War Collectivism

WAR COLLECTIVISM
Power, Business, and the Intellectual Class

in World War I
WAR COLLECTIVISM
Power, Business, and the

Intellectual Class in World War I
Murray N. Rothbard
MISES
INSTITUTE
AUBURN, ALABAMA
Cover photo copyright © Imperial War Museum. Photograph by Nicholls
Horace of “Munition workers in a shell warehouse at National Shell Filling
Factory No.6, Chilwell, Nottinghamshire in 1917.”
Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in

whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.
Ludwig von Mises Institute

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. War Collectivism in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
II. World War I as Fulfillment:

Power and the Intellectuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
Piestism and Prohibition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57
Women at War and at the Polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Savings Our Boys from Alcohol and Vice . . . . . . . . . .74
The New Republic Collectivists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
Economics in Service of the State:
The Empiricism of Richard T. Ely. . . . . . . . . . . . . .94
Economics in Service of the State:
Government and Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5
I
War Collectivism
in World War I
M ore than any other single period, World War I was the
critical watershed for the American business system. It
was a “war collectivism,” a totally planned economy run largely
by big-business interests through the instrumentality of the cen-
tral government, which served as the model, the precedent, and
the inspiration for state corporate capitalism for the remainder
of the twentieth century.
That inspiration and precedent emerged not only in the
United States, but also in the war economies of the major com-
batants of World War I. War collectivism showed the big-busi-
ness interests of the Western world that it was possible to shift
radically from the previous, largely free-market, capitalism to a
new order marked by strong government, and extensive and per-
vasive government intervention and planning, for the purpose of
providing a network of subsidies and monopolistic privileges to
business, and especially to large business, interests. In particular,
the economy could be cartelized under the aegis of government,
with prices raised and production fixed and restricted, in the
classic pattern of monopoly; and military and other government
This is reprinted from A New History of Leviathan, Ronald Radosh and

Murray N. Rothbard, eds. (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1972), pp. 66–
110.
7
8 War Collectivism
contracts could be channeled into the hands of favored corporate

producers. Labor, which had been becoming increasingly ram-
bunctious, could be tamed and bridled into the service of this new,
state monopoly-capitalist order, through the device of promoting a
suitably cooperative trade unionism, and by bringing the willing
union leaders into the planning system as junior partners.
In many ways, the new order was a striking reversion to
old-fashioned mercantilism, with its aggressive imperialism and
nationalism, its pervasive militarism, and its giant network of
subsidies and monopolistic privileges to large business interests.
In its twentieth-century form, of course, the New Mercantil-
ism was industrial rather than mercantile, since the industrial
revolution had intervened to make manufacturing and industry
the dominant economic form. But there was a more significant
difference in the New Mercantilism. The original mercantilism
had been brutally frank in its class rule, and in its scorn for the
average worker and consumer.1 Instead, the new dispensation
cloaked the new form of rule in the guise of promotion of the
overall national interest, of the welfare of the workers through
the new representation for labor, and of the common good of all
citizens. Hence the importance, for providing a much-needed
popular legitimacy and support, of the new ideology of twenti-
eth-century liberalism, which sanctioned and glorified the new
order. In contrast to the older laissez-faire liberalism of the pre-
vious century, the new liberalism gained popular sanction for
the new system by proclaiming that it differed radically from the
1
On the attitudes of the mercantilists toward labor, see Edgar S. Furniss,
The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism (New York: Kelley &
Millman, 1957). Thus, Furniss cites the English mercantilist William Petyt,
who spoke of labor as a “capital material . . . raw and undigested . . . commit-
ted into the hands of supreme authority, in whose prudence and disposition it
is to improve, manage, and fashion it to more or less advantage.” Furniss adds
that “it is characteristic of these writers that they should be so readily disposed
to trust in the wisdom of the civil power to ‘improve, manage and fashion’ the
economic raw material of the nation” (p. 41).
War Collectivism in World War I 9
old, exploitative mercantilism in its advancement of the welfare

of the whole society. And in return for this ideological buttress-
ing by the new “corporate” liberals, the new system furnished
the liberals the prestige, the income, and the power that came
with posts for the concrete, detailed planning of the system as
well as for ideological propaganda on its behalf.
For their part, the liberal intellectuals acquired not only
prestige and a modicum of power in the new order, they also
achieved the satisfaction of believing that this new system of
government intervention was able to transcend the weaknesses
and the social conflicts that they saw in the two major alterna-
tives: laissez-faire capitalism or proletarian, Marxian socialism.
The intellectuals saw the new order as bringing harmony and
cooperation to all classes on behalf of the general welfare, under
the aegis of big government. In the liberal view, the new order
provided a middle way, a “vital center” for the nation, as con-
trasted to the divisive “extremes” of left and right.
I
We have no space here to dwell on the extensive role of big
business and business interests in getting the United States into
World War I. The extensive economic ties of the large business
community with England and France, through export orders
and through loans to the Allies, especially those underwrit-
ten by the politically powerful I.P. Morgan & Co. (which also
served as agent to the British and French governments), allied
to the boom brought about by domestic and Allied military
orders, all played a leading role in bringing the United States
into the war. Furthermore, virtually the entire Eastern business
community supported the drive toward war.2
2
On the role of the House of Morgan, and other economic ties with the Allies
in leading to the American entry into the war, see Charles Callan Tansill,
America Goes to War (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1938), pp. 32–134.
10 War Collectivism
Apart from the role of big business in pushing America

down the road to war, business was equally enthusiastic
about the extensive planning and economic mobiliza-
tion that the war would clearly entail. Thus, an early
enthusiast for war mobilization was the United States
Chamber of Commerce, which had been a leading
champion of industrial cartelization under the aegis of
the federal government since its formation in 1912. The
Chamber’s monthly, The Nation’s Business, foresaw in
mid-1916 that a mobilized economy would bring about
a sharing of power and responsibility between govern-
ment and business. And the chairman of the U.S.
Chamber’s Executive Committee on National Defense
wrote to the du Ponts, at the end of 1916, of his ex-
pectation that “this munitions question would seem to
be the greatest opportunity to foster the new spirit” of
cooperation between government and industry.3
The first organization to move toward economic mobili-

zation for war was the Committee on Industrial Preparedness,
which in 1916 grew out of the Industrial Preparedness Com-
mittee of the Naval Consulting Board, a committee of indus-
trial consultants to the Navy dedicated to considering the rami-
fications of an expanding American Navy. Characteristically,
the new CIP was a closely blended public-private organization,
officially an arm of the federal government but financed solely
by private contributions. Moreover, the industrialist members of
the committee, working patriotically without fee, were thereby
able to retain their private positions and incomes. Chairman
of the CIP, and a dedicated enthusiast for industrial mobiliza-
tion, was Howard E. Coffin, vice-president of the important
Hudson Motor Co. of Detroit. Under Coffin’s direction, the
CIP organized a national inventory of thousands of industrial
3
Quoted in Paul A.C. Koistinen, “The ‘Industrial-Military Complex’ in
Historical Perspective: World War I,” Business History Review (Winter,
1967): 381.
facilities for munitions-making. To propagandize for this effort,

christened “industrial preparedness,” Coffin was able to mobi-
lize the American Press Association, the Associated Advertis-
ing Clubs of the World, the august New York Times, and the
great bulk of American industry.4
The CIP was succeeded, in late 1916, by the fully gov-

ernmental Council of National Defense, whose Advisory
Commission—largely consisting of private industrialists—was
to become its actual operating agency. (The Council proper
consisted of several members of the Cabinet.) President Wilson
announced the purpose of the CND as organizing “the whole
industrial mechanism . . . in the most effective way.” Wilson
found the Council particularly valuable because it “opens up
a new and direct channel of communication and cooperation
between business and scientific men and all departments of the
Government. . . .”5 He also hailed the personnel of the Coun-
cil’s Advisory Commission as marking “the entrance of the
nonpartisan engineer and professional man into American gov-
ernmental affairs” on an unprecedented scale. These members,
declared the President grandiloquently, were to serve without
4
The leading historian of World War I mobilization of industry, himself a
leading participant and director of the Council of National Defense, writes with
scorn that the scattered exceptions to the chorus of business approval “revealed
a considerable lack . . . of that unity of will to serve the Nation that was essential
to the fusing of the fagots of individualism into the unbreakable bundle of
national unity.” Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War
(Boston: Houghton Muffin, 1923), p. 13. Clarkson’s book, incidentally, was
subsidized by Bernard Baruch, the head of industrial war collectivism; the
manuscript was checked carefully by one of Baruch’s top aides. Clarkson, a
public relations man and advertising executive, had begun his effort by directing
publicity for Coffin’s industrial preparedness campaign in 1916. See Robert
D. Cuff, “Bernard Baruch: Symbol and Myth in Industrial Mobilization,”
Business History Review (Summer, 1969): 116.
5
Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War, p. 21.
12 War Collectivism
pay, “efficiency being their sole object and Americanism their

only motive.”6
Exulting over the new CND, Howard Coffin wrote to the
du Ponts in December, 1916, that “it is our hope that we may
lay the foundation for that closely knit structure, industrial, civil
and military, which every thinking American has come to real-
ize is vital to the future life of this country, in peace and in com-
merce, no less than in possible war.”7
Particularly influential in establishing the CND was Sec-
retary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo, son-in-law of
the President, and formerly promoter of the Hudson and Man-
hattan Railroad and associate of the Ryan interests in Wall
Street.8 Head of the Advisory Commission was Walter S. Gif-
ford, who had been one of the leaders of the Coffin Committee
and had come to government from his post as chief statistician
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., a giant monop-
oly enterprise in the Morgan ambit. The other “nonpartisan”
members were: Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad; Wall Street financier Bernard M. Baruch;
Howard E. Coffin; Julius Rosenwald, president of Sears, Roe-
buck and Co.; Samuel Gompers, president of the AF of L;
and one scientist and one leading surgeon.
6
Ibid., p. 22.
7
Koistinen, “The ‘Industrial-Military Complex’ in Historical Perspective:
World War I,” p. 385.
8
Originating the idea of the CND was Dr. Hollis Godfrey, president of the
Drexel Institute, an industrial training and management education organization.
Also influential in establishing the CND was the joint military-civilian Kerner
Board, headed by Colonel Francis J. Kerner, and including as its civilian
members: Benedict Crowell, chairman of Crowell & Little Construction Co.
of Cleveland and later Assistant Secretary of War; and R. Goodwyn Rhett,
president of the People’s Bank of Charleston, and president as well of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Koistinen, “The ‘Industrial-
Military Complex’ in Historical Perspective: World War I,” pp. 382, 384.
Months before American entry into the war, the Advi-

sory Commission of the CND designed what was to become
the entire system of purchasing war supplies, the system of
food control, and censorship of the press. It was the Advisory
Commission that met with the delighted representatives of
the various branches of industry, and told the businessmen
to form themselves into committees for sale of their products
to the government, and for the fixing of the prices of these
products. Daniel Willard was, unsurprisingly, put in charge
of dealing with the railroads, Howard Coffin with munitions
and manufacturing, Bernard Baruch with raw materials and
minerals, Julius Rosenwald with supplies, and Samuel Gom-
pers with labor. The idea of establishing committees of the
various industries, “to get their resources together,” began with
Bernard Baruch. CND commodity committees, in their turn,
invariably consisted of the leading industrialists in each field;
these committees would then negotiate with the committees
appointed by industry.9
At the recommendation of the Advisory Commission, Her-
bert Clark Hoover was named head of the new Food Admin-
istration. By the end of March, 1917, the CND appointed a
Purchasing Board to coordinate government’s purchases from
industry. Chairman of this Board, the name of which was soon
changed to the General Munitions Board, was Frank A. Scott,
a well-known Cleveland manufacturer, and president of Warner
& Swasey Co.
9
As one of many examples, the CND’s “Cooperative Committee on Copper”
consisted of: the president of Anaconda Copper, the president of Calumet
and Hecla Mining, the vice-president of Phelps Dodge, the vice-president
of Kennecott Mines, the president of Utah Copper, the president of United
Verde Copper, and Murray M. Guggenheim of the powerful Guggenheim
family interests. And the American Iron and Steel Institute furnished the
representatives of that industry. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War,
pp. 496–97; Koistinen, “The ‘Industrial-Military Complex’ in Historical
Perspective: World War I,” p. 386.
14 War Collectivism
Yet centralized mobilization was proceeding but slowly

through the tangle of bureaucracy, and the United States
Chamber of Commerce urged Congress that the director of
the CND “should be given power and authority in the eco-
nomic field analogous to that of the chief of state in the military
field.”10 Finally, in early July, the raw materials, munitions, and
supplies departments were brought together under a new War
Industries Board, with Scott as Chairman, the board that was
to become the central agency for collectivism in World War I.
The functions of the WIB soon became the coordinating of
purchases, the allocation of commodities, and the fixing of
prices and priorities in production.
Administrative problems beset the WIB, however, and
a satisfactory “autocrat” was sought to rule the entire econ-
omy as chairman of the new organization. The willing auto-
crat was finally discovered in the person of Bernard Baruch
in early March, 1918. With the selection of Baruch, urged
strongly upon President Wilson by Secretary McAdoo, war
collectivism had achieved its final form.11 Baruch’s credentials
for the task were unimpeachable; an early supporter of the drive
toward war, Baruch had presented a scheme for industrial war
mobilization to President Wilson as early as 1915.
The WIB developed a vast apparatus that connected to the
specific industries through commodity divisions largely staffed
by the industries themselves. The historian of the WIB, himself
one of its leaders, exulted that the WIB had established
a system of concentration of commerce, industry, and
all the powers of government that was without compare
among all the other nations. . . . It was so interwoven
with the supply departments of the army and navy, of
10
11
Scott and Willard had successively been Chairman, which post was then
offered to Homer Ferguson, president of the Newport News Shipbuilding Co.
and later head of the United States Chamber of Commerce.
the Allies, and with other departments of the Govern-

ment that, while it was an entity of its own . . . its deci-
sions and its acts . . . were always based on a conspec-
tus of the whole situation. At the same time, through
the commodity divisions and sections in contact with
responsible committees of the commodities dealt with,
the War Industries Board extended its antennae into the
innermost recesses of industry. Never before was there
such a focusing of knowledge of the vast field of Ameri-
can industry, commerce, and transportation. Never was
there such an approach to omniscience in the business
affairs of a continent.12
Big-business leaders permeated the WIB structure from
the board itself down to the commodity sections. Thus, Vice-
Chairman Alexander Legge came from International Har-
vester Co.; businessman Robert S. Brookings was the major
force in insisting on price-fixing; George N. Peek, in charge
of finished products, had been vice-president of Deere & Co.,
a leading farm equipment manufacturer. Robert S. Lovett, in
charge of priorities, was chairman of the board of Union Pacific
Railroad, and J. Leonard Replogle, Steel Administrator, had
been president of the American Vanadium Co. Outside of the
direct WIB structure, Daniel Willard of the Baltimore & Ohio
was in charge of the nation’s railroads, and big businessman
Herbert C. Hoover was the “Food Czar.”
In the granting of war contracts, there was no nonsense
about competitive bidding. Competition in efficiency and cost
was brushed aside, and the industry-dominated WIB handed
out contracts as it saw fit.
Any maverick individualistic firm that disliked the mandates
and orders of the WIB was soon crushed between the coercion
wielded by government and the collaborating opprobrium of
12
16 War Collectivism
his organized business colleagues. Thus, Grosvenor Clarkson

writes:
Individualistic American industrialists were aghast
when they realized that industry had been drafted,
much as manpower had been. . . . Business willed its
own domination, forged its bonds, and policed its own
subjection. There were bitter and stormy protests here
and there, especially from those industries that were
curtailed or suspended. . . . [But] the rents in the gar-
ment of authority were amply filled by the docile and
cooperative spirit of industry. The occasional obstructor
fled from the mandates of the Board only to find himself
ostracized by his fellows in industry.13
One of the most important instrumentalities of wartime

collectivism was the Conservation Division of the WIB, an
agency again consisting largely of leaders in manufacturing.
The Conservation Division had begun as the Commercial
Economy Board of the CND, the brainchild of its first chair-
man, Chicago businessman A.W. Shaw. The Board, or Divi-
sion, would suggest industrial economies, and encourage the
industry concerned to establish cooperative regulations. The
Board’s regulations were supposedly “voluntary,” a volun-
tarism enforced by “the compulsion of trade opinion—which
automatically policed the observance of the recommendations.”
For “a practice adopted by the overwhelming consent and even
insistence of . . . [a man’s] fellows, especially when it bears the
label of patriotic service in a time of emergency, is not lightly to
be disregarded.”14
In this way, in the name of wartime “conservation,” the
Conservation Division set out to rationalize, standardize, and
cartelize industry in a way that would, hopefully, continue
13
Ibid., pp. 154, 159.
14
Ibid., pp. 215.
permanently after the end of the war. Arch W. Shaw summed

up the Division’s task as follows: to drastically reduce the num-
ber of styles, sizes, etc., of the products of industry; to eliminate
various styles and varieties; to standardize sizes and measures.
That this ruthless and thoroughgoing suppression of competi-
tion in industry was not thought of as a purely wartime measure
is made clear in this passage by Grosvenor Clarkson:
The World War was a wonderful school. . . . It showed
us how so many things may be bettered that we are at a
loss where to begin with permanent utilization of what
we know The Conservation Division alone showed that
merely to strip from trade and industry the lumber of fu-
tile custom and the encrustation of useless variety would
return a good dividend on the world’s capital. . . . It is,
perhaps, too much to hope that there will be any general
gain in time of peace from the triumphant experiment of
the Conservation Division. Yet now the world needs to
economize as much as in war.15
Looking forward to future cartelization, Clarkson declared that
such peacetime “economizing . . . implies such a close and
sympathetic affiliation of competitive industries as is hardly pos-
sible under the decentralization of business that is compelled by
our antitrust statutes.”
Bernard Baruch’s biographer summarized the lasting
results of the compulsory “conservation” and standardization
as follows:
Wartime conservation had reduced styles, varieties,
and colors of clothing. It had standardized sizes. . . .
It had outlawed 250 different types of plow models in
the U.S., to say nothing of 755 types of drills . . . mass
production and mass distribution had become the law
of the land. . . . This, then, would be the goal of the
next quarter of the twentieth century: “To Standardize
15
Ibid., pp. 230.
18 War Collectivism
American Industry”; to make of wartime necessity a

matter of peacetime advantage.16
Not only the Conservation Division, but the entire structure
of wartime collectivism and cartelization constituted a vision to
business and government of a future peacetime economy. As
Clarkson frankly put it:
It is little wonder that the men who dealt with the in-
dustries of a nation . . . meditated with a sort of intel-
lectual contempt on the huge hit-and-miss confusion of
peacetime industry, with its perpetual cycle of surfeit
and dearth and its internal attempt at adjustment after
the event. From their meditations arose dreams of an
ordered economic world.
They conceived of America as “commodity sec-
tioned” for the control of world trade. They beheld the
whole trade of the world carefully computed and reg-
istered in Washington, requirements noted, American
resources on call, the faucets opened or closed according
to the circumstances. In a word, a national mind and
will confronting international trade and keeping its own
house in business order.17
Heart and soul of the mechanism of control of industry

by the WIB were its sixty-odd commodity sections, commit-
tees supervising the various groups of commodities, which were
staffed almost exclusively by businessmen from the respective
industries. Furthermore, these committees dealt with over three
hundred “war service committees” of industry appointed by the
respective industrial groupings under the aegis of the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States. It is no wonder that in this
cozy atmosphere, there was a great deal of harmony between
business and government. As Clarkson admiringly described it:
16
Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston: Houghton Muffin Co., 1957), p. 219.
17
Businessmen wholly consecrated to government service,

but full of understanding of the problems of industry,
now faced businessmen wholly representative of industry
. . . but sympathetic with the purpose of government.18
And:
The commodity sections were business operating Gov-
ernment business for the common good. . . . The war
committees of industry knew, understood, and believed
in the commodity chiefs. They were of the same piece.19
All in all, Clarkson exulted that the commodity sections were

“industry mobilized and drilled, responsive, keen, and fully
staffed. They were militant and in serried ranks.”20
The Chamber of Commerce was particularly enthusi-
astic over the war service committee system, a system that
was to spur the trade association movement in peacetime as
well. Chamber President Harry A. Wheeler, vice-president
of the Union Trust Co. of Chicago, declared that:
Creation of the War Service Committees promises to
furnish the basis for a truly national organization of
industry whose preparations and opportunities are un-
limited. . . . The integration of business, the expressed
aim of the National Chamber, is in sight. War is the stern
teacher that is driving home the lesson of cooperative ef-
fort.21
18
Ibid., p. 303.
19
Ibid., pp. 300–01.
20
Ibid., p. 309. On the War Industries Board, the commodity sections, and on
big-business sentiment paving the path for the coordinated industry-government
system, see James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–
1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 223 and passim.
21
In The Nation’s Business (August, 1918): 9–10. Quoted in Koistinen,
“The ‘Industrial-Military Complex’ in Historical Perspective: World War I,”
pp. 392–93.
20 War Collectivism
The result of all this new-found harmony within each indus-

try, and between industry and government, was to “substitute
cooperation for competition.” Competition for government
orders was virtually nonexistent, and “competition in price was
practically done away with by Government action. Industry
was for the time in . . . a golden age of harmony,” and freed
from the menace of business losses.22
One of the crucial functions of wartime planning was price-
fixing, set in the field of industrial commodities by the Price-
Fixing Committee of the War Industries Board. Beginning with
such critical areas as steel and copper early in the war and then
inexorably expanding to many other fields, the price-fixing was
sold to the public as the fixing of maximum prices in order to
protect the public against wartime inflation. In fact, however,
the government set the price in each industry at such a rate as
to guarantee a “fair profit” to the high-cost producers, thereby
conferring a large degree of privilege and high profits upon the
lower-cost firms.23 Clarkson admitted that this system
was a tremendous invigoration of big business and hard
on small business. The large and efficient producers
made larger profits than normally and many of the
smaller concerns fell below their customary returns.24
But the higher-cost firms were largely content with their “fair
profit” guarantee.
22
23
See George P. Adams, Jr., Wartime Price Control (Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 57, 63–64. As an example,
the government fixed the price of copper f.o.b. New York at 23 ½ cents per
pound. The Utah Copper Co., which produced over 8 percent of the total
copper output, had estimated costs of 11.8 cents per pound. In this way, Utah
Copper was guaranteed nearly 100 percent profit on costs. Ibid., p. 64n.
24
Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War.
The attitude of the Price-Fixing Committee was reflected in

the statement of its Chairman, Robert S. Brookings, a retired
lumber magnate, addressed to the nickel industry: “We are
not in an attitude of envying you your profits; we are more in
the attitude of justifying them if we can. That is the way we
approach these things.”25
Typical of the price-fixing operation was the situation in the
cotton textile industry. Chairman Brookings reported in April,
1918, that the cotton goods committee had decided to “get
together in a friendly way” to try to “stabilize the market.”
Brookings appended the feeling of the larger cotton manufac-
turers that it was better to fix a high long-run minimum price
than to take full short-run advantage of the very high prices then
in existence.26
The general enthusiasm of the business world, and espe-
cially big business, for the system of war collectivism can now he
explained. The enthusiasm was a product of the resulting sta-
bilization of prices, the ironing out of market fluctuations, and
the fact that prices were almost always set by mutual consent
of government and the representatives of each industry. It is no
wonder that Harry A. Wheeler, president of the United States
Chamber of Commerce, wrote in the summer of 1917 that war
“is giving business the foundation for the kind of cooperative
effort that alone can make the U.S. economically efficient.” Or
that the head of American Telephone and Telegraph hailed the
perfecting of a “coordination to ensure complete cooperation
not only between the Government and the companies, but
between the companies themselves.” The wartime cooperative
planning was working so well, in fact, opined the chairman of
25
Adams, Wartime Price Control, pp. 57–58.
26
Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918, pp. 224–
25.
22 War Collectivism
the board of Republic Iron and Steel in early 1918, that it

should be continued in peacetime as well.27
The vitally important steel industry is an excellent example
of the workings of war collectivism. The hallmark of the closely
knit control of the steel industry was the close “cooperation”
between government and industry, a cooperation in which
Washington decided on broad policy, and then left it up to
Judge Elbert Gary, head of the leading steel producer, United
States Steel, to implement the policy within the industry. Gary
selected a committee representing the largest steel producers
to help him run the industry. A willing ally was present in J.
Leonard Replogle, head of American Vanadium Co. and chief
of the Steel Division of the WIB. Replogle shared the long-
standing desire of Gary and the steel industry for industrial
cartelization and market stability under the aegis of a friendly
federal government. Unsurprisingly, Gary was delighted with
his new powers in directing the steel industry, and urged that he
be given total power “to thoroughly mobilize and if necessary
to commandeer.” And Iron Age, the magazine of the iron and
steel industry, exulted that
it has apparently taken the most gigantic war in all his-
tory to give the idea of cooperation any such place in the
general economic program as the country’s steel manu-
facturers sought to give it in their own industry nearly
ten years ago
with the short-lived entente cordiale between Judge Gary and

