Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Consciousness and Cognition

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog

Review

Hypnosis and belief: A review of hypnotic delusions

Michael H. Connors ⇑
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Australia
Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Hypnosis can create temporary, but highly compelling alterations in belief. As such, it can
Received 20 February 2015 be used to model many aspects of clinical delusions in the laboratory. This approach allows
Available online 7 June 2015 researchers to recreate features of delusions on demand and examine underlying processes
with a high level of experimental control. This paper reviews studies that have used hyp-
Keywords: nosis to model delusions in this way. First, the paper reviews studies that have focused on
Belief reproducing the surface features of delusions, such as their high levels of subjective
Belief formation
conviction and strong resistance to counter-evidence. Second, the paper reviews studies
Delusion
Hypnosis
that have focused on modelling underlying processes of delusions, including anomalous
Hypnotic analogue experiences or cognitive deficits that underpin specific delusional beliefs. Finally, the paper
Hypnotic suggestion evaluates this body of research as a whole. The paper discusses advantages and limitations
Instrumental hypnosis of using hypnotic models to study delusions and suggests some directions for future
Review research.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2. Modelling surface features of delusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.1. Sex change delusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2. Identity delusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3. Mirrored-self misidentification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4. Erotomania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5. Frégoli delusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6. Folie à deux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7. Interim summary and evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. Modelling underlying processes of delusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1. Paranoia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2. Mirrored-self misidentification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.1. Impaired face processing as Factor 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2. Mirror agnosia as Factor 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3. Somatoparaphrenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4. Alien control and other delusions involving altered agency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

⇑ Address: Dementia Collaborative Research Centre, Level 3, AGSM Bldg (G27), University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia.
E-mail address: [email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.05.015
1053-8100/Ó 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
28 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

4. Implications and future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4.1. Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2. Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3. Future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

1. Introduction

Hypnosis can cause compelling alterations in belief (Kihlstrom, 1985, 2007, 2008; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988). Specific sug-
gestions can cause participants to experience distortions in perception and memory and also to believe temporarily in the
external and physical reality of these experiences (Bryant & Mallard, 2003, 2005; Bryant & McConkey, 1989a, 1989b;
Hilgard, 1965; Szechtman, Woody, Bowers, & Nahmias, 1998; Woody & Szechtman, 2000, 2011). Some participants, for
example, remain unable to distinguish hypnotically-suggested hallucinations from real stimuli (Bryant & Mallard, 2003)
and maintain the reality of their experiences despite considerable social pressure (Bryant & McConkey, 1989a; McConkey,
1990, 1991, 2008). This subjective conviction in the reality of what is suggested distinguishes hypnosis from mere compli-
ance and role-playing (Hilgard, 1965; Kihlstrom, 2007, 2008; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988; Orne, 1959). As this subjective con-
viction is in conflict with external reality, hypnotised participants have been described as temporarily deluded (Kihlstrom,
2007; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988; Sutcliffe, 1958, 1961).
Given this ability to produce highly compelling subjective experiences, hypnosis has been used to model a wide range of
clinical disorders (Oakley & Halligan, 2009, 2011, 2013). Specific hypnotic suggestions can be used to recreate the symptoms
of disorders in healthy volunteers. Unlike the clinical disorders they resemble, however, hypnotic phenomena are temporary
and have no lasting consequences for the participants involved (Cox & Barnier, 2010; Kihlstrom, 1979). According to Oakley
and Halligan (2009), this approach creates ‘‘virtual patients’’ (p. 266), temporary analogues of clinical disorders that
researchers can study to better understand the disorders themselves. Such an approach has two key advantages. First, it
allows researchers to produce symptoms on demand and to examine underlying processes that might be highly relevant
to the actual clinical disorders (Kihlstrom, 1979). Second, this approach allows researchers to isolate and manipulate hypoth-
esised contributory factors within the hypnotic model (Woody & Szechtman, 2011). This permits researchers to study psy-
chological dysfunction with a degree of experimental control that is not possible with actual clinical patients (Connors, 2012;
Kihlstrom, 1979; Oakley & Halligan, 2009).
Given its phenotypic similarity to delusion, hypnosis is particularly suited to modelling delusions (Cox & Barnier, 2010;
Kihlstrom, 1979). This paper reviews studies that have used hypnosis to produce delusional beliefs in the laboratory. The
paper focuses specifically on studies that have examined hypnotic delusions and does not consider research on hypnotic dis-
tortions of perception and memory, including age regression, which may also involve altered beliefs but which has been
reviewed comprehensively in the past (Kihlstrom, 1985, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2008; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988; Nash, 1987).
Individual studies are discussed in detail to highlight the conceptual and methodological challenges involved in creating
hypnotic analogues of particular delusions. Common themes and theoretical issues that are relevant across different types
of hypnotic delusions are discussed at the end of each section.
The paper is organised in three sections. The first section reviews studies that have focused on modelling the surface
features of delusion. These studies have used specific suggestions to induce a particular delusion in participants and
examined the consequences of the new belief. The second section reviews studies that have attempted to model the
underlying processes of clinical delusions. These studies, in contrast, have explicitly set out to recreate processes
involved in clinical delusions with a view to informing understanding of these conditions. Finally, the third section dis-
cusses the significance and limitations of this body of research as a whole and suggests some directions for future
research.

2. Modelling surface features of delusions

Specific suggestion can readily create characteristic features of delusions, such as their high levels of conviction and
strong resistance to counter-evidence. Studying these phenomena may be of intrinsic interest to understanding hypnosis.
It may also have broader applications for studying clinical delusions. In particular, clinical delusions, like other clinical symp-
toms, can be rare or difficult to study for practical reasons. Patients with delusions, for example, often have co-occurring
symptoms and impairments that may interfere with or confound investigation. Patients with delusions may also be reluctant
to participate in research that could view their strongly held beliefs as pathological. The instrumental use of hypnosis offers a
way to model some aspects of clinical delusions and overcome these practical challenges (Kihlstrom, 1979; Woody &
Szechtman, 2011). In this way, features of clinical delusions can be reproduced on demand. Both these intrinsic and applied
goals are illustrated in the following studies.
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 29

2.1. Sex change delusion

Hypnotic suggestion has been used to directly create a delusional belief that one has changed sex. In an early experiment,
Sutcliffe (1958, 1961) investigated the effect of such a hypnotic sex change delusion on participants’ behaviours and atti-
tudes. As is standard practice in hypnosis research, Sutcliffe assessed participants’ hypnotisability (a stable trait reflecting
responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions) in separate sessions before conducting the experiment (see Hilgard, 1965;
Kihlstrom, 1985, 2008; Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné, 2008; Woody & Barnier, 2008). In the experiment itself,
Sutcliffe compared 24 high hypnotisable participants (participants very responsive to hypnotic suggestions, usually less than
15% of the population; ‘‘highs’’) and 24 low hypnotisable participants (participants not responsive to hypnotic suggestions,
also usually less than 15% of the population; ‘‘lows’’) across three conditions. In a hypnosis condition, Sutcliffe gave eight
highs and eight lows a hypnotic induction and then one of two versions of a suggestion for sex change: In a
positively-worded suggestion, he told four participants from each group, ‘‘you are a man/woman;’’ in a
negatively-worded suggestion, he told four participants from each group, ‘‘you are not a man/woman.’’ In an acting condi-
tion, Sutcliffe gave eight highs and eight lows instructions to act as if the suggestion given to them was true and then one of
the two suggestions for sex change. Finally, in a control condition, Sutcliffe examined how eight highs and eight lows not
given a hypnotic induction, instructions, or suggestions responded to the experimental procedures. Sutcliffe assessed partic-
ipants’ responses by asking participants to record their sex on a questionnaire. He also asked participants to verbally report
their actual sex and complete a questionnaire measuring their sex role identity.
Sutcliffe (1958, 1961) found that six of the eight (75%) highs in the hypnosis condition failed to record their true sex on
the questionnaire. Of these eight highs, the four given the negatively-worded suggestion in hypnosis also denied their true
sex when asked and gave responses on the questionnaire consistent with the opposite sex. In contrast, the four given the
positively-worded suggestion in hypnosis resisted the suggestion: They reported their true sex when asked and gave exag-
gerated responses on the questionnaire consistent with their true sex. All other participants in the experiment – including
the eight highs in the acting condition – correctly reported their true sex when asked. The highs in the acting condition, how-
ever, gave exaggerated responses on the questionnaire consistent with the opposite sex, which implied that they were sim-
ply complying with the instructions to act and responding very differently to the genuinely hypnotised participants. Overall,
Sutcliffe (1961) concluded that ‘‘the qualitative data support the view that in a number of cases hypnotized subjects were
deluded about their sex’’ (p. 199). Sutcliffe’s findings also implied that the hypnotic delusion was different from mere acting
and that the specific wording of the hypnotic suggestion was important to determine whether or not participants developed
the delusion.
In another seminal experiment, Noble and McConkey (1995) extended Sutcliffe’s work on hypnotic sex change delusion in
two ways. First, to further rule out the possibility that the hypnotic sex change delusion was simply a reflection of partici-
pants complying with social pressures or role-playing, Noble and McConkey compared the responses of genuinely hypno-
tised participants (‘‘reals’’) – 18 high and 18 very high hypnotisable participants given a hypnotic induction and a
suggestion for sex change delusion – with non-hypnotised participants feigning being hypnotised (‘‘simulators’’) – 36 low
hypnotisable participants instructed by a second experimenter to fake their responses and deceive the hypnotist. This com-
parison of reals and simulators is known as the real-simulating paradigm in hypnosis research and was developed by Orne
(1959, 1979). According to the logic of this paradigm, if reals show the same responses as simulators, it is not possible to rule
out an explanation for the responses of reals in terms of ‘‘demand characteristics’’ – cues in the experimental procedures that
encourage particular responses from participants (see Kihlstrom, 2002). If reals show different responses to simulators dur-
ing the experiment, a conclusion can be drawn that the responses of reals cannot be explained by demand characteristics
alone (see also Sheehan & Perry, 1976).
Second, to investigate participants’ conviction in the hypnotic sex change delusion, Noble and McConkey (1995) chal-
lenged participants’ delusion with contradictory evidence. They gave participants what they called a ‘‘contradiction’’ (in
which participants were asked how they would respond if a hypothetical doctor examined them and told them that they
were not the suggested sex) and then a ‘‘confrontation’’ (in which participants were shown a live video of themselves).
As in Sutcliffe’s (1958, 1961) experiment, participants received either a positively-worded or a negatively-worded suggestion
for the sex change delusion.
Noble and McConkey (1995) found that similar numbers of participants in each group responded to the suggestions: 89%
of highs, 100% of very highs, and 100% of simulators passed the suggestions and did not deny their suggested opposite sex.
Unlike Sutcliffe (1958, 1961), they found no difference between the positively and negatively worded suggestions, and pro-
posed that this could be due to the fact that it was more culturally permissible to be the opposite sex when they conducted
their experiment than compared to when Sutcliffe conducted his in 1957. Most notably, Noble and McConkey found that
very high hypnotisable participants responded differently to both high hypnotisable participants and simulators.
Specifically, very high hypnotisable participants rated their experience of sex change as more real and were more likely
to change their name to be consistent with the suggested opposite sex than highs or simulators. Importantly, very high hyp-
notisable participants were also more likely to maintain their delusion in response to the confrontations than either the
highs or the simulators.
On the basis of these differences, Noble and McConkey (1995) argued that the hypnotic delusion could not be accounted
for solely in terms of demand characteristics alone. Noble and McConkey also pointed to the comments of reals as evidence
for the compelling nature of the hypnotic sex change delusion. Very high hypnotisable participants, for example, reported in
30 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

