Solicitor General v. MMA G.R. No. 102782

11/4/23, 10:39 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 204
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 837

Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority.
*
G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA,

STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners, vs. THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the
MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.
Court rules; Power of Supreme Court to suspend procedural

rules.—The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking
the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged
only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the
settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be
relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as
those in the present controversy. x x x. Regrettably, not one of the
complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances,
including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have
been more assertive of their rights. Given these considerations,
the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to
it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the
complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus,
through its inaction, allow them to fester. The step we now take is
not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably,
the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the
exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the
Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning “pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts.” In proper cases, procedural rules
may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice,
which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
formalistic adherence to such rules,
Administrative Law; Local Government; Delegation of

legislative power.—The Court holds that there is a valid
delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it
appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the statute making
the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Under
the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018b9ac6851851829678000d00d40059004a/p/AQT027/?username=Guest 1/15
complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate
will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it.
What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine
what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law
shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a
________________
* EN BANC.
838
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority
second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in

accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and thus
“prevent the delegation from running riot.” This requirement has
also been met. It is settled that the “convenience and welfare” of
the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case
at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the
delegate’s authority.
Same; Same; Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance;

Measures under consideration do not conform to existing law.—
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable;
and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A
careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures
under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do
not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605.
PD1605 does not allow either the removal of the license plates or
the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed
in Metropolitan Manila.
Same; Same; Same.—The requirement that the municipal

enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue
and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate

legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government
unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their
principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which
are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of a statute.
PETITION to review the resolution of the Metropolitan

Manila Authority.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CRUZ, J.:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs.

Hon. Arsenio M.
1 Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on
July 13, 1990, the Court held that the confiscation of the
license
________________
1 En Banc 187 SCRA 432.
839
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 839

plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among

the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under
the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled
vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also
observed that even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for
traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree
nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the
Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision
was submitted. The judgment became final and executory
on August 6,1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira
complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an
alleged traffic violation, his driver’s license was confiscated
by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and
Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who
should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case,
whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their
driver’s licenses, and where they should file their

complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February
14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against
the confiscation of his driver’s license by Traffic Enforcer
A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in
Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7,
1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation
of his driver’s license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati
Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated
April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another
lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license
plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-
Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his
driver’s license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan
Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against
him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of
driver’s licenses and the removal of license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic
840

violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated
Trieste’s driver’s license pursuant to a memorandum dated
February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the
Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine
National Police assured the Court in his own Comment
that his office had never authorized the removal of the
license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had
in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned
decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached,
entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated
February 28,1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the
Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license
plates and not the confiscation of driver’s licenses.
On May 24,1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority
issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself
“to detach the license plate/tow and impound

attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.”
On July 2,1991, the Court issued the following
resolution:
The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by

the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of
1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The

Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operations Center, is
authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the

Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it
was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be
detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.
Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against
the confiscation by police authorities of driver’s licenses for
alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said
decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
841
VOL, 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 841

To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-

enforcement officers and motorists, the Court Resolved to require
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to
submit, within ten {10) days from notice hereof, separate
COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority

defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was
adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO
392, It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the
Council (its governing body) the responsibility among
others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic

services requiring coordination or consolidation for
the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of
metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of
basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of

its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between

the decision and the ordinance because the latter was
meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It
stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of
license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or
ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted.
The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not
be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action
challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view
that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative
power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit,
and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates
and the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations
in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of
the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in
the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24,1991, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted a motion for the early resolution of the
questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the
uncertainty of their validity. A similar motion was filed by
the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its
contention that the incidents in
842

question should be dismissed because there was no actual

case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in
invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can
be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally.
That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is
not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under
exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present
controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices
complained of have created a great deal of confusion among
motorists about the state of the law on the questioned
sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these
sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong
decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the

disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a
driver’s license dismissed the Gonong decision as “wrong”
and said the police would not stop their “habit” unless they
received orders “from the top.” Regrettably, not one of the
complainants has filed a formal challenge to the
ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are
lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must
address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it
as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the
basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its
inaction, allow them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or
judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the
power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the
Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
2 “pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts." In proper cases,
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be
miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to
such rules.
The Court has taken this step in3 a number of such cases,
notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, where Justice Tuason

justified the deviation on the ground that “the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled
________________
2 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5(5).

3 84 Phil. 368.
843
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 843

promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,

technicalities of procedure.”
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9,1988,161
SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own
rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant
petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure
that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed
directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the
other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all
of them present the same fundamental question which, in our
view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same
reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or
sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054
and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition
lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can
be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the
decision in the cases wherein the petitioners’ cause of action or
the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be
controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821
cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve

filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11-Series of
1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority, and Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R.
Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-
petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as
respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782.
The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall
be taken into account by the Court in the
844

resolution of the substantive issues raised.

