Financial Stability Review June 2024

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW
First edition
2024
www.resbank.co.za
First edition
2024
ii
© South African Reserve Bank
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the Financial Stability Review (FSR) of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) as the source.
The contents of this publication are intended for general information purposes only and are not intended to serve
as financial or other advice. While every precaution is taken to ensure the accuracy of information, the SARB shall
not be liable to any person for inaccurate information and/or opinions contained in this publication. Unless indicated
otherwise, data were supplied by the SARB.
Comments and enquiries relating to this FSR are welcomed and should be addressed to:
Head: Financial Stability Department

South African Reserve Bank
P O Box 427
Pretoria
0001
Tel. +27 12 313 3601

Email: [email protected]
www.resbank.co.za ISSN: 1811-2226
Printed by the Publishing Section of the South African Reserve Bank
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

iii
Contents
Background to the Financial Stability Review................................................................. iv
Legal basis and purpose of the Financial Stability Review............................................ v
Key terms used in the FSR................................................................................................... vi
Executive summary............................................................................................................... viii
Financial stability developments........................................................................................ 1
Global developments.............................................................................................................. 1
Financial stability risks and vulnerabilities in South Africa.......................................... 4
SARB Risks and Vulnerabilities Matrix............................................................................... 4
Weak fiscal position and the sovereign-financial sector nexus................................... 5
Capital outflows and declining market depth and liquidity.......................................... 9
Tight financial conditions for longer....................................................................................... 14
Intensification of geopolitical risks.......................................................................................... 17
Remaining on the FATF greylist beyond June 2025........................................................ 17
Insufficient and unreliable electricity supply...................................................................... 17
Perpetual risks................................................................................................................................. 19
Structural impediments contributing to low and inequitable
economic growth............................................................................................................................ 19
Cyber-risk........................................................................................................................................... 21
Climate risk........................................................................................................................................ 22
Policy actions and initiatives undertaken to enhance domestic
financial stability...................................................................................................................... 23
Enhancing the financial safety net through the operationalisation of CODI.......... 23
Ongoing progress with resolution standards...................................................................... 23
Introducing a positive cycle neutral countercyclical capital buffer........................... 24
Mitigating the sovereign-financial sector nexus................................................................. 24
Increasing the financial sector’s resilience to deal with a national
electricity grid shutdown............................................................................................................ 24
Collaborating with FSOC members........................................................................................ 24
Enhancing macroprudential policy transparency............................................................. 24
Enhancing cyber-resilience within the financial sector................................................... 24
Enhancing the financial sector’s resilience against climate risk.................................. 24
Assessment............................................................................................................................. 24
Briefings on selected topics................................................................................................ 25
Feedback on the proposed Banks Act Directive for implementing a
PCN CCyB and continuous assessment of potential implications.............................. 25
Results of the 2023/24 Insurance Common Scenario Stress Test................................ 26
Executive summary....................................................................................................................... 26
Purpose, scope and methodology........................................................................................... 27
Scenarios............................................................................................................................................ 28
Results................................................................................................................................................. 29
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 31
Abbreviations......................................................................................................................... 32
Annexure A: Financial stability heatmap.......................................................................... 34
Annexure B: Banking and insurance sector indicators................................................... 38

iv
Background to the Financial

Stability Review
The mandate for financial stability

The primary mandate of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), as stated in the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, is to achieve and maintain price stability
in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth in South Africa. The
Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (FSR Act) assigns a statutory mandate to
the SARB to protect and enhance financial stability in South Africa. The SARB’s
primary and statutory mandates culminate in the SARB’s vision of leading in serving
the economic well-being of South Africans through maintaining price and financial
stability.
Defining financial stability

Section 4 of the FSR Act defines ‘financial stability’ as meaning that:
• financial institutions and market infrastructures are capable of:
o providing financial products and financial services; and
o performing their functions and duties in terms of financial sector laws without
interruption and despite changes in economic circumstances; and
•
there is general confidence in the ability of financial institutions and market
infrastructures to keep providing the said products and services and to keep
performing their functions and duties.
Phrased differently, ‘financial stability’ refers to a financial system that is resilient to

systemic risks and shocks and that can efficiently intermediate funds, even in adverse
conditions, thereby bolstering confidence in the financial system and financial
institutions. Financial stability is not an end in itself, but a precondition for balanced
and sustainable economic growth.

v
Legal basis and purpose of the

Financial Stability Review
Section 12 of the FSR Act requires the SARB to:
• monitor and review any risks to financial stability, including the nature and extent
of those risks as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the financial system; and
• take steps to mitigate risks to financial stability, including advising the financial
sector regulators and any other organ of state of the steps to take to mitigate
those risks.
Section 13 of the FSR Act requires the SARB to assess the stability of the South
African financial system at least every six months and to communicate its assessment
in the Financial Stability Review (FSR). Among other things, the SARB is required to
include the following in the FSR:
• its assessment of the stability of the financial system during the six-month review
period;
• its identification and assessment of the risks to financial stability in at least the
next 12 months;
• an overview of the steps taken by the SARB and financial sector regulators to
identify and manage identified risks and vulnerabilities in the financial system; and
• an overview of the recommendations made by the SARB and the Financial Stability
Oversight Committee (FSOC) during the period under review and progress made
in implementing those recommendations.
The SARB assesses financial stability as part of its ongoing operations, and its Financial
Stability Committee (FSC) reviews the financial stability conjuncture and outlook at
four meetings per year. The FSR provides readers with the SARB’s assessment of the
stability of the South African financial system. The period under review is six months,
from November 2023 to May 2024 for this edition, while the forecast period is until
May 2025.
The FSR is tabled in Parliament and is targeted at the Members of Parliament,

participants in the financial sector, international central bank peers, ratings agencies,
international financial institutions, standard-setting bodies and academia. The
FSR aims to stimulate debate on pertinent issues related to financial stability in
South Africa.

vi
Key terms used in the FSR

Drawing on the definitions used by the Financial Stability Board (2021), key terms
in this document are defined as follows:
Financial sector regulators: As per the FSR Act, (i) the Prudential Authority; (ii)
the Financial Sector Conduct Authority; (iii) the National Credit Regulator; and
(iv) the Financial Intelligence Centre.
Financial stability: According to section 4 of the FSR Act, financial stability

means (i) financial institutions and market infrastructures are capable of
providing financial products and financial services and performing their functions
and duties in terms of financial sector laws without interruption and despite
changes in economic circumstances; and (ii) there is general confidence in the
ability of financial institutions and market infrastructures to keep providing the
said products and services and to keep performing their functions and duties.
Phrased differently, ‘financial stability’ refers to a financial system that is resilient
to systemic risks and shocks and that can efficiently intermediate funds, even in
adverse conditions, thereby bolstering confidence in the financial system and
financial institutions. Financial stability is not an end in itself, but a precondition
for balanced and sustainable economic growth.
Financial system: The system of institutions and markets through which financial
products, financial instruments and financial services are provided and traded
and includes the operation of a market infrastructure and payment system.
Macroprudential instrument: Any policy instrument, regardless of the institutional

authority with whom it vests, that is explicitly applied to (i) mitigate vulnerabilities
in the financial system and reduce systemic risk; thereby (ii) improving the
resilience of the financial system; in turn ultimately (iii) protecting and enhancing
financial stability in South Africa.
Residual/net vulnerability: The remaining vulnerability after considering the

identified mitigating factors and actions.
Resilience: The ability of a financial system to deal with shocks without leading
to financial instability.
Risk: The possibility of an adverse or undesirable event or outcome materialising.

Risks may have materialised already or could still materialise in future. The
materialisation of risks can often not be prevented completely, but the impact of
a risk materialising may be mitigated to a greater or lesser extent.
Risks and Vulnerabilities Matrix (RVM): The RVM shows the residual vulnerability
of the financial system after considering existing mitigating factors and policy
actions.
Shock: An event that may cause disruption to, or the partial failure of, the financial
system.

vii
Systemic event: According to the FSR Act, ‘an event or circumstance, including
one that occurs or arises outside [of] the Republic [of South Africa], that may
reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the financial
system or on economic activity in the Republic, including an event or circumstance
that leads to a loss of confidence that operators of, or participants in, payment
systems, settlement systems or financial markets, or financial institutions, are
able to continue to provide financial products or financial services, or services
provided by a market infrastructure’.
Systemic risk: According to the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, ‘the danger of
a failure or disruption of the whole or significant part of [South Africa’s] financial
system’.
Transmission channels or mechanisms: The channels through which vulnerabilities

may lead to the actual disruption of the financial system, should a shock occur.
Vulnerability: A property of the financial system that (i) reflects the existence
or accumulation of imbalances; (ii) may increase the likelihood of a shock; or
(iii) when impacted by a shock, may lead to systemic disruption.

viii
Executive summary
The South African financial system has remained resilient since the release of
the November 2023 FSR despite heightened uncertainty over domestic election
outcomes as well as those in the more than 70 countries voting in 2024 across
the globe.
Globally, risk factors that dominated financial markets include intensifying

geopolitical tensions over the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, sticky
inflation that may require interest rates in advanced economies to remain high
for longer than expected and persistent high levels of government debt. The
difficulty in pricing in these highly uncertain and often contradicting factors led
to heightened market volatility.
Domestically, the key risks to the financial stability outlook remain the weak
fiscal position, the high levels of government debt, the concomitant increase
in government’s debt-service costs and the financial sector’s high exposure to
the sovereign. These factors contribute to increased interconnectedness and
concentration in the domestic financial system, in turn inhibiting its capacity to
absorb financial shocks and ultimately reducing financial system resilience.
Since the release of the November 2023 FSR, steady progress has been made to
strengthen the domestic financial safety net by continuing with the implementation
of the strengthened resolution framework and by introducing an explicit deposit
insurance scheme. Significant efforts are also being made to mitigate the impact
of a potential systemic event. Financial institutions are increasing their provisions
in anticipation of increasing credit risk and, in aggregate, continue to exceed
prudential requirements under close supervision of the Prudential Authority (PA).
One of the ways in which the SARB assesses the resilience of financial institutions
is to test their ability to continue operating in severe adverse scenarios. In the
past, stress tests had been limited to the banking sector. However, in 2023/24
the SARB conducted its first comprehensive stress test of the major insurance
companies. The results of this inaugural insurance stress test are shared in
this edition of the FSR. Overall, the results of the insurance stress test confirm
that participating firms are adequately capitalised to withstand the severe but
plausible adverse scenarios considered.
Overall, the South African financial system remains resilient as evidenced by

financial institutions’ ability to provide financial services uninterruptedly, and this
resilience is expected to be sustained over the forecast period to May 2025.

