Motion Time and Place According To William Ockham

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PHILOSOPHY SERIES NO. 13
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Edited by Allan B.Wolter, O. F. M. 188
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MOTION, TIME AND PLACE
ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OCKHAM
by
Herman Shapiro, Ph. D.
DEUSMEUS ETOMNI
A
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MOTION, TIME AND PLACE ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OCKHAM
Franciscan Institute Publications
PHILOSOPHY SERIES NO. 13
Edited by Allan B.Wolter, O. F. M.
MOTION, TIME AND PLACE
ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OCKHAM
by
Herman Shapiro, Ph. D.
Published by
THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE

ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y.
and
E. NAUWALAERTS F. SCHONINGH
LOUVAIN, BELGIUM PADERBORN, GERMANY
1957
BX
3601
.S143
nos. 13-15
Cum permissu superiorum

To those who waited , and had faith
PREFACE
The present study is undertaken in the belief that William Ockham's

analyses of the problems centering about motion , time and place which
were current in the fourteenth-century, would not be devoid of interest
to contemporary philosophers of science. It is a belief made firm by the
realization that Ockham's inquiries - although couched in different
terms, and involving a different background are directed toward a
solution of problems which are still very " live" issues in contemporary
attempts to philosophically understand the nature of science, and the
nature of scientific explanation.
The frequency with which certain points, once established , are
restated or reemphasised, will, we hope, be excused on the ground that
the philosophic power of Ockham's treatment of motion, time and place
can only be properly gauged by the sufficiency of his own principles and
procedures for the ordering and solution of each encountered problem .
Multiplication of instances, therefore, in which this sufficiency is ex-
hibited, despite the violence offered to rhetorical unity and the reader's
patience, becomes thus a necessary evil.
The responsibility for this study is ours ; its sins of omission and
commission are our own. But for matter of learning beyond reproach
we gladly acknowledge our debt to Professor P. O. Kristeller, Professor
E. A. Moody, and Professor J. H. Randall, jr . , all of Columbia Uni-
versity.
H. SHAPIRO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE VI
INTRODUCTION
Objectives, Sources and Procedures
CHAPTER ONE
1. Ockham and the Metaphysical Foundations of Medieval Science 6
2. Science : General Notions 13
3. Signification and Supposition 15
4. Truth and the Physical World 18
5. Absolute and Connotative Terms 20
6. General Conclusions 22
CHAPTER TWO. CONCERNING MOTION : THE BROAD SENSE

1. Arguments Against Hypostatization of Mutation . 25
2. Mutation According to Ockham 27
3. Objections and Resolutions 29
4. Mutation, Conclusion 35
CHAPTER THREE . CONCERNING MOTION : THE NARROW
SENSE
1. Arguments Against Hypostatization of Motion 36
2. Motion According to Ockham • 38
3. Objections and Resolutions 4I
4. Divisions of Local Motion • 44
6. Ockham and Projectile Motion : Impetus 51
7. Ockham and Text 71 . 54
8. Augmentation and Diminution • 62
9. Divisions of Alterative Motion • 69
10. Alterative Motion Broad : Forma . 71
II. Alterative Motion Broad : Habitus 76
12. Alterative Motion Narrow: Contrariety 79
13. Intension and Remission 83
CHAPTER FOUR . CONCERNING TIME

1. Arguments Against Hypostatization of Time 91
2. Time According to Ockham . 95
3. Time and Motion . 98
4. Objections 100
5. Resolutions 102
6. Concerning the Subjectivity of Time. ΙΙΟ
VII
VIII Table of Contents
CHAPTER FIVE . CONCERNING PLACE

1. Arguments Against Hypostatization of Place 112
2. Place, According to Ockham . 114
4. The Universe as a System of Systems 128
CONCLUSION
1. Ockham : Metaphysics and Science . 132
2. The Mechanics of Ockham's Approach 135
3. Ockham : The Philosophy of External Relations · 138
4. The Elimination of Abstract Entities . 141
BIBLIOGRAPHY . • · 145
ANALYTICAL INDEX 149

INTRODUCTION
Objectives, Sources and Procedures¹
There exists no dearth of studies, exhibiting the highest degree of

There
scholarship, devoted to expositions and evaluations of William
Ockham's logic. Again related questions, ontological and epistemological,
as they arise for consideration within the context of his logical writings ,
1 Note on Abbreviations .
Quodl. refers to Ockham's Quodlibeta septem , Strasbourg, 1491 (H.
11941 ) . A reference to this work, followed by : " II, qu. 6,"
means: "Quodlibetum II , Question 6.
Sent. refers to Ockham's Quaestiones et decisiones in IV libros senten-
tiarum, Lyons, 1495 (H. 11942 ) . A reference to this work,
followed by: "I, dist. 17, qu . 8, b, " means : " Book I , Distinction
17, Question 8, Article b."
Phil. Nat. refers to Ockham's Philosophia Naturalis ( Summulae in libros
physicorum), Rome, 1637. A reference to this work, followed
by: "III, 14," means " Part III , Chapter 14."
In transcribing from the three works listed above, all contractions have
been expanded . Punctuation has been modernized , and, in many cases,
added. All translations have been kept as close to the spirit of the original
latin as was possible.
Tractatus. refers to Ockham's Tractatus de Successivis , edited by Philo-
theus Boehner ; Franciscan Institute Publication no. 1 , St. Bo-
naventure, N. Y. (1944) .
Logic. refers to Ockham's Summa totius logicae, (pars prima) , edited
by Philotheus Boehner ; Franciscan Institute Publication no. 2,
St. Bonaventure, N. Y. ( 1951 ) .
Altaris. refers to Ockham's De Sacramento altaris, edited and translated
by T. Bruce Birch ; Lutheran Literary Board , Burlington ,
Iowa, ( 1930) .
Expositio. refers to Ockham's Expositio super libros Physicorum . The
Prologue, edited by G. E. Mohan, is printed in Franciscan
Studies, vol. XXVI ( 1945 ) 235 sqq . Those portions which I
have used that have reference to Text 71 , are edited by E. A.
Moody, and appear in his article, " Ockham and Aegidius of
Rome," Franciscan Studies, vol . 9 , no. 4 (1949) , 417 sqq .
References to both of these excerpts from Ockham's Ex-
positio, followed by a page number, refers to the pagination
of the article in which they appear.
Quaestiones. refers to Ockham's Quaestiones super libros Physicorum . Those
portions relevant to Text 71 were edited by E. A. Moody and
appear in the same article as above . A reference to this work,
followed by: "Qu . 89, p . 429, " means : " (Ockham's) Question
89, p. 429 (of Professor Moody's article) . "
I
2 Introduction
have attracted the interest of many capable scholars. But that these
studies logical, ontological and epistemological represent but a
(not unimportant) portion of what Ockham had to say a portion
inadequate for a full understanding of his contribution to philosophical
thought is evidenced by the fact that there yet obtains profound
disagreement with respect to his position concerning certain fundamental
philosophical issues. For example : two outstanding medieval scholars ,
K. Michalski and E. Gilson , persist in viewing Ockham's philosophy as
displaying a propaedeutic " scepticism ;" two equally capable scholars
on the other hand , E. A. Moody and P. Boehner , are vigorously opposed
to this view of Ockham as a "humean precursor . " Patently, the two
adopted and authoritatively rendered stands are mutually exclusive :
Ockham cannot have been both sceptical and not-sceptical . Now the
present study is not undertaken as an attempt to resolve this, or any
other equally interesting and disputed question relative to Ockham's
actual views (although the author cannot always avoid partisanship
as will become apparent in the sequel) , but rather it takes its origin
from the observation that both sides, in discussing any moot point
almost invariably seek substantiation for their position by having
recourse to Ockham's logical writings . This suggests that further and
detailed examination of what Ockham said in his other writings would
most certainly prove helpful for the task of determining with a greater
degree of precision than was hitherto possible his signal contribution
to intellectual history . It is the general aim of the present study to widen
the field of debate by examining an area of Ockham's thought which
has not yet been accorded adequate scholarly exposition .
-
Ever since the appearance of Pierre Duhem's pioneering studies
studies illustrating the medieval origins of modern-classical physics
it has been the informed consensus that William Ockham's writings on
the physical sciences occupy a rôle analogous to that of drum-major
in the triumphal procession of physics from the fourteenth to the present
century. Since Ockham enjoys such an enviable reputation as a scien-
tist ,2 we deem it curious that there exists no abundance of detailed
2 We shall, throughout this work continue to refer to Ockham's physical

investigations and writings as " scientific" . Needless to say, Ockham was
not a "scientist" in the " modern" sense of the word . The reader will note,
almost at once, that for Ockham, as for his medieval predecessors and
contemporaries, "science" was aristotelian science . Thus, Ockham will be
seen to accept as basic most of Aristotle's explanations of physical questions
e. g., he accepts the matter-form analysis of physical substances ; the
theory of the qualitative contraries ; the thesis of the continuous and infinitely
Introduction 3
studies of the writings upon which this repute depends to correspond

with the volume and quality of the extant analyses of his other writings.
This lack appears the more curious inasmuch as any adequate study of
his metaphysic must indicate its scientific efficacy, while no valuable
treatment of his logic fails to remark that Ockham himself regarded
these procedures as exhibiting their chief utility when employed as
scientific organon. It is the particular aim of this study to contribute to
the fuller understanding of Ockham's philosophy by attempting to
display the character and function of his metaphysic and methodology
in its actual operation as basis of scientific determinations. But, as we
have indicated, this is a first such study: hence, it is only proper to
begin ab ovo . We propose, then, to show how, within the context of his
metaphysic , Ockham's logic provided him the means to analyze the
most fundamental concepts of general physics : motion, time and
place.3
Philosophia Naturalis (entitled Summulae in libros physicorum in
the editions of Bologna, 1494, and Venice, 1506) , is an indisputably
authentic work of Ockham's so admirably suited to our purpose as to
suggest that it was his aim in composing it to provide a primer exhibiting
the scientific utility of his ontological presuppositions and logical
procedures. For the work displays a studied and persistent application
of his unique method of analysis to a specific determination of these
-
surprisingly evasive concepts basic to physics — i . e. , motion , time and
place. On the strength, then, of its eminent suitability, we have selected
Philosophia Naturalis as the principal primary source for our projected
study. Naturally, as the need arises, either for purposes of verification
of a doubtful point , clarification of an obscure one, or amplification of
a pregnant one, we will have reference to other of Ockham's genuine
writings.
divisible nature of body, of motion (stricte) , and of time ; he accepts, vi-

gorously, Aristotle's denial of a void or of a real " empty space ; " etc. , etc.
Specifically, Ockham takes over Aristotle's definitions of motion, time and
place verbatim, but bends his whole effort toward showing that these def-
initions do not imply absolute entities distinct from individual substances
and/or particular qualities. What we consider to be the ground for this
characteristic emphasis will be treated below.
³ Ockham, unfortunately, left no single writing specifically devoted
to metaphysic . Just as we shall seek to exhibit his method of logical
analysis by a study of its application in the determination of problems
involving motion , time and place, so we shall be forced to seek in the same
material for his metaphysical principles and presuppositions . Hence, our
findings with respect to the character of Ockham's metaphysic cannot
claim to be exhaustive, but will necessarily stress its ramifications for
scientific inquiry.
Introduction
Philosophia Naturalis, as it has been transmitted to us, appears in

the form of an incomplete tract. Originally, Ockham had rather ambi-
tious plans for this work, writing (Phil. Nat. , 1,6) :
Prima pars erit de conditionibus communibus et magis notis omnium
naturalium ; secunda erit de corporibus caelestibus et eorum proprietatibus :
tertia erit de corporibus inanimatis et eorum passionibus : quarta docebit
de corpore animato anima rationali et actibus eius ; quinta de caeteris ani-
malibus et eorum proprietatibus ; sexta erit de plantis ;
but for no reason that we can as yet determine, only the first part was
actually attempted . It is this first part which constitutes the extant
text of Philosophia Naturalis.
Like so many details of Ockham's biography, the actual chronology
of his writings is still a mystery. This much, however, with regard to
their relative order, is patent : that Philosophia Naturalis, which con-
tains explicit reference to both Expositio aurea super artem veterem , and
Expositio super libros Physicorum , post-dates both of these . Again ,
insofar as Expositio aurea quotes from Ockham's Quaestiones et decisiones
in IV libros sententiarum , Philosophia Naturalis is obviously later than
this commentary. Now all of the available evidence indicates that
Philosophia Naturalis was composed at approximately the same time
as Summa totius logicae (terminus ante 1329) , which also makes reference to
the three works determined as antedating Philosophia naturalis . Un-
fortunately, since neither Philosophia naturalis , nor the Summa contain
any significant dates or cross-references, it is not yet possible to accurate-
ly establish their relative order. We submit, however that Philosophia
naturalis is the later of the two works for the reason that Ockham, in
the work on natural philosophy, utilizes with power and assurance the
logical tools which only realized their full expression in this last of his
4
works dealing specifically with logic. The most probable order of the
five writings then, as we see it, is : Quaestiones et decisiones in IV libros
sententiarum: Expositio aurea super artem veterem; Expositio super
Summa totius logicae; and Philosophia naturalis.
Aside from Philosophia Naturalis , there are three other writings by
Ockham exclusively concerned with natural philosophy : Tractatus de
successivis; Quaestiones in libros Physicorum; and the already mentioned
Expositio super libros Physicorum. The tract, de successivis , which we
shall have occasion to employ as a supplementary source, is an authentic
Both Ockhamist scholars, P. Boehner and L. Baudry, agree that

Phil. Nat. post-dates Logic., although neither, as the present writer, is able
to supply any but internal evidence to support this claim.
Introduction 5
work of Ockham's in the sense that every word it contains was written
by him, although the tract itself appears to have been compiled entirely
from the text of Expositio by later and anonymous editors. Neither the
early Expositio, nor the later (terminus post 1333 ) Quaestiones — again
a work which appears to be largely based on the content of Expositio -
have ever been printed. Inasmuch as the attempt to collect, examine
and critically compare all the manuscripts of these works so as to render
them useful to our proposed program would be an arduous task which
we cannot hope to undertake at this time, we have chosen to restrict our-
selves to Ockham's printed works. Moreover, we have every reason to
believe that Ockham's printed works provide quite adequate sources
for our express purposes. So much for our aims and principal sources ;5
it yet remains for us to discuss our procedures.
In general , the method which we have elected to adopt is determined

not by the aim of passing judgement upon the presuppositions and
decisions of Ockham's physical inquiries, but rather by the desire to under-
stand what they are. Hence, our treatment of Philosophia naturalis
will be largely expository. This approach, however, introduces a diffi-
culty: Philosophia Naturalis, not unreasonably, presupposes of its
intended audience more than a passing familiarity with those four (or
three) prior works of its author. Patently, since Ockham in Philosophia
Naturalis does not repeat those views which we hold to be necessary
for a proper understanding of this later writing, preferring to refer the
reader to " other places" wherein these are expounded at length, we are
in a difficulty ; for unless the reader has this presupposed knowledge,
our intended exposition will fall far short of its intended mark. We have
chosen to overcome this difficulty, by prefixing to our forthcoming
exposition a summary of those of Ockham's views which are essential
for a philosophic comprehension of his scientific procedures . Chapter
One, then, of the present study, is not intended to " slant" the reader's
view in a direction compatible with our own philosophic preconceptions,
but rather to ensure for the modern reader the same background which
Ockham assumed his medieval reader to possess : to enable him to
understand how his logic and metaphysic were sufficient for the task of
determining the key concepts of the physical sciences.
Those interested in pursuing further the question of the probable

order, chronology, authenticity, etc. , of Ockham's writings, are referred to
L. Baudry's brilliant work of scholarly detection : Guillaume d'Occam, Sa
vie, Ses Idées Sociales et Politiques, Tome I , “ L'Homme et Les Oeuvres,"
(Paris, 1950) .
6 Ockham: Motion, Time and Place
As much to impress the reader with the relative efficacy of Ockham's

metaphysic for the scientific enterprise, as to provide our exposition
its proper context , we shall, in Chapter One, approach Ockham's meta-
physic from a historical point of view. The same chapter will briefly
expound his theory of science, and those of his logical procedures whose
knowledge is needed for any intelligent perusal of his scientific writings.
The order and content of the four succeeding chapters will follow that
of Ockham's own treatment of motion , time and place as found in
Philosophia Naturalis . In our closing chapter, we shall attempt to single
out the significant elements and important general notions suggested
by Ockham's analyses and decisions.
CHAPTER ONE
I.
Ockham and the Metaphysical Foundations of Medieval Science

The principal quest in the philosophical doctrine of St. Augustine
is determined by the initial presentation of his absolutely first principle :
God - conceived as eternal and immutable Being. Directly, there arises
the problem which is central to augustinian thought : the relation of
the ceaselessly "becoming" to the eternally Unchanging — of the myriad
of inferior beings in constant flux, to the one, superior, and changeless
Being.
As the Word, Augustine's first Principle is the intelligible pattern
of the universe, and all modes of the possibly or actually existential
are modeled after this absolutely rational expression of perfect Being.
Along with Plato and Plotinus, Augustine saw clearly that in a world
of shimmering images, the search for Truth must be guided by the
attempt to relate reflected "things" to their absolute prototypes.
Insofar as the swarm of contingent beings are patterned after an
unblemished Idea, they all express , to some degree, the utter perfection
of their common Fount . For Augustine, then, even the lowest creation
in the hierarchy of created beings is determined by an intelligible formula
bringing to finite expression what it must necessarily be ; and so it is a
corporeal articulation of formal order lending itself nicely to mathematical
restatement. But to thus be able to determinately express the relation
defining contingent beings and states, is to express the constantly
changing in invariant terms : it is to rationally wrest "becoming" from
the exigency of flux by recognition of an underlying element of con-
--
stancy of true Being. All knowledge in this way becomes, for Augus-
Chapter One 7
tine, the one science of God ; and the nature of that truth which the
human soul thus apprehends - by the very nature of its object — must
exhibit the characteristics of necessity, immutability, and eternality.
Thus, for Augustine, there is no external road to knowledge . The
very possibility of an empirical science is defeated at the outset by the
restless, contingent and fundamentally illusory character of an object
which cannot yield necessary, immutable and eternal truth. Only by
fixing on the given of internal experience, apprehended by internal
observation, can we hope to pierce the reflected veil of "things" and
attain to a vision of Things in their Truth. Hence introspection with
Augustine, is become the starting-point for philosophy ; and all science
is reduced to but one : mathematical science whose internally seen
certainties alone reflect the perfect Certainty of the Word.
It is perhaps tribute enough to St. Augustine's christian thought
to note that all of the questions to which his philosophy could offer but
stammering replies, or silence, were peripheral to orthodoxy as having
been raised originally by pagan philosophers. Although it is true that
the arrival in the thirteenth-century of the balance of the aristotelian
corpus - the writings on metaphysic, psychology and natural philosophy
together with their Arab commentaries - necessitated the sounding of
foreign accents and variegated emphases in the christian theatre, still
the central conflict of the medieval drama, as written by St. Augustine,
was to remain unaltered for some eight centuries.
St. Thomas Aquinas, a sincere disciple of Augustine's Divine Comedy,
sought to keep it in the public eye by absorbing into it those elements
responsible for the disturbingly popular appeal of the newly-produced,
Arab-edited, aristotelian writings. To the extent that the older theme
and central problem still shone through, Thomas' synthesis was a
success ; nonetheless, the exotic colloquialisms which he found it neces-
sary to inject, occasioned a unique emphasis which all but destroyed
the unity of Augustine's original work.
St. Augustine's one, necessary Truth is retained as a principle
fundamental to St. Thomas' doctrine. He views it , however, as totally
transcending the scope and grasp of man's finite intellect, and as ad-
equated only to the divine Intellect's apprehension of the relation of
all lesser acts of being to Itself. In contradistinction to Augustine's
view of man as being essentially a soul using a body, Thomas regards
the human soul as the form of its material body. As such , it has ceded
its augustinian capacity for approaching to the Intelligible, and must
direct itself to painfully compounding knowledge based on abstractions
from the sensible experience of "things" in relation to itself. Thus,

Thomas is directed first to a realization of the limited variety of truths
to which we can attain , and then to the necessary assumption of an
immutable and eternal Truth of which these lesser truths are indicative .
The appearance of man in the thomistic downgrade hierarchy of
created being, is characterized by the initial appearance of corporeality.
Still related to the immaterial realms stretching above him through his
possession of an intellective soul , man is but one among countless number
of beings consisting in matter and form. Matter is the individuating,
particularizing principle in this substantial unity of individual beings,
while form is the universal element therein contained ; and knowledge
consists in the compounding of judgements based on simple apprehen-
sions abstracted as intelligible species from the sensible species which
impinge directly on the human organs of sense. God , in His Truth, then,
can never be known : as immaterial act of Being He presents, in Himself,
nothing adequated to the human capacity for abstractive knowledge.
Although man cannot know what He is, he can, however, know that He
is by observation of the contingent character of His lesser creations.
All Thomas' proofs for the existence of God proceed, thus, from primary
observations conducted in the sensible realms adequated to finite in-
tellectual propensities . "
All human knowledge then derives from sense-data . From these
data, we abstract that which is only potentially (so far as man's intellect
is concerned) intelligible, and does not appear evidently in nature . This
knowledge, in turn, leads us on to the necessary assumption of what is,
in actuality, most evidently exhibited in nature : the existence of God.
Whereas Augustine had made the operations of the human soul the
primary object of human understanding, and held that it is from re-
flection on these internal data that we must aspire to the one Truth ,
Aquinas makes the " quiddity of sensible things" the object of human
understanding, and considers that we must infer from this variety of
data the truths about God's existence. For Thomas, the search for
wisdom, or for knowledge of the " invisible things of God " must be built on
external experience plus reason ; for Augustine it had been built on pure
reflective consideration of internal experience. This shift , philosophi-
cally and scientifically, is of extreme importance, for with Thomas
Aquinas, Physics is become the starting-point of philosophy.
Now this is not to be construed to imply St. Thomas himself to have
been voicing any scientific predelictions . He was , in the final analysis,
merely putting into practice the practically efficacious and politic in-
Chapter One 9
junction : "if you can't beat ' em, absorb ' em" --- "
'em" being the alarm-
ingly increasing number of pagan-inspired christian philosophers with
empirical-scientific proclivities . To be sure, he thus opened the way to
a naturalistic conception of science, but he was motivated everywhere
by the theological end of seeking to exhibit the necessitous relationship
to Augustine's ultimate Truth implied by the discovery of the lesser
truths of experience and reason . Faced, that is, with the problem of
bolstering the augustinian structure which threatened to collapse under
the telling blows of an aristotelian-inspired intellectual revolt, Thomas
dedicated his "naturalism" to indications that the way back to Augus-
tine's one, infinite Cause was in no way impeded by a concentration
on what empirical observation could only prove to be the completely
contingent character of Its finite effects. Apparently, Thomas was no
more a " man of science" in any strict sense, than was Augustine before
him.
John Duns Scotus, still absorbed in the central metaphysical problem
articulated by St. Augustine, completely inverts the thomistic approach.
With Thomas he yields his assent to the sensible original of all human
knowledge ; but where Thomas had felt himself restricted to indications
that the lesser truths engaged by the finite mind all required for their
ultimate explanation the necessary existence of Augustine's one Truth ,
Duns seeks within the context of the truths thus engaged for the ground
of an absolute certitude which will lead him back, with St. Augustine,
to a realization of that eternal Truth to which the finite mind aspires.
Where Thomas , that is, had seen the empirical content as offering up
a sensible realm peopled by contingents all requiring for their existence
the necessary existence of God, Duns sees the same realm as offering
up necessarily true statements independent of the experience which
occasioned them.
Duns is fully cognizant of the objections which might be raised on
the theoretical level against any program which sought to exhibit
infallible truths and certainties as internal to an order of truth deriving
from sensible experience . Even St. Augustine had held as deeply suspect
the evidence delivered by the senses , and if the data of experience were ,
indeed, at best but uncertain, and at worst, systematically -or worse
still, unsystematically delusory, how could one ever hope to attain
to truths other than those compounded on the internal experience of
immediate self-awareness ?
Duns' reply is clear and decisive. Even if we are being deluded in a
particular instance of perception, say of hot and cold, we can still know
2 Ockham : Motion
ΙΟ Ockham: Motion , Time and Place
with certainty, by analysis of what it means to be " hot" or " cold ," that :
"hot is not cold." Duns locates his basis of certitude in the formal relation
of the terms involved in the reasonings occasioned by our sensible ex-
perience. Thus, despite the fact that our senses appear to assure us that
two material bodies are occupying the same place at the same instant,
ultimate recourse to the analysis of the statement occasioned by this
particular sense report : "two bodies are simultaneously occupying the
same spatial location , " will reveal the perceptual fraud as well as guaran-
tee the truth of the principle that : "two bodies cannot occupy the same
place at the same time. " For Duns, the logician's analysis adequately
mirrors an entirely parallel synthetic structure in " things" and discovers
the purely formal relations which obtain between God and His creatures."
Now Thomas, insisting on the material basis of particularization ,

had been led to construct a metaphysic in which individuals of the same
species differ only numerically, and not at all in kind. Individual sub-
stances , as a consequence , were become fundamentally opaque to reason .
In his noetic scheme, it will be recalled , knowledge can only arise after
the intellect has abstracted the pure intelligible species from the tainted
wrapping of the directly experienced sensible species. For Scotus, on
the other hand, the principle of individuation is formal. Consequently,
he promulgates a theory of knowledge in which the individual is handled
on the basis of a formal distinction — a distinction intermediary between
a mere distinction of reason , and a real distinction which the mind
discovers. The ground for Scotus' formal distinction is the actual presence
in each individual of formally distinct entities ; thus conceived, the
"formalities" are both really distinct formal entities in the thing, and
really one as consisting in the actual being of the total subject whose
parts they are.
Of immediate relevance is the fact that Scotus' metaphysic introduces

a realm of real abstracta as necessarily prior to, and distinct from, the
individual entities which they inform. Thus, the aristotelian definitions
of motion, time and place, are seen to require the hypostatized existence
On the question of certainty, that is, Duns Scotus, like Augustine ,

finds that the perfect certainties, for us, are of a logical or mathematical
("analytic") order - i . e., certainties of the principles by which our minds
operate in discursive thought. Thomas, while acknowledging these cer-
tainties, gives more weight to certainty concerning external sensible things
i. e., truths about bodies and their properties, etc. These are certain, for
Thomas, as universal truths evident by our intellectual grasp of essential
nature or of the "quiddities " of sensible things but he does not accord
such certainty to contingent propositions about individual instances .
Chapter One II
of corresponding entities of an abstract and absolute nature as proper

designata for the terms " motion," "time" and " place." With Scotus,
"where-ness" (ubietas) is become a real entity distinct from located
bodies as if to -be-at-Columbia is a reality prior to, and distinct from ,
the things located at Columbia, and Columbia itself. "When-ness"
(quandeitas) is become a certain "flowing thing" (res fluens) successively
inhering in the things existing in time ; while motion , similarly , is seen
to be a continuously flowing reality whose " parts " are constantly
utilized acquired and destroyed - by the bodies which it serves to
move. Scotism, in short, was pressing Aristotle's physics into the service
of a metaphysic of absolute, abstract entities, non-observable to sense
and "perceptible to the mind alone."
The signal flavor of William Ockham's philosophy — and that which
accounts, in marked contrast to his medieval predecessors, for his
singularly secular attitude with respect to the problems of natural
science arises directly consequent on his persistent refusal to identify
the I am Who am of revelation , with the being which provides metaphysic
its primary subject . He is led , thus, to rule out as irrelevant to meta-
physic proper, the most fundamental problem which his christian
brethren had engaged in the name of that science : the attempt to explain
and/or account for the determinate being of the finite, by ultimate
reference to an indeterminate Infinite.
Insofar as metaphysic is the science of being qua being, it is concerned
with a concept and not a thing. Rather than a nebulous, absolute prin-
ciple prior to the actuality of the individual existents which it serves,
somehow, to generate and explain , being is a notion formed subsequent
to our sensible experience of the particular beings in which the world con-
sists. One could not even conceive of an existent God - a God who
cannot in Himself be apprehended - unless there first arose a general
concept, abstracted from our everyday traffic with finite individuals,
of what it means to be.
Along with Aristotle, the reality of whose metaphysic he is thus
everywhere concerned to show as intrinsically contained and exemplified
by all human science, Ockham never questions the objectivity of the
material world as it lies palpable to sense. The reality of the world's
7 Sent., III, qu. 9, t.
Ockham is like Thomas in giving more weight to our knowledge of
things accessible to sense (though he also follows Augustine in allowing us
certainty of our own acts of knowing and willing) . But Ockham is unlike
Thomas, in that he finds the basis of our certain knowledge of scientific
truths about sensible things to lie in the evidence of our judgements con-
cerning singular instances, expressed in evident contingent propositions ---
individual, existent population is the very condition of our perceptive

awareness ; and it is simply bootless to inquire about how things "really"
are, when how they are at any given moment in their history of change,
is the principle of how they are observed, at that moment, to be. The
material world, for William Ockham, neither provides some sort of
delusion encouraging queries as to its noumenal ground, nor is it a mere
manipulation or manifestation of the ordering mind.
Sentient awareness, however, of the world thus disclosed, is not
itself of a material nature. Certainly, material substances in their passages
from state to state may be touched, seen, or otherwise apprehended by
the avenues of sense ; but "vision" and "touch" are no more themselves
tangible in character than are our judgements concerning the signals
yielded by sensation.
Awareness, consciousness, or mind, then, is not matter, nor is matter
mind; and whereas Ockham is never concerned to reduce one to the
other, he is concerned, as we shall see, to establish direct lines of com-
merce across the mind-world chasm. On the one hand this attempt,
owing directly to his affirmation of the primacy of being, will determine
his logic as nominalistic ; on the other, this same realization that the
first principles of all knowledge are prior to, and distinct from , the
scientific constructs of mind, will define and determine as empiristic
his approach to the natural sciences. Viewed thus, the essential dif-
ferential demarcating the philosophy of William Ockham from that of
his medieval predecessors stems directly from his instauration and
strict adherence to the simple, empirically oriented metaphysic which
he believed to be that of Aristotle. Insofar as certain of his contemporaries
and predecessors promulgated a theory of science which appeared to
Ockham to be directly counter to the basic empiricism of Aristotle, "
and he considers the certainty of universal judgements (other than purely

"analytic" ones) to be derivative from the certainty of evident contingent
knowledge .
Even a superficial examination of Ockham's writings yields the in-
formation that was strongly inclined against what we shall continue, through-
out this paper, to call the " absolute" theory and its supporters . Ockham,
however, names no names ; and although Walter Burleigh springs all too
readily to mind as one possible object of Ockham's attack, L. Baudry's
article, "Les Rapports de Guillaume d'Occam et de Walter Burleigh, "
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge, IX ( 1934) , establishes
nicely that there is no conclusive evidence to prove Burleigh to have been
Ockham's intended butt. Only further research of the kind offered by Prof.
E. A. Moody, in his article, " Ockham and Aegidius of Rome, " Franciscan
Studies, vol. 9, no . 4 ( 1949 ) , in which Aegidius Romanus, long considered to
have been a thoroughgoing thomist, is conclusively shown to have been
an adherent of the theory of absolute quantity which Ockham so bitterly
assails, will eventually bring to light the actual identity of Ockham's opponents.
Chapter One 13
it becomes his main task to show how Aristotle's metaphysic was sufficient
to the task of providing all the ontological basis needed for the key concepts
of physical science. If we are correct, then Ockham's evident concern
to show that the terms " motion , " "time," and " place" do not signify
absolute entities distinct from individual substances and particular
qualities, arises as an expression of his metaphysical position that
whatever exists is a res singularis, and that these terms, therefore, are
reducible by logical analysis to expressions whose elements signify only
individual substances and qualities. The exposition which we intend,
then, may be seen as a first example, in medieval philosophy, of the
accomplishments possible in the natural sciences to a philosopher-
scientist concerned to show how the most basic concepts of dynamics
and kinematics can be defined in function of an ontology which offers
no place for metaphysical figments, hypostatized abstractions or un-
observable absolutes.
2.
Science: General Notions
Science, according to William Ockham, consists in a " collection "

of systematically related noetic " habits" existent in the intellective
soul of the person said to possess the science . In every instance , the
patron so imbued , is equipped with a unified corpus of intellective
qualities comprehending, as integral parts, knowledge of the fundamental
principles of a particular science ; conclusions related thereto ; and that
"knowledge of terms" methodologically adequated to the task of refut-
ing and solving "false arguments and errors . " 10
10 Expositio., Prol. , p . 239 : "... scientia vel est quaedam qualitas

existens subiective in anima, vel est collectio aliquarum talium qualitatum
animam informantium ; et loquor tantum de scientia hominis . " (p . 240) :
"... scientia aliquando accipitur pro uno habitu secundum numerum non
includentem plures habitus specie distinctos, aliquando accipitur pro
collectione multorum habituum ordinem determinatum et certum haben-
tium . Et isto secundo modo accipitur scientia frequenter a Philosopho. Et
scientia isto modo comprehendit tamquam partes aliquo modo integrales
habitus principiorum et conclusionum , notitias terminorum, reprobationes
falsorum argumentorum et errorum, et solutiones eorum ; et sic dicitur
Metaphysica esse scientia, et Naturalis Philosophia esse scientia ; et ita de
aliis.... Metaphysica , similiter Mathematica et Scientia Naturalis, non
est una scientia secundum numerum illo modo quo haec albedo est una
numero, et iste calor , et iste homo, et iste asinus. " (p. 241 ) : ". . . Philosophia
Naturalis est collectio multorum habituum sicut dictum est ; nec est aliter
'una' nisi sicut civitas dicitur una . . . vel exercitus comprehendens homines
et equos et cetera necessaria dicitur unus, vel sicut regnum dicitur unum ...
vel sicut mundus dicitur unus." The qualitative species, habitus, with
particular reference to the question of whether or not it is subject, properly
speaking, to alterative motion , will be more fully treated in the body of
this work. For a complete expository treatment of the importance of habitus
14 Ockham: Motion , Time and Place
Ockham does not mean that the scientist, armed with the fundamen-
tals pertinent to his science, and that knowledge of logic sufficient for
making explicit the conclusions entailed , is endowed with a " knowledge
of terms" for the purpose of confounding his opposition with a display
of dialectical pyrotechnics. Clearly, interest in the rejection of " false
arguments and errors" implies a concomitant interest in the establish-
ment of truth ; and if a " knowledge of terms " is requisite to the first
endeavor, it is of equal efficacy to the second.
That there obtains, in Ockham's view, this intimate relationship
between scientific truth and terminological knowledge, arises from his
conception of the content of science. Ockham writes :
natural philosophy considers, primarily, sensible substances and composites
of matter and form ... to the understanding of which it must be known
that all science is in respect of a proposition or propositions (complexi vel
complexorum). And just as it is that propositions are known through science,
so the terms (incomplexa) in which the propositions consist, are that in
which that science consists . Now, however, the propositions which are known
through natural science do not consist in sensible things , nor in substance ·
but consist in intentions, or concepts of the soul common to such things .
And , therefore, natural science, properly speaking, is not concerned with
corporeal and generable things, because such things are not the subject and
predicates known in the conclusions of natural science . . . However, speak-
ing improperly and metaphorically, natural science is concerned with
corruptibles and mobiles because it is concerned with the terms which
stand for (supponunt) such things.11
to the philosophy of Ockham, see O. Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit Accord-

ing to William Ockham ( Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1952 ) .
11 Expositio., Prol . , p. 243. See also Sent. , I , dist . 2 , qu . 4 , m, o. In the
above, as in all subsequent quotations from Ockham's works, the italics
are mine. The best work on Ockham's theory of science and logic, is still
E. A. Moody's The Logic of William of Ockham (London, Sheed and Ward,
1935 ) . For two recent considerations of the historical role and import of
Ockham's logic, see : P. Boehner, Medieval Logic (Manchester Univ. Press,
1952 ) ; and E. A. Moody, Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic (North-
Holland Publ . Co. , Amsterdam, 1953) . As an indication of the far-reaching
effects of Ockham's teachings, and of the fact that these, even in his own
lifetime, were in grave danger of misinterpretation, we offer this portion of
the Parisian Statute of Dec. 29, 1340. The translation, from Chartularium
Universitatis Parisiensis , II , no . 1042 , is by E. A. Moody and appears
on pp. 129-130 of his article, " Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autre-
court, " in Franciscan Studies, vol. 7, June ( 1947) : " Further, that no one
shall say that there is no knowledge of things which are not signs, that is,
which are not terms or statements ; because in the sciences we use terms for
things, which we cannot carry with us to the disputations . Hence, we
have knowledge concerning things, even though it is by means of terms or
statements. " Patently, there is nothing in this statement which can be
construed as directed against Ockham, for Ockham would be the first to
agree with it. As Professor Moody shows, this statute and the statute of
the previous year ( Sept. 25, 1339) , which were traditionally assumed to be
defense measures against the incursion of Ockhamist teachings into the
Chapter One 15
Patently, as prerequisite for an adequate understanding of Ockham's

treatment of problems proper to the province of natural science, some
consideration of the way in which he conceives of the relation between
scientific propositions, terms, and those things about which something
is being affirmed or denied, is in order.
3.
Signification and Supposition
Broadly conceived , the term " sign" is properly applied to everything
which stimulates cognition of something previously known . Thus, when
the physical appearance of a puff of smoke on the horizon presents to
cognition anything at all — from "forest fire" to "Indians on the war-
path," both previously known to have some connection with smoke -
then the smoke is exercising a significatory function.12
Restricted, however, to the realm of language, it is the term -
written, spoken or conceived¹³which assumes the role of the "puff
of smoke. " A linguistic sign, that is, shares the condition with "sign"
Parisian university, were, in actuality, directed against the sceptical ten-
dencies of the teachings of Nicholas of Autrecourt.
12 Logic. , Ch. 1 , p . 9 : " (Signum accipitur) pro omni illo quod apprehen-
sum aliquid aliud in cognitionem facit venire, quamvis non faciat mentem
venire in primam cognitionem eius ... sed in`actualem post habitualem
eiusdem." For a dramatic presentation of the way in which this statement
of Ockham's owing to imprecise understanding, can be abused into con-
structing a " picture of Ockham as an anticipation of Hume, or as a sceptic, "
see P. Boehner's article, " Ockham's Theory of Signification, " Franciscan
Studies, n. s. VI ( 1946) ; and cf. C. D. Burns' article, "William of Ockham
on Universals, " in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n. s. 14 ( 1914 ) .
Burns is one of those who sees a certain similitude between Ockham and
Hume.
13 In Logic. , Ch. 1 , p . 8, Ockham writes : "... triplex est terminus,
scilicet scriptus, prolatus, et conceptus. " Concerning the relation between
written, spoken and conceived terms, Prof. Moody (The Logic of William
of Ockham, op. cit. , p. 40) points out that : " Ockham concedes that in the
broadest sense of the word ' sign' the spoken word is a sign of the concept.
In this broad sense anything is a sign of its cause, or of whatever comes into
the mind when it is itself apprehended ; and since the spoken word is an
indication of the presence, in the mind of the speaker, of the concept cor-
responding to it, we may in this sense say that it ' signifies' the concept.
But we cannot say that the spoken word signifies the concept in the sense
that it means the concept, or in the sense that it denotes it in this sense
of the word ' signify, ' the spoken word signifies not the concept, but rather
the thing or things signified by the concept. The spoken or written word ,
in this sense, is a sign of the thing or things which it can denote, just as
much as the concept is. It is subordinate to the concept only because the
signification of the written or spoken word is established by convention ,
whereas the signification of the concept is established by the acts of under-
standing which brings it into existence . The concept, in other words, is a
natural sign of what it means, or of the things which it can denote, whereas
the written or spoken word is instituted by convention to be a sign of what
the concept corresponding to it signifies by nature."
in general that it bring something other than itself to cognition.14 In

short, a language-sign is anything ranging from a single noun with
a finite, or non-finite significatum (i. e. , a categorematic or syncategore-
matic term¹5) , a verb, or any other part of speech, to a total proposition
consisting in an "addition" of these which possesses the capacity
to exercise a significatory function in the linguistic realm.16
Within the scope of a given proposition, one and the same language-
symbol may exercise its function variously. Clearly, " man," in the
proposition : "man is an animal," is a different sort of sign than "man"
when used in this proposition : "man is a noun. " It is with an eye to
obviating potential "false arguments and errors" based upon such
terminological equivocations that Ockham emphasises the distinction
between the ways in which a term can enter into discourse.17
When the subject or predicate term of a proposition "stands for"
(supponit) the particular and real things which it means, then it is
significatively employed and has personal supposition . "Man, " then, in
our first example, supposits personally for this, that, and all individual
men. When the term in question, however, stands only for the type of
sign that it is as in our second example - then it is non-significatively
14 With this important difference : mental language signs (variously

called " mental terms, " "passions of the soul, " and " intentions" ) , are them-
selves natural signs obtained intuitively and not through a species or any
intermediary ; they are themselves, that is, the first cognition of an object
and make the object known directly, or they are the revival of a former
cognition, in which instance the object is again known without an inter-
mediary. Mental language signs, then, differ from " signs " in general, in
that they do not lead to a secondary cognition , habitually known, deriving
from a primary cognition . For an authoritative treatment of the possibility
of intuitive cognition of non -existents, see P. Boehner, "The Notitia Intuitiva
of Non-existents According to William Ockham, " Traditio, vol . 1 , ( 1943 ) .
In this article Boehner corrects the previous work done on this question
by E. Hochstetter, Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms
von Ockham (Berlin u . Leipzig, 1927) . For objections to Boehner's article
see A. C. Pegis, "Concerning William of Ockham, " Traditio, vol. II ( 1944) .
Boehner replies in : " In propria causa . A Reply to Prof. Pegis, " Franciscan
Studies, vol. 5 ( 1945) . For further remarks, see A. C. Pegis, “ Some Recent
Interpretations of Ockham," Speculum, vol. 23 ( 1948) .
15 Logic., Ch. 4, p. 15 : "Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent
significationem sicut hoc nomen ' homo' significat omnes homines, et hoc
nomen ' animal' omnia animalia ... Termini autem syncategorematici,
cuiusmodi sunt tales : ' omnis, ' ' nullus, ' ' aliquis ' . .. et huiusmodi non habent
finitam significationem et certam, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a
rebus significatis per categoremata . "
16 Logic., Ch. 1, p. 10 : "Aliter accipitur ' signum ' pro illo, quod aliquid
facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in
propositione .. .'
17 To demonstrate the way in which such equivocation can lead to
"false arguments and errors" Professor Moody (op . cit . , p . 43 ) cites this
instance : " man is a species, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a species."
Chapter One 17
employed, and has simple or material supposition depending upon

whether it is taken for the kind of concept that it is (simple supposition) ,
or for the variety of spoken or written sign that it is (material supposition) .18
Now, as we have seen, the propositions of natural science are
composed of language signs which " supposit " for things which exist by
nature. The propositions of logic , on the other hand — and in this logic
and natural science are clearly demarcated areas of knowledge — are
composed of language-signs standing for language-signs.19 Yet another
way of marking this clear dichotomy is to note, with Ockham, that
natural science is exclusively concerned with terms of first intention in
significative employ, while the logician deals only in terms of second
intention , again in significative employ.20 Terms of first intention , then,
are categorematic words signifying things that exist by nature ; while
terms of second intention are significant categorematics such as supposit
only for things that are themselves terms.21
18 Logic., Ch. 63 , p . 175 : "Dicto de significationibus terminorum, restat
dicere de suppositione, quae est proprietas conveniens termino, sed num-
quam nisi in propositione. . . . Dicitur . . . suppositio quasi pro alio posito,
ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo, de quo " sive de pronomine demon-
strante ipsum, ille terminus . . . verificatur . .. (ch. 64, p. 177) : " Suppositio
simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non
tenetur significative . . . . Suppositio personalis universaliter est illa quando
terminus supponit pro suo significato. . . . Suppositio materialis est, quando
terminus non supponit significative, sed supponit vel pro voce vel pro
scripto." For an elucidating exposition of Ockham's theory of supposition,
see P. Boehner, " Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the Notion of
Truth, " Franciscan Studies, vol. 6, no . 3 (1946) . Cf. Petrus Hispanus,
Summulae Logicales, Tractatus 6, articles 5 and 8. Peter of Spain, a realist
in the controversy over universals, treats personal and simple supposition
in this way : "Personalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis
inferioribus, ut cum dicitur 'homo currit' iste terminus ' homo' supponit
pro suis inferioribus, scilicet pro Socrate et pro Platone et sic de aliis.
... Suppositio simplex est acceptio termini communis pro re universali
figurata per ipsum, ut cum dicitur ' homo est species ' ... iste terminus
'homo' supponit pro homine in communi et non pro aliquo inferiori . . ."
19 Expositio. , Prologue, p . 244-5 : " ... dicendum est quod scientia
realis non est de rebus, sed est de intentionibus supponentibus pro rebus ,
quia termini propositionum scitarum supponunt pro rebus . . .. Per idem . . .
dico quod Logica per hoc distinguitur a scientiis realibus quia scientiae
reales sunt de intentionibus quia de universalibus supponentibus pro rebus ;
quia termini scientiarum realium, quamvis sint intentiones, tamen suppo-
nunt pro rebus. Sed Logica est de intentionibus supponentibus pro intentioni-
bus ..."
20 One knows what Ockham should have added - i. e., that the state-
ments of Metaphysics, as distinct from both those of logic and natural
philosophy, alone employ such predicate terms as ens, and unum . This
would have completed, on the same basis, Ockham's distinction between
significant terms or concepts. Unfortunately, although it is implied, one
cannot find this further distinction stated in Ockham's writings .
21 Logic., Cap. 11 , pp. 37-8 : " Nomina secundae intentionis vocantur
illa nomina, quae praecise imposita sunt ad significandum intentiones
animae, vel praecise intentiones animae, quae sunt signa naturalia, et alia
4.
Truth and the Physical World
Obviously, for Ockham, whether or not something is being correctly
predicated of some subject term cannot be divorced from a semantic
consideration of the terms involved . Ockham writes :
the diverse supposition of terms bears directly on the fact (bene facit ad hoc)
that with respect to some term, some predicate is truly affirmed or denied .
Whence, by the fact that this may be true : ' a mutable thing is a subject,
or that about which something is known, ' the supposition of this term
(“ mutable thing" ) is of key importance (bene facit suppositio istius termini) .
. . . For if this term " mutable thing, " supposits simply, for itself, then this
is true : “a mutable thing is (that about which something is known) ; " that
is, this common (term) " mutable thing, " is that about which something is
known. If, however, it supposits personally, then (the proposition) is false
because any singular is false . 22 And so the diverse supposition of the same
term bears directly on the fact that, with regard to the same term, something
is truly negated or affirmed . For if in this : "man is a species," "man"
supposits simply, this proposition is true ; and if in this : "man is not
species, " the same term supposits personally , this (proposition) is still true.23
Not for a moment, however, does Ockham forget that the scientific
enterprise deals in statements about natural entities and occasions. In
all cases the ultimate ground for the truth of the stated fact is the actual
being of the things about which the fact is true. Science presupposes the
signa ad placitum instituta ... Nomina, autem, primae intentionis vocan-

tur omnia alia nomina a praedictis, quae videlicet significant aliquas res,
quae non sunt signa nec consequentia talia signa, cuiusmodi sunt omnia
talia : ' homo, ' ' animal, ' ' Sortes, ' . . . ' verum, ' ' bonum , ' et huiusmodi, quorum
aliqua significant praecise res, quae non sunt signa nata supponere pro
aliis, aliqua significant talia signa et simul cum hoc alias res.
22 See Expositio. , Prol. , p. 244 : "... scientia non est de singularibus ,
sed est de universalibus supponentibus pro ipsis singularibus,'" and cf.
H. Ritter, Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie (Hamburg , 1845 ) , vol . VIII ,
p. 582 : " Dieser Richtung schließt Occam sich an, indem er erklärt, daß die
reale Wissenschaft nicht vom Allgemeinen sei , sondern nur vom Besondern ."
E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age (Payot, Paris, 1930) p. 253 writes :
"Mais du point de vue auquel Occam s'est placé, c'est le particulier qui est
l'objet de la science . " In a later work, however , (History of Christian Philos-
ophy in the Middle Ages, Random House, N. Y. 1955 ) Gilson emends his
original view noting that for Ockham (p . 490) : "there is science of the
general only." Cf. J. Lindsay's article, " Logic and Metaphysics of Occam, ”
in The Monist, vol. XXX, ( 1920) . On pp . 522—3 , for example, Dr. Lindsay
writes : "And Occam was, in somewhat extreme nominalism, to declare
for individuals as the alone real (sufficienter singularibus et ita tales res
universales_omnino frustra ponuntur) . In doing so, he was pointing the
way to real science (scientia est de rebus singularibus) , through immediate
apprehension of the actual world . ” Dr. Lindsay does not say who, or what,
he is here quoting.
23 Expositio., Prol . , p . 245 .
Chapter One 19
real, knowable, physical world ; and it is this objective natural realm

which provides for the very possibility of science. The scientific proposi-
tion is itself related to matters of physical fact as sign to significatum ;
and objective circumstance lends verity to scientific statements while
remaining, itself, unaffected by such pronouncements.24
And, therefore, the numerous distinctions by means of which it is
distinguished that mobile or mutable things can be considered thus, or thus,
and that in one mode they are mutable, and in another mode, immutable,
and in one mode contingent, and in another necessary, effects nothing
(nihil valent); for with the same facility I can say that a man, if considered
thus, is an ass, if in another way, an ox, and if in a third way, a she-goat.
Whence, it must be known, that my consideration or yours has nothing to
do with the fact (nihil facit ad hoc) that a thing is mutable or immutable ;
nor with the fact that you are black, or white, or in the house or outside .
... To hold that that thing which is outside (res quae est extra) is, owing
to one consideration of mine mutable, and owing to another consideration
of mine, immutable, is simply false and asinine, just as if I wish to say that
Sortes, because of one consideration of mine is white, and because of another,
is black.25
Truth, then, and falsity, when predicated of a proposition, express the

