class proles)
in accordance with the binary opposition of totalitarianism and socialism, the
narrative works to unite "good" and "evil" (Winston with O'Brien as superior
individuals, and the proles with party functionaries as inferior masses).
Orwell's ideological project is to portray Winston and the proles as comple-
mentary forces of individual freedom and moral community destroyed by
totalitarianism. However, this intended effect is subverted by Winston's su-
periority and the inferiority of the proles. While consciously insisting on the
common interests of Winston and the proles, the text unconsciously under-
mines the notion of a populist unity of individualism and moral community
by suggesting the inevitable dominance of the former over the latter.
A middle- and working-class alliance uniting the alienated party-
member Winston and the exploited proles is impossible because there can
be little common ground for a cooperative relationship between superior
and inferior beings. A revolution of the proles is simply unthinkable within
20. For the novel as satire, see Bernard Crick, "Reading Nineteen Eighty-Four as Satire,"
in Mulvihill, ed., Reflections on America, 15-45, Stephen J. Greenblatt, Three Modern
Satirists (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), and Carl Freedman, "Antinomies of
Nineteen Eighty-Four," in Bernard Oldsey and Joseph Brown, ed., Critical Essays on
George Orwell (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1986), 90-109. For an overview of the voluminous
literature regarding the reception of the novel as prophecy and propaganda, written with
uncritical admiration for Orwell as a liberal moralist, see Rodden, Politics of Literary
Reputation, 244-321.
the dystopian framework of Oceania. "If there was hope, it lay in the proles,"
Winston muses, but when one "looked at the human beings passing you
on the pavement ... it became an act of faith" (73). The reason, accord-
ing to Winston, is the fact that the proles are incapable of thinking. "They
were like the ant, which can see small objects but not large ones" (79).
Still, the proles "had remained human" (135), capable of personal loyalty but
only because they are also unthinkingly orthodox: "They simply swallowed
everything, and what they swallowed did them no harm because it left no
residue behind, just as a grain of corn will pass undigested through the
body of a bird" (126). Faith in the proles, Winston concludes, is a "mystical
truth and palpable absurdity" (70). Class prejudices such as these separate
Winston from the values of social equality and moral community, and place
him, however reluctantly, on the side of elitism. The contrary relationship
between Winston and the proles, ostensibly subsumed (and masked) by
their common state of victimization and their antitotalitarian values, weak-
ens the moral contrast between the national family and totalitarianism by
introducing into the representation repressed antagonisms of superiority
and inferiority.
Winston's ambivalence toward the proles is, of course, widely dis-
cussed by Orwell's critics. However, the unconscious force exerted by Or-
well's elitism produces less recognized, but equally disruptive, effects on
the other relationships depicted in Figure 5. In the case of the contradic-
tory intraclass opposition between dissident Winston and loyal functionaries
(Symes, Parsons, and Ampleforth), we find that it is Winston's intelligence
and independence as much as his sense of human decency that distinguish
him from their passive, unthinking careerism. The conforming Outer Party
cadres are defined in a doubly negative sense. In keeping with the category
of totalitarianism, they are negatively valued by their lack of human decency
(which distinguishes them from Winston and the proles), but they are even
more negatively valued by their inferiority, by a lack of critical intelligence
and will to power (which distinguishes them from Winston and O'Brien).
The characterization of the party cadres as gullible flunkies and the proles
as herd animals so strongly reinforces the complementary relationship be-
tween them that the primary contrast of good and evil between state power
and moral community becomes confused. By the conventions of totalitarian-
ism, the Outer Party functionaries should be exploiters benefiting from their
privileged position as representatives of state power, but they are repre-
sented instead as unwitting dupes, as much the victims as the conscious
agents of the evil system they serve. For the cadres, as for the proles, inferi-
ority naturalizes subordination. Because they are inferior, the Outer Party
functionaries "naturally" accept and reproduce their own dehumanization
as well as that of the proles; because the proles are inferior, they passively
accept their dehumanized existence as the "natural" state of things.
