UL 9540A Installation Level Research

Tests - Safety Considerations for

Outdoor Containerized Li-Ion ESS

April 20, 2021 | Adam Barowy

Research Engineer, Fire Research & Development

Energy Storage Systems Safety and Reliability Forum

Copyright 2021 UL Inc. All rights reserved
Agenda
1. Objectives
2. Test Setup
3. Results
4. Key Findings
5. Tactical Considerations
6. Future Test Method R&D

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Objectives - UL 9540A Demonstration Series

1. Develop nonproprietary UL 9540A installation test data with

representative lithium-ion battery products, with and without active fire
protection systems.
2. Develop fire service size-up considerations using typical fire service
hazard evaluation equipment under anticipated li-ion ESS thermal
runaway use conditions.

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Test Setup - Installation Level Test Configurations
➢ Test 1 – Without any provision for fire protection.

➢ Test 2 – With Novec 1230 total flooding clean agent system (8 v% concentration).

➢ Test 3 – With 0.5 gpm/ft2 density water spray system (from ceiling).

1'-2 1/8"

4'-11 9/16"

BMS BMS

7'-8 3/4"

6'-3 3/4"

Operation pressure 0.5 psig; vent area calculation based on NFPA 68,
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Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting
Test Setup – ESS Unit Construction and Spacing
Side B 3.0in.

Double Initiating
Partial
Dummy Unit
Unit
Unit
Dimension Spacing
Aisle 35”

Side C
35.20in. Unit side to wall 0”
Unit rear to wall 3”
Double Single
Unit to unit 0”
Partial
Dummy Dummy Unit
Unit Unit

Side D 3.0in.

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Test Setup – ESS Unit Construction

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Test Setup - Instrumentation (Elevation View, Long Axis)

Pressure Transducers
Wall Surface Thermocouple
Gas Temperature Thermocouple 16in.

Battery Temperature Thermocouple

Vertical Thermocouple Array (in plan view)
Smoke Detector
Smoke Obscuration Meter
BMS BMS
Gas Measurement Probe
Hydrogen Gas Detector
LEL Gas Detector
Carbon Monoxide Detector
Heat Flux Gauge
Deflagration vent 36.00

Live batteries
16i
Dummy unit area n.

Expanded metal unit door

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Test Results

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Results - Test 1, Timeline of Major Events

Smoke accumulation Ignition

[TR + 00:00:31] [TR + 00:00:31]

Partial volume deflagration

TR propagation Flaming outside container [TR + 00:00:31]
for 3 hours [TR + 00:47:18]
[TR + 00:11:54] 9
Results - Test 2, Timeline of Major Events

Novec 1230 discharge Smoke stratification before

[TR + 00:00:58] ignition [TR + 00:26:51]

Deflagration
[TR + 00:44:39]
Ignition [TR + 00:28:32] Flashover and flaming from
open door[TR + 02:09:48]
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Results - Test 3, Timeline of Major Events

Ignition, sust. flaming Waterflow @ 0.5 gpm/ft2

[TR + 00:08:49] [TR + 00:10:13]

Deflagration
[TR + 00:42:02]
TR propagation after TR propagation continues
water flow off after water flow
[TR + 01:13:05] restart [TR + 01:49:54] 11
Key Findings

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Key Findings – Gas Detection
Common combustible gas/hydrogen detectors:

1) Effective for detecting that thermal runaway has occurred.

2) Not reliable for ongoing hazard assessment.

Advantages:
• All detectors responded within seconds when exposed to battery gas.
• Nuisance activation unlikely given measurands (e.g., H2, CO, LEL).

Limitations:
• Detection time dependent on positioning. Positional dependency was not within test scope.
• Cross sensitivity diminishes electrochemical sensor accuracy
• Catalytic bead:
• Imprecise measurements of flammable gas mixtures,
• Requires > 10% O2 for proper operation,
• “Poisoned” by halogen exposure.

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Key Findings – Novec 1230 Total Flooding System
When simulating a total flooding system approach, Novec 1230 did not deliver sufficient cooling to
prevent propagation of thermal runaway or to prevent thermal exposure to combustible construction
materials.

Firefighting
period

Rear Wall – No Novec 1230 Rear Wall – w/ Novec 1230

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Key Findings – Water Spray Suppression System
Ceiling-based water spray suppression system prevented unit-to-unit propagation, cooled surfaces
adjacent to initiating ESS unit. Limited effectiveness to prevent module-to-module thermal runaway
propagation within initiating unit.

Rear Wall – No Water Rear Wall – w/ Water

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Key Findings – Deflagration Protection System
The generation and accumulation of battery gases created an explosion hazard and was mitigated
with an engineered deflagration protection system.

Test 1 - Baseline Test 2 – Novec 1230 Test 3 – 0.5 gpm/ft2

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Key Findings – Comparison to Room and Content Fires
Propagating thermal runaway events generate more severe flammability and toxicity hazards than
typical room and content fires.

• THC: ~3 v%
• H2: > 10 v% • H2 = 0 v%
• CO: 12 v% - 15 v% • CO: ~6 v%
• CO2: ~10% • CO2: ~10%
Gottuk, D, Beyler, C., Roby, R., Peatross, M., “Carbon Monoxide 17
Production in Compartment Fires”, J. of Fire Prot Eng. 4, 4, 1992
Tactical Considerations

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Tactical Consideration – Ventilation
Ventilation of an ESS installation may result in a deflagration or rapid transition to flashover.

UL Tests - Flashover Surprise, AZ – Deflagration*

∆t = 21 s ∆t ≈ 3 min

*M. B. McKinnon, S. DeCrane and S. Kerber, "Four Firefighters Injured In Lithium-Ion Battery Energy
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Storage System Explosion - Arizona," UL Firefighter Safety Research Institute, Columbia, MD, 2020.
Tactical Considerations
• Using portable gas meters to evaluate interior conditions or the gases/vapors leaking from an ESS places
firefighters in an explosion hazard area.
• Portable gas meter measurement of battery gas is likely to be compromised by clogging and cross-sensitivity to
battery gas mixture species.
• A deflagration event is hard to predict, even with good quality gas concentration data.
• Responding firefighters should consider using portable gas meters and visual observations to define an
exclusion zone, while wearing full structural PPE (Level D Ensemble) with full SCBA.
• Additional tactical considerations and detail available in the full report:
https://ulfirefightersafety.org/research-projects/firefighter-line-of-duty-injuries-and-near-misses.html

Future Needs:
1. Better understanding and ID of ESS deflagration precursors are needed for incident
size-up.
2. Responding firefighters need access to ESS instrumentation data, particularly gas
measurement, through a remote monitoring panel and to personnel who can aid in
interpretation.

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Enclosure Explosion Safety Test Method Development

• Test methodology, performance criteria needed to

evaluate safety performance of ESS enclosures
designed to contain deflagration pressures or
control deflagration pressure relief.
• Deflagration venting systems cannot be
evaluated unless a deflagration occurs during
test.
• Deflagration severity during a UL 9540A test is
dependent on gas conditions at the time of
ignition.
• Evaluation ESS product explosion hazards
should not be conducted by unqualified persons.

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Enclosure Explosion Safety Test Method Development

Methodology under development to evaluate explosion hazards:

➢ ESS enclosure rupture ➢ Blast waves and projectiles ➢ Direction of energy release

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Thank you for your time. Questions?

Adam Barowy
[email protected]

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