fact that there does or does not obtain an agreement between the
proposition as formulated and the fact as given.26
24 If we mean then , by “nominalist” someone who construes the con-
cepts employed in the process of knowledge as nothing more than con-
ventional signs, linguistic artifices, or pure fictions, Ockham certainly does
not qualify as a nominalist. Ockham's "nominalism , " as Prof. Moody shows
(op. cit. ) , arises from his persistent attempt to preserve and exhibit the
realism of Aristotle's metaphysic. Being, that is, for both the Stagirite and
Ockham , is prior to, and independent of the procedures and creations of
discursive thought. It is this metaphysical realism, then, which leads to
Ockham's brand of logical nominalism . See also E. Hochstetter's article,
"Nominalismus ?" in Franciscan Studies, vol. 7 , no . 4 ( 1949) . Dr. Hoch-
stetter, in the main, agrees with Prof. Moody's findings . See also, L. Kugler,
Der Begriff der Erkenntnis bei Wilhelm Ockham , (Breslau , 1913 ) .
25 Expositio., Prol . , p. 245 : Ockham continues : "Tamen si vellem uti
isto termino aequivoce, puta pro uno homine nigro et pro uno alio homine
albo, tunc ista : Sortes est albus, ' est vera, si hoc nomen ' Sortes' accipiatur
pro illo homine albo : et haec: ' Sortes est niger, ' est vera si accipiatur pro
alio homine nigro. Sicut est de ista : ' omnis canis est animal, ' quod si canis
stet pro animali latrabili tantum , tunc est vera : si iste terminus ' canis' stet
pro caelesti sidere tantum , tunc est falsa. Et sic distinguere propositiones
est ars tradita a Philosopho ; non autem dicere quod eadem res secundum
unam considerationem est asinus et eadem secundum considerationem est
capra ."
26 That Ockham is thus committed to what is now known as a " corre-
spondence theory of truth" is noted by P. Boehner in his article , "Ock-
ham's Theory of Truth , " Franciscan Studies , vol . 5 , no . 2 ( 1945) . See also,
by the same author, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham "
in Traditio, vol . iv, ( 1946) . Boehner writes (p . 311 ) : " Since conceptualism
is characterized by the affirmation of universals in the mind and by the
denial of any universality outside the mind , Ockham's theory is conceptual-
20 Ockham : Motion , Time and Place
5.
Absolute and Connotative Terms
Clearly, with an eye to the possibility of empirical verification as

envisioned by Ockham, there is a great disparity between such state-
ments as: "Sortes is swimming," and : "time is composed of instants ."
In the former case, verification is a relatively simple feat. One has
merely to seek " Sortes" out, and encountering him , take cognizance
of whether or no he is, in fact , enjoying the predicated aquatic activity.
If so, the statement is true ; if not, it is false. In the latter instance ,
however, "verification " takes on a new tinge. Where and how does one
"seek out" and encounter time? How does one demonstrate its structural
components to be instants? How can one empirically determine the
truth or falsity of this assertion ? Still, if Ockham's notion of the relation
obtaining between truth, scientific assertion, and matters of empirical
fact is to avoid a break-down, such verification must be, in some way,
capable of accomplishment. It is with this problem in mind that Ockham
marks the distinction between absolute and connotative terms.
"Absolute terms," Ockham writes :
are those which do not signify one thing primarily, and another thing .
secondarily ; but whatever is signified through such a name is signified with
equal primacy (aeque primo) .27
A connotative term, on the other hand,
is that which signifies something primarily, and something else secondarily ;

and such a name properly has a nominal definition (habet definitionem ex-
28
primentem quid nominis) .²
Absolute terms, that is, have real definitions, while connotative terms
are nominally defined ; and it is precisely by the character of the definition
that connotative and absolute terms can be distinguished . When the
elements entering into the definition of a term signify only the individual
entities for which the defined term can stand, then the term is absolute.
ism . Since, however, realism can be characterized by the affirmation of a

correspondence or similarity between concepts and reality, or by the in-
tentionality of concepts as regards reality - a correspondence which is
either denied or at least not affirmed by idealism - Ockham's conceptualism
has to be qualified as realistic conceptualism , and not as idealist conceptual-
ism. " In the same article Boehner emends E. Hochstetter's treatment of
Ockham's theory of universals. Hochstetter had , that is, in his Studien zur
Metaphysik ... op. cit. , attributed traces of idealism to Ockham. Cf. Lind-
say, op. cit., pp. 522-3 : "The real value of universals was denied by Occam .
His main line of argumentation was ' that the universal is not something
real that has explicit subjectivity, neither in the soul, nor in the thing' .
Again Dr. Lindsay does not say whom or what he is quoting.
27 Logic. , Ch . 10, p . 33 . 28 Ibid., p. 34 .
Chapter One 21
Thus , “animal," signifies " oxen, asses, and men" primarily, and means
precisely the entities which it is used to denote.29 When, on the other
hand, the elements entering into the definition of a term do not all
signify the same individual entities for which the definiens is a sign,
then the term is connotative . In this way "shape" (figura) , for example,
is a connotative term , in that at least one part of its definition does not
stand for that which the term itself denotes : for what " shape" signifies
in reality, is some substance whose parts are arranged in a determinate
spatial ordering. Hence, the connotative term " shape " signifies one
―― -
thing primarily i. e., the subject which possesses the shape and
consignifies, or connotes, at the same time, its determinate physical
configuration.30
Now the furniture of the physical universe, so far as Ockham is
concerned, admits of but two varieties of actual existent : substance and
quality. Hence, there are but two kinds of absolute terms - terms properly
ordered under the category of substance³¹ (concrete absolute terms) , and
terms properly ascribed to the category of quality32 (abstract absolute
terms). Neither class of actual existent, however, is ever experienced in
abstraction from contingent circumstance . Substances, that is, are
never apprehended per se, apart from their accidental determinations ;
no more are the qualities ever experienced apart from change ; and
since the written, spoken, or conceived expression of these contingent
circumstances is invariably couched in connotative terms, it is the
29 Ibid.; "... sicut patet de hoc nomine, ' animal ' quod non significat
nisi boves et asinos et homines et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat
unum primo et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in
recto et aliud in obliquo, nec in definitione exprimente quid nominis oportet
ponere talia distincta in diversis casibus vel aliquod verbum adiectivum .
Immo proprie loquendo talia nomina non habent definitionem exprimentem
quid nominis."
30 Logic. , ch. 10 , pp. 34-5 : " Sicut est de hoc nomine ‘ album' , nam
habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua una dictio ponitur
in recto et alia in obliquo. Unde si quaeras , quid significat hoc nomen
' album' , dices, quod ista oratio tota , aliquid informatum albedine ' , vel,
' aliquid habens albedinem ' . Et patet, quod una pars orationis istius ponitur
in recto et alia in obliquo. Potest etiam aliquando aliquod verbum cadere
in definitione exprimente quid nominis ; sicut si quaeratur, quid significat
hoc nomen ' causa', potest dici, quod idem quod haec oratio aliquid ad
cuius esse sequitur aliud', vel, ' aliquid potens producere aliud', vel aliquid
huiusmodi.... ' figura ' , ' rectitudo ' , ' longitudo' , ' altitudo ' , . . . et huiusmodi
sunt nomina connotativa . " See below p . 72 ff.
31 Excepting essential differentiae which are connotative.
32 Not all of the species of quality can be considered as actual existents .
Habitus and figura, for example, are rather accidental . modifications of
substance, than existents per se . Only those qualities subject to alterative
motion stricte are res permanens . These are, essentially, the qualitative
contraries.
connotative term which is first in the order of coming-to-know a

primacy which, as we shall see, led many of Ockham's contemporaries
and predecessors to regard such terms as though they were absolutely
significative. All such terms, however, according to Ockham, are sus-
ceptible of ultimate resolution into functions of absolute terms . Professor
Moody writes :
all such terms are ... capable of analysis or of definition, whereby their
meaning is exhibited as a function of elements or principles signified by
absolute terms . Where we are able to state both parts of the nominal defini-
tion of a connotative term determinately (e . g. , to define " the calefactible”
not merely as " something in which heat can be present" but as "a body
determinable with respect to heat" ) , we achieve . . . a complete analysis
of the meaning of the connotative term , through reduction to absolute
terms . . .33
The significance for Ockham's theory of empirical verification, of
the distinction and ultimate relationship obtaining between absolute
and connotative terms , is quite clear. Unless there is some way of exhibit-
ing connotative terms as functions of absolute terms whose significata ,
in turn, can be " sought out" in the physical realm of substances and
qualities, definition as well as demonstration would involve circularity ,
or infinite regress, and the possibility of empirical verification of scientific
pronouncements, as conceived by Ockham, would be vitiate.
6.
General Conclusions
In general, Ockham's evident concern to establish and preserve the

autonomous province of each area in which knowledge is possible,
provides a basis for understanding three fundamental features which ,
as we shall see, characterize his treatment of the problems centering
about motion, time, and place. Before turning to a direct examination
of this treatment , it might be well to indicate the significance of these
carefully drawn distinctions in the particular area of our interest.
1. Insofar as the originative source of all our knowledge of the
existent world arises from our experience of the contingent circum-
stances surrounding the indemonstrable first principles of natural
33 E. A. Moody, op . cit. , pp. 56-7 . Couched in more modern language,

what Ockham is saying, is this : terms belonging to categories other than
substance and quality are to be analyzed as statements forms of the
form : "x is greater than y ;" "j is at place m, n, o before v is at place z ; ”
"r is successively next to place p, q, n , 1, " and so on . When one wishes to
determine designata for these, only names of the substances or qualities
actually connoted by these designata are to be substituted for the unknowns.
Chapter One 23
science and sense perception - i. e., individual substances and the

qualitative contraries we can never determine that A is the cause of
B, or F is the effect of G , by reasoning a priori. The nature of the problems
under consideration warrants, as fundamental to their solution , but
one procedural approach empirical investigation.34
2. For Ockham, the natural sciences receive sufficient guarantee for
their specific certitude by recognition of the actual being of the things
about which the fact is true. It is precisely this faith in the ability of the
human mind to construct sciences about things, without seeking the
ultimate guarantee of a supreme Certitude in the light of which all
lesser certitudes are to be understood, and to which, somehow, they are
to be related, that gives Ockham the confidence to meet the individual
problems concerned with motion, time, and place, on their own ground ,
and to deal with them in their own terms.35
34 That the subject matter under investigation, however, thus demands

the adoption of an empirical attitude by the investigator, is not to be taken
as ground for assuming Ockham to be denying the importance of strict
demonstration in the natural sciences . As we have already seen, the very
possibility of science hinges on the ability to analytically reduce the syn-
thetic constructs of the specific science to its principles principles which,
with regard to the problems concerning motion, time, and place, are yielded
by experience (although grasped in abstraction from the contingent circum-
stances which bring them to apprehension) . For an excellent treatment of
the importance of strict demonstration to the philosophy of Ockham,
stressing the fact that he accepts the basically aristotelian ideal of a strictly
demonstrative science while admitting that it is an ideal which cannot
always be realized , see D. Webering, op. cit.
35 We should like to stress again that only by conceiving metaphysic
to be a study devoted to demonstrations and explanations of the relation
between the finite world, and some " real" world of Eternal Objects and
Timeless Truths, can Ockham's refusal to regard " lesser" truths as related
to an Absolute Truth be construed as an anti-metaphysical bias. Meta-
physics, for Ockham, is concerned with the concept of being as such. Not
only are the first principles of any individual science indemonstrable, but
it is a further and obvious impossibility that metaphysics - the science of
first principles as such should be capable of demonstrating either the
first principles of any individual science, or its own first principles . The
individual sciences, however, not only can, but invariably do demonstrate
metaphysical truths . The practicing scientist, that is , in any of the discursive
sciences, by the very cognition of the primacy of those first principles upon
which his particular science is based, is , at one and the same time, committed
to a recognition of the prior metaphysical principles embodied and exempli-
fied within the specific area of his investigations . For a fine treatment of
Ockham's Metaphysics, see P. Boehner, "The Metaphysics of William
Ockham , " in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 1 , no. 4, ( 1948 ) . See also
E. Hochstetter, op. cit.; and E. Moody, op . cit . , ch . 4. Cf. J. Lindsay, op.
cit. , p. 538 : " Only in Metaphysics was Occam sceptic. Occam's position
was that Science has only to do with phenomena which it observes, and
that what lies beyond this is the object of belief alone . . . ; "' (p . 540) : “ There
is for Occam no ... concept of being. " Cf. also E. Gilson , History of Christian
Philosophy in the Middle Ages , op . cit . , p . 489 : ". . . An Ockhamist intellect
is as badly equipped as possible for metaphysical cognition, and since where
3. Since the acquisition of scientific knowledge is, as Ockham sees

it, possible in its own right, those " false arguments and errors" represent-
ing the alternative attempts of his predecessors and contemporaries to
come to grips with the problems of motion , time, and place, are culpable ,
and will be criticized, as we shall see, in that they exhibit a linguistic
naiveté which tends to obliterate the clearly defined bounds obtaining
between the several sciences, thus relegating the ultimate measure of
truth to a realm in which the principles of metaphysics and the laws
of thought are so inextricably confused as to render natural science
incapable of any means of surety other than dialectical-metaphysical
demonstration. Ockham will make the point again and again, that a
thorough knowledge of the precise supposition and signification of
terms as they appear in the propositions of a given science, is fundamental
to the initial ordering and ultimate solution of that given problem.
CHAPTER TWO
CONCERNING MOTION : THE BROAD SENSE
I.
Arguments Against Hypostatization of Mutation

Certain of Ockham's contemporaries, or predecessors , whose views
were current enough to be referred to as " common opinion" insisted
on the absolute character of motion , time, and place.36 They hypostatiz-
ed these concepts : positing them to possess an entity completely indepen-
dent of, and yet responsible for, the particular occasions in which they
there is no metaphysical knowledge theology can expect little help from

philosophy, the consequence of Ockhamism was to substitute for the positive
collaboration of faith and reason which obtained in the golden age of scho-
lasticism, a new and much looser regime in which the absolute and self-
sufficient certitude of faith was only backed by mere philosophical probabil-
ities ." As D. Webering shows, at least part of Gilson's view of Ockham's
philosophy is colored by his failure to see what " probability" meant to
Ockham. A probable statement is a statement which can be proved although
it fails to satisfy all the requirements for a strict demonstration . The con-
clusion, that is, of a probable syllogism is derived, according to Ockham ,
from premisses which are generally accepted opinions ; the conclusions of a
demonstrative syllogism, on the other hand , are derived from necessary
and self-evident premisses. See Webering, op . cit. , p . 5 ff. For further views
of Ockham's philosophy as a destructive force, see E. Gilson's The Unity
of Philosophical Experience ( Scribners, N. Y. 1954) ; and A. C. Pegis , "Con-
cerning William of Ockham, " Traditio, II , ( 1949) .
36 Ockham refers to them in this way in the opening lines of Tractatus ,
P. 32 : “ Quia communis opinio est, quod motus , tempus et locus sunt quae-
dam res aliae a mobili et locato, ideo quae sit intentio Philosophi . . . de hoc
est videndum . . ."
Chapter Two. Motion : The Broad Sense 25
are manifested -- i . e. , the body in motion, the body moved in time,

and the body located in space.
The whole force of Ockham's physical theorizing was directed against
this absolute view, and the theory he presents to supplant it is, in evers
respect, its precise antithesis. Thus, Ockham persistently employs the
absolute theory as a foil, and a point of departure for the expression of
his own position ; and turning first to his treatment of motion, we see'
as typical, that he prefaces it by expressing himself as determined to
prove that motion cannot be some sort of entity, existent per se, in utter
divorce from things that exist-by-nature (res permanens) .37
Initially, however, Ockham notes that the term " motion" itself is
not applied with precision. In its broadest application (motus large) it
is employed to embrace all the changes - whether sudden or successive
- which have operative scope within the four categories of substance,
quantity, quality, and place ; while "motion" employed in its narrower

sense (motus stricte) , has reference only to the successive changes
properly attributable to the three categories of quantity , quality and
place. His first objective, then, is to indicate that " sudden change"
(mutatio subita) , which is the additive factor delineating the broad
sense of "motion, " is not " another thing distinct as regards itself as a
whole" apart from a mutated subject and the terminus acquired, or
lost, as a result of its suffering a sudden change.38
37 Tractatus., p . 33 : "... probandum est, quod nullus motus est aliqua

una res, secundum se totam distincta ab omnibus rebus permanentibus , et
quod motus non est aliqua una res extra essentiam omnium rerum permanen-
tium, et quod nulla res permanens est de essentia motus sicut albedo est
totaliter extra essentiam substantiae et substantia est totaliter extra
essentiam albedinis . " See also Phil . Nat., III , 2 , and cf. Aristotle, Physics,
III , 1. An excellent " kritischer Vergleich der Summulae in libros physicorum
(i. e. Phil. Nat . ) mit der Philosophie des Aristoteles" is provided by Dr. Si-
mon Moser, "Grundbegriff der Naturphilosophie bei Wilhelm von Ock-
ham ," Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften , IV Band , 2/3 Heft, ( 1932) .
38 Tractatus., p. 32—3 : “ Est enim primo videndum et sciendum, quod
motus aliquando accipitur stricte, secundum quod includit successionem ,
aliquando sumitur generaliter pro omni mutatione, sive sit subita sive
successiva. " See also Phil . Nat. , III , 2 : " Oportet autem scire, quod ...
motus accipitur large et stricte, large accipitur pro mutatione subita, et
motu continuo et extenso, stricte autem accipitur secundum quod distin-
guitur contra mutationem subitam. " (Ibid. , III , 1 ) : " . . . secundum philo-
sophum huius (i . e . , III, 3 Physics) tantum in quatuor praedicamentis est
motus, scilicet in substantia , quantitate, qualitate, ubi, et accipit ibi motum
large pro mutatione, et motu proprie dicto. " (Ibid . , III , 8 ) : generatio
et corruptio sunt motus large accipiendo motum, sed non sunt motus stricte
accipiendo hoc vocabulum motus ' . " ( Tractatus . , p . 33 ) : " Primo ergo pro-
bandum est, quod mutatio subita non est alia res secundum se totam di-
stincta a mobili seu movente et termine acquisito vel deperdito et caeteris,
quae ponuntur res permanentes . " See also Sent., I, dist . 44, f ; and cf.
Aristotle, Physics, V, 1 , 2 .
3 Ockham: Motion
To accomplish this, Ockham sets forth several dialectical arguments

indicating specific theoretical impossibilities involved in the postulation
of an hypostatized "mutation ." To begin with, such postulation involves
the " impossible" consequence that an infinite number of totally distinct
things would have been generated and corrupted in a finite time- span .
For since the time-period during which a subject is being mutated is
capable of infinite division , and since, consequently, the mutant is
undergoing an infinite number of mutations, it then follows that were
mutation such an absolute - consisting in discrete and absolute parts —
an infinite number of these distinct parts would have been generated
and corrupted during the finite time-period encompassed by the actual
mutation.39
Secondly, were " mutation" some objective existent, it could — as
any positive thing - be assigned a proper categorical designation . A
cursory examination , however, of the several categories is sufficient
to indicate that an entitized " sudden change" cannot properly be
relegated to any of them.40
Further, Ockham rejects the notion that "mutation" can be granted
a categorical designation through reduction (per reductionem) . For in
order that it be thus in a category, "mutation" must fulfill the condition
of being an intrinsic, essential, part of some subject existing per se in
the category. In this way, for example, "matter," and "substantial
form ," can be said to be reductively in the category of substance, for
they are proper parts of a subject which is, per se, in the category , while
"mutation" is not a proper and intrinsic part of any subject, in any
category whatever.41
39 Phil. Nat. , III , 2 : " Quod autem non sit talis res, (i . e. , aliqua res
secundum se totam distincta ab omni re permanente), probo, quia si sic,
sequeretur quod infinitae res totaliter distinctae, quandocumque aliquid
moveretur, essent destructae et perditae, quia infinita instantia sunt in
quolibet tempore in quo aliquid movetur, et per consequens infinitae mu-
tationes, si ergo mutationes essent tales res, sic infinitae res essent generatae
et corruptae. See also, Tractatus , p . 34 , beginning : "Impossibile est esse
res infinitas per naturam, quarum nulla est pars alterius nec faciunt per se
unum , sed secundum se totas sunt distinctae, et nulla facit per se unà cum
alia, generatas vel corruptas in tempore finito ..."
40 Phil. Nat. , III , 2 : "Praeterea , si sit talis res, quaero in quo praedica-
mento ponitur : non in genere substantiae patet, quia tunc substantia
corrumperetur quandocumque mobile cessaret mutari , nec in genere quanti-
tatis, ut patet inductive discurrendo per omnes species quantitatis, nec
qualitatis vel relationis, nec ubi, nec habitus, nec actionis, nec passionis,
quia actio et passio non sunt tales res ..." See also Altaris . , p. 17, 25.
41 Phil. Nat., III , 2 : " Sed dicetur quod mutatio non est per se in praedi-
camento aliquo ; sed per reductionem tantum . . . hoc non sufficit, quia nihil
est in praedicamento per reductionem nisi sit pars alicuius per se existentis
in illo praedicamento, sicut materia et forma substantialis sunt per reduc-
Chapter Two. Motion: The Broad Sense 27
Finally, Ockham invokes the principle of economy.42 In order to

"save" (explain) the phenomena of mutation , there is never any occasion
to have reference to any factor beyond form, matter, and agency . All
that is requisite in order that one explain any single instance of mutation,
is observation that some "suddenly changed" subject has a form which
it previously had not ; and that this form was acquired in a non -successive
manner. Since, therefore, an explanation embracing these conditions is
complete, and suffices to explain any instance of mutation , introduction
of supra-sensible and extraneous entities as an hypostatized "sudden
change" - is entirely unnecessary.43
2.
Mutation According to Ockham

Couched within Ockham's effective demonstration that "mutation ,"
as an absolute entity is theoretically inacceptable, is his own notion of
what mutation is. Briefly stated , Ockham's position is this : "mutation"
always involves a mutated subject; and for “a subject to be mutated ,
is nothing else than for the subject itself to have a form which it previously
had not, or to lose a form which it previously had . Not, however, part-by-
part (partibiliter) , but so that it does not have one part of the form prior
to another, nor does it previously lose one part and then another ; but the
whole form is received, or lost, simultaneously.44
The mechanics of the " sudden " substantial changes - changes

which involve passage between contradictory states differ from those
truly successive passages, through intermediates, between contrary
states in that the parts of the subject of sudden change are activated
once, and once only, by their one, proper, " informing" part of the
newly acquired or lost substantial form. Ockham writes :
tionem in praedicamento substantiae, quia substantiae sunt partes, quae

est per se in praedicamento substantiae ..." See also Sent., II , qu . 9, f
(conclusion 4) ; Altaris. , p . 17, 25 ; Tractatus. , p . 58 ff.
42 For a background discussion of Ockham's famous " law of parsimony, "
see: W. M. Thorburn, "Occam's Razor, " Mind, April ( 1915 ) ; C. D. Burns,
"Ockham's Razor, " Mind, Oct. ( 1915) ; W. M. Thorburn, "The Myth of
Occam's Razor, " Mind, July ( 1918 ) .
43 Tractatus. , p . 35 : " Praeterea : frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri
per pauciora ... posito quod materia primo non habeat formam et postea
habeat formam et non habeat partem ante partem , vere materia mutatur ;
ergo, propter mutationem salvandam frustra ponitur alia res a materia et
forma et agente . Confirmatur : quia ad mutationem sufficit, quod materia
habeat aliquam formam, non ponitur alia res a materia et forma, nec per
hoc quod materia prius (non) habuit illam formam , necesse est ponere aliam
rem a materia et forma et agente . . . ergo, praeter res permanentes non est
alia res, quae sit mutatio. "
44 Tractatus., p. 37 See also Phil . Nat . , III, 3 .
3.
It must be known that generation is not successive motion, but only

sudden change. The reason (ratio) for this is that although one part of the
matter can receive one part of the form, and another part of the matter,
another part of the form . . . yet the same part of the matter cannot succes-
sively receive one part of the form after another part of the form ; which ,
however, is required for successive motion since in order that something
be moved (in the narrow sense) it is requisite that that which is moved
acquire one part after another. Because, therefore, the whole matter receives
the same part of the form which it receives simultaneously, therefore, that
(one) part of the matter in receiving the form is not successively moved ;
45
and, therefore, generation is not motion (in the narrow sense) .ª
Ockham should not be construed to be here denying that the subject

of a substantial change, being material and divisible, comes to be a
"such" through a temporal process :
it is obvious that the subject which is generated is generated in time , since
one part is continually generated before another part ;
he is, however, insisting that the substantial form "comes to be" in the
mutant, in an instantaneous, non-successive, whole and immediate
sense :
no substantial form comes about in the same part of matter in time, but
instantaneously. From the foregoing it is obvious that generation and
corruption are motion by accepting " motion " in its broad sense, but they
are not motion in the strict application of this word, "motion . "46
Claiming the weight of Aristotle's authority as endorsing his inter-

pretation, Ockham next extends the applicable range of the term
"sudden change", to embrace all generation and corruption - accidental
as well as substantial. No generative or corruptive changes, be they
substantial or accidental, can be considered as "motion" in the narrow
sense, since they all come into being in an instantaneous, non-successive ,
fashion. And since the proofs which Aristotle presents47 apply equally
as well to the generation and corruption of both accidental and sub-
stantial forms, these proofs, therefore, according to Ockham, embrace
"universally" all generative and corruptive motions.48
Thus, from Ockham's viewpoint , it is proper to maintain that when
some accident is newly-generated in a subject, it is the subject itself
which is properly said to be moved (in the narrow sense) ; but that
45 Phil. Nat. , III , 8.

46 Phil. Nat., III , 8. See also Altaris . , p . 77 , 79.
47 These proofs occur in Aristotle's Physics, V, 1 .
48 Phil. Nat ., III , 8 ; " Et tamen rationes Philosophi non probant de
mutatione substantiae tantum , sed universaliter de omni generatione et
corruptione : quia nulla generatio, sive sit substantiae, sive accidentis, est
motus, nec aliqua corruptio est motus. " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, V, 1.
generated accident can not itself be considered as being in motion,

(except in the broad sense) .49 For example :
when heat is augmented in a piece of wood, although the wood is truly
moved (in the strict sense) , yet the heat which is generated . . . is not (except
in the large sense) moved.50
3.
Objections and Resolutions
Assuredly, the initial distinction between motion broad, and motion
narrow, is not original with Ockham.51 But its restatement and reempha-
sis has provided him a primary ground for defending his views against
the attacks of the absolute theory's adherents. For, as it develops,
Ockham is able to vitiate and destroy the force of some of his adversaries'
objections, by simply indicating that these attempts are based upon
ignorance of the distinction and its nuances. Thus, when his opponents.
considered the " commonly said" phrase : "mutation is indivisible and
unextended, " instead of realizing this statement to be implying a
differentia between motion broad, and motion narrow, they added the
observation: "but any natural object (permanens in his inferioribus)
is divisible and extended ; " and concluded from this argument that
mutation, far from not being other, in reality, from the mutant subject
(non differre realiter a re quae mutatur) , as Ockham has insisted, must
be "a certain thing distinct from permanent things . "' 52 Ockham , on the
other hand, cognizant of the distinction , and identifying his stand with
that of the " ancients" (antiqui) , grants the truth of the initial statement,
"mutation is indivisible and unextended" -- but points out that what
is actually meant by that " indivisible," is that mutation is non-successive.53
In much the same summary fashion , Ockham demolishes two more
objections which purport to demonstrate the error of his view as against
that of his adversaries. This one:
49 Phil . Nat., III , 8 : "Est autem advertendum quod quamvis, quando

generatur accidens secundum quod est motus, tunc subiectum illius acciden-
tis movetur ; tamen illud quod generatur
" non movetur, sed subiectum illius
quod generatur, movetur vere ."
50 Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Physics , V, 1 .
51 It stems, of course , from Aristotle . See Physics , V, 1 , 2 .
52 Phil. Nat. , III , 4 : " Videtur enim, quod mutatio sit quaedam res
distincta a rebus permanentibus, primo quidem, quia communiter dicitur
quod mutatio est indivisibilis et inextensa ; sed quodlibet permanens in his
inferioribus est divisibile et extensum, ergo, etc."
53 Ibid.: "Unde quando dicitur mutatio est indivisibilis , et inextensa,
dico quod ista propositio secundum intellectum antiquorum est vera, quia
per istam intelligitur ista : quando aliquid mutatur acquirendo, vel deper-
dendo aliquid, indivisibiliter acquirit, vel amittit illud, hoc est, non est
verum dicere successive . . ."
mutation is instantaneous, and not temporal ; but a permanent thing is not

only instantaneous but also temporal ; 54
Ockham renders impotent by merely indicating that to say "mutation

is instantaneous (in instanti) ” is, as we have seen, tantamount to saying
that a mutant is not changed in a successive manner i. e ., through
-
delimitably prior and posterior stages but simultaneously, each part
of the subject being moved once, and once only. "Just as when it is said
the illumination of the air is instantaneous , it means this : the air is not
illuminated successively . "'55
To the second objection , Ockham points out that these premisses :
mutation is measured instantaneously, and not temporally ; but permanent
56
things are not measured instantaneously,5
cannot be properly construed to involve the conclusion : "mutation is
a certain thing distinct from permanent things ; " for the meaning of
"mutation is measured instaneously, " is really this : a mutant is not
successively, but simultaneously changed to its new form.57
There remain , however, for Ockham's consideration, yet two more
objections dedicated to demonstrating the impossibility of his position :
through mutation form is acquired ; but form is not acquired through a
permanent thing,
and :
mutation ceases when a thing ceases to be changed ; but no permanent thing
then ceases ;58
both of which point, according to his adversaries , to the existence of a
distinct and absolute "mutation ."
These arguments, patently, do not lend themselves to treatment
under Ockham's initial distinctions. For they contain no reference ,
54 Ibid. See also Tractatus ., p . 41 ; Logic. , ch . 8 , p . 31 ; Altaris. , p. 45 .
55 Phil. Nat. , III , 4 : “ . . . quando dicitur quod mutatio est in instanti ,
dicendum est, quod sensus est iste : quando aliquid mutatur, in instanti
mutatur, et non in tempore ; hoc est, non mutatur successive per prius et
posterius, sed simul, sicut quando dicitur quod illuminatio aeris est in in-
stanti, sensus est iste : aer non illuminatur successive. " In Altaris. , p. 55,
Ockham writes : "... I say that this proposition, ' generation is in an in-
stant, ' must not be accepted under the meaning that it signifies as if one
thing may be in another; as through this proposition, ' water is in a vase,'
it is denoted that one thing is in another in a distinct thing ; ... but this
proposition , ' generation is in an instant', ought to be accepted under this
meaning, ' when something is generated , a part is not generated before a
part, but the whole is generated at the same time . . ." See also Tractatus .,
P. 42 ; Sent . , II , qu . 12 , ii , 11 .
56 Phil. Nat. , III, 4.
57 Ibid.: quod sensus istius propositionis, ' mutatio mensuratur in
instanti' , est iste : mobile non successive mutatur ad illud quod acquirit ;
sed in instanti hoc est, non successive. " See also, Quodl. , IV, qu . 14.
58 Phil. Nat., III , 4.
implicit or direct, to either the successive or the sudden character of

the change involved . Ockham, then, must attack them from a new
quarter.
"There are certain names (nomina) ," Ockham declares at the outset,
which properly stand for some determinates . . . as : " man, " "animal, " ...
"agent," "patient," and the like.59
These, he demarcates as significatively distinct from those other "cer-

tain names ,"
which do not properly stand for any things whatsoever . . . such as : " action, "
"passion, " "motion ," "mutation, " and others.60
Names of this latter caste , Ockham feels to be derivative of the

several other parts of speech . As such, they are not signs suppositing
for some existent-by-nature, but they either stand in a proposition for
the word from which they are descended , or are, in themselves , equiv-
alent to a proposition (complexus) in signification . Indeed, these names
are not indispensable speech counters, for they owe their existence to
one of two human propensities : a desire for linguistic economy, or a
penchant for linguistic embellishment . And fundamentally , as Ockham
sees it, it is the failure to realize this heritage which militates for the
confusion surrounding their true status.61
59 Phil. Nat. , III, 4.
60 Ibid.
61 Tractatus., p. 37 : " Dicendum est quod tali[a] nomina, quae descen-
dunt a verbis et etiam nomina descendentia ab adverbiis, coniunctionibus ,
praepositionibus, necnon et a syncategorematibus, sive sint nomina syn-
categorematica, sive verba, sive quaecumque alia, sive alterius partis
orationis, non sunt introducta nisi causa brevitatis loquendi vel ornatus
locutionis, et multa eorum aequivalent complexis in significando, quando
supponunt non pro illis, a quibus descendunt ; et ideo non significant aliquas
res praeter illas, a quibus descendunt, et significata eorum. Huiusmodi
autem nomina sunt omnia talia : negatio, privatio, conditio, perseitas ,
contingentia . . . mutatio, motus, et universaliter omnia nomina verbalia
descendentia a verbis, quae sunt in praedicamentis agere et pati, et multa
alia, de quibus modo non est pertractandum. " See also Phil. Nat. , III , 4 :
"Quaedam sunt nomina propter eloquii ornatum inventa quae
proprie non supponunt pro rebus quibuscumque, sed ponuntur loco plurium
dictionum, et quandocumque verborum, et adverbiorum , et huiusmodi, et
talia sunt multa nomina ab adverbiis, et verbis ficta, et ab aliis partibus
orationis formata , cuiusmodi talia, actio, passio , motus, mutatio , et similia . "
In Altaris., p . 44-45 , Ockham writes : not only is this true of the
name ' point' , (i . e . , that it does not signify an objective existent) ; but it is
also true of all verbal names and all names formed from adverbs , conjunc-
tions, pronouns, prepositions, and in general of all syncategorematics , and
in general of all, which do not precisely have the virtue of a name ; so that
they can not be the extremes of a proposition separated by a copula without
any figure and a property of common speech ... indeed , even the popular
and common mode of speaking frequently employs such figurative expression .
... hence, not only the expression can be transferred from a proper to an
improper signification, but even sometimes terms are given which have no
The method for treatment, then, of those propositions which employ

a noun of this type as though it were a sign suppositing primarily for
some natural entity, suggests itself. Such names are to be reduced
directly to either the part of speech from which they derive, or to the
complex of which they are actually significative ; and this once accom-
plished , then judgements pertinent to the status of the proposition in
which they appear can be projected.62
The proposition : "mutation is the acquisition or loss of something , ”
is a case in point . Prior to any attempt to employ it correctly as premise
for an argument, the word "mutation , " should be understood as an
abbreviated form of the complex : "when something is changed" while
the nouns, " acquisition , " and " loss , " reduce to the verbs of which they
are derivative respectively : "acquires," and " loses . " Proper resolution
then, renders the proposition in question to this form : "when something
is changed , it acquires or loses something. "63 Having set the stage thus ,
proper signification , such as they have when first instituted . And as a trans-
lation is made . . . for a threefold cause (here Ockham introduces another
reason for the existence of derivative names ) : sometimes for the sake of
metre as in the poets ; sometimes for the sake of ornament as in rhetorical
speech ; sometimes for the sake of necessity , either brevity or utility, as in
philosophy; and in all of these ways a translation is made in theology . So
the application of such names . .... is made for a threefold cause ; namely for
the sake of metre, ornament, and utility or brevity. Although from the
previous causes many errors . . . originate among the simple-minded , who
wish to accept all the statements of the philosophers and of the Saints
according to a property of common speech, when it must be taken figura-
tively." See also pp. 53 , 55 , and Phil . Nat. , I, 13. Cf. the fourth prohibition
of the Parisian Statute of Dec. 29, 1340. It reads almost as though Ockham
himself had dictated it : “ Further, that no one shall say that no proposition
is to be conceded unless it is true in its literal sense ; because to say this ,
leads to . . . errors , since the Bible and the authors do not always use words
according to their proper sense . Therefore, one ought rather to attend to the
subject matter, than to the proper forms of speech, in affirming or denying
statements ; for a disputation concerned with the forms of speech and
accepting no proposition other than in its proper sense, is nothing but a
sophistical disputation . Dialectical and doctrinal disputations which aim
at the discovery of truth, have very little concern for names. " This trans-
lation from Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis , II , n. 1042 , is by E. A.
Moody and appears in his article, " Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of
Autrecourt," op. cit. , p . 129 .
62 Phil. Nat. , III , 4 : " Et quandocumque talia ponuntur in orationibus ,
resolvendae sunt orationes in alias, in quibus ponuntur dictiones proprie
sine omni tropo, et figura , et per tales orationes sunt alia (e) intelligendae ,
et secundum eas iudicandum est ( ab) veritate impropriarum. " See also,
Altaris ., p. 61 , ff. , Tractatus. , pp . 40-41 ; Phil . Nat. , III , 3 .
63 Tractatus ., p. 39 : " Verumtamen sciendum, quod hoc nomen mutatio
frequenter ponitur loco unius complexi . . . sicut sic dicendo : " mutatio est
acquisitio vel deperditio alicuius, " hoc nomen ' mutatio ' ponitur loco huius
complexi : ' quando aliquid mutatur ; ' et ista nomina, ' deperditio, ' ' acquisitio ,'
ponuntur loco istorum verborum, ' acquirit, ' ' deperdit' ... Verbi gratia ,
ista oratio : ' mutatio est deperditio vel acquisitio alicuius, ' ponuntur loco
Ockham is now prepared to examine those two further arguments which

his opponents have proferred.
Addressing himself to the first of these, he translates, "mutation ,"
in the proposition : “through mutation form is acquired , " to its complex
formi. e., "when something is changed" and the statement now
reduces to the non-problematic : "when something is changed, it ac-
quires a form." Thus stated , the entity " mutation " appears an unneces-
sary figment ; and in evaluating the newly-translated proposition , one
is not misled into conceiving of mutation as something distinct from
the subject acquiring the form and the acquired form itself.64
"The meaning of such propositions, " Ockham points out in his
reply to the second argument ,
as : " mutation ceases, " " mutation does not remain, " " mutation is destroy-
ed," and the like , "65
become evident when the troublesome "mutation" is resolved , in these

propositions, to its proper origin . This accomplished , they read, respectiv-
ely :
" the mutable ceases to be changed , " "the mutable is not changed , " "the
mutable stops changing, " and thus similarly, it must be said of similars . "
Conceived thus, it is patent that the statement : "the mutable ceases to

be changed," will not be evidenced by the cessation in being of any
actual entity ; hence , no extraneous factor need be sought to account
for the mutative phenomenon . All that the proposition implies, is that
some mutable thing is organized now in a way in which it previously
was not ; and "mutation ," hypostatized , is seen to be a superfluous
construct, posited needlessly in accounting for the change.67
Having fairly replied to these objections, Ockham envisages his now
abashed opponents as making one final stand. He anticipates it taking
this form :
either mutation is something, or nothing, if nothing , then it does not have
reference to anything known ; if something, then it either is a permanent
illius . . . ' quando aliquid mutatur, acquirit vel deperdit aliquid ; ' vel istius . :
' si aliquid mutatur, etc. '" See also p . 41 ff . for further examples of properly
"resolved" terms.
6 Phil. Nat., III , 4 : "... dicendum est, quod quando dicitur ' per
mutationem acquiritur forma' , iste est sensus, ' quando aliquid mutatur
acquirit formam', et ideo mutatio non est aliqua res distincta ab acquirente
formam et a forma acquisita . . ."
65 Phil. Nat., III, 4. 66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.: "Ista autem propositio, mutabile cessat mutari, non verificatur
per cessationem alicuius rei in esse reali ; sed ex hoc ipso , quod mutabile rem
aliam habet, quam prius non habuit : ... et ideo mutatio non est talis res,
quia frustra poneretur. ”
thing, which does not seem consonant with the Philosopher's view, or it is
other than a permanent.68
Clearly, the supporters of the absolute view wish Ockham to yield both
that "mutation is something," and that " it is something other than a
permanent thing. " For these points being granted and to accept the
offered alternatives would make his own position untenable⁹ they
feel that the brief for absolute mutation is back once again on a stable
basis. Indeed , these are the assumptions upon which their own position
hinges.
Ockham, however, is quite equal to the occasion. He cordially grants
that both he and the "ancients" with whose views he claims constant
agreement would unhesitatingly yield both the desired points.
However, speaking properly, what they would be yielding by affirming
the proposition : " mutation is something, " is this :
when some mutable is changed, and it acquires or loses something, it is
something. 70
It is in this sense that Ockham would allow the truth of the proposition
at issue. "Moreover," he adds :
if you take this proposition, “ mutation is something, " in another way
namely, that “mutation ” stands for some determinate in the way in which
in this proposition : "white is something, " the subject stands for the subject
of the whiteness ; and in this proposition : "man is an animal, " in which
"man" stands for this and that thing which is a man then it is proper
that it (mutation ) may stand for some permanent thing. . . . If, however,
you say that it does not stand for a permanent thing in the way in which
"permanent thing " has been above denoted, . . . I say that mutation is not
something, because there is no such thing. "1
Ockham's easy acceptance of the truth of the second proposition -

i. e., " mutation is something other than a permanent thing" - affords
his adversaries as little satisfaction as did his acceptance of the first .
All that this statement entails, in his view, is that :
when a mutable is changed , it is not changed to some determinate in diverse
times but simultaneously, and once only.72
68 Ibid.
69 That this would be the case is, perhaps, brought home more strongly
in the following, substantially similar presentation, from Tractatus . , p. 37 :
"Et si quaeratur, an mutatio sit aliqua res vel non sit res : si non sit res,
igitur nihil est, igitur non mutatur aliquid mutatione reali ; si autem sit res
et non sit alia res quam res permanens . . . igitur mutatio est res permanens ."
70 Phil . Nat., III , 4. In Altaris . , p. 57, Ockham writes : "I say that
generation is something under this meaning, when something is generated,
one whole form is received at the same time and not a part before a part
is added to matter." See also Tractatus . , p . 41 .
71 Phil. Nat. , III , 4. See also Quodl. IV, qu . 14 .
72 Phil . Nat. , III , 4 .
That is, by affirming that "mutation is something other than a perma-

nent thing" one is merely emphasising that which serves most clearly
to distinguish it from successively moved permanent things. Obviously
then, to infer from the yielded " mutation is something other than a
permanent thing," that it must be, therefore, " another thing apart from
permanent things, " is to draw an unwarranted conclusion . 73
4.
Mutation, Conclusion
In fine, in his rejection of the absolute view, Ockham has made the
point that its supporters are culpable in that their approach to language
is uncritical and overly-literal. The absolute theory appears to him to
have its root origin in the naive belief that there exists, by nature, a
correlate for every distinct language-sign.74 And whereas Ockham ,
regards the noun "mutation" to be significative, primarily of a mutant
subject, while connoting, or consignifying, secondarily, some form
acquired "suddenly " by that mutant subject, the adherents of the ab-
solute theory, deluded by their correspondent view of language, are
forced to the vain postulation of a literally existent, although admittedly
supra-sensible "mutation ." Thus, as Ockham sees it, a proposition in
which the connotative term "mutation" appears, implies a proposition
in which some subject acquires or loses some form " suddenly. " " Muta-
tion," for Ockham, does not supposit for either a physical change, or
the physical changeling taken alone; nor does it supposit for anything
apart from either; it is, rather, both, taken conjunctively, which the term
signifies. "Mutation ," according to Ockham, is, precisely, a significative
term standing in a proposition , for a mutated subject and its mutated
form .
73 Ibid.: " Quando dicitur quod non est res permanens , dico ... quod
ista est vera : quia est sensus, quando mutabile mutatur, non mutatur ad
aliquid determinatum in diversis temporibus ; sed simul, et semel tantum .
Et quando infers, ergo est alia res a rebus permanentibus, non valet con-
sequentia."
74 Tractatus., p . 47-7 : "... dicendum, quod talis fictio nominum ab-
stractorum ab adverbiis , coniunctionibus, praepositionibus, verbis, syn-
categorematibus, facit multas difficultates, et multo (s) ducit in errores .
imagina (n) tur enim multi, per hoc, quod sicut sunt nomina distincta, ita
sint res distinctae correspondentes ..." In Phil. Nat. , III , 7 , Ockham
writes : "Et ideo hoc est principium multorum errorum in philosophia,
quod semper distincto vocabulo correspondeat distinctum significatum. "
In Altaris., p . 63 , Ockham writes : " And , indeed, many fall into various
errors by virtue of this, that they accept the passages of the ancients as
they sound according to the letter and according to a property of common
speech, which intent, however, the ancients have not held .'
am on
36 Ockh : Moti , Time and Place
CHAPTER THREE
CONCERNING MOTION : THE NARROW SENSE
I.
Arguments Against Hypostatization of Motion
Were one to inquire after the nature of this entity "motion," the
answer offered by a proponent of the absolute theory could be couched ,
conceivably, in this wise : motion is a certain "flux" - a continuous ,
uniform flow of "parts" of motion from being to non-being- so that
in the absolute coursing of units which comprise its totality, the corrup-
tion of one discrete part is continuously balanced by the institution in
being of yet another, thus keeping the flux streaming in infinite proces-
sion.
Within this theoretical frame, the single motions of individual moved
bodies would be accounted for, by our hypothetical absolute theorist,
by positing them to have been invested with a given objective portion
of "motion." Initial acquisition of this new quality was assumed to be
the precipitating ground for single motion ; while surcease of movement,
and final rest, were explained by its gradual depletion and eventual
loss.75
Ockham , however, will allow none of this. To begin with, he points
out that there is no better ground for assuming the absolute character
75 Ockham does not state this to be absolute theory of motion in so

many words, presumably because it was so well broadcast as not to require
literal restatement. Nevertheless, it is a relatively easy task to reconstruct
it, by wedding Ockham's rejection of specific arguments designed to support
it, to those points which he claims his opponents do, and do not, concede .
Such ancillary phrases, of course, as are introduced by secundum sic opinan-
tes; and: secundum ponentes , etc. , further facilitate the task of reconstruction.
It will become apparent as we proceed with Ockham's examination of the
absolute theory that he is rejecting the view of motion as a forma fluens
i . e., the view that the moved possesses intrinsically the successive parts
of a continuously flowing reality. Ockham, as against this conception of
motion as a forma fluens, will be seen to be championing a special form of
the theory of motion as a fluxus formae i. e., he identifies motion with
the permanent thing in its successive passage to a terminus . For an excellent
treatment of the medieval forma fluens, fluxus formae controversy, see
E. Borchert, "Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Nicolaus Oresme , " Beiträge
zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band xxxi, Heft 3 ( 1934) .
A. Maier, in Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, ( Rome , 1949) , gives
a historical treatment of the growth of these views. See also : P. Duhem,
Études sur Léonard de Vinci (Paris , 1906) vol . iii , p . 40 ff.; A. C. Crombie,
Grosseteste and Experimental Science ( Oxford, 1953) pp. 171-77. For a
typical statement of the forma fluens explanation of local motion , see Duns
Scotus, Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum , qu . 7, where he writes :
"... in motu locali acquiritur quidam fluxus, seu dispositio inhaerens mobili,
secundum quam mobile dicitur localiter moveri : sicut albedo est dispositio
inhaerens mobili, secundum quam mobile dicitur album. ”
Chapter Three. Motion : The Narrow Sense 37
of motion, than there was for postulating the absolute character of

mutation. Hence, all of the preceding arguments, by means of which
he indicated the specific impossibility of an absolute motion in the
broad sense, militate also against the hypostatization of motion in the
narrow sense.76
Further, if motion consisted in divisible " parts," and these were

simultaneously existent , it would follow that " motion" would possess
actual physical dimensions - a ridiculous consequent which , under-
standably, his adversaries chose not to " concede. " On the other hand,
were the parts of motion not simultaneously existent, the case for
absolute motion would fare no better ; since, as Ockham is quick to
point out, that which is not, cannot successfully be maintained to be
the unit comprising an actual entity. No " being" consists in "non-
beings."77
Passing now from this generalized rejection of absolute motion ,
Ockham indicates the inadequacy of this conception for motion's
several genera. To begin with , if local motion were some " thing" existing
objectively in a mobile, the "absurd" consequence would follow that
the heavenly bodies would be in potential not only to changes of
position, but also to investiture by the objectified " local motion" which
served to move them.
Secondly, the motion of alteration can not be such an entity, because,

obviously, when a subject is altered by the successive loss of a form
which it had, it receives nothing - that is, no objective, alterative
"motion . " Similarly, when a subject successively acquires a new qualita-
tive form, nothing beyond the form itself, and its parts - is newly
acquired.
Finally, this same argument has force against an hypostatized
quantitative "motion . " For in the instance of quantitative diminution
it is obvious that the moved subject acquires nothing ; and similarly,
in the case of an augmentive change , there is no necessity for postulating
76 Tractatus. , p. 43 : "Mutatio non dicit aliquam rem secundum se totam

distinctam a rebus permanentibus ; ergo eadem ratione nec motus, quia
non est maior ratio de mutatione quam de motu . .." See also Sent. , II , qu.9.
77 Phil. Nat. , III , 5 : " Si motus est res distincta a rebus permanentibus
est res divisibilis, aut indivisibilis ; non indivisibilis secundum eos, ergo
divisibilis. Aut ergo ex partibus simul existentibus, et tunc motus est vere
longus, latus, et profundus quod non concedunt vel ex partibus non
simul existentibus, sicut ipsi concedunt, quod non potest dici; quia illud,
quod non est, non potest esse pars alicuius entis. Nullum enim ens componitur
ex non entibus, ergo motus non potest dici aliquod ens aliud a permanentibus
propter talia non entia . " See also Tractatus., p. 43 .
ham ion e ce
38 Ock : Mot , Tim and Pla
the presence of anything other than the subject, and its successive ,
linearly mensurable, quantitative gain.78
2.
Motion According to Ockham

