Strategies For Dealing With Self-Represented Litigants
Strategies For Dealing With Self-Represented Litigants
Strategies For Dealing With Self-Represented Litigants
Volume 30
Article 3
Number 2 Volume 30, Number 2
4-1-2008
Recommended Citation
Goldschmidt, Jona (2008) "Strategies for Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 30 : No. 2
, Article 3.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol30/iss2/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
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Goldschmidt: Strategies for Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants
JONA GOLDSCHMIDT*
See also Jona Goldschmidt, Barry Mahoney, Harvey Solomon, & Joan Green, MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT
MANAGERS 72-104 (1998) [hereafter, MEETING THE CHALLENGE] (describing fourteen pro se
assistance programs).
5. The mission statement of this non-profit organization in Williamsburg, Virginia, states,
inter alia, that "[t]hrough original research, consulting services, publications, and national educa-
tional programs, [the] NCSC offers solutions that enhance court operations with the latest tech-
nology; collects and interprets the latest data on court operations nationwide; and provides
information on proven 'best practices' for improving court operations." http://www.ncsconline.
org/D.About/index.htm (last visited January 31, 2008).
6. William Downs, Where We've Been: Pro Se Information Trends, http://www.ncsconline.
org/WC/Publications/Trends/2004/ProSeWhereTrends2004.pdf:
As AOCs [administrative offices of courts] develop more comprehensive and effective pro-
grams for pro se litigants, more people will decide to go to court pro se. Naturally, this will
increase the public interest in pro se litigation and the amount of media devoted to pro se
litigants. These changes will shift the issues the courts will have to address in the future to
include dealing with larger numbers of pro se litigants and fine tuning their programs so that
no pro se litigant is denied access to justice. The National Center should expect more infor-
mation requests from private citizens asking for legal assistance, legal information, or infor-
mation on unbundling as going to court pro se becomes easier and more acceptable. The
AOCs and court staff members will make more information requests about ensuring access
to the larger and more diverse group of people who are pro se litigants.
7. The best articles (and the only ones I have found) on the subject are Cornelius D. Hel-
frich, Facing a Pro Se Litigant, THE COMPLEAT LAWYER 41- 43 (Summer 1997); Scott L. Gar-
land, Avoiding Goliath's Fate: Defeating a Pro Se Litigant, 24 LITIG. 45-67 (Winter 1998); and
Paul B. Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, 15 LITIG. 13, 15 (Summer 1989).
8. In 2006, of all pro se cases filed in the federal courts, only 19,468, or 28 percent, were
filed by non-prisoners. Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR, Table S-24, Civil Pro Se & Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus
2006/tables/s24.pdf (Data showing the distribution of SRLs across case types is not reported).
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132 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:130
I. ETHICAL ISSUES
A. Legal Ethics
Many attorneys are under the misconception that legal ethics rules
require that their personal interactions with SRLs must be minimal
and detached. In fact, attorneys are permitted to engage with SRLs as
they would with any opposing counsel. Interactions between attor-
neys and SRLs are primarily governed by Rule 4.3 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (2007), entitled Dealing with an Unrep-
resented Person.1 5 That rule states:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinter-
ested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,
the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstand-
ing. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person,
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reason-
ably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a
middle-income spectrum"; (2) a 1997 evaluation of the Maricopa County Self-Service Center
which found that the typical use of the center was a first-time SRL who filed for divorce or
divorce-related relief, had an annual income under $40,000, and completed high school and some
college, with 18 percent of such users having a college degree or some graduate study; and (3) a
1995 California study that found that "it appears that a significant portion of the family pro pers
[the term California uses to refer to SRLs] in California are not poor and not poorly educated.").
See also, John M. Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Services Responses to
Their Needs: What We Know 3 (2002), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/SRL
whatweknow.pdf ("We have poor data on who is self-represented.").
14. Id.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2007). The 1983 version of Rule 4.3 (which
was resolved in the 2003 amendments) generated numerous court and ethics opinions regarding
such issues as what constitutes "misleading" the unrepresented person, what protocol is neces-
sary when an attorney interviews unrepresented employees of corporations or other organiza-
tions, whether a lawyer may submit documents to the unrepresented party for signature, and the
distinction between giving an unrepresented person information versus legal advice. See ABA
Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, 409-12 (3d ed.
