The Continuity of Ethics and Political Theory

Alice Baderin, University of Reading

What is the relationship between ethics and political theory? In particular, is the study of interpersonal and social
morality continuous with inquiry into how we should lead our political lives? This article evaluates the call for firmer
boundaries between moral and political thought that is central to recent realist critiques of analytical political theory. I
identify, and reject, three versions of this position, which I term “discontinuity realism.” My critique draws attention to
an important silence within discontinuity realism, concerning how its call to address politics from within relates to the
feminist insight that politics is deeply intertwined with our personal choices and interpersonal relationships. The article
goes on to defend an alternative “continuity” approach to the study of ethics and political theory. This approach better
realizes the realist’s own aspiration for greater sensitivity to empirical detail in normative political theory.

W hat is the relationship between ethics and political

theory? Is the study of interpersonal and social
morality continuous with inquiry into how we
should lead our political lives? Or are there firm boundaries
between moral and political thought? In particular, is there
forms does discontinuity realism fulfill these conditions. Sec-
ond, the article seeks to open a new conversation about the
relationship between realism and feminism. Here I draw at-
tention to an important silence, among both realists and their
critics, concerning how the call to address politics from within
something about the nature of politics that makes the values or relates to the feminist insight that politics is deeply intertwined
methods of individual and social ethics unhelpful or harmful with our personal choices and interpersonal relationships.2
in political theory?1 The article addresses these questions, starting The feminist message, I suggest, is in tension with the realist
from a claim that is central to recent realist critiques of analytical drive to identify and shore up the boundaries between political
political theory: that political theory should be (more) autono- theory and ethics. The article goes on to offer a positive defense
mous from ethics. Realists argue that many of its contemporary of the disciplinary continuity of political theory and ethics,
practitioners inappropriately subsume political theory within eth- drawing on recent work on epistemic injustice to illustrate how
ics and thereby fail to appreciate the essential character of pol- we can productively trace morally salient features of our re-
itics and the distinctive kinds of normative theory appropriate lationships across a variety of political and nonpolitical con-
to that domain. texts. Finally, the article departs from prominent recent re-
This view, which I term “discontinuity realism,” has been sponses to realism by advancing a partly internal critique. In
the subject of significant recent critical attention (notably in particular, I point to tensions between the discontinuity ac-
Erman and Möller 2015, 2018; Leader Maynard and Worsnip count and the realist call for greater sensitivity to empirical
2018). The article aims to advance existing debate in three detail in political theory; identifying places in which the em-
main ways. First, I provide a sharper focus for the discussion, phasis on the distinctiveness of politics leads realists to seek
by distinguishing three forms of the discontinuity view and to settle, in theoretical terms, questions that are more pro-
making explicit some key desiderata for an appealing version ductively seen as subject to ongoing empirical debate. I ar-
of that position. The article argues that in none of its main gue that we should take up the realist call for more contextual

Alice Baderin ([email protected]) is a lecturer in political theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading,
Whiteknights, PO Box 218, Reading, Berkshire, RG6 6AA, United Kingdom.
1. I use the terms ethics and moral philosophy interchangeably. I revisit this assumption later in the article, when I consider whether the realist account
in fact turns on a distinction between ethics and morality/moral philosophy/applied ethics, where the latter are inherently problematic modes of ethical
thought.
2. Frazer (2018) is, as far as I am aware, the only extended exploration of the relationship between realism and feminism. Frazer argues that feminism is
essentially realist in important ways.

Published online July 16, 2021.

The Journal of Politics, volume 83, number 4, October 2021. q 2021 Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. Published by The University
of Chicago Press for the Southern Political Science Association. https://doi.org/10.1086/715068
 Volume 83 Number 4 October 2021 / 1735

and empirically engaged forms of political theory, while re- “political theory is not applied ethics,” the charge is in fact
sisting the second-order claims about the relationship be- that political theorists have replicated mistakes within par-
tween political theory and ethics to which this demand is often ticular traditions of ethics. I discuss how the latter claim re-
connected. lates to the discontinuity view that is the primary focus of my
A few clarificatory remarks on the concept of politics are critical discussion, and I show what it would imply for the
necessary before I proceed. Realists characteristically treat pol- realist project. Finally, the article makes the positive case for
itics as a particular sphere of life, rather than a process (e.g., working in a continuous way across the fuzzy boundaries of
the exercise of power or resource allocation) that arises across questions of political and nonpolitical morality.
many domains (for this distinction, see Leftwich 2017, 2, 13–
14). For example, Rossi and Sleat note that “realists posit a REALISM IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY
dichotomy between the realm of human action that is now The last 15 years have seen growing calls for a reorienta-
appropriately regulated by morality . . . and the realm of pol- tion of political theory in a more “realist” direction. Realist
itics, which requires separate norms” (2014, 691). More spe- critics, many of them drawing inspiration from the work of
cifically politics, for many realists, is the sphere within which Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams, argue that much an-
we seek to generate binding decisions for a whole society and alytical political theory has failed properly to engage with real
thereby to provide order, given our conflicting interests and politics. For example, it focuses excessively on questions of
value commitments (e.g., Sleat 2016b). It is a significant fea- justice and neglects the more fundamental political problem of
ture of the debate around realism that something like this securing order, it fails to recognize the ineradicability of con-
understanding of politics is shared ground with many moral- flict and disagreement in political life, and it is insufficiently
ists.3 Thus, my objections to discontinuity realism will center contextual and historically sensitive. This article addresses one
not on the realist conception of politics but rather on the re- important strand within recent realist thought, which locates
strictive normative agenda that is seen to flow from it. It is contemporary political theory’s lack of fidelity to real politics
also important to note that this conception of politics does in a tendency to proceed as if political theory were a subfield of
not imply that political theory is concerned exclusively with ethics. On this view, realists “aim to defend the importance of
the collective, and ethics with the individual. The latter view ‘distinctively political thought’ as opposed to the applied ethics
unhelpfully closes down space for normative inquiry into the they believe characterizes much contemporary political theory
behavior of individual political actors, and it is also in ten- and causes it to misunderstand and make mistakes about its
sion with the prominent strand of realist thought that fo- subject matter” (Jubb 2019, 360). This discontinuity critique
cuses on individual political conduct (e.g., Philp 2010). Thus, offers both a specific diagnosis of the general problem identi-
on the view I adopt, and attribute to realists, we can include fied by realists (i.e., the absorption of political theory within
within the sphere of politics the actions and decisions of indi- ethics) and a particular solution (the establishment of political
viduals as they use, or seek to influence, the coercive power of theory as a more autonomous discipline).4
the state. There are important aspects of realist thought that stand
The article proceeds in four parts. First, I outline the dis- outside, or in an uncertain relationship with, the disconti-
continuity account and situate my argument within the wider nuity view. Insofar as realists are concerned with the pri-
literature on realism. Second, the article identifies, and rejects, ority of nonideal over ideal theory or with issues of political
three versions of discontinuity realism. Third, I discuss an feasibility, realism appears orthogonal to the discontinuity/
alternative realist picture of the relationship between political continuity question.5 The connection to the strand of “re-
theory and ethics and thereby address a potential objection alism as ideology critique” (Prinz and Rossi 2017) is also com-
to my argument. The discontinuity claim, as it is commonly plex. For example, Geuss, in this vein, asserts that “ethics is
expressed, seems to leave ethics untouched. On this view,
the problem is not with ethics itself but rather with the way
in which it has come to govern our approaches to politi-
4. One way of distinguishing ethics and political theory would be to
cal theory. Here I consider whether, when realists object that treat only the former as a fundamentally evaluative and normative en-
terprise. I am concerned with a more complex view, according to which
political theory is centrally a normative and evaluative discipline but ought
not to be pursued as a subfield of ethics.
3. For example, Swift (2017, 138) offers a similar characterization of 5. While issues of political feasibility arise in the realist literature, some
politics in the course of arguing that political philosophy is a subfield of realists emphasize that their concerns are not contiguous with calls for political
moral philosophy. Compare Sleat (2016a) and McQueen (2018), who claim theorists to deliver more in the way of action-guiding recommendations for real
that the realist critique turns on a distinctive conception of politics. politics (e.g., Sleat 2016a).
1736 / Ethics and Political Theory Alice Baderin