a postexperimental inquiry that ‘‘it was so real it was disgusting’’ and ‘‘I could actually feel myself changing’’ (p. 72).
Likewise, in response to the challenges, most very high hypnotisable participants dismissed the doctor as mistaken and
reported that the person they saw on the television monitor was not themselves. Overall, the findings demonstrated that
the hypnotic sex change delusion was both compelling and resistant to challenge.
In another experiment, Burn, Barnier, and McConkey (2001) investigated the extent to which hypnotised participants pro-
cessed and recalled information consistent with their sex change delusion. They gave 24 high, 12 very high, and 18 simula-
tors a hypnotic induction and a positively-worded hypnotic suggestion for sex change delusion. They then played
participants a story involving a male and female character on an audiocassette to see whether the hypnotic sex change delu-
sion altered their recall of the story when tested after hypnosis. Burn et al. found that all groups responded similarly to the
suggestion: 88% of high, 92% of very high, and 100% of simulators did not deny their suggested sex, and all groups were
equally likely to change their name to one consistent with their suggested sex. Very high hypnotisable participants, however,
were less likely to identify with the opposite-sex character in the story than highs or simulators, yet also recalled signifi-
cantly more information about this opposite-sex character after hypnosis was terminated compared to the other two groups.
Burn et al. proposed that the very high hypnotisable participants may have related information in the story about the
opposite-sex characters to themselves, and so showed superior recall for this personally-relevant information. The findings
thus implied that participants engaged in selective information processing in service of their delusion.
In a fourth experiment, McConkey, Szeps, and Barnier (2001) investigated the role of hypnosis in participants’ response to
a suggestion for sex change delusion. To do this, McConkey et al. gave 12 highs given a hypnotic induction (hypnosis con-
dition) and 13 highs instructions to imagine the suggestion given to them (imagination condition). McConkey et al. then gave
all participants a positively-worded suggestion for sex change delusion. McConkey et al. also asked participants to use a dial
measure to indicate the strength of the suggested effect on their experience from the time when they received the suggestion
for sex change delusion to the time when the suggestion for sex change was cancelled. McConkey et al. found that a similar
number of highs reported the sex change delusion in the hypnosis and imagination conditions. On the dial measure, how-
ever, highs in the hypnosis condition indicated that the sex change delusion came about more quickly than highs in the
imagination condition. This finding showed that hypnosis itself may influence the rate of onset of a suggested experience
and so facilitate a hypnotic delusion.
Overall, these four experiments of hypnotic sex change demonstrated that hypnosis could produce the subjective convic-
tion and resistance to challenge seen in clinical delusions. It should be noted, however, that these four experiments did not
explicitly seek to model a discrete clinical delusion (even though clinical patients with sex change delusion have been
reported; see Borras, Huguelet, & Eytan, 2007; Gittleson & Dawson-Butterworth, 1967; Gittleson & Levine, 1966).

2.2. Identity delusions

Other research has used hypnotic suggestions to create temporary delusions of identity. Early case reports demonstrated
that hypnotic suggestions could create delusions of identity in very high hypnotisable participants (Azam, 1883; Binet, 1896;
Ferrari, Héricourt, & Richet, 1886; James, 1890; Richet, 1884; Sarbin, 1939). Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard (1963) also included a
suggestion for an identity delusion in their rarely used Stanford Profile Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility. The suggestion for
altered personality tells participants, ‘‘. . .you will no longer be the person you are now. You will have a different name
and background. You will be an illiterate, dull, slow-witted individual, a peasant of low mental calibre, a clod’’ (p. 43).
Participants’ response to this suggestion is indexed with a number of questions about their identity and some selected items
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS).
When developing the test, Hilgard (1965) gave 143 medium and high hypnotisable participants and 16 low hypnotisable
participants the suggestion. Hilgard found 49% of the medium and high hypnotisable participants changed their name in
response to the suggestion. Most of these participants also reported a different age, occupation, and place of residence,
and most showed significantly lower scores on the WAIS compared to when they were tested before the suggestion. In con-
trast, none of the 16 lows responded to the suggestion. The responses of medium and high hypnotisable participants thus
indicated that hypnosis could be used, not only to alter personality, but also to bring about delusion-like beliefs about per-
sonal identity as well.
More recently, Cox and Barnier (2009a, 2009b, 2013) used hypnosis to create an analogue of reverse intermetamorphosis,
a clinical delusion involving the belief that one’s identity has changed to someone else. In an initial experiment, Cox and
Barnier (2009a) gave 32 high and 32 low hypnotisable participants either a hypnotic induction (hypnosis condition) or
instructions to imagine the suggestion (imagination condition) followed by a suggestion to become a same-sex friend or rel-
ative. They tested the delusion by asking participants to give their name and to describe themselves. Cox and Barnier found
that significantly more highs (78%) than lows (34%) showed evidence of a changed identity. Highs also rated their experience
as more real and showed more changes in how they described themselves during hypnosis than lows. There were no differ-
ences in pass rates or ratings between highs in the hypnosis condition and highs in the imagination condition. However, Cox
and Barnier noted that the postexperimental comments of highs in the hypnosis condition implied a more complete and
compelling delusion than highs in the imagination condition.
In a second experiment, Cox and Barnier (2009a) examined the autobiographical memories of participants when experi-
encing a hypnotic identity delusion. They focused in detail on the subjective experiences of 10 high hypnotisable participants
using the ‘‘Experiential Analysis Technique’’ (EAT; Sheehan & McConkey, 1982). The EAT involves a second experimenter
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 31

who shows the participants a videotape of the hypnosis experimental session and asks them questions about their experi-
ences. Cox and Barnier (2009a) also challenged participants’ identity delusion using techniques adapted from Noble and
McConkey’s (1995) experiment on hypnotic sex-change delusion. Cox and Barnier’s challenges involved a confrontation
(in which participants were asked how they would respond if their mother came into the room and said they were not their
suggested identity) and a confrontation (in which participants were asked to look at themselves on a live television screen).
Cox and Barnier (2009a) found that nine of their ten high hypnotisable participants showed evidence of developing an
identity delusion by not denying their suggested identity. When asked to elicit autobiographical memories, these nine highs
reported specific memories of events that they had personally experienced, but reinterpreted these memories from the per-
spective of their suggested identity. When the hypnotist challenged their delusion, seven highs maintained the delusion in
response to both the contradiction and confrontation. In much the same way as highs in Noble and McConkey’s (1995)
experiment responded to challenge, these highs, when challenged via contradiction, dismissed their mother as ‘‘crazy’’
and, when challenged via confrontation, denied that the person on the television monitor was themselves. Cox and
Barnier suggested that clinical patients with reverse intermetamorphosis, like their hypnotised participants, might resist
challenges by generating memories from the perspective of their deluded identity.
In other experiments, Cox and Barnier showed that suggestions to become non-existent or less well-known people were
equally successful as suggestions to become personally known people (Cox & Barnier, 2013), and that the hypnotic identity
delusion led participants to remember more information from a story about a character similar to their delusional identity
than a character similar to their actual identity (Cox & Barnier, 2009b). This latter finding, like Burn et al.’s study of hypnotic
sex change, implies that highs encode material in a biased way that is consistent with their deluded identity and that this
bias later affects their retrieval. Across these experiments, a proportion of low hypnotisable participants also passed the
identity delusion. This observation suggests that factors other than hypnosis, such as compliance or role playing, may have
contributed to the responses of the highs.
To address whether the demand characteristics of the experiment may have affected highs, Cox and Barnier (2013) car-
ried out a further experiment using the real-simulating design. They found that real, high hypnotisable participants reported
specific memories that they justified from the perspective of their deluded identity, whereas simulating, low hypnotisable
participants gave general memories that they did not justify having experienced. On the basis of these differences, the
authors argued that the hypnotic identity delusion could not be explained in terms of demand characteristics alone.
Overall, this line of research showed that hypnotic suggestions can create a compelling analogue of a specific clinical delu-
sion, reverse intermetamorphosis, and simulate its impact on information processing.

2.3. Mirrored-self misidentification

Other recent work has used hypnosis to model the clinical delusion of mirrored-self misidentification, the belief that one’s
reflection in the mirror is someone other than oneself. This delusion occurs most frequently in dementia (Connors &
Coltheart, 2011; Connors, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2015) and is difficult to study because of the accompanying clinical symp-
toms. To examine whether hypnosis could be used to recreate the features of this clinical delusion, Barnier et al. (2008)
focused on recreating the belief that one’s reflection in the mirror was not oneself. They gave 12 high hypnotisable partic-
ipants a hypnotic induction and one of three different hypnotic suggestions to model potential experiences of the delusion.
These suggestions were: (1) to see a stranger in the mirror, (2) to see a window with a view of a stranger on the other side, or
(3) to see a window. The hypnotist then asked participants to look into a mirror and describe who they saw.
Overall, 67% of participants reported seeing a stranger in the mirror and 75% of participants described the person in the
mirror as having different physical characteristics to themselves. The first two suggestions, which specified seeing a stranger
(whether in the mirror or in a window), were also more effective in generating the delusion than the third suggestion that
only specified seeing a window. For the participants who reported seeing a stranger, the hypnotist challenged the delusion
by first asking participants to describe what a close friend or family member would say about what they could see, and then
to touch their nose while looking in the mirror and explain why the person copied them. All the participants who experi-
enced the delusion maintained their belief throughout these challenges. Overall, these hypnotised participants reported
experiences and behaved in ways that were strikingly similar to clinical patients with mirrored-self misidentification delu-
sion (for discussions, see Bortolotti, Cox, & Barnier, 2012; Connors, Barnier, Langdon, & Coltheart, in press).
Barnier, Cox, Connors, Langdon, and Coltheart (2011) replicated and extended this experiment. They focused on the most
effective suggestion from the previous experiment – the suggestion to see a stranger in the mirror – with a larger sample of
38 high hypnotisable participants. In this replication, Barnier et al. were interested in the explanations that participants
offered for seeing a stranger in the mirror. They gave half the participants an additional hypnotic suggestion to find it easy
to think of reasons for seeing a stranger in the mirror. Barnier et al. also used a more extensive series of challenges. They gave
participants who reported the delusion three sets of challenges to determine the resilience of their belief. In the ‘‘appear-
ance’’ challenges, the hypnotist asked participants how a close friend or family member would be able to tell them apart
from the stranger. Next, in the ‘‘visual’’ challenges, the hypnotist stood next to participants so that both the participants’
and hypnotist’s reflections were visible in the mirror and asked participants how they could explain what they saw.
Finally, in the ‘‘behavioural’’ challenges, the hypnotist asked participants to touch their nose and then a tennis ball while they
looked in the mirror, and to explain why the stranger copied them.
32 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

