31.

\epublic of tbe ~bilippines

~upreme <!Court
;fffilmtiln

EN BANC

PATRICIA MARIE I. RANADA, G.R. No. 246126

MARA ALYSSABEL D.
CEPEDA, RAYMON G. Present:
DULLANA, FRANKLIN Y. GESMUNDO, CJ.,*
CIMATU, MAURICIO E. LEONEN **
'
VICTA, CAMILLE KRISTINA CAGUIOA,
S. ELEMIA, RALPH MARTINS.I HERNANDO,
RIVAS, BALTAZAR ESPINOSA LAZARO-JAVIER,
LAGSA and RAPPLER, INC., INTING,
Petitioners, ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.
DR. FLORANGEL BRAID, GAERLAN,
MELINDA QUINTOS DE ROSARIO,
JESUS, CERES DOYO, JOHN LOPEZ, J.,
NERY, SOLITA MONSOD, MA. DIMAAMPAO,
SALVACION "INDAY" MARQUEZ,
VARONA, MARLON RAMOS, KHO, JR., and
VERGEL SANTOS, LOURO SINGH,JJ
ERNEST DE VEYRA,
JOSELITO DELOS REYES, Promulgated:
MURIEL "TWINK"
June 27, 2023
MACARAIG, NIKOLETTEI
KRISTINE NONNA "NIKKO"
DIZON, AND OTHER
JOURNALISTS AND MEDIAi
PRACTITIONERS LISTED IN
ANNEX A,
Petitioners-in-Intervention,

* On official leave.
** Leonen, SA.J. , designated as Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No . 2990, dated June 24, 2023 .
BARTHOLOME T.
GUINGONA, ANA THERESA P.
SANTOS, MICHELLE D.L.
ABAD, JOSE FRANCISCO M.
LUNA, MIKAELA ANDREA R.
GARCIA, MERINETTE A.
RETONA, JENNINA MARIE M. •
MORA, RANEZA E. PINLAC,
ANDREW DANIEL H.
MENCILAS, GILLIAN N.
VILLANUEVA, PHOEBE C.
SALVADOR, SHERWIN G. DE
VERA, ANGELO A.M. SILVA,
ARMIN REY P. ADINA, ODINA
E. BATNAG, MA. ANNA
MARGARITA V. BUENO,
ANGEL S. AVERIA, JR.,
MARIA LOURDES M.
JIMENEZ, EDNA 0. AQUINO,
ANTONIO TIAMSON, NOEMI
L. DADO, MARIA LORETO P.
ROCES, AND MARLON
ANTHONY TONSON,
Petitioners-in-Intervention, •

PAGBABAGO@PILIPINAS
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Petitioner-in-Intervention,

- versus-

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
OPERATIONS OFFICE,
MEDIA ACCREDITATION
REGISTRATION OFFICE, and
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
GROUP,
Respondents.

x--------- ----------------- - - - - - - x
 DECISION

SINGH,J.:

The Court is asked to determine whether the freedom of the press, as

enshrined in Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, has been violated.
However, supervening events have foreclosed the need for the Court to rule
on the substantive issues raised.

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition [With (1) Prayer for the
• Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and (2) Motion for Special Raffle] 1
dated April 10, 2019 (the Petition), was filed by petitioners Patricia Marie I.
Ranada (Ranada), Mara Alyssabel D. Cepeda, Raymon G. Dullana, Franklin
Y. Cimatu, 2 Mauricio E. Victa, Camille Kristina S. Elemia, Ralph Martin S.
Rivas, Baltazar Espinosa Lagsa (collectively, the Rappler Journalists), and.
Rappl er Inc. (Rappler) (collectively, the petitioners). The petitioners prayed
that the Court issue the necessary writs to prohibit the respondents Office of
the President, Office of the Executive Secretary, Presidential
Communications Operations Office (PCOO), Media Accreditation
Registration Office (MARO), and Presidential Security Group (collectively,
the respondents), from implementing a ban that would prevent Rappler and
its journalists from covering any and all newsworthy events involving the
presence and/or participation of the then Chief Executive, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte (President Duterte), and to declare the ban void. 3

