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Michael Williams: Problems of Knowledge

Article · January 2002

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izmeðu naizgled razlièitih teorija ili ob- su npr. supstancija, Bog itd., mi imamo
jašnjenja, ona su zapravo istovrijedna i, »ontološku obavezu« prihvatiti ih jer su
u biti, prazna, te se zastupnici takvih, na- onda ti entiteti dijelovi naših najboljih
izgled razlièitih mišljenja, u takvom slu- objašnjenja koja za nas imaju instru-
èaju uzaludno spore. mentalnu vrijednost. Na tim temeljima
Kako se naše sveukupno iskustvo sastoji James i raspravlja o nekoliko znaèajnih
od mnoštva razlièitih dijelova i velikog pitanja filozofije – postojanje Boga, slo-
mnoštva pojedinaènih dogaðaja i do®iv- boda volje, jedinstvo i mnoštvo itd.
ljaja, da bismo to iskoristili na najuèin- Filozofija Williama Jamesa, kao uosta-
kovitiji naèin, moramo nekako obraditi i lom i pragmatizam u cjelini, nije samo
meðusobno povezati razlièite i pojedi- povijesno znaèajna filozofija, veæ je ona
naène dijelove tog cjelokupnog iskustva. izvršila i znatan utjecaj na suvremenu fi-
Zbog toga uvodimo pojmove i ideje koje lozofiju; izravan utjecaj oèigledan je kod
slu®e tome da dobro povezuju dijelove jednog od najznaèajnijih predstavnika
iskustva u koherentnu cjelinu. Prema Ja- anti-realizma u filozofiji znanosti, van
mesu, koji se ovdje oslanja na Deweya i Fraassena, dok Quine, Rorty i Putnam,
F. C. S. Schillera, ideje, a mi bi smo danas da spomenem samo neke najznaèajnije
rekli sudovi ili teorije, upravo postaju is- suvremene filozofe, grade dijelove svo-
tinite kada uspostavimo odgovarajuæe od- jih filozofskih teorija na temeljima i vrli-
nose. Tako je ovdje razraðena instrumen- nama pragmatizma.
talistièka teorija istine. Takoðer, korisno Što se tièe prijevoda, on je napravljen
nam je uvidjeti i da li unutar mnoštva znalaèki tako da se tekst i na hrvatskom
pojedinaènih dogaðaja i do®ivljaja u is- èita teèno, a argumenti ništa ne gube na
kustvu ima nekih zajednièkih karakteris- jasnoæi.
tika, te onda iz njih apstrahiramo i dola-
®elio bih takoðer istaknuti i izuzetno
zimo do nekih opæenitijih principa koji
koristan predgovor prevoditelja iz kojeg
nam mogu na zadovoljavajuæi naèin ob-
se mo®e saznati još nešto više o Jamesu,
jasniti to mnoštvo pojedinaènih stvari i
pragmatizmu i njihovom utjecaju danas,
dogaðaja. Za razliku od krutog empi-
a prilo®en je i popis glavnih Jamesovih
rizma ili krutog pozitivizma, pragmatisti,
djela te dvije adrese web stranica s dalj-
a pogotovo James, otvoreni su za razma-
njim tekstovima i informacijama za one
tranje svih filozofskih problema, pa tako
koji æe se više zainteresirati ovom knji-
i metafizièkih i teoloških, jer ukoliko pro-
gom.
naðemo zadovoljavajuæa objašnjenja, s
potporom u iskustvenom dijelu, ali koja Davor Peænjak
ukljuèuju i neopa®ljive entitete kao što Filozofski fakultet u Zadru – Sveuèilište u
Splitu, Obala kralja Petra Krešimira IV, 3,
HR-23000 Zadar

Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to

Michael Williams’ introduction to epis- mology, is a good book in more than one
temology, entitled Problems of Know- sense of the word. Firstly, it is written
edge. A Critical Introduction to Episte- with clarity and simplicity on rather con-
 Prikazi knjiga / Book Reviews 79

