Oecd Competition Assessment Reviews Cambodia 2021

FOSTERING COMPETITION IN ASEAN
OECD Competition Assessment Reviews

CAMBODIA
LOGISTICS SECTOR
OECD Competition Assessment Reviews:
Logistics Sector in Cambodia
PUBE
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Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2021), OECD Competition Assessment Reviews: Logistics Sector in Cambodia
https://www.oecd.org/competition/fostering-competition-in-asean.htm
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions
expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the OECD or of
the governments of its member countries or those of the European Union.
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status or sovereignty over any
territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city,
or area.
The OECD has two official languages: English and French. The English version of this report is the only
official one.
© OECD 2021
OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

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Foreword
Southeast Asia, one of the fastest growing regions in the world, has benefited from a broad embrace of
economic growth models based on international trade, foreign investment and integration into regional and
global value chains. Maintaining this momentum, however, will require certain reforms to strengthen the
region’s economic and social sustainability. This will include reducing regulatory barriers to competition
and market entry to help foster innovation, efficiency and productivity.
The logistics sector plays a significant role in fostering economic development. Apart from its contribution
to a country’s GDP, a well-developed logistics network has an impact on most economic activities. An
efficient logistics system can improve a country’s competitiveness, facilitate international trade and
enhance its connectivity to better serve consumers and meet the needs of regionally-integrated production
facilities for reliable delivery of inputs and outputs.
The OECD Competition Assessment Reviews: Logistics Sector in Cambodia, undertaken within the
framework of the ASEAN Competition Action Plan, assesses the impact of regulation on competition in the
sector. This report covers the five main subsectors of the logistics market: freight transportation, including
transport by road, inland waterway and maritime; freight forwarding; warehousing; small-package delivery
services; and value-added services. In parallel, the OECD has assessed the impact of state-owned
enterprises on competition in Cambodia in the OECD Competitive Neutrality Reviews: Small-Package
Delivery Services in Cambodia.
The OECD assessment was conducted in consultation with the Cambodian authorities and local
stakeholders, and with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Economic Reform
Programme under the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK Government). The
assessment prioritises 28 pieces of legislation and identifies 50 regulatory barriers where changes could
be made to foster greater competition in the logistics sector. This is especially important for Cambodia
where the transport and storage sector currently account for about 7.8% of the country’s GDP. This report
offers policy recommendations that can help the Cambodian government address structural and regulatory
shortcomings in this sector.
These structural reforms have become even more pressing as the Cambodian economy shrunk by about
3 % in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with key economic activities such as exports and tourism
severely affected by border closures and a decrease in trade. These policy recommendations contribute
to reforms that can help the Cambodian economy resume sustainable growth and job creation by
enhancing competitiveness, encouraging investment and stimulating productivity in the logistics service
sector, with knock-on economy-wide effects and benefits for its consumers.
I congratulate the Cambodian government, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat and the UK Government, on
their efforts to lift regulatory barriers to competition and to improve the business environment. The OECD
looks forward to continuing and broadening its co-operation with ASEAN to support further its reforms to
the benefit of its citizens.
Greg Medcraft
Director, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs

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Acknowledgments
The findings in this report are the result of an independent assessment by the OECD based on an analysis
of selected (prioritised) Cambodian legislation, stakeholder interviews and desk research. The
recommendations are the result of this analysis and are non-binding.
The report was prepared in collaboration with the following authorities and public companies who
participated in the meetings and provided information, advice and feedback throughout the project:
 Ministry of Commerce
o Consumer Protection, Competition and Fraud Repression Directorate General
‒ Department of Competition
 Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT)
o Logistics Department
o Directorate of Administrative Services
‒ International Co-operation Department
o Directorate of Transport
‒ Road Transport
‒ Land Transport
‒ Water Transport
‒ Merchant Marine
 Ministry of Economics and Finance
o Public Enterprise Department
 Sihanoukville Autonomous Port Authority
 Phnom Penh Autonomous Port Authority
 Ministry of Land Management
 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
 Cambodia Post
The following trade associations and private companies were interviewed:
 Cambodian Truckers’ Association (CAMTA), Cambodian Freight Forwarders’ Association
(CAMFFA), EuroCham, AMCHAM, Royal Railway, Phzar, Kerry Logistics, FedEx, DHL, Advance
Glory Logistics and Fair & Easy.
The OECD project team consisted of Federica Maiorano, Senior Competition Expert and Competition
Assessment Project Leader, Takuya Ohno, Competition Analyst, Sophie Flaherty, Competition Analyst,
Gaetano Lapenta, Competition Analyst, Wouter Meester, Competition Expert and Competitive Neutrality
Project Leader, and Matteo Giangaspero, Competition Expert, all from the OECD Competition Division.
The report was drafted by Takuya Ohno and Sophie Flaherty under the supervision of Federica Maiorano.

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Lynn Robertson provided valuable comments on the final draft. The report was prepared for publication by
Eleonore Morena and Erica Agostinho.
The OECD team was assisted by David Fruitman.
Antonio Capobianco, Acting Head of the OECD Competition Division and Ruben Maximiano, Senior
Competition Expert and ASEAN Project Co-ordinator provided valuable comments throughout the process
and on the final report.
The project was funded by the ASEAN Economic Reform Programme under the UK Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office (UK Government).
The information and figures in this report are updated as of April 2021, while economic forecasts have
been updated with more recent figures reflecting the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Fostering competition in ASEAN

ASEAN member states have agreed to implement significant advances in competition policy as part of
the ASEAN Competition Action Plan 2016-2025 (ACAP 2016-2025), which provides strategic goals,
initiatives and outcomes to fulfil the competition-related vision of the AEC Blueprint 2025. In order to
increase awareness of the benefits and role of competition in ASEAN, the ACAP 2016-2025 provides
for an assessment to be conducted on the impact of non-tariff barriers on competition in the markets of
ASEAN member states followed by recommendations.
The logistics sector was chosen by the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Experts Group on Competition
(AEGC), together with the OECD, as it can play a significant role in increasing ASEAN’s economic
development, and is included in the AEC Blueprint’s 12 priority integration sectors. Indeed, efficient
logistics can play a significant role in increasing a country’s economic development by facilitating
international trade and improving its competitiveness. By developing an efficient logistics system, a
country can enhance its connectivity to better serve its importers and exporters, and satisfy the needs
of regionally integrated production facilities for reliable just-in-time delivery of inputs and outputs.
Against this background, the ASEAN Secretariat, with funding from the UK Government, tasked the
OECD to assist with the implementation of Initiatives 4.1 and 4.2 of the ACAP 2016-2025. These two
initiatives require an assessment of the impact of competition law and policy on the markets of all 10
ASEAN member states, both in general (4.1) and with a focus on state-owned enterprises (4.2).
This report contributes to ACAP Outcome 4.1.2 (Impact of non-tariff barriers on competition), building
on a competition assessment of regulatory constraints on competition in the logistics services sector.
More specifically, the agreed scope for the project is to cover:
1. freight transportation, including transport by road, inland waterways and maritime, and rail
2. freight forwarding
3. warehousing
4. small-package delivery services
5. value-added services.
This regional report concludes a series of 10 similar assessments, one for each ASEAN member state.

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Table of contents
Foreword 3
Acknowledgments 5
Abbreviations and acronyms 9
Executive summary 11
1 Introduction 13
1.1. Introduction to the ASEAN competition assessment project 13
1.2. Introduction to the logistics sector 13
1.3. Benefits of competition 16
1.4. Introduction to Cambodia 18
2 Economic overview of the logistics sector in Cambodia 21

2.1. Key figures of the logistics sector 21
2.2. Key stakeholders 27
3 Overview of the legislation in the logistics sector in Cambodia 31

3.1. Road freight transport 31
3.2. Maritime freight transport 33
3.3. Freight forwarding and Warehouses 38
3.4. Small-package delivery services 39
3.5. International agreements 40
3.6. Horizontal 43
References 49
Notes 53
Annex A. Methodology 59
Annex B. Legislation screening by sector 63

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FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Services as a percentage of GDP in ASEAN countries, 2000-19 19
Figure 1.2. Doing Business – Ease of Doing Business score 20
Figure 1.3. Time required to start a business (days) 20
Figure 2.1. GDP from transportation and storage sector (billion KHR) 22
Figure 2.2. Quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure 23
Figure 2.3. Rail freight traffic volume, in thousand tonnes, 1998-2017 24
Figure 2.4. Annual Liner Shipping Connectivity Index, (maximum 2006=100) 25
Figure 2.5. Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI), 2020 26
Figure 3.1. Regulatory quality estimates for ASEAN and selected OECD countries, 2016-19 44
TABLES
Table 2.1. Logistics costs over sales by components (%) 22
Table 2.2. Number of trucks in Cambodia (2008-2017) 23
Table 2.3. Cambodia’s total trade in transport services (millions of USD) 25
Table 2.4. LPI overall ranking (2018) 26
Table 3.1. Number of screened pieces of legislation, restrictions and recommendations 31
Table 3.2. Example of multi-manning operation in the EU, 30-hour period 32
BOXES
Box 2.1. Logistics Performance Index 27
Box 2.2. MPWT’s functions and duties 28
Box 3.1. OECD best practices in public procurement, concessions and fighting bid rigging 34
Box 3.2. What is regulatory quality? 45
Box 3.3. World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators: the Regulatory Quality Estimate 45
Box 3.4. Open government 46
Box 3.5. Legal databases in Singapore, Australia and the United Kingdom 48
Box A A.1. OECD Competition Assessment checklist 60

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB Asia Development Bank
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AEGC ASEAN Experts Group on Competition
AFAMT ASEAN Framework on Multimodal Transport
AFAS ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEC ASEAN Secretariat
CDC Council for the Development of Cambodia
CAMFFA Cambodia Freight Forwarders Association
CAMTA Cambodia Trucking Association
DWT Deadweight tonnage
FDI Foreign direct investment
GDL General Department for Logistics
GDP Gross domestic product
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities
KAMSAB Kampuchea Shipping Agency and Brokers
LSBCI Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index
LPI Logistics performance index
MEF Ministry of Finance
MFP Multifactor productivity
MOC Ministry of Commerce
NLC National Logistics Council
MPTC Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
MPWT Ministry of Public Works and Transport
PMR Product market regulation
PPAP Phnom Penh Autonomous Port
PPP Purchasing power parity
SAP Sihanoukville Autonomous Port
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SME Small- and medium-sized enterprise
SNEC Supreme National Economic Council
SOE State-owned enterprise
STRI Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (OECD)
TEU Twenty-foot equivalent
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

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Units of measurement
g gramme
kg kilogramme
t tonne
km kilometre
m2 square metre

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Executive summary
Main economic characteristics of the logistics sector in Cambodia
In 2019, the transportation and storage market in Cambodia was worth USD 2.1 billion, representing 7.8%
of the country’s economy.1 The Cambodian logistics sector is largely dominated by road freight transport
(ADB, 2019, p. 2[1]). The number of registered trucks more than doubled between 2008 and 2016.2 Despite
significant investment and improvements in recent years, it is reported that Cambodia’s transport
infrastructure is still inadequate in terms of both quantity and quality. 3 Logistics costs over sales in
Cambodia were estimated at 20.5% in 2018, higher than some ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and
Viet Nam, and the global average of 10-12% (World Bank, 2018, p. 111[2]). In terms of overall logistics
performance, Cambodia ranked 98 out of 160 in the World Bank’s Global Logistics Performance Index
(World Bank, 2018[3]).
Key recommendations by sub-sector
In order to contribute to the continued improved efficiency of the logistics services sector in Cambodia, the
report makes 30 recommendations on specific legal provisions that should be reviewed, amended or
removed. The main recommendations are summarised below.
Road freight transport
 In relation to a so-called multi-manning requirement whereby freight transport vehicles with a total
weight of more than 16 tonnes must have a driver and an assistant driver, consider offering
additional options to ensure road safety, such as appropriate rest requirements for the driver, so
that transport operators can select the most suitable approach.
Maritime freight transport
 Consider the advantages and disadvantages of the provision of port services by private entities. If
a policy decision was made in favour of private involvement in the provision of port services, create
appropriate legal frameworks so that the provision of port services could be tendered based on
fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms to guarantee competition for the market.
 In cases where competition is limited, limit price regulation to the regulation of maximum prices,
not minimum prices for port services. Maximum prices should be regularly revised to ensure they
remain in line with market dynamics and provide the necessary incentives for innovation and
investment.
 Remove or limit the discretion of the decision maker in the vessel registration process. If discretion
is maintained, publish guidelines on the exercise of this discretion. Ensure applicants have the right
to reasons to understand the basis for the decision.

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 In relation to the business licence for international transport, clarify the meaning of “single purpose”
and any geographical restriction. Consider removing the requirement to stipulate a single
destination and business objective in the licensing process and the requirement to obtain a second
business licence.
 In relation to vessel repairs, limit ex ante approval and ex post inspection to significant renovations,
not day-to day repairs.
Small-package delivery services
 Amend legislation to remove any ability to regulate the rates of small package delivery services
(SPDS). The legislation should reflect current practice where there is no price regulation of SPDS
and where SPDS providers are free to set their own prices.
 Clarify the Postal Law to ensure that the monopoly does not include small package delivery
services (i.e. courier services).
International agreements
 Where international agreements contain provisions that limit the number of operators or vehicles
that can provide cross-border transport in Cambodia, the OECD makes two recommendations.
First, remove these restrictive provisions setting quotas and replace with a licence system. The
licensing criteria should be clearly defined in the international agreement or implementing laws or
regulations. Second, assess market need and demand every one to three years, and consider
adapting the number of licences that can be issued. Both these recommendations would require
negotiations between signatory countries.

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1 Introduction
1.1. Introduction to the ASEAN competition assessment project
Logistics plays a significant role in increasing a country’s economic development. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chose the logistics sector as one of its 12 priority sectors in its ASEAN
Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors, signed in 2004. As part of the ASEAN
Competition Action Plan 2016-2025, the ASEAN Secretariat asked the OECD to carry out: 1) an
independent competition assessment of legislation in the logistics sector; and 2) prepare a regional report
assessing the impact on competition of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-linked
monopolies in selected markets in ASEAN.
An OECD team has been conducting competition assessments of laws and regulations in ten ASEAN
member states (AMS), as well as a study for the ASEAN region. It has worked in close co-ordination with the
ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC), the ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC), as well as with the
responsible authorities within each AMS, in particular, competition authorities. For Cambodia, the analysis
was carried out with the support of the Ministry of Commerce (Consumer Protection, Competition and Fraud
Repression Directorate General, Department of Competition) and funded by the ASEAN Economic Reform
Programme under the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK Government).
The following study covers the first component of the project, the competition assessment of laws and
regulation in the logistics sector in Cambodia. A separate OECD report, OECD Competitive Neutrality
Reviews: Small-Package Delivery Services in Cambodia (2021) analyses possible distortions to
competition for postal services related to SOEs.
1.2. Introduction to the logistics sector
According to a common definition, logistics is the process of planning, implementing, and controlling
procedures for the efficient and effective transportation and storage of goods including services, and
related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to
customer requirements. This definition includes inbound, outbound, internal, and external movements
(Mangan and Lalwani, 2016, p. 9[4]).
Other authors define logistics as the process of strategically managing the procurement, movement and
storage of materials, parts and finished inventory (and the related information flows) through an
organisation and its marketing channels in such a way that current and future profitability are maximised
through the cost-effective fulfilment of orders (Christopher, 2016, p. 2[5]).
Using twenty-foot equivalent (TEU) containers is nowadays a fundamental feature of all major national and
international transport modes. TEUs can be stacked on top of each other on-board a ship, allowing the
efficient use of space and better cargo handling. Containerisation makes the so-called “intermodal system
of freight transport” possible, which enables the uncomplicated movement of bulk goods from one mode
of transport to another. TEU containers and container systems also allow a number of small packages to
be consolidated into a large single unit, leading to a reduction in transport and handling costs.

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Generally, logistics is a cluster of activities with each area involving a range of different actors and
services.4 This report will focus on five subsectors of logistics:
 Freight transportation (excluding air transport)
 Freight forwarding
 Warehousing
 Small-package service delivery
 Value-added logistics.
The exact scope of the logistics sector was agreed with the ASEAN Secretariat and each ASEAN member
state in the context of the ASEAN Experts Group on Competition.
The report does not cover customs issues.
1.2.1. Freight cargo transport
Five principal modes of transport of freight are generally defined: 1) road; 2) water; 3) rail; 4) air; and
5) pipelines (Mangan and Lalwani, 2016, p. 103[4]). This report only covers the first three modes of freight
transport. Transport by air, which only makes up a small percentage of overall freight transport in the
ASEAN region, raises a set of different questions that are most often regulated in bi-lateral or multilateral
agreements. Transport by pipelines is usually not counted as logistics and is legislated for under energy
law. For that reason, this report does not cover the transport of oil and gas.
Road freight transport
The road freight transport sector encompasses the transportation of goods between economic enterprises and
between enterprises and consumers, including bulk goods and goods requiring special handling, such as
refrigerated and dangerous goods. The law covering road transport usually distinguishes between transport
for own-account, which is freight transportation between establishments belonging to the same business, and
transport for hire or reward. As in many countries, road freight transport continues to be the dominant mode
of transport in Cambodia. Fixed costs are low as the physical transport infrastructure, such as motorways, is
usually in place and publicly funded; variable costs include fuel costs, and maintenance charges, road use
and congestion. Road is also often the most suitable or efficient mode of transport since it allows door-to-door
transport without any transfers of cargo between different vehicles, which results in lower costs for senders
and recipients, as well as in reduced risks of possible loss or damage from cargo transfers.
Inland waterway and maritime freight transport
Waterborne freight transport refers to goods transported on waterways using various means, including
boats, steamers, barges and ships, both within and outside the country. When the goods are transported
by using inland waterways such as rivers or canals, transport is referred as inland waterway transport.
Maritime transport refers to seaborne movement of goods on ships, linking a large number of origin and
destination points, either within the country’s territorial waters, for instance within an archipelago or in case
of coastal trading (known as cabotage) or, more often, to other countries (OECD, 2016, p. 141[6]).5 Of
global international trade, 90% is transported by sea. Transporting cargo by sea is ideal for high-volume
cargo that is not necessarily time sensitive or which has long lead times for delivery (Rushton, Croucher
and Baker, 2017, p. 447[7]). Fixed costs for waterborne freight transport include vessels, handling
equipment and terminals; variable costs are low due to economies of scale based on large volumes of
freight (Mangan and Lalwani, 2016, p. 105[4]).
On the global level, cargo transported by the liner shipping industry represents about two-thirds of the
value of total global seaborne trade.6 Shipping liners are carriers providing shipping services to shippers
on fixed routes with regular schedules between ports (International Transport Forum, 2018, p. 10[8]). In the

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past, liners were often organised into conferences, formal groups of shipping lines operating on shipping
routes that brought together all lines operating in a specific geographic zone to set common freight rates
and regulate capacity. This practice has been under scrutiny in some regions of the world, such as in the
EU,7 and its relevance has decreased in the last decades, mostly as a result of the United States’ 1998
Ocean Shipping Reform Act and the repeal of the EU Block Exemption to liner shipping conferences in
2006 (International Transport Forum, 2018, p. 11[8]).
Ports in maritime and inland waterway transport serve as infrastructure to a wide range of customers
including freight shippers, ferry operators and private boats. One of the main functions of ports is facilitating
domestic and international trade of goods, often on a large scale. Most ports have an extensive network
of infrastructure including quays, roads, rails tracks, areas for storage and stacking, repair facilities, as well
as fences or walls to securely enclose the port. In addition, ports include superstructures constructed above
main infrastructure, which comprise terminal buildings, warehouses and cargo-handling equipment, such
as lifting cranes and pumps. Major shipping lines usually organise their services as hub-and-spoke
networks with hubs centred on large container ports.
The two international ports in Cambodia are Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP) and Sihanoukville
Autonomous Port (PAS).
Typical port services include:
 Cargo-handling, which involves both cargo-loading operations, commonly known as stevedoring,
and marshalling services, such as storage, assembly and sorting of cargo. Charges for cargo
handling vary from port to port and by the type of cargo handled. Not all ports are capable of
handling all types of cargo and some ports are established to handle only one type of cargo, such
as crude-oil terminals.
 Piloting, which is a specialised service provided by pilots with local knowledge who assist ship
captains navigating and manoeuvring vessels inside the port area. Maritime pilots tend to be
navigation experts with high skill levels (often former captains) and specialised knowledge of the
particular navigation conditions of a port, such as tide, wind direction and sea depth. These skills
enable them to manoeuvre ships through the narrow channels of a port, reduce the speed of heavy
vessels, and to avoid dangerous areas.
 Towage, which is the service of moving ships within the port using tugboats, small but powerful
vessels used to assist much larger ships to manoeuvre in a port’s limited space. Tugboats are
capable of both pushing and towing vessel.
 Other services such as bunkering (fuel supplies) and providing water and electricity.
Some shipping services, as well as shipping-related activities taking place in ports, are provided by the
port administration under monopoly conditions, while others are subject to competition. In some
geographical regions, there is fierce competition between ports as well as within ports (OECD, 2018[9]). In
others, however, enhancing competition would be difficult, especially when ports are local natural
monopolies with limited space and so subject to heavy national regulations. The state of port competition
would need to be assessed in the context of ports facing global shipping alliances with strong bargaining
power (International Transport Forum, 2018[8]), especially since certain shipping sectors such as container
shipping have recently become much more concentrated (OECD, 2018, p. 181[9]).
Rail freight transport
Rail freight refers to freight, cargo or goods transported by railways and does not include parcels or
baggage transport services associated with railway passenger services. Fixed costs for rail tend to be high
due to expensive requirements such as locomotives, wagons, tracks and facilities such as freight terminals;
variable costs are, however, mostly low (Mangan and Lalwani, 2016, p. 105[4]). The OECD has stated
regulatory authorities should ensure competition development in the provision of services and non-