1
Financial stability developments

Global developments
Since the release of the November 2023 FSR, global financial markets have been
buoyed by growing evidence that steady progress towards sustained disinflation
is being made. Increasing asset prices and declining risk premiums have further
contributed to positive investor sentiment. However, factors such as ongoing
geopolitical tensions and the potential resulting impact on energy prices as well as
uncertainty over election outcomes in the second half of the year could result in
heightened market volatility.
More than half of the world’s population across more than 70 countries will vote
in national elections in 2024. The changes in policy that may accompany changes in
governments, intensifying geopolitical tensions and uncertainty about the timing of
policy rate cuts were a counterweight to prospects of a steady but divergent global
economic recovery. The difficulty in pricing in these material but disparate factors
has led to heightened market volatility in recent months (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Selected volatility measures

Index 100 = June 2023
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
2023 2024
VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index
MOVE = Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate
G7 FX = G7 Foreign Currency Volatility Index
EM FX = Emerging Market Foreign Currency Volatility Index
Source: Bloomberg
So far, the global financial system has withstood the impact of higher interest
rates well. Among other factors, high savings buffers, locked-in low rates from the
pre-hiking period and competitive labour markets in advanced economies have
cushioned the initial impact of high interest rates, and the global financial system has
proven resilient. However, as rates remain high for longer, the strain on borrowers is
expected to increase.

2
Globally, fiscal deficits,1 government debt levels and debt-service costs remain
elevated. This vulnerability is expected to increase in 2024 due to a combination of
tighter global financial conditions and the tendency of governments to lower taxes
while increasing spending during election years. Historically, during election years
fiscal deficits exceeded forecasts by 0.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) when
compared to non-election years. 2 This ‘fiscal slippage’ may lead to fiscal consolidation
not being prioritised in the near term, with growing implications for debt sustainability
over the medium term. 3
Inflation has proven stickier than anticipated and expectations of interest rate
cuts have been pushed back to later in the year. At the time of the November
2023 FSR, policy rates in advanced economies (AEs) were at or near their peaks,
with expectations that AE interest rates would start declining by the first quarter of
2024. However, the latest forecasts show that expectations (Figure 2) of rate cuts in
selected AEs have been moved out to the second half of the year. This, combined
with high government borrowing, could cause policy rates to remain high for longer
and contribute to market uncertainty. The policy rate in the United States (US) in
particular is expected to remain high for longer than anticipated at the start of 2024,
resulting in a divergence between the expected US and Eurozone interest rates and
a stronger US dollar in the year to date.
Figure 2: Policy rate expectations in selected AEs

Per cent
6
0
2022 2023 2024 2025
US* US** UK* UK** Eurozone* Eurozone**
* April 2024
** November 2023
Source: Bloomberg
AE sovereign bond yields increased as markets priced in higher real rates and
more persistent inflation (Figure 3). As spreads between yields on emerging market
(EM) debt and US Treasuries (Figure 4) narrowed, the relative attractiveness of more
risky EM debt waned. This could result in reduced capital flows to EMs, currency
depreciations and higher costs for new and refinanced debt.
1 The shortfall in government income relative to government spending.

2 IMF. 2024. Fiscal Monitor. April 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2024/04/17/
fiscal-monitor-april-2024?cid=ca-com-compd-pubs_belt
3
See the IMF’s April 2024 Global Financial Stability Report (https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
GFSR/Issues/2024/04/16/global-financial-stability-report-april-2024?cid=ca-com-compd-pubs_
belt) for a more detailed discussion of the issue.

3
Figure 3: Selected 10-year AE government bond yields

Per cent
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
US UK Germany Japan
Source: Bloomberg
Figure 4: Selected 10-year EM government bond yield spreads

Per cent
12
10
0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Brazil South Africa Indonesia Mexico India
Source: Bloomberg
The strong growth in private credit extension in some advanced economies is

increasingly highlighted as an emerging risk to financial stability. 4 Private credit
refers to credit provided to households and corporates by non-banks through
bilateral agreements. In recent years, credit provision has increasingly migrated
from regulated banks and financial markets to more opaque private credit providers,
which may not necessarily be subjected to the same rigorous levels of regulation and
supervisory oversight. While this risk is not yet seen as a global systemic risk, the
lack of data and information about the size, sources and possible spillovers to the
regulated financial sector makes it a source of concern.
Pressure continues to mount in the global commercial real estate (CRE) sector.
While jurisdictions are impacted to different extents, the common causes of the build-
up of vulnerabilities in CRE property markets include high interest rates, tight lending
standards, and structural changes after COVID-19. These factors have resulted in
reduced transactional volumes and lower property valuations. The extent to which
the financial sector is exposed to the CRE sector may result in losses that could affect
the outlook for financial stability.
As a small, open economy, South Africa remains vulnerable to spillover effects

from global markets and developments. However, South Africa also faces several
idiosyncratic risks that may interact with global risks, as discussed in the next section.
4 The second chapter of the IMF’s April 2024 Global Financial Stability Report is dedicated to a discussion
of this risk (https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2024/04/16/global-financial-stability-
report-april-2024).

4
Financial stability risks and vulnerabilities in South

Africa
The SARB relies on a wide range of quantitative indicators as well as qualitative
assessments to identify the build-up of risks and vulnerabilities that could threaten
the financial system over the short, medium and longer term. 5 These risks and
vulnerabilities can be categorised as:
• those that have become so structurally entrenched that they have become chronic
or perpetual;
• those that are circumstantial, specific to current developments or events; and
• emerging risks that cannot yet be assessed as systemic but have the potential to
become so and therefore have to be monitored.
SARB Risks and Vulnerabilities Matrix (RVM)

This assessment of risks and vulnerabilities is communicated in the SARB’s RVM. The
RVM shows the residual vulnerability of the financial system after considering existing
mitigating factors and policy actions. The colours in the RVM represent the residual
vulnerability of the financial system to each risk. If there are mitigating factors in
place and the financial system is relatively well placed to absorb a shock without a
broader spillover of distress across the system, the residual vulnerability is lower. If
no or limited mitigating actions are taken or are available, the residual vulnerability
to risk events is higher and there is a greater probability that it may lead to financial
instability.6
Figure 5 shows the SARB’s latest RVM. Each of the risks and vulnerabilities is discussed
in subsequent sections.
5 For detailed information on how the SARB monitors and assesses financial stability conditions, refer
to Macroprudential Policy (https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/what-we-do/financial-
stability/macroprudential-policy/SARB%20macroprudential%20policy%20framework%20and%20
decision-making%20process.pdf)
6 The RVM should be interpreted with the following definitions in mind:
• Risk: The possibility of an adverse or undesirable event or outcome materialising. Risks may have
materialised already or could still materialise in future. The materialisation of risks can often not be
prevented completely, but the impact of a risk materialising may be mitigated to a greater or lesser
extent.
• Vulnerability: A property of the financial system that (i) reflects the existence or accumulation of
imbalances; (ii) may increase the likelihood of a shock; or (iii) when impacted by a shock, may lead to
systemic disruption.
• Shock: An event that may cause disruption to, or the partial failure of, the financial system.
• Residual vulnerability: The remaining vulnerability after considering mitigating factors and actions.

5
Figure 5: SARB RVM
Perpetual risks
High Weak fiscal position and the
sovereign-financial sector nexus
Structural Insufficient and unreliable electricity

impediments supply
contributing to
low and Tight financial
inequitable conditions for longer
Likelihood
economic
Capital outflows and declining
growth
market depth and liquidity
Intensification
Climate risk of geopolitical risks
Remaining on the FATF
greylist beyond June 2025
Cyber-risk
Low
Near term Time frame Longer term
High vulnerability
Moderate vulnerability
Weak fiscal position and the sovereign-financial sector nexus7

South Africa’s fiscal position has steadily deteriorated over the last decade,
with growth in debt-service costs and the stock of sovereign debt in issuance
accelerating following the pandemic and inflation shocks. As global interest rates
are expected to remain high for longer and the outstanding debt that the government
must service has increased, South Africa’s debt-service costs are projected to remain
above 20% of main budget revenue in the medium term, well above its long-term
average of 13.0%. 8
South Africa’s debt stands out compared to other EMs. South Africa’s debt-to-GDP
ratio of 73.7% is well above the EM average of 58.9% (Figure 6), and its interest-to-
GDP ratio stands at 4.7%, compared to the EM average of 3.1% (Figure 7).
7 For a detailed discussion of how a weak fiscal position could impact financial stability, refer to the Topical
Briefing published at (https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/what-we-do/financial-stability/
Topical%20Briefing_Financial%20stability%20considerations%20of%20fiscal%20sustainability.pdf).
For a discussion on how a weak fiscal position may interact and exacerbate the sovereign-financial
sector nexus, refer to Box 1 of the November 2023 FSR.
8 Refer to the 2024 Budget Review available here: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20
Budget/2024/review/FullBR.pdf.

