Chapter 15

Reliability and Preventive Maintenance

Itamar Esdras Martínez García, Alejandro Sánchez Sánchez, and

Stefano Barbati

Abstract In this chapter, the authors explain how to perform the core analysis of
a Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) process for an offshore wind turbine.
The aim is to provide an engineering guide which can improve the maintenance of
the system, and consequently increases its availability and the production of energy.
The initial investigations have been carried out using a database for an onshore
5 MW wind turbine; the data has then been converted using a proper conversion
factor, so that it can be used for a 10 MW offshore turbine case. The reliability
and availability of the entire offshore wind turbine have been calculated through
Reliability Prediction and a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD). In addition, a failure
mode analysis is done using FMECA, in order to identify the most important failure
modes in a risk priority order, and to the note the effect of propagation of each
functional failure. The maintenance part of the RCM analysis has also been studied,
to facilitate the creation of an optimum packaging of preventive maintenance tasks,
which can help to avoid the functional failures of items throughout the system.
Although the main target of the RCM is to reduce the downtime of the wind turbine,
a reduction in Life Cycle Costs can be also accomplished through this process.

Nomenclature

Acronyms

4M Four Months
6M Six Months
2Y Two Years
5Y Five Years
6Y Six Years
A Annually
AA Achieved Availability
AI Inherent Availability

I.E. Martínez García () • A.S. Sánchez • S. Barbati

Relex Italia SRL, Via Val Seriana, 4, 00141 Rome, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]

© The Author(s) 2016 235

W. Ostachowicz et al. (eds.), MARE-WINT, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39095-6_15
236 I.E Martínez García et al.

AO Operational Availability
AE Age Exploration
CONV Converter
DFIG Doubly Fed Induction Generator
FF Failure Finding
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FMECA Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis
GE Generator
HT Hard Time
IGBT Insulated Gated Bipolar Transistor
L Lubrication
LCC Life Cycle Cost
LOR Level Of Repair
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
LSA Logistic Support Analysis
LSAR Logistic Support Analysis Record
MDT Mean Down Time
MTA Maintenance Task Analysis
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR Mean Time to Repair
MVS Medium Voltage Switchgear
OC On Condition
OWT Offshore Wind Turbine
PCNR Percentage of Component Nominal Rating
PFC Power Feeder Cables
PHS&T Packaging Handling Storage and Transportation
PM Preventive Maintenance
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
RPN Risk Priority Number
S Servicing
SF Significant Function
TRANS Transformer
WT Wind Turbine

Definitions

Availability Probability that an item will perform its required function

under given conditions at a stated instant of time
Corrective maintenance Actions required to restore the proper operation of an
item which has failed, either changing the failed item for
a new one or fixing it
Failure rate Number of failures per million of hours
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 237

MTBF Defines the mean time between failures

MTTF Represents the average time until a failure occurs
RCM Process created by the aviation industry in order to
develop and improve maintainability programs and
ensuring safe operations with low costs
Reliability The ability of an item to perform a required function
under stated conditions for a given time interval. Relia-
bility is expressed as a probability value (a value between
0 and 1)

15.1 Overview

During last 20 years, a great number of new technologies have been introduced
in the field of green energy systems. The gradual appearance of different devices
for energy production using renewable resources, have required novel research into
improving the efficiency, in terms of both performances and costs. Taking such
developments into consideration, reliability, availability and maintainability studies
represent an essential investigation in order to identify how to optimize the design
and the life cycle management from a cost/efficiency point of view.
The relevance of this topic has been well understood by the European Commis-
sion, as they promoted a research project named Reliawind (2011) between 2008
and 2011, for an on-shore wind turbine generator system. One of the aims of this
research, in the work package led by Relex Italia s.r.l., was to assess the reliability
for a 5 MW onshore wind turbine by creating a reliability model.
In 2014, the industry took a further step forward when the MARE-WINT project
was approved. A new complete study on a wind turbine generator has been planned
increasing generated power capacity to 10 MW and moving the wind turbine from
onshore to an offshore environment. These changes reflect the improving design and
concept for wind energy generation.
For a better explanation, Fig. 15.1 depicts the supportability analysis method
derived from the procedure applied in the aeronautics and aerospace industries.
This method has been used to initiate the current research; however, this method is
quite extensive, and it was not possible to feasibly fulfill each and every component.
Therefore, the attention has been focused on the core of this procedure (colored in
pink) which can reasonably be considered the essential part.
As shown in Fig. 15.2, the knowledge acquired during Reliawind project, the
reliability model, and the database have been used as starting point for the current
work. An accurate study on the best power and environmental conversion factor has
been conducted and a new reliability model, for reliability prediction and reliability
block diagram studies, has been developed. Meanwhile an investigation into failure
modes, classified by severity, has been conducted in order to identify riskiest
failures for the system both from safety/environmental and economic/operational
point of view. The second and third part of the research mainly consists of the
238 I.E Martínez García et al.

Fig. 15.1 Supportability analysis method

Fig. 15.2 MARE-WINT research

Reliability Centered Maintenance analysis—which has made it possible to optimize

a maintenance plan with respect to all information collected in the previously
analysis. The detailed procedure is described in the following chapter.
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 239

15.2 Offshore Wind Turbine Configuration

There are several wind turbine configurations which could be studied and compared
in future works.
Figure 15.3 shows the whole hierarchy system which has been used in order to
develop the reliability model. Main assembly and sub-assembly characteristics have

Fig. 15.3 Whole hierarchy offshore wind turbine

240 I.E Martínez García et al.

been described as follows:

• The Rotor Module is composed of a hydraulic pitch system which optimizes the
position of the blades based on the wind direction. It is also the primary brake
system for the wind turbine.
• The Drive Train Module transmits wind forces and torque from the rotor to the
main shaft. It is done through a gearbox which is a combination of a planetary
stage, followed by two parallel stages, and a mechanical brake.
• Four electrical yaw gears with motor brakes are included into the Nacelle
Module. The yaw system rotates the top part of the nacelle into the upwind
direction to maximize power production and minimize loads.
• A doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) with rated power 10 MW Power
Module has been selected.
• A converter is connected between the generator and the grid. It is a four quadrant
converter with the insulated gated bipolar transistor (IGBT) on the generator-
side. An active crowbar unit is placed on the generator-side to ensure the
compliance with grid requirements. The converter is located in the rear part of
the nacelle.

15.3 Reliability Prediction

Reliability prediction is a quantitative analysis technique that has been used to

predict the failure rate (œ) of an offshore wind turbine (OWT) using an established
model with defined operating conditions. The goal of reliability prediction is to
predict the rate at which components and systems fail.

15.3.1 Definition and Assumptions

The general formulation for the reliability through time is shown as Eq. (15.1):
Rt
R.t/ D e 0 .x/dx (15.1)

where R is the reliability and œ is the failure rate (number of failures per million of
hours) and t is the time.
A component’s lifetime is often described by three phases. During first phase,
the failure rate decreases down early with time and failures are attributable to
manufacturing and quality problems. After that in the second phase, failure rate
œ(t) is approximately constant (chance failures). In the third phase, the failure rate
increases with time due to aging, wear out, fatigue, etc. If it is assumed that the
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 241

failure rate is constant along time (2nd phase), we get Eq. (15.2):

œ .t/ D œ (15.2)

Using Eq. (15.2), the reliability function shown in Eq. (15.1) can be expressed as
Eq. (15.3):
t
R.t/ D e (15.3)

The reliability exponential function (Eq. 15.3) has been selected as the way to
describe the component’s reliability.

