EXPLOSION-PROTECTION

with
IN-LINE FLAME ARRESTERS

Dr. Michael Davies

1
Agenda

• How flame arresters work – the basics

• Assessing the different types of flame arresters available

today

• Critical factors to consider when chossing a flame arrester

• How the layer of protection concept ensures flashback

protection

• Sizing of devices – what to take into account

2
Applications of Flame Arresters

1. Storage Tank Farms for

Refineries and
Chemical Plants
2. Processing Systems for
Chemical and
Pharmaceutical
Industries
3. Vapour Combustion
Systems and Flares
4. Ship Building, Offshore
Platforms, Loading
Systems
5. Vapour Recovery Units
6. Integrated Component
of Equipment, Machines
and Vessels

3
Dateiname 4
Definition of Flame Arrester (ISO 16852)

A device fitted to the opening of an enclosure or to

the connecting pipe work of a system of enclosures
and whose intended function is to allow flow but
prevent transmission of flame

Protected side Unprotected side

5
Propane / air without flame arresting element
1200 fps

Video 1

6
Propane / air with flame arresting element
1200 fps

Video 2

7
Hazard situation from the combustion process
Process of Combustion
stabilised burning explosion
short time burning endurance burning deflagration detonation

unconfined confined stable unstable

deflagration deflagration detonation detonation
Detonation
arrester tested
for stabilized
burning
In-line flame arrester

Incinerator

8
 Different Types of Flame Arresters
end-of-line

deflagration unstable stable detonation

detonation
in-line

flame front velocity

explosion pressure

9
Video 3

10
Transmission of a detonation in a flame arrester

11
Transmission of a strong deflagration in a flame arrester

90 µs 290 µs

490 µs 690 µs 890 µs

1090 µs 1290 µs

12
FLAME ARRESTER STANDARDS

EN 12874 33 CFR
154
ISO 16852
Flame arresters -
Performance
requirements, test IS 11006
methods and limits
Z343-98 for use

Msr./Circ. 677
UL 525
FMRC
6061
13
International Standard ISO 16852

differences to EN 12874

no
small
significant
new

14
 IN-LINE DETONATION TEST

without restriction

L/D = 10 min. 3 m

restriction
with restriction 2,5% of cross section area

L/D = 4 L/D = 50

15
 Deflagration tests of detonation arresters

without restriction

L/D = 50 / 30* L/D = 50 / 30*

restriction
with restriction

L/D = 50 / 30* L/D = 4 L/D = 50

* For explosion group IIB and IIC 16

Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line

In-Line Application
End-of-Line
calls for true in-line
Deflagration Test
testing
L
D
Deflagrationarrester:
consider L/D- ratio
L/D = 10

17
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line

v F

unburnt mixture burnt mixture

Tu vb
Tf

Ignition source at a open pipe

vF = Flame front velocity
vG = Flow velocity of the unburnt mixture in front of the flame
vb = Burning velocity = flame velocity relative to the unburnt mixture

vF = vG + vB vF = vb ; vG = 0

After ignition at the open pipe end the burnt mixture is pushed out ;
the unburnt mixture stays at rest (vG = 0).

18
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line

Ignition Source at closed end

burnt mixture v F
unburnt mixture
Tf vG vb Tu

vF = Flame front velocity

vG = Flow velocity of the unburnt mixture in front of the flame
vb = Burning velocity = flame velocity relative to the unburnt mixture

vF = vG + vB

After ignition at the closed pipe end the expansion of the burnt mixture
thrusts the flame front and generates flow and turbulence ahead in the
unburnt mixture.

19
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line

Flame arrester test configuration for 3” pipe

A) closed pipe, B) restricted pipe, C) open pipe

20
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line
200
flame velocity [m/s]

150

100

50

0
0 10 20 30 40 50
running up distance [L/D]

closed restricted open

Flame velocity versus run up distance for

stoichiometric methane/air mixtures
21
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line

600
flame velocity [m/s]

500

400

300
200
100

0
0 10 20 30 40 50
running up distance [L/D]

closed restricted open

Flame velocity versus run up distance for stoichiometric

ethylene/air mixtures
22
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line
10
9
deflagration pressure [bar]

8
7
6 open
5 restricted
4 closed
3
2
1
0
methane propane ethylene hydrogen

Deflagration pressure at L/D=40 for various gases

23
Critical Factor:
End-Of-Line Flame Arresters installed In-Line
End Of Line Arrester Tested with extended Pipe

Problem: EPA Requirements Force Plants to install Vapor

Recovery or Vapor Destruction Systems. Due to this, End
Of Line FAs are often retained in the Vent Header Systems
and are therefore exposed to long pipe run up distances
Result: Such End-Of-Line Flame Arresters fail when
misapplied in an In-Line Mode

24
End-of-line flame arrester installed in-line

Video 4

25
 Hazard situation from the combustion process
Process of Combustion
stabilised burning explosion
short time burning endurance burning deflagration detonation

unconfined confined stable unstable

deflagration deflagration detonation detonation
Detonation
arrester tested
for stabilized
burning
In-line flame arrester

Incinerator

26
 Critical Factor:
Endurance burn test configuration

Vertical test position Horizontal test position

27
Endurance Burn Test

Video 5

28
 Endurance burn test results

Arrester
failed

Manufacturer A USCG approved Group D

arrester - 4.2 vol% Propane vertical

29
 Endurance burning test results:
Flame Vapor Test gas Position Time to flash
arrester Group back
type
A D Propane Vertical 12 min 48 sec
Horizontal 9 min 45 sec
Horizontal + 5 m pipe 7 min 37 sec
B C Ethylene Vertical 2 min 57 sec
Horizontal 1 min 55 sec
C D Propane Vertical 26 min 54 sec