Ockham brings to bear in his statement of motion in the narrow
sense, the same explicit and economical approach which characterized
his treatment of motion , broad . Again he evidences the same tenacious
78 Tractatus., PP. 44-5 : " Praeterea : si motus localis esset alia res
existens subiective in mobili , sicut dicunt sic ponentes, igitur omne motum
localiter haberet de novo aliquam rem in se subiective existentem praeter
ubi . . . et per consequens , cum non semper sit sub tali re, corpus caeleste
esset in potentia ad eam, et ita in corpore caelesti non esset tantum potentia
ad ubi, sed ad aliam rem subiective existentem in eo . . . quae omnia sunt
absurda. .. Ostendo quod motus alterationis non sit alia res etc. , quia
aliquando est alteratio sine omni acquisitione rei novae, sicut quando ali-
quid alteratur continue deperdendo partem post partem formae habitae,
et tunc illud continue movetur, et tamen nihil se recipit, sed tantum deperdit ;
igitur eadem ratione quando aliquid acquirit partem formae post partem,
non oportet quod aliquid habeat praeter ipsam formam et partem eius ..
patet idem de augmentatione et diminutione , quia in tali motu sufficit quod
sola quantitas acquiratur vel deperdatur sine omni alio ; igitur frustra
ponitur ibi alia res praeter quantitatem et alia permanentia . ” In Sent. , II ,
qu . 9, c, Ockham writes : “... motus alterationis non dicit aliquid positum
ultra res absolutas permanentes . . . ” There follows a proof of this based
upon the fact that were such a motion actually an absolute thing distinct
from a terminus, it would be either in the genus of quality or quantity.
“Running through " the various species of these genera, however, fails to
disclose such an absolute existent. Further on (Ibid. , d , e, f, g) , Ockham
gives six conclusiones, and their proofs, all dedicated to establishing the
unity of motion and permanent things . Conclusion 1 , for example , is : “ motus
alterationis non dicit aliquid positivum ultra res absolutas permanentes ...”
In conclusion 2 , Ockham proves that : " motus augmentationis non distingui-
tur a rebus permanentibus realiter ; " while conclusion 3 states that : “ motus
localis non distinguitur a rebus permanentibus . " Ockham's most trenchant
arguments against the existence of a separable and absolute quantity,
totally distinct from substance or quality , appear in Altaris ., qu . 1—3 . În
qu. 1 , pp. 7—83 , he proves that a point is not an absolute thing distinct from
a quantity, (see also Logic . ch . 44 , p . 123 ; Quodl. I , qu . 4 ) ; in qu . 2 (Altaris.,
pp. 83-93 ) , he demonstrates the impossibility of a line, or surface, which
consists in points, being " an absolute thing really distinct from a subject ; "
and in qu. 3 , pp. 93—159 , a quantity, which is a substance defined by its
surfaces, is shown to be absolutely incapable of existence per se. See also ,
Ibid. , p. 247 ff. , where Ockham proves that quantity is " not an absolute
thing really distinct from quality.” See also, p. 285 , where Ockham
makes the point that "the quantity remaining in the sacrament of the
altar is not an absolute thing really distinct from the qualities remaining
in the same sacrament. " See also, Logic. , ch . 8 , p . 31 , and ch . 10, p . 35.
In Ibid. , ch . 45 , p . 128 , Ockham writes : " Et quia communiter ponitur
a modernis quod quaelibet quantitas est quaedam res distincta realiter
et totaliter à substantia et qualitate .. etc., and then goes on to
prove, as against their views, that quantity, as an absolute and separable
entity, is impossible . See also , Quodl. , IV, qu . 23 , 30, 31 , 32. C. Delisle
Burns article: "William of Ockham on Continuity," in Mind, Oct. ( 1916) ,
is an enlightening but summary statement of Ockham's view of infinite
divisibility .
regard for the sensible subject under discussion ; for he directs the seeker.
after the "what" of motion , first of all, to moved things ― to bodies in
motion. And for a body to be in motion, "it suffices," according to
Ockham ,
that ... (it) ... continuously without any interruption of time, or rest --
acquire or lose something, part-by-part (partibiliter) , one after another.79
It is Ockham's contention that every physical situation involving

a body in motion can be " saved " without having recourse to anything
other than the body itself and its successive states ; hence , the gratuitous
introduction of an absolute "motion" represents an unnecessary compli-
cation. But to show that motion can thus be adequately " saved " in the
economical manner which he endorses, Ockham proposes to examine
the "single parts " of motion.80
Since, by positing that a body is first located in one place, and than
at another, without mediate rest, nothing other than a moved body,
and the course of the moved body, are referred to - and still these
suffice to "save" any instance of local motion the introduction of
any condition , or factor else, is "vainly" posited . For,
beyond a body and a place no other thing is required ; but all that is required
is that a body was previously in one place, and thereafter in another place,
and thus continuously, so that never in the whole time does it rest in some
place . And it is patent that beyond all these, nothing, aside from permanent
things, is posited . Whence, by the fact that a body is first in A, nothing else
aside from A (and a body) is posited ; similarly, by the fact that it was not
first in B, there is nothing posited aside from B and a body ; similarly, by
the fact that a body is secondly in B, there is nothing posited aside from
B and a body . . . and this it is to be locally moved : first to have one place
... and after to have another place without any mediate rest ... and to
progress thus continuously ... And, consequently, the whole ground of
79 Phil. Nat. , III , 6 : “Ostenso quod motus non est alia res a rebus
permanentibus ; videndum est, quid est motus. Ad cuius evidentiam viden-
dum est quando aliquid movetur. ... Et dico quod ad hoc, quod aliquid
moveatur sufficit quod mobile continue sine interruptione temporis, et
quiete, continue partibiliter acquirit vel deperdit . . ." etc. See also, Logic. ,
ch . 46, p. 134. For a body to be at rest, on the other hand, is, in Ockham's
view, for that body to fail to satisfy the conditions which qualify its being
designated as " moving . " " For, " Ockham writes, ( Phil. Nat. , III , 28 ) , “ if
a subject acquires nothing , nor loses anything, then it rests ... because
that is moved which acquires or loses something, but that which rests
neither acquires nor loses anything." Cf. Aristotle, Physics , III , 2 ; V, 2 ; V, 6.
80 Tractatus. , p. 45 : " Ideo dicendum est, quod motus non est talis res
distincta secundum se totam a re permanente, quia frustra fit per plura
quod potest fieri per pauciora , sed sine omni re tali possumus salvare motum
et omnia quae dicuntur de motu ; igitur talis res alia frustra ponitur. Quod
autem sine tali re addita possumus salvare motum et omnia quae dicuntur
de motu, patet discurrendo per singulas partes motus. "
motion, without any other thing whatsoever, can be saved by the fact a
body is in distinct places successively, and not at rest in any. 81
With regard to qualitative motion , all that is requisite for some body
to be said to be undergoing alteration , is that it - the subject itself -
receive the parts of some newly-impressed form, successively.
Therefore, beside a subject and the parts of a form , it is not proper to
posit some other thing, but it suffices to posit a subject, and the parts of
a form, which, however, are not acquired simultaneously . 82
As for the motions of augmentation and diminution , these can be

"saved" through this alone :
that there is more and more, or less and less quantity, and not simultaneous-
ly. By the fact, however, that it is said that there is more and more quantity,
it is not proper to posit there any other thing apart from permanent things ...
but permanent things suffice ; so that the same thing is first of so much
quantity, and thereafter not of so much . 83
This conception of " motion" (narrow) , as a generic term including

all events in which a subject suffers successive change - and which ,
consequently, reduces "motion" to those permanent things in motion —
Ockham feels to be in perfect accord with the view of Aristotle . For to
define motion as the " actualization of that which is in potentiality, in
the respect in which it is in potentiality," 84 is tantamount, according
to Ockham, to saying that when something is moved, it has something
in actuality, and is in potential to further, successive, acquisition .
Just as when a mobile is in actuality in an acquired place, and is in
potential to another place which it will acquire without any mediate inter-
ruption, then it is truly locally moved . 85
81 Tractatus ., p. 46. In Quodl . I , qu . 5 , in the discussion centering about

the question "utrum angelus possit moveri localiter, " Ockham answers the
question in the affirmative : an angel can be locally moved - “quia ex quo
angelus continue existit, et manifestum est ex scriptura quod angelus potest
coassistere diversis locis successive sine quiete media, manifestum est quod
angelus potest moveri localiter. " Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Quod-
libetales . In Quodlibetum 9, qu . 4 , art. 1 , Aquinas answers affirmatively
the question : " utrum angeli moveantur in instanti. " In Quodlibetum II,
qu. 4, art. 4, he answers affirmatively : "utrum motus angeli sit in instanti . '
The significance of these opposed positions will become apparent when we
come to the medieval controversy centering about the aristotelian Text 71 .
82 Tractatus . , p. 46. 83 Ibid. , p . 47, see also Logic . , ch . 47 , p. 138 .
84 Aristotle, Physics, III , 1 .
85 Phil. Nat. , III , 6 : ". . . ad hoc, quod aliquid moveatur, non requiritur
alia res praeter res permanentes, et per consequens, motus non est alia res
a rebus permanentibus. Istam autem sententiam exprimit Philosophus
quando diffinit motum dicens : ' motus est actus entis in potentia, secundum
quod in potentia ; ' hoc est, quando aliquid movetur, actu aliquid habet, et
est in potentia ad aliud sine quiete media in loco acquirendo . . ." See also,
Tractatus., p. 63 ff. Ockham feels also that his view of motion is in perfect
accord with that of Averroes ; See Tractatus . , pp. 49-53.
Chapter Three. Motion: The Narrow Sense 4I
3.
Ockham now allows his theory of motion as being a concept having
no extra-mental reality apart from moving bodies undergoing successive
change, to be subjected to the critical survey of his opponents. Accord-
ing to Ockham , these proffered objections once again evidence linguistic
naiveté, and he is obliged to remark, as preface to his solution of ob-
jections (solutio obiectorum) , that :
just as has been said concerning mutation, such words as " motion, " "muta-
tion," and consimilars, have been invented more to grace speech than
because of necessity ; since without these, which are in common employ,
we can sufficiently express all of our concepts . Therefore, propositions in
which such words as "motion , " "mutation, " " successive, " "succession,"
and the like are posited, are to be resolved in propositions in which such
words are posited : " is moved, " "moved, " "succeeds, " "succeeding, " and
the like and the propositions are to be seen according to these .
The first of these objections held for an independent "motion, "

totally divorced from permanent things, by indicating that whereas
motion was spoken of as being a " certain flux, " no permanent thing
could be considered a " flux ," since it endured, per se, without any
successive destruction or reconstitution of its parts.87
Ockham, in reply, examines two meanings of the term "flux." The

first of these :
motion is a thing distinct from all permanent things, which flows from
being to non-being, or conversely, so that one part is being continuously
destroyed and another succeeds it continuously in the nature of things,98
is the one to which his opponents subscribe. This is the forma fluens
conception of motion which Ockham has previously examined and found
wanting. 89 The alternate meaning - the one which he himself endorses-
regards "flux" in the properly "resolved" sense, to mean that,
when something is moved, it flows continuously ; that is, it continuously ac-
quires or loses something -- as when something is locally moved, it flows
continuously from one place to another - not due to (the presence of)
anything beyond a mobile and the place which it acquires , but because it
is always in one place and then another. "
The second argument proposed, maintained that the attribution of

successivity to motion militated against its being placed among the
86 Phil. Nat. , III , 7.
87 Ibid . , nunc autem . . . videtur quod motus sit alia res secundum
se totam distincta a rebus permanentibus. Videtur enim quod motus sit
quidam fluxus ; sed res permanens non est fluxus, sed per se stans, ergo, etc. "
88 Ibid. , III, 7. 89 See page 36, and esp . n. 75. 90 Ibid .
4 Ockham : Motion
class of permanent things. All permanent things, that is , are simultaneous-

ly existent having all their parts at once and since motion was
spoken of as being successive, it must , obviously, be some sort of distinct
entity apart from permanent things.91
"Motion ," is "resolved , " by Ockham, to its complex : "when some-
thing is moved," and the proposition : "motion is successive ," which the
absolutists assumed as indicative of a demarcation between distinct
things "motion," and "permanent things" - now reduces to the
innocuous and clear formulation : "when something is moved , it does
not acquire or lose (anything) simultaneously, but successively." Thus
explained, the argument proposed to distinguish between permanent
things and " motion" lacks legitimate ground . "Local motion ," Ockham
continues in order to illustrate his point ,
is called successive because the (locally) moved mobile is not simultaneously

in all these places, but is previously in one place, and then in another. 92
The third argument assumes the fact that one can discuss the velocity
of motion, to be indicative of its divorce from permanent things. No
dermanent thing is ever spoken of as being " quick," or " slow," per se;
but motion is referred to in this way. "Motion ," then , on this account ,
must be a " thing" distinctly other than a permanent thing.93
The statement that "motion is fast or slow," as Ockham sees it , is
a reference to the mobile's rate of acquisition or loss. Speaking of a " fast"
motion implies nothing more than that some moved body has a quick
rate of acquisition or loss ; while a reference to the "slowness" of a
motion, would be informative of the fact that in the same temporal
span embraced by a “quick ” motion , the "slow" mobile acquires or
loses relatively less than when in "quick" motion . 94 Thus, in the case
of local motion, more " places" would be acquired in a given time-period
by a quickly moving body, than would be acquired in an equal time-
span by a slowly moving body.
Ockham discounts the fourth objection in that it commits the
"figure of speech " fallacy (fallacia figurae dictionis) .95 The objection
91 Phil. Nat. , III , 7 : " Secundo, motus est successivus , sed res permanens
non, sed tota simul." See also Tractatus . , p . 53 , argumenta (1) .
92 Ibid., see also Tractatus ., P. 54, (ad 1m) and ff.
93 Phil. Nat."", III , 7 : " Tertio, motus est velox, vel tardus ; sed res
permanens non .
94 Phil. Nat., III, 7 : "Ad tertium dico, quod per istam, motus est
velox, vel tardus ; datur intelligi ista : quando aliquid movetur tarde, vel
velociter movetur - hoc est, in parvo tempore acquirit multum, vel parvum. ”
Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 14.
95 Prof. Moody (Logic of William of Ockham , op . cit ., pp . 294—5 ) ,
writes : "It is worthy of note that the one form of fallacy to which Ockham
itself maintains that since a permanent thing can exist without motion,
the two - motion, and permanent things must, therefore, be
distinct. The error involved in this type of reasoning, according to
Ockham, is similar to that involved in this argument :
whenever anything can exist without remaining things, they are distinct ;
but Sortes can exist without music ; therefore, music is distinct from Sortes .
For certainly Ockham yields that "a permanent thing can exist without
motion ;" but he does not find that this statement, and the statement
"motion is not another thing apart a permanent thing," are mutually
exclusive, any more than the true proposition , "Socrates can endure
without whiteness, " excludes the truth of, "Socrates is white . " 96
The fifth objection to Ockham's view, seizes on the supposed fact
that motion is a quantity distinctly other than the quantity of a perma-
nent thing. The truth of this premise stems, according to the absolute
theorists, from the oft-reiterated statement that motion has a successive
quantity, and therefore it cannot be equated with permanent things , which
possess a permanent quantity.97
Motion does not possess some quantity distinct as regards itself as a whole
from the quantity of a permanent thing,
Ockham replies . What is meant by a quantitative designation applied

to motion, is actually a reference to the moved body itself.98 Thus , were
devotes many pages of detailed discussion (at the end of Logic .) , is that of
'figure of speech . ' This is perhaps the most frequent source of error in
philosophy, for it is involved in the attribution of characteristics and dis-
tinctions that belong to signs, to the things of which they are signs . This
habit, which in the long run reduces to the equivocal use of terms with
respect to their significative and non-significative forms of supposition,
results in the confusion of logic, natural science, and metaphysics, and gives
rise to what may be called indifferently a ' logical realism ', or a ' metaphysical
nominalism .' Whatever name may be given to it, it is what Ockham opposes
as the worst error in philosophy, destructive of all truth, reason, science,
and of the whole philosophy of Aristotle. ”
96 Phil. Nat. , III , 7 : Quarto, res permanens potest esse sine motu ,
sed non sine re permanente . " "Ad quartum dico, quod res permanens
potest esse sine motu ; . . . unde sicut ista conceditur , ' Sortes potest existere
sine albedine ' et cum hoc stat, quod Sortes vere est albus, ita istae stant
simul : ' res permanens potest esse sine motu , ' et tamen : ' motus non est alia
res a re permanente . ' Sed contra, quando aliquid potest separari ab aliquo,
distinguitur ab illo ; sed res permanens potest esse sine motu, ergo, etc. Dico
quod in tali modo arguendi est fallacia figurae dictionis . . . quia . . . sicut
quando arguitur quandocumque aliquid potest existere sine reliquo, illa
distinguntur ; sed Sortes potest existere sine musico, ergo musicum distingui-
tur a Sorte."
97 Ibid.: " Quinto, motus est quantitas alia a quantitate rei permanentis ;
quia non habet quantitatem permanentem, sed tantum successivam . "
98 Ibid.: " Ad sextum ( !) dico, quod motus non habet quantitatem
aliquam distinctam secundum se totam a quantitate rei permanentis ,
aliquid tamen intelligitur per hoc nomen, quantum, magnum, parvum et
one to say: "a great deal of motion is present ," or something of the sort,
what is meant by this statement, is that some moved body is enjoying
an intense amount of successively acquisitive, or disquisitive , activity .
4.
Divisions of Local Motion
Ockham proposes next to extend his explication of motion, narrow,
to a consideration of the more important included species of local,
qualitative, and quantitative motion. First of all, he addresses himself
to the several varieties of local motion.99
The path described by a mobile undergoing actual motion of trans-
lation is the first means by which Ockham classifies local motion . It
appears, also , in this connection, that the geometric configuration of the
mobile must be considered ; for whereas the characterization of rectilinear,
circular, or mixed motions of translation exhaust all possible cases
describing the course of a locally moved subject, yet only a spheric
mobile can undergo circular motion , while a mobile of any physical
shape whatsoever can be moved either rectilinearlyor in a mixed manner. 100
The appellation, rectilinear motion , is properly ascribed in all cases
in which a subject of any shape is translated in a continuous line from
some place of motive initiation , to some place of final rest. This con-
huiusmodi, quando verificatur de motu , sic dicendo motus est magnus ,

parvus, etc.
Although Ockham presents but five objections the five which we
have reviewed above he presents six solutiones obiectorum ; one designed
to refute an objection which does not appear in the text of the 1637 edition .
A check with the 1506 edition yielded the same result : five objections, and
six solutions . At the time of this writing, the first ( 1494 Bononiae) edition
was not available, so the source of the omission, if indeed a printer's error,
could not be determined .
In any event, the sixth of the solutions which Ockham presents , stresses
the impossibility of relegating an hypostatized " motion" to any category,
while it lends support to his theory by pointing out that it is only res per-
manens in motion which are categorizable. Ockham writes : “ Ad quintum
dico quod hoc nomen ' motus , ' non est per se in genere, eo quod significat
diversas res diversorum generum, tamen omnis res significata per ' motum , '
scilicet per hoc nomen ' motus , ' est per se, in genere." See also Tractatus.,
PP. 58 ff.
99 Phil. Nat. , III , 8 : "Dictum de motu in generali, dicendum est de
primis speciebus motus. " Ibid. , III , 9 : " Dictum de motu in genere sub-
stantiae sumendo large vocabulum, nunc tractandum est de alia specie
motus , scilicet de motu locali."
100 Ibid., III , 9 : "Dividitur . . . motus localis in motum rectum, circu-
larem, et mixtum . . . Est autem inter istos motus differentia, quia motus
rectus, vel mixtus potest competere corpori cuiuscumque figurae . Quia tam
corpus angulare, quam triangulare, potest moveri motu recto, et motu
mixto ; sed motus circularis, proprie loquendo, non potest competere nisi
corpori sphaerico ..." Cf. Aristotle, Physics , VIII, 8.
Chapter Three. Motion: The Narrow Sense 45
trasts with circular motion in that the subject suffering circular motion
rotates about a fixed orbit - and hence, is forever in the "same place"
with respect to the total motion. There is no properly demarcated
beginning, nor any proper end-point to true circular motion ; but the
motion is regarded as a totality ; and so, relative to change of position ,
it can be considered as always remaining in the same place. This, how-
ever, is not the case where the parts of the circularly moved subject are
concerned. For these do relative to surrounding place constantly,
and successively, acquire new places ; and so the whole mobile is said,
properly, to be in motion . "When something is truly moved in a circular
motion," Ockham writes :
then it continuously is in the same place in which it was previously

another part of space, however, continuously corresponds to another part
of the moved ; but the whole moved is always in the same place and,
consequently, the whole moved acquires nothing new, but any part acquires
a place continually other than the one in which it was previously.101
A question arises, however, in the case of circular motion . We do ,

that is, compare the motions of the heavenly bodies, saying that orb
F is more swiftly moved than orb G ; implying that with respect to
some beginning and end point, as in the case of a rectilinearly moved
body, orb F has traversed more space than orb G in a given time. But the
paths of the circularly moved heavenly bodies have no such delimitable
beginning or end points ; their motions occur always in the same place ;
how, then, can such comparisons be validated ? In resolving this diffi-
culty, Ockham finds it necessary to denote two modes in which " circular
motion" can be understood.
"Circular motion ," in its narrow (stricte) sense, is the designation

covering all instances of circular motion which do not lend themselves
to such comparison . Here, the circular motion is inviolate ; for the moved
remains always in the same total place, and since no one mobile, being
moved in a circular motion (narrow) can ever be thought of as traversing
more or less space than any other mobile moved in a (narrow) circular
101 Phil. Nat. , III , 10. In Ibid. , III , 9, Ockham writes : "Motus rectus
est quando mobile secundum lineam rectam movetur sursum, vel deorsum,
et secundum alias differentias loci respectu corporis caelestis . Quando autem
sic movetur, totum mutat locum ita quod totum est in alio, et alio loco,
tam in fine motus , quam in principio, vel in medio . Motus autem circularis
est quando mobile semper manet in eodem loco secundum totum, quamvis
partes suae mutent locum, et tale motum non posset esse nisi mobile
sphaericum, vel ovale. Quia si aliquis angulus esset in mobili , tunc totum
mobile, quando movetur . . . mutaret locum ; ita quod totum esset successive
in diversis locis totalibus . . ." Cf. Aristotle, Physics, VI , 9 ; VIII , 9 .
m n
46 Ockha : Motio , Time and Place
motion, there is no legitimate ground for holding that one is moved more
swiftly, or more slowly, than another.
The case, however, in which a mobile is said to be undergoing circular
motion in the broad sense (large) , is of a different character. For these
mobiles, despite the fact that their total motion is still circuitous, do
change total place: i. e. , they are undergoing local motion along a circular
path. The fact that distances traversed by mobiles being moved in such
a manner can be protracted on a rectilinear scale allows us to compare
the swiftness or slowness of any two such mobiles. "It is in this mode ,"
Ockham concludes ,
that a heavenly body can be said to be "more swiftly" or " more slowly”
102
moved : in this, that according to itself as a whole, it does change place.¹
The mixed motions are those aberrant cases which can neither be
properly classed as circular, nor as rectilinear . A sphere revolving about
its axis, and at the same time undergoing a rectilinear displacement,
is one example of a mixed motion ; while the parabolic arc described by
a flung projectile would be yet another. Mixed motions, Ockham writes,
are all those which are
neither rectilinear nor circular. That is, when a mobile is not moved accord-
ing to a direct line, nor does it always remain in the same place, but is moved
tortuously as when something (is moved) in an angular path, or is twisted
about (volvitur) , or rolled round and round ( vertitur) .103
102 Phil . Nat. , III , 31 : “ Est . . . sciendum, quod motus circularis dupli-
citer accipitur, scilicet large et stricte . Stricte dicitur motus circularis
quando aliquid movetur et non mutat locum secundum totum, sed semper
manet in eodem loco. Large dicitur quando motum secundum se totum
mutat locum, tamen movetur secundum spatium circulare . Primus motus
circularis nullo modo est compar(a) bilis, quia motui recto illi motus sunt
comparabiles quorum uno pertransitur maius spatium quam alio, quod
non potest accidere in proposito quantum ad motum totius. Secundo modo
circularis est in aliquo comparabilis recto, quia maius spatium potest esse
unum quam aliud, quod potest stare ex hoc : quod magnitudo super quam
motus circularis dictus sic fertur, potest fieri recta, et ita est maior, vel "
minor, alia, et illo modo pars caeli circuit, et circulariter movetur . .
This whole question arose in the context of Ockham's discussion of how it
was possible to compare motions with respect to their velocitas and tarditas .
In this connection, it is important to know that Ockham feels that, "not
all motions are comparable, one to the other, as regards their swiftness or
slowness. Just as local motion is not swifter nor slower than an alteration ;
nor is heating swifter or slower than a rectilinear motion . " Ockham writes
that in order for two changes to be thus compared, it is only requisite that
they be specifically the same : "the motions . . . of the same species are
comparable, just as two rectilinear motions are comparable ; for that (mo-
bile) is swifter which covers more space (than another) in an equal time.
Similarly, two alterations of the same species are comparable ; for that
whitening is ... more swift than another in which (the latter subject) does
not acquire a whiteness as intense (as the former subject) in the same time."
This discussion occurs in Phil . Nat . , III , 31. See also Logic. , ch . 55 , p . 165 ;
Sent. , II, 9, q ; and cf. Aristotle, Physics, VII , 4 . 103 Phil. Nat. , III , 9.
Since the terms, "rectilinear," "circular," and "mixed ," are equiv-
ocally employed, another distinction which embraces them in a rather
simple fashion is allowed by Ockham as valid. Rectilinear and circular
motion, in this second " division ," are called the simple motions ; while
all mixed motions, on the other hand, are subsumed under the single
rubric, composite . 104
Next, for his third "division ," Ockham seizes upon the fact that the
-
various types of motive institution and prolongation — i . e . , natural,
-
violent, or mixed (composito) — provide a mode for further classifying
locally moved subjects. Natural motion originates from the "intrinsic"
physical constitution of the moved itself. Thus, the natural motion of
the heavy directs it downward, just as that of a light body is inclined
upward as a result of its intrinsic nature.105
Now the heavenly motions were said to be natural, and yet the
motion of the heavenly bodies was assumed to be occasioned by the
extrinsic agency of moving " intelligences." There seems , then, an obvious
discrepancy between this use of the word "natural," and the one upon
which Ockham is insisting ; and it is with an eye to accounting for this
aberration that Ockham introduces two ways in which “ natural motion"
can be understood narrow and broad.
Natural motion, narrow, requires only that an active intrinsic

principle be the moving cause. Thus, the active intrinsic principle
directing a heavy body downward, or fire to heat, etc. , are instances of
"natural motion" strictly applied.
The broad sense, however, of "natural motion, " is properly used in
those cases in which a body is moved by an extrinsic agency in a manner,
or direction , which is not counter to its natural inclination . The apparently
renegade instance, then, of the heavenly bodies being in natural motion ,
despite their motion being directed by extrinsic agency, is "saved. ”
Their motion is " natural" in the broad sense ; for although moved by
104 Phil. Nat., III , 9 : "Aliter stricte utitur ... istis vocabulis, ' motus
rectus,' ' circularis, ' et ' mixtus' . . . quod non obstat praedictis cum vocabula
valde sumantur aequivoce. Unde, et ista potest esse secunda divisio motus
localis, quia motus localis quidam est simplex , quidam compositus . Simplex
dividitur in motu(m) rectum . . . et motum circularem ... Motus autem
compositus sive mixtus . . . patebit inferius." Cf. Aristotle, Physics, V, 6 ;
VIII , 4.
105 Phil. Nat ., III , 9 : "Terti (a) distinctio motus localis potest esse ,
quia motus localis quidam est naturalis, quidam violentus, et potest addi
tertium membrum, quod quidam est mixtus ex istis . Motus naturalis est,
quod est a principio intrinseco ... sicut motus gravis deorsum et motus
levis sursum . . ." Cf. Aristotle, Physics, V, 6 ; VIII , 4.
ham ion e ce
extrinsic agency, they are yet moved in a way which is not counter to
their "natural" propensity for motion.106
Violent motion is instituted as a result of contraverting the natural
inclination of some body to move by virtue of its intrinsic nature. In
this way, were one to fling a heavy body upward, thus frustrating its
natural inclination to travel in a downward direction, this body would
be violently moved.107
A mixed motion has its origin from both intrinsic and extrinsic
factors.
Just as if a small stick were bound to a stone and moved downward, then
it is moved according to the inclination of the stick as well as that of the
stone, and therefore it (the stick) is more swiftly moved than if it were let
drop by itself.108
Now these three - natural, violent, and mixed motion according

to Ockham, completely exhaust the universe of the locally moved .
106 Phil. Nat., III , 32 : " Sed ad hoc, quod sit motus naturalis, requiritur
quod sit a principio intrinseco activo, et hoc proprie, et stricte, accipiendo
motum naturalem. Large, vero accipiendo motum naturalem est ille, qui
non est contra inclinationem aliquam ipsius moti, et sic motus corporis
caelestis ab intelligentia potest dici naturalis , quia quamvis sit ab extrinsece ,
quia tamen non est contra inclinationem aliquam ipsius moti, ideo dicitur
naturalis." Ockham also gives (Phil . Nat. , III, 29) as the most elegant
example of motions which are one in number and regular, the motion of the
heavenly bodies, which move uniformly, with constant velocity, over a
path of constant magnitude . Motions which are one in number and irregular,
are those which exhibit either changes in magnitude, or inconstancy with
regard to velocity in their passage from place to place (or, in the case of an
alterative motion , from terminus to terminus) . In general, for any motion
to be regarded as one in number, it must satisfy three prescriptions : unity
of subject ; unity of goal ; and unity of time . Ockham writes : “În order that
some motion be one in number, three things are required : namely the
unity of number of that which is moved for if two things are moved,
there can
- be no unity of motion of these ; unity of termini ad quem is re-
quired for if something is moved with respect to whiteness, and locally,
it is not one motion numerically ; and third is required unity of time, con-
tinuously and without interruption for if something is moved in some
mode, and thereafter rests, and thereafter is moved further, it is not one
motion numerically. " Motions can also be related in terms of their being
one in genus, or one in species. Motions which are generically "one" all
occur within the frame of any one category : thus all the motions of any one
(or more) mobile(s) with regard to place, or all of a mobile's qualitative
changes, can be regarded as being "one" one in genus. “A motion , ”
Ockham writes, “ is called one in species which is ad terminos of the same
species . Whence, just as every change of place, and every alteration is in
the same genus as every other change of place and alteration, so every
'blackening' is in the same species with every blackening, and every ‘whiten-
ing' with every whitening." Cf. Aristotle, Physics, V, 4 ; VII, R.
107 Phil. Nat. , III , 9 : "Motus violentus est quod est contra inclinationem
moti, sicut grave quando movetur sursum, et leve deorsum. " Cf. Aristotle,
Physics, V, 6.
108 Phil . Nat. , III, 9.
Nor is it proper to posit some local motion which is neither natural, nor
violent, nor mixed ; since all local motion in which something can be moved
is either according to the inclination of the moved, or against its inclination.109
There are, however, some further sub-divisions of these major varieties.

Violent motion, for example, consists in those cases in which a body is
moved by pulsion , (the "common " term for expulsion and impulsion),
traction, vection, and vertigo.
Impulsion, or "pushing," requires constant contact between mover
and moved, so that the motion ceases when direct contact is broken.
This is opposed to expulsion, which does not require constant contact
between mover and moved to preserve the motion . Ockham cites as
example of expulsive motion, the flinging of a stone.110
Traction is the simple motion of pulling a subject from place to
place ; while vection describes that motion undergone by some subject
adhering to another, which is moved by the motion of its patron. Ver-
tiginous motion, finally, is said to be occurring when some subject is
being revolved in some manner, and this reduces, in the last analysis,
to an instance of pushing and pulling.111
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.: " Motus autem violentus dividitur in septimo huius (Aristotle,
Physics,VII , 2) , in impulsionem (read : pulsionem) tractionem , vectionem, verti-
ginem. Pulsio est communis impulsioni et expulsioni . Impulsio est quando
pellens coniungitur mobili , quamdiu ipsum mobile movetur, ita quod cessante
movente, quiescit motum. Expulsio est quando pellens non coniungitur ""
mobili continue dum movetur sicut est in proiiciente lapidem a se .'
111 Phil. Nat., III , 9 : "Tractio est quando movens movet aliud ad se,
vel ad alterum trahit. Vectio est quando aliquid adhaerens alteri movetur
ad motum ipsius. Vertigo est quando aliquod vertitur, et est ibi pulsus et
tractio." (A grindstone, for example, provides an instance of vertiginous
motion. For it revolves in a manner which allows analysis of its motion into
the upward "push" of one-half, and the downward "pull " of the other. ) It
must be noted that pulsion and traction are not always instances of violent
motion. For it is quite possible that such motions act in a direction which is
not counter to the natural inclination of the moved . When this circumstance
comes about, the motion is more properly classified as mixed, than as
violent. Thus, if a mover situated at some height were to fling a heavy body
downward, he would be acting in accord with the intrinsic nature of the
moved, and this body, according to Ockham, " would be more swiftly moved
than if it were allowed to drop of itself. " In this instance, both intrinsic and
extrinsic factors are operative, hence the motion is properly of the mixed
variety. Ockham writes (Ibid) : "Est autem notandum quod pulsio et
tractio non sunt motus violenti, scilicet contra inclinationem omnino moti ;
sed etiam sunt motus mixti : quia in pulsu et tractu possibile est quod
pulsum et tractum moveantur secundum inclinationem sicut, si aliquis
existens sursum proiiceret lapidem deorsum, iste lapis velocius movetur ...”
etc. There is no conflict here between natural motion large, and mixed
motion ; for in a mixed motion the body is moved more swiftly than it would
have been moved if moved by natural motion large . Natural motion, large,
it is true, consists also in a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic factors,
nevertheless, the net result of the combination of extrinsic and intrinsic
5.
To be moved (in the narrow sense), as Ockham has repeatedly
stressed, is to acquire or lose " something" in a successive manner. His
opponents maintain that an actual, objectively inhering new quality
is the what which is acquired or lost by the locally moved ; and if Ock-
ham is to persist in denying that a locally moved body acquires or loses
"something" he must be prepared to face the counter-charge that this
denial violates the definition which he has himself endorsed .
His adversaries , indeed, level three objections against the view that
denies the successive acquisition or loss of something as a new quality
-to the locally moved subject. In the first place, were Ockham to
insist that the moved is constituted in exactly the same way before and
- that is , as neither having gained
after suffering a local displacement —
nor lost anything - how could he seriously maintain that it was moved
at all ? 112
Secondly, his opponents held that the necessary condition which
cails for the successive verification of contradictories in any motion,
could not be satisfied except by positing the successive production or
destruction of a something in the moved. Therefore , since Ockham refuses
to yield the actual acquisition or loss of something in the locally moved,
can he explain the phenomena of local motion ? 113
In the third place, his opponents are quick to point out, were every-
thing to be equal in the moved both before and after local motion, as
Ockham holds, there could be no better reason for a subject to be in
any one place, than in any other. In short : without the acquisition or
loss of some inhering " thing" in the moved as loss or gain of "motion"
-
why should a body move at all ? ¹¹4
Ockham commences his reply to these objections by saying that a
body does, in his view, have
something which it previously had not ; not, however, that it "has ” it as if
a thing inhering in it as in a subject ( subiective) -
— but as a place. . . . I say
that such locally moved things do not acquire something inherent, in the
factors active in a natural motion, large is not to move a body with a greater
or lesser velocity than it has a natural propensity to assume.
112 Phil. Nat ., III , 10 : " Et ... dicas (his opponents argue) , si motum
nihil habeat quod prius non habebat, ergo non movetur."
113 Ibid.: "Et si dicatur ulterius, quod contradictoria non verificantur
de aliquo successive , nisi propter aliquam destructionem alicuius, vel
productionem, ergo si nihil novum acquiritur nec aliquid destruitur, non
movetur. "
114 Ibid.: "Praeterea, si omnes res nunc sunt quae prius erant, et non
aliae, non est maior ratio quod hoc sit in hoc loco nunc, quam prius."
way that a substantial form is in matter, or heat in fire, but they acquire
only surrounding place . . . . Further, it is against the opinion of the Philos-
opher that when something is moved , something inheres in it . . . for indeed,
when something is locally moved it is not that something is "in" the moved,
but that the moved is in something — in a place · where it was not previous-
ly, 115
To the next objection , he points out that
contradictories can be successively verified without the production or de-
struction of any thing, through this alone : that a mobile changes place,
and goes from one place to another . Whence , by this itself, that a body,
without any other thing, is in this place , and it was not previously in his
place, contradictories can be verified.116
To the last argument, Ockham feels it sufficient reply to indicate

that although everything is inherently the same before and after local
motion, yet the mere fact that the moved is now in this place, and it
was not in this place prior to the motion , is indicating that place, and
place only, is the what acquired or lost through local motion.117
6.
Ockham and Projectile Motion : Impetus

The Aristotelian dictum, "everything that is moved, is moved by
another" (omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur) 118 met with an apparent
aberration in the case of projectile motion . The principle was obviously
satisfied in those cases where direct and prolonged physical contact
between mover and moved could be observed as in the simple in-
stances of pulling and pushing ; but how could this principle be defended
in those cases where mover and moved were separate in situation as
in the case of a thrown stone ?
Aristotle attempted to encompass the deviant case of projectile
motion within the bounds of his dictum by positing the medium itself,
which was in constant and intimate contact with the projectile , to be
responsible for the continued motion 119 - an explanation which Ockham
cannot counterance. For , as Ockham points out , were someone standing
at point C to fire a projectile directed at point B, while another person
115 Phil . Nat. , III , 10.

116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.: "Ex hoc patet ... quod quamvis omnis res sit quae prius, et
non alia, tamen nunc est in hoc loco , quia movens movet ipsum ad hunc
locum, et prius non, sic ergo dico quod per motum localem acquiritur solus
locus et non aliquod aliud . . .”
118 See Aristotle, Physics, VIII, 10 .
119 That is, Aristotle felt that the original agent imparts a gradually
exhausted virtus motiva to the medium which serves to further the motion
of the projectile . See Aristotle, Physics , IV, 8, and VIII , 10 .
stationed at point F were to fling a projectile at point C , so that at some

point, M, the two projectiles met, it would be required , under the terms
of the Aristotelian explanation, that the same portion of air, at point M,
be moved simultaneously in two different directions.120 The impossibility
of which, as Ockham sees it, vitiates the Aristotelian explanation of
projectile motion.
Yet another way is open to reconcile Aristotle's dictum , “everything
that moves," with the apparently renegade case of projectile motion :
this way consists in positing the motive power to be transmitted, as an
objective, indwelling, new quality, from the projector to the projected .
An explanation which was endorsed by certain of the Medievals, and
which is of great interest, being, as it is, an archetypal impetus theory.121
The apparent ingenuity of this second theory seems in no way to
have dismayed Ockham. Building on the premise that a given cause
produces always a given effect, he indicates that the projector - grant-
ing it to possess and transmit that certain " force " (virtus) which instigates
and sustains projectile motion - should always produce the effect,
120 In Sent. , II , qu . 26, m, in his discussion of whether or not to the air
can be accounted the power to further projectile motion , Ockham writes :
"nec aer; quia potest moveri motu contrario, sicut si sagitta obviaret
lapidi. ” In Ibid. , II , qu . 18 , j , he writes of projectile motion that : "Nec
potest dici quod aer movet sagittam , quia aliquis potest e converso33 sagittare,
ita quod ista corpora proiecta possunt sibi mutuo obviare.'
121 For a history of the impetus theory, see Anneliese Maier, op. cit. ,
Part II ., ch . 6. In this work Dr. Maier sketches rapidly the growth of the
theory from its expression by Franciscus de Marchia ; (" Und zwar scheint
der erste, der den Gedanken in Form einer wissenschaftlichen Hypothese
ausgesprochen hat, Franciscus de Marchia gewesen zu sein. ") Of Ockham
all she says (p. 132 ) , is that he was the " chief representative" of the view
that: " das proiectum wird von dem ursprünglichen Beweger, dem proiciens
mittels Fernwirkung weiterbewegt . " She adds, however, that Ockham :
"hat sie ... (i . e. , this theory of actio at-a-distance) später dann auch auf-
gegeben. " In Dr. Maier's Zwei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen Natur-
philosophie, Rome ( 1951 ) , Part II, "Die Impetustheorie ", a much more
extensive treatment of the growth of the impetus theory is found . In this
latter work Dr. Maier's treatment of Ockham is much more satisfactory.
She correctly stresses his preoccupation with the permanent thing, pointing
out that his solution to the problem of projectile motion, regards such
motion as in no way differing from any other type of local motion , (see esp .
pp. 159 ff.) . Dr. Maier also makes quite clear the fundamental difference
between John Buridan's concept of impetus, and Franciscus de Marchia's
virtus impressa . Buridan abandoned the earlier virtus impressa theory which
Ockham criticizes, in favor of the impetus theory. Impetus is understood by
Buridan as an enduring state of matter in motion , produced by a force, but
not requiring the continuous action of a force to maintain the motion . For an
extremely interesting discussion of Buridan's Ockhamism, centering about
the Parisian Statutes of 1339 , and 1340, which were traditionally considered
to be anti-Ockhamist measures, but which Professor Moody convincingly
shows to be defenses of Ockhamism as opposed to the sceptical tendencies
of Nicholas of Autrecourt's teachings, see E. A. Moody, " Ockham, Buridan
and Nicholas of Autrecourt, " op. cit.
motion, when brought into contact with a mobile. Yet, the empirical
fact is that this can not be the true cause of projectile motion , since the
effect does not always follow :
for my hand can be moved slowly to some body, and then it will not move
it locally ; and it can be moved swiftly ... and then brought to some body
in the same way as in the previous case, and then it will cause motion, and
it previously would not. 122
The cause, then, of the sustained motion of a projectile, after it has been
released by the projector, is not to be thought of as a "power" trans-
mitted from one to the other. Indeed , the very seeking of a cause for
the projectile motion effect is not allowed by Ockham as a valid enter-
prise, insofar as in his view, local motion is not a new effect at all ;
if you say that a new effect has some cause, but local motion is a new effect ;
I say that local motion is not a new effect ... since it is nothing else but that
a mobile coexist in diverse parts of space.¹123
In the vein with which we are now familiar, Ockham insists that the,
movement, in such a motion, after the separation of the mobile from the ....
projector, is the moved itself according to itself (and) not by virtue of some
power in it. 124
"It would be astonishing," says Ockham concluding this review of
projectile motion, "if my hand could cause some power in a stone by
the fact that ... it touched the stone ." 125
122 Sent., II , qu . 26, m : " Item notandum quod in motu proiectionis est
magna difficultas de principio motivo et effectivo illius motus ; quia non
potest esse ... virtus in lapide : quia quaero a quo causatur illa virtus : non
a proiciente: quia agens naturale aequaliter approximatum passivo aequa-
liter causat semper effectum. Se (d) proiciens quantum ad omne absolutum
et respectivum in eo potest aequaliter approximari lapidi et non movere
sicut quando movet. Potest enim manus mea tarde moveri et approximari
alicui corpori ; et tunc non movebit eum localiter ; et potest velociter ...
moveri, et tunc approximatur eo modo sicut prius, et tunc causabit motum
et prius non. "
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Sent., II , qu . 26, m . Ockham can almost be thought of as arguing
directly against Franciscus de Marchia here . Franciscus writes in Book IV
of his own Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences : “... Unde est scien-
dum , quod est duplex virtus movens aliquod grave sursum . . . et ista virtus
manus ; alia virtus est motus exequens inchoatum et ipsum continuans et
ista est causata sive derelicta per motum a prima. Nisi enim ponatur aliqua
virtus a prima, impossibile est dare causam motus sequentis ... Et si
quaeratur qualis sit huiusmodi virtus, potest dici quod nec est forma simpli-
citer permanens nec simpliciter fluens, sed quasi media, quia per aliquod
tempus permanens, sicut caliditas ab igne genita in aqua non habens esse
permanens simpliciter sicut in igne, nec simpliciter etiam fluens ut cale-
factio ipsa , sed habet esse permanens ad determinatum tempus. "" This
portion of Franciscus de Marchia's text is edited by Anneliese Maier, and
is printed in her Zwei Grundprobleme ... op. cit. , pp. 166–180 . The above
quotation appears on p . 172.
So far as Ockham is concerned, projectile motion provides no problem

requiring different orientation than any other type of local motion . It
is a simple instance of violent local motion of the expulsive variety ; 126
and the case of the projectile, as of any other locally moved body, is
adequately " saved" by merely positing it to acquire or lose "places”
in a successive manner, while it can never be said to be at rest in any
one of them.
7.
Ockham and Text 71
The theory of projectile motion which Ockham has just examined

and rejected, tacitly reflects the fundamental assumption ― derived
from an unwavering belief in the sanctity of the " everything that is
moved" principle - that motion under the impress of no force is a
formal impossibility. The fact , that is, that some body was in motion
locally, was itself assumed to be a condition of its being moved by some-
thing. Hence, the postulation of such continuously active motive forces,
as an " impressed force " ( virtus impressa) , was deemed a sine qua non
in the theoretical explanation of non-organic bodies in local motion.
Nor was it the absolute theorists alone who were culpable in that
they failed to mark the distinction between being in motion, and being
moved by something; for examination of the controversy centering about
the Aristotelian arguments against the possibility of motion in a void ,
indicates that this confusion was a general characteristic of all scholastic
theories of motion exposited prior to that of William of Ockham .
The most pregnant argument which Aristotle proffers pertaining to
the problem of the void, is rooted in his initial assumption that the
speed with which a heavy body passes through any corporeal medium ,
is in inverse proportion to the density of that medium. Hence, in a
rarefied medium, a falling body will travel with greater speed than if
the medium were more dense. It follows, then , that were a body to be
let fall through a medium of no density a void its speed would be
infinitely great . Since, however, such a traversal of space would neces-
sarily be instantaneous, Aristotle held that motion in a void was an
impossibility.127
126 See above, p. 49. Ockham gives there as an example of violent,

expulsive motion, the case of a flung stone .
127 Aristotle discusses the problem of the void in Physics IV, ch . 6, 7, 8
and 9. The argument given above is from ch . 8 (215a- 215b) , and is famous
as Text 71. For a history of scholastic criticisms of Aristotle's law of motion ,
largely in connection with Text 71 , see E. A. Moody's article , “Avempace
The Arab philosopher, Avempace, however, raises, as Averroes says,

"a good question " (Avempace autem bene movit hic quaestionem) , with
regard to Aristotle's position . 128 It is his claim that Aristotle's argument
presupposes that motion is temporal in character owing only to the
hampering effect of some resistent medium. If this initial assumption
were true, he points out, then the only reason why all local motions
(involving simple, non-organic bodies) are not instantaneous, is due
exclusively to the resistance offered the mobile by some medium . Avem-
pace contends that the retardation effect offered by the resistant medium
is only accidentally related to the motion, and that the essential con-
sideration in any instance of local motion of this variety , is the time of
the mobile's traversal of a magnitude of empty space.129
Averroes takes exception to Avempace's "good question " on the
ground that the latter has failed to make a proper distinction between
a moved and a mover. After all, "everything that is moved , is moved by
another," and if some simple, inorganic body is in local motion , some-
thing other than the body itself must be responsible for its continued motion .
Moved, and mover can not be postulated to be two distinct entities
possessed intrinsically by such a mobile, and the only proper explanation
of its motion lies in the fact that reciprocal relationship exists between
the moved body and the medium through which it is moving. Such a
simple body is said to be mover as a result of its action on the medium;
and it is moved insofar as the medium reacts on it. The action of the
medium, then, is not to be thought of as an accidental factor in such
motion, but is rather an essential condition of its occurrence; and motion
and Galileo, " in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol . XII , no . 2 and 3 ( 1951 ) .
Some of the same material, though less extensively treated , can be found
in Professor Moody's article, " Ockham and Aegidius of Rome, " op. cit . I
have drawn heavily on these two articles for my background discussion of
the controversy centering about Text 71 .
128 Avempace's criticism of Aristotle is known to us only through
Averroes who cites it in his own exposition of the Aristotelian text. See
Aristotelis Opera Omnia cum Averroes Commentariis , Venetiis ( 1560) , Tomus
IV . fol. 131 V. ff.
129 Avempace's argument is translated and printed in Prof. Moody's
article, "Avempace and Galileo, " op. cit., pp. 184-5 . Moody writes
(Ibid., p. 192) : "Avempace's criticism of Aristotle and his alternative law
of velocities, though known to the western scholastics only as ‘ Avempace's
theory' , had been stated, and its implications developed clearly and fully
by a Christian Neo-Platonist of Alexandria , Joannes Philoponus . For in
the commentary which Philoponus wrote on Aristotle's Physics , immediately
after his exposition of Text 71 of Book IV, we find a lengthy ' digression'
devoted to criticism of Aristotle's law of velocities and of the dynamic
assumptions on which it was based . ” For a treatment of projectile motion ,
indicating Philoponus as the forerunner of fourteenth century dynamics,
see P. Duhem, Le Système du Monde, ( Paris, 1913 ) , vol . I , esp . pp. 313-320.
is temporal, as Averroes sees it, precisely owing to the resistance of the

medium.130
Avempace's insistence on the fact that the successive, temporal,

character of motion is a function of the mobile's passage through a
divisible continuum - the physical characteristics of that continuum
notwithstanding -— is of great value from the vantage-point of modern
classical mechanics. For it constitutes a sound definition of motion in
its kinematic aspect . Nevertheless, Avempace's implicit faith that the
"everything that is moved" dictum expressed an inviolable principle
of nature, led him to construe his fundamentally sound kinematic
analysis, to be simultaneously a definition of motive force.
Averroes, on the other hand, insisted on the dynamic aspect of
-
motion, and arrived at a basically correct conception of motive power
i. e., the ability to overcome material resistance (to perform “ work” ) ,
measured by the time required to do so . The same assurance, however, that
the "everything that is moved" principle was inviolable, led Averroes to
assume that his definition of force was, at one and the same time , a
kinematic definition of what motion is. "Being in motion," so far as
Averroes was concerned, was always an instance of " being moved by
something," and motion , therefore, was always a case of overcoming
material resistance.131
Ockham opens his own investigation into the controversy centering

about Text 71 , by a careful restatement of the arguments used to defend
Averroes' thesis that local motion is temporal in character owing to the
deterrent effect of a resistant medium.132 "It must be known , " Ockham
writes :
130 Averroes' criticism of Avempace is translated by Prof. Moody, and

printed in his article " Avempace and Galileo, " op. cit., pp. 189, 191 .
131 See Moody, " Avempace and Galileo, " op . cit. , p . 380. It is of ex-
treme interest to note that when the scholastics came to study Averroes
commentary in the 13th century, each commentator was faced with the
choice, in regard to Text 71 , of siding with either Avempace or Averroes ;
and that they defended one view or another in a way which transcended
mere loyalties to orders , or representatives of these orders. Thus, St. Thomas
Aquinas defends Avempace's view, while his teacher, Albertus Magnus,
holds for Averroes ' . Aegidius Romanus, St. Thomas ' pupil, as against the
views of his master, also saw fit to go along with Averroes. Other among
those who supported the Averroist thesis were John of Jandun, and Siger
de Brabant ; while the list of those in Avempace's camp includes Roger
Bacon, Duns Scotus , Peter John Olivi , and William of Ware.
132 By the time Ockham entered the arena, the controversy had been
crystallized in this form: whether the temporal character of motion is
determined solely by the fact that a given magnitude of space must be
traversed ; or whether the resistance of the medium was sole and sufficient
guarantee for its temporal character.
that the Commentator (i . e. , Averroes) , in Comment 71 , raises the question

whether motion is in time precisely owing to resistance. And (those who
answer in the affirmative) say that the whole cause whereby heavy and
light bodies are moved in time is the resistance of the medium, insofar that
if there were a quantity of space without any resistant medium, a heavy body
would not be moved downward in time (i . e., its passage from one place to
another would be instantaneous) .133
These who preferred this view, made first an obvious but necessary
distinction : a distinction between those bodies which possessed the
-
power of self-locomotion the power to determine their own changes
of position ; and those simple, inorganic bodies which, owing to their
light or heavy forms, are determined to move locally in one "proper"
direction : downward for the heavy, and upward for the light.
Now such simple heavy bodies are either in act in a downward
direction, as a proper motion returning them to their natural place¹4
or they are, owing to accidental circumstances, not in their natural place ;
and when this occasion arises (as, say, when a stone is placed at the top
of a ladder) , these heavy bodies are accidentally in potential to motion
in a downward direction . "But when something is accidentally in
potential to something, " the anti-Avempace school argued,
in order that it achieve it, nothing else is required but the removal of the
prohibiting factors. Since, therefore, heavy bodies may be accidentally in
potential to downward flight, if the prohibition and the impediment is
removed, such heavy bodies would move steadily downward ; and because
the impediment and prohibition in such a motion is the corporeal medium
alone, therefore the whole cause whereby time is required in the motion of
heavy and light bodies is the resistance of the medium.135
133 Expositio., P. 427,