1996).
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Goldschmidt: Strategies for Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants
reasonable
6
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the
client.1
It is fair to say that a plaintiff SRL will know the role of counsel
when he or she enters an appearance for the defendant client, or vice
versa, when counsel's name appears on pleadings in a case brought
against a self-represented defendant. Nevertheless, prudent counsel
will take the "reasonable effort" of preceding all communications with
a SRL by way of a cautionary admonition - preferably in writing -
providing the information required by Rule 4.3.
According to Rule 4.3, Comment 1:
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing
with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyal-
ties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer
represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will
typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, ex-
plain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepre-
sented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a
lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent,
see Rule 1.13(f) 7
What exactly does the Rule 4.3 prohibition against providing "legal
advice" to SRLs mean? a" Comment 2 of Rule 4.3 provides as follows:
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2007). Practically speaking, the advice to
obtain counsel will fall on deaf ears, inasmuch as the SRL in most cases has already been unable
or is unwilling to secure counsel due to the high cost of legal services, the non-meritoriousness of
the case which made it impossible to secure counsel, or because the SRL is of the view that he or
she can handle the case himself.
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 4.3, cmt. 1; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R 1.13(f) provides, "In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, mem-
bers, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of
the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing." Id. at R, 1.13(f).
18. Cf., John M. Greacen, Legal Information vs. Legal Advice: Developments During the
Last Five Years, 84 JUDICATURE 198-204 (2001), and John M. Greacen, No Legal Advice from
Court Personnel:What Does That Mean? 34 THE JUDGES' JOURNAL 10-15 (1995), both of which
address the same question in the context of nonlawyer court clerks' communications with SRLs.
In the 1995 paper, Greacen states:
Neither of these distinctions-advice versus information-is satisfactory for the poor deputy
clerk who needs to decide whether to answer a question. Cases are often won or lost on
procedural issues. It is hard to know what is information, when an inquiring citizen is
clearly going to rely and act on what you say.
The author suggests adoption of the following principle:
Court staff have an obligation to inform litigants, and potential litigants, how to bring their
problems before the court for resolution. It is entirely appropriate for court staff to apply
their specialized expertise to go beyond providing generalized information (how do I file a
lawsuit?) to giving detailed procedural guidance (how do I request a hearing?). What does
the court like to see in an application for fees, a motion for default, a child support enforce-
ment order, a motion to suppress evidence, or an application for letters testamentary?
Any advice that a court staff member gives, which is limited to this purpose and function, is
appropriate-including the provision of references to applicable rules, statutes or court
precedents, the supplying of forms or examples of pleadings commonly used by other coun-
sel, or the articulation of the reasons for the court's preferring a particular process. Such
advice is helpful to the party receiving it. The party might have committed a fatal procedu-
ral mistake if it had not gotten such advice. But the fact that it is helpful does not make it
improper. The court system has an interest in seeing that disputes are decided on their
merits. Court staff should help litigants use procedures to reach that end, not erect them as
hurdles over which court users will stumble.
Id. at 14.
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. 2.
20. Id. and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3.
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. 2.
22. Id.
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136 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:130
23. Id.
24. Several other provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide additional
guidance for the attorney dealing with an SRL. These include the provisions in the Preamble
stating that every lawyer is, inter alia, "an officer of the legal system" (MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT preamble, at % 1) who, as a negotiator, "seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others" (Id. at 1 2). The lawyer "should
use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others" (Id.
at %5). Lawyers "should seek ...access to the legal system .... " and "should be mindful of
deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons
who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance" (Id. at 91 6). Lawyers are required to
maintain "a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal
system" (Id. at 919). Rule 3.4, entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel," provides
additional duties, including prohibitions upon unlawfully obstructing a party's access to evi-
dence, or altering, destroying, or concealing evidence; falsifying evidence, or counseling or assist-
ing a witness to testify falsely; disobeying obligations under the rules of a tribunal; making
frivolous discovery requests, or failing to diligently respond to discovery requests; alluding to
matters at trial not reasonably relevant or admissible, asserting personal knowledge of facts un-
less testifying, or stating personal opinions regarding the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or requesting a
person other than a client to refrain from giving testimony, unless the person is a relative, em-
ployee or other agent of the client, or where the lawyer reasonably believes the person's inter-
ests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information. Model Rules of
Prof'I Conduct R. 3.4. See also Rule 4.1, entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to Others," which
prohibits knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a third person, or failing
to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by a client, unless such fact is confidential. Id. at R. 4.1.
25. Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Helping the Pro Se Litigant: A Changing Landscape, 39 CT.
REV. 8, 13 (2003):
From an examination of the specific tasks involved in pursuing litigation, it becomes clear
that access to legal information is the most critical need of self-represented litigants in the
vast majority of cases. Legal judgment-the reasonable inferences that an experienced legal
professional makes based on available information-can be critical to litigants in more com-
plicated cases in which the sheer volume and complexity of legal information requires more
time than the average layperson can commit to preparing his or her own case. But in less
complex cases, self-represented litigants are typically able to make reasonable inferences
from legal information, and thus the need for access to legal advice can be very helpful, but
is not absolutely necessary. The question then becomes who is best situated to provide accu-
rate legal information to self-represented litigants, and to encourage litigants to seek legal
advice in appropriate circumstances.
Id.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives in-
formed consent."). The term "unbundled" refers to providing discrete-task legal services rather
than full representation, first proposed by Beverly Hills, California, attorney Forrest Mosten as a
means of enhancing access to justice for persons of moderate means. See Forrest S.Mosten,
Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 Fam. L.Q. 421 (1994) (proposing that a
cafeteria-style form of limited legal representation, allowing clients of limited means to select
which service(s) they want, thus empowering them by the act of making this decision, and also
benefitting attorneys who are willing to service this niche population); Forrest S. Mosten. UN-
BUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE (2000).
27. Limited representation rules to regulate the growing availability of unbundled legal ser-
vices have been adopted by statute and/or court rule in thirteen states to date: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine, Missouri, North Carolina, Utah,
Vermont, and Washington.
28. 1 have found no state court decisions addressing the ethics or legality of ghostwriting.
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29. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994), affd on
other grounds, Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Labor, 85 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
1996); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D.Va. 1997);
Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001). Cf. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES
JUDGES, CANON 5(F) (prohibiting judges from practicing law, but permitting judges to "give
legal advice to and draft or review documents for a member of the judge's family."); Richard
Posner, OVERCOMING LAW 57 (Harvard University Press, 1995) ("[A] majority of the Supreme
Court's opinions [are] being written by law clerks; today, a judge written opinion, at any level of
the American judiciary, is rare."); Lisa G. Lerman, Misattributionin Legal Scholarship:Plagia-
rism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 468 (2001) ("A law school graduate
who becomes a judicial clerk probably will spend a year or two ghostwriting for a judge.").
30. Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145 (2002).
31. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (May
5, 2007) (availableat http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200707/07-446-2007.pdf) (last visited
Feb. 2, 2008); Arizona State Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-06 (July 2005)
(http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=525) (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
B. Judicial Ethics
In litigating against SRLs, lawyers must recognize that judges have
a constitutional duty to provide parties, as a matter of due process,
with a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."3 2 In addition, they have
several ethical duties which arise during the litigation process.
Judges must "uphold and promote the.., impartiality of the judici-
ary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety."3 3 For many years judges felt themselves in a quandary when
presiding over "mixed cases," that is, cases involving a represented
and an unrepresented party. They realized that they had to maintain
their impartiality, but they also knew that there were instances in
which - in order to avoid possibly harsh results - they had to provide
SRLs with information and certain guidance in order to meet their
constitutional obligation.3 4
In February 2007, the ABA addressed this issue by revising the
Model Code to include the following comment to Rule 2.2: "It is not a
violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations
to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly
heard."3 5 This provision constitutes a sea change in judicial ethics,
which many commentators and pragmatic judges believed was neces-
sary in order to avoid claims of bias on the part of represented parties
and their attorneys whenever judges provided minimal assistance to
SRLs.3 6
32. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
33. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (MCJC), http://www.abanet.
org/judicialethics/ABAMCJC.approved.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). See also MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (requiring that judges perform the duties of their office "impar-
tially, competently, and diligently"); and MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.2 (requiring
judges to "perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially").
34. See MEETINO THE CHALLENOE, supra note 4, at 52-61 (reporting the results of a na-
tional survey of state judges indicating that this is the central problem in pro se litigation with
which they were concerned).
35. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2007), http://www.abanet.org/judi-
cialethics/ABA_-MCJCapproved.pdf.
36. Judges are loath to provide any assistance often cite McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,
183-84 (1984), in which the Supreme Court stated that, in the context of a criminal trial, "[a]
defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge
on courtroom procedure. Nor does the Constitution require judges to take over chores for a pro
se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of course." The
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reasoning of most judges is that, if the Court took this position in criminal cases, it surely applies
in civil cases.
37. See, e.g., Marshall H. Tanick, Self-Representation: The Perils of Pro Se, FINDLAW, http://
library.findlaw.com/1999[Nov/1/131043.html (last visited February 2, 2008) (describing the expe-
rience of a partner in the author's law firm who had a case in Federal court in St. Paul involving
complex labor law issues in which the claimant represented himself. The partner was represent-
ing "the employer who was being sued, along with the National Labor Relations Board, [and]
felt that the pro se individual did a 'reasonably good job' in the case, but that he made some
legal and tactical blunders that [the partner] properly took advantage of to help his client get the
case promptly dismissed.").
38. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
aggressively toward him, for that will surely increase the SRL's hostil-
ity to the lawyer, or his client.3 9
At the outset, counsel should contact the SRL in writing to request
a meeting to discuss the case. This letter should include the admoni-
tion required by Rule 4.3 to the effect that counsel is not the individ-
ual's own attorney, but represents the adverse party in the matter.
This may result in an opportunity to learn the facts underlying the
SRL's position, and may possibly lead to the discovery of relevant
documents, names of witnesses, or other evidence. If a settlement is
reached as a result of these discussions, a letter should be sent to the
SRL reciting the settlement terms, suggesting that the SRL retain
counsel to look over the agreement, and requesting that, upon his or
her approval, a copy of the letter be signed and returned to counsel.
Counsel may find that the SRL is upset about a matter that can be
remedied by something as simple as an apology.
A settlement letter will not only memorialize the agreement, but
also the ethical manner of communication between counsel and the
SRL. Counsel should then schedule one or more settlement or pre-
trial conferences in which the court should be asked to inquire of the
litigant, on the record, as to his or her understanding of the terms of
the agreement, its fairness to the parties, and the fairness with which
counsel treated the litigant during the negotiations.
If trial seems inevitable, an initial effort should be made to engage
in informal discovery rather than a formal notice to appear at a depo-
sition. An informal notice, for example, would be a phone call to the
SRL from counsel's secretary asking what days and times might be
most convenient for the litigant to come to counsel's office (or for
counsel to come to the litigant's home, or a neutral location, if the
SRL prefers) to discuss the case. This is probably not a meeting to
which counsel should bring his or her client.
A meeting with both parties may prove useful later-especially if liti-
gation is inevitable-if counsel can persuade the SRL to meet and dis-
cuss those facts about the dispute which can be agreed upon. A
written stipulation of certain facts would ideally be one product of this
meeting. When counsel presents the court with such stipulations, or a
settlement agreement itself, it shows that counsel is assisting the court
to process its caseload smoothly, and evidences counsel's good faith
treatment of one whom the court may consider the underdog.
39. "Don't do anything to cause the pro se opponent to turn the thing about which she is
angry into an all-consuming cause. If you do that, you may never get rid of her. Don't talk down
to her. Even if she does not have a clue, treat her as your equal. Treat her with respect; kill her
with kindness. Surprisingly, your good behavior is frequently reciprocated." See Helfrich, supra
note 7, at 43.
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Any such meeting would be an educational one for the SRL. First,
it would be the time to explain to the SRL the "underlying legal obli-
gations" of the parties, as permitted by Commentary 2 of Rule 4.3.40
After the SRL explains his perception of the liability of the parties,
counsel can explain his view of the merits of the SRL's claim (or de-
fense), and of his client's position. Counsel could point to the defi-
ciencies or weaknesses, if any, of the SRL's claim, and what counsel
believes will happen if the matter proceeds to trial. If the SRL is a
plaintiff, he will probably have no idea of the necessary elements of
the cause of action he seeks to bring, nor of the available defenses of
his adversary. It may expedite resolution of the dispute if counsel pro-
vides such information about the deficiency in a SRL's claim or per-
haps the existence of a statute of limitations that appears to bar the
claim.