usually dead politics” (2010, 42). Here Geuss suggests that po- EVALUATING DISCONTINUITY REALISM
litical theorists have gone wrong not in trampling on the proper The discontinuity critique rests on two sets of contrasts: be-
boundaries between political theory and ethics but in failing to tween realist political theory and its moralist target and be-
recognize the extent to which politics and ethics are intertwined, tween (properly political) political theory and ethics. Thus,
since our ethical claims typically represent the residue of past a successful version of discontinuity realism must meet three
political battles. conditions:
While neither exhaustive of realism nor central to the
work of all thinkers, the discontinuity claim is significant 1. Nontriviality: It must assert/embody something about
to the wider realist turn in two ways. First, the call for a the practice of political theory that many contempo-
sharper separation between political theory and ethics recurs rary political theorists, at least implicitly, deny.
across many realist writings. For example, Sleat (2018, 3) sug- 2. Plausibility: It must offer an appealing view of the
gests that “political theorists have in recent years too often character of political theory.
treated politics as if it were merely a form of ‘applied ethics’ or ‘a 3. Nondistortion: It must succeed in distinguishing po-
branch of moral philosophy.’” Jubb (2015, 689) notes “realism’s litical theory from ethics, without relying on a dis-
hostility to contemporary political philosophy’s tendency to see torted picture of the latter.
itself as a form of applied moral philosophy,” and Larmore
(2018, 43) emphasizes that “political philosophy is not a prov- Below I reconstruct three forms of discontinuity realism and
ince of moral philosophy.”6 Second, realists themselves some- evaluate them against these conditions. While they are not
times present the discontinuity claim as an overarching com- exhaustive of the ways in which we can seek to give “greater
mitment that draws together different strands of thought. For autonomy to distinctively political thought” (Williams 2005,
example, in an important overview of the literature, Rossi and 3), I believe that these are the central patterns of argument in
Sleat summarize the realist critique: “Mainstream moralist po- the recent realist literature.
litical philosophy fails, from the realist perspective, to take Before I proceed, it is helpful to explain briefly how this
seriously enough the peculiarities of the political. . . . To the organizing framework departs from some prominent re-
extent to which politics can be theorised in a manner that is cent critiques of realism. My concerns about the disconti-
appropriately sensitive to the nature of politics, political phi- nuity view partially overlap with issues addressed by Erman
losophy ceases to be a branch of moral philosophy” (2014, 690, and Möller in a series of critical works on realism. How-
emphasis added). The powerful charge here is that by treating ever, their defense of an “ethics first” approach (Erman and
political theory as akin to ethics, political theorists assume away Möller 2015) ranges across the three issues of subject matter,
the very subject matter of politics that they claim to address (see values, and methods, which I suggest should be distinguished
also Sleat 2016b, 252; 2018, 2, 8). If we can make good on this in order to give clearer meaning to the discontinuity posi-
thought, Rossi and Sleat suggest, we should see a changing shape tion.7 A sharper organizing framework is offered by Leader
to the disciplinary landscape: “recognising the force of realist Maynard and Worsnip (2018), in an important paper in
claims should force a methodological transformation of the which they delineate five potential paths to the realist claim of
discipline: some theorists would embrace fully fledged political a distinctively political normativity. Here I treat that claim as
realism, others would maintain the moralist approach and so just one way of filling out the discontinuity view, which I take
move away from political theory and towards moral philoso- to be more basic.8 While the idea of a distinctively political
phy” (2014, 696). normativity is increasingly prominent in the realist literature,
realists sometimes urge that we distinguish the practice of
political theory from that of ethics, without committing to,
6. There are many further examples (see, e.g., Cozzaglio 2020, 9; Hall
2015, 466; Hall and Sleat 2017, 278). Realists sometimes claim that politics
(rather than political theory) is distinct from applied ethics. I find this 7. A clearer interpretive framework is offered in Erman and Möller
statement difficult to interpret, except as shorthand for a claim about the (2018), where they distinguish three routes to minimalist realist accounts
distinctiveness of political theory or as expressing something uncontro- of political legitimacy. But there Erman and Möller are concerned specifi-
versial about the way in which real world politics departs from our ethical cally with the source of a set of substantive normative claims in realism. This
ideals. Conversely, I take it that the “anodyne sense” in which Geuss affirms article addresses a broader realist picture of the place of political theory vis-à-
that “politics is applied ethics” is also shared ground. Realists and moralists vis ethics.
agree that politics “is not and cannot be a strictly value-free enterprise, and so 8. See Jubb’s comment (2019, 361, emphasis added) that Leader Maynard
is in the very general sense an ‘ethical activity’ ” (Geuss 2008, 1). They disagree and Worsnip “try to disarm at least one of the ways in which realists criti-
about whether it is therefore appropriate to approach normative political cize contemporary political theory’s supposed reliance on ethics and moral
thought as a branch of ethics. philosophy.”
 Volume 83 Number 4 October 2021 / 1737

