‭Week 5 Lecture‬

‭Early Modern Humanism and Social Contract Theory‬

‭●‬ ‭In the early modern context there is the beginning of thinking about social and political‬
‭arrangements, independently of a kind of a metaphysical backdrop (God and the underlying order‬
‭of the natural world)‬
‭●‬ ‭That is, in contrast to being found in either the natural order (Christian thought and Virtue Ethics of‬
‭Plato and Aristotle) or in individual sensations (Locke and Hume), it is found in relations between‬
‭individuals and the state‬
‭Hobbes‬
‭-‬ ‭saying that society is the only thing that can make human beings get along with each other and we‬
‭are naturally kind of wanting to compete, and society has to be there to kind of make us behave‬
‭ourselves.‬
‭-‬ ‭the ruling order of society has to be a bigger threat than the person one is competing with - only‬
‭way one can avoid violence, competition, going wrong etc.‬
‭Rousseau‬
‭-‬ ‭says that society is actually where we start going wrong and that any society has to guarantee‬
‭greater freedom than we would otherwise have, whereas Hobbs is going to say there is no‬
‭possibility of freedom except for in society.‬
‭-‬ ‭talks about natural freedom as being the ultimate human good and if we look within to our inner‬
‭nature, that is where we will find the highest good for our lives → shows how he will be the father‬
‭of romanticism and liberalism‬
‭-‬ ‭society is there to not necessarily to crush us as individuals, but we have to find ways to live in‬
‭society in such a way that our you know authentic nature can be expressed‬

‭‬
● ‭ re society and politics there to encourage our inherent virtue? - Rousseau’s idea‬
A
‭●‬ ‭Or are they there to correct our inherent wickedness (self-interest)? - Thomas Hobbes’ idea‬
‭●‬ ‭Hobbes is the founder of the ideas of Social Contract‬
‭●‬ ‭Rousseau takes it up in a different way. The social contract is the idea that human beings give up‬
‭their natural rights, their natural freedoms to society as a whole in order to get some greater‬
‭freedom.‬
‭○‬ ‭e.g. we have the physical capability to jump over the fence and break into our neighbour's‬
‭house and get food out of their fridge if we wanted to. But we don’t do that because we‬
‭know that if we did that the neighbour would perhaps call the police and there would be a‬
‭bigger force looming over us. Or we would then curtail our own freedom, because we'd‬
‭then be worried about whether our neighbour will break in and take things from our fridge.‬
↳
‭ being part of society is giving up some of our individual freedoms for some‬
‭greater freedom e.g. greater security‬

‭Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)‬

‭●‬ ‭Considered the father of political philosophy: setting down a model for the modern representative‬
‭state where we live in societies too big for all of us to be in a direct democracy model.‬
‭●‬ ‭Writing from his negative experiences as a monarchist during the English Civil War and tutor to‬
‭Charles II while in exile in France (after Charles I had been executed)‬
 ‭○‬ H ‭ obbes is very much affected by this idea that the moment power or the monarch takes the‬
‭foot off the oppression, the people rise up leading to chaos.‬
‭●‬ ‭Human beings inherently self-interested, and only way one can get them to pay is by agreeing to‬
‭terms that are ultimately in their greater self-interest and than their immediate self-interest‬
‭○‬ ‭You can't break people out of self-interest from this model, you can only channel it.‬
‭●‬ ‭talks about human beings as exhibiting a kind of a basic quality of ability to pursue their goals and‬
‭goes on to say that even when we are physically not as strong as someone else, we inevitably go‬
‭join up with other people to equalise our strength → how we compete for resources.‬
‭●‬ ‭each of us has a natural right - we just want as much as we can - we then all have a natural good‬
‭which is basic self preservation.‬
‭●‬ ‭there's a tension between I want whatever I can get, but I want to stay alive → but my wanting‬
‭everything I can get is what's endangering my staying alive because I'm constantly afraid of what‬
‭external threat of somebody doing it to me.‬
↳
‭ this tension gives rise to societies and how society is based on an overwhelming sharp strength‬
‭that people have to submit to for their own safety.‬
‭●‬ ‭Says once human beings are reduced to a state where the governments are gone, they start brutal‬
‭competition with each other.‬
‭●‬ ‭The resolution to this tension is that people join in league with others, they behave themselves and‬
‭hand over some of their rights for the sake of entering into society because they're forced to by‬
‭necessity or by actual force or power on the part of the State.‬
↳
‭ The State as Leviathan embodied in the Sovereign‬
‭●‬ ‭The only way that one does not fight each other is if both are equally over-awed by the threat of a‬
‭greater power, hence the imposition of the State (the ‘Leviathan’ the ‘monster’) to mediate as a‬
‭common power embodied in the Sovereign (the king)‬
‭○‬ ‭“men have no pleasure but on the contrary a great deal of grief in keeping company where‬
‭there is no power able to overawe them all”‬
‭●‬ ‭People who have some power will not willingly give it up for the sake of all, but rather they must be‬
‭forced to by being awed by the overwhelming power of the state‬
‭●‬ ‭The only way to have peace and do without violence is for the state to have an overwhelming‬
‭monopoly on violence or the threat of violence e.g. the police, the army etc and only once this is‬
‭assured, we can think of reason, rationality etc‬