15.3.2 Reliability Prediction Data-Base

Since published reliability data of offshore wind farms does not exist, it has been
necessary to convert the failure rate data from onshore to offshore using published
data of onshore wind turbines. Before starting the reliability prediction, a literature
review of published data sources (e.g. Windstats, WMEP, LWP and Swedish Wind)
was conducted, and the Reliawind data-base was chosen as being the most suitable
for this research.

15.3.2.1 Reliawind Data-Base

Reliawind is a project in which the reliability of large wind turbines (5 MW) was
investigated. Recommended methods of measuring reliability and processing data
from onshore wind turbines and wind farms were studied. During this project a
large data-base, containing data on more than a thousand items, was developed. The
project ran from 2008 to March, with active involvement of ten partners.

15.3.2.2 Conversion Factor

Since our current turbine operates in a different environment, and has different
parameters compared to the Reliawind turbine, a conversion factor has been
introduced to convert the database data of the 5 MW onshore wind turbine to that
of a 10 MW offshore wind turbine. This factor has been derived as combination of
two parameters (Karyotakis 2011; Davidson and Hunsley 1994). The first parameter
“K1 ”, takes into consideration the environmental stress; “K2 ” is based on the power
rating stress.
K1 offshore is the environmental stress factor and it is defined as the effect of environmental
condition (e.g. weather and humidity condition) on the offshore wind turbine.
242 I.E Martínez García et al.

Table 15.1 Environmental stress factor

Environmental conditions Environmental stress factor K1
Ideal, static conditions 0.1
Vibration free, controlled environment 0.5
Ground-based 1
Naval Sheltered 1.5
Naval Exposed 2
Road 3
Rail 4
Air 10
Missile 100

K2 offshore is the power rating stress factor that depends on the operating power ranges of
the wind turbine.

It is well known that offshore wind farms are exposed to higher power rating
stress factor and adverse environment. Thus, Eq. (15.4) is used to describe the failure
rate for the offshore wind turbine:


offshore D onshore
K1 offshore
K2 offshore (15.4)

Table 15.1 shows how the value of the environment stress conversion factors varies,
depending on the environmental conditions.
In our case, K1 is considered to be ‘Naval Sheltered’ for items within the
nacelle. ‘Naval Exposed’ is chosen for the items that are fully exposed to marine
environment. K1 onshore is considered to be ‘Ground Based’ (K1 onshore D 1); K1 offshore
is assumed to be between naval sheltered and exposed (1; 5  K1 offshore  2).
The other parameter, K2 , is obtained by taking into consideration the ‘windiness’
of the wind farm site. The windiness of the OWT is measured by the capacity
factor of the wind turbine. This average capacity factor is assumed to be 25 % for
onshore, 35 % for near-offshore and 45 % for far-offshore (Boccard 2009; BWEA
2000; CA-OWEE 2001; DTI 2002); in our case, the wind farm is considered to be
‘near-offshore’.
Table 15.2 shows the exponential relationship between the power rating stress
factor and the component nominal rating. Values from Table 15.2 are plotted on
Fig. 15.4 and the equation of the curve can be derived from the values showed in
Table 15.2. As per the previous considerations, the difference between the average
capacity factor for ‘far-offshore’ and ‘onshore’ is 20 % (45 %–25 %). Accepting a
capacity factor of 25 % as the average onshore (assumed as a PCNR value of 100 %),
and assuming that K2 onshore is equal to 1 (from Table 15.2), the PCNR of far-offshore
is calculated as: 45% 25% C 100% D 120%.
Similarly, if—from Table 15.2—K2 far offshore is equal to 2, the PCNR of near
offshore can calculated by using the same method which has been used for the
far-offshore case; assuming a near offshore capacity factor of 35 %; the PNCR of
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 243

Table 15.2 Power rating stress factor for mechanical components

Percentage of component nominal rating (PCNR) Power rating stress factor K2
140 4
120 2
100 1
80 0.6
60 0.3
40 0.2
20 0.1

4
Power Rating Stress Factor K2

3.5
3 Far-offshore
capacity factor 45%
2.5
Near-offshore
2 capacity factor 35%
1.5
Onshore capacity
1 factor 25%
y = 0.0541e0.0301x
0.5
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Percentage of component nominal rating (%)

Fig. 15.4 Percentage of component nominal rating plotted against stress factor K2 . Graph
constructed based on the data presented in Table 15.2

near-offshore is then: 35% 25%C100% D 110%. K2 near offshore is then calculated

through Eq. (15.5), using this PCNR value of 110 %:

K2 D 0:0541
e0:0301PCNR (15.5)

As a result, K2 near offshore is equal to 1.483. Then, Eq. (15.6) can be obtained by
introducing K2 near offshore into Eq. (15.4):


offshore D onshore K1 offshore
1:483 (15.6)

15.3.3 Reliability Prediction Results

The system failure rate value obtained from the reliability prediction analysis is
1866.36 failures per million hours. Figure 15.5 shows the number of failures per
244 I.E Martínez García et al.

Predicted Failure per year/Turbine Rotor Module

Drive train Module

Nacelle Module

Structural Module
Sub-systems

Power Module

Control and Safety System

Control and Communication

System
Condition Monitoring
System
Wind Farm System SCADA
0 1 2 3 4
Failure per year

Fig. 15.5 Results reliability prediction on sub-systems

year associated with each sub-system (the failures of the auxiliary equipment are
not included in Fig. 15.5).

15.4 Reliability Block Diagram

15.4.1 Definition and Assumptions

A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a visual representation of the parts of

the system, through blocks (representing items) linked together (Fig. 15.6). An
RBD also shows how various parts are connected logically to fulfill the system
requirements.
Since reliability predictions assume that all components in a system are in series,
they cannot be used to analyze a system with redundant components. RBDs are
used to evaluate the reliability of systems that are complex in their configurations.
RBDs also provide an efficient and effective way to compare various configurations
to identify the best overall system design. An example of a RBD for the OWT that
presents redundancies is depicted in Fig. 15.7. The pitch system RBD shows how
the main line is connected in standby configuration with the emergency line. A
functional reliability model is created in order to evaluate the real configuration on
the typical 10 MW wind turbine, and shown in Fig. 15.8.
The goal of the Reliability Block Diagram is to determine the reliability and
maintainability metrics—such as Reliability, Availability, Failure rate and MTTR
(mean time to repair)—for a complete system. The elements which are necessary
for the required function are connected in series, while elements which can fail with
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 245

Fig. 15.6 Development of

RBD within a system

Fig. 15.7 Pitch system RBD

no effect on the required function are connected with redundancies. There are three
types of redundancies: parallel, load sharing and standby.

15.4.2 Inherent Availability

The Availability is the probability that the system is operating satisfactorily at any
point in time when used under stated conditions; here, the time considered includes
246 I.E Martínez García et al.