D D Propane Vertical 23 min 15 sec

30
Please keep in mind that accidents do occur!

31
Conclusions from test results and incidents:

• Even third party approved in-line detonation arresters can not provide 2
hours of burn time safety; they fail after a very limited period of time

• All in-line flame and detonation arresters should be equipped with

temperature sensors if installed in front of a permanent ignition source
(incinerator, flare, etc.) if a continuous flow of combustible mixture is
present for a long time

• One safety measure alone does not provide sufficient safety, and a
layer of protection should be provided for increased plant safety

32
Critical Factor: MESG Value

33
 MAXIMUM EXPERIMENTAL SAFE GAP

1,5
n-Hexane
1,4 C6H14
IIA1
1,3
Propane
1,2
C3H8 Hydrogen sulf ide
H2S
1,1
Saf e Gap [mm]

1,0 IIA

0,9 Et hylene IIB1

C2H4
IIB2
0,8

0,7 IIB3

0,6 M ESG
IIB
0,5
Hydrogen
0,4 H2
IIC

0,3

0,2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

[VOL-%]
34
Chosing the wrong explosion group

Video 6

35
Critical Factor: Process Temperature

36
 Critical Factor: Process Pressure
3.2
ne

e
a

an
x
he

h
-

et
n

m
2.4

lene
y
Eth
gap width in mm

1.6

rog ene
0.8 Hyd

0 1.2 2.4 3.6

1/P in 1/bar

37
 Critical Factor: Oxygen Concentration
4,0
3,5 Aceton 1,0 bar
Aceton 0,5 bar
3,0
Methanol 1,0 bar
2,5
SW in mm

2,0
1,5
1,0 AIR
0,5
0,0
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
ϕ(O2)/[ϕ(O2)+ϕ(N2)]

38
 Steps for applying the correct flame arrester (NFPA 69)

Engineering Design Procedures have to be developed

and strictly followed !

Decide ...... 1. Location of Flame Arrester

End Of Line
In Line
In Equipment (vacuum pumps, blower)
Decide ...... 2. Type of COMBUSTION
Deflagration (confined, unconfined)
Detonation (stable, unstable)
Stabilized Burning (short-time, endurance)

39
Steps for applying the correct flame arrester (NFPA 69)

Decide ...... 3. PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION

Liquids: Flashpoint
Vapors: MESG Maximum
Experimental Safe Gap
Group A,B,C,D (NEC)
Operating Conditions: Operating Pressure, Operating Temperature
and O2 concentration

Remember: Air 21 Vol-% O2, 79 Vol-% N2 !

40
 Steps for applying the correct flame arrester (NFPA 69)

Decide ..... 4. PROCESSING-PLANT CLASSIFICATION

Hazardous Areas
Class1 Div. 1 Haz. Loc. (normally hazardous) (NEC) Zone 0
normally or frequently hazardous (EC,IEC)
Class1 Div. 1 Haz. Loc. (normally hazardous) (NEC) Zone 1
occasionally hazardous (EC,IEC)
Class1 Div.2 Haz. Loc. (not normally hazardous) (NEC) Zone 2 not
normally hazardous (EC,IEC)

Ignition Sources
A) present, B) likely to occur, C) fully prevented

41
 Layer of Protection Concept
When designing overall safety concepts one has to take account of:
• The likelihood of adverse events (e.g. flame transmission from ignition
source)
• The extent of the consequences (e.g. range of devastating explosion
pressure)

Explosive Atmoshere
permanent sometimes rare never
(non-
Ignition harzardous
Source area)
permanent 3 2 1 0
sometimes 2 1 0 -
rare 1 0 - -
never 0 - - -

Number of independent measures against flame transmission

42
 Layer of Protection Concept

Protection for an Incinerator

Zone 0

Process Incinerator
unit

43
 Layer of Protection Concept

Protection for an Incinerator

1. measure: velocity loop

2. measure: Deflagration flame arrester with RTD
3. measure: Detonation arrester with RTD

L2 L1
Process Blower of
unit category 1 incinerator

44
 Layer of Protection Concept
end-of-line
endurance burn
arrester
combustor

gas jet pump

detonation arrester deflagration arrester

waste gas
zone 0
TIS+A+

control
FIS-A-
unit

inert gas motive gas

45
Sizing of devices – what to take into account
Boundary conditions from process
 Example: operating pressure
˙
DA-SB- 200/100-IIA-P1,4-X3

P = 1,013
P = 1,8 bar abs.
bar abs.

T=
180 °C

On unprotected side (side of ignition source):

pressure ≤ maximum allowable operating pressure of the device
Example: DA-SB-200/100-IIA-P1,4-X3 → Pzul = 1,4 bar abs.

46
Sizing of devices – what to take into account
 Normal volume flow or operating volume flow ?
 Equivilant volume flow (Diagram volume flow)

T = 273 K Q T = 410 K (273*1,5)

P = 1,013 bar P = 1,013 bar

3
• m • m 3

V =1N V = 1 N
h h
ρ
3
• m
• m 3
∆p ≈ ∗v 2
V = 1,5
V =1
B
B
2 h
h

• • ρ 0,86
V =V * B ,Gas
= 1,5 * = 1,22
ρ
äq ,Luft B ,Gas

N . Luft
1,29

47
Final conclusion
• End-of-line flame arresters do not belong into an in-line
application
• There is no true endurance burning safety for in-line flame
or detonation arresters
• Always consider the process parameters
• Multiple layers of protection are recommended to increase
plant safety
• Have engineering guidelines in place
• Always request an independent third party approval from
the supplier
• Flame arresters are the safest measure for plant protection
if the application limits are known

48