• After the filing of the Rappler Petition, three Petitions-in-Intervention

were subsequently filed with the Court. The first Petition-in-Intervention,4
dated April 23, 2019, was filed by Dr. Florangel Braid, et al. (Braid, et al.)
who are journalists and media practitioners. 5 The second Petition-in-
Intervention,6 dated April 22, 2019, was filed by Bartholome T. Guingona, et
al. (Guingona, et al.), who are composed of student journalists as well as_
members of the academe. 7 The third Petition-in-Intervention, 8 dated May 24,
2019, was filed by Pagbabago@Pilipinas Foundation, Inc. (Pagbabago),
which is a foundation and the organizer ofMediaNation, a network of media
practitioners (collectively, the petitioners-in-intervention). 9

1
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 3-94.
• 2
Spelled as "Frank Cimatu" in his Verification and Certification ofNon-Forum Shopping; Id.at 83 .
3
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 4.
4
Id at218-227.
5
Id at 219.
6
Id. at 249-288.
7
Id at251-253.
8
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 581-591.
9
Id. at 582-583.
 •
Decision 2 G.R. No. 246126

The Court issued a Resolution 10 dated July 30, 2019, requiring the
respondents to comment on the Petition and the Petitions-in-Intervention. The
respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, accordingly filed
their Consolidated Comment [re: Petition dated April 10, 2019, Petitions-in-
Intervention dated April 22, 2019, April 29, 2019 and May 24, 2019], dated
September 24, 2019. 11

The Court then issued a Resolution 12 dated November 19, 2019,

requiring the petitioners and the petitioners-in-intervention to file their
respective replies to the Consolidated Comment. Accordingly, the petitioners
filed their Reply 13 dated January 20, 2020; Guingona, et al. filed their
Omnibus Reply 14 dated January 20, 2020, although the Reply of Pagbabago, 15
•
dated November 4, 2019, predates the Court's Resolution.

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution 16 dated April 5, 2022,

dispensing with the reply of Braid, et al., as they had failed to file their Reply
within the prescribed period.

The Antecedents

On January 11, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

released a Decision 17 revoking Rappler's Certificate of Incorporation (COi),
for "violating the constitutional and statutory Foreign Equity Restrictions in
Mass Media[.]" 18

Subsequent to the revocation of Rappler's COI, Rappler and its

journalists were prohibited, or banned, from attending presidential events- •
essentially, events where President Duterte was in attendance.

The petitioners contend that the extent of the ban prevents them "from·
covering any and all newsworthy events involving the presence and/or
participation of the Chief Executive in any venue and in any capacity, from
business forums to electoral exercises such as campaign rallies." 19

JO Id. at 604-606.
11 Id. at 618-665.
12 Id. at 902-A to 902-B.
13 Rollo, Vol. 3, p. 1079-1142.
14 id. at 1039-1074.
15 Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 903-910.
16 Rollo, Vol. 3, pp.1157-1158.
17 Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 698-726.
18 Id. at 726. •
19 Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 4.
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 246126

The respondents meanwhile submit that due to the revocation of

Rappler's COI, "petitioner Rappler and all its affiliated journalists have no
special access to cover the Malacafiang complex and all other events attended
by the President himself." 20

• The characterization of this situation as a "ban" or simply a lack of

"special access" differs between the petitioners and the respondents. Further,
the petitioners and the respondents differ in their perceived basis for the ban,
as well as the scope thereof.

Viewpoint of the petitioners

The petitioners submit that "[o]n 20 February 2018, Respondents

commenced imposing a ban against Petitioner Rappler and its affiliated
journalists from covering newsworthy events involving the presence or
participation of the President and his political party, Partido Demokratiko.
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan Party ("PDP-Laban"), including those held in public
places that are accessible to members of the public." 21

As to the reason for this ban, the petitioners allege that "[t]he Ban is
• based on three (3) verbal declarations by the Chief Executive directed against
Petitioner Rappler." 22

As stated in the petitioners' Reply: 23

In a Media Interview with President Rodrigo Roa Duterte during the

Inauguration of the New Communications Development Project held on 16
January 2018, the Chief Executive declared Rappl er as a "fake news outlet":

"Kaya ko kayong bastusin 'yang p***** i** xxx ~

Rapp/er, pati kung mayroon ako.

