Effects of Optimism On Psychological and Physical
Effects of Optimism On Psychological and Physical
Effects of Optimism On Psychological and Physical
201-228
Charles S. Carver
University of Miami
The primary purpose of this paper is to review recent research examining the
beneficial effects of optimism on psychological and physical well-being. The
review focuses on research that is longitudinal or prospective in design.
Potential mechanisms are also identified whereby the beneficial effects of
optimism are produced, focusing in particular on how optimism may lead a
person to cope more adaptively with stress. The paper closes with a brief
consideration of the similarities and differences between our own theoretical
approach and several related approaches that have been taken by others.
KEY WORDS: optimism; stress; coping; health; adjustment; personality.
The optimist thinks that this may be one of the best days ever. The pessimist fears
that the optimist may be right.
Health psychologists are slowly discovering what many lay people seem to
have known for y e a r s - that positive thinking is helpful (e.g., Cousins,
1Preparation of this article was facilitated by NSF grants BNS-9010425 and BNS 90-11653,
by NIH grant 1R01HL4432-01A1, and by American Cancer Society grant PBR-61173.
Michael Scheier would like to dedicate this article to the fighting spirit and optimism of his
mother, Mary Scheier, who was lying critically injured in the hospital during the time in
which it was being written.
2Address all correspondence, including requests for reprints, to Michael F. Scheier,
Department of Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213.
201
0147-5916/92/0400-0201506.50/0© 1992PlenumPublishingCorporation
202 Scheier and Carver
1977; Peale, 1952). If the effects of optimism were limited to making people
feel better, the claim would be less surprising, although still interesting and
potentially quite important. The effects of positive thinking go beyond sim-
ply making people feel better, however (see also Taylor, 1989; Taylor &
Brown, 1988). Optimism also confers benefits on what people do and what
people are able to achieve in times of adversity.
Our own interest in optimism derives from a more general interest
in the processes that underlie the self-regulation of behavior (e.g., Carver
& Scheier, 1981, 1990a; Scheier & Carver, 1988). Most relevant in the pre-
sent context is the idea that people's actions are greatly influenced by their
expectations about the consequences of those actions. This idea, of course,
is not new with us. Expectancies have provided the cornerstone over the
years for a variety of theories of motivated action(e.g., Bandura, 1977,
1986; Rotter, 1954; Seligman, 1975). In our view, people who see desired
outcomes as attainable continue to strive toward those outcomes, even
when progress becomes difficult or slow. Alternatively, if outcomes seem
sufficiently unattainable (regardless of the reason for the difficulty), people
withdraw their effort and disengage themselves from the goals that they
have set m even if the consequences of such disengagement are at times
severe. Thus, we see people's expectancies as a major determinant of the
disjunction between two general classes of behavior: continued striving vs.
giving up and turning away.
Paralleling this disjunction in behavior is a disjunction in affect
(Carver & Scheier, 1990a, 1990b). When people believe that their goals
are attainable, they experience positive affect, ranging from pride to grati-
tude to simple relief, depending upon the reason underlying the favorable
expectancy (Carver & Scheier, 1990a, 1990b; Weiner, 1982). In analogous
fashion, unfavorable expectancies give rise to negative affect. Depending
again upon the specific attributions that are made, the ultimate quality of
this negative affect can also be far-ranging, encompassing feelings such as
shame, anger, and resentment. Regardless of whether the affect is positive
or negative, its intensity is presumed to vary directly with the importance
of the goal that is threatened.
Our research on positive and negative thinking began with studies on
the effects of situation-specific expectancies (for a review, see Scheier &
Carver, 1988). Over the years, the focus of our research has slowly shifted
to a consideration of expectancies that are more general, if not more amor-
phous, in nature (see, e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1985). We think of these
global expectancies as being relatively stable across time and context, and
as forming the basis of an important characteristic of personality. We la-
beled this characteristic dispositional optimism, and formally defined it as
Optimism and Health 203
the tendency to believe that one will generally experience good vs. bad
outcomes in life (Scheier & Carver, 1985).
Having made the decision to define dispositional optimism in terms
of generalized expectancies, we set out to develop a brief measure of this
characteristic (Scheier & Carver, 1985). The measure we constructed, called
the Life Orientation Test (or LOT), consists of eight coded statements plus
four filler items. The items, half phrased optimistically and half phrased
pessimistically, are high in face validity and simply inquire about the per-
son's general expectations regarding the favorability of future outcomes
(e.g., "I hardly ever expect things to go my way," and "I'm always optimistic
about my future"). After appropriate reversals, responses to items are
summed, with higher scores indicating greater optimism.