fusing problems. Secondly, in only 250 lytic problem (What is knowledge?); (2)
pages it covers almost all relevant topics the problem of demarcation, which is
of contemporary epistemology. Finally, divided into two sub-problems: (2.1) ex-
it gives a critical introduction to debate ternal problem (if some definition of
on naturalized epistemology and norma- knowledge is given, can we determine,
tivity in knowledge. As the author him- in principle, what things we can know?);
self says, the title of the book is an allu- (2.2) internal problem (are in the prov-
sion to Ayer’s The Problem of Knowl- ince of knowledge some significant
edge (1956). What Ayer wrote in the boundaries [such as a priori and a poste-
preface of this book – »In this book I riori knowledge?]); (3) the problem of
begin by taking the question of what is method (how the knowledge is to be ob-
meant by knowledge as an example of a tained?). This problem is divided into
philosophical inquiry« – may very well two sub-problems: (3.1) the problems of
stand for Williams’ book as well. Wil- unity or the question is there just one
liams believes, namely, that Ayer’s book way of acquiring the knowledge, or are
is the model of philosophical writing, so there several ways?; (3.2) the ameliora-
he follows this model, especially in his tive problem (or the question can we
attempt to appeal to wide a range of improve our ways of seeking the know-
readers (not only to young undergradu- ledge?); (4) the problem of scepticism,
ates but to non-specialists as well). or the question is it possible to obtain
This introduction however is opiniona- knowledge at all? (this problem is clo-
ted in the first place by Williams’ own sely linked with the problem of justifica-
epistemological position from his ear- tion); (5) The problem of value or the
lier works. By this, I have in mind his question why is knowledge worth hav-
Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possi- ing, or are there beside knowledge some
bility of Epistemology (1977) with expli- other goals of inquiry? (p. 1–2). How-
cit Sellarsian impact, and an Unnatural ever, some sections of introduction are
Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the very interesting – like the one on the
Basis of Scepticism (1991) with explicit knowledge as contemplation and as po-
contextualist theory of justification. The wer and the one on the descriptive and
book is divided into 20 chapters with in- normative dimensions of knowledge –
troduction and conclusion. In the intro- and they are crucial for his goal in the
duction he raises fundamental, let us book (p. 7–12).
say metaepistemological, questions or Twenty chapters of the book are: the
question concerning the very nature of standard analysis, knowledge without evi-
epistemological inquiry itself. »[W]hat dence, two ideals, unstable knowledge,
is implied by saying that epistemology is Agrippa’s trilemma, experience and re-
a branch of philosophy? What is special ality, foundations, the problem of basis,
about philosophical investigations of reduction and inference, coherence, the
knowledge?« […] »Many philosophers myth of the system, realism and truth,
today deny that philosophical questions evidence and entitlement, knowledge in
about knowledge have any special char- context, seeing and knowing, scepticism
acter. They argue that epistemology and epistemic priority, induction, pro-
needs to be ’naturalized’: that is, made jection and conjecture, relativism and
continuous with one or more of the objectivity and progress.
sciences, cognitive psychology perhaps.
Other philosophers assert that episte- The crucial point of the book is the idea
mology is dead« (p. 1). of »Prior Grounding Requirement«
(PGR), which places justification
After introducing the problem, Williams mainly in the sphere of personal rela-
makes a distinction between five central tion and responsibility. PGR stands on
epistemological problems. (1) The ana- simple distinction between: (1) persons
80 Prolegomena 1 (1/2002)

believing that p and (2) p that person be- temology is rather strange for Williams,
lieves. Williams follows James (and so- because of his »elastic account of episte-
me contemporary epistemologists) in mology« (p. 243) or, should we say,
making this distinction and it is really a non-reductive account. In addition, Wil-
distinction between the idea of »grounds« liams shows that this model was not fol-
and the idea of »responsibility«. James lowed by main figures of epistemologi-
used the distinction in his famous essay cal tradition, such as Plato or Locke (p.
»The Will to Believe« where he defen- 243–244).
ded a pragmatic (truth-independent) ar-
In answering the five fundamental ques-
gument in favour of a religious belief.
tions Williams is constrained. He is
Williams shows several reasons why we sceptical about finding explicit necessary
have to answer epistemological questions. and sufficient conditions of knowledge,
Firstly, because there is no short way of but he defends standard analysis. This
refuting the sceptic’s challenge. Secondly, puts him in opposition to contemporary
because epistemology cannot be »com- epistemologists since they are purely:
pletely« naturalized. Thirdly, because it reliabilist, externalist and non-justifica-
is impossible to completely eliminate tional. It is not just about »clash of intui-
normative dimensions of knowledge (es- tions« because: »[t]he possession of pro-
pecially in H. Putnam). positional knowledge, while often im-
After this, in the conclusion, five funda- portantly dependent on tacit know-how,
mental epistemological questions are is thus essentially involved with practices
answered. First, he answers to the ques- of justifying what one says« (p. 245).
tion of the end of epistemology (which Williams here accepts certain kind of
Williams himself, but also Rorty raised). contextualist theory of justification and
Williams makes a crucial distinction, explicitly defends normativity. About
namely between the idea of reformation the question of demarcation Williams is
of epistemology (Quine), and avoidance a kind of a coherentist but without end-
of epistemology (Rorty). In Williams’ ing with radical holism. Important fact is
terminology, Quine is a naturalist, and that »moral judgements (or normative
Rorty is an obituarist »announcing the elements in epistemology in general) are
death of epistemology« (p. 241). not beyond criticism simply in virtue of
Williams gives an explanation why his being normative« (p. 247).
own pragmatism is not the same as that On the question of method Williams
of Quine or Rorty, because pragmatism endorses combination of contextualism
leads them to the elimination of episte- and fallibilism and fallibilistic conception
mology. On the other hand, he tries to of rationality (e.g., Popper’s critical ra-
show that it isn’t necessarily so (e.g. lead- tionalism). On the question of scepti-
ing him to be naturalist or obituarist). cism, he distinguishes between strong
Here is the story. Quine and Rorty are (Descartes) and broad methodological
assuming that (traditional) epistemolo- scepticism or we can call it »diagnostic
gy must satisfy three requirements: (1) scepticism« (which has its roots in Witt-
unity (theory must be single one), (2) genstein’s position from Philosophical
autonomy of epistemology (autonomy Investigations and On Certainty). On the
from metaphysics and sciences), (3) a question of value Williams takes in-
priori status of epistemology (p. 242). strumentalist position of truth (James:
The gap between these requirements »true beliefs are beliefs that work«). In a
and foundations of knowledge is filled way, knowledge is always embedded in
with methodological scepticism. That is socially transmitted practices of inquiry
why a traditional epistemologist is led to (and apart from Baconian view of knowl-
choose between scepticism and founda- edge as power), so Williams defends a
tionalism. However, this picture of epis- position that knowledge is always a
 Prikazi knjiga / Book Reviews 81

