Stalin, On The Opposition

‫مرد‬
J. V. STALIN
ON
THE
OPPOSITION
WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!
y
M. Елип.
Are noiiba il
J. V. STALIN
TOM 211211804
SON
dailgn aids ni boninens 6.V dorisssge bas zabine off
od lo ob odh 20g40 sdt 0 to uoisibs
THE OPPOSITION
(1921-27)
ni 19raitdug od vd bosssibni 518
THE
bers
Party
Discus
Causes
Defects
The Can
How Shod
Remov
PREOBRAZHENSKY
TROTSKY'S LETTER
The Discus FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS
Rafail PEKING 1974 dini haini
First Edition 1974
MIJATE V .[
PUBLISHER'S NOTE
ИО
The articles and speeches by J. V. Stalin contained in this English
edition of On the Opposition follow the order of the Russian
edition put out by the State Publishing House of the Soviet
Union in 1928. The English translation, including the notes
at the end of the book, is taken from J. V. Stalin's Works, Vols.
5-10, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953-54, with
some technical changes.
References in Roman numerals to Lenin's Works mentioned in
the text are to the third Russian edition. The English references
are indicated by the publisher in footnotes.
гиячилUӘИАЛ ИОНО
Printed in the People's Republic of China
CONTENTS
AM
OUR DISAGREEMENTS
I. Two Methods of Approach to the Mass of the

TURIT 11 30 SIN
Workers
II. Conscious Democracy and Forced "Democracy"
THE PARTY'S TASKS. Report Delivered at an En

larged Meeting of the Krasnaya Presnya District Com
mittee of the R.C.P.(B.), with Group Organisers, Mem
bers of the Debating Society and of the Bureau of the
Party Units, December 2, 1923 12
Discussion a Sign of the Party's Strength

-
13
Causes of the Discussion 14

771
Defects in Internal Party Life IS
The Causes of the Defects 17
How Should the Defects in Internal Party Life Be

Removed? 20
THE DISCUSSION, RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES BY

PREOBRAZHENSKY AND SAPRONOV, AND
TROTSKY'S LETTER 28
The Discussion 28
Rafail 31
i
CONTENTS
Preobrazhensky's Article 35
Sapronov's Article 37
Trotsky's Letter 40
A NECESSARY COMMENT (Concerning Rafail) 45
THE THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.

(B.), January 16-18, 1924 49
I. Report on Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs,

January 17 49
II. Reply to the Discussion, January 18 69
THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.),

May 23-31, 1924 88
AUD
Reply to the Discussion, May 27 88
Tuman
THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE R.C.P. (B.). Excerpts from the Report De
livered at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) Courses for Secretaries
HAT 102
of Uyezd Party Committees, June 17, 1924
SM
TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM? Speech Delivered at
the Plenum of the Communist Group in the A.U.C.C.
T.U., November 19, 1924 2504
105
I. The Facts About the October Uprising 105
II. The Party and the Preparation for October

CONCE
to 112
III. Trotskyism or Leninism? 128
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE TACTICS T

OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS. Preface to the
Book "On the Road to October" 139
1
I. The External and Internal Setting for the October HT

GAN NAIBOER
Revolution ORA2 139
II. Two Specific Features of the October Revolution

or October and Trotsky's Theory of "Per
manent" Revolution 143
CONTENTS 111
III. Certain Specific Features of the Tactics of the

Bolsheviks During the Period of Preparation for
October 161
IV. The October Revolution as the Beginning of and

the Pre-condition for the World Revolution 176
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM OF THE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE CENTRAL
CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE R.C.P.(B.),

January 17, 1925 183
THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOUR
TEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (B.).
Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Activists of the

Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.), May 9, 1925 188
I. The International Situation 189
II. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Parties
in the Capitalist Countries 199
III. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Elements
in the Colonial and Dependent Countries 204
IV. The Fate of Socialism in the Soviet Union 206
V. The Party's Policy in the Countryside 218
VI. The
The
Metal Industry 225
THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.
(B.), December 18-31, 1925 230
Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the

IN
Central Committee, December 23 230
S www.miy houst
P 1. Sokolnikov and the Dawesation of Our Country 231
2. Kamenev and Our Concessions to the Peasantry 233
3. Whose Miscalculations? 237
4. How Sokolnikov Protects the Poor Peasants 238

5. Ideological Struggle or Slander? 239
6. Concerning NEP 241

iv CONTENTS
7. Concerning State Capitalism 242

8. Zinoviev and the Peasantry 248
9. Concerning the History of the Disagreements 255
10. The Opposition's Platform 262

II. Their "Desire for Peace" TVI 264
12. The Party Will Achieve Unity 266
LE P.
CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF LENINISM 268
TIMMOO JASTM80
I. The Definition of Leninism 268
II. The Main Thing in Leninism 271
III. The Question of "Permanent" Revolution 273
IV. The Proletarian Revolution and the Dictatorship HT

of the Proletariat 276
V. The Party and the Working Class in the System

of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 287
VI. The Question of the Victory of Socialism in One

Country CA 317
VII. The Fight for the Victory of Socialist Construction 331

Ann
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN UNITY COMMITTEE. Speech
Delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee
and the Central Control Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.), July
15, 1926 347
MTTV
THE OPPOSITION BLOC IN THE C.P.S.U. (B.).
Theses for the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the
C.P.S.U.(B.), Adopted by the Conference and Endorsed
by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 363
Haglan tall
I. The Passing Over of the "New Opposition" to
Trotskyism on the Basic Question of the Character
and Prospects of Our Revolution 365
II. The Practical Platform of the Opposition Bloc 370
III. The "Revolutionary" Words and Opportunist

Deeds of the Opposition Bloc 376
IV. Conclusions 380
CONTENTS
THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR
PARTY. Report Delivered at the Fifteenth All-Union

Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), November 1, 1926 382
Famo tmotot iniz
I. The Stages of Development of the Opposition
O
Bloc 382
1. The First Stage 383
2. The Second Stage 384
3. The Third Stage 386
4. The Fourth Stage 387
5. Lenin and the Question of Blocs in the Party 388
6. The Process of Decomposition of the Opposition Bloc 390
7. What Is the Opposition Bloc Counting on? 392
II. The Principal Error of the Opposition Bloc 394
1. Preliminary Remarks 40 TAMBOR 395

2. Leninism or Trotskyism?
ARKI 2399
3. The Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the
R.C.P.(B.) 412
4. The Passing Over of the "New Opposition" to

Trotskyism IT 415
10:
5. Trotsky's Evasion. Smilga. Radek TL 420
N01
6. The Decisive Importance of the Question of the
Prospects of Our Constructive Work 424
7. The Political Prospects of the Opposition Bloc 427
III. The Political and Organisational Errors of the

Opposition Bloc 431
kina
IV. Some Conclusions 437
REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORTE

ON "THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION
IN OUR PARTY," November 3, 1926 442

SHOGE NOW E30
I. Some General Questions 442
1. Marxism Is Not a Dogma, but a Guide to Action 442
2. Some Remarks of Lenin on the Dictatorship of the

Proletariat 451
3. The Unevenness of Development of the Capitalist

Countries MM 456
CONTENTS
II. Kamenev Clears the Way for Trotsky 0460

III. An Incredible Muddle, or Zinoviev on Revolu
tionary Spirit and Internationalism 468
IV. Trotsky Falsifies Leninism 476
1. Trotsky's Conjuring Tricks, or the Question of "Per

manent Revolution" 476
2. Juggling with Quotations, or Trotsky Falsifies Leninism 484
3. "Trifles" and Curiosities 490
V. The Practical Platform of the Opposition. The

Demands of the Party 493
VI. Conclusion 496
THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN

CHINA. Speech Delivered in the Chinese Commission
of the E.C.C.I., November 30, 1926 499
I. Character of the Revolution in China 500
II. Imperialism and Imperialist Intervention in China 501
III. The Revolutionary Army in China 504
IV. Character of the Future Government in China 506
V. The Peasant Question in China 509
VI. The Proletariat and the Hegemony of the Prole

tariat in China 513
VII. The Question of the Youth in China 514

VIII. Some Conclusions SI5
THE SEVENTH ENLARGED PLENUM OF THE

E.C.C.I., November 22-December 16, 1926 517
20. AUTO MI
Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our
Party. Report Delivered on December 7 517
I. Preliminary Remarks 517
1. Contradictions of Inner-Party Development 517
2. Sources of Contradictions Within the Party 523
II. Specific Features of the Opposition in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 526

a III. The Disagreements in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 533
CONTENTS vii
JOIN 1. Questions of Socialist Construction 534

2. Factors of the "Respite" 538
3. The Unity and Inseparability of the "National" and
International Tasks of the Revolution 540
4. Concerning the History of the Question of Building

Socialism 542
5. The Special Importance of the Question of Building

Socialism in the U.S.S.R. at the Present Moment 548
6. The Perspectives of the Revolution 551
7. How the Question Really Stands 553
8. The Chances of Victory nied to anno 1 555
9. Disagreements over Political Practice JL 557

IV. The Opposition at Work 560
V. Why the Enemies of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Praise the Opposition noithong 20
564
HEVI. Defeat of the Opposition Bloc 568
AT
VII. The Practical Meaning and Importance of the Fifteenth
Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) TAG EVVS71
Reply to the Discussion, December 13 TOROVE $73

I. Miscellaneous Remarks MAT IMOO HT 573
1. We Need Facts, Not Inventions and Tittle-Tattle 573
2. Why the Enemies of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Praise the Opposition 579
20 3. There Are Errors and Errors 585

4. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat According to
Zinoviev $89
nuod
5. Trotsky's Oracular Sayings 593
6. Zinoviev in the Role of a Schoolboy Quoting Marx,

Engels, Lenin 595
7. Revisionism According to Zinoviev mul 605

II. The Question of the Victory of Socialism in Individual
Capitalist Countries 609
at
1. The Prerequisites for Proletarian Revolutions in In
dividual Countries in the Period of Imperialism 609
2. How Zinoviev "Elaborates" Lenin 619
III. The Question of Building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. 624
1. The "Manoeuvres" of the Opposition and the "Na
tional-Reformism" of Lenin's Party 624
2. We Are Building and Can Completely Build the
Economic Basis of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. 634

viii CONTENTS
3. We Are Building Socialism in Alliance with the World

Proletariat
645.
4. The Question of Degeneration 648
IV. The Opposition and the Question of Party Unity 650

V. Conclusion 654
QUESTIONS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

Theses for Propagandists, Approved by the C.C.,
C.P.S.U.(B.) 657
I. Prospects of the Chinese Revolution 657

II. The First Stage of the Chinese Revolution 659
M
III. The Second Stage of the Chinese Revolution 662
W
IV. Errors of the Opposition 664
TALK WITH STUDENTS OF THE SUN YAT-SEN
UNIVERSITY, May 13, 1927 667
THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA AND THE TASKS
OF THE COMINTERN. Speech Delivered at the

Tenth Sitting, Eighth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., May 24,
1927 696
I. Some Minor Questions 696
II. The Agrarian-Peasant Revolution as the Basis of

the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution 699
III. The Right Kuomintang in Nanking, Which Mas

sacres Communists, and the Left Kuomintang in
Wuhan, Which Maintains an Alliance with the
Communists 707
IV. Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in

China Dur 710
po3
V. Two Lines 720
gubting to m
NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY THEMEST 726
20
I. The Threat of War 726
II. China 734
CONTENTS ix
JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION
OF THE C.P.S.U. (B.), July 29-August 9, 1927 765
The International Situation and the Defence of the

U.S.S.R. Speech Delivered on August I 765
I. The Attacks of the Opposition on Sections of the Comintern 765

II. About China
772
III. The Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee 797

IV. The Threat of War and the Defence of the U.S.S.R. 802
Speech Delivered on August 5 819
With Reference to the Opposition's "Declaration" of

August 8, 1927. Speech Delivered on August 9 843
THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN
OPPOSITION. Excerpts from a Speech Delivered at a

Joint Meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Com
mittee of the Comintern and the International Control
Commission, September 27, 1927 850
THE TROTSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND
NOW. Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Joint

Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), October 23, 1927 864
I. Some Minor Questions 864
II. The Opposition's "Platform" 869

III. Lenin on Discussions and Oppositions in General 874
IV. The Opposition and the "Third Force" 875
V. How the Opposition Is "Preparing" for the Con
88c
gress
VI. From Leninism to Trotskyism 884
VII. Some of the Most Important Results of the Party's

