3 01 Afdp Counterair

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-01
COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS
15 JUNE 2023
Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01, Counterair Operations
Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01,

Counterair Operations
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS ..................................................................... 1

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR ........................................................................................ 4
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR ........................................................................................ 5
INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ............................................................. 7
Chapter 2: COMMAND AND CONTROL ....................................................................... 8
COUNTERAIR ROLES AND AUTHORITIES .............................................................. 9
THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM......................................................................... 12
Chapter 3: COUNTERAIR PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT ...................................... 16
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING .................................................................. 16
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING .................................................................. 20
COUNTERAIR SUPPORT PLANNING ..................................................................... 22
COUNTERAIR ASSESSMENT ................................................................................. 23
Chapter 4: EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................. 25
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR ...................................................................................... 25
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR ...................................................................................... 27
References ................................................................................................................... 30
“The Air Force organizes, trains, and equips forces to be an air component to a
joint force commander (JFC). As part of the joint force’s air component, our
forces must be prepared to accomplish JFC objectives. The air component
commander’s administrative authorities are derived from Title 10, U.S. Code,
and exercised as the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). The air
component commander’s operational authorities are delegated from the JFC
and exercised as both the COMAFFOR, over Air Force forces, and as the
functional joint force air component commander (JFACC), over joint air forces
made available for tasking. Thus, the air component commander leads Air Force
forces as the COMAFFOR and the JFC’s joint air operations as the JFACC. This
duality of authorities is expressed in the axiom: Airmen work for Airmen and the
senior Airman works for the JFC.”
--Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 1, The Air Force
Since the COMAFFOR and JFACC are nearly always the same individual,
this AFDP will use the term “air component commander” when referring
to duties or functions that could be carried out by either or both, unless
explicit use of the term “COMAFFOR” or “JFACC” is necessary for clarity.
FOREWORD
Doctrine embodies the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions
in support of national objectives. It is a body of carefully developed, authoritative ideas
that have been officially approved and establishes a common frame of reference for
solving military problems. However, to be an effective guide, the challenge for doctrine is
to be simultaneously focused on the past, applicable in the present, and facing toward
the future; all in equal measure.
The United States Air Force must prepare for a new reality, one in which decision
advantage, freedom of maneuver, and freedom of action are increasingly challenged. To
deter, compete, and win across the competition continuum, Airmen must advance
solutions that allow us to conduct operations in highly contested environments. Broadly,
the joint force’s approach to meeting this challenge is encapsulated in joint all-domain
operations (JADO). Together with joint all-domain command and control, JADO provides
a JFC the means to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict the convergence of effects
across all domains to achieve operational advantage.
AFDP-1, The Air Force, supports this effort by establishing mission command as the
Airman’s philosophy for the command and control of airpower. Despite our advances,
adversaries will likely retain an ability to deny or degrade our communications. Therefore,
decision makers at all echelons should have the ability to develop understanding, make
decisions, and converge effects when disconnected from higher echelons. Mission
command embraces centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized
execution as the foundation for the responsiveness, flexibility, and initiative necessary to
ensure capabilities continue to function, even when information is degraded or denied.
AFDP 3-01, Counterair Operations, though firmly rooted in the past, also looks to the
future, adapting where needed to ensure continued utility and efficacy for the challenges
to come. Properly planned and executed, counterair operations are a crucial element of
the fires and protection joint functions that enable achievement of joint force commander
objectives in cooperation, competition, and conflict. Airmen should be trained to plan and
execute operations in a distributed and decentralized manner and execute missions when
isolated from higher-level decision makers. Airmen at all levels should be comfortable
making decisions and operating based on the commander’s intent and the tenet of
mission command.
Though not completely adapted to the challenges identified here, this doctrine represents
what we believe based on the best evidence to date. As we continue to advance our
capabilities, it is critical we continue to evolve our doctrine. Throughout history, innovative
Airmen have developed methods of employment to meet operational challenges. We will
continue to do so.
CHAPTER 1: COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

Control of the air is normally one of the first priorities of the joint force. This is especially
important whenever the enemy is capable of threatening friendly forces from the air or
inhibiting a joint force commander’s (JFC’s) ability to conduct operations. Whether directly
in the air, or through advances in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities, peer and
near-peer competitors are capable of challenging or denying control of the air. Potential
adversaries have significant—and constantly improving—ballistic missile forces and con-
tinue to develop advanced aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles,
and sophisticated integrated air defense systems (IADS). These capabilities, supported
by peer and near-peer cyberspace and space advancements, present growing challenges
to the joint force’s ability to achieve control of the air.
Counterair operations ensure freedom to maneuver, freedom to attack, and freedom from
attack. Additionally, counterair capabilities can deter hostile adversary action by providing
a credible military threat to enemy maneuver and attack capabilities. As one of its primary
missions, the United States Air Force (USAF) brings resources, capabilities, and
experience to the joint force to achieve counterair objectives.1 The counterair mission
integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain control of the air and
protection of forces by neutralizing or destroying threats from all domains that directly or
indirectly challenge control of the air. These forces may include, but are not limited to,
aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), ballistic missiles, airfields, fuel, command and
control (C2) facilities and systems, and network links.
Airpower’s inherent flexibility allows missions and aircraft to shift from defense to offense,
adapting as needed to changing conditions in the operational environment. Operations
may be conducted in and over enemy, friendly, and international airspace, land, and
waters, as well as in space and cyberspace. Counterair missions may involve seeking out
and destroying an enemy’s aircraft and missiles (air-to-air, surface-to-air, cruise, and bal-
listic), through measures designed to minimize the effectiveness of those systems, or
countering enemy efforts in other domains, such as space and cyberspace.
CONTROL OF THE AIR
Control of the air describes a level of influence in the air domain relative to that of an
adversary. The relative degree of control is typically categorized within a spectrum
ranging from parity, where neither adversary can claim control over the other, to air
superiority, to air supremacy. To enable successful execution of joint operations such
as strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support (CAS), the desired degree of control
is typically air superiority. In a peer or near-peer conflict, air superiority may not be achiev-
able in all places or at all times.
1Joint doctrine provides broad guidance for countering air and missile threats (see JP 3-01, Countering
Air and Missile Threats), but does not describe the entire continuum of control of the air, as this
publication does.
1
Control of the Air Continuum
Air parity is a condition in which no force has control of the air. It is a situation in
which both friendly and adversary land, maritime, and air operations may encounter
significant interference by the opposing force. Parity is not a standoff, nor does it mean
aerial maneuver or ballistic missile operations have halted. On the contrary, parity may
be typified by fleeting, intensely contested battles at critical points during an operation
with maximum effort exerted between combatants in their attempt to achieve some level
of favorable control.
Air superiority is that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct
of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air
and missile threats. Air superiority may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically)
and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.
Air supremacy is that degree of control of the air wherein the opposing force is inca-
pable of effective interference within the operational area using air and missile threats.2
Air supremacy may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it
may be broad and enduring. This is the highest level of control of the air that air forces
can pursue. Air supremacy may be difficult to achieve in a peer or near-peer conflict.
Control of the air hinges on preventing prohibitive or effective interference to friendly
forces from enemy forces in the air domain. Air supremacy prevents effective interfer-
ence. It does not imply that no interference exists. Rather, any attempted interference can
be easily countered or should be so negligible as to have little or no effect. While air
supremacy is most desirable, it may not be operationally feasible. Air superiority, even
local or mission specific, may provide sufficient freedom of action to create desired ef-
fects. Commanders should determine the minimum level of control of the air required to
accomplish their mission and assign an appropriate level of effort to achieve it.
2 JP 3-01.
2
What Is Parity, Superiority, or Supremacy?