President Roosevelt.28
27
Melvin I. Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 152–53.
28
Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration , pp. 153–57. In his
important study of business-government relations in the War Industries Board,
Professor Robert Cuff has concluded that federal regulation of industry was
shaped by big-business leaders, and that relations between government and
It is true that wartime relations between government and

steel companies were sometimes strained, but the strain and
the tough threat of government commandeering of resources
was generally directed at smaller firms, such as Crucible Steel,
which had stubbornly refused to accept government contracts.29
In the steel industry, in fact, it was the big steelmakers—
U.S. Steel, Bethlehem, Republic, etc.—who, early in the
war, had first urged government price-fixing, and they had to
prod a sometimes confused government to adopt what eventu-
ally became the government’s program. The main reason was
that the big steel producers, happy at the enormous increase of
steel prices in the market as a result of wartime demand, were
anxious to stabilize the market at a high price and thus insure
a long-run profit position for the duration of the war. The gov-
ernment—steel industry price-fixing agreement of September,
1917, was therefore hailed by John A. Topping, president of
Republic Steel, as follows:
The steel settlement will have a wholesome effect on the

steel business because the principle of cooperative-regu-
lation has been established with Government approval.
Of course, present abnormal profits will be substantially
reduced but a runaway market condition has been pre-
vented and prosperity extended. . . . Furthermore, sta-
bility in future values should be conserved.30
Furthermore, the large steel firms were happy to use the

fixed prices as a rationale for imposing controls and stability
big business were smoothest in those industries, such as steel, whose industrial
leaders had already committed themselves to seeking government-sponsored
cartelization. Robert D. Cuff, “Business, Government, and the War Industries
Board” (Doctoral dissertation in history, Princeton University, 1966).
29
Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration, p. 154.
30
In Iron Age (September 27, 1917). Quoted in Urofsky, Big Steel and the
Wilson Administration, pp. 216–17
24 War Collectivism
upon wages, which were also beginning to rise. The smaller

steel manufacturers, on the other hand, often with higher costs,
and who had not been as prosperous before the war, opposed
price-fixing because they wished to take full advantage of the
short-run profit bonanza brought about by the war.31
Under this regime, the steel industry achieved the highest
level of profits in its history, averaging twenty-five percent per
year for the two years of war. Some of the smaller steel compa-
nies, benefiting from their lower total capitalization, did almost
twice as well.32
The most thoroughgoing system of price controls during

the war was enforced not by the WIB but by the separate Food
Administration, over which Herbert Clark Hoover presided as
“Food Czar.” The official historian of wartime price control
justly wrote that the food control program “was the most impor-
tant measure for controlling prices which the United States . . .
had ever taken.”33
Herbert Hoover accepted his post shortly after American
entry into the war, but only on the condition that he alone
have full authority over food, unhampered by boards or com-
missions. The Food Administration was established without
legal authorization, and then a bill backed by Hoover was
put through Congress to give the system the full force of law.
Hoover was also given the power to requisition “necessaries,”
31
Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration , pp. 203–06. Also see
Robert D. Cuff and Melvin I. Urofsky, “The Steel Industry and Price-Fixing
During World War I,” Business History Review (Autumn, 1970): 291–06.
32
Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration, pp. 228–33.
33
Paul Willard Garrett, Government Control Over Prices (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 42.
to seize plants for government operation, and to regulate or

prohibit exchanges.
The key to the Food Administration’s system of control was
a vast network of licensing. Instead of direct control over food,
the FA was given the absolute power to issue licenses for any
and all divisions of the food industry, and to set the conditions
for keeping the license. Every dealer, every manufacturer, dis-
tributor, and warehouser of food commodities was required by
Hoover to maintain its federal license.
A notable feature introduced by Hoover in his reign as
Food Czar was the mobilization of a vast network of citizen
volunteers as a mass of eager participants in enforcing his
decrees. Thus, Herbert Hoover was perhaps the first Ameri-
can politician to realize the potential—in gaining mass accep-
tance and in enforcing government decrees—in the mobiliz-
ing of masses through a torrent of propaganda to serve as
volunteer aides to the government bureaucracy. Mobilization
proceeded to the point of inducing the public to brand as
a virtual moral leper anyone dissenting from Mr. Hoover’s
edicts. Thus:
The basis of all . . . control exercised by the Food Ad-

ministration was the educational work which preceded
and accompanied its measures of conservation and
regulation. Mr. Hoover was committed thoroughly to
the idea that the most effective method to control foods
was to set every man, woman, and child in the country
at the business of saving food. . . . The country was
literally strewn with millions of pamphlets and leaflets
designed to educate the people to the food situation. No
war board at Washington was advertised as widely as
the U.S. Food Administration. There were Food Ad-
ministration insignia for the coat lapel, store window,
the restaurant, the train, and the home. A real stigma
was placed upon the person who was not loyal to Food
Administration edicts through pressure by the schools,
26 War Collectivism
churches, women’s clubs, public libraries, merchants’

associations, fraternal organizations, and other social
groups.34
The method by which the Food Administration imposed
price control was its requirement that its licensees should receive
“a reasonable margin of profit.” This “reasonable margin” was
interpreted as a margin over and above each producer’s costs,
and this cost-plus “reasonable profit” for each dealer became
the rule of price control. The program was touted to the public
as a means of keeping profits and food prices down. Although
the Administration certainly wished to stabilize prices, the goal
was also and more importantly to cartelize. Industry and gov-
ernment worked together to make sure that individual maverick
competitors did not get out of line; prices in general were to
be set at a level to guarantee a “reasonable” profit to every-
one. The goal was not lower prices, but uniform, stabilized,
non-competitive prices for all. The goal was far more to keep
prices up than to keep them down. Indeed, any overly greedy
competitor who tried to increase his profits above prewar levels
by cutting his prices was dealt with most severely by the Food
Administration.
Let us consider two of the most important food-control

programs during World War I: wheat and sugar. Wheat price
control, the most important program, came in the wake of
wartime demand, which had pushed wheat prices up very rap-
idly to their highest level in the history of the United States.
Thus, wheat increased by one dollar a bushel in the course
of two months at the start of the war, reaching the unheard of
price of three dollars a bushel. Control came in the wake of
agitation that government must step in to thwart “speculators”
by fixing maximum prices on wheat. Yet, under pressure by
34
Garrett, Government Control Over Prices, p. 56.
the agriculturists, the government program fixed by statute, not

maximum prices for wheat but minima; the Food Control Act
of 1917 fixed a minimum price of two dollars a bushel for the
next year’s wheat crop. Not content with this special subsidy,
the President proceeded to raise the minimum to two dollars
and twenty-six cents a bushel in mid-1918, a figure that was
then the precise market price for wheat. This increased mini-
mum effectively fixed the price of wheat for the duration of the
war. Thus, the government made sure that the consumers could
not possibly benefit from any fall in wheat prices.
To enforce the artificially high price of wheat, Herbert
Hoover established the Grain Corporation, “headed by practi-
cal grain men,” which purchased the bulk of the wheat crop in
the United States at the “fair price,” and then resold the crop
to the nation’s flour mills at the same price. To keep the mill-
ers happy, the Grain Corporation guaranteed them against any
possible losses from unsold stocks of wheat or flour. Moreover,
each mill was guaranteed that its relative position in the flour
industry would be maintained throughout the war. In this way,
the flour industry was successfully cartelized through the instru-
ment of government. Those few mills who balked at the cartel
arrangement were dealt with handily by the Food Adminis-
tration; as Garrett put it: “their operations . . . were reasonably
well controlled . . . by the license requirements.”35
The excessively high prices of wheat and flour also meant arti-
ficially high costs to the bakers. They, in turn, were taken under the
cozy cartel umbrella by being required, in the name of “conserva-
tion,” to mix inferior products with wheat flour at a fixed ratio. Each
baker was of course delighted to comply with a requirement that
he make inferior products, which he knew was also being enforced
upon his competitors. Competition was also curtailed by the Food
Administration’s compulsory standardization of the sizes of bread
loaves and by prohibiting price-cutting through discounts or
35
Ibid., p. 66.
28 War Collectivism
rebates to particular customers—the classic path toward the

internal breakup of any cartel.36
In the particular case of sugar, there was a much more sin-

cere effort to keep down prices—due to the fact that the United
States was largely an importer rather than a producer of sugar.
Herbert Hoover and the Allied governments duly formed an
International Sugar Committee, which undertook to buy all of
their countries’ sugar, largely from Cuba, at an artificially low
price, and then to allocate the raw sugar to the various refiners.
Thus, the Allied governments functioned as a giant buying car-
tel to lower the price of their refiners’ raw material.
Herbert Hoover instigated the plan for the International
Sugar Committee, and the United States government appointed
the majority of the five-man committee. As Chairman of the
committee, Hoover selected Earl Babst, president of the pow-
erful American Sugar Refining Co., and the other American
members also represented refiner interests. The ISC promptly
fixed a sharp reduction of the price of sugar: lowering the New
York price of Cuban raw sugar from its high market price of six
and three-quarter cents per pound in the summer of 1917 to
six cents per pound. When the Cubans understandably balked
at this artificially forced price reduction of their cash crop, the
United States State Department and the Food Administration
collaborated to coerce the Cuban government into agreement.
Somehow, the Cubans were unable to obtain import licenses for
needed wheat and coal from the United States Food Adminis-
tration, and the result was a severe shortage of bread, flour, and
coal in Cuba. Finally, the Cubans capitulated in mid-January,
1918, and the import licenses from the United States were
36
Ibid., p. 73.
rapidly forthcoming.37 Cuba also induced to prohibit all sugar

exports except to the International Sugar Committee.
Apparently, Mr. Babst insured an extra bonus to his Amer-
ican Sugar Refining Company; for, shortly, officials of com-
peting American refineries were to testify before Congress that
this company had particularly profited from the activities of the
International Sugar Committee and from the price that it fixed
on Cuban sugar.38
Although the American government pursued with great
diligence the goal of pushing down raw material prices for
United States refiners, it also realized that it could not force
down the price of raw sugar too low, since the government had
to consider the marginal United States cane and beet-sugar pro-
ducers, who had to receive their duly appointed “fair return.”
Jointly to harmonize and subsidize both the sugar refiners and
the sugar growers in the United States, Mr. Hoover established
a Sugar Equalization Board that would simultaneously keep
the price of sugar low to Cuba while keeping it high enough for
the American producers. The Board accomplished this feat by
buying the Cuban sugar at the fixed low price and then reselling
the crop to the refiners at a higher price to cover the American
producers.39
The result of the artificially low prices for sugar was, inevi-
tably, to create a severe sugar shortage by reducing supplies and
by stimulating an excessive public consumption. The result was
that sugar consumption was then severely restricted by federal
rationing of sugar.
It is not surprising that the food industries were delighted
with the wartime control program. Expressing the spirit of the
37
See Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1960), pp. 20–21.
38
Ibid., p. 191.
39
Garrett, Government Control Over Prices, pp. 78–85.
30 War Collectivism
entire war-collectivist regime, Herbert Hoover, in the words of

Paul Garrett:
maintained, as a cardinal policy from the beginning,
a very close and intimate contact with the trade. The
men, whom he chose to head his various commodity sec-
tions and responsible positions, were in a large measure
tradesmen. . . . The determination of the policies of con-
trol within each branch of the food industry was made
in conference with the tradesmen of that branch. . . . It
might be said . . . that the framework of food control,
as of raw material control, was built upon agreements
with the trade. The enforcement of the agreements once
made, moreover, was entrusted in part to the coopera-
tion of constituted trade organizations. The industry it-
self was made to feel responsible for the enforcement of
all rules and regulations.40
Also separate from the War Industries Board were the
nation’s railroads, which received the greatest single minis-
tration of government dictation as compared to any other indus-
try. The railroads, in fact, were seized and operated directly by
the federal government.
As soon as the United States entered the war, the Admin-
istration urged the railroads to unite as one in behalf of the
war effort. The railroads were delighted to comply and quickly
formed what became known as the Railroads’ War Board,
promising faithfully to pursue a goal that they had long sought in
peacetime: to cease competitive activities and to coordinate rail-
road operations.41 Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad and Bernard Baruch’s predecessor as head of
the WIB, happily reported that the railroads had agreed to vest
their War Board with complete authority to override individual
Ibid. pp. 55–56.

40
See K. Austin Kerr, American Railroad Politics, 1914–1920 (Pittsburgh:

41
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), pp. 44 ff.

railroad interests. Under its Chairman, Fairfax Harrison of the

Southern Railroad, the War Board established a Committee
on Car Service to coordinate national car supplies. Aiding the
coordination effort was the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the longtime federal regulatory body for the railroads. Once
again, the government-promoted monopoly was an inspiration
to many who were looking ahead to the peacetime economy.
For several years the railroads had been agitating for “scientific
management” as a means of achieving higher rates from the
ICC and a governmentally imposed cartelization; but they had
been thwarted by the pressure of the organized shippers, the
industrial users of the railroads.
But now even the shippers were impressed. Max Thelen,
chairman of the California Railroad Commission, president
of the National Association of Railway and Utilities Com-
missions, and the leading spokesman for the organized ship-
pers, agreed that the critical railroad problem was “duplica-
tion,” and the “irrational” lack of complete inter-railroad coor-
dination. And Senator Francis G. Newlands (D., Nev.), the
most powerful congressman on railroad affairs as the chairman
of a joint committee on transportation regulation, opined that
the wartime experience was “somewhat shattering on old views
regarding antitrust laws.”42
Soon, however, it became clear that the system of voluntary
private coordination was not really working well. Traffic depart-
ments of individual roads persisted in competitive practices;
the railroad brotherhood unions were persistently demanding
substantial wage increases; and the railroads and organized
shippers locked horns over railroad demands for an across-the-
board rate increase. All groups felt that regional coordination
and overall efficiency would best be achieved by outright fed-
eral operation of the railroads. The shippers first proposed the
scheme as a method of achieving coordination and to forestall
42
Kerr, American Railroad Politics, 1914–1920, p. 48.
32 War Collectivism
higher freight rates; the unions seconded the plan in order to

obtain wage increases from the government; and the railroads
cheer fully agreed when President Wilson assured them that
each road would be guaranteed its 1916/17 profits—two years
of unusually high profits for the railroad industry. With the fed-
eral government offering to take on the headaches of wartime
dislocation and management, while granting the roads a very
high guaranteed profit for doing nothing, why shouldn’t the
railroads leap to agreement?
The most enthusiastic Administration proponent of fed-
eral operation of the railroads was Secretary of the Treasury
McAdoo, a former New York railroad executive and close
associate of the Morgan interests, who in turn were the lead-
ing underwriters and owners of railroad bonds. McAdoo was
rewarded by being named head of the United States Railroad
Administration after Wilson seized the railroads on December
28, 1917.
Federal rule by the Morgan-oriented McAdoo proved to
be a bonanza for the nation’s railroads. Not only were the rail-
roads now fully monopolized by direct government operation,
but also the particular railroad executives now found themselves
armed with the coercive power of the federal government. For
McAdoo chose as his immediate assistants a group of top rail-
road executives, and all rate-setting powers of the ICC were
shifted to the railroad-dominated Railroad Administration for
the duration.43 The significance of the shift is that the railroads,
43
McAdoo’s “cabinet,” which assisted him in running the railroads, included
Walker D. Hines and Edward Chambers, respectively chairman of the board
and vice-president of the Santa Fe R.R.; Henry Walters, chairman of the
board of the Atlantic Coast R.R.; Hale Holden, of the Burlington R.R.;
A.H. Smith, president of the New York Central R.R.; John Barton Payne,
formerly chief counsel of the Chicago Great Western R.R.; and Comptroller
of the Currency John Skelton Williams, formerly chairman of the board of
the Seaboard R.R. Hines was to be McAdoo’s principal assistant; Payne
became head of traffic. The Division of Operation was headed by Carl R.
although largely responsible for the inception and growth of the

ICC as a cartelizing agency for the railroad industry, had seen
control of the ICC slip into the hands of the organized shippers
in the decade before the war. This had meant that the railroads
had found it very difficult to win freight rate increases from the
ICC. But now the wartime federal control of the railroads was
shunting the shippers aside.44
McAdoo’s brazen appointment of railroad men to virtually
all the leading positions in the Railroad Administration, to the
virtual exclusion of shippers and academic economists, greatly
angered the shippers, who had launched an intense barrage of
criticism of the system by midsummer of 1918. ‘This barrage
came to a head when McAdoo increasingly turned the direc-
tion of the RA, including the appointment of regional direc-
tors, over to his principal assistant, railroad executive Walker
D. Hines. Shippers and ICC commissioners complained that
railroad lawyers from the entire country descended on
Washington, told their troubles to other railroad lawyers
serving on McAdoo’s staff, and were “told to go into
an adjoining room and dictate what orders they want.”45
As in the case of the War Industries Board, the railroad
executives used their coercive governmental powers to deal a
crippling blow to diversity and competition, on behalf of monop-
oly, in the name of “efficiency” and standardization. Again,
over the opposition of shippers, the RA ordered the compul-
sory standardization of locomotive and equipment design,
eliminated “duplicate” (i.e., competitive) passenger service
and coal transportation, shut down off-line traffic offices, and
Gray, president of the Western Maryland R.R. One Unionist, W.S. Carter,
head of the Brotherhood of Firemen and Engineers, was brought in to head
the Division of Labor.
44
Kerr, American Railroad Politics, 1914–1920, pp. 14–22.
45
Ibid., p. 80.
34 War Collectivism
ordered the cessation of competitive solicitation of freight by the

railroads.
All of these edicts reduced railroad services to the hap-
less shippers. There were still other coerced reductions of ser-
vice. One ended the shippers’ privileges of specifying freight
routes—and thereby of specifying the cheapest routes for ship-
ping their goods. Another upset the peacetime practice of mak-
ing the railroads liable for losses and damages to shipments;
instead, the entire burden of proof was placed upon the ship-
pers. Another RA ruling—the “sailing day plan”—ordered
freight cars to remain in their terminals until filled, thus sharply
curtailing service to small-town shippers.
The granting of absolute power to the railroad-dominated
RA was cemented by the Federal Control Act of March, 1918,
which ex post facto legalized the illegal federal takeover. Work-
ing closely with railroad lobbyists, the RA, backed by the full
support of President Wilson, was able to drive through Con-
gress the transfer of rate-making powers to itself from the ICC.
Furthermore, all power was taken away from the invariably
shipper-dominated state railroad commissions.
The RA hastened to exercise its rate-setting powers,
announcing freight rate increases of twenty-five percent across
the board in the spring of 1918—an act that permanently
cemented shipper hostility to the system of federal operation.
To add insult to injury, the new higher rates were set without
any public hearings or consultation with other agencies or inter-
ests involved.
II
Historians have generally treated the economic planning of
World War I as an isolated episode dictated by the require-
ments of the day and having little further significance. But, on
the contrary, the war collectivism served as an inspiration and as
a model for a mighty army of forces destined to forge the history
of twentieth-century America. For big business, the wartime

economy was a model of what could be achieved in national
coordination and cartelization, in stabilizing production, prices,
and profits, in replacing old-fashioned competitive laissez-faire
by a system that they could broadly control and that would har-
monize the claims of various powerful economic groups. It was
a system that had already abolished much competitive diversity
in the name of standardization. The wartime economy espe-
cially galvanized such business leaders as Bernard Baruch and
Herbert Hoover, who would promote the cooperative “asso-
ciation” of business trade groups as Secretary of Commerce
during the 1920s, an associationism that paved the way for the
cooperative statism of Franklin Roosevelt’s AAA and NRA.
The wartime collectivism also held forth a model to the
nation’s liberal intellectuals; for here was seemingly a system
that replaced laissez-faire not by the rigors and class hatreds of
proletarian Marxism, but by a new strong State, planning and
organizing the economy in harmony with all leading economic
groups. It was, not coincidentally, to be a neomercantilism,
a “mixed economy,” heavily staffed by these selfsame liberal
intellectuals. And finally, both big business and the liberals
saw in the wartime model a way to organize and integrate the
often unruly labor force as a junior partner in the corporatist
system—a force to be disciplined by their own “responsible”
leadership of the labor unions.
For the rest of his life, Bernard Mannes Baruch sought to
restore the lineaments of the wartime model. Thus, in summing
up the experience of the WIB, Baruch extolled the fact that:
many businessmen have experienced during the war,
for the first time in their careers, the tremendous ad-
vantages, both to themselves and to the general public,
of combination, of cooperation and common action…
Baruch called for the continuance of such corporate asso-
ciations, in “inaugurating rules” to eliminate “waste” (i.e.,
36 War Collectivism
competition), to exchange trade information, to agree on the

channeling of supply and demand among themselves, to avoid
“extravagant” forms of competition and to allocate the loca-
tion of production. Completing the outlines of a corporate state,
Baruch urged that such associations be governed by a federal
agency, either the Department of Commerce or the Federal
Trade Commission
an agency whose duty it should be to encourage, under
strict Government supervision, such cooperation and
coordination . . .46
Baruch also envisioned a federal board for the retraining and
channeling of labor after the war. At the very least, he urged
standby legislation for price control and for industrial coordina-
tion and mobilization in the event of another war.47
During the 1920s and 1930s, Bernard Baruch served
as a major inspiration of the drive toward a corporate state;
moreover, many of the leaders of this drive were men who had
served under him during the heady days of the WIB and who
continued to function frankly as “Baruch’s men” in national
affairs. Thus, aided by Baruch, George N. Peek, of the Moline
Plow Company, launched in the early 1920s the drive for farm
price supports through federally organized farm cartels that
was to culminate in President Hoover’s Federal Farm Board in
1929 and then in Roosevelt’s AAA. Peek’s farm equipment
business, of course, stood to benefit greatly from farm subsi-
dies. Hoover appointed as first Chairman of the FFB none
other than Baruch’s old top aide from World War I, Alexander
Legge of International Harvester, the leading farm machinery
manufacturer. When Franklin Roosevelt created the AAA, he
46
Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in the War (New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1941), pp. 105–06.
47
Coit, Mr. Baruch, pp. 202–03, 218.
first offered the job of director to Baruch, and then gave the
post to Baruch’s man, George Peek.
Neither was Baruch laggard in promoting a corporatist sys-
tem for industry as a whole. In the spring of 1930, Baruch
proposed a peacetime reincarnation of the WIB as a “Supreme
Court of Industry.” In September of the following year, Gerard
Swope, head of General Electric and brother of Baruch’s clos-
est confidant Herbert Bayard Swope, presented an elaborate
plan for a corporate state that essentially revived the system of
wartime planning. At the same time, one of Baruch’s oldest
friends, former Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo, was pro-
posing a similar plan for a “Peace Industries Board.” After
Hoover dismayed his old associates by rejecting the plan,
Franklin Roosevelt embodied it in the NRA, selecting Gerard
Swope to help write the final draft, and picking another Baruch
disciple and World War aide General Hugh S. Johnson—also
of the Moline Plow Company—to direct this major instrument
of state corporatism. When Johnson was fired, Baruch himself
was offered the post.48
Other leading NRA officials were veterans of war mobi-
lization. Johnson’s chief of staff was another old friend of
Baruch’s, John Hancock, who had been Paymaster General of
the Navy during the war and had headed the naval industrial
program for the War Industries Board; other high officials of
the NRA were Dr. Leo Wolman, who had been head of the
production-statistics division of the WIB; Charles F. Homer,
leader of the wartime Liberty Loan drive; and General Clar-
ence C. Williams, who had been Chief of Ordnance in charge
of Army war purchasing. Other WIB veterans highly placed in
the New Deal were Isador Lubin, United States Commissioner
of Labor Statistics in the New Deal; Captain Leon Henderson
of the Ordinance Division of the WIB; and Senator Joseph
Guffey (D., Pa.), who had worked in the WIB on conservation
48
Ibid., pp. 440–43.
38 War Collectivism
of oil, and who helped pattern the oil and coal controls of the
New Deal on the wartime Fuel Administration.49
Another leading promoter of the new cooperation subse-
quent to his experience as wartime planner was Herbert
Clark Hoover. As soon as the war was over, Hoover set out
to “reconstruct America” along the lines of peacetime coop-
eration. He urged national planning through “voluntary”
cooperation among businessmen and other economic groups
under the “central direction” of the government. The Federal
Reserve System was to allocate capital to essential industries
and thereby to eliminate the competitive “wastes” of the free
market. And in his term as Secretary of Commerce during the
1920s, Hoover assiduously encouraged the cartelization of
industry through trade associations. In addition to inaugurat-
ing the modern program of farm price supports in the Federal
Farm Board, Hoover urged the coffee buyers to form a cartel
to lower buying prices; established a buying cartel in the rubber
industry; led the oil industry in working toward restrictions on
oil production in the name of “conservation”; tried repeatedly
to raise prices, restrict production, and encourage marketing
co-ops in the coal industry; and tried to force the cotton textile
industry into a nationwide cartel to restrict production. Spe-
cifically in furtherance of the wartime abolition of thousands of
diverse and competitive products, Hoover continued to impose
standardization and “simplification” of materials and products
during the 1920s. In this way, Hoover managed to abolish or
“simplify” about a thousand industrial products. The “simplifi-
cation” was worked out by the Department of Commerce in
49
See William E. Leuchtenburg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,”
in John Braeman et al., eds., Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century
America (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 122–23.
collaboration with committees from each industry.50 Grosvenor