Barnier et al. (2011) found that 68% of participants reported seeing a stranger. Participants given the suggestion to think
of reasons for their experience offered more explanations for seeing a stranger in the mirror than those who did not receive
this suggestion. Participants, for example, said that the mirror was really a window into another room or that it was some
kind of trick mirror. However, the suggestion to find it easy to think of reasons did not affect whether or not participants
experienced the delusion. The hypnotic delusion was also resistant to challenge. Just over half the participants who experi-
enced the delusion maintained the delusion throughout all the challenges. The visual challenge, where the hypnotist stood
next to the participant in the mirror, proved to be especially successful in breaching the delusion when compared to the
other challenges. Overall, these two experiments demonstrated that hypnotic suggestion could model the surface features
of the mirrored-self misidentification delusion.

2.4. Erotomania

In a similar way, research has used hypnotic suggestion to model the outward features of erotomania, a clinical delusion
in which patients believe that they are loved from afar by another person. This delusion may reflect motivational factors
rather than neurological damage alone (Segal, 1989). Attewell, Cox, Barnier, and Langdon (2012) gave 24 highs and 16 lows
a hypnotic induction and read them a story about a fictional character. They then gave participants a hypnotic suggestion to
believe that this fictional character was in love with them. They also gave participants a second suggestion to have amnesia
for this first suggestion. Attewell et al. tested the delusion by asking participants about their relationship to the fictional
character and then asking participants to interpret four ambiguous social scenarios involving the participant and the fictional
character. Attewell et al. found that more highs (83%) reported that the fictional character was in love with them than lows
(19%). Highs also were more likely to interpret the ambiguous social situations in line with an erotomania delusion than
lows. Given the nature of the delusion, it was necessary to use hypothetical situations and a fictional character for ethical
reasons. As a result, though, the experiment was somewhat limited in its ecological validity. Nevertheless, this experiment
showed that hypnotic suggestion could model some aspects of a delusion that may occur as a result of motivational forces
rather than neurological damage.

2.5. Frégoli delusion

Research has likewise used hypnosis to model Frégoli delusion, a clinical delusion in which patients believe that strangers
are known people in disguise. Elliott (2010) gave 22 highs and 20 lows a suggestion that an unfamiliar confederate, who
entered the room before the suggestion, was someone the participant knew in disguise (see also Connors et al., 2014c). In
response, 12 highs (55%) passed suggestion and identified the confederate as someone they knew. Once the confederate left
the room, these highs, when prompted, described the ways in which the person they knew had changed their appearance. A
number of highs also provided reasons why they thought the person disguised themselves in this way (e.g., it was a prank or
to hide from other people). Elliott (2010) then challenged the hypnotic Frégoli delusion with a contradiction (in which the
hypnotist asked participants what they would say if someone else told them that the confederate was a stranger), a talking
challenge (in which the hypnotist asked participants how the confederate’s voice differed from how the person they believed
it was normally spoke), and a walking challenge (in which the hypnotist asked participants how the confederate’s gait dif-
fered from how the person they believed it was normally walked). In response, five highs maintained their delusion.
Altogether, the study illustrates how it is possible to use hypnosis to model delusions involving other people in the
laboratory.
Importantly, participants in this study had completed a number of measures of personality several months prior to the
experiment. Subsequent analyses revealed that high levels of delusion proneness (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) –
an index of unusual beliefs and subclinical delusional ideation in the ordinary population – predicted which highs passed
the Frégoli suggestion independent of hypnotisability scores (Connors et al., 2014c). These findings suggest that a proclivity
to unusual beliefs may be influential in hypnotic analogues of delusions. One possible explanation is that participants who
are high in delusion proneness may be more likely to accept a hypnotic suggestion for an unusual belief and so engage their
hypnotic talents to bring it about than participants low in this trait. Participants low in delusion proneness may instead dis-
miss the suggestion as implausible and not use the necessary cognitive strategies to bring about an effect. The findings thus
also highlight possible commonality between hypnotic and clinical delusions in terms of underlying traits.

2.6. Folie à deux

Other research has used hypnosis to model folie à deux – delusions that are shared between two or more people.
Adapting the paradigms used to model mirrored-self misidentification and Frégoli delusions, Freeman, Cox, and Barnier
(2013) gave 17 highs and 10 lows a hypnotic induction and told them that another person – described as either ‘‘very cred-
ible’’ or ‘‘interesting’’ – would enter the room. A confederate then entered the room and began a dialogue with the hypnotist,
following a set script, as the participant watched. In particular, the hypnotist asked the confederate to look at a mirror on the
wall and report who they saw. The confederate reported seeing a stranger and acted as if they had mirrored-self misiden-
tification delusion. The confederate then turned to the participant, asked the participant to look at the mirror – at an angle
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 33

at which only the confederate’s reflection was visible – and identify who they saw. In response, 11 of the 17 highs, but no
lows, reported that the confederate’s reflection was a stranger.
These participants were then asked to lean forward to look directly in the mirror – so they could see their own reflection –
and were asked who they saw. In response, five highs who were told that the confederate would be very credible reported
seeing a stranger; four of these five highs continued to maintain their delusion when asked to touch their nose. No highs,
however, who were told that the confederate would be interesting identified their own reflection as a stranger. Following
a similar procedure, Freeman et al. (2013) also invited the confederate into the hypnosis session for a second time. This time,
however, the confederate claimed to hear ‘‘jingle bells’’ and asked participants if they could hear it too. In response, 10 highs
and one low reported hearing ‘‘jingle bells.’’ Freeman et al. thus demonstrated that a confederate could induce a
mirrored-self misidentification delusion and an auditory hallucination in hypnotised participants in the absence of a direct
suggestion from the hypnotist.
This appears to be the first study in which a confederate, rather than the hypnotist, has given an indirect suggestion to
participants. There are, however, a number of limitations that will need to be addressed in future studies. As the hypnotist
directly introduced the confederate to participants within a context in which they had received other hypnotic suggestions
immediately beforehand, it is possible that participants simply interpreted the confederate as having a similar role and
authority as the hypnotist and responded accordingly. In addition, the fact that one low also reported hearing the auditory
hallucination indicates that, as the authors acknowledge, there may have been strong social pressures to play along with the
confederate and it is unclear the extent to which these social pressures resemble those in clinical folie à deux. Finally, there
are no clinical reports of folie à deux involving mirrored-self misidentification – a delusion that typically only occurs in
dementia or organic brain injury (see Connors & Coltheart, 2011). Nevertheless, the study marks an important first step
in using hypnosis to examine social processes involved in some delusions.

2.7. Interim summary and evaluation

Overall, this set of studies clearly demonstrates that hypnotic suggestion can recreate the surface features of clinical delu-
sions. Across studies, participants reported beliefs with high levels of conviction and maintained these beliefs despite chal-
lenges and strong evidence to the contrary. In many cases, participants also elaborated on the belief and confabulated
evidence in support of the delusion. Indeed, several studies (Burn et al., 2001; Cox & Barnier, 2009a, 2009b, 2013) demon-
strated that the hypnotic delusion resulted in specific alterations in memory, which has theoretical implications for models
of autobiographical memory (Cox & Barnier, 2013). In addition, in all of these studies, participants reported beliefs that were
very similar to those held by clinical patients with delusions. In particular, hypnotic suggestion was able to recreate delu-
sions that involve both oneself and other people, as well as delusions that result from both neurological damage and moti-
vational factors.
This set of studies has also established a number of practices, drawn from experimental hypnosis, that are of particular
importance to investigating hypnotic delusions. First, challenge techniques allowed researchers to examine the resilience
and fixity of hypnotic delusions. Second, the hypnosis-wake design, in which participants given suggestions with hypnosis
are compared to participants given suggestions without hypnosis, allowed researchers to investigate the role of the hypnotic
context in generating the delusion. Third, Orne’s (1959, 1979) real-simulator paradigm allowed researchers to rule out alter-
native explanations for participants’ behaviour, such as mere compliance or faking. Finally, detailed postexperimental inqui-
ries, such as Sheehan and McConkey’s (1982) EAT technique, allowed researchers to index hypnotised participants’
subjective experiences in detail.
For the most part, however, this set of studies has focused on understanding the properties of hypnotic delusions, includ-
ing their outward similarity to clinical delusions, rather than advancing theoretical understanding of the clinical delusions
themselves. As such, this research provides the empirical basis for extending the hypnotic delusions paradigm and applying
hypnotic models to investigate more clinically relevant issues. When considering this set of studies in terms of this new goal,
there are two important limitations of previous work.
First, these studies have tended to use suggestions that directly specified the content of the delusion to participants.
Researchers, for example, told participants they would become the opposite sex (Noble & McConkey, 1995), become another
person (Cox & Barnier, 2009a), or see a stranger in the mirror (Barnier et al., 2011). This sort of suggestion is an important
first step in demonstrating that hypnosis can model the surface features of the delusion in question. However, the amount of
information in the suggestions makes it possible that this surface similarity is simply the result of this level of specification,
rather than the result of any shared mechanisms between hypnotic and clinical delusions (see also Weitzenhoffer, 1953,
2000). According to Reyher (1962, 1967), phenotypic identity (similar surface features) does not necessarily imply genotypic
identity (similar underlying processes). To establish the clinical relevance of the hypnotic model, researchers need to be able
to distinguish the mechanisms of hypnotic suggestion from the mechanisms that underpin the disorder that the researcher is
seeking to model (Reyher, 1962, 1967).
Second, these studies have not been guided by theories of clinical delusions. Most previous research has tended to focus
on recreating the surface features of delusions but has not attempted to model the underlying processes that are hypothe-
sised to cause the delusions in clinical patients. As Kihlstrom (1979) observed, however, ‘‘If the modeling agenda is to suc-
ceed, investigators must move beyond mere ‘demonstration’ experiments and begin to analyze the underlying psychological
processes in detail’’ (p. 464). To establish the clinical relevance of the hypnotic model, researchers need to demonstrate that
34 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

the hypnotic delusions share some degree of commonality with the clinical delusions in terms of their underlying psycho-
logical processes and show that the hypnotic models can inform theories of the clinical conditions (see Abramson &
Seligman, 1977; Kihlstrom & McGlynn, 1991). With greater understanding of the properties of hypnotic delusions and the
ongoing development of cognitive theories of clinical delusions (Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011; Connors & Halligan,
2015; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000), other studies have moved to establish closer links between hypnotic modelling and the-
ories of clinical delusions.