If communication is not utilized, the SRL will flounder and make
numerous procedural mistakes, which will be costly to one's client be-
cause of the necessary time expended addressing them. There may be
ill-conceived pleadings leading to several amendments being filed with
the court, to which counsel will need to respond. There will be mo-
tions filed that are not authorized by the rules of court, and not no-
ticed up or filed with improper notice of filing. Or the SRL may fail
to appear at depositions, or otherwise comply with discovery or proce-
dural rules. These kinds of problems can be avoided by using concilia-
tory, friendly communication with the SRL. In contrast, a "scorched
earth" approach in which counsel out-maneuvers the SRL to the lat-
ter's detriment may cause him or her to become more litigious in turn.
This would create the "Frankenstein's monster" of an overzealous pro
se litigant that lawyers hope to avoid.
41. "After all, the attorney should know better. Just as bad, the court will procrastinate,
which means that the lawyer will have to put off the impatient client who was promised an easy
victory." Garland, supra note 7, at 46.
42. Zuydhoek, Litigation Against a Pro Se Plaintiff, supra note 7, at 15. An exception to
this rule is where the plaintiff fails to make proper service. See, e.g., Michelson v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 619 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980) (no error where trial court dismissed pro
se plaintiff's action after he failed twice to properly serve defendants). But see Valentin v.
Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997) (the court has obligation to assist pro se plaintiff in the
identification of defendants and in the service of process); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152-
53 (4th Cir. 1978) (Upon stating a meritorious claim, the court has duty to "advise him how to
proceed and direct or permit amendment of the pleadings to bring that person or persons before
the court."); Meckley v. United States, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9033, *4 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he
district court has some responsibility to assist pro se litigants who are unable to identify the
proper defendant."). These principles have not stopped some courts from dismissing complaints
where the SRL failed to properly serve a defendant per state procedural rules. See, e.g., Brown
v. Thaler, 880 A. 2d 1113, 1116 (Me. 2005) (Dismissal of SRL complaint was proper where sum-
mons was first served improperly by certified mail, and no effort was subsequently made to
obtain and file the required an "acknowledgement of receipt" executed by defendants, or to
have defendants personally served.).
43. Zuydhoek, supra note 7, at 15.
44. Garland, supra note 7, at 47.
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IV. DISCOVERY
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982); Graham v. Lewinski, 848
F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1988); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975); Klingele v.
Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988); Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138 (10th Cir. 1985);
United States v. One Colt Python .357 Caliber Revolver, 845 F.2d 287 (11th Cir. 1988).
47. One court requires by local rule that the movant's counsel provide such notice. See,
e.g., N.D. I11.
R. 56.2 (requiring a special notice, included in the rule, containing summary judg-
ment proceeding instructions in plain English be served upon non-movant SRLs).
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V. TRIAL STRATEGIES
At trial, counsel must realize that there are many opportunities for
coming on too strong and playing-in the eyes of the judge or jury-the
role of Goliath.
The most important piece of advice I have for a lawyer litigating
against a pro se litigant is to protect your credibility by avoiding
hubris. Hubris is tempting when you, a hardy, experienced litigator,
have to deal with a pro se litigant who does not know the law, does
not play by the rules, and cannot communicate without engaging in a
harangue. The temptation grows to omit legal citations from your
briefs, engage in ad hominem attacks, and speak to the judge or the
clerk about "this mess we should all clear up," as if you and the court
stand united against the pro se party.
Don't. There are two reasons why not.
First, such behavior turns the court against you. If there is anything
more unappetizing than a smug lawyer, it is a smug lawyer opposing
an obviously outclassed pro se party. Nothing is more likely to remind
the court of its special obligation to protect the unrepresented party.