134 For a complete discussion of the scholastic conceptions of natural
and proper motions with respect to their natural places, see A. Maier, An der
Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (Rome 1952 ) , Part . I. Cf. Aris-
totle, Physics, IV, 1 ; V, 6.
135 Expositio., p. 427-8 : " Corporea quaedam moventur ex se, quaedam
non moventur ex se. Quaecumque autem moventur ex se, non determinantur
ad unam differentiam positionis tantum, sed quodam modo habent quod
moventur ad plures differentias positionis . Animal enim, quod movetur ex
se, habet se ad plures differentias positionis ; sic etiam et caelum, quod ex
se movetur, quodam modo movetur ad plures differentias positionis .... Ea
vero quae non moventur per se, ex se et essentialiter, secundum suum motum
naturalem et proprium determinantur ad unam differentiam positionis
tantum, sicut patet de gravibus et levibus . Et ideo, si loquimur de proprio
motu gravium et levium, quae non moventur ex se, patet quod tota causa
quare requiritur tempus in motu est impedimentum medii. Gravia enim
non sunt in potentia essentiali ut sint deorsum, immo ex sua essentia et
per se semper habent quod sint deorsum . Et ideo vel sunt actu deorsum ,
vel si non sint actu ibi, sunt solum in potentia accidentali ut ibi existant.
Sed quando aliquid est in potentia accidentali ad aliquid . . . ” etc. As for
those bodies which possess the power of voluntary self-locomotion, the
S Ockham : Motion
ham ion e e
58 Ock : Mot , Tim and Plac
The second argument offered in defense of Averroes' thesis, makes

use of an analogy between the motions which conclude in the moved
subject's acquisition of some new qualitative state (motus ad formam) ,
and those which terminate in the moved subject's acquisition of a new
place (motus ad ubi) . The point of this analogy being that the temporal
character of all motion is totally independent of terminal distance, and
wholly dependent on resistance.
The motion involved in the acquisition of a qualitative form, the
argument runs, is temporal in character owing to the existence in the
subject of a disposition which is inimical to that of the newly-impressed
form (contraria dispositio existens in materia) . This " contrary disposition"
is, in effect, an actual resistance - a resistance which must be overcome
before the new form is determinately established ; and the quantity of
matter, the actual physical dimension of the subject involved in this
alteration, is of no consequence, and in no way affects the speed with
which the transition is accomplished. Should there be no resistance to
the newly-impressed form - just as the air has no contrary disposition
with respect to the illumining power of the sun - the new form is
instantaneously aquired. "Therefore ," the argument concludes :
just as in motion to a form , so in motion to a place ; just as the reason of
quantity does not require time in motion to form, but only the reason of
contrary disposition - thus in motion to place the reason of quantity of
space is not required , but the reason of resistance, or the reason of an imped-
ing medium. That, therefore, which the impeding medium does in the mo-
tions of heavy and light bodies, the contrary disposition in a subject does
in the motion to form ; whereby, if there was some evacuated space, and all
resistant medium were lacking in it, a mobile would pass through that space
instantaneously.1136
temporal character of their motions is not owing to corporeal resistance :

"Sed de motu illorum quae moventur ex se, dicitur quod talia secundum
quod huiusmodi non habent quod sint in uno loco tantum . Sol enim non
habet de se quod sit semper in oriente vel in occidente . Et ideo cum est in
oriente, ad hoc sit in occidente non est in potentia accidentali solum. Et
ideo quia sol, quando est in oriente, de se non habet quod sit in occidente
semper, si tollatur medium impediens, non statim est in occidente . Et ideo,
quod motus corporum supercaelestium sit in tempore, non est causa resisten-
tia medii."
136 Expositio. , P. 429—30 : “... Videmus quod causa enim quare in
motu ad formam requiritur tempus, non est quantitas, sed est contraria
dispositio existens in materia. Si enim materia esset sufficienter disposita
ad aliquam formam, et non haberet contrariam dispositionem illi formae,
in illo instanti in quo appropinquaret sufficiens activum illi materiae,
introduceretur talis forma in tota ista materia ; nec refert utrum materia
illa esset parvae quantitatis vel magnae : sicut patet de illuminatione aeris
a sole, propter Quod aer non habet contrariam dispositionem ad lucem.
Sicut ergo est in motu ad formam, sic suo modo est in motu ad ubi ... "
etc. Cf. Quaestiones. , qu . 89, 90, p . 430 .
The first of these arguments, Ockham points out , indicates a breach

of fidelity with the first principles of the very men who posit it. For its
protagonists conceive of the vacuum as being pure magnitude a
three-dimensional continuum possessing real and distinct quantitative
parts totally divorced from any substantial or qualitative determina-
tions ;137 and since they conceive of the vacuum in this way, they are
actually committed to the position that motion through such a magnitude
would be temporal. The passage of a mobile, that is, through such a
magnitude, could be clearly shown to involve the acquisition of successive
quantitative mid-marks in its course from extreme to extreme. Since
this position is entailed in their view of the vacuum, these defenders of
Averroes' original thesis are forced to a grudging admission of Avem-
pace's thesis : i. e. , that the distance traversed by the mobile - the physical
properties of the medium notwithstanding -- is alone sufficient guarantee
for the temporal character of motion.138
137 Ockham, on the other hand , conceives of the vacuum in a purely

negative sense . In Quodl. , I , qu . 6, he writes : "... dico quod utraque istarum
distinguenda, scilicet, ' vacuum est aliquid ' ; vacuum est nihil' . Unus sensus
est iste : vacuum est aliquid, id est, inter aliqua corpora non est medium
positivum inter qu (ae) fuit medium positivum, vel potest esse sine motu
locali partium istorum corporum. Et sic est verum : ' vacuum est aliquid' .
Secundus sensus est ille : aliqua res qu(ae) est aliquid, vel potest esse aliquid,
et haec est vacuum ita quod hoc nomen ' vacuum' vere predicatur affirma-
tive de aliqua re qu (ae) existit, vel potest existere . Et iste sensus est falsus
et impossibilis, quia quacumque re demonstrata haec est falsa, ' hoc est
vacuum ' . Eodem modo haec est distinguenda : ' vacuum' est nihil . Et potest
habere duos sensus . Primus est iste : inter aliqua corpora non est medium
positivum , etc. , sicut prius dictum est. Et iste sensus est verus. Secundus
sensus est quod nihil est aliqua res, vel potest esse, quae sit vacuum et de
qua vacuum vere praedicetur . Et ille est falsus et impossibilis ... ‘ illa
vacuum est nihil' , vel, ' nihil est vacuum' ."
138 Expositio., p. 431 : " In istis continentur multa falsa, secundum quod
ea intelligunt dicentes. Primum est , quod ponit quod tota causa quare
motus est in tempore, est impedimentum medii, ita quod quantitas spatii
non sufficeret, si poneretur. Hoc enim falsa est secundum príncipia istorum,
quia ipsi ponunt quod praeter substantiam et omnem qualitatem est quanti-
tas media, quae nullo modo est activa et per consequens non potest resistere
cuicumque, et hoc positive, quomodo isti loquuntur. Sed si poneretur talis
quantitas sine omni substantia et omni qualitate quacumque, non resisteret ;
immo, posito quod posset secum compati mobile quod debet pertransire
ab extremo ad extremum, necessario prius perveniet ad medium quam ad
extremum. Sed omne quod prius perveniet ad medium quam ad extremum,
movetur successive et per consequens in tempore. Ergo tale mobile, in tali
medio quanto separato ab omni substantia et qualitate, moveretur in
tempore. Confirmatur, quia nullum corpus potest moveri de extremo ad
extremum nisi attingendo medium ; ergo tale mobile attingeret medium .
Aut igitur, quando attingit medium, est in extremo, aut non . Si sic, ergo
idem corpus est simul in duobus locis , quod est impossibile . Si autem
non est in extremo, et postea erit in extremo, ergo non in instanti sed in
tempore transit de extremo ad extremum . " Cf. Quaestiones ., qu . 90,
P. 431-2.
5.
The second argument, too , Ockham turns against its protagonists ,

exhibiting it as actually entailing the opposite of the conclusion which
it was designed to imply. The "contrary disposition , " he writes,
is not the cause whereby motion to form is in time, except because the
contrary disposition and the induced form cannot be simultaneously in a
subject ; because if the contrary disposition were compossible with the
induced form, then such motion would not be in time on account of the
contrary disposition . Therefore, just as a subject can not be simultaneously
under the induced form and under its contrary disposition, and therefore
motion with respect to form is successive and in time according to those
(who posit the argument) , so one part of a quantity of space is incompossible
with another part . . . so that the same mobile can not be in two parts of a
quantity of space ; and therefore that motion, in such a space, will be in
time.139
And Ockham concludes this portion of the discussion , saying :
Therefore, insofar as this argument is concerned, it must be said that if
there were some place, or space, lacking everything other than quantity,
provided that there was there a true quantity, and there was there an ex-
treme distant from an extreme, through a medium distinct really from each
of them , whether that medium would resist that mobile or not, and if there
could be a mobile in this medium, truly the motion in this medium would
be in time ; because owing to the fact that the same mobile can not be
simultaneously in distinct places, it necessarily previously touches one part
of the medium equal to it, then another ; and so it passes the whole in time,
and not instantaneously.140
The fact that Ockham has committed himself to an acceptance of
Avempace's kinematic theory is now made explicit :
It must therefore be said briefly, that the distance of the termini, at (both
of) which a mobile cannot be simultaneously . . . alone suffices in order that
a mobile be moved in time . . . A mobile can not be moved except in time,
whether that mobile is moved by itself, or by another. And the reason is
that a mobile cannot be simultaneously in diverse places . Just as, if some-
thing were to change from white to black by way of all the mediate colors,
from this itself, that the mediate colors are not compossible neither
among themselves nor with white or black time is required in which to
make this transition ...
. . . Thus, a mobile cannot be simultaneously in diverse
places, just as the same subject cannot be simultaneously colored in diverse
colors. On this account, if a mobile is to be moved from one extreme to
another through a medium, whether it is moved by itself or by another,
whether the medium be compossible with the mobile or not, time is required ,
and this motion is in time, and not instantaneous.141
Nevertheless, having thus allied himself with Avempace's kinematic
analysis of motion , Ockham refuses to give support to Avempace's
139 Quaestiones. , qu . 90, p. 432. Cf. Expositio . , p . 432 .
140 Expositio., p. 432. Cf. Quaestiones., qu. 90, p. 432 .
141 Expositio. , P. 434. Cf. Quaestiones . , qu . 89, p. 434.
dynamics; and he refuses to yield that in allying himself with Avem-

pace's thesis relating to the cause of motion requiring time , he has
committed himself simultaneously to the position that the speed with
which a heavy body passes through a corporeal medium is determined.
by the difference between the motive power, and the retarding effect
of the medium. Ockham, that is, denies that the espousal of Avempace's
kinematic thesis involves, at one and the same time, acceptance of his
dynamics ; and further, he denies that Averroes ' dynamic principle is
incompatible with Avempace's kinematic theory.
After clearly drawing up the opposing lines of the problem, 142 Ock-
ham makes the point that Averroes takes issue with Avempace's theory
on but one count :
not ... that he posits that the distance of the termini alone suffices in order
that rectilinear motion be in time ; but ... that he posits any heavy and
light body to have one natural motion to which is added . . . an accidental
retardation by the resistance of the medium.143
Averroes' arguments then, according to Ockham, are not directed

against him:
... the Commentator refutes Avempace because he posits that the retard-
ative (effect) of the resistant medium is something distinct added to the
natural motion - which I do not posit. Therefore , his argument is not against
me, because I posit ... that a mobile could be moved in time even though
the medium does not resist positively. But it is compatible with this, that
when there is an impeding medium , then the proportion of resistance to
resistance is as the proportion of time to time, and motion to motion, and
conversely. Whence, the Commentator does not reprove Avempace in that
he posits that motion can be in time owing to the distance of the termini.144
In this final statement, the kinematic question is clearly distinguished
from the dynamic question. Where the medium does offer material
resistance, Ockham holds, the proportion of motive power to resistive
power determines the time of motion . Thus , Ockham preserves Averroes'
sound conception of motive force- i. e., the capacity to do work : to
142 Expositio., P. 435 : " Sed contra ista dicitur esse Commentator,
primo, quia reprobat Avempace propter hoc quod ponit duplex tempus
requisitum ad motum, sive unum naturale propter distantiam terminorum,
et aliud propter resistentiam medii . Sed hoc idem ponitur in praedicta
declaratione ; quia ponitur quod se solum termini distarent, adhuc motus
gravium esset in tempore ; et manifestum est quod tempus requiritur propter
resistentiam medii , secundum Philosophum et Commentatorem hic ; ergo
ista opinio coincidit cum opinione Avempace, quam reprobat Commentator,
dicens : ' Et si hoc quod dicit Avempace concedatur ... (etc. , Ockham here
gives the quotation from Averroes' commentary on Text 71 ) ... Ex isto
patet quod de intentione Commentatoris est, quod motus talis non est in
tempore propter solam distantiam terminorum, et quod tarditas motus non
est accidentialiter a resistentia medii ."
143 Ibid. 144 Expositio., p. 435.
overcome material resistance . In the case, however, where there is no

resistance offered to a body in motion, Ockham supports that sound
-
kinematic element in Avempace's theory i. e. , that the temporal
character of motion is sufficiently explained by the mobile's traversal
of an extended medium, the physical properties of that medium not-
withstanding. Ockham, in defining local motion as the successive
passage of a mobile from place to place, without feeling the necessity
to take into account a constantly active motive force, 145 was able to draw
the distinction between the states of being in motion, and being moved
by something. His analysis shook the established belief in the inviolable
character of the everything that is moved principle, and provided ingress
for further investigations of a fruitful order.146
8.
Augmentation and Diminution
Ockham now trains his sights for a finer focus on the quantitative
motions of augmentation and diminution . The term "augmentation "
itself, he points out initially, enjoys a dual (duplex) status. In the first
instance of its employ, it has reference to the animate only ; while its
second, and more interesting use, embraces both the animate and the
inanimate. The narrower usage is reserved, therefore, for that type of
growth peculiar to the living creature growth which comes about
145 Thus, in the case of projectile motion , we can understand Ockham
to mean that an external force is necessary to set the projectile in motion,
but is not required for the continuation of its state of being in motion.
146 Professor Moody ( " Ockham and Aegidius of Rome, " op. cit., p . 438) ,
writes : "After Ockham the discovery of the principle of inertia, and of the
definition of force as what determines change in the condition of motion,
rather than continuation of the same condition, became philosophically
possible . The first fruits of this contribution of Ockham's were gathered
soon after he left Oxford , by Thomas Bradwardine and his ' Mertonian'
pupils, who developed kinematics independently of the dynamic question
of the causes of motion, and provided the mathematical patterns, expressing
the ' how' of natural motions, to which Buridan and his ' Parisian' disciples
gave a new dynamical interpretation that prepared the way for modern
mechanics."
The fact that Ockham, as we have seen, is led to question the universal
applicability of the omne quod movetur principle, led G. Manser, in his
article "Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip im XIV. Jahrhundert, " Jahrbuch
für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie, Band 27 , ( 1912 ) , to assume that
he was questioning the validity of the principle of causality. E. Hochstetter
(Studien ... op. cit. ) however, carefully and adequately criticizes Manser's
opinion, showing that for Ockham, causality was a relation having no being
per se, and differing in no way from the cause and the effect taken conjunc-
tively. P. Duhem (Études . . . op. cit. , II , p . 86) construed Ockham's affirma-
tion that the continuation of local motion does not require any continuously
active motive forces to be the first statement of the law of inertia. Duhem's
enthusiasm is considerably modified by P. Doncoeur " Le Nominalisme
d'Occam ,'" Revue de Philosophie, vol . xxviii , Mai ( 1921 ) ; and S. Moser,
op. cit., vierter Teil.
due to the incorporation and assimilation of matter, making one per se

with the preexistent matter. The broader use of the term is properly
applicable to all cases ― be the subject animate or inanimate — in
which a mobile has been physically extended due to extrinsic agency.
Ultimately, all motions of this latter variety are embraced by the single
147
motion of rarefaction.1
"Diminution" too, as we might expect , is a twin term. The narrow
sense of this term is at the opposite pole from the narrow sense of "aug-
mentation ;" for if the narrow sense of the latter is applicable only to
the growth of the animate, it is the " recession" (recessum) of the sub-
stance of the animate the very antithesis of the animate growth
process - to which the restricted use of the term "diminution" is
properly applicable. And as for the narrow, so for the broad employment
of "diminution ". For its proper use is found at the other extreme of the
pendulum swing from the broad sense of "augmentation". Where
"augmentation," broad, had reference to the increase in physical dimen-
sion of any subject , just so " diminution," broad, is applied to all cases
in which actual physical contraction , owing to extrinsic agency, has
occurred. And just as augmentation, broad, reduces ultimately to the
single motion of rarefaction , so diminution , broad, reduces, in the final
analysis, to condensation.148
147 Phil. Nat. , III, 12 : "Non solum ponitur motus ad ubi, sed etiam
motus ad quantitatem, qui vocatur augmentatio et diminutio ... Sed in
primis est sciendum, quod augmentatio est duplex, sicut et diminutio.
Nam quaedam est augmentatio quae est per adventum alicuius substantiae,
et ista solum convenit animatis, secundum quod videmus animata crescere
per adventum materiae facientis per se unum cum materia praeexistente ...
Alia dicitur augmentatio sine adventu substantiae ; sed solum per hoc,
quod aliquod mobile extenditur nunc magis quam prius, et tunc est maioris
quantitatis . Et ista augmentatio non est nisi rarefactio, et convenit tam
animatis, quam inanimatis . " In Sent. , I , dist . 17 , qu . 8 , e , Ockham makes
these further distinctions : "Dico ... quod augmentatio est duplex ; quaedam
est extensiva, quaedam est intensiva. Augmentatio extensiva est duplex :
una per additionem partis ad partem facient (i) s per se unum cum ista, et
distinct(ae) ab ea loco et situ sicut quando aqua additur aquam, vel quando
alicuius totius primo dealbatur una pars postea alia, vel quocumque alio
modo. Alia est augmentatio extensiva per rarefactionem quando substantia
aliqua vel qualitas rarefit . Quia in tali augmentatione, dico quod vel tota
quantitas praecedens corrumpitur et fit nova, vel quantitas non est res alia
absoluta informans substantia (m) sicut homines communiter imaginantur,
et ita non est ibi additio quantitatis ad quantitatem tamquam partis ad
partem sicut est in aliis . Alia est augmentatio intensiva , qui per additionem
partis ad partem facientis per se unum cum ea et indistincta(e) ab ea loco
et situ , sic(ut) quando album secundum se totum fit albius quam prius . . ."
Cf. Aristotle , Physics, VII , 2 .
148 Phil. Nat., III , 12 : " Et eodem modo diminutio (i . e . , duplex est) ,
quaedam est per recessum alicuius partis substantiae, quaedam sine omni
recessu partis substantiae, sed per maiorem coartationem partium moti ,
quae vocatur condensatio ."
Now just as Ockham has denied, in his examination of local motion,

that the moved subject acquires or loses any objective, indwelling,
motive force, he denies that the quantitatively moved, moves as a result
of the waxing and waning of an absolute and separable "quantity."
And, as in the previous examination of local motion , it is now incumbent
upon him to supply the answer to just "what" it is that is successively
lost or acquired by a mobile undergoing quantitative motion ; for his
definition of motion , narrow, it will be recalled , demands that a “moved
body acquire or lose something in a successive manner. "
Again, it is place which satisfies that requirement for a something
which is successively lost or acquired by the quantitatively moved .
Ockham maintains that the parts - the structural component units
of a quantitatively moved body assume positions more and more discrete
with respect to one another (in a rarefactive movement) , and thus it
comes about that the body as a whole is physically extended to a greater
degree. Conversely, the parts of a body undergoing condensative motion
are moved to positions less distant one from the other, and so the con-
densed subject, as a totality, is physically reduced.
Thus, in Ockham's view, only place is successively acquired or lost
by the quantitatively moved. Both in its parts, and in its entirety, a
mobile occupies more place after undergoing a rarefactive motion than
before the institution of such motion ; while a condensed subject loses
place, and occupies less place after being moved , than prior to its mo-
tion.149
There are certain very obvious questions which Ockham will have
to treat before his position becomes clear and tenable. To begin with,
if he is to persist in holding that a quantitatively moved body is not
-
moved with respect to "quantity," (ad quantitatem) — since only place
and not quantity is acquired or lost, and that it is not moved with
respect to quality (ad qualitatem) , for the same reason ; there seems no
149 Phil. Nat., III, 12 : " Et primo ... quae est rarefactio, de qua dico,
quod secundum intentionem Philosophi per talem augmentationem non
acquiruntur aliquae res, nec aliqua quantitas, nisi locus tantum ; hoc est,
quando aliquis sic augetur, vel rarefit, non acquiritur moto, nisi locus
tantum; hoc est, quando aliquid augetur, illud rarefit sine adventu rei
inhaerentis, sed partes moti dilata(n)tur, et extenduntur, et fiunt in maiori
loco ... Patere poterit, quomodo diminutio est motus ad quantitatem ,
non quod in diminutione, quae est condensatio, aliqua quantitas deperdatur,
ita quod aliqua quantitas destruatur, sed quia partes rei motae fiunt minus
distantes quam prius, sine destructione cuiuscumque rei, et ita tunc motum
non perdit aliquam quantitatem sibi inhaerentem; sed tantum perdit
locum; quia sit in minor loco quam prius propter hoc : quod partes eius
fiunt minus distantes . . . quam prius, sine omni destructione cuiuscumque
rei ." Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 9.
better ground for designating a motion as being "quantitative," than

there would be for designating it as "qualitative, " insofar as Ockham
seems to be saying that the motion no more involves " quantity," than
it does "quality."
Secondly, if some subject is augmentatively or diminutively moved,
and as a result acquires or loses nothing but place, how then can this
motion be distinguished from local motion ? 150
Directly, Ockham points out that quantity ("according to the Philos-
opher's intent" ) , is not a thing distinct either from substances or
quality , enjoying an objective, separable, existence (" as so many of the
'moderns' posit " ) .151 Were it such an absolute , it would be required
that a mobile undergoing a motion of rarefaction would receive a new,
hence separable and objectively existent " quantity. " This gives rise to
three questions : is the whole of the preceding quantity destroyed to
make way for the new? or does the whole of the old quantity remain
in addition to the new ? or does a part of the old quantity remain , while
a part of it is destroyed to make way for the new ? If Ockham can indicate
that none of these alternatives are tenable, he feels that he will have
adequately destroyed the absolute tenet that a new "quantity" is
infused in a rarefactive motion ; further, if he can succeed in doing this,
he will, as a result, have unhorsed the whole theory of absolute and
separate quantity while giving additional impetus to his own by indicat-
ing that quantitative motion can occur without the postulation of any
new "quantity. "152
For the whole of the preceding quantity to remain in the subject
being rarefactively moved, there are only two possibilities open : it
either remains in the same subject in which it previously inhered --
and then there would be two distinct and absolute quantities not making
one per se, inhering in the same subject ; or one of the quantities would
150 Phil. Nat. , III , 12 : “ . si illa sit augmentatio, et non est ad quanti-
tatem - quia nulla quantitas acquiritur ; nec ad qualitatem, ideo illa non
magis est ad quantitatem, quam ad qualitatem : quia non erit plus quanti-
tatis quam qualitatis . . . si aliquid rarefit (vel condensit) et non acquiritur
nisi locus, augmentatio (et diminutio) ... non differet a motu locali . "
151 See above, n. 78.
152 Phil. Nat., III , 12 : ". . . secundum intentionem Philosophi , quantitas
non est res distincta a substantia et qualitate, ita quod non est aliqua res … ..
quae sit subiective in substantia, sicut multi moderni ponunt et falso
imaginantur ... Quod autem non sit talis res (ostendo) . nam si quando
aliquid rarefit aliqua nova quantitas acquiritur, quaero : aut tota quantitas
praecedens corrumpitur, aut tota manet, aut una pars manet, et alia non .
Sed si nullam istorum potest dici , sequitur quod nulla nova quantitas
acquiritur, ergo cum rarefactione potest stare quod nova non acquiritur. "
have to migrate to another subject. Both possibilities, however, accord-

ing to Ockham who wields Aristotle's authority on this, are " impos-
sible. "153
Next, Ockham gives three arguments disestablishing the possibility
of the whole of the preceding quantity's destruction at the time of the
new quantity's institution. The first of these involves the impossibility
of infinite generation and corruption taking place during the course
of a finite time-span , which we have seen him employ in another connec-
tion ; 154 while the second points out the fact that there is lacking an
agent in nature with the capacity not only to destroy the preceding
155
quantity, but to simultaneously generate and institute the new one .
It seems obvious from this that the whole of the preceding quantity
can not be destroyed in a rarefactive motion . The third ground which
Ockham offers , seizes on the fact that since all accidents are destroyed
along with their destroyed subject, the agent responsible for the total
destruction of the old quantity would not only have to be capable of
initiating the new, but also of instituting anew all of the accidents which it
destroyed incidental to the destruction of the initial, absolute, quantity.156
Examining the last of the three possible ways in which an absolute
-
quantity can be conceived of as existing i . e . , a part of it remaining,
153 Ibid.: " Quod autem tota praecedens non manet, si nova quantitas
acquiritur, ostendo : quia si manet, aut manet in eodem subiecto in quo
prius, et tunc duae quantitates essent in eodem subiecto, vel una migravit
de subiecto in subiectum, quorum utrumque est impossibile apud Ari-
stotelem ."
154 Ibid.: " Quod autem tota non corrumpatur patet . Primo, quia si sic,
quandocumque aliquid rarefieret, partes infinitae secundum se totas di-
stinctae essent generatae et corruptae : quia ex quo sunt infinita instantia
in quolibet illorum erit nova quantitas generata, et praecedens corrupta . ”
155 Phil. Nat. , III , 12 : " Secundo, quia non apparet aliquod agens quod
potest quantitatem praecedentem destruere, et sequentem generare, quia
ex quo sunt eiusdem rationis naturaliter, idem non potest esse corruptivum
unius, et productivum eiusdem rationis naturaliter."
156 Ibid .: "Tertio , quia si sic, cum accidens corrumpatur ad corruptionem
sui subiecti immediate . . . sequeretur quod etiam omnes qualitates rarefacti
corrumperentur ; et continue novae generarentur, cum tamen nullum agens
possit dari, quod potest tales qualitates generare. " This third argument
presupposes the view of his adversaries that qualities inhere in substance
only by way of quantity . This is to say that the theory he is here challenging
held for the extensive , divisive , and numerable character of substances and
qualities as a result of the accidental inherence in them of a distinct entity
called "quantity. " Professor E. A. Moody has conclusively shown this to
be the theory (immensely important for Eucharistic doctrine) propounded by
Aegidius Romanus ; see “ Ockham and Aegidius of Rome, " by Prof. Moody
in op. cit.; see also G. Buescher, The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham
(Franciscan Institute , St. Bonaventure, N. Y. , 1950) . Cf. St. Thomas,
Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Quodlibetum 7, qu . 4, art. 3, where he holds that
God can make a sensible quality lacking in quantity, as well as a quantity
lacking a substance .
-
and a part being destroyed — Ockham makes the point that in a subject
possessing distinct and absolute parts, all of which are presumably
equivalent in every respect, there would be no better reason for one
part to be destroyed , than for any other. The second reason for his
rejecting this notion , repeats what he has pointed out before— that is ,
either one has to commit himself to the position that there are two
"quantities" (not making one, per se) after rarefaction , in the same part
of the same subject ; or that one of them has migrated to another subject
— both of which possibilities were previously rejected on Aristotle's
authority.157
Finally, Ockham shows that, as before , since the qualities of the
parts of the subject whose previous quantity has been partially destroyed ,
would be destroyed incidentally, there is still wanting a natural causative
agent capable of accomplishing the requisite task of destruction and
generation this time “ partial” — of both subject and accidents, 158
"Thus, I say therefore ," Ockham concludes,
that according to the Philosopher's intent, when something is rarefied it

acquires no new quantity, nor is the old destroyed ; but the same which
was previously, remains only it is more extended , and its parts are more
distant and discrete and occupy more place than previously; and this
quantity is itself the substance of the thing. Nor is this quantity some “ quan-
tity" inhering in the substance of the thing, because quantity is nothing
other than for a thing to have part distant from part. . . . Nor is there, by
the fact that a substance has a part distant from a part, anything required
other than the parts of a substance, and an extrinsic cause making them
distant.159
To those accustomed, as his opponents seem to have been, to con-

ceiving of quantitative increase and diminution as a function of the
157 Phil. Nat., III , 12 : ". . . Quod autem non possit dici quod una pars
corrumpatur et alia praecedens manet, patet . Primo quia non est maior
ratio quod una pars corrumpatur quam alia ... Secundo, quia hoc dato,
illa pars, cuius quantitas manet, non esset rarefacta, nisi accidens migrareret
de subiecto in subiectum, vel ponerentur duae quantitates in eadem parte
subiecti."
158 Ibid.: "Tertio, quia tunc aliquae qualitates, scilicet qualitates partis ,
cuius quantitas corrumpitur, corrumperentur, et novae generarentur."
159 Phil. Nat., III , 12 See also Altaris ., p. 115 : “When a thing becomes
rare from dense, I ask whether or not there is there another new quantity ;
but it is precisely the same quantity numerically ; if it is new there, then
any preceding quantity is corrupted, which seems false. If a part be new :
I ask about the subject of that quantity, for it is necessary that there be a
whole rarefied substance or a part of it ; not the whole, because then the
two quantities would be at the same time, which they deny who think thus.
If a part, the same argument follows, or that an accident might travel
subject into subject, as would be able to be clearly shown, but it is omitted
for the sake of brevity . . ."
amount of "quantity" gained or lost by a mobile, Ockham's view"

stressing the factor of direct, linear, measure as the gauge whereby
determination of the degree of quantitative motion suffered by any
mobile can be ascertained , seems incredible ; for it is Ockham's contention
that "more" quantity can be numerically identical with " less" quantity.
That is, since he has refused to admit the existence of additional “ quan-
tity" per se, in the rarefied mobile, but will only see rarefactive motion
as being constituted by the spatial increase among the structural com-
ponent units of a mobile, he can be understood to be saying that "more"
quantity is numerically the same as " less" quantity - the only difference
between " less" and "more" quantity being the relative dispersion and
disposition of the substantial parts of the moved, and not their per se
numerical increase or decrease.
Ockham clearly states his position , and attempts to enlighten his

opposition, in this way:
but by chance it can be doubted in what way "more" quantity can be

numerically the same (eodem numero) as " less " quantity ; especially since
when some things are equal to the same thing they are equal to each other,
and consequently a quantity of one foot, and (a quantity) of two feet, if
they are equal to one quantity, are equal to each other . I say that this is
never true : "more quantity is less quantity ; " this, however, is true : " more
quantity was less quantity, " since this is nothing other than to say that
the parts (of a subject) are more discrete now than previously, or the con-
verse. Similarly, this is true : "whenever there are some things which are
equal to the same thing, they are equal to each other. " This, however, is
false : "Whenever there are such that each of them was equal to the same
quantity, these are equal to each other. " Whence, in demonstrating two
things (to be) equal, it is possible that each of them was numerically equal
to the same quantity on this account : that the same numerical quantity
(for both) was sometimes less, and sometimes more ; that is, the parts were
sometimes less, and sometimes more , distant.160
It has now become clear in what manner the second question — i. e.,
how does quantitative motion differ from local motion ? which arose
as a result of his positing place , and place only , to be the " what" succes-
sively lost or gained by the quantitatively moved, is to be answered .
The subject of local motion, that is, never suffers physical alteration as
a result of its motion, but is the same in value , quantitatively, both
before and after its motion . Not so, however, with the quantitatively
moved body, which is of certain linearly mensurable proportions prior
160 Phil. Nat. , III , 12.

to being moved, and possesses a different quantitative value as a direct

outcome of its motion.161
Having thus indicated in what manner local and quantitative mo-
tions differ, Ockham is now prepared without danger of being mis-
understood - to actually relate the two.
Through what has been said before, with regard to the argument that
rarefaction and local motion do not differ, it must be said that " local motion"
is taken in two ways : namely broad, and narrow (large et stricte) . Broad,
for all motion in which place is acquired ; and thus augmentation, which is
rarefaction, is local motion. " Local motion" is taken in another way, narrow;
and then motion is called "local motion " when something is moved locally,
and there is no greater or less quantity (i . e. , more or less distance between
its parts) . And in this way augmentation differs from local motion. 162
Ockham's investigations have made sufficiently clear what he
conceives the true nature of quantity to be. " Quantity " is a connotative
term suppositing, in a proposition , directly for some substance or quality
signified by an absolute term , while consignifying the theoretical
capacity of this individual substance or quality to be divided into an
infinitude of really distinct parts.
9.
Divisions of Alterative Motion
Ockham initiates his investigation of qualitative motion with the

statement of two distinctions, the first being the Aristotelian division
of the category of quality into the four species of "habit" (habitus) ,
"natural potential" (naturalis potentia) , " affective qualities" (passio),
and "shape" (forma) . The second distinction which Ockham demarcates
is between those "sensible" qualities which are discerned by one partic-
ular sense, and those qualities which are not sensed by any one particular
organ. To this latter class belong the sensations themselves "vision ,"
for example, can not itself "be seen, " nor can " tasting," "be tasted."
Here also, are classed as non -sensibles, such psychological functions as
"desire" (actus appetendi) , and "volition" (volitio) , and others of
similar status.163
161 Ibid.: "Ex praedictis patet quomodo augmentatio distinguitur a

motu locali, quia in motu locali mobile non est maioris quantitatis nec
minoris in principio quam in fine."
162 Ibid. See also Altaris.
163 Phil. Nat. , III , 14 : " Et est sciendum quod sicut ponit Aristoteles ...
(see Aristotle, Categories, VIII) quatuor sunt species qualitatis . Quaedam
est habitus, vel dispositio . Alia est naturalis potentia, vel impotentia. Alia
est passio vel passibilis qualitas. Quarta est forma, et circa aliquid constans
70 Ockham: Motion , Times and Place
It is quite correct, as Ockham sees it , to posit that in a qualitative

motion something real, and new, is gained if the motion is qualitatively
acquisitive ; while, should a disquisitive alterative motion be activating
some mobile, Ockham would agree that some "old thing" (res antiqua) ,
as a result of the motion , is lost.164
"Alteration," however, should be understood to be employed in
two ways. Its broad sense is properly applicable to every instance in
which a sensible or non-sensible change - sudden or successive, acquisi-
tive or disquisitive - is occurring in a mobile. Thus,
the air is altered (in this broad sense) , when it is illuminated ; and the sense
165
is altered when it actually senses ; and the intellect when it is understanding.¹
The other use of "alteration ," however, is restricted in that it applies

only to the successive induction or loss of some quality ; or to the induc-
tion of some quality which is inimical to the continued existence (in its
original state) of the subject itself. Thus, when water is altered by being
submitted to the application of heat, it is suffering alteration narrow166
figura. Sed praeter istam divisione (m) potest poni alia divisio qualitatis,
quod quaedam est qualitas sensibilis, quae ab aliquo sensu particulari potest
sentiri, cuiusmodi sunt calor, frigus, color, sapor et sic de aliis . Alia est
autem qualitas quae non est sensibilis ab aliquo sensu particulari, cuiusmodi
sunt ipsae sensationes, quia ipsa visio oculi non potest videri, nec ab aliquo
sensu sentiri . Sed talis qualitas est imaginatio interior, et actus appetendi,
et intellectio, et volitio." See also, Logic. , ch . 55 , p . 165. Cf. Aristotle,
Physics, VII , 2 .
164 Phil. Nat., III , 14 : " Oportet autem scire, quod alteratio ... est
motus successivus, quo aliqua qualitas inhaerens subiecto acquiritur, vel
amittitur, ita quod vere res nova acquiritur, si sit motus acquisitivus, vel
res antiqua deperditur si sit motus deperditivus. " As the sequel will prove,
M. de Wulf was in grave error when he wrote (Histoire de la Philosophie
Médiévale, 6th ed. , Louvain, 1947 ; vol . III , p . 33 ) , that in Ockham's theory,
"à leur tour les qualités corporelles se confondent avec la substance.'
Later (p. 43) , de Wulf adds confusion to confusion , for he writes here that
for Ockham, "la qualité étant réduite à la quantité . . ." In truth, as we
shall see, only certain qualities were regarded by Ockham as not being
divorced from substance ; while quantity is never found distinct and apart
from substance or from quality. See also Logic. , ch . 55 , p . 164 : " Sunt autem
quaedam in genere qualitatis, quae important res distinctas a substantia,
ita quod illa res non est substantia, sicut sunt ‘ albedo' et ‘ nigredo ', ' color',
' scientia', 'lux' et huiusmodi . Quaedam autem sunt, quae alias res a praedictis
qualitatibus et substantia non important, cuiusmodi sunt ' figura' , ' curvi-
tas' , ' rectitudo' , ' densitas', ' raritas' et huiusmodi . See also Quodl . VII ,
qu. 10: "Utrum qualitas differat realiter a substantia."
165 Phil . Nat. , III , 14 : " Sed oportet scire, quod alteratio accipitur
dupliciter, large pro omni inductione qualita (tis) vel deperditione, sive sit
conveniens , sive disconveniens subiecto in quod inducitur, sive successive
sive subito in subiecto inducitur, et sic aer alteratur quando illuminatur...”
etc.
166 Ockham does not himself use the term stricte for this application
of "alteration , " preferring merely to say : "Aliter accipitur alteratio . . . ”
in that the heat is " disposed to destroy" (dispositiva ad corruptionem)

the water.167
The proper application of the terms natural and violent are not to
be restricted, according to Ockham , solely to instances in which a mobile
is locally moved. For that alterative motion which is counter to the
propensity of a subject to retain its natural qualitative state just as
"violent" in nature as is the forced upward flight of a heavy body.
Further, just as a heavy body is said to be "naturally at rest" when
lying quiescent on the earth, so a subject can be said to be "naturally
at rest" with respect to a certain qualitative state, when the particular
quality is quiescent under its natural terminus. For example : water
tends, owing to an intrinsic inclination , to be cool. Thus , when it is cool ,
it is "naturally" at rest. Suppose, however, that it is undergoing a
"cooling" alterative motion from some pre-heated state - the water
is now said to be enjoying " natural motion :" i . e. , passage to the quali-
tative terminus stemming from its natural tendency to be cool. Con-
versely, an extrinsic heating agent applied to the naturally cool water
would occasion a "violent" motion from cool to hot ; while were heat to
be applied just sufficient to maintain the temperature of the water at,
say, one-hundred degrees, the water would then be " violently at rest"
168
- that is, neither acquiring nor losing any more parts of heat.16
Having stated the divisions proper to the category of quality, and
to the motion of alteration , Ockham is next concerned with seeing to
which species of quality some one mode of alteration is properly ascribed .
For alteration, in his view, is not properly predicated of all four qualita-
tive divisions.169
10.
Alterative Motion Broad: Forma
“Shape," (forma) , is the first species of quality which Ockham holds

to be outside the proper pale of alterative motion . In itself, he maintains,
167 Phil. Nat. , III , 14 : "Aliter accipitur alteratio pro inductione suc-
cessiva alicuius qualitatis, vel pro dispositione inducente ad corruptionem
subiecti, sicut aqua alteratur, quando calefit, quia illa calefactio est disposi-
tiva ac corruptionem aquae . . .
168 Phil. Nat . , III , 32 : " De motu autem naturali et violento, est notan-
dum quod istae differentiae non tantum inveniuntur in motu locali, sicut
dicimus quod grave naturaliter movetur deorsum , et violenter sursum, sed
etiam inveniuntur in alteratione, sicut aqua naturaliter frigefit, et violenter
calefit. Et sicut aliquod mobile localiter quiescit violenter et aliquod na-
turaliter, et sicut idem quandoque quiescit naturaliter quandoque violenter, ita
est alteratione, nam aliquid naturaliter quiescit sub illa qualitate ad quam
naturaliter transmutatur, et violenter sub illa ad quam violenter movetur."
169 Ibid. , III , 15 : " Positis divisionibus qualitatum, et alterationum ,
videndum est ad quas qualitates est alteratio, et ad quas non ."
"shape" is not another thing apart from substance or quality . just as

the figure of copper is not another thing from the copper, nor is the figure
of whiteness another thing apart from the whiteness, and thus of others.170
This utter dependence of shape upon the shaped is demonstrated ,

according to Ockham, by the fact that the separation of a part of one
thing from the whole is not marked by the appearance of any new thing.
For example, were one to remove a small portion from a quantity of
copper, or a splinter from a piece of wood, he would have created no
new thing by the separating process, delimitable as distinct from the
- and this lack of anything new and distinct , is sufficient
original subject —
indication that neither of the two resultant shapes is, per se, anything
new.1171
Further, we have seen that the local motion of a body is not explained
by positing anything new in the body ; so that when some body assumes
a figure other than its original owing to the local motion of its parts
as when a straight twig is bent into a curve "shape," as a distinct
and newly-induced quality, is not a result of the motion.172
Finally, where would one find an agent possessing the power to bring
about such a thing as a new "shape, " per se? That no such agent can
be posited, Ockham declares, its patent inductively.173
170 Ibid. See also Altaris. , pp . 83-93 ; Logic. , ch. 55 , p . 165. Ockham
is here taking arms against those who posit, as he writes in Logic. , ch. p . 165 :
"formam et figuram... distingui realiter a substantia et qualitatibus aliarum
specierum . Unde etiam dicunt, quod quando aliquod corpus rectum cur-
vatur, vere unam rem absolutam amittit et aliam rem absolutam novam
acquirit."
171 Phil. Nat. , III , 15 : " Est autem sciendum quod figura non est alia
res ... sicut figura aeris non est alia res ab aere, nec figura albedinis est
alia res ab albedine , et sic de aliis. Quod autem non sit alia res patet : quia
per solam separationem unius rei ab alia non fit nova res. Sed frequenter
aes, vel lign(um ) , fit alterius figurae per separationem partium ab aere,
vel ligno, ergo non est aliqua res nova . In Altaris. , p. 213, Ockham writes :
"When wood is divided into two equal parts, no substance new as regards
itself as a whole is generated ; but there are now two substances really
distinct locally ; for otherwise, when wood is divided into halves, the acci-
dents would remain without a subject in one-half ; from which, therefore,
no substance new as regards itself as a whole is generated . It is necessary,
that those two substances, each of which is a certain whole after division,
were previously making one whole wood , and were not at the same time in
thesa me place ; therefore, there were before two parts of one total wood
separate in situation ."
172 Phil. Nat. , III , 15 : " Item , per solum motum localem alicuius cor-
poris non fit nova res in corpore, sed quandocumque corpus fit alterius
figurae per solum motum localem partium, sicut patet de virga recta si
curvetur, et de multis talibus," ergo tunc non fit nova res, et per consequens
figura illa non est nova res. See also Logic. , ch . 55 , p . 164 .
173 Phil . Nat. , III , 15 : " Item, talis res nova potest fieri ab aliquo agente,
quia ibi nullum est agens " , quod habeat virtutem producendi talem rem ,
sicut patet inductive.'
Just as it is, then, impossible to relate qualitative motion, broad,

and shape, so it is impossible to relate qualitative motion, narrow, and
shape. For were change of figure a genuinely alterative motion, narrow,
it would be required that the induction of a new terminus of motion be
instituted, while the destruction of the old be consummated as is the
case when, by means of any really alterative motion, a quality is induced
or lost in a subject . Since, however — as in the case of separation of
one thing from another no terminus of motion can be posited, nor is
any old quality destroyed , " shape " cannot be considered to be one of
those qualitative species subject to any manner of alterative motion.174
Shape, then, is dismissed from consideration as a distinct and new
quality subject to true alterative motion ; for, as Ockham has demon-
strated, it falls short of the mark on two counts : it demonstrably is not
acquired or lost by any subject in a successive manner - hence, it is not
alterative motion, narrow; nor does it qualify as alterative motion,
broad, insofar as there is no new quality induced in a subject as a result
of a change in its shape.175 " Shape " is a qualifying connotative term
signifying directly the same individual and existent significatum signified
by the absolute term to which it (" shape") is reduceable, and consignifying
the particular physical configuration assumed by this substantial or
qualitative significatum .
Ockham elects this moment as propitious for the clarification of a
problem which has been present , though unarticulated, since his first
equation of motion and the moved. It comes into open view as a direct
consequence of his position that shape is nothing apart from the shaped,
and it takes the form of this question :
in what mode is shape in the four species of quality, insofar as it is not

distinguished from a shaped thing, which is in the genus of substance ?
Having confused predication with signification , such a query can seem,

to the absolute theorists, to be constitutive of a genuine threat to
Ockham's theory of motion. Unless, they feel , Ockham can account for
this, his theory has suffered a death-blow. "Nothing," Ockham replies ,
almost gently, in his attempt to indicate the great difference obtaining
between signification and predication,
174 Phil. Nat., III , 15 : " Ex quo patet ... quod ad figuram non est
alteratio ; nisi quando aliqu (a) qualitas nova inducitur in subiecto distincto
realiter, vel deperditur. Aliquid autem quod est unius figurae fit alterius
figurae absque novi termini inductione, et antiqui destructione, igitur
secundum figuram non est alteratio ."
175 Ibid.: " Ex praedictis patet quod non tantum ad figuram et formam
non est alteratio quae est motus successivus, sed nec etiam alteratio quae
est inductio cuiuscumque qualitatis ..." Cf. Aristotle, Physics, VII , 3.
6 Ockham: Motion
prohibits the same thing from being in diverse categories. That is, nothing
prohibits the same thing from being signified through the predicables of
diverse categories . These names, therefore, "triangular," "quadrangular,"
"circular," and others of similar status, are in the category of quality
regardless of the fact that they signify a thing of the genus of substance .
The reason for assigning predicables from diverse categories to one and
the same subject , is the circumstance that :
through one of these is made answer to the question asked concerning the
"what" of an individual substance, and through the other is made answer
to the question concerning characteristics (quale) accidentally in the same...
individual.
That is, should one ask a question concerning the " what" (quid) of a
piece of wood , he is most conveniently answered with predicables drawn
from the category of substance. Thus, any question relative to the
subject which evokes a response such as : "a substance, " "a plant," or
"a body" (substantia, planta , corpus) , would be in answer to a query
concerning the "what" of the piece of wood . Should , however, the question
beg a reply of the sort : "square," "round" or "triangular, " etc. , (qua-
dratum, rotundum, triangulare, et huiusmodi) , then the question asked
has been relative to the "character" of the piece of wood.
It must therefore be said that through one (predicable) is answered
conveniently the question asked in reference to the "what" of an individual
substance, since that signifies such an individual no matter how its parts
are situated, just as no matter how the parts of the piece of wood are situated ,
always, while it is itself in the nature of things, it is signified through the
word (ly) "substance, " and through this name "body, " and thus through
other predicables in the genus of substance .
It is not signified through this name " square, " however, unless its parts
are situated in such a way ; since, if they are situated otherwise through
being locally moved, it ceases immediately to be signified by this name
"square" regardless of the fact that it itself (i. e . the substance) remains in
the nature of things. One, therefore, is predicated contingently, and the
other necessarily, and still through one is answered conveniently the question
asked concerning the " characteristics " (which is the contingent designation) ,
and through the other the question concerning the "what" (the necessary
designation).176
Having thus explained in what manner the same thing may be "in"
diverse categories (quomodo eadem res sit in diversis praedicamentis) ,
Ockham can turn to examine three objections which his opponents
offer to his position that shape is nothing apart from the shaped .
176 Phil. Nat. , III , 16. See also Altaris. , p. 249 ; Logic . , ch. 40, p . 102 ff.;
ch. 41 , p. 106 ; ch . 46 , p . 134. In both Altaris . , and Logic., Ockham cites
St. John Damascene as authority for his view.
Shape, the first of these objections insists, must be something other