The innate superiority of Winston to the proles parallels the innate
superiority of the Inner Party elite to the middle-class members of the Outer
Party. The figuration of the contrary relationship between O'Brien and func-
tionaries Parsons, Symes, and Ampleforth should be reconciled by empha-
sizing the social superiority they share by virtue of party membership and by
de-emphasizing the personal attributes of intelligence and will to power that
decisively separate Inner from Outer Party members. However, the unity of
will to power and bureaucratic organization, naturalized and guaranteed by
the synthetic term totalitarianism, is actually undermined by the opposition
of superior and inferior individuals, which positively values the Inner Party
while casting the Outer Party members into the ranks of the inferior masses.
Even the contradictory relationship between O'Brien and the proles fails to
conform unambiguously to the opposition of good and evil implied by the
category of totalitarianism. Despite the fact that their sense of moral com-
munity is uncorrupted by will to power or party membership, the positive
valuation of the proles is weakened by the fact that their moral community
is identified as much with their innate inferiority as their innate decency.
The opposition of superiority and inferiority undercuts the moral con-
demnation of O'Brien and the Inner Party, and lends an aura of inevita-
bility, if not outright legitimacy, to the totalitarian concentration of power.
The tension between conscious condemnation and unconscious, hence un-
representable, justification makes the complementary relationship between
Winston and O'Brien the central focus of the novel. The implicit opposi-
tion of superior individuals and inferior masses will unconsciously work to
foreground those similarities between Winston and O'Brien that Winston's
rebellion and O'Brien's triumph function to obscure. The conventions of
antitotalitarianism require that the opposition between individual freedom
and party dictatorship be a struggle between good and evil, yet the moral
significance of the conflict is necessarily weakened by the fact that it occurs
exclusively within the ranks of superior individuals. The climactic confronta-
tion between Winston and O'Brien will be determined by the complementary
nature of will to power and individual freedom, while the tragedy of Win-
ston's defeat will be lessened by the fact that in certain, as yet unspecified
respects he is more like O'Brien than unlike him.
21. Orwell refused to allow the Book of the Month Club to cut either the "Appendix on
Newspeak" or Goldstein's "Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism." "I can't pos-
sibly agree to the kind of alteration and abbreviation suggested. It would ... leave out
a good deal that is essential" (CEJL, 4:483). In his biographical study, Crick insists that
Orwell's refusal stems from the fact that the Goldstein book and appendix are very much
part of the meaning of the novel, and "if readers could not see their significance, they
could not understand the book" (Crick, George Orwell, 386).
Totalitarianism
(Oceania, Eastasia, Eurasia)
Unconscious Opposition:
Superior Elite Inferior Masses
(Inner Party elite) (Outer Party middle class and
working-class proles)
Unconscious Opposition:
Not-Inferior Masses Not-Superior Elite
Not-Oceania
(world of the "author" of Nineteen Eighty-Four)
22. Marin, "Theses on Ideology and Utopia," in Utopics, 195-200. On Marin, see Fredri
Jameson, "Of Islands and Trenches: Naturalization and the Production of Utopian Dis
course," Diacritics 7, no. 2 (summer 1977): 2-21, and Eugene D. Hill, "The Place of the
Future: Louis Marin and his Utopics," Science-Fiction Studies 9 (1982): 167-79.
23. See Alex Zwerdling, "Orwell's Psychopolitics," in Ejner J. Jensen, ed., The Future of
"Nineteen Eighty-Four "(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 87-110. Anthony
West sees Orwell's insight as biographical, stemming from his boarding school experi-
ences, in "George Orwell," in Principles and Persuasions (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1957), 164-76.
tion (169); and third, in comparison with previous revolutionary groups, this
new middle class was "less avaricious, less tempted by luxury, hungrier for
pure power, and, above all, more conscious of what they were doing" (169),
namely, "arresting progress and freezing history" (168).