In modern warfare, parity is often not recognized
when it exists. It is more easily identified
retrospectively as the situation immediately
preceding the point at which momentum swung
in favor of one combatant over another.
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian
surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries in the
Sinai desert were employed so effectively that
the Israeli Air Force—an otherwise effective
force—could not accomplish its air interdiction or
suppression of enemy air defenses mission. The
Egyptian Air Force was similarly unable to
interfere with Israeli maneuver, creating an air
parity situation.
Both air and ground force maneuver came to a
halt for 48 hours. The stalemate—the period of
air parity—was not broken until the Israelis
changed tactics by using direct infantry attacks
on the Egyptian SAM system, an example of
integrating capabilities of the joint force into
counterair operations. Those attacks swung the
momentum back to the Israeli side by allowing
their Air Force to regain control of the air and
eventually assert air superiority across the entire
front.
By war’s end, the Israeli Air Force was virtually
unchallenged in the sky.
EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO COUNTERAIR

Like other air operations, counterair is fundamentally effects-based. This means that
counterair operations are designed, planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to
influence or change system behavior to achieve desired outcomes. Effective counterair
operations should be part of a larger, coherent plan that logically ties the overall
operation’s end state to all objectives, effects, and tasks. This plan should guide execution
and the means of gaining feedback. Measuring success should be planned for and
evaluated throughout execution and assessment.
In an effects-based framework, effects fall into two broad categories: direct effects—the
immediate outcomes created by friendly actions—and indirect effects—higher-order ef-
fects created on adversarial or neutral actors within the operational environment.
3
The counterair framework, illustrated in the figure “Counterair Framework,” shows typical
friendly actions taken to create effects in support of counterair operations. It lists and
categorizes numerous distinct tasks or missions conducted within the larger framework.
The finer distinctions do not substantially change the way operations are conducted but
may help Airmen understand the elements of offensive counterair (OCA) and defensive
counterair (DCA). Note that in many cases the distinctions between the categories may
blur. For example, an attack on an enemy SAM site may be considered an attack opera-
tion or suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
(Source: JP 3-01)
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
OCA operations seek to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of threats,
resulting in greater freedom from attack and increased freedom of action. It includes four
operations used to achieve specific counterair effects: attack operations, SEAD, fighter
escort, and fighter sweep. Tasked units normally have decentralized execution authority
and are given significant latitude to plan and coordinate tasks. OCA efforts should be
properly planned for, directed, and integrated with other offensive operations.
 Attack operations. Attack operations are intended to destroy, disrupt, or degrade
counterair targets on the ground and may be accomplished through kinetic or
non-kinetic actions. These missions are directed against enemy air and missile
threats, their C2, and their support infrastructure (e.g., airfields, launch sites,
launchers, fuel, supplies, and runways). The main goal is to prevent enemy employ-
ment of air and missile capabilities.
4
 SEAD. SEAD operations aim to neutralize, destroy, or degrade enemy surface-based

air defenses by destructive or disruptive means. SEAD requirements may vary
according to mission requirements, system capabilities, and threat complexity. SEAD
planners should coordinate with intelligence personnel to ensure collection and
exploitation opportunities are considered prior to destroying or disrupting emitters.
SEAD operations3 fall into three categories:
 Area of responsibility (AOR) / joint operations area (JOA) air defense sys-
tem suppression. These operations target high-payoff air defense assets, re-
sulting in the greatest degradation of the enemy's total system.
 Localized suppression. These operations are normally confined to geographical
areas associated with specific ground targets or friendly transit routes and
contribute to local air superiority.
 Opportune suppression. These operations are normally unplanned and include
aircrew self-defense and attack against targets of opportunity. The JFC or joint
forces air component commander (JFACC) normally establishes specific rules of
engagement (ROE) to permit the conduct of opportune suppression.
 Fighter escort. Fighter escort provides dedicated protection sorties by air-to-air
capable fighters in support of other air operations over enemy territory. Fighter escort
may also be used in a DCA role to protect aircraft such as a high-value airborne asset
(HVAA).
 Fighter sweep. Fighter sweep is an offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out
and destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area. Normally,
fighter sweeps are conducted to achieve local or JOA-wide air superiority. The nature
of air and missile threat and JFC or JFACC objectives are the primary determinants
regarding employment of fighter sweep missions versus attack operations.
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
DCA operations defend friendly lines of communication, deny the enemy the freedom to
carry out offensive attacks from the air, and provide a secure area from which all elements
of the joint force can operate. DCA operations can be conducted in conjunction with, or
independent of, OCA operations. Effective OCA greatly reduces the DCA requirement,
freeing assets for more offensive operations. However, some degree of DCA is normally
necessary in every operation. In some cases, DCA may be the only means to counter air
and missile threats due to political constraints. Generally, DCA is classified into two
categories: active and passive air and missile defense (AMD).
AMD—both active and passive—is direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces
3For additional information on SEAD, see AFTTP 3-2.28, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (MTTP) for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.
5
and assets. It includes actions to counter enemy manned and unmanned aircraft (UA),
aerodynamic missiles (cruise, air-to-surface, and air-to-air), and ballistic missiles. Several
DCA tasks help provide a permissive environment for friendly air action.4
 Active air and missile defense. Active AMD consists of air defense (AD) and ballistic
missile defense (BMD). The aggregation of these elements—a mix of weapon and
sensor systems across the joint force—form an IADS, supported by secure and highly
responsive C2 systems, to find, fix, track, target, and destroy or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile airborne threats. The IADS is unique to each operational area
and contributes to defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that
increase the probability for success.
 Air defense. AD includes defensive measures designed to destroy attacking
aircraft and aerodynamic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such
attack. It includes the use of aircraft, SAMs, antiaircraft artillery, electromagnetic
warfare (EW) (including directed energy), multiple sensors, and other available
weapons or capabilities.
 Ballistic missile defense. BMD includes defensive measures designed to
destroy attacking enemy ballistic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness
of such attacks.
These actions are closely integrated to form essential DCA capabilities, but may involve
different defensive weapon systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures.
 Passive air and missile defense. Passive AMD includes all measures, other than
active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets. Passive AMD is often an additional means of
defense should active AMD efforts fail. Passive AMD measures are considered the
same for air and missile threats, with one exception: detection and warning of ballistic
missile attack is normally provided by supporting assets from outside the theater in
concert with deployed C2 systems and sensors. These are briefly summarized in the
section on execution considerations for passive defense:
 Detection and warning.
 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defenses.
 Camouflage, concealment, and deception (including countermeasures
designed to reduce electronic and infrared signatures, and stealth technology).
 Hardening.
 Reconstitution.
 Dispersion.
4 For additional information on AMD, see AFTTP 3-2.31, MTTP for Air and Missile Defense.
6
 Redundancy.
 Mobility.
INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) is an approach to counter some, but not all,
air and missile threats. IAMD integrates capabilities and overlapping operations to defend
the homeland and United States (US) national interests, protect the joint force, and enable
freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to create adverse effects from their
air and missile capabilities.
(Source: JP 3-01)
At the theater level, IAMD combines OCA attack operations and DCA operations to
achieve the JFC’s desired effects. Within the IAMD approach, OCA attack operations are
commanded by the JFACC and DCA is commanded by the area air defense commander
(AADC). The JFACC is responsible for integration between the OCA and DCA compo-
nents of IAMD. It is important to note that the OCA attack operations component of IAMD
are not planned and executed in isolation but are part of a wider offensive effort against
a variety of enemy targets. Additionally, OCA attack operations include missions that con-
tribute to air superiority (e.g., attacks on enemy fighter airfields) which are not part of the
IAMD approach. At the tactical level, IAMD incorporates counter rocket, artillery, and
mortar activities. These tactical level activities are the responsibility of the ground
commander; not the JFACC or AADC. Beyond the theater level, IAMD supports global
missile defense, homeland defense, and global strike.
7
CHAPTER 2: COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Airman’s philosophy for the C2 of airpower is mission command, executed through
centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution (CC-DC-DE). Of
CC-DC-DE’s three components, decentralized execution is the most critical to maximize
airpower’s flexibility and lethality in combat. Guided by clear commander’s intent and mis-
sion orders, decentralized execution allows subordinates to exploit fleeting opportunities
in dynamic situations.5 However, the capabilities of modern communication and near-
real-time display technologies make centralized execution—i.e., direct control of missions
from the air operations center (AOC)—possible. As a result, at various times in recent
operations, senior commanders have attempted a degree of control approaching central-
ized execution. Such command arrangements degrade flexibility and may not be effective
in a fully stressed, dynamic combat environment. Centralized execution is seldom, if ever,
appropriate for counterair operations—especially OCA. Future conflicts involving opera-
tions in a contested, degraded, or operationally limited environment further emphasize
the importance of mission command.
Centralized Execution During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