Additionally, on the occasions when you are wrong, you will look
plain stupid and childish. To avoid provoking this negative emotional
reaction, treat the pro se litigant with respect: do not complain or snig-
ger about the pro se party's lack of skill, intelligence, or coherency;
52. Zuydhoek, supra note 7, at 60. Other commentators suggest relaxing, or even eliminat-
ing, the Rules of Evidence for non-jury cases involving SRLs. John Sheldon & Peter Murray,
Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility in Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227 (2003).
and avoid ex parte contacts with the court regarding the pro se liti-
gant's position. While superciliousness might find favor with some
courts, most likely that number is small.53
This suggestion is especially apt in the context of evidentiary objec-
tions. While it may be an annoyance to hear testimony that is laden
with objectionable statements, the better practice is to be judicious
with one's objections. Despite reformers' efforts to modify traditional
evidentiary, procedural, and judicial ethics rules as they pertain to
SRLs,5 4 judges differ in the extent to which they require SRLs to fol-
low the rules of evidence.55 Therefore, objections should be limited to
testimony that has the potential to actually damage a client's case:
"Letting the pro se litigant babble on about irrelevant things makes
the problem the judge's, not yours. It also makes you seem rather
reasonable, both to the court and the unrepresented litigant."5 6 Mini-
mal objections will also serve to show how reasonable you are to the
57
jury.
When making objections, or responding to any comments from the
SRL, it is prudent to avoid straying from the general practice of ad-
dressing the court directly. Likewise, one's client should be admon-
ished beforehand to maintain a poker face regardless of irrelevant,
53. Garland, supra note 7, at 46. (emphasis added). Some courts recognize a judicial duty
to protect SRLs because they are unskilled in legal matters and prone to making errors. See,
e.g., Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). As noted in one
survey, "Judges observe that some attorneys take advantage of the fact their opponent is self-
represented. They say that they 'must bend over backwards to keep [the] pro se litigant from
being taken advantage of'." MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 53. Some courts recog-
nize that judges have a duty to protect vulnerable SRLs. See, e.g., Bolshakov v. McCarthy, 702
N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1999) (denying malpractice defendants' motion to preclude or dis-
miss action for failure to respond to overbroad bill of particulars where "the within complaint
indicates a vulnerable plaintiff," and "the demands that are the subject of this motion display an
effort to take advantage of that vulnerability. The court ... may, on its own initiative [pursuant
to court's authority to regulate discovery], issue a protective order so as to prevent disadvantage
or other prejudice to a litigant.").
54. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAM.
CT. REV. 36, 51 (2002) (arguing that rules of procedure and evidence should be relaxed in cases
involving SRLs); Sheldon & Murray, supra note 52, at 228 ("When [a pro se] litigant faces a
party represented by counsel in a jury-waived proceeding, rules of admissibility become more
than superfluous: They become weapons that the lawyer can use to gain an advantage that has
nothing to do with the merits of the case.").
55. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 57.
56. Helfrich, supra note 7, at 42.
57. Until such time as courts relax the rules of evidence in pro se cases, attorneys opposing
SRLs may want to consider making a request outside the presence of the jury that the court
follow the rules of evidence. And, while a judge may ask questions of the plaintiff or witnesses, if
the judge tries to relax the rules of evidence, "Try to persuade the court that the evidentiary
rules should not be relaxed for the pro se litigant." Zuydhoek, supra note 7, at 60, (citing An-
drews v. Bechtel Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 142 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986))
(district court did not err in finding pro se plaintiff had failed to introduce evidence to satisfy his
"itle VII claim, despite fact that evidence had been adduced earlier in connection with class
certification hearing, where to do so "would violate the basic tenets of the adversary system").
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Goldschmidt: Strategies for Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants
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Goldschmidt: Strategies for Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants
150 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:130
fect compliance with court rules does not permit the court to become
an advocate for the litigant. This is a point of which counsel can re-
mind the court, and place on record in the event of an appeal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Today's family law litigators and others practicing in courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction are facing a growing number of SRLs, a trend de-
scribed by a prominent trial court administrator as "both apparent
and irreversible." 69 Litigators, like courts as institutions, must adapt
to this movement. To do otherwise is to risk the possibility of lengthy,
acrimonious, and costly litigation from the minority of such litigants
who may feel mistreated and who come to believe there is a vast con-
spiracy against them by the bar and the judiciary. The suggestions
presented above for handling cases involving the majority of sincere
SRL adversaries-coupled with a patient attitude toward them, their
legal situation, and their real objectives-will help the litigator avoid
such potential contentiousness, so that an expeditious and just result
can be achieved, and one's sanity can be maintained.
69. See Gordon M. Griller, Litigants without Lawyers: "Going It Alone" in the Nation's
Courts, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 413, 413-415 (Gordon M.
Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr., eds., 7th ed. 2002).