6
Figure 6: Debt-to-GDP ratios: South Africa Figure 7: Interest-to-GDP ratio: South Africa
vs EM average vs EM average
Per cent Per cent
80 5.0
75
4.5
70
65 4.0
60
3.5
55
3.0
50
45 2.5
40
2.0
35
30 1.5
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
South Africa South Africa
EM average EM average
Source: SARB
The Government’s R150 billion drawdown on the Gold and Foreign Exchange
Contingency Reserve Account (GFECRA)9 is anticipated to moderate government
debt somewhat (Figure 8). Government debt is now expected to peak at 75.3%
of GDP, as opposed to the previous 77.7% of GDP announced in the 2023 Medium
Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS).10 South Africa’s fiscal accounts nevertheless
remain under pressure from sustained spending on non-growth-inducing priorities
(e.g. debt-service costs and financial support to state-owned enterprises (SOEs)) and
slow economic growth. South Africa’s elevated debt ratio, coupled with high borrowing
costs, means that debt-service costs continue to be one of the fastest-growing
expenditure components for the government (Figure 9). The growth in government’s
debt-service costs as a share of fiscal spending has potential implications for social
instability. The initial stagnation and subsequent decline in real social spending in
recent years have impaired the government’s ability to fund the provision of public
services such as healthcare, education, housing and social protection. Given the
extent of inequality in South Africa, a reduction in the availability and quality of public
services and the social safety net exacerbates the already elevated risks to social
cohesion.
9
For more information, see https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-
pages/media-releases/2024/Gold-and-Foreign-Exchange-Contingency-Reserve-Account-QandA.
10
For more information, see https://www.gov.za/news/speeches/minister-enoch-godongwana-2024-
budget-speech-21-feb-2024.

7
Figure 8: Projected government Figure 9: Projected government

debt-to-GDP ratio debt-service cost
Percentage of GDP Percentage of GDP
79 5.6
77 5.4
5.2
75
5.0
73
4.8
71
4.6
69
4.4
67 4.2
65 4.0
2023/24
2025/26
2023/24
2025/26
2024/25
2024/25
2026/27
2022/23
2026/27
2022/23
2021/22
2021/22
2023 Budget 2023 Budget

2023 MTBPS 2023 MTBPS
2024 Budget 2024 Budget
Source: NT
The South African financial system is highly exposed to government debt. The
government’s borrowing requirement has been financed with an increased issuance
of long-term government bonds,11 which the domestic financial sector has increasingly
absorbed amid the steady decline in the relative holdings of non-resident investors in
recent years. Government bonds comprise a high and growing proportion of financial
institutions’ balance sheets, potentially crowding out lending to or investing in the
private sector, exposing the financial system to market risk in the event of a sharp
repricing of government debt, and undermining market resilience as the financial
system is increasingly exposed to a common risk.
A higher concentration of government bonds on domestic financial institutions’

balance sheets also inhibits the capacity of the domestic financial system to
absorb financial shocks. It may also lead to increased high-volatility, low-liquidity
episodes in the domestic bond market, which would impair price discovery and
represent a deterioration of trading conditions for South African government bonds
(SAGBs) that could spill over to the rest of the financial market. In turn, the overall
resilience of the domestic financial system is reduced.
The relatively large financing requirements of the government place upward

pressure on government bond yields and increase funding costs across the
financial system (Figure 10). As borrowing costs in the economy are linked to the
yield curve, an upward shift and steepening of the yield curve result in higher funding
costs for both public and private sector borrowers. In turn, this could make more long-
term investment projects unviable and create a negative feedback loop between the
elevated debt levels and debt-service costs. This has a lasting dampening impact on
potential economic growth.
11
For a detailed discussion of the financial stability implications of the issue, see https://www.
resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/what-we-do/financial-stability/Topical%20Briefing_Financial%20
stability%20considerations%20of%20fiscal%20sustainability.pdf.

8
Figure 10: SAGB yield curve

Per cent Basis points
14 70
13 60
50
12
40
11
30
10
20
9
10
8 0
R186 R2030 R213 R2032 R2035 R2037 R2040 R209 R214 R2044 R2048
Change – rhs May 2024 Feb 2024
Source: SARB
The composition of new debt issuance on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

(JSE) has changed significantly over the past decade (Figure 11). In 2013, SOEs
and municipalities collectively accounted for over 30% of the value of newly issued
non-government bonds, with this number falling to 11.9% in 2023 (SOEs accounted
for the full 11.9% as there was no municipal issuance in 2023). Figure 12 illustrates
the decreasing number of SOEs capable of placing debt in the listed market. This
limits the ability of public sector entities to support their capital expenditure plans by
accessing private sector funding.
Figure 11: Issuance per sector in the non-government bond market (%)
2013 2023
33.6% 28.5%
Banks/Financials SOEs 48.9% 26.9%
Banks/Financials Corporates
23.4% 10.0%
Securitisations
11.9% 7.3% 5.1%
Corporates 2.7% 1.9% SOEs
Municipal Inward Securitisations Inward
listings listings
Source: JSE, RMB Markets

9
Figure 12: Issuance per SOE in the non-government bond market

R billions
50
40
30
20
10
0
2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2024
Umgeni SANRAL IDC Denel

Transnet Rand Water Eskom ACSA
TCTA Landbank DBSA
Source: JSE, RMB Markets
Considering the prevalence of government guarantees for SOE debt, a portion

of the exposure to SOEs could convert to additional national government debt.
Capital outflows and declining market depth and liquidity12

South Africa’s capital markets have become shallower and less liquid over the
past few years, which reduces the diversification options of both borrowers and
investors. The government has increasingly dominated issuance in the domestic
bond market, increasing its share of total outstanding bonds from around 60% in
2008 to 81% at the end of February 2024 (Figure 13). Meanwhile, on the JSE, there
have been net company delistings every year since 2016 (Figure 14). Turnover in both
the domestic bond and equity markets have also declined in recent years (Figure 15),
potentially affecting efficient pricing, investor returns and the cost of funding.
12 See Box 2 of the May 2022 FSR for an initial write-up of the declining market depth and liquidity.

10
Figure 13: Value of government bonds as a percentage of total

outstanding bonds
Percentage
Per cent points
85
81%
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024
Government bonds as percentage of total outstanding bonds

Source: NT
Figure 14: Listings and delistings

Number of companies
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2023
Initial price offerings Delistings
Source: JSE

11
Figure 15: Bond and equity turnover as percentage of total

market capitalisation
Per cent Per cent
7 200
6
150
5
4 100
3
50
2
1 0
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024
Shares Bonds (rhs)

Source: Strate
There are several factors that contribute to lower capital market depth and
liquidity.13 Some of the main ones are South Africa’s low growth and domestic saving
rates, the crowding out of private sector debt by government, reduced foreign
portfolio investment and domestic investors increasingly diversifying into global
markets.
Non-residents were net sellers of R12.4 billion worth of JSE-listed bonds in the
first quarter of 2024 after net purchases of bonds to the value of R11.2 billion in the
fourth quarter of 2023 (Figure 16). Continued outflows from the equity market were
reflected in the share of non-residents’ holdings of domestic shares, which reached
a new low of 27.6% at the end of March 2024 (down from 29.7% in December 2023).
13 he SARB is doing more work on structural changes in South Africa’s capital markets. This and the
T
reasons for it will be shared in future editions of the FSR.

12
Figure 16: Non-resident net transactions in the domestic bond and

equity markets
R billions Per cent
50 45
25
40
0
35
-25
30
-50
25
-75
-100 20
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Bonds Shares
Holdings of SA government Holdings of shares (rhs)
bonds (rhs)
Sources: JSE and NT
On 23 February 2022, following a decision by National Treasury (NT), the SARB

issued a circular to increase the offshore prudential limit for all South African
institutional investors to 45%, inclusive of the 10% Africa allowance.14 This followed
the announcement in the 2022 Budget Speech that the offshore prudential limit for
all insurance, retirement and savings funds would be harmonised at 45% of total
retail assets under management, applicable to all qualifying institutional investors.
The previous limits were set at 30% or 40% for different investors, with a separate
Africa allowance of up to 10%.
The rationale for the decision was that with a shrinking economy, sustained
delistings on the JSE and structurally lower economic growth, the offshore
prudential limit increase should offer increased diversification opportunities
to domestic investors. The previous increase in the offshore prudential limit for
domestic institutional investors was in 2018. Following the announcement of the
increase in both 2018 and 2022, there was a marked increase in domestic investors’
foreign asset allocation, with a sharp increase in exposure to foreign equities at
the expense of domestic equities and exposure to domestic property portfolios
(Figure 17).
14 Refer to Exchange Control Circular No. 10/2022, available at https://www.resbank.co.za/

content/dam/sarb/what-we-do/financial-surveillance/institutional-investors/10-2022.pdf.

13
Figure 17: Changes in domestic investors’ asset allocation after

the prudential limit increase
Index, 100 = effective date of prudential limit increase
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec
2018 2022 2023
Foreign equities Domestic bonds Domestic equities Property
Sources: SARB and World Bank
At the end of 2023, total offshore asset allocations of domestic institutional

investors were almost the size of South Africa’s nominal GDP, having more
than doubled since 2012 (Figure 18). As total offshore asset allocation increased,
domestic institutional investors’ unutilised offshore capacity decreased, with
a marked acceleration noted since the latest limit increase in February 2022
(Figure 19).
Figure 18: Total offshore asset allocation as a percentage of GDP

Percentage of nominal GDP
120
100
80
99.4
60
40
45.9
20
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Sources: SARB and Bloomberg

14
Figure 19: Unutilised offshore capacity of domestic institutional investors

Percentage points
25
20
15
10
5
Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec
2022 2023
Collective investment schemes Retirement funds Long-term insurers
Source: SARB
The increase in offshore prudential limits has both positive and negative financial
stability implications. While it may have distributional effects on the domestic capital
markets and contribute to a loss of depth and liquidity, it provides diversification
opportunities and the possibility of higher earnings for domestic investors. As the
aggregate new limit is approached (considering that not all investment mandates
allow foreign exposures), it becomes a stabilising factor as all returns that push
exposures over the limit have to be repatriated.
Tight financial conditions for longer

High policy rates contribute to restrictive financial conditions, as households,
companies and governments find it more difficult and more expensive to access
credit. From a bank perspective, banks initially benefit from the endowment effect
arising from rising interest rates, as a significant part of its deposit base does not
reprice as quickly as interest rates increase. However, this effect wears off the longer
interest rates remain high as deposit rates start to respond. Higher lending rates also
increase credit risk and borrower distress. Figure 20 shows that the banking sector’s
non-performing loans (NPLs)15 for the largest asset classes are at their highest levels
in a decade, and well above the average for the past 10 years. This could manifest in
rising credit losses, which could reduce bank capital and profitability.
15 Non-performing loans are defined as loans that are overdue for more than 90 days.