The six months of major combat in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in
Afghanistan saw not only centralized planning, but also a degree of centralized
execution that was unique in the US experience… [Technology] allowed sensor-
to-shooter links to be shortened, in some cases, from hours to minutes. It also,
however, resulted in an oversubscribed target-approval process that lengthened
rather than compressed the kill chain. As a result, the human factor became the
main constraint impeding more effective time-critical targeting…
This... close connectivity, however, cut both ways. Although it was helpful—and
even essential—up to a point, it also often resulted in gridlock, in that it encouraged
higher-level leaders and their staffs to try to micromanage the fighting. Senior
leaders often intervened at the tactical level not because circumstances required
it, but simply because they could. As a result, fast-moving targets sometimes were
allowed to get away.
―Benjamin S. Lambeth
by permission, excerpted from Air Power Against Terror: America’s
Conduct of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
Airmen should expect most counterair operations to be joint or combined efforts. As the
supported commander for counterair operations, other component assets capable of
performing counterair missions are normally made available to the JFACC for tasking.
Therefore, it is essential Airmen understand other joint force components and participat-
ing allies’ counterair capabilities and how to integrate them in joint and combined coun-
terair operations.
5 AFDP 1, The Air Force.
8
Effective counterair operations require a reliable C2 capability. C2 assets should be

capable of exchanging information rapidly with other services, components, and multina-
tional partners. The information flow supports the chain of command and should be as
complete, secure, and near real-time as possible.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Effective operations require the establishment and promulgation of easily understood
ROE. ROE are established to convey national leadership and senior military commander
intent and guidance regarding the use of force. They reflect legal constraints and political
imperatives that may impact an operation’s overall end state. Effective ROE should align
with commander’s intent and balance restrictions with risk and the imperative for success.
When establishing the ROE, commanders and planners should obtain the legal advice of
the supporting judge advocate. Furthermore, where supplemental measures restrict
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approved ROE, notification must be given to SecDef
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS).6
Overly restrictive ROE can be contrary to decentralized execution and may lead Airmen
to rely on ever-increasing levels of oversight and approval, potentially leading to situations
where Airmen hesitate to act. Such a scenario may increase risk, both to the mission and
to Airmen. As such, commanders should be careful not to create ROE so restrictive that
they place friendly forces at unnecessary risk or at an operational disadvantage. This
could be a pitfall in a peer or near-peer, contested environment.
COUNTERAIR ROLES AND AUTHORITIES

As the JFACC, and the supported commander for counterair operations, the air compo-
nent commander’s responsibilities normally include planning, coordination, allocation,
and tasking based on JFC priorities and guidance. Additional responsibilities include AMD
and airspace control. As such, the air component commander is normally assigned the
roles of AADC and airspace control authority (ACA). Assigning responsibility and authority
to coordinate and integrate airspace control and counterair operations to one air com-
mander greatly enhances unity of command.7
AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER
Splitting C2 of AMD assets among multiple commanders reduces their effectiveness.
Therefore, AADC is assigned to the component commander with the C2 capability to plan,
execute, and assess AMD with other air operations. Likewise, separating BMD from the
overall AMD structure has the potential to seriously degrade the overall AMD effort and
increase the risk of friendly fire among multi-layered AMD assets. To facilitate AMD, the
AADC establishes an IADS. The friendly IADS is a robust integration of the Services’
AMD capabilities and comprises sensors, weapons, C2 systems, and personnel.
6 For additional information on ROE, see JP 3-84, Legal Support and CJCS Instruction (CJCSI)
3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement / Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces
7 For additional information, see AFDP 3-30, Command and Control.
9
Effective integration of surface-to-air weapons into the DCA plan requires a reliable link
with air operations and a reliable identification (ID) process. All available surface-to-air
assets in the AOR should be incorporated into the DCA plan and are subject to the
integrated procedures, ROE, and weapons control measures directed by the AADC. The
AADC should be granted the necessary authority to deconflict and control engagements
and to exercise real-time battle management when required.
Area air defense and airspace control plans. Together with service or functional
component commanders, the AADC develops, integrates, and distributes the area air
defense plan (AADP). Planners should strive to create a reliable and consistent common
operational picture (i.e., a fused and correlated air, ground, maritime, space, and cyber-
space picture) available to all supporting C2 facilities. The AADP should arrange a lay-
ered, overlapping defense to allow for multiple engagement opportunities, contain
detailed weapons control and engagement procedures, and specify coordination
measures required for AMD.8
Combat identification. One of the AADC’s most critical responsibilities is to provide guid-
ance and articulate combat identification (CID) procedures for counterair. CID is the
process of achieving an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational
environment sufficient to support an engagement decision.9 The objective of CID is to
obtain the highest confidence positive identification (PID) possible. Lacking PID, the
objective is to reach the level of confidence in an ID that can be supported by the ROE
for an engagement authority to decide. ID can be accomplished through several recog-
nized methods. The JFC approves the procedures used for ID and designates who may
be delegated that authority in the AADP, special instructions (SPINS), and airspace
control plan (ACP).
Accurate and timely ID enhances real-time tactical decisions by allowing timely, beyond-
visual-range engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles while conserving resources and
reducing the risk to friendly forces. CID information may be obtained from various land-,
air-, and space-based systems, along with coordination measures documented in the
ACP or the airspace control order (ACO). To be effective, this CID “system of systems”
requires effective guidance from the AADC and a common data link architecture with the
goal of near-real-time information sharing among platforms. To avoid a single point of
failure, no single node acts as an exclusive conduit of all CID information. Electronic
methods, which provide the most rapid and reliable means of ID, are normally used when
available. Visual and procedural means of ID are not as practical but may be required in
some situations. Some individual weapons systems retain an autonomous CID capabil-
ity.10
AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY
The air component commander is normally designated as the ACA. The ACA is respon-
sible for airspace control, coordinating airspace use, developing airspace control policies
8 A detailed description of the AADP is available in AFTTP 3-2.31.

9 JP 3-01.
10 For additional information on CID, see AFTTP 3-2.31.
10
and procedures, and directing required coordination among theater airspace users. The
ACA establishes an airspace control system for the JFC, integrates that system with host
nations, and coordinates user requirements. A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide
the flexibility needed within the airspace control system to rapidly employ forces.
The ACA incorporates these procedures into an ACP and, after JFC approval, promul-
gates it throughout the theater. The ACP should be integrated closely with the AADP and
is implemented through the ACO. The ACO is published either as part of the air tasking
order (ATO) or as a separate document to implement specific control procedures for
established time periods. The ACO may include airspace coordinating measures, fire
support coordinating measures, and AD measures such as minimum risk routes, combat
air patrols, fire support coordination lines, fighter engagement zones, and missile engage-
ment zones.11
REGIONAL AND SECTOR AIR DEFENSE COMMANDERS
During complex operations conducted in a large theater, the AADC may recommend, and
the JFC may approve, the division of the operational area into separate AD regions. The
AADC and regional air defense commander (RADC), as approved by the JFC, may
choose to further divide regions into sectors, each with a sector air defense commander
(SADC) with authorities appropriate for their responsibilities. Generally, regions and sec-
tors are based on geographic size and terrestrial features. When RADCs/SADCs are em-
ployed in support of BMD operations, regional and sector boundaries are normally
assigned according to predicted ballistic missile impact points.12
IDENTIFICATION, COMMIT, AND ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITIES
In counterair operations it is imperative that the command lines, engagement authorities,
engagement procedures, ROE, and terminology be standardized, documented, clearly
understood, and rehearsed (if possible) before an engagement decision is necessary.13
 Identification authority. ID authority is the authority to assign an identity classifi-
cation to an unknown contact, if possible. The AADC establishes the policy for ID
authority, with JFC approval. Execution of the ID policy is normally delegated to the
tactical level, but care must be taken that the tactical commander is capable of
performing the ID function in real time.
 Commit authority. The area defense echelon with commit authority is permitted to
authorize assets to prepare to engage an entity (e.g., position a DCA fighter to inter-
cept or direct an air defense artillery [ADA] unit to track and target). Commit authority
does not imply engagement authority.
 Engagement authority. This authority may be delegated to a subordinate
commander. The AMD entity with engagement authority is permitted to authorize
engagement of an air or missile threat. For AMD engagements within the theater, the
11 For more information see AFDP 3-52, Airspace Control, and AFTTP 3-2.78, MTTP for Airspace Control.
12 For more information on RADC and SADC, see JP 3-01.
13 For more information on these authorities, see JP 3-01.
11
authority is normally delegated to the AADC who may further delegate the
engagement authority to tactical levels (e.g., RADC or SADC).
THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