It is stressed that this action is not intended to
disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized
often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is
because of the failure of the proper parties to file the
appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and

the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the
important substantive issues raised. Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No.
11Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred
upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is
justified on the basis of the General4 Welfare Clause
embodied in the Local Government Code. It is not disputed
that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort
and convenience of the public and to alleviate the
worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in
large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of
legislative power to promulgate such measures, it
appearing that the requisites of such delegation are
present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the
statute making the5 delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard.
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the
legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such
that all the delegate will have to do when the statute
reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is
not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but
the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced.
This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be
effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the
function of which is to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the delegation from
running riot.” This requirement has also been met. It is
settled that the “convenience and welfare” of the public,
particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at
bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard
________________
4 R A 7160, Title One, Chapter 2, Section 16.

5 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569.
845
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 845

6
to delimit the delegate’s authority.

But the problem before us is not the validity of the
delegation of legislative power. The question we must
resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated

power.
The measures in question are enactments of local
governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must
reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the
validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we
apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid
down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable;7 and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that
the measures under consideration do not pass the first
criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The
pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either
the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver’s
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan
Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the
decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission
(and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose
such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the

power to impose fines and otherwise discipliñe drivers and
operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For
this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission
and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such
violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the
Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be
imposed is suspension or revocation of driver’s license or certificate
of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila
________________
6 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726.

7 U.S. v. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165.
846

Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such

license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver’s license or
the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission
or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their
records update.
xxx
Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and
regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned
from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to
graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for
the second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year
suspension of driver’s license for the fourth offense, and a
revocation of the driver’s license for the fifth offense: Provided,
That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher
penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances
prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets
and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall
not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately
issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed,
the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he
can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or
Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days
from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period
herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the
lawenforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the
proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing
of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal
court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver’s license and records
show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver’s license shall not be
renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.
xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is
concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such

sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was
allowed to “impose fines and otherwise discipline” traffic
viola-
847
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 847

tors only “in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed,” that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is
the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree
or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.
Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that “in case
of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be
confiscated.” These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including
the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not
violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue 8 and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution
itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but
must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the
case before us, the enactments in question, which are
merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure
itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila
Authority to impose the questioned9 sanction.
In Villacorta vs. Bernardo, the Court nullified an
ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City
for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The
decision held in part;
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo
declared:
“From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would

justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance, Section 1 of said
ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of
________________
8 Article X, Section 5.
9 143 SCRA 480.
848

Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be
submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval
to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the
Director of Lands as provided for in Section 68 of said Act. Section 2 of
the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act
496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of
every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the
ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because
the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City
Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the
subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty
for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other
words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision
owner additional conditions.
xxx
“The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in
bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the
government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in
enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall
impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a
general law subordinated to a local ordinance.”
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to
other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the
guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage
licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to
minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall
fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise
of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is
endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra
vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the

requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the
decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so
doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect
partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that
PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is
an
849
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 849

exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No.

4136 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to
punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country
with the sanctions therein prescribed, including those here
questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were
enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of
the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic
problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition
and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic
violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the
public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the
enforcement of such sanctions, including the illicit practices
described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the
fact is that there is no statutory authority for—and indeed
there is a statutory prohibition against—the imposition of
such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence,
regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the
challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated
legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own
discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority
to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan
Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective
and continues to prohibit the confiscation of license plates
of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in
LOI 43) and of driver’s licenses as well for traffic violations
in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the

Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No.
7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in
Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized
under LOI 43) and confiscating driver’s licenses for
traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,

Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado; Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., No part. Did not participate in the
deliberations.
850

Navarra vs. Court of Appeals
Ordinance null and void.
Note.—Courts should not be so strict about procedural

lapses which do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. (Seriña vs. Court of Appeals, 170
SCRA 421.)
——o0o——
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11/4/23, 10:39 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 204

VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 837

G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA,

Court rules; Power of Supreme Court to suspend procedural

Administrative Law; Local Government; Delegation of

838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority

second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in

Same; Same; Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance;

Same; Same; Same.—The requirement that the municipal

mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate

PETITION to review the resolution of the Metropolitan

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs.

1 En Banc 187 SCRA 432.

VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 839

plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among

driver’s licenses, and where they should file their

840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“to detach the license plate/tow and impound

The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by

Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the

VOL, 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 841

To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-

In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority

1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic

basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between

842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

question should be dismissed because there was no actual

decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the

notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, where Justice Tuason

2 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5(5).

VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 843

promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools

Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve

844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

resolution of the substantive issues raised.

appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and

4 R A 7160, Title One, Chapter 2, Section 16.

VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 845

to delimit the delegate’s authority.

resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated

Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the

6 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726.

846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such

VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 847

“From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would

848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The measures in question do not merely add to the

VOL. 204, DECEMBER 11, 1991 849

exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No.

(1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the

Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,