or even rejecting, that notion (e.g., Larmore 2018). Thus, it is that we typically confront disagreement in a context where high-
helpful to consider ways in which the discontinuity account stakes decisions must be made that will be binding on many
might stand, or fall, independently of the idea of a distinc- others who disagree.10 Indeed getting enforceable decisions
tively political normativity. to structure our interactions with others who disagree is, re-
alists emphasize, why we need politics in the first place. It is
Subject discontinuity: Political theory and ethics in this context that realists see a fundamental problem with
address distinctive normative problems much contemporary theorizing about justice. If politics is
What, if anything, legitimizes the exercise of the coercive essentially about making binding decisions in the face of on-
power of the state? What kind of economic order is justified going disagreement, they argue, it seriously misses the mark
at the national level? New questions arise when we think to propose theories that hold that we should all agree on some
about how we should organize our political lives; issues that ideal of justice: “To think that a fully just society would be
have no direct analogue outside of the political sphere (Estlund one in which all people converged on the same principles of
2017, 387). Is it a mistake then to treat political theory as a justice is, in an important sense, to put the possibility of full
subfield of moral theory? The basic observation that politics justice outside of the political realm and into a world devoid
throws up distinctive normative problems is insufficient to of much of the original impetus for politics in the first place”
mark a significant divide between political theory and ethics (Sleat 2016b, 259). Sleat’s point, which is echoed by other
(condition 3), since our nonpolitical lives also encompass a realists, is not simply that we will never agree about the de-
wide variety of roles and relationships that generate their own mands of justice. It is also that an imagined situation in which
normative agendas. For example, a significant amount of work we did so would no longer be a situation of politics.
in medical ethics centers on problems that are distinctive to The stronger version of this critique suggests that there
the domain of health care and to the character of the doctor- is an internal tension within much theorizing about justice.
patient relationship. The challenge then for discontinuity real- For example, Jubb objects that “theories like luck egalitari-
ists is to show that the subject matter of political theory dif- anism assume levels of moral agreement among those to whom
fers from that of ethics, in a way in which the diverse moral they are supposed to apply which would, independently of
problems we face outside of politics do not vary from each their application, remove the difficulties with which they are
other. supposed to deal” (2015, 680). Jubb goes on to suggest that
One candidate answer to this question, which recurs in luck egalitarianism involves “circular recommendations” in
the realist literature, is that politics and therefore political a sense described by Patrick Tomlin. Think, Tomlin suggests,
theory (but not ethics) is centrally about disagreement. Can of a situation in which our car has run out of fuel and a so-
this argument from the “primacy of disagreement” (Estlund lution is offered that involves driving the car to a nearby petrol
2017, 391) in political theory ground the discontinuity ac- station: “If we could do that, we would not have this problem.
count? Realists do not deny that we are deeply divided about And if we could do that, we would not pursue this solution,
many ethical issues outside of the political sphere. Rather they we would pursue the (currently unavailable) first best” (2012,
suggest that politics distinctively demands that we deal with 43). It is difficult to see how the parallel with the empty tank
disagreement. This claim still needs to be nuanced further, case is supposed to work here. It cannot be that proposing
since we also face a wide variety of moral problems about how an answer to a problem about which we disagree is to as-
to handle disagreement in our personal and professional lives. sume away the fact of the disagreement. Indeed, it is often
For example, think about the position of a doctor who believes the presence of disagreement that shows us there is some-
that a patient’s life support should be withdrawn, but she needs thing interesting and philosophically significant to think and
to decide how to act in light of disagreement on the part of to argue about. Rather, when Jubb objects that luck egali-
relatives or professional colleagues. It would be wrong for her tarians “demand that political power realize the highest moral
to proceed without giving any consideration to the fact of these ideals, whether we can agree on what those are or not” (2015,
opposing views.9 It is within the sphere of politics, however, 680), he appears to be pressing a version of a complaint that
recurs in the realist literature: that moralists illicitly seek to

9. If we are not working within a set of democratic procedures that

already take others’ views into account, there will sometimes be a greater
individual duty to anticipate disagreement and to build what other people 10. While we do stand in a variety of authoritative relationships in our
think into our own decision-making. Thus, there is a respect in which nonpolitical lives (e.g., parent-child or umpire-player), this authority is
disagreement should sometimes weigh more heavily on the individual typically restricted in scope and may depend on political decisions for its
outside of democratic politics. bindingness (cf. Leftwich 2017, 13–14; Miller 2016, 163).
1738 / Ethics and Political Theory Alice Baderin