‭Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1761)‬

‭●‬ ‭Rousseau as the father of Romanticism and of Modern Liberalism‬
‭○‬ ‭takes up the idea that human beings in a natural state are good and we have this natural‬
‭condition of freedom and society is only justified to the extent that we end up having more‬
‭freedom within it than we lose by entering into it.‬
‭●‬ ‭The central problem is not our natural state as for Hobbes but rather society:‬
‭○‬ ‭“Man was born free‬‭(natural state)‬‭, and he is everywhere‬‭in chains‬‭(society)‬‭. Those who‬
‭think themselves the masters of others are indeed greater slaves than they.”‬
‭■‬ ‭human beings that have enslaved people are slaves to a completely wrong idea that‬
‭human beings can ultimately be the master of each other as Rousseau thinks we‬
‭are all only our own master‬
‭○‬ ‭Assumes the ‘being’ of a human as they are born (= free) is different to the ‘being’ of a‬
‭human as we see around in society (= in chains)‬
‭○‬ ‭The highest moral obligation is to our innate freedom: authenticity - expressing who you‬
‭are‬
 ‭○‬ ‭mastery over another (in society) is ultimately illusory as it‬
‭-‬ ‭only obtains so long as force obtains‬
‭-‬ ‭this force cannot obtain forever and to believe it can obtain forever is a enslaving‬
‭delusion in itself,‬
‭-‬ ‭Thus: (internal) freedom is always there ready to ‘push back’ against (external)‬
‭restriction by force which is not always there;‬
‭■‬ ‭force is contingent/extrinsic, while freedom is essential/intrinsic →force and might‬
‭cannot serve as a basis for a social order‬
‭■‬ ‭the natural (permanent) condition is freedom;‬‭“men‬‭are not naturally enemies”‬
↳
‭ shapes a lot of political thinking of whether you think that human beings are good,‬
‭therefore it's about rewarding virtue and encouraging virtue, or whether you believe human‬
‭beings are bad, in which case it's about correcting vice and punishment.‬
‭●‬ ‭Has the idea that the state is actually there for the individual rather than the individual being there‬
‭for the State.‬
‭●‬ ‭The state, in order to be justifiable, has to mediate a conflict between what is right (for the‬
‭collective/all) and individual interests (what the individual wants)‬
‭●‬ ‭Holds the belief everyone should maximise individual freedoms to the maximum extent that we can‬
‭without those individual freedoms impinging on anybody else's freedoms - very minimal idea of‬
‭what State is needed for.‬
‭○‬ ‭good & bad and an action or an activity is not inherently good or bad, but it becomes bad if‬
‭it undermines somebody else's freedom.‬
‭●‬ ‭Through the Social contract:‬
‭○‬ ‭voluntarily entered into by both the individual as ‘associate’ and the social body as‬
‭‘association’ (vs Hobbes where we have to be forced)‬
‭○‬ ‭The state = (i) what is right for the individual/individual rights + (ii) collective wants / the‬
‭common good → the combination of what's right for the individual and the common good.‬
‭○‬ ‭The State is legitimate to the extent that there is a perfect overlap between these two‬
‭(individual rights and collective wants)‬
‭●‬ ‭The state is the collective will of the people (individuals freedoms put together) when we ‘choose‬
‭to’ enter into the state, we do so because we understand that we are ‘choosing ourselves’ and our‬
‭own personal liberty‬

