AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY,

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.

NAME: BABANGIDA STEPHEN

REG. NO: P23SSPS8058

TOPIC: DISCUSS THE RECENT ECOWAS POLITICAL CRISES

IN WEST AFRICA

COURSE CODE: POL 807

COURSE TITTLE: ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD
POLITICS
COURSE LECTURER: DR E. AGUBAMAH

MAY, 2024
 ABSTRACT

This seminar paper seeks to study the recent political crises in ECOWAS. The study is
specifically focused on the Political crises in the following member-states of ECOWAS; Mali,
Niger, Burkina Faso and Guinea. The study adopts secondary sources of data collection, which
includes the use of journals, articles, textbooks etc.The study gives a historical background of
how ECOWAS came into existence; it explains the treaty of 1975 in Lagos where 15 West
African countries agreed to be members of ECOWAS. Cape Verde joined the community in 1977.
The study identifies and examine the five executive bodies that constitutes the institutional
framework of ECOWAS, these bodies include; the Authority of Heads of State and Government,
the Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat, the Tribunal, and the Fund for Cooperation,
Compensation and Development. The study employs the use of Cosmopolitan theory.
Cosmopolitanism is a theory in international relations where people are viewed as citizens of the
world, rather than belonging to particular states or nation-states. The study further examines the
responses of ECOWAS towards the recent political crises in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and
Guinea; ECOWAS employed the use of sanctions and threatening force, and then gradually
moved to the use of mediation in order to curtail the issue of the military taking over power from
democratically elected leaders. In some situations, like the case of Niger, countries that are not
members of ECOWAS had to intervene, example Algeria, in order to find a solution to the
political upheaval. In the course of the crises in ECOWAS there were prominent individuals that
were delegated by ECOWAS to mediate over the issue. For instance, the former President of
Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan led the ECOWAS mediation team to Mali, the Nigerian
military Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar and the Sultan of Sokoto Muhammadu
Sa’ad Abubakar were also delegated to mediate over the political crisis in Niger. The study finds
out that the military in the process of taking over power usually infringes on the constitutional
rights of the democratic elected leaders as well as citizens, it also discovers that ECOWAS are
most times uncertain of the best strategy to apply when a coup occurs in the country of its
member-state(s). The study recommends that ECOWAS should diversify its methods of approach
to political crisis, it suggests that the use of military action should not be the first means of
engagement. Thus, diplomatic means would be a more useful means.

1
INTRODUCTION

The 15 nation ECOWAS came into force on 28th May 1975, when the Treaty was signed in
Lagos, Nigeria, by a group of countries comprising Dahomey (now Benin), The Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-
Leone, Togo, and Burkina Faso (former Upper Volta). Cape Verde acceded to ECOWAS in
1977. Hence, establishing a market of 280 million consumers and a geographical area of 6.2
million square kilometres. However, the Treaty from inception has been faced with a series of
challenges, including security, underdevelopment and the implementation of the Protocol on
Free Movement of Goods, Persons and the Right to establishment in the member States.
(Esekumemu, 2014)

Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) is a vital organization in the West
African region of Africa and Africa as a whole. It is an organization that aims at uniting
countries in West Africa in order to support its member states both economically and politically.
Despite the positive objectives of ECOWAS, there are serious challenges that are bedeviling the
organization and its operations, these challenges are largely political.

It is against this backdrop that this study examines and discusses the recent political crisis of
ECOWAS. The study specifically focuses on the military takeover of power in Mali and Niger
and also how ECOWAS was able to respond to the issue.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study employs the use of Cosmopolitan theory to explain the interrelationship between and
among countries in ECOWAS.

Cosmopolitanism is a theory in international relations where people are viewed as citizens of the
world, rather than belonging to particular states or nation-states. This idea challenges the
classical ideological political traditions of realism and liberalism within international relations.
Realism and liberalism suggest that states are internally sovereign and possesses the monopoly
on violence within its own territory. Furthermore, realism and liberalism believes are that the
sovereign state is the dominant actor in the international arena of politics where anarchy reigns –

2
meaning sovereign states are not subordinated to any authority (although Liberalism believes in
the importance of state-cooperation) (Benning, 2018, cited in William, 2018).

A realist would argue that actions of states are based on self-interest and that international
institutions have little to no effect on shaping the behavior of states. The cosmopolitanism world
view, however, argue that there is no real distinction between international and domestic political
affairs. Liberalism and cosmopolitanism share the idea that power is important to analyze in
international relations but that there is more than just share power-relations in international
affairs; economic, cultural, military and technology also binds states and people together.
Cosmopolitanism believe in sovereignty in people, rather than the state as the sole political entity
and that a society of states should ”evolve into a society of people”. (William, 2018). Benning
(2018) cited in William (2018) claims that in cosmopolitanism, states are not the law; they are,
however, bound by it.
The morality and philosophical ideas of cosmopolitanism is based on the values of humans as
well as the idea of globalization. The principles of this ideology is breaking free from the notion
of territorial-based political entities and the belief in transnational institutions and state
cooperation. Mary Kaldor (2012) cited in William (2018) argues that cosmopolitanism is not a
project for a single world government” but rather transnational institutions which are made up of
a cluster of sovereign states; all of which agreeing to be subordinated to a particular set of rules
and laws. In other words, the ‘cosmopolitanism’ is the law which all member states have
accepted. Kaldor calls this a ‘global overwatch’; the international institutions, be they NGO’s
(non-governmental organization) or continental organizations, operate within the same
boundaries and parameters as the sovereign states. (William, 2018)

The function of the ”global overwatch” is to ensure that states implement these sets of rules,
especially those regarding humanitarian laws and human rights. This would allow the
”overwatch” to intervene in internal conflicts and domestic affairs as it is simply a way of
ensuring that states operate within these sets of rules. (William, 2018)