16 
discriminatory access to infrastructure, while providing for the right incentives for investment in the network,
ensuring public-service needs and safeguarding consumers’ rights (OECD, 2018, p. 158[9]). This report
does not contain recommendations on rail transport for Cambodia.
1.2.2. Freight forwarding
Freight forwarding means organising the transportation of items, on behalf of customers according to their
needs; this can also include ancillary activities, such as customs clearance, warehousing, and ground
services. Unlike the providers of cargo transport services, freight forwarders do not generally own any part of
the network they use and normally hire transportation capacity from third parties. Freight forwarders instead
specialise in arranging storage and shipping of merchandise on behalf of shippers. They usually provide a
full range of services such as tracking inland transportation, preparation of shipping and export documents,
booking cargo space, negotiating freight charges, freight consolidation, cargo insurance, and filing of
insurance claims. Other services include arranging order collection from the point of origin to the shipping
port, customs clearance, final delivery at the destination country, and providing knowledge of the different
costs associated with different modes and destinations (Rushton, Croucher and Baker, 2017, p. 444[7]).
1.2.3. Warehousing, small-package delivery services, and value-added services
The last three subsectors investigated in this report comprise warehousing, small-package delivery
services and value added services.
Warehousing encompasses the storage (holding) of good in bonded warehouses (where dutiable goods
may be stored, manipulated, or undergo manufacturing operations without payment of duty) or non-bonded
warehouses. Often, the main problem for building and operating new warehouses is accessing land in
central locations.
Small-package delivery services deliver small packages from pick-up location to drop-off location. They
can include express or deferred delivery, both domestically and internationally, by any mode of transport.
A separate OECD report, OECD Competitive Neutrality Reviews: Small-Package Delivery Services in
Cambodia (2021) has been published analysing possible distortions to competition for postal services
related to SOEs and so these will not be covered here. The current report will cover only those issues that
affect both SOEs and private players.
Value-added logistics are services related to physical activities, including quality-control services, packing
and packaging, labelling and tagging, configuration and customisation, and assembly and kitting.
1.3. Benefits of competition
The Competition Assessment of Laws and Regulations project aims to identify regulations that may unduly
restrict market forces and, by doing so, may harm a country’s growth prospects. In particular, the project
identifies regulatory provisions that:
 are unclear, meaning they lack transparency or may be applied in an arbitrary fashion
 prevent new firms, including small- and medium-sized businesses from accessing markets
 allow a limited number of firms to earn greater profits than they otherwise would, for reasons
unrelated to their underlying productivity or the quality of their products
 cause consumers to pay more than they otherwise would.
Each restriction is likely to have an impact well beyond individual consumers in the sectors assessed.
When consumers can choose and shop around for a variety of products and services, firms are forced to
compete, innovate more, and improve their productivity (Nickell, 1996[10]; Blundell, 1999[11]; Griffith,

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2006[12]). Industries in which there is greater competition experience faster productivity growth. These
conclusions have been demonstrated by a wide variety of empirical studies and summarised in the OECD’s
“Factsheet on how company policy affects macro-economic outcomes” (OECD, 2014[13]). Competition
stimulates productivity primarily because it provides the opportunity for more efficient firms to enter and
gain market share at the expense of less efficient firms.
In addition to the evidence that competition fosters productivity and economic growth, many studies have
shown the positive effects of more flexible product market regulation (PMR), the area most relevant to this
report.8 These studies analyse the impact of regulation on productivity, employment, research and
development, and investment, among other variables. Differences in regulation also matter and can reduce
significantly both trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Fournier et al., 2015[14]; Fournier, 2015[15]).9 By
fostering growth, more flexible PMR can help the sustainability of public debt.
There is a particularly large body of evidence on the productivity gains created by more flexible PMR. At
the company and industry level, restrictive PMR is associated with lower multifactor productivity (MFP)
levels (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003[16]; Arnold, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2011[17]).10 The result also holds
at aggregate level (Égert, 2017[18]).11 Anti-competitive regulations have an impact on productivity that goes
beyond the sector in which they are applied and this effect is more important for the sectors closer to the
productivity frontier (Bourlès et al., 2013[19]).12 Specifically, a large part of the impact on productivity is due
to investment in research and development (Cette, Lopez and Mairesse, 2013[20]). Moreover, lowering
regulatory barriers in network industries can have a significant impact on exports (Daude and de la
Maisonneuve, 2018[21]).
Innovation and investment in knowledge-based capital, such as computerised information and intellectual
property rights (IPRs), are also negatively affected by stricter PMR. A number of studies show that
competitive pressure, as measured by lower regulatory barriers (for example, lower entry costs to a
market), encourages firms in services sectors, such as retail and road transport, to adopt digital
technologies (Andrews and Criscuolo, 2013[22]; Andrews and Westmore, 2014[23]; Andrews, Nicoletti and
Timiliotis, 2018[24]). Pro-competition reforms to PMR are associated with an increase in the number of
patent awards (Westmore, 2013[25]). More stringent PMR is shown to be associated with reduced
investment and amplifies the negative effects of a more stringent labour market (Égert, 2017[18]).13
Greater flexibility can also lead to higher employment. A 2004 study found that after deregulating the road
transport sector in France, employment levels in the sector increased at a faster rate than before
deregulation (Cahuc and Kamarz, 2004[26]).14 A 10-year, 18-country OECD study published in 2014
concluded that small firms that are five years old or less on average contribute about 42% of job creation
(Criscuolo, Gal and Menon, 2014[27]).15 As noted in the OECD report Economic Policy Reforms 2015:
“such a disproportionately large role by young firms in job creation suggests that reducing barriers to
entrepreneurship can contribute significantly to income equality via employment effects” (OECD, 2015[28])
There is also some evidence on the benefits of lifting anticompetitive regulations for reducing income
inequality. One study found that less restrictive PMR improved household incomes and reduced income
inequality.16
Finally, one 2018 study looked at the impact of PMR on the persistence of profits in the long term (Eklund
and Lappi, 2018[29]). It concluded that regulations that raise barriers to entry can protect incumbents’ above
average profits and more stringent product market regulation, as measured by the OECD PMR indicator,
is associated with persistent profits.
The results described above hold in a variety of settings, but the specific estimates may differ depending
on the country. For instance, a 2017 study quantified the impact of structural reforms, including PMR and
labour reform, in a large sample including both OECD and non-OECD countries, and found that:

18 
“stringent product market regulations will have a three-time larger negative impact on MFP in countries with
per capita income lower than about USD 8 000 (in PPP terms)” (Égert, 2017[18])17
Increased market competition may also reduce gender discrimination and equality (Pike, 2018[30]; Cooke,
2018[31]). Further, the 2018 OECD Roundtable on Competition Policy and Gender noted that restrictive or
discriminatory laws or policies against women’s economic participation may be interpreted as
anticompetitive regulations. Consequently, pro-competitive regulations following from a pro-competition
policy that takes gender into account can help to address issues of gender equality. For this reason, this
project will also address any laws that specifically hinder the involvement of women in the logistics
business, resulting in the creation of anti-competitive barriers. Such laws could indeed restrict competition
by limiting the ability of some suppliers (women) to provide a good or service or by significantly raising the
cost of entry or exit by a supplier (women).
In summary, anti-competitive regulations that hinder entry into and expansion in markets may be
particularly damaging for a country’s economy because they reduce productivity growth, limit investment
and innovation, harm employment creation, and may favour a certain group of firms over other firms and
consumers, with consequences for income inequality.
1.4. Introduction to Cambodia
Cambodia is located in the south-eastern part of the Indochinese Peninsula in Southeast Asia and is
bordered by Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. It covers an area of approximately 181 040 square
kilometres.18 In 2019, Cambodia’s population was estimated at 16.5 million; it has been growing at an
average annual rate of 1.5 % since 2008.19
1.4.1. GDP and economic growth
With a 2019 nominal GDP of USD 27.1 billion,20 Cambodia is the 103th largest economy in the world.21 Its
economy sustained an average growth rate of 8% between 1998 and 2019, making Cambodia the fastest-
growing economy in ASEAN. Furthermore, it reached lower middle-income status in 2015 according to the
World Bank’s classification.22 The COVID-19 outbreak has significantly impacted Cambodia’s economy in
2020. According to the Asian Development Bank, its economic growth in 2020 was negative at -3.1%.
Cambodia is however expected to record positive growth in 2021, with forecast GDP of 4%, rebounding
further in 2022 to 5.5% (Asian Development Bank, 2021, p. 35[32]).
Cambodia is an active trading country and recorded a total export of USD 16.5 billion in 2019. 23
Cambodia’s exports, composed mainly of garments and agricultural products, have increased steadily
since the 1990s and account for more than 60% of Cambodia’s GDP. 24 Cambodia’s main export partners
are China, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.
1.4.2. Contribution to GDP by sector and the importance of services
In 2019, the services sector accounted for 38.9% of Cambodia’s GDP, industry for 34.2% and agriculture
for 20.7%. The contribution of the services sector to the country’s GDP has remained around 40% since
2000, while the contribution of the agriculture sector has been declining, in favour of the industry sector. In
2017, the services sector accounted for 36.3% of the employed population. 25 Within services, the
transportation and storage sector accounted for 7.8% of Cambodia’s GDP in 2019. 26
The contribution of the services sector to Cambodia’s GDP (38.9%) is relatively low compared to other
ASEAN countries (Figure 1.1), where the growing relevance of the services sector is a widespread trend.
As pointed out by the OECD, Cambodia and Myanmar made the slowest progress in the services sector
from 2006 to 2016 among ASEAN countries (OECD, 2019, p. 73[33]). The OECD observed that both

 19
countries still have large agricultural sectors and will be shifting towards more industrial production before
substantially expanding their services sectors (OECD, 2019, p. 73[33]).
It should nevertheless be noted that Cambodia, together with Singapore, is very open to foreign investment
in the services sector when compared with both ASEAN peers and many OECD countries (OECD, 2019,
p. 13[33]). In fact, the services sector of Cambodia attracted more than 50% of the total inward FDI into the
country between 2012 and 2016, above Myanmar (43%) and Malaysia (38%) (OECD, 2019, p. 29[33]).
With respect to ASEAN, in 2016, services accounted for 73% of ASEAN inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) stock, similar to the OECD member country average (70% in 2015) and to global trends (OECD,
2019, p. 27[33]). More generally, this is also the result of an ASEAN-wide strategy of strengthening co-
operation among member countries under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). 27
Under this framework, all countries are required to move forward with commonly agreed liberalisation
programmes, with a view to removing restrictions to trade in services and boosting ASEAN services-based
economies. In previous reports, the OECD has highlighted that AFAS contained relatively deep
liberalisation commitments (particularly in certain service sectors, such as transport) and has achieved
some positive results in terms of liberalisation. However, it continued: “ASEAN agreements need to go
deeper to provide the sort of catalytic liberalisation needed to bring their overall level of restrictiveness
closer to the average openness observed elsewhere in the developing world” (OECD, 2019, p. 37[33]).
Figure 1.1. Services as a percentage of GDP in ASEAN countries, 2000-19
Brunei Darussalam East Asia & Pacific Indonesia Cambodia Lao PDR
Myanmar Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TOTL.ZS?locations=BN-Z4-ID-MM-MY-PH-SG-TH-VN-KH.
1.4.3. Business environment
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranks Cambodia 100 out of 141 surveyed
economies in terms of the extent of market concentration, 115 for trade openness, and 118 for competition
in services (World Economic Forum, 2019, p. 131[33]).28
The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report ranks Cambodia 144 out of 190 surveyed economies for
the ease of doing business with an overall score of 53.8, after Lebanon (143) and before Palau(145) (World
Bank Group, 2020[34]). On the global level, New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong, China are the top
three performers, while in the ASEAN region, the top performers after Singapore (2) are Malaysia (12),
followed by Thailand (21) and Brunei Darussalam (66).29

20 
Figure 1.2. Doing Business – Ease of Doing Business score
0 100
86.2: Singapore (Rank:2)

81.5: Malaysia (Rank: 12)
80.1: Thailand (Rank: 21)
70.1: Brunei Darussalam (Rank: 66)

69.8: Viet Nam (Rank: 70)
69.6: Indonesia (Rank: 73)
62.8: Philippines (Rank: 95)
53.8: Cambodia (Rank: 144)
50.8: Lao PDR (Rank: 154)
46.8: Myanmar (Rank: 165)

Source: World Bank, www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings.
The time required to open a new business is one factor the World Bank takes into account in its calculations
of the ease of doing business in a country.30 Regulations regarding the launch of a new business can affect
market entry more generally. In particular, the World Bank collects data on the number of days needed to
complete all the necessary procedures to operate a legal business in the country. As shown in Figure 1.3,
since 2015, almost all ASEAN member states have significantly reduced the amount of time required to
start a business. However, this is not the case for Cambodia, where it takes approximately 100 days to
start a business.
Figure 1.3. Time required to start a business (days)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar OECD Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
Darussalam members
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.REG.DURS?end=2018&locations=TH-PH-BN-AU-

MY-VN-MM-KH-LA-DE-JP-SG-OE&start=2018&view=bar.

 21
2 Economic overview of the logistics

sector in Cambodia
The logistics sector is a crucial sector for the development of any economy, connecting firms to both
domestic and international opportunities (World Bank, 2018[3]). Apart from its large contribution to GDP,
the existence of a well-developed logistics network ultimately impacts upon most economic activities and
is fundamental to productivity and growth.
Recognising the importance of connectivity and logistics for the economies of its member states, ASEAN
adopted a Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, with the aim of strengthening ASEAN
competitiveness through enhanced trade routes and supply-chain efficiency.31
As a major component of the logistics sector, freight transport has an important role in enhancing economic
growth and promoting consumer welfare. The movement of freight within a country and across borders
improves the integration of national and international markets, fostering competition and specialisation. It
can also aid development by connecting remote regions to centres of economic activity and by allowing
consumers to benefit from a wider variety of products and services, while spreading technological
advancements across the country and internationally (Boylaud, 2000[36]).
Similarly to other ASEAN member states, Cambodia is suffering from the socio-economic impact of the
COVID-19 outbreak. The pandemic has resulted in the disruption of supply chains and limited the flows of
trade and investments. Logistics companies have been affected by operational constraints and are facing
financial distress. According to the Cambodia Freight Forwarders Association (CAMFFA), about 10 to 15%
of logistics providers were heading for bankruptcy as of June 2020.32
2.1. Key figures of the logistics sector
2.1.1. Contribution of the logistics sector to GDP
GDP from the transportation and storage sector amounted to KHR 8 618 billion (approximately USD 2.1
billion) in 2019 and has been constantly increasing, as shown in Figure 2.1 below.33 The transportation
and storage sector represents 7.8% of the country’s economy.
In 2018, logistics costs over sales in Cambodia were estimated at 20.5% (transport (9.0%), warehousing
(3.7%), inventory carrying (6%) and logistics administration (1.9%)) (World Bank, 2018, p. 111[2]). Logistics
costs are higher in Cambodia compared to some ASEAN countries, such as Thailand and Viet Nam, and
compared to the global average of 10-12% (OECD, 2020, p. 25[36]).34 However, Cambodia’s logistics costs
are lower than other ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia (Table 2.1). The World Bank
also noted that that informal logistics charges levied by government agencies remain significant, estimated
at about 48% of the logistics administration cost (World Bank, 2018, p. 94[2]).

22 
Figure 2.1. GDP from transportation and storage sector (billion KHR)
9 000
8 000
7 000
6 000
5 000
4 000
3 000
2 000
1 000
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: ADB, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2020, https://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-2020.
Table 2.1. Logistics costs over sales by components (%)
Activity/Sales Cambodia Vietnam Thailand Indonesia Philippines
Transport 9.0 7.0 5.6 8.8 10.7
Warehousing 3.7 3.8 2.5 3.5 5.2
Inventory carrying 6.0 4.0 2.0 7.2 8.8
Logistics administration 1.9 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.5
Logistics cost/sales 20.5 16.3 11.1 21.4 27.2
Source: (World Bank, 2018, p. 111[2]).
2.1.2. Infrastructure
The World Bank collects data on the quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure and provides an
aggregate indicator across 160 countries. This indicator captures logistics professionals’ perception of the
quality of a country’s trade and transport-related infrastructure, including ports, railways, roads and
information technology, on a scale that ranges from one (very low quality) to five (very high quality).
As shown in Figure 2.2, the indicator for Cambodia (2.1 in 2018) is lower than most ASEAN Member
States. The indicator ranges between 1 (lowest) and 5 (highest). Despite significant investment and
improvements in recent years, Cambodia’s transport infrastructure is still inadequate in terms of both
quantity and quality (OECD, 2018, p. 199[37]). Improving transport infrastructure in Cambodia would seem
essential in order to reduce logistics costs which remain relatively high when compared to other ASEAN
member states.

 23
Figure 2.2. Quality of trade and transport-related infrastructure
2016 2018
4.5
3.5
2.5
1.5
1
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
Darussalam
Source: World Bank and Turku School of Economics, Logistic Performance Index Surveys, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/L
P.LPI.OVRL.XQ.
Road transport
Road transport is the main mode of transportation in Cambodia. It is estimated that the share of road
transportation for both passengers and freight represents around 90% (ADB, 2019, p. 2[1]). Cambodia’s
road network covers 61 543 kilometres, including 2 254 kilometres of national paved roads, 5 007
kilometres of inland national roads, of which 72% are paved, and 9 031 kilometres of provincial roads, of
which only 30% are paved. The remaining 45 242 kilometres are rural roads, of which only 5% are paved
(ADB, 2019, p. 1[1]).
The number of registered trucks more than doubled between 2008 and 2016 (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2. Number of trucks in Cambodia (2008-2017)
Year Number of registered trucks (in thousand)

2008 3.29
2009 3.24
2010 2.24
2011 2.89
2012 4.71
2013 5.13
2014 5.49
2015 6.21
2016 7.21
2017 6.26
Source: ASEAN Stats, https://data.aseanstats.org/indicator/ASE.TRP.ROD.B.008.

24 
Water transport
While water transport represents a smaller proportion of the freight transportation sector in Cambodia, it is
an important element for the country’s local economy and exports. Cambodia has two international ports -
Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP) and Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (SAP)35 - as well as inland
waterways for freight and passenger traffic. The PPAP and the SAP are operated by SOEs and overseen
by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).
SAP is the only deep-water seaport in Cambodia and in 2018 recorded container throughput of 541 228
TEUs.36 While not being a deep-water seaport, the import-export volume through PPAP in 2018 was higher
than that of SAP.37 The volume handled by both ports recorded solid growth in 2019 where SAP handled
633 099 TEUs and PPAP handled 275 000 TEUs.38
Railway transport
Rail transport for passenger and freight is negligible in Cambodia compared to road transport. Cambodia’s
rail network covers 640 kilometres. It consists of two main axes: the Northern line, which links Phnom Penh
to the Thai border at Poi Pet, crossing Battambang and the Southern line, which links Phnom Penh to the
port of Sihanoukville. Rail freight transport was almost inexistent in 2010, due to serious deterioration of
the rail infrastructure (Figure 2.3). The Southern line reopened to freight traffic in 2013, mostly for bulky,
non-perishable goods such as rice and petroleum. The Northern line is still undergoing significant
rehabilitation (OECD, 2018, p. 200[37]). The figure below shows the development of rail freight traffic in
Cambodia.
Figure 2.3. Rail freight traffic volume, in thousand tonnes, 1998-2017
Southern Line Nothern Line
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: (ADB, 2019, p. 11[1]).
2.1.3. International trade and connectivity
Transport-service exports
Following a similar positive trend as global markets in recent years,39 Cambodia’s exports of transport
services have grown over the last ten years. The most recent figures show exports amounted to
approximately USD 793 million in 2019 (Table 2.3).

 25
Table 2.3. Cambodia’s total trade in transport services (millions of USD)
2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Transport-service exports 136 226 419 456 562 688 793
Transport-service imports 361 604 1 207 1 298 1 441 1 461 1 671
Transport-service trade balance -225 -378 -787 -842 -879 -773 -878
Source: UNCTADStat, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/MaritimeProfile/en-GB/116/index.html.
Liner shipping
Figure 2.4 shows Cambodia and other comparable ASEAN countries’ Annual Liner Shipping Connectivity
Index rating, which shows countries’ levels of integration into the global networks of liner shipping. 40 Since
2006, Cambodia’s connectivity index has been increasing, passing from 3.6 out of 100 in 2006 to 9.4 in
Q4 2020, although it remains lower than that of the majority of other ASEAN countries.
Figure 2.4. Annual Liner Shipping Connectivity Index, (maximum 2006=100)
Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Myanmar

Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Q4 2020
Source: UNCTADStat, generated from data provided by MDS Transmodal, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?Re

portId=96618.
Figure 2.5 shows Cambodia’s position on the Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI), which
tracked with which countries Cambodia had the strongest bilateral connections in 2020.41 This is a crucial
determinant of bilateral exports, as there is a close relationship between bilateral maritime liner-shipping
connectivity and exports in containerised goods: evidence shows that a lack of a direct maritime connection
with a country results in lower values of exports to that country (Fugazza and Hoffmann, 2017[38]).

26 
Figure 2.5. Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI), 2020
Thailand
Hong Kong (China)
China
Viet Nam
Singapore
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Taiwan (China)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Note: Leading partners: 0 minimum, 1 maximum.