3. Modelling underlying processes of delusions

A number of studies have used hypnosis to examine the underlying mechanisms of clinical delusions. Many of these stud-
ies have been motivated by cognitive models of delusions. In particular, a number of theories of delusions have noted that
delusional ideas can arise from an attempt to explain an unusual experience (Ellis & Young, 1990; James, 1890; Maher, 1974,
1988; Reed, 1972). This can be illustrated, for example, by Capgras delusion, the belief that a known person has been
replaced by an imposter. In this case, a deficit in autonomic responsiveness – acquired, for instance, by brain injury or stroke
– can lead a patient to encounter a familiar face with less autonomic response or familiarity then what they are accustomed.
As a result, a patient may infer that the familiar person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990, 1996). In
support of this account, a number of studies have found that patients with Capgras delusion show reduced autonomic
responses (as indexed by skin conductance recordings) to photographs of familiar faces (Brighetti, Bonifacci, Borlimi, &
Ottaviani, 2007; Ellis, Young, Quayle, & de Pauw, 1997; Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997). In a similar way, there are plausible
deficits that can account for the content of many other clinical delusions (see, e.g., Coltheart et al., 2011; Connors et al., 2015;
Ellis & Young, 1990). Hypnosis is particularly relevant to such accounts as it can be readily used to generate anomalous expe-
riences in healthy volunteers and test whether these experiences produce delusional ideation (Kihlstrom, 1979; Kihlstrom &
Hoyt, 1988).
A later development of these earlier psychological theories of delusions is the two-factor account (Coltheart, 2007, 2010;
Coltheart et al., 2011; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). This theory has been described as ‘‘by far the most influential neurocog-
nitive account of delusion in the scientific literature at the present time’’ (Braun & Suffren, 2011, p. 2). According to this the-
ory, two separate cognitive disruptions are necessary for a delusion to form and be maintained. As in previous theories, this
account proposes that a delusion’s content arises from some type of perceptual, emotional and/or autonomic anomaly
(Factor 1). In contrast to earlier accounts, however, this account argues that a second factor is needed to explain why the
delusional hypothesis is not rejected. In particular, this account proposes that a delusion is accepted and maintained over
time due a deficit in belief evaluation (Factor 2). This second factor explains why some patients with Factor 1 develop a delu-
sion whereas other patients with Factor 1 do not (for a description of patients with Factor 1 deficits without Capgras delu-
sion, see Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995). Thus, patients with both Factor 1 and Factor 2 will develop the delusion (for a
more recent, multi-factorial account of delusions, see Connors & Halligan, 2015).
Importantly, the two-factor theory of delusion, like later refinements, is a cognitive neuropsychiatric theory (Coltheart,
2007, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2011; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). According to this cognitive neuropsychiatric approach, psy-
chiatric symptoms, in this case delusions, can be explained in terms of breakdowns in normal cognitive processing (Connors
& Halligan, 2015; David & Halligan, 1996, 2000; Halligan & David, 2001). It follows from this approach that the two-factor
theory is a general cognitive model of delusions and that any disruptions to the cognitive processes involved in belief gen-
eration and belief evaluation should create a delusion, regardless of the distal causes of those cognitive disruptions.
In clinical patients with monothematic delusions, these disruptions are often caused by neuropsychological damage
(Coltheart et al., 2011). In some other patients, however, the disruptions may instead be caused by motivational factors
(Connors & Halligan, 2015; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005, 2007). It is possible, for example, that delusions of erotoma-
nia and persecution could result as compensation for a lack of self-esteem (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, &
Kinderman, 2001; Segal, 1989). In patients with these delusions, motivational forces may interfere with belief formation
in a top-down manner without any organic pathology. Like motivational forces, hypnosis may be able to cause disruptions
to the cognitive processes involved in belief formation (Cox & Barnier, 2010; Oakley & Halligan, 2009). As a result, hypnotic
suggestion may be able to produce cognitive disruptions similar to those responsible for clinical delusions and, when mod-
elling organic delusions, temporarily simulate the cognitive impact of organic pathology. This possibility is illustrated in a
number of studies.

3.1. Paranoia

In an important experiment, Zimbardo, Andersen, and Kabat (1981) used hypnotic suggestion to model paranoia. In par-
ticular, Zimbardo et al. tested a theory that deafness, without awareness of its source, could cause paranoia. According to this
theory, patients who are unaware of their own deafness may interpret their inability to hear other people talking as evidence
that these people are whispering to conceal information or are conspiring against them (Cooper, 1976; Houston & Royse,
1954; Langdon, McKay, & Coltheart, 2008; Piker, 1937). Zimbardo et al. gave six high hypnotisable participants a posthyp-
notic suggestion for partial deafness with amnesia for the source of their deafness. They compared these participants to two
control groups, including six highs given a posthypnotic suggestion for partial deafness without amnesia for the source of
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 35

their deafness, and a further six highs given an unrelated posthypnotic suggestion to scratch their ear. All participants com-
pleted a task while two confederates talked between themselves and the cue for the posthypnotic suggestion was triggered.
Afterwards, the participants rated their feelings about the experiment and completed three measures of paranoia. As
expected, participants given the suggestion for deafness with amnesia for its source reported feeling more hostile and agi-
tated, and showed higher scores on the paranoia scales than participants in the two control groups. Although this experiment
did not explicitly investigate delusional belief, it demonstrated that hypnotic suggestion could be used to generate anoma-
lous experiences – akin to Factor 1 in Langdon and Coltheart’s (2000) theory – that in turn lead to delusional ideation.

3.2. Mirrored-self misidentification

Following previous studies that recreated the surface features of mirrored-self misidentification delusion (Barnier et al.,
2008, 2011), other research has attempted to extend this analogue and model mirrored-self misidentification delusion from
its underlying processes. According to the two-factor theory, either impaired face processing (and hence a difficulty recog-
nising oneself in the mirror) or mirror agnosia (an inability to use mirror knowledge when interacting with mirrors) can lead
to the idea that there is a stranger in the mirror and generate the content of the delusion (Factor 1; Breen, Caine, & Coltheart,
2001; Coltheart et al., 2011). A second deficit in belief evaluation (Factor 2) is needed to explain why the delusion is main-
tained. This second factor explains why some patients with Factor 1 develop mirrored-self misidentification delusion
whereas others do not (for a description of patients with Factor 1 deficits without the delusion, see Connors & Coltheart,
2011; Ellis & Florence, 1990). Adopting this framework, Connors and colleagues attempted to recreate mirrored-self misiden-
tification delusion from its proposed Factor 1 (either impaired face processing or mirror agnosia) and Factor 2 (impaired
belief evaluation) components over six experiments (for a more detailed review of this program of research, see Connors
et al., in press).

3.2.1. Impaired face processing as Factor 1

One set of studies focused on the impaired face processing pathway to mirrored-self misidentification. In their first exper-
iment, Connors, Barnier, Coltheart, Cox, and Langdon (2012) attempted to model the delusion from its underlying Factor 1
and Factor 2 components in a sample of 46 highs. To model Factor 1, they gave highs a suggestion to not recognise the face
they saw in the mirror. To model Factor 2, they gave half the participants an additional suggestion to impair belief evaluation
by suggesting that they could accept any explanation of what was happening that came to mind (based on an account of the
second factor by Turner & Coltheart, 2010). As a hypnotic induction by itself may disrupt belief evaluation without the need
for an additional suggestion (see, e.g., Bryant & Mallard, 2003, 2005; Crawford & Allen, 1983; Oakley, 2008; Shor, 1959), they
compared participants given the suggestions during hypnosis with other participants who received the suggestions outside
hypnosis (in a wake control). Connors et al. found that the suggestion for impaired face processing in combination with hyp-
nosis was most successful in generating the delusion. Overall, 73% of participants given the Factor 1 alone suggestion with
hypnosis as Factor 2 passed the delusion. The delusion was also resistant to challenging. This finding indicated that a hyp-
notic analogue of the delusion could be created by modelling the underlying deficits and that hypnosis itself might act as
Factor 2.
Connors and colleagues extended this analogue of mirrored-self misidentification due to impaired face processing in
three subsequent experiments. First, Connors et al. (2013) examined the role of the hypnotic induction and the specific sug-
gestion in the analogue. In particular, they directly compared this new Factor 1 suggestion to impair face processing with
Barnier et al. (2008)’s earlier suggestion for mirrored-self misidentification (referred to as a ‘‘fully-formed’’ suggestion
because it directly specified the content of the delusion; i.e., that they would see a stranger), in both hypnosis and wake con-
ditions. Connors et al. found that the Factor 1 suggestion was just as effective as the fully-formed suggestion in generating a
hypnotic analogue of mirrored-self misidentification, despite not directly specifying the intended experience to participants.
Both suggestions were also significantly more effective when given in hypnosis than in a wake control, confirming the
importance of hypnosis to the analogue.
Second, Connors et al. (2013) examined the role of demand characteristics in the analogue. Adopting a real-simulating
design, they compared 14 reals and 14 simulators given the Factor 1 suggestion. While more simulators passed the sugges-
tion than reals, there were also a number of more subtle differences in the responses of the two groups. Whereas reals did
not provide reasons for their experience, simulators did. Reals and simulators also seemed to show an overall different pat-
tern of response to the visual challenges whereby reals tended to breach the delusion suddenly and simulators tended to
either maintain the delusion or breach the delusion more gradually over the course of all the challenges. Altogether, these
findings indicated that although the overall task requirements of the experiment were clear to simulators, it was unlikely
that the responses of reals could solely be attributed to compliance or role-playing.
Third, Connors et al. (2014a) tested whether hypnotic mirrored-self misidentification affected self-recognition in other
visual media and recognition of other people. This is important because some clinical patients with the delusion recognise
themselves in photographs or handheld mirrors and recognise other people in the mirror, despite maintaining that their own
reflection is a stranger (Breen et al., 2001; Connors & Coltheart, 2011; Feinberg, 2001). Connors et al. (2014a) gave 22 highs
and 20 lows suggestions for either impaired self-face recognition (the Factor 1 suggestion from Connors et al., 2012a) or
impaired recognition of all faces (prosopagnosia). They tested whether participants recognised themselves in a mirror, pho-
tograph, live video feed, and a handheld mirror. They also tested whether participants recognised a lecturer they knew in a
36 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

photograph, the experimenter’s reflection in the mirror, and a series of famous faces in a formal forced-choice familiarity
discrimination test. Both suggestions produced impaired self-face recognition and recreated features of the clinical delusion
in highs. Only the suggestion for general impairment in face recognition, however, disrupted recognition of other faces, albeit
in a minority of highs. Importantly, two highs given this suggestion were also impaired on the famous faces task, indicating
that the face processing deficit was apparent on a stringent neuropsychological test. Altogether, the findings confirm that
hypnotic suggestion can disrupt face processing and recreate other features of mirrored-self misidentification.