3
HISTORY OF ECOWAS

ECOWAS is the result of several prior attempts to form economic groups among Anglo-French
nations in West Africa. Consideration of the previous three major attempts to form economic
groups provides the background necessary for understanding the creation and objectives of
ECOWAS. Before discussing the historical background of ECOWAS, however, it is useful to
consider the other major economic integration endeavors which took place among French
speaking nations in West Africa. Central African Customs and Economic Union [Union
Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)] has as its members the states of
Cameroon, Central African Republic, People's Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Chad, the
latter having rejoined in 1976 after temporarily leaving the group. The UDEAC members have
harmonized their tariff rates and incidental charges, i.e., port fees, so that many imports are
subject to duties at the same level in each country. However, the number of exceptions to the
general tariff rates have been steadily increasing and have diminished the effectiveness of the
customs union. The tariff is levied on imports from both member and non-member states, yet
most of the import duty is refunded to exporters in Member States. The balance of this duty is
retained by UDEAC for its expenses and various projects. The UDEAC has also eliminated
import quotas.' A second economic integration group is the Economic Community of West
Africa [Communaute tconomique de I'Afrique de l'Ouest(CEAO)] which replaced a prior,
ineffective economic union known as the East African Customs Union. The CEAO includes the
French speaking countries of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.
Benin City is an observer. The objective of the CEAO is to establish a common outer tariff and
eliminate intra-community trade barriers. Since its establishment in January 1974, only limited
progress has been achieved. The initiative to form a regional economic grouping of Anglo-
French nations in West Africa was made in 1964 by President Tubman of Liberia. On August 24,
1964, representatives from the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea met in Monrovia,
Liberia, to discuss the prospects for the establishment of a free trade community among their
respective nations. As a result of the Monrovia meeting, a committee of ministers and experts
was assigned the task of making studies and recommendations for consideration at the next
intergovernmental meeting. Agreement was reached among the representatives at the Monrovia
meeting that cooperation should go forward in stages. (Bruce, 1978)
4
On May 28, 1965, the next intergovernmental meeting was held at Freetown, Sierra Leone, at
which time an agreement between Anglo-French nations was signed creating an interim
organization based on the study of the committee of experts. The agreement provided for the
establishment of a ministerial commission, a small claims secretariat, and specialized committees
to be established by the ministerial commission and composed of experts and technicians
designated by the governments of the Member States. In addition, in September 1965, an
administrative office of the West African Interim Organization was created in Monrovia. The
second major development in Anglo-French economic cooperation among West African states
resulted from a series of sub-regional meetings to develop regional economic cooperation
sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for West Africa (ECA). In the second
sub-regional meeting at Accra, Ghana, on May 4, 1967, a tentative agreement on seven Articles
of Association for the Establishment of an Economic Community for West Africa was signed by
thirteen English and French speaking West African states. The Articles of Association
constituted another stage in the interim organization and movement toward a permanent
organization for economic cooperation. The treaty primarily provided for the establishment of an
interim Council of Ministers with the responsibility of drafting a treaty concerning a more
comprehensive economic community for West Africa. The community would then become
governed by the treaty provisions." The first meeting of the economic community of West Africa
was held in Dakar, Senegal, from November 21 to 24, 1967. There the interim Council of
Ministers agreed to aim at achieving economic union rather than limiting themselves to either a
free trade area or customs union. From April 23 to 25, 1967, the Heads of State and Government
of the West African Regional Group, prior to its official incorporation, signed a protocol
establishing it as the West African Regional Group and promulgated the Articles of Association
which were drafted by the Ministers for the proposed West African community. The protocol
provided for the establishment of the Conference of Heads of State, a Council of Ministers, an
Executive Secretariat and various unspecified organs of government. (Bruce, 1978)
Nevertheless, the limited scope of the Articles of Association caused dissatisfaction among a
number of the group's members, and in April 1972 the Heads of State of Nigeria and Togo began
promoting the establishment of a more cohesive and integrated community. Nigeria and Togo
arranged for meetings with officials of other interested West African countries in order to discuss

5
cooperative arrangements and prepare a draft treaty 'for the West African Economic Community.
In 1973, after solidifying proposals for the community, a joint Nigerian-Togolese mission visited
West African capitals to lobby for its proposals. The next significant meeting took place in
Accra, Ghana during the week of February 11 to 15, 1973. At that meeting lawyers and experts
from fifteen West African countries studied a draft treaty for economic integration based on a
joint proposal by Nigeria and Ghana. The meeting resulted in an agreement to be forwarded to a
ministerial conference of West African states. On January 24, 1975, in a meeting of the
ministerial council at Monrovia, the draft treaty was approved and then was recommended to the
Heads of State and Government at a meeting held in Lagos in 1975. On May 28, 1975, the treaty
establishing the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS) was signed by Heads of State
of fifteen West African countries. (Bruce, 1978)

The ECOWAS Constitution is the Lagos Treaty of May, 1975 and its objectives include:
Economic stability among the member States, improve the standard of living of their people,
customs union, freedom of movement of persons, capital, services, agriculture, transportation,
telecommunication, energy and development, industrial master-plan. Several reasons will push
states to create /form economic integration among them. Indeed, reasons like economic
weakness, dependence status, economies of scale and scope, political influence, security and
stability may lead to it. For instance, in the West African Sub-region the principal reasons that
pushed for economic integration include to encourage intra West African trade which was less
than 4%, to strengthen their weak economies, improve the living standard of their people and be
independent of extra African powers in the realpolitik game as a consequence of the Cold War.
Since the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment was
put in place in 1979. The Protocol has failed to actualize its main goals in ECOWAS’ member
states as consequences of a myriad of challenges including lack of political commitment, cross-
border security, wars, political instability and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
and terrorism. (Esekumemu, 2014)

ECOWAS INSTITUTIONS
Bruce (1978) identified the five executive bodies that comprises the institutional framework of
ECOWAS. They are as follows:

6
(1) the Authority of Heads of State and Government, which is responsible for the general
direction and control of the community's executive functions;"

(2) the Council of Ministers, which is composed of two representatives of each Member State
and empowered with the responsibility of policy-making as well as acting as intermediary
between the Authority and the subordinate institutions;

(3) the Executive Secretariat, which acts as the principal executive arm in coordinating and
assisting the Authority and the Council in implementing the Treaty;

(4) the Tribunal, which has the responsibility to settle disputes among Member States
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty; and

(5) the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, which will finance projects and
compensate Member States that suffer from liberalization of trade. While the Authority is
empowered to establish various technical commissions as it deems necessary, the Treaty
especially provides for the establishment of four technical and specialized commissions. The
subject matter areas of the four commissions are as follows:

Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments; Industry, Agriculture, and Natural
Resources; Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy; and Social and Cultural Affairs. Each
commission has only two express functions:

(1) to submit reports and recommendations from time to time to the Council, and

(2) to possess "such other functions as are imposed on it under this Treaty.
The success of ECOWAS institutions may well depend upon the ability of the commissions to
perform meaningful and autonomous activities. In the past, the failure of governments to
surrender sovereignty to inter-governmental organs has prevented the establishment and efficient
functioning of organizations capable of achieving regional integration. The actual responsibilities
and roles to be assumed by the Tribunal, Secretariat, and the Fund will be critical in the
development of ECOWAS.

7
 RECENT CRISES IN ECOWAS: MALI, NIGER, BURKINA FASO AND GUINEA

POLITICAL CRISIS IN MALI AND THE INTERVENTION OF ECOWAS

Geopolitical Background of Mali

Mali is located in the Northern part of the West African sub-region. The country shares
boundaries with Algeria in the northeast, the Niger Republic to the east, Burkina Faso in the
southeast, Cote d’Ivoire to the south, Guinea to the southwest, Senegal to the west and
Mauritania to the northwest (Imperato 2020: 124 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). Although a
multiethnic nation, three ethnic groups dominate the political landscape of Mali. The Bambara
ethnic group who ‘live along the upper Niger River’ constitute 36 per cent of the total
population; they are followed by the Fulani (14 per cent) and the Sarakole (10 per cent). Other
minority ethnic groups include the Tuareg, the Senufo, the Malinke, the Dogon, Songhai, and a
host of other migrant populations who have come to settle in Mali as a result of political asylum
and refugee crises in neighbouring countries (Imperato, Clark & Kathleen 2021 cited in Chidume
etal, 2021).