I do not have to cover anything because you can dig the

entire cemetery of lies and you will not find anything.
XXX
"Since you are a fake news outlet, then I am not surprised
that your articles are also fake."

20
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 623.
21
Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 8.
22
Rollo, Vol. 3, pp. 1085.
23
Id. at 1079-1142.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 246126
•
In an interview dated 22 February 2018, the Chief Executive
invoked "executive action" to impose the Ban against Petitioners from
entering Malacafiang or covering any presidential event:

"Q: Sir, last na Zang. 'Yung sa Rappler Zang po, sir. Ano
Zang po 'yung assurance na the decision ofMalacafzang not
to allow Rappler to cover any presidential event will be a
precedent to other media or -

PRESIDENT DUTERTE: No, because it is not a legitimate

agency according to SEC.

So I am now invoking executive action based on the SEC

ruling. na kung sabihin na sila, legitimate sila, pasok kayo
uli. Walang problema sa akin 'yan."

This was reiterated on O1 March 2018 during the Opening

Ceremony of the National SWAT Challenge in which the Chief Executive •
declared a broader order against Petitioners:

"Huwag kayong sumagot. You 're investigating us, fact-

finding, well sorry. Do not .f"** with me. Mahirap kasi 'pag
palabas 'yan, kita mo 'yung mga newspaper, mga Rapp/er.
Iba tong speech ko ngayon. Bukas, iba ang presentation
niyan.

Kaya bawal 11gayo11 sila. That is my order. Do not talk to

people who will produce lies out of your statements. And
who can twist it forever to the angle that they would like
it to." 24 (Emphasis in the original; numbering omitted)

The petitioners, therefore, submit that the ban is based merely on

President Duterte's personal distaste for or animus towards Rappler and its
journalists, as the ban "arises from a manifest and hostile animus against
Petitioners." 25
•
Viewpoint of the respondents

On the other hand, the respondents counter that the "ban" is, in
actuality, nothing more than a failure of the petitioners to abide by the rules
and procedures governing accreditation for journalists to be able to enjoy
access to presidential events. 26

24 Id. at 1085-1086; see rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 159-174, Annex K of the Petition.
25 Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 66.
26 Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 621-623.

•
•

Decision 5 G.R. No. 246126

The respondents explain that for "special access" to cover the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, media entities must apply for accreditation
with the International Press Center (IPC), which is an office under the .
PC00. 27

The respondents aver that one of the functions of the IPC is to establish
and maintain a system of accreditation for local and foreign members of the
media. The IPC requires the submission of an IPC Press Accreditation Form
for the application and renewal ofMalacafiang Press Corps (MPC) members,
members of the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines
•
(FOCAP), as well as visiting foreign journalists. After approval, accredited
media organizations and reporters are issued ID Cards, which are valid only
for one year from January 1 until December 31 of the same year of issuance. 28

Further, in order for local media entities to have "special access" to

cover the President, they must apply for membership with the MPC, which is
an organization of television, radio, print, or online reporters assigned by their
respective media organizations to cover Malacafiang, as only Filipino media
practitioners who are MPC members are allowed to enter the premises of
Malacafiang. 29

The respondents cite Section 2, Article 4 of the MPC's by-laws as

enumerating the requirements to qualify as a member of the MPC, and they
list the requirements as follows:

• a) duly RECOGNIZED AND ENDORSED by the Presidential

Communications Operations (PCOO) as bona fide media
organization;
b) subject to the approval of the MPC officials;
c) has been in operation for at least one year;
d) duly ACCREDITED by the International Press Center; and
e) duly REGISTERED at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 30 (Emphasis in the original)

The foregoing is consistent with the copy of the MPC by-Laws, 31 which.
the petitioners annexed to their Petition.