‭Rousseau on Natural Liberty and Civil Liberty‬

‭●‬ ‭Before we enter into the social contract, we have natural liberty which is limited. The only natural‬
‭liberty we have is our freedom from you know other people attacking us and our freedom is for the‬
‭sake of self preservation.‬
‭○‬ ‭Once we agree to the contract we gain civil liberty:‬
‭■‬ ‭“What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right‬
‭to anything that tempts him and that he can take; what he gains by the social‬
‭contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property in what he possesses”‬
‭●‬ ‭possession and property especially is the main thing that lures us into‬
‭society on this model‬
‭■‬ ‭in nature, the human is free but under the social contract, the human can be free‬
‭and equal (in contrast to Hobbes, who saw equality as natural and as the problem‬
‭■‬ ‭So the idea is that we are obliged to be part of society and obey society's laws to‬
‭the extent that we have a net gain in freedom. Although we lose some freedoms by‬
 e‭ ntering into society, we gain more freedoms and to the extent that that's the case,‬
‭society itself is legitimate.‬
‭ ‬ ‭Rousseau, “the fundamental problem to which the social contract holds the solution” is:‬
●
‭○‬ ‭“How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member‬
‭with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with‬
‭all the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before”‬
‭○‬ ‭The Social Contract is legitimate and just to the extent that it does not result in a net loss of‬
‭freedom for the individual‬
‭○‬ ‭Rousseau is talking about a natural freedom that we have, that we have to be true to and in‬
‭that process of being through is what we call authenticity.‬

‭Kant‬
‭●‬ T‭ akes up the idea that we actually cannot know the world directly. Rather, we can only know the‬
‭world as it appears to us; the world is inaccessible to human understanding.‬
‭●‬ ‭Philosophy becomes not about knowing the world directly, but instead about understanding how‬
‭and why the world appears to us in the way that it does → brings a focus to how we know the‬
‭world rather than the nature of the world.‬
‭●‬ ‭Sees the danger if we take the good and ethics is not being something objective in the world. Does‬
‭that just mean that we all can do whatever we like?‬

‭Move from the Good to the Right: Kant and the Enlightenment‬
‭●‬ ‭Reason alone as a universally valid measure of knowledge and certainty‬
‭○‬ ‭the idea that reason is the ultimate yardstick for understanding the world and that if it is‬
‭verifiable by reason, that's the only measure by which we can say something is - shift to‬
‭epistemology and knowing.‬
‭●‬ ‭The Right (Morality) becomes emphasised because it can be determined by reason, independently‬
‭of time and place‬
‭●‬ ‭By contrast: Ethics (the good) is determined by habit over an extended period of time as when as‬
‭being tied to cultural context (hence a cultural ethic) and hierarchy (some individuals being more‬
‭virtuous than others) → not as reconcilable with democratic ideals‬
‭○‬ ‭just because it is something that we've done for a long time as a society that doesn't‬
‭necessarily guarantee that it's right - reason is, comes up to be the yardstick by which this is‬
‭measured‬
‭○‬ ‭in a modern context a person becomes good through doing the right thing potentially‬
‭whereas in a virtue ethics model, something can become the right thing to do because a‬
‭good person does it‬
‭●‬ ‭Reason extends beyond just our time, place and culture, and is universal in scope‬
‭○‬ ‭ideas from the past can be potentially overturned. You know the just because something‬
‭was the case in the past is not necessarily the reason it has to be now - the past may be an‬
‭obstacle for understanding the present‬
‭●‬ ‭Kant’s ethics are knowns as deontology → deontological ethics (dion means duty) → emphasises‬
‭the right before the good:‬
‭●‬ ‭Right =‬‭“the sum of the conditions under which the‬‭choice of one can be united with the choice of‬
‭another in accordance with a universal law of freedom”‬
‭●‬ ‭He is against any ethics based on self-interested calculation (e.g. social contract, utilitarian ethics)‬
‭Kant on Good Will‬
‭●‬ ‭Against empiricist grounding for morality (e.g. Locke and Hume):‬
‭●‬ ‭“the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the‬
‭circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason”‬
‭○‬ ‭a priori knowledge vs a posteriori knowledge (key distinction Kant brings out) - a priori‬
‭knowledge is knowledge that you have prior to or before any experience, whereas a‬
‭posterior knowledge comes after experience.‬
‭○‬ ‭e.g. if one was to say there is a magpie in the garden to somebody, they would not need to‬
‭look. In fact the person could be blind and use reason. This is not derived from experience,‬
‭this is derived purely from pure reason and a priori principle, meaning that we already have‬
‭the knowledge all magpies are birds. So therefore, somebody could validly say in further say‬
‭there is a bird there without having the sensory experience of seeing a magpie.‬
↳
‭ talks about how knowledge is a synthesis of experience, empirical observation and pure‬
‭reasoning; a priori reasoning‬
‭○‬ ‭a priori categories are things like time, space, causality, relation, etc that exist in the human‬
‭understanding and by which we understand our experience → goes along with the idea‬
‭that we can't gain direct access of the world itself, we only gain access mediated through‬
‭our a priori categories (transcendental idealism)‬
‭●‬ ‭“ any other precept, which is based on principles of mere experience - even if it is universal in a‬
‭certain respect - insofar as it rests in the least part on empirical grounds, perhaps only in terms of a‬
‭motive can indeed be called a practical rule but never a moral law”‬
‭●‬ ‭Law alone cannot be a basis for morality:‬
‭●‬ ‭“in the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it conform with the moral law but it‬
‭must also be for the sake of the law; without this, that conformity is only very contingent and‬
‭precarious, since a ground that is not moral will indeed now and then produce actions in conformity‬
‭with the law, but it will also often produce actions contrary to the law”‬
‭○‬ ‭For example, self-interest may coincide with the law, but self-interest is not morally good‬
‭just because it happens to coincide with the moral - that is not enough to make it good.‬
‭Rather, our actions must be for the sake of the moral law without this, that conformity is‬
‭only very contingent and precarious.‬
↳
‭ not enough to say somebody is a moral person, just because they happen to obey the‬
‭laws and their interests coincide with the laws‬
‭●‬ ‭Good will determines the goodness of actions in contrast to virtues which are good in themselves;‬
‭the four virtues for Kant are merely temperaments but there is no guarantee that they are‬
‭inherently good (e.g. a murderer could be patient)‬
‭●‬ ‭Says a character is good because of its volition (intention)‬