The 2020 Crises in Mali and the Intervention of ECOWAS

As a sub-regional institution, ECOWAS is a 15-member regional group, established on 28 May,
1975, via the treaty of Lagos’ with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of
activity of the constituting countries (ECOWAS 2016 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). These
countries share a common historical, colonial and geographical experience. Although its
formation was originally inspired by the need to foster economic interactions among member
states, emerging security issues that undermine economic and political stability in the region has
necessitated increased cooperation across a broad spectrum of concerns. The organization under
its protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security have
continuously pioneered peacekeeping operations within the sub-region. For instance, ECOWAS
peacekeeping forces intervened in Liberia (1990–97 and again in 2003), Sierra Leone (1993–
2000), and Guinea-Bissau (1998–99). (Chidume etal, 2021)

In 2001, the organization adopted the supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance to forestall unconstitutional change of government. The protocol legitimized an

8
automatic use of sanction and suspension to deter and reprimand unconstitutional change of
government among member states and also set guidelines for constitutional transfer of power and
electoral laws (ECOWAS 2021 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). It was this protocol that
rationalized the intervention in the Mali Crises of 2020. The intervention which was in two
phases saw ECOWAS Ministerial and Mediation Mission in Mali in an attempt to nip in the bud
the protest that followed the parliamentary elections of April and June 2020. The failure to reach
a compromise among parties and the consequent military coup in August saw ECOWAS
imposing economic sanctions and suspending Mali from its decision-making body as means of
pressuring the junta to transmit power to a civilian government. Notwithstanding, Malians
rejected ECOWAS resolution to the crises.

Constitutionally, the national assembly in Mali comprises 147 ‘Members of Parliament (MPs)
elected by absolute majority vote (50% +1) in single-member constituencies through a two round
system for a five-year term (renewable once), through universal suffrage (The Constitution of the
Republic of Mali 1992 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). However, the precarious situation, political
stalemate, and violence that trailed the re-election of IBK in 2018 caused the parliamentary
elections, scheduled to hold after the presidential elections to be postponed to 2019. The
government, subsequently, adjusted the date of the election from 2019 to 29 March, 2020 on the
grounds of the resurgence of the Tuareg and extremist insurgency in the north and some parts of
southern Mali (Gerenge 2020: 8 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). These adjustments fuelled
consternation among the populace and particularly among government opposition and electoral
stakeholders who began to mount political pressures on government, questioning ‘the legitimacy
of the tenure of the MPs in office whose term ended in December 2018’ (Gerenge 2020: 11 cited
in Chidume etal, 2021). Similarly, following the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic some
members of the opposition called for further adjustment in the date of the election expressing
concerns over the vulnerability of the electorates in the face of a weak healthcare system in the
country (DW 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). Amidst these twists of concern, the government
determined to go ahead with elections scheduled for 29th of March, 2020 (four days after the
first case was reported in Mali) arguing that adequate preparations have been made for the
elections and that voters should take necessary precautions during voting (Global Security.org
2019 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). The pandemic added to the already tense political atmosphere
9
arising from the kidnapping of the main opposition leader Soumalia Cisse; insecurity (in regions
such as Gao, Kidal, Monte and Timbuktu), inter-communal violence and inadequate electoral
preparedness (International Crisis Group 2019 cited in Chidume etal, 2021), would later have an
impact on the outcome of the election.
Consequently, in the first round of the election held on 29 March, fear over the pandemic caused
significant voter apathy. Voters’ turnout was estimated at ‘about 35 per cent nationwide with less
than 13 per cent participation in the capital’; (France24 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021), about
274 out of approximately 12,500 polling stations were unable to open due to insecurity.
Concerns over the wellbeing of Somalia Cisse, the main opposition leader who was being held
by the jihadists overshadowed the poll. In some areas, election observers were kidnapped, while
voters were prevented from voting as a result of ballot box snatching (France24 2020 cited in
Chidume etal, 2021). The second round of voting which took place on 19 April witnessed about
23.2 per cent voter turnout and was equally marred by varying levels of irregularities ranging
from vote-buying, destruction of voting equipment, threats from jihadists in the northern region,
intimidation and removal of electoral officials (France24 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021).
Despite the allegations of executive interference and widespread electoral irregularities, the
constitutional court on 30 April, went ahead to declare the election results where they overturned
the results of 31 seats and handed 10 more parliamentary seats to the President’s party (Rally
Mali) making it the ‘largest bloc’ in the parliament (France24 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021).
The declaration which the opposition alleged was different from the actual results of the poll was
greeted with widespread protests initially calling for the reversal of the election results and the
dissolution of the constitutional court (Afrique 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021).
The protest turned violent when the Movement-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP) (ECOWAS
2020, cited in Chidume etal, 2021), joined the protest and began to demand the resignation of the
President based on corruption, insecurity and poor governance. In line with the ECOWAS
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the Authority of Heads of States of ECOWAS
deployed a ministerial mission to Bamako. The ministerial mission after its investigation
between 18 and 20 June on the causes of the crises came up with the following solutions and
recommendations (ECOWAS 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021);

10
• A reconstitution of the Constitutional court after the abrogation of the decree appointing its
members

• Addressing the disputed 31 seats in parliament and

• Formation of a government of national unity.
The M5-RFP rejected the proposal of ECOWAS and went ahead to mobilize protesters to
demand the resignation of the president whose second term is due in 2023. At the height of the
protest, between 11 and 13 of July, about 10 deaths were recorded with several others injured
(ECOWAS 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). In response to these escalations, ECOWAS
appointed the former president of Nigeria; Goodluck Jonathan to lead a Mediation Mission to
Mali. The mediation team, between 15 and 19 of July met with all the stakeholders including
representatives from the M5-REP, civil societies and government and formulated a road map
based on the recommendations of the Ministerial Mission. Similarly, the M5-REP rejected the
road map and instead intensified calls for IBK’s resignation, formation of a transition
government, the release of Soumaila Cisse and the establishment of a commission of enquiry to
investigate the killing of protesters (ECOWAS 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). Renewed
protests prompted the ECOWAS to send a five (5) man high profile delegation led by the
ECOWAS Chairman and President of Niger Republic, Mohammed Issoufou alongside his
counterparts from Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire. The delegation on 23 July met
with the President, M5-REP representatives, the presidential majority in parliament and civil
society leaders and later held an extraordinary summit of the commission to fashion a resolution
to the crises. In a communiqué issued at the end of the summit on the 27 of July, the commission
reiterated the recommendations of the Ministerial mission and the mediation mission and based
on the demands of the M5-REP, the commission added;

The resignation of the 31 MP whose elections were overturned to be followed by a by-election, a

national unity government headed by Boubou Cisse with 50% of its members drawn from the
ruling coalition, 30 % from the opposition and 20 % from civil society, an investigation into the
deaths and casualties of 10, 11, and 12 July and that the IBK led government should institute a
fund to support the injured and assist the families of the victims of the demonstrations, and the
formation of a Monitoring Committee to oversee the implementation of the road map within 10

11
days (Maas 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021).
The President adopted the recommendations, announced the reconstitution of the constitutional
court, and reappointed Boubou Cisse as the prime minister (Cserkits 2020 cited in Chidume etal,
2021). Contrarily, the opposition intensified the protest insisting on the resignation of the
president. At the peak of the crisis on August 18, senior military officers under the National
Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), seized power from the government, arrested
the president and compelled him to resign on national television (DW 2020 cited in Chidume
etal, 2021). The CNSP among other things claimed that the military takeover was expedient to
avert the looming chaos and violence arising from the continuous protest in the country. They
later added the government’s failure to contain extremist insurgencies, unpaid arrears and
entitlements, delayed promotions and inadequate facilities for the military, as the reasons for the
military junta (ECOWAS 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021).