The theater air control system (TACS) provides the air component commander with an
overarching means to C2 counterair operations. It includes the personnel, procedures,
and equipment necessary to plan, direct, control, coordinate, and assess air operations.
The TACS can be tailored to support contingencies of any size. TACS elements may be
employed in garrison, deployed for contingencies, or deployed to augment theater-
specific systems.
The TACS is divided into ground and airborne elements based on the environment in
which they operate, not on the portion of the operations for which they provide C2.14 In
joint operations, the TACS may be combined with other service or functional component
C2 elements to form the theater air-ground system (TAGS).15 All AMD elements should
coordinate continuously to eliminate duplication of effort and ensure adequate commit-
ment of assigned weapons against threats.
THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM GROUND ELEMENTS
Air operations center. The AOC is the senior element of the TACS and is the principal
entity to design, plan, direct, control and assess combat air operations. The AOC
disseminates tasking orders; executes and directs execution of daily air and cyberspace
operations; provides rapid reaction to immediate situations; and provides the capability to
conduct deliberate and dynamic targeting. In joint or multi-national operations, the AOC
is typically designated the joint or combined AOC (JAOC/CAOC) respectively.
Within the AOC, the airspace control management team integrates the use of airspace in
theater. It provides the current air and surface situation and is responsible to the ACA for
developing the ACP and coordinating airspace control activities. The AOC may perform
certain airspace management and airspace control functions directly or delegate them to
a control and reporting center (CRC) or other tactical C2 agency. The AOC may be
assigned responsibility to manage data links for all components and participating nations
(vital for CID and air battle management) and management of the overall AD effort. The
AOC may also perform C2 liaison, mission control, combat search and rescue (CSAR)
assistance, threat warning, and coordination of ADA unless delegated to the CRC, air
support operations center (ASOC), or other tactical C2 elements.
Control and reporting center. The CRC is the airspace control and surveillance radar
facility directly subordinate to the AOC. The CRC may be assigned an airspace control
sector by the ACA and manages the functions of all USAF surface radars deployed within
that sector. The CRC’s primary mission is to provide airspace management and airspace
control, including aircraft detection, tracking, and ID. The CRC also issues scramble or
14 For additional information on each TACS element, see AFDP 3-52; AFTTP 3-3.TACS and AFTTP
3-2.17, MTTP for the Theater Air-Ground System.
15 Other service control systems include the Army air-ground system, the Navy tactical air control system,
the Marine air command and control system, or the special operations air-ground system.
12
airborne orders, performs data link management functions, and manages AMD activities
within its sector. Additionally, the CRC provides C2 liaison, mission control, CSAR
support, aircraft threat warning, and coordinates ADA through a collocated ADA fire
control officer. The CRC may further delegate control of surveillance areas to subordinate
radar units or airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft within its sector.
When assigned RADC or SADC roles, the CRC establishes operating procedures for
initial assignment of airborne targets to ADA and fighters, ensuring defensive assets are
employed in mutually supporting roles. The AADC may delegate engagement authority
to the CRC as part of RADC or SADC responsibilities. In a CID-constrained environment,
the CRC may be the lowest tactical level with engagement authority for enemy air and
missile threats.
Notional Theater Air Control System
Air support operations center. As part of the TACS ground element, the ASOC is the
functional air component responsible for planning, coordinating, controlling, and execut-
ing air operations that directly support ground combat forces. The ASOC can affect the
counterair battle through coordination for SEAD missions, management of some airspace
control measures, CAS, and others. The ASOC is usually collocated with the senior Army
tactical echelon and coordinates operations with the permanently assigned tactical air
control party, Army fires cell, and the AOC.
13
Battle control center. The battle control center (BCC) is a ground-based fixed element
of the TACS, comprised of four major systems: a C2 processing and display system—
Battle Control System-Fixed; primary and secondary radar capabilities; flight-plan
processing and identification systems; and communication and data link connectivity. The
BCC fuses all-source sensor and intelligence data into a common tactical picture and
disseminates tactical warning and attack assessment information to the appropriate users
and decision-makers. It can perform all tasks that facilitate the full spectrum of airpower
including ATO execution, airspace management and integration, surveillance and CID,
and data link management. The BCC can find, fix, track, and target airborne threats and
exchange air picture data with other C2 systems and combat aircraft (to include
aerospace control alert fighters on the ground in scramble status) through tactical data
link (TDL) systems.
The USAF employs four BCCs as the primary tactical C2 nodes for homeland defense
and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in support of the Commander, North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and US Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) and US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Combatant
Commanders (CCDRs). BCCs operate continuously to provide wide-area surveillance,
early warning, battle management, target detection and tracking, and non-lethal warning
and weapons control functions. In the event of lost connectivity, BCCs can operate au-
tonomously and provide immediate mutual support and redundancy if another BCC
becomes inoperative.
THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM AIRBORNE ELEMENTS
Airborne Warning and Air Control System. The AWACS provides the TACS with a
flexible and capable airborne radar platform. It provides battle management, C2, and is
normally among the first systems to arrive in theater during contingency operations.
Through voice and data connectivity, AWACS issues threat warnings, directs aircraft on
counterair missions, manages air refueling, provides a common tactical picture, and
coordinates CSAR efforts. AWACS can detect and identify hostile airborne and SAM
threats and assign weapon systems to engage enemy targets.
AWACS may carry an airborne battle staff or airborne command element authorized to
redirect forces under the authority of the JFACC and AADC. When employed with an
airborne command element, AWACS can scramble and divert aircraft conducting coun-
terair operations and recommend changes in AD warning conditions. The AWACS can
perform many, but not all, CRC functions.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) is a long-range, airborne sensor system that provides real-time
radar surveillance information on moving and stationary surface targets via secure data
links to air and surface commanders. JSTARS information builds situational awareness
for the JFC and JFACC to direct air operations, update target information, and provide
real-time dynamic targeting. JSTARS can play an important role in the effort to gain
control of the air. When combined with other intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (ISR) sensors, JSTARS contributes to the commander’s overall situational
awareness by identifying and locating targets such as SAMs, launchers, radars, and
14
antiaircraft artillery sites. JSTARS provides updates on enemy force disposition and
performs limited battle management functions, which may be important in managing the
OCA effort.
CONTROL ELEMENT AUTHORITIES, ROLES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL
ALIGNMENT
 Common Control Authorities. According to the nature of the operation and specific
asset or organizational capabilities, the air component commander may delegate all
or portions of ID, commit, engagement, and airspace control authorities to the CRC,
AWACS, JSTARS, and BCC to dynamically execute commander’s guidance and
intent. These entities are not certified to perform ATC services.
The BCC may be delegated data link control authority.
 Common Roles and Alignment. The CRC, AWACS, and JSTARS can accept dele-
gated responsibility to execute missions and tasks for offensive and defensive air
operations.
The CRC and AWACS may be RADC or SADC responsibilities and are a key C2
element for DCA operations.
The CRC, AWACS, JSTARS, and BCC are under the operational control of the air
component commander and vertically integrated with the AOC. They may be
employed alone or horizontally integrated with other C2 and surveillance and recon-
naissance elements of the TAGS.
15
CHAPTER 3: COUNTERAIR PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

Counterair planning is conducted using the joint planning process for air detailed in JP 3-
30, Joint Air Operations and AFDP 3-0, Operations and Planning. During joint intelligence
preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), planners should determine the
adversary’s active and passive counterair capabilities, as well as their ability to contest
control of the air. This, in turn, should inform JFACC and JFC decisions during mission
analysis and course of action (COA) development.16 Determining the desired and attain-
able level of control of the air necessary to achieve JFC objectives, along with the
acceptable level of risk (ALR) for the effort, is one of the JFACC’s top priorities, if not the
highest. This guidance drives priorities for planning air operations. The JFACC should
inform the JFC regarding the level of control that is realistic and achievable with provided
capabilities and allocated assets.
Counterair planning should account for the capabilities of all Services, joint force compo-
nents, interagency and multinational partners, and every instrument of national power that
can be leveraged to achieve counterair objectives. Non-military instruments of national
power can be critically important in certain circumstances, as when diplomatic efforts
permit or deny basing or overflight rights.
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING

The nature of airpower is such that offensive combat power can frequently be “massed”
through effects rather than by massing forces. By applying an effects-based approach to
operations (EBAO), a systematic view of the enemy is used to determine centers of grav-
ity and associated critical vulnerabilities. Such targets are prioritized according to the
ability for effects against them to generate synergy and cascade through second and third
order effects across the entire system. OCA targets may include electrical infrastructure,
key communications and C2 nodes, network infrastructure, national military leadership,
and critical nodes within an enemy IADS. Attacks concentrated in time and space stand
the greatest chance of causing systemic shock; similar to that in a human body wherein
attacks at various points combine to overload the system and cause it to shut down.
Improper planning risks spreading the OCA effort too thin. Doing so may cede the initia-
tive and counteract airpower’s strengths.17
Timely and accurate intelligence is key to determine the adversary’s capabilities. Modern
counterair capabilities—including US, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russian, and
Chinese systems—have been proliferated worldwide. Even those nations that lack
significant OCA capabilities are likely to maintain a significant, if not formidable IADS
consisting of both active and passive defenses. IADS range from coordinated fire from
small and medium caliber antiaircraft artillery, man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS) and small arms fires, up to complex, integrated, and highly redundant
theater-level systems. In the case of the more complex IADS, employing parallel attacks
16 For additional information on JIPOE, see Joint Guide, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment.
17 For additional information on EBAO, Targeting, and parallel attacks, see AFDP 3-0, Operations and
Planning, AFDP 3-60, Targeting, and AFDP 3-70, Strategic Attack.
16
against the larger enemy system will likely yield greater effects and may cause cascading
failures within the IADS. However, significant threats to the OCA effort (aircraft, missiles,
antiaircraft artillery, electromagnetic attack) may force the employment of sequential
attacks (vice parallel) and necessitate substantial emphasis on neutralizing or disrupting
them prior to striking other targets.
Offensive Counterair Example

To gain control of the air, friendly forces must
counter enemy air and missile threats, not only to
assure full force protection, but also to enable full
flexibility to conduct parallel operations across the
operational area. Airpower’s flexibility may tempt
commanders to divert it to other tasks; this must be
guarded against. Control of the air is a prerequisite
for subsequent theater operations. Relaxing
pressure on the enemy’s air forces may allow them
to gain air superiority with disastrous results. For
example, Hitler’s decision during World War II to
divert the Luftwaffe from direct attack on Royal Air
Force (RAF) targets, to bombing cities instead,
allowed the RAF to recover, reconstitute, and
eventually win the Battle of Britain.
What the Luftwaffe failed to do was to destroy

the fighter squadrons of the RAF, which were,
indeed, stronger at the end of the battle than
at the beginning.
-- Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C.T.

Dowding Fighter Command, RAF
OBJECTIVES, DESIRED EFFECTS, AND CAPABILITIES

Objectives drive desired effects. Broadly, counterair operations aim to disrupt, degrade,
or destroy enemy counterair capabilities. To achieve objectives, it may not be necessary
to destroy a capability, but to degrade it temporarily instead. The latter may require less
effort, thereby freeing assets for other missions. Though one method may be superior to
another, there are likely numerous means to achieve a particular effect. When selecting
the means to achieve a desired effect, planners and commanders should consider the full
range of available assets and capabilities that conduct or contribute to OCA, along with
the timing and tempo of operations, persistence of threats, and “opportunity costs” of
using OCA assets for other purposes. This type of analysis may vary from one operation
17
to another but should provide effective target priorities and aid efficient use of assets.
Consideration should be given to those most likely to generate second and third-order or
cascading effects.
Against fixed, highly defended targets deep within enemy territory, employment of all-
domain solutions (e.g., space, cyberspace, EW, information warfare, etc.) may achieve
desired effects while minimizing risk to friendly forces. For instance, jamming
communications and radars may achieve short term, localized suppression. Likewise,
both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against C2 nodes, communication channels, and net-
works used to integrate the enemy’s AD system may force sites to operate independently,
thereby reducing their effectiveness and threat to friendly forces.
TARGET PRIORITIZATION
In early operational phases, the number of OCA targets may likely exceed the capacity
to engage them. Proper target prioritization is key to ensuring economy of force. The
following considerations are important for determining OCA targeting priorities and meth-
ods:
 Threat. The threat posed by specific enemy capabilities (aircraft, missiles, etc.)
includes an assessment of the urgency or the need to counter that threat. Systems
capable of weapons of mass destruction delivery would normally merit prioritization
over other immediate threats, such as a SAM site.
 Direct effects—the immediate, direct results of actions characterized by simple and
clear cause and effect. Direct effects are typically physical and readily recognizable
(e.g., weapon employment results). Planners should avoid a target servicing mindset.
Targets should be chosen according to the potential for intended, direct effects against
them to achieve desired objectives; whether directly or through intended, second and
third-order effects.
 Indirect effects—second, third, or higher-order effects created through intermediate
effects or causal linkages. These may be physical, psychological, functional, or
systemic in nature. They may be created in a cumulative, cascading, sequential, or
parallel manner. They are often delayed and are typically more difficult to recognize
and assess.
 Forces available. The forces available are assessed against the number, types, and
priority of targets that can be attacked. Sufficient and capable forces should be pro-
vided to ensure the desired results are obtained.
 Time available and time required. Time constraints are integral to prioritization and
planning. The time allowed to achieve the direct and indirect effects, as well as the
duration required of those effects, will influence the number and type of forces
required.
 Risk. In determining the ALR, commanders consider the anticipated risk to friendly
forces against expected gains from a given COA weighed against the cost of inaction
18
or failure. Different objectives and circumstances drive different acceptable levels of

risk.
 Measures and indicators. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of
performance (MOP) are essential components of assessment and must be planned
for in advance.18
DETAILED PLANNING FOR OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
In early planning stages, the JFACC, along with the AOC’s strategy and ISR divisions,
determine objectives, desired effects, and relative priorities. Planners in the strategy,
combat plans, and ISR divisions identify enemy systems, capabilities, and assets capable
of contesting control of the air. Combat plans and combat operations personnel use this
information to match desired effects to targets—provided by the ISR division—and create
tactical tasks by matching targets to available assets and capabilities that can achieve
those effects. To facilitate operations, a prioritized target list is developed before hostilities
begin and continually updated based on current intelligence and progress of the opera-
tion.
 On-call missions. OCA operations are employed in a fast-moving, dynamically
changing operational environment. Though many targets may be known and planned
in advance, planners should establish procedures to handle real-time mission re-
tasking enabling commanders to rapidly re-task OCA missions to attack time-sensitive
targets and similar fleeting, emerging, or higher-priority OCA targets. A frequently
used best practice is to task on-call aircraft. Armed appropriately, aircraft sit in alert
status on the ground or loiter while airborne awaiting the call to strike a target. If no
call comes, they may proceed to strike pre-planned OCA (or other) targets.
Offensive counterair mission planning. Attacks on fixed, highly defended targets, deep
within enemy territory, require detailed, accurate, and timely intelligence, detailed and
accurate target analysis, effective deconfliction of mission timing, and thorough aware-
ness of enemy active and passive defenses. The following considerations are important
for OCA planning at the AOC and unit mission planning levels.19
 Enemy threat, location, and capabilities. Highly detailed and accurate intelligence
on regarding enemy threats is necessary to properly plan, position, and sequence
(timing) OCA missions.
 Friendly command and control capabilities. Theater C2 assets such as AWACS
and JSTARS, are tasked by numerous units and agencies. As such, OCA planners
should verify the availability of C2 capabilities for each OCA mission.
 ROE and SPINS. These directives are authoritative and may critically affect how
missions are performed. All levels, from the JFACC down to individual aircrews,
18For additional information on MOE and MOP, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence and AFDP 3-0.
19For more information on integrated planning considerations, see AFTTP 3-3.IPE, Combat Aircraft
Fundamentals—IPE.
19
should understand the ROE that apply to the accomplishment of their missions and
include both the ROE and SPINS in mission planning.
 Weaponeering. Effective target and weapon pairing is critical to achieve desired
effects.
 Deconfliction. Airspace, mission routing, effects, timing, and numerous other aspects
of OCA execution require deconfliction. The theater SPINS, ATO, ACO, and other
operational guidance provide the primary means for doing so. However, deconfliction
equally applies to individual missions and force packages. Thorough planning is key.
However, procedures and C2 structures and mechanisms should be established to
enable real-time deconfliction of all planned missions, including space, cyberspace,
and information warfare.
 Environmental conditions. Environmental conditions and weather can limit sensor
or seeker sensitivity, limiting available munitions. Likewise, varying terrain can be a
challenge to pilots or offer refuge to an adversary. Terrain will often limit munitions
selection. Adverse environmental factors may increase the weight of effort required to
achieve OCA objectives. Planners should address the need for sufficient counterair
assets to offset the loss of capability and desired effects due to environmental factors.
 Distance, timing, and refueling. Counterair assets typically require refueling support
for sustained presence. Refueling coordination requires constant management by
planners.20
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING

Planning considerations for OCA apply equally to DCA. Generally, there will be
insufficient DCA capabilities to defend all forces in theater. DCA planning typically begins
by prioritizing which assets and capabilities to defend. To ensure available DCA is
focused where needed most, the JFC directs establishment of a critical asset list (CAL)
and a defended asset list (DAL).21 This task is performed within the JFC’s staff and relies
on inputs from all components. The CAL is forwarded to the AADC, who then allocates
available AMD capabilities to defend the prioritized assets listed as required. Planners
then match available forces against threats to ensure assets on the CAL are defended.
Mission-critical assets and capabilities requiring protection will vary from operation to
operation and from phase to phase within a single operation. JFC and air component
staffs continually evaluate the CAL and will shift the DCA effort as required to ensure DCA
efforts are allocated and focused where needed.
ACTIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Effective AMD requires the integrated employment of air-to-air and surface-to-air defen-
sive systems, supported by multi-domain detection, tracking and warning capabilities, to
detect, identify, engage, and defeat enemy attacks from the air. Planners should keep in
20 For additional information on refueling considerations, see AFDP 3-36, Air Mobility Operations.
21 For additional information on critical and defended asset lists, see JP 3-01 and AFTTP 3-2.31.
20
mind the complexities of airspace control in a DCA environment. DCA engagements may
occur inside friendly airspace, requiring deconfliction between friendly assets, such as
fighters and SAMs. Airspace control in an active AMD environment is extremely difficult
and further complicated by the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). A rapid,
reliable, and secure means of ID is critical. Continuous surveillance and reporting of real
time and near real time target track data is required.
Thorough and detailed DCA planning is critical to ensure the establishment of procedures,
C2 structures, and communication methods for air surveillance and track ID. To maximize
engagement opportunities and optimize DCA employment, discrimination of friend from
foe should be rapid and early. All-source sensor data (ground-, air-, sea-, and space-
based sensors) should be fused into an accurate, accessible common tactical picture.
Track data should provide sufficient detail to accurately evaluate the track and designate
the appropriate AMD asset to engage it. This information should be disseminated as
rapidly as possible via datalink, voice, and text as applicable.
To prevent friendly fire, great caution should be exercised when employing auton-
omous CID in DCA operations. If no IADS is established, procedural means should be
established to permit the safe passage of friendly aircraft while still allowing for the use of
available AMD weapons. Since many AMD assets are owned by different services and
coalition partners, standardized integration, coordination, and airspace control proce-
dures are required to enable or enhance the capabilities of the various systems.
An emerging threat to airbase operations arises from the proliferation of low, slow, and
small UAS. These UAS pose a unique challenge to conventional DCA capabilities. As
capabilities are developed to counter this threat, integration with existing DCA C2 systems
must be a priority. Countering this threat is a shared responsibility between DCA opera-
tions and airbase defense.22
PASSIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Passive AMD is similar for air and ballistic missile threats, except for their respective
detection and warning times. Passive AMD measures are designed to provide protection
for friendly forces and assets by complicating the enemy’s identification, surveillance, and
targeting processes and by countering the enemy’s planned effects. The first step of
passive AMD is to hide valuable assets from the enemy or to encourage the enemy to
attack decoys. Like active AMD, thorough passive AMD should include layered defense
in depth. Passive measures can work concurrently to achieve this goal. Measures to
reduce enemy targeting effectiveness include mobility; deception; EW; camouflage,
concealment, and deception; hardening; reconstitution; dispersal; and electronic and
infrared countermeasures.
Per JP 3-01, there are four principal considerations for planning passive AMD:
 Detection and Warning Systems and Procedures. Timely detection and warning of
air and missile threats provide reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or take
appropriate action. Reliable and redundant connectivity for communications and sen-
22 For additional information on countering UAS threats, see AFTTP 3-2.31.
21
sor systems is vital for accurate and timely warning. To be effective, warning methods
and procedures should be established, disseminated, and rehearsed down to the unit
level.
 Reduction of Enemy Targeting Effectiveness. Certain measures can be taken to
reduce the effectiveness of enemy targeting and attacks, to include mobility, decep-
tion, EW, and operations security.
 Reducing Vulnerability. Four measures that may enable friendly assets to survive
enemy attacks by reducing their vulnerability are hardening, redundancy, dispersal,
and CBRN defense.
 Recovery and Reconstitution. Following an air or missile attack, prior planning
should aid the restoration of units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commen-
surate with mission requirements and available resources.
COUNTERAIR SUPPORT PLANNING

AIR REFUELING
Air refueling is an essential enabler of counterair operations. Many air assets that perform
the counterair mission have relatively short on-station times or operate from bases far
removed from their intended targets. These assets rely on air refueling to extend range,
on-station time, tactical flexibility, and persistence. Fuel planning is determined by
receiver requirements, tanker fuel capacity, and types of refueling booms or refueling
drogues available. Planners must appropriately match refueling aircraft configurations to
USAF, Navy, Marine, or coalition forces capabilities. Strategists and planners should build
needed refueling support into the air component’s planning products.
Advanced adversary capabilities may require refueling aircraft to operate in airspace con-
tested by land, maritime, and air threats. This airspace is determined by the needs of the
receiver aircraft, enemy threat capabilities, risk analysis and ALR, and political boundary
consideration.
Refueling coordination requires constant management during both planning and
execution. The deliberate nature of OCA allows for more predictable fuel planning but
requires more tankers to provide fuel simultaneously prior to an OCA push. Refueling
support to DCA operations may require fewer tankers but fuel planning and execution
may be more dynamic. Complete refueling planning goes beyond fuel and compatibility
requirements and must include: a robust C2 plan, sufficient battlespace situational
awareness, expedient threat notification, and detailed retrograde planning.23
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Effective counterair operations planning and execution require timely, reliable, and
accurate ISR from air-, land-, and space-based sensors that contribute to warning,
situational awareness, targeting, and assessment. Though ISR consists of separate
23 For additional information on air refueling, see AFDP 3-36.
22
elements, it should be addressed wholistically to provide optimized support to counterair