While we have relied exclusively on the LOT in our own research,
at least two other scales have been designed to measure roughly the same
quality. One of these scales is the Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Weissman,
Lester, & Trexler, 1974). This scale is similar in format to the LOT, but
farther-ranging, assessing the person's affective experience and giving-up
tendencies (in addition to expectancies). Another potentially relevant mea-
sure is the Generalized Expectancy for Success Scale (Fibel & Hale, 1978),
which measures optimism by asking respondents to indicate their concrete
expectancies across a number of specific life domains.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING
At least a half dozen prospective studies have examined the effect of
dispositional optimism on subjective well-being. One of the first examined
the development of postpartum depression in a group of women (Carver &
Gaines, 1987). Women in this study completed the LOT and the Beck De-
pression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) in the third trimester of pregnancy.
They completed the BDI again 3 weeks postpartum. An inverse prospective
association was found between optimism at intake and depression measured
3 weeks p o s t p a r t u m - a relationship that remained significant even when
level of depression at intake was statistically controlled.
A second study investigated the subjective reactions of a group of
men over time to coronary artery bypass surgery (CABS; Scheier et al.,
1989). Each subject was interviewed at three points in time: on the day
prior to surgery, 6 to 8 days postsurgery, and again 6 months later. A variety
of data were obtained from subjects, including information about coping
tactics, mood, rate of both pre- and postdischarge recovery, and quality of
life. Optimism was assessed presurgery using the LOT. In addition to psy-
chosocial variables, medical data were gathered at baseline and at several
points during recovery.
204 Scheier and Carver
3As is true of several studies discussed here, this project provides data from several different
domains. We have chosen to describe the results from these studies in three separate sections
centering around psychological well-being, physical well-being, and coping. The findings of
this study bearing on the latter two domains are described later in the article. Discussion of
the other multifaceted studies is similarly organized.
Optimism and Health 20S
PHYSICAL WELL-BEING
A number of studies have also considered the possibility that opti-
mism may be beneficial to physical well-being. Our own first effort in this
direction focused on college students over the final weeks of their academic
semester (Scheier & Carver, 1985, Study 3), a particularly stressful time
for most students. Four weeks before the semester ended and again at the
close of classes, subjects completed the LOT and a brief physical symptom
checklist. Optimists in our study reported developing significantly fewer
4Interpretation of the findings from this study is complicated by the fact that the Hopelessness
Scale contributed to the first distress index. As noted earlier, the Hopelessness Scale and
the LOT are in many ways similar to each other. Thus, the criticism might be raised that
the result in question serves only to show that optimism predicts optimism. This problem
does not arise with respect to the second distress index. As a result, the conclusion drawn
regarding the relationship between optimism and distress would still seem to hold, even if
the focus were restricted to the single distress measure.
Optimism and Health 207
physical symptoms than did pessimists across time. Moreover, this relation-
ship remained significant even when baseline level of symptoms was
statistically controlled. We have recently replicated these results conceptu-
ally in our study of adaptation to college (Scheier & Carver, 1991), as have
Aspinwall and Taylor (1990).
The findings just reviewed are suggestive, but only that. The problem
is that they are all restricted to self-reports of symptoms and/or overall
health. It thus remains unclear whether optimists truly have a more favor-
able health status, or are simply reporting that they are healthier. Relevant
to this issue is the study described earlier examining the effect of optimism
on recovery from CABS (Scheier et al., 1989). Some of the information
gathered in that study pertains to the patient's physical health status and
rate of recovery. While portions of this information involved the patient's
self-report of health status, other measures were more behavioral and
physiological in nature.
The first finding to note is that optimism was related to several pe-
rioperative physiologic reactions. Compared to pessimists, optimists were
significantly less likely to have developed new Q-waves on their EKGs as
a result of the surgery. They were also less likely to have shown a clinically
significant release of an enzyme labeled AST. Both of these measures are
widely taken as markers for myocardial infarction (MI). The data thus sug-
gest that optimists were significantly less likely than pessimists to infarct
during surgery.