15
Figure 20: NPLs in the banking sector

R billions
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Retail – secured Retail – Corporate SME (retail Government
unsecured (including and corporate) and public
specialised sector entities
lending)
January 2024 High Average
Source: SARB
NPL ratios16 for significant asset classes are above their long-term averages and
rising (Figure 21). The highest ratio of NPLs is in unsecured retail loans, which is
usually the first asset class to exhibit increasing stress. Although corporate loans
have one of the lowest NPL ratios, the growth in NPLs for this loan category has
averaged over 50% since the third quarter of 2023. NPLs for secured retail lending
(i.e. for loans made against collateral such as houses and cars) have grown more
than 30% on average since September 2023, suggesting that consumers are under
increasing stress in the current high interest rate environment.
16 The NPL ratio is the ratio of loans overdue for more than 90 days as a percentage of on-balance sheet
loans and advances.

16
Figure 21: NPL ratios for significant loan types

Per cent Per cent
6 16
14
5
12
4
10
3 8
6
2
4
1
2
0 0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Retail: secured (long-term average) Retail: secured

SME (retail and corporate) (long-term average) SME (retail and corporate)
Total banking sector (long-term average) Total banking sector
Corporate (including specialised lending) Corporate (including specialised lending)
(long-term average)
Government and public sector entities Government and public sector entities
(long-term average)
Retail: unsecured (long-term average) (rhs) Retail: unsecured (rhs)
* Long-term average: average since January 2014

Source: SARB
To mitigate the uptick in NPLs, banks have been increasing their provisions for
potential credit losses (Figure 22). Banks have been increasing their provisions
faster than credit is being extended, as reflected by the growing value of impairments
raised, suggesting that they should be able to absorb a further increase in defaults.
Figure 22: Impairments and specific impairments as a percentage of

impaired advances
R billions Per cent
220 52
200
50
180
160 48
140
46
120
100 44
80
42
60
40 40
2021 2022 2023 2024
Portfolio impairments Coverage ratio (specific credit impairments as percentage
Specific impairments of impaired advances) (rhs)
Coverage ratio: average since January 2008 (rhs)
Source: PA

17
Intensification of geopolitical risks

Since the publication of the November 2023 FSR, geopolitical risks and
geoeconomic fragmentation have intensified, with potential implications for
financial stability in South Africa. In a world of escalating military conflicts, shifting
economic and political alliances and uncertain international policies, a small open
economy such as South Africa faces several risks. These include, among other risks,
changes in the level and direction of existing trade and financial flows, volatility in
the prices of both imported and exported commodities, supply chain constraints and
disruptions in international transport systems.
The ongoing uncertainty associated with simmering geopolitical tensions is also

likely to weigh on investor sentiment, resulting in volatile capital flows and asset
prices. At a political level, policy uncertainty as a result of elections in more than 70
countries, an upsurge in nationalism and populism across the world and increased
polarisation around the conflicts in Ukraine and Middle East as well as around the
US-China relationship may have unintended consequences in terms of capital flows,
trade relations and access to international financial markets.
Remaining on the Financial Action Task Force greylist

beyond June 2025
As a result of being added to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) greylist in
February 2023, the European Union (EU) added South Africa to its list of high-risk
countries in June 2023. Subsequently, in early December 2023, the United Kingdom
(UK) also classified South Africa as a high-risk third-party country, with the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) derecognising JSE Clear as a qualifying
central counterparty (CCP) with effect from 29 December 2023. The Bank of England
granted a 15-month run-off regime for JSE Clear which will end on 28 March 2025,
with the possibility of extension based on future developments.
The FATF published the latest update on South Africa on 23 February 202417
following its Plenary meetings. After the greylisting in February 2023, a jointly
agreed-upon Action Plan between South Africa and the FATF was adopted. The
Action Plan listed 22 action items linked to the strategic deficiencies identified in
South Africa’s anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism
(AML/CFT) regime, all of which have to be addressed by no later than January 2025
if South Africa is to be removed from the greylist following its next assessment.
Insufficient and unreliable electricity supply

After experiencing record levels of load-shedding in 2023, the scale and intensity
of load-shedding have been considerably milder since April 2024. Eskom’s energy
availability factor (EAF) averaged approximately 52% in the first quarter of 2024,
before improving notably to 58.2% at the end of April (Figure 23).
17
Updates on the FATF greylist are available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-
and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html.

18
The rapid uptake of alternative energy sources is likely to have contributed to

reduced demand for Eskom-supplied electricity. According to Eskom estimates,
rooftop solar capacity of approximately 5.5 gigawatts (GW) had been installed as at
30 April 2024, compared to 3.1GW in January 2023 (Figure 23). In addition,
new electricity generation projects (primarily by the private sector)
registered with the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA)
totalled 4.49GW in 2023, compared with 1.66GW for the entire 2022,
bringing the cumulative generation capacity of registered projects to 7.2GW as at
30 April 2024. Eskom’s residual electricity demand18 is noticeably lower than in
previous years (Figure 24).
The confluence of the factors described above, coupled with broader energy
sector reforms and ongoing efforts by Eskom to stabilise the performance of its
coal-fired power stations, suggests that electricity supply and grid stability may
continue to improve gradually. Over time, such improvement should reduce the
drag of load-shedding on economic activity.19
Figure 23: Eskom EAF and renewable generation registered and installed
Factor (%) Gigawatts
75 8
7
70
6
5
65
4
60 3
2
55
1
50 0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Eskom: EAF
NERSA: Cumulative generation capacity registered (rhs)
Eskom: Maximum installed rooftop solar (rhs)
Sources: Eskom, NERSA and SARB
18 Residual electricity demand refers to electricity demand that Eskom needs to meet with dispatchable
generation sources (e.g. coal-fired power stations) and imports.
19 As highlighted in the April 2024 MPR, the SARB now expects load-shedding to detract 0.6, 0.2 and
0.04 percentage points from growth in 2024, 2025 and 2026 respectively, which is lower than the
estimate of 0.8 and 0.4 percentage points for 2024 and 2025 at the time of the October 2023 MPR.
South African Reserve Bank, Monetary Policy Review, Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank, April 2024.

19
Figure 24: Average monthly Eskom residual demand

Gigawatts
26
25
24
23
22
21
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
2024* 2023 2022 2021
* As at 21 May 2024
Source: Eskom
The risk of a complete electricity grid failure has reduced but cannot yet be
completely ruled out. The SARB continues, through the Financial Sector Contingency
Forum (FSCF), to plan and prepare for a situation, such as a grid failure, that could
require the sudden closure of financial markets. Current efforts are centred on
developing, coordinating and testing contingency plans to mitigate, to the extent
possible, the impact on the financial system and the economy.
Perpetual risks
There are certain perpetual, long-term risks that cannot readily be fitted into the RVM,
but that pose continuous risks to financial stability. The main perpetual risks discussed
in this edition of the FSR are structural impediments contributing to low and inequitable
growth, the impact of climate change and the risk of major cyber-attacks.
Structural impediments contributing to low and inequitable

economic growth
A long period of low growth can have a slow-burning effect on financial stability
through various channels. These include, among other channels, higher risk premiums
and funding costs, lower capital inflows and foreign investment, a greater probability
of social unrest with spillover effects on the financial system, higher levels of risk
taking by financial institutions as they try to maintain profitability and a reduced
offering of less profitable products.
Poor economic performance continues to weigh on South Africa’s attractiveness

as an investment destination. Since 2009, South Africa’s economic growth has
lagged behind that of the world, emerging market and developing economies
(EMDEs) and sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 25). South Africa’s unemployment rate of
32.9% at the end of March 2024 (up from 32.1% in December 2023)20 is significantly
higher than other emerging markets. Youth unemployment also increased from
44.3% in December 2023 to 45.5% in March 2024. High unemployment is a major
contributing factor to economic inequality.
20
For more information, see https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20
QLFS%20Q1%202024.pdf.