Clarkson hailed the fact that:
it is probable that there will never again be such a mul-
tiplicity of styles and models in machinery and other
heavy and costly articles as there was before the restric-
tions necessitated by the war… The ideas conceived
and applied by the War Industries Board in war are
being applied in peace by the Department of Commerce
. . .51
Not the least of the influential groups dazzled and marked
by the experience of war collectivism were the liberal intellectu-
als. Never before had so many intellectuals and academicians
swarmed into government to help plan, regulate, and mobilize
the economic system. The intellectuals served as advisers, tech-
nicians, framers of legislation, and administrators of bureaus.
Furthermore, apart from the rewards of newly acquired pres-
tige and power, the war economy held out to such intellectuals
the promise of transforming the society into a “third way” com-
pletely different from the laissez-faire past that they scorned
or the looming proletarian Marxism that they reviled and
feared. Here was a planned corporate economy that seemed
to harmonize all groups and classes under a strong and guid-
ing nation-state with the liberals themselves at or near the helm. In
a notable article, Professor Leuchtenburg saw the war collectivism
50
See Herbert Hoover, Memoirs (New York: Macmillan, 1952), vol. 2, pp.
27, 66–70; on Hoover and the export industries, Joseph Brandes, Herbert
Hoover and Economic Diplomacy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1962); on the oil industry, Gerald D. Nash, United States Oil Policy, 1890-
1964 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968); on coal, Ellis W.
Hawley, “Secretary Hoover and the Bituminous Coal Problem, 1921–1928,”
Business History Review(Autumn, 1968): 247–70; on cotton textiles, Louis
Galambos, Competition and Cooperation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1966).
51
Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War, pp. 484–85.
40 War Collectivism
as “a logical outgrowth of the Progressive movement.”52 He

demonstrated the enthusiasm of the Progressive intellectuals for
the social transformation effected by the war. Thus, the New
Republic hailed the “revolutionizing” of society by means of
the war; John Dewey hailed the replacement of production for
profit and “the absoluteness of private property” by produc-
tion for use. Economists were particularly enchanted by the
“notable demonstration of the power of war to force concert of
effort and collective planning,” and looked for “the same sort of
centralized directing now employed to kill their enemies abroad
for the new purpose of reconstructing their own life at home.”53
Rexford Guy Tugwell, ever alert to the advance of social
engineering, was soon to look back wistfully upon “America’s
wartime socialism”; lamenting the end of the war, he declared
that “only the Armistice prevented a great experiment in con-
trol of production, control of price, and control of consump-
tion.” For, during the war, the old system of industrial competi-
tion had “melted away in the fierce new heat of nationalistic
vision.”54
Not merely the NRA and AAA, but virtually the entire
New Deal apparatus—including the bringing to Washington
of a host of liberal intellectuals and planners—owed its inspira-
tion to the war collectivism of World War I. The Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, founded by Hoover in 1932 and
expanded by Roosevelt’s New Deal, was a revival and expan-
sion of the old War Finance Corporation, which had loaned gov-
ernment funds to munitions firms. Furthermore, Hoover, after
52
Leuchtenburg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,” p. 84n.
53
Ibid., p. 89.
54
Ibid., pp. 90–92. It was very similar considerations that also brought many
liberal intellectuals, especially including those of the New Republic, into at
least a temporary admiration for Italian Fascism. Thus, see John P. Diggins,
“Flirtation with Fascism: American Pragmatic Liberals and Mussolini’s Italy,”
American Historical Review (January, 1966): 487–506.
offering the post to Bernard Baruch, named as first Chairman

of the RFC, Eugene Meyer, Jr., an old protégé of Baruch’s,
who had been managing director of the WFC. Much of the old
WFC staff and method of operations were taken over bodily
by the new agency. The Tennessee Valley Authority grew out
of a wartime government nitrate and electric-power project at
Muscle Shoals, and in fact included the old nitrate plant as one
of its first assets. Moreover, many of the public power advocates
in the New Deal had been trained in such wartime agencies as
the Power Section of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. And
even the innovative government corporate form of the TVA was
based on wartime precedent.55
Wartime experience also provided the inspiration for the
public housing movement of the New Deal. During the war,
the Emergency Fleet Corp. and the United States Housing
Corp. were established to provide housing for war workers.
The war established the precedent of federal housing, and also
trained architects like Robert Kohn, who functioned as chief of
production for the housing division of the United States Ship-
ping Board. After the war, Kohn exulted that “the war has put
housing ‘on the map’ in this country”; and in 1933, Kohn was
duly named by President Roosevelt to be the director of the
New Deal’s first venture into public housing. Furthermore, the
Emergency Fleet Corp. and the United States Housing Corp.
established large-scale public housing communities on planned
“garden city” principles (Yorkship Village, N.J.; Union Park
Gardens, Del.; Black Rock and Crane Tracts, Conn.), prin-
ciples finally remembered and put into effect in the New Deal
and afterward.56
The oil and coal controls established in the New Deal also
rested on the precedent of the wartime Fuel Administration.
Indeed, Senator Joseph Guffey (D., Pa.), leader in the coal
55
Leuchtenburg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,” pp. 109–10.
56
Ibid., pp. 111–12.
42 War Collectivism
and oil controls, had been head of the petroleum section of the
War Industries Board.
Deeply impressed with the “national unity” and mobili-
zation achieved during the war, the New Deal established
the Civilian Conservation Corps to instill the martial spirit in
America’s youth. The idea was to take the “wandering boys”
off the road and “mobilize” them into a new form of Ameri-
can Expeditionary Force. The Army, in fact, ran the CCC
camps; CCC recruits were gathered at Army recruiting sta-
tions, equipped with World War I clothing, and assembled in
army tents. The CCC, the New Dealers exulted, had given a
new sense of meaning to the nation’s youth, in this new “for-
estry army.” Speaker Henry T. Rainey (D., Ill.) of the House
of Representatives put it this way:
They [the CCC recruits] are also under military train-
ing and as they come out of it . . . improved in health
and developed mentally and physically and are more
useful citizens . . . they would furnish a very valuable
nucleus for an army.57
III
Particularly good evidence of the deep imprint of war collectiv-
ism was the reluctance of many of its leaders to abandon it when
the war was finally over. Business leaders pressed for two post-
war goals: continuance of government price-fixing to protect
them against an expected postwar deflation; and a longer-range
attempt to promote industrial cartelization in peacetime. In par-
ticular, businessmen wanted the price maxima (which had often
served as minima instead) to be converted simply into outright
minima for the postwar period. Wartime quotas to restrict pro-
57
Ibid., p. 117. Roosevelt names union leader Robert Fechner, formerly
engaged in war labor work, as director of the CCC to provide a civilian
camouflage for the program, p. 115n.
duction, furthermore, needed only to remain in being to func-

tion as a frank cartelizing for raising prices in time of peace.
Accordingly, many of the industrial War Service Com-
mittees, and their WIB Section counterparts, urged the con-
tinuance of the WIB and its price-fixing system. In particular,
section chiefs invariably urged continued price control in those
industries that feared postwar deflation, while advocating a
return to a free market wherever the specific industry expected
a continuing boom. Thus, Professor Himmelberg concluded:
Section chiefs in their recommendations to the Board
consistently followed the wishes of their industries in
urging protection if the industry expected price declines
and release of all controls when the industry expected a
favorable postwar market.58
Robert S. Brookings, Chairman of the Price-Fixing Com-
mittee of the WIB, declared that the WIB would be “as helpful
. . . during the reconstruction period as we have during the war
period in stabilizing values.”59
From the big-business world, meanwhile, Harry A.
Wheeler, president of the United States Chamber of Com-
merce, presented to Woodrow Wilson in early October, 1918,
an ambitious scheme for a “Reconstruction Commission,” to
be composed of all the economic interests of the nation.
The WIB itself concurred, and urged the President to allow
it to continue after the war. Baruch himself urged upon Wilson
the continuation of at least the minimum price-fixing policies
of the WIB. However, Baruch was gulling the public when he
foresaw a postwar WIB as guarding against both inflation and
deflation; there was no inclination to impose maximum prices
against inflation.
58
Robert F. Himmelberg, “The War Industries Board and the Antitrust
Question in November 1918,” Journal of American History (June, 1965): 65.
59
Ibid.
44 War Collectivism
The great problem with these ambitious plans of both indus-

try and government was President Wilson himself. Perhaps a
lingering attachment to the ideals, or at least to the rhetoric, of
free competition prevented the President from giving any favor-
able attention to these postwar schemes.60 The attachment was
particularly nourished by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker,
of all Wilson’s advisers the closest to a believer in laissez-faire.
Throughout October, 1918, Wilson rejected all of these pro-
posals. The response of Baruch and the WIB was to put fur-
ther pressure on Wilson during early November, by publicly
predicting and urging that the WIB would definitely be needed
during demobilization. Thus The New York Times reported,
the day after the Armistice, that
War Industries Board officials declared there would be
much work for that organization to do. They foresee
no serious industrial dislocation with the Government’s
grip on all war industries and material held tight.61
The President remained adamant, however, and on Novem-
ber 23 he ordered the complete disbanding of the WIB by the
end of the year. The disappointed WIB officials accepted the
decision without protest; partly because of expected congres-
sional opposition to any attempt to continue, partly from the
hostility to continued controls by those industries anticipating a
boom. Thus, the shoe industry particularly chafed at any con-
tinuing controls.62 The industries favoring controls, however,
urged the WIB at least to ratify their own price minima and
agreements for restricting production for the coming winter, and
60
Ibid., pp. 63–64; Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration, pp.
298–99.
61
Quoted in Himmelberg, p. 64.
62
Favoring continuing price controls were such industries as the chemical,
iron and steel, lumber, and finished products generally. Opposing industries
included abrasives, automotive products, and newspapers. Ibid., pp. 62, 65,
67.
to do so just before the disbandment of the agency. The Board

was sorely tempted to engage in this final exploit, and indeed
was informed by its legal staff that it could successfully continue
such controls beyond the life of the agency even against the will
of the President. The WIB, however, reluctantly turned down
requests to this effect by the acid, zinc, and steel manufacturers
on December 11.63 It only rejected the price-fixing plans, how-
ever, because it feared being overturned by the courts should
the Attorney General challenge such a decision.
One of the most ardent advocates of continued WIB price
control was the great steel industry. Two days after the Armi-
stice, Judge Gary of U.S. Steel urged the WIB to continue
its regulations, and declared that “The members of the steel
industry desire to cooperate with each other in every proper
way . . .” Gary urged a three-month extension of price-fixing,
with further gradual reductions that would prevent a return to
“destructive” competition. Baruch replied that he was person-
ally “willing to go to the very limit,” but he was blocked by
Wilson’s attitude.64
If the WIB itself could not continue, perhaps the wartime

cartelization could persist in other forms. During November,
Arch W. Shaw, Chicago industrialist and head of the Con-
servation Division of the WIB (whose wartime work in foster-
ing standardization was being transferred to the Department
of Commerce) and Secretary of Commerce William Redfield
agreed on a bill to allow manufacturers to collaborate in “the
adoption of plans for the elimination of needless waste in the
public interest,” under the supervision of the Federal Trade
Commission. When this proposal fizzled, Edwin B. Parker, Pri-
orities Commissioner of the WIB, proposed in late November
63
Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration, pp. 306–07.
64
Ibid., pp. 294–302.
46 War Collectivism
a frankly cartelizing bill that would allow the majority of the

firms in any given industry to set production quotas that would
have to be obeyed by all the firms in that industry. The Parker
plan won the approval of Baruch, Peek, and numerous other
government officials and businessmen, but WIB’s legal counsel
warned that Congress would never give its consent.65 Another
proposal that interested Baruch was advanced by Mark Requa,
Assistant Food Administrator, who proposed a United States
Board of Trade to encourage and regulate industrial agree-
ments that “promoted the national welfare.”66
Whatever the reason, Bernard Baruch failed to press hard
for these proposals, and so they died on the vine. If Baruch
failed to press matters, however, his associate George Peek,
head of the Finished Products Division of the WIB, was not so
reticent. By mid-December, 1918, Peek wrote Baruch that the
postwar era must retain the “benefits of proper cooperation.”
In particular,
proper legislation should be enacted to permit co-

operation in industry, in order that the lessons we have
learned during the war may be capitalized . . . in peace-
time. . . . Conservation; . . . standardization of products
and processes, price fixing under certain conditions,
etc., should continue with Government cooperation.67
By late December, Peek was proposing legislation for:
some kind of an Emergency Peace Bureau . . . in order

that businessmen may, in conjunction with such a Bu-
65
Himmelberg, “The War Industries Board and the Antitrust Question in
November 1918,” pp. 70–71.
66
Ibid., p. 72; Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, pp. 231–32.
67
Himmelberg, “The War Industries Board and the Antitrust Question in
November 1918,” p. 72.
reau, have an opportunity to meet and cooperate with

Governmental cooperation . . .68
The leading business groups endorsed similar plans. In early
December, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
called a meeting of the various industrial War Ser vice Commit-
tees to convene as a “Reconstruction Congress of American
Industry.” The Reconstruction Congress called for revision
of the Sherman Act to permit “reasonable” trade agreements
under a supervisory body. Furthermore, a nationwide Chamber
referendum, in early 1919, approved such a proposal by an
overwhelming majority; and president Harry Wheeler urged
the “cordial acceptance by organized business” of regulation
that would ratify business agreements. The National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, before the war devoted to competition,
warmly endorsed the same goals.
The last gasp of wartime cartelization came in February,

1919, with the establishment by the Department of Commerce
of the Industrial Board.69 Secretary of Commerce William C.
Redfield, formerly president of the American Manufacturers
Export Association, had long championed the view that gov-
ernment should promote and coordinate industrial cooperation.
Redfield saw an entering wedge with the transfer of the WIB’s
Conservation Division to his department shortly after the Armi-
stice. Redfield continued the wartime stimulation of trade asso-
ciations, and to that end established an advisory board of former
WIB officials. One of these advisers was George Peek; another
68
Robert D. Cuff, “A ‘Dollar-a-Year Man’ in Government: George N. Peek
and the War Industries Board,” Business History Review (Winter, 1967):
417.
69
On the Industrial Board, see Robert F. Himmelberg, “Business, Antitrust
Policy, and the Industrial Board of the Department of Commerce, 1919,”
Business History Review (Spring, 1968): 1–23.
48 War Collectivism
was Peek’s assistant on the WIB, Ohio lumber executive Wil-

liam M. Ritter. It was Ritter, in fact, who originated the idea of
the Industrial Board.
The Industrial Board, conceived by Ritter in January,
1919, and enthusiastically adopted and pushed by Secretary
Redfield, was a cunning scheme. On its face, and as promoted
to President Wilson and to others in the Administration and
Congress, the Board was merely a device to secure large price
reductions, and thereby to lower the inflated level of general
prices and to stimulate consumer demand. It was therefore
seemingly unrelated to the previous cartelizing drive and hence
won the approval of the President, who established the new
Board in mid-February. At Ritter’s urging, George Peek was
named chairman of the IB; other members included Ritter him-
self; George R. James, head of a major Memphis dry-goods
concern and former chief of the Cotton and Cotton Linters
section of the WIB; Lewis B. Reed, vice-president of the U.S.
Silica Co. and another former assistant to Peek; steel castings
manufacturer Samuel P. Bush, former head of the WIB’s Facil-
ities Division; Atlanta steel-fabricating manufacturer Thomas
Glenn, also a veteran of the WIB; and two “outsiders,” one
representing the Labor Department and the other the Railroad
Administration.
No sooner did the IB get under way than it pursued its real,
but previously camouflaged, purpose: not to reduce, but rather
to stabilize prices at existing high levels. Moreover, the method
of stabilization would be the longed-for but previously rejected
path of ratifying industrial price agreements arrived at in col-
laboration with the Board. Deciding on this cartelizing policy
in early March, the IB moved toward the first application in a
conference with, unsurprisingly, the steel industry on March
19-20, 1919. Opening the conference, Chairman George Peek
grandly declared that the event might prove “epoch-making,”
especially in establishing “real genuine cooperation between
Government, industry, and labor, so that we may eliminate the
possibility of the destructive forces . . .”70 The steel men were

of course delighted, hailing the “great chance . . . to come into
close contact with the Government itself . . .”71 The IB told the
steel industry that any agreement to sustain prices agreed upon
by the conference would be immune from the antitrust laws.
Not only was the price list offered by the IB to the steel men still
very high even if moderately lower than existing prices; but Peek
agreed to announce to the public that steel prices would not be
lowered further for the remainder of the year. Peek advised the
steel men that his statement would be their biggest asset; for “I
don’t know what I wouldn’t have given in times past if in my
own business I could say that the government of the United
States says this is as low a price as you could get.”72
The IB-steel agreement lowered steel prices by a modest
ten to fourteen percent. The small, high-cost steel producers
were disgruntled, but the big steel firms welcomed the agree-
ment as a coordinated, orderly reduction of inflated prices, and
especially welcomed the Board’s guarantee of the fixed price for
the remainder of the year.
The elated IB proceeded with similar conferences for the
coal and building materials industries, but two dark clouds
promptly appeared: the refusal of the government’s own Rail-
road Administration to pay the fixed, agreed-upon price for
steel rails and for coal; and the concern of the Justice Depart-
ment for the evident violation of the antitrust laws. The railroad
men running the RA particularly balked at the reduced but
still high price that they were going to be forced to pay for steel
rails—at a rate that they declared was at least two dollars per
70
Himmelberg, “Industrial Board,” p. 13.
71
Professor Urofsky surmised from the orderly and very moderate price
reductions in steel during the first months of 1919 that Robert S. Brookings
had quietly given the steel industry the green light to proceed with its own price-
fixing. Urofsky, Big Steel and the Wilson Administration, pp. 307–08.
72
Himmelberg, “Industrial Board,” p. 14n.
50 War Collectivism
ton above the free-market price. Walker D. Hines, head of the

RA, denounced the IB as a price-fixing agency, dominated by
steel and other industries, and he called for the abolition of
the Industrial Board. This call was seconded by the powerful
Secretary of the Treasury Carter Glass. The Attorney General
concurred that the IB’s policy was illegal price-fixing and in vio-
lation of the antitrust laws. Finally, President Wilson dissolved
the Industrial Board in early May, 1919; wartime industrial
planning had at last been dissolved, its formal cartelization to
reappear a decade and a half later.
Yet remnants of wartime collectivism still remained. The high

wartime minimum wheat price of two dollars and twenty-six cents
a bushel was carried over to the 1919 crop, continuing until June,
1920. But the most important carry-over of war collectivism was
the Railroad Administration: the government’s operation of the
nation’s railroads. When William Gibbs McAdoo resigned as
head of the RA at the end of the war, he was succeeded by the
previous de facto operating head, railroad executive Walker D.
Hines. There was no call for immediate return to private opera-
tion, because the railroad industry generally agreed upon drastic
regulation to curb or eliminate “wasteful” railroad competition and
coordinate the industry, to fix prices to insure a “fair profit,” and
to outlaw strikes through compulsory arbitration. This was the
overall thrust of railroad sentiment. Furthermore, being in effective
control of the RA, the roads were in no hurry to return to pri-
vate operation and jurisdiction by the less reliable ICC. Although
McAdoo’s plan to postpone by five years the given 1920 date for
return to private operation gained little support, Congress pro-
ceeded to use its time during 1919 to tighten the monopolization
of the railroads.
In the name of “scientific management,” Senator Albert
Cummins (R., Iowa) proceeded to grant the railroads’ fond-
est dreams. Cummins’ bill, warmly approved by Hines and
railroad executive Daniel Willard, ordered the consolidation of
numerous railroads and would set the railroad rates according

to a “fair,” fixed return on capital investment. Strikes would
be outlawed, and all labor disputes settled by compulsory arbi-
tration. For their part, the Association of Railroad Executives
submitted a legislative plan similar to the Cummins Bill. Also
similar to the Cummins Bill was the proposal of the National
Association of Owners of Railroad Securities, a group com-
posed largely of savings banks and insurance companies. In
contrast to these plans, the Citizens National Railroad League,
consisting of individual railroad investors, proposed coerced
consolidation into one national railroad corporation, and the
guaranteeing of minimum earnings to this new road.
All of these plans were designed to tip the prewar balance
sharply in favor of the railroads and against the shippers, and,
as a result, the Cummins Bill, in passing the Senate, ran into
trouble in the House. The trouble was fomented by the ship-
pers, who demanded a return to the status quo ante when the
shipper-dominated ICC was in charge. Furthermore, for their
part the wartime experience had embittered the shippers, who,
along with the ICC itself, demanded a return to the higher
quality service provided by railroad competition rather than
the increased monopolization provided by the various railroad
bills. Unsurprisingly, however, one of the leading nonrailroad
business groups favoring the Cummins Bill was the Railway
Business Association, a group of manufacturers and distribu-
tors of railroad supplies and equipment. The House of Rep-
resentatives, in its turn, passed the Esch Bill, which essentially
reestablished the prewar rule of the ICC.
President Wilson had put pressure on Congress to make
a decision by threatening the return of the railroads to private
operation by the given date of January 1, 1920, but, under
pressure of the railroads who were anxious to push the Cum-
mins Bill, Wilson extended the deadline to March 1. Finally,
the joint conference committee of Congress reported out the
Transportation Act of 1920, a compromise that was essentially
52 War Collectivism
the Esch Bill returning the railroads to the prewar ICC, but
adding the Cummins provisions for a two-year guarantee to the
railroads to set rates providing a “fair return” of five and a half
percent on investment. Furthermore, on the agreement of both
shippers and the roads, the power to set minimum railroad rates
was now granted to the ICC. This agreement was the product
of railroads eager to set a floor under freight rates, and shippers
anxious to protect budding canal transportation against railroad
competition. Furthermore, although railway union objections
blocked the provision for the outlawing of strikes, a Railroad
Labor Board was established to try to settle labor disputes.73
With the return of the railroads to private operation in
March, 1920, war collectivism finally and at long last seemed
to pass from the American scene. But pass it never really did;
for the inspiration and the model that it furnished for a corpo-
rate state in America continued to guide Herbert Hoover and
other leaders in the 1920s, and was to return full-blown in the
New Deal, and in the World War II economy. In fact, it sup-
plied the broad outlines for the Corporate Monopoly State that
the New Deal was to establish, seemingly permanently, in the
United States of America.
On the maneuvering leading to the Transportation Act of 1920, see Kerr,

73
American Railroad Politics, 1914–1920, pp. 128–227.

II
World War I as Fulfillment:

Power and the Intellectuals
INTRODUCTION
I n contrast to older historians who regarded World War I as the

destruction of progressive reform, I am convinced that the war
came to the United States as the “fulfillment,” the culmination,
the veritable apotheosis of progressivism in American life.1 I
regard progressivism as basically a movement on behalf of Big
Government in all walks of the economy and society, in a fusion
or coalition between various groups of big businessmen, led by
the House of Morgan, and rising groups of technocratic and
statist intellectuals. In this fusion, the values and interests of
both groups would be pursued through government.
1
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at a Pacific Institute Conference
on “Crisis and Leviathan,” at Menlo Park, Calif., October 1986. It appeared
in print in the Journal of Libertarian Studies 9, no. 1 (Winter, 1989). It was
reprinted in John V. Denson, ed., The Costs of War: America’s Pyrrhic Victories
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997). The title of this paper
is borrowed from the pioneering last chapter of James Weinstein’s excellent
work, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918 (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968). The last chapter is entitled, “War as Fulfillment.”
53
54 War Collectivism
Big business would be able to use the government to car-

telize the economy, restrict competition, and regulate produc-
tion and prices, and also to be able to wield a militaristic
and imperialist foreign policy to force open markets abroad and
apply the sword of the State to protect foreign investments. Intel-
lectuals would be able to use the government to restrict entry
into their professions and to assume jobs in Big Government
to apologize for, and to help plan and staff, government opera-
tions. Both groups also believed that, in this fusion, the Big
State could be used to harmonize and interpret the “national
interest” and thereby provide a “middle way” between the
extremes of “dog-eat-dog” laissez faire and the bitter conflicts
of proletarian Marxism.
Also animating both groups of progressives was a post-
millennial pietist Protestantism that had conquered “Yankee”
areas of northern Protestantism by the 1830s and had impelled
the pietists to use local, state, and finally federal governments
to stamp out “sin,” to make America and eventually the world
holy, and thereby to bring about the Kingdom of God on earth.
The victory of the Bryanite forces at the Democratic national
convention of 1896 destroyed the Democratic Party as the vehi-
cle of “liturgical” Roman Catholics and German Lutherans
devoted to personal liberty and laissez faire and created the
roughly homogenized and relatively non-ideological party sys-
tem we have today. After the turn of the century, this develop-
ment created an ideological and power vacuum for the expand-
ing number of progressive technocrats and administrators to fill.
In that way, the locus of government shifted from the legislature,
at least partially subject to democratic check, to the oligarchic
and technocratic executive branch.
World War I brought the fulfillment of all these progressive
trends. Militarism, conscription, massive intervention at home
and abroad, a collectivized war economy, all came about during
the war and created a mighty cartelized system that most of its
leaders spent the rest of their lives trying to recreate, in peace
World War I as Fulfillment 55
as well as war. In the World War I chapter of his outstanding

work, Crisis and Leviathan, Professor Robert Higgs concen-
trates on the war economy and illuminates the interconnections
with conscription.
In this paper, I would like to concentrate on an area that
Professor Higgs relatively neglects: the coming to power dur-
ing the war of the various groups of progressive intellectuals.2
I use the term “intellectual” in the broad sense penetratingly
described by F.A. Hayek: that is, not merely theorists and
academicians, but also all manner of opinion-molders in soci-
ety—writers, journalists, preachers, scientists, activists of all
sort—what Hayek calls “secondhand dealers in ideas.”3 Most
of these intellectuals, of whatever strand or occupation, were
either dedicated, messianic postmillennial pietists or else former
pietists, born in a deeply pietist home, who, though now secu-
larized, still possessed an intense messianic belief in national
and world salvation through Big Government. But, in addition,
oddly but characteristically, most combined in their thought and
agitation messianic moral or religious fervor with an empiri-
cal, allegedly value-free, and strictly scientific devotion to social
science. Whether it be the medical profession’s combined sci-
entific and moralistic devotion to stamping out sin or a similar
position among economists or philosophers, this blend is typical
of progressive intellectuals.
In this paper, I will be dealing with various examples of
individual or groups of progressive intellectuals, exulting in the
2
Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987), pp. 123–58. For my own account of the collectivized war economy of
World War I, see Murray N. Rothbard, “War Collectivism in World War I,”
in R. Radosh and M. Rothbard. eds., A New History of Leviathan: Essays
on the Rise of the American Corporate State (New York: Dutton. 1972), pp.
66–110.
3
F.A. Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” in Studies in Philosophy,
Politics and Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp.
178ff.
56 War Collectivism
triumph of their creed and their own place in it, as a result of