Goldstein's account of the transition to totalitarianism is notable for
its voluntarism and its elitism, tendencies rendered even more extreme by
the fact that the new middle class is able to come to power under circum-
stances of increasing economic development and prosperity, circumstances
that "threatened the destruction--indeed in some sense was the destruc-
tion-of a hierarchical society" (156). Paradoxically, the principal cause of
the totalitarian revolution was the fact that, "as early as the beginning of the
twentieth century, human equality had become technically possible" (168).
While it was still true that men were not equal in their native talents and that
social functions had to be specialized in ways that favored some individuals
against others, "there was no longer any real need for class distinctions or
for large differences of wealth" (168). However, from the point of view of the
ambitions of the new middle class-ambitions that the reader can only as-
sume to be innate and instinctive since they are otherwise unmotivated-
"human equality was no longer an ideal to be striven after, but a danger to
be averted" (168).
Such a representation of the origins of totalitarianism could hardly
have been welcomed by critics and enthusiasts anxious to erase class
struggle from the rhetoric of the cold war. More interestingly, we see Orwell
speaking out here as populist tribune and moral critic of capitalism, assert-
ing the objective possibility of social equality, and forthrightly condemning
the professional middle class for betraying it. Clearly, Orwell recognizes
and condemns the immorality of middle-class elitism, but, just as clearly, he
is silent with respect to the structural-economic taproot of their behavior.
Indeed, the very possibility of economic motivation is denied in the text's
representation of world history as a ceaseless struggle between "high,
middle, and low." Instead of social circumstances explaining elitism, we are
presented with elitism as an explanation of social circumstances--will to
power bereft of any purpose or goal other than the perpetuation of class
inequalities that are no longer rational or necessary. In short, the totali-
tarian revolution is caused by the intelligence and will of innately superior
individuals. These individuals are immoral, to be sure, but far from being
a disadvantage, a lack of morality seems to be a sign of the superiority of
the victorious new middle class. Despite economic conditions objectively
ripe for a utopian transformation to a moral society, we are presented with
liberty because they have no intellect" (173). This view of the proles is not
inconsistent with Orwell's representation of the working class within the
national family and the popular alliance against capitalism. As we have also
already noted, Orwell's notion of capitalist England as a family with the
wrong members in control recognizes the working class as a positive force,
but only for its alleged capacity for human solidarity and moral commu-
nity, not for intelligence or initiative, capacities Orwell reserves exclusively
for the middle class.24 Whether he represents them as moral or immoral,
socialist or totalitarian, Orwell invariably represents middle-class individuals
as intellectually superior to their working-class counterparts. The class alli-
ance posited by his populist socialism may be negated in Oceania, but the
class stereotypes remain unchanged. Moreover, neither utopian class alli-
ance nor dystopian class antagonism is economically determined. In both
instances, class stereotypes are substituted for class interest, although in
the utopian case, the absence of economic exploitation serves to enhance
the plausibility of class collaboration, while in the dystopian case, it simply
renders the posited antagonism between the middle and working classes
incomprehensible.
Inferior by nature, the proles may be safely left alone, but it is differ-
ent with the Outer Party, that is, with middle-class individuals endowed with
a capacity for thought and action. In a party member, "not even the smallest
deviation of opinion on the most unimportant subject can be tolerated. A
Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police"
(173). A party member "is expected to have not only the right opinions, but
the right instincts. He or she is expected to have no private emotions and
no respites from enthusiasm" (173). However, the introduction of such a
degree of control over party members introduces a serious anomaly within
the figuration of Oceania, one ultimately rooted in the contrary relationship
24. In The Road to Wigan Pier, Orwell remarks that "no genuine working man grasps the
deeper implications of socialism" (176). Orwell evinces a profound suspicion for working-
class intellectuals and seems to believe that workers who become educated necessarily
betray their fellow workers: "It is of course true that plenty of people of working class
origin are Socialists of the theoretical bookish type. But they are never people who have
remained working men .... They ... belong to the type who squirms into the middle class
via the literary intelligentsia, or the type who becomes a Labour MP or a high-up trade-
union official. This last type is one of the most desolating spectacles the world contains.