»practical« affair (p. 250). Against Qui- fallibilist conception of rationality, that
ne and Rorty, Williams thinks that is friendly to the socially distributed and
knowledge and, consequently, epistemo- historically situated character of knowl-
logy is and should be normatively sig- edge, and that offers a principled es-
nificant. In that light, we should accept cape from traditional sceptical conun-
his arguments for general thesis (p. drums. This is why we should adopt it.«
254): »Contextualism gives us a picture
of knowledge and justification that stays Kristijan Krkaè
close to the phenomenology of everyday Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of
Jesus, Jordanovac 110, HR-10000 Zagreb
epistemic practices, that articulates a [email protected]

Hilary Rose and Steven Rose (eds.), Alas, Poor Darwin. Arguments
Againts Evolutionary Psychology, Vintage, London 2001, 292 pp.

Zbornik radova Alas, Poor Darwin. Ar- Kao »glavne igraèe« tog pristupa ured-
guments Against Evolutionary Psychology, nici navode Ledu Cosmides, Johna
prema rijeèima njegovih urednika, femi- Toobyja, Margo Wilson, Martina Da-
nistièke sociologinje Hilary Rose i neu- lyja, Stevena Pinkera, Randy Thornhill,
roznanstvenika Stevena Rosea, idejno Craiga Palmera, njihove popularizatore,
je zaèet poèetkom 1998. kao sintetièko znanstvene novinare Roberta Wrighta,
djelo »mnogih glasova« iz razlièitih Matta Ridleya i Helenu Cronin, te svi-
znanstvenih disciplina i intelektualnih ma njima zajednièke prethodnike i »in-
podruèja okupljenih u zajednièkoj kri- telektualne heroje« E. O. Wilsona, Ri-
tici evolucijske psihologije (EP). Djelo charda Dawkinsa, Roberta Triversa i
je prvi put objavljeno u Velikoj Britaniji Davida Bussa. Nakon što su jasno ozna-
2000., a sadr®i petnaest izvornih znan- èili znanstvenike koji su predmet kritike
stvenih radova u kojima se iz razlièitih radova u zborniku, Roseovi u tri toèke
misaonih kutova kritizira »loša teorija« definiraju svoje opæe vrijednosno staja-
EP. Prema urednicima, EP je dosad naj- lište iz kojega se kritika izvodi. Prvo,
utjecajnija znanstvena disciplina koja tvrdnje EP u poljima biologije, psiholo-
se napaja na najprodornijem od suvre-
gije, antropologije, sociologije, kultur-
menih »intelektualnih mitova« izraslom
nih studija i filozofije ne samo da su
iz darvinistièke evolucijske teorije. Ro-
»pogrešne, veæ su i kulturalno pogub-
seovi definiraju EP kao najveæim dije-
ne«. Drugo, EP posjeduje negativnu po-
lom anglo-amerièki fenomen, kao disci-
litièku dimenziju. I, treæe, stavovi EP za-
plinu koja »tvrdi da mo®e objasniti sve
aspekte ljudskog ponašanja«, kulture i dobivaju snagu u posebnom suvreme-
društva na temelju univerzalnih osobina nom društvenom i povijesnom konteks-
uma koje su se evolucijski oblikovale za tu èija su posljednja desetljeæa obilje®ila
djetinjstva naše vrste prije, otprilike, veliki društveni, ekonomski i kulturni
100–600 tisuæa godina. Spomenute uni- preokreti, pad komunizma, završetak
verzalne osobine uma zastupnici EP ob- Hladnog rata, krvavi nacionalistièki i re-
jašnjavaju i prepoznaju kao biološke gionalni sukobi, slabljenje dr®ave blago-
adaptacije, kao ponašanja koja su »od- stanja i poveæani strahovi zbog ekološ-
abrana« tijekom evolucije èovjeka. kih katastrofa. Paralelno su se zbila ve-

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