America’s entry into World War I. Unfortunately, limitations of
space and time preclude dealing with all facets of the wartime
activity of progressive intellectuals; in particular, I regret having
to omit treatment of the conscription movement, a fascinating
example of the creed of the “therapy” of “discipline” led by
upper-class intellectuals and businessmen in the J.P. Morgan
ambit.4 I shall also have to omit both the highly significant
trooping to the war colors of the nation’s preachers, and the
wartime impetus toward the permanent centralization of scien-
tific research.5
There is no better epigraph for the remainder of this paper
than a congratulatory note sent to President Wilson after the
delivery of his war message on April 2, 1917. The note was
sent by Wilson’s son-in-law and fellow Southern pietist and
progressive, Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McA-
doo, a man who had spent his entire life as an industrialist in
New York City, solidly in the J.P. Morgan ambit. McAdoo
wrote to Wilson: “You have done a great thing nobly! I firmly
believe that it is God’s will that America should do this tran-
scendent service for humanity throughout the world and that
4
On the conscription movement, see in particular Michael Pearlman, To Make
Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the Progressive
Era (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984). See also John W. Chambers
II, “Conscripting for Colossus: The Adoption of the Draft in the United
States in World War I,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1973; John Patrick
Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American
Military Preparedness, 1914–1917 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1974); and John Gany Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training
Camp Movement (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972).
5
On ministers and the war, see Ray H. Abrams, Preachers Present Arms
(New York: Round Table Press, 1933). On the mobilization of science,
see David F. Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology and the Rise
of Corporate Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), and
Ronald C. Tobey, The American Ideology of National Science, 1919–1930
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).
you are His chosen instrument.”6 It was not a sentiment with

which the president could disagree.
PIETISM AND PROHIBITION

One of the few important omissions in Professor Higgs’s book
is the crucial role of postmillennial pietist Protestantism in the
drive toward statism in the United States. Dominant in the
“Yankee” areas of the North from the 1830s on, the aggressive
“evangelical” form of pietism conquered Southern Protestant-
ism by the 1890s and played a crucial role in progressivism
after the turn of the century and through World War I. Evan-
gelical pietism held that requisite to any man’s salvation is that
he do his best to see to it that everyone else is saved, and doing
one’s best inevitably meant that the State must become a cru-
cial instrument in maximizing people’s chances for salvation. In
particular, the State plays a pivotal role in stamping out sin, and
in “making America holy.” To the pietists, sin was very broadly
defined as any force that might cloud men’s minds so that they
could not exercise their theological free will to achieve salvation.
Of particular importance were slavery (until the Civil War),
Demon Rum, and the Roman Catholic Church, headed by the
Antichrist in Rome. For decades after the Civil War, “rebel-
lion” took the place of slavery in the pietist charges against
their great political enemy, the Democratic party.7 Then in
6
Cited in Gerald Edward Markowitz, “Progressive Imperialism: Consensus
and Conflict in the Progressive Movement on Foreign Policy, 1898–1917.”
Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971, p. 375, an unfortunately neglected
work on a highly important topic.
7
Hence the famous imprecation hurled at the end of the 1884 campaign that
brought the Democrats into the presidency for the first time since the Civil War,
that the Democratic Party was the party of “Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion.”
In that one phrase, the New York Protestant minister was able to sum up the
political concerns of the pietist movement.
58 War Collectivism
1896, with the evangelical conversion of Southern Protestant-

ism and the admission to the Union of the sparsely populated
and pietist Mountain states, William Jennings Bryan was able
to put together a coalition that transformed the Democrats
into a pietist party and ended forever that party’s once proud
role as the champion of liturgical (Catholic and High Ger-
man Lutheran) Christianity and of personal liberty and laissez
faire.8
The pietists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries were all postmillennialist: They believed that the Second
Advent of Christ will occur only after the millennium—a thou-
sand years of the establishment of the Kingdom of God on
earth—has been brought about by human effort. Postmillenni-
alists have therefore tended to be statists, with the State becom-
ing an important instrument of stamping out sin and Christian-
izing the social order so as to speed Jesus’s return.9
8
For an introduction to the growing literature of “ethnoreligious” political
history in the United States, see Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture (New
York: the Free Press, 1970); and idem, The Third Electoral System, 1853–
1892 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). For the latest
research on the formation of the Republican Party as a pietist party, reflecting
the interconnected triad of pietist concerns—antislavery, prohibition, and
anti-Catholicism—see William E. Gienapp, “Nativism and the Creation of a
Republican Majority in the North before the Civil War,” Journal of American
History 72 (December 1985): 529–559.
9
Orthodox Augustinian Christianity, as followed by the liturgicals, is
“a-millennialist,” i.e., it believes that the “millennium” is simply a metaphor
for the emergence of the Christian Church and that Jesus will return without
human aid and at his own unspecified time. Modern “fundamentalists,”
as they have been called since the early years of the twentieth century, are
“premillennialists,” i.e., they believe that Jesus will return to usher in a thousand
years of the Kingdom of God on Earth, a time marked by various “tribulations”
and by Armageddon, until history is finally ended. Premillennialists, or
“millennarians,” do not have the statist drive of the postmillennialists; instead,
they tend to focus on predictions and signs of Armageddon and of Jesus’s
advent.
Professor Timberlake neatly sums up this politico-religious

conflict:
Unlike those extremist and apocalyptic sects that re-
jected and withdrew from the world as hopelessly cor-
rupt, and unlike the more conservative churches, such
as the Roman Catholic, Protestant Episcopal, and Lu-
theran, that tended to assume a more relaxed attitude
toward the influence of religion in culture, evangelical
Protestantism sought to overcome the corruption of the
world in a dynamic manner, not only by converting men
to belief in Christ but also by Christianizing the social
order through the power and force of law. According
to this view, the Christian’s duty was to use the secular
power of the state to transform culture so that the com-
munity of the faithful might be kept pure and the work
of saving the unregenerate might be made easier. Thus
the function of law was not simply to restrain evil but to
educate and uplift.10
Both prohibition and progressive reform were pietistic, and
as both movements expanded after 1900 they became increas-
ingly intertwined. The Prohibition Party, once confined—at
least in its platform—to a single issue, became increasingly and
frankly progressive after 1904. The Anti-Saloon League, the
major vehicle for prohibitionist agitation after 1900, was also
markedly devoted to progressive reform. Thus at the League’s
annual convention in 1905, Rev. Howard H. Russell rejoiced
in the growing movement for progressive reform and particularly
hailed Theodore Roosevelt, as that “leader of heroic mould, of
absolute honesty of character and purity of life, that foremost
man of this world. . . .”11 At the Anti-Saloon League’s conven-
tion of 1909, Rev. Purley A. Baker lauded the labor union
10
James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900–
1920 (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 7–8.
11
Quoted in Timberlake, Prohibition, p. 33.
60 War Collectivism
movement as a holy crusade for justice and a square deal. The

League’s 1915 convention, which attracted 10,000 people,
was noted for the same blend of statism, social service, and
combative Christianity that had marked the national convention
of the Progressive Party in 1912.12 And at the League’s June
1916 convention, Bishop Luther B. Wilson stated, without
contradiction, that everyone present would undoubtedly hail
the progressive reforms then being proposed.
During the Progressive years, the Social Gospel became
part of the mainstream of pietist Protestantism. Most of the
evangelical churches created commissions on social service to
promulgate the Social Gospel, and virtually all of the denomi-
nations adopted the Social Creed drawn up in 1912 by the
Commission of the Church and Social Service of the Federal
Council of Churches. The creed called for the abolition of child
labor, the regulation of female labor, the right of labor to orga-
nize (i.e., compulsory collective bargaining), the elimination of
12
The Progressive Party convention was a mighty fusion of all the major
trends in the progressive movement: statist economists, technocrats, social
engineers, social workers, professional pietists, and partners of J.P. Morgan
& Co. Social Gospel leaders Lyman Abbon, the Rev. R. Heber Newton
and the Rev. Washington Gladden, were leading Progressive Party delegates.
The Progressive Party proclaimed itself as the “recrudescence of the religious
spirit in American political life.” Theodore Roosevelt’s acceptance speech was
significantly entitled “A Confession of Faith,” and his words were punctuated
by “amens” and by a continual singing of pietist Christian hymns by the
assembled delegates. They sang “Onward Christian Soldiers,” “The Battle
Hymn of the Republic,” and especially the revivalist hymn, “Follow, Follow,
We Will Follow Jesus,” with the word “Roosevelt” replacing “Jesus” at every
turn. The horrified New York Times summed up the unusual experience by
calling the Progressive grouping “a convention of fanatics.” And it added, “It
was not a convention at all. It was an assemblage of religious enthusiasts. It was
such a convention as Peter the Hermit held. It was a Methodist camp following
done over into political terms.” Cited in John Allen Gable, The Bull Moose
Years: Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party (Port Washington, N.Y.:
Kennikat Press, 1978), p. 75.
poverty, and an “equitable” division of the national product.

And right up there as a matter of social concern was the liquor
problem. The creed maintained that liquor was a grave hin-
drance toward the establishment of the Kingdom of God on
earth, and it advocated the “protection of the individual and
society from the social, economic, and moral waste of the liquor
traffic.13
The Social Gospel leaders were fervent advocates of stat-
ism and of prohibition. These included Rev. Walter Rauschen-
busch and Rev. Charles Stelzle, whose tract Why Prohibition!
(1918) was distributed, after the United States’s entry into
World War I, by the Commission on Temperance of the Federal
Council of Churches to labor leaders, members of Congress,
and important government officials. A particularly important
Social Gospel leader was Rev. Josiah Strong, whose monthly
journal, The Gospel of the Kingdom, was published by Strong’s
American Institute of Social Service. In an article supporting
prohibition in the July 1914 issue, The Gospel of the Kingdom
hailed the progressive spirit that was at last putting an end to
“personal liberty”:
“Personal Liberty” is at last an uncrowned, dethroned
king, with no one to do him reverence. The social con-
sciousness is so far developed and is becoming so auto-
cratic, that institutions and governments must give heed
to its mandate and share their life accordingly. We are no
longer frightened by that ancient bogy—”paternalism in
government.” We affirm boldly, it is the business of gov-
ernment to be just that—Paternal. Nothing human can
be foreign to a true government.14
13
Timberlake, Prohibition, p. 24.
14
Quoted in Timberlake, Prohibition, p. 27. Italics in the article. Or, as the
Rev. Stelzle put it, in Why Prohibition!, “There is no such thing as an absolute
individual right to do any particular thing, or to eat or drink any particular
thing, or to enjoy the association of one’s own family, or even to live, if that
62 War Collectivism
As true crusaders, the pietists were not content to stop with

the stamping out of sin in the United States alone. If American
pietism was convinced that Americans were God’s chosen peo-
ple, destined to establish a Kingdom of God within the United
States, surely the pietists’ religious and moral duty could not
stop there. In a sense, the world was America’s oyster. As Pro-
fessor Timberlake put it, once the Kingdom of God was in the
course of being established in the United States,
it was therefore America’s mission to spread these ide-
als and institutions abroad so that the Kingdom could
be established throughout the world. American Protes-
tants were accordingly not content merely to work for
the kingdom of God in America, but felt compelled to
assist in the reformation of the rest of the world also.15
American entry into World War I provided the fulfillment
of prohibitionist dreams. In the first place, all food production
was placed under the control of Herbert Hoover, Food Admin-
istration czar. But if the US government was to control and
allocate food resources, shall it permit the precious scarce sup-
ply of grain to be siphoned off into the “waste,” if not the sin, of
the manufacture of liquor? Even though less than two percent
of American cereal production went into the manufacture of
alcohol, think of the starving children of the world who might
otherwise be fed. As the progressive weekly the Independent
demagogically phrased it. “Shall the many have food, or the
few have drink?” For the ostensible purpose of “conserving”
grain, Congress wrote an amendment into the Lever Food and
Fuel Control Act of August 10, 1917, that absolutely pro-
hibited the use of foodstuffs, hence grain, in the production
of alcohol. Congress would have added a prohibition on the
thing is in conflict with the law of public necessity.” Quoted in David E. Kyvig,
Repealing National Prohibition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979),
p. 9.
15
Timberlake, Prohibition, pp. 37–38.
manufacture of wine or beer, but President Wilson persuaded

the Anti-Saloon League that he could accomplish the same
goal more slowly and thereby avoid a delaying filibuster by the
wets in Congress. However, Herbert Hoover, a progressive
and a prohibitionist, persuaded Wilson to issue an order, on
December 8, both greatly reducing the alcoholic content of beer
and limiting the amount of foodstuffs that could be used in its
manufacture.16
The prohibitionists were able to use the Lever Act and war
patriotism to good effect. Thus, Mrs. W. E. Lindsey, wife of
the governor of New Mexico, delivered a speech in November
1917 that noted the Lever Act, and declared:
Aside from the long list of awful tragedies following in
the wake of the liquor traffic, the economic waste is too
great to be tolerated at this time. With so many people
of the allied nations near to the door of starvation, it
would be criminal ingratitude for us to continue the
manufacture of whiskey.17
Another rationale for prohibition during the war was the
alleged necessity to protect American soldiers from the dangers
of alcohol to their health, their morals, and their immortal souls.
As a result, in the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917,
Congress provided that dry zones must be established around
every army base, and it was made illegal to sell or even to give
liquor to any member of the military establishment within those
16
See David Burner, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1979), p. 107.
17
James A. Burran, “Prohibition in New Mexico, 1917.” New Mexico
Historical Quarterly 48 (April 1973): 140–141. Mrs. Lindsey of course
showed no concern whatever for the German, allied, and neutral countries of
Europe being subjected to starvation by the British naval blockade. The only
areas of New Mexico that resisted the prohibition crusade in the referendum
in the November 1917 elections were the heavily Hispanic-Catholic districts.
64 War Collectivism
zones, even in one’s private home. Any inebriated servicemen

were subject to courts-martial.
But the most severe thrust toward national prohibition was
the Anti-Saloon League’s proposed eighteenth constitutional
amendment, outlawing the manufacture, sale, transportation,
import or export of all intoxicating liquors. It was passed by
Congress and submitted to the states at the end of December
1917. Wet arguments that prohibition would prove unenforce-
able were met with the usual dry appeal to high principle:
Should laws against murder and robbery he repealed simply
because they cannot be completely enforced? And arguments
that private property would be unjustly confiscated were also
brushed aside with the contention that property injurious to the
health, morals, and safety of the people had always been subject
to confiscation without compensation.
When the Lever Act made a distinction between hard
liquor (forbidden) and beer and wine (limited), the brewing
industry tried to save their skins by cutting themselves loose
from the taint of distilled spirits. “The true relationship with
beer,” insisted the United States Brewers Association, “is with
light wines and soft drinks-not with hard liquors.” The brewers
affirmed their desire to “sever, once for all, the shackles that
bound our wholesome productions to ardent spirits.” But this
craven attitude would do the brewers no good. After all, one of
the major objectives of the drys was to smash the brewers, once
and for all, they whose product was the very embodiment of the
drinking habits of the hated German-American masses, both
Catholic and Lutheran, liturgicals and beer drinkers all. Ger-
man-Americans were now fair game. Were they not all agents
of the satanic Kaiser, bent on conquering the world? Were they
not conscious agents of the dreaded Hun Kultur, out to destroy
American civilization? And were not most brewers German?
And so the Anti-Saloon League thundered that “German
brewers in this country have rendered thousands of men ineffi-
cient and are thus crippling the Republic in its war on Prussian
militarism.” Apparently, the Anti-Saloon League took no heed

of the work of German brewers in Germany, who were presum-
ably performing the estimable service of rendering “Prussian
militarism” helpless. The brewers were accused of being pro-
German, and of subsidizing the press (apparently it was all
right to be pro-English or to subsidize the press if one were
not a brewer). The acme of the accusations came from one
prohibitionist: “We have German enemies,” he warned, “in
this country too. And the worst of all our German enemies, the
most treacherous, the most menacing are Pabst, Schlitz, Blatz,
and Miller.”18
In this sort of atmosphere, the brewers didn’t have a chance,
and the Eighteenth Amendment went to the states, outlawing
all forms of liquor. Since twenty-seven states had already out-
lawed liquor, this meant that only nine more were needed to
ratify this remarkable amendment, which directly involved the
federal constitution in what had always been, at most, a matter
of police power of the states. The thirty-sixth state ratified the
Eighteenth Amendment on January 16, 1919, and by the end
of February all but three states (New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Connecticut) had made liquor unconstitutional as well as
illegal. Technically, the amendment went into force the follow-
ing January, but Congress speeded matters up by passing the
War Prohibition Act of November 11, 1918, which banned
the manufacture of beer and wine after the following May and
outlawed the sale of all intoxicating beverages after June 30,
1919, a ban to continue in effect until the end of demobiliza-
tion. Thus total national prohibition really began on July 1,
1919, with the Eighteenth Amendment taking over six months
later. The constitutional amendment needed a congressional
enforcing act, which Congress supplied with the Volstead (or
National Prohibition) Act, passed over Wilson’s veto at the
end of October 1919.
18
Timberlake, Prohibition, p. 179.
66 War Collectivism
With the battle against Demon Rum won at home, the rest-
less advocates of pietist prohibitionism looked for new lands to
conquer. Today America, tomorrow the world. In June 1919
the triumphant Anti-Saloon League called an international
prohibition conference in Washington and created a World
League Against Alcoholism. World prohibition, after all, was
needed to finish the job of making the world safe for democ-
racy. The prohibitionists’ goals were fervently expressed by
Rev. A.C. Bane at the Anti-Saloon League’s 1917 conven-
tion, when victory in America was already in sight. To a wildly
cheering throng, Bane thundered:
America will “go over the top” in humanity’s greatest
battle [against liquor] and plant the victorious white
standard of Prohibition upon the nation’s loftiest emi-
nence. Then catching sight of the beckoning hand of our
sister nations across the sea, struggling with the same
age-long foe, we will go forth with the spirit of the mis-
sionary and the crusader to help drive the demon of
drink from all civilization. With America leading the
way, with faith in Omnipotent God, and bearing with
patriotic hands our stainless flag, the emblem of civic
purity, we will soon bestow upon mankind the priceless
gift of World Prohibition.19
Fortunately, the prohibitionists found the reluctant world a
tougher nut to crack.
WOMEN AT WAR AND AT THE POLLS

Another direct outgrowth of World War I, coming in tandem
with prohibition but lasting more permanently, was the Nine-
teenth Amendment, submitted by Congress in 1919 and ratified
by the following year, which allowed women to vote. Women’s
19
Quoted in Timberlake, Prohibition, pp. 180–181.
suffrage had long been a movement directly allied with prohibi-

tion. Desperate to combat a demographic trend that seemed
to be going against them, the evangelical pietists called for
women’s suffrage (and enacted it in many Western states).
They did so because they knew that while pietist women were
socially and politically active, ethnic or liturgical women tended
to be culturally bound to hearth and home and therefore far less
likely to vote. Hence, women’s suffrage would greatly increase
pietist voting power. In 1869 the Prohibitionist Party became
the first party to endorse women’s suffrage, which it continued
to do. The Progressive Party was equally enthusiastic about
female suffrage; it was the first major national party to per-
mit women delegates at its conventions. A leading women’s
suffrage organization was the Women’s Christian Temperance
Union, which reached an enormous membership of 300,000
by 1900. And three successive presidents of the major women’s
suffrage group, the National American Woman Suffrage Asso-
ciation—Susan B. Anthony, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, and
Dr. Anna Howard Shaw—all began their activist careers as
prohibitionists. Susan B. Anthony put the issue clearly:
There is an enemy of the homes of this nation and that
enemy is drunkenness. Everyone connected with the
gambling house, the brothel and the saloon works and
votes solidly against the enfranchisement of women,
and, I say, if you believe in chastity, if you believe in
honesty and integrity, then take the necessary steps to
put the ballot in the hands of women.20
For its part, the German-American Alliance of Nebraska sent

out an appeal during the unsuccessful referendum in Novem-
ber 1914 on women suffrage. Written in German, the appeal
20
Quoted in Alan P. Grimes, The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 78.
68 War Collectivism
declared, “Our German women do not want the right to vote,

and since our opponents desire the right of suffrage mainly for
the purpose of saddling the yoke of prohibition on our necks,
we should oppose it with all our might. . . .”21
America’s entry into World War I provided the impetus for
overcoming the substantial opposition to woman suffrage, as a
corollary to the success of prohibition and as a reward for the
vigorous activity by organized women in behalf of the war effort.
To close the loop, much of that activity consisted in stamping
out vice and alcohol as well as instilling “patriotic” education
into the minds of often suspect immigrant groups.
Shortly after the US declaration of war, the Council of
National Defense created an Advisory Committee on Wom-
en’s Defense Work, known as the Woman’s Committee. The
purpose of the committee, writes a celebratory contemporary
account, was “to coordinate the activities and the resources of
the organized and unorganized women of the country, that their
power may be immediately utilized in time of need, and to sup-
ply a new and direct channel of cooperation between women
and governmental department.”22 Chairman of the Woman’s
Committee, working energetically and full time, was the former
president of the National American Woman Suffrage Asso-
ciation, Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, and another leading mem-
ber was the suffrage group’s current chairman and an equally
prominent suffragette, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt.
The Woman’s Committee promptly set up organizations in
cities and states across the country, and on June 19, 1917 con-
vened a conference of over fifty national women’s organizations
to coordinate their efforts. It was at this conference that “the
first definite task was imposed upon American women” by the
Grimes, Puritan Ethic, p. 116.

21
Ida Clyde Clarke, American Women and the World War (New York: D.
22
Appleton and Co., 1918), p. 19.

indefatigable Food Czar, Herbert Hoover.23 Hoover enlisted the

cooperation of the nation’s women in his ambitious campaign
for controlling, restricting, and cartelizing the food industry in
the name of “conservation” and elimination of “waste.” Cele-
brating this coming together of women was one of the Woman’s
Committee members, the Progressive writer and muckraker
Mrs. Ida M. Tarbell. Mrs. Tarbell lauded the “growing con-
sciousness everywhere that this great enterprise for democ-
racy which we are launching [the US entry into the war] is a
national affair, and if an individual or a society is going to do its
bit it must act with and under the government at Washington.”
“Nothing else,” Mrs. Tarbell gushed, “can explain the action of
the women of the country in coming together as they are doing
today under one centralized direction.”24
Mrs. Tarbell’s enthusiasm might have been heightened by
the fact that she was one of the directing rather than the directed.
Herbert Hoover came to the women’s conference with the pro-
posal that each of the women sign and distribute a “food pledge
card” on behalf of food conservation. While support for the
food pledge among the public was narrower than anticipated,
educational efforts to promote the pledge became the basis of
the remainder of the women’s conservation campaign. The
Woman’s Committee appointed Mrs. Tarbell as chairman of
its committee on Food Administration, and she not only tire-
lessly organized the campaign but also wrote many letters and
newspaper and magazine articles on its behalf.
In addition to food control, another important and imme-
diate function of the Woman’s Committee was to attempt to
23
Clarke, American Women, p. 27.
24
Ibid., p. 31. Actually Mrs. Tarbell’s muckraking activities were pretty much
confined to Rockefeller and Standard Oil. She was highly favorable to business
leaders in the Morgan ambit, as witness her laudatory biographies of Judge
Elbert H. Gary, of US Steel (1925) and Owen D. Young of General Electric
(1932).
70 War Collectivism
register every woman in the country for possible volunteer or

paid work in support of the war effort. Every woman aged six-
teen or over was asked to sign and submit a registration card
with all pertinent information, including training, experience,
and the sort of work desired. In that way the government would
know the whereabouts and training of every woman, and gov-
ernment and women could then serve each other best. In many
states, especially Ohio and Illinois, state governments set up
schools to train the registrars. And even though the Woman’s
Committee kept insisting that the registration was completely
voluntary, the state of Louisiana, as Ida Clarke puts it, devel-
oped a “novel and clever” idea to facilitate the program: wom-
en’s registration was made compulsory.
Louisiana’s Governor Ruftin G. Pleasant decreed October
17, 1917 compulsory registration day, and a host of state offi-
cials collaborated in its operation. The State Food Commission
made sure that food pledges were also signed by all, and the
State School Board granted a holiday on October 17 so that
teachers could assist in the compulsory registration, especially
in the rural districts. Six thousand women were officially com-
missioned by the state of Louisiana to conduct the registration,
and they worked in tandem with state Food Conservation offi-
cials and parish Demonstration Agents. In the French areas of
the state, the Catholic priests rendered valuable aid in person-
ally appealing to all their female parishioners to perform their
registration duties. Handbills were circulated in French, house-
to-house canvasses were made, and speeches urging registra-
tion were made by women activists in movie theaters, schools,
churches, and courthouses. We are informed that all responses
were eager and cordial; there is no mention of any resistance.
We are also advised that “even the negroes were quite alive
to the situation, meeting sometimes with the white people and
sometimes at the call of their own pastors.”25
25
Ibid., p. 277, pp. 275–79, p. 58.
Also helping out in women’s registration and food control

was another, smaller, but slightly more sinister women’s organi-
zation that had been launched by Congress as a sort of prewar
wartime group at a large Congress for Constructive Patriotism,
held in Washington, D.C. in late January 1917. This was the
National League for Woman’s Service (NLWS), which estab-
lished a nationwide organization later overshadowed and over-
lapped by the larger Woman’s Committee. The difference was
that the NLWS was set up on quite frankly military lines. Each
local working unit was called a “detachment” under a “detach-
ment commander,” district-wide and state-wide detachments
met in annual “encampments,” and every woman member was
to wear a uniform with an organization badge and insignia. In
particular, “the basis of training for all detachments is standard-
ized, physical drill.”26
A vital part of the Woman’s Committee work was engaging
in “patriotic education.” The government and the Woman’s
Committee recognized that immigrant ethnic women were most
in need of such vital instruction, and so it set up a committee
on education, headed by the energetic Mrs. Carrie Chapman
Catt. Mrs. Catt stated the problem well to the Woman’s Com-
mittee: Millions of people in the United States were unclear on
why we were at war, and why, as Ida Clarke paraphrases Mrs.
Catt there is “the imperative necessity of winning the war if
future generations were to be protected from the menace of an
unscrupulous militarism.”27 Presumably US militarism, being
“scrupulous,” posed no problem.
Apathy and ignorance abounded, Mrs. Catt went on, and
she proposed to mobilize twenty million American women, the
“greatest sentiment makers of any community,” to begin a “vast
educational movement” to get the women “fervently enlisted to
26
Ibid., p. 183.
27
Ibid., p. 103.
72 War Collectivism
push the war to victory as rapidly as possible.” As Mrs. Catt

continued, however, the clarity of war aims she called for really
amounted to pointing out that we were in the war “whether the
nation likes it or does not like it,” and that therefore the “sacri-
fices” needed to win the war “willingly or unwillingly must be
made.” In the end, Mrs. Catt could come up with only one rea-
soned argument for the war, apart from this alleged necessity,
that it must be won to make it “the war to end war.”28
The “patriotic education” campaign of the organized
women was largely to “Americanize” immigrant women by
energetically persuading them (a) to become naturalized
American citizens and (b) to learn “Mother English.” In the
campaign, dubbed “America First,” national unity was pro-
moted through getting immigrants to learn English and trying
to get female immigrants into afternoon or evening English
classes. The organized patriot women were also worried about
preserving the family structure of the immigrants. If the chil-
dren learn English and their parents remain ignorant, chil-
dren will scorn their elders, “parental discipline and control
are dissipated, and the whole family fabric becomes weakened.
Thus one of the great conservative forces in the community
becomes inoperative.” To preserve “maternal control of the
young,” then, “Americanization of the foreign women through
language becomes imperative.” In Erie, Pennsylvania, wom-
en’s clubs appointed “Block Matrons,” whose job it was to
get to know the foreign families of the neighborhood and to
back up school authorities in urging the immigrants to learn
English, and who, in the rather naive words of Ida Clarke,
“become neighbors, friends, and veritable mother confessors
to the foreign women of the block.” One would like to have
heard some comments from recipients of the attentions of the
Block Matrons.
28
Ibid., pp. 104–05.
All in all, as a result of the Americanization campaign, Ida

Clarke concludes, “the organized women of this country can
play an important part in making ours a country with a com-
mon language, a common purpose, a common set of ideals—a
unified America.”29
Neither did the government and its organized women
neglect progressive economic reforms. At the organizing June
1917 conference of the Woman’s Committee, Mrs. Carrie Catt
emphasized that the greatest problem of the war was to assure
that women receive “equal pay for equal work.” The conference
suggested that vigilance committees be established to guard
against the violation of “ethical laws” governing labor and also
that all laws restricting (“protecting”) the labor of women and
children be rigorously enforced. Apparently, there were some
values to which maximizing production for the war effort had to
take second place.
Mrs. Margaret Dreier Robins, president of the National
Women’s Trade Union’s League, hailed the fact that the Wom-
an’s Committee was organizing committees in every state to
protect minimum standards for women and children’s labor in
industry and demanded minimum wages and shorter hours for
women. Mrs. Robins particularly warned that “not only are
unorganized women workers in vast numbers used as under-
bidders in the labor market for lowering industrial standards,
but they are related to those groups in industrial centers of our
country that are least Americanized and most alien to our insti-
tutions and ideals.” And so “Americanization” and carteliza-
tion of female labor went hand in hand.30
29
Ibid., p. 101.
30
Ibid., p. 129. Margaret Dreier Robins and her husband Raymond were
virtually a paradigmatic progressive couple. Raymond was a Florida-born
wanderer and successful gold prospector who underwent a mystical conversion
experience in the Alaska wilds and became a pietist preacher. He moved to
Chicago, where he became a leader in Chicago settlement house work and
74 War Collectivism
SAVING OUR BOYS FROM