than the shaped, just as the subject of a form is distinguished from the
form . The fact that copper, for example, may be the subject of some
contingent form is ample indication that the two- copper, and the
figure of the copper are quite distinct.
Secondly, that " thing out of which something comes, " is markedly
different from "that which comes out." Now a statue is said to "come
out" of copper ; hence, the copper must be something other than the
statue, just as the completed statue is patently other than the unshaped
copper. Once again , according to Ockham's adversaries, the independence
of figure from the figured has been demonstrated.
Finally, the fact that a body can change figure, presupposes it to
have been first of one figure, and then of another. One figure, then,
must have succeeded the other ; and since "nothing succeeds itself,"
several "shapes" each as a distinct and separate " thing" must be posited.
Figure, on the basis of this reasoning, is very apparently other than the
figured.177
It just remains for Ockham, in order to vitiate these arguments, to
have a closer look at what it means to state that " copper is the subject
of a statue," or : "wood is the matter of a bed." Both propositions
tacitly contain the information that some human agency was at work
in the formation of the statue, and the bed, from, respectively, the
copper and the wood. Thus, the rectilinear figure of the completed bed,
as well as the particular form of the statue, arises as a result of the
-
physical manipulation of some natural substance a process which ,
as Ockham has pointed out before - is the result of the local motion of
its parts, and is not a genuinely alterative motion at all. Hence , all of
the previous reasoning by means of which Ockham had established
the unity of figure and the figured still holds. The objections of his
opponents in no way affect them, for these objections, as Ockham's
178
analysis has shown , are actually meaningless.¹
177 Phil. Nat. , III , 16 : “Ad manifestationem praedictorum (i . e. , figura
non sit res distincta a figurato) ponentur quaedam obiectiones ad quas
expedit respondere . Videtur enim quibusdam, quod figura sit alia res a
figurato ; primo, quia subiectum formae distinguitur a forma, sed aes est
subiectum formae, et figurae, ergo, etc. Secundo, illud ex quo fit aliquid,
distinguitur ab illo quod fit, sed ex aere fit statua, igitur aes non est statua,
nec statua est aes . Tertio , quia superius dicitur quod corpus fit alterius
figurae, igitur primo est unius figurae, et posterius est alterius figurae, et
per consequens una figura succedit alteri, sed nihil succedit sibi ipsi, igitur
illae figurae distingu (n) tur, et per consequens non sunt eadem res cum
figurato."
178 Phil. Nat. , III , 16 : "Ad primum istorum dicendum est ... quod
haec locutio est impropria : ' aes est subiectum formae, et figurae, ' et etiam
6.
m n
II.
Alterative Motion Broad: Habitus
Ockham now examines the character of the changes involved in the

acquisition and loss of habit (habitus) ; and these too just as the
shaping of matter into some determinate figure - he finds to be lacking
the necessary requirements which would qualify them as being genuinely
alterative.179 In order to facilitate his exposition of this species of
quality, and its method of change, Ockham finds it expedient to divide
habit into two broad groupings : corporeal habits, and mental habits.180
The corporeal habits are further subdivided into two classes : habits
of the nature of physical, manipulatory skills, such as are exemplified
in the mastery of a musical instrument ; and habits which are not
"simply one in number" (simpliciter unus numero) , but which owe
their being to the interplay and resultant proportion of various factors
qua(e)libet talis : ' aes est materia statuae, ' ' lignum est materia lectuli, ’
quia per tales intelliguntur tales : ' aes fit forma, ' ' aes fit statua, ' 'lignum fit
lectulus, ' vel, ‘lignum fiebat lectulus, ' et sic de aliis. Sunt autem, usitatae
tales locutiones propter aliquam similitudinem subiecti respectu formae,
et aeris, vel rei naturalis respectu formae, vel statuae ; sicut enim subiectum
supponitur formae quam recipit, et postea recipit, sic res naturalis prius
est lignum vel aes, quam fiat statua. Similiter, sicut potest non recipere
subiectum formam, ita aes, aut lignum, potest non esse statua non per
alicuius rei destructionem, sed per solam diversum partium situationem,
et propter consimiles similitudines dicitur quod aes est subiectum, vel
materia statuae, sicut homo dicitur quod est subiectum albedinis, et materia
est materia compositi ... Ad secundum per idem ; quia ex aere dicitur
fieri statua quoniam aes fit statua. Nec aliud intelligunt loquentes recte,
quando dicunt quod ex tali re naturali fit res artificialis, nisi quod res
naturalis fit artificialis sicut lignum fit lectulus, et aes fit statua, sine omni
novitate rei, sed solum per diversam partium situationem ... Ad tertium
similiter dicitur, quod haec est figurative locutio : ' corpus fit alterius figurae
nunc, quam prius, ' quia per istam intelligitur ista : ' corpus quod erat trian-
gulare vel quadrangulare, fit pentagonum, vel exagonum, ' non quod sint
alterius figurae, sed quia primo res est triangularis, et postea quadrangularis
propter solam diversam situationem partium. Quod accidit ex solo motu
locali partium, sicut eadem res quae est primo recta postea fit curva propter
solum motum localem, quo partes appropinquantur, quae primo distabant
in rectum quantum poterat absque hoc de novo fieret aliquid, et ita in rei
veritate una figura non succedit alteri , nec sunt ibi diversae figurae succes-
siva, quia illa eadem figura quae primo est triangularis postea est qua-
drangularis, vel e converso . Sic sicut illa res, quae primo est rectitudo postea
est curvitas, et e contra, sine omni novitate, et diversitate rei . Dicitur
tamen secundum communem modum loquendi, quod sunt diversae figurae,
quia eadem res est aliter et aliter figurata, se (d) sine novitate rei inhaerentis,
licet non sine motu locali partium . . . " Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione, I, 18.
179 Ibid. III , 17 : "Non solum autem non est alteratio secundum for-
mam et figuram , sed nec est alteratio secundum habitus. " Cf. Aristotle,
Physics, VII , 3.
180 Phil. Nat., III , 17 : "Ad quod faciliter intelligendum oportet con-
siderare quod habitus quidam est corporalis, quidam spiritualis.” See also,
Logic., ch. 55, p . 164.
(debita proportio humorum) . Of this caste are such habits as health ,

and beauty, 181
The group of mental habits , Ockham continues, consists in a similar
two-fold division. By the narrow use of mental habit (habitus spiritualis),
Ockham would understand a reference to a habit of the intellective soul
(anima intellectiva) . The broad use is properly directed to all habits
having their seat in the sensitive soul (parte sensitiva) .182
The habits of both the intellective soul, and the sensitive soul, allow
further subdivision . The former consisting in habits intellective and
moral; and the latter, in habits apprehensive and appetitive.183
The first class of bodily habit which Ockham has demarcated - the
manipulatory skills are acquired through constant repetitive act,
and lost through disuse . The requisite that a new quality, totally distinct
from the subject itself, inhere in the subject, is obviously not satisfied
by changes of this sort. These habits then , are eliminated as being qualities
184
which are subject to alterative motion proper.¹
No more are the second class of bodily habits properly acquired or
lost by an alteration . For again, a subject can acquire or lose health ,
or beauty, without there necessarily having been a new quality induced.
For example:
someone beautiful can become ugly solely through the abcission of a part.
For if the nose, or eyes, or legs are removed from such a one, he becomes
181 Ibid.: " Corporalis vere dupliciter dicitur . Quidam enim sumitur
unus numero , sicut habitus derelictus in aliquo organo ex frequentibus
actibus, sicut patet in cantore, cui ex frequentibus actibus cantandi, dere-
linquitur cantori quaedam habilitas in organo ad bene cantandum, qualis
non habetur sine habitu cantandi . Quidam autem est habitus corporalis ,
qui non simpliciter unum numero . . . sed est aggregatio multorum, quibus
habitis dicitur habens se habere bene, vel male, et sic sanitas dicitur habitus,
quia est debita proportio humorum. Et pulchritudo dicitur habitus . . . ”
etc.
182 Ibid.: " Et similis distinctioni potest dari de habitu spirituali ...
scilicet stricte et sic tantum intellectu ... aliter large, sic est in parte sensi-
tiva."
183 Ibid.: "Habitus autem qui est in anima intellectiva subdividitur :
quia quidam est intellectualis et quidam est moralis . Similiter ... potest
dividi habitus in parte sensitiva, quia . . . quidam est apprehensivus et
quidam appetitivus . "
184 Phil. Nat. , III , 18 : ". . . secundum habitus corporales qui non sunt
aggregati ex diversis ... non est necesse fieri alterationem . Accipitur enim
habitus large pro omni eo, quod per assuefactionem actuum aliquid redditur
habilius et facilius ad actus consimiles, sicut aliquis per assiduitatem scribendi
... redditur aptior, vel promptior ad scribendum ... et sic de consimilibus .
Et secundum tales habitus non est necesse alterari : quia taliter potest
aliquis habituari quandocumque per alicuius indispositionis ammotionem,
sine omni qualitate adveniente, et per consequens non est necesse tale
alterari ." See also, Sent . , III , qu . 4 , 10, 11 .
m n
ugly; and yet there is no induced quality nor any rejected quality .
Therefore, (a subject) can become ugly, or healthy, or ill, without any such
quality advening to it, or receding from it. Therefore, with regard to such
qualities, it is not ... alteration.185
That is, the mere act of separation of a part from a whole can so
vary the "proportion of humors " as to generate a corporeal habit
and such separation, in which no new quality is induced or destroyed,
is not true qualitative motion.186 So much for the corporeal habits.
If "alteration" be taken in its broad sense - as a designation , that
is, covering all cases in which a distinct quality is induced in a subject
then Ockham will grant that the second of his broad divisions of habit
(i. e., habitus spiritualis) , is subject to alteration.187 It yet remains for
him, however, to relate in what mode these habits, couched in the
intellective and sensitive souls, are distinct, induced, qualities.
"Whenever," Ockham writes,
the sensitive soul (or the intellective soul) cognizes, or appetits something,
a quality really distinct from a subject is induced hence, alteration
occurs here . . . It is proved , for such a cognitive or appetitive act is a true
quality, which I prove thus : the perfection of any perfectible is either a
substantial or an accidental form . But the cognitive or appetitive act is a
perfection of the intellective or sensitive soul it is , therefore, either a
substantial or an accidental form - and it is nothing other than a quality.
Therefore, the proposition stands . 188
More particularly, that such a quality, distinct from a subject , is

induced in an appetitive act, is proved owing to the fact that what the
sensitive soul receives from the object of its appetition , is a sensation --
which is, itself, a quality.189
Again, as an example of such a quality induced via alteration, broad,
in the intellective soul , Ockham proffers the quality "love." Since it is
185 Ibid. , III , 17.

186 Phil. Nat., III , 17 : " Sciendum est . . . quod secundum habitum qui
est debita congregatio multorum non fit . . . alteratio, quia omni (s) alteratio
est per inductionem vel abiectionem alicuius qualitatis a subiecto suo ; sed
possibile est quod subiectum denominetur secundum talem habitum absque
alicuius qualitatis, vel inductione , vel abiectione per solam separationem
partium .
187 Phil. Nat. , III , 19 : " Restat videre an secundum actus cognitionis
(vel) appetitionis, tam partis sensitivae, quam intellectivae, sit alteratio .
Et dicendum quod secundum tales actus est alteratio large accipiendo
alteratione(m) , pro quacumque, scilicet inductione cuiuscumque qualitatis . "
188 Ibid .
189 Ibid .: "" .. potentia sensitiva aliquid recipit ab obiecto, et non nisi
sensationem , ergo sensatio ibi recipitur, et non recipitur ibi nisi qualitas, et
per consequens sensatio est qualitas. " See also above, p . 260-261 .
possible to affirm that some subject did not formerly love some object,
which it does now love, contradictories of the quality "love " have
become verified ; hence, alteration broad, can be said to have transpired
in the institution of this new, and distinct , quality.190
None, however, of the mental habits thus induced within the scope
of alteration, broad, have been induced in a successive manner. Hence,
despite the fact that contradictories of such induced qualities can be
verified ; and that a new quality can be demonstrated to be present
owing to alterative motion these yet cannot be accounted alteration ,
narrow. For those mental habits instituted via alteration broad, are,
according to Ockham, induced , instantaneously (in instanti) .191 Thus,
one part at a time of the sensitive soul, in the induction of an appetitive
habit, is moved once, and once only, by one, and only one, part of the
newly induced quality. Similarly, in the instance of the induction of an
intellective habit , as “ love, " or "charity," each part of the soul is moved
once, and once only, by an induced portion of this new and distinct
quality.
12.
Alterative Motion Narrow: Contrariety
That a subject does undergo alteration of its sensibly perceptible

qualities requires no proof, Ockham points out, other than the fact of
everyday experience . And it is this variety of qualitative motion --
successive change from one sensible contrary into its contrary - which
Ockham recognizes to be alteration, narrow (stricte) .192 Despite the
190 Phil. Nat., III , 19 : " Item ... confirmatur qui (a) actus amoris est
vera qualitas ... quia impossibile est contradictoria successive verificari
nisi propter aliquam mutationem subiecti ... sed possibile est aliquem qui
prius non dilexit aliquem, nunc diligere, ita et per consequens successive
verificantur contradictoria, et non sufficit sola transitio temporis, igitur
alia mutatio, et non localis, manifestum est, nec augmentatio, nec diminutio,
nec generatio, nec corruptio, constat igitur quod ibi aliqua alteratio, ita
quod aliqua qualitas acquiritur vel deperditur ; sed nulla nisi actus amoris :
igitur ille actus est vera qualitas, et per consequens est ibi alteratio, sic
accepto vocabulo pro inductione qualitatis."
191 Ibid.: " Dicendum est igitur, quod quilibet talis actus est vera
qualitas inhaerens subiecto , et ideo illud subiectum vere alteratur, sed non
est necesse ut alteretur successive, quoniam in instanti, et sine successione
causatur actus in partibus sensitiva et intellectiva . "
192 Phil. Nat. , III , 22 : “ Subiectum alterari secundum qualitates sensi-
biles non potest aliter quam per experientiam probari . Unde per experien-
tiam scimus quod aliquid de calore alteratur ad frigus , et e converso . . .
et sic de aliis consimilibus qualitatibus . Et secundum illas qualitates non
solum est alteratio qualiscumque, sed est secundum eas successio, et altera-
tio, quae est de contrario in contrarium, sicut de dulcedine ad amaritudinem."
See also Logic. , ch . 55 , p . 164 ; Sent. , I , dist. 17, qu . 4, h . Of the final species
of quality naturalis potentia, vel impotentia Ockham feels it sufficient
to merely note (Logic . , ch . 55 , p . 165 ) that : “aliud genus qualitatis ponitur
universal accord which must be granted the empirical fact of sensible

qualitative change, there is yet a problem indeed, a "special diffi-
culty" (difficultas specialis) with regard to the manner in which
these phenomena occur.
Ockham presents two possible answers to the question of how phen-
omenal variation is to be accounted for. The first theoretical approach
maintains that the previous quality is totally expelled prior to the
advent of the new, successively induced, contrary. The second point of
view holds for the newly introduced quality being induced in the sup-
planted quality. This supplanted quality is not expelled, the adherents of
this theory feel, but lies, rather, in a latent , non-predominant, remiss
degree within its new and dominant contrary. Thus, the first school of
thought would explain the heating of a cold body by postulating the
prior expulsion of its cold, followed by its successive acquisition of
degree after degree of heat. The second school , on the other hand, would
account for the same phenomenon by postulating the injection of heat
into the heart, so to speak, of the cold ; and, as the degrees of heat are
intended (i. e. , “increased" ) , by just so many degrees is the cold remitted;
and when the final degree of heat is reached , the cold has not been
expelled, but it remains, in its last achieved remiss degree, dormant,
in the now predominant heat.193
naturalis potentia vel impotentia . Unde omnis res, qua potest aliquod
faciliter agere vel resistere actioni , in hoc genere ponitur. " Although Ock-
ham marks two ways in which " motions of contrariety" may be understood ,
(Phil. Nat., III , 30 : “... sciendum quod contrarietas motuum dupliciter
accipitur. Uno modo pro omnibus motibus incompossibilibus . Et ad viden-
dum qui motus sunt contrarii, non oportet nisi videre qui motus non possunt
simul convenire eidem. . . . Secundo modo sunt contrarii motus ad terminos
contrarios sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum , sicut dealbatio et deni-
gratio, et calefactio et frigefactio " ) , the two approaches are ultimately
convergent and for all practical purposes lead to the same conclusions with
regard to the contrariety of certain fundamentally opposed pairs. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to note that Ockham considers the alterative
passage of a subject from one contrary terminus to another (e. g. "black "
to "white") , as a " motion of contrariety. " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, V, 5.
193 Phil . Nat., III , 22 : " Sed de ista alteratione (stricte), est una difficultas
specialis, quae in aliis motibus et mutationibus non habet locum. Est autem
difficultas haec : quando aliquid alteratur de contraria qualitate in con-
trari(a)m qualitatem, an simul expellantur, aut una qualitas introducatur
in alia, ita quod illae qualitates secundum gradus remissos simul maneant . ”
Both theories concede the qualities to be intensively divisible, that is, and
the question of whether or not the contraries are overlapping can be more
clearly grasped, perhaps, if put in this way :
the contraries overlap as follows :
2nd theory: 0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8- degrees of heat
8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1-0- degrees of cold .
8-8-8-8-8-8-8-8- temperature
Ist theory: the contraries do not overlap :
degrees of cold 8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1-0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8- degrees of heat.
Now Aristotle had stated that "everything which is moved is partly

in a terminus ' from which,' and partly in a terminus ' to which,'" (omne
quod movetur partim est in termine a quo , et partim in termino ad quem),
and this statement was offered as supporting authority by those who
espoused the latter of these two theories. "For," its adherents reasoned ,
when something is altered from a contrary quality to a contrary quality,

one quality is the " terminus from which, " and the other, the " terminus to
which . "194
Therefore, they argued , when a mobile is moved by an alterative motion,

both of these termini must be constantly present to it. This being the case,
what could be more reasonable than to account for the necessary presence
of both contraries, by positing one of them to be present in the other in a
remiss grade ?
But, the adherents of the first theory retorted, it follows as a result

of this, that a subject undergoing the alterative motion of (say) whiteness
to blackness, would be, in truth, both black and white at the same time.195
Further, they pursued , since contraries can be said to remain at one and
the same time in a subject in a remiss degree, there is no reason to
suppose that they can not remain there in intense grades, too . And this
extrapolation would place the adherents of the second theory in an
embarrassing position , for then such fundamental opposites as heat and
In restricting her source for Ockham's position with regard to the intension
and remission of forms to his Sent. , ( I , dist . 17, qu . 4-7) , Dr. Anneliese
Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme ... op. cit., overlooked this facet of Ockham's
theory. Dr. Maier sees Ockham's treatment of intension and remission of
forms as expressing (p. 75) " der allgemeinen Tendenz des Nominalismus,
ontologische Probleme als logische anzusehen, " and accordingly accents
the logical-grammatical side of Ockham's approach to intension and remis-
sion . Ockham , however, certainly can not be included in the roster of those
who might possibly qualify as exhibitors of such a " general tendency . ” As
Prof. Moody ably shows (Logic of William of Ockham, op. cit. ) , Ockham was
greatly concerned with maintaining the distinction between Metaphysics,
the discursive real sciences, and Logic : which fundamental concern is
indicated by his division of significant terms into terms of first intention
(which alone may enter into statements of the real sciences) ; and terms of
second intention (which alone belong in the statements of logic) . See above,
Chapter One, p. 11 ff. , 19 , 23.
194 Phil. Nat.,
" III , 22 : "Dicit enim Philosophus ... ' omne quod movetur
partim est . etc. See Aristotle, Physics, VI , 4 .
195 Ibid. : 'Sed (istis ) (that is, the Philosopher's authority given as a
ground for the second theory ) non obstantibus , oppositum tenendum est,
nam si remanea (n)t tales gradus remissi , puta gradus albedinis , quando
dealbatum denigratur , sequeretur , quod simul , et semel , esset album et
nigrum , nam ille gradus est vera albedo , quia si sit aliquod oportet quod
sit qualitas , sive gradus , et non nisi albedo, igitur est vera albedo , et per
consequens subiectum habens ipsum erit vere album . Et eodem modo
gradus nigredinis est vera nigredo , et per consequens subiectum informatuu
illo gradu est vere nigrum et ita simul , et semel . esset album et nigrum .”
cold, sweet and bitter, etc. , could no longer be regarded as prime con-
traries, but only
as "heat intense, " and "cold intense ; " just as corporeal qualities and mental
qualities are not contraries or as joy and sadness (are not contraries) , but
only "this joy, " and "this sadness . '' 196
And, finally, it was argued against the position which insisted that
a replaced quality could remain in a remiss grade, that
if white and black are simultaneously in the same (subject) , since the vision
of white does not impede the vision of black, nor conversely, as is obvious
through experience , and further, by the fact that the visions of contraries
are not contraries, it would follow that such a body would be judged simul-
taneously by a vision of white and of black . . . Therefore, white and black
are not (both) there.197
It is to the first theory - the one which holds for the total expulsion
of the former, prior to the successive advent of the latter quality that
Ockham subscribes. It remains for him, therefore , to attempt to reconcile
this view with the apparently contradictory aristotelian statement
quoted as support for the "remiss grade" theory. He proceeds immediately
to do this, and to carefully and clearly restate what he considers to be
the true explanation of how sensible qualities are altered .
"When something is successively moved with regard to some quality,"
Ockham writes :
it does not acquire that whole (new) quality simultaneously, but successively ;
and so while it is moved , it is partly in a “ terminus from which ” — that is ,
it loses some part of the previous form ; and it is partly in a " terminus to which"
- that is, it has some other part which it previously had not. Whence, when
something is altered from one quality to another, the subject is continuously
remitted, and the contrary form is expelled ; and this whole having been
expelled, the other quality, contrary to the preceding, is continuously and
successively acquired . So that at first there precedes the disquisitive motion
of the prior quality, which is followed by the acquisitive motion of the
posterior quality, and no grades of these qualities are simultaneous.198
196 Phil. Nat. , III , 22 : " Non videtur quoque maior repugnantia inter
gradus intensos, quam gradus remissos , igitur si gradus remissi stent simul,
et intensi . Confirmatur : quia si gradus remissus caloris staret simul cum
gradu remisso frigiditatis, calor et frigus non essent primo contraria, sed
tantum calor intensus et frigus intensu (m) . . ." etc.
197 Ibid.
198 Phil. Nat. , III , 22 : Ockham seems, then, to be wedded to the view
that any motion of contrariety consists, actually, in two motions one
wholly acquisitive in character, and the other, similarly distinct, and
deprivative in character. Despite this, he explicitly espouses the position
that any motion of contrariety is one - and he is faced with the problem of
explaining away these two, apparently contradictory stands. " It must be
known," he writes in explanation ( Phil. Nat. , III , 30), " that although when
something is truly moved from one contrary to another, there are diverse
13 .
Intension and Remission
But what of those qualitative motions in which no form is totally

expelled, nor is there any new form instituted ? ---- qualitative motion
which is not a motion of contrariety, but rather a case of the intension
and remission of an already impressed qualitative form ? For just as
surely as we perceive the variations suffered by a subject in its passage
from black to white, we perceive the transition of a subject from a less
to a more intense degree of, say, green . We perceive, for example, that
the green of a favorite plant intensifies is somehow augmented
with the advent of summer ; or we observe , perhaps, that it has lost some
of its summer verdancy as winter approaches. Obviously, there is here
no motion involving contraries; and just as obviously a qualitative
change involving a sensibly perceptible deviation - one case an augmen-
tation of the pre-existent form, and in the other a diminution of the
pre-existent form - has occurred ; and such quantitatively determinate
qualitative changes demand explanation.
It became customary for the scholastics to center discussion of this
problem around the qualitative form "charity," asking first after the
possibility of charity's augmentation , and then, supposing an affirmative
reply to the first question, there followed an explication of the "how"
of such augmentation.199
motions there : namely, the expulsion of one quality, and thereafter the
introduction of the contrary . Still these two motions are called one motion
because they are of necessity concomitant to each other, so that one can
not be without the other following. For if something is changed from white to
black... that motion is of necessity a motion of acquisition of black, or of
some other mediate color, in that the mobile can not be without any color —
and on this account it is said to be one motion . " The destruction , that is,
of some quality necessarily implies the concomitant induction of a contrary,
insofar as a subject cannot be, and totally lack the contrary of a destroyed
quality. For the destruction, say, of " heat " in a subject, does not leave
that subject temperatureless , but it does imply the concomitant induction
of " cold." Similarly, the destruction of the color " white" does not leave
the subject transparent, or totally lacking in all color, but this destruction
is uniformly coupled to the advent of a new color. See also above, p. 272 ;
Sent., IV, qu. 3 , d ; in Altaris . , p . 263-5 , Ockham proves that one quality
can not be the subject of another quality, which is implied by holding that
a quality can remain in a remiss degree in another quality. See also, Quodl.
III , q. 4.
193 For the pre-scholastic sources pertinent to the discussion of intension
and remission in general, see A. Maier, op. cit. , Part I, esp. ch . 2,3 . Of im-
mediate interest is Dr. Maier's statement (p. 12-13 ) , that for the scholastics ,
"die eigentliche Hauptstelle für die Interpretation der intensiven Größe
und der Intension ist nun aber eine Frage aus den Sentenzen des Petrus
Lombardus, lib. 1 , distinctio 17 : Utrum concedendum sit quod Spiritus
sanctus augeatur in homine, vel magis vel minus habeatur vel detur . Denn
Ockham, opening his investigation into this question, states flatly

at the outset that charity can be augmented ; for,
every form which suffers a "more" and a " less" is augmented ; but charity
suffers a "more" and a " less ; " therefore, charity is augmented . 200
"But," he continues,
concerning the mode of positing augmentation, there are diverse opinions

as will become obvious in what follows ; 201
and directly, Ockham raises the question : "whether the pre-existent

charity remains at the end of an augmentation. " 202 It is in answer to this
question that the first theory conceived to answer the " how" of qualita-
tive augmentation comes to light.
It was contended, by those who professed this first theory, that
each instant of charity's change is marked by the induction of a new,
indivisible, degree of charity. The character of this new grade is more
intense, in itself, if charity is being augmented ; or it is less intense than
the one induced in the instant before if charity is being diminished.
In either event, the previous grade is destroyed entirely in favor of the
newest ; and Ockham's original question is answered in the negative :
the pre-existent charity does not remain at the end of an augmentation.203
die charitas soll mit dem Heiligen Geist identisch sein, anderseits nimmt
aber die charitas im Menschen zu und ab und ist zu verschiedenen Zeiten
verschieden groß. Ist nun anzunehmen, daß der Heilige Geist im Menschen
zu- und abnimmt oder mehr und weniger besessen wird ? Das würde eine
Veränderlichkeit des Heiligen Geistes voraussetzen, die mit der schlecht-
hinigen Unveränderlichkeit Gottes unvereinbar wäre. Also müßte entweder
die charitas nicht mit dem Heiligen Geist zusammenfallen, oder sie müßte
im Menschen nicht zu- und abnehmen können. Petrus Lombardus gibt die
Antwort : die charitas ist schlechthin unveränderlich , empfängt in sich
kein magis oder minus ; aber im Menschen oder richtiger für den Menschen
kann sie zu- und abnehmen und wird mehr oder weniger gegeben und be-
sessen, sicut Deus dicitur magnificari et exaltari in nobis, qui tamen in se
nec magnificatur nec exaltatur . " See also P. Duhem , Études . . ., III , ch . 12 ,
pp. 314-46 ; and P. Doncoeur, " La Théorie de la Matière et de la Forme
Chez Guillaume d'Occam, " in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologi-
ques, (1921) .
200 Sent., dist. 17, qu . 4, a. Ockham makes this flat statement in re-
sponse to several arguments against the augmentation of charity. Typical
of these, are the following : ". . . si charitas augeretur ergo charitas movetur.
Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens praeterea, augmentatio et
alteratio sunt motus distincti ; et motus distincti habent terminos distinctos ;
et charitas est terminus alterationis, ergo non est termin(us) augmentationis,
et per consequens non augetur ... praeterea, illud quod augetur est subiec-
tum augmentationis ; sed charitas non est subiectum augmentationis , ergo
non augetur." etc.
201 Ibid. qu. 4, b.
202 Ibid . qu . 5.
203 Sent., I, dist. 17, qu . 5 , b : "Ad quaestionem dicitur quod in augmen-
tatione charitas praecedens corrumpitur et alia nova succedit sibi ; et ita
The argument offered in support of this view points out that since
the termini of any motion are incompossible ; and the preceding grade
of charity is one terminus (the terminus a quo) , while the succeeding
grade is the other terminus (the terminus ad quem) ; one of them (ob-
viously the preceding grade) must be destroyed . 204
In refutation, Ockham points out that alterative motion consists
in passage between positive termini. The results of a true alterative
passage are verified by the fact that a once white subject, (for example),
is now black. But those who argue for the first theory are positing a
privative alterative terminus ; maintaining that the destroyed degree
(the terminus a quo) is merely less intense than the new degree. Thus, to
posit the previous degree of charity to be one terminus, and the following
degree to be the other, is not to posit acceptable, positive, alterative
termini at all.205
The original question , in fine,206 as Ockham sees it , must be given

an affirmative answer: in any augmentation, the preceding degree does
remain. This conclusion, however, gives rise to another question :
"whether in the augmentation of charity something differing really
from the preceding is advened to it. "207 And in Ockham's examination
of this question, three more theories concerning the "how" of augmen-
tation make their appearance .
The first of these holds that all qualitative intension and remission
derives from the separation of contraries. A qualitative intension is a
function of the degree of freedom from mixture with its contrary, enjoyed
by one member of a contrary qualitative pair. Thus " cold " is intensified
dicitur esse ultra in augmentatione cuiuscumque formae accidentalis. "

Among those of the scholastics who professed this theory were Godfrey
of Fontaines, Walter Burleigh, and Walter Chatton. See A. Maier, op . cit.,
Part I.
204 Ibid.: "Pro ista opinio(ne) arguitur sic : termini motus sunt incom-
possibiles ; sed istius augmentationis charitas praecedens est terminus a
quo, et terminus ad quem est charitas sequens ; ergo istae charitates sunt
incompossibiles . "
205 Ibid.: "Contra : alteratio est motus inter terminos positivos , quia
est a subiecto in subiectum, ergo nulla privatio est per se terminus suus."
206 Ockham gives, beside the one which we have considered, four more
proofs of his thesis that the preceding charity remains at the end of an
augmentation . He concludes the question, saying . (Ibid ., article h) : " Dico
ideo quod propositio praedicta est intelligenda in generatione substantiali ;
quando aliquod individuum secundum omnem formam suam substantialem
generatur, tunc naturaliter oportet formam aliquam substantialem corrumpi.
Similiter, in generatione accidentali , est vera quando unum contrariorum
inducitur per abiectione (m) alterius contrarii. Sed in augmentatione non
est vera quia tunc semper manet praecedens . ”
207 Sent., I, dist . , 17, qu . 6, a.
the more it is separated from " heat ;" "white" is intensified owing to
its being further freed from admixture with "black," and so on. This
theory, then, offers a negative reply to Ockham's question , for its
adherents do not concede the addition of any new parts to the previously
existent charity, but feel that its augmentation derives only from the
fact it is now more separate from its contrary.208
Ockham rejects this theory on two counts : in the first place, he
demonstrates , there exist qualities which undergo an intensification ,
or a lessening of intensity, which do not have contraries.209 In itself,
merely listing such examples would suffice to render this theory
vacuous, but Ockham points out further, that
it follows from this theory (opinio) that no form is augmented but that the
contrary form is ( also) augmented . . . Since I want heat to be augmented ,
then, according to this theory, the augmented heat is itself less mixed with
cold ; therefore cold is less mixed with heat; therefore the cold is augmented .
If it is nothing other for a form to be augmented than that it is less mixed
with its contrary, therefore, it follows from first to last that : “ heat is aug-
mented, therefore cold is augmented . "' 210
The next theory which Ockham examines, also answers his question
in the negative. Charity, the proponents of this theory feel, is augmented
as a result of the deeper participation of its subject (secundum participa-
tionem subiecti) in the form. Thus, just to the degree in which a subject
participates in a certain indivisible qualitative form , to just that degree
does it possess the quality. Should it be augmented, it is obviously
participating more in the quality; while should a lessening of intensity
occur, the subject has withdrawn a degree or so from participation.211
208 Sent. , I , dist . 17 , qu . 6, b : "Ad istam quaestio(nem) est una opinio

quod quaelibet forma quando augmentatur non unitur alicui de novo
realiter differenti, sed depuratur et separatur a suo contrario magis quam
prius ; et hoc est eam intendi vel augmentari . " See also, Sent. , III , 6, b.
Among those of the scholastics who supported this theory was Albertus
Magnus . See A. Maier, op. cit. , p . 19 .
209 Sent., I, dist. 17 , qu . 6, c : "Contra : aliquid suscepit magis et minus
quod non habet contrarium. Patet de lumine ergo ; minus permisceri cum
suo contrario non est ipsum intendi . Et hoc idem patet, quia per actu (m)
sciendi et per actum veritatis generatur et augmentatur habitus intellec-
tualis et virtuosus, et tamen nihil est ibi contrarium, quia quaero a quo
causaretur : non ab actu sciendi nec ab actu virtutis, manifestum est, nec
ab actu erroris, nec ab actu vici (os)o quia nullus est ibi . . ."
210 Ibid. See also Sent. , III , 6, c.
211 Ibid., I , dist . 17 , qu . 6, d : "... dicunt quod charitas non augmentatur
per additionem . Primum declarant sic : si augmentum et diminutio in formis
quae intenduntur et remittuntur accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius formae
secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione subiecti , et sic non
fit augmentatio per additionem formae ad formam, quia si esset talis additio
hoc non potest esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars subiecti recipit formam quam prius
non habeba(t) , vel quia aliud aliquid subiectum additur participans eandem
Ockham rejects this theory as inadequate, and points out in his

rejection, that charity, as every other qualitative form, is augmented
via formal addition. "In order," he writes ,
that a thing is said to be " more such" some variation either of the parts
of a subject, or the parts of its form is requisite . If it is said that this
variation is owing to the fact that a subject participates at first less , and
then more, in a form -— against : it is impossible to pass from a contradictory
to a contradictory without local motion, or the production or destruction
of something ; but in the (proposed explanation) everything remains the
same in situation and place ; therefore, it is proper that either something is
destroyed or produced and it is certain that nothing is destroyed except
it be posited that something is produced therefore , something is produced
here, and (it is not produced) in a subject's parts, hence in the parts of a
212
form.21
The next theory which Ockham turns to evaluate, agrees that the
augmentation of charity does involve formal addition. This addition is,
however, seen to be of a singular character ; for the strength of any
individual qualitative grade is contained, so this view goes, in that of the
following, more intense, grade. Each quality, this theory contends,
which can be thought of as undergoing a waxing and waning of intensity,
contains essentially, in a potential state, all the grades of intension
which it can exhibit. The intensive grade of any quality is thus seen to
be a function of the amount of actualized degrees, each of which con-
tains in itself the intensive strength of the previous, less intense , degree.213
formam et partem, quod neutrum potest dici . " See also, Sent. , III , 6, b.
Among the scholastics who supported this view were St. Thomas Aquinas,
Aegidius Romanus and Richard of Middleton. See A. Maier, op. cit.
212 Sent., I, dist. 17, qu . 6, f . See also Sent. , III , 6, c.
213 Sent. , I , dist . 17 , qu . 6 , g : "Alia est opinio quod forma non suscipit
magis et minus propter esse suum in subiecto , sed est gradualiter unum , quod
cum magis et minus suscipit per crementum et decrementum , illud fit per
partium appositionem vel subtractionem, secundum quas illud, scilicet
quod dicitur aliquid magis vel minus, dicitur in se magis vel minus, ita
quod qua(e) libet forma secundum quam aliquid dicitur magis vel minus ,
in sua natura habet partes vel paucas vel multas. Secundum quas potest
diversimode in diversis gradibus sistere inter terminos, et dicitur in se,
secundum illas partes magna vel parva, et subiectum maius vel minus.
Aliter enim secundum nullam formam diceretur aliquid magis vel minus
omnino. Et considerande sunt iste partes in formis simplicibus secundum
quantitatem spiritualis virtutis in perfectione secundum naturam rei in se,
et in vigore eius ex comparatione ad opus proprium , et hoc, per similitudinem,
ad quantitatem mobilis acceptam secundum rationem continui vel discreti .
Et quemadmodum ibi quod maius est , mobile continet quod minus est
pluries vel semel et aliquam eius partem ... Consimiliter, maius in virtute
continet in se minus secundum partes perfectionis. Et quemadmodum in
longitudine extensa corporaliter sunt infiniti gradus in potentia signandi
ratione quorum est motus localis, sic in calid (it)ate extensa virtualiter inter
summum et primum sunt infiniti gradus in potentia signandi . " See also
Sent., III, 6, b, c.
There is involved in this theoretical explanation of qualitative

augmentation, Ockham feels , a fundamental contradiction which renders
it invalid. Since its proponents are positing augmentation to occur as
a result of the addition of formal part to part, these parts must be
severally distinct ; and yet their insistence that each subsequent degree
contains the intensive strength of the preceding degree, makes each
degree, in itself, indistinguishable from the next. In any real addition ,
Ockham points out, each unit part which is being added is clearly de-
marcated from the part to which it is added, and the theory under
examination provides an unsatisfactory explanation of augmentation
since it has failed to observe this distinction.214
Ockham concludes his discussion of the question indicating that it
is only proper to explain the augmentation of any form, by positing the
addition of a new formal part to the previously existent part , so that the
new becomes one, per se, with the old.215 Ockham writes :
I say therefore, that just as in any quantitative augmentation ... nothing
is augmented except by the advent of something real and distinct from the
prior, which remains with it so it is in the augmentation of a quality :
because, since it is not possible to explain (such augmentation) by means
of local motion . .. it is proper that something really new is added to the
prior. 216
Having established that at any stage of a qualitative augmentation
the degree of intensity contains the composite of all pre-existent degrees ,
and that in such augmentation a real, new, and distinct increment is
added to the previously existent quality making one, per se, with it,
Ockham turns to examine the fifth and final theory of qualitative
augmentation - a theory which capitalizes on a supposed flaw in his
own conception of augmentation.
To explain qualitative augmentation as occurring through formal
addition, argue those who posit this final theory, presupposes the
214 Sent., dist. 17, qu . 6, i .: " Ista opinio videtur includere contradictio-
nem in hoc, quod ponit quod qua(e) libet talis forma augmentatur per
acquisitionem partis, et tamen quod partes non realiter distinguantur.
Quia impossibile est aliquid succedere alteri quod est idem realiter cum
illo. Sed part(i) una pars succedit alteri, ergo ista pars non est realiter illa,
et utraque illarum partium est ; ergo, realiter distinguitur haec pars ab illa. '
215 Sent., I , dist, qu . 6, k : " Ideo dico aliter ad quaestionem quod aug-
mentatione cuiuslibet formae vere aliquid reale differens realiter a priori
addatur quod etiam postquam additur realiter distinguitur ab eodem et
facit per se unum cum eo. "
216 Ibid. Among those of the scholastics who felt that intensive and
remissive were contained in the qualitative essence, was Henry of Ghent
(See A. Maier, op. cit. , p . 31 ) . Hervaeus Natalis , according to Dr. Maier,
(p. 33) , felt that each subsequent degree contains the strength of the prior
within it.
distinct, distinguishable character of each part entering into the union ;

and yet, were the parts to be added so that they made one per se, even
a superhuman intellect would not be able to distinguish any individual
parts. A more adequate explanation, these men feel, consists in positing
the pre-existent and newly-added parts of augmented charity as being
a "togetherness-of-charity " (concharitas) -— as being, so to say, charity
through reduction only. For its parts, in truth , are not distinct entities
stemming from a single specific ground, but are rather totally imprecise
increments, indistinguishable among themselves.217
The very fact that one can even speak of a qualitative augmentation,
Ockham points out in rebuttal, indicates that the parts involved are
specifically the same. For if heat , say, were added to black, there would
certainly be no augmentation of either heat or black. Only when heat
is added to heat, or black to black, can we properly expect an augmenta-
tion of these qualities. Hence, the parts involved in qualitative augmen-
tation must be of the same species, and whatever can be predicated of
any one part can be predicated of any other part. If one can say of the
pre-existent grade that "this is charity," one can therefore say, with
equal rectitude, of any added part, that "this is also charity." Any
qualitative degree, then , entering into a unified composite with a previous
grade, is, in itself, distinguishable from the prior grade. Ockham writes :
whatever is predicated per se of something, as if of an individual per se,
should that individual persist and not be destroyed, it will always be true
to predicate the same thing of it before and after an augmentation.218 This
217 This was the theory original with Petrus Aureoli, and Ockham's
presentation of it seems , indeed, to be a paraphrase of Aureoli's own presen-
tation. Aureoli writes : " Realitas illa, secundum quam minor charitas
perficitur et intenditur, non potest esse integra charitas et praecisa distincte,
participans realitatem ac rationem specificam, quasi unum individuum
charitatis, sed participat realitatem et rationem charitatis per quandam
reductionem ut quasi potest dici ' concharitas' ." This portion from Aureoli's
Commentary on the Sentences (I, dist. 17, part 3 ) is from the Rome, 1596
edition, and is reprinted in A. Maier's Zwei Grundprobleme ... op. cit.,
pp. 55-56. Ockham, (Sent. , I , dist. 17, qu. 7, b) , writes : "Circa istam
quaestionem est opinio quod charitas et qua (e) libet forma augmentatur
per aliquam realitatem realiter distinctam prima realitate et cum ipsa
faciente per se unum . Sed dicitur quod realitas illa secundum quam minor
charitas perficitur et intenditur non est integra charitas et praecisa distincte,
participans realitatem et rationem charitas, sed per quandam reductionem ,
ut quasi possit dici ' concharitas ' est enim realitas omnino impraecisibilis
tam re quam intellectu . Unde, non est factibilis per se etiam per divina(m )
potentiam, sic quod capiat esse praecisum et determinatum, nec est intuitive
intelligibilis, sed communicabilis in duas charitates, sed semper charitas
aucta occurrit sibi ut unum cui additum est, aliquid charitatis, non charitas.
Et per eundem modum est intelligendum de albedine et calore et omni
forma quae augetur."
218 It is of importance to note that for Ockham, as indeed for most of
the scholastics of his time, any proposition which is once verified by a fact
7 Ockham : Motion
is true : " a is charity, " taking " a" to signify the whole of the preceding
charity, therefore " a" remains and is not destroyed . This will always be
true : "a is charity." But after augmentation "a" does remain and is not
destroyed ; therefore , this is true : "a is charity ; " therefore it is true to say
of a part of charity that it itself is charity, because "a" is then a part. But
there is no better reason for one part of charity to be charity, than for any
other; therefore any part of charity is truly and really charity. If it is said
that it is not "whole charity" (charitas integra) , this is not valid , because
"whole charity" means "charity which is not a part of another. " Thus, it is
manifest that it is not "whole" charity, and in the same way it must be
conceded that a part of water is not "whole" water, because a part of water
is a part. Hence, my theory does not contain a contradiction ; because the
added charity is truly a part of charity. Similarly, it would follow (from
Aureoli's theory), that a part of quantity distinct in location and situation
from another part, would not be quantity which is manifestly false and
self-negating.219
Having himself pointed to a certain similarity between qualitative and

quantitative augmentation , Ockham qualifies his comparison :
I say that there is a similarity and dissimilarity in the augmentation of
quality and of quantity, they are dissimilar in this : that in the augmentation
of a quality, there is something new, as regards itself as a whole, making
one per se with the first, while this is not the case in the augmentation of
quantity,220
Ockham's theory of qualitative augmentation then , holds fast , as
against the five other theories which he has examined , to these principles :
or state of things, has a corresponding proposition in the same terms about

the past which is necessarily true. Thus, if the contingent proposition " Sortes
is sitting", is true once. then it will always be true thereafter that "Sortes
sat" . Hence, it is impossible that a once-verified proposition can ever be-
come false. This position is plainly in opposition of that of Peter Damiani
who held that God can bring about that state in which a fact of the past
never has been a fact . Ockham ( Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescien-
tia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure,
N. Y., 1945 ) , Qu . 1 , tertia suppositio, M, ) writes : " Quod aliquae sunt
propositiones de praesenti secundum vocem et secundum rem, et in talibus
est universaliter verum, quod omnis propositio de praesenti vera habet
aliquam de praeterito necessariam , sicut tales : Sortes sedet, Sortes ambulat,
Sortes est iustus, et huiusmodi . Aliquae sunt propositiones de praesenti tan-
tum secundum vocem et sunt aequivalenter de futuro, quia earum veritas
dependet ex veritate propositionum de futuro ; et in talibus non est ista
regula vera, quod omnis propositio vera de praesenti habet aliquam de
praeterito necessariam. Et hoc non est mirabile, quia sunt propositiones
verae de praeterito et de futuro, quae nullam habent veram de praesenti ,
sicut istae: album fuit nigrum, album erit nigrum, quae sunt verae, et sua
de praesenti est falsa, scilicet ista : album est nigrum. " For the importance
of this distinction in reconciling God's foreknowledge with human free-will,
see Boehner's lucid editorial comments to this edition of Ockham's Trac-
tatus de Praedestinatione . . op. cit. , pp. 43-88.
219 Sent., I , dist . 17 , qu . 7 , c. See also Sent. , III , 6, e.
220 Sent. , I, dist. 17, qu . 7, m.
Chapter Four. Concerning Time 91
qualitative augmentation comes about through the formal addition of

new, real and distinct, specifically similar qualitative parts, which join
to form a unity of determinate intensity with the pre-existent parts.221
Ockham's exposition of motion is not yet complete. It has, however,

reached the point where it can no longer be fruitfully discussed without
introducing the concepts of time and position . And since Ockham , as
Aristotle, feels that "time is motion, or something belonging to motion,"
we will, accordingly, turn next to Ockham's treatment of time.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCERNING TIME
I.
Arguments Against Hypostatization of Time
Prior to attempting a direct explication of what he considers to be

the true nature of time, Ockham proposes to see what time is not ; 222 and
his strenuous negative statement is of great interest for it yields a positive
statement of what the absolute theorists conceived time to be.
"Concerning an instant, " Ockham writes at the commencement of
his oblique approach to time,
it is the opinion of many that an instant is a certain flowing thing (res

fluens) which is steadily destroyed , or lost, so that it does not remain .
221 Those who went on to develop the independent study of kinematics

felt, with Ockham , that “. . . an intensible and remissible quality is composed
of the qualities of the same species, coexisting together, which are the parts
generated in the motion of alteration ; and each of them remains at the end ;
and all of them thus coextended form the degree ..." They disagreed,
however, fundamentally with Ockham's view, in that they held to a com-
pletely alien notion of the mode in which quantity is augmented. Qualities,
they held, are intended ... " just as the quantitative parts make up the
quantity;" i. e., that quantity is augmented by the addition of quantitative
part to part. This is the theory of John Dumbleton, one of Thomas Brad-
wardine's "Mertonians " , as it appears in his Summa Logicae et philosophiae
naturalis. Unfortunately, there are no printed editions of this work, and I
used Professor Moody's transcription of chapters 16-23 . This transcription
can be found in the Columbia University libraries.
222 Phil. Nat., IV, 1 : " Quoniam secundum Philosophum tempus est
motus, vel aliquid ipsius motus, ideo post considerationem de motu videndum
est de tempore. Ideo videndum est quid sit tempus, et quorum est tempus,
et quomodo se habet cum aliis quae sunt ad temporis cognitionem . Antequam
videatur quid sit tempus, videndum est quid non est instans, et quid non est
tempus."
Whence, they posit that there is continuously another and another instant,
and that it is itself a certain thing which cannot possibly remain through
time. Indeed, they say it is distinguished from all permanent things.223
It follows, however, as a result of positing time's moments to be thus

atomic, that serious theoretical incapacities are involved . First , Ockham
points out that an infinite number of these discrete, distinct moments
would be present in any given time-passage . Since, that is, the continuous
character of any time-period allows for its division into an infinite
number of arbitrarily small moments, and since each of these moments
is posited, by the theory under examination , to be a simple, independently
existent, separable unit, there follows the impossible consequence that
any finite time-sequence consists in an infinite number of distinct
moments.224
Secondly, since there has been no contrary introduced, and since the
original cause is still active-nor can the subject of these absolute
moments be said to have been destroyed how can one explain the
inexorable passage out of being of absolute moment after moment ? In
other words : how are these moments destroyed ? 225
Thirdly, as an absolute existent , the absolute moment must be either
a substance or a quality. Being neither matter, nor form, nor a composite
of these, it is obviously not a substance . No more, however, can the position
that it is a quality be defended ; for the patron of any such accident
is either divisible, or indivisible, and its patron cannot be held to be
divisible, for all the accidents of a divisible subject are similarly divisible,
and the absolute theorists have already postulated the atomic , discrete,
223 Ibid. In Tractatus . , P. 102 , Ockham writes : "Videntur enim procedere,

ac si nunc sive instans esset aliqua una res distincta realiter secundum se
totam a tempore quasi medians inter duas partes temporis distinctas realiter
secundum se totas, ita quod tanta esset distinctio realis inter instans et
tempus et partes temporis, quanta est modo suo inter ligamen et duo ligata "
per ipsum, quod est omnino falsum et contra intentionem Philosophi.'
224 Phil. Nat., IV, 1 : “... si instans sit talis res (i. e. , an atomic entity) ,
sequeretur quod in quolibet tempore essent infinitae res secundum se totas
distincte et non facientes unum per se ; probatur, quia quodlibet instans
esset secundum se totum distinctum a quolibet alio, et non faciunt per se
unum , et etiam infinita instantia sunt in quolibet tempore, consequens
est falsum et impossibile, ergo, etc. " See also, Tractatus., p. 120 : "Tum quia
in tempore finito essent res infinitae secundum se totas distinctae per-
transitae ;" and Logic. , ch. 59, p. 171 .
225 Phil. Nat. , IV, 1 : “... si instans sit talis res statim desinens esse, vel
ergo desinit esse ad introductionem sui contrarii , vel subtractionem suae
causae, vel ad corruptionem sui subiecti , sed nullum istorum potest dari,
sicut inductive patet. " See also, Tractatus., p. 120 : "Tum quia non posset
dari, quomodo talis res possit corrumpi , quia nec per corruptionem sui
subiecti nec per inductionem contrarii nec per subtractionem causae con-
servantis vel per eius absentiam, sicut patet inductive ; ” and Altaris. , p . 51 .
and indivisible character of a moment of time. If, however, they are

to grasp at the alternative, and hold that the subject is not divisible,
their case is again hopeless, for Ockham relentlessly points out that
this indivisible subject must be either a substance or an accident ; and
since it cannot be a substance - being neither corporeal nor incorporeal -
it must be an accident . Ockham then , would raise the question concerning
the nature of this accident's subject, and so on "into infinity."226
Finally, Ockham invokes the principle of economy. Since every
physical situation involving the passage of time can be "save" without
positing the existence of such an entity as an absolute moment of time —
what conceivable service does the postulation of such an entity perform ?
Everything which can be explained (possunt salvari) through such a

thing (i . e., the absolute moment) , can be explained through this : that the
heavens, according to their parts, are in such a position. If, indeed , the
primum mobile is locally moved without the acquisition of any other thing,
everything can be explained (through this) , just as through the positing
of that thing. 22
Having demonstrated the vulnerability of the hypostatized moment,