Source: UNCTADStat, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96618.
2.1.4. Logistics rankings
As seen in Table 2.4 in 2018, Cambodia ranked 98 out of 160 countries in the Logistics Performance Index
(LPI), a drop from 73 in 2016.
Table 2.4. LPI overall ranking (2018)

Overall ranking Country
1 Germany
2 Sweden
3 Belgium
4 Austria
5 Japan
6 Netherlands
7 Singapore
8 Denmark
9 United Kingdom
10 Finland
[…]
32 Thailand
39 Viet Nam
41 Malaysia
46 Indonesia
60 Philippines
80 Brunei Darussalam
82 Lao PDR
98 Cambodia
137 Myanmar

 27
As noted in Box 2.1, the score ranges between 1 (lowest) and 5 (highest). Analysis of each of the six
indicators suggests that infrastructure (with a score of 2.14) is the most challenging area for Cambodia.
Cambodia scores relatively well in timeliness (3.16) and international shipments (2.79).
Box 2.1. Logistics Performance Index

The World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI) benchmarks countries’ performances in the logistics
sector from 1 – lowest – to 5 – highest – to create an overall LPI index that allows for worldwide, regional
and income-group country comparison.
The LPI uses the weighted average of a country’s scores meeting six key criteria.
1. Efficiency – speed, simplicity and predictability – of clearance processes by border-control
agencies, including customs.
2. Quality of trade- and transport-related infrastructure.
3. Ease of arranging competitively priced shipments.
4. Competence and quality of logistics services, such as transport operators and customs brokers.
5. Ability to track and trace consignments.
6. Timeliness of shipments arriving within the scheduled or expected delivery time.
Source: (World Bank, 2018[3]).
Cambodia has taken several actions in order to improve the country’s logistics performance. One of the
key actions was the establishment in 2016 of National Logistics Council (NLC). NLC is chaired by the
Deputy Prime Minister and comprises all the main national stakeholders including the Ministry of Public
Works and Transport (MPWT), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), the Council for the
Development of Cambodia (CDC), Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and Supreme National Economic Council
(SNEC). NLC is supported by National Logistics Steering Committee (NLSC) and General Department for
Logistics (GDL) in order to deal with transport and logistics issues and sector policy development (World
Bank, 2018[2]).
2.2. Key stakeholders
2.2.1. Government stakeholders and institutional framework
The Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) was established under the Law on the Establishment
of Royal Kram No. Ns/RKAM/0196/03 dated 24 January 1996. The MPWT oversees public and private
transport in Cambodia. The Ministry has eight Departments, including the General Department of Land
Transport, the General Department of Waterway and Maritime Transport, and Ports, and the General
Department of Logistics.
The Ministry also oversees the Municipal and Provincial Department of Public Works and Transport,
Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, Phnom Penh Autonomous Port, Kampuchea Shipping Agency and
Brokers (KAMSAB)42 and the Laboratory of Construction and Public Works.43

28 
Box 2.2. MPWT’s functions and duties

In carrying out its mission, the MPWT has the following main functions and duties:
 “Prepare, implement and monitor the implementation of the Royal Government of Cambodia's
policy and national strategic plan for the development of the public works and transport sectors.
 Manage, monitor, study, research, design and evaluate the construction, development, repair
and maintenance of roads, bridges, ferries, railways, rivers, seas, ports, logistics and other
works related to public works and transportation.
 Manage, monitor and evaluate transportation businesses (land, sea, railway and logistics) and
other work related to the public works and transport sectors.
 Manage, evaluate, recognize and certify construction business services that serve the public
and transport sectors, prepare draft laws, guidelines and legal documents related to the public
and transport sectors, and monitor the implementation of letters.
 Prepare, manage and disseminate technical regulations or new technical standards and
technologies to ensure the quality of construction of public infrastructure, railway construction
and port construction.
 Collaborate with relevant ministries and institutions to lead and participate in the implementation
of the Royal Government's strategic policy on international cooperation in the field of public
works and transport and the integration of the Kingdom of Cambodia into the sub-regional and
global framework. Private sector participates in the development of the public and transport
sectors of the Kingdom of Cambodia.
 Develop human resources by encouraging the study, research, technology and transfer of new
technologies to the development of public works and transport”.
Source: Adapted from the functions and duties mentioned under “Mission” on the website of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport,
see https://www.mpwt.gov.kh/en/about-us/mission-and-vision.
The MPWT is in charge of licensing processes for the operation of land logistics businesses. Applicants
are able to apply for the licence online.44
As mentioned above, the General Department of Waterway and Maritime Transport, and Ports is one
of the MPWT’s Departments and has four sub-departments:
 Department of Waterway Transport
 Department of Maritime Transport
 Department of Port Administration
 Department of Waterway Infrastructure and Port Construction
The General Department of Waterway and Maritime Transport and Ports has issued a Draft Port Law, a
Draft Law on Maritime Transport and a Draft Law on Inland Waterway Transport.
Through administrative decisions, the MPWT, along with the MEF sets prices in Cambodia’s two
international ports, Phnom Penh Autonomous Port and Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (World Bank, 2018,
p. 48[39]).
The General Department of Land Transport is responsible for safety and technical requirements of
commercial vehicles and licences technical inspection centres.

 29
The General Department of Logistics is responsible for formulating and implementing logistics related
policies.
In addition to the MPWT, the following ministries hold relevant responsibilities for the logistics sector:
 Ministry of Land Management. It oversees construction law, and relevantly, stipulates the
technical requirements for warehouses.
 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPTC). It oversees the post, telecommunications
and ICT sectors in Cambodia.45 Under the Department of postal management control, the MPTC
issues licences to postal operators. Cambodia Post is known as an “autonomous unit” under
MPTC.
 Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF). Its functions and organisation are described in Sub-
Decree No.488 of the Government dated 16 October 2013. One of its functions is to oversee and
manage public enterprises (SOEs).46
 Ministry of Commerce. The Consumer Protection, Competition and Fraud Repression Directorate
General, Department of Competition is in charge of competition policy in Cambodia. The draft
competition law is pending finalisation.47
2.2.2. State-owned enterprises
Because of considerable privatisation efforts, Cambodia has few state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (OECD,
2018, p. 26[41]). The following SOEs are active in the logistics sector, as either market players or regulators
with a corporate structure.
Cambodia Post provides domestic and international postal services. Cambodia Post is regulated by the
MPTC and wholly owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Based on publicly available information,
Cambodia Post recorded USD 13.3 million revenue in 2018 and pre-tax profits of USD 1.3 million. Its
revenue steadily increased since 2010, when it initially recorded USD 2.16 million.48
Port Authority of Phnom Penh is the port authority and operator of the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port
(PPAP). It is under the supervision of the MPWT and the Ministry of Finance. PPAP is an international river
port. The Port Authority operates the five terminals within the port. In 2018, PPAP’s recorded revenue was
USD 20 722 928, operating income USD 8 852 532 and net profit USD 8 100 738.49 The PPAP was listed
on the Cambodian Securities Exchange in 2015. 50 The Ministry of Economy and Finance holds 80% of
the shares.
Port Authority of Sihanoukville is the port authority and operator of the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port
(PAS). PAS is Cambodia’s only deep-water port and second international port. It is located on the bay of
Kampong on the Gulf of Thailand. PAS was listed on the Cambodian Securities Exchange in 2017. The
Ministry of Economy and Finance holds 75% of shares.
2.2.3. Main trade associations and logistics companies
The main trade associations active in the logistics sector in Cambodia include:
Cambodia Freight Forwarders Association (CAMFFA) was established in 2004 and has more than 100
companies registered as members. Members provide a range of logistics services including trucking,
custom brokerage, land, air, maritime freight transport and warehousing services.
Cambodia Trucking Association (CAMTA) has been active since 2004 and is registered under the Law
on Associations of the Ministry of Interior. CAMTA liaises with government authorities, as a representative
of trucking companies in Cambodia and works with other logistics-related associations, such as CAMFFA.
Most of its members are large container truck companies. To be a member of CAMTA, members must be
a legal entity and have at least three trucks.

30 

 31
3 Overview of the legislation in the

logistics sector in Cambodia
Following desk based research and the fact finding mission, the OECD identified 28 pieces of legislation
related to the logistics sector, including international agreements.
Table 3.1. Number of screened pieces of legislation, restrictions and recommendations
Sector Legislation analysed Restrictions found Recommendations

Freight transport Road 3 9 3
Maritime 9 26 17
Freight forwarding and warehousing 7 3 1
Small-package delivery 3 4 3
International agreements 6 8 6
Total 28 50 30
Source: OECD.
A summary of the pieces of legislation reviewed by the OECD, the number of barriers identified, and the
recommendations made in this report are summarised below, while all barriers and recommendations are
set out in Annex B.
3.1. Road freight transport
The main pieces of legislation affecting freight transport by road are:

 The Law on Land Traffic. Its objective is to ensure road safety in Cambodia. It sets out rules
relating to traffic, registration of vehicles, driving and transport operation licences, inspection of
vehicles and inspection operation licences. It also provides the powers of the authorities’ in
applying these rules and associated penalties.
 The Law on Road. Its objective is to ensure management and development of road infrastructure
in Cambodia. It provides for rules relating to the development and maintenance of roads,
specification of vehicles (e.g., weight and dimensions) and penalties for the violation of its
provisions.
The OECD has identified nine restrictive regulations for road freight transport and makes three
recommendations. This report will outline the recommendation on staffing requirements in the operation of
road freight transport. Other barriers are set out in the Annex and are characterised more as administrative
burdens.

32 
3.1.1. Staffing requirement
Description of the obstacle. Article 7 of the Law on Land Traffic provides for a so-called multi-manning
requirement in the operation of certain freight transport vehicles. Pursuant to this provision, a freight
transport vehicle with a total weight of more than 16 tonnes must have a driver and an assistant driver.
This requirement appears to apply irrespective of travel time, distance or rest periods taken by drivers.
Harm to competition. The requirement to have at least two drivers could restrict the ability of small and
medium businesses with fewer drivers to compete effectively in the road freight transport market in
Cambodia. Given the requirement, these businesses may not be able to serve many customers at the
same time.
Policymaker’s objective. The OECD understands that the multi-manning requirement aims to ensure
road safety. The fact that the requirement is only applicable to freight transport vehicles with a total weight
of more than 16 tonnes suggests that the requirement aims to ensure road safety by securing sufficient
rest for drivers operating heavy trucks, also considering that many roads in Cambodia are not paved.
However, it would seem that such an objective can also be achieved by less restrictive measures such as
appropriate rest requirements. In this case, travel may take longer since the vehicle would stop more
frequently, compared to a scenario with two drivers. Businesses may have the flexibility to select which
option would be preferable, depending on their customers’ needs. It could also be envisaged to limit the
application of the requirement to long travel in terms of time and distance.
International comparison. In the European Union, Regulation 561/2006 lays down rules on driving times,
breaks and rest periods for drivers engaged in the carriage of goods and passengers by road. Among other
things, it imposes the maximum daily driving time of 9 hours and a break of at least 45 minutes after a
driving period of no more than 4.5 hours.
Under the regulation, multi-manning is not a requirement but an option for operators allowing more flexible
working hours and rest requirements. More precisely, where a given operation is qualified as multi-manning
within the meaning of the regulation, 51 each driver can take their daily rest period of 9 hours within the
30-hour period, instead of the normal 24 hour period. This allows drivers’ duties to spread over 21 hours
as illustrated in the table below:
Table 3.2. Example of multi-manning operation in the EU, 30-hour period
Driver 1 Driver 2
Daily rest Daily rest
Other work 1 hour Daily rest (not on vehicle)
Driving 4.5 hours Availability 4.5 hours
Break + availability 4.5 hours Driving 4.5 hours
Driving 4.5 hours Break + availability 4.5 hours
Break + availability 4.5 hours Driving 4.5 hours
Driving 1 hour Driving 1 hour
Break 1 hour Break 1 hour
Daily rest 9 hours Daily rest 9 hours
Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32006R0561.
Recommendation. The OECD recommends offering additional options to ensure safety, so that transport
operators can select the most suitable option for their needs. For instance, rest requirements could be
envisaged to achieve the same policy objective.

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3.2. Maritime freight transport
There is no primary legislation for maritime (sea and inland waterways) and ports. These sectors are
currently governed by other legal instruments such as decrees, sub-decrees, regulations and guidelines.
The OECD understands that laws covering these sectors are being drafted. Various organisations have
noted that the lack of sector legislation is a challenge for the Ministry of Public Works and Transport
(MPWT) in being able to carry out its functions. 52
Under the current framework, the main pieces of legislation affecting the freight transport by inland water
sector are:
 Circular #003 on management of means of water transport
The main pieces of legislation affecting the freight transport by sea sector are:
 Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1994
 Circular No 006 (MPWT) on Management of sea navigation (1 October 1999)
3.2.1. Licensing regimes and vessel registration
To conduct an inland water transport business, operators must obtain a business licence from the Ministry
of Public Works and Transport (MPWT).53 The legislation sets out the obligations of licence holders and
the supervisory functions of the MPWT.54 To operate international transport, operators with their
headquarters in Cambodia must obtain a business licence from the Department of Commercial Vessels of
the MPWT.55 The legislation sets out the obligations of licence holders and the supervisory functions of
the MPWT. Vessels must also be registered under the Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1994.
3.2.2. Ports
The Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) has the role of port regulator, formulating and
executing the rules and regulations related to ports. 56 It implements the National Policy on Port and Port
Administration dated 10 May 2013, which seeks to develop the Cambodian port sector. It sets out four key
strategies: the development of the legal and institutional framework, the development of infrastructure,
human resource development and research and compilation of statistics and information. 57
Circular 070 dated 27 December 2011 concerns the establishment and operation of ports in Cambodia. It
sets out the submission of and evaluation of the port construction plan, the port construction permit and
the port operation permit.
The main legal texts and policies affecting the port sector are:
 Circular No. 70 dated 27 December 2011 on Port Construction and Operation
 National Policy on Port and Port Administration dated 10 May 2013
In relation to Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (SAP), the main legal texts analysed include:
 Sub-Decree # 50 (RGC) on Establishment of Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (PAS) (July 17, 1998)
 Ministry of Public Works and Transport Prakas 053 on the Determination of Service Fees for Each
Port of Service and other Taxes of the Port Authority of Sihanoukville (17 January 1997).58
In relation to Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP), the main legal texts analysed include:
Sub-Decree # 51 (RGC) on Establishment of Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP) (July 17,
1998) (Sub-decree 51).

34 
 Inter-Ministerial Prakas # 561 (MEF+MPWT) on Management of Rental Fees and Fees for Using
Domestic Port, Passenger Terminal and Phnom Penh Port Centre (September 6, 2002)
(Prakas 561).
The OECD team identified 26 restrictive regulations for transport of freight by sea or inland waterway and
made 17 recommendations concerning the following topics.
 Provision of port services by third parties
 Regulation of port tariffs
 Vessel registration
 Permits and authorisations
 Operational restrictions
3.2.3. Provision of port services by third parties
Description of the obstacle. The Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP) and the Sihanoukville
Autonomous Port (SAP) follow a public service port management model. The port authority owns the
infrastructure and superstructure and provides port services (World Bank, 2018, p. 60[2]). The
responsibilities of the port authority are set out in the legislation. In the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port, for
example, legal instruments explain that the port authority is responsible for providing port services. 59 The
port authority is also in charge of “organizing buildings, warehouses, land areas/premises, and water
surface in the business centre of the Phnom Penh Port” and shall charge fees for the use of the facilities
or to those who operate businesses within the Port centre. 60 The World Bank described PPAP as a “one-
stop shop” in its provision of “lift-on and lift-off, stripping and stuffing, survey, dredging, compulsory pilotage
and warehousing”. The participation of private operators is limited to “container repair and maintenance
services” while in SAP, there is more private participation, notably in container freight stations and
warehousing (World Bank, 2018, p. 61[3]). The OECD understands that the authority can outsource
services, and that, as an SOE, it would need to comply with the public procurement regime when doing so
(See Box 3.1 on OECD best practices in public procurement, concessions and fighting bid rigging). 61
Harm to competition. The authority is the provider of services within the port. Exclusive rights may lead
to monopoly pricing and potentially the provision of lower quality services. In addition, the current service
provider was not awarded those rights following an open tender. Therefore, there was no competition for
the market, in order to select the most suitable service provider, based on variables such as prices and
quality of service. The World Bank has described the high cost of port services in Cambodia when
compared to Viet Nam and Thailand, noting that “the provision of important maritime auxiliary services is
currently monopolized by state-owned enterprises, leaving a large gap for competition to improve services’
quality and delivery” (World Bank, 2018, p. 48[39]). If a policy decision was made in favour of private
involvement in the provision of port services, authorities should consider OECD best practices in
concessions (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1. OECD best practices in public procurement, concessions and fighting bid rigging
The operation of ports or terminals (and the provision of certain port services) often function as
concessions or public-private partnerships governed by similar rules to public procurement. The
OECD’s comprehensive work on public procurement has led the organisation’s council to make a
number of recommendations, including:
 a public-procurement system should be transparent at all stages of the procurement cycle

 35
 the integrity of a public-procurement system should be preserved through general standards

and procurement-specific safeguards, such as internal training, and compliance measures for
relevant stakeholders
 access to procurement opportunities for potential competitors of all sizes should be facilitated
 transparent and effective stakeholder participation should be fostered in the design of public-
procurement systems
 digital technologies should be employed to support appropriate e-procurement innovation
throughout the procurement cycle to the greatest extent possible
 workforces should receive training to develop their public-procurement know-how
 oversight and control mechanisms should be applied to support accountability throughout the
public-procurement cycle, including appropriate complaint and sanctions processes.
The OECD has also worked specifically on concessions and highlighted the importance of concession
design. One crucial factor is the duration of the contract, as this can have a significant effect on
investment. For example, while a longer period encourages the concessionaire to make the necessary
infrastructure investments at the beginning of the period that incentive diminishes as the concession
nears its end.
How a concession is awarded is also critical. Auctions are considered the most effective award method.
Although negotiations are an option, experience has shown that public authorities are sometimes at a
disadvantage to their private-sector counterparts. It is also important that a country’s competition
authority is involved in the concession process, including in tender design.
The OECD has also undertaken significant work on the design of pro-competitive tenders and fighting
bid rigging.1 The OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement are part of the OECD
Council Recommendation adopted in 2012, which encourages governments to assess their public-
procurement laws and practices to promote more effective procurement and reduce the risk of bid
rigging in public tenders. The Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging help to identify:
 markets in which bid rigging is more likely to occur
 methods to maximise the number of bids
 best practices for tender specifications, requirements and award criteria
 procedures that inhibit communication among bidders and;
 suspicious pricing patterns, statements, documents and behaviour by firms.
Note: 1 For an overview of the OECD’s work in procurement reform, see
www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/fightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm.
Source: The OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement (www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/OECD-Recommendation-on-Public-
Procurement.pdf); the OECD Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement
(www.oecd.org/daf/competition/RecommendationOnFightingBidRigging2012.pdf) and the Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public
Procurement (www.oecd.org/daf/competition/guidelinesforfightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm). Adapted from (OECD, 2019[41]).
Policymaker’s objective. The monopoly of the port authority in the provision of port services likely reflects
a primary concern for the safety of port operations, including the protection of port infrastructure, prevention
of environmental hazards, and controlling maritime traffic in the port area.
Recommendations. The OECD recommends considering the advantages and disadvantages of the
provision of port services by private entities. If a policy decision was made in favour of private involvement
in the provision of port services, the authorities should create appropriate legal frameworks so that the
provision of port services could be tendered based on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms to
guarantee competition for the market.

36 
3.2.4. Regulation of port tariffs
Description of the obstacle. Currently, the MPWT and the MEF set prices in Cambodia’s two international
ports, Phnom Penh Autonomous Port and Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, through administrative
decisions (World Bank, 2018, p. 48[39]). Tariffs can be changed by the Board of Directors of the port
authority, which contain representatives of Cambodian ministries (World Bank, 2018, p. 63[39]).
In relation to the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (SAP), the Ministry of Public Works and Transport has
set a framework for port tariffs, which can be charged by the port. 62 This decision refers to a proposal of
Sihanoukville Port Authority (dated 22 October 1996). The annex sets out, for example, tonnage dues,
berthage dues, pilotage charges, tug-boat assistance charges, stevedoring charges, container handling
charges and storage charges. Most charges are fixed, with discounts or additional fees applicable if specific
conditions are met. For pilotage charges, for example, rates are fixed but there is also a minimum rate that
must be paid by a vessel. The OECD understands that this document is still in force but that the port
authority can change these tariffs with permission from its board of directors. Several announcements have
been made by the SAP to amend tariffs and conditions.63
For the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port (PPAP), there is an Inter-Ministerial Prakas of the MPWT and MEF,
which sets out fixed rental fees and fees for using the domestic port, passenger terminal and Phnom Penh
Port Centre. This Prakas does not cover fees at the International Port. The OECD understands that there
is no price regulation set by the Ministry but that the PPAP publishes its tariffs on its website. 64
Harm to competition. Price regulation in the provision of port charges and port services may limit
operators’ ability to set their prices and prevent them from competing on price. This can lead to inefficient
outcomes as prices do not adjust to supply and demand and can alter the competitive structure of a given
product or market.
In particular, when minimum prices are set above what the market would have set consumers pay higher
prices while consuming less, and can be worse off than without government intervention. Moreover, higher
prices keep inefficient, high-cost suppliers in the market, which may result in excess supply (with more
output than real demand), preventing a more efficient reallocation of resources. Finally, minimum prices
dampen competition between firms and prevent more efficient firms from innovating or increasing
productivity to offer lower prices and increased quality to consumers in order to capture market share.
Beyond their distortionary impacts, minimum prices can be challenging for governments to put in place.
They are often set with the objective of ensuring that suppliers cover their costs and achieve a reasonable
rate of return. This process is not straightforward, however, and assumptions regarding costs can be
crucial.
Maximum prices can similarly lead to significant problems in market functioning. In practice, a maximum
price can act as a focal point for firms, limiting price competition since firms will seek to charge a price as
close as possible to the market price. It may lead to consumer demand outstripping supply, making
shortages more likely. This form of price regulation does protect consumers and allows some form of
competition as operators can grant discounts. However, firms that would have been able to compete in an
efficient market may be forced to exit if they are unable to earn a sufficient return to cover their costs. It is
therefore important that maximum prices enable operators to recover their costs, including a reasonable
rate of return.
Some studies suggest that the current tariffs in Cambodian ports are excessive. According to the OECD
Investment Policy Review “a recent cost benchmarking exercise carried out by members of EuroCham
Cambodia (2016) suggest that port dues and charges relating to comparable vessels are 3.7 times higher
at Sihanoukville than at Cai Mep, Viet Nam” (OECD, 2018, p. 202[41]). As discussed above, the World Bank
has found that port-related services in Cambodia are high when compared with like services in Thailand
and Viet Nam (World Bank, 2018, p. 48[2]).