He has been picked out to fight for his mates, and all it means to him is a soft job ....
Not merely while but by fighting the bourgeoisie he becomes a bourgeois himself" (177).
Orwell seems to imply that a working man can only become a socialist by becoming
middle class, while if he remains a worker, he cannot really be a socialist at all.
between the nihilistic will to power that animates the Inner Party and the
bureaucratic rationality associated with the Outer Party cadres. For mem-
bers of the Inner Party, support for the goal of perfect orthodoxy and a
comprehensive supervisory apparatus is plausible, because it is they who
have freely designed the entire system, and because it works entirely for
their material benefit. Not only does an Inner Party member participate
in the exercise of total power, the luxuries he enjoys--"his large, well ap-
pointed flat, the better texture of his clothes, the better quality of his food
and drink and tobacco, his two or three servants, his private motorcar or
helicopter" (158)-set him in a different world from members of the Outer
Party. Members of the Outer Party, by contrast, are frightfully oppressed by
Oceania's repressive state apparatus. Although we are told that the Outer
Party has a "similar advantage" (158) over the proles as the Inner Party has
over them, in actuality, it is the proles who are better off. Not only are the
proles relatively free (able to enjoy love, friendship, and privacy-to name
only the more important things denied to members of the Outer Party), they
live relatively securely, if poorly, and although uneducated, they are, for the
most part, happy in their ignorance. By contrast, the domination endured
by members of the Outer Party is so oppressive and so all-encompassing
that their ability to survive at all strains our credibility while the enthusiasm
for serving the party attributed to them is completely unbelievable. Unlike
the proles, members of the Outer Party are not ignorant. They know, for
example, that the state of continuous warfare by which the economic sur-
plus is wasted is a complete hoax and that popular loyalty to the regime
is assured only by the grossest deception and manipulation. They know,
in short, that things are needlessly oppressive and, more importantly, that
the sufferings they themselves endure are utterly unnecessary. Like every
middle class known to history, the Outer Party is absolutely essential to
the ruling class of exploiters they serve; however, unlike any middle class
known to history, they receive no benefits for their service and no incentive
for accepting and reproducing the ideological values of the dominant class.
Instead of being relatively privileged exploiters of others, the members of
the Outer Party are unprivileged victims of oppressive acts for which they
themselves are responsible.
The Outer Party is an impossible combination of total coercion and
total cooperation. Having no plausible motive for ideological self-deception
and possessed of very real knowledge of the deceptions they perpetrate,
the question arises as to how the members of the Outer Party can be repre-
sented at all. The fundamental contradiction between the total coercion
exercised against the Outer Party and the total cooperation they neverthe-
less provide is a paradox only apparently "resolved" by means of Oceania's
extreme voluntarism. As Goldstein's text explains it, "speculations which
might possibly induce a skeptical or rebellious attitude are killed in advance
by his [the party member's] early acquired inner discipline." Many variations
of this "mental discipline" are described, but, ultimately, we are assured,
they are all reducible to a single form: doublethink.