settle, in philosophical terms, issues that should be addressed Perhaps we can do better in identifying some locus for
instead by political means. In response, moralists have pointed agreement if we shift our attention from ideals of equality
out that this objection blurs two distinct senses of “settle”: to or justice to legitimacy, as some realists have urged? A long-
try to identify a correct answer to the question and to enforce standing body of psychological research emphasizes a com-
an answer politically (Baderin 2014, 138–39). Thus luck egal- mon tendency for perceptions of legitimacy to be grounded
itarians, for example, need not, and typically do not, think in the presence or absence of voice in decision-making pro-
that their theory of fairness should be imposed through non- cedures (Tyler 2006). However, there is also evidence to sug-
democratic means. gest that procedural voice has limited power to temper dis-
The problem with how moralists treat disagreement then agreement when that disagreement is seen to be moral in
is not one of circularity. Nor is it an antidemocratic attempt character (Bauman and Skitka 2009, 47). More generally, the
to bypass the political process. The objection must be that even extent of and relationship between disagreement over legiti-
if theories of justice do what they set out to do, what they seek macy and justice are contested empirical questions. We should
to do is not properly seen as a project in political theory. Thus, resist making the parameters of the discipline contingent on
some realists argue that political theory should be centrally answering them.
concerned with questions of legitimacy; theorizing about jus- I have briefly illustrated the challenge realists face in try-
tice belongs instead to ethics. But this move, which relocates a ing to occupy a different kind of space with respect to po-
wide range of issues from political to moral theory, is under- litical disagreement, even as they advance their own norma-
motivated (Estlund 2017, 392). There are a variety of questions tive agendas. I believe the right response to these difficulties
we can raise in response to the disagreement that forms part is not to seek some more minimal normative position that
of political life.11 We can ask what we should think, even when holds out the possibility of greater consensus but rather to
the answer to that question makes no practical difference to reject the strong charge that drives this search. We can pro-
what we do (Cohen 2008, 268). We can ask what side we should pose theoretical answers to problems about which people are
take, as democratic actors, in the ongoing political conflict (and will likely remain) in disagreement without denying or
(Mason 2016, 38). Theories of justice seek to play some role suppressing that disagreement or illicitly assuming away pol-
here in guiding how we use the levers of the democratic pro- itics itself.
cess, and it remains unclear why we should close down dis-
ciplinary space for these projects within political theory (con- Value discontinuity: Political theory and ethics deal
dition 2). with distinctive values or forms of normativity
The commitment to foregrounding disagreement in po- The second thesis I consider holds that political theory is
litical theory has stimulated a realist search for a thinner and distinct from ethics because the values that ought to gov-
less contestable set of normative principles. But here realists ern our political lives are distinct from those that apply in
have failed to show how we are to proceed without replicat- nonpolitical contexts. On this view, realism is based on a
ing the charge of suppressing or denying disagreement that “commitment to working within the parameters of a sphere
is leveled at the moralist (condition 1). For example, Jubb de- of politics with its own normative standards” (Prinz and
fends a form of “negative non-intrinsic egalitarianism,” involv- Rossi 2017, 352). We can helpfully distinguish progressively
ing a commitment to avoiding the harms of status inequality, stronger versions of this claim. First, there is the idea that
as a locus of consensus in contemporary politics (2015, 680). we should weigh candidate moral values differently in po-
However, studies of social dominance orientation—“the belief litical and nonpolitical spheres. Some considerations (e.g.,
that some people are inherently superior or inferior to others order, stability, and legitimacy) count for more when we are
and approval of unequal group relationships” (Pratto et al. 1994, dealing with political decisions that commonly involve high
745)—suggest that negative nonintrinsic egalitarianism is not stakes, draw in large numbers of people, and are backed up
a value on which the public converges. Rather we differ sig- by the possibility of coercive enforcement. This idea is re-
nificantly in the extent to which we disavow status hierarchy, flected, for example, in realist writings on political conduct,
with important consequences for the dynamics of contempo- which emphasize that the virtues we require of politicians
rary politics (745). diverge from those we ought to display in our personal lives
(Philp 2010). Some realists suggest that not only the relative
weight of our value considerations but also their valence may
11. To reiterate a point made earlier, my objection here is not to the
realist understanding of politics, on which politics is partly constituted by
shift across political and nonpolitical contexts; it is often the
disagreement, but rather to the narrowness of the normative agenda that case that “private virtue turns out to be public vice” (Bellamy
realists take to follow from that conception. 2010, 414).
 Volume 83 Number 4 October 2021 / 1739

One potential response to these arguments is to point political situation, in which something is said to justify the
to some higher-level principle that guides the selection or exercise of power by one group over another, and circum-
weighing of values for both political and nonpolitical con- stances of domination or brute force, in which no such jus-
texts. On this view, discontinuity at the level of our specific tification is given. Thus, he argues that the notion of politics
values would be underpinned by a deeper value continuity. itself gives us the basic legitimation demand (BLD), which
However, we need not appeal to context-invariant principles calls for some justification of the exercise of political power
in order to resist this version of discontinuity realism. While to be offered to each subject. Even if this principle of legiti-
particular values may come to the fore or weigh more heavily macy is moral, it does not represent a morality that is prior
in politics, similar discontinuities arise within our nonpolit- to politics, since “it is a claim that is inherent in there being
ical lives (and indeed across different parts of our political such a thing as politics” (Williams 2005, 5). Leader Maynard
lives). To the extent then that we have a distinctive “code and Worsnip sharply expose the problem with Williams’s move
of political ethics” (Bellamy 2010, 420), we also have codes of as a basis for the claim of a distinctively political normativity.
workplace ethics, family ethics, and so on (Leader Maynard Williams’s argument, they note, is built on an equivocation
and Worsnip 2018, 760–61).12 We cannot fix ethics and poli- between a putative principle being satisfied and its being jus-
tics, at least in advance of a specific normative inquiry, as the tified: “to show that the satisfaction of the BLD is built into
key point of value rupture (condition 3). the definition of politics is not to show that politics justifies
A stronger version of the value-discontinuity view holds the BLD. . . . It doesn’t answer the question of why we should
not that we should weigh competing moral values differently adhere to the BLD” (Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018, 784).
in the political sphere but rather that moral values play a more It is open to the realist to maintain that there is a dis-
restricted role in normative thinking about politics. This claim tinctively political normativity in some further sense or that
is sometimes seen to follow from a recurring realist obser- there are alternative routes to the one sketched by Williams.
vation about the relatively weak causal and motivational power However, any such argument will need to defeat a reason-
of ethical ideals in political life (e.g., Rossi and Sleat 2014, able presumption against the proliferation of forms of norma-
691). But this is unpromising terrain for discontinuity real- tivity: Will we also recognize medical normativity or family
ism. The claim of motivational discontinuity implicates a normativity (Leader Maynard and Worsnip 2018, 761)? Un-
hugely complex set of issues in moral and political psychol- like the distinction between moral and prudential normativity,
ogy, and it seems unlikely that the relative motivational force political normativity does not mark a boundary that we are
of ethical ideals will map onto any broad dividing line be- already implicitly aware of in practice. While we do commonly
tween political and nonpolitical life. talk about “political reasons” in everyday conversation, this
A second way in which realists restrict the role of moral typically expresses some notion of instrumental normativity
values within political theory is to claim that political the- (e.g., she did it for “political reasons”). Thus, the burden rests
ory deals, at least in part, in a distinctively political and non- with the realist to justify demarcating a distinctive category
moral set of values, reasons, or oughts. On this view, “it is of political normativity.
possible to derive normative political judgements from spe-
cifically political values—a position resting on the view that Methodological discontinuity: Political theory
not all values are moral values, plus the more controversial and ethics employ distinctive modes
claim that such political values can and should guide politics, of normative reasoning
whereas moral values are ill-suited to that task” (Rossi and Within the realist literature we see a cluster of related
Sleat 2014, 690). What is the source of this political norma- claims concerning how we should think normatively about
tivity? The most prominent answer to this question, outlined politics: an emphasis on contextual rather than abstract modes
by Williams, involves looking first to the concept of politics of theorizing, the importance of situated judgment over the
itself. Specifically, Williams draws a distinction between a mechanical application of universal principles, and the in-
determinacy of theory and the necessity of historical under-
standing. My intention here is not to evaluate these claims as
12. As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out to me, there is an accounts of how to do political theory. Instead, I want to
alternative view on which the realist might happily embrace this result. suggest that these methodological commitments are unsuited
Specifically, if the complaint is not about the absorption of political theory as grounds for discontinuity realism because it is unclear how
into ethics but rather about the application of flawed universalistic and
context-insensitive models of ethics, then this picture of multiple discon-
and why they resist the boundaries between ethics and po-
tinuities might give the realists what they want. I discuss this alternative po- litical theory (condition 3). For example, the antitheory ideas
sition later in the article. expressed by some realists echo a perspective that is well
1740 / Ethics and Political Theory Alice Baderin

