Afdd2 2
Afdd2 2
Afdd2 2
SPACE Guide
OPERATIONS
Air Force20Doctrine
September 2002
Document 2-2
27 November.
2006
This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-14,
Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-2
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 27 NOVEMBER 2006
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
This version updates Air Force space doctrine based on recent operational
experience. The chapter on command and control defines space coordinating authority
(page 13), discusses the joint force air and space component commander’s role as the
supported commander for counterspace operations (page 15), and includes the position
of director of space forces (page 16). The planning chapter describes space integration
considerations for planners based on observations during recent military operations
(page 21). The execution chapter expands discussion of the space air and space
operations center, which now operates as the joint space operations center (page 29).
Finally, the development of the space professionals chapter updates the discussion of
exercises, wargames, red teaming and experiments (pages 38).
Our space forces perform functions that are critical for the joint force—
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; command and control; positioning,
navigation, and timing; weather services; counterspace; communications; and spacelift.
As our reliance on space increases, so too, must our ability to integrate space
capabilities throughout joint operations. To retain the US military’s asymmetric
advantage based on space superiority, our Air Force must fully exploit and defend the
space domain.
To that end, our space warfighters are Airmen trained in the operation and
employment of space operational concepts and forces. These Airmen integrate air and
space power with joint forces on a daily basis, proving their worth in military operations.
This space operations doctrine describes our shared beliefs about the integration
of space power across the range of military operations. Specifically, it recommends a
command and control construct for space operations we found extremely effective in
recent operations. As a keystone doctrine document, it emphasizes the force-
multiplying and enabling nature of space operations. It is our job as Airmen to operate
and organize space forces based on the premises articulated in this doctrine.
T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
General, USAF
Chief of Staff
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... v
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ..................................................................... vii
CHAPTER ONE—Space Operations Fundamentals ............................................................. 1
An Airman’s Perspective on Space Power .......................................................................... 2
Key Space Operations Principles .......................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER TWO—Command and Control (C2) of Space Operations ................................ 8
Global And Theater Considerations ...................................................................................... 9
C2 of Global Space Forces .................................................................................................. 10
C2 of Theater Space Forces ................................................................................................ 10
Integrating Global Space Forces ..................................................................................... 11
Theater Space Forces ....................................................................................................... 12
Theater-organic Space Forces......................................................................................... 13
Presentation of Forces ...................................................................................................... 13
The Combined Force Air and Space Component Commander’s Authority and
Role in Theater Space Operations.................................................................................. 13
Space Coordinating Authority........................................................................................... 13
Supported Commander for Counterspace Operations and Strategic Attack............ 15
Director of Space Forces .................................................................................................. 16
CHAPTER THREE—Planning for Space Operations .......................................................... 18
Campaign Planning................................................................................................................ 18
Contingency Planning........................................................................................................ 18
Crisis Action Planning........................................................................................................ 19
Range of Military Operations............................................................................................ 19
Air and Space Operations Planning ................................................................................ 20
Joint Space Operations Plan Development ................................................................... 20
Planning Factors .................................................................................................................... 21
Phasing ................................................................................................................................ 21
Space Integration Considerations ................................................................................... 21
Space Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.................................... 24
Spacelift ................................................................................................................................... 25
Legal Issues ............................................................................................................................ 26
CHAPTER FOUR—Executing Space Operations ................................................................ 29
Execution of Global Forces .................................................................................................. 29
Space Air and Space Operations Center (AOC)/Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) ............................................................................................................................... 29
Space AOC/JSpOC Organization.................................................................................... 30
Integrating Global With Theater Space Operations...................................................... 32
Execution of Space Forces in Theater................................................................................ 34
Integrating Civil, Commercial, Foreign Space Assets ...................................................... 35
Responding to an Asymmetric Attack Against US Space Capabilities.......................... 36
iii
CHAPTER FIVE—Development of Space Professionals.................................................... 38
Space Training and Evaluation ............................................................................................ 38
Exercises ................................................................................................................................. 39
Integrated Air, Space, and Information Test Range ..................................................... 39
Education................................................................................................................................. 39
Developmental Education ................................................................................................. 39
Wargames ............................................................................................................................... 40
Red Teaming .......................................................................................................................... 40
Experiments ............................................................................................................................ 40
Suggested Readings ................................................................................................................. 41
Appendix...................................................................................................................................... 43
Glossary....................................................................................................................................... 51
iv
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
This document refines general doctrinal guidance from Air Force Doctrine
Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, and AFDD 2, Operations and
Organization. It establishes specific doctrinal guidance for space operations integrated
across the range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence, to crisis response, contingencies and, if necessary, major
operations and campaigns. This doctrine forms the foundation upon which Air Force
commanders plan, execute and assess space operations, as well as integrate space
capabilities throughout joint operations.
APPLICATION
This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel,
including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members.
Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of
military operations.
SCOPE
This doctrine expands upon basic Air Force beliefs and operating principles
found in AFDD 1 and AFDD 2, providing further detail on employing space forces and
capabilities in the joint environment. Air Force forces, to include people, weapons, and
support systems, can be used at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military
operations. This document discusses the fundamental beliefs that underpin the
application of space power to accomplish missions assigned by the President and the
Secretary of Defense.
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COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC
A note on terminology
One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force
prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air
Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and
space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1)
While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will
normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are
different, and should be executed through different staffs.
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FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS
Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which
AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these
statements.
Space power should be integrated throughout joint operations as both an enabler
and a force multiplier. (Page 1)
Space power operates differently from other forms of military power due to its global
perspective, responsiveness, and persistence. (Page 2)
Global and theater space capabilities may be best employed when placed under the
command of a single Airman through appropriate command relationships, focused
expeditionary organization and equipment, reachback and specialized talent. (Page
3)
Space is a domain—like the air, land, sea, and cyberspace—within which military
operations take place. (Page 3)
Space coordinating authority (SCA) is an authority within a joint force aiding in the
coordination of joint space operations and integration of space capabilities and
effects. SCA is an authority, not a person. (Page 13)
The combined force air and space component commander (CFACC) should be
designated as the supported commander for counterspace operations. (Page 15)
To plan, execute, and assess space operations, the commander of Air Force forces
typically designates a director of space forces, an Air Force senior space advisor
who facilitates coordination, integration, and staffing activities. (Page 16)
Space operations should be integrated into the joint force commander’s contingency
and crisis action planning to magnify joint force effectiveness. (Page 18)
Integration of theater space requirements must consider both a global and a theater
perspective. (Page 21)
An established relationship between the CFACC and the commander, joint functional
component command for space is essential to ensure flexibility and responsiveness
when integrating space operations. (Page 32)
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CHAPTER ONE
Military forces have always viewed the "high ground" as one of dominance and
advantage in warfare. With rare exceptions, whoever owned the high ground owned the
fight. Space assets offer an expansive view of the Earth operating high above the
planet’s surface; satellites can see deep into an adversary’s territory, with little risk to
humans or machines. Today, control of the ultimate high ground is critical for space
superiority and assures the force-multiplying capabilities of space power. Tomorrow,
space superiority may enable instant engagement anywhere in the world.
Space assets have not only enhanced our national security but have also
fundamentally changed military operations. Because of this, the Air Force views space
power as a key ingredient for achieving battlespace superiority. Space power is defined
as the total strength of a nation’s capabilities to conduct and influence activities to, in,
through, and from space to achieve its objectives (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Space power
should be integrated throughout joint operations as both an enabler and a force
multiplier. This chapter focuses on space operations fundamentals, including an
Airman’s perspective on space power, effects-based approach to operations (EBAO),
and key space operations principles.