Ockham extends the range of his dialectical examination to the notion
of an hypostatized time : time conceived of as an equably flowing entity
streaming from the dim past to the unknown future in absolute divorce
from permanent objects.228
226 Tractatus., p. 120 : " Et quod instans non sit talis res raptim transiens
secundum se totam distincta ab omni re permanente, sicut moderni ponunt,
ostendo breviter sic : tum quia aut est substantia aut accidens ; non sub-
stantia, quia nec materia nec forma nec compositum. Nec accidens, quia
quaero de subiecto eius primo : aut est divisibile aut indivisibile . Non primum,
quia quando subiectum primum est divisibile, ipsum accidens existens in eo
est divisibile. Si detur secundum, scilicet quod subiectum primum est in-
divisibile, tunc quaero de isto subiecto : aut est substantia aut accidens ;
non primum, quia nec substantia corporea nec incorporea, sicut patet
inductive ; nec accidens, quia quaerendum est de subiecto eius primo, et sic
in infinitum ." The same argument can be found in Phil. Nat. , IV, 1 , with
this deviation : " tum quia esset subiectum instantis divisibile, cum non
possit esse nisi in mobili , et cum non est maior ratio quare sit in una parte
mobilis quam in alia, erit in qualibet parte mobilis, et ponitur a nonnullis
tota esse in toto corpore et in qualibet parte, vel erunt diversa instantia
in diversis partibus, quorum utrumque est impossibile. Non est ergo accidens
indivisibile secundum extensionem, nec est accidens divisibile secundum
quod sit extensum ad extensionem subiecti , quia tunc esset longum, latum,
et profundum, quod videtur absurdum . "
227 Phil. Nat. , IV, I.
228 Phil. Nat. , IV, 2 : " Per aliquas rationes priores potest probari quod
tempus non est alia res secundum se totam distincta ab omni re permanente. "
In Tractatus., p. 96, Ockham writes : ". . . tempus non est aliqua res distincta
secundum se totam ab omni re permanente et ab omnibus rebus permanen-
tibus. " As the sequel will show, Ockham is combatting the theory of time
as a forma fluens.
Since there is no better ground for assuming time to be a distinct

substance than there was for the assumption that an absolute moment
was a separable substance, time, Ockham indicates, must, in the ab-
solute scheme, be an accident . It must be, further, a divisible accident,
since it is posited by the absolute theorists to be in a temporal body,
just as any other quality imbues its patron, and the divisibility of such
a patron subject is sufficient guarantee for the divisibility of all of its
accidents. Being, therefore, a divisible accident, time must have simul-
taneously existent parts to account for its extended and divisible
character but Aristotle expressly denied the simultaneity of the parts
of time. If, on the other hand, the absolute theorists wish to evade this
head-on clash with Aristotelian authority by insisting that time's
extended character is owing to successive addition of temporal part
to temporal part, rather than to their simultaneous existence, they are
still shown, by Ockham, to be at odds with authority, since the temporal
subject which time is posited to be in is extended by means of simultane-
ously existent, extended, parts, hence time - a quality investing this
subject - must be conceded to consist in simultaneously existent
parts.229
Still pursuing the absolutists ' notion that subjects are in time owing
to the inherence in them of some portion of time absolute , Ockham once
again shows this theory to be directly opposed to the Philosopher's
view. Since time invests the whole of the heavens, it must, conceived
as an accident, be in any part. It cannot be held to be a whole in any
one part of the heavens ; hence, one part of time must be in one part of
the heavens, and another in another. Time, then, is shown once more to
be extended owing to simultaneously existent parts, for its subject, the
230
heavens, consists in simultaneously existent parts.2
229 Phil. Nat. , IV, 2 : " Primo : quia cum tempus non possit esse substantia
talis oportebit quod sit accidens. Sed non est accidens indivisibile, cum sit
in corpore subiective, ergo est divisibile, et per consequens extensum habens
partes simul existentes, quod est contra Philosophum qui dicit quod partes
temporis non sunt simul. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10). Si dicas quod
tempus est extensum non secundum partes simul existentes, sed sibi invicem
succedentes, hoc non valet, quia subiectum temporis est extensum secundum
partes simul existentes, ergo , etc." See also Sent., II , 12 , vv ; and cf. Aristotle,
Physics, IV, 10.
230 Phil. Nat., IV, 2 : "Praeterea, tempus est in toto caelo, vel ergo est
in qualibet parte caeli , vel in nulla ; non in nulla, quia tunc non esset in toto :
quod enim, nec secundum se, nec secundum aliquam suam partem est in
aliquo, non est in toto, ergo tempus est in qualibet parte caeli ; sed non est
totum in aliqua parte caeli, quia nullum accidens tale est in caelo, igitur
una pars temporis est in una parte caeli , et alia pars in alia, et ita tempus
est extensum secundum partes simul existentes, et erunt plura tempora
simul, quia quaelibet pars temporis est tempus. " See also, Altaris. , p. 19 .
"Further, " Ockham continues, concluding this rejection of time

conceived of as an absolute existent :
quantity, body, surface, line and place are not distinct really from substance
and quality ; because every body and surface and line and place is a substance
or a quality ... therefore, for the same reason, time is not really distinct
from a substance or a quality ; but no substance or quality is a thing distinct
from permanent things, therefore, etc. Further, it has been shown that
motion is not a thing distinct from permanent things ; therefore, and for
the same reasons, neither is time. And again, everything can be explained
without such an absolute thing, as will become obvious as we proceed.231
2.
Time According to Ockham
Time, as the measure whereby we determine the duration of motion,

of rest, and of those physical objects subject to generation and corruption
is, according to Ockham, not only completely knowable, but is , indeed,
actually known more intimately and with greater certitude than the
physical events which it measures. That thing, after all, by means of
which the unknown is rendered knowable, must itself be better known
than that which it orders.232
Nor is this intimate knowledge of the true character of time the
exclusive property of some few savants ; for there is no one so ignorant,
Ockham maintains,
as not to know of something through time - — that one of two things either
rests longer, or moves longer, or endures longer, or for an equal span, than
another.233
231 Phil. Nat., IV, 2. See also : Logic., ch. 44, p. 127, ch. 46, p. 134 ;
Tractatus., p. 96-7 ; Sent. , II , qu . 12, a ; Quodl. , VII , qu . 7.
232 Phil. Nat. , IV, 3 : “Ostenso quid non est tempus, dicendum est quid
est tempus ... Sunt autem aliqua praemittenda. Primum est quod tempus
est mensura motuum quorum quantitas est nobis ignota, hoc est, per tempus
certificamur quamdiu aliquid movetur, et quod unum mobile diutius movetur
quam aliud, illud enim dicitur diutius moveri quod in maiori tempore
movetur. Aliud est, quod tempus est mensura rerum temporalium : per
tempus certificamur quod una res permanens diutius durat quam alia.
Aliud est, quod sicut per tempus mensuratur motus, et res temporalis, ita
etiam tempus est mensura quietis, quia per tempus certificamur quae res
diutius quiescat et quae minus, et quae aequaliter quiescit cum alia. Et ista
sunt principalia, vel praecipua propter quae ponitur tempus, et propter
quae cognitio temporis est nobis necessaria. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 12).
Ex quibus sequitur quod cum quantitas mensurae debeat esse nobis notior
quam quantitatis mensurati, quia propter quantitatem mensurae certifi-
camur de qualitate mensuratorum, quod natura temporis quantum ad suam
quantitatem sit notior nobis, quam quantitate motuum mensuratorum ;
ex quibus sequitur quod tempus non est res latens incognoscibilis, sicut
aliqui dicunt, immo est nobis notum ..." See also, Sent. , II , qu . 11 , a.
233 Phil. Nat., IV, 3. Ockham adds : " (dicendum est) autem tempus
valde ignotum propter multas difficultates emergentes tractantibus de
m n
In practice, however, Ockham notes, there are two modes by which

-
unknown quantities are ordered and rendered known — and , indeed,
two distinct varieties of measure. The first mode consists in referring
the unknown quantity directly to some determined standard of measure ;
while the second mode consists in a haphazard estimate of the unknown
quantity, which approximation in itself presupposes prior acquaintance
with the first mode of measurement. Although this latter mode is in
common employ, it is obviously less precise than the former ; hence, it
is the first, more exact, mode of measurement which is of scientific value .
When the first mode is employed to determine the quantity of any
permanent, extended object - any object, that is, which has all of its
parts at once - the first of two varieties of measure is being employed :
the " measure of permanent things" (mensura permanentium) . In this
case the standard to which the unknown quantity is referred is some
conventionally determined scalar quantity. When, however, the first
mode is applied to the measure of successive quantities — quantities
which do not have all their parts at once then the second variety of
measure : the "measure of successive things" (mensura successivorum) ,
is being employed . This consists in referring the quantity to be measured
to the standard of a constant and uniform motion , rather than a static ,
predetermined, linear scale.234 Ockham writes :
natura ipsius ex auctoritatibus auctorum male intellectis, propter quod

tales philosophantes non intelligentes modos loquendi , et auctoritates
philosophorum magis dubitant de tempore, quam alii simplices utentes
solum modo secundum usum vocis, sicut plus dubitant de motu qui tamen
ad sensum apparet, et per sensum apparet, et per sensum notificatur. "
234 Phil. Nat. , IV, 3 : " Oportet autem scire quod quando quantitas
alicuius rei ignotae debet certificari et notari, quandoque notificatur per
applicationem quantitas mensurae notae ad rem cuius quantitas ignoratur,
semel, vel pluries sicut per applicationem ulnae, cuius quantitas nota est
semel, vel pluries ad pannum applicatur, et tunc notificatur de quantitate
panuum, quandoque autem aliquis habens magnam experientiam de tali
mensuratione potest per solum aspectum rei certificari quanta res est,
utrum, scilicet sit tricubita vel bicubita, quamvis talis certificatio non sit
ita nota et certa sicut prior. Et isto duplici modo proportionabiliter quando
ignoratur de duabus rebus, quae ipsarum est maior vel minor vel an sint
aequales quarum non potest una alteri applicari, certificatur quaeque earum
sit maior vel minor, scilicet per applicationem eiusdem ad utramque earum,
vel solum per aspectum illarum quamvis secunda noticia sit incertior quam
prima. Et sicut est duplex talis notificatio in permanentibus, ita in succes-
sivis. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 12) ... duplex est mensura . Quandoque
enim aliquid dicitur mensura alicuius, quando una re notum est quanta
ipsa est, scilicet, quando notum est quod ipsa est pedalis, vel bipedalis et de
alio ignoratur quanta est, quia nescitur an fit pedalis vel semipedalis, sed
cum re priore scitur postea quanta est illa prius ignota, et ista potest vocari
mensura permanentium. Alia dicitur esse mensura quando de aliqua re ,
sive sit notum quanta ipsa sit, sive ignotum , scitur tamen quod movetur
uniformiter, scilicet aequaliter per quod de alio, sive sit notum quantum est,
sive nesciatur quantum est, potest certificar(i) quamdiu est, vel diu movetur,
when someone does not know for how long something is moved, he can be
rendered certain through some motion known to him ; for by considering
and applying the motion of the sun (which is) known to him, to that other
motion, and noting that that other mobile is moved from such a point to
such a point, he knows for how long it was moved.235
What Ockham is driving at, then, when he defines time as
the measure of all things whose duration can be certified by the intellect
236
by means of something else better known to it,23
is that time is a certain non-spatial dimension of motion.
It is the ordered, progressive, natural sequence of motion , Ockham
contends, which allows us to cognize, and employ as a measure, its
temporal dimension . The clearly demarcated character of some one
mobile's present physical constitution , or situation, as contrasted with
still another such achieved condition or location, validates the temporal
designations "prior, " and "posterior. " From here it is but a short step
to supplying numerical values to the continuous sequential passage from
the prior to the posterior stage or situation ; and time is precisely this
numerical statement of motions' uniform aspect. Ockham, then, ex-
presses himself as being in perfect accord with Aristotle's definition
of time as " the number of motion with respect to prior and posterior." 237
It is not, Ockham continues, that we stand in time and number
motion by correlating the prior, and posterior, and all intermediates, with
this, and this, passing moment - — quite the contrary : time is gleaned
from the physically prior and posterior, and is the numerical expression of
this ordered aspect of the moved. Time is not number by which we number
(quo numeramus); but is, rather, the numbered number (numerus numera-
tus), which is itself a part of the numbered thing (pars rei numeratae) .238
vel quiescit, et ista potest vocari mensura successivorum . Et secundum

hoc cum scitur qualiter res permanens movetur, scitur de alio quamdiu
permanet, sive etiam durat, movetur, vel quiescit . " See also , Sent. , II ,
qu . 11, b.
235 Phil . Nat . , IV, 3. 236 Ibid .
237 Phil. Nat., IV, 4 : " Praedictis concordat ratio Philosophi 4 huius ...
sive diffinitio quae talis est : Tempus est numerus motus secundum prius
et posterius. Tunc enim certificamur per tempus de aliis motibus istorum
inferiorum quando est ordo inter priùs et posterius in motu uniformiter ;
hoc est, quando consideramus motum quod uniformiter est in tali loco,
et posterius in alio, per hoc scimus quamdiu movetur illud quod ignoramus.
Unde nisi cognosceremus quod mobile uniformiter prius est in tali loco,
et postea in alio, numquam possemus cognoscere, nec per ipsum iudicare
quamdiu aliquid movetur, quiescit, vel durat. Ex quo patet quod hoc
possumus scire per hoc solum, quod consideramus et numeramus prius
et posterius in motu . " See also, Tractatus. , p . 107 ; and cf. Aristotle, Physics,
IV, 11.
238 Phil. Nat. , IV, 4 : " Quoniam autem numerus est duplex, et namque
quod numeramus, et numerabile numerum dicimus, et quo numeramus ;
ham ion e ce
3.
Time and Motion
Ockham's position with respect to the nature of time has, up to this

point, assumed the existence in nature of a precise normative motion,
whose very uniformity validates the numerically mensurable approach
to questions involving temporal duration. He himself, however, con-
cludes that the character of the most obvious frame of reference - the
diurnal passage of the sun is not itself of such nature as to yield ab-
solute certainty in such matters : for the motion of the sun is only granted
the status of normative standard owing to the relatively difform character
of more mundane motions.239
Nevertheless, the motion of the sun, for all practical purposes, does
provide, if not absolute certainty as a standard of reference , a standard
which is sufficiently accurate for our temporal determinations ; as,
indeed, Ockham points out, it is eminently more reasonable to measure
the less uniform, by the more uniform, than to attempt to gauge the
more uniform by referring it to the difform.240
Ultimately, even the relatively uniform motion of the sun, which
provides a pragmatically adequate norm for our earthly temporal
mensuration, receives the degree of uniformity which the intellect must
accord it, through fundamental reference to the first agency of motion
(primum mobile) - i. e . , the sphere of the fixed stars whose motion
alone is the perfect , uniform, and constant motion which is normative
quidem tempus autem est quod numeratur, et non quod tempus est numerus
numeratus, quia est pars rei numeratae . " Ockham continues : "Frustra
ergo ponitur aliud a motu, et prius ostensum est quod motus non est alia
res a rebus permanentibus , ergo nec tempus est aliquod accidens inhaerens
moto, vel motui ." See also, Tractatus. , pp. 110-111 ; and cf. Aristotle,
Physics, IV, 11 .
239 Phil. Nat., IV, 6 : "... tempus est motus sub isto intellectu : quod
per hoc, quod aliquid movetur uniformiter, potest aliquis certificari de
diuturnitate rei. Non tamen est universaliter verum quod omne per quod
sic cognoscitur, scilicet quantum est, est tempus illius motus, cum ista res,
scilicet tempus non potest competere cuiuscumque motui. Quia quamvis
per motum inferiorem difformem mensuremus motum uniformem; quia
quando quis cognoscit horam diei per motum suum et exercitium, et cognoscit
in quo situ in caelo est sol, et etiam per motum talem mensuramus alios
motus, tamen hoc non potest fieri per certitudinem, nec competit ex natura
rei, sed magis propter defectum aliquem, ideo non cuiuslibet motus est
tempus, sicut non quilibet pannus est ulna, quamvis per pannum possit
certificari de aliquo quod sit ulna."
240 Ibid .: ... Aliquis enim sciens quo(d) ulnarum est pannus, per illum
pannum, potest certificari de aliquo ligno ... quod est ulna ; et tamen ille
pannus non est ulna, quia de natura sua habet magis quod debet mensurari
quam mensurare, et ita est de motu uniformi respectu motuum difformium,
quia potius debet mensurare difformia, quam mensurari ab eis."
for the entire universe . True time, then, must be affirmed to be a passion
(passio) of this prime agency of motion.241
"Time," Ockham writes,
is a passion of the first motion just as mensurability is a passion of an ell ,
and risibility of a man. Just as, notwithstanding that a man is truly risible,
and yet we say that risibility is a passion of man, so we can say that first
motion is time, and yet time is a passion of first motion, because such
propositions which appear to be repugnant are verified through diverse
suppositions of terms . Just as in this : " man is risible, " the terms stand in
personal and significative supposition ; but in this : " risibility is a passion of
man, " this term “man” is used in simple, or material supposition . . . Simi-
larly, here : "first motion is time, ” the terms are used in personal and signif-
icative supposition, because through this nothing more is denoted except
that the prime mobile is uniformly and swiftly moved, through which
(motion) the intellect can ascertain of other things how long they endure,
move or rest. In this, however : "time is a passion of the first motion, " the
terms are used in simple or material (supposition) ; for it denotes that time
is predicated ... of motion ... just as measure is predicated of an ell.242
"It is obvious," Ockham concludes,
from what has been said, that time is not something other than the prime
motion, because through the prime motion . . . we know for how long temporal
things endure, move, or rest. And still "time, " and " prime motion, " differ
in definition, since " time" imports a soul which is certified, and other things
of which it is certified ; and so it does not import other than permanent things,
although it may import that some of these permanent things are moved.243
241 Phil. Nat., IV, 7 : "Patet ex iam dictis cui motui compet(i) t esse
tempus, scilicet primo motui primi mobilis, uniformiter et velocissime moti,
quamvis per motum solis possimus metiri motum multarum rerum, tamen
ratio ipsius magis convenit illi motui primo, quia quantum est ex se, magis
natus est certificare de aliis motibus, quam motus soli ; immo, per illum
motum natus est intellectus certificari de motu solis, et aliorum planetarum,
ergo tempus est passio primi motus. " See also, Tractatus ., p. 107 ; and cf.
Aristotle, Physics, IV, 14. Philotheus Boehner, (in his article : "Scotus'
Teachings According to Ockham, " Franciscan Studies, n. s. vol. 6 ( 1946)
p. 101 writes : " Passio is a technical term (for the scholastics) and indicates
that a term is predicated in the second mode of per se predication about
its subject. The first mode of per se predication is given when the predicate
defines the subject ; for instance ' rational' is predicated in the first mode
of per se predication about the subject ' man ;' the second mode of per se
predication is given, when the subject enters the definition of the predicate
as for instance ' risible, ' for its definition would be : man who is able to laugh . "
Ockham (Phil . Nat. IV, 11 ) , writes : “tempus non sequitur motum sicut
res inhaerens sibi, sed dicitur sequi motum quia praedicatur per se secundo
modo de primo motu . " See also, Tractatus. , p. 119 ; Logic. , ch. 37, pp. 96—8.
242 Phil. Nat. , IV, 7. See also, Sent. , II, 12 , c, ss.
243 Phil. Nat., IV, 7. See also, Sent. , II , 12 , c, ss. In Tractatus . , p. 11I,
Ockham is much more direct : "... dico quod tempus primo et principaliter
significat illud quod significat motus, quamvis consignificet tam animam
quam actum animae, quo cognoscit prius et posterius illius motus secundum
modum praeexpositum. Et ideo supponendo dicta de motu, et quod pro-
The true moment of time - as against the absolutists' conception

is seen by Ockham to be a translation into temporal terms of the spatial
changes suffered by the sphere of the fixed stars. As such, the temporal
moment does not differ substantially from the prime motion ; but each
moment is, rather, a predication of the prime mobile, providing the
mode through which its spatial changes, with respect to its parts, are
known and expressed.244
4.
Objections
To hold, as Ockham does, that time is motion, even after his carefully
stated qualifications, is to raise a host of dissenting voices. The first
objection to his view wields the potent weapon of Aristotelian authority ;
for Aristotle, this dissenting opinion points out, holding any part of time
to be time, proved that time could not be circular motion, as it is not the
case that any part of circular motion is, itself, circulation.245
positiones intelligantur, in quibus ponitur hoc nomen motus modo, quo

dictum est, potest dici, quod tempus significat motum in recto et animam
seu actum animae in obliquo ; et propter hoc significat prius et posterius
in motu in recto. Ex quo sequitur, quod tempus non erit numerus quo
numeramus, sed erit numerus numeratus, quia erit prius et posterius in
motu praenumerata ab anima . ”
244 Phil. Nat. , IV, 8 : " Viso quid est tempus, videndum est quid est
instans. Circa quod dico , quod instans non est res statim desinens esse in
rerum natura, sed instans non est aliud ab ipso primo mobili . Unde sicut
mutatum esse, sive mutatio , non est aliqua res statim desinens esse, sicut
prius dictum est, sed importat mobile alicubi existens, ubi prius non erat
immediate ante, ita instans non est nisi primum mobile existens alicubi
secundum suas partes, ubi non erat ante immediate, ut hoc nomen ' instans'
non dicat nisi primum mobile existens in tali loco, ubi prius non erat imme-
diate ante, nec immediate post erit ; ut sicut cum dicimus : ' homo est, ' in
tali locutione , vel : ' hoc nunc est album, ' non importatur plus nisi quod
hoc est album quando primum mobile est alicubi , ubi prius non erat, nec
postea erit ... Et ita res importata per hoc nomen 'instans ' est eadem
semper non variata in sua substantia, et tamen illa res variatur secundum
locum , hoc est, successive est in diversis locis propter quod secundum prius
et posterius successive de eodem , vel diversis, dicitur nunc esse . . . non est
ibi aliqua res quae vere sit corrupta desinens esse, sed ibi est primum mobile,
quod existens alicubi secundum partes desinit esse ibi, et est alibi , eo quod
movetur continue . ” See also, Tractatus . , p . 102 , 121 .
245 Phil. Nat., IV, 9 : “Ad maiorem evidentiam praedictorum ponendae
sunt aliquae obiectiones. Primo enim videtur quod tempus non sit motus,
et hoc propter rationes Philosophi , per quas probat quod tempus non est
motus circularis, sive circulatio ; quia quaelibet pars temporis est tempus,
sed non quaelibet pars circulationis est circulatio, ergo tempus, et circulatio
prima, non sunt idem ; et per consequens circulatio non est tempus, nec e
converso." Since time is not to be identified with circular motion , it is to be
presumed that it cannot be identified with any of the " less perfect" varieties
of motion - i. e., rectilinear, or mixed . See Tractatus . , p. 114 ; and cf.
Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10.
Chapter Four. Concerning Time ΙΟΙ
If there were many heavens, this argument runs, then there must be
admitted to be many prime mobiles ; hence, in terms of Ockham's
equivalence, there is implied an " inconvenience " - i . e. , the possibility
of a plurality of "times."246
Again, motion and mutation were shown by Ockham not to be other
than individual moved and mutated subjects ; hence, his own theory
of motion seems to run counter to his equation of time and motion ; for
time, which he claims to be of a generalized and uniform character
obtaining equally among all moved substances , can not itself be
identified with any one motion or mutation.247
Next, a speculative extrapolation of Ockham's equation of motion
and time purports to demonstrate the inconsistency of his position.
Finally, motions may be fast or slow, but time is the equable,
uniform measure which lends verity to these designations : " fast," and
"slow," and is not, in itself, "fast ," or " slow. " Time, on this account,
obviously cannot be motion. 248
Similarly, Ockham's claim for the substantial unity of the temporal
moment and the prime mobile comes in for its share of criticism. If an
instant were, in actuality, one and the same with the substance of the
prime mobile, Ockham's opponents argue, how can one account for the
fact of time's successive character ? For the fact that one moment follows
on another? And to deny that time is continuous in nature, is to fly
in the face of Aristotle's express views on this subject.249
Again, mutation, it is argued, occurs instantaneously ; but Ockham
has not claimed the substantial unity of mutation and the prime mobile ;
how then can he maintain the substantial unity of an instant and the
prime mobile ? The measure of motion is a unit of time, and not the
substance of the prime mobile ,250
Further, since time, as any continuum , is divisible, and must consist
in more than one terminus ; and since an instant is, in fact , the terminus
246 Phil. Nat., IV, 9 : “ Item , si motus esset tempus, ergo si essent plures
caeli primi, essent plures motus primi , ergo essent plura tempora, quod est
inconveniens. " See also, Tractatus . , p . 114.
247 Phil. Nat., IV, 9 : " Item, motus et mutatio tantum sunt in ipso
mutato vel moto, sed tempus est simul ubique et apud omnes, ergo tempus
non est motus nec mutatio. " See also, Tractatus., p . 114.
248 Phil. Nat., IV, 9 : “ Item , motus est velox vel tardus , sed tempus nec
velox nec tardus, ergo etc., minor patet quia velox et tardum certificantur
tempore et etiam diffiniuntur. " See also Tractatus. , p. 114.
249 Phil. Nat., IV, 9 : “Item, quod instans non sit ipsa substantia mobilis
videtur, quia si esset substantia mobilis, nullo modo esset aliud et aliud
instans, quod est contra Philosophum. " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, VI, 2 .
250 Phil. Nat., IV, 9 : " Item, mutatio est in instanti ; sed mutatio non est
in substantia primi mobilis ; ergo, etc. Item, mutatio mensuratur in instanti,
et non mensuratur substantia primi mobilis ."
of time, time must consist in many instants - but there cannot be many
substances of the prime mobile ; hence, it follows that any instant, and
the substance of the prime mobile, are distinct things.251
Finally, Ockham's adversaries point out, the " now" - the moment
of time -links the past and the future ; and no one could seriously
maintain that this " link" corresponded in any way to any mobile.252
5.
Resolutions
Ockham pauses just long enough before attempting to reply to the

objections which his opponents have proferred, to restate what he holds
to be the real ground upon which their own theory of time is based; the
implicit faith that all distinct names, as " time," have finite signification ;
and that for all such distinct names there obtains in nature a non-
connotative, non-relational, absolute entity.253 Once again, he suggests
for the enlightenment of those deluded by this correspondent view ,
that proper "resolution" of such terms would be beneficial.254
Ockham feels, with regard to the first objection levelled against
his equating of time with motion, that his adversaries are abusing
Aristotle's authority when they seek to direct it against him, insofar
as they seem to have completely missed the point that Aristotle was
striving to make. Aristotle, Ockham insists, was everywhere motivated
by the desire to make clear that the only difference obtaining between
"prime motion," or " prime circulation," and "time," was difference
in definition (and not " difference" in any material sense) ; and these
differ in definition owing to the circumstance that through the term
251 Phil. Nat. , IV, 9 : " Item ... nullius divisibilis est tantum unus
terminus ; sed instans est terminus temporis, et tempus est divisibile ; ergo
sunt illic plura instantia, sed non sunt plures substantiae primi mobilis ;
ergo etc. " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, VI, 2.
252 Ibid.: " Item, nunc terminus temporis, et continuat praeteritum cum
futuro, sed ista non competunt mobili. " See also Sent., II, 12, a.
253 Phil. Nat. , IV, 10 : " Ad solutionem praedictarum rationum notandum
est quod sicut de motu oriuntur multae difficultates, propter modum
loquendi, quia scilicet propter varietatem eloquii frequenter utuntur homines
hoc nomine ' motus' et diutius hoc verbo ' movetur, ' ita est de tempore, quod
propter hoc quod utuntur hoc nomine, ' tempus' credunt multi quod una
res aliqua absolute,
"" sine connotatione et relatione importetur hoc nomine
'tempus' ..
254 Tractatus. , p. 100 : "... tales propositiones : ' motus est, ' ' tempus est,'
et huiusmodi non sunt eodem modo recipiendae sicut istae : ' homo est, '
'animal est,' . . . et huiusmodi, sed debent resolvi in alias, ut idem sit dicere :
'motus est, ' et aliquid movetur. ' Similiter, idem est dicere : ' tempus est,'
et 'aliquid movetur, ' unde potest anima cognoscere, quantum aliquid movetur.
Et revera simplices, qui imaginantur, quod sicut nomina distinguuntur,
ita semper correspondent distinctae res, melius esset eis uti tali modo
loquendo quam alio. " See also, Altaris. , p. 53-58.
"time," there is connoted something which is not signified through the

term "motion," and conversely.255
That which the terms " prime motion, " or " prime circulation"
import, and which, consequently, defines these terms, is the undif-
ferentiated process of the prime motion - prime motion conceived
in its totality. "Time, " however, the very conception of which, as we
have seen, arises from the necessity for marking the endurance,
motions , and rests of particular mobiles, is an aspect of this prime
motion which, consequently, connotes much more : it consignifies first
of all, the actuality of that prime motion of which it is a dimension ;
secondly, it connotes the divisibility of this prime motion into numerable
parts ; third, it consignifies the existence of the mentality which marks
and numbers these divisible parts ; and, finally, the name "time" imports
the real existence of an object, or objects, whose perseverance, motion,
or period of quiet, is being submitted by some mind, to measure . 256 This,
Ockham believes, as against the absolutists , is what Aristotle really meant .
Ockham concludes this treatment of the first objection in this manner :
from the foregoing, it follows that time is something belonging to motion —
i. e., it is (both) something predicable of motion, and importing motion ,
just as "risible" is something belonging to man, since it is a proper passion
of man. And therefore, these obtain simultaneously : " man is risible, " and :
"risibility is something belonging to man, " just as these hold simultaneously:
"time is motion, " and : "time is something belonging to motion, " because
it is a passion of prime motion . 257
255 Phil. Nat., IV, 11 : "...dico quod Philosophus non intendit improbare
istam conclusionem ; motus primus non est tempus, nec per consequens,
istam : motus non est tempus, nec econverso ; sed intendit probare istam
conclusionem : motus primus sive circulatio non sunt cum tempore idem
diffinitione. Similiter, istam : motus et tempus non sunt idem diffinitione,
hoc est, non habent eandem diffinitionem. Et ista fuit opinio Aristotelis . . .
tempus et circulatio non sunt idem diffinitione, hoc est, non habent eandem
diffinitionem, vel quod aliquod importatur per ' tempus ' quod non importatur
per ' motum ' vel eodem modo per ‘ circulationem , ' vel econverso . " See also,
Tractatus., p. 115.
256 Phil. Nat., IV, 11 : ". . . intendit Philosophus probare quod aliquid
importatur per ' motum ' quod non importatur per ' tempus ' , et econverso,
et hoc utrumque verum est, quia per ' primum motum' importatur, sive
per ' circulationem ' praecise totus motus et non pars ; per ' tempus' autem,
importatur tam pars motus, sive circulationis , quam totum simul ; cum hoc
per ' tempus' importatur anima, et motus, et alia de quibus anima debet
certificari per tempus ... Et patet evidenter, quod per istam (Aristotle)
... non intendit probare nisi quod isti termini non sunt idem diffinitione,
et aliquid importetur per unum , quod non importatur per reliquum, vel
saltem eodem modo . " See also, Tractatus . , p. 118-9.
257 Phil. Nat., IV, 11. In Tractatus . , p . 103 , Ockham writes : “ ... hoc
nomen ' tempus' aliquid significat vel consignificat , quod non significatur
vel consignificatur per hoc nomen ' motus ' quod quidem consignificatum
per ' tempus' est anima mensurans ."
With regard to the second objection, Ockham is perfectly willing to

concede that his equation of time and the prime mobile does lead —
granting the possibility of numerous heavens and prime mobiles ―
to the conclusion that there would be a plurality of " times. " He does not,
however, see that this argument in any way involves a rejection of his
position. Even, he points out, were this fictional condition — a plurality
of heavens to exist, the various resultant "times" would be, for all
practical purposes, equivalent to but one verifiable, knowable, functional
measure of motion, rest, and endurance. Ockham writes :
if there were two (other heavens) equal to a first, and many prime motions,
truly there would be many times ; still, these would be equivalent to but one.
That is, these two (other) times do nothing more with regard to measuring,
than does one only, and this one only would be apprehensible by all. Just
as if someone, wishing to measure something, would accept many ells (as
standard), then there would be many ells truly although all of them would
be one through equivalence - that is, one (ell) would do as much as two with
respect to the measured . Another example could be given using location -
since by positing that water and air simultaneously are the place of some
body, and this air and water are not situated differently in terms of situation
and location, that body would be truly in two places, since there is no better
ground why it should be in the air than in the water, or conversely. And
so it would be in each of them, or in neither ; and yet it would be said to be
in one place. Because, in order that that body be in a place, it is no more
required that it be in water and air, than that it be in only one. Hence, if
through an impossibility there were a plurality of prime motions, then there
would be a plurality of times ... still (these times) would be equivalent
to one in the way that has just be explained . 258
258 Phil . Nat. , IV, 11. It is in an entirely different spirit that St. Thomas
Aquinas differentiates two kinds of time : one quantitatively discontinuous ,
which measures the motions of spiritual creatures, and one continuous,
which holds for all corporeal creatures. See Aquinas, Quaestiones Quod-
libetales, Quodlibetum secundum, qu . 3 , art. 1. See also his Commentum
in Librum I Sententiarum , dist. 37, qu . 4, art. 3 , where he writes : “ ... di-
cendum, quod non potest accipi aliqua proportio temporis in quo movetur
corpus, ad tempus in quo movetur angelus, quia tempus quo movetur
angelus, non est divisibile divisione continui, sed discreti in plura instantia
finita; in tempore autem quo movetur corpus, sunt infinita instantia in
potentia ; et ita nulla est proportio. " Taking into cognizance his stand (with
Avempace) in the controversy centering around the Aristotelian Text 71
(see above, pp. 266-274) , Aquinas adds : “ ... dicendum quod tempus istud
quo angelus movetur, divisibile est in duo, quae non copulantur ad unum
communem terminum, cum hoc tempus non sit continuum . Unde non sequitur
quod in medio instanti sit in medio spatii : quia non est necessarium accipere
medium instans. " The second objection to Ockham's theory is answered
differently in the Tractatus .; on pp. 117-8, Ockham replies in this fashion :
"per talem modum arguendi (non) convenit inferre pluralitatem ex pluralitate,
quando unum praedicatur de alio utroque sumpto significative, sicut non
sequitur: intelligentia prima est ens, igitur se sint plura entia, sunt plures
intelligentiae primae, et sic de multis aliis . Sed quando accipitur illa esse
eadem vel habere eandem definitionem, contingit tunc semper inferre
The validity of the third objection too, as the first, according to

Ockham hinges on an interpretation of Aristotle . Whatever force this
third argument has is derived from the notion that Aristotle meant
by the ubiquity of time, its actual presence among objects, in a material
sense. Ockham then, in order to knock the supports out from this
argument , affirms that this absolutist interpretation of Aristotle's
statement : "time is everywhere, among all things," is not at all in keep-
ing with the Philosopher's intent.259 What Aristotle really meant, Ockham
writes, is that
time is that through which whatever things are mensurable, with regard
to their motions and rests, can be measured ; so that time can be said to be
on land and on sea, since everything which is on land and sea can be measured
by time. 260
This (true) interpretation , Ockham continues, follows quite naturally

from the position with respect to time and motion which both he and
Aristotle have been maintaining all along.
It follows that not all motion is time, because not all motions are those
through which all things, on land or sea, can be measured . But the prime
mobile's motion is that through which all things on sea and land can be
measured.201
Ockham neatly turns the tables on his opponents with respect to
their final objection, demonstrating it to actually imply his position
rather than discredit it. To observe - correctly - that time is constant ,
while motions can be more or less swift, entails only the obvious con-
clusion , according to Ockham, that not all motions are time, and that
pluralitatem ex pluralitate . Et ideo quamvis non sequatur formaliter :

motus caeli est tempus, igitur si sint plures caeli , sunt plura tempora ; tamen
ista consequentia est bona et formalis : motus caeli et tempus habent ean-
dem definitionem vel sunt nomina synonyma, igitur si sint plures caeli,
sunt plura tempora . Ex quo patet, quod Philosophus non intendit improbare
istam propositionem : motus est tempus, sed istam : motus et tempus sunt
idem vel habent eandem definitionem . " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10.
259 Phil. Nat., IV, 11 : "Ad tertium dico , quod quando Philosophus dicit
quod tempus est simul ubique, etc. , non intendit quod realiter sit apud
omnia, illo modo quo motus localis illius corporis est realiter ubi est corpus,
sed intendit per istam propositionem : ' tempus est ubique apud omnia , '
dicere istam: ' tempus est id, per quod omnia' . . ." etc.
260 Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10 ; IV, 12.
261 Ibid . Here Ockham anticipates an equivocation : "Sed numquid
debeat concedi quod motus primus est in terra et in mari, sicut conceditur
quod tempus est in terra et in mari, cum motus primus sit tempus ;" which
he answers thus : "Dico quod ista, et similes , sunt quaestiones sophistarum,
qui ignorant modos loquendi improprios quibus auctores frequenter utuntur.
Unde, non est modus loquendi quod ' motus primus sit in terra et in mari ;'
sed quod ' tempus est in mari et terra," et ideo unum conceditur et non
reliquum, Et ideo in isto sophismate, ' tempus est in terra, motus primus est
tempus, ergo motus primus est in terra, ' est fallacia amphibologiae, quia
maior improprie accipitur. "
8 Ockham: Motion
the terms "time," and "motion," are not convertible ---- i. e., they
differ in definition. 262
Owing directly to the premisses that the events which are measured
by time are of various duration , while the measure is itself uniform in
nature, one cannot conclude that the measure itself is not a motion ; 263
for time, as Ockham has demonstrated, is a motion — but a motion of
such rigorously constant velocity as to be normative for the entire
universe .
Strictly speaking, Ockham points out , it can not be properly main-
tained that time is "fast," or "slow ;" nevertheless, it would not be
incorrect, by virtue of a less rigorous mode of speech , to affirm that
time is "fast ," since it is an aspect of the swiftest motion in the universe ;
accordingly, in no mode ought it to be conceded that time is "slow,"
nor that since it is, in addition , an aspect of the most uniform motion
in the universe any one " time," varies in duration from another
"time."264
When it is held that "swift," and " slow," are defined by time, it
must be remembered, Ockham insists, that the term "time" connotes
the prime motion . That motion, accordingly, is more swift in which the
mobile moves from one point to another while the prime mobile enjoys
a greater amount of activity, than is that motion in which the moved
.
travels from one place to another while the prime mobile moves cor-
respondingly less than in the first instance. While should one object
that the motion of any mobile may provide a frame of reference by
means ofwhich the motion , rest or endurance of mobiles may be measured ,
Ockham would agree : but he points out that the degree of precision
suffers accordingly as these physical events are referred for measure
262 Phil. Nat., IV, 11 : " Ad quartum dico quod illud probat quod non
omnis motus est tempus, et quod motus et tempus habe (n) t diversas dif-
finitiones. Ex hoc enim, quod unus motus velocior alio, et unum tempus
non est velocius alio, sequitur quod motus et tempus non sunt adaequate
et convertibiliter idem, et quod non omnis motus est tempus - et hoc
concedo." See also Tractatus. , pp. 116—7.
263 Phil. Nat. , IV, 11 : "Unde, sicut non sequitur, unum lignum est
longius alio, sed ulna non est lignum, ergo ulna non est lignum (sic !) ita
nec alia consequentia (i. e . , the one which his opponents drew from the
premisses : " motions are fast and slow ; time is not fast or slow, etc. ") valet ."
Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10 ; IV, 12.
264 Phil. Nat., IV, 11 : " Probat Philosophus quod non omnis motus est
tempus, et quod differunt diffinitione, et ideo de rigore modi loquendi
numquam potest concedi quod tempus est velox vel tardum. Dico igitur,
quod de vírtute sermonis, secundum principia Philosophi, potest concedi
quod tempus est velox, quia tempus est velocissimus motus, sed non debet
concedi quod tempus est tardum, nec quod unum tempus sit velocius alio,
sicut nec motus primus sit velocior primo motu . " See also, Tractatus . , p. 116.
to any standard less constant than the uniformly swift motion of the
prime mobile.265
Ockham turns now to a critical evaluation of the objections launched
against his stand that the moment of time is, itself, substantially one
with the prime mobile. Temporal instants do, in fact, follow continu-
ously one on the other, Ockham replies to the first objection, but this
is not to be understood in the sense that each instant is an atomic
component which inexplicably arises, is somehow destroyed, and is
once again replaced in the absolute timestream ; but is rather to be
understood as connoting the successive changes in position (with respect
to its parts) , of the prime mobile. The parts of the prime mobile, that is,
successively acquire place after place, each instant of time consignifying
by its " now" that the prime mobile is " here. " 266 The constant velocity
of the prime mobile is guarantee for the perfect successive order, and
constant value, of each moment of time.
That Ockham will concede, quite cheerfully, the truth of the prop-
osition : "mutation is instantaneous," is, on the basis of his previous
handling of mutation, easily anticipated . It will be recalled that for
Ockham , endorsement of the truth of the statement under consideration
involves affirmation of the fact that there is no delimitable priority or
posteriority of stages exhibited by a mobile undergoing a sudden change ;
but rather that the mutant receives its form non-successively - i . e. ,
"in an instant ."267 Consequently, to employ the premise: "mutation is
265 Phil. Nat., IV, 11 : " Et quando dicitur quod velox et tardum diffini-
untur tempore, dico quod verum est quod diffinitur motu primo ; illud
enim est velocius quod dum movetur a tali puncto at tale (m) punctum ,
mobile primum plus movetur ; et illud tardius, quod dum movetur, mobile
primum minus movetur. Et si dicas quod tempus potest haberi de motu
a(li)quo, an sit velocior alio per alium inferiorem dico quod verum est;
sed non ita certitudinaliter, nec a tot, nec ita bene et faciliter a communitate,
maxime si motus sit primus. Unde, ille motus erit tempus, et alius non,
qui motus magis certificat quamcumque rem, et totam communitatem
certificare habet de aliis, quantum durant, moventur, vel quiescunt, et
omne(s) istae conditiones competunt primo motui. " Cf. Aristotle, Physics,
IV, 12.
266 Phil. Nat., IV, 12 : "Postquam solutae sunt rationes quibus probatur
quod tempus est alia res a motu , nun (c ) solvendae sunt rationes quibus
probatur quod instans est alia res a primo mobili . Unde, ad primum dico
quod instans non est aliud et aliud sic, quod sunt diversa instantia quae
sint diversae res totaliter ; sed sub isto intellectu potest concedi quod instans
est aliud et aliud ; hoc est, quod primum mobile est successive in diversis
locis, et alibi et alibi , ita quod primum mobile secundum diversas partes suas
nunc est hic, et nunc alibi . " See also, Tractatus. , p . 121 ; Sent . , II , 12, gg,
mm.
267 Phil. Nat., IV, 12 : " Ad aliud dico quod ista propositio : ' mutatio est
in instanti, ' conceditur sub isto sensu : quando aliquid subito movetur,
tunc quicquid acquirit, subito acquirit ; ita quod non est aliquid prius et
8.
instantaneous, " in an argument designed to conclude that there is an

absolute divorce between mutation and the prime mobile , is to present
an argument displaying the logical fallacy of equivocation.268
The second objection too, according to Ockham, is tainted by the
amphibological fallacy. This time it is the equivocal character of the
proposition : "mutation is measured in an instant ," which renders suspect
the validity of any argument in which it appears as a premise . In addition ,
Ockham indicates that this argument, which his opponents have designed
to attack him, is a veritable boomerang ; for by granting the truth of the
absolutists' claim concerning the absolute nature of mutation and an
instant, the proposition : "mutation is measured in an instant," is,
understood in their own terms, self-negating and vacuous. That is,
on the one hand the absolute theorists have postulated the indivisibility
of both an instant, and mutation ; and on the other, they cling tenaciously
to the idea that "mutation is measured in an instant ; " it but remains
for Ockham , in order to put his opponents entirely to rout, to point
out that there is no conceivable way in which one indivisible could
measure another.2269
Ockham removes the barb from the last two objections directed
against his conception of the temporal moment, by properly "resolving"
the statement : " an instant is the terminus of time, " into the complex
of which it is actually significative. This resolution leads, subsequently,
aliquid posterius acquisitum ; ita quod ista propositio : ' mutatio est in
instanti, intelligitur per illam aliam longam . " See also, above, Chapter 2.
268 Ibid.: "... ideo modus arguendi ex talibus : ' mutatio est in instanti, '
et universaliter ex his quae sunt improprie causa(n) t fallaciam aequivoca-
tionis, vel amphibologiae, et iudicandum est de eis, et de argumentis in
quibus ponuntur per illas quae per eas intelliguntur. Et ideo sicut non
sequitur: quando aliquid mutatur, totum simul acquiritur dum primum
mobile est in aliquo determinato situ , sed mutatio non est in substantia
primi mobilis , ergo instans est alia res -— quia semper est licitum propositio-
nem quae per aliam intelligitur poni loco ipsius.'
269 Phil. Nat., IV, 12 : “Ad aliud , quando dicitur : ' mutatio subita men-
suratur instanti , ' dico quod ista est falsa etiam secundum alios qui ponunt
instans esse aliam rem a substantia mobilis, et mutationem esse aliam rem
a motu et mobili et omni re permanente. Nam secundum eos tam mutatio
quam instans, est res indivisibilis ; sed numquam indivisibile quantum ad
suum esse mensuratur alio indivisibili . Sicut si esset aliqua magnitudo
indivisibilis, numquam mensuraretur alio indivisibili , quia non posset
mensurari quia intellectus tantum dubitat quantum est unum quantum
aliud et non potest per unum indivisibile de aliquo certificari quantum est . . .
Et eodem modo numqua ( m) potest intellectus certificari de aliquo quantum
est per aliud, nisi quando unu (m) est maius alio , vel quando unum est
divisibile et ignoratur utrum sit aequale , vel inaequale alteri indivisibili .
Dico, igitur, quod ista non est vera de virtute sermonis : ' mutatio subita
mensuratu(r) instanti ; ' si , tamen, per eam intelligatur ista : ' quando aliquid
mutatur subito, acquirit totum simul et non secundum prius et posterius , '
bene potest concedi . " See also, Sent. , II , 12 , ii.
to a precise notion of how it is that the instant can be thought of as

the “ link” between the past and the future.
I say that this proposition : "the instant is the terminus of time, " is true
in this sense : that when a mobile is moved, it is in that determinate place
in which it was not immediately before, nor will be immediately thereafter,
and time continues. And this is not other than (to say) that the prime mobile
is continuously moved, and so always that it is in a determinate place in
which it was not before, nor (in which it) will be immediately thereafter.
Nor is it other for time to be continuous than (that) the prime mobile is
continuously moved. Similarly, when it is said that some part of time is
past and some (part) is future, it ought not be conceded that some thing,
which is a part of time, was before, and that ... this thing is not (now),
and that some thing will be which is not ; but this : "a part of time is past,
and a part of time is future, " is posited in place of this : " the prime mobile
was moved immediately before, and will be afterwards moved , or will be
in a place in which it is not (now) ." Just as time is called " continuous ” —
i. e. , the prime mobile is continuously moved → so it is said that "the
instant is the end of the past, and the beginning of the future, ”
because the prime mobile is ,,, in one place , and was immediately before
in another (place) , and will be immediately thereafter in another, so that it
is then proper to say: "this was previously moved and will be moved there-
after, " and in this mode this proposition : "(the instant) is the link of
time, ” and similarly other such propositions, are to be explained . 270
270 Phil. Nat., IV, 12. In Tractatus. , pp . 100—101 , Ockham writes :