operations throughout each phase of the targeting cycle. Timely target detection, devel-
opment, geolocation, weapon selection, mission planning, and assessment all depend on
integrated collection and analysis. Planning for ISR is a complex, multi-part process.
Advance, detailed ISR planning ensures its ability to support operations. Effective
integration of ISR assets is often as crucial to successful counterair operations as
are traditional lethal effects.
Intelligence mission data. Well-defined intelligence mission data (IMD) is necessary to
mitigate risks to friendly forces posed by enemy air and missile threats. Robust IMD plan-
ning includes the development, production, and sharing of information including, but not
limited to signatures, EW-integrated reprogramming, order of battle, and system charac-
teristics and performance. ISR may also provide important indications concerning how an
adversary may use their own counterair capability. Strategy division targeteers use ISR
products, to include target system analysis (TSA) products, to continuously update TSA
assessment and to develop objectives, tasks, and MOE that form the foundation of
combat assessment. Likewise, targeteers also provide combat assessment inputs
(contributing to battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, and mission
assessment), feeding the ATO cycle.24
COUNTERAIR ASSESSMENT
Planning and assessment are two sides of the same coin. Effective assessment depends
on thorough planning. Once in execution, planning hinges on the ability to accurately
assess the progress of operations. Assessment evaluates requirements for future action
by addressing two questions: “Are we doing things right?” and “Are we doing the right
things?”
OCA and DCA performance may be measured separately or combined depending on the
course of action selected. In many cases, desired effects for control of the air are
applicable to both DCA and OCA. For example, OCA efforts to shut down enemy sortie
production can have a positive impact on the DCA effort since fewer enemy aircraft will
be available to challenge friendly air defenses. Conversely, successful enemy air attacks
on friendly airfields (due to unsuccessful DCA efforts) will have a negative impact on
friendly sortie generation—affecting both DCA and OCA.
ALIGNMENT OF TASKS, EFFECTS, AND OBJECTIVES
Tasks are designed to create effects, and desired effects lead to the achievement of
objectives. Selected indicators should align with that flow—from cause, to effect, towards
the purpose. Effective assessment should generate as many questions as answers. By
measuring friendly actions (tasks) and changes in the enemy system (effects) separately,
critical review of actions and effects becomes possible, providing the clearest picture of
progress towards achieving the objective. Planners should consider, “Why are my actions
not producing results?”, “Why is the enemy behaving in this manner?”, and “What
24 For additional information on ISR systems and requirements, see AFDP 2-0, Intelligence.
23
changes should be made to the plan – and why?” When the levels of performance in task,
effect, and objective do not align, it may have a profound effect on future actions in the
OCA or DCA effort.
For example, OCA missions may be tasked to destroy enemy runways, aiming to degrade
the enemy’s sortie generation capabilities. Though they may successfully achieve the
intended, direct effects, if the enemy remains capable of generating sorties, then the OCA
plan should be re-evaluated—How is the enemy continuing to generate sorties? Are they
rapidly repairing the runways? Have they relocated to other airfields or highway strips?
Perhaps airfield runways are not critical vulnerabilities after all. Targeting other
capabilities, such as fuel or munitions storage, may yield better results.
INDICATORS, MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE, AND MEASURES OF
EFFECTIVENESS
Assessing the degree of friendly control of the air is challenging. Similarly, the inherent
characteristics of airpower—speed, range, and flexibility—apply to enemy air and missile
threats as well, making assessment of adversary actions and intent more difficult.
However, assessment should be guided by counterair objectives—ensuring freedom to
maneuver, freedom to attack, and freedom from attack. Counterair tasks and desired
effects should be logically tied to these three items. For effective assessment, indicators
should be developed at the same time as the objectives, effects, and tasks they
measure—not after the fact. Indicators should be either directly observable or be reliably
inferred from other data.
Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be identified during planning according to
the nature of tasks and desired effects. Planners should choose criteria that describe or
establish when actions have been accomplished, desired effects have been created, and
objectives have been achieved. Indicators are generally classified as either MOP or MOE.
 Measures of performance. MOPs are objective or quantitative measures used to
assess task accomplishment. At the tactical level, MOPs are generally related to
weapons effects on individual targets. Operational level tasks and MOPs are typically
broader and system-based (e.g., the number of SAM sites neutralized versus number
of SAM sites operational).
 Measures of effectiveness. MOEs are quantitative or qualitative measures used to
evaluate progress of operations toward achieving objectives. MOEs help answer the
question, “Are we generating the effects necessary to meet objectives?"
At the tactical level, MOPs feed combat assessment: Was the mission flown? Were
weapons released as intended? Did they create the desired effect? Within the AOC, the
ISR division’s analysis, correlation, and fusion cell uses tactical data to determine the
status of enemy air systems (operational status of airfields, enemy sorties flown, and SAM
sites destroyed) and feeds the data to the strategy division’s operational assessment
team. Operational level tasks (e.g., neutralize enemy SAM systems) are also measured
by MOPs and provide a big-picture report to the JFACC on task performance.
24
CHAPTER 4: EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

During the ongoing battle rhythm, weapon systems are matched to specific targets or
missions based on their ability to achieve desired effects. There are numerous systems
and capabilities available to conduct counterair missions. Each may be more or less
capable than the next for a given mission or task. Similarly, employment methods may
differ between OCA and DCA. Matching capable assets with intended tasks is critical to
overall mission success.
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR CAPABILITIES
The following are some of the resources and capabilities used to conduct OCA:
 Aircraft. Fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft provide the bulk of the weapon systems
for OCA operations. Other types of aircraft and weapon systems are often critical en-
ablers of counterair operations. Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) may be used in coun-
terair operations to provide ISR; communication relay; deception; jamming; harass-
ment; or destruction of enemy forces and air defense systems when the situation
permits.
 Missiles. These weapons include surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and air-to-air
missiles, as well as air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles. These weapon sys-
tems may eliminate or reduce the risk of harm to friendly forces by destroying enemy
systems in the air and on the ground.
 Missile warning sensors. A combination of air-, space-, and ground-based sensors
may be used to provide missile launch detection and missile tracking functions. These
systems provide tactical missile warning and attack assessment information to oper-
ational command centers.
 Space operations. Space provides several capabilities to support counterair opera-
tions. Planners should work closely with their space contacts at the AOC and US
Space Command (USSPACECOM) to ensure effects are incorporated into the overall
planning scheme. Considerations include enhanced position, navigation, and timing
(PNT); Global Positioning System (GPS) product charts; electro-magnetic
interference (EMI) detection and mitigation; space EW; missile warning; space
weather; commercial satellite support, etc.
 Special operations forces. Special operations forces (SOF) can conduct direct
action missions, special reconnaissance, and terminal guidance for attacks against
valuable enemy targets. Planners in the AOC coordinate with the special operations
liaison element (SOLE) to coordinate the use of special operations assets in support
of counterair missions. Planners should coordinate with the SOLE to ensure OCA
operations are deconflicted with SOF operations and activities.
25
 Surface fire support. Artillery and naval surface fire support may be employed in
OCA operations. AOC planners should coordinate the use of these fires with the Army
and Navy liaison elements early in the planning process.
 Command and control systems. C2 systems enhance OCA operations by providing
early warning, intelligence, ID, and targeting data, as well as C2 of friendly forces.
 Electronic warfare assets. EW assets are frequently used to suppress enemy C2,
IADS, and other significant military use of the electromagnetic spectrum.25
 Cyberspace operations. Cyberspace operations can enhance counterair operations
and may reduce the demand for sorties. Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) may
be employed to target enemy C2 nodes, communications and network infrastructure,
theater missiles and support infrastructure, IADS, and airfields or operating bases. To
employ cyberspace operations, planners should address required authorities, ROE,
availability of access, and time available to generate a desired effect.26
 ISR systems. ISR systems and resources provide intelligence, surveillance, recon-
naissance, deception, and other effects against enemy forces and air defense sys-
tems. These activities include the use of air, space, cyberspace, and ground assets.
 Land forces. The ability to destroy, damage, secure, and occupy key OCA targets
(such as SAM sites) can achieve vital counterair effects. Though the bulk of OCA
operations are likely to occur before major ground operations, land forces should still
be considered when their use is an option.
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR TARGETS
OCA targets are those that directly or indirectly challenge control of the air. OCA
concentrates on degrading these capabilities as close to their source as possible. The
following are representative OCA targets, and do not reflect the full array for OCA
employment:
 Aircraft. This category includes enemy fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UA. Enemy
aircraft may be targeted while airborne or on the ground but are most vulnerable while
on the ground. Precision weapons with penetration capabilities, combined with timely
intelligence, may be required to counter enemy passive AMD, such as hardened
shelters.
 Airfields and operating bases. Damaging runways or taxiways may prevent use of
an airfield for short periods. Destruction of support facilities—hangars, shelters,
maintenance facilities, and fuels—may degrade the enemy’s ability to generate aircraft
sorties over a longer period.
25 For additional information on aspects of EW, see AFDP 3-51, Electromagnetic Warfare and
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.
26 For additional information on OCO, see AFDP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
26
 Air defense systems. Disruption or destruction of enemy IADS and the personnel
who control, maintain, and operate them may render those systems ineffective against
friendly forces.
 Command and control systems. C2 systems are critical to the effective employment
of forces and integration of IADS and should be given a high priority during OCA
targeting. The integral C2 components of an IADS includes intelligence-gathering,
warning, and control systems (ground-controlled intercept, early warning, acquisition,
and other sensors), and associated support facilities. Destruction or nonlethal
disruption of such systems may substantially reduce the enemy’s ability to detect and
respond to attacks.
 Electromagnetic warfare capabilities. Early and persistent efforts should be aimed
at defeating enemy EW capabilities that could otherwise create devastating effects on
friendly systems.
 Missiles and support infrastructure. Destruction of ballistic, surface- and air-to-
surface, and cruise missiles along with launch platforms, support facilities, and in-
frastructure greatly limits effective enemy missile attacks. OCA operations seek to
destroy or disable these missiles pre-launch due to the increased resources required
to engage them post-launch.
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR CAPABILITIES
Layering mutually supporting defensive capabilities helps absorb and progressively
weaken enemy attacks. The following are some of the resources and capabilities used to
conduct DCA:
 Fighter aircraft. Fighter aircraft use combat air patrols, and may be positioned well
ahead of forces being protected, to ensure rapid reaction to enemy attacks. Employed
in this manner, fighters intercept and destroy hostile aircraft and/or missiles before
they can reach their intended targets.
 HVAA. These aircraft provide unique capabilities such as surveillance, early warning,
and electromagnetic attack. Importantly, airborne national assets are generally
considered so important that the loss of even one could seriously impact United States
warfighting capabilities or provide the enemy with significant propaganda value.
 Surface-to-air weapons. The bulk, if not all, joint surface-to-air capabilities are
employed by other services. These systems include missiles (e.g., Patriot, Terminal
High Altitude Air Defense [THAAD], or the Aegis BMD System), artillery (e.g., Phalanx
or Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar [C-RAM] system), and MANPADS (e.g.,
Stinger). These systems provide theater, sector, area, and point defense to defend
critical fixed sites, C2 nodes, and airfields as well as mobile naval surface forces and
land component maneuver units.
27
ACTIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE MISSIONS