ALCOHOL AND VICE
One of organized womanhood’s major contributions to the war
effort was to collaborate in an attempt to save American soldiers
from vice and Demon Rum. In addition to establishing rigorous
dry zones around every military camp in the United States, the
Selective Service Act of May 1917 also outlawed prostitution
in wide zones around the military camps. To enforce these pro-
visions, the War Department had ready at hand a Commission
on Training Camp Activities, an agency soon imitated by the
Department of the Navy. Both commissions were headed by
a man tailor-made for the job, the progressive New York set-
tlement-house worker, municipal political reformer, and former
student and disciple of Woodrow Wilson, Raymond Blaine
Fosdick.
municipal reform. Margaret Dreier and her sister Mary were daughters
of a wealthy and socially prominent New York family who worked for and
financed the emergent National Women’s Trade Union League. Margaret
married Raymond Robins in 1905 and moved to Chicago, soon becoming
longtime president of the league. In Chicago, the Robinses led and organized
progressive political causes for over two decades, becoming top leaders of the
Progressive Party from 1912 to 1916. During the war, Raymond Robins
engaged in considerable diplomatic activity as head of a Red Cross mission
to Russia. On the Robinses, see Allen F. Davis, Spearhead for Reform: The
Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement, 1890–1914 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967).
For more on women’s war work and woman suffrage, see the standard
history of the suffrage movement, Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The
Woman’s Rights Movement in the United States (New York: Atheneum,
1968), pp. 288–89. Interestingly, The National War Labor Board (NWLB)
frankly adopted the concept of “equal pay for equal work in order to limit the
employment of women workers by imposing higher costs on the employer. The
“only check,” affirmed the NWLB, on excessive employment of women “is to
make it no more profitable to employ women than men.” Quoted in Valerie I.
Conner, “‘The Mothers of the Race’ in World War I: The National War Labor
Board and Women in Industry,” Labor History 21 (Winter, 1979–80): 34.
Fosdick’s background, life, and career were paradigmatic

for progressive intellectuals and activists of that era. Fosdick’s
ancestors were Yankees from Massachusetts and Connecticut,
and his great-grandfather pioneered westward in a covered
wagon to become a frontier farmer in the heart of the Burned-
Over District of transplanted Yankees, Buffalo, New York. Fos-
dick’s grandfather, a pietist lay preacher born again in a Baptist
revival, was a prohibitionist who married a preacher’s daughter
and became a lifelong public school teacher in Buffalo. Grand-
father Fosdick rose to become Superintendent of Education in
Buffalo and a battler for an expanded and strengthened public
school system.
Fosdick’s immediate ancestry continued in the same vein.
His father was a public school teacher in Buffalo who rose
to become principal of a high school. His mother was deeply
pietist and a staunch advocate of prohibition and women’s suf-
frage. Fosdick’s father was a devout pietist Protestant and a
“fanatical” Republican who gave his son Raymond the middle
name of his hero, the veteran Maine Republican James G.
Blaine. The three Fosdick children, elder brother Harry Emer-
son, Raymond, and Raymond’s twin sister, Edith, on emerg-
ing from this atmosphere, all forged lifetime careers of pietism
and social service.
While active in New York reform administration, Fosdick
made a fateful friendship. In 1910, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,
like his father a pietist Baptist, was chairman of a special grand
jury to investigate and to try to stamp out prostitution in New
York City. For Rockefeller, the elimination of prostitution was
to become an ardent and lifelong crusade. He believed that
sin, such as prostitution, must be criminated, quarantined, and
driven underground through rigorous suppression.
In 1911, Rockefeller began his crusade by setting up the
Bureau of Social Hygiene, into which he poured $5 million in
the next quarter century. Two years later he enlisted Fosdick,
already a speaker at the annual dinner of Rockefeller’s Baptist
76 War Collectivism
Bible class, to study police systems in Europe in conjunction

with activities to end the great “social vice.” Surveying Ameri-
can police after his stint in Europe at Rockefeller’s behest, Fos-
dick was appalled that police work in the United States was
not considered a “science” and that it was subject to “sordid”
political influences.31
At that point, the new Secretary of War, the progressive
former mayor of Cleveland Newton D. Baker, became dis-
turbed at reports that areas near the army camps in Texas on
the Mexican border, where troops were mobilized to combat the
Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa, were honeycombed with
saloons and prostitution. Sent by Baker on a fact-finding tour
in the summer of 1916, scoffed at by tough army officers as the
“Reverend,” Fosdick was horrified to find saloons and brothels
seemingly everywhere in the vicinity of the military camps. He
reported his consternation to Baker, and, at Fosdick’s sugges-
tion, Baker cracked down on the army commanders and their
lax attitude toward alcohol and vice. But Fosdick was beginning
to get the glimmer of another idea. Couldn’t the suppression of
the bad be accompanied by a positive encouragement of the
good, of wholesome recreational alternatives to sin and liquor
that our boys could enjoy? When war was declared, Baker
quickly appointed Fosdick to be chairman of the Commission
on Training Camp Activities.
Armed with the coercive resources of the federal govern-
ment and rapidly building his bureaucratic empire from merely
one secretary to a staff of thousands, Raymond Fosdick set out
with determination on his twofold task: stamping out alcohol
31
See Raymond B. Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), p. 133. Also see Peter Collier and
David Horowitz, The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty (New York: New
American Library, 1976), pp. 103–05. Fosdick was particularly appalled that
American patrolmen on street duty actually smoked cigars! Fosdick, Chronicle,
p. 135.
and sin in and around every military camp, and filling the void
for American soldiers and sailors by providing them with whole-
some recreation. As head of the Law Enforcement Division
of the Training Camp Commission, Fosdick selected Bascom
Johnson, attorney for the American Social Hygiene Associa-
tion.32 Johnson was commissioned a major, and his staff of forty
aggressive attorneys became second lieutenants.
32
The American Social Hygiene Association, with its influential journal
Social Hygiene, was the major organization in what was known as the “purity
crusade.” The association was launched when the New York physician Dr.
Prince A. Marrow, inspired by the agitation against venereal disease and
in favor of the continence urged by the French syphilographer, Jean-Alfred
Fournier, formed in 1905 the American Society for Sanitary and Moral
Prophylaxis (ASSMP). Soon, the terms proposed by the Chicago branch of
ASSMP, “social hygiene” and “sex hygiene,” became widely used for their
medical and scientific patina, and in 1910 ASSMP changed its name to
the American Federation for Sex Hygiene (AFSH). Finally, in late 1913,
AFSH, an organization of physicians, combined with the National Vigilance
Association (formerly the American Purity Alliance), a group of clergymen
and social workers, to form the all-embracing American Social Hygiene
Association (ASHA).
In this social hygiene movement, the moral and medical went hand in
hand. Thus Dr. Morrow welcomed the new knowledge about venereal disease
because it demonstrated that “punishment for sexual sin” no longer had to be
“reserved for the hereafter.”
The first president of ASHA was the president of Harvard University,
Charles W. Eliot. In his address to the first meeting, Eliot made clear that total
abstinence from alcohol, tobacco, and even spices was part and parcel of the
anti-prostitution and purity crusade.
On physicians, the purity crusade, and the formation of ASHA, see
Ronald Hamowy, “Medicine and the Crimination of Sin: ‘Self-Abuse’ in 19th
Century America,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies I (Summer, 1972):
247–59; James Wunsch, “Prostitution and Public Policy: From Regulation
to Suppression, 1858–1920,” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1976; and
Roland R. Wagner, “Virtue Against Vice: A Study of Moral Reformers and
Prostitution in the Progressive Era,” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin,
1971. On Morrow, also see John C. Burnham. “The Progressive Era
78 War Collectivism
Employing the argument of health and military necessity,

Fosdick set up a Social Hygiene Division of his commission,
which promulgated the slogan “Fit to Fight.” Using a mixture
of force and threats to remove federal troops from the bases if
recalcitrant cities did not comply, Fosdick managed to bludgeon
his way into suppressing, if not prostitution in general, then at
least every major red light district in the country. In doing so,
Fosdick and Baker, employing local police and the federal Mili-
tary Police, far exceeded their legal authority. The law autho-
rized the president to shut down every red light district in a
five-mile zone around each military camp or base. Of the 110
red light districts shut down by military force, however, only 35
were included in the prohibited zone. Suppression of the other
75 was an illegal extension of the law. Nevertheless, Fosdick
was triumphant: “Through the efforts of this Commission [on
Training Camp Activities] the red light district has practically
ceased to be a feature of American city life.”33 The result of this
permanent destruction of the red light district, of course, was
to drive prostitution onto the streets, where consumers would
be deprived of the protection of either an open market or of
regulation.
In some cases, the federal anti-vice crusade met consider-
able resistance. Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels, a progres-
sive from North Carolina, had to call out the marines to patrol
Revolution in American Attitudes Toward Sex,” Journal of American History

59 (March 1973) 899, and Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in
America, 1820–1920 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978),
p. 201. Also see Burnham, “Medical Specialists and Movements Toward
Social Control in the Progressive Era: Three Examples,” in J. Israel, ed.,
Building the Organizational Society: Essays in Associational Activities in
Modem America (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 24–26.
33
In Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort 1917–
1919 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 222. Also see ibid.,
pp. 221–24; and C.H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biography (Cleveland:
World Publishing Co., l96l), pp. 99–102.
the streets of resistant Philadelphia, and naval troops, over the

strenuous objections of the mayor, were used to crush the fabled
red light district of Storyville, in New Orleans, in November
1917.34
In its hubris, the US Army decided to extend its anti-vice
crusade to foreign shores. General John J. Pershing issued an
official bulletin to members of the American Expeditionary
Force in France urging that “sexual continence is the plain duty
of members of the A.E.F., both for the vigorous conduct of the
war, and for the clean health of the American people after the
war.” Pershing and the American military tried to close all the
French brothels in areas where American troops were located,
but the move was unsuccessful because the French objected bit-
terly. Premier Georges Clemenceau pointed out that the result
of the “total prohibition of regulated prostitution in the vicinity
of American troops” was only to increase “venereal diseases
among the civilian population of the neighborhood.” Finally,
the United States had to rest content with declaring French
civilian areas off limits to the troops.35
The more positive part of Raymond Fosdick’s task during
the war was supplying the soldiers and sailors with a construc-
tive substitute for sin and alcohol, “healthful amusements and
34
Fosdick, Chronicle, pp. 145–47. While prostitution was indeed banned
in Storyville after 1917, Storyville, contrary to legend, never “closed”—the
saloons and dance halls remained open, and contrary to orthodox accounts,
jazz was never really shut down in Storyville or New Orleans, and it was
therefore never forced up river. For a revisionist view of the impact of the closure
of Storyville on the history of jazz, see Tom Bethell, George Lewis: A Jazzman
from New Orleans (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 6–7;
and Al Rose, Storyville, New Orleans (Montgomery: University of Alabama
Press, 1974). Also, on later Storyville, see Boyer, Urban Masses, p. 218.
35
See Hamowy, “Crimination of Sin,” p. 226 n. The quote from Clemenceau
is in Fosdick, Chronicle, p. 171. Newton Baker’s loyal biographer declared
that Clemenceau, in this response, showed “his animal proclivities as the ‘Tiger
of France.’“ Cramer, Newton Baker, p. 101.
80 War Collectivism
wholesome company.” As might be expected, the Woman’s

Committee and organized womanhood collaborated enthu-
siastically. They followed the injunction of Secretary of War
Baker that the government “cannot allow these young men to
be surrounded by a vicious and demoralizing environment, nor
can we leave anything undone which will protect them from
unhealthy influences and crude forms of temptation.” The
Woman’s Committee found, however, that in the great under-
taking of safeguarding the health and morals of our boys, their
most challenging problem proved to be guarding the morals of
their mobilized young girls. For unfortunately, “where soldiers
are stationed the problem of preventing girls from being misled
by the glamour and romance of war and beguiling uniforms
looms large.’’ Fortunately, perhaps, the Maryland Committee
proposed the establishment of a “Patriotic League of Honor
which will inspire girls to adopt the highest standards of wom-
anliness and loyalty to their country.”36
No group was more delighted with the achievements of
Fosdick and his Military Training Camp Commission than the
burgeoning profession of social work. Surrounded by hand-
picked aides from the Playground and Recreation Association
and the Russell Sage Foundation, Fosdick and the others “in
effect tried to create a massive settlement house around each
camp. No army had ever seen anything like it before, but it
was an outgrowth of the recreation and community organization
movement, and a victory for those who had been arguing for
36
Clarke, American Women, pp. 90, 87, 93. In some cases, organized women
took the offensive to help stamp out vice and liquor in their community. Thus
in Texas in 1917 the Texas Women’s Anti-Vice Committee led in the creation
of a “White Zone” around all the military bases. By autumn the Committee
expanded into the Texas Social Hygiene Association to coordinate the work
of eradicating prostitution and saloons. San Antonio proved to be its biggest
problem. Lewis L. Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in
the Wilson Era (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), p. 227.
the creative use of leisure time.”37 The social work profession

pronounced the program an enormous success. The influential
Survey magazine summed up the result as “the most stupen-
dous piece of social work in modern times.”38
Social workers were also exultant about prohibition. In
1917, the National Conference of Charities and Corrections
(which changed its name around the same time to the National
Conference of Social Work) was emboldened to drop what-
ever value-free pose it might have had and come out squarely
for prohibition. On returning from Russia in 1917, Edward
T. Devine of the Charity Organization Society of New York
exclaimed that “the social revolution which followed the prohi-
bition of vodka was more profoundly important than the politi-
cal revolution which abolished autocracy.” And Robert A.
Woods of Boston, the Grand Old Man of the settlement house
movement and a veteran advocate of prohibition, predicted in
1919 that the Eighteenth Amendment, “one of the greatest
and best events in history,” would reduce poverty, wipe out
prostitution and crime, and liberate “vast suppressed human
potentialities.”39
37
Davis, Spearheads for Reform, p. 225.
38
Fosdick, Chronicle, p. 144. After the war, Raymond Fosdick went on to
fame and fortune, first as Under Secretary General of the League of Nations,
and then for the rest of his life as a member of the small inner circle close
to John D. Rockefeller, Jr. In that capacity, Fosdick rose to become head of
the Rockefeller Foundation and Rockefeller’s official biographer. Meanwhile,
Fosdick’s brother, Rev. Harry Emerson, became Rockefeller’s hand-picked
parish minister, first at Park Avenue Presbyterian Church and then at the new
interdenominational Riverside Church, built with Rockefeller funds. Harry
Emerson Fosdick was Rockefeller’s principal aide in battling, within the
Protestant Church, in favor of postmillennial, statist, “liberal” Protestantism and
against the rising tide of premillennial Christianity, known as “fundamentalist”
since the years before World War I. See Collier and Horowitz, The Rockefellers,
pp. 140–42, 151–53.
39
Davis, Spearheads for Reform, p. 226; Timberlake, Prohibition, p. 66;
Boyer, Urban Masses, p. 156.
82 War Collectivism
Woods, president of the National Conference of Social

Work during 1917–18, had long denounced alcohol as “an
abominable evil.” A postmillennial pietist, he believed in
“Christian statesmanship” that would, in “propaganda of
the deed,” Christianize the social order in a corporate, com-
munal route to the glorification of God. Like many pietists,
Woods cared not for creeds or dogmas but only for advancing
Christianity in a communal way; though an active Episcopa-
lian, his “parish” was the community at large. In his settlement
work, Woods had long favored the isolation or segregation of
the “unfit,” in particular “the tramp, the drunkard, the pau-
per, the imbecile,” with the settlement house as the nucleus of
this reform. Woods was particularly eager to isolate and punish
the drunkard and the tramp. “Inveterate drunkards” were to
receive increasing levels of “punishment,” with ever-lengthier
jail terms. The “tramp evil” was to be gotten rid of by rounding
up and jailing vagrants, who would be placed in tramp work-
houses and put to forced labor.
For Woods the world war was a momentous event. It had
advanced the process of “Americanization,” a “great human-
izing process through which all loyalties, all beliefs must be
wrought together in a better order.”40 The war had wonder-
fully released the energies of the American people. Now,
however, it was important to carry the wartime momentum
into the postwar world. Lauding the war collectivist soci-
ety during the spring of 1918, Robert Woods asked the cru-
cial question, “Why should it not always be so? Why not
continue in the years of peace this close, vast, wholesome
organism of service, of fellowship, of constructive creative
power?”41
40
Eleanor H. Woods, Robert A. Woods; Champion of Democracy (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1929), p. 316. Also see ibid., pp. 201–02, 250ff., 268ff.
41
Davis, Spearheads for Reform, p. 227.
THE NEW REPUBLIC COLLECTIVISTS

The New Republic magazine, founded in 1914 as the lead-
ing intellectual organ of progressivism, was a living embodi-
ment of the burgeoning alliance between big-business interests,
in particular the House of Morgan, and the growing legion
of collectivist intellectuals. Founder and publisher of the New
Republic was Willard W. Straight, partner of J.P. Morgan &
Co., and its financier was Straight’s wife, the heiress Dorothy
Whitney. Major editor of the influential new weekly was the
veteran collectivist and theoretician of Teddy Roosevelt’s New
Nationalism, Herbert David Croly. Croly’s two coeditors were
Walter Edward Weyl, another theoretician of the New Nation-
alism, and the young, ambitious former official of the Intercol-
legiate Socialist Society, the future pundit Walter Lippmann.
As Woodrow Wilson began to take America into World War I,
the New Republic, though originally Rooseveltian, became an
enthusiastic supporter of the war, and a virtual spokesman for
the Wilson war effort, the wartime collectivist economy, and the
new society molded by the war.
On the higher levels of ratiocination, unquestionably the
leading progressive intellectual, before, during, and after World
War I, was the champion of pragmatism, Professor John Dewey
of Columbia University. Dewey wrote frequently for the New
Republic in this period and was clearly its leading theoretician.
A Yankee born in 1859, Dewey was, as Mencken put it, “of
indestructible Vermont stock and a man of the highest bearable
sobriety.” John Dewey was the son of a small town Vermont
grocer.42 Although he was a pragmatist and a secular humanist
most of his life, it is not as well known that Dewey, in the years
before 1900, was a postmillennial pietist, seeking the gradual
development of a Christianized social order and Kingdom of
42
H.L. Mencken, “Professor Veblen,” in A Mencken Chrestomathy (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 267.
84 War Collectivism
God on earth via the expansion of science, community, and the

State. During the 1890s, Dewey, as professor of philosophy at
the University of Michigan, expounded his vision of postmillen-
nial pietism in a series of lectures before the Students’ Christian
Association. Dewey argued that the growth of modem science
now makes it possible for man to establish the biblical idea of
the Kingdom of God on earth. Once humans had broken free
of the restraints of orthodox Christianity, a truly religious King-
dom of God could be realized in “the common incarnate Life,
the purpose animating all men and binding them together into
one harmonious whole of sympathy.”43
Religion would thus work in tandem with science and
democracy, all of which would break down the barriers between
men and establish the Kingdom. After 1900 it was easy for
John Dewey, along with most other postmillennial intellectuals
of the period, to shift gradually but decisively from postmillen-
nial progressive Christian statism to progressive secular statism.
The path, the expansion of statism and “social control” and
planning, remained the same. And even though the Christian
creed dropped out of the picture, the intellectuals and activists
continued to possess the same evangelical zeal for the salvation
of the world that their parents and they themselves had once
possessed. The world would and must still be saved through
progress and statism.44
43
Quoted in the important article by Jean B. Quandt, “Religion and Social
Thought: The Secularization of Postmillennialism,” American Quarterly 25
(October 1973): 404. Also see John Blewett, S.J., “Democracy as Religion:
Unity in Human Relations,” in Blewett, ed., John Dewey: His Thought and
Influence (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), pp. 33–58; and John
Dewey: The Early Works, 1882–1989, eds., J. Boydstan et al. (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1969–71), vols. 2 and 3.
44
On the general secularization of postmillennial pietism after 1900, see
Quandt, “Religion and Social Thought,” pp. 390–409; and James H.
Moorhead, “The Erosion of Postmillennialism in American Religious
Thought, 1865–1925,” Church History 53 (March 1984): 61–77.
A pacifist while in the midst of peace, John Dewey pre-

pared himself to lead the parade for war as America drew
nearer to armed intervention in the European struggle. First, in
January 1916 in the New Republic, Dewey attacked the “pro-
fessional pacifist’s” outright condemnation of war as a “senti-
mental phantasy,” a confusion of means and ends. Force, he
declared, was simply “a means of getting results,” and therefore
would neither be lauded or condemned per se. Next, in April
Dewey signed a pro-Allied manifesto, not only cheering for an
Allied victory but also proclaiming that the Allies were “strug-
gling to preserve the liberties of the world and the highest ideals
of civilization.” And though Dewey supported US entry into
the war so that Germany could be defeated, “a hard job, but
one which had to be done,” he was far more interested in the
wonderful changes that the war would surely bring about in the
domestic American polity. In particular, war offered a golden
opportunity to bring about collectivist social control in the inter-
est of social justice. As one historian put it,
because war demanded paramount commitment to the
national interest and necessitated an unprecedented de-
gree of government planning and economic regulation
in that interest, Dewey saw the prospect of permanent
socialization, permanent replacement of private and
possessive interest by public and social interest, both
within and among nations.45
In an interview with the New York World a few months after
US entry into the war, Dewey exulted that “this war may easily
be the beginning of the end of business.” For out of the needs
of the war, “we are beginning to produce for use, not for sale,
and the capitalist is not a capitalist [in the face of] the war.”
Capitalist conditions of production and sale are now under gov-
45
Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher
Learning in America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975),
p. 92.
86 War Collectivism
ernment control, and “there is no reason to believe that the old

principle will ever be resumed…. Private property had already
lost its sanctity . . . industrial democracy is on the way.”46
In short, intelligence is at last being used to tackle social
problems, and this practice is destroying the old order and cre-
ating a new social order of “democratic integrated control.”
Labor is acquiring more power, science is at last being socially
mobilized, and massive government controls are socializing
industry. These developments, Dewey proclaimed, were pre-
cisely what we are fighting for.47
Furthermore, John Dewey saw great possibilities opened
by the war for the advent of worldwide collectivism. To Dewey,
America’s entrance into the war created a “plastic juncture”
in the world, a world marked by a “world organization and
the beginnings of a public control which crosses nationalis-
tic boundaries and interests,” and which would also “outlaw
war.”48
The editors of the New Republic took a position similar
to Dewey’s, except that they arrived at it even earlier. In his
editorial in the magazine’s first issue in November 1914, Her-
bert Croly cheerily prophesied that the war would stimulate
America’s spirit of nationalism and therefore bring it closer to
46
Quoted in Gruber, Mars and Minerva, pp. 92–93. Also see William E.
Leuchtenburg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,” in J. Braeman, R.
Bremner, and E. Walters, eds., Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century
America (New York: Harper & Row, l966), p. 89. For similar reasons,
Thorstein Veblen, prophet of the alleged dichotomy of production for profit
vs. production for use, championed the war and began to come out openly
for socialism in an article in the New Republic in 1918, later reprinted in his
The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts (1919). See Charles
Hirschfeld, “Nationalist Progressivism and World War I,” Mid-America 45
(July 1963), p. 150. Also see David Riesman, Thorstein Veblen: A Critical
Interpretation (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960), pp. 30–31.
47
Hirschfeld, “Nationalist Progressivism,” p. 150.
48
Gruber, Mars and Minerva, p. 92.
democracy. At first hesitant about the collectivist war econo-

mies in Europe, the New Republic soon began to cheer and
urged the United States to follow the lead of the warring Euro-
pean nations and socialize its economy and expand the powers
of the State.
As America prepared to enter the war, the New Repub-
lic, examining war collectivism in Europe, rejoiced that “on its
administrative side socialism [had] won a victory that [was]
superb and compelling.” True, European war collectivism was
a bit grim and autocratic, but never fear, America could use the
selfsame means for “democratic” goals.
The New Republic intellectuals also delighted in the “war
spirit” in America, for that spirit meant “the substitution of
national and social and organic forces for the more or less
mechanical private forces operative in peace.” The purposes
of war and social reform might be a bit different, but, after
all, “they are both purposes, and luckily for mankind a social
organization which is efficient is as useful for the one as for the
other.”49 Lucky indeed.
As America prepared to enter the war, the New Republic
eagerly looked forward to imminent collectivization, sure that it
would bring “immense gains in national efficiency and happi-
ness.” After war was declared, the magazine urged that the war
be used as “an aggressive tool of democracy.” “Why should not
the war serve,” the magazine asked, “as a pretext to be used to
foist innovations upon the country?” In that way, progressive
intellectuals could lead the way in abolishing “the typical evils
of the sprawling half-educated competitive capitalism.”
Convinced that the United States would attain socialism
through war, Walter Lippmann, in a public address shortly
49
Hirschfeld, “Nationalist Progressivism,” p. 142. It is intriguing that for the
New Republic, intellectuals, actually existent private individuals are dismissed
as “mechanical,” whereas nonexistent entities such as “national and social”
forces are hailed as being “organic.”
88 War Collectivism
after American entry, trumpeted his apocalyptic vision of the