Fig. 15.8 Main RBD of the offshore wind turbine

Fig. 15.9 (a) Non-reparable system and (b) reparable system

operating time, active repair time, administrative time and logistic time. Through
this parameter, one can calculate the inherent availability, in which the proportion
of the total time that the item is available is the steady-state availability. Therefore,
the availability of an item is a function of its failure rate  and of its repair or
replacement rate . The difference between repairable and non-repairable system is
illustrated graphically in Fig. 15.9. For a simple unit with a constant failure rate and
a constant mean repair rate,  is shown as Eq. (15.7):

1
D (15.7)
MTTR
Then, Eq. (15.8) can be derived to calculate the steady-state availability:

MTBF 
AD D (15.8)
MTBF C MTTR œC

15.4.3 Reliability Block Diagram Results

RBD results for our study are shown in Figs. 15.10 and 15.11. From Fig. 15.11, it
can be seen that the MTBF is equal to 3723.37 h (2.37 failures per year). According
to theory, the value of MTBF is the time at which the reliability value is 0.37. The
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 247

RBD Failure per year/Turbine

Rotor Module

Drive train Module

Assemblies

Nacelle Module

Structural Module

Power Module

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 Wind Farm System SCADA

Failure per year

Fig. 15.10 Results RBD on sub-systems

Fig. 15.11 Reliability through time in a year operation

inherent availability is calculated with a year mission time (8760 h), and at that time
the value of inherent availability is about 99 %.
248 I.E Martínez García et al.

15.5 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis

15.5.1 Definition

A Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is one of the most
used analysis tools in the engineering field for developing designs, processes and
services. To develop a FMECA, potential failure modes are analyzed to determine
their effects all along the system, and classified according to their severity (FMEA)
and probability of occurrence (FMECA).

15.5.2 Objectives

The main target of this analysis is to identify the weakest parts of the OWT,
understand their failure modes and the associated effects, and then improve their
availability by introducing possible redundancies or design changes, and updating
the preventive maintenance. Other objectives that are possible to achieve through
this analysis are:
• Anticipate the most important problems.
• Prevent failures from occurring.
• Minimize the failure consequences as cost effectively as possible.
• Give technical information to maintenance personnel about failures that might
come out during system life.
• Compare results with previous maintenance reports and update the analysis.
• Provide necessary information to create a cost/benefit analysis.
• Provide those modes that need preventive maintenance in a risk priority order.

15.5.3 Method

A FMECA is a bottom up approach analysis by which the system design and

performance are studied. With this analysis the potential failure modes are defined,
as well as the occurrence and severity of each failure effect associated to them. The
analysis can be done in two ways: component level (referred as component FMEA)
or functional level (referred as functional FMEA). A component FMECA has been
chosen based on the tasks 101 and 102 (Table 15.3) of the military standard MIL-
STD-1629A from the Department of Defense of USA (DoD 1980).
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 249

Table 15.3 FMECA MIL-STD-1629 tasks

Task Description
Task 101 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. The purpose of the Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) is to study the results or effects of item failure on system
operation and to classify each potential failure according to its severity
Task 102 Criticality Analysis. The purpose of the Criticality Analysis (CA) is to rank each
potential failure mode identified in the FMEA according to the combined influence
of severity classification and its probability of occurrence
Source: DoD (1980)

OWT
(SYSTEM)

ROTOR
SUB-SYSTEM Z
(SUB-SYSTEM A)

FAILURE MODES
DRIVE TRAIN
(SUB-SYSTEM B)

GEARBOX MAIN SHAFT MECHANICAL BRAKE ASSEMBLY BZ

(ASSEMBLY BA) (ASSEMBLY BB) (ASSEMBLY BC)

MAIN SHAFT MAIN SHAFT ROTOR MAIN SHAFT GEARBOX

(SUB-ASSEMBLY BBA) COUPLING COUPLING SUB-ASSEMBLY BBZ
(SUB-ASSEMBLY BBB) (SUB-ASSEMBLY BBC)

COMPONENTS COMPONENTS COMPONENTS COMPONENTS

Fig. 15.12 Example of the hierarchy structure used to perform the FMECA

15.5.4 Approach

A FMECA can be initiated at any system level but due to the complexity, huge
amount of components and the lack of data, a proper level of indenture of our OWT
has been chosen: the FMEA has been performed starting from the component level,
while the FMECA starts from the line replaceable unit (LRU) level. A bottom-up
approach is used, noting the failure modes of the lowest level items of the system
and then moving up the hierarchy and noting the effect of the failure to the end item
(the OWT itself). Figure 15.12 illustrates the distribution mentioned before.
250 I.E Martínez García et al.

15.5.5 Criticality

A criticality analysis completes the FMEA by using two parameters: occurrence

and severity. With these parameters the risky parts of the systems are identified.
Calculating criticality numbers gives us the possibility to define the criticality
of each item and its associated failure modes from a quantitative point of view;
however, this method is only used when enough data is available. The mode
criticality number “Cm ” and the item criticality number “Cr ” (see Table 15.4), can
be calculated according to definitions in MIL-HDBK-1629 (DoD 1980).
These numbers are defined using Eqs. (15.9) and (15.10):

Cm D ’  “  œp  t (15.9)

j
X
Cr D .Cm /n for n D 1; 2 : : : j (15.10)
n

– Cr D Criticality number for the item

– Cm D Criticality number for a failure mode under a particular severity classifica-
tion.
– ’ D Failure mode ratio. The probability, expressed as a decimal fraction, that the
part or item will fail in the identified mode.
– œp D Part failure rate.
– “ D Conditional probability of mission loss given that the failure mode has
occurred. Table 15.5 defines “ values.
– t D Mission time.
– n D Failure modes in the items that fall under a particular severity classification.
– j D Last failure mode in the item under the severity classification.

Table 15.4 Criticality numbers description from MIL-HDBK-1629

Criticality number Description
Cm The portion of the “Cr ” number due to one of its failure modes under a
particular severity classification
Cr Number of system failures of a specific type expected due to the item’s
failure modes
Source: DoD (1980)

Table 15.5 “ classification “ value Failure effect

from MIL-HDBK-1629
1 Actual loss
1–0.1 Probable loss
0.1–0 Possible loss
0 No effect
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 251

Alternatively, a qualitative method can be used, which allows us to represent the

criticality results using a Risk Matrix. The matrix is constructed by inserting the
total number of OWT failure modes in the matrix areas representing the severity
classification and the frequency level assigned. The frequency is calculated as the
ratio between failure mode probability of occurrence in a certain time interval,
and the overall system probability of occurrence in the same time interval, as Eq.
(15.11):

œp  ’  t œp  ’
fD D (15.11)
œs  t œs

– f D Frequency
– ’ D Failure mode ratio. The probability, expressed as a decimal fraction, that the
part or item will fail in the identified mode.
– œp D Part failure rate.
– œs D Total system failure rate.
The results of the analysis for our OWT are summarized in the Criticality Matrix
shown in Fig. 15.13, in which three risk areas can be identified:
• Green area (Low occurrence and low severity) indicates that the risk associated
to that failure mode located on it, is acceptable or well controlled. This area refers
to those placed in minor severity with frequency from I to III, marginal severity
with frequency I and II, critical severity with frequency I.
• Red area (High occurrence and high severity) indicates that actions must be taken
to decrease the severity associated to that failure mode and occurrence of the
failure modes placed on it. This area refers to those placed in marginal severity
with frequency V, in critical severity with frequency IV and V and catastrophic
severity with frequency from III to V.
• Yellow area (Medium risk) gathers those failure modes which must be monitored
and controlled. This area refers to those modes placed in minor severity with