Consequently, ECOWAS citing its protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, immediately,
on 20 August, ‘suspended Mali from all ECOWAS decision making bodies’, called for ‘the
reinstatement of IBK’, ‘closed all lands and air borders as well as stopped all financial, economic
and trade flows and transaction between ECOWAS member states and Mali, imposed sanctions
on the junta and their allies and called for immediate ‘activation of the ECOWAS standby force’
(Orosz 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). However, this did not deter the putschists who
continued to enjoy a rousing welcome among civil societies and Malians who trooped out to the
street to celebrate the exit of the IBK government. In a three-day, open consultation held with
500 representatives drawn from various spheres of Malian society, civil society groups and the
M5-REP the junta drew up an 18 monthly plan for transition to democratic rule (ECOWAS 2020
cited in Chidume etal, 2021). Similarly, in another meeting on 20 August, the Authority of Heads
of State of ECOWAS agreed to send its Mediation mission led by Goodluck Jonathan to assess
the political situation in Mali. Between 22 and 24 August, the Mediation mission met with the
military junta, IBK, the constitutional court, the group of Ambassadors to Mali, representatives
of the African Union, the United Nations and the Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel
(ECOWAS 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). In its review of the Mediation mission report, on
28 August, ECOWAS called on the CNSP to immediately; constitute a transition committee
which must be led by a civilian appointed President, appoint a prime minister to head the
12
government and that the Transition committee should implement the transition programme
within 12 months (UNSC 2020, cited in Chidume etal, 2021)
The rescinding of ECOWAS's insistence on the reinstatement of IBK in its later resolution
followed the President’s acknowledgement of his willful resignation. During a ‘mini-summit’ on
15 September with the leadership of the CNSP, the organization, however, reiterated its
commitment to the 12 monthly transition period and that the president and prime minister must
be civilians. The junta rejected ECOWAS’ ultimatum for a 12 months transition and insisted on a
Transition Government (TG) midwifed by the military in line with its earlier 18 months
transition plan (Cserkits 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). Although there was a rumour that the
coup was backed by the M5-REP opposition coalition, ‘the Malian Armed Forces have for many
years been seen as one of the main reasons why the country has not fallen completely apart
(UNSC 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021). Similarly, the M5-REP disagreed with the CNSP
proposal which allowed the military to lead a transition period (Ahmed 2020 cited in Chidume
etal, 2021). To stem the tide of opposition, the military tactically yielded and announced on 21
September, the appointment of Bah N’Daw, a ‘retired colonel’ and Colonel Goita, leader of the
CNSP as President and Vice President of the TG and subsequently appointed Moctar Ouane as
transition prime minister (Orosz 2020 cited in Chidume etal, 2021).

POLITICAL CRISIS IN NIGER AND THE INTERVENTION OF ECOWAS

At first glance, the coup in Niger appears similar to other crises that ECOWAS has faced in the
past—military leaders within a member state (in this case, head of the presidential guard
Abdourahamane Tchiani) wrested power from an elected civilian leader (Mohamed Bazoum).
Yet, several aspects make this crisis unique. (Sahil, 2024)

Sahil (2024) identified some reasons for the crisis in Niger, the reasons are as follows;

First, the Niger coup is the first to occur after ECOWAS leaders agreed in December 2022 to set
up a regional force specifically to combat unconstitutional changes of government. This decision
—a direct response to the string of coups since 2020—has not yet been implemented.
Nonetheless, the Niger military’s actions directly challenge this new ECOWAS initiative.
Second, Niger represents the fourth member state to succumb to a coup in the last three years. In
13
the words of ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Abdel-
Fatau Musah, “This coup is one coup too many.” This creates additional pressure for ECOWAS
to contain the perceived contagion of coups.
Third, the emergence of an anti-ECOWAS coalition among member states presents a new,
unique challenge. In past crises, ECOWAS has often had to factor in the response of the crisis
state’s neighbour(s). But the nature and extent of the ECOWAS-adverse involvement of Burkina
Faso and Mali in the Niger crisis is more serious than any that ECOWAS has encountered
before.
Fourth, the crisis broke out only a month after ECOWAS leaders elected the new Nigerian
president, Bola Tinubu, as ECOWAS Chair. How ECOWAS handles Niger is a test of President
Tinubu’s chairmanship of the organization.

Finally, several characteristics of Niger as a country make this a unique crisis. Niger is the
largest country in West Africa by area. Despite having only the ninth-largest economy in
ECOWAS (with a GDP of around $14 billion in 2022), Niger is the fourth-largest ECOWAS
country by population (over 26 million in 2022). Compared to Guinea-Bissau or The Gambia—
targets of recent ECOWAS military interventions—Niger is a large country with a stronger
military. Niger’s significant importance to external actors, including France (as an exporter of
uranium and former colony) and the United States (as a regional partner in combatting terrorism
in the Sahel), means that the crisis has an “outsized global impact.”
Niger also shares a long border with Nigeria, the dominant country within ECOWAS.
Correspondingly, Niger shares significant bilateral trade with Nigeria ($226 million in 2022)
and, particularly with northern Nigeria, strong cultural and historical affinities. The crisis,
therefore, could directly affect Nigeria.

Combined, these features make the present crisis critical for ECOWAS. Niger’s size implies that
ECOWAS has much at stake: effective handling would serve as a boost for the organization, but
a failure to address the crisis might prove severely damaging. Measures to thwart a “coup
contagion” do not appear to have worked thus far. Not only that, the banding together of the
coup-affected countries threatens regional unity, if not ECOWAS itself. In their role as
ECOWAS chair, Nigeria and President Tinubu face the difficult task of steering ECOWAS back

14
towards democracy. But this is no easy task. Pushing too hard might portend a regional split, but
being too soft risks appearing inadequate, or worse, irrelevant. (Sahil, 2024)

ECOWAS Responses to the Military takeover in Niger.

Sahil (2024) identified and explained the following responses of ECOWAS to the military
takeover in Niger:

Initial Response: Sanctions and Threatening Force

ECOWAS’s first response was a statement from the ECOWAS Commission released on July 26
—the day the crisis emerged—condemning the “attempted coup.” This was followed by
condemnation and a commitment to restore order from Nigerian President Tinubu in his capacity
as ECOWAS Chair. Condemnatory statements constitute a standard response—nearly all
international and regional organizations make such statements in the event of a coup. Notably,
ECOWAS labelled the takeover as an attempted coup, fearing that calling it a coup would accord
a degree of recognition to the junta.