25. Thus, only with respect to the Inner Party can we accept the commonplace interpre-
tation of doublethink as a satire on Nazi or Soviet elites. With respect to the Outer Party,
Orwell's use of doublethink crosses the line from satire, an impossible exaggeration of
reality, to fantasy, a realistic treatment of an impossibility-a shift motivated by contradic-
tions within his political ideology not by any lapse on his part. On fantasy in the novel, see
Anthony Easthope, "Fact and Fantasy in Nineteen Eighty-Four," in Norris, ed., Inside the
Myth, 263-85; Alex Zwerdling "Orwell and the Techniques of Didactic Fantasy," in Hynes,
Twentieth-Century Interpretations, 88-101. On the relation of satire to the genre of utopia,
see Robert C. Elliott, The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1970); see also Gary Saul Morson, The Boundaries of Genre
(Evanston: Northeastern University Press, 1981).
middle class who is neither inferior nor immoral. Neither prole, loyal party
functionary, nor member of the Inner Party elite, Winston is a contradictory
figure. Possessed of intelligence, personal initiative, and decency in a world
where these attributes cannot exist together, Winston is indeed the "last
man," as O'Brien mockingly describes him, the last vestige of the progres-
sive middle class on whom Orwell's populist ideology of socialism depends.
He exists, and only exists, so that the evil of totalitarianism might be recog-
nized and resisted from within. However, because Winston is a middle-class
individual, we must not lose sight of the fact that his struggle for "individual"
freedom is inseparable from its origins in "bourgeois" freedom.
In conformity to the opposition of socialism and totalitarianism, Win-
ston's quest for freedom and his defeat at the hands of O'Brien reinforce the
contrast of good and evil that formally constitutes Orwell's populist ideology.
Like the proles, Winston is a victim of the totalitarian system, and his de-
feat negatively affirms the necessity of a socialist alliance of the middle and
working classes. At the same time, however, the clear-cut moral contrast
between Winston and O'Brien is subtly blurred by the repressed opposi-
tion of superior individuals and inferior masses. The confrontation of good
and evil-a struggle where nothing less than the future of civilization is at
stake-takes place exclusively within the ranks of the middle class, and it is
determined, in the last instance, by innate characteristics of psychological
strength and critical intelligence. Given these stakes and these conditions,
the ideological significance of Winston's struggle can hardly be exagger-
ated, and yet we find Winston depicted as objectively inferior to O'Brien
and, in the end, completely defeated, his spirit crushed. This outcome is all
the more curious, since neither Orwell's conscious opposition of totalitarian
immorality to socialist morality nor his unconscious opposition of superior
individuals to inferior masses precludes a representation of Winston as a su-
perior individual of sufficient intelligence and strength of character to stand
up to O'Brien and to die beaten but unbroken. Of course, Orwell's desire
to convey the experience of totalitarianism to his middle-class readers im-
plies a figuration of Winston as outwardly unexceptional, but even this con-
sideration hardly requires that he be mentally or morally inferior to O'Brien.
Why, like Ernest Everhard, the charismatic revolutionary of London's Iron
Heel, does Winston not join the proles, become a leader in the struggle
against the party, and, with his soul mate Julia, die a martyr to "the good
old Cause"-a mythic ancestor for the posttotalitarian "author" of his saga
(and, of course, an exemplary figure for the middle-class reader of 1949)?
After all, Orwell's figuration of Oceania points toward just such a hero. So
26. For the most part, this unspoken desire for heroism has gone unrecognized, although
Richard Rees criticizes Orwell for demanding "superhuman bravery" from his characters
and Nineteen Eighty-Four as a grim culmination of this "all or nothing" philosophy. See
Richard Rees, George Orwell: Fugitive from the Camp of Victory (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1961), 103-4. For Orwell as a heroic liberal in a decadent post-
liberal age, see Philip Rieff, "George Orwell and the Post-Liberal Imagination," in Harold
Bloom, ed., George Orwell: Modern Critical Views (New York: Chelsea House, 1987),
45-62.
27. For a thoughtful analysis of the instinctual dynamics between Julia, Winst
O'Brien from the perspective of Freudian theory, see Paul Robinson, "For the L
Big Brother: The Sexual Politics of Nineteen Eighty-Four," in Stansky, ed., On "N
Eighty-Four," 148-58.