1
The ability to create accurate effects is crucial in military operations. Space
capabilities contribute to situational awareness; highly accurate, all-weather
weapon system employment; rapid operational tempo; information superiority;
increased survivability; and more efficient military operations. For example, the
integration of space–based PNT capabilities with airborne platforms has expanded
military precision strike capabilities. Today Airmen destroy multiple targets per sortie
with global positioning system (GPS)-aided munitions in all weather conditions, when
similar targets in previous conflicts frequently required multiple attacks per target.
Space power operates differently from other forms of military power due to
its global perspective, responsiveness, and persistence. Through the integration of
space capabilities, Airmen conduct simultaneous operations affecting multiple theaters,
unlike surface forces that typically divide up the battlefield into individual,
geographically-based operating areas. Because space-related effects and targeting
can be global in nature, Airmen involved in the application of space power are inherently
poised to accomplish an effects-based approach to space operations based on
functional capabilities rather than geographic limitations.
The Air Force leverages the strengths of space platforms to produce effects
based on this global perspective and responsiveness. Moreover, the space domain
provides a unique degree of persistence with regard to military operations. Space
2
assets hold the ultimate high ground; they offer the potential for persistent presence
over any part of the Earth. This is a different kind of persistence than other forces
provide, but it is relevant because this persistence can allow military forces to bring
modern combat power to bear with a small in-theater footprint. The challenge for
campaign planners is to ensure space operations are integrated throughout the joint
force commander’s (JFC’s) scheme of maneuver across all levels of war—strategic,
operational, and tactical. While this is no different than any other form of military
capability, space operations usually occur over great distances and are conducted by
units far from the battlefield, so the challenge is significant.
However, space operations and the space domain are unique. Like mobility
forces, space power defies a single model for organization and operations because it
requires both a theater and a global perspective. Some capabilities create theater
effects and generally are more easily deployable, and thus organize and operate within
a regional model. Other capabilities have global responsibilities; such forces are best
organized and controlled through a functional model. However, global and theater
space capabilities may be best employed when placed under the command of a
single Airman through appropriate command relationships, focused
expeditionary organization and equipment, reachback, and specialized talent.
There are two different, but mutually inclusive, perspectives as to the doctrinal
view of space. First, space is viewed as a physical domain where space-centric
activities are conducted to achieve objectives. Space is a domain – like the air, land,
sea, and cyberspace – within which military operations take place. This view is
relevant at the tactical (e.g., operation of specific platforms), operational (e.g.,
synchronization of military operations to achieve the commander’s objectives), and
strategic (e.g., space as a domain that must be protected and controlled) levels of war.
The tactical level focuses on execution of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
Space is relevant at the operational level because it enables improved horizontal and
vertical integration. The strategic level, consistent with national policy, is where the
President of the United States (POTUS), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and unified
combatant commanders focus.
3
The second doctrinal view of space is an effects-centric view, and is particularly
relevant at the operational level of war—that level at which campaigns and major
operations are planned, executed, and assessed to accomplish strategic objectives
within theaters. In terms of planning, execution, and assessment, commanders are
concerned with achieving effects, not whether those effects come from space
capabilities. The focus of EBAO is on the end result, not the differences in how
individual platforms operate to achieve that result.
Also, EBAO allows for JFC direction on operational objectives while enabling
warfighting components to determine the best means of achieving those objectives. If
the JFC desires the effect of removing enemy air defense’s command and control (C2)
communications infrastructure, it could be accomplished via kinetic strike on an uplink
terminal or via uplink jamming of the C2 signal. As a result, Airmen should focus on
commanding air and space forces to achieve strategic and operational effects, not just
on managing target lists. Recognizing the overarching role of the political sector in
determining objectives, the end state, and rules of engagement, commanders must be
prepared to correlate military objectives to political objectives and to advise civilian
leaders on courses of action. In doing so, they should always consider the integration
of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
For an in-depth discussion of EBAO, see AFDD 2, Operations and Organization.
This section discusses key principles and concepts to describe space operations,
giving Airmen a common perspective. It includes discussion on the space mission
areas, categories of space capabilities, and space-related terminology.
Space mission areas describe the capabilities space brings to the fight. Space
force enhancement (SFE) capabilities contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of
military air, land, sea, and space operations (e.g. ISR, warning, communication,
PNT, blue force tracking, space environment monitoring, and weather services).
4
Space control (SC) capabilities attain and maintain a desired degree of space
superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit space capabilities while denying an
adversary’s ability to do the same (e.g., surveillance, protection, prevention, and
negation). The Air Force uses counterspace as an equivalent definition of the space
control mission. Counterspace aligns more appropriately to other Air Force air and
space power functions (i.e., counterair, counterland, and countersea), provides less
ambiguity, and provides common Air Force language. Space force application
(SFA) capabilities execute missions with weapons systems operating in, through or
from space which hold terrestrial-based targets at risk (e.g., intercontinental ballistic
missiles [ICBM], ballistic missile defense, and force projection). Space support (SS)
capabilities provide critical launch and satellite control infrastructure, capabilities and
technologies that enable the other mission areas to effectively perform their
missions.
There are three terms used to describe different categories of space capabilities—
space systems, space assets, and space forces.
Space systems. All the devices and organizations forming the space network.
These consist of: spacecraft; ground and airborne stations; and data links among
spacecraft, mission, and user terminals. Space systems refer to the equipment
required for space operations, and these systems are comprised of nodes and links.
There are three types of nodes: space, airborne, and terrestrial. Space nodes
include satellites, space stations, or reusable space transportation systems like the
space shuttle. Airborne nodes are primarily aircraft weapon systems that leverage
space capabilities. Terrestrial nodes include any land or sea equipment that
receives, processes, or uses data derived from space capabilities. Information
conduits called links tie these nodes together. These links also are classified into two
types: control and mission. Space operators use control links to operate space
systems. Space systems disseminate data on mission links, which enable force
multiplication (see Figure 1.1). For example, Airmen in the 4th Space Operations
Squadron (4 SOPS) are part of the terrestrial node, and they operate and employ
the Milstar constellation via the control link. The data stream between the
receiver/user and the Milstar satellites in orbit is the mission link.
Space assets. Space assets include military and civil space systems, commercial
and foreign entities (CFE), ground control elements, operators, and spacelift
vehicles. These assets are unique in that they provide global persistence,
perspective, and access unhindered by geographical or political boundaries. Military
space assets are aligned under established military C2 processes, different from civil
and CFE C2 processes. It is essential to integrate these separate processes for
synergistic space effects.
5
SPACE NODE
AIRBORNE NODE
TERRESTRIAL NODE
Space forces. Space forces are military space assets and personnel utilized by the
joint force, are normally organized as units, and are categorized by their impact on
global or theater requirements. As such, there are global space forces and theater
space forces. Global space forces support multiple theater and/or national
objectives and are controlled by the commander, United States Strategic Command
(CDRUSSTRATCOM). Theater space forces support individual theater
requirements and generally fall under the control of the geographic combatant
commander (GCC). Theater space forces are primarily focused on a single theater,
with little or no direct impact outside the designated area of responsibility (AOR).
