The document discusses different types of hypnotic experiences and subjects. It analyzes Barber's conclusion that there are three distinct types of hypnotic subjects and experiences. It also discusses how terms like 'hypnosis' have been applied too broadly to describe historical practices and that different experiences may have been categorized separately.
The document discusses different types of hypnotic experiences and subjects. It analyzes Barber's conclusion that there are three distinct types of hypnotic subjects and experiences. It also discusses how terms like 'hypnosis' have been applied too broadly to describe historical practices and that different experiences may have been categorized separately.
The document discusses different types of hypnotic experiences and subjects. It analyzes Barber's conclusion that there are three distinct types of hypnotic subjects and experiences. It also discusses how terms like 'hypnosis' have been applied too broadly to describe historical practices and that different experiences may have been categorized separately.
The document discusses different types of hypnotic experiences and subjects. It analyzes Barber's conclusion that there are three distinct types of hypnotic subjects and experiences. It also discusses how terms like 'hypnosis' have been applied too broadly to describe historical practices and that different experiences may have been categorized separately.
T.X. Barber’s investigations of hypnotic phenomena have considerably changed the
direction of the field, in my opinion for the better. Some of his early papers (for example, Barber, 1962) placed the term ‘hypnosis’ in quotation marks, a ploy that angered many of my friends. To me, however, it was a reminder that ‘hypnosis’ is a theoretical construct and that, in another time and place, a different word or words could have been used to identify similar phenomena. In fact, I have objected to the use of the term ‘hypnosis’ when it is used to describe premodern meditative practices, shamanic rituals or self-regulatory procedures (Krippner, 1993). For example, Sapp (1997b) writes, ‘Hypnosis can be traced to biblical times’ (p.43) and Agogino (1965) states, ‘The history of hypnotism may be as old as the practice of shamanism’ (p.31). Agogino adds that priests in the healing temples of Asclepius (commencing in the 4th century BC) induced their clients into ‘temple sleep’ by ‘hypnosis and auto-sugges- tion’ (p.32). These references are well meaning but tend to categorize hypnosis as a phenomenon that existed before the word ‘hypnosis’ was first conceived. As Gergen (1985) observes, the terms in which the world is understood are social artefacts, ‘products of historically situated interchanges among people’ (p.267). To use the term ‘hypnosis’ to describe exorcisms, the laying-on of hands, dream incubation and the like does an injustice to the history of hypnosis, as well as to the varieties of cultural experience. The terms ‘hypnosis’ and ‘hypnotic state’ were concretized too early and too often, distracting the serious investigator from an appreciation of earlier uses of human imagination, suggestion and motivation that are worthy of study in their own right. Barber’s conclusions, following his four decades of industrious scholarship, bear this out. Why did it take him so long to identify ‘three distinct types of very good hypnotic subjects’ and the ‘three dimensions of hypnosis’? From my perspective, the reification of the term ‘hypnosis’ led most investigators, including Barber himself, to assume that hypnosis was a unitary phenomenon. Most of the measures of ‘hypnotizability’ classify their subjects on a unidimensional scale, assuming that what is being measured is a sin- gle trait, one that exists ‘on a continuum’ (Sapp, 1997a: 24). Instead, there are a variety of hypnotic experiences, and a variety of hypnotized subjects as well. A general axiom of science is that there is no knowledge without comparison, and that measurement is required for comparisons to be made. Profound individual dif- ferences in hypnotic experience had been noted earlier (for example, Sarbin, 1950), but well-crafted measures had yet to document these observations. Once the Barber, Stanford, Harvard and Carleton Scales were supplemented by such measures as Wilson and Barber’s (1981) Creative Imagination Scale and Carlson and Putnam’s (1993) Dissociative Experiences Scale, investigators were able to document that not all ‘very good hypnotic subjects’ experienced hypnotic induction in the same way. 157 158 Krippner In another time and place, psychology and psychiatry could have produced three different words for hypnosis, based on the experiences of what Barber refers to as ‘amnesia-prone’, the ‘fantasy-prone’ and the ‘positively set’ subjects. ‘Hypnosis’ (from Hypnos, the Greek god of sleep) would still have been an appropriate term for the description of inductions for the ‘amnesia-prone’ because James Braid, who coined the term, was impressed by ‘somnambules’. But someone working with the ‘fantasy-prone’ might have originated the term ‘morphosis’ (from Morpheus, the god of dreams), and an investigator of the ‘positively set’ might have invented the term ‘themosis’ (from Themis, the goddess of ceremonies and oracles). The umbrella term might have been ‘imagination’, ‘suggestion’, ‘motivation’ or some other word. Barber graciously gives credit to those practitioners who had referred to two of these three types, and I suspect that their own style of hypnotic induction was more conducive to eliciting some types than others. Barber’s ‘fifth dimension’, that of the hypnotist, recognizes this possibility – as well as situational demand characteristics (his ‘fourth dimension’) and the instructions themselves (Barber’s ‘sixth dimension’). I am in agreement with Barber that he has developed a new paradigm of hypnosis, and one with important clinical implications. Barber’s essay concludes with directions for further research, and I would like to comment on his mention of ‘subtypes’ within each category. He cites Cardeña’s (1996) seminal paper on ‘two distinct personality types’ of shamans, one of which resembles the ‘fantasy-prone’ individuals ‘who go on imagined journeys to a different world’ and the other the ‘amnesia-prone’ person who ‘is temporarily taken over by some entity that acts through him or her’. Peters and Price-Williams (1980) compared 42 societies from four different cultural areas in an attempt to delineate shamanic alterations in consciousness. Shamans in 18 of these societies engaged in ‘spirit incor- poration’ (that is, the ‘amnesia-prone’), 10 in out-of-body ‘journeying’ (that is, the ‘fantasy-prone’), 11 in both and three in some different altered state. The fact that shamans in 11 groups engaged in both types of experience suggests that these societies might have provided opportunities for both of Cardeña’s ‘distinct’ personality types to express themselves. But what might have happened to the ‘fan- tasy-prone’ potential shaman in the 18 societies where spirit incorporation was emphasized, and to the ‘amnesia-prone’ person with shamanic potentials in the 10 societies where ‘journeying’ was featured? My personal observations of dozens of shamans around the world convinces me that some shamans engage in both ‘incorporation’ and ‘journeying’, depending on the needs of the client or their community at the time. Does this mean that these shamans ‘play against type’ when the occasion demands it, or that they are versatile enough to both ‘incorporate’ and ‘journey’? Further, there are shamans (for example, the Navajo hataalii ) who neither ‘incorporate’ nor ‘journey’ (Krippner, 1993: 701). In other words, Cardeña’s ‘distinct’ personality types may blur in practice. Finally, are there psychobiological markers for each of these shamanic activities, and for each of Barber’s three types of hypnotic activities? Spiegel (1998) has reported more left frontal theta activity on the part of high hypnotizables, as well as changes in event-related potentials. If these findings hold up, it would be reasonable to ask if there are three sets of psychobiological correlates for Barber’s three types of hypnotized subjects. Indeed, Barber’s new paradigm may be the end of one adven- ture, and the beginning of another. Varieties of hypnotic experience 159 References Agogino GA. The use of hypnotism as an ethnologic research technique. Plains Anthropologist 1965; 10: 31–6. Barber TX. Toward a theory of ‘hypnotic’ behavior: the hypnotically induced dream. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 1962; 135: 206–21. Cardeña E. ‘Just floating on the sky’: a comparison of hypnotic and shamanic phenomena. In van Quekelberghe R, Eigner D (eds) Jahrbuch #6 für Transkulturelle Medizin und Psychotherapie, 1994. Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Bildung, 1996, pp.85–112. Carlson EB, Putnam FW. An update on the Dissociative Experiences Scale. Dissociation 1993; 6: 16–27. Gergen K. The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. American Psychologist 1985; 40: 266–75. Krippner S. Cross-cultural perspectives on hypnotic-like procedures used by native healing practitioners. In Rhue JW, Lynn SJ, Kirsch I (eds) Handbook of Clinical Hypnosis. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1993, pp.691–717. Peters LG, Price-Williams D. Towards an experiential analysis of shamanism. American Ethnologist 1980; 7: 397–418. Sapp M. Hypnotizability scales: what are they, and are they useful? Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis 1997a; 18: 25–32. Sapp M. Theories of hypnosis. Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis 1997b; 18: 43–53. Sarbin TR. Contributions to role-taking theory: I. Hypnotic behavior. Psychological Review 1950; 57: 225–70. Spiegel D. Social psychological theories cannot fully account for hypnosis: the record was never crooked. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 1998; 41: 158–61. Wilson SC, Barber TX. Vivid fantasy and hallucinatory abilities in the life histories of excellent hypnotic subjects (‘somnambules’): preliminary report with female subjects. In Klinger E (ed.) Imagery: Concepts, Results, and Applications. New York: Plenum Press, 1981, pp.133–49.
Address for correspondence:
Stanley Krippner Saybrook Graduate School, #300, 450 Pacific Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94133, USA Email: [email protected]