Policy During the Past Few Years 887
VIII. Back to Axelrod 892
NOTES 897
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OUR DISAGREEMENTSmil
Our disagreements on the trade-union question are not

disagreements in principle about appraisal of the trade unions.
The well-known points of our programme on the role of the
trade unions, and the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress
on the trade unions, which Trotsky often quotes, remain
(and will remain) in force. Nobody disputes that the trade
unions and the economic organisations ought to and will per
meate each other ("coalescence"). Nobody disputes that the
present period of the country's economic revival dictates the
necessity of gradually transforming the as yet nominal indus
trial unions into real industrial unions, capable of putting our
basic industries on their feet. In short, our disagreements are
not disagreements about matters of principle. 4(höcheing
Nor do we disagree about the necessity of labour discipline
in the trade unions and in the working class generally. The
talk about a section of our Party "letting the reins slip out of
its hands," and leaving the masses to the play of elemental
forces, is foolish. The fact that Party elements play the lead
ing role in the trade unions and that the trade unions play the
leading role in the working class remains indisputable.co
1
ON THE OPPOSITION
Still less do we disagree on the question of the quality of

the membership of the Central Committees of the trade unions,
and of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions. All
agree that the membership of these institutions is far from

ideal, that the ranks of the trade unions have been depleted by
a number of military and other mobilisations, that the trade
unions must get back their old officials and also get new ones,
that they must be provided with technical resources, and so
forth.
No, our disagreements are not in this sphere.
jon shu Emup musib wo

miTWO METHODS OF APPROACH TO
ad to ao THE MASS OF THE WORKERS-flow si
NEST andinu stan
Our disagreements are about questions of the means by

which to strengthen labour discipline in the working class, the
methods of approach to the mass of the workers who are being
drawn into the work of reviving industry, the ways of trans
forming the present weak trade unions into powerful, genuine
ly industrial unions, capable of reviving our industry.inanini
There are two methods: the method of coercion (the mili
tary method), and the method of persuasion (the trade-union
method). The first method by no means precludes elements
of persuasion, but these are subordinate to the requirements
of the coercion method and are auxiliary to the latter. The
second method, in turn, does not preclude elements of coer
cion, but these are subordinate to the requirements of the
persuasion method and are auxiliary to the latter. It is just
as impermissible to confuse these two methods as it is to
confuse the army with the working class. ad ni alox
OUR DISAGREEMENTS
A group of Party workers headed by Trotsky, intoxicated

by the successes achieved by military methods in the army,
supposes that those methods can, and must, be adopted among
the workers, in the trade unions, in order to achieve similar
successes in strengthening the unions and in reviving industry.
But this group forgets that the army and the working class are
two different spheres, that a method that is suitable for the
army may prove to be unsuitable, harmful, for the working
class and its trade unions.
The army is not a homogeneous mass; it consists of two

main social groups, peasants and workers, the former being
several times more numerous than the latter. In urging the
necessity of employing chiefly methods of coercion in the army,
the Eighth Party Congress² based itself on the fact that our
army consists mainly of peasants, that the peasants will not go
to fight for socialism, that they can, and must, be compelled to
fight for socialism by employing methods of coercion. This
explains the rise of such purely military methods as the system
of Commissars and Political Departments, Revolutionary
Tribunals, disciplinary measures, appointment and not elec
tion to all posts, and so forth.
In contrast to the army, the working class is a homogeneous
social sphere; its economic position disposes it towards social
ism, it is easily influenced by communist agitation, it voluntari
ly organises in trade unions and, as a consequence of all this,
constitutes the foundation, the salt of the earth, of the Soviet
state. It is not surprising, therefore, that the practical work
of our industrial unions has been based chiefly on methods of
persuasion. This explains the rise of such purely trade-union
methods as explanation, mass propaganda, encouragement of
initiative and independent activity among the mass of the
workers, election of officials, and so forth.
ON THE OPPOSITION
The mistake Trotsky makes is that he underrates the dif

ference between the army and the working class, he puts the
trade unions on a par with the military organisations, and
tries, evidently by inertia, to transfer military methods from
the army into the trade unions, into the working class. Trotsky
writes in one of his documents:
"The bare contrasting of military methods (orders, punishment) with

trade-union methods (explanation, propaganda, independent activity)
is a manifestation of Kautskian-Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary preju
dices. The very contrasting of labour organisations with military
organisation in a workers' state is shameful surrender to Kautskyism."
2002
LEDGE
That is what Trotsky says.
CONS
Disregarding the irrelevant talk about "Kautskyism,"

"Menshevism," and so forth, it is evident that Trotsky fails to
understand the difference between labour organisations and
military organisations, that he fails to understand that in the
period of the termination of the war and the revival of in
dustry it becomes necessary, inevitable, to contrast military
with democratic (trade-union) methods, and that, therefore, to
transfer military methods into the trade unions is a mistake,
is harmful.
Failure to understand that lies at the bottom of the recently
published polemical pamphlets of Trotsky on the trade unions.

Failure to understand that is the source of Trotsky's
mistakes.
cult quiositamin
II
CONSCIOUS DEMOCRACY AND FORCED

"DEMOCRACY"
Some think that talk about democracy in the trade unions

is mere declamation, a fashion, called forth by certain phe
OUR DISAGREEMENTS 5
nomena in internal Party life, that, in time, people will get tired
of "chatter" about democracy and everything will go on in the
"old way."
Others believe that democracy in the trade unions is, es
sentially, a concession, a forced concession, to the workers'
demands, that it is diplomacy rather than real, serious business.
Needless to say, both groups of comrades are profoundly
mistaken. Democracy in the trade unions, i.e., what is usually
called "normal methods of proletarian democracy in the
unions," is the conscious democracy characteristic of mass
working-class organisations, which presupposes consciousness
of the necessity and utility of systematically employing methods
of persuasion among the millions of workers organised in the
trade unions. If that consciousness is absent, democracy be
comes an empty sound.
While war was raging and danger stood at the gates, the
appeals to "aid the front" that were issued by our organisations
met with a ready response from the workers, for the mortal
danger we were in was only too palpable, for that danger had
assumed a very concrete form evident to everyone in the
shape of the armies of Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin, Pilsudski
and Wrangel, which were advancing and restoring the power of
the landlords and capitalists. It was not difficult to rouse the
masses at that time. But today, when the war danger has been
overcome and the new, economic danger (economic ruin) is
far from being so palpable to the masses, the broad masses
cannot be roused merely by appeals. Of course, everybody
feels the shortage of bread and textiles; but firstly, people do
contrive to obtain both bread and textiles in one way or
another and, consequently, the danger of a food and goods
famine does not spur the masses to the same extent as the
war danger did; secondly, nobody will assert that the masses
6 ON THE OPPOSITION
are as conscious of the reality of the economic danger (shortage

of locomotives and of machines for agriculture, for textile
mills and iron and steel plants, shortage of equipment for
electric power stations, and so forth) as they were of the war
danger in the recent past. To rouse the millions of the working
class for the struggle against economic ruin it is necessary to
heighten their initiative, consciousness and independent activ
ity; it is necessary by means of concrete facts to convince them
that economic ruin is just as real and mortal a danger as the
war danger was yesterday; it is necessary to draw millions of
workers into the work of reviving industry through the medium
of trade unions built on democratic lines. Only in this way
is it possible to make the entire working class vitally interested
in the struggle which the economic organisations are waging
against economic ruin. If this is not done, victory on the eco
nomic front cannot be achieved.
In short, conscious democracy, the method of proletarian

democracy in the unions, is the only correct method for the
industrial unions. oldegies, pot in
Forced "democracy" has nothing in common with this
democracy.ed de lo q
Reading Trotsky's pamphlet The Role and Tasks of the

Trade Unions, one might think that he, in essence, is "also" in
favour of the "democratic" method. This has caused some
comrades to think that we do not disagree about the methods

of work in the trade unions. But that is absolutely wrong,
for Trotsky's "democracy" is forced, half-hearted and un
principled, and, as such, merely supplements the military
bureaucratic method, which is unsuitable for the trade unions.
Judge for yourselves.
At the beginning of November 1920, the Central Committee
adopted, and the Communist group at the Fifth All-Russian
OUR DISAGREEMENTS
Conference of Trade Unions carried through, a resolution stat

ing that the "most vigorous and systematic struggle must be
waged against the degeneration of centralism and militarised
forms of work into bureaucracy, tyranny, officialdom and
petty tutelage over the trade unions.. that also for the
Tsektran (the Central Committee of the Transport Workers
Union, led by Trotsky) the time for the specific methods of
administration for which the Central Political Administration
of the Railways was set up, owing to special circumstances, is

beginning to pass away," that, in view of this, the Communist
group at the conference "advises the Tsektran to strengthen
and develop normal methods of proletarian democracy in the
union," and instructs the Tsektran "to take an active part in
the general work of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade
Unions and to be represented in it on an equal footing with
other trade-union associations" (see Pravda, No. 255). In
spite of that decision, however, during the whole of Novem
ber, Trotsky and the Tsektran continued to pursue the old,
semi-bureaucratic and semi-military line, continued to rely on
the Central Political Administration of the Railways and the
Central Political Administration of Water Transport, strove
to "shake up," to blow up, the A.R.C.C.T.U. and upheld the
privileged position of the Tsektran compared with other trade
union associations. More than that. In a letter "to the members
of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee," dated
November 30, Trotsky, just as "unexpectedly," stated that "the

Central Political Administration of Water Transport ..
cannot possibly be dissolved within the next two or three
months." But what happened? Six days after that letter was
written (on December 7), the same Trotsky, just as "unex
pectedly," voted in the Central Committee for "the immediate
abolition of the Central Political Administration of the
8 ON THE OPPOSITION
Railways and the Central Political Administration of Water

Transport, and the transfer of all their staffs and funds to the
trade-union organisation on the basis of normal democracy."
And he was one of the eight members of the Central Committee
who voted for this against the seven who considered that the
abolition of these institutions was no longer enough, and who
demanded, in addition, that the existing composition of the
Tsektran be changed. To save the existing composition of the
Tsektran, Trotsky voted for the abolition of the Central Polit
ical Administrations in the Tsektran.
What had changed during those six days? Perhaps the

railway and water transport workers had matured so much
during those six days that they no longer needed the Central
Political Administration of the Railways and the Central
Political Administration of Water Transport? Or, perhaps,
an important change in the internal or external political situa
tion had taken place in that short period? Of course not. The
fact is that the water transport workers were vigorously de
manding that the Tsektran should dissolve the Central Political
Administrations and that the composition of the Tsektran
itself should be changed; and Trotsky's group, fearing defeat
and wishing at least to retain the existing composition of the
Tsektran, was compelled to retreat, to make partial conces
sions, which, however, satisfied nobody.
Such are the facts.
It scarcely needs proof that this forced, half-hearted, unprin

cipled "democracy" has nothing in common with the "normal
methods of proletarian democracy in the unions," which the
Central Committee of the Party had recommended already at
the beginning of November, and which are so essential for the
revival of our industrial trade unions.
OUR DISAGREEMENTS
In his reply to the discussion at the meeting of the Commu

nist group at the Congress of Soviets,3 Trotsky protested against
the introduction of a political element into the controversy
about the trade unions, on the ground that politics had nothing
to do with the matter. It must be said that in this Trotsky is
quite wrong. It scarcely needs proof that in a workers' and
peasants' state, not a single important decision affecting the
whole country, and especially if it directly concerns the work
ing class, can be carried through without in one way or another
affecting the political condition of the country. And, in gen
eral, it is ridiculous and shallow to separate politics from eco
nomics. For that very reason every such decision must be
weighed up in advance also from the political point of view.
It can be now taken as proved that the methods of the
Tsektran, which is led by Trotsky, have been condemned by
the practical experience of the Tsektran itself. Trotsky's aim
in directing the Tsektran and influencing the other unions
through it was to reanimate and revive the unions, to draw the
workers into the task of reviving industry. But what has he
actually achieved? A conflict with the majority of the Commu
nists in the trade unions, a conflict between the majority of the
trade unions and the Tsektran, a virtual split in the Tsektran,
the resentment of the rank-and-file workers organised in trade
unions against the "Commissars." In other words, far from
a revival of the unions taking place, the Tsektran itself is
disintegrating. There can be no doubt that if the methods of
the Tsektran were introduced in the other unions, we would get
the same picture of conflict, splits and disintegration. And the

result would be that we would have dissension and a split in
the working class. i
10 ON THE OPPOSITION
Can the political party of the working class ignore these

facts? Can it be asserted that it makes no difference to the
political condition of the country whether we have a working

class solidly united in integral trade unions, or whether it is
split up into different, mutually hostile groups? Can it be said
that the political factor ought not to play any role in appraising
the methods of approach to the masses, that politics have
nothing to do with the matter? 1916
Obviously not. faze
The R.S.F.S.R. and its associated republics now have a
population of about 140,000,000. Of this population, 80 per
cent are peasants. To be able to govern such a country, the
Soviet power must enjoy the firm confidence of the working
class, for such a country can be directed only through the me
dium of the working class and with the forces of the working
class. But in order to retain and strengthen the confidence of
the majority of the workers, it is necessary systematically to
develop the consciousness, independent activity and initiative
of the working class, systematically to educate it in the spirit
of communism by organising it in trade unions and drawing
it into the work of building a communist economy.
Obviously, it is impossible to do this by coercive methods
and by "shaking up" the unions from above, for such methods
split the working class (the Tsektran!) and engender distrust
of the Soviet power. Moreover, it is not difficult to understand
that, speaking generally, it is inconceivable that either the
consciousness of the masses or their confidence in the Soviet
power can be developed by coercive methods.
Obviously, only "normal methods of proletarian democracy
in the unions," only methods of persuasion, can make it pos
sible to unite the working class, to stimulate its independent
activity and strengthen its confidence in the Soviet power,
OUR DISAGREEMENTS 11
the confidence that is needed so much now in order to rouse

the country for the struggle against economic ruin.
As you see, politics also speak in favour of methods of
persuasion.
SIGN OF
January 5, 1921
on I would like to here is that of the

Pravda, No. 12,
January 19, 1921 the discission that is
Signed: J. Stalin Party units. What does this discussi

2284T. THASHTurst into
life of Party? Is this discussion a sign of the Par
Ayam bittegrissbhogann af its horguilera
others ).9.0.4 sdt to ssttimo binigang
Isibo2cy nits dito editing diter
is neither dotata is stronius bentoThe fact
matter is that the Party mature during the
past period, it has adespilysdidsinf of useless
has become more proletarian.
had not less than 700,000 me know that
reand members have dropped out, have been kicked

3 mo?
Further, the Party incr
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quality, has risco 10 this, petion
to in te
in the conditions of the working
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from, the countryside, and
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and to noiezimmos di disages lanza
workers.
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SI
AD
CARO
THE PARTY'S TASKS
Report Delivered at an Enlarged Meeting of the Krasnaya