20
Figure 25: GDP performance over the past 15 years

Index = 100
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2024
Emerging market and developing economies Sub-Saharan Africa

World Advanced economies
South Africa
Source: IMF
South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world as measured
by wealth and income distribution (Figure 26). In 2022, the wealthiest 10% of
South Africans owned more than 85% of household wealth, 5% lower than in 2010.
However, income inequality deteriorated over the same period, with the top 10% of
households earning more than 65% of total income in 2022, up from 61.4% in 2010. A
sizeable share of the country’s population remains dependent on the government for
basic income, putting a structural burden on an already strained fiscal position and
relatively narrow tax base.
Figure 26: South African wealth and income inequality (top 10% 2022)
Per cent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2010 2022
Wealth Income
Source: World Inequality Database

21
High levels of wealth and income inequality are associated with greater financial
stability risks. 21 Persistently high inequality can make societies more susceptible to
social instability, which may have subsequent spillovers to the financial sector (e.g. in
the form of increased insurance claims should there be social unrest).
Cyber-risk
A successful cyberattack with systemic consequences remains an ever-present
risk to financial stability. The financial sector has to deal with and ward off cyber-
attacks on a daily basis. A successful attack on critical financial infrastructure has the
potential to disrupt the payment, clearing and settlement system, with potentially far-
reaching consequences. Ransomware attacks threatened both critical infrastructures
and enterprises during 2023, with 78% of South African organisations reporting a
ransomware attack between January and March 2023; up from 51% in 2022. 22 The
ability of a cyberattack to cause a systemic event was observed in Lesotho when its
central bank announced on 12 December 2023 that a cyber-incident the previous
day caused it to suspend some of its systems, causing interruptions to interbank and
international payments. 23
Cyberattacks are borderless and can come from anywhere. Noteworthy is the
increase in state-sponsored cyberattacks (Figure 27). State-sponsored attacks are
potentially more harmful as they may be politically motivated and intended to disrupt
financial systems, rather than being aimed at financial gain.
Figure 27: Countries with the highest number of state-sponsored

cyberattacks
Number of cyber
operations sponsored
100
50
1
Source: Council on Foreign Relations, Cyber Operations Tracker
21 Čihák and Sahay. (2020). Finance and inequality. IMF. Available at https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/
Publications/SDN/2020/English/SDNEA2020001.ashx
22 See https://www.sophos.com/en-us/whitepaper/state-of-ransomware
23 For more information see https://www.centralbank.org.ls/images/Public_Awareness/Press_
Release/Cyber_Security_Incident_CBL.pdf

22
Due to the continuous nature of cyber-risk, persistent vigilance and the

improvement of cyber defences remain crucial. This includes implementing
fundamental security hygiene practices, such as enabling multifactor authentication;
applying zero-trust principles; using extended detection and responseas well as
anti-malware staying up to date, for instance with patching version control across all
systems; and implementing data protection and management. 24 Data on attempted
cyberattacks on domestic financial institutions remain scarce. However, financial
institutions and regulators are working collaboratively on incident reporting,
monitoring and response structures, which should result in a clearer view of the
domestic threat landscape once implemented.
To mitigate cyber-risk, the SARB published a directive in respect of cybersecurity

and cyber-resilience in the national payment system on 21 May 2024. 25 In addition,
the FSCA and PA published a joint standard on cybersecurity and cyber-resilience on
the same date. 26 The directive and joint standard set out the requirements with which
the entities under the purview of the relevant authorities must comply, including
defining cyber-risk governance structures, implementing a cybersecurity strategy
and framework and cyber-resilience measures.
Climate risk
Climate risk is split into two key risk types, namely physical risk and transition
risk. Physical risk refers to the potential financial losses that could be suffered as
a result of extreme weather events caused by climate change. The increasing
frequency and impact of extreme weather events result in more substantial damage
to property and often concomitant losses for insurance companies, banks and other
financial institutions that are exposed to the affected industries or assets. Transition
risk arises from the broader global movement towards a greener, more sustainable
and lower-carbon economy, which would, among other effects, reduce the value of
non-qualifying financial assets and exposures.
Although all financial institutions are affected by climate change, in recent years
the insurance industry has been particularly hard hit. Climate change continues
to contribute to a growing number of extreme weather events in South Africa, both
in terms of frequency and severity. Such events dominated the domestic insurance
industry’s claims statistics in 2022 and 2023. Among other implications, these
climate-related changes have exposed insurers to a periodic increase in the number of
weather-related claims, heightened re-insurance premiums and increased premiums
for consumers.
At a global level, adverse weather conditions have raised concerns over the climate
insurance protection gap, which refers to the uninsured portion of economic
losses arising from climate-related natural disasters. 27 This gap is expected to
widen amid changing weather patterns, presenting challenges for insurers. First,
increased underwriting and liquidity risks from more frequent and severe weather-
related claims can weaken insurers’ solvency positions. Second, extreme climate
24 See https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/microsoft-digital-defense-
report-2023.
25
The directive is available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/what-we-do/payments-
and-settlements/consultation-documents/Draft%20directive%20in%20respect%20of%20
cybersecurity%20and%20cyber-resilience%20within%20the%20national%20payment%20system.pdf
26
The communication and joint standard are available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/
publications/publication-detail-pages/prudential-authority/pa-public-awareness/
Communication/2024/Joint-Communication-2-of-2024-Publication-of-the-Joint-Standard-
Cybersecurity-and-cyber-resilience
27
The concept of the protection gap incorporates three key categories: (i) insured losses - total
losses covered by insurance, representing payments made for legitimate claims; (ii) insurable losses
- alongside insured losses, include amounts that could have been covered but have not been and;
(iii) economic losses - encompass the total of all losses, irrespective of their insurability.

23
and weather-related changes may hinder insurers’ ability to forecast losses due to
the unreliability of past data. Third, diversification of underwriting portfolios may
diminish due to the randomness of events across regions.
The climate insurance protection gap introduces financial stability implications

across various sectors. It has implications for households, firms, governments, banks
and other financial institutions (OFIs) such as real estate investment trusts (REITs). For
households and firms, a lack of product offerings and/or higher premiums hinder the
post-disaster financing of construction in the form of lower productivity and output,
negatively impacting GDP. Governments may face increased debt burdens, placing
additional pressure on the fiscus, potentially exerting upward pressure on bond
yields, which would impact banks, insurers and OFIs as sovereign investors. Banks
may experience increased credit risk due to a reduced pool of eligible collateral, while
declining property values may significantly impact REITs’ financial performance.
To increase the South African financial sector’s longer-term resilience against climate
risk, the PA published guidance notes on climate-related disclosures, governance and
risk practices for banks and insurers on 10 May 2024. 28
Policy actions and initiatives undertaken to enhance

domestic financial stability
Enhancing the financial safety net through the operationalisation
of the Corporation for Deposit Insurance
The Corporation for Deposit Insurance (CODI) became operational on 1 April 2024,
which means that qualifying depositors are now protected for an amount up to
R100 000 of their deposits in accounts in qualifying products should their bank
fail. The operationalisation of CODI is a significant step in enhancing the domestic
financial safety net and increasing systemic resilience. As a subsidiary of the SARB,
CODI supports the SARB’s mandate to protect and enhance financial stability. CODI’s
main functions are (i) to build and manage a fund, called the Deposit Insurance
Fund (DIF), which CODI will use to provide depositors with access to their covered
deposits in the unlikely event of their bank failing and being placed into resolution;
and (ii) to promote awareness among the public, specifically depositors of banks, of
the depositor protection they can access through CODI. 29
Ongoing progress with resolution standards

Since being designated as the Resolution Authority on 1 June 2023 in terms
of the amended FSR Act, the SARB has been working on the implementation
of the resolution framework as set out in the FSR Act. This includes work on the
development of resolution plans for designated institutions and setting detailed
requirements to improve their resolvability. In support of this objective, several
Prudential Standards are being developed and are in various stages of approval and
subsequent implementation. These include requirements on stays and resolution
moratoriums, transfer of assets and liabilities in resolution, Flac requirements,
valuators and resolution valuations, resolution groups and funding in resolution.
The steady progress being made with the development and implementation of
various resolution standards further increases the robustness of the domestic
financial system.
28 The guidance notes are available here: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/guidance-

notes
29
More information on CODI is available here: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/what-we-do/
Deposit-insurance

24
Introducing a positive cycle neutral countercyclical capital buffer

The SARB continued to monitor relevant developments in the build-up to the increase
in the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) from 0% to 1% on 1 January 2025. Refer to
the dedicated write-up in the next section for a discussion of the feedback received
from banks on the draft directive on the positive cycle-neutral (PCN) CCyB and the
policy trade-offs the SARB considered in the build-up to its final decision.
Mitigating the sovereign-financial sector nexus

The SARB continued to monitor developments around the sovereign-financial sector
nexus closely, in particular given the high levels of government debt and the domestic
financial sector’s exposure thereto.
Increasing the financial sector’s resilience to deal with a national

electricity grid shutdown
The SARB, through the FSCF, continued to plan for the highly unlikely but not impossible
scenario of a national electricity grid shutdown and other potential systemic events.
The FSCF is currently considering how best to maintain interoperability of systems,
connectivity and communications should a systemic event occur.
Collaborating with FSOC members

The SARB collaborated with FSOC members to discuss some of the key risks to
financial stability, particularly on the financial stability implications of the weak fiscal
position and the persistent trend of declining market depth and liquidity.
Enhancing macroprudential policy transparency

The SARB published an updated macroprudential policy framework and decision-
making process, and an updated financial stability monitoring and assessment
framework. 30 The publication of the two policy documents aims to increase
transparency on how the SARB pursues its financial stability mandate.
Enhancing cyber-resilience within the financial sector

On 21 May 2024, the SARB issued a directive on cybersecurity and cyber-resilience
in the national payment system. In addition, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority
(FSCA) and the PA issued a joint standard on the same topic on the same date.
The publication of the directive and the joint standard is expected to increase the
resilience of the financial system to cyber-risk.
Enhancing the financial sector’s resilience against climate risk

The PA published guidance notes on climate-related disclosures, governance and risk
practices for banks and insurers on 10 May 2024.
Assessment
The South African financial system faces several risks to financial stability. However,
steady progress has been made to reduce the vulnerability of the domestic financial
system against the key risks highlighted, most notably by strengthening the
domestic financial safety net and mitigating the impact of a potential systemic event.
30 See the SARB Macroprudential Policy, available here: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/what-we-

do/financial-stability/macroprudential-policy

25
Prudentially regulated domestic financial institutions, in aggregate, remained resilient,

as measured by their ability to maintain adequate capital and liquidity buffers to
absorb the impact of shocks. Financial institutions have been able to provide financial
services uninterruptedly and are expected to continue doing so over the forecast
period to May 2025.
Briefings on selected topics