28. James Connors, "Do It to Julia! Thoughts on Orwell's 1984," Modern Fiction S
16 (winter 1970/71): 463-73, argues that Winston is "so corrupted by his work on be
the Party that he is doomed to failure in his half-understood and belated attempt to
against a group of men whose views and values he shares far more than he re
(466). While Connors is correct to see shared views and values, and correct to poi
Orwell's strategy of scattering clues throughout the first two-thirds of the novel th
to identify Winston as a man unable to sustain a successful rebellion against the
his interpretation cannot account for the fact that Winston is able to rebel in the first
Winston is simply another in the long line of lower middle-class protagonists whose
flicting tendencies of rebellion and conformity were Orwell's constant preoccupatio
Terry Eagleton's brilliant analysis, "Orwell and the Lower Middle Class Novel," in
and Emigrds (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970), 78-108.
his inability to resist to the very end-is that he is neither moral enough
to transcend his class prejudices nor strong enough to win his battle of
wills with O'Brien. By choosing the path of personal escapism, Winston be-
comes morally complicit in his own destruction, while his failure to stand up
to O'Brien psychologically testifies to his inferiority and justifies his defeat
in purely naturalistic terms. Orwell's sadistic delight in punishing Winston
(and our vicarious pleasure in reading about his suffering?) stems in large
part from the recognition and condemnation of his weakness.
Winston's superiority to the proles and his inferiority to O'Brien com-
bine in a scandalous revelation of an underlying similarity between his
middle-class individualism and totalitarian will to power. From the outset,
Winston is fascinated by power and fatally disempowered by his belief in
the hopelessness of rebellion and in the omnipotence of the Inner Party. In
the early stages of his interrogation, at a moment when he is still fully lucid,
Winston realizes that "what most oppressed him was the consciousness of
his own intellectual inferiority [to O'Brien] .... O'Brien was a being in all
ways larger than himself. There was no idea that he had ever had, or could
have, that O'Brien had not long ago known, examined, and rejected. His
mind contained Winston's mind" (211). In precisely the same manner that he
accepts his own superiority to the proles and Outer Party cadres, Winston
acknowledges O'Brien's superiority to himself. Because his own worldview
is organized around categories of will to power and contrasts of superiority
and inferiority, it is impossible for Winston not to equate the power of the
Inner Party with the personal superiority of its members. As he is uncon-
sciously repelled by the inferiority of the proles and other members of the
Outer Party, Winston is unconsciously attracted to O'Brien, from whom he
seeks recognition as a fellow superior individual.29
On the surface, O'Brien appears evil and insane, but it is he, not
Winston, who grasps the deeper truth of their relationship, the fact that Win-
ston's defense of human decency and individual freedom is somehow, in
the vernacular of existentialism, "inauthentic." The fact is, Winston cares
only about himself. His refusal to love Big Brother and his resistance to
the party's domination is, at bottom, an egoistic drive indistinguishable from
29. In The Orwell Mystique: A Study in Male Ideology (Amherst: University of Massa-
chusetts Press, 1984), Daphne Patai provocatively explains this attraction in terms of a
masculine ideology of "gamesmanship," whereby Winston can assert his significance and
attain approval from O'Brien. For Patai, competitive games embody a "cult of masculinity,"
a gratuitous struggle for domination, which explains both O'Brien's sadism and Winston's
desire to be a worthy opponent.
30. See "James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution," CEJL, 4:160-81. Orwell's debt
to Burnham for the basic framework of Oceania is universally acknowledged, while his
criticisms of Burnham's "power worship," his tendency to assume that the drift toward
totalitarianism is irresistible (163), to associate greatness with cruelty and dishonesty
(169), and to predict the future as a continuation of whatever is happening at the present
time (172-73) are either ignored or assumed abandoned by a later, more pessimistic
Orwell. I am arguing that Winston's character preserves Orwell's critique of Burnham.