Presnya District Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)
with Group Organisers, Members of the Debating Society
and of the Bureau of the Party Units
be
December 2, 1923
Comrades, first of all I must say that I am delivering a re

port here in my personal capacity and not in the name of the
Central Committee of the Party. If the meeting is willing to
hear such a report, I am at your service. (Voices: "Yes.") This
does not mean that I disagree with the Central Committee in
any way on this question; not at all. I am speaking here in my
personal capacity only because the commission of the Central
Committee for drafting measures to improve the internal
situation in the Party is to present its findings to the Central
Committee in a day or two; these findings have not yet been
presented, and therefore I have as yet no formal right to speak
in the name of the Central Committee, although I am sure
12
THE PARTY'S TASKS 13
that what I am about to say to you will, in the main, express

the Central Committee's position on these questions.
sugin. oil
to mis à qulodman ayran
DISCUSSION - A SIGN OF THE PARTY'S STRENGTH
The first question I would like to raise here is that of the

significance of the discussion that is now taking place in the
press and in the Party units. What does this discussion show?
What does it indicate? Is it a storm that has burst into the calm
life of the Party? Is this discussion a sign of the Party's disin

tegration, its decay, as some say, or of its degeneration, as
others say? Id
I think, comrades, that it is neither one nor the other: there
is neither degeneration nor disintegration. The fact of the
matter is that the Party has grown more mature during the
past period; it has adequately rid itself of useless ballast; it
has become more proletarian. You know that two years ago
we had not less than 700,000 members; you know that several
thousand members have dropped out, or have been kicked out,
of the Party. Further, the Party membership has improved, its
quality has risen in this period as a result of the improvement
in the conditions of the working class due to the revival of
industry, as a result of the return of the old skilled workers
from the countryside, and as a result of the new wave of cul
tural development that is spreading among the industrial
workers.cineup
In short, owing to all these circumstances, the Party has
grown more mature, its quality has risen, its needs have grown,
it has become more exacting, it wants to know more than it
has known up to now, and it wants to decide more than it has
up to now. mil.
The discussion which has opened is not a sign of the Party's

weakness, still less is it a sign of its disintegration or degenera
tion; it is a sign of strength, a sign of firmness, a sign of the im
provement in the quality of the Party's membership, a sign of
its increased activity. A BIT TO MORAMO
ila ni CAUSES OF THE DISCUSSIONalingis

ni bun g
The second question that confronts us is: what has caused
the question of internal Party policy to become so acute pre
cisely in the present period, in the autumn of this year? How
is this to be explained? What were the causes? I think, com
rades, that there were two causes.
The first cause was the wave of discontent and strikes over
wages that swept through certain districts of the republic in

August of this year. The fact of the matter is that this strike
wave exposed the defects in our organisations; it revealed the
isolation of our organisations - both Party and trade-union
from the events taking place in the factories. And in con
nection with this strike wave the existence was discovered
within our Party of several secret organisations of an essentially

anti-communist nature, which strove to disintegrate the Party.
All these defects revealed by the strike wave were exposed to
the Party so glaringly, and with such a sobering effect, that it
felt the necessity for internal Party changes.h
The second cause of the acuteness of the question of internal
Party policy precisely at the present moment was the wholesale
release of Party comrades to go on vacation. It is natural, of
course, for comrades to go on vacation, but this assumed such
a mass character, that Party activity became considerably
weaker precisely at the time when the discontent arose in the
factories, and that greatly helped to expose the accumulated

defects just at this period, in the autumn of this year.
DEFECTS IN INTERNAL PARTY LIFE
I have mentioned defects in our Party life that were ex

posed in the autumn of this year, and which brought up the
question of improving internal Party life. What are these de
fects in internal Party life? Is it that the Party line was wrong,
as some comrades think; or that, although the Party's line was
correct, in practice it departed from the right road, was dis
torted because of certain subjective and objective conditions?
I think that the chief defect in our internal Party life is that,
although the Party's line, as expressed in the decisions of our
congresses, is correct, in the localities (not everywhere, of
course, but in certain districts) it was put into practice in an
incorrect way. While the proletarian-democratic line of our
Party was correct, the way it was put into practice in the lo
calities resulted in cases of bureaucratic distortion of this line.
That is the chief defect. The existence of contradictions
between the basic Party line as laid down by the Congresses

(Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth), and the way our organisa
tions put this line into practice in the localities. that is the
-
foundation of all the defects in internal Party life. in

The Party line says that the major questions of our Party
activities, except, of course, those that brook no delay, or those
that are military or diplomatic secrets, must without fail be
discussed at Party meetings. That is what the Party line says.
But in Party practice in the localities, not everywhere, of course,
it was considered that there is really no great need for a number
of questions concerning internal Party practice to be discussed
at Party meetings since the Central Committee and the other

leading organisations will decide these questions.
The Party line says that our Party officials must without fail
be elected unless there are insuperable obstacles to this, such
as absence of the necessary Party standing, and so forth. You
know that, according to the Party rules, secretaries of Guber
nia Committees must have a pre-October Party standing,
secretaries of Uyezd Committees must have at least three
years', and units secretaries a year's, Party standing. In Party
practice, however, it was often considered that since a certain
Party standing was needed, no real elections were needed.
The Party line says that the Party membership must be
kept informed about the work of the economic organisations,
the factories and trusts, for, naturally, our Party units are
morally responsible to the non-Party masses for the defects in
the factories. Nevertheless, in Party practice it was considered
that since there is a Central Committee which issues directives
to the economic organisations, and since these economic organi

sations are bound by those directives, the latter will be car
ried out without control from below by the mass of the Party
membership.
The Party line says that responsible workers in different
branches of work, whether Party, economic, trade-union, or
military workers, notwithstanding their specialisation in their
own particular work, are interconnected, constitute inseparable
parts of one whole, for they are all working in the common
cause of the proletariat, which cannot be torn into parts. In
Party practice, however, it was considered that since there
is specialisation, division of labour according to properly
Party activity and economic, military, etc., activity, the Party
officials are not responsible for those working in the economic
sphere, the latter are not responsible for the Party officials,
and, in general, that the weakening and even loss of connection

between them are inevitable.
Such, comrades, are, in general, the contradictions between

the Party line, as registered in a number of decisions of our
Congresses, from the Tenth to the Twelfth, and Party practice.
I am far from blaming the local organisations for this dis
tortion of the Party line, for, when you come to examine it,
this is not so much the fault as the misfortune of our local
organisations. The nature of this misfortune, and how things

could have taken this turn, I shall tell you later on, but I wanted
to register this fact in order to reveal this contradiction to you
and then try to propose measures for improvement. omnis
I am also far from considering our Central Committee to be
blameless. It, too, has sinned, as has every institution and
organisation; it, too, shares part of the blame and part of the
misfortune: blame, at least, for not, whatever the reason,
exposing these defects in time, and for not taking measures to
eliminate them.
But that is not the point now. The point now is to ascertain
the causes of the defects I have just spoken about. Indeed, how
did these defects arise, and how can they be removed?
dal roh 1 pidfaren
S THE CAUSES OF THE DEFECTS
The first cause is that our Party organisations have not yet
rid themselves, or have still not altogether rid themselves, of
certain survivals of the war period, a period that has passed,
but has left in the minds of our responsible workers vestiges of
the military regime in the Party. I think that these survivals
find expression in the view that our Party is not an independ
ently acting organism, not an independently acting, militant
organisation of the proletariat, but something in the nature of

a system of institutions, something in the nature of a complex
of institutions in which there are officials of lower rank and
officials of higher rank. That, comrades, is a profoundly

mistaken view that has nothing in common with Marxism; that
view is a survival that we have inherited from the war period,
when we militarised the Party, when the question of the in
dependent activity of the mass of the Party membership had
necessarily to be shifted into the background and military
orders were of decisive importance. I do not remember that
this view was ever definitely expressed; nevertheless, it, or
elements of it, still influences our work. Comrades, we must
combat such views with all our might, for they are a very real
danger and create favourable conditions for the distortion in
practice of the essentially correct line of our Party.
The second cause is that our state apparatus, which is
bureaucratic to a considerable degree, exerts a certain amount
of pressure on the Party and the Party workers. In 1917, when
we were forging ahead, towards October, we imagined that
we would have a Commune, a free association of working
people, that we would put an end to bureaucracy in govern
ment institutions, and that it would be possible, if not in the
immediate period, then within two or three short periods, to
transform the state into a free association of working people.
Practice has shown, however, that this is still an ideal which is
a long way off, that to rid the state of the elements of
bureaucracy, to transform Soviet society into a free association
of working people, the people must have a high level of culture,
peace conditions must be fully guaranteed all around us so as
to remove the necessity of maintaining a large standing army,
which entails heavy expenditure and cumbersome administra
tive departments, the very existence of which leaves its im
na
press upon all the other state institutions. Our state apparatus
is bureaucratic to a considerable degree, and it will remain so
for a long time to come. Our Party comrades work in this
apparatus, and the situation - I might say the atmosphere -
in this bureaucratic apparatus is such that it helps to bureau
cratise our Party workers and our Party organisations.
The third cause of the defects, comrades, is that some of
our units are not sufficiently active, they are backward, and
in some cases, particularly in the border regions, they are even
wholly illiterate. In these districts, the units display little activ
ity and are politically and culturally backward. That circum
stance, too, undoubtedly creates a favourable soil for the
distortion of the Party line.
The fourth cause is the absence of a sufficient number of
trained Party comrades in the localities. Recently, in the

Central Committee, I heard the report of a representative of
one of the Ukrainian organisations. The reporter was a very
capable comrade who shows great promise. He said that of
130 units, 80 have secretaries who were appointed by the
Gubernia Committee. In answer to the remark that this organ
isation was acting wrongly in this respect, the comrade plead
ed that there were no literate people in the units, that they
consisted of new members, that the units themselves ask for
secretaries to be sent them, and so forth. I may grant that half
of what this comrade said was an overstatement, that the mat
ter is not only that there are no trained people in the units, but
also that the Gubernia Committee was overzealous and follow
ed the old tradition. But even if the Gubernia Committee was
correct only to the extent of fifty per cent, is it not obvious

that if there are such units in the Ukraine, how many more
like them must there be in the border regions, where the
organisations are young, where there are fewer Party cadres
and less literacy than in the Ukraine? That is also one of the
factors that create favourable conditions for the distortion in
practice of the essentially correct Party line.

Lastly, the fifth cause - insufficient information. We sent
out too little information, and this applies primarily to the
Central Committee, possibly because it is overburdened with
work. We receive too little information from the localities.
This must cease. This is also a serious cause of the defects that
have accumulated within the Party.
HOW SHOULD THE DEFECTS IN INTERNAL

FOLDER
PARTY LIFE BE REMOVED?
Lonx
What measures must be adopted to remove these defects?
The first thing is tirelessly, by every means, to combat the
survivals and habits of the war period in our Party, to combat
the erroneous view that our Party is a system of institutions,
and not a militant organisation of the proletariat, which is
intellectually vigorous, acts independently, lives a full life, is
destroying the old and creating the new.
Secondly, the activity of the mass of the Party membership
must be increased; all questions of interest to the membership
in so far as they can be openly discussed must be submitted to
it for open discussion, and the possibility ensured of free
criticism of all proposals made by the different Party bodies.
Only in this way will it be possible to convert Party discipline
into really conscious, really iron discipline; only in this way
will it be possible to increase the political, economic and cul
tural experience of the mass of Party members; only in this
way will it be possible to create the conditions necessary to
enable the Party membership, step by step, to promote new

active workers, new leaders, from its ranks.
Thirdly, the principle of election must be applied in practice

to all Party bodies and official posts, if there are no insuperable
obstacles to this such as lack of the necessary Party standing,
and so forth. We must eliminate the practice of ignoring the
will of the majority of the organisations in promoting com
rades to responsible Party posts, and we must see to it that the
principle of election is actually applied.
10 Fourthly, there must exist under the Central Committee and
the Gubernia and Regional Committees permanently function
ing conferences of responsible workers in all fields of work -
economic, Party, trade-union and military; these conferences
must be held regularly and discuss any question they consider
it necessary to discuss; the interconnection between the work
ers in all fields must not be broken; all these workers must
feel that they are all members of a single Party family, working
in a common cause, the cause of the proletariat, which is in
divisible; the Central Committee and the local organisations
must create an environment that will enable the Party to
acquire and test the experience of our responsible workers in
all spheres of work.
Fifthly, our Party units in the factories must be drawn into
dealing with the various questions relating to the course of
affairs in the respective enterprises and trusts. Things must
be so arranged that the units are kept informed about the work
of the administrations of our enterprises and trusts and are
able to exert an influence on this work. You, as representatives
of units, are aware how great is the moral responsibility of our
factory units to the non-Party masses for the course of affairs
in the factories. For the unit to be able to lead and win the
following of the non-Party masses in the factory, for it to be

able to bear responsibility for the course of affairs in the

factory and it certainly has a moral responsibility to the
non-Party masses for defects in the work of the factory - the
unit must be kept informed about these affairs, it must be pos
sible for it to influence them in one way or another. Therefore,
the units must be drawn into the discussion of economic ques
tions relating to their factories, and economic conferences of
representatives of the factory units in a given trust must be
called from time to time to discuss questions relating to the
affairs of the trust. This is one of the surest ways both of
enlarging the economic experience of the Party membership
and of organising control from below.
Sixthly, the quality of the membership of our Party units
must be improved. Zinoviev has already said in an article of
his that here and there the quality of the membership of our
Party units is below that of the surrounding non-Party masses.
That statement, of course, must not be generalised and
applied to all the units. It would be more exact to say the fol
lowing for example: our Party units would be on a much higher
cultural level than they are now, and would have much greater
authority among non-Party people, if we had not denuded
these units, if we had not taken from them people we needed
for economic, administrative, trade-union and all sorts of
other work. If our working-class comrades, the cadres we
have taken from the units during the past six years, were to
return to their units, does it need proof that those units would
stand head and shoulders above all the non-Party workers,
even the most advanced? Precisely because the Party has no
other cadres with which to improve the state apparatus, pre
cisely because the Party will be obliged to continue using that
source, our units will remain on a somewhat unsatisfactory
cultural level unless we take urgent measures to improve the
quality of their membership. First of all, Party educational

work in the units must be increased to the utmost; furthermore,
we must get rid of the excessive formalism our local organisa
tions sometimes display in accepting working-class comrades
into the Party. I think that we must not allow ourselves to be
bound by formalism; the Party can, and must, create easier
conditions for the acceptance of new members from the ranks
of the working class. That has already begun in the local organ
isations. The Party must take this matter in hand and launch
an organised campaign for creating easier access to the Party
for new members from workers at the bench.
Seventhly, work must be intensified among the non-Party

workers. This is another means of improving the internal Party
situation, of increasing the activity of the Party membership.
I must say that our organisations are still paying little attention
to the task of drawing non-Party workers into our Soviets.
Take, for example, the elections to the Moscow Soviet that
are being held now. I consider that one of the big defects in
these elections is that too few non-Party people are being
elected. It is said that there exists a decision of the organisa
tion to the effect that at least a certain number, a certain per
centage, etc., of non-Party people are to be elected; but I see
that, in fact, a far smaller number is being elected. It is said
that the masses are eager to elect only Communists. I have
my doubts about that, comrades. I think that unless we show a
certain degree of confidence in the non-Party people they may
answer by becoming very distrustful of our organisations.
This confidence in the non-Party people is absolutely necessary,
comrades. Communists must be induced to withdraw their
candidatures. Speeches must not be delivered urging the