After the initial statements, ECOWAS held an extraordinary summit of the Authority in Abuja
on July 30. To the surprise of many, in the summit’s final communiqué, ECOWAS leaders
threatened to use force to restore constitutional order in Niger if the coup leaders did not hand
power back to Bazoum within one week. To back this up, the Authority directed the ECOWAS
Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) to prepare to deploy troops. This threat was made
alongside the imposition of diplomatic, economic, and financial sanctions. The communiqué
called for the appointment of a special representative of the ECOWAS Chair, but only to deliver
the Authority’s demands, with no explicit mediation mandate.
While some experts favoured these measures, this initial response was rather surprising.
ECOWAS had threatened military intervention before exhausting other means such as mediation
and sanctions. Not only did this move deviate from past ECOWAS practice, but it also appeared
to go against ECOWAS’s legal frameworks. Article 6 of the Supplementary Act on Sanctions
lists the political sanctions that ECOWAS can impose. “Peace enforcement or restoration of
constitutional order by use of legitimate force” is the final option. Further, Article 13 states that
sanctions “shall be enforced in increasing order of severity.” However, during a television

15
interview, PAPS Commissioner Abdel-Fatau Musah defended ECOWAS actions by noting that
“ECOWAS array of tools…is not necessarily sequential…[Rather], it depends upon the
circumstances. They could be sequential [or] they can be a combination.”
What explains ECOWAS’s initial belligerence? One factor is that when leaders meet for an
extraordinary summit, they go into closed-door discussions with less material input from the
Council of Ministers, the ambassadorial meetings, and the Commission staff compared to
ordinary summits. This might make them more prone to take harsher actions. Still, this was not
ECOWAS’s first extraordinary summit, so the response begs further explanation.

Three aspects seem to have influenced ECOWAS strong stance. One, the crisis represented the
first major challenge for newly elected ECOWAS Chair Bola Tinubu. Himself facing challenges
to his election victory in Nigeria, President Tinubu may have felt the need to portray strong
regional leadership and saw threatening the use of force in Niger as the means to do so. But
Authority decisions are taken by consensus, meaning all heads of state need to be on board. This
leads to a second aspect: other ECOWAS leaders, especially those facing simmering crises of
their own, such as Senegal’s Macky Sall, may have wanted to avert potential crises in their own
countries by demonstrating that ECOWAS would deal with coups quickly and with force. Three,
the urgency instigated by the Niger coup—owing to the country’s size, the spread of coups in the
region, and the formation of an anti-ECOWAS coalition—puts ECOWAS in new waters, thereby
testing the organization’s past practice. The threat of sliding into irrelevance on matters of
regional security may have prompted ECOWAS to emphasize force. As Ambassador Musah
noted, “we must draw a line in the sand.”
ECOWAS initial threat of force and tight deadline generated intense pushback. In direct response
to the threat, suspended ECOWAS members Burkina Faso and Mali rallied to support Niger. On
August 1, they announced that an ECOWAS military intervention in Niger would be considered
a “declaration of war” against their countries. By August 24, Nigerien coup leader Tchiani had
authorized Burkinabé and Malian troops to enter Niger to fight against a potential ECOWAS
military intervention. On September 16, these three countries cemented their position into a
mutual defence pact—the Alliance of Sahel States—guaranteeing a joint response to any attacks
on their territories.
Opposition to the use of force also came from a diverse array of other actors. Civil society
16
leaders strongly criticized the direct resort to threatening force. For instance, the West African
Civil Society Forum, an umbrella network of regional civil society organizations partly founded
by ECOWAS, issued a statement calling on ECOWAS to avoid military intervention and use
peaceful means to resolve the crisis. Leaders from Nigeria’s northern states protested the move:
Former governor of Kaduna State Nasir El-Rufai referred to an ECOWAS military intervention
as a “war between brothers.” Kano State witnessed popular protests against the planned
ECOWAS intervention. The Nigerian Senate advised a more peaceful approach. Algeria, Niger’s
northern neighbour who is not an ECOWAS member, cautioned ECOWAS against using force.
Even the CCDS, tasked by the Authority with preparing for military intervention, appeared to
favour diplomacy Had ECOWAS gone too far? In trying to manage the situation in Niger, had
ECOWAS leaders put the organization’s legitimacy, if not survival, at risk? ECOWAS original
deadline for reversal of the coup, August 6, passed without an ECOWAS military intervention
materializing. According to one prominent scholar of ECOWAS, this left the organization with
“egg on its face.” Would ECOWAS realize this damage to its reputation and shift strategies?
Although the move was gradual, ECOWAS did appear to change tack as the crisis persisted.
Gradual Shift to Mediation
After the threat to intervene militarily did not compel the coup leaders to relinquish power,
ECOWAS gradually shifted focus to mediation, albeit somewhat grudgingly. At the beginning of
August, ECOWAS appeared to send mixed signals. During a second extraordinary summit on
August 10, the ECOWAS Authority directed the CCDS to “immediately activate the ECOWAS
Standby Force with all its elements” and “ordered its deployment…to restore constitutional
order” in Niger, while also, in apparent contradiction, espousing a “continued commitment to the
restoration of constitutional order through peaceful means.”
This dual approach was evident at a CCDS meeting in Accra on August 18. Summarizing the
discussions, PAPS Commissioner Abdel-Fatau Musah noted that the “D-day” for a military
intervention had been decided and that ECOWAS was “ready to go anytime the order is given.”
All active member countries save Cabo Verde had agreed to contribute troops, indicating support
for a military intervention from ECOWAS leading members. In the same breath, however,
Ambassador Musah stated,
"I don’t think we must focus on the military aspect. We are ready to resolve it peacefully, but it

17
takes two to tango…Let no one be in doubt that if everything else fails the valiant forces of West
Africa, both the military and the civilian components, are ready to answer to the call of duty.
Meanwhile, we are still giving diplomacy a chance and the ball is in the court of the junta"
Indeed, amid the brouhaha of a potential military intervention, ECOWAS mediation machinery
had sprung into action: ECOWAS was undertaking efforts to speak with both the coup leaders
led by Tchiani and ousted president Bazoum, and to get both parties to the negotiating table. To
be sure, mediation was never absent from ECOWAS leaders’ minds. On July 26, one of Tinubu’s
first actions was to ask Beninese President Patrice Talon to go to Niamey to mediate. Initial
mediation efforts, however, faltered. Talon does not appear to have made the trip to Niamey;
instead, the president of Chad (a non-ECOWAS member) Mahamat Déby visited Niamey on
July 31—evidently at ECOWAS behest—and met both Tchiani and Bazoum. An ECOWAS
delegation comprising former Nigerian military Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar
and the Sultan of Sokoto Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar, tasked with delivering the ultimatum
agreed at the first extraordinary summit, was unable to meet the junta leaders on a visit to
Niamey on August 4, and a joint mission by ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN was rebuffed by the
coup leaders on August 8.