For his most well-known discussion of power worship, see George Orwell, "Raffles and
Miss Blandish," CEJL, 3:212-24; Orwell's conception is defended in Gorman Beauchamp,
"From Bingo to Big Brother: Orwell on Power and Sadism," in Jensen, The Future of
Nineteen Eighty-Four, 65-85. See also, Gerald Fiderer, "Masochism as Literary Strategy:
Orwell's Psychological Novels," Literature and Psychology 20 (1970): 3-21.
31. Here it is customary to cite Orwell's remark that Jack London "could foresee Fas-
cism because he had a Fascist streak in himself" ("Introduction to Love of Life and Other
Stories by Jack London," CEJL, 4:23-29). This remark is usually taken to explain Orwell's
own capacity for writing so powerfully about totalitarianism. Much rarer are quotations
of the complete sentence, which ends with "or at any rate a marked strain of brutality
and an almost unconquerable preference for the strong man against the weak man" (25).
Also absent from the critical literature are remarks about London's "instinct" toward ac-
ceptance of a "natural aristocracy of strength, beauty, and talent" (26). It is precisely this
elitism that Orwell unconsciously recognizes as his own.
32. A characterization generalizable to pioneering science fiction writers of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, such as H. G. Wells and Jules Verne. See Darko
Suvin, Metamorphosis of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), and Pierre Macherey, "Jules Verne: The Faulty
Narrative," in A Theory of Literary Production, 159-239.
Winston fails, and must fail, because he does not measure up to the stan-
dard of superiority implicit in Orwell's political ideology, but his defeat leaves
open the possibility that another, superior middle-class hero will yet emerge
to organize the proles and defeat the party. Because the utopian frame de-
clares that totalitarianism will be overthrown, Winston's defeat cannot mean
the end of socialism. The fact that this particular Winston is corrupted by
petty bourgeois weaknesses does not, therefore, resolve the mystery of
the missing middle-class hero whose presence is implied by the demise of
Oceania but who appears nowhere in the existing text. The absent pres-
ence of the middle-class hero can only be explained by the tension between
Orwell's populism and his elitism that renders both the utopian frame and
the middle-class hero who will call it into existence unrepresentable. Able
to portray evil elites but not the evil of elitism, Orwell may be justly accused
of perpetrating a dystopian mysticism of cruelty; unfortunately, his utopian
negation of cruelty-the (socialist) negation of the (totalitarian) negation of
capitalism -is itself no more than a mysticism of morality.
34. See, for example, "Will Freedom Die," Left News (Apr. 1941): 1682-85, where Orwell
expresses fear of a loss of liberty with the passing of capitalism and the advent of social-
ism. Significantly, this piece is omitted from CEJL. Such elitist attitudes make it possible
for neoconservatives such as Norman Podhoretz to lay an otherwise specious claim to
Orwell's legacy. See "If Orwell Were Alive Today," Harper's, Jan. 1983, 30-37; see also
Christopher Hitchens and Norman Podhoretz, "An Exchange on Orwell," Harper's Feb.
1983, 56-58.
and totalitarianism, Orwell can find no plausible motivation for superior indi-
viduals of the middle class to act morally and take the side of the inferior
masses of the working class. This important, if unintended, insight provides
one important clue to the mystery of the absent middle-class hero within the
novel. The Orwell inside the text tries valiantly to provide viable images of
the national family-the Outer Party as middle-class victims as oppressed
in their own fashion as the working-class proles, and Winston as a middle-
class dissident who admires the prole's humanity and recognizes in them
the hope for the future-but he succeeds only in representing the impossi-
bility of an alliance of the middle and working classes. Orwell believes the
middle class has "nothing to lose but its aitches," but in putting this ideology
to work, he comes up against profound structural-economic antagonisms
that resist being (mis)represented as merely cultural-ideological. In the very
act of denying it, Orwell is compelled to represent the incoherence of a
middle class victimized under totalitarianism and the coherence of middle-
class support for the exploitation of the working class under capitalism. The
national family cannot be coherently represented, because, within a capi-
talist society, the middle class has no coherent reason for abolishing the
exploitative distinction between mental and manual labor that is the source
of its class status and power.