election only of Communists; non-Party people must be en
couraged, they must be drawn into the work of administering
the state. We shall gain by this and in return receive the re

ciprocal confidence of the non-Party people in our organisa
tions. The elections in Moscow are an example of the degree
to which our organisations are beginning to isolate themselves
within their Party shell instead of enlarging their field of
activity and, step by step, rallying the non-Party people
around themselves.
Eighthly, work among the peasants must be intensified. I

do not know why our village units, which in some places are
wilting, are losing their members and are not trusted much by
the peasants (this must be admitted) - I do not know why,
for instance, two practical tasks cannot be set these units:
firstly, to interpret and popularise the Soviet laws which affect
peasant life; secondly, to agitate for and disseminate elemen
tary agronomic knowledge, if only the knowledge that it is
necessary to plough the fields in proper time, to sift seed, etc.
Do you know, comrades, that if every peasant were to decide
to devote a little labour to the sifting of seed, it would be
possible without land improvement, and without introducing
new machines, to obtain an increase in crop yield amounting
to about ten poods per dessiatin? And what does an increase
in crop yield of ten poods per dessiatin mean? It means an
increase in the gross crop of a thousand million poods per
annum. And all this could be achieved without great effort.
Why should not our village units take up this matter? Is it
less important than talking about Curzon's policy? The peas
ants would then realise that the Communists have stopped
engaging in empty talk and have got down to real business;
and then our village units would win
ya
the boundless confidence
of the peasants.
There is no need for me to stress how necessary it is, for im
proving and reviving Party life, to intensify Party and political
educational work among the youth, the source of new cadres,

in the Red Army, among women delegates, and among non
Party people in general.pharen Haldwan
Nor will I dwell upon the importance of increasing the in
terchange of information, about which I have already spoken,
of increasing the supply of information from the top down
wards and from below upwards.
Such, comrades, are the measures for improvement, the
course towards internal Party democracy which the Central
Committee set as far back as September of this year, and which
must be put into practice by all Party organisations from top
to bottom.intille vastupiti a
I would now like to deal with two extremes, two obsessions,
on the question of workers' democracy that were to be noted
in some of the discussion articles in Pravda.
The first extreme concerns the election principle. It mani

fests itself in some comrades wanting to have elections
"throughout." Since we stand for the election principle, let us
go the whole hog in electing! Party standing? What do we
want that for? Elect whomever you please. That is a mistaken
view, comrades. The Party will not accept it. Of course, we
are not now at war; we are in a period of peaceful develop
ment. But we are now living under the NEP. Do not forget
that, comrades. The Party began the purge not during, but
after the war. Why? Because, during the war, fear of defeat
drew the Party together into one whole, and some of the dis
ruptive elements in the Party were compelled to keep to the
general line of the Party, which was faced with the question
of life or death. Now these bonds have fallen away, for we
are not now at war; now we have the NEP, we have permit
ted a revival of capitalism, and the bourgeoisie is reviving.
True, all this helps to purge the Party, to strengthen it; but on
the other hand, we are being enveloped in a new atmosphere

by the nascent and growing bourgeoisie, which is not very
strong yet, but which has already succeeded in beating some
of our co-operatives and trading organisations in internal
trade. It was precisely after the introduction of the NEP
that the Party began the purge and reduced its membership by
half; it was precisely after the introduction of the NEP that
the Party decided that, in order to protect our organisations
from the contagion of the NEP, it was necessary, for exam
ple, to hinder the influx of non-proletarian elements into the
Party, that it was necessary that Party officials should have
a definite Party standing, and so forth. Was the Party right
in taking these precautionary measures, which restricted "ex
panded" democracy? I think it was. That is why I think that
we must have democracy, we must have the election principle,
but the restrictive measures that were adopted by the Eleventh
and Twelfth Congresses, at least the chief ones, must still
remain in force.
The second extreme concerns the question of the limits of

the discussion. This extreme manifests itself in some comrades
demanding unlimited discussion; they think that the discus

sion of problems is the be all and end all of Party work and
forget about the other aspect of Party work, namely, action,
which calls for the implementation of the Party's decisions. At
all events, this was the impression I gained from the short
article by Radzin, who tried to substantiate the principle of
unlimited discussion by a reference to Trotsky, who is alleged
to have said that "the Party is a voluntary association of like
minded people." I searched for that sentence in Trotsky's
works, but could not find it. Trotsky could scarcely have
uttered it as a finished formula for the definition of the Party;
and if he did utter it, he could scarcely have stopped there.
The Party is not only an association of like-minded people; it

is also an association of like-acting people, it is a militant as
sociation of like-acting people who are fighting on a common
ideological basis (programme, tactics). I think that the ref
erence to Trotsky is out of place, for I know Trotsky as one of
the members of the Central Committee who most of all stress
the active side of Party work. I think, therefore, that Radzin
himself must bear responsibility for this definition. But what
does this definition lead to? One of two possibilities: either
that the Party will degenerate into a sect, into a philosophical
school, for only in such narrow organisations is complete like
mindedness possible; or that it will become a permanent de
bating society, eternally discussing and eternally arguing, until
the point is reached where factions form and the Party is split.
Our Party cannot accept either of these possibilities. This is
why I think that the discussion of problems is needed, a dis
cussion is needed, but limits must be set to such discussion in
order to safeguard the Party, to safeguard this fighting unit of
the proletariat, against degenerating into a debating society.
In concluding my report, I must warn you, comrades, against
these two extremes. I think that if we reject both these ex
tremes and honestly and resolutely steer the course towards in
ternal Party democracy that the Central Committee set already
in September of this year, we shall certainly achieve an im
provement in our Party work. (Applause.)
Pravda, No. 277,

December 6, 1923
m
THE DISCUSSION, RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES
BY PREOBRAZHENSKY AND SAPRONOV,
AND TROTSKY'S LETTER
THE DISCUSSION
The discussion on the situation within the Party that opened

a few weeks ago is evidently drawing to a close; that is, as far
as Moscow and Petrograd are concerned. As is known,
Petrograd has declared in favour of the line of the Party. The
principal districts of Moscow have also declared in favour of
the Central Committee's line. The general city meeting of
active workers of the Moscow organisation held on December
II fully endorsed the organisational and political line of the
Central Committee of the Party. There is no ground for
doubting that the forthcoming general Party conference of the
Moscow organisation will follow in the footsteps of its districts.
The opposition, which is a bloc of a section of the "Left"
Communists (Preobrazhensky, Stukov, Pyatakov, and others)
with the so-called Democratic Centralists (Rafail, Sapronov,
and others), has suffered a crushing defeat.
28
THE DISCUSSION 29
The course of the discussion, and the changes that the

opposition went through during the period of the discussion,
are interesting.
The opposition began by demanding nothing more nor less

than a revision of the main line in internal Party affairs and
internal Party policy which the Party has been pursuing dur
ing the past two years, during the whole NEP period. While
demanding the full implementation of the resolution passed by
the Tenth Congress on internal Party democracy, the opposi
tion at the same time insisted on the removal of the restrictions
(prohibition of groups, the Party-standing rule, etc.) that were

adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses.
But the opposition did not stop at this. It asserted that the
Party has practically been turned into an army type of organi
sation, that Party discipline has been turned into military dis
cipline, and demanded that the entire staff of the Party ap
paratus be shaken up from top to bottom, that the principal
responsible workers be removed from their posts, etc. Of
strong language and abuse of the Central Committee there was,

of course, no lack. The columns of Pravda were replete with
articles, long and short, accusing the Central Committee of all
the mortal sins. It is a wonder that it was not accused of
causing the earthquake in Japan.

During this period the Central Committee as a whole did
not intervene in the discussion in the columns of Pravda, leav
ing the members of the Party full freedom to criticise. It did

not even think it necessary to repudiate the absurd charges
that were often made by critics, being of the opinion that the
members of the Party are sufficiently politically conscious to
decide the questions under discussion themselves.
That was, so to speak, the first period of the discussion.
Later, when people got tired of strong language, when abuse

ceased to have effect and the members of the Party demanded
a business-like discussion of the question, the second period
of the discussion set in. This period opened with the publica
tion of the resolution of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission on Party affairs.5 On the basis of the deci

sion of the October Plenum of the Central Committee, which
endorsed the course towards internal Party democracy, the

Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Presidium
of the Central Control Commission drew up the well-known

resolution indicating the conditions for giving effect to internal
Party democracy. This marked a turning point in the discus
sion. It now became impossible to keep to general criticism.
When the Central Committee and the Central Control Com
mission presented their concrete plan the opposition was faced

with the alternative of either acc ting this plan of pre
senting a parallel, equally concrete, plan of its own for giving
effect to internal Party democracy. At once it was discovered
that the opposition was unable to counter the Central Com
mittee's plan with a plan of its own that would satisfy the
demands of the Party organisations. The opposition began to
retreat. The demand for cancellation of the main line of the
past two years in internal Party affairs ceased to be part of the

opposition's arsenal. The demand of the opposition for the
removal of the restrictions on democracy that were adopted by
the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Party Congresses also paled
and faded. The opposition pushed into the background and
moderated its demand that the apparatus be shaken up from
top to bottom. It deemed it wise to substitute for all these
demands the proposals that it was necessary "to formulate pre
cisely the question of factions," "to arrange for the election of
THE DISCUSSION 31
all Party bodies which hitherto have been appointed," "to

abolish the appointment system," etc. It is characteristic that
even these much moderated proposals of the opposition were
rejected by the Krasnaya Presnya and Zamoskvorechye district
Party organisations, which endorsed the resolution of the Cen
tral Committee and the Central Control Commission by over
whelming majorities.
This was, so to speak, the second period of the discussion.
We have now entered the third period. The characteristic
feature of this period is the further retreat, I would say the dis
orderly retreat, of the opposition. This time, even the latter's
faded and much moderated demands have dropped out of its
resolution. Preobrazhensky's last resolution (the third, I think),
which was submitted to the meeting of active workers of the
Moscow organisation (over 1,000 present), reads as follows:
ply the
"Only the spee
speedy, unanimous and sincere implementation of the Po
litical Bureau's resolutions and, in particular, the renovation of the
internal Party apparatus by means of new elections, can guarantee our
Party's transition to the new course without shocks and internal struggle,
and strengthen the actual solidarity and unity of its ranks."
The fact that the meeting rejected even this very innocuous
proposal of the opposition cannot be regarded as accidental.
Nor was it an accident that the meeting, by an overwhelming
majority, adopted a resolution "to endorse the political and
organisational line of the Central Committee."
Winted
RAFAIL
I think that Rafail is the most consistent and thorough

going representative of the present opposition, or, to be more
exact, of the present opposition bloc. At one of the discussion

meetings Rafail said that our Party has practically been turned
into an army organisation, that its discipline is army discipline,
and that, in view of this, it is necessary to shake up the entire
Party apparatus from top to bottom, because it is unfit and
alien to the genuine Party spirit. It seems to me that these or
similar thoughts are floating in the minds of the members of
the present opposition, but for various reasons they dare not
express them. It must be admitted that in this respect Rafail
has proved to be bolder than his colleagues in the opposition.
Nevertheless, Rafail is absolutely wrong. He is wrong not
only from the formal aspect, but also, and primarily, in sub
stance. If our Party has indeed been turned, or is even only
beginning to be turned, into an army organisation, is it not
obvious that we would now have neither a Party in the proper
sense of the term, nor the dictatorship of the proletariat, nor
the revolution?
What is an army?
An army is a self-contained organisation built from above.
The very nature of an army presupposes the existence at its
head of a General Staff, which is appointed from above, and
which forms the army on the principle of compulsion. The
General Staff not only forms the army, but also supplies it with
food, clothing, footwear, etc. The material dependence of the
entire army on the General Staff is complete. This, incidentally,
is the basis of that army discipline, breach of which entails a
specific form of the supreme penalty - death by shooting.
This also explains the fact that the General Staff can move the
army wherever and whenever it pleases, guided only by its own
strategic plans.
What is the Party?
THE DISCUSSION 33
The Party is the advanced detachment of the proletariat,

built from below on the voluntary principle. The Party also
has its General Staff, but it is not appointed from above, it is
elected from below by the whole Party. The General Staff
does not form the Party; on the contrary, the Party forms its
General Staff. The Party forms itself on the voluntary prin
ciple. Nor does there exist that material dependence of the
Party as a whole upon its General Staff that we spoke of above
in relation to the army. The Party General Staff does not pro
vide the Party with supplies, does not feed and clothe it. This,
incidentally, explains the fact that the Party General Staff
cannot move the ranks of the Party arbitrarily wherever and
whenever it pleases, that the Party General Staff can lead the
Party as a whole only in conformity with the economic and
political interests of the class of which the Party is itself a part.
Hence the specific character of Party discipline, which, in the
main, is based on the method of persuasion, as distinct from
army discipline, which, in the main, is based on the method of
compulsion. Hence the fundamental difference between the
supreme penalty in the Party (expulsion) and the supreme
penalty in the army (death by shooting).
It is sufficient to compare these two definitions to realise
how monstrous is Rafail's mistake.
The Party, he says, has been turned into an army organisa
tion. But how is it possible to turn the Party into an army
organisation if it is not materially dependent upon its General
Staff, if it is built from below on the voluntary principle, and
if it itself forms its General Staff? How, then, can one explain
the influx of workers into the Party, the growth of its influence
among the non-Party masses, its popularity among working
people all over the world?
One of two things:
Either the Party is utterly passive and voiceless - but then

how is one to explain the fact that such a passive and voiceless
party is the leader of the most revolutionary proletariat in the
world and for several years already has been governing the
most revolutionary country in the world?
Or the Party is active and displays initiative - but then
one cannot understand why a party, which is so active, which
displays such initiative, has not by now overthrown the mili
tary regime in the Party, assuming that such a regime actually
reigns in the Party.
Is it not clear that our Party, which has made three revolu
tions, which routed Kolchak and Denikin, and is now shaking
the foundations of world imperialism, that this Party would
not have tolerated for one week that military regime and
order-and-obey system that Rafail talks about so lightly and
recklessly, that it would have smashed them in a trice, and
would have introduced a new regime without waiting for a
call from Rafail?
But: a frightful dream, but thank God only a dream. The

fact of the matter is, firstly, that Rafail confused the Party with
an army and an army with the Party, for, evidently, he is not
clear in his mind about what the Party and what an army is.
Secondly, the fact of the matter is that, evidently, Rafail
himself does not believe in his discovery; he is forced to utter
"frightful" words about an order-and-obey system in the
Party so as to justify the principal slogans of the present op
position: a) freedom to form factional groups; and b) removal
from their posts of the leading elements of the Party from top
to bottom.
Evidently, Rafail feels that it is impossible to push through
these slogans without the aid of "frightful" words. I shoq
That is the whole essence of the matter.
THE DISCUSSION 35
Sek PREOBRAZHENSKY'S ARTICLE
Preobrazhensky thinks that the chief cause of the defects

in internal Party life is that the main Party line in Party affairs
is wrong. He asserts that "for two years now, the Party has
been pursuing an essentially wrong line in its internal Party
policy," that "the Party's main line in internal Party affairs
and internal Party policy during the NEP period" has proved
to be wrong. blup
What has been the Party's main line since the NEP was
introduced? At its Tenth Congress, the Party adopted a res
olution on workers' democracy. Was the Party right in
adopting such a resolution? Preobrazhensky thinks it was
right. At the same Tenth Congress the Party imposed a very
severe restriction on democracy in the shape of the ban on the
formation of groups. Was the Party right in imposing
such a restriction? Preobrazhensky thinks that the Party was
wrong, because, in his opinion, such a restriction shackles in
dependent Party thinking. At the Eleventh Congress the
Party imposed further restrictions on democracy in the shape
of the definite Party-standing rule, etc. The Twelfth Party
Congress only reaffirmed these restrictions. Was the Party
right in imposing these restrictions as a safeguard against petty
bourgeois tendencies under the conditions created by the
NEP? Preobrazhensky thinks that the Party was wrong,
because, in his opinion, these restrictions shackled the initia
tive of the Party organisations. The conclusion is obvious:
Preobrazhensky proposes that the Party's main line in this
sphere that was adopted at the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses
under the conditions created by the NEP should be rescinded.
The Tenth and Eleventh Congresses, however, took place
under the direct leadership of Comrade Lenin. The resolution
of the Tenth Congress prohibiting the formation of groups