3.2.2. Mirror agnosia as Factor 1

Mirror agnosia, however, may also act as Factor 1 and generate the content of mirrored-self misidentification in clinical
patients, independent of any deficits in face processing (Breen et al., 2001). Another set of studies focused on this mirror
agnosia pathway to mirrored-self misidentification. In the first experiment, Connors, Cox, Barnier, Langdon, and Coltheart
(2012) used two different hypnotic suggestions to model mirror agnosia and, following their previous research, used hyp-
nosis itself to model the deficit in belief evaluation. This study took a case study approach in which they examined the
responses of a small number of carefully selected high hypnotisable participants in detail. They gave five highs a suggestion
to not understand how mirrors work and another five highs a suggestion to experience the mirror as a window. The latter
suggestion, to experience the mirror as a window, drew upon the presumed experience of what it would seem like for a
patient with mirror agnosia to look into a mirror (see Ajuriaguerra, de Strejilevitch, & Tissot, 1963). They found that three
participants given the suggestion to not understand mirrors reported seeing a stranger in the mirror and showed features
consistent with mirror agnosia. In contrast, no participants given the suggestion to see a window reported seeing a stranger.
Although limited by the small number of participants, these findings indicated that the suggestion to not understand mirrors
could be used to model the mirror agnosia pathway to the delusion.
In a second experiment, Connors et al. (2014b) directly compared the mirror agnosia suggestion to the impaired face pro-
cessing (Connors et al., 2012a) and fully-formed suggestions (Barnier et al., 2011) in a large sample of 60 highs. In addition to
testing self-recognition in the mirror, Connors et al. also tested participants’ ability to use mirrors by asking them to define a
mirror and to reach for a ball that was visible only by its reflection in the mirror. Connors et al. found that all three sugges-
tions produced a compelling mirrored-self misidentification delusion that was highly resistant to challenge. However, only
participants given the mirror agnosia suggestion, and not the impaired-face-processing suggestion, showed an impaired abil-
ity to use and define mirrors. Interestingly, a subset of participants given the mirror agnosia suggestion developed other
beliefs: Four participants reported seeing a duplicate of themselves, while another four participants reported seeing a stran-
ger through what they took to be a window. The ability of the mirror agnosia suggestion to generate these beliefs implies
that mirror agnosia could lead to other delusions in clinical patients such as the delusion of subjective doubles (the belief
that one has a physical duplicate in the world; see Christodoulou, 1978) and the phantom boarder delusion (the belief that
uninvited strangers are living in one’s house; Hwang, Yang, & Tsai, 2003). It thus also highlights how hypnotic models may
suggest hypotheses that can be investigated in clinical patients.
Overall, these experiments demonstrate that it is possible to create a hypnotic model of mirrored-self-misidentification
delusion from analogues of its hypothesised Factor 1 and Factor 2 components, without directly specifying the intended
behaviour to participants in the suggestion. The experiments thus help to establish the relevance of hypnosis to studying
clinical delusions and indicate that hypnotic modelling can be used to examine questions relating to the underlying mech-
anisms of clinical delusions.

3.3. Somatoparaphrenia

Another recent experiment used hypnosis to model the clinical delusion of somatoparaphrenia, the belief that one’s limb
is owned by someone else. According to Coltheart et al. (2011), limb paralysis as a result of stroke can generate the idea that a
patient’s arm is not their own (Factor 1), and a deficit in belief evaluation results in the uncritical acceptance of this idea as
belief (Factor 2). Adopting this conceptualisation, Rahmanovic, Barnier, Cox, Langdon, and Coltheart (2012) gave 26 high, 37
medium, and 23 low hypnotisable participants one of two different suggestions for somatoparaphrenia. The first suggestion
was designed to model the fully-formed experience of somatoparaphrenia and told participants that their nondominant arm
would belong to someone else. The second suggestion attempted to model somatoparaphrenia from its hypothesised Factor
1 and Factor 2 components: It told participants that their nondominant arm was paralysed (Factor 1) and they would not
remember the suggestion but would accept any explanation to account for the paralysis (Factor 2). Rahmanovic et al.
indexed paralysis by asking participants to pick up a number of objects from a tray placed next to the targeted arm. They
assessed the delusion by pointing to the participants’ targeted arm and explicitly asking them whose arm it was.
Rahmanovic et al. (2012) found that both the fully-formed suggestion and the combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion
generated paralysis in participants. For example, across suggestions, approximately 90% of highs, 70% of mediums, and 50%
of lows failed to pick up a pair of scissors from the tray. However, only the fully-formed suggestion was able to recreate the
somatoparaphrenia delusion in some participants. Only seven highs (54%) and one medium (6%) given the fully-formed sug-
gestion reported that their arm was not their own. No participants given the combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion
reported the delusion. On the basis of these findings, Rahmanovic et al. proposed that paralysis with amnesia for the cause
of the paralysis may not be sufficient as Factor 1 to generate the content of somatoparaphrenia and that the inferential leap
from paralysis to the delusion was too great for the hypnotised participants. In particular, Rahmanovic et al. argued that
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 37

anosognosia – the denial of impairment that usually accompanies limb paralysis in somatoparaphrenia – might play an
important role in generating the delusional content in clinical patients with somatoparaphrenia. If so, the amnesia sugges-
tion given to participants for the source of their paralysis would not have been sufficient to recreate this denial of being
paralysed. Another possibility is that a disrupted sense of body ownership is a necessary component of Factor 1 to generate
the content of somatoparaphrenia (Fotopoulou et al., 2011) and this also was unlikely to have been modelled with the sug-
gestions used by Rahmanovic et al.
Given the large inferential leap from paralysis to the delusion, a further possible explanation for Rahmanovic et al.’s
(2012) findings is that characteristics of the experimental context influenced the types of attributions that participants made
to explain their paralysis (see Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988). The paralysis that hypnotised participants experienced, for example,
was relatively brief and limited to the hypnotic context. It also had much less emotional significance than the paralysis expe-
rienced by clinical patients. Although not specifically discussed by Rahmanovic et al., it is possible that these characteristics
may have influenced how hypnotised participants interpreted their paralysis. The short duration, laboratory setting, and lim-
ited emotional significance for example, may have made it less likely that participants would seek a stable, external attribu-
tion to explain their paralysis – such as the idea that their arm was owned by someone else – when other explanations,
involving both temporary, internal attributions (e.g., ‘‘my arm has ‘fallen asleep’’’) and temporary, external attributions
(e.g., ‘‘it’s something to do with this experiment’’), were more plausible and salient. However, despite its failure to recreate
somatoparaphrenia from its hypothesised Factor 1 and Factor 2 components, this experiment illustrates how hypnotic sug-
gestion can be used to empirically test a theoretical account of a delusion involving distorted body representation.

3.4. Alien control and other delusions involving altered agency

A number of studies have similarly used hypnotic suggestions to model alien control delusion, the belief that one’s hand,
arm, or other body part is being controlled by someone else. According to the two-factor theory, disrupted self-monitoring of
one’s actions may constitute Factor 1 in this delusion and generate the idea of one’s limb being controlled by external forces
(Coltheart et al., 2011). Many of the hypnosis studies, however, have focused on underlying neural mechanisms of the delu-
sion, rather than the cognitive factors posited by the two-factor theory. In one such study, Blakemore, Oakley, and Frith
(2003) tested six hypnotised highs while they lay supine, with their left arm attached to a pulley system, and underwent
a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan. To model alien control delusion, participants were given a hypnotic suggestion
that the pulley system would raise and lower their arm. In reality, however, the pulley system was not used. As a result, par-
ticipants moved the arm themselves, but misattributed the action to the experimenter. The neural activation in this condi-
tion was compared with two control conditions – one in which participants actively moved their arm and another when an
experimenter actually did move participants’ arms with the pulley system. Although participants made identical movements
across the three conditions, the specific brain activity varied depending on whether participants attributed the action to
themselves or an external source. In particular, the hypnotically deluded movements were associated with greater activation
in the cerebellum and parietal opercular cortex relative to the active movement condition. The authors suggested that neural
mechanisms in these areas could underpin the experience of alien control in clinical patients.
A limitation in Blakemore et al.’s study, however, was that it is unclear if the neural correlates reflected involuntariness
per se or participants’ sensory awareness of unexpected movements. To disentangle these two aspects of agency, Deeley
et al. (2013) tested 15 highs in an fMRI and used hypnotic suggestions to independently manipulate voluntariness and
awareness in movements of a joystick. Deeley et al. found these aspects of agency were associated with distinct neural areas:
Whereas perceived involuntary control of movements was associated with reduced connectivity between the supplementary
motor area (SMA) and motor regions, reduced awareness of these movements was associated with less activation in parietal
cortices (BA 7, BA 40) and insula.
A further issue is that involuntary movements can vary in terms of whether they are attributed to external forces (as
reported in delusions of control) or internal forces (as reported in spirit possession). If attributed to an external force, they
also vary in terms of whether they are attributed to personal or impersonal agents. In another experiment with a very similar
procedure, Deeley et al. (2014) investigated the neural correlates of these different attributions by giving specific suggestions
for either external personal control (alien control delusion), external impersonal control (control by a machine), or internal
personal control (possession). Although participants reported similar levels of involuntariness across the suggestions, their
brain activity and/or connectivity significantly varied with different experiences and attributions of loss of agency. Although
there were no significant differences in neural activation between external and internal personal alien control, both were
associated with increased connectivity between the primary motor cortex (M1) and a range of brain regions involved in
the attribution of mental states and representing the self in relation to others. These findings suggest that similar neural sys-
tems underpin the attributions and experiences of both alien control and possession.
Another approach to modelling alien control and delusions of altered agency has focused on automatic writing. Walsh
et al. (2014) used suggestions to model both the motor changes – related to alien control – and cognitive experiences –
related to thought insertion – involved in automatic writing. In the first experiment, they tested 20 highs in a mock fMRI
scanner. Participants wrote voluntarily and then were hypnotised and received suggestions for alien control, thought inser-
tion, and the combination of both. After each suggestion, participants were given the opportunity to write and then com-
pleted ratings of control, ownership, and awareness for both their thoughts and movements. Participants’ writing was
also assessed quantitatively in terms of the number of words and characters, as well as qualitatively in terms of the content
38 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