 37
Policymaker’s objective. Fixed or maximum rates seek to protect port users from excessive prices. In
the case of a natural monopoly or where competition is limited, price regulation prevents operators from
taking advantage of their position.
Recommendation. Only maximum prices should be stipulated in any framework for setting port dues and
charges. Maximum prices should only be set when there is a lack of competition. Maximum prices should
be regularly revised to ensure they are in line with market dynamics and provide the necessary incentives
for innovation.
3.2.5. Vessel registration: discretion of the decision maker
Description of the obstacle. Under the Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1994, the Ministry has
discretion to waive requirements for a specific applicant, 65 to refuse registration without reason,66 and to
cancel a certificate of registry “in the public interest”.67
Harm to competition. The discretion to waive any requirements for registration, to refuse registration and
to cancel a certificate of registry could result in actual or perceived bias towards certain operators. The
registration requirements should be the same for all applicants, otherwise some operators will be benefit if
they are required to satisfy fewer criteria. Unfettered discretion could also give rise to irregularities in the
registration process.
Policymaker’s objective. The OECD has not identified any policy objective for the Ministry’s discretion.
Recommendation. The OECD makes two cumulative recommendations:
1. Limit the discretion of the decision maker by removing the discretion or by providing clear, detailed
and transparent guidelines, which set out the criteria for the exercise of discretion.
2. Ensure applicants have the right to reasons for the decision taken by the Ministry in relation to
registration.
3.2.6. Permits and authorisations
Business licence for international sea transport: licence conditions
Description of the obstacle. Under Chapter V (I) of Circular 006, a business licence issued by the
Department of Commercial Vessels is required to conduct a foreign or cross border shipping business.
The business licence is valid for one year and “can be used for one single purpose irrespective of the
location in the same provincial/municipality”. Under Chapter V (II), a second business licence must be
obtained, whenever there is 1) a change of the destination or 2) a change of business objectives. The
OECD thus understands, from reading Chapter V in full, that the business licence is linked to a specific
foreign or cross border destination and to a specific business objective and that there are no further
regulations governing this licence.
Harm to competition. The requirement that the business licence be used for one single purpose and for
a specific destination may create a geographical barrier or limit the ability of operators to provide different
services. The requirement to apply for a second business licence when the applicant wishes to change
destination or business objective restricts the ability of the business owner to adapt flexibly to changing
market conditions and to take advantage of new opportunities. It imposes an additional administrative
burden and may cause delays for service providers.
Policymaker’s objective. The licence requirement itself is likely in place to control market entry. The
OECD has not identified the policy objective behind the condition for the business licence to be used for a
“single purpose” and the geographic limitation, other than the general principle that the public authority
aims to ensure quality of service.

38 
Recommendation. The OECD recommends to clarify “single purpose” and any geographical restriction.
Consider removing the requirement to stipulate a single destination and business objective in the licensing
process and the requirement to obtain a second business licence.
3.2.7. Operational restrictions
Approval to undertake repairs and re-inspection requirements
Description of the obstacle. Inland water and sea transport operators are required to obtain approval to
undertake repairs of their vessels and are subject to inspection requirements once repairs have been
carried out.68
Harm to competition. The approval requirement for repairs and the requirement for re-inspection after
the repairs have been carried out may increase costs for operators. Approvals and re-inspections are an
administrative burden and may cause delays and decrease the efficiency of business operations as
business owners must wait longer to introduce repaired vessels to the market. This permission requirement
may be stricter that what is needed for consumer protection if the mechanic, shipyard or vessel repair yard
is already licensed by the authority.
Policymaker’s objective. The approval and re-inspection requirements are likely in place to ensure safety
and that repairs are carried out properly.69
Recommendation. Approval and ex-post inspections should only be required for significant renovations,
not day-to-day repairs if these repairs are carried out by a certified mechanic or at an authorised shipyard
or repair site.
3.3. Freight forwarding and Warehouses
3.3.1. Freight forwarding
The freight forwarding sector is not regulated. There is no specific licence required to operate a freight
forwarding business. Operators only require a general business licence with freight forwarding as the
purpose of this licence. Customs brokerage is, however, regulated and operators require a specific
licence.70
The OECD thus identified no restrictive regulations for freight forwarding. It identified the licensing
requirement for customs brokers but makes no recommendation as it did not identify any restrictive
licensing requirements.
3.3.2. Warehousing
The OECD understands that there are two types of warehouses in Cambodia: general warehouses and
warehouses for temporary storage of goods awaiting customs clearance. There is currently no regulatory
regime for general warehouses. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) is currently drafting
a “warehousing business regulation”, which would impose a licensing regime for general warehouses.
Warehouses used for temporary storage of goods awaiting customs clearance are licensed by the General
Department of Customs and Excise.
The main pieces of legislation affecting the warehousing sector generally are:
 The Constitution and the Land Law (2001) in relation to land ownership requirements;
 Law on Investment (as amended in 2003).

 39
Article 44 of the Constitution explains, all persons, individually or collectively, shall have the right to
ownership. Only Cambodian legal entities (with more than 51% of shares held by Cambodians) and citizens
of Cambodian nationality shall have the right to own land. Legal private ownership is protected by the law.
This is reaffirmed by Article 8 of the Land law. According to the OECD Investment Policy Review:
Cambodia 2018, the interests of foreign investors are protected through the available legal instruments
such as “long-term leases for 15 years or more renewable, the creation of security interests (mortgage)
and other contractual arrangements)” (OECD, 2018, p. 97[41]).
The main pieces of legislation affecting customs warehouses are:
 Law on Customs dated 20 July 2007 (Customs Law) and various Prakas which detail the
requirements for Customs Bonded Warehouses and Customs Temporary Storage Warehouses.71
The OECD identified two restrictive regulations for warehouses and made one recommendation. This is
set out in the Annex and relates to administrative burdens in customs warehouses.
3.4. Small-package delivery services
The main legislation affecting the small-package delivery service (SPDS) sector is the Law on Postal
Sector of 11 July 2002 (Postal Law). The OECD understands that the Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (MPTC) is currently drafting a new Postal Law. It is expected to be finished by the
end of 2021 and implemented in early 2022. The new law is projected to change up to 80% of the current
law.72
3.4.1. Overview of types of licences and scope of licences
Pursuant to articles 16 and 23 of the Postal Law, the MPTC issues licences to fulfil postal services.
Accordingly, both foreign and domestic SPDS providers are required to obtain a licence from the MPTC to
operate in Cambodia.
According to the MPTC, Joint Prakas 1120 dated 10 Nov 2006 sets out the licensing regime for
international postal services and specifically international express mail. The OECD understands that the
licensing regime set out in this Joint Prakas also applies to operators who provide SPDS in Cambodia. It
therefore applies to both domestic and international SPDS operators. According to Joint Prakas 1120,
MPTC must make a decision on whether to issue a licence within 15 days from receipt of an application
yet the OECD understands that the process often takes longer. The licence is valid for one year and can
be extended upon application to MPTC within 30 days prior to the licence expiry date. Inter-Ministerial
Prakas 498 on Provision of Service Fees of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication dated 08 May
2018, sets out the relevant licence fee (KHR 4 200 000).
The OECD team identified four restrictive regulations in the SPDS sector and made three
recommendations concerning restrictions on operations, notably price regulation and the monopoly on the
provision of specific services.
3.4.2. Restrictions on operations
Price regulation
Description of the obstacle. Under the Postal Law, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
(MPTC) has the competence to fix service fees and set standard documents in relation to “postage
charges”, “service fees”, fee exemptions and discounts. 73 These concepts are not defined in the Postal
Law.

40 
Harm to competition. The Ministry’s discretion to set postage charges, service fees and exemptions may
prevent price competition. If operators are obliged to follow fixed rates, they are unable to set their own
prices and to compete on price (e.g. they will not be able to undercut prices of rivals in order to gain market
share). Further, the discretion may create legal uncertainty, thus discouraging potential entrants.
Policymaker’s objective. The discretion to set charges and fix rates of the universal service provider may
be a means of protecting consumers from monopoly pricing or supporting the universal service obligation.
The discretion to set charges and fix rates of non-universal service providers may aim to protect the
universal service provider from “unfair” competition. However, the OECD understands that there is
currently no price regulation for the postal sector in Cambodia, including for commercial services and those
provided by Cambodia Post.
International comparison. In other ASEAN countries (e.g. Philippines, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam)
there is no price regulation of courier services. In the EU, Article 12 of the Postal Directive provides
guidelines for regulating prices of universal postal services only. Such prices should be regulated only "for
each of the services forming part of the provision of the universal service".
Recommendation. Amend the legislation to remove any ability to regulate the rates of small package delivery
services (SPDS). The legislation should reflect current practice where there is no price regulation of SPDS
and where SPDS providers are free to set their own prices.
Monopoly on the provision of specific services
Description of the obstacle. Under the Postal Law, private businesses can carry out postal services,
which are not carried out by the state postal business.74 The extent of this monopoly (or possible monopoly)
is not clear. The OECD understands that the legislation only provides for Cambodia Post to have a
monopoly for mail or letters that weigh less than 500 grammes. This is set out in Joint Prakas 1120.
According to the MPTC, this provision is not enforced in practice and so Cambodia Post operates in
competition with other market players for all of its services.
Harm to competition. Depending on the extent of this prohibition, this may prevent operators from
providing certain services, which may limit their operations. The mere existence of this provision in the
legislation results in legal uncertainty and may discourage market entry.
Policymaker’s objective. The OECD understands that the only relevant Prakas is Joint Prakas 1120,
which outlines a limited monopoly (mail or letters that weigh less than 500 grammes). The OECD
understands that in practice, private operators are able to provide these services as the relevant provision
is not enforced.
Recommendation. Clarify the Postal Law to ensure that the monopoly does not include small package
delivery services (i.e. courier services).
3.5. International agreements
Cambodia has concluded a number of multilateral agreements with other countries on international road
transport; it is a co-signatory of the Geneva Convention on Road Traffic (1949), the Protocol on Road
Signs and Signals (1949) and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Asian Highway Network (2016).
In addition to such international agreements, Cambodia has signed several ASEAN-wide regional
agreements.
In 2004, the heads of state and governments of all ASEAN countries signed the ASEAN Framework
Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors.75 The purpose of the agreement was to identify measures,
with precise timelines, that would enable the progressive and systematic integration of such priority sectors
within ASEAN. From the outset, logistics was not, however, included within the 11 priority sectors.76 In

 41
2006, the ASEAN Economic Ministers decided to add logistics as the 12th priority sector and developed a
Roadmap for the Integration of Logistics Services, adopted in 2007 and which included specific measures
to create an ASEAN single market “by strengthening ASEAN economic integration through liberalisation
and facilitation measures in the area of logistics services”.77
Cambodia is also a party to the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Transport Facilitation, which includes
more specific agreements:
 ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit (AFAFGIT);
 ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport (AFAFIST); and
 ASEAN Framework on Multimodal Transport (AFAMT).
Finally, there are a number of sub-regional agreements signed between Cambodia and its neighbours
such as Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam. These include:
 Memorandum of Understanding between and among Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam on road
transport (2013);
 Agreement between Cambodia and Viet Nam on waterway transportation (2010);
 Memorandum of Understanding between Cambodia and Thailand on the exchange of traffic rights
for cross border transport through the Aranyaprathet-Poipet border crossing points (2008); and
 Agreement between Cambodia and Lao PDR on road transport (1999) and Protocol for the
implementation of this agreement (2007);
 Agreement between Cambodia and Viet Nam on road transportation (1998), Protocol for the
implementation of this agreement (2005) and Memorandum of Understanding on types and
quantity of commercial motor vehicles for the implementation of these agreement and protocol
(2009).
The OECD team identified two types of restrictive provisions in these international logistic agreements and
made two recommendations, concerning the limited number of licences for cross-border road transport
and the cabotage restriction.
3.5.1. Limited number of licences for cross-border road transport
Description of the obstacle. Several international agreements reviewed by the OECD contain provisions
limiting the number of operators or vehicles that can provide cross-border road transport into Cambodia.
These agreements are:
 Memorandum of Understanding between and among Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam on
road transport (2013). Pursuant to this memorandum, the quota of commercial motor vehicles of
each contracting party is 150 vehicles for cross border transport. Article 7(2) explains that an
increase in this quota can be agreed upon by the contracting parties “from time to time” and “in the
basis of economic needs and mutual interest”. Article 7(3) provides that the agreed increase in
quota may be determined in the Addendum signed by all parties to the MOU. The OECD
understands that there has been no further amendment to this quota.
 Memorandum of Understanding between Cambodia and Thailand on the exchange of traffic
rights for cross border transport through the Aranyaprathet-Poipet border crossing points
(2008). Pursuant to this memorandum, in order to transport cargo by road from Cambodia to
Thailand, it is necessary to obtain a specific licence for each vehicle. This licence is nominative,
non-transferable and valid for one year. This memorandum further sets the number of licences for
non-scheduled passenger and cargo transportation at a maximum of 40. Article 9(6) then provides
for the possibility to discuss “from time to time” this maximum limit and consequently amend it. As
of 2018, the maximum number of licences under this MoU was 150.

42 
 Protocol for the implementation of the agreement between Cambodia and Lao PDR on road
transport (2007). Under this protocol, Lao PDR and Cambodia authorise licensed transport
operators (by the other contracting party) to provide inter-state transport of goods between their
territories (Article 13). Article 4 provides for an initial limit on the number of goods vehicles allowed
to perform cross-border transport (for an initial period of 12 months), to not more than 40 permits
per country. The same article provides that “thereafter, the quantities of transport vehicles shall be
discussed from time to time between the contracting parties”. According to Article 20, the parties
meet every year to review and discuss this protocol. The OECD understands that there has been
no further amendment to this quota.
 Memorandum of Understanding on types and quantity of commercial motor vehicles for the
implementation of the agreement and protocol between Cambodia and Viet Nam on road
transportation. Pursuant to this memorandum of understanding, the quota for commercial motor
vehicles for cross border transport is 150 vehicles. Before this agreement, there was a quota of 40
vehicles in place. Article 5 provides that “the increase in quota of commercial motor vehicles for
cross border transport between the contracting parties shall be discussed from time to time on the
basis of economic needs and mutual interest”. The agreement was signed on 17 March 2009 and
this provision was amended on 30 November 2012 to increase the quota of vehicles to 500 for
each contracting party. The two countries then agreed to introduce annual 100-vehicle permit
increases each year.
Harm to competition. All of the quotas discussed above limit the ability of some operators to provide cross
border transport. As pointed out by World Bank, several Cambodian trucking companies are not allowed
to operate in Thailand and Viet Nam and vice-versa beyond the allowed permit quota, which means that
they are required to trans-load goods in the immediate border area (OECD, 2018[41]). Restricting the
number of operators may reduce competition between suppliers and result in higher prices or lower quality
for customers. It is a barrier to entry if interested companies cannot then participate in the market.
Removing the need to trans-load goods in the immediate border area could lead to more efficient and
competitive logistics and support greater global value chain activities in Cambodia (OECD, 2018[41]).
Policymaker’s objective. The likely objective of these provisions seems to be road safety, avoiding traffic
congestion and protecting each country’s national road transport service providers against competition
from foreign companies.
Recommendation. The OECD recommends one of the following options.
1. Remove these restrictive provisions setting quotas and replace with a licence system. The licensing
criteria should be clearly defined in the international agreement or implementing laws or
regulations.
2. Assess market need and demand every one to three years, and consider adapting the number of
licences that can be issued.
Both these recommendations would require negotiations between signatory countries.
3.5.2. Cabotage agreement between Cambodia and Viet Nam
Description of the obstacle. The agreement between Cambodia and Viet Nam on waterway
transportation (2010) aims to establish a legal framework for the effective implementation of freedom of
navigation in the Mekong river system and create favourable conditions for transit and cross-border
navigation within the waterways designated by the agreement. It reduces a number of restrictions that
existed for cross-border navigation between Cambodia and Viet Nam.
This agreement nevertheless provides for a cabotage restriction. Cabotage is generally known as the
movement of goods between ports within the same country or coastal shipping. Pursuant to Article 10 of

 43
this agreement, “cabotage shall be served to vessels of the contracting party [Cambodia or Viet Nam] in
whose territory the relevant regulated waterways are located, unless the competent authority of that
contracting party grants an explicit derogation.” Article 11 however allows consecutive calls at ports or
terminals (e.g. loading goods consecutively at several ports or terminals within the territory of a contracting
party for the purpose of carrying them to the territory of the other contracting party or discharging goods
consecutively at several ports or terminals within the territory of a contracting party after having taken on
board these goods within the territory of the other contracting party).
Harm to competition. The prohibition on vessels that are allowed to carry out cross-border transport to
carry out general shipping within the domestic market of the contracting countries, prevents foreign firms
from entering the national freight transportation market.
Licenced vessels of the contracting parties that carry out cross border transport are however allowed to
make several stops within a foreign waterway to load/unload their goods. The OECD understands that
they cannot pick up additional goods (i.e. operate in the domestic shipping market). A similar exemption
was introduced in the Philippines to support imports and exports.
Policymaker’s objective. The policy objective behind the cabotage principle is to support and develop
the domestic shipping industries of the contracting parties as the provision does not allow permit holders
to operate in the domestic shipping market.
Recommendation. The OECD sets out three options:
1. Open the domestic shipping market to foreign competition by lifting the ban on foreign vessels
carrying domestic cargo between ports in Cambodia, possibly based on reciprocity arrangements
(i.e. between the contracting parties to this agreement) or between ASEAN members.
2. Amend the cabotage law to allow foreign ships to carry their own cargo (and other foreign cargo)
domestically. A further step would then be to allow foreign ships to carry other domestic cargo from
the port of entry to the port of final call if the foreign vessel has capacity after unloading goods at
the port of entry.
3. Allow international ships to operate in domestic shipping market on specific routes where there is
demand.
3.6. Horizontal
The OECD’s analysis has focused on laws and regulations that may reduce competition in the logistics
sector. In addition to the specific regulatory framework of the logistics sector, the OECD has made some
observations as to the quality of regulations and of regulatory practices in Cambodia that may affect the
logistics sector. This chapter offers some suggestions for consideration, based on principles of good
regulation and on the OECD work on regulatory policy.
Regulatory quality matters for competition. For example, a clear and easily accessible regulatory
framework is essential for new entrants that are not necessarily familiar with the national legal framework,
and for small competitors, for which compliance costs and administrative burdens are relatively more
important than for larger companies. Most OECD countries have made efforts to lower regulatory burdens,
particularly in the interest of improving economic activity and the ease of doing business (OECD, 2018[43]).
To improve regulatory quality, the OECD recognises the need for governments to undertake a
comprehensive programme that includes systematically reviewing existing regulations, to ensure their
efficiency and effectiveness, and to lower the regulatory costs for citizens and businesses, integrating
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) into the process for the formulation of new regulatory proposals, and
employing opportunities of information technology and one-stop shops for licences, permits, and other
procedural requirements (OECD, 2012[43]).

44 
ASEAN has developed regional guidelines for good regulatory practices to improve the quality of
regulations. Last revised in 2018, the ASEAN Guidelines on Good Regulatory Practices include
recommendations for the design and implementation of regulations based on six core principles. According
to these guidelines, regulations should:
1. have a clear policy rationale, objectives, and institutional framework
2. produce benefits that justify costs and be the least distortive to markets
3. be consistent, transparent, and practical
4. support regional regulatory co-operation
5. promote stakeholder engagement and participation
6. be subject to regular review for continued relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness.
Box 3.2 summarises the corresponding principles of the OECD 2012 Recommendation of the Council on
Regulatory Policy and Governance and the 1995 Recommendation on Improving the Quality of
Government Regulation.
Since 2004, Cambodia has been undertaking regulatory reforms to reduce administrative burdens, lower
compliance costs, simplify regulations, and improve the regulatory quality of its legislation. Cambodia has
developed and installed ICT systems to allow certain administrative processes, such as registration and
fee payments, to be carried out online. It has created several legal databases and has introduced RIA
initiatives (OECD, 2018[44]).
However, challenges remain. Shortcomings in regulatory quality are reflected in the World Bank’s
Governance Indicator, shown in Figure 3.1. The regulatory quality estimate captures the perception of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development. Cambodia scores below the ASEAN average and needs to take steps
in order to improve regulatory quality.
Figure 3.1. Regulatory quality estimates for ASEAN and selected OECD countries, 2016-19
2016 2017 2018 2019 ASEAN average 2019
2.5
1.5
0.5
-0.5
-1
-1.5
Note: Lowest = -2.5; highest = 2.5. The regulatory quality estimate indicator captures the perception of a government’s ability to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector development.
Source: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi.