Space also enables network centric warfare by providing a global infrastructure that
can be exploited at all levels of operations—strategic, operational, and tactical. For
example, a Predator unmanned aircraft (UA) depends on space for distributed
operations. Space enables networking across vast distances, providing real-time
horizontal and vertical integration for the warfighter. Across the operational
environment, warfighters leverage space to an unprecedented degree, serving as the
foundation for 21st century warfare—space-enabled warfare.
The Air Force categorizes relative advantage in the space domain by space parity,
space superiority, and space supremacy. Space parity describes a roughly equal
degree of power between friendly and adversary use of space capabilities. Next, space
6
superiority is that degree of space advantage of one force over another that permits the
conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the
opposing force. Space superiority does not mean the enemy is prevented from
interfering with friendly operations, but rather that friendly losses or disruption will not
prevent friendly forces from achieving objectives. Finally, space supremacy is that
degree of space advantage of one force over another that permits the conduct of
operations at a given time and place without effective interference by the opposing
force. Supremacy may sometimes be an unrealistic objective because sources of
space power include commercial and third party space capabilities, and it is difficult to
completely deny an adversary’s access to these capabilities. These categories
describe the relative advantage over an adversary in the space domain.
Space forces integrate and employ at the operational level through the following
organizational constructs:
The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational structure
for deployed Air Force air and space forces.
The commander of Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) is the senior US Air Force
officer designated as commander of the US Air Force component assigned to a joint
force commander at the unified, subunified, and joint task force level. The
COMAFFOR is the senior Air Force warfighter who exercises C2 over all assigned
and attached air and space forces. The COMAFFOR commands Air Force air and
space forces engaged at the operational and tactical level of war.
The combined force air and space component commander (CFACC) plans,
coordinates, allocates, tasks, executes, and assesses air and space operations to
accomplish assigned operational missions, when designated by the JFC.
The space coordinating authority (SCA) is an authority within a joint force aiding
in the coordination of joint space operations and integration of space capabilities and
effects. SCA is an authority, not a person.
The director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is the senior Air Force space
officer who advises the COMAFFOR/CFACC. The DIRSPACEFOR facilitates
coordination, integration, and staffing activities to tailor space integration support for
the CFACC.
These terms and concepts describe space power and provide Airmen a common
vernacular on space operations. It is important for Airmen to understand this
information and articulate the impact of Air Force space operations in a joint
environment. The objective is better integration of the force-multiplying capabilities of
space operations.
7
CHAPTER TWO
This chapter provides a construct for C2 of space operations. Global and theater
considerations are discussed followed by C2 of global and theater space forces. The
chapter concludes with the CFACC’s authority and role in theater space operations.
This construct has proven to be effective in recent operations and exercises, and it will
normally be the construct for C2 of space forces.
8
GLOBAL AND THEATER CONSIDERATIONS
Many space assets support joint operations in more than one geographic area.
Space assets may be used to fulfill single theater, multiple theater, or global objectives.
Thus, the C2 structure established for integrating space assets and forces must be
robust enough to account for these various operating areas. When the effect of
employing space assets meets global or multiple theater requirements, a structure that
bridges more than one theater, and is capable of dealing with the non-DOD agencies, is
normally necessary. In this case, USSTRATCOM usually provides such a structure.
When the effects are focused primarily on a single theater, that geographic
combatant commander may control those space forces that produce strategic,
operational, or tactical effects within that theater. If needed by a joint force, the
combatant commander normally delegates operational control (OPCON) of theater
space forces to the appropriate Service component commander and tactical control
(TACON) to the appropriate functional component commander, as required. For Air
Force space forces, this Service component commander is the COMAFFOR. The
CFACC is normally best suited to integrate space operations within a combined/joint
force. Within that force, the COMAFFOR is best suited to integrate Air Force space
operations because of his ability to exercise C2 of space capabilities and the
COMAFFOR’s theater-wide warfighting perspective.
When the situation arises that there are no Air Force forces attached to a joint
task force (JTF), the COMAFFOR to the joint force commander may be tasked in a
supporting relationship to the JTF to integrate and provide space capabilities and
effects. For example, multiple JTFs in US Central Command’s AOR require space
effects for the on-going GWOT. The CFACC provides/coordinates these effects for
JTFs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa.
9
USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCC)
The JFCC Space CDR’s mission includes employing joint space forces for missile
warning, PNT, communications, spacelift, and counterspace operations.
Space experts on theater staffs facilitate space integration. The Air Force
embeds space expertise within its component and air and space operations center
10
(AOC) staff. Also, the Air Force augments theater staffs with additional space expertise,
when requested, to assist with integration of global space effects and control of theater
space forces.
For space forces providing effects via a support relationship, it is important for
both supported and supporting commanders to document their requirements in an
establishing directive. The establishing directive should specify the purpose of the
support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.
Additional information includes:
The space forces and resources allocated to the supporting commander's effort.
The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting commander's effort.
11
Examples of Space Support
GENERAL SUPPORT:
During the major combat operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF),
USSTRATCOM provided general support from space operations to the Iraqi theater
of operations. This support relationship helped the joint force integrate space
capabilities, such as positioning, navigation, and timing from GPS, and counterspace
effects.
MUTUAL SUPPORT:
During the counterinsurgency phase of OIF, the combatant commander assigned the
CFACC the task of space superiority. For this objective, the JFC designated the
CFACC as the supported commander with other component commanders in a
mutual support relationship for space operations.
DIRECT SUPPORT:
During Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF), a direct support relationship was
established between the CFACC and the 11 SWS. This relationship allowed the
AOC to directly task 11 SWS personnel and exchange real-time information from the
DSP satellite for time critical actions like personnel recovery after aircraft shoot
downs.
CLOSE SUPPORT:
Future space capabilities will be responsive to the warfighter. These space forces
may operate in close proximity with theater forces and will require detailed integration
to provide close support to theater operations. These types of forces could emerge
as technologies based on the Air Force’s operationally responsive space and joint
warfighting space operating concepts.
12
Theater-organic Space Forces
GCCs exercise COCOM of assigned theater space forces. Service component
commanders are normally then delegated OPCON of those forces. During contin-
gencies, these forces may be incorporated into a joint force. Within the joint force, the
appropriate functional component commander normally exercises TACON of forces
made available by Service component commanders. For space forces, this component
commander should normally be the CFACC if one is designated.
Presentation of Forces
If a contingency operation requires a joint force, Air Force forces will be
presented as an AETF. The commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC) is
responsible for providing Air Force space forces to an AETF, when required. Within the
AETF, space forces may be attached to an air expeditionary wing, group, or squadron.
Attached space forces are commanded by the COMAFFOR who commands the AETF
through an A-staff and controls forces through an AOC. The AOC coordinates
integration of space effects with the Space AOC/JSpOC for and execution of assigned,
attached, and supporting space forces (direct liaison authority [DIRLAUTH] should be
authorized for coordinated planning between AOC and Space AOC/JSpOC.)
13
traditional uses of space assets, planning staffs should use the established processes
for fulfilling intelligence and communications requirements.
14
During times of conflict or large-scale contingencies it is important to have a
coordinating authority for space within the joint force structure to appropriately represent
the space requirements of the joint force. With each component and many allies having
their own organic space capability, there is a requirement to integrate, synchronize, and
deconflict among the space operations, redundant efforts, and conflicting support
requests. By designating SCA for the joint force to a single commander, the JFC can
optimize space operations in the JOA. To facilitate unity of effort within theater space
operations and with global space assets, the JFC normally delegates SCA to the
CFACC.