On August 12, Tchiani met a group of Muslim clerics from Nigeria sent to mediate by Tinubu,
but it is unclear whether this was an official ECOWAS mission. That meeting, however, opened
the door for ECOWAS. Tchiani eventually expressed regret over his refusal to talk with the
ECOWAS envoys, which he claimed he did, owing to anger over ECOWAS seven-day
ultimatum. Tchiani eventually met the ECOWAS delegation on August 19, when the envoys also
met Bazoum. Following this, however, Tchiani announced a three-year transition to
constitutional order, which ECOWAS promptly rejected. Throughout August, ECOWAS leaders
and officials continued the rhetoric of using military force if talks fail. But even as the mediators
made little headway in altering the junta’s position, the intervention threat appeared increasingly
weak. Eventually, during a meeting with the Nigerian Muslim clerics on August 24, President
Tinubu stated that he was “the one holding back ECOWAS” from deploying a military force.
The following day, ECOWAS held a press conference where Commission President Omar Alieu
Touray announced that the organization would “fully explore diplomatic channels” in Niger and
downplayed the military intervention option. According to one Abuja-based practitioner,
18
ECOWAS was “trying to pretend like they never threatened the use of force—like it never
happened.”
How can we explain this switch in tactics by ECOWAS? In some ways, the mediation-based
approach reflects a return to “typical” practice. Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali are each
undergoing ECOWAS-mediated transition processes to restore constitutional order. (How those
transitions are proceeding is a separate question) But in Niger, why did ECOWAS go from all
guns blazing to a more moderate approach?
One explanation is the role of popular opinion. The intervention threat was not received well by
the people of Niger. It created popular sentiment against ECOWAS, which was seen as an
instigator of conflict and in cahoots with France. Once this became evident, ECOWAS leaders
felt they had to back down. This stands in contrast with the Gambian crisis of 2017—in that case,
the Gambian people welcomed ECOWAS troops, allowing ECOWAS to intervene militarily and
restore constitutional order. Popular support for the coup presents a quandary for ECOWAS. The
organization must, in accordance with its mandate, consider imposing punitive measures for a
clearly unconstitutional move, but at the risk of going against the will of the people. In Niger,
support for the coup from the populace may have forced ECOWAS to reconsider the military
option. A second explanation concerns ECOWAS’s consideration for its survival. International
organizations were once considered durable, even “immortal.” Recent research, however, has
shown that if an international organization underperforms or if member states no longer consider
it relevant, the organization risks becoming, in one scholar’s words, a “zombie,” or worse, dying.
When Niger called ECOWAS bluff regarding military intervention, the Authority felt it needed
to “do something.” This led them to order deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force. Yet,
when faced with backlash on this move, ECOWAS felt public opinion turning against them, rife
with accusations of warmongering. Downplaying its prior belligerence, therefore, served to
deflect criticism and to ensure that ECOWAS continued to play a leading role in managing the
crisis. Finally, the ECOWAS Commission staff may have contributed to the shift. Staff input
likely featured more prominently in deliberations as the crisis wore on. As discussed above,
extraordinary summits tend to feature lesser input and preparation from Commission staff.
However, ordinarily, Authority decisions are taken with the aid of recommendations contained in
staff reports. When a crisis emerges, staff from the PAPS Department collectively brainstorm

19
and outline different scenarios with recommended actions. The Early Warning Directorate also
prepares policy briefs, with best-case, middle-case, and worst-case scenarios. ECOWAS Early
Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) is run by a civil society organization—the West
African Network for Peacebuilding—which advocates for diplomatic solutions to crises. It’s
plausible that after two extraordinary summits, the role of the Commission staff—who may have
been caught unawares by the initial ultimatum—became more prominent in informing ECOWAS
strategy. This might account for the increased focus on mediation.
Contending with Alternative Crisis Managers
Several months into the coup in Niger, ECOWAS is contending with the role of other actors that
are seeking to manage the crisis, including Algeria and the Togolese-led African Political
Alliance. Compared to its early response, ECOWAS present rhetoric is marked by the absence of
talk of an intervention force. This about-face reflects that ECOWAS may be concerned about its
central position in managing the Niger crisis amid a growing constellation of interested actors.
Algeria entered the fray as early as August 6, when President Abdelmadjid Tebboune “rejected”
an ECOWAS military intervention as it would present a “direct threat to Algeria.”Further, on
August 23, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmad Attaf embarked on a tour of Nigeria, Benin, and
Ghana while another high-ranking Algerian Foreign Ministry official visited Niger on August
24. Following these visits, on August 29, Attaf proposed Algerian mediation between the parties
in Niger, with a six-month transition plan. Privately, some ECOWAS leaders were unhappy with
this initiative—an “external,” non-ECOWAS countries interfering in what was understood to be
a matter for ECOWAS. Yet, after Algeria announced on October 2 that Niger had accepted its
mediation offer, ECOWAS publicly welcomed the Algerian effort. However, Niger denied
agreeing to Algerian mediation, following which Algeria announced “suspension” and
“postponement” of the initiative.

On October 21–22, a meeting of the Lomé Peace and Security Forum (LPSF) marked the first
international summit participation by the Niger junta outside of its interactions with Burkina
Faso and Mali. The LPSF is a Togolese initiative under the African Political Alliance, a platform
formed by Togo in May 2023. It comprises 10 African countries, notably including ECOWAS
suspended members (Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, in addition to Niger). The summit
outcome document, the Lomé Declaration, mentions neither ECOWAS nor Niger by name, but
20
nonetheless alludes to the situation in Niger. In a veiled repudiation of ECOWAS approach, the
declaration calls on subregional, regional, and international organizations to prioritize transition
states’ control over their territories, the broader context of regional security, and “go(ing) beyond
the usual normative frameworks” in dealing with transition states.
One might view these efforts by Algeria and the LPSF as challenging ECOWAS central crisis-
response role in West Africa. Indeed, one might even read the Algerian and Togolese initiatives
as offering mediation between ECOWAS and Niger—a stark change for ECOWAS from
mediator to mediated.

POLITICAL CRISIS IN BURKINA FASO AND ECOWAS INTERVENTION

THE COUP IN BURKINA FASO

A former French colony till 1960, Burkina Faso has a long history of military rule and coups.
Former President Blaise Compaore, who took power in 1983, was ousted in a popular uprising in
2014 after attempting to amend the constitution to extend his rule. Elections were held in 2015
and in 2020, when President Roch Marc Christian Kabore was re-elected in polls that was
considered to be fair but marred by ongoing insecurity. (Augustus, 2022)

On January 24, 2022 the military overthrew Kabore and seized power. Coup leader Lieutenant-
Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba became head of the military-led Patriotic Movement for
Safeguard and Restoration MPSR that replaced the government. The military blamed Kabore’s
failure to halt an insurgency by jihadist groups in the north. However, Kabore’s ousting was not
unexpected, according to Ochieng (BBC, 2022 cited in Augustus, 2022), discontent among
security forces had been growing over the lack of support. She notes this was exacerbated further
by reports that security forces at a military base in Inata had run out of food in the weeks before
they were attacked by an armed group in November 2021. Forty-nine military police officers and
four civilians were killed in the attacks. Residents of Burkina Faso on Friday 30 September woke
up to the sounds of heavy gunfire near the main military camp and residential areas of the
capital, Ouagadougou. A large blast also rang out near the presidential palace. The coup was
confirmed by army Captain Ibrahim Traore who announced that former military ruler Lt. Col.
Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba had been deposed and his government dissolved. The MPSR