future:
We who have gone to war to insure democracy in the
world will have raised an aspiration here that will not
end with the overthrow of the Prussian autocracy. We
shall turn with fresh interests to our own tyrannies—
to our Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries,
sweatshops, and our slums. A force is loose in America.
Our own reactionaries will not assuage it. We shall
know how to deal with them.50
Walter Lippmann, indeed, had been the foremost hawk
among the New Republic intellectuals. He had pushed Croly
into backing Wilson and into supporting intervention, and then
had collaborated with Colonel House in pushing Wilson into
entering the war. Soon Lippmann, an enthusiast for conscrip-
tion, had to confront the fact that he himself, only twenty-seven
years old and in fine health, was eminently eligible for the
50
Quoted in Hirschfeld, “Nationalist Progressivism,” p. 147. A minority of
pro-war Socialists broke off from the antiwar Socialist Party to form the Social
Democratic League, and to join a pro-war front organized and financed by
the Wilson administration, the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy.
The pro-war socialists welcomed the war as providing “startling progress
in collectivism,” and opined that after the war, the existent state socialism
would be advanced toward “democratic collectivism.” The pro-war socialists
included John Spargo, Algie Simons, W.J. Ghent, Robert R. LaMonte,
Charles Edward Russell, J.G. Phelps Stokes, Upton Sinclair, and William
English Walling. Walling so succumbed to war fever that he denounced the
Socialist Party as a conscious tool of the Kaiser and advocated the suppression
of freedom of speech for pacifists and for antiwar socialists. See Hirschfeld,
“Nationalist Progressivism,” p. 143. On Walling, see James Gilbert, Designing
the Industrial State: The Intellectual Pursuit of Collectivism in America, 1880–
1940 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 232–33. On the American
Alliance for Labor and Democracy and its role in the war effort, see Ronald
Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York:
Random House, l969), pp. 58–71.
draft. Somehow, however, Lippmann failed to unite theory and

praxis.
Young Felix Frankfurter, progressive Harvard Law Profes-
sor and a close associate of the New Republic editorial staff,
had just been selected as a special assistant to Secretary of
War Baker. Lippmann somehow felt that his own inestima-
ble services could be better used planning the postwar world
than battling in the trenches. And so he wrote to Frankfurter
asking for a job in Baker’s office. “What I want to do,” he
pleaded, “is to devote all my time to studying and speculating
on the approaches to peace and the reaction from the peace.
Do you think you can get me an exemption on such highfalutin
grounds?” He then rushed to reassure Frankfurter that there
was nothing “personal” in this request. After all, he explained,
“the things that need to be thought out, are so big that there
must be no personal element mixed up with this.” Frankfurter
having paved the way, Lippmann wrote to Secretary Baker.
He assured Baker that he was only applying for a job and draft
exemption on the pleading of others and in stern submission
to the national interest. As Lippmann put it in a remarkable
demonstration of cant:
I have consulted all the people whose advice I value and
they urge me to apply for exemption. You can well un-
derstand that this is not a pleasant thing to do, and yet,
after searching my soul as candidly as I know how, I am
convinced that I can serve my bit much more effectively
than as a private in the new armies.
No doubt.
As icing on the cake, Lippmann added an important bit of
“disinformation.” For, he piteously wrote to Baker, the fact is
“that my father is dying and my mother is absolutely alone in
the world. She does not know what his condition is, and I can-
not tell anyone for fear it would become known.” Apparently,
no one else “knew” his father’s condition either, including his
90 War Collectivism
father and the medical profession, for the elder Lippmann man-
aged to peg along successfully for the next ten years.51
Secure in his draft exemption, Walter Lippmann hied off in
high excitement to Washington, there to help run the war and, a
few months later, to help direct Colonel House’s secret conclave
of historians and social scientists setting out to plan the shape of
the future peace treaty and the postwar world. Let others fight
and die in the trenches; Walter Lippmann had the satisfaction
of knowing that his talents, at least, would be put to their best
use by the newly emerging collectivist State.
As the war went on, Croly and the other editors, having lost
Lippmann to the great world beyond, cheered every new devel-
opment of the massively controlled war economy. The nation-
alization of railroads and shipping, the priorities and allocation
system, the total domination of all parts of the food industry
achieved by Herbert Hoover and the Food Administration, the
pro-union policy, the high taxes, and the draft were all hailed
by the New Republic as an expansion of democracy’s power
to plan for the general good. As the Armistice ushered in the
postwar world, the New Republic looked back on the handi-
work of the war and found it good: “We revolutionized our
society.” All that remained was to organize a new constitutional
convention to complete the job of reconstructing America.52
51
In fact, Jacob Lippmann was to contract cancer in 1925 and die two years
later. Moreover, Lippmann, before and after Jacob’s death, was supremely
indifferent to his father. Ronald Steel, Walter Lippman and the American
Century (New York: Random House, l981), p. 5, pp. 116–17. On Walter
Lippmann’s enthusiasm for conscription, at least for others, see Beaver, Newton
Baker, pp. 26–27.
52
Hirschfeld, “Nationalist Progressivism,” pp. 148–50. On the New Republic
and the war, and particularly on John Dewey, also see Christopher Lasch, The
New Radicalism in America, 1889–1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type
(New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 181–224, especially pp. 202–04.
On the three New Republic editors, see Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of
Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann and the Progressive Era, 1900–1925
But the revolution had not been fully completed. Despite

the objections of Bernard Baruch and other wartime planners,
the government decided not to make most of the war collectivist
machinery permanent. From then on, the fondest ambition of
Baruch and the others was to make the World War I system a
permanent institution of American life. The most trenchant epi-
taph on the World War I polity was delivered by Rexford Guy
Tugwell, the most frankly collectivist of the Brain Trusters of
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Looking back on “America’s
wartime socialism” in 1927, Tugwell lamented that if only the
war had lasted longer, that great “experiment” could have been
completed: “We were on the verge of having an international
industrial machine when peace broke,” Tugwell mourned.
“Only the Armistice prevented a great experiment in control
of production, control of prices, and control of consumption.”53
Tugwell need not have been troubled; there would soon be
other emergencies, other wars.
At the end of the war, Lippmann was to go on to become
America’s foremost journalistic pundit. Croly, having broken
with the Wilson Administration on the harshness of the Ver-
sailles Treaty, was bereft to find the New Republic no longer
the spokesman for some great political leader. During the late
1920s he was to discover an exemplary national collectivist
leader abroad—in Benito Mussolini.54 That Croly ended his
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). Also see David W. Noble, “The
New Republic and the Idea of Progress, 1914–1920,” Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 38 (December 1951): 387–402. In a book titled The End
of the War (1918), New Republic editor Walter Weyl assured his readers that
“the new economic solidarity once gained, can never again be surrendered.”
Cited in Leuchtenburg. “New Deal,” p. 90.
53
Rexford Guy Tugwell, “America’s War-Time Socialism” The Nation
(1927), pp. 364–65. Quoted in Leuchtenburg, “The New Deal,” pp. 90–
91.
54
In January 1927, Croly wrote a New Republic editorial, “An Apology for
Fascism,” endorsing an accompanying article, “Fascism for the Italians,” written
92 War Collectivism
years as an admirer of Mussolini comes as no surprise when

we realize that from early childhood he had been steeped by a
doting father in the authoritarian socialist doctrines of Auguste
Comte’s Positivism. These views were to mark Croly through-
out his life. Thus, Herbert’s father, David, the founder of Posi-
tivism in the United States, advocated the establishment of vast
powers of government over everyone’s life. David Croly favored
the growth of trusts and monopolies as a means both to that end
and also to eliminate the evils of individual competition and
“selfishness.” Like his son, David Croly railed at the Jefferso-
nian “fear of government” in America, and looked to Hamilton
as an example to counter that trend.55
by the distinguished philosopher Horace M. Kallen, a disciple of John Dewey

and an exponent of progressive pragmatism. Kallen praised Mussolini for his
pragmatic approach, and in particular for the élan vital that Mussolini had
infused into Italian life. True, Professor Kallen conceded, fascism is coercive, but
surely this is only a temporary expedient. Noting fascism’s excellent achievement
in economics, education, and administrative reform, Kallen added that “in this
respect the Fascist revolution is not unlike the Communist revolution. Each is
the application by force . . . of an ideology to a condition. Each should have
the freest opportunity once it has made a start. . . .” The accompanying New
Republic editorial endorsed Kallen’s thesis and added that “alien critics should
beware of outlawing a political experiment which aroused in a whole nation
an increased moral energy and dignified its activities by subordinating them to
a deeply felt common purpose.” New Republic 49 (January 12, 1927), pp.
207–13. Cited in John Patrick Diggins, “Mussolini’s Italy: The View from
America,” Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1964, pp. 214–17.
55
Born in Ireland, David Croly became a distinguished journalist in New York
City and rose to the editorship of the New York World. Croly organized the first
Positivist Circle in the United States and financed an American speaking tour
for the Comtian Henry Edgar. The Positivist Circle met at Croly’s home, and
in 1871 David Croly published A Positivist Primer. When Herbert was born in
1869, he was consecrated by his father to the Goddess Humanity, the symbol
of Comte’s Religion of Humanity. See the illuminating recent biography of
Herbert by David W. Levy, Herbert Croly of the New Republic (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1985).
And what of Professor Dewey, the doyen of the pacifist

intellectuals—turned drumbeaters for war? In a little known
period of his life, John Dewey spent the immediate postwar
years, 1919–21, teaching at Peking University and traveling
in the Far East. China was then in a period of turmoil over the
clauses of the Versailles Treaty that transferred the rights of
dominance in Shantung from Germany to Japan. Japan had
been promised this reward by the British and French in secret
treaties in return for entering the war against Germany.
The Wilson Administration was torn between the two
camps. On the one hand were those who wished to stand by
the Allies’ decision and who envisioned using Japan as a club
against Bolshevik Russia in Asia. On the other were those who
had already begun to sound the alarm about a Japanese menace
and who were committed to China, often because of connec-
tions with the American Protestant missionaries who wished to
defend and expand their extraterritorial powers of governance
in China. The Wilson Administration, which had originally
taken a pro-Chinese stand, reversed itself in the spring of 1919
and endorsed the Versailles provisions.
Into this complex situation John Dewey plunged, seeing no
complexity and of course considering it unthinkable for either
him or the United States to stay out of the entire fray. Dewey
leaped into total support of the Chinese nationalist position,
hailing the aggressive Young China movement and even endors-
ing the pro-missionary YMCA in China as “social workers.”
Dewey thundered that while “I didn’t expect to be a jingo,”
that Japan must be called to account and that Japan is the great
menace in Asia. Thus, scarcely had Dewey ceased being a
champion of one terrible world war than he began to pave the
way for an even greater one.56
56
See Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China,
1905–1921 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).
94 War Collectivism
ECONOMICS IN SERVICE OF THE STATE:

THE EMPIRICISM OF RICHARD T. ELY
World War I was the apotheosis of the growing notion of intel-
lectuals as servants of the State and junior partners in State
rule. In the new fusion of intellectuals and State, each was of
powerful aid to the other. Intellectuals could serve the State by
apologizing for and supplying rationales for its deeds. Intellec-
tuals were also needed to staff important positions as planners
and controllers of the society and economy. The State could also
serve intellectuals by restricting entry into, and thereby raising
the income and the prestige of, the various occupations and
professions. During World War I, historians were of particular
importance in supplying the government with war propaganda,
convincing the public of the unique evil of Germans throughout
history and of the satanic designs of the Kaiser. Economists,
particularly empirical economists and statisticians, were of great
importance in the planning and control of the nation’s wartime
economy. Historians playing preeminent roles in the war propa-
ganda machine have been studied fairly extensively; economists
and statisticians, playing a less blatant and allegedly “value-
free” role, have received far less attention.57
Although it is an outworn generalization to say that nine-
teenth century economists were stalwart champions of laissez
faire, it is still true that deductive economic theory proved to be
57
For a refreshingly acidulous portrayal of the actions of the historians in
World War I, see C. Hartley Grattan, “The Historians Cut Loose,” American
Mercury, August 1927, reprinted in Haw Elmer Barnes, In Quest of Truth and
Justice, 2nd ed. (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1972), pp.
142–64. A more extended account is George T. Blakey, Historians on the
Homefront: American Propagandists for the Great War (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1970). Gruber, Mars and Minerva, deals with academia
and social scientism, but concentrates an historians. James R. Mock and Cedric
Larson, Words that Won the War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1939), presents the story of the “Creel Committee,” the Committee on Public
Information, the official propaganda ministry during the war.
a mighty bulwark against government intervention. For, basi-

cally, economic theory showed the harmony and order inherent
in the free market, as well as the counterproductive distortions
and economic shackles imposed by state intervention. In order
for statism to dominate the economics profession, then, it was
important to discredit deductive theory. One of the most impor-
tant ways of doing so was to advance the notion that, to be “gen-
uinely scientific,” economics had to eschew generalization and
deductive laws and simply engage in empirical inquiry into the
facts of history and historical institutions, hoping that somehow
laws would eventually arise from these detailed investigations.
Thus the German Historical School, which managed to
seize control of the economics discipline in Germany, fiercely
proclaimed not only its devotion to statism and government
control, but also its opposition to the “abstract” deductive laws
of political economy. This was the first major group within the
economics profession to champion what Ludwig von Mises was
later to call “anti-economics.” Gustav Schmoller, the leader of
the Historical School, proudly declared that his and his col-
leagues’ major task at the University of Berlin was to form “the
intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohenzollern.”
During the 1880s and 1890s bright young graduate stu-
dents in history and the social sciences went to Germany, the
home of the Ph.D. degree, to obtain their doctorates. Almost
to a man, they returned to the United States to teach in col-
leges and in the newly created graduate schools, imbued with
the excitement of the “new” economics and political science. It
was a “new” social science that lauded the German and Bis-
marckian development of a powerful welfare-warfare State, a
State seemingly above all social classes, that fused the nation
into an integrated and allegedly harmonious whole. The new
society and polity was to be run by a powerful central govern-
ment, cartelizing, dictating, arbitrating, and controlling, thereby
eliminating competitive laissez-faire capitalism on the one hand
and the threat of proletarian socialism on the other. And at or
96 War Collectivism
near the head of the new dispensation was to be the new breed
of intellectuals, technocrats, and planners, directing, staffing,
propagandizing, and “selflessly” promoting the common good
while ruling and lording over the rest of society. In short, doing
well by doing good. To the new breed of progressive and statist
intellectuals in America, this was a heady vision indeed.
Richard T. Ely, virtually the founder of this new breed, was
the leading progressive economist and also the teacher of most
of the others. As an ardent postmillennialist pietist, Ely was
convinced that he was serving God and Christ as well. Like
so many pietists, Ely was born (in 1854) of solid Yankee and
old Puritan stock, again in the midst of the fanatical Burned-
Over District of western New York. Ely’s father, Ezra, was an
extreme Sabbatarian, preventing his family from playing games
or reading books on Sunday, and so ardent a prohibitionist
that, even though an impoverished, marginal farmer, he refused
to grow barley, a crop uniquely suitable to his soil, because it
would have been used to make that monstrously sinful prod-
uct, beer.58 Having been graduated from Columbia College in
1876, Ely went to Germany and received his Ph.D. from Hei-
delberg in 1879. In several decades of teaching at Johns Hop-
kins and then at Wisconsin, the energetic and empire-building
Ely became enormously influential in American thought and
politics. At Johns Hopkins he turned out a gallery of influ-
ential students and statist disciples in all fields of the social
sciences as well as economics. These disciples were headed by
the pro-union institutionalist economist John R. Commons,
and included the social-control sociologists Edward Alsworth
Ross and Albion W. Small; John H. Finlay, President of City
College of New York; Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of
Reviews and influential adviser and theoretician to Theodore
58
See the useful biography of Ely, Benjamin G. Rader, The Academic Mind
and Reform: The Influence of Richard T. Ely in American Life (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1966).
Roosevelt; the municipal reformer Frederick C. Howe; and the

historians Frederick Jackson Turner and J. Franklin Jameson.
Newton D. Baker was trained by Ely at Hopkins, and Wood-
row Wilson was also his student there, although there is no
direct evidence of intellectual influence.
In the mid-1880s Richard Ely founded the American Eco-
nomic Association in a conscious attempt to commit the econom-
ics profession to statism as against the older laissez-faire econo-
mists grouped in the Political Economy Club. Ely continued as
secretary-treasurer of the AEA for seven years, until his reformer
allies decided to weaken the association’s commitment to statism
in order to induce the laissez-faire economists to join the organi-
zation. At that point, Ely, in high dudgeon, left the AEA.
At Wisconsin in 1892, Ely formed a new School of Eco-
nomics, Political Science, and History, surrounded himself with
former students, and gave birth to the Wisconsin Idea which,
with the help of John Commons, succeeded in passing a host of
progressive measures for government regulation in Wisconsin.
Ely and the others formed an unofficial but powerful brain trust
for the progressive regime of Wisconsin Governor Robert M.
La Follette, who got his start in Wisconsin politics as an advo-
cate of prohibition. Though never a classroom student of Ely’s,
La Follette always referred to Ely as his teacher and as the
molder of the Wisconsin Idea. And Theodore Roosevelt once
declared that Ely “first introduced me to radicalism in econom-
ics and then made me sane in my radicalism.”59
Ely was also one of the most prominent postmillennialist
intellectuals of the era. He fervently believed that the State
is God’s chosen instrument for reforming and Christianizing
the social order so that eventually Jesus would arrive and put
an end to history. The State, declared Ely, “is religious in its
59
Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict
in American Thought 1865–1901 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1956), pp. 239–40.
98 War Collectivism
essence,” and, furthermore, “God works through the State in

carrying out His purposes more universally than through any
other institution.” The task of the church is to guide the State
and utilize it in these needed reforms.60
An inveterate activist and organizer, Ely was prominent in
the evangelical Chautauqua movement, and he founded there
the “Christian Sociology” summer school, which infused the
influential Chautauqua operation with the concepts and the
personnel of the Social Gospel movement. Ely was a friend
and close associate of Social Gospel leaders Revs. Washing-
ton Gladden, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Josiah Strong. With
Strong and Commons, Ely organized the Institute of Chris-
tian Sociology.61 Ely also founded and became the secretary
of the Christian Social Union of the Episcopal Church, along
with Christian Socialist W.D.P. Bliss. All of these activities
were infused with postmillennial statism. Thus, the Institute of
Christian Sociology was pledged to present God’s “kingdom
as the complete ideal of human society to be realized on earth.”
Moreover,
Ely viewed the state as the greatest redemptive force in
society. In Ely’s eyes, government was the God-given
60
Fine, Laissez Faire, pp. 180–181.
61
John Rogers Commons was of old Yankee stock, descendant of John Rogers,
Puritan martyr in England, and born in the Yankee area of the Western
Reserve in Ohio and reared in Indiana. His Vermont mother was a graduate
of the hotbed of pietism, Oberlin College, and she sent John to Oberlin in
the hopes that he would become a minister. While in college, Commons and
his mother launched a prohibitionist publication at the request of the Anti-
Saloon League. After graduation, Commons went to Johns Hopkins to study
under Ely, but flunked out of graduate school. See John R. Commons, Myself
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). Also see Joseph Dorfman,
The Economic Mind in American Civilization (New York: Viking, 1949),
vol. 3, pp. 276–77; Mary O. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in
the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905 (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1975), pp. 198–204.
instrument through which we had to work. Its preemi-

nence as a divine instrument was based on the post-Ref-
ormation abolition of the division between the sacred
and the secular and on the State’s power to implement
ethical solutions to public problems. The same identi-
fication of sacred and secular which took place among
liberal clergy enabled Ely to both divinize the state and
socialize Christianity: he thought of government as
God’s main instrument of redemption. . . .62
When war came, Richard Ely was for some reason (per-
haps because he was in his sixties) left out of the excitement
of war work and economic planning in Washington. He bit-
terly regretted that “I have not had a more active part than I
have had in this greatest war in the world’s history.”63 But Ely
made up for his lack as best he could; virtually from the start
of the European war, he whooped it up for militarism, war, the
“discipline” of conscription, and the suppression of dissent and
“disloyalty” at home. A lifelong militarist, Ely had tried to vol-
unteer for war service in the Spanish-American War, had called
for the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, and was par-
ticularly eager for conscription and for forced labor for “loafers”
during World War I. By 1915 Ely was agitating for immediate
compulsory military service, and the following year he joined
the ardently pro-war and heavily big business–influenced
National Security League, where he called for the liberation
of the German people from “autocracy.”64 In advocating con-
62
Quandt, “Religion and Social Thought,” pp. 402–03. Ely did not expect
the millennial Kingdom to be far off. He believed that it was the task of the
universities and of the social sciences “to teach the complexities of the Christian
duty of brotherhood in order to arrive at the New Jerusalem “which we are all
eagerly awaiting.” The church’s mission was to attack every evil institution,
“until the earth becomes a new earth, and all its cities, cities of God.”
63
64
See Rader, Academic Mind, pp. 181–91. On top big business affiliations
of National Security League leaders, especially J.P. Morgan and others in the
100 War Collectivism
scription, Ely was neatly able to combine moral, economic, and

prohibitionist arguments for the draft: “The moral effect of tak-
ing boys off street corners and out of saloons and drilling them
is excellent, and the economic effects are likewise beneficial.”65
Indeed, conscription for Ely served almost as a panacea for all
ills. So enthusiastic was he about the World War I experience
that Ely again prescribed his favorite cure-all to alleviate the
1929 depression. He proposed a permanent peacetime “indus-
trial army” engaged in public works and manned by conscript-
ing youth for strenuous physical labor. This conscription would
instill into America’s youth the essential “military ideals of har-
dihood and discipline,” a discipline once provided by life on
the farm but unavailable to the bulk of the populace now grow-
ing up in the effete cities. This small, standing conscript army
could then speedily absorb the unemployed during depressions.
Under the command of “an economic general staff,” the indus-
trial army would “go to work to relieve distress with all the
vigor and resources of brain and brawn that we employed in the
World War.”66
Morgan ambit, see C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought (New York Vanguard
Press, 1929) pp. 117–18, and Robert D. Ward, “The Origin and Activities
of the National Security League, 1914–1919,” Mississippi Valley Historical
Review 47 (June 1960): 51–65.
65
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States spelled out the long-run
economic benefit of conscription, that for America’s youth it would “substitute a
period of helpful discipline for a period of demoralizing freedom from restraint.”
John Patrick Finnegan, Against the Specter of Dragon: The Campaign for
American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1974), p. 110. On the broad and enthusiastic support given to the draft
by the Chamber of Commerce, see Chase C. Mooney and Martha E. Layman,
“Some Phases of the Compulsory Military Training Movement, 1914–1920,”
Mississippi Historical Review 38 (March 1952): 640.
66
Richard T. Ely, Hard Times: The Way in and the Way Out (1931), cited
in Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization (New York:
Viking, 1949). vol. 5, p. 671; and in Leuchtenburg, “The New Deal,” p. 94.
Deprived of a position in Washington, Ely made the stamp-

ing out of “disloyalty” at home his major contribution to the
war effort. He called for the total suspension of academic free-
dom for the duration. Any professor, he declared, who stated
“opinions which hinder us in this awful struggle” should be
“fired” if not indeed “shot.” The particular focus of Ely’s for-
midable energy was a zealous campaign to try to get his old ally
in Wisconsin politics, Robert M. La Follette, expelled from the
US Senate for continuing to oppose America’s participation
in the war. Ely declared that his “blood boils” at La Follette’s
“treason” and attacks on war profiteering. Throwing himself
into the battle, Ely founded and became president of the Madi-
son chapter of the Wisconsin Loyalty Legion and mounted a
campaign to expel La Follette.67 The campaign was meant to
mobilize the Wisconsin faculty and to support the ultrapatriotic
and ultrahawkish activities of Theodore Roosevelt. Ely wrote
to TR that “we must crush La Follettism.” In his unremitting
campaign against the Wisconsin Senator, Ely thundered that
La Follette “has been of more help to the Kaiser than a quarter
of a million troops.”68 “Empiricism” rampant.
The faculty of the University of Wisconsin was stung by
charges throughout the state and the country that its failure to
denounce La Follette was proof that the university—long affili-
ated with La Follette in state politics—supported his disloyal
antiwar policies. Prodded by Ely, Commons, and others, the
university’s War Committee drew up and circulated a petition,
signed by the university president, all the deans, and over 90
percent of the faculty, that provided one of the more striking
67
Ely drew up a super-patriotic pledge for the Madison chapter of the Loyalty
Legion, pledging its members to “stamp out disloyalty.” The pledge also
expressed unqualified support for the Espionage Act and vowed to “work
against La Follettism in all its anti-war forms.” Rader, Academic Mind, pp.
183ff.
68
examples in United States history of academic truckling to the

State apparatus. None too subtly using the constitutional ver-
biage for treason, the petition protested “against those utter-
ances and actions of Senator La Follette which have given aid
and comfort to Germany and her allies in the present war; we
deplore his failure loyally to support the government in the
prosecution of the war.”69
Behind the scenes, Ely tried his best to mobilize America’s
historians against La Follette, to demonstrate that he had given
aid and comfort to the enemy. Ely was able to enlist the services
of the National Board of Historical Service, the propaganda
agency established by professional historians for the duration
of the war, and of the government’s own propaganda arm, the
Committee on Public Information. Warning that the effort must
remain secret, Ely mobilized historians under the aegis of these
organizations to research German and Austrian newspapers
and journals to try to build a record of La Follette’s alleged
influence, “indicating the encouragement he has given Ger-
many.” The historian E. Merton Coulter revealed the objective
spirit animating these researches: “I understand it is to be an
unbiased and candid account of the Senator’s [La Follette’s]
course and its effect—but we all know it can lead but to one
conclusion—something little short of treason.”70
Professor Gruber well notes that this campaign to get La
Follette was “a remarkable example of the uses of scholarship
for espionage. It was a far cry from the disinterested search
for truth for a group of professors to mobilize a secret research
campaign to find ammunition to destroy the political career of
a United States senator who did not share their view of the
war.”71 In any event, no evidence was turned up, the movement
69
Ibid., p. 207.
70
Ibid., pp. 208, 208n.
71
Ibid., pp. 209–10. In his autobiography, written in 1938, Richard Ely rewrote
history to cover up his ignominious role in the get–La Follette campaign. He
failed, and the Wisconsin professoriat began to move away in

distrust from the Loyalty Legion.72
After the menace of the Kaiser had been extirpated, the
Armistice found Professor Ely, along with his compatriots in
the National Security League, ready to segue into the next
round of patriotic repression. During Ely’s anti–La Follette
research campaign he had urged investigation of “the kind of
influence which he [La Follette] has exerted against our country
in Russia.” Ely pointed out that modem “democracy” requires
a “high degree of conformity” and that therefore the “most seri-
ous menace” of Bolshevism, which Ely depicted as “social dis-
ease germs,” must be fought “with repressive measures.”
By 1924, however, Richard T. Ely’s career of repression
was over, and what is more, in a rare instance of the workings of
poetic justice, he was hoisted with his own petard. In 1922 the
much-traduced Robert La Follette was reelected to the Senate
and also swept the Progressives back into power in the state of
Wisconsin. By 1924 the Progressives had gained control of the
Board of Regents, and they moved to cut off the water of their
former academic ally and empire-builder. Ely then felt it pru-
dent to move out of Wisconsin together with his Institute, and
while he lingered for some years at Northwestern, the heyday of
Ely’s fame and fortune was over.
acknowledged signing the faculty petition, but then had the temerity to claim
that he “was not one of the ring-leaders, as La Follette thought, in circulating
this petition. . . .” There is no mention of his secret research campaign against
La Follette.
72
For more an the anti–La Follette campaign, see H.C. Peterson and Gilbert
C. Fite, Opponents of War: 1917–1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1957), pp. 68–72; Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of
Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), p. 120;
and Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, Robert M. LaFollette (New
York: Macmillan, 1953), vol. 2.
ECONOMICS IN SERVICE OF THE STATE:

GOVERNMENT AND STATISTICS
Statistics is a vital, though much underplayed, requisite of mod-
ern government. Government could not even presume to con-
trol, regulate, or plan any portion of the economy without the
service of its statistical bureaus and agencies. Deprive govern-
ment of its statistics and it would be a blind and helpless giant,
with no idea whatever of what to do or where to do it.
It might be replied that business firms, too, need statistics
in order to function. But business needs for statistics are far
less in quantity and also different in quality. Business may need
statistics in its own micro area of the economy, but only on its
prices and costs; it has little need for broad collections of data or
for sweeping, holistic aggregates. Business could perhaps rely
on its own privately collected and unshared data. Furthermore,
much entrepreneurial knowledge is qualitative, not enshrined in
quantitative data, and of a particular time, area, and location.
But government bureaucracy could do nothing if forced to be
confined to qualitative data. Deprived of profit and loss tests
for efficiency, or of the need to serve consumers efficiently, con-
scripting both capital and operating costs from taxpayers, and
forced to abide by fixed, bureaucratic rules, modern govern-
ment shorn of masses of statistics could do virtually nothing.73
Hence the enormous importance of World War I, not only
in providing the power and the precedent for a collectivized
economy, but also in greatly accelerating the advent of statis-
ticians and statistical agencies of government, many of which
73
Thus, T.W. Hutchison, from a very different perspective, notes the contrast
between Carl Menger’s stress on the beneficent, unplanned phenomena of
society, such as the free market, and the growth of “social self-consciousness”
and government planning. Hutchison recognizes that a crucial component
of that social self-consciousness is government statistics. T.W. Hutchison,
A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870–1929 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1953), pp. 150–51, 427.
(and who) remained in government, ready for the next leap

forward of power.
Richard T. Ely, of course, championed the new empiri-
cal “look and see” approach, with the aim of fact-gathering
to “mold the forces at work in society and to improve existing
conditions.”74 More importantly, one of the leading authorities
on the growth of government expenditure has linked it with sta-
tistics and empirical data: “Advance in economic science and
statistics strengthened belief in the possibilities of dealing with
social problems by collective action. It made for increase in the
statistical and other fact-finding activities of government.”75 As
early as 1863, Samuel B. Ruggles, American delegate to the
International Statistical Congress in Berlin, proclaimed that
“statistics are the very eyes of the statesman, enabling him to
survey and scan with clear and comprehensive vision the whole
structure and economy of the body politic.”76
74
Fine, Laissez-Faire, p. 207.
75
Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the United States
since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), p. 143.
Similarly, an authoritative work on the growth of government in England puts it
this way: “The accumulation of factual information about social conditions and
the development of economics and the social sciences increased the pressure
for government intervention. . . . As statistics improved and students of social
conditions multiplied, the continued existence of such conditions was kept
before the public. Increasing knowledge of them aroused influential circles and
furnished working class movements with factual weapons.” Moses Abramovitz
and Vera F. Eliasberg, The Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain
(Princeton: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957), pp. 22–23, 30.
Also see M.I. Cullen, The Statistical Movement in Early Victorian Britain:
The Foundations of Empirical Social Research (New York: Barnes & Noble,
1975).
76
See Joseph Dorfman, “The Role of the German Historical School in
American Economic Thought.” American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings 45 (May 1955), p. 18. George Hildebrand remarked on the
inductive emphasis of the German Historical School that “perhaps there is,
then, some connection between this kind of teaching and the popularity of
Conversely, this means that stripped of these means of

vision, the statesman would no longer be able to meddle, con-
trol and plan.
Moreover, government statistics are clearly needed for spe-
cific types of intervention. Government could not intervene to
alleviate unemployment unless statistics of unemployment were
collected—and so the impetus for such collection. Carroll D.
Wright, one of the first Commissioners of Labor in the United
States, was greatly influenced by the famous statistician and
German Historical School member, Ernst Engel, head of the
Royal Statistical Bureau of Prussia. Wright sought the collec-
tion of unemployment statistics for that reason, and in general,
for “the amelioration of unfortunate industrial and social rela-
tions.” Henry Carter Adams, a former student of Engel’s, and,
like Ely, a statist and progressive “new economist,” established
the Statistical Bureau of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, believing that “ever increasing statistical activity by the
government was essential—for the sake of controlling naturally
monopolistic industries.” And Professor Irving Fisher of Yale,
eager for government to stabilize the price level, conceded that
he wrote The Making of Index Numbers to solve the problem of
the unreliability of index numbers. “Until this difficulty could
be met, stabilization could scarcely be expected to become a
reality.”
Carroll Wright was a Bostonian and a progressive reformer.
Henry Carter Adams, the son of a New England pietist Con-
gregationalist preacher on missionary duty in Iowa, studied for
the ministry at his father’s alma mater, Andover Theological
Seminary, but soon abandoned this path. Adams devised the
accounting system of the Statistical Bureau of the ICC. This
crude ideas of physical planning in more recent times.” George H. Hildebrand,

“International Flow of Economic Ideas-Discussion,” ibid., p. 37.
system “served as a model for the regulation of public utilities

here and throughout the world.”77
Irving Fisher was the son of a Rhode Island Congrega-
tionalist pietist preacher, and his parents were both of old Yan-
kee stock, his mother a strict Sabbatarian. As befitted what his
son and biographer called his “crusading spirit,” Fisher was
an inveterate reformer, urging the imposition of numerous pro-
gressive measures including Esperanto, simplified spelling, and
calendar reform. He was particularly enthusiastic about purg-
ing the world of “such iniquities of civilization as alcohol, tea,
coffee, tobacco, refined sugar, and bleached white flour.”78
During the 1920s Fisher was the leading prophet of that
so-called New Era in economics and in society. He wrote three
books during the 1920s praising the noble experiment of pro-
hibition, and he lauded Governor Benjamin Strong and the
Federal Reserve System for following his advice and expanding
money and credit so as to keep the wholesale price level virtu-
ally constant. Because of the Fed’s success in imposing Fish-
erine price stabilization, Fisher was so sure that there could be
no depression that as late as 1930 he wrote a book claiming
that there was and could be no stock crash and that stock prices
would quickly rebound. Throughout the 1920s Fisher insisted
that since wholesale prices remained constant, there was noth-
ing amiss about the wild boom in stocks. Meanwhile he put
his theories into practice by heavily investing his heiress wife’s
considerable fortune in the stock market. After the crash he
77
Dorfman, “Role,” p. 23. On Wright and Adams, see Joseph Dorfman, The
Economic Mind in American Civilization (New York: Viking Press, 1949),
vol. 3, 164–74, 123; and Boyer, Urban Masses, p. 163. Furthermore, the first
professor of statistics in the United States, Roland P. Falkner, was a devoted
student of Engel’s and a translator of the works of Engel’s assistant, August
Meitzen.
78
Irving Norton Fisher, My Father Irving Fisher (New York: Comet Press,
1956), pp. 146–47. Also for Fisher, see Irving Fisher, Stabilised Money
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 383.
frittered away his sister-in-law’s money when his wife’s fortune

was depleted, at the same time calling frantically on the federal
government to inflate money and credit and to re-inflate stock
prices to their 1929 levels. Despite his dissipation of two fam-
ily fortunes, Fisher managed to blame almost everyone except
himself for the debacle.79
As we shall see, in view of the importance of Wesley Clair
Mitchell in the burgeoning of government statistics in World
War I, Mitchell’s view on statistics are of particular impor-
tance.80 Mitchell, an institutionalist and student of Thorstein
Veblen, was one of the prime founders of modern statistical
inquiry in economics and clearly aspired to lay the basis for
“scientific” government planning. As Professor Dorfman,
friend and student of Mitchell’s, put it:
“clearly the type of social invention most needed today
is one that offers definite techniques through which the
social system can be controlled and operated to the op-
timum advantage of its members.” (Quote from Mitch-
ell.) To this end he constantly sought to extend, improve
and refine the gathering and compilation of data. . . .
Mitchell believed that business-cycle analysis . . . might
79
Fisher, My Father, pp. 264–67. On Fisher’s role and influence during
this period, see Murray N. Rothbard, America’s Great Depression, 4th ed.
(New York: Richardson & Snyder, 1983). Also see Joseph S. Davis, The
World Between the Wars, 1919–39, An Economist’s View (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 194; and Melchior Palyi, The Twilight
of Gold, 1914–1936: Myth and Realities (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972),
pp. 240, 249.
80
Wesley C. Mitchell was of old Yankee pietist stock. His grandparents were
farmers in Maine and then in Western New York. His father followed the path
of many Yankees in migrating to a farm in northern Illinois. Mitchell attended
the University of Chicago, where he was strongly influenced by Veblen and
John Dewey. Dorfman, Economic Mind, vol. 3, p. 456.
indicate the means to the achievement of orderly social

control of business activity.81
Or, as Mitchell’s wife and collaborator stated in her memoirs:
he [Mitchell] envisioned the great contribution that gov-
ernment could make to the understanding of economic
and social problems if the statistical data gathered in-
dependently by various Federal agencies were system-
atized and planned so that the interrelationships among
them could be studied. The idea of developing social
statistics, not merely as a record but as a basis for plan-
ning, emerged early in his own work.82
Particularly important in the expansion of statistics in World
War I was the growing insistence, by progressive intellectuals
and corporate liberal businessmen alike, that democratic deci-
sion-making must be increasingly replaced by the administra-
tive and technocratic. Democratic or legislative decisions were
messy, “inefficient,” and might lead to a significant curbing of
statism, as had happened in the heyday of the Democratic party
during the nineteenth century. But if decisions were largely
administrative and technocratic, the burgeoning of state power
could continue unchecked. The collapse of the laissez-faire
creed of the Democrats in 1896 left a power vacuum in govern-
ment that administrative and corporatist types were eager to fill.
Increasingly, then, such powerful corporatist big business
groups as the National Civic Federation disseminated the idea
that governmental decisions should be in the hands of the effi-
cient technician, the allegedly value-free expert. In short, gov-
ernment, in virtually all of its aspects, should be “taken out of
politics.” And statistical research with its aura of empiricism,
81
Dorfman, Economic Mind, vol. 4, pp. 376, 361.
82
Emphasis added. Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Two Lives (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1953), p. 363. For more on this entire topic, see Murray N.
Rothbard, “The Politics of Political Economists: Comment,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 74 (November 1960): 659–65.
quantitative precision, and nonpolitical value-freedom, was in

the forefront of such emphasis. In the municipalities, an increas-
ingly powerful progressive reform movement shifted decisions
from elections in neighborhood wards to citywide professional
managers and school superintendents. As a corollary, political
power was increasingly shifted from working class and ethnic
German Lutheran and Catholic wards to upper-class pietist
business groups.83
By the time World War I arrived in Europe, a coalition
of progressive intellectuals and corporatist businessmen was
ready to go national in sponsoring allegedly objective statistical
research institutes and think tanks. Their views have been aptly
summed up by David Eakins:
The conclusion being drawn by these people by 1915
was that fact-finding and policymaking had to be iso-
lated from class struggle and freed from political pres-
sure groups. The reforms that would lead to industrial
peace and social order, these experts were coming to
believe, could only be derived from data determined by
objective fact-finders (such as themselves) and under the
auspices of sober and respectable organizations (such as
only they could construct). The capitalist system could
be improved only by a single-minded reliance upon ex-
perts detached from the hurly-burly of democratic pol-
icy-making. The emphasis was upon efficiency—and
democratic policymaking was inefficient. An approach
to the making of national economic and social policy
outside traditional democratic political processes was
83
See in particular James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State,
1900–1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); and Samuel P. Hays, “The
Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era,” Pacific
Northwest Quarterly 59 (October 1961), pp. 157–69.
thus emerging before the United States formally en-

tered World War I.84
Several corporatist businessmen and intellectuals moved at
about the same time toward founding such statistical research
institutes. In 1906–07, Jerome D. Greene, secretary of the
Harvard University Corporation, helped found an elite Tues-
day Evening Club at Harvard to explore important issues in
economics and the social sciences. In 1910 Greene rose to
an even more powerful post as general manager of the new
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, and three years
later Greene became secretary and CEO of the powerful phil-
anthropic organization, the Rockefeller Foundation. Greene
immediately began to move toward establishing a Rockefeller-
funded institute for economic research, and in March 1914
he called an exploratory group together in New York, chaired
by his friend and mentor in economics, the first Dean of the
Harvard Graduate School of Business, Edwin F. Gay. The
developing idea was that Gay would become head of a new,
“scientific” and “impartial” organization, The Institute of Eco-
nomic Research, which would gather statistical facts, and that
Wesley Mitchell would be its director.85
84
David Eakins, “The Origins of Corporate Liberal Policy Research, 1916–
1922: The Political-Economic Expert and the Decline of Public Debate,” in
Israel, ed., Building the Organizational Society, p. 161.
85
Herbert Heaton, Edwin F. Gay, A Scholar in Action (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1952). Edwin Gay was born in Detroit of old New
England stock. His father had been born in Boston and went into his father-
in-law’s lumber business in Michigan. Gay’s mother was the daughter of a
wealthy preacher and lumberman. Gay entered the University of Michigan,
was heavily influenced by the teaching of John Dewey, and then stayed in
graduate school in Germany for over a dozen years, finally obtaining his Ph.D.
in economic history at the University of Berlin. The major German influences
on Gay were Gustav Schmoller, head of the Historical School, who emphasized
that economics must be an “inductive science,” and Adolf Wagner, also at
the University of Berlin, who favored large-scale government intervention in
the economy in behalf of Christian ethics. Back at Harvard, Gay was the
However, opposing advisers to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., won

out over Greene, and the institute plan was scuttled.86 Mitchell
and Gay pressed on, with the lead now taken by Mitchell’s
longtime friend, chief statistician and vice president of AT&T,
Malcolm C. Rorty. Rorty lined up support for the idea from
a number of progressive statisticians and businessmen, includ-
ing Chicago publisher of business books and magazines, Arch
W. Shaw; E.H. Goodwin of the US Chamber of Commerce;
Magnus Alexander, statistician and assistant to the president
of General Electric, like AT&T, a Morgan-oriented concern;
John R. Commons, economist and aide-de-camp to Richard
T. Ely at Wisconsin; and Nahum I. Stone, statistician, former
Marxist, a leader in the “scientific management” movement,
and labor manager for the Hickey Freeman clothing company.
This group was in the process of forming a “Committee on
National Income” when the United States entered the war, and
they were forced to shelve their plans temporarily.87 After the
major single force, in collaboration with the Boston Chamber of Commerce,

in pushing through a factory inspection act in Massachusetts, and in early
1911 Gay became president of the Massachusetts branch of the American
Association for Labor Legislation, an organization founded by Richard T.
Ely and dedicated to agitating for government intervention in the area of labor
unions, minimum wage rates, unemployment, public works, and welfare.
86
On the pulling and hauling among Rockefeller advisers on The Institute
of Economic Research, see David M. Grossman, “American Foundations
and the Support of Economic Research, 1913–29,” Minerva 22 (Spring–
Summer, 1982): 62–72.
87
See Eakins, “Origins,” pp. 166–67; Grossman, “American Foundations,”
pp. 76–78; Heaton, Edwin F. Gay. On Stone, see Dorfman, Economic Mind,
vol. 4, pp. 42, 60–61; and Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific
Management in the Progressive Era 1890–1920 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 152, 165. During his Marxist period, Stone had
translated Marx’s Poverty of Philosophy.
war, however, the group set up the National Bureau of Eco-

nomic Research, in 1920.88
While the National Bureau was not to take final shape until
after the war, another organization, created on similar lines,
successfully won Greene’s and Rockefeller’s support. In 1916
they were persuaded by Raymond B. Fosdick to found the
Institute for Government Research (IGR).89 The IGR was
slightly different in focus from the National Bureau group, as
it grew directly out of municipal progressive reform and the
political science profession. One of the important devices used
by the municipal reformers was the private bureau of municipal
research, which tried to seize decision-making from allegedly
“corrupt” democratic bodies on behalf of efficient, nonpartisan
organizations headed by progressive technocrats and social sci-
entists. In 1910 President William Howard Taft, intrigued with
the potential for centralizing power in a chief executive inherent
in the idea of the executive budget, appointed the “father of
the budget idea,” the political scientist Frederick D. Cleveland,
as head of a Commission on Economy and Efficiency. Cleve-
land was the director of the New York Bureau of Municipal
Research. The Cleveland Commission also included politi-
cal scientist and municipal reformer Frank Goodnow, profes-
sor of public law at Columbia University, first president of the
American Political Science Association and president of Johns
Hopkins; and William Franklin Willoughby, former student
of Ely, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Census, and later
President of the American Association for Labor Legislation.90
The Cleveland Commission was delighted to tell President
88
See Guy Alchon, The Invisible Hand of Planning: Capitalism, Social
Science, and the State in the 1920’s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985), pp. 54ff.
89
Collier and Horowitz, The Rockefellers, p. 140.
90
Eakins, “Origins,” p. 168. Also see Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity, pp.
282–86.
Taft precisely what he wanted to hear. The Commission recom-

mended sweeping administrative changes that would provide
a Bureau of Central Administrative Control to form a “con-
solidated information and statistical arm of the entire national
government.” And at the heart of the new Bureau would be
the Budget Division, which was to develop, at the behest of the
president, and then present “an annual program of business for
the Federal Government to be financed by Congress.”91
When Congress balked at the Cleveland Commission’s rec-
ommendations, the disgruntled technocrats decided to establish
an Institute for Government Research in Washington to battle
for these and similar reforms. With funding secured from the
Rockefeller Foundation, the IGR was chaired by Goodnow,
with Willoughby as its director.92 Then Robert S. Brookings
assumed responsibility for the financing.
When America entered the war, present and future NBER
and IGR leaders were all over Washington, key figures and
statisticians in the collectivized war economy.
91
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of
the National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), pp. 187–88.
92
Vice-chairman of the IGR was retired St. Louis merchant and lumberman
and former president of Washington University of St. Louis, Robert S.
Brookings. Secretary of the IGR was James F. Curtis, formerly Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury under Taft and now secretary and deputy governor
of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Others on the board of the IGR were
ex-President Taft; railroad executive Frederick A. Delano, uncle of Franklin
D. Roosevelt and member of the Federal Reserve Board; Arthur T. Hadley,
economist and president of Yale; Charles C. Van Hise, progressive president
of the University of Wisconsin, and ally of Ely; reformer and influential young
Harvard Law professor, Felix Frankfurter; Theodore N. Vail, chairman of
AT&T; progressive engineer and businessman, Herbert C. Hoover; and
financier R. Fulton Cutting, an officer of the New York Bureau of Municipal
Research. Eakins, “Origins,” pp. 168–69.
By far the most powerful of the growing number of econo-

mists and statisticians involved in World War I was Edwin F.
Gay. Arch W. Shaw, an enthusiast for rigid wartime planning
of economic resources, was made head of the new Commer-
cial Economy Board by the Council for National Defense as
soon as America entered the war.93 Shaw, who had taught at
and served on the administrative board of Harvard Business
School, staffed the board with Harvard Business people; the
secretary was Harvard economist Melvin T. Copeland, and
other members included Dean Gay.
The board, which later became the powerful Conservation
Division of the War Industries Board, focused on restricting
competition in industry by eliminating the number and vari-
ety of products and by imposing compulsory uniformity, all in
the name of “conservation” of resources to aid the war effort.
For example, garment firms had complained loudly of severe
competition because of the number and variety of styles, and
so Gay urged the garment firms to form a trade association to
work with the government in curbing the surfeit of competition.
Gay also tried to organize the bakers so that they would not
follow the usual custom of taking back stale and unsold bread
from retail outlets. By the end of 1917, Gay was tired of using
voluntary persuasion and was urging the government to use
compulsory measures.
Gay’s major power came in early 1918 when the Shipping
Board, which had officially nationalized all ocean shipping,
determined to restrict drastically the use of ships for civilian
trade and to use the bulk of shipping for transport of American
troops to France. Appointed in early January 1918 as merely
a “special expert” by the Shipping Board, Gay in a brief time
became the key figure in redirecting shipping from civilian to
On the Commercial Economy Board, see Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Industrial

93
America in the World War: The Strategy Behind the Line, 1917–1918 (Boston:
Houghton Mifilin, 1923), pp. 211ff.
military use. Soon Edwin Gay had become a member of the

War Trade Board and head of its statistical department, which
issued restrictive licenses for permitted imports; head of the
statistical department of the Shipping Board; representative
of the Shipping Board on the War Trade Board; head of the
statistical committee of the Department of Labor; head of the
Division of Planning and Statistics of the War Industries Board
(WIB); and, above all, head of the new Central Bureau of
Planning and Statistics. The Central Bureau was organized
in the fall of 1918, when President Wilson asked WIB chair-
man Bernard Baruch to produce a monthly survey of all the
government’s war activities. This “conspectus” evolved into
the Central Bureau, responsible directly to the president. The
importance of the bureau is noted by a recent historian:
The new Bureau represented the “peak” statistical
division of the mobilization, becoming its “seer and
prophet” for the duration, coordinating over a thousand
employees engaged in research and, as the agency re-
sponsible for giving the president a concise picture of
the entire economy, becoming the closest approximation
to a “central statistical commission.” During the latter
stages of the war it set up a clearinghouse of statisti-
cal work, organized liaisons with the statistical staff of
all the war boards, and centralized the data production
process for the entire war bureaucracy. By the war’s
end, Wesley Mitchell recalled, “we were in a fair way
to develop for the first time a systematic organization of
federal statistics.”94
Within a year, Edwin Gay had risen from a special expert
to the unquestioned czar of a giant network of federal statisti-
cal agencies, with over a thousand researchers and statisticians
working under his direct control. It is no wonder then that Gay,
94
Alchon, Invisible Hand, p. 29. Mitchell headed the price statistics section of
the Price-Fixing Committee of the War Industries Board.
instead of being enthusiastic about the American victory he had

worked so hard to secure, saw the Armistice as “almost a per-
sonal blow” that plunged him “into the slough of despond.”
All of his empire of statistics and control had just been coming
together and developing into a mighty machine when suddenly
“came that wretched Armistice.”95 Truly a tragedy of peace.
Gay tried valiantly to keep the war machinery going, con-
tinually complaining because many of his aides were leaving
and bitterly denouncing the “hungry pack” who, for some odd
reason, were clamoring for an immediate end to all wartime
controls, including those closest to his heart, foreign trade and
shipping. But one by one, despite the best efforts of Baruch and
many of the wartime planners, the WIB and other war agen-
cies disappeared.96 For a while, Gay pinned his hopes on his
Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics (CBPS), which, in
a fierce bout of bureaucratic infighting, he attempted to make
the key economic and statistical group advising the American
negotiators at the Versailles peace conference, thereby displac-
ing the team of historians and social scientists assembled by
Colonel House in the Inquiry. Despite an official victory, and
an eight volume report of the CBPS delivered to Versailles by
the head of CBPS European team, John Foster Dulles of the
War Trade Board, the bureau had little influence over the final
treaty.97
Peace having finally and irrevocably arrived, Edwin Gay,
backed by Mitchell, tried his best to have the CBPS kept as
a permanent, peacetime organization. Gay argued that the
agency, with himself of course remaining as its head, could
95
Heaton, Edwin Gay, p. 129.
96
See Rothbard, “War Collectivism,” pp. 100–12.
97
See Heaton, Edwin Gay, pp. 129ff.; and the excellent book on the Inquiry,
Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917–
1919 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 166–68, 177–
78.
provide continuing data to the League of Nations, and above

all could serve as the president’s own eyes and ears and mold
the sort of executive budget envisioned by the old Taft Commis-
sion. CBPS staff member and Harvard economist Edmund
E. Day contributed a memorandum outlining specific tasks for
the bureau to aid in demobilization and reconstruction, as well
as rationale for the bureau becoming a permanent part of gov-
ernment. One thing it could do was to make a “continuing
canvass” of business conditions in the United States. As Gay
put it to President Wilson, using a favorite organicist analogy,
a permanent board would serve “as a nervous system to the
vast and complex organization of the government, furnishing to
the controlling brain [the president] the information necessary
for directing the efficient operation of the various members.”98
Although the President was “very cordial” to Gay’s plan,
Congress refused to agree, and on June 30, 1919 the Cen-
tral Bureau of Planning and Statistics was finally terminated,
along with the War Trade Board. Edwin Gay would now have
to seek employment in, if not the private, at least the quasi-
independent, sector.
But Gay and Mitchell were not to be denied. Nor would
the Brookings-Willoughby group. Their objective would be met
more gradually and by slightly different means. Gay became
editor of the New York Evening Post under the aegis of its new
owner and Gay’s friend, J.P. Morgan partner Thomas W.
Lamont. Gay also helped to form and become first president
of the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1920, with
Wesley C. Mitchell as research director. The Institute for Gov-
ernment Research achieved its major objective, establishing a
Budget Bureau in the Treasury Department in 1921, with the
director of the IGR, William F. Willoughby, helping to draft
98
Heaton, Edwin Gay, p. 135. Also see Alchon, Invisible Hand, pp. 35–36.
the bill that established the bureau.99 The IGR people soon
expanded their role to include economics, establishing an Insti-
tute of Economics headed by Robert Brookings and Arthur
T. Hadley of Yale, with economist Harold G. Moulton as
director.100 The institute, funded by the Carnegie Corporation,
would be later merged, along with the IGR, into the Brook-
ings Institution. Edwin Gay also moved into the foreign policy
field by becoming secretary-treasurer and head of the Research
Committee of the new and extremely influential organization,
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).101
And finally, in the field of government statistics, Gay and
Mitchell found a more gradual but longer-range route to power
via collaboration with Herbert Hoover, soon to be Secretary
of Commerce. No sooner had Hoover assumed the post in
early 1921 when he expanded the Advisory Committee on the
Census to include Gay, Mitchell, and other economists and
then launched the monthly Survey of Current Business. The
Survey was designed to supplement the informational activities
of cooperating trade associations and, by supplying business
information, aid these associations in Hoover’s aim of cartel-
izing their respective industries.
99
In 1939 the Bureau of the Budget would be transferred to the Executive
Office, thus completing the IGR objective.
100
Moulton was a professor of economics at the University of Chicago, and vice-
president of the Chicago Association of Commerce. See Eakins, “Origins,”
pp. 172–77; Dorfman, Economic Mind, vol. 4, pp. 11, 195–97.
101
Gay had been recommended to the group by one of its founders, Thomas
W. Lamont. It was Gay’s suggestion that the CFR begin its major project
by establishing an “authoritative” journal, Foreign Affairs. And it was Gay
who selected his Harvard historian colleague Archibald Cary Coolidge as
the first editor and the New York Post reporter Hamilton Fish Armstrong as
assistant editor and executive director of the CFR. See Lawrence H. Shoup
and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations
and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977),
pp. 16–19, 105, 110.
Secrecy in business operations is a crucial weapon of com-

petition, and conversely, publicity and sharing of information
is an important tool of cartels in policing their members. The
Survey of Current Business made available the current pro-
duction, sales, and inventory data supplied by cooperating
industries and technical journals. Hoover also hoped that by
building on these services, eventually “the statistical program
could provide the knowledge and foresight necessary to combat
panic or speculative conditions, prevent the development of dis-
eased industries, and guide decision-making so as to iron out
rather than accentuate the business cycle.”102 In promoting his
cartelization doctrine, Hoover met resistance both from some
businessmen who resisted prying questionnaires and sharing
competitive secrets and from the Justice Department. But, a
formidable empire-builder, Herbert Hoover managed to grab
statistical services from the Treasury Department and to estab-
lish a “waste elimination division” to organize businesses and
trade associations to continue and expand the wartime “conser-
vation” program of compulsory uniformity and restriction of the
number and variety of competitive products. As assistant sec-
retary to head up this program, Hoover secured engineer and
publicist Frederick Feiker, an associate of Arch Shaw’s busi-
ness publication empire. Hoover also found a top assistant and
lifelong disciple in Brigadier General Julius Klein, a protégé
of Edwin Gay’s, who had headed the Latin American divi-
sion of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. As the
new head of the bureau, Klein organized seventeen new export
commodity divisions—reminiscent of commodity sections dur-
ing wartime collectivism—each with “experts” drawn from the
respective industries and each organizing regular cooperation
102
Ellis W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover and Economic Stabilization, 1921–
22,” in E. Hawley, ed., Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce: Studies in
New Era Thought and Practice (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1981),
p. 52.
with parallel industrial advisory committees. And through it all