There are several reasons why the JFC normally delegates SCA to the CFACC.
First, the CFACC has space expertise embedded in their staff. Second, the CFACC
has the ability to command and control space forces via the AOC, including reachback
to the Space AOC/JSpOC. Lastly, unlike the land or maritime component commanders
who are assigned specific area of operations (AOs) within a theater, the CFACC
maintains a JOA and theater-wide perspective. This perspective is essential for
coordinating space operations that also support the JFC throughout the theater.
To ensure unity of command, the JFC should designate the CFACC as the
supported commander for counterspace operations. These operations are designed to
maintain space superiority. With US dependence on space capabilities for our
asymmetric advantages in the operational environment and the proliferation of various
threats to space systems, it is critical to have a single component commander focused
on maintaining space superiority using all available capabilities as part of the overall
joint campaign.
The CFACC is well suited to execute counterspace operations for the JFC as
part of the overall campaign for several reasons: First, the Air Force has the
overwhelming majority of satellite operations, maintenance, and C2 experience, making
it especially qualified to plan, execute and assess offensive and defensive space
activities. This expertise is integrated into the CFACC's staff. Second, the CFACC
has a complete AOR perspective due to range, speed and flexibility and is able to
employ various methods to attack the user/user equipment through kinetic and non-
kinetic means, both directly and indirectly. Also, the CFACC, as the COMAFFOR, can
recommend theater defensive measures to ensure TTPs and infrastructure reduce or
mitigate potential threats. For example, the CFACC could provide guidance in the
special instructions (SPINs) that units should be prepared to employ weapons in a GPS-
hostile environment. Third, the CFACC, through its organic C2 centers (to include
reachback) has the ability to integrate assets to deliver effects when and where
needed. Fourth, the Air Force understands the treaty, legal, and policy considerations
associated with space operations. For these reasons, the CFACC should be
designated as the supported commander for counterspace operations. In this
role, the CFACC has the authority to designate target priority, effects and timing of
15
these operations and attack targets across the entire JOA (to include targets within the
land and maritime AOs, although operations within a surface AO must be coordinated
with the AO commander).
To coordinate with the JFC and other component commands, the CFACC may
colocate an air component coordination element (ACCE) within their respective staffs.
The purpose of the ACCE is to act as the CFACC’s liaison to other commanders. The
CFACC will normally integrate space expertise (and counterspace expertise, if
designated the supported commander for counterspace) in the ACCE (or other liaison
elements) to coordinate space-related issues with the JFC and component
commanders, on their behalf.
When the situation arises that there are no Air Force forces attached to a JTF,
the COMAFFOR to the joint force commander may be tasked in a supporting
relationship to the JTF to integrate and provide space capabilities and effects. In the
situation of multiple JTFs, the DIRSPACEFOR should work for the theater
COMAFFOR/CFACC, who normally is delegated SCA, to provide space effects to the
JTF based on JFC priorities.
16
Tasks of the DIRSPACEFOR
The Air Force oganizes, trains and equips space forces for employment during
military operations based on the construct of a COMAFFOR/CFACC. However, there
may be exceptional circumstances which fall outside the bounds of this construct. First,
for the rare instances when the CFACC is not delegated SCA (e.g., a JFC retains SCA
or delegates SCA to another component commander), the DIRSPACEFOR will continue
to work space-related issues on behalf of the COMAFFOR/CFACC. Second, for the
special case when the JFC chooses to organize and employ military forces through
service components and does not designate a CFACC, the DIRSPACEFOR works for
the COMAFFOR, who is expected to be delegated SCA. In all these special
circumstances, theater-wide coordination will be the responsibility of the component
commander delegated SCA, who will normally be aided by a senior space advisor. The
Air Force recommends a senior space advisor handle day-to-day SCA responsibilities
on behalf of the component commander delegated SCA.
17
CHAPTER THREE
CAMPAIGN PLANNING
Contingency Planning
The OPLAN serves as the foundational employment concept for a theater of
operations. It provides the combatant commander’s vision and intent by articulating
broad operational and sustainment concepts for the duration of conflict. The resulting
plan provides strategic military objectives and operational direction, organizes and tasks
subordinate forces, identifies external support requirements, and designates command
relationships, additional responsibilities, and objectives.
18
The COMAFFOR supports the combatant commander’s contingency planning
process through integrated theater air and space planning. This effort should be
conducted as a single process rather than separate air and space processes. Theater
planners normally incorporate space planning into theater OPLAN annexes. However,
space requirements should be considered as part of the overall campaign, not simply
limited to an OPLAN space annex. Space planning must be embedded into the
contingency planning process so that space assets and capabilities are appropriately
integrated into each phase of the combatant commander’s campaign.
Space operations should be fully integrated into the development of all COAs. A
COA is a broad statement of possible ways to accomplish a mission. During COA
development, as with contingency planning, planners should identify tasks for space
assets in support of theater objectives. In addition, planners need to examine the role
and contributions of space assets in the various phases of the campaign. During COA
selection, the combatant commander should review space forces, along with air,
information, land, sea, and special forces, to make an informed decision on COA
selection. Additionally, global and theater space capabilities may enable the
commander’s situational awareness to facilitate this decision.
19
providing the eyes and ears of a sophisticated command and control system; the
flexibility of space forces is integral to any operation.
The JSOP is the space equivalent to the CFACC’s JAOP. The JSOP details how
joint space operations will support both global missions and theater requirements. The
JSOP prioritizes space operations across all AORs and functions based on geographic
and functional combatant commander’s requests and CDRUSSTRATCOM priorities.
Theater strategists should include theater space requirements in the JAOP. Each plan
should contain a sustainability assessment and delineate specific procedures for
allocating and exercising C2 of global space assets. In doing so, the JSOP allows for
optimum integration of global assets supporting theater operations. The Space
AOC/JSpOC will use the JSOP to guide the development of the space tasking order
(STO). The JSOP developed during this process should:
20
Integrate joint space capabilities to achieve theater and global objectives.
Identify and prioritize space objectives and desired effects, and the weight of effort
required to achieve results in support of the theater’s objectives.
Indicate the phasing of space forces in relation to the theater’s campaign plan.
PLANNING FACTORS
The following are some critical factors to consider in planning military space
operations. This list is not exhaustive but serves as a starting point for air and space
planners.
Phasing
Phasing provides an orderly schedule of military decisions and indicates pre-
planned shifts in priorities and intent. Phasing may be used to modify the prioritization
of limited space capabilities to theater operations. Space operations often occur
simultaneously and can be continuous throughout the campaign, sometimes leading to
a sense that phasing is less relevant to space operations. Phasing remains a useful
tool to communicate the JFC’s concept of operations and the shifting of emphasis
between ongoing space operations. For instance, counterspace operations may be
emphasized early in an operation and be de-emphasized once space superiority is
firmly established. Some level of regional or temporal space superiority is likely to be a
prerequisite to effective pursuit of other objectives.
21
red system (SBIRS) as an example, the theater may request constant vigilance
(CV), a tactic used by the 2 SWS for focused warning support to a very specific
geographic region. However, CV is very manpower- and operator-intensive. Very
often 2 SWS can support the supported commander’s request for warning with other
tactics and procedures that are less demanding than CV. Theaters should not
request specific tactics. Rather, theater commanders must state their desired
effects.