of the writing and the visual appearance of the writing itself. Walsh et al. found that hypnosis by itself – in the absence of any
suggestions – was associated with a significant reduction of control, ownership, and awareness for writing. There were also
significant differences between suggestions: Whereas the suggestion for alien control reduced ratings of control, ownership,
and awareness for movements, the suggestion for thought insertion reduced these ratings for thoughts. In addition, although
there was no difference in the content of writing after these suggestions, participants reported that the appearance of their
writing was unusual in both conditions.
In a second experiment, Walsh, Oakley, Halligan, Mehta, and Deeley (2015) tested 18 highs using the same suggestions and
procedure in an actual fMRI. They found that the suggestions were associated with different neural activation. Whereas thought
insertion was associated with reduced activation of networks supporting language, movement, and self-related processing,
alien control was associated with increased activity of a left-lateralised cerebellar-parietal network and decreased activity
in brain regions involved in voluntary movement. Both experiences involved a reduction in activity and altered functional con-
nectivity of the left supplementary motor area. The findings indicate that the thought and movement components of writing
can have their perceived agency independently manipulated and that these alterations are associated with distinct brain areas.
Following some of this work on neural correlates, Cox, Barnier, and Scott (2014) examined the behavioural consequences
and cognitive underpinnings of alien control delusion in two experiments. In the first experiment, they gave 22 highs and 20
lows a fully-formed suggestion that their dominant hand and arm would make a mess of whatever they were doing and that
they would be convinced that someone else was causing these movements. The hypnotist also gave participants a suggestion
for amnesia so that they would forget the original suggestion. Half the participants received these suggestions to experience
the effects during hypnosis and half received the suggestions to experience the effects posthypnotically (i.e., after the hyp-
nosis session was terminated). Cox et al. tested the suggestion by asking participants to sign their name on a digital graphics
tablet and then to pick up and manipulate a number of objects, such as a comb and bottle, from a tray.
In response, 20 highs and 3 lows reported that it felt unusual to sign their names, and 13 highs and 3 lows reported that
their signature was different. This was confirmed by independent raters who compared participants’ signatures to the ones
on their consent forms. The majority of highs, but very few lows, also had difficulty picking up and manipulating the various
objects. Importantly, either during the hypnosis session or the postexperimental inquiry, 12 highs said that they had
believed that someone else was controlling their hand or arm, indicating the presence of the delusion. However, although
some highs could experience the delusion post-hypnotically, it appeared less compelling than when the suggestion was
given hypnotically. A number of participants also offered other alternative explanations for their impaired movements, such
as being clumsy, not having energy, or that their hand was slippery.
In a second experiment, Cox et al. (2014) attempted to model the alien control delusion from Factor 1 and Factor 2 com-
ponents. They gave 20 highs, 27 medium hypnotisable participants, and 18 lows either a fully-formed suggestion (that some-
one else would cause the movements in their dominant hand and arm) or a combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion (that
they would feel as if they were not causing the movements of their dominant hand and arm, and that they would come up
with an account for why this was plausible). Cox et al. tested participants’ responses by placing a graphics tablet on their lap
and instructing them to pick up a stylus and sign their name with it on the tablet. Whereas the majority of highs given the
fully-formed suggestion had difficulty with the writing task, only two highs given the combined Factor 1 and Factor 2 sug-
gestion had difficulties (one medium given the fully-formed suggestion also had difficulties).
Next, Cox et al. gave participants a self-monitoring task that was adapted from a clinical study. Participants were asked to
draw a series of pictures on the graphics tablet either with their eyes open or closed. After each drawing, the computer displayed
the picture alongside three copies that were rotated at 90 degrees, 180 degrees, and 270 degrees. Participants were asked to
identify the image they drew (i.e., the image that had not been rotated). Highs identified fewer abstract drawings, which the
participants had completed with their eyes closed, than lows. There was also a trend for participants given the fully-formed
suggestion to have greater difficulty identifying the correct orientation of their drawing than those given the combined
Factor 1 and Factor 2 suggestion, particularly for drawings when the participants’ eyes were closed. When asked after the exper-
iment if they thought that someone else was causing their movements, nine highs, nine mediums, and one low said they had.
Overall, these different studies demonstrate how hypnotic suggestion can create both delusions of alien control and the
impaired self-monitoring that is thought to underpin the condition. The findings also highlight how different hypnotic sug-
gestions and subjective experiences of involuntary movement are associated with distinct neural areas. As in the hypnotic
somatoparaphrenia experiment, however, it is unclear whether the failure to recreate the delusion from Factor 1 and Factor 2
components was due to the fact that the suggestion did not appropriately match Factor 1 or to other aspects of the hypnotic
procedure. Nevertheless, given the complexity in possible attributions and experiences of involuntary movements (Deeley
et al., 2014), there remain a number of other possibilities for Factor 1 in this delusion that could be tried as suggestions
in the paradigm.

4. Implications and future directions

4.1. Evaluation

Overall, this second set of studies illustrates how hypnotic suggestion can be used to investigate processes relevant to
clinical delusions. The ability of specific suggestions to recreate paranoia (Zimbardo et al., 1981) and mirrored-self
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 39

misidentification (Connors, Barnier, et al., 2012; Connors et al., 2013) from hypothesised underlying factors confirm the
value of hypnotic analogues for studying underlying mechanisms. Indeed, the failures to recreate somatoparaphrenia
(Rahmanovic et al., 2012) and alien control (Cox et al., 2014) from hypothesised Factor 1 and Factor 2 deficits may prove
equally informative as they suggest possible refinements to theoretical models of these conditions and their likely contrib-
utory factors. Irrespective of these latter findings, by focusing on the underlying mechanisms of clinical delusions and avoid-
ing directly specifying the particular delusion in suggestions, this set of studies has improved the ecological validity of
hypnotic models and demonstrated that hypnotic analogues could be used to investigate processes relevant to the clinical
disorder (Kihlstrom, 1979; Reyher, 1962, 1967). The findings also imply that future research could use hypnotic suggestion
to investigate other clinical delusions in a similar way.
There are, however, a number of important differences between clinical and hypnotic delusions (see also Connors et al.,
2013, in press; Cox & Barnier, 2010; Oakley & Halligan, 2009; Woody & Szechtman, 2011). First, clinical and hypnotic delu-
sions have different aetiologies. Whereas some clinical delusions arise from neurological damage, hypnotic delusions arise
from hypnotic suggestion and require the active cooperation of the participant. Second, clinical and hypnotic delusions differ
in their duration and in the contexts in which they occur. Whereas clinical delusions can endure across time and across dif-
ferent environmental contexts, hypnotic delusions are relatively short-lived and are confined to the hypnosis laboratory.
Third, clinical and hypnotic delusions differ in some features of the experience. Clinical delusions may involve considerable
distress and personal investment that is not recreated in the hypnotic model.
In addition to these limitations, it remains to be seen whether hypnotic analogues can recreate the neural mechanisms
involved in clinical delusion. Such a convergence at the neural level with the clinical delusion, however, may not be neces-
sary for the hypnotic model to be worthwhile. As a model, the analogue is intended as an approximation of the disorder that
is useful within the laboratory. As such, the criterion for a successful model may be its ability to generate and test new ideas,
rather than its ability to produce an exact replica of the disorder (Woody & Szechtman, 2011). In any case, delusions, like
many psychiatric conditions, are defined according to diagnostic criteria by the outward behaviour and reported experience
of patients, rather than by the presence of specific neuroanatomical features or biomarkers. The ability of hypnotic sugges-
tion to recreate the outward behaviour and subjective experience of a disorder means that it is able to generate a model with
enough similarity to the clinical condition for it to be useful for a variety of research purposes (Oakley & Halligan, 2009, 2011,
2013; Woody & Szechtman, 2011).

4.2. Applications

Despite these limitations, hypnotic models have a number of advantages. The use of hypnotic models, for example, avoids
some of the challenges of studying clinical patients directly. The hypnotic model allows researchers to investigate variables
that can be difficult to study in clinical patients who typically have a range of other co-occurring deficits or who may be
reluctant to participate in research. As already noted, the analogue has the added advantage of allowing researchers to
experimentally manipulate variables of interest within the model and test their contribution to the overall disorder
(Kihlstrom, 1979; Oakley & Halligan, 2009; Woody & Szechtman, 2011). Such an approach could be used to test and refine
the theories of other clinical delusions. In addition, as the analogue is temporary and completely reversible, it avoids certain
ethical issues that are involved in dealing with clinical patients. It is, for example, not always in the patient’s best interest to
investigate the delusion if the patient has more pressing clinical issues, as may be the case in dementia and other neurolog-
ical conditions. Likewise, certain questions could also inadvertently reinforce the delusion (see Barnier et al., 2011). The hyp-
notic model allows researchers to test questions and challenges on hypnotised participants before trialling them with
clinical patients. The modelling process, with its requirement for a detailed specification of the disorders’ parameters, can
also highlight important gaps in knowledge about the clinical condition.
Hypnotic models may have a number of more immediate practical applications. Hypnotic models could be used for a vari-
ety of training purposes in a similar way to the use of actors to simulate clinical disorders when training clinicians (Oakley &
Halligan, 2009). Unlike simulating actors, however, hypnotic models recreate not only the outward verbal and behavioural
responses, but the subjective experience of the disorders as well. The hypnotic model may provide a way to create a highly
realistic depiction of the clinical condition on demand. The analogue provides a safe environment for trainees to learn and
practice clinical skills or to be assessed on their competence without risk to clinical patients. In addition, the analogue gives
trainees exposure to uncommon conditions without having to wait for suitable real-life cases to present. Trainees could also
potentially be hypnotised themselves and given suggestions for disorders, providing they are sufficiently high hypnotisable
(P.W. Halligan, personal communication, November 19, 2010). This could provide trainees with a greater understanding of
the disorders, as well as greater empathy for those who suffer from them.