This section focuses on briefings on topics relevant to financial stability, to inform and
stimulate debate.
Feedback on the proposed Banks Act Directive for implementing a

positive cycle-neutral countercyclical capital buffer and continuous
assessment of potential implications
On 27 November 2023, the PA published for comment the proposed directive
for implementing a PCN CCyB. 31 Comments were received from six banks and
predominantly related to the potential redundancy of Pillar 2A as the banks noted
it could be used to accommodate the 1% increase in the CCyB. Some banks were
concerned about the potential adverse effects on lending due to the CCyB increase,
noting the currently low credit-to-GDP gap, while others advocated for a longer
transition period.
At its meeting in February 2024, the SARB FSC considered and discussed the
comments received, but agreed that implementing the PCN CCyB was a prudent
move to enhance the banking sector’s resilience. However, the FSC resolved that
the initial impact assessment be supplemented by an economic impact assessment,
which is currently under way. Salient details of the initial impact assessment and
decision-making process are discussed below.
Following in-principle agreement by the FSC that a PCN CCyB should be implemented
in South Africa, one of the key considerations was how the PCN CCyB would be funded
by banks. Two options were considered, each with arguments for and against its use:
Option 1: Implement a PCN CCyB by substituting part of the existing capital

framework.
Table 1: Arguments for and against implementing a PCN CCyB by substituting

part of the existing capital framework
Arguments for Arguments against
• Substituting part of the existing capital • Substituting part of the existing capital
framework would potentially enhance framework would mean lower minimum
flexibility, transparency and predictability in capital requirements.
terms of how various parts of the capital
framework would be utilised. •
Common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital is
required to fund the PCN CCyB, whereas
• There is an existing component of the capital only 50% of the Pillar 2A requirement needs
framework that aims to mitigate systemic to be funded by CET1 capital.
risk and applies to all banks uniformly (i.e.
Pillar 2A).
•
During the COVID-19 crisis, Pillar 2A was
effectively used as a countercyclical
macroprudential instrument to address
potential systemic risk from a macroeconomic
shock.
• This option carries relatively limited costs to
the banking system and increases the ability
of banks to support lending during a crisis.
31 The proposed directive is available here: https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/

prudential-authority/pa-documents-issued-for-consultation/2023/proposed-directive---pcn-ccyb/
Proposed%20Directive%20PCN%20CCyB.pdf

26
Option 2: Implement a PCN CCyB as an addition to the existing capital

framework.
Table 2: A
rguments for and against implementing a PCN CCyB as an addition to
the existing capital framework
Arguments for Arguments against
•
Like option 1, this option would enhance • There is a cost of building additional capital.
flexibility, transparency and predictability of
the capital framework and increase the ability •
Credit growth and banking sector capital
of banks to support lending during a crisis. ratios are correlated, suggesting that
increasing banking sector capital
•
The additional capital would increase the requirements may decrease credit extension
ability of banks to absorb future credit losses and have a negative impact on economic
and therefore would increase banking sector activity.27
resilience.
• While the capital adequacy ratios of South

African banks have improved during the past
10 years, they have deteriorated relative to
other jurisdictions.
•
Capital adequacy ratios of South African
banks are likely to lag other jurisdictions even
further as more jurisdictions implement a
PCN CCyB, especially if South Africa makes
use of the existing capital framework to
compensate for the implementation of a
PCN CCyB.
After extensive deliberations at several meetings of the FSC, it was resolved at its
October 2023 meeting that a PCN CCyB of 1% would be implemented in South Africa
as an addition to the existing capital framework (i.e. option 2). Given the potential
impact on the real economy, it was suggested that an increase in the total capital
requirement be phased in. It was subsequently agreed that the phase-in period for
implementing the 1% PCN CCyB will commence on 1 January 2025 for 12 months, and
is to be fully implemented by 31 December 2025.
Results of the 2023/24 Insurance Common Scenario

Stress Test
Executive summary
The 2023/24 Insurance Common Scenario Stress Test (ICSST) subjected a set of
potentially systemic South African insurers to a selection of severe but plausible
shocks and scenarios. The results of the exercise highlight the following outcomes:
In the main, the selected insurance firms are adequately capitalised to withstand the
shocks and scenarios considered. That said, the industry was moderately susceptible
to the impact of unfavourable market movements and deterioration in the credit
quality of their counterparties, while non-life insurers are significantly vulnerable to
an increase in their claims ratio.
32 Pillay and Makrelov (2024). The lending implications of banks holding excess capital. Available here:
https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/working-papers/2024/the-lending-
implications-of-banks-holding-excess-capital.pdf

27
Purpose, scope and methodology

The FSR Act mandates the SARB to protect and enhance financial stability in South
Africa by monitoring and assessing any risks to the financial system and making
policy recommendations to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system to such
risks. Macroprudential stress tests of the financial system are part of the toolkit at the
disposal of the SARB to assess the resilience of the financial system.
In the second edition of the 2021 FSR,33 the SARB presented results of an exploratory
insurance stress-testing exercise and highlighted the need for more advanced and
comprehensive stress tests of the insurance industry. The 2023/24 ICSST is the
second macroprudential exercise to be conducted on the South African insurance
industry and is an enhancement of the 2020/21 exercise.
The objective of this exercise was to assess the resilience of the insurance industry to
adverse but plausible shocks and scenarios and consider any resultant vulnerabilities.
While in the previous exercise only single-market and insurance-specific shocks
were applied, the 2024 exercise extended the stress test to include comprehensive
macroeconomic scenarios, in line with the SARB’s ambition to harmonise the
insurance stress testing framework with the common scenario stress tests (CSSTs)
of banks. The exercise further introduced a climate change add-on under which the
non-life insurers were required to assess their vulnerability to historically consistent
flood and drought scenarios.
The number of participants was reduced from 19 in the 2021 exercise to nine in the 2024
exercise: five life insurers and four non-life insurers. The life insurers participating in
the exercise were Old Mutual Life Company of South Africa, Sanlam Life, Liberty Life,
Momentum Metropolitan Life and Hollard Life which together account for roughly
60% of the total assets of the life insurance segment. The non-life insurers, chosen
based on gross written premiums, were Santam, GuardRisk, Hollard and Old Mutual
Insure, together accounting for more than 49% of total gross written premiums. The
number of participants may be reviewed again in future ICSSTs.
Unlike the SARB’s banking CSST exercises, this exercise was performed from a
bottom-up perspective only. The SARB continues to enhance its stress-testing
framework and will investigate the possibility of having a combination of bottom-up
and top-down exercises in the future.
The ICSST exercise was restricted to a solvency assessment based on the Insurance
Act 18 of 2017 and its Prudential Standards. This approach allows for a common basis
for the assessment of the sector’s resilience. The exercise focused on key solvency
metrics such as excess of assets over liabilities, basic own funds, solvency capital
requirement (SCR) and the SCR ratio. Insurers were asked to recalculate their balance
sheet and solvency position by employing similar methodologies and models used in
standard regulatory reporting, under the scenarios specified below.
33 Available here: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/reviews/

finstab-review/2021/second-edition-2021-financial-stability-review.

28
Scenarios
The scenarios for this exercise comprised a suite of single-factor market and
underwriting shocks as well as the two adverse inter-temporal macroeconomic
scenarios (referred to as Domestic Adverse and Global Adverse). The former mirror
the shocks commonly used in the regular reporting but calibrated to generate severe
but plausible shocks at two different levels of severity. Table 3 provides a summary
of the market and underwriting shocks applied in the current ICSST.
Table 3: Market and underwriting shocks applied in the current ICSST

Applicable Scenario category (a) Shocks (b) Shocks
insurers
All Absolute 15% decline in equity Absolute 40% decline in
Equity price and prices equity prices
volatility Relative 50% volatility Relative 100% volatility
increase increase
One credit quality step Three CQS down for all
(CQS)33 down for all counterparties + largest bank
counterparties + largest bank counterparty default
counterparty default
Spread and
default One CQS down + top 10 Three CQS down + top 10
non-systemically important non-SIFI counterparties below
financial institution (non-SIFI) CQS 12 default
counterparties below CQS 12
default
300 basis points parallel 500 basis points parallel
downward shift downward shift
Nominal yield 300 basis points parallel 500 basis points parallel
curve upward shift upward shift
Relative 50% volatility Relative 100% volatility
increase increase
Mass lapse Once-off 10% lapse event for Once-off 30% lapse event for
retail book retail book
Mass lapse
Once-off 20% lapse event for Once-off 50% lapse event for
group book group book
Mortality 5% relative increase in 10% relative increase in
mortality mortality
Catastrophe Relative 25% increase in Relative 100% increase in
addition to normal mortality addition to normal mortality
rates for 3 months rates for 3 months
Non-life Claim ratios 10% relative increase in claims 30% relative increase in claims
ratio ratio
Large claims 10% increase in claim amounts 30% increase in claim
amounts
Largest losses Second largest exposure event Single largest exposure event
occurs occurs
The inter-temporal scenarios were designed to capture the adverse effects on the
broader economy. The Domestic Adverse scenario aimed to capture South Africa’s
idiosyncratic risks, primarily weak economic growth, the energy crisis as well as
higher interest rates. In the Global Adverse scenario, shocks emanated from elevated
geopolitical polarisation, strong and persistent global inflationary pressures and the
deterioration in global sovereign debt sustainability. 35
34 The CQS forms the basis from which credit ratings are assigned to an insurer’s counterparties.
35 The ICSST inter-temporal scenarios were designed to be consistent with the two scenarios used in the
2023 banking CSST. For more details on the inter-temporal scenarios refer to the second edition of
the 2023 FSR (https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/reviews/
finstab-review/2023/second-edition-2023-financial-stability-review).