developed in ethics in general, as well as within particular behaviour,” when political morality need not (2011, 277, 279).14
subfields such as bioethics. Why, if we are drawn to claims It is interesting to note that Dworkin (typically seen as an
about the limited value, or dangers, of general theoretical archmoralist) shares something of the realist’s bifurcated view
principles in thinking normatively about politics, would we of the methods of ethics and political theory, although in
reject the parallel arguments in ethics? A similar challenge roughly the opposite form (for critical discussion of this fea-
arises for claims about the sensitivity of political theory to ture of Dworkin’s view, see Clayton and Stemplowska [2015]).
history or to political attitudes “now and around here.” For But Dworkin’s version of the methodological discontinuity
example, Sleat argues that some candidate political values (e.g., thesis looks similarly undermotivated. It is highly plausible
aristocratic notions of dignity or highly demanding concep- that the appropriate methods for normative theory will de-
tions of citizenship) cannot be values for us because we are pend in part on the nature of the question we are addressing;
unable coherently to integrate them into our lives (2016b, for example, at what level of abstraction are we working? How-
262). But if the lack of purchase on prevailing attitudes or ever, this observation does not support a general methodo-
practices undermines these political values, should we not be logical divide between ethics and political theory.
similarly suspicious of interpersonal and social ideals that are
out of step with contemporary norms?13 POLITICAL THEORY VERSUS ETHICS, OR POLITICAL
The most promising answer to this comparative challenge THEORY VERSUS MORAL THEORY?
recalls some core realist ideas about the nature of politics. I have reconstructed three forms of the realist claim that
Specifically, when we are dealing with questions about the le- political theory is distinct or discontinuous from ethics. In
gitimate use of the coercive power of the state—a form of each case, I emphasized the variegated nature of our ethical
power that is typically inescapable and involves high stakes— lives and suggested that many of the discontinuities realists
perhaps political theorists have reasons to attend to what peo- identify are replicated within ethics. I have also emphasized
ple actually think, in a way that moral theorists (who are ask- that political theory—even on the realist view of politics—
ing what individuals or groups without a hand on or eye to has disciplinary space for a wide range of projects. Thus, the
the levers of state power should do) do not. While it has sur- drive to demarcate clearer boundaries between ethics and
face plausibility, there is a flaw in this argument, in the way political theory risks flattening out the inherent diversity of
in which it moves from the observation that political legitimacy the subject matter and methods of each discipline. In addi-
is bound up with the actions of democratic citizens to the im- tion, my discussion has identified a number of places in which
plication that political theory should therefore be carried out the discontinuity account forecloses issues that are best treated
in an opinion-sensitive manner. To justify an opinion-sensitive as matters of ongoing empirical debate—a result that is at odds
approach to political theory on the basis of a commitment with the realist’s own call for greater sensitivity to empirical
to democratic legitimacy is to suggest that the work of de- detail in political theory.15
termining what is politically legitimate can be done partly in I now want to consider a potential response to my ac-
advance of real democratic politics, through a combination count, which suggests that I have misrepresented the nature
of theoretical reflection and empirical investigation of public of discontinuity claim. Specifically, it might be objected that
views. It is therefore to amplify the claims of political theory realists do not seek to demarcate political theory from eth-
over actual democratic politics, in a way that should be par- ics but only from specific deformations of the ethical, such
ticularly unattractive to realists (Baderin 2016). as Williams’s “morality system” ([1985] 2011). This move is
I have emphasized the difficulty of making good on a re- explicit in a recent paper by Hall and Sleat: “if morality cannot
alist form of methodological discontinuity, according to which
political theory is distinctively contextual, historical, or opinion
sensitive. But the challenge here is a general one that faces 14. Dworkin is concerned here with issues of individual aid and harm
any attempt to demarcate ethics from political theory on the between strangers. Thus, his personal morality is only one element of a
broader sphere of nonpolitical morality.
basis of their characteristic methods. Consider Dworkin’s sug-
15. Consider also the strand of realism that identifies lying as a char-
gestion that personal morality should “make sense of . . . acteristic feature of political life. There is a rapidly developing body of work in
common moral opinion” and “make best sense of [existing] psychology and behavioral economics exploring when, why, and how much
people lie. This research suggests that to understand the role of lying, we will
need to look beyond politics as a category and consider different types of
13. Again, there is an alternative reading of the realist critique on which political situations and interactions. For example, to what extent does a po-
we might happily concede that this asymmetry cannot be established and litical interaction involve communicating a personal message (Cappelen,
embrace an overarching commitment to context sensitivity across political Sorensen and Tungodden 2013)? Is it a context in which smaller lies can pave
and nonpolitical ethics. I discuss this possibility further below. the way for bigger lies (Welsh et al. 2015)?
 Volume 83 Number 4 October 2021 / 1741