The MARO, an office also under the PCOO, accredits local and foreign
media in covering Malacafiang Palace and any other Presidential events

27
• Id. at 621.
28 Id. at 621-622.
29
Id. at 622.
,o Id.
1
' Rollo, Vol.1,pp. 100-106.
 •

Decision 6 G.R. No. 246126

outside it, and is also the office which endorses media organizations to the
MPC. As related by the respondents, for accreditation, the MARO requires,
first, a Press ID issued by the IPC, and second, membership with the MPC. 32

On December 31, 201 7, all IPC and MARO accreditations expired in

line with the one calendar year validity period stated above, including
Rappler's, and would need to be renewed. Accordingly, Ranada, Rappler's
Malacafiang beat reporter, filed an application for renewal of her IPC Press
ID in 2018 as a member of the MPC. However, as mentioned previously, the
SEC issued a Decision revoking Rappler's COI on January 11, 2018. 33 Thus,
considering that Rappler' s SEC registration had been revoked, this led to the
•
petitioners' failure to comply with the requirements for renewal of
accreditation, for which reason, Ranada's application was denied by the IPC.
As a result, Ranada was denied special access to the Malacafiang Palace, and
Ranada's IPC Press ID was not renewed. 34

Since then, Rappl er and all its affiliated journalists have had no "special
access" to cover the Malacafiang Complex and all other events attended by
President Duterte himself. 35

From the foregoing, it is clear that the respondents anchor the propriety
and validity of the events affecting Rappler and its journalists on the SEC's
revocation of Rappler's COL They portray Rappler's continuing corporate
existence as a key requisite in the overlapping requirements that are necessary
for a media entity to be afforded access to presidential events.
•
The Arguments

Proceeding from their disparate views on the nature and basis of the
prohibition, the petitioners and the respondents necessarily diverge in their
submissions as to the legal and constitutional ramifications of this occurrence.

Petitioners

The petitioners contend that the ban abridges the freedom of the press,
as barring access to members of the press, or otherwise restricting or censoring

•
32
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 622-623.
33
Id at 623.
'' Id
,s Id
 Decision 7 G.R. No, 246126

the ability of the press to cover activities or events of the President,

contravenes their constitutional rights. 36

The petitioners go on to assert that a free press must not be dependent

•
on "any fonn of government license as a prerequisite to the exercise of press.
freedoms," and that "[m]embers of the press, by the mere fact of exercising
such profession and with the recognition of their peers as responsible
journalists, do not require any prior approval or accreditation from a
government agency to perform their functions or editorial freedoms." 37 The
petitioners submit that "[t]o hold as Respondents' claim that Petitioners'
constitutional protection attaches only after their accreditation or on the
clearance of other government agencies, i.e. the SEC or BIR, would justify
unwarranted governmental intrusion into their press freedoms. If the
proscription against government interference with the press can be simply
avoided through the use of'regulatory' creativity, then the protection becomes
illusory ."38

The petitioners further assert that the media is self-governing and self-
regulating, and therefore any interference or attempt by the government to
regulate them, such as through the accreditation system detailed by the
• respondents, is invalid. 39 They cite as legal basis for this assertion, Republic
Act (RA) No. 4363, 40 titled "An Act to Further Amend Article Three Hundred
Sixty of the Revised Penal Code," as well as Presidential Decree (PD) No.
576, 41 titled "Abolishing the Media Advisory Council and the Bureau of
Standards for Mass Media and Authorizing the Organization of Regulatory
Councils for Print Media and Broadcast Media."

The petitioners assert that "[a] self-regulating press therefore means a

press that possesses the sole and exclusive power to d~fine the standards for
quality journalism, to ensure compliance therewith andl to accept, suspend or
revoke its members independent of any Government ifiltervention. Thus, the
prerogative to determine: (1) who are legitimate journJJists; and (2) who has
access to public venues to cover public newsworthy evdnts is a prerogative of
the self-regulating press which cannot be co-opted by le Government." 42

• Next, the petitioners submit that the ban is 1

form of subsequent
punishment. They write that "[p]lainly put, the ban was a retaliation for the
I

36
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 36.
37
Id at 37.
38
Id at 38.
39
Id at 45-48.
40
Approved on June 19, 1965.
41
Approved on November 9, 1974.
42
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 45-46.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 246126

content of their reporting," and that the ban constitutes "punitive action
•
against them."43