Herbert Hoover made a series of well-publicized speeches dur-
ing 1921, spelling out how a well-designed government trade
program, as well as a program in the domestic economy, could
act both as a stimulant to recovery and as a permanent “stabi-
lizer,” while avoiding such unfortunate measures as abolishing
tariffs or cutting wage rates. The best weapon, both in foreign
and domestic trade, was to “eliminate waste” by a “cooperative
mobilization” of government and industry.103
A month after the Armistice, the American Economic
Association and the American Statistical Association met
jointly in Richmond, Virginia. The presidential addresses were
delivered by men in the forefront of the exciting new world of
government planning, aided by social science, that seemed to
loom ahead. In his address to the American Statistical Associa-
tion, Wesley Clair Mitchell proclaimed that the war had “led to
the use of statistics, not only as a record of what had happened,
but also as a vital factor in planning what should be done.”
As he had said in his final lecture in Columbia University the
previous spring, the war had shown that when the community
desires to attain a great goal “then within a short period far-
reaching social changes can be achieved.”
“The need for scientific planning of social change,” he
added, “has never been greater, the chance of making those
changes in an intelligent fashion has never been so good.” The
peace will bring new problems, he opined, but “it seems impos-
sible” that the various countries will “attempt to solve them
without utilizing the same sort of centralized directing now
employed to kill their enemies abroad for the new purpose of
reconstructing their own life at home.”
103
Hawley, “Herbert Hoover,” p. 53. Also see ibid., pp. 42–54. On the
continuing collaboration between Hoover, Gay, and Mitchell throughout the
1920s see Alchon, Invisible Hand.
But the careful empiricist and statistician also provided a

caveat. Broad social planning requires “a precise comprehen-
sion of social processes” and that can be provided only by the
patient research of social science. As he had written to his wife
eight years earlier, Mitchell stressed that what is needed for
government intervention and planning is the application of the
methods of physical science and industry, particularly precise
quantitative research and measurement. In contrast to the quan-
titative physical sciences, Mitchell told the assembled statisti-
cians, the social sciences are “immature, speculative, filled with
controversy” and class struggle. But quantitative knowledge
could replace such struggle and conflict by commonly accepted
precise knowledge, “objective” knowledge “amenable to math-
ematical formulation” and “capable of forecasting group phe-
nomena.” A statistician, Mitchell opined, is “either right or
wrong,” and it is easy to demonstrate which. As a result of
precise knowledge of facts, Mitchell envisioned, we can achieve
“intelligent experimenting and detailed planning rather than
agitation and class struggle.”
To achieve these vital goals none other than economists and
statisticians would provide the crucial element, for we would
have to be “relying more and more on trained people to plan
changes for us, to follow them up, to suggest alterations.”104
In a similar vein, the assembled economists in 1918 were
regaled with the visionary presidential address of Yale econ-
omist Irving Fisher. Fisher looked forward to an economic
“world reconstruction” that would provide glorious opportuni-
ties for economists to satisfy their constructive impulses. A class
struggle, Fisher noted, would surely be continuing over distri-
bution of the nation’s wealth. But by devising a mechanism of
“readjustment,” the nation’s economists could occupy an envi-
able role as the independent and impartial arbiters of the class
Alchon, Invisible Hand, pp. 39–42; Dorfman, Economic Mind, vol. 3, p.

104
490.
struggle, these disinterested social scientists making the crucial

decisions for the public good.
In short, both Mitchell and Fisher were, subtly and per-
haps half-consciously, advancing the case for a postwar world
in which their own allegedly impartial and scientific profes-
sions could levitate above the narrow struggles of classes for
the social product, and thus emerge as a commonly accepted,
“objective” new ruling class, a twentieth-century version of the
philosopher-kings.
It might not be amiss to see how these social scientists,
prominent in their own fields and spokesmen in different ways
for the New Era of the 1920s, fared in their disquisitions and
guidance for the society and the economy. Irving Fisher, as we
have seen, wrote several works celebrating the alleged success
of prohibition, and insisted even after 1929, that since the price
level had been kept stable, there could be no depression or stock
market crash. For his part, Mitchell culminated a decade of
snug alliance with Herbert Hoover by directing, along with
Gay and the National Bureau, a massive and hastily written
work on the American economy. Published in 1929 on the
accession of Hoover to the presidency, with all the resources
of scientific and quantitative economics and statistics brought
to bear, there is not so much as a hint in Recent Economic
Changes in the United States that there might be a crash and
depression in the offing.
The Recent Economic Changes study was originated and
organized by Herbert Hoover, and it was Hoover who secured
the financing from the Carnegie Corporation. The object was
to celebrate the years of prosperity presumably produced by
Secretary of Commerce Hoover’s corporatist planning and to
find out how the possibly future President Hoover could main-
tain that prosperity by absorbing its lessons and making them
a permanent part of the American political structure. The
volume duly declared that to maintain the current prosperity,
economists, statisticians, engineers, and enlightened managers
would have to work out “a technique of balance” to be installed

in the economy.
Recent Economic Changes, that monument to “scientific”
and political folly, went through three quick printings and was
widely publicized and warmly received on all sides.105 Edward
Eyre Hunt, Hoover’s long-time aide in organizing his planning
activities, was so enthusiastic that he continued celebrating the
book and its paean to American prosperity throughout 1929
and 1930.106
It is appropriate to end our section on government and
statistics by noting an unsophisticated yet perceptive cry from
the heart. In 1945 the Bureau of Labor Statistics approached
Congress for yet another in a long line of increases in appro-
priations for government statistics. In the process of questioning
Dr. A. Ford Hinrichs, head of the BLS, Representative Frank
B. Keefe, a conservative Republican Congressman from Osh-
kosh, Wisconsin, put an eternal question that has not yet been
fully and satisfactorily answered:
There is no doubt but what it would be nice to have a
whole lot of statistics. I am just wondering whether we
are not embarking on a program that is dangerous when
we keep adding and adding and adding to this thing.
. . . We have been planning and getting statistics ever
105
One exception was the critical review in the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle (May 18, 1929), which derided the impression given the reader
that the capacity of the United States “for continued prosperity is well-nigh
unlimited.” Quoted in Davis, World Between the Wars, p. 144. Also on
Recent Economic Changes and economists’ opinions at the time, see ibid., pp.
136–51, 400–17; David W. Eakins, “The Development of Corporate Liberal
Policy Research in the United States, 1885–1965,” Ph.D. diss., doctoral
dissertation University of Wisconsin, 1966, pp. 166–69, 205; and Edward
Angly, comp., Oh Yeah? (New York: Viking Press, 1931).
106
In 1930, Hunt published a book-length, popularizing summary, An Audit
of America. On Recent Economic Changes, also see Alchon, Invisible Hand,
pp. 129–133, 135–142, 145–151, 213.
since 1932 to try to meet a situation that was domes-

tic in character, but were never able to even meet that
question. Now we are involved in an international ques-
tion. It looks to me as though we spend a tremendous
amount of time with graphs and charts and statistics and
planning. What my people are interested in is what is
it all about? Where are we going, and where are you
going?107
107
Department of Labor—FSA Appropriation Bill for 1945. Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Appropriations. 78th Congress, 2nd Session, Part
I (Washington, 1945), pp. 258f., 276f. Quoted in Rothbard, “Politics of
Political Economists,” p. 665. On the growth of economists and statisticians
in government, especially during wartime, see also Herbert Stein, “The
Washington Economics Industry,” American Economic Association Papers and
Proceedings 76 (May 1986), pp. 2–3.
Index
Adams, Henry Carter, 106 Brookings Institute, 119

Alexander, Magnus, 112 Brookings, Robert S., 15, 21, 43,
American Economic Association, 97 49, 114, 119
American Navy, 10 Bryan, William Jennings, 58
Naval Consulting Board, 10 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 124
See also Committee on Bureau of Social Hygiene, 75
Industrial Preparedness Bush, Samuel P., 48
American Press Association, 11
American Social Hygiene cartelization, 26–34, 38, 120
Association, 77 and trade associations, 38
American Society for Sanitary and during peacetime, 42–43, 45–46
Moral Prophylaxis (ASSMP), through the Industrial Board,
77 48–49
Anthony, Susan B., 67 Catt, Carrie Chapman, 67, 68,
Associated Advertising Clubs of the 71–73
World, 11 Central Bureau of Planning and
Statistics (CBPS), 116–17
Babst, Earl, 28 Chamber of Commerce (U.S.). See
Baker, Newton D., 44, 76, 78, 89, United States
97 Chambers, Edward, 32
Baker, Purley A., 59 citizen volunteers, 25
Bane, A.C., 66 Clarke, Ida, 71–73
Baruch, Bernard, 11, 12, 14, 17, Clarkson, Grosvenor B., 11, 16, 17,
30, 35–37, 41, 43–45, 46, 91, 18–20, 39
116 Clemenceau, Georges, 79
Blaine, James G., 75 Cleveland Commission, 113–14
Bliss, W.D.P., 98 Cleveland, Frederick D., 113
127
Coffin, Howard E., 10–12 Dorfman, Joseph, 108

See also Committee on Industrial Drexel Institute, 12
Preparedness du Pont family, 10, 12
Committee on Industrial Dulles, John Foster, 117
Preparedness (CIP), 10–11
Commons, John R., 96–98, 101, Eakins, David, 110
112 economists and the state, 94–98
competition, 20 deductive economic theory, 94–95
Comte, Auguste, 92 German Historical School, 95,
Postivism of, 92 105
conscription, 55, 99–100 Eliot, Charles W., 77
peacetime “industrial army,” 100 Ely, Richard T., 96–103, 105, 112
Copeland, Melvin T., 115 End of the War, The (Weyl), 91
Coulter, E. Merton, 102 Engel, Ernst, 106
Council of National Defense
(CND), 11–12, 68 fascism, 91–92
Advisory Committee of, 11 Fechner, Robert, 42
on Women’s Defense Work Federal Farm Board (FFB), 36, 38
(Woman’s Committee), 68 Federal Reserve System, 38, 107
original members of, 12 Federal Trade Commission, 36, 45
responsibilities of, 13 Feiker, Frederick, 120
Commercial Economy Board, 16. Finlay, John H., 96
See also War Industries Board Fisher, Irving, 106–08, 122–23
design and function of, 13 Fosdick, Raymond Blaine, 74–78,
Purchasing Board, 13. See also 81, 113
General Munitions Board Food Administration (FA), 13,
Council on Foreign Relations 24–29, 90
(CFR), 119 and women’s suffrage, 69
Crisis and Leviathan (Higgs), 55 licensing, 25, 26
Croly, Herbert David, 83, 86, Food Control Act, 27
91–92 food-control programs, 26–27
Crowell, Benedict, 12 sugar, 26, 28–29
Cummins, Albert, 50 wheat, 26–27
Fournier, Jean-Alfred, 77
Daniels, Josephus, 78 Frankfurter, Felix, 89
Day, Edmund E., 118 Fuel Administration, 38, 41
deflation, 42–43
Department of Commerce, 36, 39, 45 Gary, Elbert, 22, 45
of the Industrial Board, 47 Garrett, Paul, 30
Devine, Edward T., 81 Gay, Edwin F., 111–12, 115–19
Dewey, John, 40, 83–86, 92, 93 Gifford, Walter S., 12
Index 129
General Munitions Board, 13 coffee, 38

Gladden, Washington, 98 Deere & Co., 15
Glass, Carter, 50 International Harvester Co.,
Glenn, Thomas, 48 15, 36
Godfrey, Hollis, 12 Moline Plow Company, 36, 37
Gompers, Samuel, 12 sugar, 26, 28–29
Goodnow, Frank, 113 wheat, 26–27, 50
Goodwin, E.H., 112 automobiles, 10
Gospel of the Kingdom, The Hudson Motor Co., 10
(Strong), 61 coal, 38, 41
Grain Corporation, 27 copper, 20
Gray, Carl R., 32–33 Utah Copper Co., 20
Greene, Jerome D., 111 cotton, 21, 38
Guffey, Joseph, 37, 41 finance, 12
Wall Street, 12
Hadley, Arthur T., 119 food, 15, 24–26
Hancock, John, 37 iron, 44
Harrison, Fairfax, 31 lumber, 21, 44
Hayek, F.A., 55 machinery, 37
Henderson, Leon, 37 General Electric, 37
Higgs, Robert, 55, 57 munitions, 13
Hines, Walker D., 32, 33, 50 nickel, 21
Hinrichs, A. Ford, 124 oil, 38, 41
Holden, Hale, 32 publications, 11
Homer, Charles F., 37 American Press Association,
Hoover, Herbert Clark, 13, 15, 11
24–30, 35, 38, 40, 62–63, 69, Associated Advertising Clubs
90, 119–21 of the World, 11
Howe, Frederick C., 97 New York Times, 11, 44
Hunt, Edward Eyre, 124 railroads, 12, 13, 15, 30–34,
Hutchinson, T.W., 104 49–52
Atlantic Coast Railroad, 32
Industrial Board, 47–50 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
dissolution of, 50 12, 15, 30
stabilization of high prices, 48 Burlington Railroad, 32
“industrial preparedness,” 11 California Railroad
industries of big-business, 14–15, Commission, 31
18–19 Chicago Great Western
agriculture, 15 Railroad, 32
American Sugar Refining Cummins Bill, 51
Co., 28–29 Esch Bill, 51
Hudson and Manhattan Jameson, J. Franklin, 97

Railroad, 12 Johnson, Bascom, 77
New York Central Railroad, 32 Johnson, Hugh S., 37
Railroad Labor Board, 52
Santa Fe Railroad, 32 Kallen, Horace M., 92
Seaboard Railroad, 32 Keefe, Frank B., 124
Southern Railroad, 31 Kerner Board, 12
Transportation Act of 1920, Kerner, Francis J., 12
51–52 Klein, Julius, 120
Union Pacific Railroad, 15 Kohn, Robert, 41
Western Maryland Railroad,
33 La Follette, Robert M., 97, 101–02
raw materials, 13 laissez-faire capitalism, 9, 35, 44, 96
rubber, 38 Lamont, Thomas W., 118
shoes, 44 Legge Alexander, 15, 36
steel, 15, 22–24, 44–45, 48–49 Leuchtenburg, William, 39–40
American Vanadium Co., 15, 22 Lever Food and Fuel Control Act,
Bethlehem Steel, 23 62–64
Crucible Steel, 23 liberal intellectuals, 9, 39, 94
Republic Iron and Steel, 22, See also progressive intellectuals
23 liberalism, 8–9
United States Steel, 22, 23, 45 licensing, 25, 26
telephone, 12 Lindsey, W.E., 63
American Telephone and Lippmann, Walter, 83, 87–91
Telegraph Co., 12, 21 Lovett, Robert S., 15
textiles, 12 Lubin, Isador, 37
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 12
industry regulation, 20–23 Making of Index Numbers, The
big-business involvement in, (Fisher), 106
20–22 market stability, 21–22
Institute for Government Research Marrow, Prince A., 77
(IGR), 113–114 Marxian socialism, 9
Institute of Christian Sociology, 98 McAdoo, William Gibbs, 12, 14,
Institute of Economic Research, 111 32–33, 37, 50, 56
International Sugar Committee Menger, Carl, 104
(ISC), 28 mercantilism, 8
Interstate Commerce Commission Military Training Camp
(ICC), 31–34, 51–52 Commission, 74–81
Statistical Bureau of the, 106 Mises, Ludwig von, 95
Iron Age, 22 Mitchell, Wesley Clair, 108, 111–
James, George R., 48 12, 117–18, 121, 123
Index 131
“mixed economy,” 35 Pleasant, Ruftin G., 70

Moulton, Harold G., 119 Positivist Circle, 92
Mussolini, Benito, 91–92 postmillennial pietist Protestantism,
54, 57–58–66, 83–84, 97–99
National American Woman Suffrage development of statism, 57–58,
Association, 67, 68 84
National Association of women’s suffrage, 66–73
Manufacturers, 47 price control see price-fixing
National Board of Historical price-fixing, 20–21, 23, 26–27, 43,
Service, 102 45
National Bureau of Economic See also War Industries Board
Research, 113, 118 opposition to, 24, 44
National Civic Federation, 109 price maxima/minima, 42, 44
National Conference of Social Work, price stabilization, 21, 23, 26
81–82 profit, reasonable margin of, 26
National League for Woman’s progressive intellectuals, 55–56, 83
Service, 71 Progressive Party, 60, 67, 74, 103
national planning progressivism, 53–54, 58–60
“voluntary” cooperation, 38 Social Creed, 60–61
National Women’s Trade Union Social Gospel, 60
League, 73 prohibition, 59–66, 81, 107, 123
neomercantilism, 35 and soldiers, 74
New Deal, 37, 40–42, 52, 91 Anti-Saloon League, 59–66
Civilian Conservation Corps, 42 during the war, 63–64
Corporate Monopoly State, 52 Eighteenth Amendment, 64–65,
public housing, 41 81
New Mercantilism, 8 Volstead (National Prohibition)
New Republic, 40, 83, 85–91 Act, 66
in support of war collectivism, War Prohibition Act, 65
86–87 Prohibitionist Party, 67
New York Times, 11, 44 prostitution, 75–79
New York World, 85, 92 public housing movement, 41
Newlands, Francis G., 31
Railroads’ War Board, 30–31
Parker, Edwin B., 45 Rainey, Henry T., 42
Payne, John Barton, 32 rationing, 29
Peace Industries Board, 37 Rauschenbusch, Walter, 61, 98
Peek, George N., 15, 36, 37, 46, Recent Economic Changes in
48 the United States (Mitchell),
Pershing, John J., 79 123–124
personal liberty, 61 Reconstruction Commission, 43
Reconstruction Congress of Stelzle, Charles, 61

American Industry, 47 Stone, Nahum I., 112
Reconstruction Finance Straight, Williard W., 83
Corporation, 40 Strong, Benjamin, 107
Redfield, William, 45, 47, 48 Strong, Josiah, 61, 98
Reed, Lewis B., 48 suffrage, 66–73
religion and the state, 57–60 and prohibition, 67
Replogle, J. Leonard, 15, 22 and World War I, 68
Requa, Mark, 46 food pledge cards, 69
Rhett, R. Goodwyn, 12 National American Woman
Ritter, William M., 48 Suffrage Association, 67, 68
Robins, Margaret Dreier, 73 Nineteenth Amendment, 66
Robins, Raymond, 73–74 Women’s Christian
Rockefeller, John D. Jr., 75–76, 81, Temperance Union, 67
112 women’s work support of war, 70
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 35, 36, 41, Sugar Equalization Board, 29
42 Survey, 81
Roosevelt, Theodore, 59, 97, 101 Survey of Current Business, 119–20
Rorty, Malcolm C., 112 Swope, Gerard, 37
Rosenwald, Julius, 12 Swope, Herbert Bayard, 37
Ross, Edward Alsworth, 96
Ruggles, Samuel B., 105 Taft, William Howard, 113
Russell, Howard H., 59 Tarbell, Ida M., 69
Tennessee Valley Authority, 41
Schmoller Gustav, 95 Thelen, Max, 31
Scott, Frank A., 13 Timberlake, James, 59
Shaw, Albert, 96 Topping, John A., 23
Shaw, Anna Howard, 67, 68 Tugwell, Rexford Guy, 40, 91
Shaw, Arch W., 16, 17, 45, 112, Turner, Frederick Jackson, 97
115
Sherman Act, 47 United States
Small, Albion W., 96 Chamber of Commerce, 10, 14,
Smith, A. H., 32 18–19, 43, 47
Social Hygiene, 77 Navy, 10. See also American
social work, 80–81 Navy
standardization, 27, 33, 35, 38, 45, Utah Copper Company, 20
115
state corporate capitalism, 7 Veblen, Thorstein, 86, 108
statistics and the state, 104–25 Versailles Treaty, 91, 93
as a basis for state planning, 109,
121 Walters, Henry, 32
Index 133
war collectivism, 34–35 Weyl, Walter Edward, 83, 91

as economic planning, 34–35 Wheeler, Harry A., 19, 21, 43, 47
definition of, 7 Whitney, Dorothy, 83
during peace time, 42–43 Willard, Daniel, 12, 15, 30, 51
war contracts, 15 Williams, Clarence C., 37
War Finance Corporation, 40 Williams, John Skelton, 32
War Industries Board (WIB), Willoughby, William Franklin, 113
14–15, 30, 35, 37, 42–45 Wilson, Luther B., 60
big-business leaders in, 15 Wilson, Woodrow, 11, 14, 32, 34,
Committee on Car Service 43–45, 50, 51, 56, 63, 74, 97,
(railroads), 31 116, 118
commodity committees, 18–19 opposition to post-war WIB,
see also industries of big- 44–45
business Wisconsin Idea, 97
Conservation Division, 16–18, Wisconsin Loyalty Legion, 101,
45, 115 103
goals of, 17–18 Wolman, Leo, 37
tasks of, 17 women’s suffrage. See suffrage
control of industry, 18 Women’s Committee, 71–73, 80
disbanding of, 44 and prostitution, 80
during peace time, 43 Block Matrons, 72
Finished Products Division, 46 committee on “patriotic”
functions of, 14 education, 71–72
Peace Industries Board, 37 English instruction, 72
Price-Fixing Committee, 21, 43 Woods, Robert A., 81–82
Railroad Administration, 32–33 World War I
Federal Control Act, 34 United States entry into, 9–10
“sailing day plan,” 34 Wright, Carroll D., 106
Shipping Board, 115–16

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War Collectivism - 3

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Power, Business, and the Intellectual Class

Power, Business, and the

Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in

Ludwig von Mises Institute

I. War Collectivism in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

II. World War I as Fulfillment:

This is reprinted from A New History of Leviathan, Ronald Radosh and

contracts could be channeled into the hands of favored corporate

old, exploitative mercantilism in its advancement of the welfare

Apart from the role of big business in pushing America

The first organization to move toward economic mobili-

facilities for munitions-making. To propagandize for this effort,

The CIP was succeeded, in late 1916, by the fully gov-

pay, “efficiency being their sole object and Americanism their

Months before American entry into the war, the Advi-

Yet centralized mobilization was proceeding but slowly

the Allies, and with other departments of the Govern-

his organized business colleagues. Thus, Grosvenor Clarkson

One of the most important instrumentalities of wartime

permanently after the end of the war. Arch W. Shaw summed

American Industry”; to make of wartime necessity a

Heart and soul of the mechanism of control of industry

Businessmen wholly consecrated to government service,

All in all, Clarkson exulted that the commodity sections were

The result of all this new-found harmony within each indus-

The attitude of the Price-Fixing Committee was reflected in

the board of Republic Iron and Steel in early 1918, that it

with the short-lived entente cordiale between Judge Gary and

It is true that wartime relations between government and

The steel settlement will have a wholesome effect on the

Furthermore, the large steel firms were happy to use the

upon wages, which were also beginning to rise. The smaller

The most thoroughgoing system of price controls during

to seize plants for government operation, and to regulate or

The basis of all . . . control exercised by the Food Ad-

churches, women’s clubs, public libraries, merchants’

Let us consider two of the most important food-control

the agriculturists, the government program fixed by statute, not

rebates to particular customers—the classic path toward the

In the particular case of sugar, there was a much more sin-

rapidly forthcoming.37 Cuba also induced to prohibit all sugar

entire war-collectivist regime, Herbert Hoover, in the words of

Ibid. pp. 55–56.

See K. Austin Kerr, American Railroad Politics, 1914–1920 (Pittsburgh:

University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), pp. 44 ff.

railroad interests. Under its Chairman, Fairfax Harrison of the

higher freight rates; the unions seconded the plan in order to

although largely responsible for the inception and growth of the

ordered the cessation of competitive solicitation of freight by the

of twentieth-century America. For big business, the wartime

competition), to exchange trade information, to agree on the

collaboration with committees from each industry.50 Grosvenor

as “a logical outgrowth of the Progressive movement.”52 He

offering the post to Bernard Baruch, named as first Chairman

duction, furthermore, needed only to remain in being to func-

The great problem with these ambitious plans of both indus-

to do so just before the disbandment of the agency. The Board

If the WIB itself could not continue, perhaps the wartime