4.3. Future directions

There are many possibilities for future research on each of the hypnotic delusions already discussed. There are, however, a
number of more general directions for future research across these different analogues. One important direction of research
is to compare hypnotic delusions with their clinical counterparts in more detail. This could involve, for example, neuropsy-
chological, psychophysiological, and neuroimaging measures to determine the degree of similarity between the two types of
delusion. A second direction of future research is to use hypnotic suggestions to model different aspects of delusions that are
40 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

not yet captured in hypnotic models. These include, for example, the fluctuations in delusional belief evident in some clinical
patients over time (Connors & Coltheart, 2011) and the specific physiological deficits associated with some delusions (Ellis &
Young, 1990; Ellis et al., 1997). A third direction of future research could be to model other clinical delusions and their under-
lying processes. A number of theories have hypothesised deficits responsible for the content of other clinical delusions
(Factor 1 in the two-factor theory): Capgras delusion, for example, could involve a loss of autonomic responsiveness to faces;
Frégoli delusion could involve heightened autonomic responsiveness to faces; and reduplicative paramnesia (the belief that a
place has been duplicated) could involve an inappropriate sense of familiarity for the present situation or déjà vu (see
Connors et al., 2015). Specific suggestions could be used to create Factor 1 in each of these delusions. Finally, a fourth direc-
tion of research could be to use hypnosis to investigate nonpathological belief formation. This could be done, for example, by
adopting various learning paradigms to compare hypnotically-induced beliefs and other beliefs that participants hold.

5. Conclusion

Overall, hypnosis provides a way of modelling both the surface features and underlying processes of delusions under con-
trolled laboratory conditions. Although care needs to be taken in interpreting the findings when transitioning between the
laboratory and the clinic, hypnosis provides a way of recreating many of the core features of delusions and testing theories of
how they develop (Kihlstrom, 1979; Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988). In future research, this approach could be employed to model
many other types of delusions and be used in more a more applied manner that might inform clinical understanding. In addi-
tion, hypnosis offers a means of manipulating normal belief formation and examining processes involved in belief more gen-
erally (see Connors & Halligan, 2015). In this way, hypnosis can be used as a tool to study belief in both normative and
pathological forms.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Amanda Barnier and John Kihlstrom for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also
grateful to Max Coltheart, Emily Connaughton, Rochelle Cox, Peter Halligan, Robyn Langdon, and Vince Polito for many help-
ful discussions.

References

Abramson, L. Y., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1977). Modeling psychopathology in the laboratory: History and rationale. In J. P. Maser & M. E. P. Seligman (Eds.),
Psychopathology: Experimental models (pp. 1–26). San Francisco, CA: W H Freeman.
Ajuriaguerra, J., de Strejilevitch, M., & Tissot, R. (1963). A propos de quelques conduites devant le miroir de sujets atteints de syndromes démentiels du
grand âge. [On the behaviour of senile dementia patients vis-à-vis the mirror]. Neuropsychologia, 1, 59–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0028-
3932(63)90013-7.
Attewell, J., Cox, R. E., Barnier, A. J., & Langdon, R. (2012). A hypnotic analogue of erotomania. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 60,
1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207144.2011.621863.
Azam, E. (1883). Les altérations de la personnalité. [Alterations of personality]. Revue Scientifique, 32, 610–618.
Barnier, A. J., Cox, R. E., Connors, M., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2011). A stranger in the looking glass: Developing and challenging a hypnotic mirrored-self
misidentification delusion. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 59, 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207144.2011.522863.
Barnier, A. J., Cox, R. E., O’Connor, A., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., Breen, N., et al (2008). Developing hypnotic analogues of clinical delusions: Mirrored-self
misidentification. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 13, 406–430. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546800802355666.
Bentall, R. P., Corcoran, R., Howard, R., Blackwood, N., & Kinderman, P. (2001). Persecutory delusions: A review and theoretical integration. Clinical
Psychology Review, 21, 1143–1192. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7358(01)00106-4.
Binet, A. (1896). Alterations of personality. New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company.
Blakemore, S.-J., Oakley, D. A., & Frith, C. D. (2003). Delusions of alien control in the normal brain. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1058–1067. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/s0028-3932(02)00313-5.
Borras, L., Huguelet, P., & Eytan, A. (2007). Delusional ‘‘pseudotranssexualism’’ in schizophrenia. Psychiatry: Interpersonal & Biological Processes, 70, 175–179.
Bortolotti, L., Cox, R., & Barnier, A. (2012). Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory? Philosophical Psychology, 25, 109–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
09515089.2011.569909.
Braun, C. M. J., & Suffren, S. (2011). A general neuropsychological model of delusion. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 16, 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13546800903442314.
Breen, N., Caine, D., & Coltheart, M. (2001). Mirrored-self misidentification: Two cases of focal onset dementia. Neurocase, 7, 239–254. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1093/neucas/7.3.239.
Brighetti, G., Bonifacci, P., Borlimi, R., & Ottaviani, C. (2007). ‘‘Far from the heart far from the eye’’: Evidence from the Capgras delusion. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 12, 189–197. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546800600892183.
Bryant, R. A., & Mallard, D. (2003). Seeing is believing: The reality of hypnotic hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 219–230. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00003-5.
Bryant, R. A., & Mallard, D. (2005). Reality monitoring in hypnosis: A real-simulating analysis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 53,
13–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207140490914216.
Bryant, R. A., & McConkey, K. M. (1989a). Hypnotic blindness, awareness, and attribution. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98, 443–447. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0021-843X.98.4.443.
Bryant, R. A., & McConkey, K. M. (1989b). Hypnotic blindness: A behavioral and experiential analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98, 71–77. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.98.1.71.
Burn, C., Barnier, A. J., & McConkey, K. M. (2001). Information processing during hypnotically suggested sex change. International Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Hypnosis, 49, 231–242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207140108410073.
Christodoulou, G. N. (1978). Syndrome of subjective doubles. American Journal of Psychiatry, 135, 249–251.
Coltheart, M. (2007). The 33rd Bartlett Lecture: Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60, 1041–1062.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470210701338071.
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 41

Coltheart, M. (2010). The neuropsychology of delusions. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1191, 16–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
6632.2010.05496.x.
Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. (2011). Delusional belief. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 271–298. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.psych.121208.131622.
Connors, M. H. (2012). Virtual patients in the hypnosis laboratory. The Psychologist, 25, 786–789. Retrieved from <https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/getfile/
889>.
Connors, M.H., Barnier, A.J., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (in press). Hypnotic models of mirrored-self misidentification delusion: A review and an evaluation.
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.
Connors, M. H., Barnier, A. J., Coltheart, M., Cox, R. E., & Langdon, R. (2012a). Mirrored-self misidentification in the hypnosis laboratory: Recreating the
delusion from its component factors. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 17, 151–176. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2011.582287.
Connors, M. H., Barnier, A. J., Langdon, R., Cox, R. E., Polito, V., & Coltheart, M. (2013). A laboratory analogue of mirrored-self misidentification delusion: The
role of hypnosis, suggestion, and demand characteristics. Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 1510–1522. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.10.006.
Connors, M. H., Barnier, A. J., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., Cox, R. E., Rivolta, D., et al (2014a). Using hypnosis to disrupt face processing: Mirrored-self
misidentification delusion and different visual media. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00361.
Connors, M. H., Barnier, A. J., Langdon, R., Cox, R. E., Polito, V., & Coltheart, M. (2014b). Delusions in the hypnosis laboratory: Modeling different pathways to
mirrored-self misidentification. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1, 184–198. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/css0000001.
Connors, M. H., Halligan, P. W., Barnier, A. J., Langdon, R., Cox, R. E., Elliott, J., et al (2014c). Hypnotic analogues of delusions: The role of delusion proneness
and schizotypy. Personality and Individual Differences, 57, 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.09.012.
Connors, M. H., & Coltheart, M. (2011). On the behaviour of senile dementia patients vis-à-vis the mirror: Ajuriaguerra, Strejilevitch and Tissot (1963).
Neuropsychologia, 49, 1679–1692. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.02.041.
Connors, M. H., Cox, R. E., Barnier, A. J., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2012b). Mirror agnosia and the mirrored-self misidentification delusion: A hypnotic
analogue. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 17, 197–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2011.582770.
Connors, M. H., & Halligan, P. W. (2015). A cognitive account of belief: A tentative roadmap. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1588. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/
fpsyg.2014.01588.
Connors, M. H., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2015). Misidentification delusions. In: D. Bhugra & G. S. Malhi (Eds.), Troublesome disguises: Managing
challenging disorders in psychiatry (2nd ed., pp. 169-185). Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118799574.ch13.
Cooper, A. F. (1976). Deafness and psychiatric illness. British Journal of Psychiatry, 129, 216–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjp.129.3.216.
Cox, R. E., & Barnier, A. J. (2009a). Hypnotic Illusions and clinical delusions: A hypnotic paradigm for investigating delusions of misidentification.
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 57, 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207140802463419.
Cox, R. E., & Barnier, A. J. (2009b). Selective information processing in hypnotic identity delusion: The impact of time of encoding and retrieval. Contemporary
Hypnosis, 26, 65–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ch.358.
Cox, R. E., & Barnier, A. J. (2010). Hypnotic illusions and clinical delusions: Hypnosis as a research method. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15, 202–232. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546800903319884.
Cox, R. E., & Barnier, A. J. (2013). Shifting self, shifting memory: Testing the self-memory system model with hypnotic identity delusions. International
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 61, 416–462. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207144.2013.810479.
Cox, R. E., Barnier, A. J., & Scott, A. (2014). An hypnotic analogue of alien control: Modeling the delusion and testing its impact on behavior and self and
monitoring. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1, 407–430. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000028.
Crawford, H. J., & Allen, S. N. (1983). Enhanced visual memory during hypnosis as mediated by hypnotic responsiveness and cognitive strategies. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 112, 662–685. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.112.4.662.
David, A. S., & Halligan, P. W. (1996). Cognitive neuropsychiatry [Editorial]. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 1, 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/135468096396659.
David, A. S., & Halligan, P. W. (2000). Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Potential for progress. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 12, 506–510.
Deeley, Q., Oakley, D. A., Walsh, E., Bell, V., Mehta, M. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2014). Modelling psychiatric and cultural possession phenomena with suggestion
and fMRI. Cortex, 53, 107–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2014.01.004.
Deeley, Q., Walsh, E., Oakley, D. A., Bell, V., Koppel, C., Mehta, M. A., et al (2013). Using hypnotic suggestion to model loss of control and awareness of
movements: An exploratory fMRI study. PLoS ONE, 8, e78324. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.
Elliott, J. (2010). Lucy in ‘disguise’ with diamonds: A hypnotic analogue of Frégoli delusion (Unpublished honours thesis). Macquarie University, Sydney,
Australia.
Ellis, H. D., & Florence, M. (1990). Bodamer’s (1947) paper on prosopagnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 7, 81–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
02643299008253437.
Ellis, H. D., & Young, A. W. (1990). Accounting for delusional misidentifications. British Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 239–248. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/
bjp.157.2.239.
Ellis, H. D., & Young, A. W. (1996). Problems of person perception in schizophrenia. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.), Schizophrenia – A
neuropsychological perspective (pp. 397–416). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Ellis, H. D., Young, A. W., Quayle, A. H., & de Pauw, K. W. (1997). Reduced autonomic responses to faces in Capgras delusion. Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 264, 1085–1092. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1997.0150.
Feinberg, T. E. (2001). Altered egos: How the brain creates the self. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Ferrari, H., Héricourt, J., & Richet, C. (1886). La personnalité et l’écriture, essai de graphologie experimentale. [The personality and the writing: A test of
experimental graphology]. Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 21, 414–424.
Fotopoulou, A., Jenkinson, P. M., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Rudd, A., & Kopelman, M. D. (2011). Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: Dissociation
between first- and third-person perspectives on body ownership. Neuropsychologia, 49, 3946–3955. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.011.
Freeman, L. P., Cox, R. E., & Barnier, A. J. (2013). Transmitting delusional beliefs in a hypnotic model of folie à deux. Consciousness and Cognition, 22,
1285–1297. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.07.011.
Gittleson, N. L., & Dawson-Butterworth, K. (1967). Subjective ideas of sexual change in female schizophrenics. British Journal of Psychiatry, 113, 491–494.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjp.113.498.491.
Gittleson, N. L., & Levine, S. (1966). Subjective ideas of sexual change in male schizophrenics. British Journal of Psychiatry, 112, 779–782. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1192/bjp.112.489.779.
Halligan, P. W., & David, A. S. (2001). Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Towards a scientific psychopathology. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 209–215. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1038/35058586.
Hilgard, E. R. (1965). Hypnotic susceptibility. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Hirstein, W., & Ramachandran, V. S. (1997). Capgras syndrome: A novel probe for understanding the neural representation of the identity and familiarity of
persons. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 264, 437–444. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1997.0062.
Houston, F., & Royse, A. B. (1954). Relationship between deafness and psychotic illness. British Journal of Psychiatry, 100, 990–993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/
bjp.100.421.990.
Hwang, J.-P., Yang, C.-H., & Tsai, S.-J. (2003). Phantom boarder symptom in dementia. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 18, 417–420. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1002/gps.853.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology (Vol. 2). New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1979). Hypnosis and psychopathology: Retrospect and prospect. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 459–473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0021-843X.88.5.459.
42 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1985). Hypnosis. Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 385–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.36.020185.002125.