(the resolution on unity) was moved and steered through the
congress by Comrade Lenin. The subsequent restrictions on
democracy in the shape of the definite Party-standing rule,
etc., were adopted by the Eleventh Congress with the close
participation of Comrade Lenin. Does not Preobrazhensky
realise that, in effect, he is proposing that the Party line under
the conditions created by the NEP, the line that is organi
cally connected with Leninism, should be rescinded? Is not
Preobrazhensky beginning to understand that his proposal to
rescind the Party's main line in Party affairs under the condi
tions created by the NEP is, in effect, a repetition of some
of the proposals in the notorious "anonymous platform,"
which demanded the revision of Leninism?
It is sufficient to put these questions to realise that the

Party will not follow in Preobrazhensky's footsteps.
What, indeed, does Preobrazhensky propose? He proposes
nothing more nor less than a reversion to Party life "on the
lines of 1917-18." What distinguished the years 1917-18 in this
respect? The fact that, at that time, we had groups and factions
in our Party, that there was an open fight between the groups
at that time, that the Party was then passing through a critical
period, during which its fate hung in the balance. Preobrazhen
sky is demanding that this state of affairs in the Party, a state
of affairs that was abolished by the Tenth Congress, should
be restored, at least "partly." Can the Party take this path?
No, it cannot. Firstly, because the restoration of Party life on
the lines that existed in 1917-18, when there was no NEP, does
not, and cannot, meet the Party's needs under the conditions
prevailing in 1923, when there is the NEP. Secondly, because
the restoration of the former situation of factional struggle
THE DISCUSSION 37
would inevitably result in the disruption of Party unity, espe

cially now that Comrade Lenin is absent.
Preobrazhensky is inclined to depict the conditions of in
ternal Party life in 1917-18 as something desirable and ideal.
But we know of a great many dark sides of this period of in
ternal Party life, which caused the Party very severe shocks.
I do not think that the internal Party struggle among the
Bolsheviks ever reached such intensity as it did in that period,
the period of the Brest Peace. It is well known, for example,
that the "Left" Communists, who at that time constituted a
separate faction, went to the length of talking seriously about
replacing the existing Council of People's Commissars by an
other Council of People's Commissars consisting of new people
belonging to the “Left" communist faction. Some of the mem
bers of the present opposition - Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov,
Stukov and others - then belonged to the "Left" communist
faction.
Is Preobrazhensky thinking of "restoring" those old "ideal"

conditions in our Party?
It is obvious, at all events, that the Party will not agree to
this "restoration."
SAPRONOV'S ARTICLE
Sapronov thinks that the chief cause of the defects in in

ternal Party life is the presence in the Party's apparatuses of
"Party pedants," "schoolmistresses," who are busy "teaching
the Party members" according to "the school method," and
are thus hindering the real training of the Party members in the
course of the struggle. Although dubbing the responsible
workers in our Party apparatus "schoolmistresses," Sapronov
does not think of asking where these people came from, and
how it came to pass that "Party pedants" gained control of
the work of our Party. Advancing this more than reckless and
demagogic proposition as proved, Sapronov forgot that a Marx
ist cannot be satisfied with mere assertions, but must first
of all understand a phenomenon, if it really exists at all, and
explain it, in order then to propose effective measures for im
provement. But evidently Sapronov does not care a rap about
Marxism. He wants at all costs to malign the Party apparatus
-
and all the rest will follow. And so, in Sapronov's opinion,
the evil will of "Party pedants" is the cause of the defects in
our internal Party life. An excellent explanation, it must be
admitted.
Only we do not understand:

1) How could these "schoolmistresses" and "Party pedants"
retain the leadership of the most revolutionary proletariat in
the world?
2) How could our "Party schoolchildren" who are being

taught by these "schoolmistresses" retain the leadership of the
most revolutionary country in the world?
At all events it is clear that it is easier to talk about "Party
pedants" than to understand and appreciate the very great mer

it of our Party apparatus.
How does Sapronov propose to remedy the defects in our
internal Party life? His remedy is as simple as his diagnosis.
"Re-examine the composition of our staff," remove the present
responsible workers from their posts such is Sapronov's
-
remedy. This he regards as the principal guarantee that in

ternal Party democracy will be practised. From the point of
view of democracy, I am far from denying the importance of
new elections as a means of improving our internal Party life;
but to regard that as the principal guarantee means to under
THE DISCUSSION 39
stand neither internal Party life nor its defects. In the ranks of
the opposition there are men like Byeloborodov, whose "de
mocracy" is still remembered by the workers in Rostov;
Rosenholtz, whose "democracy" was a misery to our water
transport workers and railwaymen; Pyatakov, whose "de
mocracy" made the whole of the Donets Basin not only cry out,
but positively howl; Alsky, with the nature of whose "de
mocracy" everybody is familiar; Byk, from whose "democracy"
Khorezm is still groaning. Does Sapronov think that if the
places of the "Party pedants" are taken by the "esteemed com
rades" enumerated above, democracy will triumph in the
Party? Permit me to have some doubts about that.
Evidently, there are two kinds of democracy: the democracy
of the mass of Party members, who are eager to display initia
tive and to take an active part in the work of Party leadership,
and the "democracy" of disgruntled Party big-wigs who think
that dismissing some and putting others in their place is the
essence of democracy. The Party will stand for the first kind
of democracy and will carry it out with an iron hand. But the
Party will throw out the "democracy" of the disgruntled Party
big-wigs, which has nothing in common with genuine internal
Party democracy, workers' democracy.
To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary, first of
all, to rid the minds of some of our responsible workers of the
survivals and habits of the war period, which cause them to
regard the Party not as an independently acting organism, but
as a system of official institutions. But these survivals cannot
be got rid of in a short space of time.
To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary, second
ly, to do away with the pressure exerted by our bureaucratic
state apparatus, which has about a million employees, upon
our Party apparatus, which has no more than 20,000-30,000
workers. But it is impossible to do away with the pressure of

this cumbersome machine and gain mastery over it in a short
space of time.
To ensure internal Party democracy it is necessary, thirdly,
to raise the cultural level of our backward units, of which there
are quite a number, and to distribute our active workers cor
rectly over the entire territory of the Union; but that, too, can
not be achieved in a short space of time.
As you see, to ensure complete democracy is not so simple
a matter as Sapronov thinks, that is, of course, if by democracy
we mean not Sapronov's empty, formal democracy, but real,
workers', genuine democracy.
Obviously, the entire Party from top to bottom must exert
its will to ensure and put into effect genuine internal Party
democracy.
nang hoa antos goikalimalls

TROTSKY'S LETTER
The resolution of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission on internal Party democracy, published on

December 7, was adopted unanimously. Trotsky voted for this
resolution. It might have been expected, therefore, that the
members of the Central Committee, including Trotsky, would
come forward in a united front with a call to Party members for
unanimous support of the Central Committee and its resolu
tion. This expectation, however, has not been realised. The
other day Trotsky issued a letter to the Party conferences which
cannot be interpreted otherwise than as an attempt to weaken
the will of the Party membership for unity in supporting the
Central Committee and its position.
THE DISCUSSION 41
After referring to bureaucracy in the Party apparatus and

the danger of degeneration of the old guard, i. e., the Leninists,
the main core of our Party, Trotsky writes:
"The degeneration of the old guard' has been observed in history

more than once. Let us take the latest and most glaring historical exam
ple: the leaders and the parties of the Second International. We know
that Wilhelm Liebknecht, Bebel, Singer, Victor Adler, Kautsky, Bernstein,
Lafargue, Guesde, and others, were the immediate and direct pupils of
Marx and Engels. We know, however, that all those leaders some
partly, and others wholly- degenerated into opportunism.". "We,
that is, we 'old ones,' must say that our generation, which naturally plays
a leading role in the Party, has no self-sufficient guarantee against the
gradual and imperceptible weakening of the proletarian and revolutionary
spirit, assuming that the Party tolerates a further growth and consolida
tion of the bureaucratic-apparatus methods of policy which are transform
ing the younger generation into passive educational material and are
inevitably creating estrangement between the apparatus and the member
ship, between the old and the young.". . . "The youth the Party's
-
truest barometer - react most sharply of all again Party bureaucracy."..

"The youth must capture the revolutionary formulas by storm.
MINTE
First, I must dispel a possible misunderstanding. As is
evident from his letter, Trotsky includes himself among the
Bolshevik old guard, thereby showing readiness to take upon
himself the charges that may be hurled at the old guard if it
does indeed take the path of degeneration. It must be admitted
that this readiness for self-sacrifice is undoubtedly a noble
trait. But I must protect Trotsky from Trotsky, because, for
obvious reasons, he cannot, and should not, bear responsibility
for the possible degeneration of the principal cadres of the
Bolshevik old guard. Sacrifice is a good thing, of course, but
do the old Bolsheviks need it? I think that they do not.
Secondly, it is impossible to understand how opportunists
and Mensheviks like Bernstein, Adler, Kautsky, Guesde, and
the others, can be put on a par with the Bolshevik old guard,
which has always fought, and I hope will continue to fight

with honour, against opportunism, the Mensheviks and the
Second International. What is the cause of this muddle and
confusion? Who needs it, bearing in mind the interests of the

Party and not ulterior motives that by no means aim at defence
of the old guard? How is one to interpret these insinuations
about opportunism in relation to the old Bolsheviks, who ma
tured in the struggle against opportunism?
Thirdly, I do not by any means think that the old Bolsheviks
are absolutely guaranteed against the danger of degeneration
any more than I have grounds for asserting that we are
absolutely guaranteed against, say, an earthquake. As a
possibility, such a danger can and should be assumed. But does
this mean that such a danger is real, that it exists? I think that
it does not. Trotsky himself has adduced no evidence to show
that the danger of degeneration is a real danger. Nevertheless,
there are a number of elements within our Party who are capa
ble of giving rise to a real danger of degeneration of certain
ranks of our Party. I have in mind that section of the Menshe
viks who joined our Party unwillingly, and who have not yet
got rid of their old opportunist habits. The following is what
Comrade Lenin wrote about these Mensheviks, and about this
danger, at the time of the Party purge:

"Every opportunist is distinguished for his adaptability . . . and the
Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt themselves 'on principle,' so to speak,
to the prevailing trend among the workers and assume a protective colour
ing, just as a hare's coat turns white in the winter. It is necessary to
know this specific feature of the Mensheviks and take it into account.
And taking it into account means purging the Party of approximately
ninety-nine out of every hundred of the Mensheviks who joined the
Russian Communist Party after 1918, i.e., when the victory of the Bol
sheviks first became probable and then certain" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 13).[1]
[¹] Lenin, Purging the Party. (1921) od po sebo ad

THE DISCUSSION 43
How could it happen that Trotsky, who lost sight of this and
similar, really existing dangers, pushed into the foreground a
possible danger, the danger of the degeneration of the Bolshe
vik old guard? How can one shut one's eyes to a real danger
and push into the foreground an unreal, possible danger, if one
has the interests of the Party in view and not the object of un
dermining the prestige of the majority in the Central Com
mittee, the leading core of the Bolshevik old guard? Is it not
obvious that "approaches" of this kind can only bring grist to
the mill of the opposition?
Fourthly, what reasons did Trotsky have for contrasting the
"old ones," who may degenerate, to the "youth," the Party's
"truest barometer"; for contrasting the "old guard," who may
become bureaucratic, to the "young guard," which must
"capture the revolutionary formulas by storm"? What grounds
had he for drawing this contrast, and what did he need it for?
Have not the youth and the old guard always marched in a
united front against internal and external enemies? Is not the
unity between the "old ones" and the "young ones" the basic
strength of our revolution? What was the object of this attempt
to discredit the old guard and demagogically to flatter the
youth if not to cause and widen a fissure between these prin
cipal detachments of our Party? Who needs all this, if one has
the interests of the Party in view, its unity and solidarity, and
not an attempt to shake this unity for the benefit of the
opposition?
Is that the way to defend the Central Committee and its
resolution on internal Party democracy, which, moreover, was
adopted unanimously?
But evidently, that was not Trotsky's object in issuing his
letter to the Party conferences. Evidently there was a different
intention here, namely: diplomatically to support the opposi
tion in its struggle against the Central Committee of the