Theater missile warning requirements should also be considered. Many factors will
determine the support requirements for missile warning capabilities. Decisions on
timeliness, tolerance of false reports, coverage, and data distribution may drive
configuration changes in missile warning constellation alignment and possibly in the
communications allocation for transmitting the reports to the theater.
Since GPS accuracy varies due to the number of visible satellites, orientation, and
other factors, planners should identify AOR accuracy requirements so GPS assets
can be better deployed/commanded. Specific geographical accuracy enhancements
may be temporarily achieved which could possibly result in changing operational
time lines.
22
military operations. The theater intelligence directorate of a joint staff accomplishes
operational environment characterization, in coordination with continental US
(CONUS)-based organizations.
Theater planners must also consider friendly space vulnerabilities as well as threats.
Theater planners are responsible for planning strikes on adversary counterspace
capabilities or preparing alternatives for the possible loss of friendly space
capabilities if strikes are neither appropriate nor feasible. Strikes may not be
appropriate or feasible if the intelligence value of the adversary space capability is
deemed more important. They also should consider available countermeasures. An
essential part of this effort will be attack detection, assessment, and reporting.
Operators and planners must know as quickly as possible the origin of any anomaly
and be able to identify and geolocate the threat in a timely manner. Determining
whether an event is the result of intentional attack, unintentional interference, or
space weather is crucial in determining a course of action.
Potential adversaries have access to a range of space systems and services. This
includes fielding of potential counterspace assets (some commercially available)
against US space assets. Even an adversary with no indigenous space assets may
use space through US, allied, commercial, or consortium space services. These
services could potentially include precision navigation, high-resolution imagery,
environmental monitoring, and satellite communications. For example, during
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Iraqi government used a leased transponder on
Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT), a Middle Eastern
consortium-owned communications satellite, to broadcast propaganda on news
networks.
Planners should consider targeting adversary space assets using all instruments of
national power. Adversary space targets may include data links; launch sites;
booster storage facilities; satellite storage and assembly facilities; mission data
processing facilities; communications links; telemetry, tracking, and commanding
nodes; satellites; research and development facilities; and launch vehicles. Planners
should consider the potential impact of allowing an adversary unrestricted or
unlimited use of a space asset. If the potential impact is sufficient enough to require
action, then the desired effect (deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or
destruction) should be considered. For example, if the objective is to prevent an
adversary from using space imagery to observe preparations for a counteroffensive
in a specific area, then any instrument of power could be employed: Diplomatic—
persuade a consortia-owned satellite company to deny service to the adversary;
23
Informational—provide US intelligence to a friendly nation in exchange for their
denial of information to adversaries; Military—denial, disruption, degradation,
deception, or destruction of an adversary space system; or Economic—buy imagery
to prevent the adversary from acquiring it. Additionally, if the objective is to
permanently disrupt adversary C2 of fielded forces, any of the instruments of power
could be effective to include permanent destruction of assets, if necessary.
Planners must continuously mesh appropriate actions with respect to a target’s
intelligence value, JFC objective, the action’s impact on conflict escalation, and
collateral damage mitigation.
Defining the Operational Environment: This involves determining the orbital and
terrestrial regimes in which space forces will be employed and space effects will be
generated or realized. Space intelligence planners will bound the intelligence
preparation needs by using satellite assessed maneuver capabilities and ranges to
determine the potential area of interest and potential natural hazards, for example,
predicting upcoming meteor showers, solar flares or other significant environmental
threats or obstacles to space vehicles or communications signals. This also
includes determination of which nation-states are supporting or affected by a
potential conflict and possible avenues of approach for friendly forces. It also
includes mapping the background electromagnetic environment and characterizing
or mapping the coherent signals in that environment.
24
Describing electromagnetic effects includes determining the effect of an energized
atmosphere or scintillated ionosphere on space communications, determining the
susceptibility of a given signal, satellite, line of communication, or ground asset to
the effects of the electromagnetic environment (such as interference).
Evaluating the Adversary: This includes evaluating the adversary force composition
and order of battle; satellite capabilities; offensive or defensive counterspace
capabilities, tactics, and doctrine; ability to sustain or reconstitute space capabilities;
the friendly assets the adversary is likely to target; and the adversary’s willingness to
engage in various combat operations. Additional analysis is performed on enemy
space centers of gravity and critical nodes and assets that are critical to the success
of the enemy’s operations. Furthermore, US forces must evaluate adversary access
to commercial space products and services by analyzing their impact on the battle
space. US forces must also attempt to understand enemy space crew force training
status, use of space communications and ISR capabilities, and C2 capabilities.
25
operations. In addition, the US does not have the capability to perform multiple
launches in rapid succession, or make rapid changes to a planned launch’s payload.
Today, spacelift requirements need to be identified years ahead of operational need.
Furthermore, military planners are limited to on-orbit assets when responding to
contingencies.
In the future, the Air Force may field a robust “launch-on-demand” spacelift
infrastructure, the ability to place a satellite on orbit within days or even hours of being
requested. Combined with operationally responsive satellites, military planners will
have more flexibility to meet joint warfighter requirements.
LEGAL ISSUES
The laws applicable to space operations flow mainly from four treaties. Additionally,
general principles of international law, including those embodied in the United Nations
Charter and law of armed conflict, apply to the conduct of space operations. There are
also several arms control agreements impacting military space activities. Domestically,
we must consider the impact of US laws and policies on our space activities. While the
space legal regime imposes a few significant constraints, the bulk of this regime
provides a great deal of flexibility for military operations in space.
The Outer Space Treaty. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, more familiarly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST),
establishes the fundamental precepts governing outer space operations. The OST
establishes several important principles:
The Freedom Principle. Article I of the OST establishes that outer space
“shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of
any kind….” An important aspect of this principle is that satellites may freely
operate in space, including over other nations, without the same sovereignty
concerns applicable to territorial airspace relating to the overflight of aircraft.
26
Article IV also prohibits a limited range of military activities to include
establishing bases, weapons testing, and the conduct of military maneuvers
on celestial bodies. Thus, the placement of weapons other than weapons of
mass destruction in outer space is permissible (except for testing of a weapon
on celestial bodies), as is the transit of nuclear weapons, such as ICBMs,
through space.
Peaceful Purposes. The OST recognizes “the exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes.” The majority of nations have traditionally held
that the “peaceful purposes” language does not prohibit military activities in
outer space; such activities have taken place throughout the space age
without significant international protest. The phrase, rather, has been
interpreted to require that activities in space be non-aggressive, or in other
words, in compliance with the requirements under the United Nations Charter
and international law to refrain from the threat or use of force except in
accordance with the law, such as in self-defense or pursuant to United
Nations Security Council authorization.
Other Space Treaties. Other major treaties pertaining to space are the 1968
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Rescue and Return Agreement), the 1972
Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
(Liability Convention) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space (Registration Convention) of 1974. The Rescue and Return Agreement
obligates nations to cooperate in the rescue and return of distressed astronauts and
to take those measures it deems practicable to return space objects of other nations
that come to Earth within its territory. The Liability Convention provides a system for
assessing liability for damage caused by space objects. Generally, a nation is
responsible for damage caused by a space object to objects on the ground or to
aircraft in flight. Damage caused to other space objects, on the other hand, will only
lead to liability if one party can establish fault on the part of the other party. Finally,
the Registration Convention requires nations to notify the UN “as soon as
practicable” after an object has been launched into outer space, providing certain
descriptive information, to include orbital parameters and a general statement of the
purpose of the space object.