Frequent (V) 1 1
Reasonably
Frequency

probably (IV)
Occasional (III) 3 4 2 1

Remote (II) 6 1
Extremely
8 1 6
Unlikely (I)
Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic

Severity

Fig. 15.13 Risk matrix

252 I.E Martínez García et al.

Table 15.6 Severity classification

Value
associated with
Severity Definition RPN analysis
Catastrophic A failure mode which causes death, system loss, severe 250
environmental damage, damage over 900,000 A C or
downtime over 2 days
Critical A failure mode which causes severe injury, major system or 175
environmental damage, mission loss, damage over 90,000 A C
but less than 900,000 A
C and loss of availability between
24 hours and 7 days
Marginal A failure mode which causes minor injury, minor system and 100
environmental damage, mission degradation, damage
between 90.000 A C and 9000 A C and loss of availability
between 24 h and 4 h
Minor Only unscheduled maintenance or repair, damage under 25
9000 AC and loss of availability under 4 h

frequency IV and V, marginal severity with frequency III and IV, critical severity
with frequency II and III, and catastrophic severity with frequency I and II.
The matrix provides a way to identify and compare failure modes, with respect to
their associated severity and frequency. Severity degrees assigned to failure modes
are described in Table 15.6. A classification of frequency is given in Table 15.7.

15.5.6 Process

The ‘bottom-up’ procedure for component FMECA is the following:

1. Construct a OWT FMECA system tree;
2. Identify all potential items;
3. Evaluate failure modes (from mode library) of each component;
4. Evaluate the local effect for each component failure mode;
5. Roll-up all local effects at higher level (at higher level, the rolled-up effect
becomes the failure mode at that level);
6. Repeat step 5 until system level;
7. For each end effect at system level identify the detection, severity and occurrence;
8. Build down the FMECA by transferring all the end system effects and severity
to sub-system, assembly and component level.
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 253

Table 15.7 Frequency/occurrence classification

Value associated
with RPN
Frequency Description analysis
Frequent A high probability of occurrence during the item 4
operative time interval. High probability may be
defined as a single failure mode probability greater
than 0.20 of the overall probability of failure
during the item operative time interval
Reasonably probable A moderate probability of occurrence during the 3
item operative time interval. Probable may be
defined as a single failure mode probability of
occurrence which is more than 0.10 but less than
0.20 of the overall probability of failure during the
item operative time
Occasional An occasional probability of occurrence during 2
item operative time interval. Occasional probability
may be defined as a single failure mode probability
of occurrence which is more than 0.01 but less than
0.10 of the overall probability of failure during the
item operative time
Remote An unlikely probability of occurrence during item 1
operative time interval. Remote probability may be
defined as a single failure mode probability of
occurrence which is more than 0.001 but less than
0.01 of the overall probability of failure during the
item operative time
Extremely unlikely A failure whose probability of occurrence is 0
essentially zero during item operative time interval.
Extremely unlikely may be defined as a single
failure mode probability of occurrence which is
less than 0.001 of the overall probability of failure
during the item operative time

15.5.7 Limitations

FMEA takes into consideration only non-simultaneous failure modes. In other

words, each failure mode is considered individually, assuming that other system
items work as usual. Effects of multiple item failures on wind turbine functions
and redundant items are not covered by FMEA. These events are usually studied
for those systems or sub-systems that perform safety functions by the Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) and Markov analysis.
254 I.E Martínez García et al.

15.5.8 Results

Due to the complexity of the full FMECA just the consequential results are shown in
this section, which are related to the hierarchical structure described in Sect. 15.5.4.

15.5.8.1 Risk Matrix and Criticality Evaluation

A risk matrix is probably one of the most widespread tools for risk evaluation.
Figure 15.13 reports the number of failure modes that lead to the end effect with
each particular combination of severity and frequency values.
Figure 15.13 shows seven failure modes located in yellow zones where actions
to control or monitor them must be taken (three of them are: The Drive train
Module Failure, the Power Module Failure and the Structural Module Failure).
Twenty-four failure modes, whose risk is considered to be low are in the green
areas. Three failure modes are located in the red areas where mitigating actions
must be taken (The Auxiliary Power Equipment Failure in Marginal-Frequent,
The Rotor Module Failure in Critical-Frequent, and the Nacelle Module Failure in
Catastrophic-Occasional).
The results of the Auxiliary Power Equipment are due to the large amount of
items contained within it, while for the Rotor Module this result is due to the high
failure rate of the Blades assembly. For the Nacelle Module Failure, the reason why
it is placed in a red zone is because the Nacelle is one of the main structures of the
WT where the majority of the main assemblies are located.
From what is presented in Sect. 15.4.3, the MTBF of the system is 3723.37 h
(2.37 failures per year). For this reason, the time until system fails has been taken as
the mission time.
As mentioned in Sect. 15.5.5, another quantitative analysis has been performed,
the results of which are shown in Fig. 15.14. From Fig. 15.14, it can be seen that:
• Six marginal failure modes have the highest criticality number for the system.
• Nine critical failure modes have almost the same criticality number as Marginal
failure modes.
• Seventeen ‘minor’ failure modes have more than three times criticality compared
to the two ‘Catastrophic’ failure modes, but less than half the value of criticality
number compared to Marginal and Critical failure modes.
Equation (15.12) is derived from Eqs. (15.9), (15.10) and (15.11), and it can help
to explain why the item criticality numbers are so high for the less severe modes:

j
X
Cr D . fn  t  “  œs / (15.12)
n
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 255

3.5

Cr 2.5

2
6
9
1.5

1
17
0.5
2
0
Minor Marginal Critical Catastrophic
Severity

Fig. 15.14 Item criticality number (Cr) distribution

Considering that “t” does not change, œs is constant and “ values are the same for
all failure modes, one can obtain Eq. (15.13):

j
X
Cr D k  fn (15.13)
n

Therefore, for the marginal classification, high values of frequency and a high
number of failure modes are the reason for high item criticality numbers.

15.5.8.2 Mode Criticalities at System Level

The ten modes with the highest criticalities are reported in Fig. 15.15. Blades are
well known as the parts that most suffer in wind turbines due to their continuous
work under adverse environmental conditions; in fact Rotor Module Failure (which
includes the Blades) is characterized by the highest mode criticality value (mode
criticality of 2.88).
Unifying all Auxiliary Equipment failure modes would lead to the highest mode
criticality (3.41), simply due to the large amount of assemblies contained in this
sub-system; however these failure modes have been sorted based on the equipment
in which they can manifest.
Even with the aforementioned equipment separated, the second highest mode
criticality belongs to Auxiliary Power Equipment Failure, while the third and fourth
positions are taken by WT Auxiliary Equipment Failure and Air Conditioning
Equipment Failure, respectively.
The remaining failures with the lowest values of mode criticality belong to
Condition Monitoring System Failure, Control and Safety System Failure, Nacelle
Module Failure, Drive Train Module Failure and Power Module Failure.
256 I.E Martínez García et al.