21
subsequently appointed Traore as President and head of the armed forces. Traore has since
announced plans to hold a national meeting on 14 and 15 October to select a transitional
President. (Augustus, 2022)

In ousting Damiba, Traore gave the same reason as his predecessor; the failure to address the
Islamist insurgency. In a written statement, Traore said that, faced with a deteriorating situation,
they had tried to persuade Damiba to refocus the transition on the security question. The
statement went on to say “Damiba’s actions gradually convinced us that his ambitions were
diverting away from what we set out to do. We decided this day to remove Damiba” (Reuters,
2022 cited in Augustus, 2022)

In recent years, Burkina Faso has replaced Mali as the epicenter of Islamist violence in the Sahel,
according to Heni Nsaibia (Nsaibia, 2022 cited in Augustus, 2022). There have been devastating
attacks on civilians in recent years. More than 130 people were killed by armed militants in the
northern town of Solhan in June 2021, believed to be the deadliest attack for years. An attack on
Seytenga in June 2022 prompted almost 16,000 people to leave their homes. UNHCR says
Burkina Faso’s displacement crisis is “one of the world’s fastest growing” with an estimated 1.9
million people internally displaced (UNHCR, 2022 cited in Augustus, 2022)

The Government has also struggled to assert authority, and controls only 60% of the country,
according to Mahamadou Issoufou, a former president of Niger and ECOWAS’ mediator to
Burkina Faso (Al Jazeera, 2021 cited in Augustus, 2022). Jihadist groups have blockaded
northern towns, and just before the latest coup, an Al Qaeda affiliated group claimed
responsibility for an attack on a supply convoy near Gaskinde that resulted in the deaths of 27
soldiers and 10 civilians (Al Jazeera, 2022 cited in Augustus, 2022). The trucks were heading for
Djibo, which has reportedly been under an effective blockade by jihadist groups for months (Al
Jazeera 2022, cited in Augustus, 2022).

The country has been locked in a conflict with militant groups linked to Islamic State and al-
Qaida for almost seven years, experiencing its second coup in eight months. ECOWAS is
expected to establish relations with the new junta leader, Captain Ibrahim Traore, and to
reinforce a two year transition period for the country to return to democracy set up under the

22
previous junta. Burkina Faso is seen as a strategic lynchpin in the western Sahel conflict, with
terrorism already spreading from its southern border to West Africa’s coastal states. ECOWAS
has a major stake in Burkina Faso’s success in security matters. According to Michael Shurkin,
an analyst with 14 North Strategies, a Washington based consultancy, if Burkina Faso falls, or as
it falls, it puts in danger a lot of other countries that surround Burkina Faso. Thousands have died
in Burkina Faso due to the conflict, almost two million people have been displaced, representing
roughly 10% of the country’s twenty two million population.Damiba, who has reportedly fled to
neighboring Togo, offered his resignation under seven conditions, which Traore accepted-
including a promise that the country would continue with the commitments made to the
ECOWAS on a two year transition to democratic power. (Augustus, 2022)

However, it is increasingly likely that in seeking to reduce attacks by armed groups and thereby
keep themselves in power, the new coup leaders will join Mali and pursue support from the
Wagner Group, a private military company founded by Russia Oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Burkinabe soldiers see the relative success that the Wagner Group had in seizing back territories
from armed militias in the Central African Republic and in preventing rebels from deposing its
government. Russia has sought closer ties with African countries wracked by insecurity by
offering military arms and support. Damiba had started on a path of cooperation with ECOWAS,
having so far held out against Russia’s offer to train Burkinabe troops. He also allowed former
President Blaise Compraore back into the country within a framework of national reconciliation,
despite Compraore’s life sentence for the murder of Sankara. Many felt Damiba was becoming
more of a politician than a military leader who could succeed against the jihadists. (Augustus,
2022)

The future of these relations will partly depend on how the Western powers support the new
authorities. But what is certain is that part of the public opinion which supported this counter
coup will continue to demand a shift in favor or Russia. Russian flags were waved by some of
Traore’s’ supporters in Ouagadougou due to grievances against former colonial power France.
Meanwhile, the French Embassy was attacked by angry protesters after an officer said France
was sheltering Damiba at a French military base and that he was planning a counteroffensive.

23
Both Damiba and French authorities have denied those allegations. Demonstrators also attacked
the French cultural center in Bobo-Dioulasso, the country’s second largest city. (Augustus, 2022)

ECOWAS RESPONSE TO THE COUP

ECOWAS, the regional grouping of West African countries, condemned “in the strongest terms’
the seizure of power and reaffirmed its “unreserved condemnation of any seizure or retention of
power by unconstitutional means (ECOWAS, 2022, Communiqué of the ECOWAS Commission
on the Socio-Political situation in Burkina Faso cited in Augustus, 2022).

The West Africa regional bloc, ECOWAS, has suspended Burkina Faso in the aftermath of the
military coup, making it the third member to be punished for a military takeover in only eighteen
months. ECOWAS said it found the new coup inappropriate at a time when progress had been
made in ensuring an orderly return to constitutional order in Burkina Faso. ECOWAS reaffirmed
its unreserved opposition to any seizure or retention of power by unconstitutional means and
demands the scrupulous respect of the timetable already agreed with the Transitional Authorities
for a rapid return to constitutional order. Ghanaian President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo,
the current ECOWAS chairman, called the recent spate of coups in West Africa a direct violation
of our democratic tenets. In the past eighteen months, the fifteen nation ECOWAS has suspended
two other members- Guinea and Mali- where coups have occurred. ECOWAS suspended
neighboring Mali after a coup there in August 2020 and then took similar action against Guinea
after the President was overthrown in September 2021. Mali is also under punishing economic
sanctions, including flight bans and asset freezes, after its coup leader failed to organize elections
within eighteen months as promised. (Augustus, 2022)

The latest suspension on Burkina Faso has very little effect as the sanctions put in place in
Guinea and Mali has done very little to change things. ECOWAS has faced criticisms for its
handling of the coups, particularly in Mali where mediators negotiated with the military
government on the eighteen month deadline for holding democratic elections. Mali’s coup leader
has said that will not be met, citing security conditions, and has announced a vote to take place
four years from now instead. ECOWAS representatives had been doubling their efforts in
neighboring Mali to negotiate the release of Ivory Coast soldiers that the Malian junta had

24
deemed mercenaries. ECOWAS mediators arrived in Ouagadougou on Tuesday to
demonstrations against the bloc’s delegates. As a result, the meeting with the junta had to be held
at the airport. Traore’s comments so far suggest he is open to working with all international
partners excluding France, who Burkinabe perceive as having worsened civilian casualties in the
region. The junta could also seek out the assistance of Turkey, which has increased its military
sales to Africa. (Augustus, 2022)

