No. L-69866. April 15, 1988.

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL ETABAG,

DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN
JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH
PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO,
ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN, petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER,
COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ.
RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT.
ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95),
Quezon City, respondents.
Constitutional Law;  Civil Law; Purpose ofArticle 32 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.—It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide
a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate those sacred rights
with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the
temptation is strongest to yield—borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee—to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to
remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot
be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The
rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic
principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to
nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.
“Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is
respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect
implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the
matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which
is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls.”
Same;  Public Officers;  View that respondents as public officers are covered by
the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
duties or functions totally misplaced.—Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs’
complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance
of official duties or functions. We find respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of
state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents
actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties within
the ambit of their powers.
Same;  Same; Same;  Fact that respondents as members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines were merely responding to their duty cannot be construed as a
blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint.
—lt may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance
with Proclamation No, 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on
January 27,1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes
against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of
the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The
ConBtitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low,
civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Same;  Same; Damages; Respondents are not exempted from responsibility
underArticle 32 of the Civil Code.—Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any
public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating
the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Same;  Same; Same;  Military authorities are not restrained from pursuing their
assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor but are required to observe
constitutional and legal safeguards.—This is not to say that military authorities are
restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor.
We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies,
whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or
subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are
merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and
legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start
to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as
vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in
the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
Same;  Same; Habeas Corpus; Plaintiffs’ cause of action not barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—We find merit in
petitioners’ contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other viola-tions of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Same;  Same; Respondeat Superior;  Doctrine of respondent superior rejected in
the instant case.—Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is
inapplicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been
generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant
(i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between
superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Same;  Same; Same;  The person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.—Be that as it may, however,
the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the
actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgressions joint tort-feasors.
—By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer
may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in
February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or
indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
Civil Procedure;  Evidence;  Dropping defendants General Fabian Ver etc. not
supported by the record nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.—In the case
at bar, the trial court.dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson,
Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo
Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1st Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo
Bacalso from the complaint on the assumption that under the law, they cannot be
held responsible for the wrongful acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the
ground that they alone “have been specifically mentioned and identified to have
allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiffs, which acts of
alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of
action.” But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law
and jurisprudence.
Same;  Same; Court cannot limit plaintiffs’ action for damages to acts of alleged
physical violence which constituted delict or wrong.— Firstly, it is wrong to limit the
plaintiffs’ action for damages to  acts of alleged physical violence” which constituted
“

delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in

any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein.
Same;  Same; Complaint;  The instant complaint alleges facts showing with
abundant clarity and details how plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and liberties were
violated and impaired by defendants.—The complaint in this litigation alleges facts
showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and
liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search
warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures
and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to
plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor
covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or
under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several
undisclosed places of “safehouses” where they were kept incommunicado and
subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and
brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Same;  Same; Same;  Only the facts alleged in the complaint and no other
should be considered in determining the suffering of the cause of aciion.—The
responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based
on what appears on the face of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the
cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be
considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf
of a party can be assumed unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or
the party concemed.—In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8,
1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintifFB. They needed no
specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf
of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or
the party concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse
on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set
aside the order of November 8,1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by
some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed
by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took
umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the
complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose
lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal
infirmity cannot be sanctioned.

PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution and order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. XCV (95).

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

YAP. J.:

This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon
by this Court. It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may
be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as wel!7
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other
violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.”
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of
the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted
and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said
plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00;
moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00
each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney’s fees amounting to not less
than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then
Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause
a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of
their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against
the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs
Marco Palo, Danilo de la Puente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8,1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez,
Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo
Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz Plores, Rogelio Aberca,
Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21,1983. On November
7,1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants’ counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding,  issued a resolution
1

granting the motion to dismiss. H. sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the
defendants’ contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into
the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because,
as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that
assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are
immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties;
and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants,
since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint
confiscated plaintiffs’ purely personal properties in violation of their
constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo, committed acts of torture and
maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct
supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious
liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court
stated? “After a careful study of defendants’ arguments, the court finds the
same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand,
plaintiffs’ arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit.”
 A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on
November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9,
1983, the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs,
furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys.
Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto
Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella, Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander
Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag. Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15,1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting
himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the
motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, “to preclude any
suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending
motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to
plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to
resolve said pending motion.” This order prompted plaintiffs to file an
amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P.
Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984,
the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for
reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11,1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising,
Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of November
8,1983, issued an order, as follows:
“It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno,
Alan Jasminez, represented by counsel, Atty. Augusto Sanchez, Spouses Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Protatio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio
Beltran, Alfredo Mansos, represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and
Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion
to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor
interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by
the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.”
Assailing the said order of May 11,1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protado-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin
failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983
dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary periocL Plaintiffs claimed
that the motion to set aside the order of November 8,1983 and the
amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs,
although signed by only some of the lawyers,
In its resolution of September 21,1984, the respondent court dealt with
both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with
respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8,1983 had already
become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8,1988 granting
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of
September 21,1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolutiori of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth ProtacioMarcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is denied for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:

1. 1.Gen Fabian Ver
2. 2.Col. Fidel Singson
3. 3.Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. 4.Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. 5.Col. Galileo Kintanar
6. 6.Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. 7.Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 8.1 Lt. PedroTango
9. 9.Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10.10.Lt. Raul Bacalso

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present
action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied; but in so far as it
affects and refers to defendants, to wit:

1. 1.Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and

2. 2.Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba,

the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated

November 3,1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect,
reconsidered and modified.”
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15,1985
seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court’s resolution of
November 8, 1983-, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the
petition, which it did on November 9,1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on
August 26,1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners’ complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:

1. (1)Freedom of religion;
2. (2)Freedom of speech;
3. (3)Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
4. (4)Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5. (5)Freedom of suffrage;
 6. (6)The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
7. (7)The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public
use;
8. (8)The right to the equal protection of the laws;
9. (9)The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
10.(10)The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11.(11)The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12.(12)The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;
13.(13)The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
14.(14)The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15.(15)The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16.(16)The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
17.(17)Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness:
18.(18)Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
19.(19)Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act
or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a
sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred
rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political
stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield—borrowing the words of
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee—to the law of force rather than the force of
law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties
are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious
demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will
perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law
compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the
expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.
“Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the
law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now
this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to
the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain
residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason
nevertheless controls." 2

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint, the respondents

postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of
state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or
functions. In support of said contention, respondents maintain that—
“Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary
duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that
the President may call them “to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.” (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).
On January 17,1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial
law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The
proclamation also provided “that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect.”
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver’s order to Task Force Makabansa to launch preemptive
strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners
claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task
force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful
searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to
property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task
force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a preemptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent
members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional
duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts
performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to
shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and
from potentially disabling threats of liability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2731;
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534), and upon the necessity of protecting the
performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran
v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
x x x           x x x           x x x
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of
their duties is now a settled jurisprudence (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phii. 308; Zulueta v.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780,16 S. Ct.
631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct.
2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de
Leune, 602 P. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President
and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such
immunity from suit." 3
We find respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit
totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts
done by officers in the performance of official duties within the ambit of their
powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4

“No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-
General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and
circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to
him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power.
Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the
purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested
in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the
courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for
the exercise of this authority.”
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, “to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the
lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective,
to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged com-munist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a
roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard
or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined
in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme
law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe
obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or
any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights
and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing
their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no
quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of
the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or
subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we
are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very
fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies,
the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin
in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost
or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents’ suggestion that plaintiffs’ cause of
action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Respondents contend that “Petitioners cannot circumvent the
suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at
the same purpose—a judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their
detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is
indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are
inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional
rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release
from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial
inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place.
The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension
ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere
expedient of altering the title of their action.”
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners’ contention that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining
his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article
1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
“However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-
delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one
(1) year.”
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners’
right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and
cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents’ confiscation of their private belongings, the
violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitu-tional issue
pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question
therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior
officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages,
jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is
inapplicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondeat superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master
and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view. is
the language of Article 32, The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under
the Constitution  acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension.
5

No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the
factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily
be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver,
Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., CoL
Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1st Lt. Pedro
Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the complaint on the
assumption that under the law, they cannot be held responsible for the
wrongful acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master
Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they
alone “have been specifically mentioned and identified to have allegedly
caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiffs, which acts of alleged
phy sical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of
action.” But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord
with law and jurisprudence. Firstly, it is wrong to limit the plaintiffs’ action for
damages to “acts of alleged physical violence” which constituted delict or
wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any
manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein, among others—

1.1.Preedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;

2.2.The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3.3.The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4.4.The privacy of communication and correspondence;
 5.5.Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a state witness.

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity
and details, how plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in
Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The
complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants
or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures
and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive
and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of
plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
“safehouses” where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to
physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal
treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the
plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
“directly” should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply
set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence
that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint.  To 6

determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered.  For this purpose, the motion
7

to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. 8

Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing
for lack of cause of action the complaint against all defendants, except Major
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint
contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted
hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action
against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing
the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente,
Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of
said piaintiffS' to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of
November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November
8, 1983 was filed by "plaintiffs, through counsel." True, the motion was
signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgurido; Atty.
Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty.
Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V.
Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for
Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was
filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the
understanding of defendants’ counsel himself for when he filed his comment
on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who
signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose W.
Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez,
Antonio Rosales, Pedro Ella, Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker
Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the
signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no
specific authority to do that The authority of an attorney to appear for and in
behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the
adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case.
Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon
himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8,1953
dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its
very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all
of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a
contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had
already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did
not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal
infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution
of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11,
1984 and its resolution dated September 21,1984. Let the case be remanded
to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco
, Bidin, Sarmiento, CorUs and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
     Teehankee, C.J., concurs with a separate opinion.
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
     Padilla, J., no part; related to counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
610
610 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aberca vs. Ver

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court’s judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public
officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private
individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any
manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of
another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as
provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for
damages filed in the court below by petitionersplaintiffs for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional
rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of
the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility that would
hold a superior officer jointly and severally accountable for damages,
including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior
officer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for
he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being
held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily
accountable with the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in this
wise: “ln a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the
potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it
breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto
himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal
law the end justifies the means x x x x would bring terrible retribution."1

As the writer stressed in Hildawa vs. Enrile   which was an action to enjoin

2

the operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, “ln a
democratic state, you don’t stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to
what they do, then we’re
________________

 Olmstead vs. U.S. 277 U.S. 438; dissenting opinion.

1

 138 SCRA 146, 161.

2

611
VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 611
1988
Aberca vs. Ver
no better than they x x x x there would be no difference.” x x x The Supreme
Court stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all
persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic role under the
Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and
letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person’s life be snuffed out without due process in
a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto-unless it was called for
as an act of selfdefense by the law agents using reasonable means to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.”
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the “Sparrow Units” or death squads
of the NPA which have infiltrated the cities and suburbs and performed their
despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police officers
constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and
must be severely condemned by all who adhere to the Rule of Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of
office in February, 1986 was to file our government’s ratification and access
to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United
Nations, declaring thereby the government’s commitment to observe the
precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people
decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the
Commission on Human Rights has been created and organized with ample
powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures
against all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups
Petition granted; resolution and order annulled and set aside. Case
remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
Note.—Public officials are not liable for damages for performing their
duties required by law and absent bad faith. (Mabutol vs. Pascual, 124 SCRA
867.)