Units employed to create AMD effects usually have decentralized execution authority and
the necessary latitude to conduct detailed planning and coordination of assigned DCA
tasks. The following types of missions are most closely associated with active AMD:
 Area Defense. Area defense missions are conducted for the defense of a broad area.
There can be more localized applications of area defense when friendly assets are
dispersed over a large geographical area with defined threat boundaries.
 Point Defense. Point defense missions are conducted for the protection of a limited
area, normally in defense of friendly forces and installations.
 Self-Defense. Self-defense is conducted by friendly forces to defend themselves
against direct attack or threat of attack using organic weapons and systems. Inherent
to all ROE and weapon control procedures is the right of self-defense. Importantly,
employment in self-defense may or may not extend to defense of others. Such
instructions are normally detailed in SPINS and other authoritative guidance.
 HVAA Protection. Fighter aircraft, surface, and naval fires may be employed to
protect airborne HVAA assets.
PASSIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Passive AMD entails the following types of actions:
 Detection and warning systems. Timelines for detection and warning of enemy
missile attacks are generally compressed. Timely detection and warning provides
maximum reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or take other appropriate
actions.
 CBRN defensive elements. CBRN defensive elements are made up of contamination
avoidance, protection, and contamination control. Contamination avoidance
measures include covering critical assets, remaining inside facilities during attacks,
detecting and identifying contaminated areas, and avoiding those areas. Protection
includes such things as collective protection facilities and individual protective
equipment. Contamination control is standard disease prevention and control
measures, contaminated waste management, and decontamination procedures.27
 Camouflage, concealment, and deception. Visual signature reduction measures
“hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly forces, systems, and capabilities. These
measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings and
may be coupled with deception measures to further complicate enemy attacks.
27
For additional information on CBRN defense, see AFDP 3-40, Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction
Operations.
28
 Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications security and an

emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic signature reduc-
tion can deny or hinder the enemy’s ability to acquire and ID friendly target systems.
 Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters are hardened to protect against hostile
attacks: physical, electromagnetic pulse, and transient radiation. Hardening actions
are usually accomplished during peacetime but may continue throughout operations.
 Reconstitution. This capability provides for the rapid repair of damage resulting from
enemy attacks and the return of damaged units to a desired level of combat readiness.
Reconstitution includes the ability to repair valuable assets such as airfields, commu-
nications, warning and surveillance systems, and to restore essential services such
as power, water, and fuel.
 Dispersion. Dispersion complicates the enemy’s ability to locate and target friendly
assets. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersion increases uncertainty as to
whether a location is occupied or will remain occupied. It forces the enemy to search
more locations, requiring more resources and time.
 Redundancy. Duplication of critical capabilities keeps vital systems functioning even
when critical nodes are destroyed or damaged. Redundancy includes dual, contin-
gency, or back-up capabilities that can assume primary mission functions, in whole or
in part, when the primary system is degraded or fails.
 Mobility. Mobility is the capability to move from one location to another and is
facilitated by keeping a small footprint. Frequent movement of units, inside the
enemy’s decision cycle, can be of critical importance. Mobility reduces vulnerability
and increases survivability of friendly assets by complicating enemy surveillance,
reconnaissance, and targeting.28
28 For additional information on dispersion and mobility, see AFDN 1-21, Agile Combat Employment.
29
REFERENCES
All websites accessed 05 April 2023.
Doctrine can be accessed through links provided at: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/
US AIR FORCE DOCTRINE: https://www.doctrine.af.mil/
 AFDP 1, The Air Force
 AFDP 2-0, Intelligence
 AFDP 3-0, Operations and Planning
 AFDP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations
 AFDP 3-30, Command and Control
 AFDP 3-36, Air Mobility Operations
 AFDP 3-40, Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations
 AFDP 3-51, Electromagnetic Warfare and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
 AFDP 3-52, Airspace Control
 AFDP 3-60, Targeting
 AFDP 3-70, Strategic Attack
 AFDN 1-21, Agile Combat Employment
JOINT DOCTRINE
Joint Electronic Library (JEL): https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/
JEL+: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=2
 JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence

 JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats
 JP 3-84, Legal Support
 Joint Guide, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
TACTICAL DOCTRINE
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTPs):
https://www.alsa.mil/
 AFTTP 3-2.17, MTTP for the Theater Air-Ground System
 AFTTP 3-2.28, MTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
 AFTTP 3-2.31, MTTP for Air and Missile Defense
 AFTTP 3-2.78, MTTP for Airspace Control
Air Force Weapon System TTPs (AFTTPs):
https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/561jts/SitePages/Home.aspx
 AFTTP 3-3.IPE, Combat Fundamentals IPE
 AFTTP 3-3.TACS, Combat Fundamental TACS
30
MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS
 CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement / Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces
31

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AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-01

Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01,

Chapter 1: COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS ..................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1: COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

Control of the Air Continuum

What Is Parity, Superiority, or Supremacy?

EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO COUNTERAIR

 SEAD. SEAD operations aim to neutralize, destroy, or degrade enemy surface-based

INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

CHAPTER 2: COMMAND AND CONTROL

Centralized Execution During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

5 AFDP 1, The Air Force.

Effective counterair operations require a reliable C2 capability. C2 assets should be

COUNTERAIR ROLES AND AUTHORITIES

8 A detailed description of the AADP is available in AFTTP 3-2.31.

THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

Notional Theater Air Control System

CHAPTER 3: COUNTERAIR PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING

Planning, AFDP 3-60, Targeting, and AFDP 3-70, Strategic Attack.

Offensive Counterair Example

What the Luftwaffe failed to do was to destroy

-- Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C.T.

OBJECTIVES, DESIRED EFFECTS, AND CAPABILITIES

or failure. Different objectives and circumstances drive different acceptable levels of

DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR PLANNING

22 For additional information on countering UAS threats, see AFTTP 3-2.31.

COUNTERAIR SUPPORT PLANNING

23 For additional information on air refueling, see AFDP 3-36.

elements, it should be addressed wholistically to provide optimized support to counterair

CHAPTER 4: EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

ACTIVE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE MISSIONS

 Emission Control/Communications Security. Communications security and an

 JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence

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