POLITICAL CRISIS IN GUINEA AND ECOWAS INTERVENTION

The elite troops who removed Guinean president Alpha Condé from office were created by the
dictator himself for the protection of the nation against ‘terrorism’, as he had declared without
clear definition of the term – internal or external, for example. Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya,
commander of these elite forces, became president of the National Committee of Reconciliation
and Development/Comité National de Rassemblement et du Développement (CNRD), which
took power on 5 September. The CNRD did not allow Condé to leave the country. It presented a
charter for ‘civilian transition’ on 28 September 2021, swore Doumbouya in as interim president
in the same month and, on 6 October, appointed the former UN employee and agricultural expert
Mohamed Beavogui as interim prime minister. The military junta promised to rely heavily on
former UN personnel; that no member of it would compete in future elections; and that these
would be organised for the earliest possible opportunity in 2022. The goal would be, as the junta
repeatedly stated, only and exclusively the ‘transition to democracy’. (Roland, 2021)

It is obvious that the coup was unconstitutional and thus unequivocally condemnable by the anti-
coup mechanisms established by the African Union (AU), the regional economic organisation
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African states) and other continental and
international bodies. Equally obvious is that the reasons for the events reached deep into the
ousted government and could have been avoided with better governance. The three main origins
of the coup were, first, the constant fuelling of ethnic divisions by the government and other
forces involved; second, the socio-economic decline of the country due to corruption and
misgovernance, combined with increasing repression and violence by the governmental forces;

25
and third, the sell-out of Guinea’s riches by the regime’s elite. In particular, anti-government
sentiment over the past years grew not only due to dubious policies of the presidency, apparently
at least partially in contrast with the constitution and its main institutions, but also because
Guineans observed an increasing exploitation of the riches of their subsoil without being able to
participate in the benefits. The ousted government multiplied the number of mining sites
throughout the country and identified this as economic development. The contracts (bauxite,
gold, diamonds) were often granted under obscure conditions. It was often more of a sell-off than
thoughtful and rational exploitation. The resource extraction area of the economy became a
source of covetousness and operations often related to corruption. The visible part of these
contracts was given to Chinese and Russian enterprises in forms that resembled the opacity of
the period before 2010. (Roland, 2021)

Chinese and Russian representatives have ruled these areas as lords, with little respect for local
populations. Russia’s heavy involvement has been underscored by its reaction to the September
2021 coup, as government spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that Moscow was closely
monitoring the situation because of the potential impact on global aluminium prices. Conflicts
between Guineans and Chinese have frequently broken out recently, as in Boffa, for example.
Similar to other sectors, the recruitment of workers in the mining area has been oriented towards
their ethnic group and its affiliation to the government, to the detriment of the region’s young
people. Youth revolts against this practice have been frequent in these regions. The damage to
the environment (houses, rivers, fruit crops) has been considerable. (Roland, 2021)

As a consequence, health problems are likely to be expected in the near future. The September
coup came at a time when Guinea was on the verge of a major domestic conflict that could have
had severe consequences for the country’s social and territorial integrity. Due to increasing
ethnic rivalries, economic and financial shortages and violence, many people were afraid of an
upcoming civil war and, according to accounts from the pro-democracy camp on the ground,
wanted to get out of the situation but did not know how. Before the coup, the closure of borders
to neighbouring countries, for security reasons, in violation of ECOWAS’ community rules,
reinforced the feeling of an imminent crisis among most observers of Guinean social and
political life. In addition, there were persistent and concordant rumours of the creation of an

26
armed resistance against Condé’s government. Indeed, such a movement appears to have been
born during a secret meeting of Guinean dissidents and opposition leaders between 27-29 March
2021 in the Mali-Senegal-Guinea triangle. According to information circulating in the
democratic camp(s), they apparently planned to take action against the Condé government
starting at the end of February-beginning of March 2022. This tense atmosphere was part of the
reason for the rather positive reception of the coup by considerable parts of the population.
(Roland, 2021)

The opposition Front National pour la Défense de la Constitution (FNDC) presented a case at the
ECOWAS Court of Justice against ECOWAS and its member states for not enforcing its own
regulations related to democratic alternation and respect for human rights (Diallo 2020), but
apparently the case was suspended as Guinea’s ECOWAS membership was discontinued after
the coup. (Kimana and Thibaut, 2021)

FINDINGS

The following are the findings of the study:

1. Countries that have experienced coups before are prune to experiencing another one.

2. Most coup leaders claim their intentions are to replace corrupt or incompetent governments
and then give power to the people, but often times they end up becoming autocratic leaders.

3. The military in the process of taking over power usually infringes on the constitutional rights
of the democratic elected leaders as well as citizens.

4. ECOWAS are most times uncertain of the best strategy to apply when a coup occurs in the
country of its member-state(s)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ECOWAS should diversify its methods of approach to crisis, the use of military action should
not be the first means of engagement. Use of military might could result to lots of casualties and
destruction of properties, thus resulting to retrogressing the region.

2. In resolving crisis, peace should be the primary goal, in order not to escalate violence.
27
3. Experts from ECOWAS should be employed in resolving issues of crisis in the region,
because they would have better understanding of the situation and bring out the best means of
resolving the problem.

4. Promotion and development of the West African region should be the target of ECOWAS;
thus, diplomacy should be applied in the resolution of political crisis in the region.

CONCLUSION

This study is centered on the recent crises in ECOWAS. The crises have resulted to severe issues
within the region. The current situation in Niger and Mali is a test to ECOWAS, it really goes to
show that ECOWAS need to be strategic on how they resolve political issues between and
among their member states. As it is ECOWAS are not really certain on the best means or strategy
to apply in these recent cases, thus, there is an urgent need for the Community to come up with
plans that would resolve political crises in the region going forward.

Moreso, there is need for the Community to foster peace and harmony, because the current state
of the West Africa region is fragile and any miscalculated effort could result to further crises,
which would not be good for the region and the entire continent of Africa. The way ECOWAS
handles these current political issues would in a long run determine its relevance in the region or
undermine the organization. By and large, ECOWAS should be proactive and resolve issues
within its scope amicably.

28
REFERENCES

Augustus O. (2022). ECOWAS, Democratic Governance and the coup in Burkina Faso Fisher.
Devotion Journal for research and Community service. Volume 3, Number 13, e-ISSN:
2797-6068 and p-ISSN: 2777-0915

Bruce Z (1978) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): An Analysis and
Prospects, 10 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93. Available at:
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/7

Chidume C. G., Oko-Otu C. N., Aro G. C., Agha E. O., Ekwe M. O, Nwankwo F. M., Ngene I.
A., Aloh J. N. and Nwaigwe H. C. (2021). ECOWAS Intervention in the 2020 Mali
Political Crises and Political Stability in West Africa. Webology (ISSN: 1735-188X),
Volume 18, Number 6, 2021

Esekumemu V. C. D.P (2014). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):
the Challenges to the Implementation of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Goods,
Persons and Establishment. Developing Country Studies www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-607X
(Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) Vol.4, No.6.

Kimana Z. and Thibaut N. (2021). The 2021 Coup pandemic: Post-Coup transitions and
International responses. Annual review of Constitution-building: 2021.

Roland B. (2021). Prospects for Guinean elections after the coup are uncertain.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/11/23/prospects-for-guinea-elections-democracy-
after-coup-are-uncertain-conde/

Sahil M. (2024). A Test for West African Regionalism: Explaining ECOWAS response to the
Crisis in Niger.

William A. (2018) The Evolution of ECOWAS: How the Economic Organization Transitioned
into Peace and Security. Lund University, Department of Political Science.

29