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1997). Hypnosis, memory, and amnesia. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 352, 1727–1732. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1997.0155.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Demand characteristics in the laboratory and the clinic: Conversations and collaborations with subjects and patients. Prevention and
Treatment, 5, 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1522-3736.5.1.536c.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (2003). Hypnosis and memory. In J. F. Byrne (Ed.), Learning and memory (2nd ed., pp. 240–242). Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference.
Kihlstrom, J. F., & Hoyt, I. P. (1988). Hypnosis and the psychology of delusions. In T. M. Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (Eds.), Delusional beliefs (pp. 66–109). New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Kihlstrom, J. F., & McGlynn, S. M. (1991). Experimental research in clinical psychology. In M. Hersen, A. E. Kazdin, & A. S. Bellack (Eds.), The clinical psychology
handbook (2nd ed., pp. 239–257). New York, NY: Pergamon Press.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (2008). The domain of hypnosis, revisited. In M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research and practice
(pp. 21–52). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198570097.013.0002.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (2007). Consciousness in hypnosis. In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch, & E. Thompson (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of consciousness
(pp. 445–479). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816789.018.
Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind & Language, 15, 184–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-
0017.00129.
Langdon, R., McKay, R., & Coltheart, M. (2008). The cognitive neuropsychological understanding of persecutory delusions. In D. Freeman, R. Bentall, & P.
Garety (Eds.), Persecutory delusions: Assessment, theory, and treatment (pp. 221–236). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Laurence, J.-R., Beaulieu-Prévost, D., & Du Chéné, T. (2008). Measuring and understanding individual differences in hypnotizability. In M. R. Nash & A. J.
Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory, research, and practice. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198570097.013.0009.
Maher, B. A. (1974). Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder. Journal of Individual Psychology, 30, 98–113.
Maher, B. A. (1988). Anomalous experience and delusional thinking: The logic of explanations. In T. F. Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (Eds.), Delusional beliefs
(pp. 15–33). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
McConkey, K. M. (1990). The construction of hypnotic experience. The relevance of belief. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 18, 1–7.
McConkey, K. M. (1991). The construction and resolution of experience and behavior in hypnosis. In S. J. Lynn & J. W. Rhue (Eds.), Theories of hypnosis:
Current models and perspectives (pp. 542–564). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
McConkey, K. M. (2008). Generations and landscape of hypnosis: Questions we’ve asked, questions we should ask. In M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.), The
Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research and practice (pp. 53–77). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780198570097.013.0003.
McConkey, K. M., Szeps, A., & Barnier, A. J. (2001). Indexing the experience of sex change in hypnosis and imagination. International Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Hypnosis, 49, 123–138. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207140108410073.
McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2005). ‘‘Sleights of mind’’: Delusions, defences, and self-deception. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10, 305–326. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546800444000074.
McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2007). Models of misbelief: Integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions. Consciousness and Cognition,
16, 932–941. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.01.003.
Nash, M. (1987). What, if anything, is regressed about hypnotic age regression? A review of the empirical literature. Psychological Bulletin, 102, 42–52. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.42.
Noble, J., & McConkey, K. M. (1995). Hypnotic sex change: Creating and challenging a delusion in the laboratory. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 69–74.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.104.1.69.
Oakley, D. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2009). Hypnotic suggestion and cognitive neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 264–270. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.tics.2009.03.004.
Oakley, D. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2011). Using hypnosis to gain insights into healthy and pathological cognitive functioning. Consciousness and Cognition, 20,
328–331. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.01.013.
Oakley, D. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2013). Hypnotic suggestion: Opportunities for cognitive neuroscience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14, 565–576. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn3538.
Oakley, D. A. (2008). Hypnosis, trance, and suggestion: Evidence from neuroimaging. In M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypnosis:
Theory, research and practice (pp. 365–392). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198570097.013.0014.
Orne, M. T. (1959). The nature of hypnosis: Artifact and essence. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58, 277–299. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
h0046128.
Orne, M. T. (1979). On the simulating subject as a quasi-control group in hypnosis research: What, why, and how. In E. Fromm & R. E. Shor (Eds.), Hypnosis:
Developments in research and new perspectives (pp. 519–565). New York, NY: Aldine Publishing Company.
Peters, E., Joseph, S., Day, S., & Garety, P. (2004). Measuring delusional ideation: The 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI). Schizophrenia Bulletin,
30, 1005–1022. Retrieved from <http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org>.
Piker, P. (1937). Some psychologic aspects of deafness. Laryngoscope, 47, 499–507.
Rahmanovic, A., Barnier, A. J., Cox, R. E., Langdon, R. A., & Coltheart, M. (2012). ‘‘That’s not my arm’’: A hypnotic analogue of somatoparaphrenia. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 17, 36–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2011.564925.
Reed, G. (1972). The psychology of anomalous experience. A cognitive approach. London, UK: Hutchinson & Co..
Reyher, J. (1962). A paradigm for determining the clinical relevance of hypnotically induced psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 59, 344–352. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0047160.
Reyher, J. (1967). Hypnosis in research on psychopathology. In J. E. Gordon (Ed.), Handbook of clinical and experimental hypnosis (pp. 110–147). New York,
NY: The Macmillan Company.
Richet, C. (1884). L’homme et l’intelligence. Fragments de physiologie et de psychologie. Paris, France: F. Alcan.
Sarbin, T. R. (1939). Rorschach patterns under hypnosis. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 9, 315–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-
0025.1939.tb05596.x.
Segal, J. H. (1989). Erotomania revisited: From Kraepelin to DSM-III-R. American Journal of Psychiatry, 146, 1261–1266.
Sheehan, P. W., & McConkey, K. M. (1982). Hypnosis and experience. The exploration of phenomena and process. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Inc..
Sheehan, P. W., & Perry, C. W. (1976). Methodologies of hypnosis: A critical appraisal of contemporary paradigms of hypnosis. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Shor, R. E. (1959). Hypnosis and the concept of the generalized reality-orientation. Journal of Psychotherapy, 13, 582–602.
Sutcliffe, J. P. (1958). Hypnotic behaviour: Fantasy or simulation? (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Sydney, Australia: University of Sydney.
Sutcliffe, J. P. (1961). ‘‘Credulous’’ and ‘‘skeptical’’ views of hypnotic phenomena: Experiments on esthesia, hallucination, and delusion. Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 62, 189–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0046745.
Szechtman, H., Woody, E., Bowers, K. S., & Nahmias, C. (1998). Where the imaginal appears real: A positron emission tomography study of auditory
hallucinations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 95, 1956–1960. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.4.1956.
Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (1995). Double dissociation between overt and covert face recognition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 7, 425–432.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.1995.7.4.425.
Turner, M., & Coltheart, M. (2010). Confabulation and delusion: A common monitoring framework. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15, 346–376. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/13546800903441902.
 M.H. Connors / Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015) 27–43 43

Walsh, E., Mehta, M. A., Oakley, D. A., Guilmette, D. N., Gabay, A., Halligan, P. W., et al (2014). Using suggestion to model different types of automatic writing.
Consciousness and Cognition, 26, 24–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.02.008.
Walsh, E., Oakley, D. A., Halligan, P. W., Mehta, M. A., & Deeley, Q. (2015). The functional anatomy and connectivity of thought insertion and alien control of
movement. Cortex, 64, 380–393. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2014.09.012.
Weitzenhoffer, A. M. (1953). Hypnotism: An objective study in suggestibility. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Weitzenhoffer, A. M. (2000). The practice of hypnotism (2nd ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Weitzenhoffer, A. M., & Hilgard, E. R. (1963). Stanford profile scales of hypnotic susceptibility forms I and II. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Woody, E. Z., & Barnier, A. J. (2008). Hypnosis scales for the twenty-first century: What do we need and how should we use them? In M. R. Nash & A. J.
Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research and practice (pp. 255–281). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198570097.013.0010.
Woody, E., & Szechtman, H. (2000). Hypnotic hallucinations: Towards a biology of epistemology. Contemporary Hypnosis, 17, 4–14. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1002/ch.186.
Woody, E., & Szechtman, H. (2011). Using hypnosis to develop and test models of psychopathology. Journal of Mind-Body Regulation, 1, 4–16. Retrieved from
<http://mbr.synergiesprairies.ca>.
Zimbardo, P. G., Andersen, S. M., & Kabat, L. G. (1981). Induced hearing deficit generates experimental paranoia. Science, 212, 1529–1531. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1126/science.7233242.