 45
Box 3.2. What is regulatory quality?

Regulations are the rules that govern the everyday life of businesses and citizens. They are essential
for economic growth, social welfare and environmental protection, but can also be costly in both
economic and social terms. In that context, “regulatory quality” is about enhancing the performance,
cost effectiveness, and legal quality of regulation and administrative formalities. The notion of regulatory
quality covers process – the way regulations are developed and enforced – which should follow the key
principles of consultation, transparency, accountability and evidence. Beyond process, the notion of
regulatory quality also covers outcomes, which should be regulations that are effective at achieving
their objectives; efficient (do not impose unnecessary costs); coherent (when considered within the full
regulatory regime); and simple (regulations and the rules for their implementation are clear and easy to
understand for users).
Building and expanding on the OECD’s 1995 Recommendation of the Council on Improving the Quality
of Government Regulation, regulatory quality can be defined by regulations that:
1. serve clearly identified policy goals, and are effective in achieving those goals
2. are clear, simple, and practical for users
3. have a sound legal and empirical basis
4. are consistent with other regulations and policies
5. produce benefits that justify costs, considering the distribution of effects across society and
taking economic, environmental and social effects into account
6. are implemented in a fair, transparent and proportionate way
7. minimise costs and market distortions
8. promote innovation through market incentives and goal-based approaches
9. are compatible as far as possible with competition and trade- and investment-facilitating
principles at domestic and international levels.
Source: OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation,
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/128/128.en.pdf.
Box 3.3. World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators: the Regulatory Quality Estimate
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) aim at capturing different aspects of governance across
200 countries. They include indicators on:
1. voice and accountability
2. political stability and absence of violence
3. governance effectiveness
4. regulatory quality
5. rule of law
6. control of corruption.
As data are based on a wide variety of sources, for each indicator researchers have used a statistical
methodology known as an unobserved components model to standardise data and provide an

46 
aggregate indicator of governance as a weighted average of variables. This reflects possible

imprecisions in measuring governance.
Regarding specifically the Regulatory Quality (RQ) indicator, it aims to capture “perceptions of the ability
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development”. A country’s score is an aggregate indicator, ranging from -2.5 (lowest
score) to 2.5 (highest score).
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2011), Hague Journal of the Rule of Law, 3:220,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404511200046.
While the OECD has not identified any barriers in horizontal legislation for the purpose of this report, it
makes some policy suggestions on horizontal issues identified in the process of reviewing sector-specific
legislation in Cambodia. These suggestions concern:
1. access to legislation, including the availability of online databases; and
2. online digital applications for transport licences
3.6.1. Access to legislation
In general, a basic requirement for improving the quality of a regulatory framework is legislation that is
accessible and organised in a user-friendly manner so that all rules and regulations enforced by agencies
are clear and publicly available (see Box 3.2). Market participants need to have full transparency of those
rules and regulations that apply to them. Government authorities should ensure that there is an up-to-date
version of the legislation and guidelines they administer on their website and on the official government
legal database. Importantly, this means that any amendments to a piece of legislation should be included
in a new consolidated version (or alternatively be provided as a link) and obsolete legislation should be
marked as such. While amending public legal databases, can be costly and time-consuming, it should be
a long-term goal for all ASEAN member states.
Box 3.4. Open government

OECD Recommendation on open government
The 2012 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance includes a
recommendation to adhere to principles of open government. This includes transparency and
participation in the regulatory process to ensure that regulation serves the public interest and is informed
by the legitimate needs of those it interests and affects. This includes providing meaningful opportunities
(including online) for the public to contribute to the process of preparing draft regulatory proposals and
gathering high-quality supporting analysis. Governments should ensure that regulations are
comprehensible and clear and that parties can easily understand their rights and obligations.
One key component of open government is that regulations should be easily accessible to the public.
A complete and up-to-date legislative and regulatory online database should be freely available to the
public in a searchable format and with a user-friendly interface.
Source: (OECD, 2012[43]).

 47
Description of obstacle. While reviewing legislation in this project, the OECD team identified several
issues, including:
1. A lack of primary legislation in certain sectors (e.g. water freight transport and ports). The World
Bank has noted that there are three draft laws covering these sectors. They are not yet finalised
however. The associated time lines are uncertain and “some of them were drafted 10 years ago or
more” (World Bank, 2018, p. 61[39]). Due to the limited capacity of Ministries, there is a tendency to
issue secondary legislation as the process of drafting and finalising primary laws is long and
onerous. This leads to gaps in the legal framework and inconsistencies may arise.
2. A lack of a comprehensive legal database. It appears that there is no single official website, where
all the laws, including secondary legislation or “prakas”, are published. This is especially important
given the reliance on and preference for secondary legislation by Ministries (World Bank, 2018,
p. 61[39]). The OECD has previously noted that:
“The ECOSOCC database should include laws, decrees and sub-decrees. However, it does not include
legislation at the level of Prakas or below, which would mean that it omits a significant body of regulatory and
procedural information. Some Ministries maintain good records of regulatory policies relevant to their duties,
while others do not. It can be difficult to track when old regulations have been superseded by new ones, as
many new regulations simply say that any older ones are overruled without naming them” (OECD, 2018,
p. 67[44])
Further, when available in an online database, legislation is often not available in an electronically
searchable format.
Harm to competition. Difficulties in accessing logistics legislation creates legal uncertainty and increases
costs for actual and potential market participants. Logistics providers and consumers are required to
undertake additional work, allocate resources and endure additional costs (i.e. fees for legal advice) to
understand the applicable legal framework at any specific point in time. This may consequently deter
market entry and expansion.
International experience provides examples of good practices in this respect (see Box 3.5).
The OECD has three policy suggestions:
1. Publish all primary and secondary legislation in a single database. Alternatively, or until this is
implemented, each logistics authority should publish a complete list of legislation it administers on
its website along with its status. Obsolete legislation should be marked as such.
2. Update all logistics legislation in the database to include new amendments allowing stakeholders
to access consolidated versions of relevant legislation. Alternatively, or until this is implemented,
publish the original version of legislation with links to any amendments.
3. Ensure that published legal texts are electronically searchable.

48 
Box 3.5. Legal databases in Singapore, Australia and the United Kingdom
Singapore Statutes Online
In Singapore, the Attorney-General’s Chambers provides a free service called Singapore Statutes
Online (SSO; https://sso.agc.gov.sg), which consists of a complete list of current and historical versions
of legislation, including revised editions.
Federal Register of Legislation, Australia

In Australia, all federal laws are published on the Federal Register of Legislation website
(www.legislation.gov.au). The latest consolidated version of the legislation is clearly marked as “In force
– Latest version”. Users are able to “View Series” to see all versions of the legislation in question and
can easily find any amending acts. Users can easily can see previous versions to understand which
law was applicable at which time, and see any amendments and their date. The website also links to
related bills.
Legislation.gov.uk, United Kingdom

The website www.legislation.gov.uk lists changes to legislation, including repeals, amendments and
other effects, such as modifications and commencement information, made by subsequent legislation.
The lists are updated generally within two weeks of new legislation being published.
Source: Singapore Statutes Online, Federal Register of Legislation, www.legislation.gov.au; legislation.gov.uk, www.legislation.gov.uk.
3.6.2. Online digital applications for transport licences
In 2020, the Global Innovation Index ranked Cambodia 123 in the provision of online government services
and 126 in the e-participation index out of 131 economies (Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO,
2020[45]).78
Some of the logistics-related licences can be applied for online in Cambodia. For example, it is possible to
apply online for the operator licence as well as the certificate of business registration that are needed for
road freight transport, on the website of the MPWT.79 However, logistics providers cannot currently apply
online for all licences and accreditations. Certain authorisations, require applicants to submit hard-copy
applications with the relevant agency. For example, applicants for international express mail service
licences must submit a hardcopy application to the MPTC. The OECD understands however that an online
application process will be implemented in early 2021.
Harm to competition. For logistics providers, specifically, the lack of digitalisation increases costs as they
may be required to submit a different hard-copy application to the relevant agency for each authorisation.
Handing in hard copies in person also increases the danger of irregularities. It may also slow down the
processing of applications, resulting in delayed entry by new market players. In Cambodia, inadequate
Internet access may limit the positive impact of digitalisation and online applications on market entry and
competition.80
Policy suggestion. Introduce whenever practicable digitalisation of all application procedures for logistics-
related authorisations and in addition to paper applications, allow online applications.
The majority of OECD countries allow online application processes for transport and logistics related
licences and authorisations. In the UK, for instance, a user-friendly online procedure for transport-operator
licences is available (with fees payable online by credit card), although it is also possible to file an
application by post if the online service cannot be used. Decisions are usually issued more quickly for
online applications (seven weeks) than applications by post (nine weeks).

 49
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Notes
1
ADB, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2020, https://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-
and-pacific-2020.
2
ASEAN Stats, https://data.aseanstats.org/indicator/ASE.TRP.ROD.B.008.
3
World Bank and Turku School of Economics, Logistic Performance Index Surveys, https://data.worldba
nk.org/indicator/LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ.
4
See for instance EC merger case COMP/M.7630 – Fedex / TNT Express of 8 January 2016, EC merger
case COMP/M.6570 – UPS/ TNT Express of 30 January 2013.
5
The separation between inland waterway transport and maritime transport is not always clear-cut, as
shown for instance in Viet Nam by the overlap of responsibilities between the Vietnam Inland Waterway
Administration (VIWA) and the Vietnam Maritime Administration (VINAMARINE).
6
See https://www.worldshipping.org/facts-figures.
7
See European Commission, Case AT.39850, Container Shipping, closed with commitments on 7 July
2016.
8
The methodology followed in this project is consistent with the product market regulations (PMR) index
developed by the OECD. To measure a country’s regulatory stance and track progress of reforms over
time, in 1998, the OECD developed an economy-wide indicator set of PMR (Nicoletti et al., 1999); this
indicator was updated in 2003, 2008 and 2013, https://www.oecd.org/economy/reform/indicators-of-
product-market-regulation/.
9
Fournier, et al. (2015) find that national regulations, as measured by the economy-wide PMR index, have
a negative impact on exports and reduce trade intensity (defined as trade divided by GDP). Differences in
regulations between countries also reduce trade intensity. For example, convergence of PMR among EU
member states would increase trade intensity within the European Union by more than 10%. Fournier
(2015[15]) studied the impact of heterogeneous PMR in OECD countries and concluded that lowering
regulatory divergence by 20% would increase FDI by about 15% on average across OECD countries. He
investigated specific components of the PMR index and found that command-and-control regulations and
measures protecting incumbents (such as antitrust exemptions, entry barriers for networks and services)
are especially harmful in reducing cross-border investments.
10
Arnold, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2011[17]) analysed firm-level data in 10 countries from 1998 to 2004
using the OECD’s PMR index at industry-level, and found that more stringent PMR reduces firms’ MFP.
11
Égert (2017[18]) investigates the drivers of aggregate MFP in a sample of 30 OECD countries over a 30-
year period.
12
The study of 15 countries and 20 sectors from 1985 to 2007 estimated the effect of regulation of upstream
service sectors on downstream productivity growth. The productivity frontier refers to the most productive
countries and sectors in the sample. The farther a sector is from the frontier, the less productive it is.

54 
13
Égert investigated the link between product and labour-market regulations with investment (capital stock)
using a panel of 32 OECD countries from 1985 to 2013.
14
Employment growth in France increased from 1.2% a year between 1981 and 1985 to 5.2% a year
between 1986 and 1990. Between 1976 and 2001, total employment in the road transport sector doubled,
from 170 000 to 340 000.
15
The sample includes 18 countries over a 10-year period.
16
Using the OECD’s summary index of PMR in seven non-manufacturing industries in the energy,
telecoms and transport sectors, (Causa, 2015[49]) found stringent PMR had a negative impact on household
disposable income. This result held both on average and across the income distribution, and led to greater
inequality. The authors noted that lower regulatory barriers to competition would “tend to boost household
incomes and reduce income inequality, pointing to potential policy synergies between efficiency and equity
objectives”.
17
Multi-factor productivity (MFP) is a measure of the “efficiency with which labour and capital inputs are
used together in the production process”. See, https://data.oecd.org/lprdty/multifactor-productivity.htm.
18
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.SRF.TOTL.K2?end=2018&locations=KH&start=2
018.
19
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=KH.
20
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=KH.
21
World Bank, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-ranking.
22
World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/overview.
23
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD?locations=KH.
24
World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=KH.
25
ILO, https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer47/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EMP_TEMP_SEX
_ECO_NB_A.
26
ADB, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2020, https://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-
and-pacific-2020.
27 The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services was signed in Bangkok on 15 December 1995; see,
https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-framework-agreement-on-services.
28
The indicators used in the Global Competitiveness Report are based on a mix of hard data obtained
from various international organisations and soft data collected via the global Executive Opinion Survey
conducted by the World Economic Forum and its local partner institutions in the participating countries.
The extent of market dominance is measured based on the response to the following survey question:
“in your country, how do you characterize corporate activity? [1 = dominated by a few business groups;
7 = spread among many firms].” The indicator for competition in services is based on the average of the
scores of the three components of the following survey questions: “In your country, how competitive is the
provision of the following services: professional services (legal services, accounting, engineering, etc.);
retail services; and network sector (telecommunications, utilities, postal, transport, etc.)? [1= not at all

 55
competitive; 7 = extremely competitive].” Trade openness is computed by taking the average of the scores
in the following indicators: prevalence of non-tariff barriers, trade tariffs, complexity of tariffs and boarder
clearance efficiency. For further information, please refer to Appendix A of the Global Competitiveness
Report.
29
For the full list of countries with their respective rankings, see https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit
stream/handle/10986/32436/9781464814402.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y.
30
Another factor is the time necessary to register property.
31
This master plan follows the adoption of an earlier version, Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2010.
See https://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Master-Plan-on-ASEAN-Connectivity-20251.pdf for the full Master
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 report.
32
Khmer Times, 25 June 2020, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50737975/up-to-15-percent-of-logistics-
providers-heading-for-bankruptcy/.
33
According to Mordor Intelligence, the Cambodian freight and logistics market was valued at
USD 1.7 billion in 2019, and it is expected to reach USD 2.0 billion by 2025, registering a growth rate of
2.8% during the forecast period (2019-2025) (Mordor Intelligence, 2020[48]).
34
For example, OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Egypt 2020 noted that in this lower-middle-
income economy, logistics costs to GDP accounted for around 20% of GDP (OECD, 2020, p. 26[36]).
35
SAP was established by Sub-Decree 50 on Establishment of Sihanoukville Autonomous Port (PAS)
(July 17, 1998). The PPAP was established by Sub-Decree # 51 (RGC) on Establishment of Phnom Penh
Autonomous Port (PPAP) (July 17, 1998). Article 1 in both of these sub-decrees explains that the PAS and
the PPAP are SOEs under the technical supervision of the MPWT and with “financial supports from” the
Ministry of Economy and Finance. They are “technically, administratively, and financially autonomous”.
36
Website of Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, accessed 9 February 2021: http://www.pas.gov.kh/en/pag
e/statistics.
37
In 2018, the import–export volume through SAP amounted to 5 196 399 tonnes and 537 107 twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEU), while the volume through the PPAP amounted to 12 899 000 tonnes and
205 000 TEU (ADB, 2019, p. 13[1]).
38
Khmer Times, 9 January 2020, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50677964/solid-growth-in-nations-
ports/.
39
Between 2015 and 2018, global exports of transport services increased from USD 902.8 billion to
USD 1 trillion. Source: UNCTADStat, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?Re
portId=135718.
40
UNCTAD explains that the current version of the index is based on six components:1) the number of
scheduled ship calls a week in the country; 2) deployed annual capacity in TEUs: total deployed capacity
offered in the country; 3) the number of regular liner-shipping services from and to the country; 4) the
number of liner-shipping companies that provide services from and to the country; 5) the average size in
TEUs of the ships deployed by the scheduled service with the largest average vessel size; and 6) the
number of other countries that are connected to the country through direct liner-shipping services.

56 
41
The Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI) comprises five components: 1) the number of
transhipments required to get from country A to country B; 2) the number of direct connections common to
both country A and B; 3) the geometric mean of the number of direct connections of country A and of
country B; 4) the level of competition in services that connect country A to country B; 5) the size of the
largest ships on the weakest route connecting country A to country B. For more details on the methodology,
see “Table summary” (accessible through the information icon after “Liner shipping bilateral connectivity
index, annual”) https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96618.
42
The OECD understands that KAMSAB is no longer in operation.
43
Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Organisation Chart, https://www.mpwt.gov.kh/en/about-
us/organization-chart.
44
Applicants can apply for this license through the Ministry’s automation system at https://www.mpwt.gov
.kh/en/public-services/transport-licensing.
45
See https://mptc.gov.kh/en/mptc-structure/.
46
Ministry of Economy and Finance, https://www.mef.gov.kh/.
47
See https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/cambodia-to-finalize-antitrust-competition-draft-
law/.
48
See https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/cambodia-post-registers-more-133-million-revenue-
last-year.
49
Phnom Penh Autonomous Port, http://www.ppap.com.kh/financial-highlight/.
50
Cambodian Securities Exchange, http://csx.com.kh/.
51
For the purposes of the regulation, multi-manning’ means the situation where, during each period of
driving between any two consecutive daily rest periods, or between a daily rest period and a weekly rest
period, there are at least two drivers in the vehicle to do the driving. For the first hour of multi-manning the
presence of another driver or drivers is optional but for the remainder of the period it is compulsory
(art. 4 (o)).
52
See, for example, UNESCAP, Port Development and Operation in Cambodia, PowerPoint Presentation
dated 8-9 October 2019 (Vientiene, Lao PDR, presented by Mr Ros Sophornna), slide 23, https://www.un
escap.org/sites/default/files/Country%20presentation%20-%20Cambodia%20Session%206-1.pdf
accessed on 8 February 2021.
53
See Chapter VII(A) Circular #003 on management of means of water transport.
54
See Chapter VII (B) and Chapter VII (C) of Circular #003 on management of means of water transport.
55
See Chapter V (I) Circular No 006 (MPWT) on Management of sea navigation (1 October 1999).
56
National Policy on Port and Port Administration dated 10 May 2013, Glossary (port regulator).
Sub-decree on The Organization and the Function of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (No. 216,
13/10/2016) established the General Department of Waterway Maritime Transport and Port and the Port
Administration Department.

 57
57
National Policy on Port and Port Administration dated 10 May 2013, 4. Strategy.
58
The OECD understands that the Sihanoukville Port has issued various announcements to amend its
service fees. For example, Announcement 009 dated 22 April 2019 set out modifications to the Lift-on-Lift-
off tariffs at the container yard of the port (decrease in charges) and Notification 003dated 29 January 2016
set out modifications to the Container Storage Tariff (Storage Charge) at the container yard of the port (no
change in tariff but in application to encourage quick release of containers).
59
Article 2 of Prakas 561.
60
Article 5 of Prakas 561.
61
See Law on Public Procurement dated 14 January 2012, https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/sites/ppp.worldbank.org/files/documents/Law%20on%20Public%20Procurement%20%28draf
t%29%202011.pdf.
62
Ministry of Public work and Transport Prakas 053 on the Determination of Service Fees for Each Port of
Service and other Taxes of the Port Authority of Sihanoukville (17 January 1997).
63
The OECD understands that the Sihanoukville Port has issued various announcements to amend its
service fees. For example, Announcement 009 dated 22 April 2019 set out modifications to the Lift-on-Lift-
off tariffs at the container yard of the port (decrease in charges) and Notification 003 dated 29 January
2016 set out modifications to the Container Storage Tariff (Storage Charge) at the container yard of the
port (no change in tariff but in application to encourage quick release of containers).
64
See https://www.ppap.com.kh/tariff/.
65
Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1994, Article 20.
66
Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1994, Article 23(3) provides that “The Director after consultation
with the Minister may refuse to register any vessel as a Cambodian ship under this Section without
assigning any reason therefore”.
67
Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1994, Article 37(2).
68
For inland water transport, this requirement is set out in Circular #003 on management of means of
water transport (Chapter IV (II and III)). In addition, the constriction or development of a repair site must
be authorised by the Department of Water Transport (Chapter IV (IV)). For sea transport, Circular No 006
(MPWT) on Management of sea navigation (1 October 1999) provides that a vessel owner, shipyard
director or repair site owner must obtain authorisation to carry out repairs and that once repairs have been
completed, the repair site owner shall issue a statement of repairs to the vessel owner and the vessel’s
specification shall be inspected prior to the issuance of the business licence. See Chapter II (Construction
of vessels) 1-4.
69
For inland water transport, Circular #003 on management of means of water transport, provides that its
policy objective is “to ensure proper management of all kinds of vessels and/or boats navigating on the
waterways” and “to ensure the safety, comfort, security, hygiene, traffic order, and to protect the lives of
the crew, passengers, tourists, property, means of transport, and the environment”
70
See Article 32, Law on customs dated 20 July 2007 (S/RKM/0707/017). Section 9 of this law defines
customs broker as “a person authorized to carry on the business of arranging for the customs clearance
of goods directly with Customs on behalf of another person”.
58 
71
See, for example, Prakas 116 MEF dated 15 February 2008 on Customs Bonded Warehouse and
Prakas 106 (15 February 2009) on customs temporary storage
72
Feedback provided by MPTC.
73
Postal Law, Chapter III (Competence of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications), Articles 15 and 18.
74
Postal Law, Chapter V (Postal Business Licence), section 23.
75
For the full text of the agreement, see https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-framework-agreement-for-
the-integration-of-priority-sectors-vientiane-29th-november-2004.
76
The priority sectors included in the ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors
were: agro-based products, air travel, automotive, e-ASEAN, electronics, fisheries, healthcare, rubber-based
products, textiles and apparels, tourism, and wood-based products.
77
https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/sectoral-bodies-under-the-purview-of-
aem/services/logistics-services/
78
The Global Innovation Index is produced by Cornell University, INSEAD, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). In 2020, it looked at 131 economies using 80 detailed metrics including
ecological sustainability, online creativity, and knowledge diffusion.
79
See https://www.mpwt.gov.kh/en/public-services/transport-licensing.
80
According to the Asian Development Bank, “more than 70% of people in Cambodia, Indonesia, the
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar remain offline and so cannot fully participate in the digital
economy” (Asian Development Bank, 2020, p. 15[47]).