3
2.5
Mode Criticality

2
1.5 2.88
1 2.03

0.5 0.84 0.77 0.54 0.29 0.28 0.21 0.2 0.19

0
Equipment Failure

Equipment Failure

Nacelle Module Failure

Condition Monitoring
WT Auxiliary Equipment

Drive Train Module Failure

Control & Safety System
Rotor Module Failure

Power Module Failure

Auxiliary Hydraulic Group
Air Conditioning
Auxiliary Power

System Failure

Failure
Failure

Failure

Failure Mode

Fig. 15.15 Top 10 mode criticalities

15.5.8.3 Risk Priority Number (RPN)

RPN is a criticality study in which the severity, occurrence and detection are
multiplied in order to obtain information about the riskiest failure modes. Thus,
greater attention is paid to critical parts. Equation (15.14) is used to obtain RPN
numbers:

RPN D Severity  Occurrence  Detection (15.14)

Figure 15.16 shows the consequent risk priority classification with the highest RPNs
of the OWT.
In this case, Rotor Module Failure is still in first position because of its high
occurrence and severity and also its low detection level comparing to the others,
followed now by the Structural Module Failure and the Nacelle Module Failure
due to its high severity and low detection. The rest of the failure modes have such
combinations that give them a gradual position on the graph until getting a value of
200 for the last two modes.
It is important to note that the mode criticality graph and the RPN graph give
different lists of the riskiest failure modes of the OWT. This is because the mode
criticality analysis focuses on the probability of occurrence, while the RPN analysis
considers the detection parameter combined with severity and occurrence. All
RPN values related to severity, occurrence and detection, and used to perform this
analysis, are listed in Tables 15.6, 15.7 and 15.8 respectively.
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 257

3500
3000
2500
2000
RPN

3500
1500
1000
1500 1500 1400
500 1050 800 600 600
0 200 200

Equipment Failure
Nacelle Module Failure

Condition Monitoring

Auxiliary Hidraulic Group

Structural Module Failure
Rotor Module Failure

Drive Train Module Failure

Control & Safety System

Control & Communication
Power Module Failure

Auxiliary Power

System Failure
System Failure

Failure

Failure
Failure Mode

Fig. 15.16 Top 10 RPN

Table 15.8 Detection classification

Value associated
with RPN
Detection Description analysis
Almost certain Inspections will almost certainly detect a 1
functional failure
Very high Very high chance the inspections will detect a 2
functional failure
High High chance the inspections will detect a 3
functional failure
Moderately high Moderately high chance the inspections will 4
detect a functional failure
Moderate Moderate chance the inspections will detect a 5
functional failure
Low Low chance the inspections will detect a 6
functional failure
Very low Very low chance the inspections will detect a 7
functional failure
Remote Remote chance the inspections will detect a 8
functional failure
Very remote Very remote chance the inspections will detect 9
a functional failure
Absolutely impossible Inspections will not and/or cannot detect a 10
functional failure or there are no the
inspections
258 I.E Martínez García et al.

15.6 Preventive Maintenance (PM)

During the Wind Turbine life different types of maintenance tasks are required in
order to retain or restore its operation. In this section, we explain how to apply the
“NAVAIR 00-25-403” procedure to define the PM tasks for our OWT (NAVAIR
2003). This standard explains a complete reliability centered maintenance (RCM)
process which can be applied for almost any system.

15.6.1 Definition

Preventive Maintenance looks at actions that can be used to extend the useful
life of system with a good cost-benefit relation, whilst simultaneously ensuring
the safety of the system. PM tasks are generally performed during an intended
downtime, though they can also be performed during corrective maintenance and
even while the system is running (Predictive Maintenance using nondestructive
inspection techniques).

15.6.2 Preventive Maintenance Tasks Classification

15.6.2.1 Scheduled Tasks

Scheduled task are those which are performed in set intervals of time. These
intervals can be measured in different units depending on how the system operates
(e.g. cycles, time and events). The main units used in the Wind Turbine tasks are
units of time: hours, days months and years. Scheduled tasks include:
• Servicing (S): this task involves the replenishment of consumables that are
wasted overtime, as for example oil and fuel. Usually no further analysis should
be done for these tasks due to they should be performed according to their
manufacturer’s instructions, which include information about how often, how to
do it, level of disassembly, operator skills and other maintenance requirements.
• Lubrication (L): this task is applied to those components that must be lubricated
periodically according to design specifications. As for S tasks, manufacturers
give the instructions to perform it as well as its intervals to be applied
• Hard Time (HT): It consists of the replacement or restoration of the item
before it fails. This task is performed when the degradation of the item cannot
be detected. The degradation phase of the item is called “Wear Out”, which
shows different increases of the probability of failure with time depending on
the type of component. The time to perform the task is established according
to the consequences of the effects that the item failure causes. If the conse-
quences are safety/environmental related, the limit time to perform the task
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 259

will be established before the wear out age while if the consequences are
operational/economic related the limit time will be flexibly established before
the functional failure.
• Failure Finding (FF): this schedule task allows finding functional failures that
have already occurred but are not apparent to the operators/maintainers, also
called hidden failures. Emergency or back-up systems such as firefighting system
or pumps in the hydraulic system are examples of elements that are subjected to
Failure Finding task.

15.6.2.2 On Condition Task

On Condition (OC) tasks are periodical or continuous inspections. In contrast to

HT tasks, these have a well-defined degradation period where the potential failure
indicates that a functional failure will occur. Periodic and continuous inspections
ensure that the items work until a potential failure comes along, extending its
useful life, and therefore decreasing its maintenance costs. Once the potential failure
is found, the next inspections are performed with flexible intervals of time in
order to find the right time to take corrective actions. Periodical inspections range
from simple visual checks to non-destructive inspections which need specialized
equipment. The most used continuous inspection in wind turbines is condition mon-
itoring. Condition monitoring is usually used for failure modes whose functional
failures have environmental/safety-related effects, as these need to be continuously
controlled.

15.6.3 Significant Function Selection

System failures may have different levels of function losses. Hence, functions are
classified as “Significant Function (SF)” or “Non-SF”, depending on whether the
consequences of these failures may lead to any losses of function, or effects, in
terms of safety, environment, operations or economic impacts.

15.6.3.1 Significant Function (SF) Logic

Function failures have been analyzed through several questions which identify all
significant failures. Items may have more than one significant function and each one
should be analyzed individually. Functions which are not significant are not taken
into consideration. The logic diagram shown in Fig. 15.17 has been followed in
order to identify all significant functions.
The diagram is composed of four questions, that point out which loss of function
has adverse effects on safety, environment, operations and economic impacts—
and if the function is already protected by an existing PM task. The significant
260 I.E Martínez García et al.

Fig. 15.17 Significant function selection logic diagram

function selection logic diagram is represented in Fig. 15.17. All functions are
followed through the diagram in order to classify them in “SF” or “Non-SF”. If
the four questions’ in Fig. 15.17 are answered as “No”, the function is classified
as “Non-SF”. A positive answer is enough to consider the function as a “SF”. The
SF Identification process ensures that all functions and effects have been taken into
consideration before a Task Evaluation analysis is developed.