Arms Control Treaties. A few arms control treaties have provisions with some
impact on space operations. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, prohibits
nuclear explosions in space. Many arms limitations treaties also prohibit
interference with “national technical means” of treaty verification. These national
technical means include certain surveillance satellites. During times of hostilities,
however, arms control treaty obligations may be suspended as between belligerents
to the extent those terms are inconsistent with a state of armed conflict.
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Space Policy. National and DOD policy have long asserted that the US is
committed to exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes
and for the benefit of all humanity. US policy has consistently been that peaceful
purposes include defense and intelligence purposes. The US further recognizes the
right of all nations to engage in the exploration and use of outer space free from
harmful interference. In fact, national and DOD space policy state that “[p]urposeful
interference with US space systems will be viewed as an infringement on sovereign
rights.” Finally, both US and DOD policy specifically assign DOD the four space
mission areas of space support, space force enhancement, space control, and
space force application.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Space AOC/JSpOC
The Air Force provides a Space AOC that forms the core of the JSpOC. The
Space AOC/JSpOC is located at Vandenberg AFB CA. It includes personnel, facilities
and equipment necessary to plan, execute and assess space operations and integrate
space power.
The Space AOC/JSpOC tracks assigned and attached space forces/assets and
provide reachback support to organic theater space personnel. The Space
AOC/JSpOC translates CDRUSSTRATCOM’s OPORDs and CDR JFCC Space
guidance into the STO. STOs task and direct assigned and attached space forces to
29
fulfill theater and global mission requirements in support of national objectives. The
STO cycle is flexible to synchronize with the theater’s battle rhythm.
Strategy Division. The strategy division recommends both long- and short-term
strategies to achieve USSTRATCOM and theater objectives by developing, refining,
disseminating, and assessing strategy. This is normally presented through the JSOP
and space operations directive (SOD), which will be used to guide tasking order
development, and during crisis action planning will be expanded or modified to meet
the crisis situation. The strategy division is organized into three teams: Strategy
development team, strategy guidance team, and operational assessment team.
Strategy Guidance Team produces the SOD and ensures theater air
operations directive and USSTRATCOM OPORDs and FRAGOs are linked to
the overall objectives.
Each of these teams has individuals who are matrixed from other Space
AOC/JSpOC divisions to provide subject area expertise for development of strategy
division products.
30
Combat Plans Division. The combat plans division performs operational planning
to develop execution orders for joint space operations. The combat plans division
publishes and disseminates the STO. This document applies specific space
capabilities and assets to accomplish tasks in fulfillment of global USSTRATCOM
and/or theater missions. The combat plans division is divided into two teams, the
master space plan team and STO production team.
Master Space Plan Team defines space effects and builds the master space
plan (MSP). The MSP is similar to the master air attack plan.
The STO production cycle is based on the six-step targeting cycle described in
joint doctrine. The cycle is typically designed around the joint standard of 72 hours
(48 hours for planning and 24 hours for execution). However, the cycle is flexible to
synchronize with the warfighter’s battle rhythm requirements.
Combat Operations Division (COD). The COD monitors execution of the current
tasking order and publishes any required changes. The COD maintains space
situational awareness and provides a 24/7 reachback interface for theater AOCs.
Timely coordination between the COD and each tasked wing operations center
(WOC) is essential for effective tasking order execution. Wing commanders and
their squadrons receive orders, directives, and other guidance from the Space
AOC/JSpOC through the WOC.
Space Superiority is that level of control in the space domain that one force
enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time
and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space
superiority may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and
persistent. Achieving space superiority is of primary concern since it allows
control and exploitation of the space domain in order to provide space effects
in and through space. The Air Force achieves space superiority through
counterspace operations, including offensive and defensive operations, both
of which are based on robust space situational awareness.
31
services describes space assets ability to contribute to information superiority
and includes such capabilities as positioning, navigation, and timing; satellite
communications; and blue force tracking.
Assured Access. Our capabilities to gain access and operate in the space
domain describe assured access to space. This includes launch and range
operations, satellite control networks, as well as terrestrial communication
networks that link ground nodes of our C2 systems.
Space Force Applications are those forces that deliver kinetic effects to,
from, or through space. While only ICBM systems currently fall into this
category, future space systems, such as the common aerospace vehicle,
land-based strategic deterrent, and conventional ICBM, could deliver combat
effects to terrestrial and space targets.
ISR Division. The ISR Division (ISRD) is focused on providing the strategic,
operational, tactical, and technical knowledge about adversary capabilities
necessary to effectively plan US operations. Since knowledge of adversary
capabilities, tactics, strengths, and weaknesses is necessary to optimally plan and
execute both offensive and defensive operations, ISRD personnel support all Space
AOC/JSpOC divisions. ISRD activities include IPOE, maintaining adversary orders
of battle, enemy COA prediction, identifying and tracking critical indicators of
pending foreign activity, recognizing and predicting foreign patterns and behavior,
and providing target system analysis and target nomination lists.
32
The Space AOC/JSpOC normally synchronizes its supporting operations with the
theaters because the supported commander drives tasking requirements. By adjusting
its operational schedule, the Space AOC/JSpOC optimizes support to the theater and
space integration. If more than one theater is being supported, an operational schedule
will be adjusted to balance support to all theaters.
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EXECUTION OF SPACE FORCES IN THEATER
Today, there are multi-Service space forces that can deploy to support operations.
Some of these forces are designed to integrate into various levels of command within
the joint force. Other deployable space forces possess capabilities that must be
integrated into the overall military campaign. Depending on theater requirements and
the global situation, the SecDef may attach these forces to geographic combatant
commanders conducting combat operations.
When deployed, Air Force space forces are normally attached to an AETF under
the OPCON of the COMAFFOR. When the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the CFACC,
the CFACC is normally given TACON of other Service space forces in excess of their
organic requirements. The CFACC should integrate and task assigned, attached, and
other Service forces into operations via the AOC and the ATO process. Air Force space
experts are matrixed across the AOC, ensuring space capabilities and effects are
integrated into theater operations via the ATO, for deployed space forces, and STO, for
global space forces.
Vietnam War – Even though USSTRATCOM and AFSPC were decades from
formation, a significant example of deployed space forces occurred during the
Vietnam War. Two DMSP ground stations were deployed to theater. One
went to Vietnam and the other went to Thailand to support military operations
with weather data. Weather was a major concern during Vietnam. The DMSP
satellites became the primary short-term forecasting tool for tactical military
operations. The impact was profound. The commander of Air Force operations
in Southeast Asia stated: “As far as I am concerned, this [satellite] weather
picture is probably the greatest innovation of the war.”
Air Force Space Support Teams (AFSSTs) (1993-2000) – The AFSSTs
deployed to several operations, supporting the JFACC in the AOC by providing
space education and expertise. Due to the success of the AFSST, the Air
Force recognized the need to integrate space expertise into theater staffs. By
the end of 2000, the Air Force had deactivated the AFSSTs and begun the
integration of space forces across the combat air forces.