Optimism was also a significant predictor of the rate of the patient's
recovery during the immediate postsurgical period, as assessed by two dif-
ferent types of measures. First, optimists were generally faster to achieve
selected behavioral milestones of recovery (e.g., sitting in bed, walking
around the room) than were pessimists. Second, optimists were rated by
the rehabilitation staff members as showing a more favorable physical re-
covery vis-a-vis the patient's specific medical profile.
Optimists also had a recovery advantage at the time of the 6-month
followup. Patients were asked at this time to indicate the extent to which
their lives had returned to normal across several discrete domains. Opti-
mists were significantly more likely than pessimists to have resumed
vigorous physical exercise, and marginally more likely to have returned to
work on a full-time basis. A significant association also emerged between
dispositional optimism and a composite index, indicating that optimists had
normalized their lives in general across a greater number of domains.
Patients were also asked to indicate how long it took them to nor-
malize their lives in the areas surveyed. Optimists tended to resume
vigorous physical exercise and return to their prior recreational activities
more quickly than did pessimists. Moreover, when rate of recovery within
208 Scheier and Carver
they also report attempting to make the best of the situation by trying to
construe it in a more positive way and learning from the experience. Taken
together, the findings serve to further reinforce the picture of optimists as
active topers and pessimists as avoidant copers who are more prone to
give up under adversity.
A third study relevant to the relationship between optimism and cop-
ing is the longitudinal study of men at risk for AIDS described earlier
(Taylor et al., 1991). In background interviews, these men revealed that
the primary source of their AIDS-related stress concerned their ability to
deal effectively with unwanted thoughts about the possibility of developing
AIDS. Consequently, a scale was constructed to assess what the men were
doing to cope with their thoughts. Factor analysis of this instrument re-
vealed five f a c t o r s - - m a i n t a i n i n g positive attitudes, growing as a
person/helping others, seeking social support, engaging in fatalism/self-
blame/escape, and avoiding AIDS information. Two of these factors proved
to differentiate optimists from pessimists: optimists scored higher on the
positive attitudes factor than did pessimists and lower on the fatalism/self-
blame/escape factor.
reframing, acceptance, and the use of humor were all related inversely to
self-reports of distress, both before surgery and after. Denial and behav-
ioral disengagement were positively related to distress at all measurement
points in the study. At the 6-month followup, a new association emerged,
such that distress was positively correlated with another kind of avoidance
c o p i n g - mental disengagement, or self-distraction. Not unexpectedly,
given the pattern of these correlations, further analysis revealed that there
was a substantial indirect effect of optimism through coping on distress,
particularly at postsurgery. The direct effect of optimism (i.e., unmediated
by coping) also remained significant, however, at presurgery and at the
3-month followup.
completing the program. On the other hand, a more recent study has failed
to find evidence for a role of optimism in remaining abstinent during in-
patient treatment for alcoholism (Carver & Dunham, 1991).
If returning to alcohol abuse is an extreme sort of disengagement, it
is not the worst that might be imagined. Consider suicide, for example, in
many ways the ultimate form of d i s e n g a g e m e n t - a disengagement from
life itself. Beck, Steer, Kovacs, and Garrison (1985) conducted a 10-year
followup of people who had been hospitalized with suicidal ideation. Dur-
ing the hospitalization, all had completed the BDI (Beck, 1967) and the
Hopelessness Scale (Beck et al., 1974), assessing pessimism. Ten years later,
pessimists were more likely to have killed themselves than optimists (see
also Fawcett, Scheftner, Clark, Hedeker, Gibbons, & Coryell, 1987; Petrie
& Chamberlain, 1983). It is of interest that overall BDI scores did not
predict subsequent suicide in this study. One item of the BDI did predict
suicide reliably, however: an item that deals explicitly with pessimism for
the future. This is one further source of information that suggests that pes-
simism is not merely another name for depression.
IS IT REALLY OPTIMISM?
Optimism, as we construe it, is a broad concept relating to a variety
of other personality characteristics. As one might expect, optimism is cor-
related with several different measures of neuroticism and trait anxiety
(e.g., Robbins et al., 1991; Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, & Poulton, 1989). It
is also correlated with measures of personality characteristics that are more
positive in nature such as self-mastery (Marshall & Lang, 1990), locus of
control (AspinwaU & Taylor, 1990; Scheier & Carver, 1985), and self-es-
teem (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1990; Scheier & Carver, 1985). Given these
correlations, the question might be asked whether optimism really underlies
the findings that we have outlined in this article, or whether the findings
are better explained in terms of alternative constructs.