be all it has purported to be not only does this undermine best to interpret the characteristic realist claim that “political
traditional moral philosophies, it also throws into severe theory is not applied ethics”? Thus far I have taken D1 as the
doubt any political theory that takes itself to be grounded focus of my critical discussion, but are realists more plausibly
in those philosophies. Accordingly, one of the reasons why understood to be advancing D2?
politics cannot be applied ethics is because ethics cannot be For the “political theory is not applied ethics” claim (and
applied ethics. If we continue to think that politics is a form similar) to stand for a version of D2, there must be some im-
of ‘applied ethics’ then the problems that we encounter in plied criticism of applied ethics qua ethics. But (with the ex-
making sense of morality are only going to replicate them- ceptions noted here), such statements strongly suggest that
selves at the level of politics” (2017, 283; see also Owen 2018). the problem lies in the application of methods, approaches,
This suggests an alternative reading of realist arguments or ideals from ethics (where their appropriateness is not ques-
about, for example, the folly of abstracting from history and tioned) to questions about politics. For example, when Rossi
context. Above I discussed these ideas as they have been used and Sleat argue (2014, 696) that moralist political theorists
in service of a claim about the distinctiveness of political should “move away from political theory and towards moral
theory. But perhaps they are better understood as a critique philosophy,” they do not go on to indict moral philosophy
of certain modes of ethics in general? It is notable in this re- itself, when kept out of the political sphere. A similar obser-
gard that Geuss and Williams, the two most prominent figure- vation applies to Larmore’s claim (2018, 43) that political
heads of political realism, are also highly critical of many theory is not “a province of moral philosophy” and Jubb’s
features of modern moral philosophy. Hence, the utilitarian (2019, 365) suggestion that realists “do not think it is useful
and Kantian forms that Williams picks out in his critique to understand political philosophy as continuous with moral
of enactment and structural models of political moralism are philosophy.” Such claims call for a sharper separation between
also models of “morality” against which he sets his ethics.16 political theory and moral philosophy, rather than identifying
Following Hall and Sleat’s claim, we can usefully distin- any problem within the practice of moral philosophy.18
guish two realist pictures of the relationship between political The realist might respond here that “political theory is not
theory and ethics: applied ethics” was always intended as a criticism of applied
ethics itself, not (or not only?) as a claim about the disciplinary
D1. Contemporary political theory’s failures of real- distinctiveness of political theory. If that is the response, then
ism reflect political theorists’ tendency to proceed as I hope the article will play a useful role in pushing realists to
if their discipline were a branch or subfield of ethics. clarify their position in relation to these two alternatives. But
this move would also not be cost free for the realist. A pic-
D2. Contemporary political theory’s failures of real- ture on which there is significant asymmetry between the
ism reflect political theorists’ tendency to replicate proper endeavors of political and moral theorists has, I think,
mistakes to be found within particular traditions of underpinned some of the appeal of realism. On the D2 ac-
ethics.17 count this falls away; the objective is no longer to separate
political theory from ethics but only from bad ethics—and
These positions are typically not clearly distinguished in even ethicists should not do that.
the realist literature. For example, Geuss objects to the claim I have sought to respond to the worry that, in focusing
that “politics is applied ethics” as a “specific view about the on D1, I am addressing a straw man, or a less significant
nature and structure of ethical judgement and its relation to form of the realist view about the relationship between po-
politics” (2008, 4, emphasis added) without commenting on litical theory and ethics. While there is not scope within this
the relationship between these two critical thoughts. How then

18. In claiming that there are interpretive grounds to favor D1 as a

16. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation and for press- reading of realist claims about the distinctiveness of political theory, I do
ing me to clarify my response to the alternative realist position considered in not deny that many characteristic realist claims about the practice of po-
this section. Note that recent contributors to the realist literature have differed litical theory (e.g., that it should be contextual, historically sensitive, or sus-
on the question of what role the distinction between ethics and the morality picious of systematization) have strong parallels in particular modes of ethical
system plays in Williams’s own critique of political moralism (cf. Bavister- thought. Indeed, I highlighted these parallels in my response to the meth-
Gould 2013; Miller 2016, 160). odological version of the discontinuity critique. My interpretive claim is that
17. “One of the reasons” gives a more equivocal tone to Hall and Sleat’s realists have tended to draw attention to these features of political theory as
claim and perhaps suggests that they mean to endorse a mixed view, com- markers of the distinctiveness of political thought, rather than as unifying
bining D1 and D2. features of ethics and political theory.
1742 / Ethics and Political Theory Alice Baderin

article to evaluate D2 in its own terms, it is helpful to say and is produced by, women’s material and political disad-
something briefly about where this claim would leave the vantage (notably Moller Okin 1989). Thus, we cannot properly
realist project. Specifically, D2 points to two potential routes understand, or begin to address, gender inequality until we
forward for realism. First, realists might better integrate their see family, society, work, and politics as deeply interconnected.
metalevel claims about the appropriate practice of politi- Within feminist thought this claim is often linked to a de-
cal theory into the parallel, and well-established, debates in mand to increase the scope of political authority, or even to
ethics. This will implicate realism in complex interpretive erode the boundaries of the concept of politics itself, such
and metaethical issues (cf. Nye 2015). Take, for example, the that “politics is everywhere . . . because no realm of life is
version of D2 suggested by Hall and Sleat, which draws on immune to relations of conflict and power” (Squires 2017,
Williams’s opposition between ethics and the morality sys- 119). However, we can take up the basic feminist epistemic
tem. Central to Williams’s critique of morality is its alleged insight—that we better understand the moral problems that
reductionism, in terms of the concept of obligation. To what politics presents, and the potential solutions, if we attend to
extent are realists faithful to Williams on this point, given the commonalities and causal connections with our nonpo-
that an important strand of realism calls for the concept of litical lives—while resisting the associated conceptual move.
legitimacy to be made more central to political theory? Wil- The feminist message is also consistent with a range of views
liams ([1985] 2011, 194) also emphasizes that the morality about the degree of continuity in the substantive content of
system is “not an invention of philosophers” but a feature of the normative principles that apply within interpersonal and
the modern world. Would realists endorse a parallel claim political spheres. This question about substantive continuity
about the political sphere; that is, has the morality system de- structures several important areas of contemporary norma-
formed contemporary politics, as well as political theory? If tive inquiry. For example, debate about the legitimacy of pa-
so, where does this leave the basic realist claim that politi- rental efforts to shape their children’s values has turned, in
cal theory must show greater fidelity to the actual practice of part, on the question of the ethically salient parallels between
politics? the state-citizen and parent-child relationship. Notably, Clayton
An alternative route forward for realists is to focus on argues that these relationships are analogous to the extent
engaging in first-order normative inquiry, applying their pre- that both are nonvoluntary, involve coercion, and have pro-
ferred mode of ethical thinking within the political sphere. found effects on individual lives. Hence, he concludes that
Indeed, realists have increasingly noted the imperative to re- parental conduct, like political action, should be governed by
orient their agenda away from metalevel critique, and there the principle of liberal legitimacy, and be “guided by ideals
has been a series of recent contributions applying the realist and principles that do not rest on the validity of any particular
perspective to concrete political problems (e.g., Beetz 2018; reasonable comprehensive doctrine” (Clayton 2006, 95).19 Or,
Cozzaglio 2020). Taking the issue of epistemic injustice as an to take another example, it is contentious within just war the-
example, the next section outlines an approach to normative ory to what degree restrictions on military violence should be
theory with some features that are in sympathy with these continuous with those that apply between private individuals.
realist efforts. But I also emphasize that the payoffs of recent Is state-sponsored violence morally special, or should our ac-
work on epistemic injustice have stemmed partly from the- count of the ethics of war cohere with our broader ideas about
orists’ willingness to move back and forth across the fuzzy when it is morally permissible to attack another person?
boundaries of ethics and political theory. The point here is not to endorse the substantive conti-
nuity position on these two issues but rather to emphasize
THE CASE FOR CONTINUITY that moving back and forth across the boundaries between
Our ethical lives are not compartmentalized. Morally sig- the personal and the political in relation to these (and other)
nificant phenomena replicate themselves in different places, normative problems gives rise to illuminating lines of inquiry.
and there are important causal interactions between differ- For example, the three features Clayton picks out do indeed
ent domains. For both reasons it is often morally illuminating, appear to hold across both parent-child and state-citizen re-
and sometimes morally necessary, to study the intersections lationships. But are there also some special, and especially
between different spheres of life. Ethics and political theory valuable, features of parent-child relationships that would be
in particular are intertwined because our interpersonal rela-
tionships are shaped by political decisions, and our social in-
19. I thank Adam Swift for pointing to the relevance of Clayton’s
teractions and personal choices in turn affect how political argument. The direction of travel in Clayton’s work is from the political to
power is used. This observation has a powerful form in fem- the familial. Below I suggest it will often be more fruitful to work in the
inist work that reveals how the nuclear family produces, other direction, starting from nonpolitical ethics.
 Volume 83 Number 4 October 2021 / 1743