The petitioners also submit that the ban does not pass the test of strict
scrutiny, as no compelling state interest has been shown, and the ban has not
been shown to be narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means, given its
broad and encompassing nature. 44

The petitioners lastly contend that they were denied procedural due
process, as they did not receive any formal written notice of the imposition of
the ban and an opportunity to be heard,45 and also that they were denied equal
protection, as they were arbitrarily, if not malevolently, singled out, and a
disparate treatment was effected.46

All told, the petitioners contend that any accreditation requirements

forwarded by the respondents are merely a pretextual cover, and that the ban '
is actually premised on the verbal directives of President Duterte, whose
statements evince his personal dislike of the petitioners and therefore cannot
serve as valid basis for denying them access to presidential events.

Respondents

The respondents, meanwhile, assert that no constitutional issues are

raised by the events that occurred, and no constitutional rights have been
violated or even implicated by the prohibition. They state that "[t]he denial
of an entity, whose legal existence is in serious doubt, to 'personally' cover
presidential events does not equate to a serious constitutional issue as
petitioners want this Honorable Court to believe." 47

The respondents maintain that the petitioners' failure to comply with

the requirements for their accreditation is at the heart of the controversy.48 •
The respondents underscore that a local media entity or journalist must be
accredited by the MARO in order to cover presidential events, and that under
the rules of the MARO, accreditation requires that a media entity or journalist
be both a holder of an IPC Press ID as well as an MPC member in good
standing. 49 The respondents also reiterate that the MPC by-Laws require,

43
Id at 50.
44
Id at 60-63.
45
Id. at 63-64.
46
Id. at 64-67.
47
Rollo, Vol. 2, p. 630.
48
Id. at 636-641.
49 Id. at 636.

•
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 246126

among other things, that a media organization must be duly registered with
the SEC in order to be accredited as an :MPC member. 50 The respondents thus
submit that a journalist or media entity must be accredited by the IPC, the
MARO, and be a member of the :MPC, in order to be able to cover presidential
events. 51

The respondents state that the IPC Press ID card is valid only for the
year in which it was issued, and must thus be renewed annually in order for·
its holder to continue enjoying the privilege of covering presidential events
both within and outside Malacafiang grounds. 52 Here, Ranada's IPC Press ID
expired on December 31, 2017, and no IPC Press ID was issued in her favor
for the year 2018 due to the revocation ofRappler's SEC registration. 53
•
Respondent PCOO, through the IPC and MARO, are merely
implementing their accreditation rules in determining which media entity or
journalist is allowed to enter and cover presidential events and press
briefings. 54 Therefore, the respondents submit that the mere act of enforcing
its accreditation rules does not, in any way, affect or trample upon the
petitioners' constitutional freedom of the press. 55

The respondents assert that access to presidential events is akin to a

privilege, and not a right that is afforded under the freedom of the press, saying
that "the coristitutional freedom of the press does not certainly include the .
right to demand a special press pass, special accreditation, or special spot at
any news conference or press briefing." 56

The respondents also allege that the accreditation requirements cannot

be considered as imposing a prior government license such as may be
• considered a form of prior restraint. They argue that the IPC Press ID is
required by all journalists to cover Malacafiang and was not imposed
specifically on Rappler. Further, the petitioners were able to continuously
report and publish articles despite their lack of accreditation, as it was only
their physical access to presidential events that was affected. 57

The respondents state that they have not interfered with or hampered
the petitioners in their gathering of material and their reporting, and in fact

50
Id at 637.
51
Id
52
Id at 637.
53
Id at 638.
54
Id
55
Id. at 640.
56
Id. at 641.
57
Id. at 642-643 .
•
Decision G.R. No. 246126

they assisted the petitioners in securing live audio and video broadcasts, and
so "[i]t is thus misleading for the petitioners to state that their absence in the
same room where the event is being held constitutes prior restraint." 58