‭Kant: Good Will as the basis of Duty rather than Reason or Happiness as the Basis of Morality‬
‭●‬ ‭“A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain‬
‭some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself”‬
‭○‬ ‭​the good is not really existing in the world anymore, it's about us, our attitude and what we‬
‭bring to it‬
‭●‬ ‭“an impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being‬
‭graced with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a good will seems to constitute the‬
‭indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy.”‬
‭○‬ ‭just because you see somebody in a state of uninterrupted prosperity, he says that that's‬
‭not proof of the goodness‬
 ‭ ‬ ‭Happiness is not just a good in itself if unworthy‬
○
‭●‬ ‭Will is more important than reason at a moral point of view, since reason can be self-interested,‬
‭calculative (for personal pain) and ultimately becomes self-defeating‬
‭‬
● ‭Reason must serve the good will, not the good will serving reason‬
‭●‬ ‭Pure reason is not self-interested or partial‬
‭●‬ ‭maxims are subjective principles of action) → maxims as universalizable → laws (objective‬
‭principles of action)‬
‭○‬ ‭the guiding principle for Kant is whether maxims can be universalisable. When they can be‬
‭universalisable and applied everywhere at all times, everywhere to everybody, then they‬
‭become laws which are objective principles of action.‬
‭○‬ ‭difference between a maxim and a law is a maximum is subjective and laws are objective‬
‭○‬ ‭once maxim's stop being just subjective to one, they become universalisable and then‬
‭become laws‬
‭‬
● ‭Maxim lacks moral content if it is done in accord with duty but not from duty‬
‭●‬ ‭Maxim only has moral content if done from duty‬
‭○‬ ‭if the subjective maxim just happens to coincide with a law, then that doesn't make it a‬
‭moral action.‬