compromised by a commitment to liberal neutrality within sense of, and to communicate, their experiences. Thus, work
the family (Brighouse and Swift 2014, 170)? To cut off these on epistemic injustice offers an appealing model of applied
debates, or to seek to settle them via some general view about ethics. It identifies a core moral problem—the wrong of
the disciplinary boundaries between ethics and political the- systematic exclusion from the community of knowers—that
ory, would be a mistake. First, there is no reason to think that makes sense of our ethical experience across a wide range of
our stance on these issues should move together; we might contexts. Crucially though, recognizing the unified form of
consistently reject the state-citizen/parent-child analogy while the basic problem does not preclude us from thinking about
taking a substantive continuity position in relation to the particular instances of epistemic injustice in contextually sen-
ethics of war or vice versa. Second, we risk impoverishing the sitive ways. Indeed, the idea of epistemic injustice is increasing
resources of both ethics and political theory. Recognizing being (re)interpreted and applied across a number of spheres,
where there are morally relevant continuities between political including health care and education (see Kidd, Medina, and
and nonpolitical life gives us a broader range of insights to Pohlhaus 2019).
draw on in normative inquiry. Moreover, studying the specific In addition to this growing body of research within eth-
discontinuities will sometimes also be illuminating. Below I fill ics, there has been an important political turn in studies of
out this broad outline of the case for continuity through a epistemic injustice. In Fricker’s own work, this has taken the
discussion of the recent political turn in work on epistemic form of an exploration of the relationship between epistemic
injustice. injustice and nondomination, as an ideal of political freedom
(Fricker 2013). More generally, the problem of epistemic in-
Epistemic Injustice justice is increasingly being considered in relation to demo-
Epistemic injustice concerns the wrongs done to individ- cratic decision-making, deliberation, and legitimacy. For exam-
uals specifically in their capacity as knowers (Fricker 2007, ple, Fricker’s framework has recently been applied to the issue
1). In her influential account, Fricker traces two main forms.20 of state intervention in the running of financially distressed US
Testimonial injustice arises when a speaker receives less cred- municipalities. Since 2011 in the state of Michigan, this inter-
ibility than deserved because of identity prejudice on the part of vention has taken the form of the appointment of emergency
the hearer. Consider, for example, a black witness to crime managers, with extensive powers to assume the responsibili-
whose testimony is not taken seriously by police because of ties of local elected officials. Doan employs the concept of tes-
racial prejudice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when members timonial injustice in order to draw out the ethical-epistemic
of marginalized groups lack the conceptual resources required component of these governance practices. Specifically, he ar-
to make sense of, or to communicate, some significant aspect of gues that emergency management “legitimizes the use of ‘fis-
their experience, because of their exclusion from processes of cal responsibility’ as a proxy for the credibility of entire pop-
collective meaning making. A central case here is the situation ulations” (Doan 2017, 183). Thus, emergency management
of women struggling to interpret their subjection to sexual is grounded in an unfair denial of credibility to the residents
harassment, before its being recognized as such. of particular municipalities, on the basis of the financially dis-
The power of Fricker’s work comes in part from the way tressed state of their city, and it involves an ongoing com-
in which she traces, and gives a name to, a problem that we mitment to disregarding their testimony on matters of public
may have glimpsed in a variety of more inchoate ways. policy concern. By viewing emergency management laws anew
Epistemic injustice, Fricker notes, often goes unacknowl- through the lens of epistemic injustice, Doan suggests, we see
edged, in part because it commonly operates below the level an intrinsic injustice that has been overlooked within the ex-
of conscious belief, through prejudicial images embodied in isting critical literature.
the social imagination (2007, 15). But, when we are shown Political theorists are also increasingly exploring the spe-
it, we do instinctively recognize this picture of the prob- cifically political implications of hermeneutical injustice. We
lematic patterns in our epistemic relations: problems about have seen that hermeneutical injustice concerns the gaps in
whom we tend to believe and whom we do not and who our interpretive resources that arise when members of some
does and does not have access to the tools needed to make groups are marginalized in processes of collective meaning-
making. Fricker shows how these “hermeneutical lacuna” (2007,
188) can undermine an individual’s ability to make sense of
20. There are important prior traditions of work (notably in black her own experiences and thereby damage her life in signifi-
feminist thought) that address related problems without the terminology
of epistemic injustice (see McKinnon 2016, 438–39). I focus here on
cant ways. But there are also significant negative implications
Fricker’s highly influential account, in order to illustrate, more concretely, for our political agency, which remain unexplored in Fricker’s
the payoffs of a continuity approach. original work (Morgan-Olsen 2010, 217–18). Specifically, gaps
1744 / Ethics and Political Theory Alice Baderin