In this regard, Smith et al. (1989) have recently suggested that the
effects of optimism-pessimism are best understood in terms of neuroticism
or negative affectivity, based on two sets of considerations. First, LOT
scores in their research correlated more highly with two measures of nega-
tive a f f e c t i v i t y t h a n t h e y did with an a l t e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e o f
optimism-pessimism. Ideally, this pattern of correlations should have been
reversed. Second, associations reported by Smith et al. between optimism
and several outcome measures were sometimes substantially reduced when
neuroticism was controlled.
Should effects of pessimism be attributed to neuroticism as Smith et
al. (1989) suggested? Not necessarily. Let's first consider the issue of con-
216 Scheier and Carver
vergent and discriminant validity. Smith et al. took as their alternative mea-
sure of optimism the Generalized Expectancy for Success Scale (GESS;
Fibel & Hale, 1978). This measure may be a less than optimal indictor, in
spite of our suggestions to the contrary elsewhere (e.g., Scheier & Carver,
1987). More concretely, this scale assesses optimism by asking respondents
to indicate their specific expectancies across a number of distinct life do-
mains. The assumption is that a measure of generalized expectancies can
be derived by summing the person's specific expectancies across domains.
This assumption may not hold. That is, generalized optimism may be more
of an emergent phenomenon, arising out of domain-specific expectancies,
but being somewhat separate from them (cf. Marsh, 1986). If so, one would
not expect correlations between the GESS and the LOT to be exceedingly
high. Indeed, research by ourselves (Scheier et al., 1989) and others (Taylor
et al., 1991) suggests that correlations between generalized optimism and
domain-specific expectancies can be quite low. This suggests that one
should look elsewhere for an alternative measure of optimism.
What about the second basis for Smith et al.'s (1989) s u g g e s t i o n -
the fact that associations between optimism and other variables are some-
times reduced when neuroticism is controlled? In this regard, it is important
to keep in mind that neuroticism is conventionally viewed as a multifaceted
construct which consists partly (though not entirely) of pessimism. Its broad
scope means that it confounds pessimism with other qualities, such as emo-
tional lability and worry (Scheier, 1987). Thus, to ask whether an effect of
pessimism is really an effect of neuroticism begs the question of whether
all facets of neuroticism are important in producing the effect, or only that
part of neuroticism which is pessimism.
The same issue bears on trait anxiety, though less obviously so, be-
cause trait anxiety as a concept is seemingly less multifaceted in nature. It
is important to remember, however, that knowing what variable is being
measured requires one to look at the indicators in the measure, the specific
items of which it is composed, and not just at the measure's title (cf. Briggs,
1989; Nicholls, Licht, & Pearl, 1982). Trait anxiety, though conceptually
different from pessimism, is often measured by item sets in which some
items have strong overtones of pessimism, or by items assessing qualities
that are conceptually distinct from both pessimism and trait anxiety but
moderately related to each, such as depression. As an example, consider
the following representative items from the Trait Anxiety Scale (Spiel-
berger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970): "I am happy," and "I feel blue." Both
of these items are depression items, and as such might be expected to relate
to both pessimism and trait anxiety. Indeed in cases such as this, it seems
reasonable to ask whether the overtones of optimism vs. pessimism carried
Optimism and Health 217
e.g., "I feel secure that I can do most of the things I try," suggests that it
might best be construed as a measure of self-mastery or competency. The
association that was found between optimism and health-enhancing behav-
iors was significant even when variations in this variable were statistically
controlled. Similarly, all of the effects that were obtained for optimism in
Aspinwall and Taylor's (1990) study of adaptation to college life were found
to be independent of self-esteem, locus of control, and desire for control.
In short, although the data are somewhat mixed (Marshall & Lang,
1990, Smith et al., 1989), we see no compelling reason at this point to
attribute the effects of optimism to an alternative construct.
stressor increases. The available data suggest that this is in fact the case
(Levine et al., 1987; see also Suls & Fletcher, 1985).
for good vs. bad outcomes. We should note, however, that there are several
other theoretical frameworks which bear some similarity to this one, which
have given rise to their own literatures. Several of these alternatives are
discussed in the sections that follow.
Attributional Style
Self-Efficacy
therapeutic behavior change, and has gone on to argue that it plays a major
role in effortful behavior more generally (Bandura, 1986).