‭Kantian deontological Ethics (Morality)‬

‭●‬ ‭Uses the idea of Deon = ‘duty’: against Hume’s empiricist reduction of virtue and vice to subjective‬
‭pleasant or unpleasant sensations or happiness, which can never be the basis for universally valid‬
‭moral or ethical principles‬
‭○‬ ‭Not concerned with pleasant or unpleasant consequences but with what is morally right‬
‭●‬ ‭The only law that can be applied universally must be derived from reason because reason is the‬
‭only means that we as human beings can access universal truths in terms of the world of‬
‭understanding in contrast to the world of the senses which is always local and partial‬
‭○‬ ‭reason alone can access universal fruits, e.g. 2 plus 2 equals 4‬
‭○‬ ‭senses can only access local and partial truths, e.g. it is a sunny day‬
‭○‬ ‭reasoning has to be involved somehow, if we're going to derive a universal moral law,‬
‭because only reason can access universal truths.‬
‭●‬ ‭To be free is to be autonomous, and only that which is free and autonomous can be universal‬
‭(unconstrained by external limitation)‬
‭○‬ ‭Reason for Kant is knowledge that is autonomous, whereas knowledge derived from the‬
‭senses is not autonomous. It's dependent on time, place, the weather, etc‬
‭○‬ ‭Universal knowledge, unconstrained by external limitation, is what reasoning is and only‬
‭reasoning is knowledge that is autonomous‬
‭●‬ ‭Only via reason, which alone can be applied universally, can we rise above partiality and‬
‭self-interest‬
‭●‬ ‭World of understanding = free and active, universal, autonomous (hence free) autonomy =‬
‭governed by morality‬
‭○‬ ‭autonomy is the key idea that joins the current reason and morality because autonomy is‬
‭related to freedom and only if we're free, can we be morally responsible‬
‭●‬ ‭World of the senses = passive (captive to the circumstances), localised, heteronomous = governed‬
‭by pleasure‬
‭●‬ ‭The will of reason at the level of understanding (what is universal and autonomous) is the only basis‬
‭for what Kant calls the ought of action and this at the level of the senses (what is local and‬
‭heteronomous)‬
 ‭●‬ T‭ he will without impulses (dependent on circumstances) chooses the right in conformity with‬
‭universal principles, not just self-interested principles, but the necessarily partial nature of the‬
‭senses distorts it e.g. I want everybody to stop at a red light therefore I will stop at a red light - not‬
‭just because the law tells me to.‬
‭○‬ ‭Our rational side (reasoning, analytic judgement) allows us access to the universal but it is‬
‭unable, in itself, to impel us toward action‬
‭○‬ ‭Our inherent freedom (our being-in-itself) as individuals is the source of our autonomous‬
‭will to act but it alone cannot access universal principles to guide us‬
↳
‭ reasoning does not directly tell you the right thing to do, rather reasoning and morality‬
‭go back to this common source of free autonomy, which is our nature.‬