 59
Annex A. Methodology
The assessment of laws and regulations has been carried out in four stages. The present annex describes
the methodology followed in each of these stages.
Stage 1: Mapping the sectors
The objective of Stage 1 of the project, which started in the first half of 2020, was to identify and collect
sector-relevant laws and regulations. The main tools used to identify the applicable legislation were online
databases, the websites of the relevant Cambodian authorities and local consultants. Over the course of
the project, the lists of legislation were refined, as additional pieces were discovered by the team, while
other pieces initially identified were found not to be relevant to the sectors or no longer in force. In total, 28
different pieces of legislation were identified.
Another important objective of the first stage was the establishment of contact with the market through the
main authorities, industry associations and private stakeholders active in the sectors. In February 2020,
the OECD team conducted a virtual fact-finding mission to meet with government and private stakeholders.
Interviews with market participants contributed to a better understanding of how the sub-sectors under
investigation actually work in practice and helped in the discussion of potential barriers deriving from the
legislation.
Based on those meetings and the discussion on practical problems stakeholders face, and backed up by
further research, the OECD team identified the legislation to be prioritised for areas in which prima facie
barriers to competition existed and an impact on competition could therefore be expected.
Stage 2: Screening of the legislation and selection of provisions for further

analysis
The second stage of the project mainly entailed the screening of the legislation to identify potentially
restrictive provisions, as well as providing an economic overview of the relevant sectors. Every piece of
legislation was scanned by a team member or an outside national consultant, where no English translation
was available.
The legislation collected in Stage 1 was analysed using the framework provided by the OECD Competition
Assessment Toolkit. This toolkit, developed by the Competition Division at the OECD, provides a general
methodology for identifying unnecessary obstacles in laws and regulations and developing alternative, less
restrictive policies that still achieve government objectives. One of the main elements of the toolkit is a
competition-assessment checklist that asks a series of simple questions to screen laws and regulations
with the potential to restrain competition unnecessarily.

60 
Box A A.1. OECD Competition Assessment checklist

Further competition assessment should be conducted if a piece of legislation answers “yes” to any of
the following questions:
A) Limits the number or range of suppliers

This is likely to be the case if the piece of legislation:
4. grants a supplier exclusive rights to provide goods or services
5. establishes a licence, permit or authorisation process as a requirement of operation
6. limits the ability of some types of suppliers to provide a good or service
7. significantly raises the cost of entry or exit by a supplier
8. creates a geographical barrier to the ability of companies to supply goods, services or labour,
or invest capital.
B) Limits the ability of suppliers to compete

This is likely to be the case if the piece of legislation:
1. limits sellers’ ability to set the prices of goods or services
2. limits the freedom of suppliers to advertise or market their goods or services
3. sets standards for product quality that provide an advantage to some suppliers over others or
that are above the level that certain well-informed customers would choose
4. significantly raises the costs of production for some suppliers relative to others, especially by
treating incumbents differently from new entrants.
C) Reduces the incentive of suppliers to compete

This may be the case if the piece of legislation:
1. creates a self-regulatory or co-regulatory regime
2. requires or encourages information on supplier outputs, prices, sales or costs to be published
3. exempts the activity of a particular industry or group of suppliers from the operation of general
competition law.
D) Limits the choices and information available to customers

This may be the case if the piece of legislation:
1. limits the ability of consumers to decide from whom they purchase
2. reduces the mobility of customers between suppliers of goods or services by increasing the
explicit or implicit costs of changing suppliers
3. fundamentally changes the information required by buyers to shop effectively.
Source: (OECD, 2019[46]).
Following the toolkit’s methodology, the OECD team compiled a list of all the provisions that answered any
of the questions in the checklist positively. The final list consisted of 50 provisions across the logistics sector.
The OECD also prepared an economic overview of the logistics sector (and refined it during later stages),
covering industry trends and main indicators, such as output, employment and prices, including

 61
comparisons with other ASEAN and OECD member countries where relevant. The analysis conducted
during this stage aimed to furnish background information to better understand the mechanisms of the
sector, providing an overall assessment of competition, as well as explaining the important players and
authorities.
Stage 3: In-depth assessment of the harm to competition
The provisions carried forward to Stage 3 were investigated in order to assess whether they could result
in harm to competition. In parallel, the team researched the policy objectives of the selected provisions, so
as to better understand the regulation. An additional purpose in identifying the objectives was to prepare
alternatives to existing regulations, taking account of the objective of the specific provisions when required,
in Stage 4. The objective of policymakers was researched in the recitals of the legislation, when applicable,
or through discussions with the relevant public authorities and local consultants.
The in-depth analysis of harm to competition was carried out qualitatively and involved a variety of tools,
including economic analysis and research into the regulations applied in other OECD countries. All
provisions were analysed, relying on guidance provided by the OECD’s Competition Assessment Toolkit.
Interviews with government experts complemented the analysis by providing crucial information on
lawmakers’ objectives and the real-life implementation process and effects of the provisions.
Stage 4: Formulation of recommendations
Building on the results of Stage 3, the OECD team developed preliminary recommendations for those
provisions that were found to restrict competition. It tried to find alternatives that were less restrictive for
suppliers, while still aiming to fulfil the policymakers’ initial objective. For this process, the team relied on
international experience– from the ASEAN region, and European and OECD countries – whenever
available.
In total, the review makes 30 recommendations to the Cambodian government.

62 

 63
Annex B. Legislation screening by sector
Road transport
No. and title of

Number Article Description of the obstacle Policymaker’s objective Harm to competition Recommendation
regulation
1 Law on Land Traffic Art. 7, para. 2 This provision sets out a requirement to The OECD understands that the multi-manning The requirement to have The OECD recommends
2017 have 1 driver and 1 assistance driver for a requirement aims to ensure road safety. The fact at least two drivers could offering additional
goods transport vehicle with a total weight that the requirement is only applicable to freight restrict the ability of small options to ensure safety,
of 16 tonnes and more. transport vehicles with a total weight of more and medium businesses so that transport
than 16 tonnes suggests that the requirement with fewer drivers to operators can select the
aims to ensure road safety by securing sufficient compete effectively in the most suitable option for
rest for drivers operating heavy trucks, also road freight transport their needs. For
considering that many roads in Cambodia are market in Cambodia. instance, rest
not paved. Given the requirement, requirements could be
However, it would seem that such an objective these businesses may envisaged to achieve
can also be achieved by less restrictive not be able to serve the same policy
measures such as appropriate rest requirements. many customers at the objective.
In this case, travel may take longer since the same time.
vehicle would stop more frequently, compared to
a scenario with two drivers. Businesses may
have the flexibility to select which option would
be preferable, depending on their customers’
needs. It could also be envisaged to limit the
application of the requirement to long travel in
terms of time and distance.
International comparison
Rules in the EU:
In the EU, it appears that “multi-manning” is not a
requirement but a possibility allowing more
flexible working hours/rest requirements for
drivers. In fact, while a daily rest period of at
least 9 hours within the 24 hours is required in
case of “single-manning”, “multi-manning” allows
to take these 9 hours within the 30-hour period.
64 
No. and title of

regulation
2 Law on Land Traffic Art. 45, para. 2 According to this provision, the validity of The different treatment of foreign licence holders This provision appears to The OECD recommends
2017 the foreigners’ driving licences obtained via (when they obtain a Cambodian licence through impose administrative reconsidering the
an exchange of their previous national exchange) may be in place to protect Cambodian burden on foreigners limitation to one year of
driving licences is one year, while the workers. wishing to enter in the the validity of the
validity of their licences obtained via a Cambodian market and foreigners’ driving
driving test is the same as that of a would restrict the ability licences (see row 3
Cambodian licence. of foreign operators to below).
compete effectively in the
market.
3 Law on Land Traffic Art. 45, para. 3 The provision seems to exclude the This requires foreign licence holders to become The provision would The OECD recommends
2017 possibility for foreigners to exchange their qualified in Cambodia following the Cambodian restrict the ability of considering ways to
driver’s licence of certain categories for a licencing process. This may be in place to foreign operators to recognise foreign
Cambodian licence of the equivalent ensure drivers comply with Cambodian compete effectively in the driver’s licences, e.g.
category. standards concerning goods vehicles. market since foreign under reciprocity
In particular, regarding the goods transport drivers holding a licence agreements.
vehicles, foreigners holding their national for certain category of
licence for vehicles with a total maximum goods transport vehicles
weight exceeding 3.5 tons are unable to are not able to exchange
exchange their licence against an their licence for the
equivalent Cambodian licence C (that is for licence of the equivalent
vehicles with a total maximum weight category in Cambodia.
exceeding 3.5 tons). They can only However, foreigners are
exchange it against a Cambodian licence B not barred from obtaining
(that is for vehicles with a total maximum a Cambodian licence
weight of less than 3.5 tons). through the same
process as Cambodians.
4 Law on Land Traffic Art. 47 and 48 Article 47 explains that ‘All types of vehicles Registration of vehicles is required worldwide. The registration No recommendation.
2017 moving on the road must be attached with a requirement is a barrier
vehicle identification certificate and a to entry.
number plate’. The article provides that ‘The
registration for vehicle identification
certificate and number plate must be
determined in the sub-decree’.
5 Law on Land Traffic 49 Article 49 provides that ‘All motor vehicles, Technical inspections are likely required to Frequent inspections No recommendation.
2017 trailers, and semi-trailers moving on the road ensure vehicles comply with safety standards. increase costs for market
must be attached with a technical inspection participants and may be
certificate issued by the Ministry of Public Technical inspections are carried out by garages, an administrative burden.
Works and Transport or a company licenced by the MPWT (barrier identified from During the inspection, the

 65
No. and title of

regulation
authorized by the Ministry of Public Works page 52 of WB report). truck must spend time off
and Transport’. the road and in the
Specifically, under Article 49(3) new inspection centre and
passenger or goods vehicles must apply to therefore cannot be used
be inspected and this first inspection is valid during this time for freight
for 2 years. After this period, a technical transport.
inspection must be carried out every year.
The same rule applies for new trailers and The frequency of
semi-trailers (Article 49(5)). If the vehicle is inspections appears to be
second hand, it must be inspected every in line with international
year (see section 49(4) for passenger/goods practice. In the EU, The
vehicles and 49(6) for trailers/semi-trailers). EU Directive 2014/45 of
Article 49 explains that vehicle technical 3 April 2014 requires
specifications and technical inspections member states to carry
must be defined in Prakas of the MPWT. out periodic safety and
emission
(roadworthiness)
inspections. For vehicles
over 3.5 tonnes, vehicles
must be inspected no
more than 1 year after
initial registration and
then annually.
6 Law on Land Traffic Article 50 Article 50 provides for the licencing of The requirement to obtain a licence to operate a The licence is likely in No recommendation
2017 vehicle technical inspection centres. Vehicle technical inspection centre is a barrier to entry. place to ensure
technical inspection centres must obtain an Such requirements restrict entry into the market, inspection centres are
operating licence from the MPWT. Article 50 limiting the number of suppliers and increasing properly qualified to
states that entry costs for potential entrants. inspect vehicles.
‘The requirements and procedures for
issuance of the operation licensing of vehicle The OECD has not had access to the Prakas
technical inspection must be defined in defining these requirements.
Prakas of the Minister of Public Works and
Transport’.
7 Law on Land Traffic 52 Article 52 provides that ‘All vehicle repair or The requirement to obtain a licence to operate a The licence is likely in No recommendation
2017 modification garages must obtain their repair or modification garage is a barrier to entry. place to ensure garages
business license, issued by the Ministry of Such requirements restrict entry into the market, are properly equipped
Public Works and Transport and the Ministry limiting the number of suppliers and increasing and staffed and comply
of Industry and Handicrafts, and if entry costs for potential entrants. with safety standards.

66 
No. and title of

regulation
necessary, they must be inspected by the
Ministry of Interior. The management of
repairing or modified vehicle garages must
be determined in a sub-decree’.
Pursuant to Sub-Decree 180 on

Management of Garage Businesses for
Repairing and Processing Vehicles dated
3 November 2008, a natural person and
legal entity who intends to obtain the
license must have a mechanic with at least
two years of experience, a location
authorized by the local authority and
standard tools and equipment.
8 Law on Land Traffic Art. 57 This provision sets out to the maximum Safety and consumer protection. This could raise the cost No recommendation.
2017 dimensions of vehicles authorised: of entry if the required
- a maximum authorized width must not International comparison size of vehicles are not in Cambodia should
exceed 2.50 meters, except for tools- line with international however should
The maximum dimensions in Cambodia do not
equipped vehicles but no longer than 3 standards as it may continue ensuring that
appear to be significantly different from those in
meters; prevent companies from
other EU countries.1 maximum dimensions of
- a maximum authorized height should not importing cheaper or vehicles are not
exceed 4.20 meters; better quality vehicles imposed beyond what is
and requiring them to use strictly necessary for
- a maximum authorized length of each
vehicles made to fit local safety and consumer
vehicle must not exceed 12.20 meters;
requirements. protection.
vehicle with a semi-trailer must not exceed
16 meters; and If the maximum
dimensions are smaller
than what is necessary
vehicle with a trailer must not exceed
for safety and consumer
18 meters.
protection, it may raise
the cost of providing
services and decrease
efficiency.
1 Source: ITF - Permissible Maximum Dimensions of Lorries in Europe, https://www.itf-oecd.org/weights-and-dimensions.

 67
No. and title of

regulation
9 Law on Road Art. 26 This article provides for the maximum Safety and consumer protection. If the maximum weight is No recommendation.
weight for a number of different categories lower than what is
of vehicles (e.g. 30 tons for automobile necessary for safety and Cambodia should
with four axles). consumer protection, it however should
may raise the cost of continue ensuring that
Rules in other jurisdictions providing services and vehicle weight limitations
decrease efficiency. are not imposed beyond
International Transport Forum (IFT)
provides an overview of permissible what sis strictly
maximum weights of lorries in Europe.2 The OECD understands necessary for safety and
The IFT’s classification of vehicle is that it might be difficult to consumer protection.
different from Cambodia’s making the compare across
comparison difficult. As far as the possibly countries the maximum
comparable categories are concerned, it weight that is necessary
seems that the maximum weight of 16 tons for safety and consumer
for automobiles with twin axles in protection since the
Cambodia is lower than that of 18 tons quality of roads differs
applied in most jurisdictions in Europe. across countries.
Protocol 4 (Technical requirements of

vehicles) annexed to the ASEAN
Framework Agreement on the Facilitation
of Goods in Transit provides for a
maximum weight of the vehicle/trailer
(including any load carried on it). Such
weight limits are between 21 and 38 tons,
depending on the vehicle.
2 See https://www.itf-oecd.org/weights-and-dimensions.

 68
Inland water transport
No. and title of

regulation
1 Circular #003 on Chapter III (I) Pilotage is a service provided by a The policy maker’s objective is set The licence requirement is a No recommendation.
management of means pilot with local knowledge and out in the preamble to this barrier to entry but is justified on
of water transport skills, which enables him or her to legislative instrument. The safety grounds and as it helps to
conduct the navigation and requirement for pilots to be ensure service standards are
manoeuvring of the vessel in and licenced is likely in place to upheld.
approaching the harbour.1 ensure traffic management,
security and safety and to protect
This circular provides for three the lives of crew, passengers,
types of piloting licences (for tourists, property, means of
vessels/trailer boats of different transport, and the environment.
capacities). The licence is issued
by the Ministry of Public Works and
Transport (MPWT). Applicants
must pass an examination in order
to be issued with a licence (see
Article VI). The MPWT issues a
temporary licence which is valid for
45 days, the holder of the
temporary licence shall pick up
his/her licence within 2 or 3 days
prior to the expiration of the
temporary licence (Article VI).
2 Circular #003 on Chapter III (II) This circular provides that each The staffing requirement likely The licence requirement is a No recommendation
management of means boat shall have one licenced aims at ensuring proper barrier to entry but is justified on regarding the licence
of water transport mechanic who is in charge of the maintenance of vessels and thus safety grounds and as it helps to requirement for mechanics
boat engine. There are at improving safety. ensure service standards are working on boats.
three types of mechanic licences upheld.
(for vessels/boats with varying
capacities). The licence is issued
by the Ministry of Public Works
and Transport (MPWT).
Applicants must pass an
examination in order to be issued
with a licence (see Article VI). The
MPWT issues a temporary licence
 69
No. and title of

regulation
which is valid for 45 days, the
holder of the temporary licence
shall pick up his/her licence within
2 or 3 days prior to the expiration
of the temporary licence (Article
VI).
3 Circular #003 on Chapter III (III) This circular provides that each The pilot and mechanic The requirement to have one pilot No recommendation
management of means boat with an engine capacity of requirements likely aim at and one mechanic on vessels with regarding the requirement
of water transport 15HP or more shall have one ensuring proper operation and a certain engine capacity may to have a licenced pilot and
patron or pilot and one mechanic. maintenance of vessels and thus prevent new players from entering mechanic working on boats.
The patron shall have a piloting are aimed at improving safety and the market as it may significantly
licence and the mechanic shall efficiency. raise the cost of entry and
have a mechanic licence. operation
4 Circular #003 on Chapter IV(II) and (III) Department permission is The approval and re-inspection The approval requirement for Approval should only be
management required to repair vessels requirements are likely in place to repairs and then the requirement required for significant
operating in Cambodian waters. ensure safety. for re-inspection after the repairs renovations, not day-to-day
This circular provides that “a have been carried out may repairs if these repairs are
repair of any kind of vessel/boat increase costs for operators. carried out by a certified
shall be authorised by the Approvals and re-inspections may mechanic.
Department of Water Transport of cause delays and decrease the
the general department of efficiency of business operations.
transport”. It provides that a boat
owner shall submit an application
for boat repair, attaching a
number of files (application form,
list of materials, copy of boat
design and copy of residential
certificate). Once the repairs have
been carried out, the owner must
report to the Department for
technical re-inspection.
5 Circular #003 on Chapter VII (A) A boat owner wishing to conduct a The policy maker’s objective is set The licence requirement may be a No recommendation.
management of means water transport business must out in the preamble to this barrier to entry and may be an
of water transport have a business licence. The legislative instrument. It is in place administrative burden if
application for a business licence in order to “ensure proper requirements are excessive. The
must include several documents management of all kinds of licence requirement is likely justified
including the boat identity card, vessels and/or boats navigating on safety grounds and is common
technical inspection book and on the waterways and to ensure worldwide.

70 
No. and title of

regulation
piloting and mechanic licence. the safety, comfort, security,
hygiene, traffic order, and to
protect the lives of crew,
passengers, tourists, property,
means of transport, and the
environment”.
The OECD understands that

water transport operators may
lease vessels to conduct a water
transport business as long as the
lease arrangement is submitted to
the MPWT.
6 Circular #003 on Chapter VII (C) The revocation of the business To supervise and control the This discretion could lead to The OECD makes
management of means licence is at the discretion of the market. discrimination. Discretion leads to two cumulative
of water transport Ministry. Chapter VII (C) explains uncertainty and discourages market recommendations:
that failure to comply with the entry. 1. Limit the discretion of the
circular provisions in relation to decision maker by removing
the business licence shall result in the discretion or by
its revocation. The Ministry of providing clear, detailed
Public Works and Transport and transparent guidelines,
(Department of water transport) which set out the criteria for
has the right to decide any the exercise of discretion.
revocation. The discretion is 2. Ensure applicants have
somewhat limited by the criteria the right to reasons for the
stated in the circular, but it decision taken by the
appears the Ministry still has Ministry in relation to
broad discretion. registration.
7 Circular #003 on Chapter VIII (Inspection Owners of local ports and ferry The licence requirement is likely The licence requirement is a barrier No recommendation in
management of means of local ports and ferry ports who wish to conduct a port in place to ensure certain to entry can be justified on the basis relation to this licence
of water transport ports) or ferry business must obtain a standards of service and safety of safety and efficiency. The lack of requirement.
business licence from the Ministry are upheld. clarity on the application process
of Public Work and Transport however may discourage new Ensure all licence
(General Department of Waterway entrants. requirements and
and Maritime Transport and processes are publicly
Ports). The circular does not available and clear.
provide any clarity on the
application process (time limits of

 71
No. and title of

regulation
granting licence, discretion of
decision maker) but lists the
documents to be included with the
application form (construction
licence, residential certificate,
material/equipment using plan,
receipt of tax payment).
8 The use of 1 A transportation logbook of goods The aim of this provision is to This administrative burden may No recommendation.
transportation logbook of and passengers by land, water follow up/keep track of the increase costs for market
goods and passengers and sea shall be created in order quantity of goods and passengers participants.
by land, by water and by to follow up/keep track of the transported throughout the
sea (July 24, 2002) quantity of goods and passengers Kingdom of Cambodia (Article 1).
transported throughout the
Kingdom of Cambodia. According
to Article 4, The owners of vehicle
/ water vehicles or drivers shall be
required to return the
transportation logbooks to the
General Department of Transport
after they have been recorded for
one year, and shall be attached
the expired former business
license for renewal.
Note:
1. See (OECD, 2011, p. 7[38]).