The respondents go on to state that " [a] survey of free speech cases in
our jurisdiction reveals the same disposition: there is prior restraint when the
government act forbids speech, prohibits the expression of a message, or
imposes onerous requirements or restrictions for the publication or
dissemination of ideas." 59 They continue: "[c]learly, the lack of physical
access of petitioners during presidential events does not, in any way, restrict
the publishing of news articles, much less could it be characterized as prior
restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of information before •
publication nor any imposition of requirements." 60

The respondents also state that the prohibition cannot be considered as

subsequent punishment, as the petitioners have not been sanctioned, and it is
instead the constitutional issue regarding Rappler's ownership that has
stripped it and its journalists of the privilege to cover President Duterte in
Malacafiang. 61

The respondents then assert that the right to self-regulation of the press,
as found in RA No. 4363 and PD No. 576, is limited to ethical issues,
including investigation and imposition of penalties therefor. Respondents
state that, on the contrary, the issue here revolves around the legal existence.
of Rappler in accordance with law and jurisprudence, which is beyond the
scope of self-regulation. 62
•
The respondents also raise the fact that Rappler had argued in the SEC
case that it was not a "mass media entity" within the contemplation of the
Constitution, as the Constitutional Commission did not intend this to cover
online media platforms. Thus, the respondents state that the enforcement of
the IPC and MARO accreditation rules was only to ensure that only legitimate
mass media entities and journalists be granted special access to presidential
events. 63

The respondents also contend that strict scrutiny should not apply as
there is no infringement of fundamental rights such as speech or the press, as

58
Id. at 643.
59
Id at 645.
60 Id.
,1 Id. •
62 Id. at 648-649.
63 Id. at 650.
 Decision 11 G.R. No. 246126

the petitioners' claim that the ban is a form of retaliation and a personal
prejudgment of credibility by President Duterte is unfounded, and that their
lack of access is simply the result of their lack of accreditation, which finds
its basis in the January 11, 2018 SEC Decision. 64

• Lastly, as regards the due process and equal protection arguments of

the petitioners, the respondents state that a discussion on notice and hearing
is not relevant as what is in issue is simply the lack of accreditation, and
further that this lack of accreditation justifies the difference in treatment as
they are not similarly situated with other journalists who possess such·
accreditation. 65

Having summarized the main arguments of both sides, the Court

proceeds to its ruling.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds that there is one primary issue that needs to be
addressed: that of mootness. However, implicated in the Court's discussion
on mootness is one other procedural consideration, which is, that the
• resolution of factual issues is not a proper function of the Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction. The Court's ruling on these procedural issues
precludes the need for the Court to rule directly on the substantive issues.

Mootness

President Duterte is no longer the current President of our Republic.

His term ended at noon on June 30, 2022 in accordance with Article VII,
Section 4 of the Constitution, when he was succeeded in office by President
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. (President Marcos).

Given that the primary assertion of the petitioners is that the ban was
the result of the various offices in the executive department acting to
implement the verbal directives of President Duterte, and that the
accreditation issue was merely a pretext for President Duterte's personal
• dislike of the petitioners, it is clear that the expiration of his term as President
has mooted this Petition.

64
Id at 654-655.
65
Id at 655-659.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 246126

The Court, in Pangilinan v. Cayetano, 66 thoroughly discussed the

necessity of an actual case or controversy as a prerequisite to the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and that, in its absence, a case is to be considered
moot and no longer a proper subject of review: •

The Petitions are moot. They fail to present a persisting case or

controversy that impels this Court's review.

In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an "existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory."

An actual case deals with conflicting rights that are legally

demandable and enforceable. It involves definite facts and incidents to be
appreciated, and laws to be applied, interpreted and enforced vis-a-vis
ascertained facts. It must be "definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief."

A constitutional question may not be presented to this Court at an

inopportune time. When it is premature, this Court's ruling shall be
relegated as an advisory opinion for a potential, future occurrence. When •
belated, concerning matters that are moot, the decision will no longer affect
the parties.

Either way, courts must avoid resolving hypothetical problems or

academic questions. This exercise of judicial restraint ensures that the
judiciary will not encroach on the powers of other branches of government.
As Angara v. Electoral Commission explained:

[T]his power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and

controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must •
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.