‭Kant’s Categorical Imperative‬

‭●‬ ‭Hypothetical imperative: that which I must do to attain a specific end, therefore it is only applicable‬
‭to that end‬
‭●‬ ‭Categorical Imperative: applicable to all actions:‬
‭●‬ ‭“act only in accordance with that maxim [=subjective] through which you can at the same time will‬
‭that it become a universal law [=objective]… act as if the maxim of your action were to become by‬
‭your will a universal law of nature.”‬‭(Groundwork‬‭4.421, p31)‬
‭●‬ ‭Greater extent than the golden rule since it is not limited by ‘as we would have others do unto us’‬
‭●‬ ‭Categorical imperative as a formula to be applied to actions:‬
‭○‬ ‭Ethical judgement arrived at by means of its form or as a procedure rather than by means‬
‭of content, state of mind or consequence‬
‭○‬ ‭Act from the standpoint of God who acts freely in creating (ordaining, ordering) the whole‬
‭world‬
‭■‬ ‭God does not act out of necessity - he doesn’t need anything‬
‭●‬ ‭Conscience (“the moral law within”) guides us at the individual level, i.e. we freely respond to it as‬
‭rational beings, hence we are autonomous‬
‭○‬ ‭So, it is subjective to the extent that it appeals to our inner freedom and rational autonomy,‬
‭but without collapsing into sensibility as determinate‬
‭○‬ ‭Objective to the extent that it concerns the universal (other autonomous rational beings)‬
‭but without commitment to metaphysics – greater than or beyond our own mind‬
‭○‬ ‭The autonomy of other rational beings (that they must be treated as an end in itself) is an‬
‭objective fact: any activity or lay that reduces another rational subject (a person) to a‬
‭means toward our own subjective end is unjust and wrong:‬
‭■‬ ‭Humanity must be a “kingdom of ends” not means‬
‭●‬ ‭The (objective) moral law proceeds from our (subjective) freedom, because our freedom is found in‬
‭our use of reason (whereas the senses are passively impressed from without, so are not free)‬
‭○‬ ‭Reason → freedom → autonomy → maxims (subjective principles of action) → maxims as‬
‭universalizable → laws (objective principles of action)‬
‭■‬ ‭Only in this can we respect the autonomy of others‬
‭●‬ ‭Only our freedom can universal because it assumes for itself under the condition of the moral law‬
‭(applying to all rather than just to the individual)‬
‭●‬ ‭Obedience to the moral law is a positive outworking of our reasoning, freedom and authority, not a‬
‭negative restriction on our action, a positive incentive rather than a fear of punishment‬
‭History as the Development of the Consciousness of Freedom (the Geist)‬
‭●‬ ‭The driving force of history is consciousness, hence idealism‬
‭●‬ ‭Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’ as our human freedom (free will) → Hegel: Spirit’s starting point: the‬
‭unknowable ‘being-in-itself’ of freedom that does not yet know itself as free‬
‭●‬ ‭History, i.e., progress, is simply the consciousness of freedom coming to fuller and fuller expression‬
‭as full and complete knowledge of itself:‬
‭●‬ ‭The Subject, consciousness, looking out at the world, seeking for itself in what is ‘Other’:‬
‭○‬ ‭“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for‬
‭another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged”‬‭(Phen. Spirit 178)‬
‭○‬ ‭the ‘I’ strives for recognition from others: further requirement for justice, but tension with‬
‭equality‬
↳
‭ takes up Rousseau's idea of authenticity, but it's in terms of recognition‬
‭●‬ ‭“ The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom”‬
‭○‬ ‭Talks about history being the unfolding of what he calls the geist (ghost in German) and he‬
‭defines it as consciousness of freedom. This consciousness of freedom comes to a greater‬
‭and greater self-awareness as certain social ethics and customs come to be questioned.‬
‭●‬ ‭History moved from East to West: finding its fulfilment in the modern West:‬
‭○‬ ‭“ The East [India and China, Asia] knew and to the present day knows only that One is Free‬
‭[realisation of Oneness/ non-duality], the Greek and Roman world, that some are free; the‬
‭German World knows that All are free. The first political form therefore which we observe‬
‭in History is Despotism, the second Democracy and Aristocracy, the third Monarchy”‬
‭●‬ ‭Ethic(s) (‘Sittlichkeit’) as historically bound custom/habit: able to be historicised to particularly‬
‭culture, time and place) as simply different stages in the development of the Geist, hence different‬
‭ethics may get closer to the Right‬
‭●‬ ‭Opposed to morality and the Right which transcends time and place: the right = consciousness of‬
‭freedom under the condition of the limitation of the world‬

‭Historical Progress as a Dialectic of (Consciousness of) Freedom‬

‭●‬ ‭Dialectic structure involves a thesis that gives rise to its opposite an antithesis (which arises in‬
‭response to or in reaction to the thesis), and these are then brought together or reconciled in a‬
‭synthesis.‬
‭●‬ ‭Extremes (e.g. freedom and slavery) always give rise to their opposite, e.g., the French Revolution‬
‭giving rise to the Terror‬
↳
‭ he sees the emergence of different ethics as being part of a historical unfolding. They're not‬
‭unlimited in time and space in the way that the right is and right is based on this consciousness of‬
‭freedom, that and recognition.‬
‭Hegel’s Dialecticism‬
‭●‬ ‭For Hegel: History moves in a dialectic that can be traced back to the dialectic structure of how we‬
‭come to know the world.‬
‭●‬ ‭We do not come to know the universe, rather the universe comes to know itself through us (e.g.,‬
‭mediated through mathematics etc)‬

‭Dialectical Movement of (Consciousness of) Freedom: Dialectical Idealism‬

‭●‬ T‭ he movement of the Spirit beginning in the recognition of the Other as a Self, i.e., consciousness‬
‭annuls alienation (we cannot know something as totally unknowable; even to say it is “unknowable”‬
‭is already to know it in some way, as ‘unknowable’, to ‘annul [cancel out] its otherness’‬