Party while pretending to support the Central Committee's
resolution.
That, in fact, explains the stamp of duplicity that Trotsky's

letter bears.
Trotsky is in a bloc with the Democratic Centralists and

with a section of the "Left" Communists therein lies the
political significance of Trotsky's action.
Pravda, No. 285,
December 15, 1923

Signed: J. Stalin
who
da cu ratol
A NECESSARY COMMENT
(Concerning Rafail)
In my article in Pravda (No. 285) "The Discussion, Rafail,

etc." I said that according to a statement Rafail made at a
meeting in the Presnya District "our Party has practically been
turned into an army organisation, its discipline is army disci
pline and, in view of this, it is necessary to shake up the entire
Party apparatus from top to bottom, because it is unfit." Con
cerning this, Rafail says in his article in Pravda that I did not
correctly convey his views, that I "simplified" them "in the
heat of debate," and so forth. Rafail says that he merely drew
an analogy (comparison) between the Party and an army, that
analogy is not identity. "The system of administration in the
Party is analogous to the system of administration in an army
-
this does not mean," he says, "that it is an exact copy; it only

draws a parallel."
Is Rafail right?
No. And for the following reasons.
Firstly. In his speech at the meeting in the Presnya District,
Rafail did not simply compare the Party with an army, as he
45
now asserts, but actually identified it with an army, being of

the opinion that the Party is built on the lines of an army. I
have before me the verbatim report of Rafail's speech, revised
by the speaker. There it is stated: "Our entire Party is built
on the lines of an army from top to bottom." It can scarcely be
denied that we have here not simply an analogy, but an iden
tification of the Party's structure with that of an army; the two
are placed on a par.
Can it be asserted that our Party is built on the lines of an
army? Obviously not, for the Party is built from below, on the
voluntary principle; it is not materially dependent on its Gen
eral Staff, which the Party elects. An army, however, is, of
course, built from above, on the basis of compulsion; it is
completely dependent materially upon its General Staff, which
is not elected, but appointed from above. Etc., etc.
Secondly. Rafail does not simply compare the system of
administration in the Party with that in an army, but puts one
on a par with the other, identifies them, without any "verbal
frills." This is what he writes in his article: "We assert that
the system of administration in the Party is identical with the

system of administration in an army not on any extraneous
grounds, but on the basis of an objective analysis of the state
of the Party." It is impossible to deny that here Rafail does
not confine himself to drawing an analogy between the admin
istration of the Party and that of an army, for he "simply"
identifies them, "without verbal frills." soft eid
Can these two systems of administration be identified? No,

they cannot; for the system of administration in an army, as
a system, is incompatible with the very nature of the Party and
with its methods of influencing both its own members and the
non-Party masses.
A NECESSARY COMMENT 47
NOThirdly. Rafail asserts in his article that, in the last analysis,

the fate of the Party as a whole, and of its individual members,
depends upon the Registration and Distribution Department of
the Central Committee, that "the members of the Party are
regarded as mobilised, the Registration and Distribution De
partment puts everybody in his job, nobody has the slightest
right to choose his work, and it is the Registration and Dis
tribution Department, or 'General Staff,' that determines the
amount of supplies, i.e., pay, form of work, etc." Is all this
true? Of course not! In peace time, the Registration and Dis
tribution Department of the Central Committee usually deals
in the course of a year with barely eight to ten thousand peo
ple. We know from the Central Committee's report to the
Twelfth Congress of the R.C.P.S that, in 1922, the Registration
and Distribution Department of the Central Committee dealt
with 10,700 people (i.e., half the number it dealt with in 1921).
If from this number we subtract 1,500 people sent by their local
organisations to various educational institutions, and the peo
ple who went on sick leave (over 400), there remain something
over 8,000. Of these, the Central Committee, in the course of
the year, distributed 5,167 responsible workers (i.e., less than

half of the total number dealt with by the Registration and
Distribution Department). But at that time the Party as a
whole had not 5,000, and not 10,000, but about 500,000
members, the bulk of whom were not, and could not, be affect
ed the distribution work of the Registration and Distribu

tion Department of the Central Committee. Evidently, Rafail
has forgotten that in peace time the Central Committee usually
distributes only responsible workers, that the Registration and
Distribution Department of the Central Committee does not,
cannot, and should not, determine the "pay" of all the mem
bers of the Party, who now number over 400,000. Why did
Rafail have to exaggerate in this ridiculous way? Evidently,

in order to prove "with facts" the "identity" between the
system of administration in the Party and that in an army.
Such are the facts.
That is why I thought, and still think, that Rafail "is not
clear in his mind about what the Party and what an army is."
As regards the passages Rafail quotes from the decisions of
the Tenth Congress, they have nothing to do with the present
case, for they apply only to the survivals of the war period in
our Party and not to the alleged "identity between the system
of administration in the Party and that in an army."
Rafail is right when he says that mistakes must be corrected,
that one must not persist in one's mistakes. And that is precise
ly why I do not lose hope that Rafail will, in the end, correct
the mistakes he has made.
Pravda, No. 294,

December 28, 1923
Signed: J. Stalin
145 Gabão Jud
ha dhe
Jequid and
shuning
THE THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)⁹
January 16-18, 1924

Be Smoll
I. REPORT ON IMMEDIATE TASKS
IN PARTY AFFAIRS
January 17
Comrades, it is customary for our speakers at discussion

meetings to begin with the history of the question: how the
issue of inner-Party democracy arose, who was the first to
say "A," who followed by saying "B," and so on. This meth
od, I think, is not suitable for us, for it introduces an ele
ment of squabbling and mutual recrimination and leads to
no useful results. I think that it will be much better to begin
with the question of how the Party reacted to the Political
10
Bureau resolution on democracy that was subsequently con
firmed by the C.C. plenum.
I must place on record that this resolution is the only one,
I believe, in the whole history of our Party to have received the
full I would say the absolutely unanimous - approval of
49
the entire Party, following a vehement discussion on the ques

tion of democracy. Even the opposition organisations and
units, whose general attitude has been one of hostility to the
Party majority and the C.C., even they, for all their desire to
find fault, have not found occasion or grounds for doing so.
Usually in their resolutions these organisations and units,
while acknowledging the correctness of the basic provisions
of the Political Bureau resolution on inner-Party democracy,
have attempted to distinguish themselves in some way from
the other Party organisations by adding some sort of appendage
to it. For example: yes, yours is a very good resolution, but
don't offend Trotsky, or: your resolution is quite correct, but
you are a little late, it would have been better to have done all
this earlier. I shall not go into the question here of who is
offending whom. I think that if we look into the matter prop
erly, we may well find that the celebrated remark about Tit
Titych fits Trotsky fairly well: "Who would offend you, Tit
Titych? You yourself will offend everyone!" (Laughter.) But
as I have said, I shall not go into this question. I am even pre
pared to concede that someone really is offending Trotsky.
But is that the point? What principles are involved in this ques
tion of offence? After all, it is a question of the principles of
the resolution, not of who has offended whom. By this I want
to say that even units and organisations that are open and sharp
in their opposition, even they have not had the hardihood to
raise any objections in principle to the resolution of the Political
Bureau of the C.C. and Presidium of the Central Control Com
mission. I record this fact in order to note once more that it
would be hard to find in the whole history of our Party another

such instance of a resolution which, after the trials and tribula
tions of a vehement discussion, has met with such unanimous
THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 51
approval, and not only of the majority, but virtually of the

entire Party membership.
I draw two conclusions from this. The first is that the reso
lution of the Political Bureau and C.C.C. fully accords with the
needs and requirements of the Party at the present time. The
second is that the Party will emerge from this discussion on
inner-Party democracy stronger and more united. This conclu
sion is, one might say, a well-aimed thrust at those of our ill
wishers abroad who have long been rubbing their hands in glee
over our discussion, in the belief that our Party would be
weakened as a result of it, and Soviet power disintegrated.
I shall not dwell on the essence of inner-Party democracy.
Its fundamentals have been set forth in the resolution, and the
resolution has been discussed from A to Z by the entire Party.

Why should I go over the same ground here? I shall only say
one thing: evidently there will not be all-embracing, full de
mocracy. What we shall have, evidently, will be democracy
within the bounds outlined by the Tenth, Eleventh and
Twelfth Congresses. You know very well what these bounds
are and I shall not repeat them here. Nor shall I dilate on the
point that the principal guarantee that inner-Party democracy
becomes part of the flesh and blood of our Party is to strengthen
the activity and understanding of the Party masses. This, too,
is dealt with fairly extensively in our resolution.
I pass to the subject of how some comrades among us, and
some organisations, make a fetish of democracy, regarding it
as something absolute, without relation to time or space. What
I want to point out is that democracy is not something constant
for all times and conditions; for there are times when its im
plementation is neither possible nor advisable. Two conditions,
or two groups of conditions, internal and external, are required
to make inner-Party democracy possible. Without them it is

vain to speak of democracy.
It is necessary, firstly, that industry should develop, that
there should be no deterioration in the material conditions of
the working class, that the working class increase numerically,
that its cultural standards advance, and that it advance quali
tatively as well. It is necessary that the Party, as the vanguard
of the working class, should likewise advance, above all
qualitatively; and above all through recruitment among the
country's proletarian elements. These conditions of an internal
nature are absolutely essential if we are to pose the question of
genuine, and not merely paper, implementation of inner-Party
democracy.
But these conditions alone are not enough. I have already
said that there is another group of conditions, of an external
nature, and in the absence of these democracy in the Party is
impossible. I have in mind certain international conditions
that would more or less ensure peace and peaceful develop
ment, without which democracy in the Party is inconceivable.
In other words, if we are attacked and have to defend the
country with arms in hand, there can be no question of de

mocracy, for it will have to be suspended. The Party mobilises,
we shall probably have to militarise it, and the question of
inner-Party democracy will disappear of itself.
That is why I believe that democracy must be regarded as
dependent on conditions, that there must be no fetishism in
questions of inner-Party democracy, for its implementation, as
you see, depends on the specific conditions of time and place at
each given moment.
To obviate undesirable infatuation and unfounded accusa
tions in future, I must also remind you of the obstacles con

fronting the Party in the exercise of democracy - obstacles
THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (B.) 53
which hinder the implementation of democracy even when the

two basic favourable conditions outlined above, internal and
external, obtain. Comrades, these obstacles exist, they pro
foundly influence our Party's activities, and I have no right to
pass them over in silence. What are these obstacles?
These obstacles, comrades, consist, firstly, in the fact that in
the minds of a section of our Party functionaries there still
persist survivals of the old, war period, when the Party was
militarised. And these survivals engender certain un-Marxist
views: that our Party is not an independently acting organism,
independent in its ideological and practical activities, but
something in the nature of a system of institutions - lower,
intermediate and higher. This absolutely un-Marxist view has
nowhere, it is true, been given final form and has nowhere
been expressed definitely, but elements of it exist among a
section of our Party functionaries and deter them from the
consistent implementation of inner-Party democracy. That is
why the struggle against such views, the struggle against surviv
als of the war period, both at the centre and in the localities,
is an immediate task of the Party.
The second obstacle to the implementation of democracy in
the Party is the pressure of the bureaucratic state apparatus on
the Party apparatus, on our Party workers. The pressure of
this unwieldy apparatus on our Party workers is not always
noticeable, not always does it strike the eye, but it never re
laxes for an instant. The ultimate effect of this pressure of the
unwieldy bureaucratic state apparatus is that a number of our
functionaries, both at the centre and in the localities, often in
voluntarily and quite unconsciously, deviate from inner-Party
democracy, from the line which they believe to be correct, but
which they are often unable to carry out completely. You can
well visualise it: the bureaucratic state apparatus with not less
than a million employees, largely elements alien to the Party,

and our Party apparatus with not more than 20,000-30,000
people, who are called upon to bring the state apparatus under
the Party's sway and make it a socialist apparatus. What
would our state apparatus be worth without the support of the
Party? Without the assistance and support of our Party ap
paratus, it would not be worth much, unfortunately. And
every time our Party apparatus extends its feelers into the
various branches of the state administration, it is quite often
obliged to adapt Party activities there to those of the state
apparatus. Concretely: the Party has to carry on work for
the political education of the working class, to heighten the
latter's political understanding, but at the same time there
is the tax in kind to be collected, some campaign or other that
has to be carried out; for without these campaigns, without
the assistance of the Party, the state apparatus cannot cope
with its duties. And here our Party functionaries find them
selves between two fires - they must rectify the line of the
state apparatus, which still works according to old patterns,
and at the same time they must retain contact with the workers.
And often enough they themselves become bureaucratised.
Such is the second obstacle, which is a difficult one to sur
mount, but which must be surmounted at all costs to facilitate
s to 12
the implementation of inner-Party democracy.
Lastly, there is yet a third obstacle in the way of realising
democracy. It is the low cultural level of a number of our
organisations, of our units, particularly in the border regions
(no offence to them meant), which hampers our Party organisa
tions in fully implementing inner-Party democracy. You know
that democracy requires a certain minimum of cultural develop
ment on the part of the members of the unit, and of the or
ganisation as a whole; it requires a certain minimum of active
members who can be elected and placed in executive posts.

And if there is no such minimum of active members in the
organisation, if the cultural level of the organisation itself is

low, what then? Naturally, in that case we are obliged to
deviate from democracy, resorting to appointment of officials
and so on.
Such are the obstacles that have confronted us, which will
continue to confront us, and which we must overcome if
inner-Party democracy is to be implemented sincerely and
completely.
I have reminded you of the obstacles that confront us, and
of the external and internal conditions without which de
mocracy becomes an empty, demagogic phrase, because some

comrades make a fetish, an absolute, of the question of
democracy. They believe that democracy is possible always,
under all conditions, and that its implementation is prevented
only by the "evil" will of the "apparatus men." It is to oppose
this idealistic view, a view that is not ours, not Marxist, not
Leninist, that I have reminded you, comrades, of the condi
tions necessary for the implementation of democracy, and of
the obstacles confronting us at the present time.
Comrades, I could conclude my report with this, but I con
sider that it is our duty to sum up the discussion and to draw
from this summing-up certain conclusions which may prove of
great importance for us. I could divide our whole struggle in
the field of the discussion, on the question of democracy, into
three periods.
The first period, when the opposition attacked the C.C.,
with the accusation that in these past two years, in fact
throughout the NEP period, the whole line of the C.C. has
been wrong. This was the period prior to the publication of
the Political Bureau and C.C.C. Presidium resolution. I shall
not deal here with the question of who was right and who
wrong. The attacks were violent ones, and as you know, not
always warranted. But one thing is clear: this period can be
described as one in which the opposition levelled its bitterest
attacks on the C.C.
The second period began with the publication of the Political

Bureau and C.C.C. resolution, when the opposition was faced
with the necessity of advancing something comprehensive and
concrete against the C.C. resolution, and when it was found
that the opposition had nothing either comprehensive or con
crete to offer. That was a period in which the C.C. and the
opposition came closest together. To all appearances the
whole thing was coming to an end, or could have come to an
end, through some reconciliation of the opposition to the C.C.
line. I well remember a meeting in Moscow, the centre of the
discussion struggle - I believe it was on December 12 in the
Hall of Columns - when Preobrazhensky submitted a resolu
tion which for some reason was rejected, but which had little
to distinguish it from the C.C. resolution. In fundamentals,
and even in certain minor points, it did not differ at all from
the C.C. resolution. And at that time it seemed to me that,
properly speaking, there was nothing to continue fighting over.