in a society’s conceptual framework can impair members of we pool our ideas, “the interpersonal pushes and pulls in
marginalized groups in their ability to express, or secure up- daily life encode the larger social structures one hopes to
take for, political claims. Thus, the hermeneutical injustice lens understand. . . . The micro is generally a good place to start,
points toward conceptual exclusion as an important aspect of for one does not really understand the structural or know
political exclusion.21 It also suggests a potential expansion of how to combat it unless one also understands a good deal
our duties of democratic citizenship, to include an active ob- about how it is played out at the micro level” (Fricker 2019,
ligation to assist in the translation of the political claims of the 57). Thus, the development we see in recent work on epi-
marginalized (238–42). stemic injustice—in which the phenomenon was initially
Recent work on epistemic injustice has directed ethical identified and explored primarily in interpersonal contexts
attention toward our practices of giving and pooling knowl- and subsequently addressed in its political form—is contin-
edge; practices that are also central to many aspects of dem- gent but not wholly accidental.22 It is reflective of the broader
ocratic political life. I have briefly illustrated how political methodological point that we often come to better under-
theorists are taking up this parallel in a productive way, de- stand normative problems that arise in the political sphere by
ploying Fricker’s ethics-oriented concept of epistemic injus- engaging first with related phenomena in our interpersonal
tice to generate normative insights into democratic politics. lives.
However, explorations of its political manifestations have not This, more tentative, commitment to the epistemic priority
left the concept of epistemic injustice entirely untouched. of interpersonal ethics follows from an idea that is in sym-
This work has also pointed to some shifting of emphasis rel- pathy with realism, about the value of grounding normative
ative to Fricker’s original account, which stresses identity theory in close engagement with everyday lived experience.
prejudice as the source of testimonial injustice, and the culti- On this view, political theory can benefit from an “ethno-
vation of individual epistemic virtue as a crucial part of the graphic sensibility,” according to which we start the process of
solution. Political theoretical work on testimonial injustice has normative theorizing “with the situated experience of ordi-
served to highlight its sometime-structural character: that nary agents” (Herzog and Zacka 2019, 764). If we take this
unfair denials of credibility can result directly from institu- idea of an ethnographic sensibility seriously, our attention will
tional structures, as well as residing in prejudice on the part of often turn toward interpersonal, family, social, and workplace
individual hearers (Anderson 2012). Thus Doan, for example, contexts—arenas that are typically experienced more directly,
argues that emergency management laws involve a distinc- richly, and vividly than is political life. For instance, the
tive form of epistemic injustice, which he terms “epistemic phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice is given powerful
redlining”: “an act of spatial demarcation” (2017, 183) that shape in Fricker’s work through the story of Carmita Wood
deflates the credibility of entire residential populations. Ep- and her experiences of sexual harassment at work in the 1960s
istemic redlining, he emphasizes, is neither directly traceable (Fricker 2007, 149–62). Realists have tended to connect their
to individual prejudice nor amenable to correction through opposition to starting political theory with insights derived
the cultivation of virtue on the part of individual hearers. from nonpolitical contexts with a concern about excessive
What we see exemplified in the recent literature on epistemic abstraction or idealization. For example, Hall (2013, 180, em-
injustice then is not simply the political application of a static phasis added) urges that “if we want our reflections on poli-
concept derived from individual and social ethics. It is a fluid tics to be at all convincing it is imperative that we begin from
moving back and forth across the boundaries between po- within the political domain and not with some idealised position
litical and nonpolitical ethics, with potential payoffs on both
sides.
The primary aim of the article is to defend a continuity 22. The defenders of a “politics first” approach to political theory might
approach to ethics and political theory. But the epistemic reply here that the conceptual and normative resources generated by work on
injustice example also points to a selective case for the epi- epistemic injustice in interpersonal contexts are not necessary precursors for
thinking about related ethical-epistemic features of politics. And they might
stemic priority of nonpolitical ethics. If we are interested in
rightly point to insights into political forms of interpretive injustice, before
the operation of power relations in the processes by which Fricker’s formulation of the concept of epistemic injustice (see, e.g., the
discussion of Stokely Carmichael in Atkins [2019]). My claim here is not that
it is impossible to recognize these normatively salient aspects of politics
21. Morgan-Olsen illustrates the problem of conceptual exclusion in without the ethics-derived concept of epistemic injustice in hand. However, I
relation to two main political cases: the concept of pregnancy at work in have sought to illustrate how theorists have generated useful perspectives on
Supreme Court rulings on pregnancy discrimination in the 1970s and democratic politics by starting from work on epistemic injustice in inter-
disputes over the meaning of land between Belyuen Aborigines and the personal contexts. There seems little reason to disregard these resources and
Australian Northern Territory government. insist that we must begin again from within politics.
 Volume 83 Number 4 October 2021 / 1745

external to it.” But, as the epistemic injustice example illus- concede much of the substance of what I want to argue here.
trates, we can hold apart these features of the practice of po- To the extent that we are driven to identify epistemic in-
litical theory. Starting from without politics, “in the thick of justice as always essentially political in character, this reflects
everyday life” (Herzog and Zacka 2019, 780) often offers us the interconnectedness of moral problems that arise within
easier epistemic access to morally important phenomena that our interpersonal, familial, professional, and political rela-
also have application in the political sphere. To this extent, “the tionships and the value of studying these spheres of life in a
ethical is primary” (Fricker 2007, 177).23 continuous way.
Discontinuity realists “do not think it is useful to under-
stand political philosophy as continuous with moral philoso- CONCLUSION
phy” (Jubb 2019, 365). The first part of this article emphasized Some of the appeal of the recent realist turn in political
the challenges that realists face in filling out their characteristic theory has stemmed from its promise of a mode of norma-
claims about the distinctiveness of political theory vis-à-vis tive theory that is more distinct from ethics and, thus, more
ethics. In this section I have sought to put further pressure on responsive to the special character of politics. This article has
the discontinuity view, by outlining an appealing exemplar of sought to show both the difficulty of making good on that
a continuity model. Epistemic injustice is a particularly help- promise of greater disciplinary autonomy and the costs of
ful example for my purposes, because there is much here for seeking to do so. The effect of such a separation of political
the realist to applaud. As well as engaging in-depth with details theory from ethics would be to distance political thought from
of our lived experience, work on epistemic injustice exem- valuable evidence about our everyday lived experiences and
plifies the realist-friendly principle of “methodological nega- to block fruitful lines of inquiry into the varying continuities
tivism”: of starting with dysfunction rather than with explo- and discontinuities across different spheres of life. Instead, I
ration of an ideal. However, I have emphasized that some of have argued that we should take up the realist call for more
what is powerful in recent studies of epistemic injustice stems empirically engaged and contextually sensitive forms of po-
from the way in which theorists have moved across the fuzzy litical theory, while setting aside its second-order claims about
boundaries of ethics and political theory—tracing a key fea- the distinctiveness of moral and political thought.
ture of the moral quality of our relationships through differ-
ent spheres of life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There is a potential response to my argument that might
I am grateful to the editor and three anonymous reviewers
tempt the realist here. Work on epistemic injustice highlights
of this journal for comments that significantly improved the
the role of power in our lives as knowers; it reveals the morally
article. Earlier versions were presented at the conference Doing
problematic ways in which power relations shape who we
Realist Political Theory at the University of Münster and at
tend to believe and who can make themselves understood.
the University College London Legal and Political Theory
The realist might argue that insofar as epistemic injustice is
Seminar. Thanks to participants on those occasions for very
about power, it is always a political phenomenon and there-
helpful discussion. For written comments, I am especially grate-
fore does not support my case for the continuity of ethics and
ful to Rob Jubb and Patrick Tomlin.
political theory. However, this reply involves a shift from the
notion of politics as a distinct sphere of life, with which we
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