The requirement of a bona fide controversy precludes advisory

opinions and judicial legislation. For this Court, "only constitutional issues
that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained," and only when they are raised at the opportune time.

66
G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021 [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 246126
•

A case is moot when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy

by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value." There may have been conflicting rights, disputed
facts, or meritorious claims warranting this Court's intervention, but a
supervening event rendered the issue stale. In Penafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc.
v. Sugar Regulatory Administration:

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it

ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not
• serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect
because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced. 67
(Citations omitted)

In this case, there would indeed no longer be any practical value in a

judgment from the Court. Not only is President Duterte, whose acts were
assailed as violative of constitutional rights, already out of office, but further,
and importantly, it does not appear that Rappler remains without access to
presidential events under President Marcos, based on the list of MPC
members as of February 20, 2023, 68 as well as an opinion piece published by
Rappler. 69

It is conceded that the doctrine of mootness is not without well-

recognized exceptions. As held in Timbol v. Commission on Elections: 70

This court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when:
•
(]) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case
involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public

67 Id.
68
List of the latest Malacafiang Press Corps members as requested on August 18, 2022, and replied to on
February 22, 2023, through the Freedom of Information Program website, available at:
<https://www.foi.gov.ph/requests/aglzfinVmb2ktcGhyHgsSBONvbnRlbn0iEVBDT08tNjg5NT04Mz
AzNTY4DA> (last accessed on March 21, 2023). The list includes Bea Cupin ofRappler as an MPC
Regular Member.
69
"[OPINION] Bongbong and the media: So-so" by Chay F. Hofilefia, dated October 11, 2022, Rappler
website, available at: <https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/first-100 days-marcos-jr-
philippine-media-so-so-relations/> (last accessed on March 21, 2023). The pertinent passage reads "[t]he
heavy-handed style ofDuterte does not, however, seem to be the preference of Marcos. He's had regular-
hour press conferences, let his former spokesperson (really an outsider) communicate with the media,
and has made no move to shame or exclude critical media from Palace coverages." (Emphasis
supplied)
70
754 Phil. 578 (2015) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc] .

•
 •

Decision 14 G.R. No. 246126

interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling

principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was
capable of repetition yet evading review. 71

Despite this case seemingly presenting some of the aforementioned

exceptions, the Court declines to rule on the substantive issues not only as an
exercise of judicial restraint, but also because there are a number of factual
questions which would prevent the Court from rendering an instructive ruling.

Questions ofFact
•

As explained by the Court in the case of GJOS-Samar, Inc. v.

Department of Transportation and Communications: 72

In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with
the RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct
recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law.
Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under
Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the
detennination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the
Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by
structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these
are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is
the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on
the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-
line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the •
transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause
raised. 73 (Citations omitted)

Here, the Court finds that there are certain issues that would require a
factual determination, and as such, prevent a characterization of the issues
raised as purely questions oflaw.

One issue that reflects the opposing factual assertions of the petitioners
and the respondents has to do with whether Rappler remained a member of
the MPC despite the revocation of its COI by the SEC, as the petitioners insist
that MPC never revoked Rappler's accreditation or Ranada's membership, 74
while the respondents attached annexes containing the lists ofMPC members

•
71
Id at 578 & 585.
72 849 Phil. 120 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].
73
Id. at 149-150.
74
Rollo. Vol. I, pp. 8 & 11.
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 246126

to show that Rappler and its journalists no longer appear in the same. 75
Settling this issue would, for one, aid the Court in determining whether the
respondents' arguments for accreditation hold water.