Korea – Currently, the air component commander uses a deployable data
downlink station operated by the Army and Navy to integrate an in-theater
capability to support theater missile warning operations. The JTAGS provides
data for warning and attack operations against ballistic missile attack. The Air
Force provides mission data to JTAGS via the DSP satellite.
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INTEGRATING CIVIL, COMMERCIAL, FOREIGN SPACE ASSETS
Today, many civil, commercial, and foreign organizations contribute space
capabilities to military operations. Some organizations, such as those within the
communications and intelligence communities, have established processes for military
forces to request services. Non-military space assets provide alternatives to meet the
military’s operational needs.
Civil, commercial, and foreign space assets can be leveraged through pre-
established agreements, but often must be requested on an unplanned basis. For
example, the military may request NASA to redirect focus from a scientific mission to
support a military operation. DOD organizations like the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency and Defense Information Systems Agency are designated to
contract with commercial entities for services. In any case, because of unique C2
processes, pre-established agreements enhance effectiveness.
Similarly, foreign space assets, even those provided by our allies, may not be
easily integrated into military operations. Civil, commercial, and/or foreign space assets
may be specialized and not have sufficient flexibility for dynamic re-tasking, may require
unique procedures and equipment, and may not meet critical requirements for military
operations.
35
Examples Of Civil/Commercial Space Assets In The Fight
Vietnam War – During the Vietnam War, the military used a NASA
communications satellite, the synchronous communications satellite, to provide
communications between Saigon and Hawaii. Also, the military leased
commercial satellite communications circuits to connect Saigon and Hawaii to
meet administrative and logistical needs. Satellite usage during the Vietnam
conflict established the military practice of relying on civil and commercial space
systems.
Operation DESERT STORM – Civil remote sensing satellites played a key role
in providing wide-area information in the theater. The Pentagon spent up to
$6M on data from the US-owned Land Remote Sensing Satellite and French-
owned SPOT imaging satellites. These satellites were used to provide wide-
area surveillance to augment and complement US intelligence satellites.
36
attack against friendly space capabilities attractive. For example, some adversaries
have a limited ability to attack links or nodes of our space systems. During Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, the adversary employed GPS jammers to interfere with coalition
weapons employment. Military planners and operators must be prepared for electronic
as well as other types of attacks.
37
CHAPTER FIVE
... the US must, over the next few years, develop a cadre
of experienced, intensely knowledgeable people skilled in
applying space to combat. We are talking about an entirely
new breed of war fighters, who will ultimately transform the
power and scope of warfighting in the same way airpower
professionals have done in the last century.
—The Honorable Peter B. Teets
Former Acting Secretary of the Air Force,
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
and DOD Executive Agent for Space
38
EXERCISES
Exercises are conducted to achieve training objectives. For training to best
prepare participants for actual requirements, exercises should be planned and
conducted to resemble real operations as closely as possible. Space forces are no
exception and should be realistically exercised to the full extent possible, consistent with
operational requirements. To improve readiness, space forces should participate as a
full partner with air and information assets in large-scale exercises overseas and in the
US. Joint exercises in overseas locations provide realistic training for in-theater and
deployable Air Force forces, and also allow other Services and allied military forces to
gain valuable experience in integrating space capabilities. When it is impossible to
meet mission requirements and take part in an exercise, high fidelity simulators should
be used to present the correct “space picture” to participants.
EDUCATION
Education broadens understanding of space’s overall contribution to military
operations and gives operators an appreciation of how their specific area of expertise
impacts global and theater operations. Education is necessary to move space
professionals beyond the tactical and technical focus of their day-to-day jobs and to
assure the requisite level of technological skills necessary to sustain the space mission.
Space education goes beyond individual service requirements and encompasses all
organizations within the national security space environment.
39
WARGAMES
Wargames are used for educating personnel and testing of new concepts of
employment and organization. Because the United States has yet to meet a “space
peer” in conflict, wargames continue to be a primary means of assessing the potential
doctrinal implications of the use of space systems. Wargames generate insights into
the current and future uses of space in warfighting. This venue allows the US to test
potential actions used by adversaries to attack our space capabilities. An important
element in wargames is to demonstrate unanticipated consequences involved with
future space capabilities including vulnerabilities, policy, and force structure concerns.
Space forces should be modeled in a realistic fashion consistent with other military
forces.
RED TEAMING
EXPERIMENTS
Experiments are used for evaluating operational concepts and new technologies.
Through experiments, the Air Force gains knowledge about future systems technology
and processes, spiral development of developing technology and processes, and rapid
transition of proven technology and processes to the warfighter. Experimentation is
fundamentally different from exercises. Exercises involve training all personnel in
established processes on fielded systems. Combatant commanders are encouraged to
conduct experiments to test new operating concepts. However, because experiments
are designed to be repeated, desired system and process knowledge is gained.
However, lessons learned should not be overstated given the carefully orchestrated
nature of experiments.
40
SUGGESTED READINGS
Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the
Air Force Doctrine Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil)
Joint Publications
Other Publications
Arnold, David C., Spying from Space: Constructing America's Satellite Command and
Control Networks (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005).
Cleary, Mark C., The Cape: Military Space Operations, 1971–1992 (45th Space Wing,
History Office), 1994.
Gorn, Michael H., Harnessing the Genie, Science and Technology Forecasting for the
Air Force 1944-1986 (Office of Air Force History), 1988.
Goure, Daniel, and Christopher M. Szara, Air and Space Power in the New Millennium
(Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1997.
Hayes, Peter, Space Power for the Next Millenium (Air University Press), 2000.
Jelonek, Mark P., Toward an Air and Space Force: Naval Aviation and the Implications
for Space Power (Air University Press), 1999.
Johnson-Freese, Joan, and Roger Handberg, Space, the Dormant Frontier: Changing
the Paradigm for the 21st Century (Praeger), 1997.
41
MacDougall, Walter A., …the Heavens and the Earth (Johns Hopkins University Press),
1985.
Mantz, Michael R., The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power (Air University
Press), 1995.
Peebles, Curtis, High Frontier: The U.S. Air Force and the Military Space Program (Air
Force History and Museums Program), 1997.
Preston, Bob, Plowshares and Power: The Military Use of Civil Space (National Defense
University Press), 1994.
Spires, David N., Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership (Air
Force Space Command), 1997.
United Nations, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: text and status
of treaties and principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of
outer space, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (Office for Outer Space
Affairs, United Nations), 1994.
42
APPENDIX
ORBITAL FUNDAMENTALS
43
2. A Satellite Orbital Period
The size of a satellite’s orbit determines its period, or the time it takes to
complete one revolution. The lower the orbital altitude, the shorter the period. Common
orbits have periods ranging from about 90 minutes (low orbits just above the
atmosphere) to 24 hours (“geosynchronous” orbits approximately 22,300 statute miles
above the Earth’s surface) (see Figure A.2).
3. Eccentricity
Eccentricity is used to describe how much an orbit’s shape deviates from a circle.
The figure ranges from 0 to 1 with a value of 0 for a circular orbit.
4. Inclination
A satellite’s inclination is the angle between the Earth’s equatorial plane and the
satellite’s orbital plane (measured counterclockwise from the equatorial to the orbital
plane at the point where the satellite’s path crosses the equator headed northward) (see
Figure A.3). This angle determines what part of the Earth’s surface passes directly
beneath the satellite—a critical consideration in accomplishing its mission (see Figure
A.4). Depending on the inclination, a single satellite may not be able to provide
coverage of a specific point on or region of the Earth. However, a constellation may
have that capability. Other space assets—civil, commercial, international, and military—
may be used to supplement the satellite’s capability and provide continuous, non-
intrusive coverage.