15.6.4 Task Evaluation

A ‘task decision logic’ process must be undertaken using the Decision Logic
Diagram (Fig. 15.18), after SFs have been identified.
An appropriate failure management strategy is implemented in order to accept,
eliminate or decrease the consequences of functional failures. All possible Predic-
tive Maintenance tasks have been studied to cover each functional failure through
the Decision Logic Diagram shown in Fig. 15.18.
The study of each functional failure or failure mode effect goes through
different branches depending on its circumstances, which finally identifies the
suitable options in a two-step process. A failure that is not apparent under normal
circumstances is classified as “hidden” because it only appears when a dormant
function is activated. Both evident and hidden failures have adverse impacts which
require actions, but if for each mode more than one action is possible, an economic
and operational impact study is required to identify the best option.
The Decision logic branches identify four types of PM tasks: Lubrication
tasks, OC tasks, HT tasks, and FF tasks which have been explained before. Task
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 261

Fig. 15.18 Decision logic

Fig. 15.19 Example of decision logic for the MV Switchgear and Transformer

evaluations are shown for the MV Switchgear and Transformer in Fig. 15.19;
evaluating all the failure effects and reporting that the failures on these parts are
“evident” for the crew with an economic/operational impact, is what the decision
logic shown in Fig. 15.19 can provide, as an example.
262 I.E Martínez García et al.

In other words, this is the process in which the best suited task is selected to
prevent and deal with each failure mode. If tasks cannot completely prevent the
functional failure, the consequences must be reduced until they are acceptable. The
available suitable tasks are identified in order to deal with each failure mode through
the task selection in the next Sect. 15.6.5.

15.6.5 Task Selection

Once all possible maintenance tasks are known, the following step is the task
selection. This evaluation process is done by looking through suitable tasks and
taking into account cost analysis and operational consequences, thus determining
which one deals better with a given failure mode.

15.6.5.1 Cost

Costs are evaluated for each task, including consumables cost, charter cost for
the kind of vessel that is used for the preventive tasks, crew cost, energy losses
cost and transportation cost. Costs are measured in euros (A C). Special attention
has been paid to those activities or resources which play an important role in
offshore maintenance: for instance, the energy losses during activity maintenance
have been taken under consideration as well as fuel consumptions. All costs have
been assumed under a literature review (Krohn et al. 2009; Malcolm and Hansen
2006; Myhr et al. 2014; Poore and Walford 2008; IRENA 2012; RAB 2010; The
Crown Estate 2010). Equation (15.15) shows how the overall cost is based on
associated costs:

C D CConsumables C CVessel C Ctransportation C CCrew C CLosses (15.15)

CConsumables is the cost of the consumables. Assuming that vessels and equipment are
needed, costs such as the rental vessel and equipment cost—CVessel —are also taken
into account. Ctransportation is the cost based on transportation from the harbor to the
wind farm. It is represented by Eq. (15.16):

CTransportation D d
C1 (15.16)

– d D Distance from
 .  to wind farm and come back .km/.
harbor
– C1 D Fuel cost AC Km .

CCrew , the crew cost is based on Eq. (15.17):

CCrew D t
Cd .td C t0 C tr / (15.17)

15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 263

– t D Number of technicians.  . 
– Cd D Cost technicians per hour A C hours .
– td D Transportation time; round trip .hours/.
– t0 D Time to adjust the actions .hours/. It has been assumed as 2 h.
– tr D Time to develop the preventive task .hours/.
CLosses , the cost associated with losses of energy can be calculated via Eq.
(15.18):

CLosses D .tr /
CL (15.18)

– CL D W
E
Cfactor .
– W D Power Ratio.MW/.
C=MWh.
– E D Electricity price D A
Table 15.9 shows assumptions about CCrew and CLosses . Other general assump-
tions have been established as follows:
• The nominal power of the offshore wind turbine is 10 MW.
• A distance from harbor to wind farm of 30 Km.
• Logistic delays have not been taken into account.
• The weather window is always perfect to develop the replacement and there is
no environmental condition by which to wait in onshore until the maintenance
could begin (e.g. wave height).
A Crew Transfer Vessel has been selected in order to carry out the preventive
tasks. This vessel is selected for the replacement of items with small and low weight.
The role is to transport the crew to the OWT and items of a few tones. Characteristics
of the selected vessel are shown in Table 15.10.

Table 15.9 General Cd D Technicians Cost .AC=hour/ 90 A

C/h
assumptions
Electricity price (A
C/MWh) 83 A
C/MWh
Capacity factor 45 %

Table 15.10 Crew Transfer Vessel features

CTV—Crew Transfer Vessel
Fuel cost, round trip (A
C) 145.72 A
C
Charter cost (A
C) 3.373 A
C
Number of technicians G1 D 2; G2 D 1
td D Transportation time; round trip .hours/ 1.3
Operational speed 24 knots
Fuel consumption 0.24 mt/h (metric ton/h)
264 I.E Martínez García et al.

15.6.5.2 Operational Consequences

The right tasks have to ensure that there are no operational consequences in
the OWT. A balance between cost and operational impact should be chosen: a
less expensive task will not be selected unless it fits in a work package without
operational consequences. As an example, the most suited maintenance tasks
associated with each failure mode are shown in Table 15.11, for several Transformer
parts.

Table 15.11 Maintenance task assignation

Transformer Maintenance tasks Failure modes
THV “Use vacuum to remove dirt” Oil Insulation Failure; Cooling
System Failure, Mechanical damage
and faults in insulation
“Do an infrared scan and compare it Mechanical damage and faults in
with previous reports. Test insulation; Short circuit, personal
temperature. Check ground safety; Bushings Failure; Tank
connections. Check for discolored Failure; Oil Insulation Failure;
copper and discolored insulation. Possible fire; Winding deformation
Check for carbon tracking on
insulators”
“Visual check around the Bushings Failure; Mechanical
transformer area” damage and faults in insulation;
Loss of efficiency
“Test fans and controls for proper Cooling System Failure
operation”
MV Winding & “Carry out ratio test of windings in Drift; Mechanical Failure
LV Winding all tap positions to ensure accuracy
according to manufacturer’s data.
Compare test data”
“Remove dirt using vacuum cleaner, Mechanical Failure
blower or compressed air. Clean the
areas of contact and tighten bolts
and nuts. Apply air dry varnish”
Transformer “Vibration test” Increased core temperature
“Check diaphragm or bladder for Increased core temperature
leaks if there is conservator”
“Check heat exchangers operation” Increased core temperature
“Check voltage and adjust it to the Opened; Shorted
most suitable tap”
Bushings “Clean surfaces using brush or Worn Out
wiping with lint free cloth”
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 265