“Unde quando dicitur ... tempus componitur ex illis , quae non sunt,
scilicet ex praeterito et futuro,' dicendum quod ista propositio distinguenda
est penes amphibologiam. Unus sensus est quod tempus sit aliquid unum
distinctum ab omnibus aliis vere compositum tamquam ex partibus ex
praeterito et futu (r)o ; et iste sensus est falsus, quia tempus non est aliquid
tale. Alius sensus est iste, quod tempus significat aliquid esse praeteritum
et aliquid esse futurum , et ideo in definitione exprimente quid nominis
ipsius temporis debet poni tam praeteritum quam futurum ; et pro tanto
praeteritum et futurum dicuntur partes temporis. Nec aliud intelligunt
Philosophus et Commentator, quando dicunt, quod tempus componitur
ex praeterito et futuro et quod praeteritum et futurum sunt partes temporis,
nisi quod praeteritum et futurum ponuntur in definitione exprimente quid
nominis temporis . " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 11 ; IV, 13 ; VI , 3. Ockham
devotes Phil. Nat. , IV, 13 , 14 , 15 (Cf. Aquinas, above, p . 104 , n. 258) to proofs
that time is limited to measure of empirically verifiable events -i . e., the
limited motions, rests and periods of perseverance suffered by objective
existents. In Chapter 13, he writes : " Nullum necessarium et perpetuum
mensuratur tempore, quia de nullo tali potest sciri per tempus quantum
tale aliquid durat . Unde si esset aliquod corpus infinitum illud non posset
mensurari nec per finitum, nec per infinitum, sed eo ipso quod apprehen-
deretur et cognosceretur esset finitum, ita si aliquid in perpetuum duret,
non potest sciri per aliquid aliud quantum durat, et ita tale non poterit
mensurari. ” In Chapter 14, he writes : " Omnia praeter perpetua me (n) su-
rantur tempore, ideo vocantur ' temporalia . ' Unde, generabilia et corruptibilia
tempore mensurantur, quia per tempus durant. " In Chapter 15 : "... Nulla
res inferior potest esse mensura Dei, et ita Deus nullo modo mensuratur sed
est immensus - hoc est, non mensuratur. " See also Sent. , II , qu. 12 , gg, mm
and qu . 13 ; and cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 12.
IIO Ockham: Motion , Time and Place
6.
Concerning the Subjectivity of Time
Owing to the circumstance that confusion exists among the "phi-

losophers" concerning the question of whether or not time is a purely
subjective construct , Ockham feels constrained to conclude his exposition
of time with an explicit and final statement of the true relationship
obtaining between time and the intellect.271
The key to this relationship, and the answer to the question con-
cerning time's status, is to be found, according to Ockham , in a certain
power possessed by the intellect the propensity which it has for
singling out and completing certain aspects of extra-mental existents,
thus bringing to an express and completed state a phase which is very
real, though lacking in articulated being prior to its intellectual "com-
pletion. " 272 It is thus, by the intellectual completion of an aspect of
real, extended bodies, that linear units of measure are brought to actual
being.
Just as a branch which is truly an ell (in length) , could not be an ell were
there no soul. Because if the soul were not, nothing could be measured by
using the branch -- but an ell is that through which something can be
measured - hence, if the soul were not, the branch could not be an ell,
and yet that branch is in reality an ell, and an ell is outside the soul . It is no
more in the soul than a stone ; still, the soul is posited in the definition of
this name, "ell, " and not (in this name) " stone . " And in this regard it can
be said that an ell is other than the soul, and that its being is completed by
the soul.273
271 Phil. Nat., IV, 16 : " Quia philosophi faciunt difficultatem circa
tempus, an sit in anima, vel possit esse sine anima, ideo quomodo tempus
se habeat ad animam est sciendum." Cf. Aristotle. Physics, IV, 14 .
272 Phil. Nat., IV, 16 : "... patet quod si anima non posset esse, tempus
non posset esse tempus, cum nihil posset esse numerus vel mensura. Unde
motus primus, quamvis posset esse uniformissimus et velocissimus, si tamen
anima non posset esse, tunc ille motus non posset esse tempus . Ideo Philo-
sophus dicit quod tempus est ens in anima, et quod suum esse completum
est ab anima, nihil aliud intelligens, nisi quod motus extra non posset esse
tempus sine anima. " See also Sent. , II , 12 , ddd . In Tractatus . , p . 97 , Ockham
writes: "... dicit Commentator . (see Averroes, op. cit. , Comment 88,
f. 142г) , quod ' talia nondum habent esse completum, sed esse eorum com-
ponitur ex actione animae et ex eo, quod est in eis extra animam ; et entia
completa sunt illa in quorum esse nihil facit anima, ut postea declarabitur
de tempore.' Quod est sic intelligendum, quod talia, cuiusmodi sunt motus
et mutatio et huiusmodi, quae important successionem, nondum habent
esse completum, hoc est, non sunt entia completa secundum se tota distincta
a rebus permanentibus, nec sunt quaedam completa secundum se tota ...
composita realiter ex rebus permanentibus ; sed esse eorum componitur
ex actionibus animae in eo, quod est non-ens extra animam , hoc est, aliqua
importat per talia non habent esse extra animam, quamvis possint cognosci
ab anima et aliquid importatum ab eis est extra animam .”
273 Phil. Nat. , IV, 16.
Chapter Four. Concerning Time III
The same relationship, then, obtains between time and the prime
motion - i . e. , the intellect mediates, and brings to completed being
that uniform and sequential aspect of prime motion which is time.
Now there are two ways, Ockham maintains in an attempt to re-
concile the differences of opinion concerning the true status of time,
in which the intellect can be thought of as being involved in the definition
of time. The first way consists in defining time as being "that through
which the soul is rendered certain. " Conceived in this way, time would
be related to the prime motion only on those occasions when the in-
tellect, directing itself to the standard of the prime motion, sought
confirmation involving problems of individual rest , motion , or endurance.
Time, that is, thus conceived, would depend absolutely upon the in-
quiring intellect .
In the second way, the role of the intellect is immensely changed.
Time, in this conception , is held to be that which the soul uses to measure
the duration of other things. Seen in this light, time is, as an aspect
of the prime motion, always "there" for use by the intellect ; and it
exists, so long as the prime motion exists, whether the soul is actually
employing it to measure other motions, rests, periods of longevity, or not.
The intellect, thus, does not call time into being, but completes its being
by applying the mensurable propensity of real prime motion to concrete
physical situations requiring measurement. It is to this latter mode of
relating time, the intellect, and prime motion, that Ockham subscribes.274
Ockham concludes :
it is patent that that which is time is really outside the soul, and yet it
depends on the soul that it is time. Because time could not be time - or
274 Phil. Nat. , IV, 16 : "Oportet autem scire, quod dupliciter potest
intelligi quod anima ponatur in diffinitione temporis . Uno modo, ut denotetur
tempus esse illud per quod anima actualiter certificatur, ut ista sit descriptio
temporis : tempus est illud per quod anima certificatur. Alio modo, ut
denotetur quod tempus est illud quo anima potest mensurare alia, quamvis,
de facto, non mensuret, vel sive men(s) uret actualiter, sive non. Et tunc
talis potest esse descriptio temporis : tempus est illud per quod anima pot (est)
certificari de aliis. Si primo modo intelligatur descriptio temporis, dico
quod primus motus non est tempus, nisi quando anima per ipsum mensurat
alia, et tunc sub isto intellectu oportet concede (re) , quod si anima non
numeraret motum primum secundum prius et posterius mensurando alia per
ipsum, non esset tempus. Si autem secundo modo intelligatur, tunc debet
dici quod motus primus est tempus, sive anima mensuret vel numeret
primum motum, sive non ; et ita tempus est, sive anima mensuret, sive non. "
See also, Sent., II , 12, xx ; and cf. S. C. Tornay, Ockham , Studies and Selections
(Open Court Pub. co . , La Salle, Ill . ( 1938 ) . On p . 45 , Prof. Tornay writes :
"the distinctive feature of Ockham's conception (of time) lies in his sub-
jectivist approach. " As we have seen, however, Professor Tornay must be
in error. "Time, " for Ockham, is a connotative term signifying directly
the motion of an absolute existent -- i . e. , the prime mobile - and con-
signifying the soul which imparts number to this motion .
that which is time could not be time without the soul, just as a cause in
no way depends on its effect, and yet the cause could not be a cause without
its effect.2275
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCERNING PLACE
I.
Arguments Against Hypostatization of Place
That there is such a thing as "place" is no more open to serious

doubt, Ockham feels, than it is to demonstration a-priori . " Places"
are universally acknowledged to be the immediate physical scene in
which are played the several dramas involving bodies moved in time .
Since there is this happy agreement holding with regard to the existence
of place, Ockham , with a passing reference to Aristotle's discussion, feels
quite justified in moving on to consider its more controversial aspect :
although all seem willing to admit that place is, there seems to be
variance concerning just what it is.276
It is the conception that places are themselves absolute, receptive,
spatial lacunae ―― places as pure extensive quantities of space totally
distinct from the extended, located bodies which occupy them that
draws Ockham's dialectical fire.277 Were places thus existent per se,
he points out initially, the infinite number of parts into which any
located, finitely dimensionate substance is theoretically divisible, would
each , severally, require a separate, distinct and absolute place. Thus ,
any finite " here" in which some substance is situated, would , if places
275 Ibid. See also Tractatus. , p . 99 ; Sent. , II , 12, 0 , p, xx.

276 Phil. Nat., IV, 18 : " Sicut omne quod movetur, movetur in tempore,
ita omne quod movetur, movetur in loco , ideo post considerationem de
tempore, restat considerare de loco ... Quod autem locus sit, manifestum
est, nec potest demonstrari a priori , tamen constat quod locus est per hoc :
quod corpora localiter mota transeunt de loco ad locum, et in eodem loco
succedunt invicem diversa corpora . Alia(s) autem rationes ponit Philosophus
(see Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1 ) . Quia tamen omnes concedunt locum esse,
ideo illas omitto quare eas videas ibi. Quid autem sit locus maiorem habet
difficultatem . "
277 Phil . Nat. , IV, 19 : " ... Quidam enim . . . (dicunt) quod locus est
spatium contentum inter latera continentis , sicut totum spatium contentum
inter parietes domus est locus, et sic de aliis." Ockham points also to two
other theories of place : “ Alii autem (dicant) locum esse materiam, alii autem
formam;" but goes on to add that : " (Illae) duae ... opiniones postremae,
parvam vel nullam habent apparentia(m) , et modernis temporibus malos
defensores habent, quas Philosophus sufficienter improbat. (See Aristotle,
Physics, IV, 3) . Ideo, circa eas, nolo immorari. ”
Chapter Five. Concerning Place 113
are indeed thus absolute, necessarily consist in an infinite number of

distinct places.278
Again, if place is posited to be equivalent to some precise quantity

of space, it must be granted corporeal status ; and if corporeal, then
mobile. Now no mobile enjoys eternal quiescence ; hence, there will
be some time at which these places will be in motion ; and, once in
motion, one absolute place can only move through, or come to rest in,
other absolute places. The theory of separable and absolute place is
thus shown by Ockham to involve the ridiculous consequent that each
of an infinite number of spatially discrete containers will not only at
some time be in motion, but that when the motion occurs, one discrete
container necessarily becomes the contained of yet another such con-
tainer.279
Ockham pursues relentlessly :
place is not such a space, because either such a space is other than the
located, or not. If not, then place is the placed , and the same thing would
be in itself as if in a place . If other and it is manifestly not something
indivisible ― then it is divisible and extended ; (but it is not extended) any
more with respect to any one part than to any other ; therefore it is long,
broad, and deep, and is, consequently, a body - which cannot be said.280
As a final rejection of the theory of place absolute, Ockham raises

the question : what kind of a thing could such an absolute place be ?
It is patently not itself a substance. No more can it be an accident .
For if it were an accident , there is implied the contradiction that two
substances could , at one and the same time, occupy a single site . Every
accident, that is, has a subject ; and since place cannot be predicated
to be the accident of a located mobile it must be an accident of some
other substance extant within the confining limits of the same portion
.
of space which contains the located mobile. And this involves the physical
278 Phil. Nat. , IV, 19 : " Si (locus sit) spatium medium . . . sequeretur
quod loci essent infiniti. Ista consequentia patet evidenter et potest declarari
multipliciter, uno modo sic : si spatium medium esset locus, tunc aliquid
diceretur in loco quia esset praesens spatio ; sed ita convenit cuilibet parti
totius esse praesens tali spatio sicut toti, aequaliter ergo totum est in loco,
et pars quaelibet ; sed sunt infinitae partes, ergo loca sunt infinita . ”
279 Ibid.: “... si locus sit spatium ergo locus est corpus . Sed omne corpus
est mobile, ergo illud spatium moveri poterit de loco ad locum, et ita Îoci
erit locus. Sed non est verisimile quod aliquod corpus quieverit per tempus
infinitum ; ex quo, ergo, illud spatium, si sit corpus, movebatur, et numquam
quievit continue per tempus infinitum, ergo infinities fuit motum, et per
consequens erunt infinita loca, quia infinita loca movebantur infinities ad
unum . " Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 1 .
280 Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, loc. cit.
impossibility that two substances are simultaneously occupying an

identical spatial location.281
In short, Ockham is denying that there obtains in nature an absolute
system of distinct and separable places, relation to any one of which
will yield the exact physical location of any extended substance.
2.
Place, According to Ockham
Just as there exists no real distinction between an extended sub-

stance and its surface,282 so there can be no real distinction , Ockham holds ,
between the place of some located body, and the innermost surface of
the locating, extended body. Both Aristotle's definition of place : "the
furthest limit of the containing body," and that of Averroes : "it is the
boundary and terminus, " imply, according to Ockham, the truth of
this thesis, insofar as it can only be the surface of some locating body
which is the "terminus, " or "boundary," of the located.283
Further, application of the principle of economy indicates the utter

superfluity involved in positing two distinct things : surface and place -
where one suffices. Ockham pleads thus for theoretical elegance :
in vain is that accomplished through more, which can be accomplished

through less ; for everything which can be said of place can be " saved"
without this : that place is a thing distinct from the surface of the con-
taining body — because that will locate, and so will contain, and so will
281 Phil. Nat. , IV, 19 : "" locus non sit tale spatium ... Tum quia duo
corpora tunc essent simul, tum quia nec substantia, sicut patet inductive,
nec accidens, quia nullum accidens potest esse sine subiecto, ergo oportet
ponere aliquam substantiam in qua esset illud accidens, et ita haberetur
quod praeter substantiam locatam esset ali (a) substantia infra latera con-
tinentis.'" See also Aristotle, Physics , IV, I.
282 See above , p. 322.
283 Phil . Nat., IV, 20 : “ Viso quid non sit locus, videndum est quid est
locus . . . non est imaginandum quod in corpore locante sit aliqua superficies
vel aliquis situ (s) distinctus totaliter a corpore locante quomodo albedo
distinguitur secundum se totam a subiecto, et quod illa superficies, quae
est finis vel terminus est locus aequalis locato . Et circa hoc primo ostenden-
dum est quod locus non est aliqua red talis ... Primo probatur quod locus
non sit talis res alia a corpore loca (n) t(e), quia superficies non est aliqua
res alia a corpore locato distincta secundum se tota(m) , ergo nec locus .
Consequentia patet, quia locus et superficies non distinguuntur realiter,
quod patet per hoc quod superficies est ultimum corporis, et secundum
Commentatorem, est finis et terminus, sed nulla res alia est finis corporis,
ergo etc." See also Logic. , ch . 46, p. 134 ; ch . 61 , p. 174. From Phil . Nat. IV, 20,
to its close (Chapters 20 , 21 , 22 ), there is literal correspondence with only
the slightest deviations, none of which cause textual aberration ― with
Tractatus., pp. 69—96 . For a summary of the manuscript and text tradition
of Phil. Nat., and Tractatus ., and their relation to Expositio. , see P. Boehner's
introduction to Tractatus . , pp. 28―30.
be equivalent to the located, just as if some other thing were posited . There-
fore, place is not something other than surface . 284
Again, if place exists per se and is not indissolubly wedded to body

as its furthest limit, generic investigation should substantiate its in-
dividual status. The fact is, however, that such investigation points
to the inescapable truth of Ockham's claim . Place - being neither
substance nor quality is patently in the genus of quantity. As a
quantity, place is either discrete or continuous . Obviously, it is not the
former. But if continuous, it is either permanent or successive . Assuredly
it is in the class of permanently continuous quantities ; and since all
such quantities have, essentially, linearly mensurable proportions,
place must be either line, surface, or body.285
Granting, however, for the moment , that a surface does have the
capacity for separable existence, "surfaces" would then be accidental
predications of extended substances. Now any accident investing a
primary subject must necessarily be represented by a part in every
part of the substance which it informs ; and since an accidental surface
can not possibly be thought of as investing every substantial part of its
primary subject, something is radically amiss. Obviously, the outermost
parts of the limiting, defining, accidental surfaces of some extended
body, cannot be a part in a part of the substance which is confined
within them. The surfaces of any body, that is , conceived as accidents,
must have parts which lie outside the body proper; hence, it has parts
which do not invest parts of its primary subject . "Surface" is clearly
286
not capable of existence in divorce from individual, extended subjects.2
284 Phil. Nat . , IV, 20. See also Logic. , ch. 61 , p . 174.
285 Phil. Nat., IV, 20 : "... si locus sit alia res a superficie, oportet quod
sit in genere quantitatis, qualitatis, vel substantiae ; et non potest poni in
genere qualitatis, nec substantiae, ut satis patet, ergo est in genere quantitatis .
Et si sic, vel est quantitas continua, vel quantitas discreta ; (Non est discreta)
certum est ; ergo est continua. Aut ergo est successiva, aut permanens .
Non successiva manifestum est, ergo permanens . Vel est ergo longitudo,
vel latitudo, vel profunditas, vel tales dimensiones, et per consequens est
linea, vel superficies, vel corpus. Confirmatur : omne quantum permanens
continue est longum, latum, et profundum, igitur locus est longus, latus,
et profundus, et nihil est cuiusmodi nisi sit linea , vel corpus, vel superficies . "
Further on (Ibid . ) Ockham writes : " Item notandum quod hoc nomen
'locus' est nomen relativum secundum Commentatorem, et tamen illud de
quod verificatur hoc nomen 'locus ' est vere quantitas ; et propter hoc ponit
Philosophus locum in genere quantitatis ... (see Aristotle, Categories,
ch. 6) . Sed quia hoc nomen 'locus ' est proprie relativum ideo non ponitur
per se in genere quantitatis, sed per accidens . " See also Logic. , ch . 46, p. 134.
286 Phil. Nat., IV, 20 : " Quod autem superficies non sit alia res secundum
se totam distincta probatur ... quia tunc esset accidens et haberet subiectum
primum. Tunc quaeritur de isto subiecto primo aut est corpus, aut aliud
à corpore. Si primum, tunc in qualibet parte istius corporis erit aliquid
Similarly, Ockham continues, what position would be taken by those

who conceive a surface to be a distinct thing, added as the physical
limit of an extended subject, with regard to this question : does each of
any two parts of some continuous mobile possess its own surface, so
that the total surface of any quantitatively continuous subject consists
in one "surface" being immediate to another this was a notion sufficient-
ly discredited by Aristotle , Ockham feels, not to merit further refutation.
If, on the other hand, it is held that the surface terminating any two
parts of an extended body is one, then, Ockham holds, the physical
division of any continuous body would result in the destruction of the
one surface, and the creation of two others one for each of the divided
portions. It is impossible, however, to maintain that one surface is
destroyed and two new ones are generated as a result of such physical
division; no generation ever destroys a specific individual while simultane-
ously generating, in one and the same subject , a specifically similar
individual. And again, how could that surface , conceived as an accidental
attribute, possibly have been destroyed ? Its subject was not destroyed ;
nor was its contrary induced ; nor has its cause disappeared . Again,
after such physical division , does the prime subject of the original
surface remain, or not ? If not, then some substance , as a result of this
division, has been destroyed and since all of the original matter is
demonstrably present after such division, only some form can have been
destroyed. This being so , with reference to the matter of this now
non-existent form , Ockham asks the question : "wherein does it remain ?"
Is it in each of the two divided parts ? In neither ? or in only one ? It is
obviously not in each of them ; nor can it be totally dissociated , existing
somehow in separation from either of the two ; nor is it possible that it
is in one part only, since there is no better reason why it should invest
one part, than that it should be in the other. Or, if it is held that the
prime subject of the original surface does remain after its physical
division, then the same indefensible position is involved ; for Ockham
would once again inquire whether it remained in each of its divided
parts, in neither, or in one only - none of which conditions are possible
as the same grounds given above can be employed to demonstrate .
Ockham holds it patent, then , that his original thesis has been amply
substantiated, and that
superficiei illius quod est manifeste falsum, quia in parte citra illam super-
ficiem non est illa superficies, aut alia pars eius. Nec subiectum primum est
aliud a corpore, quia tunc esset substantia ; sed omnis substantia extensa
est longa, lata, et profunda, igitur habet aliquam partem in profundo quae
non est sub aliqua parte illius superficiei , ergo, etc. "
place is not a thing apart from a surface, (and that) a surface is not a thing
apart from a body.287
3.
Ockham chooses to supplement his conception of the true character

of place by employing as a point of departure the flood of objections
which his opponents, at this juncture, loose upon his primary assumption
of the relationship which obtains between place , surface, and extended
body. In the first place, his opponents argue, the furthest limit of a
containing body is something distinctly other than the body of which
it is the furthest limit ; for were it not, then the containing body would
be its own furthest limit. And since place , as Aristotle has it, is the
"furthest limit of the containing body," it follows that a real distinction
288
holds between place and the containing body.2
The difficulty here involved, according to Ockham, centers around
his opponents' failure to mark a distinction between two senses in which
place, as "the furthest limit of the containing body, " is to be understood .
In the case, for example, of a vase containing water, it can be held that
the vase is "the furthest limit of the containing body" insofar as it is
not incorrect to say that the water's " place " is in the vase ; but more
287 Phil. Nat., IV, 20 : " Similiter : si superficies sit alia res, accipio duas
partes continui et quaero utrum est eadem superficies terminans utramque
partem corporis continui, aut aliam et alia(m) ; si est alia et alia, igitur
superficies est immediata superficiei , quod Aristoteles improbat. Si sit una,
per divisionem corrumperetur, et generarentur duae superficies, quia non
est maior ratio, si remanet illa superficies post divisionem, quod remaneat
in una parte, plusquam in alia, et per consequens manet simul in utraque,
vel in nulla. Sed impossibile est quod per divisionem una superficies cor-
rumpatur, et duo generarentur, quia generans non destruit unum individuum
unius speciei, et generat novum individuum eiusdem speciei in eodem sub-
iecto. Tum quia accidens non destruitur, nisi vel per destructionem sub-
iecti sui, vel per inductionem sui contrarii, vel alicuius incompossibilis, vel
per absentiam suae causae, quorum nullum potest contingere in proposito .
Tum quia accipio substantiam quae est primum subiectum primae super-
ficiei, et quaero utrum illa manet, vel non . Si non manet, igitur aliqua
substantia per divisionem corrumpitur, et non materia, igitur forma . Tunc
quaero de materia quae erat sub forma corrupta, ubi manet, vel in utraque,
vel in neutra, vel in altera . Non in utraque, manifestum est, nec in neutra -
quia tunc separaretur, et esset nova inductio formae, et tunc non esset sola
divisio , quod est impossibile. Nec manet in altera . Tum quia non est maior
ratio quare sit plus in una quam in alia . Si primum subiectum manet, aut
igitur in utraque parte, aut in altera tantum, aut in neutra, et deducatur
idem quod prius . Propter istas rationes, et alias consimiles . .." etc. See
also, Logic., ch. 46, p. 134—5 .
288 Phil. Nat . , IV, 21 : Sed contra ista videntur aliqua argumenta .
Primo, quia ultimum continentis non est illud continens, quia idem esset
ultimum suiipsius ."
properly, in the case at point, it is those parts of the inner surface of

the vase which are contiguous with the surface (i . e . , the "furthest
limit" ) of the contained water, that represent the true "furthest limit
of the containing body. " And the relationship between this second ,
more precise, delineation of place, and the first usage, is as the relation-
ship of a part to the whole : each " place " then, is distinct from the
containing body, in exactly the same way that a part can be said to be
"distinct" from the whole of which it is a part. It is in this sense that
Ockham will cede to his opponents that place is not the containing
body place, that is, is not the whole of the containing body ; but is,
rather, those of its innermost parts which are contiguous with the
outermost extended parts of the contained.28
"Both the Philosopher and the Commentator," Ockham continues,
distinguish between a "common container" and a " proper container."
The first they call simply : "the containing body ; " and the second they call :
"the furthest limit of the containing body. " Just as is exemplified by the
air, and by the furthest limits of the air with respect to some body existing
in the air say, with respect to a stick of wood, or a bird, or some such
thing. Because the whole air - by accepting "whole" categorematically
contains that body, and yet (the whole air) is not its proper place ; because,
that is, it contains that body and many other bodies as well. But the furthest
limit of the air - wherever it is is that which contains only that (body),
and is precisely that body's proper place . And that "furthest limit" differs
from the "whole" air in just the same way that a part differs from the whole.
290
Therefore, the proper place is not the whole air, but it is a part of this air.2
The second objection purports, at one stroke, to demonstrate the

complete independence of place from surface, and both from extended
body. Since , it is argued -on Aristotle's authority - the whole body
of air is not the proper place of anything , insofar as place and the placed
must be equal ; it follows, on the same ground, that no other whole body
289 Phil. Nat., IV, 21 : " Ad primum dicendum quod aliquid ultimum
continentis est illud continens, et aliquod non ; nam accipiendo vas continens
aquam, ipsum vas vocatur ultimum continentis ... praeter, etiam , illud
continens ultimum, quaelibet pars vasis tangentis totam aquam vocatur
ultimum continentis, et quaelibet illarum distinguitur a vase continente ,
sicut pars a suo toto, et e converso, ita quod iste locus non est illud continens ,
hoc est, non est totum, sed est pars. " Although I translate ultimum continens
as: "the furthest limit of the containing body," what is meant in this context,
is: "the innermost limit of the containing body which is defined by its being
in immediate contact with the contained body. " For example : the place
of a bird in the air at any given moment would be the parts of the air in
immediate contact with the parts of the bird's body still, these parts
of the containing body are the furthest limits, with respect to its content,
and are the innermost surface with respect to the continent air.
290 Ibid. See Aristotle, Physics, IV, 2 ; and Averroes, op. cit. , Comment 33 ,
fol. IIIг.
can be the proper place of a thing. Nevertheless, it is true that some

portion of that whole body of air is the proper place equal to some body.
And this portion of the container is equal to the whole of the contained ,
rather than a part, because again, if it were equal to but a part of the
contained, place and the placed would not be equal . Hence, that con-
taining portion can be equal only to the surface of the contained , since
only the surface of an extended body confines all of its parts.291
The argument : the whole air is not the place of something ; therefore
neither is any other whole body the place of something is, according
to Ockham , a non sequitur. Space is a plenum and, as such , ultimately
contains all spatially located bodies and stretches in all directions from
any one of its furthest limits (which are defined by located bodies)
to the outermost heavenly spheres. But from the fact that the air as a
whole has many parts not in contact with some one contained body,
it does not follow that there is not some body such that some innermost
parts of it are in contact with the outermost parts of the located body,
and such that this (innermost part of the continent) is the immediate
place (locus primus) of the located body.292
Ockham's reply to the next objection :
place and the placed are equal ; but the containing body is not equal to the
contained ... therefore, etc.;
allows him to elaborate on the meaning of the term “ equal" which was
previously employed without that linguistic precision upon which he
characteristically insists. "When it is said, " Ockham writes ,
that place and the placed are equal, it is patent through what has gone
before in what mode they are equal ; because, namely, (they are equal)
according to the furthest parts which are in contact ... And yet this holds
with this : that ... the outer parts (of the containing body) , not touching
291 Phil. Nat., IV, 21 : " Item dicit Aristoteles quod totus aer non est
locus proprius alicuius, quia tunc locus et locatum non essent aequalia ;
et tunc, qua ratione totus aer non est locus alicuius, nec totum corpus est
alterius ; et tamen oportet quod aliquid illius sit locus alicuius, et non aliqua
pars, propter eandem rationem ; ergo aliquod aliud, quod non potest esse
nisi superficies."
292 Tractatus. , p. 77-8 : " Per idem patet ad aliud , quod non totus aer,
scilicet qui continet illud corpus et aliud, est locus proprius et primus illius,
et hoc quia habet multas ultimas partes, quae non tangunt illud corpus
praeter partes superiores, quae tangunt aliam sphaeram superiorem. Et ideo
non sequitur: totus aer non est locus proprius illius, igitur nec aliquod aliud
corpus totum est locus alicuius, quia multae sunt partes ultimae aeris
totius, quae non tangunt aliquam partem illius locati. Sed non est sic de
quocumque alio corpore, quia alicuius corporis nulla est pars ultima interior,
quin tangat aliquam partem ultimam illius corporis locati , et ideo est locus
primus illius corporis."
the located body, may be longer or even broader (than the place of the
located) . 293
Physical "equality" then, so far as the relation of place to the placed is

concerned , is a term yielding the information that the furthest limits of
the containing body are in immediate and intimate contact with the
furthest limits of the contained .
Ockham's solution of the fourth objection allows him, subsequently,

to enlarge on a distinction barely touched upon in his reply to the second
objection : that between the first and second place of a thing. The argu-
ment itself, designed to demonstrate the divorce between place and the
placed, takes its point of departure from Averroes' stand that there are
two different places, a first and a second; and that a subject is in a second
place by virtue of its being in a first place. For example : something is
located in the air when it is in the furthest enveloping limit of the air.
Hence, Ockham's opponents conclude , the total body of air is the
second place of the located body ; while the furthest limit of the air,
which contains the body itself, is its first place. Consequently, it is held
to be demonstrated that whereas the first place is related to the second
place, both places are physically distinct from that which is enveloped. 294
"It is obvious, " Ockham replies,
that the Commentator is speaking of the whole air containing many bodies ;
which is, therefore, not the first place of any of these bodies. But in that
whole air, a body is said to be located because it is in some part of the body
of air, and any furthest part directed against the located touches some part
of the located . And that the Commentator is speaking of the whole air, is
clear, because he says that the bound (i . e. , the furthest limit) of one thing
(i. e., the whole air) is the proper place of a thing which is said to be in the
air, and (the second place is) something else which contains itself and the
other. Verbi gratia : the bound of the whole air, and, therefore, the whole
air, is the second place ; but that air equal with respect to length, breadth,
and depth to the located, is its proper place ; and these two "airs, " so to
say, are distinguished as a whole and a part.295
Thus far the chief merit of Ockham's replies to his adversaries'
objections lies rather in their efficacy for removing those sophistical
difficulties raised on linguistic grounds, than in a constructive extension
293 Phil. Nat. , IV, 21 ; cf. Aristotle, op . cit. , IV, 4 .

294 Phil. Nat . , IV, 21 : " Item : Commentator (see Averroes, op. cit.,
Comment 33 , fol . 111г) ... dicit quod alius est locus primus, alius est locus
secundus ; et dicit quod res est in secundo loco quia est in primo, et exem-
plificat sicut aliquid est in aere, est quia, in ultimo fine continente ipsum.
Igitur, secundum eum, aer est locus secundus, et ultimum continens corpus
ipsum locus primus ; et per consequens sunt distinctae res. "
295 Phil. Nat . , IV , 20.
of his view of place and the placed. This, however, is not to be the
case with regard to a final objection . For in his reply to this argument :
every body is mobile ... but place is immobile,296
designed, obviously, to demonstrate the independence of place from
the placed - Ockham expands materially on his initial thesis.
Now several previous attempts - two of which Ockham will ex-
amine to preserve the theoretical immobility of place have been, as
far as Ockham is concerned, dismally abortive . One school sought to
preserve that immobility upon which Aristotle has insisted, by the nice,
if devious method of marking a distinction between two ways in which
any extended object could be said to be " in a place : " materially, and
formally. Place is, of course, immobile when considered from the material
aspect - i. e., as being the place defined by the "furthest limit of the
containing body" in intimate contact with the surfaces of the located.
When, however, that extended body changes its place, its former place
can still be considered as immobile viewed from the formal aspect — i . e . ,
with respect to the order of the universe.297
This thesis, preserving under all circumstances the immobility of
place, can be illustrated by analogy. A ship tied at anchor in a flowing
stream is not always, in the material sense, in the same place, insofar
as its surfaces are in contact with first one , and then another, part of
the water in which the entire body of water consists . It is, however,
viewed formally, always in the same place - i. e., with respect to the
whole stream; and seen thus, in the formal sense, the place of each
part of the water, of the ship tied at anchor, and by further reference
the whole body of water itself, are all immobile.298
296 Phil. Nat. , IV, 20 : " Omne corpus est mobile ; secundu (m) Philo-
sophu(m) locus est immobilis ut patet in diffinitione, ergo, etc. " Cf. Aristotle,
Physics, IV, 4.
297 Phil. Nat., IV, 22 : “ Quantum ad ultimum argumentum de immo-
bilitate, est sciendum quod istam immobilitatem loci diversi diversimode
nituntur salvare. Dicunt enim aliqui, quod in loco est duo considerare ;
scilicet, illud quod est materiale ibi loci , et est superficies corporis continentis ;
et illud quod est ibi loci formale, scilicet ordo ad universum."
298 Phil. Nat., IV, 22 : " Sicut videmus quod quaelibet pars fluvii movetur,
totus autem fluvius est immobilis quodammodo, quia quamdiu durat cursus
aquarum, tamdiu cursus retinet eundem situm . Navis, enim, si ligetur ad
anchora(m) , ut non simul cum flum(ine) fluat, dicetur se (m) per esse in eodem
loco ; quia licet alia et alia aqua sit subter eam, et licet navis non semper
habeat eundem ordinem ad partes fluvii, quia partes illae sunt mobiles, quia
tamen quamdiu sit ligata est in eodem loco respectu ad totum fluvium,
propter quod totus fluvius dicitur quodammodo locus, quia locus navis
habet immobilitatem ex ordine ad totum fluvium." Ockham here appears
to be examining the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. In Commentaria in
Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Lib. IV, Cap. IV, Lect. VI , 14 , St. Thomas
writes : "... sic igitur fluvius totus inquantum est immobilis, est locus
9 Ockham : Motion
Passing now to a more generalized statement, the proponents of

this attempt to preserve the immobility of place, point out that since
precisely the same absolute spatial relationship obtains at all times
between the furthest limits of the universe, and the center of the earth,
all places in between are, in the formal sense, immobile. Should the furthest
limits of the containing body of air, for example, defining the simply
material place of some extended body in space be changed by the action
of a capricious wind, the immobility of place is still preserved , owing
to the fact that that body, by ultimate reference to the poles of the world
and the center of the earth , is still, formally, in the same place.299 It
seems that Ockham will be forced here from the consideration of a
fundamentally naive conception of distinct and absolute places, to a
much more sophisticated and generalized theory of absolute space.
In rebuttal , Ockham points out that if places were the formal order
obtaining with respect to some absolutely privileged system (i. e. , the
immobile center of the earth, and the immobile poles of the world) ,
that order would be formally in the locating rather than in the located
body ; and if order were an accident of the locating body, then a change
communis. Cum autem locus proprius sit pars loci communis oportet accipere
proprium locum navis in aqua fluminis, inquantum habet ordinem ad totum
fluvium ut est immobilis. Est igitur accipere locum navis in aqua fluente,
non secundum hanc aquam quae fluit, sed secundum ordinem vel situm
quem habet haec aqua fluens ad totum fluvium : qui quidem ordo vel situs
idem remanet in aqua succedente . Et ideo licet aqua materialiter praeter-
fluat, tamen secundum quod habet rationem loci , prout scilicet consideratur
in tali ordine et situ (ad) totum fluvium, non mutatur. Et per hoc similiter
accipere debemus quomodo extremitates corporum mobilium naturalium
sint locus, per respectum ad totum corpus sphaericum caeli ; quod habet
fixionem et immobilitatem propter immobilitatem centri et polorum. Sic,
igitur licet haec pars aeris quae continebat, vel haec pars aquae effluat et
moveatur inquantum est haec aqua ; tamen secundum quod habet haec aqua
rationem loci, scilicet situs et ordinis ad totum sphaericum caeli , semper
manet. Sicut etiam dicitur idem ignis manere quantum ad formam, licet
secundum materiam varietur consumptis et additis quibusdam lignis. "
This latter part of St. Thomas ' statement will come in for its share of criticism
by Ockham. See below, pp. 123-4.
299 Phil. Nat. , IV, 22 : "Similiter, et si quaelibet pars universi sit mobilis,
tamen universum non mutat locum suum secundum substantiam, et locus
sursum dicitur esse immobilis, quia concavum orbis Lunae semper est in
eadem distantia ad centrum, nec est in uno tempore plus sursum quam in
alio ; et sicut locus sursum est immobilis, ita locus deorsum. Est enim im-
mobilis, quia centrum immobilitatis perseverat, sic ergo in ordine ad uni-
versum habet locus immobilitatem. Et, ideo, si aliquid in terra quiesceret,
et vento flante moveretur, et tolleretur totus aer, qui est circa ipsum, non
diceretur mutare locum, quia eundem haberet ordinem ad totum universum
quem prius habuit, ergo. etc. Probat idem sic : quia licet te quiescente posset
moveri aer qui est iuxta te, vel aliquod corpus circumdans te, semper tamen
dicereris esse in eodem loco, quia semper es in eadem distantia ad centrum
et ad polos mundi qui sunt immobiles, et ideo per respectum ad ista locus
dicitur esse immobil (i)s."
in the immediate physical environment of any located body would

result, necessarily, in a complete change of order.300 "It is confirmed,"
Ockham writes :
because just as an absolute accident, numerically one, cannot be in diverse
subjects, so that accident (of order) — which these men posit to be respective
— cannot be numerically the same and in diverse subjects. Therefore, that
order does not remain in a moved subject having that order ; therefore, that
(order) does not remain immobile when the surface of the containing body
has been changed ; consequently, place is neither materially nor formally
immobile .301
Further, to conclude that a ship at anchor in a flowing stream is
always in the same place because it maintains the same position with
respect to the entire stream, is to ignore the necessary distinction between
common and proper places. Ockham writes :
since the ship is located, it is in the stream ; and it is manifest that the whole
stream is not the ship's proper place. Hence , some part of the stream is the
ship's proper place, and then it is argued thus : this part of the stream, which
is the proper place of the ship, does not always have the same distance
with respect to the whole stream ; consequently, the place of the ship is
not always the same.302
Ockham's final criticism brings the whole theoretical structure here
under scrutiny, tumbling about the heads of its defenders. The funda-
mental conception - that which made it at all reasonable to assume the
existence of an invariant formal order that there exists in nature some
absolutely immobile point of reference by means of which an invariant
order can be said to obtain, is treated by Ockham, thus:
and that which was said in the second reason, concerning the immobility
of the poles and of the center, proceeds from a false conception namely :
that there are in the heavens some immobile poles, and in the earth one
immobile center. This is impossible. For it is impossible that the subject
of some accident be locally moved while the accident itself, if it remains
the same in number, be not locally moved. But any subject of an accident,
and any substance in the heavens, is locally moved ; therefore, the poles
303
either do not remain (numerically) the same, or they will be locally moved ."
300 Phil. Nat., IV, 22 : " Sed ist (i) non declarant immobilitatem loci,
quia si locus sit formali (ter) ordo, vel distantia ad centrum et ad polos mundi ,
ille ordo erit formaliter in corpore locante, et non in corpore locato, quia
si esset in corpore locato , sequeretur quod locus formaliter esset in corpore
locato formaliter, quod est contra Aristotelem. Si , ergo, ille ordo est in locante,
ergo mutato loca (n) te mutatur ordo, quia cum ordo sit quoddam accidens ,
secundum istum errorem, impossibile est ordinem illum esse immobilem
mutato habente eundem ordinem."
301 Ibid.
302 Ibid.
303 At this point the Tractatus. , p . 85, contains an additional passage :
"et si dicatur quod poli non sunt accidentia, sed substantiae contra :
9.
And if it be said that a pole, which is indivisible, is not a part of the

heavens, since the heavens are a continuum and a continuum does not
consist in indivisibles against : if there is a pole, and it is not a part of the
heavens, it is either, therefore, a corporeal or an incorporeal substance .
If corporeal, it is therefore divisible, hence it is not indivisible . If it is an
incorporeal substance, it is , therefore, intellectual, and is, consequently,
intelligence ; and so intelligence would be a pole of the heavens, which is
ridiculous. Consequently, it is impossible to posit such an indivisible accident,
or such a substance, which may be a pole. 304
The second attempt to preserve the immobility of place is greeted
by Ockham with partial approval . This attempt, he feels, although still
falling short of the sought-for mark on theoretical grounds , more closely
approximates the truth than did the first. Place, according to this latter
theory, is a relation ; a relation which is totally destroyed when either
the contained is locally moved, or the containing body in intimate
contact with the contained , is somehow disturbed . The place of anything,
it is further contended , is not of necessity numerically one. Consider, for
example, the instance in which a playful wind-current is constantly
whipping up those " furthest limits" of the containing air contiguous
with some extended body. Obviously, place , as a relation, is being
continuously destroyed, and one place is succeeding to another ; these
places are, patently, not numerically one and the same - they are,
however, it is held, one through equivalence.305
tunc in caelo esset aliqua pars caeli non mota localiter ; " which is not found in
Phil. Nat. The critical apparatus in Tractatus . , does not note this as an
omission in the Phil. Nat.
304 Phil. Nat. , IV, 22.
305 Phil. Nat. , IV, 22 : Alii magis veridici dicunt quod quando
aliquod tale corpus movetur circa quiescens, non manet idem locus numero,
sed (est) alius et alius numero, (et tamen idem locus) per aequivalentiam .
Ideo dicunt quod locus est alius, tamen dicunt quod locus est immobilis,
quia nullo modo potest moveri locus, sed quando superficies movetur ille
locus corrumpitur, et illa est relatio, quae corrumpitur subiecto illo moto
localiter." Ockham here appears to be examining Duns Scotus' theory.
See Scotus: Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum, dist. II , qu . 6:
"Dico ... locus habet immobilitatem oppositam motui locali omnino, et
incorruptibilitatem secundum aequivalentiam per comparationem ad motum
localem. Primum patet, quia si est aliquid modo mobile localiter, quantum-
cumque accipiatur per accidens , et ei assignari alius et alius locus , sicut
licet similitudo moveatur quasi accidentaliter per accidens, quia scilicet
in quarto vel in quinto gradu, quia primo corpus, et per hoc superficies,
et per hoc albedo, et per hoc similitudo ; tamen superficies , vel albedo, vel
similitudo, vere est, quando movetur in toto corpore in alio et alio loco.
Similiter tunc aliquid quiescens posset moveri localiter, nam quod habet
alium et alium locum successive, localiter movetur ; fixum autem posset
habere alium et alium locum continentem, si moveretur locus per accidens .
Secundo ... licet locus corrumpatur moto eius subiecto localiter, ita quod
moto aere localiter non manet in eo eadem ratio loci, quae prius ... Nec
eadem ratio loci potest manere in aqua succedente, quia idem accidens
numero non potest manere in duobus subiectis, tamen illa ratio loci succedens,
This opinion meets with Ockham's approval in this : that it posits,

in the case where the containing body is disturbed, place to be other
than one in number. Insofar, however, as it posits place to be destroyed
when a subject is locally moved , Ockham will take issue with it ; for this,
he holds, is grounded in the specious assumption that place is "a certain
relation really distinct from the locating body. " " Such a relation, " he
writes,
is not the furthest limit of the containing body, therefore, it is not place ;
consequently, notwithstanding that such a relation is destroyed, it does
not follow that place is destroyed, and consequently the immobility of place
does not follow from its opposition to local motion . Similarly : no property
of place corresponds to such a relation ; since it (place as a relation) neither
contains such a located, which (properties) are, however, the precise grounds
of place.308
quae est alia a ratione praecedenti secundum veritatem, est eadem prae-
cedenti per aequivalentiam quantum ad motum localem, nam ita incom-
possibile est localem motum"" esse ab hoc loco in hunc locum, sicut si esset
omnino idem locus numero .' See also P. Duhem's article : "Le Mouvement
Absolu et le Mouvement Relatif, " (cinquième article) , in Revue de Philo-
sophie, vol . XII , March ( 1908 ) , where Duhem points out (p . 247 ) that
Ockham " se sépare nettement de Duns Scot au sujet de la nature même
du lieu. Pour le Docteur Subtil, le lieu est une certaine entité dont le fonde-
ment se trouve en la surface de contact du contenant au contenu ."
306 Phil . Nat. , IV, 22 : " Ista opinio est vera quantum ad hoc, quod ponit
quod est alius locus numero in tali casu quando corpus circumdans locatum
movetur localiter. Sed quantum ad hoc, quod ponit quod locus corrumpitur
per hoc, quod subiectum movetur localiter, fals(a) est, et procedit ex falsa
imaginatione, scilicet : quod locus sit quaedam relatio distincta realiter a
locante ... et ... talis relatio non est ultimum corporis continentis, ergo
non est locus .... " etc. For Ockham the category of relation (ad aliquid)
is similar to the category of quantity in this : that both quantitative and
relative terms are connotative, and in significative employ stand primarily
for either an individual substance, or an individual quality, and not for an
absolute and real relation or quantity . See the Tractatus de Praedestinatione ...
op. cit., the main thesis of which is concerned to prove that neither pre-
destination nor reprobation are real relations representing entities distinct
either from God or from the predestined or reprobated person . See also
the "Quaestio De Relatione attributed to William Ockham, " by Gaudens
E. Mohan, Franciscan Studies, vol. XI , no . 3 and 4 ( 1951 ) , which Tract,
although it appears to have been compiled by someone other than Ockham,
is nevertheless at one with his teachings on relation as found in Sent., I ,
dist. 30, qu . 3 ; Quodl . , VI , qu . 8—25 ; and VII , qu . 1—25 ; Logic. , ch . 49-55,
pp. 140-163 ; and Tractatus. , pp. 35-6. P. Boehner, in commenting on
the Tractatus de Praedestinatione ... (op. cit. , p . 50-51 ) , notes carefully
that "it is not easy to identify those Scholastics who were of this opinion
(i . e., that predestination and reprobation are real relations) . One thinks
of Scotus, but though Scotus admits that a relatio realis is a different entity
from the terms related , it is not certain, nor is it even probable, that he
admitted passive predestination or reprobation to be a real relation . For
he makes a clear distinction between relationes reales and relationes rationis,
and it seems that he did not consider even the relation of time or the prae-
dicamentum quando as a separate relation-entity. With some caution, we
dare to suggest that Walter Burleigh, a contemporary of Ockham, adhered
to the criticized opinion . At least he admits the category quando to be a
Having disposed thus of previous attempts to retain that immobility

of place upon which Aristotle had insisted, and to eschew commitment
to the indefensible theory of distinct and absolute places, while yet
giving a coherent physical account of motion from place to place,
Ockham directs his own energies to an explication of how the immobility
of place is to be "saved."
Ockham commences by pointing out that every empirically en-

countered subject is, in the nature of things, generable and corruptible .
And since all such generables and corruptibles are either substances
or accidents ; and since all substances and accidents are mobile, either
per se or per accidens , 307 there is no gainsaying the conclusion that place ,
which is one of those subjects with which we commonly traffic, is , either
per se or per accidens - mobile!
However, Ockham continues before a chorus of outraged voices can

shout him down, it is by virtue of speech on the literal plane - speech
proper to a discussion of place on the scientific level that place should
be thus accorded mobile status. A mode of speech more suitable to the
plain man's discussion of place can, following Aristotle, hold place to be
immobile. Aristotle , Ockham feels, found it extremely useful as a forceful
illustrative device to discuss place as if it were immobile . In this way,
Aristotle was enabled to sharply accent the fundamental properties
of place ; and if some of the Philosopher's literal-minded readers mis-
takenly assumed him to mean that place was, per se, immobile, they
are gravely misinterpreting his original intent. All that Aristotle meant
to intimate, was that for purposes of discussion, place could be con-
real entity that is added to the thing which is in time ." For more on Ockham's
theory of relation, see L. Baudry , " Apropos de la Théorie Occamiste de la
Relation, ” Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Age. Vol. IX,
(1934) ; P. Doncoeur, "Le Nominalisme de Guillaume Occam," Revue
Néoscolastique, ( 1921 ) ; G. Martin, " Ist Ockhams Relationstheorie Nomina-
lismus ?" Franziskanische Studien, ( 1950), and by the same author, Wilhelm
von Ockham, (Walter de Gruyter and Co. , Berlin, 1949) .
307 For Ockham , the predication per se of an attribute to a subject
considers either an intrinsic element of the subject (which is a predication
per se primo modo) , or it is the predication of a property not expressed in the
essential definition, but follows from the essential definition (per se secundo
modo see above, p . 99, n . 241 , where "time" is predicated per se in this
second mode of " motion" ) .
A predicable per se is opposed to a predicable per accidens, in that the
predication per accidens may or may not belong to the subject. "Man is
rational" is a per se predication primo modo since " rational" is a part of the
definition of " man .'" 'Man is risible, " on the other hand, is a per se predication
secundo modo, since this predicate does not express an essential element
of the subject but expresses rather a property which follows necessarily
from the nature of man as a rational animal . See Logic . , ch. 37, pp. 96-98.
sidered as immobile : but its true immobility, is immobility through

equivalence - which is tantamount to the proper observation that
place is, in fact, mobile.
Ockham expands thus on " immobility through equivalence," in-
dicating the efficacy of this conception for satisfying all the requisite
properties of place in relation to the placed ; subsequently, he adds a
clarification of the way in which a place can be conceived of as " distinct. ”
Whence, when some one part of a (contained) body is in some (con-

taining) body, and some other part (of the same contained body) is in
another (containing) body of another species - as when a stick of wood
is thrust into the bottom of a stream (so that its top is still above water) ,
one part is contained by the water, and another by the air, and another by
the earth still, it is in the same (one) place through equivalence. Similarly :
when the (containing) body around some resting body is continually moved,
it (the resting body) is in one place through equivalence. So that, with regard
to "saving" the quiet of the located body, and other things are said of place
and the placed, they only lend strength to this : (that) place is numerically
distinct and nothing more . And it is this for place itself to be distinct : place
(is) numerically one through equivalence.308
This notion of equivalent immobility "saves" the curious consequent

which follows when the place of some body is continuously changed owing
to accidental circumstance, while the body itself is lying immobile.
A body whose places are continuously changing about it, is not, according
to Ockham, necessarily in local motion ; it is only in local motion if
it were such that it would be continuously in different places if place were
immobile- that is, the situation presents a paradox only if places are
postulated to be per se immobile ; which Ockham's conception of “ im-
mobility" — immobility through equivalence - eschews the difficulty
entirely. Even if the immediate places of a body are many, or are chang-
ing, as long as these places are equivalent to one place as determined
308 Phil . Nat. , IV, 22 : " Ideo, de virtute sermonis proprie loquendo debet
concedi quod locus est mobilis, quia nihil est in istis inferioribus generabilibus
et corruptibilibus quin sit mobile motu locali per se, vel per accidens, quia
omne quod est in istis inferioribus vel est substantia vel accidens. Si sit
substantia, sive sit materia, forma sive compositum, adhuc est mobile,
patet inductive. Si autem accidens , et suum subiectum sit mobile, est mobile
per accidens ; et ideo locus oportet esse mobile per se, vel per accidens . . .
Verumtamen pro intentione Philosophi est sciendum quod Philosophus
intendit dicere quod locus est immobilis per aequivalentiam , hoc est, quod
tantum valet locus ad salvandum omnia quae ponuntur de loco, ac si realiter
esset immobilis, et ita possunt in eodem loco sibi succedere diversa corpora
loco mutato, sicut possent si locus esset immobilis . Similiter est de omnibus
conditionibus propriis ipsius loci, quod ita possunt salvari sicut si locus
esset immobilis simpliciter, et nihil aliud intelligo per locum esse immobilem
secundum aequivalentiam . Unde quando aliquod corpus est secundum unam
partem in aliquo corpore ..." etc.
by their relation to the center and periphery of the world, that is con-
sidered to be in one place, and at rest.
And this was the Philosopher's intent when he said that place is as a
transmutable vase ; because just as a vase, (it) can be transmuted , although
it remains immobile according to equivalence with respect to the water or
other contents of the vase.309
4.
The Universe as a System of Systems
Position, so far as Ockham is concerned, is fundamentally position

within a particular system. "When the Philosopher," he writes,
said that the whole stream is more the place of the (anchored) ship that is
some part of the stream ... he meant that some condition of place agrees
more to the whole stream (than to a part) , for the whole stream does not
lose its total place to acquire another. Still, the whole stream is not the place
of the ship other than on the account of its parts ; but first on account of
one part, and then on account of another ; hence, the stream is always the
place of the ship while the ship rests -Ithat is, however, not the case with
respect to some part of the stream . And this is the reason why the whole
stream is more the place of the ship than is some part.310
Whereas, that is, the ship is constantly changing places with respect
to one system (although it is not in local motion insofar as these places
are equivalent to but one) , it is, with respect to another system, to all
intents and purposes, at rest. Ockham continues , italicising the disparity
which may obtain between position in respect of one system as compared
to another, by pointing out "yet another reason
309 Phil. Nat. , IV, 22 : "Et si dicatur quod omne quod continue est in
alio loco et alio, movetur localiter, dicendum quod non -- sed solum illud
corpus, quod taliter se habet quod esset in alio et alio loco, etiam si locus
esset immobilis, vere movetur localiter. Et ita non est in proposito. Nam
isto casu posito, si locus esset immobilis, continue esset in eodem loco de
facto, quamvis posset esse in alio. Et hoc intendit Philosophus quando
dicit .. etc. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 4. Further on (ibid. ) Ockham
writes : "... locus et vas non differunt nisi secundum superius et inferius,
nec aliam differentiam intendit Philosophus et Commentator dare inter
locum et vas . Et si dicatur, quod si vas esset proprie locus, vere, quando
aliquid moveretur ad motum vasis, vel non moveretur, vel manens in eodem
loco moveretur dicendum est, quod tale motum vere est in eodem loco
sibi proprio, quando tamen idem locus numero est in diversis per aequivalen-
tiam, hoc tantum valet ad hoc, quod corpus existens in eo moveatur, ac
si esset aliud et aliud vas, et alius et alius locus . Et ideo concedo , quod idem
manens in eodem loco proprio movetur, non tamen manet in eodem loco
communi, nec iste idem est unus numero in eodem loco num(ero) , sed mutat
locum ; et ideo existens in eo movetur localiter. Unde in talibus est magis
difficultas vocalis quam realis, et magis potest deduci ad inconveniens vulgo,
quam sapientibus . '
310 Phil. Nat. , IV. 22. Cf. Aristotle , op. cit. , IV. 4.
why the whole stream is said to be more the place of the ship than are some
of its parts. Because in the resting ship and the stream there is neither
augmented nor diminished, in the whole time, the distance between the
furthest parts of the stream and the ship itself, although the stream has, at
diverse times, diverse furthest parts. And this is not the case as regards
some part of the stream which was, previously, the place of the ship.311
Patently, this conception of systems within systems , as of contained
within containers, can be applied over and over : this water is at rest with
respect to its containing vase ; this vase, with respect to a containing
ship ; this ship, floating downstream , with respect to its proper place
while all of these subjects, contained and container alike, in respect
of the system provided by the relatively stable stream-banks are
in motion. Yet, when in this sequence of referential systems, the ultimate
system ―― the regular and majestic motion of the containing and un-
contained³12 heavens -— is approached, there is no fixed, absolutely im-
mobile, reference point. True, the motion of this outermost system is
uniform enough to provide the temporal yardstick by means of which
relatively difform " inferior" motions are numbered ; still, aside from
this normative regularity, the " superior" reference system is no way
privileged. The universe, as Ockham sees it, in respect of motion and
position, consists in a system of systems.313
311 Phil. Nat. , IV, 22.