29
Additionally, the ICSST included two climate scenarios focused on the acute physical
risk arising from extreme flood and drought. The flood scenario was simulated based
on the 2022 KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) floods, while the drought scenario focused on
persistent rain shortages similar to the El Niño phenomenon experienced in 2023.
Results
The results show that insurers remain adequately capitalised under most of the
single factor shocks. Life insurers appear more resilient to the shocks and have
inherently higher levels of SCR ratios than their non-life counterparts. The results
indicate that life insurance companies’ SCR ratio is relatively more sensitive to market
shocks, while the non-life segment is mostly vulnerable to an increase in the claims
ratio.
Figure 28: Solvency capital requirement ratio

Life Non-life
Per cent Per cent
2.3 1.7
2.1
1.5
1.9
1.3
1.7
1.5 1.1
1.3
0.9
1.1
0.7
0.9
0.7 0.5
Equity volume increase
Spread and default 1
Spread and default 2
YCU
YCD
Yield curve vol increase
Retail lapses
Group lapses
Increase in mortality
Cat mortality
Equity decline 40%

100% volume increase
Spread and default 1 3CQS
Spread and default 2 3CQS
YCU 500bps
YCD 500bps
100% volume increase
Retail lapse 30%
Group lapse 50%
Mortality 10%
Cat mortality 100%
Claim ratio 30%
Large claims 30%
Largest exposure event
Equity shock
SCR (a) SCR (a)

SCR (b) SCR (b)
Pre-stress Pre-stress
Regulatory minimum Regulatory minimum
Source: SARB
The vulnerability of insurers to market shocks emanates from their respective asset
compositions. Life insurers’ assets comprise mainly of long-term investments, bonds
and equities while non-life insurers’ assets are predominantly concentrated in cash
and fixed income securities. This mainly exposes the industry to single factor spread
and default shocks where counterparties’ credit quality is assumed to deteriorate.
Under the worst spread and default shock the life insurers’ SCR ratio decreased from
2.18 to 1.91 while the post-stress aggregate non-life SCR ratio declined to 1.37 from a
pre-stress level of 1.56.

30
Although a 40% decline in equities was considered an extremely severe event for the
life insurers given their high exposure to equities, the results show that the insurers
did not experience significant impacts on their solvency cover ratio. Under this
scenario the solvency ratio declined from a pre-stress level of 2.18 to 2.12. This muted
decline was primarily driven by the impact of the equity symmetric adjustment
(ESA). The ESA reduces the capital requirement when equity prices decline beyond
predetermined thresholds, but increases the capital requirement in a bull market. This
reduction in capital requirements in a bear market results in an increase of the SCR
ratio, thus ensuring that the capital requirements are not pro-cyclical. 36
The outcome of this exercise shows that the biggest risk facing non-life insurers
is an increase in the claims ratio. Under the 30% increase in the claims ratio, the
aggregate solvency cover ratio for non-life insurers falls slightly below the regulatory
minimum requirement. Increases in claims ratio force insurers to liquidate some of
their assets to meet the increased cash demand. However, it is critical to observe
that the minimum capital requirement (MCR) ratios for these entities are well above
the regulatory threshold.
An additional trend worth noting is that the increase under the single factor lapse
shocks resulted in an increase in the SCR ratio post-stress. This movement was
predominantly driven by a reduction in the MCRs that insurers are required to hold,
as policyholder liabilities are removed from their balance sheets under this shock.
While from a solvency point of view this result is welcome, it may mask the future
loss of premium income that will be experienced in an environment of higher lapses.
Another key component affecting the SCR ratio is the SCR that is required based
on the prevailing balance sheet position after the shock. In the ICSST exercise the
predominant drivers for the movements in the SCR for life companies were market
risk. The market risk SCRs were markedly different for the different shocks. Apart
from the spread and default scenario as well as the downward shift in the nominal
yield curve, the market risk SCR resulted in a positive impact on the SCR ratio for the
life insurers.
For the inter-temporal macroeconomic scenarios, the results show that both life
and non-life insurers are resilient to the adverse scenarios. As expected, the Global
Adverse scenario had the strongest negative impact on SCR ratios; however, they
remain comfortably above regulatory requirements as shown in Figure 29.
36 A pro-cyclical capital requirement would require insurers to retain greater capital after a shock which
has already eroded their capital stock, further inhibiting their ability to write new business which
amplifies the effect of the shock.

31
Figure 29: SCR ratios under the inter-temporal macroeconomic scenarios

Life Non-life
Per cent Per cent
2.20 1.6
2.16 1.5
2.12 1.4
2.08 1.3
2.04 1.2
2.00 1.1
Pre-stress
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Pre-stress
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Baseline Global adverse Baseline Global adverse
Source: SARB
For the exploratory climate risk add-on the results highlight a muted impact for the
insurers. At worst, the aggregate impact only amounted to a nine basis point reduction
in the SCR. These results reflect the impact of natural catastrophe reinsurance which
is a key mitigant to the impact of climate change. However, as the frequency and
severity of the catastrophic climate change events increase, reinsurers may reduce
their appetite for these risks which poses a critical financial stability risk.
Conclusion
Life insurers are relatively resilient to identified stresses, with solvency ratios remaining
elevated despite the vulnerability stemming from market risk shocks. However, the
robust post-stress SCR ratios for life insurers may mask deterioration in current and
future profitability, which in turn may negatively impact own funds. Vulnerabilities
also exist in the non-life sector, especially from increases in claims and credit risk.
The climate risk scenarios did not result in a significant adverse capital impact on the
participants. However, should the frequency of these catastrophic events continue
to increase, protection gaps may become elevated and reduce the ability of the
economy to recover from natural disasters.

32
Abbreviations
ACSA Airports Company of South Africa Limited
AE advanced economy
AML/CFT anti-money laundering and combating
the financing of terrorism
BIS Bank for International Settlements
CAR capital adequacy ratio
CBOE Chicago Board Options Exchange
CCB capital conservation buffer
CCP central counterparty
CCyB countercyclical capital buffer
CCST common scenario stress test
CDS credit default swap
CET1 common equity tier 1
CODI Corporation for Deposit Insurance
CPI consumer price index
CRE commercial real estate
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa
DIF Deposit Insurance Fund
EBIT earnings before interest and taxes
ECDF empirical cumulative distribution function
EAF energy availability factor
EM emerging market
EMDE emerging market and developing economies
ESA equity symmetrical adjustment
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority
EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FSCF Financial Sector Contingency Forum
G7 FX G7 Foreign Currency Volatility Index
FX Emerging Market Foreign Currency Volatility Index
FIC Financial Intelligence Centre
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSC Financial Stability Committee
FSCA Financial Sector Conduct Authority
FSOC Financial Stability Oversight Committee
FSR Financial Stability Review
FSR Act Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017
GDP gross domestic product
GFECRA Gold and Foreign Exchange Contingency Reserve Account
GLA gross loans and advances
GW gigawatts
HQLA high-quality liquid assets
ICR interest coverage ratio
ICSST Insurance common scenario stress test
IDC Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited

33
IMF International Monetary Fund

IPO initial public offering
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange
KZN Kwa-Zulu Natal
LCR liquidity coverage ratio
MCR minimum capital requirement
MOVE Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate
MPR Monetary Policy Review
MTBPS Medium Term Budget Policy Statement
NFC non-financial corporates
NCR National Credit Regulator
NERSA National Energy Regulator of South Africa
NPL non-performing loan
OFI other financial institution
ORSA own risk and solvency assessment
PA Prudential Authority
PCN positive cycle neutral
REER real effective exchange rate
REIT real estate investment trust
RVM Risks and Vulnerabilities Matrix
RWA risk-weighted assets
SAGB South African government bond
SANRAL South African National Roads Agency SOC Limited
SARB South African Reserve Bank
SCR solvency capital requirement
SIFI systemically important financial institution
SME small and medium enterprise
SOE state-owned enterprise
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
TCTA Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority
UK United Kingdom
VIX Volatility Index

34
Annexure A: Financial stability heatmap

The SARB uses a wide range of financial stability indicators that are designed to act
as early warning signals of a potential build-up of cyclical changes in the financial
system that could lead to vulnerabilities if left unattended. 37 A ‘snapshot’ of all
material developments is communicated through the financial stability heatmap. The
heatmap visually depicts the statistical transformation of a wide range of financial
stability indicators against their historical averages. It is data driven and based on
historical information, and does not contain any evaluation of financial stability risks.
It serves as a communication tool to flag areas for deeper analyses.
Not every indicator used in the construction of the heatmap is discussed in the
FSR. Rather, the focus is on key global and domestic factors that may be relevant to
financial stability risks and vulnerabilities in South Africa. The potential build-up of
imbalances as reflected in the heatmap is discussed in detail in the write-up of the
key risks and vulnerabilities identified as per the SARB RVM.
37 Both Adrian et al (2015) and Aikman et al (2017) note that a shortcoming of the framework underpinning
the monitoring of financial stability vulnerabilities and the construction of financial stability heatmaps
is its focus on cyclical vulnerabilities and not structural and event vulnerabilities.