15.6.6 Packaging

After selecting the best-suited tasks the next step is to adjust all these tasks in work
packages by different criteria in an optimal way. In the first phase of packaging,
a proper metric for all the tasks must be selected in order to organize them
along the timeline. When converting the metrics of an environmental/safety-related
task, special care should be taken, ensuring that the time to perform the task is
not exceeded with the new metric. Although the first timeline graph with all the
maintenance tasks can suggest a first packaging strategy based on the frequency of
the maintenance tasks, the second phase includes other criteria to group the tasks
that should also be taken into consideration.
In the second phase, tasks with common characteristics are grouped according to
their maintenance level, kind of skills needed, equipment required, task intervals,
transportation, etc. While grouping maintenance tasks, the environmental/safety
related ones usually set the time for other tasks, due to their less flexible intervals of
time which cannot be exceeded.
In the third and last step, the final packaging is developed, introducing other
important factors such as the operational impact of the work package (e. g.
downtime) or the ability to perform tasks in parallel, managed by previous analysis
and engineering criteria. The target, at this point, is to reduce the downtime of the
wind turbine as much as possible while maintenance tasks are being performed. The
more the maintenance time is reduced, the lesser costs of maintenance; consequently
the availability of the wind turbine, and the energy produced, is also greater.
However, factors, such as labor hours (7–9 h and sometimes more) or the reduced
spaces to work (limited crew) can make it difficult to obtain optimal packages.
Sometimes tasks do not fit into the established work packages, and may have to
be performed as “Special Inspections”. Usually, these inspections have:
• A different kind of vessel: Depending on the component, on which the task is
going to be performed, the necessities and equipment needed to access it may
be different; consequently, the vessels used will also vary. Usually, three or four
kinds of vessels take part in PM programs.
• A different interval: Sometimes, the time to perform a preventive task is very
different from the time required for other tasks. This may be due to the item
operation, environment requirements, etc. This makes it harder to couple the task
to others.
When new tasks or changes on them are being implemented, and they contain the
usage of hazardous materials or the emission of contaminant, special authorizations
are required. For instance, during the recoating of blades, the use of solvents, certain
types of lubricants, and some non-destructive inspection materials may need to be
regulated and/or certificated before the task is performed.
In the following example, 59 maintenance tasks from the power module have
been packaged. The power module is divided in five parts: Medium Voltage
Switchgear (MVS), Generator (GE), Converter (CONV), Transformer (TRANS)
266 I.E Martínez García et al.

Table 15.12 Maintenance MVS GE CONV TRANS PFC

task classification by
sub-systems 1–6 7–25 26–34 35–57 58–59

and Power Feeder Cables (PFC). The maintenance tasks are numbered as shown
in Table 15.12.
The descriptions of some key tasks are shown in Table 15.13. In this case, the
system is already operating and the intervals are taken from manufacturers’ manuals.
If the system is in an early design phase, other analyses should be performed to
define task intervals. When all the intervals are identified, they are grouped every
four months (4 M), six months (6 M), annually (A), two years (2 Y), three years
(3 Y), and five years (5 Y) and six years (6 Y). Table 15.14 shows the first packaged
tasks by their intervals for the Medium Voltage Switchgear and the Generator.
The tasks using common equipment are highlighted with the same colors. In
Table 15.14, the red color (task number 1) refers to cleaning products and tools
for cleaning; the yellow color (task number 2) means advanced tools for electrical
tests; green indicates (task number 3, 10 and 11) basic tools for electrical tests; flesh
color (task number 4 and 17) indicated lubricants; blue color (task number 12, 15,
18 and 19) depicts temperature and vibration test tools; and purple color pertains to
advanced test tools.
Once the tasks are defined and classified by intervals of time, they have to be
arranged in a lifeline. In our case, the tasks have been organized for 6 years (the
maximum interval) and distributed over 3 different months with 2 days of work in
each one. The simple reason why the workload is distributed in 2 days is because
the work package has many working hours that do not fit in the limited labor hours.
The months to perform the work packages are chosen based on the best weather
periods of the year; the same for applies for the working days in each month, as
certain weather conditions must be met. Table 15.15 shows the distribution of tasks
for the first month (March) of work and for the first 6 years. The tasks highlighted
in Table 15.15 are in accordance with the previous ones shown in Tables 15.13 and
15.14 (which follow the criteria previously explained for the packaging).
The crew on board the vessel is divided in two teams which work in parallel—
thus the time to perform the maintenance tasks is considerably reduced. Table 15.16
summarizes the working time for each year, for the first month and each work
team.
Consider the second working day and first work team, with a short working time
of 1.8 h. The 1.8 h could have been better packaged with just one work team;
however, further analyses for other sub-systems led to other maintenance tasks,
that also need to be packaged with the same work team; additionally, there is the
possibility that the labor time of the day can be limited to around 8 h.
Table 15.17 shows the different cases taken into account when packaging. In the
case of October, a more flexible labor time is assumed (where it is reaches 11 labor
hours)—and so there is only one day of work. However, as it was mentioned before,
when the maintenance plan is also performed for the rest of the sub-systems, these
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 267

Table 15.13 Maintenance task descriptions

Sub Task Maintenance
Assembly assembly number task Description
MVS MV 1 OC “Check for accumulations of dirt
Switchgear especially on insulating surfaces.
Remove filings. Use suitable cleaners in
contacts”
2 OC “Inspect for proper grounding of the
equipment. Megger test: insulators to
ground, bussing phase to ground, and
phase to phase. Test contact resistance
across bolted sections of bars”
3 OC “Check electrical operation of: relays,
auxiliary contacts, visual indicators,
interlocks, cell switches and lighting.
Visually inspect arrestors, C/T’s and
P/T’s for signs of damage. Check cable
and wiring condition, appearance, and
terminations”
4 L “Lubricate doors”
5 OC “Inspect insulators and insulating
surfaces for cleanliness and cracks.
Remove drawout breakers and check
drawout equipment. Check condition of
bushings for signs of overheating,
moisture or other contamination, for
proper torque and clearance to ground”
6 OC “Check condition of contacts,
connections, starters, and circuit
breakers in accordance with test reports
and manufacturer’s data. Check
physical appearance of doors”
GE Stator 12 OC “Measure temperature at provided
windings measuring points. Measure endwinding
vibration”
Bearings 15 OC “Measure and record temperature at
provided measuring points. Measure
machine vibration. Measure and record
condition of bearings using
shock-pulse-method. Check bearing
seals for oil leakage and clean if dirty.
Check for rust”
External 18 OC “Visual inspection for rust and dirt.
fans Check the vibration level”
Internal 19 OC “Visual inspection for rust and dirt.
fans Check the vibration level”
TRANS Cooling 52 OC “Clean the cooling air channels. Check
system the cooling air circulation
ducts/openings for proper size and
obstructions”
268 I.E Martínez García et al.

Table 15.14 Packaged tasks by intervals for MVS and GE

Table 15.15 Packaged tasks for the first 6 years

Year First day Second day
0 1,3,6,7,9,11,12,15,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59
1 1,2,3,5,6,7,9,11,12,15,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59
2 1,2,3,5,6,7,9,11,12,15,18,19,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59
3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,11,12,15,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59
4 1,2,3,5,6,7,9,11,12,15,18,19,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59
5 1,2,3,5,6,7,9,11,12,15,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59
6 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,11,12,15,18,19,38,49,52 16,20,24,25,29,33,37,40,41,44,48,54,57,59

Table 15.16 Working hours for the first 6 years

First day Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Work team 1 (hours) 7.2 7.2 8.2 7.2 8.2 7.2 8.2
Work team 2 (hours) 4.2 6.9 6.9 7.15 6.9 6.9 7.15
Second day Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Work team 1 (hours) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Work team 2 (hours) 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1

times will be readjusted. In the case of July, the two working teams cannot work in
parallel because of the limited space in the nacelle; therefore they are separated in 2
days of work.