Further, there is the issue of the actual extent and coverage of the ban.
The petitioners allege that they were prevented from attending presidential
events that were otherwise open to the public, and that they would have been
• able to attend the same in their own capacities as private citizens were it not
for their affiliation with Rappler. They state that "the full scope of the ban"
included "physically preventing entry by petitioner Rappler' s reporters during
presidential events held at public places open to members of the public." 76
Meanwhile, the respondents, however, appear to only admit that "special
access" 77 was denied to the petitioners, in view of their position that "freedom
of the press does not certainly include the right to demand a special press pass,
special accreditation, or special spot at any news conference or press
briefing." 78

The factual nature of the allegations of the petitioners was also directly
noted by the respondents, who stated that "[t]he alleged physical ban and the
basis thereof are factual matters requiring presentation of evidence. The
incidents when petitioners were denied access must likewise be proven." 79

Further still, there is the sharp contrast in the petitioners' and

•
respondents' views on the basis for the ban or prohibition. While respondents
claim that accreditation issues sparked by the revocation ofRappler's COI are
the crux of this case, the petitioners assert that this is merely a pretext for
President Duterte to manifest his displeasure at their reporting. And yet, a
review of the statements of President Duterte that the petitioners cite as the
actual basis for the ban will reveal that these still, for the most part and despite
the caustic language employed, hinge on the revocation ofRappler's COL

If the full extent of the ban as alleged by the petitioners had been
established, then this would have lent great weight to their assertions that the
accreditation arguments of the respondents are indeed merely a ploy designed
to cloak their harassment of the petitioners with the veneer of law. However,
that is not the situation before the Court.

75
Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 638 & 792-799.
76
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 14.
77
Rollo, Vol. 2, p. 623.
78
Id. at 641.
79
Id. at 63 I.
Decision 16
G.R. No. 246126

Given the various interlocking and overlapping issues that the Court
will have to resolve in order to rule on the substantive issues here, a good •
number of which would require findings of fact to wholly and satisfactorily
address, the Court considers that the interests of the public will not be
adequately served, and neither will the role of the Court as an institution be
exercised properly by an attempt to rule on the substantive issues, particularly
in a moot case where no actual relief will be afforded to the petitioners.

Final Note

The Court finds in this case the presence of a combination of factors

that forestall it from rendering a judgment on the merits, and in particular, a
meaningful one.

That is not to say that the Court, by refraining from ruling on the
substantive issues, moves away in any manner from the jurisprudence
underscoring the importance of a free press. Truly, freedom of the press •
remains "one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy." 80

The Court also recognizes that the alarm of the petitioners, as well as
the impetus for the efforts by the petitioners-in-intervention to join in this
case, stem from the collective fear and outrage they express at the statements
of President Duterte, which they perceive as attacks on journalists, the media,
and on the press.

Indeed, it is plain to see why the petitioners and the petitioners-in-

intervention find these statements so troubling, to say the least, as they come
from no less than the President of the country, who is solemnly tasked with
the duty to see that our nation's laws are faithfully executed, and that the
Constitution is at all times upheld.

At the same time, the Court must strive to confine its power of judicial •
review to an actual justiciable controversy. Thus, for this case, the Court is
constrained to focus on what can be perceived directly and tangibly: the prior
disallowance ofRappler and its journalists from attending newsworthy events
involving the President, and which is an issue that has now been mooted.

In any case, the passage of time has shown the fears expressed by
petitioners-in-intervention that such a ban would fall on others aside from

80
Tulfo v. People, 587 Phil. 64, 70 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

•
 Decision 17 G.R. No. 246126

• Rappler to be groundless, as no such expansion had come to pass. This too

emphasizes why this case should now be considered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as well as

the Petitions-in-Intervention are DISMISSED on the ground ofmootness.

SO ORDERED.

, / /~ / ' .
/ ..MARiffeF~~H
~ / Associate Justice
/
~,I'~·/"'

•
WE CONCUR: ,, ///
I/' (on official leave)
/
ALEXANDER G. GESMUND
(). d;w,,d •W ~~ Chief Justice

. CAGIDOA
Senior Associate Justice
,
j . . S,4-J k,..s-:,""
J-n .})J$~

Associate Justice
AMY //Ii~
Associate Justice
~IER

•
~

HENRm17da;;TING
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

•
 .
Decision 18 G.R. No. 246126

.ROSARIO JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

•
?\)U!~~
J~IDAS P. MARQUEZ
Associate Justice

~~it;~.~
Associate Justice ·

CERTIFICATION
•
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

Acting Chief Justice