We had the C.C. resolution, which satisfied everyone, at least
as regards nine-tenths of it; the opposition itself evidently
realised this and was prepared to meet us halfway; and with
this, perhaps, we would put an end to the disagreements. This
was the second, reconciliation period.
But then came the third period. It opened with Trotsky's
pronouncement, his appeal to the districts, which, at one stroke,
wiped out the reconciliation tendencies and turned everything
topsy-turvy. Trotsky's pronouncement opened a period of
most violent inner-Party struggle a struggle which would
-
not have occurred had Trotsky not come out with his letter on
the very next day after he had voted for the Political Bureau
resolution. You know that this first pronouncement of
Trotsky's was followed by a second, and the second by a
third, with the result that the struggle grew still more acute.
I think, comrades, that in these pronouncements Trotsky
committed at least six grave errors. These errors aggravated
the inner-Party struggle. I shall proceed to analyse them.
Trotsky's first error lies in the very fact that he came out
with an article on the next day after the publication of the
C.C. Political Bureau and C.C.C. resolution; with an article
which can only be regarded as a platform advanced in opposi
tion to the C.C. resolution. I repeat and emphasise that this
article can only be regarded as a new platform, advanced in
opposition to the unanimously adopted C.C. resolution. Just
think of it, comrades: on a certain date the Political Bureau
and the Presidium of the C.C.C. meet and discuss a resolution
on inner-Party democracy. The resolution is adopted unan

imously, and only a day later, independently of the C.C., dis
regarding its will and over its head, Trotsky's article is
circulated to the districts. It is a new platform and raises
anew the issues of the apparatus and the Party, cadres and
youth, factions and Party unity, and so on and so forth - a
platform immediately seized upon by the entire opposition and
advanced as a counterblast to the C.C. resolution. This can
only be regarded as opposing oneself to the Central Com

mittee. It means that Trotsky puts himself in open and outright
opposition to the entire C.C. The Party was confronted with
the question: have we a C.C. as our directing body, or does
it no longer exist; is there a C.C. whose unanimous decisions
are respected by its members, or is there only a superman
standing above the C.C., a superman for whom no laws are
valid and who can permit himself to vote for the C.C. resolu
tion today, and to put forward and publish a new platform
in opposition to this resolution tomorrow? Comrades, we
cannot demand that workers submit to Party discipline if a
C.C. member, openly, in the sight of all, ignores the Central
Committee and its unanimously adopted decision. We cannot
apply two disciplines: one for workers, the other for big-wigs.
There must be a single discipline.
Trotsky's error consists in the fact that he has set himself
up in opposition to the C.C. and imagines himself to be a
superman standing above the C.C., above its laws, above its
decisions, thereby providing a certain section of the Party with
a pretext for working to undermine confidence in the C.C.
Some comrades have expressed dissatisfaction that Trotsky's
anti-Party action was treated as such in certain Pravda
articles and in articles by individual members of the C.C.
To these comrades I must reply that no party could respect a
C.C. which at this difficult time failed to uphold the Party's
dignity, when one of its members attempted to put himself
above the entire C.C. The C.C. would have committed moral
suicide had it passed over this attempt of Trotsky's.

Trotsky's second error is his ambiguous behaviour during
the whole period of the discussion. He has grossly ignored
the will of the Party, which wants to know what his real posi
tion is, and has diplomatically evaded answering the question
put point-blank by many organisations: for whom, in the final
analysis, does Trotsky stand for the C.C. or for the opposi
-
tion? The discussion is not being conducted for evasions but

in order that the whole truth may be placed frankly and
honestly before the Party, as Ilyich does and as every Bolshevik
is obliged to do. We are told that Trotsky is seriously ill. Let
us assume he is; but during his illness he has written three
articles and four new chapters of the pamphlet which appeared

today. Is it not clear that Trotsky could perfectly well write
a few lines in reply to the question put to him by various or
ganisations and state whether he is for the opposition or against
the opposition? It need hardly be said that this ignoring of
the will of a number of organisations was bound to aggravate
the inner-Party struggle.
Trotsky's third error is that in his pronouncements he puts
the Party apparatus in opposition to the Party and advances
the slogan of combating the "apparatus men." Bolshevism
cannot accept such contrasting of the Party to the Party ap
paratus. What, actually, does our Party apparatus consist of?
It consists of the Central Committee, the Regional Committees,
the Gubernia Committees, the Uyezd Committees. Are these
subordinated to the Party? Of course they are, for to the
extent of 90 per cent they are elected by the Party. Those who
say that the Gubernia Committees have been appointed are
wrong. They are wrong, because, as you know, comrades, our
Gubernia Committees are elected, just as the Uyezd Com
mittees and the C.C. are. They are subordinated to the Party.
But once elected, they must direct the work, that is the
point. Is Party work conceivable without direction from
the Central Committee, after its election by the congress,
and from the Gubernia Committee, after its election by the
Gubernia conference? Surely, Party work is inconceivable
without this. Surely, this is an irresponsible anarcho
Menshevik view which renounces the very principle of
direction of Party activities. I am afraid that by contrasting
the Party apparatus to the Party, Trotsky, whom, of course,
I have no intention of putting on a par with the Mensheviks,
impels some of the inexperienced elements in our Party to
wards the standpoint of anarcho-Menshevik indiscipline
and organisational laxity. I am afraid that this error of

Trotsky's may expose our entire Party apparatus - the ap
paratus without which the Party is inconceivable to attack
by the inexperienced members of the Party.
Trotsky's fourth error consists in the fact that he has put
the young members of the Party in opposition to its cadres,
that he has unwarrantedly accused our cadres of degeneration.
Trotsky put our Party on a par with the Social-Democratic
Party in Germany. He referred to examples how certain dis
ciples of Marx, veteran Social-Democrats, had degenerated,
and from this he concluded that the same danger of degenera
tion faces our Party cadres. Properly speaking, one might well
laugh at the sight of a C.C. member who only yesterday fought
Bolshevism hand in hand with the opportunists and Menshe
viks, attempting now, in this seventh year of Soviet power, to
assert, even if only as an assumption, that our Party cadres,
born, trained and steeled in the struggle against Menshevism
and opportunism that these cadres are faced with the pros
pect of degeneration. I repeat, one might well laugh at this
attempt. Since, however, this assertion was made at no or
dinary time but during a discussion, and since we are con
fronted here with a certain contrasting of the Party cadres, who
are alleged to be susceptible to degeneration, to the young
Party members, who are alleged to be free, or almost free, of
such a danger, this assumption, though essentially ridiculous
and frivolous, may acquire, and already has acquired, a
definite practical significance. That is why I think we must
stop to look into it.
It is sometimes said that old people must be respected, for
they have lived longer than the young, know more and can
give better advice. I must say, comrades, that this is an abso
lutely erroneous view. It is not every old person we must
respect, and it is not every experience that is of value to us.

What matters is the kind of experience. German Social
Democracy has its cadres, very experienced ones too: Scheide
mann, Noske, Wels and the rest; men with the greatest ex
perience, men who know all the ins and outs of the struggle.
But struggle against what, and against whom? What
matters is the kind of experience. In Germany these cadres
were trained in the struggle against the revolutionary spirit,
not in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but
against it. Their experience is vast; but it is the wrong kind
of experience. Comrades, it is the duty of the youth to explode
this experience, demolish it and oust these old ones. There, in
German Social-Democracy, the youth, being free of the ex
perience of struggle against the revolutionary spirit, is closer
to this revolutionary spirit or closer to Marxism, than the old
cadres. The latter are burdened with the experience of strug
gle against the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, they are
burdened with the experience of struggle for opportunism,
against revolutionism. Such cadres must be routed, and all
our sympathies must be with that youth which, I repeat, is
free of this experience of struggle against the revolutionary
spirit and for that reason can the more easily assimilate the
new ways and methods of struggle for the dictatorship of the
proletariat, against opportunism. There, in Germany, I can
understand the question being put in that way. If Trotsky
were speaking of German Social-Democracy and the cadres
of such a party, I would be wholeheartedly prepared to endorse
his statement. But we are dealing with a different party, the
Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party, whose cadres came into
being in the struggle against opportunism, gained strength in
that struggle, and which matured and captured power in the
struggle against imperialism, in the struggle against all the
opportunist hangers-on of imperialism. Is it not clear that there

is a fundamental difference here? Our cadres matured in the
struggle to assert the revolutionary spirit; they carried that

struggle through to the end, they came to power in battles
against imperialism, and they are now shaking the foundations
of world imperialism. How can these cadres- if one ap
proaches the matter honestly, without duplicity - how can
these cadres be put on a par with those of German Social
Democracy, which in the past worked hand in glove with
Wilhelm against the working class, and is now working hand
in glove with Seeckt; a party which grew up and was formed
in the struggle against the revolutionary spirit of the pro
letariat? How can these cadres, fundamentally different in
nature, be put on a par, how can they be confused? Is it so
difficult to realise that the gulf between the two is unbridge

able? Is it so difficult to see that Trotsky's gross misrepresenta
tion, his gross confusion, are calculated to undermine the
prestige of our revolutionary cadres, the core of our Party? Is
it not clear that this misrepresentation could only inflame
passions and render the inner-Party struggle more acute?
Trotsky's fifth error is to raise in his letters the argument
and slogan that the Party must march in step with the student
youth, "our Party's truest barometer." "The youth - the
Party's truest barometer react most sharply of all against
-
Party bureaucracy," he says in his first article. And in order

that there be no doubt as to what youth he has in mind, Trotsky
adds in his second letter: "Especially sharply, as we have
seen, does the student youth react against bureaucracy."
If we were to proceed from this proposition, an absolutely
incorrect one, theoretically fallacious and practically harmful,
we should have to go further and issue the slogan: "More
student youth in our Party; open wide the doors of our Party
to the student youth."
Hitherto the policy has been to orientate ourselves on the
proletarian section of our Party, and we have said: "Open
wide the doors of the Party to proletarian elements; our Party
must grow by recruiting proletarians." Now Trotsky turns
this formula upside down.
The question of intellectuals and workers in our Party is no
new one. It was raised as far back as the Second Congress of
our Party when it was a question of the formulation of
paragraph 1 of the Rules, on Party membership. As you know,
Martov demanded at the time that the framework of the
Party be expanded to include non-proletarian elements, in

opposition to Comrade Lenin, who insisted that the admission
of such elements into the Party be strictly limited. Subsequent
ly, at the Third Congress of our Party, the issue arose again,
with new force. I recall how sharply, at that congress, Com
rade Lenin put the question of workers and intellectuals in
our Party. This is what Comrade Lenin said at the time:
"It has been pointed out that usually splits have been headed by
intellectuals. This is a very important point, but it is not decisive. . . I
.
believe we must take a broader view of the matter. The bringing of

workers on to the committees is not only a pedagogical, but also a
political task. Workers have class instinct, and given a little political
experience they fairly soon develop into staunch Social-Democrats.
would be very much in sympathy with the idea that our committees should
contain eight workers to every two intellectuals" (see Vol. VII, p. 282). [¹]
That is how the question stood as early as 1905. Ever since,

this injunction of Comrade Lenin's has been our guiding
A
Lenin, Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. April 12 (25)-April 27
(May 10), 1905. 18. Speech on the Question of the Relations Between
Workers and Intellectuals Within the Social-Democratic Organisations.
April 20 (May 3).
principle in building the Party. But now Trotsky proposes, in

effect, that we break with the organisational line of Bolshevism.
And, finally, Trotsky's sixth error lies in his proclaiming
freedom of groups. Yes, freedom of groups! I recall that al
ready in the sub-commission which drew up the draft resolu
tion on democracy we had an argument with Trotsky on groups
and factions. Trotsky raised no objection to the prohibition of
factions, but vehemently defended the idea of permitting
groups within the Party. That view is shared by the opposition.
Evidently, these people do not realise that by permitting free
dom of groups they open a loophole for the Myasnikov ele
ments, and make it easier for them to mislead the Party and
represent factions as groups. Indeed, is there any difference
between a group and a faction? Only an outward one. This
is how Comrade Lenin defines factionalism, identifying it with
groups:
"Even before the general Party discussion on the trade unions, certain
signs of factionalism were apparent in the Party, namely, the formation
of groups with separate platforms, striving to a certain degree to segregate
themselves and to establish a group discipline of their own" (see Steno
graphic Report of the Tenth Congress, R.C.P. (B.), p. 309).[¹]
As you see, there is essentially no difference here between

factions and groups. And when the opposition set up its own
bureau here in Moscow, with Serebryakov as its head; when
it began to send out speakers with instructions to address such
and such meetings and raise such and such objections; and
when, in the course of the struggle, these oppositionists were
compelled to retreat and changed their resolutions by com
mand; this, of course, was evidence of the existence of a group
[1] Lenin, Preliminary Draft of the Resolution of the Tenth Congress

of the Russian Communist Party on Party Unity. (1921)
and of group discipline. But we are told that this was not a
faction; well, let Preobrazhensky explain what a faction is.
Trotsky's pronouncements, his letters and articles on the sub
ject of generations and of factions, are designed to induce the
Party to tolerate groups within its midst. This is an attempt
to legalise factions, and Trotsky's faction above all.
Trotsky affirms that groups arise because of the bureaucratic
regime instituted by the Central Committee, and that if there
were no bureaucratic regime, there would be no groups either.
This is an un-Marxist approach, comrades. Groups arise, and
will continue to arise, because we have in our country the most
diverse forms of economy from embryonic forms of social
-
ism down to medievalism. That in the first place. Then we