15.6.7 Age Exploration (AE)

In the process to elaborate PM programs, assumed data is necessary. An AE updates

the data during different analyses.
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 269

Table 15.17 Packaging overview for year 0

Year 0 Month Day Working team PM tasks Hours
March Day 1 Group 1 OC  5 7:2
Group 2 OC  6 4:2
Day 2 Group 1 OC  4 1:8
Group 2 OC  10 7:1
July Day 1 Group 1 OC  5 7:2
Group 2 – –
Day 2 Group 1 – –
Group 2 OC  6 4:2
October Day 1 Group 1 OC  12 10:9
Group 2 OC  13 9:4
Day 2 Group 1 – –
Group 2 – –

15.6.8 Repackaging

In order to improve the work packages there are periodic reviews of:
• Time to perform the task
• Task interval
• Work package interval
• Maintenance process
• Techniques and technologies used
The maintenance documentation from field, which contains the information as
previously mentioned, should be reviewed with maintainers to verifying whether
the analysis results are realistic.

15.7 Conclusions

The reliability analysis for a 10 MW offshore wind turbine has identified which sub-
systems, assemblies and sub-assemblies have a high failure rate. The sub-systems
with highest failure rate are Rotor Module, and Drive Train Module. In particular,
the Rotor Module is exposed to high stress and fatigue during its operation time
due to uneven high air pressure around it. It should be also noted that the gearbox
does not appear to be one of the less reliable assemblies of an OWT as it might be
expected. These results also verify the results of the Reliawind project.
The RBD shows an OWT failure rate of 2.37 failures per year, which is about
twice as large as an onshore wind turbine failure rate. This value could be accepted
for an onshore wind turbine; however it is a high failure rate for an OWT due to the
limited accessibility to perform preventive or corrective maintenance.
270 I.E Martínez García et al.

The huge dimensions of the wind turbine, its complexity and the environment
increase the failure rate of the system. Through quality improvements of compo-
nents, and by using condition monitoring on critical assemblies, the downtime can
be reduced—allowing for an accurate scheduled maintenance to be developed.
Nowadays, availability improvements have been sought, in order to reduce
energy losses and make offshore wind energy more profitable. In general, com-
mercial offshore wind turbines can achieve an availability value of about 90 %,
but, depending on the maintenance assumptions, this value can increase to 95 %.
However in this analysis, logistic delays, maintenance delays and supply delays have
not been taken into account; therefore, an availability value (inherent availability)
of 99 % has been achieved.
Regarding the FMECA study, it can be concluded that the change in environment
increases the probability of certain failures, directly or indirectly. For the Rotor
Module and the Structural Module, the analysis confirms that their failures are
mainly caused by the hazardous environment. For the Drive Train Module and Rotor
Module, the abrupt changes in wind direction lead to continuous variation on their
load conditions, and consequently cause stress and fatigue. As the OWT usually
works in extreme temperature conditions, the Air Conditioning Equipment has to
increase its power to maintain suitable environmental conditions, and this leads to
an increase in its failure rate.
From the result of the RPN and Mode Criticalities analysis, it can be seen how
each method can give different lists of riskiest parts of the system; for this reason
both analysis are suggested in order not to leave any important failure mode out of
consideration.
A successfully scheduled PM program can reduce maintenance costs and
increase the availability of the OWT without risks for the system, personnel or
environment. Throughout the packaging study, it has been seen that clear criteria
combined with expert engineering judgment can make the process much easier.
The fact that the wind turbine is placed in an offshore environment affects
the PM program due to drawbacks such as limited labor hours, expensive means
of transport, expensive maintenance tasks, the difficulty to proceed with certain
corrective actions, and the difficulty to perform some preventive tasks, amongst
other factors. Nonetheless, with the right tools and procedures, offshore wind can
be made more reliable and feasible.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/),
which permits any noncommercial use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
15 Reliability and Preventive Maintenance 271

References

Boccard N (2009) Capacity factor of wind power, realized values vs. estimates. Energ Policy
37:2679–2688. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.046
BWEA (2000) Prospects for offshore wind energy: a report written for the EU (Altener con-
tract XVII/4.1030/Z/98-395) by the British Wind Energy Association. In: Reports. Offshore
wind energy. Available via OWE. http://www.offshorewindenergy.org/reports/report_026.pdf.
Accessed 10 Apr 2016
CA-OWEE (2001) Offshore wind energy: ready to power a sustainable Europe. Final report
concerted action on wind energy in Europe NNE5-1999-562. In: Offshore wind energy CA-
OWEE reports. Available via OWE. http://www.offshorewindenergy.org/ca-owee/indexpages/
downloads/CA-OWEE_Complete.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
Davidson J, Hunsley C (eds) (1994) The reliability of mechanical systems. Mechanical Engineer-
ing Publications, London
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2002) Future offshore: a strategic framework for the
offshore wind industry. Available via Tethys, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).
https://tethys.pnnl.gov/publications/future-offshore-strategic-framework-offshore-wind-
industry. Accessed 10 Aug 2016
DoD (1980) Military standard MIL-STD-1629A: procedures for performing a failure mode, effects
and criticality analysis. Department of Defense, United States. Alion System Reliability Center
Publications. Available via SRC. https://src.alionscience.com/pdf/MIL-STD-1629RevA.pdf.
Accessed 10 Apr 2016
IRENA (2012) Wind power, renewable energy technologies cost analysis series, vol
1: power sector, Issue 5/5. In: International renewable energy agency. Available
via IRENA. https://www.irena.org/documentdownloads/publications/re_technologies_cost_
analysis-wind_power.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
Karyotakis A (2011) On the optimization of operation and maintenance strategies for offshore
wind farms. Dissertation, University College of London
Krohn S, Morthorst PE, Awerbuch S (2009) The economics of wind energy: a report by the
European Wind Energy Association. Available via EWEA. http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/
ewea_documents/documents/publications/reports/Economics_of_Wind_Main_Report_
FINAL-lr.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
Malcolm DJ, Hansen AC (2006) WindPACT turbine rotor design study: June 2000–June 2002.
Subcontract report NREL/SR-500-32495. In: National renewable energy laboratory documents.
Available via NREL. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/32495.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
Myhr A, Bjerkseter C, Agotnes A et al (2014) Levelised cost of energy for off-
shore floating wind turbines in a life cycle perspective. Renew Energy 66:714–728.
doi:10.1016/j.renene.2014.01.017
NAVAIR (2003) Naval air systems command fundamentals of reliability centered maintenance
process (RCM) analysis: NAVAIR 00-25-403. http://www.navair.navy.mil/logistics/rcm/index.
cfm. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
Poore R, Walford C (2008) Development of an operations and maintenance cost model to identify
cost of energy savings for low wind speed turbines. In: National renewable energy laboratory
documents. Available via NREL. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/40581.pdf. Accessed 10
Apr 2016
RAB (2010) Value breakdown for the offshore wind sector: a report commissioned
by the Renewables Advisory Board (RAB). In: Gov.UK corporate reports. Avail-
able via Gov.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/48171/2806-value-breakdown-offshore-wind-sector.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
Reliawind (2011) Final report—Reliawind (reliability focused research on optimizing wind energy
systems design, operation and maintenance: tools, proof of concepts, guidelines and method-
ologies for a new generation): 212966, FP7-Energy. European Commission, Community
272 I.E Martínez García et al.

Research and Development Information Service Publications. Available via CORDIS. http://
cordis.europa.eu/publication/rcn/14854_en.html. Accessed 10 Apr 2016
The Crown Estate (2010) A guide to an offshore wind farm. The Crown Estate Publications.
Available via The Crown Estate. http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/5408/ei-a-guide-to-
an-offshore-wind-farm.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2016