The Role of Personal Agency. There are obvious similarities between
self-efficacy and the optimism-pessimism construct, but there are also two
noteworthy differences. One difference is the extent to which the sense of
personal agency is seen as the critical variable underlying behavior. Our
approach to optimism vs. pessimism intentionally de-emphasized the role
of personal efficacy. In our view, perceptions of personal efficacy are one
very important source of favorable expectancies for successful goal attain-
ment, but they are only one such source. Other sources include perceptions
of being in a benign or hostile environment, available assistance from other
people, religious faith, and belief in the effectiveness of medications or pla-
cebos. Bandura's theory, which treats personal efficacy as the sole final
pathway to behavior, appears to include no theoretical role for such influ-
ences on people's expectancies.
We do agree with Bandura that personal efficacy is important. In-
deed, in some circumstances the goal behind behavior is literally to
accomplish something by oneself. In such circumstances the sense of per-
sonal agency is critical to the determination of behavior. Yet there are also
many situations in human behavior in which people do not particularly care
how a good outcome occurs, only that it does occur. Indeed, people some-
times prefer not to have personal control over outcomes (Burger, 1989).
When the person believes that the situation favors goal attainment, and
that reasonable effort will yield success, a sense of personal efficacy (as
opposed to a locus-independent optimism) is less important.
Specific vs. Generalized Expectancies. The second difference between
self-efficacy and optimism concerns the breadth of the expectancy on which
the construct focuses. Bandura (1977, 1986) has rather consistently taken
the position that people's behavior is best predicted by focalized, domain-
specific (or even act-specific) expectancies. Optimism, in contrast, is a very
generalized expectancy. Our view is that both narrow and broad expectan-
cies have a role to play as influences on behavior, and the available data
seem to bear out this belief.
Consider, for example, the CABS study described earlier (Scheier et
al., 1989). This CABS project contained a measure of dispositional opti-
mism, but it also contained measures of specific expectancies. These specific
expectancies were operationalized in terms of the number of weeks that
the patients thought it would take for their lives to normalize following
surgery, in each of five behavioral domains. Analysis revealed three impor-
tant facts. First, the average correlation between dispositional optimism and
these specific expectancies was only in the moderate range. Second, opti-
mism sometimes predicted outcomes that domain-specific expectations
224 Scheier and Carver
could not predict. Finally, even when the outcome data were first adjusted
for variations on these specific expectancies, virtually all of the significant
findings relating to dispositional optimism remained intact. Thus, disposi-
tional optimism was accounting for outcome variance in this study over
and above the variance that could be accounted for on the basis of specific
expectations.
Conceptually similar findings have emerged from Taylor et al.'s
(1991) study on coping with risk for AIDS (also described earlier). Taylor
et al. assessed specific expectancies by having subjects indicate the extent
to which they thought they were vulnerable to developing AIDS in the
future. Although these specific expectancies did influence a variety of out-
comes, they could not be used to provide a counterexplanation for the
effects of optimism, because specific expectancies and dispositional opti-
mism were largely independent in this study. Taken together with the
results of the CABS study, these data clearly suggest that both specific and
generalized expectancies are useful in the prediction of behavior. Each con-
tains predictive power that is not provided by the other.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
We began this article by noting that a number of people who stand
outside the boundaries of psychology as a science and profession have long
touted the benefits of a positive orientation to life. Only more recently
have researchers given systematic attention to this idea and its many pos-
sible manifestations in the human experience. The evidence gathered thus
far (as reviewed here) provides considerable support for the assertion that
optimism does in fact confer benefits. Compared to pessimists, optimists
manage difficult and stressful events with less subjective distress and less
adverse impact on their physical well-being.
In part, this "optimistic advantage" seems due to differences between
optimists and pessimists in the manner in which they cope with stress. Op-
timists place the best face on the problems that they confront; almost
paradoxically, however, they also tend to accept the reality of problems
when they do occur, rather than try to wish them away. They also try to
deal with problems head on, taking active and constructive steps to make
their situations better. Pessimists are more inclined than optimists to en-
gage in a variety of tactics of avoidance coping, and are more likely to give
up on efforts to move toward their goals. In short, optimists seem to be
more fully engaged in their lives and making the best of them; pessimists
experience life as harder and less manageable.
The evidence obtained thus far provides a window on how optimists
and pessimists differ from each other, but the picture is not yet complete.
Optimism and Health 225
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