72 
Maritime transport
No. and title of

regulation
1 Circular No 006 (MPWT) Chapter I (I-III) Vessels, including commercial The OECD understands that this The licence requirement is a No recommendation.
on Management of sea vessels, which are temporarily or provision provides for the licence barrier to entry but is justified on
navigation (1 October permanently operating in requirement for the vessel itself safety grounds.
1999) Cambodia must have a vessel and not for the operation of the
licence. The Ministry of Public vessel. It is likely justified on
Works and Transport (Commercial safety grounds and is common
Vessel Department) or the worldwide.
provincial/municipal office issues
the licence, depending on the type
of vessel concerned. The list of
documents required is not
burdensome.
2 Circular No 006 (MPWT) Chapter V (I) and (II) Under Chapter V (I) of Circular The licence requirement itself is The licence requirement is a The OECD recommends to
on Management of sea 006, a business licence issued by likely in place to control market barrier to entry. clarify “single purpose” and
navigation (1 October the Department of Commercial entry. The OECD has not any geographical restriction.
1999) Vessels is required to conduct a identified the policy objective The requirement that the business Consider removing the
foreign or cross border shipping behind the condition for the licence be used for one single requirement to stipulate a
business. The business licence is business licence to be used for a purpose and for a specific single destination and
valid for one year and “can be “single purpose” and the destination may create a business objective in the
used for one single purpose geographic limitation, other than geographical barrier or limit the licencing process and the
irrespective of the location in the the general principle that the ability of operators to provide requirement to obtain a
same provincial/municipality”. public authority aims to ensure different services. The second business licence.
Under Chapter V (II), a second quality of service. requirement to apply for a second
business licence must be business licence when the
obtained, whenever there is 1) a applicant wishes to change
change of the destination or 2) a destination or business objective
change of business objectives. restricts the ability of the business
The OECD thus understands, from owner to adapt to changing
reading Chapter V in full, that the market conditions and to take
business licence is linked to a advantage of new opportunities. It
specific foreign or cross border imposes an additional
destination and to a specific administrative burden and may
business objective and that there cause delays for service
are no further regulations providers.
governing this licence.

 73
No. and title of

regulation
3 Circular No 006 (MPWT) Chapter II (Construction Applicants seeking to open a The licence requirement is likely The licence requirement is a No recommendation.
on Management of sea of vessels) 1-4 shipyard or vessel repair yard in place to ensure minimum barrier to entry.
navigation (1 October must apply for an authorisation, standards and safety.
1999) which is issued by the MPWT
(Department of Commercial
Vessel).
4 Circular No 006 (MPWT) Chapter II (Construction An application must be made to The permission requirement is This permission requirement may Remove permission
on Management of sea of vessels) 1-4 construct a vessel by a shipyard likely in place to ensure safety be stricter that what is needed for requirement.
navigation (1 October owner. Any repair to a vessel must and proper construction or consumer protection because the Approval and ex-post
1999) be authorised in the same way, repairs. shipyard or vessel repair yard is inspections should only be
and is to be applied for by the already licenced. The application required for new vessels or
vessel owner, shipyard director or requirement is an administrative significant renovations that
repair site owner. Once repairs burden that may slow down the change the nature of the
have been completed, the repair process of repair or construction vessel, not day-to-day
site owner shall issue a statement and thus decrease efficiency as repairs or engine
of repairs to the vessel owner and business owners must wait longer replacements if these
the vessel’s specification shall be to introduce new vessels or repairs are carried out by
inspected prior to the issuance of repaired vessels to the market. authorised professionals or
the business licence. Further, for repairs, once the work at an authorised shipyard or
has been carried out, the vessel repair site. A new business
Section III provides, in addition, must be inspected again before it licence should not be
that if the vessel engine is can obtain the business licence required following day-to-
replaced, the replacement should and thus operate. day repairs.
be authorised by the institution
issuing the registration licence for
such vessel. The vessel owner
must then apply for the new
registration licence with a proper
stamp but the licence plate
remains the same.

74 
No. and title of

regulation
5 Circular No 006 (MPWT) Chapter III (2, 3) Vessels are required to be The inspection requirement is The inspection requirement is an No recommendation in
on Management of sea inspected every 6 months (for wood likely in place to ensure safety administrative burden and may relation to the inspection
navigation (1 October body) or once a year (for steel and the regular inspections can decrease efficiency as the vessel requirement.
1999) body). For special cases (this is not be justified. is required to be inspected and Introduce guidelines or
explained in the legislation) a cannot operate during this period. within the legislation, outline
shorter period may be set at the the reasons for random
discretion of the technical inspector. The discretion to carry out inspections. The OECD has
They can also carry out a random random inspections could result in published a Regulatory
inspection when deemed actual or perceived bias and Enforcement and
necessary. If the vessel is deemed might raise risks of irregularities in Inspections Toolkit, which
to be not seaworthy, the competent the process. sets out a checklist of 12
authority shall order an immediate criteria that reflect the 11
suspension of its operation. The “OECD Best Practice
owner is allowed to resume his/her Principles for Regulatory
business if the defects are rectified. Enforcement and
Inspections” and “a twelfth
criteria for a “reality check”
of actual performance”.1
6 Circular No 006 (MPWT) Chapter IV (II)(1)(2(, (III) The legislation sets out various The staffing requirement likely These staffing requirements may No recommendation.
on Management of sea staffing requirements for vessels. aims at ensuring proper prevent new players from entering
navigation (1 October For example, Chapter IV (II)(1) operation and maintenance of the market as it may significantly
1999) provides that any vessel with a vessels and thus at improving raise the cost of entry and
loading capacity of 20 tons or more safety. operation. It may also especially
shall have a captain assistant or prevent smaller players from
mechanic if the vessel’s engine is entering the market.
30 horse power or more. There are
three levels of captain assistant
licences and 3 levels of mechanic
licences. According to Chapter IV
(II)(2), every vessel must have a
licenced mechanic, ‘responsible for
maintaining the engine’. The
required class of mechanic is
dependent on the horsepower
capacity of the vessel.
1 See https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/oecd-regulatory-enforcement-and-inspections-toolkit-9789264303959-en.htm

 75
No. and title of

regulation
Article 3 provides that any vessel of
30 horsepower or more shall have a
captain.
7 Circular No 006 (MPWT) M To obtain a captain licence from The aim of this provision is to The licence requirement is a No recommendation on the
on Management of sea the Department of Commercial impose minimum standards to barrier to entry. licence requirement.
navigation (1 October Vessel, the applicant must meet ensure captains are properly The qualification criteria
1999) three criteria: qualified. does not seem restrictive.
A license valid for three years for a
crew serving on board of a vessel
for at least five years with a license
of qualification issued by a
supervising captain.
A license valid for five years for a
crew has completed captain
training as evidenced by a degree
or training certificate.
A crew shall be at least 25 years of
age and be in good health.
These qualification requirements
implement minimum standards for
work experience, formal education,
age and health.
8 Merchant Shipping Article 20 Notwithstanding any of the The OECD understands that the The discretion to waive any The OECD makes
(Registration) Act 1994 regulations made under this policy objective behind this requirements for registration could two cumulative
section, the Minister, on the provision could provide lead to discrimination. The recommendations:
Director’s recommendation may advantages to certain categories requirements should be the same 1. Limit the discretion of the
subject to such conditions, as he of service providers. for all applicants, otherwise some decision maker by removing
thinks it’s fit, waive any of the operators will be better off if they are the discretion or by
requirements for registration of a required to satisfy fewer criteria. providing clear, detailed and
vessel for a specific applicant. transparent guidelines,
which set out the criteria for
the exercise of discretion.
2. Ensure applicants have
the right to reasons for the
decision taken by the
Ministry in relation to
registration.

76 
No. and title of

regulation
9 Merchant Shipping Article 23 (1-3) To register a vessel, an applicant We have not been able to identify The broad discretion to refuse The OECD makes
(Registration) Act 1994 shall, in writing make a declaration the policy objective behind the vessel registration without giving two cumulative
declaring the name of the vessel, broad discretion to refuse to reasons could lead to discrimination recommendations:
its net tonnage or tonnages; the register a vessel without giving and raise irregularities in the 1. Limit the discretion of the
place where it was built, the year reasons. process. decision maker by removing
of building, and the name and the discretion or by
residence of the owner. The providing clear, detailed and
application shall include necessary transparent guidelines,
documents, specified in which set out the criteria for
regulations. Article 23(3) provides the exercise of discretion.
that “The Director after 2. Ensure applicants have
consultation with the Minister may the right to reasons for the
refuse to register any vessel as a decision taken by the
Cambodian ship under this Section Ministry in relation to
without assigning any reason registration.
therefore”.
10 Merchant Shipping Article 32 When vessels are altered, it may To ensure safety and that proper The re-registration requirement for No recommendation, if the
(Registration) Act 1994 need to be re-registered. Article 32 standards are upheld. Is it also alteration may increase costs for re-registration requirement
provides that “when a Cambodian likely in place to monitor the operators. Re-registration may is limited to significant
ship is so altered as not to types of ships operating in cause delays and decrease the alterations.
correspond with the particulars Cambodia. efficiency of the vessel and thus
relating to her tonnage or business operations.
description contained in the
certificate of registry, the owner
shall apply for the vessel to be
registered anew”. The Director or
Deputy Director shall on receipt of
the application and on production of
a certificate from a recognized
surveyor stating the particulars of
the alteration proceed as in case of
the first registry and on the delivery
up to him of the existing certificate
of registry and on the other
requisites as to registry being
complied with, shall make such
registry anew and grant a new
certificate of registry containing a
description of the vessel as altered.

 77
No. and title of

regulation
11 Merchant Shipping Article 37(2) The Director after consultation with The ability to cancel registration The ability to cancel registration “in The OECD makes
(Registration) Act 1994 the Minister may cancel the “in the public interest” provides the public interest” provides broad two cumulative
certificate of registry of a vessel if broad discretion to the decision discretion, which could lead to recommendations:
he is satisfied that it is not in the maker. discrimination, could result in actual 1. Limit the discretion of the
public interest for the vessel to or perceived bias and might raise decision maker by removing
continue to be registered as a risks of irregularities in the process. the discretion or by
Cambodian ship. providing clear, detailed and
transparent guidelines,
which set out the criteria for
the exercise of discretion.
2. Ensure applicants have
the right to reasons for the
decision taken by the
Ministry in relation to
registration.

 78
Ports
No. Title of regulation Article Description of the obstacle Policymaker’s objective Harm to competition Recommendation
1 Regulation of tariff Chapter I and II This “decision” defines the regulation of dues Price regulation may be justified in Price regulation which Only maximum prices should
on dues and and charges of the Port Authority of traditional monopoly sectors where stipulates minimum or fixed be stipulated in any
charges of Sihanoukville that is “all dues and charges to a counterweight is needed to the prices limits the ability of framework for setting port
Sihanoukville Port be levied on vessels and cargoes coming lack of competing alternatives. service providers to set their dues and charges. Maximum
1998 into and going out of the areas of Minimum rates are generally prices. prices should only be set
Sihanoukville Port”. introduced to help port operators to when there is a lack of
1: Tonnage Dues – fixed rate US$0,25/GT raise sufficient funds to increase competition. Maximum
2: Berthage charges – fixed rates service quality through investment prices should be regularly
3: Channel dues: fixed rates in advanced technology and revised to ensure they are in
infrastructure upgrades. line with market dynamics
4: pilotage charges- fixed rate (depending on
and provide the necessary
vessels GT) and there is a minimum rate that
incentives for innovation
shall be paid by one vessel.
5: tugboat assistance charges: fixed rates
based on GT
6: Mooring and unmooring charges – fixed
rates based on GT
7: charges for opening and closing hatches –
fixed rates based on GT
8: charges for sweep cleaning hold – fixed
rates based on GT
9: garbage removal charges – fixed rates
10: charges for fresh water supplied
11: charges for delivery and receiving of
cargoes
12: charges for clearance
Article 13 provides for “discount dues” –

where certain categories of vessels are able
to have a discount for certain charges, for
example 13.2 “the Cambodian ship “local
ship” exploiting in transportation from one
port to another local port shall be discounted
as follows: 20% for tonnage dues, 50% for
channel dues”.
 79
2 Regulation of tariff Chapter III Fixed rate for stevedoring charges. The rates Port services are often provided by Price regulation limits the Only maximum prices should
on dues and (Charges) are determined by the type of cargo (i.e. a single provider and so price ability of service providers to be stipulated in any
charges of livestock) and the cargo weight (tonnes). regulation is often used to prevent set their own prices. framework for setting port
Sihanoukville Port There are provisions for increasing these fixed excessive prices. dues and charges. Maximum
1998 rates (for example, for dangerous goods, prices should only be set
cargoes are increasing from 50% and for when there is a lack of
cargo handling from 24h to 7h fees are competition. Maximum
increased by 50%). prices should be regularly
revised to ensure they are in
Container charges are also stipulated as fixed line with market dynamics
rates. The rate depends on the kind of and provide the necessary
container (size and whether it is full or empty). incentives for innovation.
Container storage charges (applicable from 3
days after the completion of discharge from
vessel) are fixed (by size and whether the
container is full or empty).
Other regulated charges include repacking of
cargoes and charges for labour forces-
technicians.
3 Regulation of tariff Chapter III The legislation provides for price regulation Cargo transport services may be Price regulation limits the Only maximum prices should
on dues and (Charges) of cargo transport operated in the port’s reduced within the port and so ability of service providers to be stipulated in any
charges of areas (i.e. from vessel to quay) with price regulation is likely used to set their own prices. framework for setting port
Sihanoukville Port individual labour handling and transportation avoid excessive prices. dues and charges. Maximum
1998 charges by weight of cargoes and distance prices should only be set
of transportation when there is a lack of
competition. Maximum
prices should be regularly
line with market dynamics
incentives for innovation
4 Regulation of tariff Chapter III Rates are fixed depending on the type of Tug boat services are often Price regulation limits the Only maximum prices should
on dues and (Charges) tug-boat/vessel used (i.e. tug boat above provided by a single provider and ability of service providers to be stipulated in any
charges of 1,000 HP: US $0.07/HP/hour) so price regulation is often used to set their own prices. framework for setting port
Sihanoukville Port prevent excessive prices. dues and charges. Maximum
1998 prices should only be set
when there is a lack of
competition. Maximum
prices should be regularly

80 
line with market dynamics
incentives for innovation.
5 Inter-Ministerial Article 1 This prakras concerns the Phnom Penh This provision allows for price Price regulation limits the Only maximum prices should
Prakas # 561 Autonomous Port. regulation for some charges and ability of service providers to be stipulated in any
(MEF+MPWT) on Royalties and fees for using domestic ports, services. Port fees are likely fixed set their own prices. framework for setting port
Management of passenger terminal and Phnom Penh Port to prevent excessive prices. dues and charges. Maximum
Rental Fees and Center shall be fixed /charged. prices should only be set
Fees for Using Article 1 provides that The Phnom Penh The OECD understands that PPAP when there is a lack of
Domestic Port, Autonomous Port shall be authorized to provides the port services and that competition. Maximum
Passenger Terminal apply the table of fees for carrying/lifting any other freelance providers are prices should be regularly
and Phnom Penh goods and using domestic ports/docks, under the supervision/direct control revised to ensure they are in
Port Center passenger / tourist terminal and Phnom of PPAP. line with market dynamics
(September 6, 2002) Penh Port Center to customers, who are the and provide the necessary
owners of goods and transportation means, incentives for innovation
passengers / tourists or persons operating
business, service and other productions at
Phnom Penh Port Centre and within the
premises of domestic ports/docks.
This Prakas (Proclamation) shall not
specify/cover service fees in terms of
imported/exported goods, and the
implementation of fees at the International
Port of the Phnom Penh Autonomous
Port. Article 9 provides that fees which are
not fixed in the legal instrument shall be
determined between the port and clients.
The OECD understands that there is no
regulation on port tariffs that has been
published by RGC for the international port
but that the PHAP has published its tariffs on
its website.1
1 See https://www.ppap.com.kh/tariff/.

 81
6 Inter-Ministerial Article 2 PPAP is responsible for providing port The monopoly likely reflects a The authority is the only The OECD recommends
Prakas # 561 services and the port follows a public service primary concern for the safety of provider of services within the considering the advantages
(MEF+MPWT) on port model. PPAP is the only service port operations, including the port. Exclusive rights may lead and disadvantages of the
Management of provider in the port. It can outsource protection of port infrastructure, to monopoly pricing and provision of port services by
Rental Fees and services, and that, as an SOE, it would need prevention of environmental potentially the provision of private entities. If a policy
Fees for Using to comply with the public procurement hazards, and controlling maritime lower quality services. decision was made in favour
Domestic Port, regime when doing so. traffic in the port area. of private involvement in the
Passenger Terminal provision of port services,
and Phnom Penh the authorities should create
Port Center appropriate legal
(September 6, frameworks so that the
2002). provision of port services
could be tendered based on
fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory terms to
guarantee competition for
the market
7 Inter-Ministerial 5 Article 5 provides that Phnom Penh The OECD understands that PPAP Exclusive rights may lead to The OECD recommends
Prakas # 561 Autonomous Port shall be in charge of is the sole provider of warehousing monopoly pricing and considering the advantages
(MEF+MPWT) on organizing buildings, warehouses, land services within the port area. The potentially the provision of and disadvantages of the
Management of areas/premises, and water surface in the monopoly of the port authority in lower quality services. provision of port services by
Rental Fees and business centre of the Phnom Penh Port to the provision of port services likely private entities. If a policy
Fees for Using have orderliness, beauty and sanitation, and reflects a primary concern for the decision was made in favour
Domestic Port, shall charge fees from those who use the safety of port operations, including of private involvement in the
Passenger Terminal facilities or operate business within the Port the protection of port infrastructure, provision of port services,
and Phnom Penh Centre. prevention of environmental the authorities should create
Port Center hazards, and controlling maritime appropriate legal
(September 6, 2002) traffic in the port area. frameworks so that the
provision of port services
could be tendered based on
fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory terms to
guarantee competition for
the market

82 
Warehouses & freight forwarding
1 Law on customs 9, 32 Section 9 defines customs broker as “a Supervision, to ensure brokers are The licence requirement is a No recommendation on the
dated 20 July 2007 person authorized to carry on the business of properly qualified and trained. barrier to entry. licence requirement.
( S/RKM/0707/017) arranging for the customs clearance of goods
directly with Customs on behalf of another
person”.
Under Article 32, the Minister of Economy
and Finance may by Prakas grant or withdraw
authorisation to a person as a customs
broker, and establish the locations for which
the authorisation is valid, and any conditions
or qualifications for such authorisation.
Authorisation as a customs broker is granted

on a personal basis. When a company is
involved, authorisation must be obtained for
the company and for anyone empowered to
represent it.
Authorised customs brokers may be required

to provide security in relation to their
operations in such form and amount as
determined by Prakas of the Minister of
Economy and Finance.
Article 33.-
Any person may, without exercising the
profession of customs broker, make
customs declarations for their own business.
Such persons referred to in the first
paragraph of this Article may obtain
authorization to handle clearance for others.
This authorization may be provided by the
Minister of Economy and Finance on a
temporary and revocable basis for operations
involving specific goods.

 83
2 Prakas 106 (15 “Praka 1” of this instrument provides that “the The law provides for broad The presence of broad If these requirements are not
February 2009) on Customs Temporary Storage Facilities requirements so that they can be conditions for granting the further defined in sub-
customs temporary (CTSF) include customs warehouses and detailed in sub-decrees. licence creates uncertainty decrees, issue guidelines or
storage customs clearance areas under the and deters market entry. The equivalent to ensure all
management and control of customs legal instrument does not requirements are clear and
authority”. The conditions for the licence are explain, for example, what is publicly available.
outlined in “Praka 2”. Licences are approved meant by “good qualification
by the Ministry of Economics and Finance. “or “sufficient financial Requirements should not be
resources”. stricter than what is
The OECD understands that dry ports are necessary, for instance, the
included under “customs temporary storage” objective behind ensuring
and licenced under this Act by the MEF. sufficient financial resources
Praka 2(2) provides that “any person who does not require imposing
wishes to apply for a license shall submit an capital requirements but
application to the Director of Customs in the could be achieved by less
prescribed form, together with a detailed plan burdensome means such as
of construction and location of the proposed bank guarantees and
CTSF”. Praka 2(3) provides that the licence insurance policies.
may be issued if:
“- The applicant has good qualification.
- The applicant has sufficient financial
resources to enable him to provide the
facilities, equipment, personnel and services
required to operate the facility;
- The site of the proposed CTSF is within a
reasonable distance from main
transportation routes and a customs office;
and contains adequate space for the storage
of imported and exported goods. The building
structure of the CTSF must be suitable for
operation Customs may manage and control
the customs formalities of the goods stored in
the proposed CTSF”
The OECD understands that there are no

other regulations that further describe these
requirements.

84 
Praka 2(7) provides that “Every holder of
CTSF license shall pay an annual license fee
of 20.000.000,00 riels to the Customs and
Excise Department for state budget”.
The handbook of the MEF on public services

fees provides that the applicant is required to
submit among others, financial statements of
the company and the location and layout of
the customs temporary storage.
3 Constitution 44 Article 44 of the Constitution explains, “All According to the OECD Investment This provision prevents No recommendation
persons, individually or collectively, shall have Policy Review: Cambodia 2018, the foreigners from owning land.
Land Law 2001 the right to ownership. Only Khmer legal interests of foreign investors are Foreign investors can
(Article 8) entities (51% or more shares held by protected through the available however obtain long terms
Cambodians) and citizens of Khmer legal instruments such as “long- leases.
Law on Investment
nationality shall the right to own land. Legal term leases for 15 years or more
(as amended in 203)
private ownership shall be protected by the renewable, the creation of security
(Article 8)
law”. This is reaffirmed by Article 8 of the interests (mortgage) and other
Land law. contractual arrangements) (page
97).