35
Figure 30: Financial stability heatmap

Risk appetite and asset valuation partition
Real house price growth
Price-earnings ratio
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
South African credit default swap spread
Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate
Corporate spreads
Bank lending margin
Financial sector partition
Banks: capital adequacy ratio
Banks: real credit growth
Banks: loan-to-deposit ratio
Banks: liquidity coverage ratio
Banks: maturity mismatches
Banks: sovereign exposure
Banks: housing market exposure
Life insurance: liquidity transformation
Life insurance: leverage
Life insurance: solvency capital requirement
Non-life insurance: liquidity transformation
Non-life insurance: leverage
Non-life insurance: solvency capital requirement
*OFIs: credit intermediation
OFIs: liquidity transformation
OFIs: leverage
SRISK
Non-financial sector partition
Households: debt-to-disposable-income ratio
Households: debt-service costs
Households: net savings
Non-financial corporates: debt-to-net-operating income ratio
Non-financial corporates: interest coverage ratio
Government: debt-to-GDP ratio
Government: interest-to-revenue ratio
Government: primary budget balance
External vulnerabilities partition
US financial conditions
Real effective exchange rate
Net portfolio purchases by non-resident investors
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Low High
Methodology: the heatmap is based on a z-score transformation of the underlying
indicators. The transformed indicators are thereafter mapped onto an empirical
cumulative distribution function (ECDF). Low values from the ECDF are mapped to
green while higher values are mapped to shades of red.
*OFIs: include unit trusts and finance companies.
Source: SARB

36
The financial stability heatmap is composed by (i) identifying various financial stability
elements; and (ii) assigning a weighted colour rating to the identified elements by
using predefined indicators. The elements comprising the financial stability heatmap
and the corresponding financial stability indicators underlying the colours on the
heatmap are presented in Table A.1 below.
Table A.1: South African financial stability heatmap elements and indicators
Component Indicator Measure
Risk appetite and asset valuation partition

Residential real estate Real house price growth BIS house price index divided by
the consumer price index (CPI)
Equity market Price-earnings ratio JSE All-Share price-earnings ratio
Chicago Board Options Logarithm of CBOE VIX

Exchange (CBOE) Volatility
Index (VIX)
Government bond South African credit default CDS spread on South African
market swap (CDS) spread five-year government bond
Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Logarithm of MOVE
Estimate (MOVE)
Corporate bond Corporate spreads JP Morgan Corporate Emerging
market Market Bond Index
Banking sector – risk Bank lending margin Weighted average lending rate
appetite minus weighted average deposit
rate
Financial sector partition

Banking sector Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Capital adequacy divided by total
risk-weighted assets (RWA)
Real credit growth Real growth in gross loans and
advances (GLA)
Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) High-quality liquid asset (HQLA)
divided by net cash expected
outflows
Bank maturity mismatches On-balance sheet maturity
mismatches divided by total
assets
Loan-to-deposit ratio Gross loans and advances divided
by deposits plus current accounts
plus other creditors
Exposure to housing market Residential mortgages divided by
total loans and advances
Exposure to sovereign sector Treasury bills plus government
bonds/total assets
Insurance: life Liquidity transformation Illiquid assets divided by total
assets
Leverage Total financial assets divided by
equity
SCR Own funds divided by solvency
requirement
Insurance: non-life Liquidity transformation Illiquid assets divided by total
financial assets
equity
SCR Own funds divided by solvency
requirement

37
Table A.1: South African financial stability heatmap elements and indicators
Component Indicator Measure

Other financial Credit intermediation Loans divided by total financial
institutions (OFIs) assets
Liquidity transformation Liquid assets divided by total
financial assets
equity
Sector-wide SRISK NYU stern
Non-financial sector partition

Households Household debt-service costs Ratio of debt-service cost to
disposable income
Household debt/disposable Household debt to disposable
income income of household
Household net saving Net saving by households
Non-financial NFC debt-to-net-operating Debt divided operating income

corporates (NFCs) income ratio
NFC interest coverage ratio Earnings before interest and taxes
(ICR) (EBIT) divided by interest
expense
Government Government debt-to-GDP ratio Total gross loan debt as
percentage of GDP
Interest-to-revenue ratio Interest expenditure divided by
total revenue
Primary budget balance Primary balance as percentage of
GDP
External vulnerabilities partition

Global financial cycle US financial conditions index Federal Reserve Board and/or
Chicago Fed indices
Capital flows Net portfolio purchases by Total net purchases of shares and
non-resident investors bonds (repo and outright) by
non-residents on the JSE
Real effective REER Real effective exchange rate
exchange rate (REER) of the rand: Average for the
period – 20 trading partners –
Trade in manufactured goods

38
Annexure B: Banking and

insurance sector indicators
Table B.1: Banking sector indicators*
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Market share in terms of assets (five largest banks) 89.99 89.84 89.55 89.67 89.72
Gini concentration index 83.11 82.68 82.36 80.28 74.46
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (H-index) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Total assets (R billions) 6 457.27 6 562.26 7 019.68 7 490.56 7 662.46
- Year-on-year percentage change 11.93 1.74 6.96 6.78 4.52
Total loans and advances (R billions) 4 542.46 4 643.13 4 983.97 5 349.91 5 513.31
- Year-on-year percentage change 6.90 2.24 7.33 7.40 4.53
Total capital adequacy ratio 16.21 17.49 17.68 17.36 17.37
Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio 13.14 14.47 14.96 15.01 15.05
Common equity tier 1 capital adequacy ratio 12.33 13.30 13.63 13.43 13.38
Impaired advances (R billions)** 211.91 229.24 226.67 276.77 296.32
Impaired advances to gross loans and advances 4.66 4.94 4.55 5.17 5.37
Specific credit impairments (R billions) 92.25 105.45 109.74 127.15 136.39
Specific credit impairments to impaired advances 43.56 46.07 48.45 45.98 46.03
Specific credit impairments to gross loans and advances 2.03 2.27 2.20 2.38 2.47
Return on assets (smoothed) 0.79 0.81 1.12 1.11 1.09
Return on equity (smoothed) 10.22 10.62 14.26 14.84 14.66
Interest margin to gross income (smoothed) 58.17 58.65 58.77 60.08 60.81
Operating expenses to gross income (smoothed) 58.26 58.73 58.08 56.60 57.06
Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio) 12.18 13.33 14.02 14.96 14.90
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 24.05 24.10 25.20 27.45 27.22
Liquidity coverage ratio 142.21 144.12 145.44 150.58 149.36

* Updated as at 15 May 2024. All data are averaged for the year shown. Percentages unless stated otherwise.
** Impaired advances are advances in respect of which a bank has raised a specific impairment and include any advance or restructured
credit exposure subject to amended terms, conditions and/or concessions that are not formalised in writing.
*** 2024 is year to date (to March 2024).
Source: PA

39
Table B.2: Insurance sector indicators

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Market share in terms of assets (five largest life insurers) 73 74 73 73 74 72
Market share in terms of gross written premiums (five largest 46 48 47 50 49 56

non-life insurers)
Balance sheet
Total assets: life insurers (R millions) 3 011 459 3 143 872 3 254 815 3 724 257 3 705 455 4 115 321
Total assets: non-life insurers (R millions) 196 726 206 831 239 132 260 616 290 127 308 317
Total liabilities: life insurers (R millions) 2 638 347 2 760 773 2 909 562 3 343 586 3 353 525 3 734 322
Total liabilities: non-life insurers (R millions) 114 828 117 377 141 422 178 516 170 057 172 212
Profitability
Gross written premiums: life insurers (R millions) 529 741 551 175 564 327 620 821 631 629 673 360
Net profit before tax and dividends: life insurers (R millions) 45 067 45 373 11 766 48 731 19 848 25488
Individual lapse ratio: life insurers 61.0 91.1 66.0 77.0 76.2 63.9
Gross written premiums: non-life insurers (R millions) 144 265 159 548 158 632 169 846 181 916 105 626
Combined ratio: non-life insurers (%) 97 97 113 119 98 100.6
Operating profit ratio: non-life insurers (%) 15 23 16 -14.4 14 27
Solvency and capital*
Solvency capital requirement cover ratio (median): 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9
1.9
life insurers
Minimum capital requirement cover ratio (median): 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.7 4.9
4.3
life insurers
Solvency capital requirement cover ratio (median): 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.7
1.8
non-life insurers
Minimum capital requirement cover ratio (median): 4.0 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.3
3.9
non-life insurers
* These returns are only available from 2018 due to changes in reporting requirements.
Source: PA

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2024
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FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW

© South African Reserve Bank

Head: Financial Stability Department

Tel. +27 12 313 3601

www.resbank.co.za ISSN: 1811-2226

Printed by the Publishing Section of the South African Reserve Bank

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Background to the Financial

The mandate for financial stability

Defining financial stability

• financial institutions and market infrastructures are capable of:

o providing financial products and financial services; and

Phrased differently, ‘financial stability’ refers to a financial system that is resilient to

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Legal basis and purpose of the

The FSR is tabled in Parliament and is targeted at the Members of Parliament,

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Key terms used in the FSR

Financial stability: According to section 4 of the FSR Act, financial stability

Macroprudential instrument: Any policy instrument, regardless of the institutional

Residual/net vulnerability: The remaining vulnerability after considering the

Risk: The possibility of an adverse or undesirable event or outcome materialising.

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Transmission channels or mechanisms: The channels through which vulnerabilities

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Globally, risk factors that dominated financial markets include intensifying

Overall, the South African financial system remains resilient as evidenced by

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Financial stability developments

Figure 1: Selected volatility measures

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Figure 2: Policy rate expectations in selected AEs

1 The shortfall in government income relative to government spending.

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Figure 3: Selected 10-year AE government bond yields

Figure 4: Selected 10-year EM government bond yield spreads

The strong growth in private credit extension in some advanced economies is

As a small, open economy, South Africa remains vulnerable to spillover effects

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Financial stability risks and vulnerabilities in South

• those that are circumstantial, specific to current developments or events; and

SARB Risks and Vulnerabilities Matrix (RVM)

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Figure 5: SARB RVM

Structural Insufficient and unreliable electricity

Near term Time frame Longer term

Weak fiscal position and the sovereign-financial sector nexus7

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Figure 8: Projected government Figure 9: Projected government

2023 Budget 2023 Budget

A higher concentration of government bonds on domestic financial institutions’

The relatively large financing requirements of the government place upward

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW June 2024

Figure 10: SAGB yield curve

The composition of new debt issuance on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

Banks/Financials SOEs 48.9% 26.9%

Source: JSE, RMB Markets

Financial stability developments

14 Refer to Exchange Control Circular No. 10/2022, available at https://www.resbank.co.za/

28 The guidance notes are available here: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/guidance-

Option 1: Implement a PCN CCyB by substituting part of the existing capital