312 The fact that the heavens are uncontained occasions a theoretical
difficulty which Ockham obviates by adopting Averroes' position . Ockham
(Phil. Nat., IV, 22 ) writes : " Item ... secundum opinionem Commentatoris
(see Averroes, op. cit. , Text 43 , fol . 116r) , quod caelum est in loco per accidens,
et ita quod aequivoce dicitur caelum esse in loco et alia corpora. Verum-
tamen diffinitio quam dat Philosophus de loco (see Aristotle, op. cit., IV, 5) ,
non competit caelo per se, nec per accidens ; quamvis enim haec sit vera :
'caelum est in loco per accidens, ' haec tamen est falsa : ' caelum est in ultimo
corporis continentis per accidens, ' quia nec est in ultimo per se nec per
accidens. Et propter hoc dicit Commentator quod haec diffinitio quam dat
de loco est impossibile, quod sit communis omni corpori simplici circulari
et rotundo, scilicet ultimo caelo. Si tamen ista diffinitio competeret ultimo
caelo, omnis diffinitio loci esset saltem praedicabilis de caelo per accidens.
Et ita patet quod ultimum caelum et alia corpora aequivoce sunt in loco ,
et caelum esse in loco per accidens non est aliud quam caelum continere
aliquod quiescens quod est in loco per se tamquam continente ipsum.”
313 Phil . Nat. , IV, 22 : " Et sic, per istam rationem, potest assignari
ratio, seu causa, quare aliquid dicitur esse in toto caelo, quia scilicet, corpore
quiescente aequalis est distantia ad omnes partes ultimas caeli, ita quod
omni hora est verum dicere quod corpus tantum vel tantum accepta
aliqua determinata quantitate mensuretur ― et hoc corpus aequaliter distat
ab omnibus partibus ultimi caeli ; et propter istam rationem corpus aequaliter
distat ab omnibus partibus ultimi caeli ; et propter istam rationem dicitur
corpus quiescere in terra quantumcumque tam caelum, quam aer, movetur .
Verbi gratia : ponatur, gratia exempli, corpus quadratum, et sit una pars
eius ' a ' , secunda, ' b ', tertia, ‘c' , quarta , ‘ d', si tunc ‘ a' distat a partibus
superioribus per centum miliaria, et ' b' distat tantumdem a partibus dextris,
Ockham cheerfully grants that this conception of the relativity of

motion and position commits him to the stand that place must be in
a place if it can be said to be in motion with respect to some system ;
but he refuses to concede that the inevitability of this commitment is
an any way destructive of his entire conception , or counter to Aristotle's
precepts . The furthest limits of a containing body define the position
of a contained body, not the continent body. The air, by example, is
the place of some body by virtue of the fact that some furthest limit
of the air is contiguous with all facets of that body ; still, at all times,
this contained body has the potential capacity to change from one
location to another, which fact in no way militates against the similarly
obvious fact that all of these possible new positions are themselves
contained - are themselves in a place.314
Now place, as a furthest limit , involves a continent body just as

immediately as it does the content with whose every facet it is contiguous .
Hence, a change of place, if place is truly mobile , will involve the furthest
parts not only in a change with regard to the content, but also with
regard to the continent of which it is part. Place , in brief, if it be mobile,
is not only in a place, bur must somehow have the capacity to be moved
to another place ; and Ockham, who has postulated the mobility of
place, is faced now with the problem of explaining how this can be
accomplished.
Initially, he focusses on the furthest limits of the continent. The

whole continent , that is, is not the proper place of anything, and is not
subject to the mobility in question . Only that part of the continent which
is, truly, a place , can be moved, and this specialized portion may be
moved, according to Ockham , in two ways. In the first way, those
furthest limits which were the place of some extended body are swept
into one conglomerate ; as, for example, when the wind flows about
et sic de aliis ; et tunc dico quod haec erit vera : hoc quadratum quiescit
sive caelum moveatur, sive non, dummodo non moveatur motu recto, sed
motu circulari. Et ita bene salvabitur quies illius corporis et aequalis distantia
ad caelum si quaelibet pars caeli moveatur circulariter, sicut si non moveren-
tur, et sicut si essent poli immobiles, sicut aliqui imaginantur, et ideo
immobilitas polorum nihil facit."
314 Phil. Nat., IV, 22 : “ Et si arguitur contra praedicta quod locus non
potest moveri , quia tunc locus esset locatus dicendum quod locus vere
movetur, et vere est in loco. Aer enim vere est locus alicuius, et tamen vere
est in loco, sicut qui continentur ab alio, non tamen est in loco per ultimas
partes contiguas locato, sicut non continetur ab alio manentibus illis partibus
quibus illae partes ultimae, et omnes partes ultimae contiguantur alteri ,
sed per eas continent, et non continentur, et hoc sufficit ad intentionem
Philosophi . "
some resting body and "runs together", and drains off, those parts
of the air which constituted the proper place of the located. In this
way place is moved , in that lacking a content it is no longer a place, but is
itself, now, in a place. In the second way, the proper place of some
body does not become " conjoined" , but retains its original properties
excepting only that it now possesses a content differing from the original
- i. e., it becomes the furthest limit of the containing body in respect
to another contained. In the first way, place was moved in that it sur-
rendered its content to return to the undifferentiated mass of the
continent ; in the second way, place was moved in that it surrendered
one content for another.315
"And so it is obvious," Ockham concludes,
that place is truly mobile. It is, however, immobile through equivalence ;

because with regard to " saving" many things which are said of place
chiefly in respect of " saving" the motions and rests of natural bodies on
account of which (states) place is mainly posited it suffices that place
be mobile. For both the rest and the motion of bodies can be "saved" if
place is mobile , just as if place is immobile : nay, more : for except that some
place were mobile by means of circular motion, as (are) the heavens, the
rests and motions of bodies could not be (" saved" at all) .
This and nothing other is the intention of the Philosopher and the
Commentator. And all of the Philosopher's and Commentator's writings
which seem to be contrary should be glossed in this mode. The Philosopher
is not to be understood as saying that place is immobile simply (simpliciter),
so that it can in no mode be moved ; for the furthest limits of the heavens
are, according to him, mobile, and yet they are in a place. Since (the heavens)
are not moved rectilinearly, but circularly only (their motion) suffices to
"save" the immobility of place ... And it must be said similarly of the
middle (of the earth) that it makes no difference whether it is mobile simply,
315 Phil. Nat., IV, 22 : " Et si dicatur quod omne quod movetur requirit
aliquem locum in quem recipitur, sed locus non movetur per partes non
contiguas corporis continentis et movetur per partes contiguas contento,
per quas est locus, ergo per istas vere acquiret locum alium, et ita locus
ex ea parte qua est locus vere in loco esset - dicendum quod non omne
quod movetur, acquirit alium locum quantum ad omnes partes suas, et
ideo non movetur nisi quantum ad suas ultimas partes quibus contiguatur
contento, quibus acquirit alium locum. Sed potest moveri dupliciter per
istas partes: quia aliquando tales partes per hoc, quod moventur coniungun-
tur localiter ut cum pr(i)mo partes aeris concurrunt quando auferentur
a corpore quandoque circumdabant ; aliquando vero partes non coniunguntur,
sed remanentes semper aequaliter distant. In primo casu partes istae ultimae
quae primo erant contiguae locato, moventur, ut sint in alio loco et non
ut fiant locus alterius ; quia ex hoc ipso, quod coniunguntur, non sunt locus
quia nihil ab ipsis continetur. In secundo casu , non moventur partes istae,
ut sint in alio loco, sed ut sint locus alterius ; sicut, si aer continue fluat a
ligno, cuius est primo locus, ad lapidem contiguum illi ligno, movetur, ut
sit locus lapidis qui prius est locus ligni, et e converso."
132 Conclusion
or immobile, provided that that which is at the middle of the earth , always,
as concerns its furthest parts, is equidistant from the superior parts of
the heavens, and so with other (located) things. And , therefore, this identity
of place through equivalence is always attended , in inferior things, by equality
of distance with respect to the superior and inferior parts of the heavens. 316
CONCLUSION
I.
Ockham: Metaphysics and Science
Ockham's inquiries into nature are primary displays of that mental

temper which seeks to understand and explain the process of physical
events only in terms of the observable behavior of identifiable bodies.
His investigations, throughout, are characterized by the belief that the
intelligible processes of the physical universe are functions of the in-
dividual being of spatio-temporal located substances whose states of
activity (i. e., "motions") totally exhaust the natural universe and
provide the foundations upon which to erect a science of nature.
The science of things-that-are, however, is not the science of being-
as-such. The latter, arriving at no conclusions such as can be distinguished
from principles, is a non-demonstrative science the science of first
principles as such . Metaphysic , in the last analysis, is a kind of wisdom :
an act of intelligence by which "being" is grasped through the attributes
which belong to it in an unqualified sense . In contrast to the meta-
physician, the natural scientist has as his object being, qua changeable :
beings grasped insofar as they are thus or thus determinable as a "such."
To regard being-as-such, as well as being-qua-changeable, as a function,
or synthesis, of matter and form , would be to mark no difference between
physics and metaphysics. As such, both sciences would reduce to but
one : a " science" which attempts to account for the determinate being
316 Phil. Nat., IV, 22 ; cf. Ockham's whole discussion of place in Altaris.,
esp. ch. VI , pp. 189 and ff. In another place ( Phil. Nat. , IV, 22) , Ockham , with
regard to the notion of a center of the earth writes : " Immobilitas et identitas
loci per aequivalentiam non est attendenda ex medio mundi nisi quia primo
att(en) denda est ex immobilitate caeli motu recto ; quia enim caelum non
movetur, nec superius, nec inferius, ideo dicitur medium mundi esse immo-
bile per aequivalentiam , quod tamen vere est mobilem quamvis terra
secundum se totam nu (m)quam moveatur ." The theoretical utility of this
"center" is shown by Ockham to consist in this : " quod locus sursum et
locus deorsum accipienda sunt in comparatione ad centrum, et ideo immo-
bilitas unius indivisibilis centri, secundum quod aliqui imagina (n)tur,
nihil facit ad hoc , quod unus locus sit sursum et alius deorsum — nec ad hoc,
quod locus sit immobilis, vel idem — sed hoc solum : quod centrum non
movetur motu recto. Et ideo omnis locus qui plus appropinquat ultimae
parti centri, quam alter, est locus deorsum, et alter sursum." Ĉf. Aristotle,
op. cit., IV, 4.
Conclusion 133
of things-that-are by reference to absolute principles distinct from and/

or prior to them.
Thus, for Ockham, individual substances qua qualified -- as ap-
prehended in sense experience ― provide the principles for a science.
of nature. Not substances per se ― for substance is never experienced
apart from its qualitative variations and determinations ; nor qualities
per se - for the contraries, although capable of consideration in ab-
straction from the substances which they are said to qualify, do not
naturally exist per se, but are forms of being which exist per aliud - i. e .,
as determinations of individual substances. To ignore this distinction
would be to erase the line, carefully preserved by Ockham, between
the categories of substance and quality, by making all qualities sub-
divisions of substance.
Now Ockham, as we have seen, is perfectly willing to admit qualities

(i. e., those which are grasped by our five senses) as res absolutae. Hence,
Ockham treats qualities of this type as absolute forms distinct from
material substances, which " inhere" in substances. As against the
"absolutist", however, he denies that these absolute qualities are entities
of universal character, and insists that they are particular, or singular
-
things so that if a certain body is white, it is because a certain partic-
ular whiteness (what one might call an "instance" of whiteness) in-
heres in it. In this respect, the question now arises as to why Ockham,
who vigorously opposes the absolutist doctrine with regard to all other
categories, is willing to admit the sensible qualities as real entities.
distinct from substances.
One possible and cogent answer is that he is forced to make this
concession by reason of the Catholic dogma of the Eucharist , according
to which the accidents of bread are believed to remain in existence
when the substance of the bread is destroyed . It appears to us , however,
that there is a more philosophical reason for Ockham's position : for
if we should attempt to reduce the sensible qualities to something else,
and to eliminate them as primary and "absolute" objects of direct
cognition, we would be cutting the ground of empiricism from under us —
if, that is, all our knowledge arises from sense perception , and if all
sense perception is of qualities (as is admitted by all), then unless these.
qualities are real and irreducible entities, we would have to admit that
we do not experience the real, through our senses . So in the case of the
sensible qualities, like "whiteness," "heat," etc. , Ockham readily admits
their separateness as real entities which really "inhere" in substances.
But in the case of quantity, relation and all other categories, he denies
134 Conclusion
any such separate reality, or any theory of " inherence " in substances,
insisting that these categories signify nothing other than substances
and/or qualities, to which they are reducible by analysis or definition .
To hold, however, that the primary subject matter of physics con-
sists in individual determinate substances, must not be misconstrued
as an affirmation that only the material exists. Ockham is not blind
to the existence in experience of such things as patterns, functions and
relations of material structures and systems of such structures. He will ,
however, flatly reject any possibility that such patterns, functions, and
relations are themselves active in either their own actualization, or in the
actualization of anything else in the natural order. Ockham's conception
of natural process, as we have seen, leaves no room for the agency of
"occult" forces.
For Ockham, there is no question but that the plurality and variety
of existential modes displayed in the primary subject matter are entirely
-- not
real and irreducible components of the actual world we inhabit
symbolic and " inferior" concretions, or embodied " reflections " of
some more homogeneous, more perfect, supra-sensible substance. The
experienced orders and connections obtaining in the natural realm are
contingent relations-not material exemplifications of a pre - determined
and unified pattern of logically necessary dependencies.
In sum, the world which Ockham envisions as providing the raw
material for the physicist's inquiries is characterized by modal plurality
and real contingency. Despite the eminent "logiscibility" of its orders
and connections, it is a realm which yet defies the prior statement
of any metaphysical principle from which these, and other (yet un-
noted) orders and connections can be derived by deductive means.
Ockham's metaphysic does not provide a " basis" for his natural
philosophy in the sense that it proffers a set of substantive principles
serving to " save", in ultimate terms, the minutiae and flux of physical
occasions. The principles affirmed are offered neither as props, nor
alternates, for the specific findings accessible to the physical investigator.
Science, indeed, can get along quite nicely without metaphysic, while
it is hardly possible for the reverse to be true. Nor can Ockham's general
view of nature be regarded as the result of some highly esoteric form
of knowing. He draws no line between the inductive procedures of
common-sense and physics on the one hand , and those of metaphysic
on the other. The general account of things which he endorses, appears
to us as the broadest possible extracts from knowledge gleaned in the
course of everyday traffic with the finite beings in which the natural
Conclusion 135
realm consists. Although such a metaphysic is necessarily sparse in

content, it nonetheless proves an effective guide for Ockham's inquiries
into nature: for it provides the philosophic substance out of which
to formulate two regulative questions to which, as we have seen , he
will submit all physical descriptions, laws and hypotheses : what do the
terms that we use in these physical explanations actually mean? How can
we be assured of the truth of that which is asserted in these terms ? In the
final analysis, Ockham's two questions will allow as meaningful only
those assertions " reducible" to statements whose elements designate
observable entities, and as true only those which are satisfied by an
existing state of affairs.
Ockham's metaphysic, in short, appears to us to function chiefly as
an instrument of criticism in determining the relevance of scientific
statements to their subject matter, such that the elements of these
statements must be definable in terms of observable entities, and the
truth of such statements must be determinable by experience or ob-
servation of perceptible matters of fact . To this extent Ockham's meta-
physic is a critical validation of the principle of empiricism in physical
science.
2.
The Mechanics of Ockham's Approach
Analysis of meaning is pursued by definition. Not every term ,

however, employed in common or specialized discourse requires elaborate
treatment to insure precision of communication . Ultimately, this is
guaranteed by the utter primacy of the subject-matter of physics. For
when the terms comprising a proposition purporting to convey infor-
mation about natural entities and occasions are absolutely significative —
i. e., direct " personal supposits" for existents-by-nature (concrete
absolute terms) , or for observable properties of such existents (abstract
absolute terms) attempted refinements of language and probings
for more precise delimitations are entirely gratuitous . Such absolute
terms comprise, for Ockham, the concrete terms in the category of
substance, such as " body," "tree, " "animal," etc. , and the abstract
terms in the category of quality , such as signify perceptible qualities
directly apprehended by the five senses . These items of direct experience
such as are signified by absolute terms are grasped directly by a single,
indivisible, "intention " of the mind . The concept, that is, is a natural
sign of what it means, or of the things it can denote ; and its terminological
counterpart (written or spoken) - although "inferior" in that it is
136 Conclusion
arbitrarily instituted — is yet as simple and direct a marker for things-

that-are as is the concept which denotes these beings .
But not all terms signify, thus simply, "absolute" components
in experience ; and such perplexities as do arise to baffle inquiry in-
variably occur on the level of higher-order constructs couched in con-
notative terms. All terms of first intention that signify a determinate
being (such as can be signified by an absolute term) by consignification
of something distinct from and contingently related to that being, or
by consignifying some determinate feature of that being considered
in abstraction from it, are connotative. These terms then, are not "mere"
linguistic artifices or "pure" fictions. Connotative terms secondarily
"consignify" some perceptible, contingent state, relation, or determinate
part of individual existents considered in abstraction from these existents,
but they signify primarily individual substances or particular qualities
to which these states, relations or parts are attributable . Proper
"reduction," therefore , displays all connotative terms as functions of
absolute terms. Ockham's approach will nowhere admit the possibility
of a definitional regressus ad infinitum. A series of definitional steps
may be long, but it will terminate with definientia which are symbols
for irreducible, real, constituents of a realm outside the universe of
discourse - items of direct observation. Ockham's " reductive" analysis,
then, enables the inquirer to determine whether a given term, in the way
it is employed, has empirical i. e., "factual" reference. Ockham's
rejection of motion, time and place hypostatized, rests ultimately on
the ground that the world being as it is, and the nature of our experience
being what it is, no possible observational procedure can ever be specified
to verify the existence of " absolute" motion, time or place.
Now a very important feature of Ockham's "reductionism " is the
fact that most of the terms or expressions, when reduced to formulations
containing no nouns other than those which signify substances or qualities,
involve verbs in the reductive expressions. For example : in reducing the
connotative term " motion" to the expression " mobile quod movetur”,
the verb "movetur" appears. Being a verb, it does not denote any
thing other than the subject (" mobile" ) to which it is joined ; yet it is
the most essential part of the reductive expression because it expresses
the action connoted by the term "motion ," and it alone expresses the
difference between the conditions of motion and rest , either of which
can equally well determine a mobile. So , although Ockham insists that
motion is not any other thing than a body, or mobile, he does not reduce
the meaning of " motion " to the mere meaning of " mobile body" -
Conclusion 137
rather he shows that the word "motion" denotes a body as involved

in an action. The action is not another thing distinct from the body;
it is precisely the body itself in its actual existence at that time.
The importance of this cannot be over-emphasised because a criticism
- would be that
of Ockham's "reductionism" — improperly understood
Ockham's technique eliminates the dynamic connections and relations
characterizing the actual world, by reducing the terms which express
such relations to discrete sets of nouns, thereby "atomizing" the world.
Actually, Ockham's method of reduction does just the opposite of this -
for it keeps us from falling into the habit of construing terms (like the
term " motion") as simple names of entities, and shows us that these
-
terms are merely shorthand for expressions involving verbs — for ex-
pressions which are, to use more modern terminology, statement
form such as can find application to reality only when given values
which make them into propositions . Thus, to the " absolutist" who
would be inclined to argue that "because body B is moved, therefore
there must be an entity called ' motion' which is acquired by body B ,"
Ockham would reply as follows : "The term ' motion' is equivalent to the
expression ' for something to be moved,' which is a statement form
determining the class of propositions ' B is moved, ' ' C is moved, ' ' D is
moved,' etc." For Ockham, as we have seen, to say that "B is moved
because B acquires a motion," is simply to say that " B is moved because
B is moved." The absolutists, that is, seem to have taken the abstract
term , which is (for Ockham) no more than a shorthand name for a
certain kind of fact , or event, and then claimed to explain the event
by using this name of the event as if it were its cause. Thus, the typical
"absolutist" could be thought of as saying that the reason heavy bodies
fall downward is because they have "gravity" — which, for Ockham,
would be too ridiculous an " explanation," since " gravity" is nothing
but a noun coined from the expression " for a body to fall downward. "
The point to keep in mind, is that Ockham nowhere tries to reduce the
world to a static collection of "things" - i . e . , of substances and quali-
ties ; what he aims to do is to reduce that abstract language, which is
used as if it denoted a lot of abstract " things," to a concrete language
which expresses not only the directly observable "things" involved
in actual events, but which expresses (by means of verbs) the events,
or actions, of these things.317
317 Ockham , it will have been noted , refuses to reduce verbs to nouns.
Thus, he refuses to agree with the common practice of the " absolute"
theorists, of supposing that propositions have designata over and above
the designata of their terms . A further important point is of a similar charac-
ter. He refuses to recognize relations as entities, or as entities distinct from
10 Ockham: Motion
138 Conclusion
3.
Ockham: The Philosophy of External Relations
The fundamental philosophical error in the absolutists physical

scheme, then, appears to lie in his failure to realize that the constructs
of natural science, however unassailable within the limits of their own
relevance , cease to have any meaningful status when pressed into service
beyond those limits. It appears to be Ockham's position, that so long as
natural science is content to restrict itself to statements which can be
confirmed or rejected by appeal to the primary subject matter, it retains
its autonomy and acts as its own regulator ; but as soon as it attempts
to transcend experience, and take flight in speculative " explanations”
involving disembodied " forces" as causal factors , it must be prepared to
pass through the discipline of philosophy whereby it may be enabled, by
criticizing its own foundations, to discover just what ― if, indeed, any
at all -may be the relevance of its knowledge to metaphysical knowledge.
Now to hold, as the absolutists appear to have done, that the cate-
gories of Aristotle represent divisions of being, rather than, as Ockham
feels, ways in which things-that-are may be said to be, antecedently
disqualifies the possibility of making any non-metaphysical statements-
i. e., any statements of a factual contingent character - so that the
absolutist is completely incapable of distinguishing between hingst
and facts. The absolutist has but one basic verbal copula, namely the
verb "participates, " or its inverse " inheres " , and whatever predicate
he asserts of a subject, is, in effect , a definition , or an analysis of the
internal constitution of the subject. All relations , that is , for the absolutist,
are internal relations. To insist , for example, that this-triangular-body-
moved-in-time is triangular owing to the " inherence" in it of triangularity :
moved insofar as it "partakes" of motion : and temporal because " informed"
by time: is to argue the prior, distinct and absolute existence of triangular-
ity, motion and time. This is to reduce the primary subject of the " triang-
ularity," "motion, " and "time," to a fundamentally indeterminate
"something" known only insofar as it connotes forms or causes prior to it .
Under the terms of the "absolute" scheme, science can have only one
legitimate object : forms unobservable in their universality, indeterminate
or added to, their relata . A relation, for Ockham, is a relating - altogether
similar to a proposition or statement ; or, possibly, Ockham might have
acknowledged that relations are " facts", the actual occurrences stated by
propositions , while vehemently denying that we can treat such facts as
things. One has the feeling that Ockham would certainly grant that what
is expressed by a proposition, or by a verb, is "real" indeed, the only
actuality ; but such actuality is not a "thing" such as can be designated by
a noun, or such as could be signified by the subject term in another proposition .
Conclusion 139
with respect to individuality, and ontologically prior to things-that-are.

This is not to say that there is nothing in the empirical world ; it is,
however, to insist that empirical inquiry can yield no knowledge of the
real nature of that world inasmuch as sensible experience now serves
only as the occasion upon which the mind can grasp at its true object :
separated forms, ideas, essences or exemplars .
If this "absolute" doctrine, apparently (as we have sketched it)
a variety of augustinianism, is true, then all of Ockham's efforts were
spent in vain. For Ockham, as we have seen, persists in the belief that
the scientist does, in fact, deal with statements whose elements are
-
demonstrably those reducible to what is observable — i . e . , individual
bodies and their qualities. If, however, knowledge of the real is pre-
cluded by the belief that we apprehend only " occasional" manifestations
of what is truly real, then Ockham's attempt to exhibit the unillumined
human intelligence as adequate to the task of constructing sciences
about things-that-are reduces to the most jejune of mental exercises.
Now our "absolutists" so far as we can determine, have nowhere
denied the actual existence of physical objects independent of their
"information" by absolutes, which latter, they feel, provide the only
key to understanding the true nature of physical reality ; they merely
affirm the belief that since such physical objects are unknowable apart
from their qualifications by these absolute beings, it is a prodigious
waste of time to even consider these physical objects at all. The view
that Ockham is urging, on the other hand , is that not only is it impos-
sible to explain all our experience of the external world unless there
exist physical objects apprehended , understood, and signified as qualified
individual absolutes, but that we do have knowledge of their character.
Ockham's inquiries make it sufficiently clear that any confusion
between what is the " occasion" of intellectual knowledge on the one
hand, and what is the "real" object of knowledge on the other, is due
to a persistent failure to recognize that these are not mutually exclusive
categories for any physical situation as a whole : on the contrary, the
experienced things which are the occasions of our knowledge, are the
real objects known.
Thus, "occasions" or " finite concretions of the real" in the perceptual
realm are merely contradictions in terms. The "round" physical object
which one perceives in experience, is not a provisional occasion for the
illumination of the mind by the essence " roundness ; " it is , indeed , not
the appearance of anything at all other than itself - i . e . , a body whose
outer parts are equidistant from its central part . The fact that we can
10°
140 Conclusion
mentally abstract, and consider in isolation — as if separable - " round-

ness" or "triangularity " or "squareness" from our experience of con-
crete objects, is no proof that there is an exemplary "roundness" or
"triangularity" which is the true object of scientific knowledge, anymore
than our ability to deal in abstract numbers gives us the philosophical
right to regard the realm of nature as nothing but a system of relations.
embodying principles of mathematical synthesis as such. In other words ,
all perceptual objects are what they are, and are not "mere" occasions,
or appearances, of something else which is "really" different.
As we have seen, the whole force of Ockham's philosophy of science,

is directed against those who expound this "doctrine of internal rela-
tions ;" those, that is, who would affirm that every conceptual structure
devised by the human intellect for dealing with things experienced, has
a "real" counterpart "in" the things experienced. This is the doctrine.
of the augustinians and of Duns Scotus (" ordo rerum idem est quod ordo
idearum” ) — it is this doctrine which Ockham fights, tooth and nail,
in all his works. Ockham's whole contention is that language and reality
are not isomorphic, that logic and physics are not parallel to each other,
and that the concepts by which we signify things are not "parts" of
the things we signify by them, nor even signs of " real parts" in these
things. Duns Scotus, by way of contrast , insists that to every concept
applicable to a thing there corresponds a "realitas" in the thing. So
if Socrates is in Athens, Duns would claim that there is a reality called
"being-in-Athens" which enters into the ontological composition of
Socrates when he arrives there, and that Socrates is, to this extent,
an instance of the entity which is "to-be-in-Athens" . Ockham, in sharp
distinction, tells us that " to-be-in-Athens" is not an entity or a thing -
it is, indeed, nothing other than Socrates (in this case) , and Athens,
and far from Athens being in Socrates, it is Socrates who is in Athens -
not "in" in the sense of inherence, but in the ordinary sense of being
surrounded by the parts of the city. The fact that Socrates is in Athens,
Ockham would hold, is not an entity inhering in Socrates, or in anything
else; it is simply the actuality of Socrates at the time he is in Athens,
and it is not to be signified by a noun, but affirmed as a statement.
The same holds for the term "motion," which, for Ockham, does not
signify anything distinct from the body moved and the place through
which it is moved - there are only two things, the body and the place,
and the fact that the body is moved through that place is not a third
"thing", but it is the state of affairs which is the body moving through that
place, expressed by the statement: "body B is moved through place C,"
Conclusion 141
but not denotable by a noun, because it is not a thing, but a happening.

In short, whereas Duns Scotus and the absolutists generally, would
reduce propositions to terms, and construe true statements about things
as equivalent to partial definitions of the things, Ockham operates with
just two kinds of " absolute" terms, and preserves a sharp distinction
between definitions of things on the one hand, and statements of contingent
fact about those things , on the other. If all the facts in which a thing were
involved, were parts of the being of that thing, each and every thing
would be an infinite number of partial things, and nothing could be
defined determinately, and this as we have seen, would be ruled out by
Ockham as totally destructive of the possibility of any science . Ockham's
philosophy is a philosophy of external relations, with " things" defined
independently of their histories, the latter being thereby contingent
and non-necessitated . It is only in this way that we can know something
without knowing everything. Philosophies of internal relations, by
contrast, commit us to the position that we cannot have full knowledge
of anything without having knowledge of everything.
It would seem, then, to be to the credit of our "absolute" theorists
that in directing thought to the epistemic function of the object which
they feel " occasions" knowledge, they appear to be responsible for
recognizing the futility of inquiring what that object is really like, per
se. It provides, that is, a backdrop against which the full significance
of Ockham's insistence on that alone as real, which has real and ob-
servable effects , comes into focus. Physical objects, for Ockham, are real
insofar as they react on other physical objects, and science can give
us knowledge of them insofar as it reveals the nature of these effects .
4.
The Elimination of Abstract Entities

Let us attempt now to understand Ockham's handling of the rôle
of scientific abstractions, and of the problem of preserving their re-
ducibility to empirically determined facts, in the specific area of his
discussion of motion, time and place. In Ockham's discussion of local
motion (as of efficient causality, in general), his main theme is that
of destroying the contention of the absolutists that motion, or efficient
causality, involves any abstract entities distinct from substances and/or
(sensible) qualities. The absolutists claim that when one body pushes
another body in local motion , the agent body generates a form which
then inheres in the moved body, and which immediately moves it .
Ockham denies any such inhering form in the case of local motion,
142 Conclusion
arguing that local motion does not involve the production of any new
entity, but consists solely in the fact that the mobile body is continuously
in successive places (or successive parts of the medium) . He argues further,
that the moving agent, or the body which pushes the patient body, is the
sole and immediate cause of the movement, merely by the fact that it is
itself in motion ; so that no new entity is produced in the process. In
the case of alterative motion, however, Ockham concedes that the agent
generates the acquired quality in the patient, so that in the instance
of alterative motion something new is produced. This is, of course, in
consonance with his own doctrine that qualities are real (particular)
entities. In the case of augmentative motion, on the other hand, Ockham
admits no new production , or new entity, and analyzes augmentation
in terms of the local motion of the parts of the augmented body. The
main burden of his whole discussion is that of disposing of fictive entities
such as "motion" supposedly acquired by the moved body, or such as the
"quantity" supposedly acquired by the augmented body and his
arguments illustrate concretely his technique for reducing scientific
abstractions to elements of experience .
Now Ockham defines motion as " mobile quod movetur " so that there
is involved the existence of immediate places through which the body
moves. The problem of " motion" , therefore (i. e. , local motion) , involves
the concept of place and that of time . Since Ockham's definition of
local motion involves the concept of " place" as that to which the moved
body has successively different relations, the problem naturally arises
as to what "place" is. Now the absolutists (much like the later New-
tonians) , conceived place as a reality distinct from bodies, a pure di-
mensionality in which bodies are found , and through which bodies move ,
but which is itself immaterial and unmoved . Ockham, on the contrary,
stuck rigidly to Aristotle's definition , whereby the "place" of a thing is
that body which surrounds it and whose inner parts touch the thing said
to be in place. Ockham rejects the theory that the place of a thing is
the " space" (or pure dimensionality) of the surrounding body, because
no such immaterial space or dimensionality exists. So he has to concede
that any place , being itself a body, is movable. In consequence , Ockham's
definition of local motion turns out to be a purely relativistic one -
all we can say, is that a body, B, is moved relatively to the surrounding
body (or medium), and it is always possible (or even certain) that this
surrounding body is itself moved in relation to the body which surrounds
it, and so on out to the outermost sphere which has no place and cannot,
therefore, be said either to be moved or to be at rest. Throughout the
Conclusion 143
middle ages there was controversy about the outer sphere , or about
the " place of the world," some holding that the outer sphere, being a
body, must be capable of being moved as a whole in a rectilinear manner ;
but to make this intelligible, they had to assume something through
which it would thus be moved . Consequently, they assumed an infinite
immaterial "space" outside the world , in relation to which the world
could be moved, and in relation to which it could be said to remain
at rest . Ockham, as we have seen, will have none of this : assuming that
there is no corporeal body outside the outer sphere, then, it is meaning-
less to say that the world is in motion or at rest . That is, Ockham denies
"absolute motion " as a consequence of denying " absolute space. "
Since, however, the physicist is concerned to treat of all bodies
in their movements, as a connected system, he has to choose a common
standard frame of reference for his descriptions of the movements of
bodies. And since the outermost (and largest) body is the " place” of
all the inner bodies, it conveniently serves as our spatial frame of re-
ference. Hence, Ockham treats it as the body at rest (i. e . , the body not
displaced as a whole, though it may rotate) , and he treats the internal
dimensions of the sphere as a constant stable " theatre" in which all
movements of inferior bodies occur. It is convenient to describe the
motions of inferior bodies as movements through this dimensionality
of "space" contained by the outer sphere, as if a projectile traversed
so much pure distance, instead of traversing so much corporeal air.
Ockham certainly grants this convenience, and the legitimacy, for
science, of using this fictive " space" as a frame of reference for the
description of motions. But he constantly warns against the danger of
transforming this conceptual instrument of measurement into an im-
material reality supposedly underlying the realm of corporeal bodies.
For this would be to hypostatize, into a metaphysical concept , a purely
logical construction ; an error of the same order as that of hypostatizing
the numbers by which we count things, into eternal objects supposedly
inhering in the things counted.
Ockham treats of time in an entirely similar manner. Time, for
Ockham , is the measure of motion with respect to a before and after.
Since motion, however, is nothing other than a body moved , time is a
measure of body, or it is body qua measured with respect to before and
after. Once again Ockham eliminates abstract entities . Although,
however, the time of a particular motion (or body qua moved ) may
be said to be nothing other than the body itself in its successive positions ,
we cannot measure this time except by making comparison with some
144 Conclusion
other body in motion (or some other time) in which case we have a
timed time, and a timing time. This presents a dilemma : which time
shall we choose to be the timing time, and which one the timed time ?
So we select, with Ockham, one body in motion (i. e. , in motion relative
to all other bodies) as the standard timing time i. e., as a universal
clock. The rotation (relative to the earth) of the sphere of the fixed
stars is chosen, because it makes the best and most useful clock ; the
most useful, because its circular path is geometrically regular , and being
larger than any other path, it is more easily divided into small segments
(minutes and seconds) . We then synchronize mechanical clocks with
the sidereal clock, and say that these clocks measure " the flow of time ."
This, so far as Ockham is concerned , is fine for convenience of speech
and of measurement ; but, he warns, let us not be led into thinking that
there is some even-flowing immaterial entity called "Time", which is
measured by our sidereal clock . On the contrary, for Ockham, the
sidereal clock is time, for it is itself the unmeasured measure of all
measurable times. Thus, if one, as a metaphysician, were to ask what
time, place and motion are, Ockham would suffer but one answer they
are all movable bodies, tangible observable things in our experience ,
given privileged functions in our calculations and measurements . For
convenience, it is quite allright to talk about time and space as if they
were immaterial absolutes to which movements of bodies are referred ;
but when we track them down , in their actual use, we find that they are
bodies, like other bodies, to which we have given privileged functions
for the measurement of the movements of other bodies.
So the examination of specifically physical concepts, undertaken

by Ockham, results in the conclusion that there is no necessity of positing
unobservable and immaterial "abstract " entities, in order to account for
the possibility of our stating general truths of a scientific order about
the observable things of our experience . We can generalize, abstract,
construct, and formulate laws and equations, in our empirical sciences,
without having to posit or invoke unobservable entities or "meta-
physical figments" . The only part of science that is not contributed by
the observable things of experience, is the part which we ourselves
contribute by way of inventing terms with which to signify the things
we observe, and by constructing conceptual schema, arguments, and
other linguistic instruments for the statement of general truths about
the things of our experience . The science of physics, itself, is a logical
structure - but it is not about logical structures, but about the things
and events given to us in experience.
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ANALYTICAL INDEX
A C
"Absolute" Theory, theorists, 3 , 11, Causality 62, 112
12, 13, 24ff. , 35 , 36ff. , 54, 66, 73 , Chatton, Walter 85
91ff., 100, 104, 107ff., 113ff. , Cognitions, first and second 16ff.
133, esp. 135ff. Commentator, The see Averroes
Action-at-a-distance 52 Conceptualism 19, 20
Aegidius Romanus 12, 56, 87 Condensation, motions of 62ff.
Albertus Magnus 56, 86 "Container", common and proper
Aquinas, St. Thomas 7, 8, 9, 10, II , 118ff.
40, 56, 66, 87 , 104, 109, 121f. "Contrary disposition" 58ff.
Aristotle 2, 3, 7 , 10, 11 , 12, 13 , 19, "Correspondence theory of truth"
24, 25, 28, 34, 40, 43, 51 , 52, 54, 19, 20
55, 65, 66, 67, 69, 81 , 91 , 92, 94, Crombie, A. C. 36
95, 96, 97, 98 , 100, 102 , 103, 104, D
105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, Damascene, St. John 74
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, Demonstration , strict 23
121 , 123 , 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, de Wulf, M. 70
131, 132, 139, 142 Doncoeur, P. 62, 84, 126
Augustine, St. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 , 139,
Duhem, P. 2, 36, 55 , 62 , 84, 125
140
Autrecourt, Nicholas of, 15, 52 Dumbleton, John 91
Duns Scotus, see Scotus
Avempace 55ff., 104
Averroes 55ff. , 109 , 110, 114 , 115 Dynamics 13, 55ff., 62
118, 120, 129, 131 E
Equivocation, equivocations 16, 43 ,
B 105, 108
Bacon, Roger 56
Essential, differentia 21
Baudry, L. 4, 5 , 12 , 126 Eucharist 133
Birch, T. B. I
"Everything-that-is-moved prin-
Boehner, P. 1 , 2 , 4, 14, 15 , 16, 17, ciple" 54ff., 62 , 81ff.
19, 20, 23 , 90, 100, 115, 126
Borchert , E. 36 F
Bradwardine, Thomas 62, 91 "figure of speech fallacy" 42, 43
Buescher, G. 66 Fluxus formae 36
Buridan, John 52, 62 forma fluens II , 36, 41 , 91 , 93
Burleigh, Walter 12, 125 Franciscus de Marchia 52 , 53
Burns, C. D. 15, 27. 38 Fuchs, O. 14
149
150 Analytical Index
G N
Giles of Rome , see Aegidius Ro- "natural signs " 15, 16, 135
manus Newtonians , 142
Gilson , E. 2 , 18 , 23 , 24
Godfrey of Fontaines 85 0
"Ockham's Razor" see " principle
H of economy"
Ockham's writings, order of 4ff.
Henry of Ghent 88
Hervaeus Natalis 88
P
Hochstetter, E. 16, 19, 20, 23 , 62
Hume, David, " humean, " 2, 15 Pegis , A. C. 16, 24
Peter Damiani 90
Peter John Olivi 56
I Peter Lombard 53 , 83
Inertia, law of 62 Petrus Aureoli 89, 90
intension and remission 8off. , 83ff. Petrus Hispanus 17
intelligible species 8 Philosopher, The see Aristotle
Intelligences 47 Place of the world 143
Intentions, see Terms Plato 6
Plotinus 6
J "poles of the world ” 122ff.
Joannes Philoponus 55 predication, contingent and neces-
John of Jandun 56 sary 74; per se primo modo, per se
secundo modo 99ff. , 126 ; per se
and per accidens 126
K
Primum Mobile 93 , 99ff., 105ff.,
kinematics 13 , 56ff. , 62 , 91
142, 143
Kugler, L. 19 Principle of Economy 27 , 93 , 114
L
Q
Lindsay, J. 18, 20, 23 Quandeitas II
"quiddity," "quiddities" 8, 10
M
Maier, A. 36, 52 , 53 , 57 , 81 , 83 , 85, R
86, 87, 88, 89 "rarefaction, " motions of 62ff.
Manser, G. 62 Relations 123ff. , esp . 125 , 133 , 137
Martin, G. 126 and esp . 138
mensura permanentium 96 Richard of Middleton 87
mensura successivorum 96 Ritter, H. 18
Michalski, K. 2 S
Mind-world chasm 12 Scotus, John Duns 9, 10, 11 , 36, 56,
Mohan, G. E. 1 , 125 124, 125, 140, 141
Moody, E. A. 1 , 2 , 12 , 14 , 15 , 16, sensible species 8
19, 22, 23 , 32, 42 , 52 , 54 , 55, 56, Siger de Brabant 56
62, 66, 81 , 91 signification 15ff.
Moser, S. 25, 62 Stagirite, The see Aristotle
Motus, large, stricte 25 ff. Statements, analytic 10, 12 ; con-
mutatio subita 24ff. tingent 10, 11 ; probable 24
Analytical Index 151
Statutes, University of Paris, 14, U

15, 32, 52 ubietas II
supposition 15ff.
V
T
verification 20ff.
terms, first and second intention
virtus impressa 52, 54
15ff. , 81 , 135ff.; absolute and virtus motiva 51, 52, 53
connotative 20ff. , 136ff.; reduc-
Void, the 3, 54ff. , 59
tion of 32ff. , 41ff. , 102, 108 , 136ff.
esp. 137
Text 71 , 40, 54ff. , 104 W
Thorburn, W. M. 27 Webering, D. 23, 24
Tornay, S. C. 1II William of Ware 56
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OF MICHIGAN

S/43 Franciscan Institute Publications

MOTION, TIME AND PLACE

ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OCKHAM

Herman Shapiro, Ph. D.

THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE

I. The Tractatus de successivis Attributed to William Ockham, edit.

2. The Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris

3. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns

4. Intuitive Cognition . A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics ,

5. The De primo principio of John Duns Scotus. A Revised Text and a

6. The Psychology of Love According to Saint Bonaventure, by Robert

7. Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus, by Peter

8. The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham, by Oswald

9. The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creature

10. Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham, by Damascene

11. The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure,

12. Philotheus Boehner. Collected Articles on Ockham, edit. Eligius

13. Motion, Time and Place According to William Ockham, by Herman

1. Three Saints' Lives by Nicholas Bozon , edit. M. Amelia Klenke, 1947.

2. Seven More Poems by Nicholas Bozon , edit . M. Amelia Klenke , 1951 .

Edited by Allan B.Wolter, O. F. M.

MOTION, TIME AND PLACE

ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OCKHAM

Herman Shapiro, Ph. D.

THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE

Cum permissu superiorum

The present study is undertaken in the belief that William Ockham's

CHAPTER TWO. CONCERNING MOTION : THE BROAD SENSE

CHAPTER FOUR . CONCERNING TIME

CHAPTER FIVE . CONCERNING PLACE

ANALYTICAL INDEX 149

Objectives, Sources and Procedures¹

There exists no dearth of studies, exhibiting the highest degree of

2 We shall, throughout this work continue to refer to Ockham's physical

studies of the writings upon which this repute depends to correspond

divisible nature of body, of motion (stricte) , and of time ; he accepts, vi-

Philosophia Naturalis, as it has been transmitted to us, appears in

Both Ockhamist scholars, P. Boehner and L. Baudry, agree that

In general , the method which we have elected to adopt is determined

Those interested in pursuing further the question of the probable

As much to impress the reader with the relative efficacy of Ockham's

Ockham and the Metaphysical Foundations of Medieval Science

from the sensible experience of "things" in relation to itself. Thus,

Now Thomas, insisting on the material basis of particularization ,

Of immediate relevance is the fact that Scotus' metaphysic introduces

On the question of certainty, that is, Duns Scotus, like Augustine ,

of corresponding entities of an abstract and absolute nature as proper

individual, existent population is the very condition of our perceptive

and he considers the certainty of universal judgements (other than purely

Science: General Notions

Science, according to William Ockham, consists in a " collection "

10 Expositio., Prol. , p . 239 : "... scientia vel est quaedam qualitas

to the philosophy of Ockham, see O. Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit Accord-

Patently, as prerequisite for an adequate understanding of Ockham's

in general that it bring something other than itself to cognition.14 In

14 With this important difference : mental language signs (variously

employed, and has simple or material supposition depending upon

signa ad placitum instituta ... Nomina, autem, primae intentionis vocan-