 85
Small parcel delivery
1 Postal Law Articles 14,15 The OECD understands that the The discretion to set charges and fix The Ministry’s discretion Amend the legislation to
(NS/RKM/0702/012) Article 4 (definitions) Ministry of Posts and rates of the universal service provider to set postage charges, remove any ability to regulate
18 Telecommunications has the may be a means of protecting service fees and the rates of small package
competence to fix the service fees for consumers from monopoly pricing or exemptions may prevent delivery services. The
postal services. supporting the universal service price competition. legislation should reflect
obligation. The discretion to set current practice where there is
The Ministry of Posts and charges and fix rates of non-universal If operators are obliged to no price regulation of SPDS
Telecommunications has the power to service providers may aim to protect follow fixed freight rates, and where SPDS providers
set standard documents in relation to the universal service provider from they are unable to set are free to set their own
various aspects including: “postage “unfair” competition. However, the their own prices and to prices.
charges, accessory service fees and OECD understands that there is compete on price (e.g.
service fees for all kinds of orders, currently no price regulation for the they will not be able to
reimbursement for any loss of item, postal sector in Cambodia, including undercut prices of rivals
items exempt from service charge and for commercial services and those in order to gain market
those who are entitled to be exempt provided by Cambodia Post. share).
from service charge and discount or International comparison
profit provision”. The OECD is not In other ASEAN countries (e.g. Further, the discretion
aware of any guidelines, which outline Philippines, Thailand and Brunei may create legal
when the Ministry can intervene. The Darussalam) there is no price uncertainty, thus
OECD understands that there is regulation of courier services. discouraging potential
currently no price regulation for the In the EU, Article 12 of the Postal entrants.
postal sector in Cambodia. Directive provides guidelines for
regulating prices of universal postal
services only. Such prices should be
regulated only "for each of the services
forming part of the provision of the
universal service."

86 
2 Postal Law Articles 16, 23, 24 Private businesses wishing to operate in Supervision of industry. This provision No recommendation on the
(NS/RKM/0702/012) and 25 the postal and small package delivery establishes that a licence licence requirement.
services (SPDS) sector must obtain a is required to provide
Joint Prakas 1120 licence from the Ministry of Posts and postal services. This may As it appears that in practice,
dated 10 November Telecommunications (MPTC). The limit the number or range all licences for postal services
2006 licence is issued in accordance with of suppliers in the and small package delivery
Chapter V of the Postal Law, which Cambodian postal services are issued under
explains that the conditions for issuing, services market. Prakas 1120, despite the title
withdrawing and amending a licence are referring only to international
set out in Ministerial ‘Prakas’ (Article 23). Private providers are mail service, its wider
The OECD understands that both prohibited from carrying application should be clarified
domestic and international operators out services provided by so that market participants can
must obtain a licence under Joint the SOE. The OECD more easily understand the
Prakas 1120 dated 10 November 2006. understands that the only regulatory framework.
This joint prakas sets out the application relevant Prakas is Joint
process and licensing criteria. The Prakas 281, which
MPTC has indicated that an online outlines the licence for
application process is not currently international express
available but will become operational in delivery services.
early 2021.
Depending on the extent

Article 24 of the Postal Law explains that of this prohibition, this
a person or legal entity wishing to carry may prevent operators
out postal services must obtain the from providing certain
licence and is able to carry out the services, which may limit
services as prescribed in the licence and their operations and thus
Article 25 provides that a licence is discourage market entry.
available to any person who meets the The OECD understands
conditions. There is a penalty provision, that in practice, an
which provides for a fine for those international express
operating without a licence or for the service licence holder
inappropriate use of the licence (Article can provide both local
48). It prescribes fines from KHR 5 and international delivery
million to KHR 10 million for operating services.
without licence.
MPTC has confirmed that these

provisions are not enforced. There are a
large number of market players in the
“informal economy”.

 87
Under Joint Prakas 1120, the MPTC
must decide within 15 working days
whether to approve or decline the
application. The OECD understands that
in practice however, this process takes
longer.
Pursuant to Joint Prakas 498 of the MEF

and the MPTC dated 08 May 2018 on
the Published Fee of the MPTC (“Joint
Prakas 498”), the license fee is
KHR 4 200 000 and the license is valid
for one year.
3 Postal Law 23 According to the Postal Law, private The OECD understands that the only Depending on the extent Clarify the Postal Law to
(NS/RKM/0702/012) businesses can carry out postal relevant Prakas is Joint Prakas 1120, of this prohibition, this ensure that the monopoly
services, which are not carried out by which outlines a limited monopoly (mail may prevent operators does not include small
Joint Prakas 1120 the state postal business (Article 23). or letters that weigh less than from providing certain package delivery services (i.e.
dated 10 November The extent of this monopoly (or 500 grammes). The OECD services, which may limit courier services).
2006 possible monopoly) is not clear. The understands that in practice, private their operations. The
OECD understands that the legislation operators are able to provide these mere existence of this
only provides for Cambodia Post to services as the relevant provision is not provision in the
have a monopoly for mail or letters that enforced. legislation results in legal
weigh less than 500 grammes. This is uncertainty and may
set out in Joint Prakas 1120. discourage market entry.
According to the MPTC, this provision
is not enforced in practice and so
Cambodia Post operates in competition
with other market players for all of its
services.
4 Postal Law Article 26 A licence holder must obtain Supervision of industry. If it is burdensome No recommendation.
(NS/RKM/0702/012) authorisation from the Ministry of Posts (and/or costly) to obtain
and Telecommunications in order to an authorisation to exit
relinquish or transfer its licence. the market, this may
discourage potential
entrants and so reduce
the number of
participants in the market
over time.

88 
International agreements
No. and title of

No. Article Description of the obstacle Policymaker’s objective Harm to competition Recommendation
regulation
1 Law on the adoption of 10 Article 10 provides that “cabotage The aim of this MOU is to facilitate water The prohibition on vessels that The OECD recommends
the agreement between shall be served to vessels of the transport of cargo and passengers between are allowed to carry out cross- one of the following options.
Cambodia and Viet Nam Contracting Party in whose territory the two countries and transit transportation to border transport to carry out Remove these restrictive
on waterway the relevant regulated waterways and from third states with the territory of the general shipping within the provisions setting quotas
transportation 2010 are located, unless the Competent contracting parties. This agreement replaced domestic market of the and replace with a licence
authority of that contracting party the 1998 MOU on waterway transportation contracting countries, prevents system. The licensing
grants otherwise. Article 11 however between Viet Nam and Cambodia. foreign firms from entering the criteria should be clearly
provides for consecutive calls at national freight transportation defined in the international
ports or terminals (e.g. loading The policy objective behind the cabotage market. agreement or implementing
goods consecutively at several ports principle is to support and develop the laws or regulations.
or terminals within the territory of a domestic shipping industries of the Licenced vessels of the Assess market need and
contracting party for the purpose of contracting parties as the provision does not contracting parties, in carry out demand every one to
carrying them to the territory of the allow permit holders to operate in the cross border transport are three years, and consider
other contracting party or domestic shipping market. however allowed to make increasing the number of
discharging goods consecutively at several stops within a foreign licences that can be issued.
several ports or terminals within the waterway to load/unload their
territory of a contracting party after The OECD understands that there is no Both these
general cabotage regime in Cambodia. goods. The OECD understands recommendations would
having taken on board these goods that they cannot pick up
within the territory of the other require negotiations
additional goods (i.e. operate in between signatory
contracting party’. the domestic shipping market). countries.
A similar exemption was
introduced in the Philippines to
support imports and exports.
2 Law on the adoption of 15 Inland waterway vessels engaged in The licence requirement is likely in place to The licence requirement is a No recommendation.
the agreement between cross-border transport are required control the number and quality of operators barrier to entry.
Cambodia and Viet Nam to carry with them a cross border in the cross-border transport market.
on waterway transportation permit issued by the
transportation 2010 competent authority of their
respective nationality (Article
15(1)(c)). Article 15(2)(a-c) provides
for 3 types of Cross-border
transportation permits:
Category 1 – permits for vessels
undertaking multiple trips, maximum
validity 12 months

 89
No. and title of

regulation
Category 2 – permits for vessels
undertaking one round trip with a
maximum validity of 60 days
Special category – permits for
vessels carrying dangerous goods,
with a maximum validity of 60 days.
There is power in Article 15(4) for
the Cross-border transportation
permits to prescribe specific routes
or limit access to certain ports,
terminals or port groups according
to the type, capacity and purpose of
the vessel. The parties to the
agreement must provide each other
with lists of their licenced cross-
border transportation permit
holders.
3 MOU between and 7 The quota of commercial motor To facilitate cross border transport of goods The quota limits the ability of Option 1: remove this
among the governments vehicles of each contracting party is and people by commercial and non- some operators to provide provision and grant a
of the kingdom of 150 vehicles for cross border commercial motor vehicles. The MOU was cross border transport. licence to all those that
Cambodia, the Lao transport. Article 7(2) explains that signed on 17 January 2013 and Article 4 Restricting the number of request it, based on
People’s democratic an increase in this quota can be provides that it does not affect the rights or operators may reduce qualitative criteria. Such
republic and the socialist agreed upon by the contracting obligations of the contracting parties under competition between suppliers qualitative criteria may
republic of Viet Nam on parties ‘in the basis of economic any existing agreements to which they are and result in higher prices or include the good repute of
road transport needs and mutual interest’. Article parties. The likely objective of the quota is less desirable contract terms the operator, its adequate
7(3) provides that the agreed the protection of national road transport for customers. It is a barrier to financial standing and its
increase in quota may be service providers against competition from entry if interested companies professional competence.
determined in the Addendum signed other neighbouring countries. cannot then participate in the Each of these criteria
by all parties to the MOU. The market. should be clearly defined in
OECD understands that there has International comparison the international agreement
been no further amendment to this or implementing laws or
quota. The World Bank and IRU's Guiding regulations.
Principles for Practitioners and Policy
Makers on "Road Freight Transport Services
Reform" (p. 45) observes that "access to Option 2: Regularly assess
international markets is still largely the market’s need and
dominated by quantitative restrictions. demand, and consider
Despite quota limitations, bilateral increasing the number of
agreements have played a crucial role in licences that can be issued.

90 
No. and title of

regulation
developing international road freight The phrase “from time to
transport during decades. They supported time” in the provision should
the spectacular growth of export-import and be more clearly defined in
transit operations as well as to a certain order to ensure regular and
extent third-country road freight traffic. timely assessments.
International organizations have done their
utmost to harmonize these agreements, with Both these
mixed success. In order to maximize national recommendations would
reforms of the road transport sector, require negotiations
governments should overcome the between the contracting
drawbacks of bilateralism and quantitative parties.
restrictions."
The report also contains interesting

observations on the system of quotas for
international transport as opposed to a
system based on qualitative criteria to be
met by operators for obtaining a licence. It
refers to the Consolidated Resolution on the
Facilitation of International Road Transport
(R.E.4) as a good example and explains that
R.E.4 was adopted to liberalize the
international road transport market among
the 56 UNECE (United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe) Member States by
providing some uniform minimum conditions
and requirements to be met by international
road transport operators to obtain a licence
from the competent authority of their
respective countries. It laid down three basic
criteria:
- Good repute, consisting in the absence of
conviction for criminal offences (including
commercial crimes), an assessment of
whether the person is unfit for the occupation
and has been convicted of serious breaches
of labour, and transport law;
- Adequate financial standing, i..e, the
undertaking has available sufficient

 91
No. and title of

regulation
resources to ensure that the company is
properly set up and managed;
- Professional competence, which is met by
the person managing the activity when
he/she demonstrates that he/she has
sufficient knowledge to “engage properly and
viably in the occupation” in particular in the
fields of commercial and business
administration, technical standards and
operations, road safety, access to market,
elements of company law, social and labour
law, and civil and fiscal law."
In the authors' view, this qualitative criteria-

based system should replace the system
based on quotas of licences. They also
suggest that, in order to avoid certain
countries feeling threatened by the sudden
abandonment of quotas, a gradual approach
may be desirable, towards the introduction of
qualitative rather than quantitative
conditions.
4 Protocol for the 4 Under this agreement, Lao PDR The aim of the Protocol as stated in the The quota limits the ability of Option 1: remove this
implementation of the and Cambodia authorise licenced preamble is to “promote and facilitate cross- some operators to provide provision and grant a
road transport transport operators (by the other border transport”. Cross border transport’ is cross border transport. licence to all those that
agreement between the contracting party) to provide inter- defined in Article 1 as “inter-state transport Restricting the number of request it, based on
Government of the state transport of goods between and transit transport”. ‘Inter-state transport’ operators may reduce qualitative criteria. Such
Kingdom of Cambodia their territories (Article 13). means “transport of goods or passengers competition between suppliers qualitative criteria may
and the Government of Cambodia issues ‘cross border between the territories of contracting parties. and result in higher prices or include the good repute of
the Lao People’s transport permits’ and Lao PDR less desirable contract terms the operator, its adequate
democratic republic issues ‘International transport permit See international comparison above. for customers. It is a barrier to financial standing and its
for Lao PDR’. Article 20 states that entry if interested companies professional competence.
1999 agreement the relevant Cambodian authority is cannot then participate in the Each of these criteria
provides for the the National transit transport market. should be clearly defined in
authorisations (transport coordinating committee (General the international agreement
permit) Department of Transport). or implementing laws or
Article 4 provides for an initial limit regulations.
on the number of goods vehicles

92 
No. and title of

regulation
allowed to perform cross-border Option 2: Regularly assess
transport (for an initial period of 12 the market’s need and
months), to not more than 40 demand, and consider
permits per country. It is stated that increasing the number of
“thereafter, the quantities of licences that can be issued.
transport vehicles shall be The phrase “from time to
discussed from time to time time” in the provision should
between the contracting parties”. be more clearly defined in
The agreement was signed on 14 order to ensure regular and
December 2007. timely assessments.
According to Article 20 (institutional Both these

arrangements) the parties meet recommendations would
every year to review and discuss require negotiations
this protocol. The OECD between the contracting
understands that there has been no parties.
further amendment to this quota<
5 Protocol for the Article 17 Article 17 provides that each It is stated in Article 17, “in order to provide If the office or agent If this is a requirement,
implementation of the (representative contracting party “shall allow that relevant authorities of each Contracting party requirement is compulsory, in remove.
road transport office) transport operator of the other points of communications with the transport each contracting country where
agreement between the contracting party under this protocol operator of the other contracting party”. the transport provider operates,
Government of the to set up a representative office in this may deter new market
Kingdom of Cambodia its territory or appoint an agent It is for this reason, it appears to be entrants.
and the Government of registered under its laws and compulsory.
the Lao People’s regulations”.
democratic republic
The office or agent requirement is likely in
place to serve as a point of contact for
regulatory authorities. For example, to verify
business operations or to serve legal
documents.

 93
No. and title of

regulation
6 Memorandum of In order to transport cargo by road The likely objective of these provisions Limiting the number of licences The OECD recommends
Understanding between from Cambodia to Thailand– it is seems to be the protection of each country’s for transporting goods across repealing the provision
the Royal Government necessary to obtain a specific national road transport service providers the border constrains access to limiting the number of
of Cambodia and the licence for each vehicle. This against competition from foreign companies. the market and constitutes a licences in order to grant a
Government of the licence is nominative, non- The OECD understands that these barrier to entry. As a licence to all who request it.
Kingdom of Thailand on transferable and valid for one year. agreements were introduced to encourage consequence of this limitation, As an alternative, Cambodia
the Exchange of Traffic This is established in the following transportation services across the ASEAN in case of unavailability of should regularly assess the
Rights for Cross Border bilateral agreement: region. In the absence of such international licensed trucks, cargo will need market need and demand,
Transport through the Memorandum of Understanding agreements, many domestic laws in ASEAN to be unloaded at the border and consider increasing the
Poipet-Aranyaprathet between the Royal Government of countries would not allow foreign transport from one truck and then re- number of licences that can
Border Crossing Points Cambodia and the Government of service providers to operate. loaded onto another truck with be issued. The phrase “from
(MoU Thailand- the Kingdom of Thailand on the a domestic licence, which may time to time” in the MoU
Cambodia) Exchange of Traffic Rights for Cross result in additional costs for Thailand-Cambodia should
The World Bank and International Road companies. be more clearly defined in
Border Transport through the Transport Union (IRU) observe that: “despite
Poipet-Aranyaprathet Border order to ensure regular and
quota limitations, bilateral agreements have timely assessments. Both
Crossing Points (MoU Thailand- played a crucial role in developing
Cambodia) these recommendations
international road freight transport”. “They would require negotiations
The agreement includes a supported the spectacular growth of export-
maximum number of licences that between the co-signatories.
import and transit operations, as well as to a
can be issued. The original version certain extent third-country road freight
of the MoU Thailand-Cambodia traffic.”
(2008) set the number of licences The OECD, similarly to the World Bank and
for non-scheduled passenger and the IRU, notes that governments should
cargo transportation at a maximum remove quantitative restrictions from bilateral
of 40. Article 9(6) then provides for agreements.
the possibility to discuss “from time
to time” this maximum limit and
consequently amend it. As of 2018,
the maximum number of licences
under this MoU was 150.

94 
No. and title of

regulation
7 MOU on the types and Article 3 Cross border transport operators Article 1 provides the purpose of this MOU, No recommendation on
quantity of commercial are required to be licenced. Each which is to determine the types and quantity licence requirement.
motor vehicles for contracting party provides a list of of commercial motor vehicles for cross
implementation of the licenced operators to the other border transport of goods and/or people
agreement and the contracting party. between Cambodia and Viet Nam. It aims to
protocol between facilitate cross border transport.
Cambodia and Viet Nam
8 MOU on the types and Article 5 The quota for commercial motor Article 1 provides the purpose of this MOU, The quota limits the ability of Option 1: remove this
quantity of commercial vehicles for cross border transport is which is to determine the types and quantity some operators to provide provision and grant a
motor vehicles for 150 vehicles. Article 5 provides that of commercial motor vehicles for cross cross border transport. licence to all those that
implementation of the “the increase in quota of commercial border transport of goods and/or people Restricting the number of request it, based on
agreement and the motor vehicles for cross border between Cambodia and Viet Nam. It aims to operators may reduce qualitative criteria. Such
protocol between transport between the contracting facilitate cross border transport. competition between suppliers qualitative criteria may
Cambodia and Viet Nam parties shall be discussed from time and result in higher prices or include the good repute of
2009 (Amended in 2012) to time on the basis of economic See international comparison on licence less desirable contract terms the operator, its adequate
needs and mutual interest”. The quotas above. for customers. It is a barrier to financial standing and its
agreement was signed on 17 March entry if interested companies professional competence.
2009 and this provision was cannot then participate in the Each of these criteria
amended on 30 November 2012 to market. should be clearly defined in
increase the quota of vehicles to 500 the international agreement
for each contracting party. or implementing laws or
regulations.
The OECD understands that there Option 2: Regularly assess
has been no further increase to this the market’s need and
quota. demand, and consider
increasing the number of
licences that can be issued.
The phrase “from time to
time” in the provision should
be more clearly defined in
order to ensure regular and
timely assessments.
Both these
recommendations would
require negotiations
between the contracting
parties.

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN
CAMBODIA
Efficient logistics can play a significant role in increasing a country’s

economic development by facilitating international trade and improving its
competitiveness. This report provides an overview of the logistics sector
in Cambodia and offers recommendations to lower regulatory barriers
to competition. It covers freight transport by land and by water, freight
forwarding, warehousing, small parcel delivery and value-added logistics
services.
This report and the accompanying “OECD Competitive Neutrality Reviews:

Small-Package Delivery Services in Cambodia” are contributions to an
ASEAN-wide project that implements part of the ASEAN Competition
Action Plan 2016-2025 and is funded by the ASEAN Economic Reform
Programme under the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK
Government). Designed to foster competition in ASEAN, the project involves
conducting assessments of regulatory constraints on competition in the
logistics services sector in all 10 ASEAN countries to identify regulations that
hinder the efficient functioning of markets and create an unlevel playing field
for business.
Access all reports and read more about the project at oe.cd/comp-asean.
www.oecd.org/competition

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FOSTERING COMPETITION IN ASEAN

OECD Competition Assessment Reviews

Please cite this publication as:

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Director, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Fostering competition in ASEAN

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

2 Economic overview of the logistics sector in Cambodia 21

3 Overview of the legislation in the logistics sector in Cambodia 31

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Abbreviations and acronyms

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Main economic characteristics of the logistics sector in Cambodia

Key recommendations by sub-sector

Road freight transport

Maritime freight transport

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Small-package delivery services

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

1.2. Introduction to the logistics sector

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

1.2.1. Freight cargo transport

Road freight transport

Inland waterway and maritime freight transport

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Rail freight transport

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

1.2.2. Freight forwarding

1.2.3. Warehousing, small-package delivery services, and value-added services

1.3. Benefits of competition

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

1.4. Introduction to Cambodia

1.4.1. GDP and economic growth

1.4.2. Contribution to GDP by sector and the importance of services

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Figure 1.1. Services as a percentage of GDP in ASEAN countries, 2000-19

Source: World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TOTL.ZS?locations=BN-Z4-ID-MM-MY-PH-SG-TH-VN-KH.

1.4.3. Business environment

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Figure 1.2. Doing Business – Ease of Doing Business score

86.2: Singapore (Rank:2)

70.1: Brunei Darussalam (Rank: 66)

46.8: Myanmar (Rank: 165)

Figure 1.3. Time required to start a business (days)

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.REG.DURS?end=2018&locations=TH-PH-BN-AU-

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

2 Economic overview of the logistics

2.1. Key figures of the logistics sector

2.1.1. Contribution of the logistics sector to GDP

OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: LOGISTICS SECTOR IN CAMBODIA © OECD 2021

Table 2.1. Logistics costs over sales by components (%)

Activity/Sales Cambodia Vietnam Thailand Indonesia Philippines