His notion of the national family may be objectively false, but Orwell's
inability to depict even its subjective truth illuminates a final contradiction
within his political ideology: the discomfiting similarity between his own
middle-class populism and that of Hitler's. Characteristically, Orwell openly
acknowledges his ambivalent attitude toward fascism. In a review of Mein
Kampf, for example, he makes the following pronouncement, "I should like
to put on record that I have never been able to dislike Hitler. Ever since he
came to power ... I have reflected that I would certainly kill him if I could get
within reach of him, but that I could feel no personal animosity. The fact is
that there is something deeply appealing about him."35 Specifically, Orwell
finds appealing Hitler's pose as a "Promethean, self-sacrificing hero fight-
35. George Orwell, "Review of Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler," CEJL, 2:13. Even those who
label Orwell a "Tory radical" are looking backward, almost always admiringly, to Cobbett
and Hazlett, and never situate Orwell's radical conservatism in the context of fascism-a
lower middle-class reaction to the pressures of capitalist transformation and the threat of
a revolutionary working-class movement. See William E. Laskowski Jr., "George Orwell
and the Tory-Radical Tradition," in Rose, ed., The Revised Orwell, 149-90. Daphne Patai,
comparing Orwell's novel with Katherine Burdekin's Swastika Night, does note a connec-
tion between the inner characteristics of "fascist man" and those qualities Orwell extols-
male dominance and a cult of masculinity (Patai, Mystique, 316 n. 32).
ing against impossible odds," his grasp of the "falsity of hedonism, security,
and the avoidance of pain," and his appreciation of "patriotism and military
virtues."36 In The Road to Wigan Pier, Orwell notes the broad appeal of
fascism: "In order to combat Fascism it is necessary to understand it, which
involves admitting some good as well as much evil. ... To anyone with a
feeling for tradition and for discipline it comes with its appeal ready made"
(213). Nor does he make any secret of his own preference for a socialism
that will be "simpler and harder" rather than "safe and soft." Although he
supports a state-controlled economy and equality of incomes, Orwell has
nothing but contempt for a view of socialism that would be, as he cuttingly
puts it, "a paradise of little fat men" (193). His notion of the national family is
deeply rooted in a world we have lost, a largely mythical world of collective
individualism combining yeoman independence and rural village commu-
nity, a world that corresponds uncannily to the Nazi mythology of peasant
community, hard work, family values, and national patriotism. The worlds
of both Hitler and Orwell are based on the traditional virtues of the petty
bourgeoisie, the ideological unity of the middle and working classes, and
superior individuals defined in terms of moral purpose as well as strength
of will. Of course, the reality of Hitler's brutal methods more than offsets
the appeal of National Socialist ideals in Orwell's eyes, but his ambivalence
toward Hitler is perhaps another important clue as to why Orwell is unable
to translate his own elitism into a literary image of the middle-class hero.
The ordeal of Winston amply testifies to Orwell's contempt for both weak-
ness and inferiority, but to portray Winston as a superior individual leading
the inferior masses to victory would come too close to affirming the kind
of revolution that Nineteen Eighty-Four is intended to condemn. Although
Orwell is unconsciously drawn toward the necessity of a middle-class hero
and a protofascist revolution (and to foreclose all other possibilities), his
conscious moral commitment to social equality and his opposition to totali-
tarianism preclude the actual representation of such an outcome. Orwell is
capable of recognizing an underlying similarity between the ideologies of
bourgeois individualism and totalitarianism, but he is necessarily blind to
the existence of a homologous relationship between totalitarianism and his
own moral elitism. This relationship can only be represented by an absence,
the symptomatic absence of the middle-class hero.