44
Figure A.3. Inclination
45
a. Low Earth Orbit (LEO). LEO is the easiest type of orbit to reach, and the satellite’s
proximity to the Earth’s surface provides the best potential for high-resolution imagery
(see Figure A.6). However, satellites in these orbits can view a smaller portion of the
surface of the Earth at any one time than those at higher altitudes, and atmospheric
drag can shorten mission duration. LEO applications include manned flight,
environmental monitoring and other ISR, and communication missions.
b. Polar Orbits. A polar orbit is one with an inclination near 90 degrees. A satellite in a
polar orbit will travel pole to pole, covering all or almost all of the surface of the earth in
12 to 24 hours, making this type of orbit very useful for environmental monitoring and
other ISR missions. A particular type of near polar orbit is a sun synchronous orbit. It
has an inclination of 90 to 120 degrees and maintains a constant orientation towards the
sun throughout the year, resulting in similar lighting conditions every orbit and making it
very useful to detect changes in environmental conditions or surface features of the
Earth over time.
46
Figure A.7. Polar Orbit
c. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). MEO provides a satellite a view of a larger portion of
the Earth at any one time than LEO. While atmospheric drag is negligible, a lot more
energy is required to place a satellite in these orbits (see Figure A.8). Current
applications include navigation systems (e.g., GPS).
d. Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO). HEO is an orbit with a large eccentricity, and an orbit
shape of an ellipse vs. a circle. A useful feature of a satellite in a HEO is that the
satellite travels relatively slowly when near apogee, giving a long dwell time combined
with visibility of a large portion of the Earth. The former Soviet Union made extensive
use of a HEO called a Molniya orbit that has a period of 12 hours, an inclination of 63.4
degrees, an eccentricity of 0.7, and an apogee over the Northern Hemisphere (See
47
Figure A.9). This particular HEO is very useful for providing communications or
coverage in the high northern latitudes, a region less well covered by satellites in
geostationary orbits. HEO orbits are useful for communications and some ISR
missions.
48
Variations
6. Constellations
a. When a single satellite cannot provide the coverage necessary to accomplish a given
mission, multiple satellites performing a single mission (a constellation) are used to
provide global coverage or increase timeliness of coverage (see Figure A.11 and Figure
A.12). Navigation constellations (such as GPS) are designed to ensure that signals from
multiple satellites can be simultaneously received at a location on the ground, improving
the accuracy of the information coming from those satellites. Communications
constellations, on the other hand, are designed to ensure that at least one satellite is
within line of sight of both ends of the communications link, and may include both
equatorial and polar components. ISR constellations have satellites in both high and
low altitude orbits, providing both wide-area coverage and high-resolution data.
49
Figure A.12. Intelligence and Weather, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance
Constellations
b. Weather and reconnaissance systems may require constellations that combine high
and low altitude systems. This provides on-board sensors with the capability to acquire
wide-area, low-resolution coverage and limited field of view, high-resolution coverage,
respectively. Some ISR systems, on the other hand, need continuous access to the
areas surveyed and usually rely on high altitude, long dwell time orbits.
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GLOSSARY
DE developmental education
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized
DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces
DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
DOD Department of Defense
DSP Defense Support Program
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GEO geosynchronous earth orbit
GPS Global Positioning System
GWOT global war on terrorism
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SC space control
SCA space coordinating authority
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SFA space force application
SFE space force enhancement
SOD space operations directive
SOPS space operations squadron
SPINS special instructions
SS space support
STO space tasking order
SWS space warning squadron
UA unmanned aircraft
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
Definitions
joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air
operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint
force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
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missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. See
also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) [The joint force air and space component
commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command and
control the integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force commander’s
objectives. This title emphasizes the US Air Force position that air power and space
power together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power
alone.] [AFDD 2] {Words in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for
clarity.}
space assets. A generic term which may refer to any of the following individually or in
combination: space systems, individual parts of a space system, space personnel, or
supporting infrastructure. (AFDD 2-2)
space capability. 1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability
of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in space (e.g., a ground-based or
airborne laser capable of negating a satellite). See also space; space asset. [JP 1-02]
[The ability of a space asset or system to accomplish a mission.] [AFDD 2-2] {Words in
brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
space control. Combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to
ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when
directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The space control mission area
includes: surveillance of space; protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention
of an adversary's ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to US
national security interests; negation of space systems and services used for purposes
hostile to US national security interests; and directly supporting battle management,
command, control, communications, and intelligence. (JP 1-02) [Operations to attain
and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit
space capabilities while denying an adversaries ability to do the same (e.g. protection,
prevention and negation). SC is achieved through offensive counterspace and
defensive counterspace operations. Note: The Air Force uses counterspace as an
equivalent definition of the space control mission.] Also called SC (AFDD 2-2) {Words
in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
space coordinating authority. An authority in theater to coordinate joint space
operations and integrate space capabilities. SCA can be retained by the JFC but is
generally delegated down to the functional component commander with the prepon-
derance of space forces, expertise in space operations, and ability to command and
control. (AFDD 2-2)
space forces. The space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations,
and personnel necessary to access, use and, if directed, control space for national
security. (JP 1-02) [Operational military units which consist of some combination of
space assets such as space-based and terrestrial equipment, facilities, organizations,
and personnel used to exploit space for national security.] [AFDD 2-2] {Words in
brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
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space force application. Combat operations in, through, and from space to influence
the course and outcome of conflict. The space force application mission area includes
ballistic missile defense and force projection. Also called SFA (JP 1-02)
space situation awareness. The requisite current and predictive knowledge of space
events, threats, activities, conditions, and space system (space, ground, link) status,
capabilities, constraints and employment—current and future, friendly and hostile—to
enable commanders, decision makers, planners, and operators to gain and maintain
space superiority across the spectrum of conflict. Space situation awareness is the
cornerstone of space operations, all-inclusive of space force enhancement, space
support, and space control. Also called SSA (AFDD 2-2)
space superiority. The degree of dominance in space of one force over another that
permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space, and
special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by
the opposing force. (JP 1-02) [That level of control in the space domain that one force
enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place
without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space superiority may be
localized in time and space, or it may be broad and enduring.] (AFDD 2-2) {Words in
brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
space support. Combat service support operations to deploy and sustain military and
intelligence systems in space. The space support mission area includes launching and
deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, and deorbiting
and recovering space vehicles, if required. (JP 1-02) [Those operations conducted with
the objective of deploying, sustaining, and augmenting elements or capabilities of
military space systems. Space support consists of spacelift, on-orbit support, deorbiting
and recovering space vehicles, and reconstitution of space forces. Also called SS
(AFDD 2-2) {Words in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for
clarity.}
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space supremacy. That level of control in the space domain that one force enjoys over
another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without
effective interference by the opposing force. Space supremacy may be localized in time
and space, or it may be broad and enduring. (AFDD 2-2)
space system. A system with a major functional component that operates in the space
environment or affects a space-based capability. Space systems consist of nodes and
links. There are three nodes: space, terrestrial, and airborne. A space system also
consists of links: control and mission. (AFDD 2-2)
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