have the NEP, that is, we have allowed capitalism, the revival
of private capital and the revival of the ideas that go with it,
and these ideas are penetrating into the Party. That in the
second place. And, in the third place, our Party is made up of
three component parts: there are workers, peasants and intel
lectuals in its ranks. These then, if we approach the question in
a Marxist way, are the causes why certain elements are drawn
from the Party for the formation of groups, which in some
cases we must remove by surgical action, and in others dissolve
by ideological means, through discussion.
It is not a question of regime here. There would be many
more groups under a regime of maximum freedom. So it is
not the regime that is to blame, but the conditions in which we
live, the conditions that exist in our country, the conditions
governing the development of the Party itself.
If we were to allow groups in this situation, under these
complex conditions, we would ruin the Party, convert it from
the monolithic, united organisation that it is into a union of
groups and factions contracting with one another and entering
into temporary alliances and agreements. That would not be

a party. It would be the collapse of the Party. Never, for a
single moment, have the Bolsheviks conceived of the Party as
anything but a monolithic organisation, hewed from a single
block, possessing a single will and in its work uniting all shades
Shade
of thought into a single current of practical activities.
But what Trotsky suggests is profoundly erroneous; it runs
counter to Bolshevik organisational principles, and would
inevitably lead to the disintegration of the Party, making it
lax and soft, converting it from a united party into a federation
of groups. Living as we do in a situation of capitalist encir
clement, we need not only a united party, not only a solid
party, but a veritable party of steel, one capable of withstand
ing the assault of the enemies of the proletariat, capable of
leading the workers to the final battle.
What are the conclusions?
The first conclusion is that we have produced a concrete,

clear-cut resolution summing up the present discussion. We
have declared: groups and factions cannot be tolerated, the
Party must be united, monolithic, the Party must not be put
in opposition to the apparatus, there must be no idle talk of
our cadres being in danger of degeneration, for they are rev
olutionary cadres, there must be no searching for cleavages
between these revolutionary cadres and the youth, which is
marching in step with these cadres and will continue to do so
cop with AFCON to dete
in future.
There are also certain positive conclusions. The first and

fundamental one is that henceforth the Party must resolutely
orientate itself on, and take as its criterion, the proletarian sec
tion of our Party, that it must narrow and reduce, or eliminate
altogether, the possibility of entry of non-proletarian elements,
and open the doors wider to proletarian elements. In iquợng
As for groups and factions, I believe that the time has come
when we must make public the clause in the unity resolution
which on Comrade Lenin's proposal was adopted by the Tenth
Congress of our Party and was not intended for publication.
Party members have forgotten about this clause. I am afraid
not everyone remembers it. This clause, which has hitherto
remained secret, should now be published and incorporated
in the resolution which we shall adopt on the results of the
discussion. With your permission I shall read it. Here is what
it says:
in s
"In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet
work and to secure the maximum unanimity, doing away with all faction
alism, the congress authorises the Central Committee, in case (cases) of
breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply
all Party penaltics, up to and including expulsion from the Party and,
in regard to members of the Central Committee, to reduce them to the
status of candidate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel
them from the Party. A condition for the application of such an extreme
measure (to members and candidate members of the C.C. and members of
the Control Commission) must be the convocation of a plenum of the
Central Committee, to which all candidate members of the Central Com
mittee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If
such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party,

by a two-thirds majority, considers it necessary to reduce a member of the
Central Committee to the status of a candidate member, or to expel him
from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately."1
I think that we must incorporate this clause in the resolution

on the results of the discussion, and make it public.
Lastly, a question which the opposition keeps raising and to
which, apparently, they do not always receive a satisfactory
reply. The opposition often asks: Whose sentiments do we, the
opposition, express? I believe that the opposition expresses the
sentiments of the non-proletarian section of our Party. I
believe that the opposition, perhaps unconsciously and invol
untarily, serves as the unwitting vehicle of the sentiments of

the non-proletarian elements in our Party. I believe that the
opposition, in its unrestrained agitation for democracy, which
it so often makes into an absolute and a fetish, is unleashing
petty-bourgeois elemental forces.
Are you acquainted with the sentiments of such comrades
as the students Martynov, Kazaryan and the rest? Have you
read Khodorovsky's article in Pravda which cites passages
from the speeches of these comrades? Here, for instance, is a
speech by Martynov (he is a Party member, it appears): "It is
our business to make decisions, and the business of the C.C.
to carry them out and to indulge less in argument." This refers

to a Party unit in a college of the People's Commissariat of
Transport. But, comrades, the Party has a total of at least
50,000 units and if each of them is going to regard the C.C.
in this way, holding that it is the business of the units to decide,
and of the C.C. not to argue, I am afraid that we shall never
arrive at any decision. Whence comes this sentiment of the
Martynovs? What is there proletarian about it? And the
Martynovs, mind you, support the opposition. Is there any
difference between Martynov and Trotsky? Only in the fact
that Trotsky launched the attack on the Party apparatus, while
Martynov is driving that attack home.
And here is another college student, Kazaryan, who, it
appears, is also a Party member. "What have we got," he
demands, "a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of
the Communist Party over the proletariat?" This, comrades,
comes not from the Menshevik Martov but from the "Com
munist" Kazaryan. The difference between Trotsky and
Kazaryan is that according to Trotsky our cadres are degener
ating, but according to Kazaryan they should be driven out,
for in his opinion they have saddled themselves on the

proletariat.
I ask: Whose sentiments do the Martynovs and Kazaryans
express? Proletarian sentiments? Certainly not. Whose then?
The sentiments of the non-proletarian elements in the Party
and in the country. And is it an accident that these exponents
of non-proletarian sentiments vote for the opposition? No,
it is no accident. (Applause.)
II. REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION
January 18
I said in my report that I did not wish to touch on the history

of the question because that would introduce an element of
squabbling, as I put it, and mutual recrimination. But since
Preobrazhensky wishes it, since he insists, I am prepared to
comply and say a few words on the history of the question of
inner-Party democracy. datud latex
How did the question of inner-Party democracy arise in the
C.C.? It came up for the first time at the C.C. plenum in
September, in connection with the conflicts that had developed
in the factories and the fact, then brought out by us, that certain
Party and trade-union organisations had become isolated from
he masses. The C.C. took the view that this was a serious
matter, that shortcomings had accumulated in the Party and

that a special authoritative commission ought to be set up to
look into the matter, study the facts and submit concrete pro
posals on how to improve the situation in the Party. The same
thing applies to the marketing crisis, the price "scissors." The
opposition took no part at all in raising those questions or in
electing the commissions on the inner-Party situation and on

the "scissors" problem. Where was the opposition at the time?
If I am not mistaken, Preobrazhensky was then in the Crimea
and Sapronov in Kislovodsk. Trotsky, then in Kislovodsk,
was finishing his articles on art and was about to return to
Moscow. They had not yet returned when the Central Com
mittee raised this question at its meeting. They came back to
find a ready decision and did not intervene with a single word,
nor did they raise a single objection to the C.C. plan. The
situation in the Party was the subject of a report read by
Comrade Dzerzhinsky at a conference of Gubernia Committee
secretaries in September. I affirm that neither at the September
plenum, nor at the secretaries' conference, did the present
members of the opposition so much as hint by a single word
at a "severe economic crisis," or a "crisis in the Party," or the
"democracy" issue.
So you see that the questions of democracy and of the
"scissors" were raised by the Central Committee itself; the
initiative was entirely in the hands of the C.C., while the
members of the opposition remained silent - they were
absent. ph Lift wrofi
That, so to speak, was Act I, the initial stage in the history
of the issue. int
Act II began with the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. in

October. The opposition, headed by Trotsky, seeing that the
question of shortcomings in the Party was in the air, that the
C.C. had already taken the matter in hand and had formed
commissions, and lest God forbid - the initiative would
remain with the C.C., tried, took as its aim, to wrest the initia
tive from the C.C. and get astride the hobby-horse of
democracy. As you know, it is a spry sort of horse and could
be used in an attempt to outride the C.C. And so there ap
peared the documents on which Preobrazhensky spoke here

at such length the document of the 46¹2 and Trotsky's letter.
-
That same Trotsky, who in September, a few days before his

factional pronouncement, had been silent at the plenum, at
any rate had not objected to the C.C. decisions, two weeks
later suddenly discovered that the country and the Party were
going to rack and ruin and that he, Trotsky, this patriarch of
bureaucrats, could not live without democracy.
It was rather amusing for us to hear Trotsky hold forth on
the subject of democracy, the same Trotsky who at the Tenth
Party Congress had demanded that the trade unions be shaken
up from above. But we knew that no great difference sep
arates the Trotsky of the Tenth Congress period from the
Trotsky of today, for now, as then, he advocates shaking up
the Leninist cadres. The only difference is that at the Tenth
Congress he wanted to shake up the Leninist cadres from the
top, in the sphere of the trade unions, whereas now he wants
to shake up the same Leninist cadres from the bottom, in the
sphere of the Party. He needs democracy as a hobby-horse, as
a strategic manoeuvre. That's what all the clamour is about.
For, if the opposition really wanted to help matters, to
approach the issue in a business-like and comradely way, it
should have submitted its statement first of all to the com
missions set up by the September plenum, and should have said

something like this: "We consider your work unsatisfactory;
we demand a report on its results to the Political Bureau, we
demand a plenum of the C.C., to which we have new proposals
of ours to present," etc. And if the commissions had refused
to give them a hearing, or if the Political Bureau had refused
to hear their case, if it had ignored the opinion of the opposi
tion, or refused to call a plenum to examine Trotsky's proposals
and the opposition proposals generally, then and only then
- would the opposition have been fully justified in coming

out openly, over the head of the C.C., with an appeal to the
Party membership and in saying to the Party: "The country is
facing disaster; economic crisis is developing; the Party is on
the road to ruin. We asked the C.C. commissions to go into
these questions, but they refused to give us a hearing, we tried
to lay the matter before the Political Bureau, but nothing came
of that either. We are now forced to appeal to the Party, in
order that the Party itself may take things in hand." I do not
doubt that the response of the Party would have been: "Yes,
these are practical revolutionaries, for they place the essence
of the matter above the form."
But did the opposition act like that? Did it attempt, even
once, to approach the C.C. commissions with its proposals?
Did it ever think of, did it make any attempt at, raising and
settling the issues within the C.C. or the organs of the C.C.?
No, the opposition made no such attempt. Evidently, its pur
pose was not to improve the inner-Party situation, or to help
the Party to improve the economic situation, but to anticipate
the work of the commissions and plenum of the C.C., to wrest
the initiative from the C.C., get astride the hobby-horse of
democracy and, while there was still time, raise a hue and cry
in an attempt to undermine confidence in the C.C. Clearly,
the opposition was in a hurry to concoct "documents" against
the C.C., in the shape of Trotsky's letter and the statement of
the 46, so that it could circulate them among the Sverdlov
University students and to the districts and assert that it, the
opposition, was for democracy and for improving the economic
situation, while the C.C. was hindering, that assistance was
needed against the C.C., and so on.
Such are the facts.
I demand that Preobrazhensky refute these statements of

mine. I demand that he refute them, in the press at least. Let
Preobrazhensky try to refute the fact that the commissions
were set up in September by the C.C. plenum without the
opposition, before the opposition took up the issue. Let Pre
obrazhensky try to refute the fact that neither Trotsky nor the
other oppositionists attempted to present their proposals to
the commissions. Let Preobrazhensky try to refute the fact
that the opposition knew of the existence of these commissions,
ignored their work and made no effort to settle the matter
within the C.C.
That is why, when Preobrazhensky and Trotsky declared at

the October plenum that they wanted to save the Party through
democracy, but that the C.C. was blind and saw nothing, the
C.C. laughed at them and replied: No, comrades, we, the C.C.,
are wholeheartedly for democracy, but we do not believe in
your democracy, because we feel that your "democracy" is
simply a strategic move against the C.C. motivated by your
factionalism.
What did the C.C. and C.C.C. plenums decide at the time
on inner-Party democracy? This is what they decided:
"The plenums fully endorse the Political Bureau's timely course of
promoting inner-Party democracy and also its proposal to intensify the
struggle against extravagance and the corrupting influence of the NEP
on some elements in the Party.
"The plenums instruct the Political Bureau to do everything necessary
to expedite the work of the commissions appointed by the Political Bureau
and the September plenum: 1) the commission on the 'scissors,' 2) on
wages, 3) on the inner-Party situation.
"When the necessary measures on these questions have been worked
out, the Political Bureau must immediately begin to put them into effect
and report to the next plenum of the C.C."
In one of his letters to the C.C. Trotsky wrote that the

October plenum was the "supreme expression of the apparatus
bureaucratic line of policy." Is it not clear that this statement
of Trotsky's is a slander against the C.C.? Only a man who
has completely lost his head and is blinded by factionalism
can, after the adoption of the document I have just read, main
tain that the October plenum was the supreme expression of

bureaucracy.
And what did the C.C. and C.C.C. plenums decide at the
time on the "democratic" manoeuvres of Trotsky and the 46?
This is what they decided:
"The plenums of the C.C. and C.C.C., attended also by representatives

of ten Party organisations, regard Trotsky's pronouncement, made at the
present highly important moment for the world revolution and the Party,
as a grave political error, especially because his attack on the Political
Bureau has, objectively, assumed the character of a factional move which
threatens to strike a blow at Party unity and creates a crisis in the Party.
The plenums note with regret that, in order to raise the questions touched
on by him, Trotsky chose the method of appealing to individual Party
members, instead of the only permissible method, that of first submitting
-
these questions for discussion by the bodies of which Trotsky is a member.

"The method chosen by Trotsky served as the signal for the appearance
of a factional group (statement of the 46). W
"The plenums of the C.C. and C.C.C., and representatives of ten Party
organisations, resolutely condemn the statement of the 46 as a factional
and schismatic step; for that is its nature, whatever the intentions of those
who signed it. That statement threatens to subject the entire Party in the
coming months to an inner-Party struggle and thereby weaken the Party
at a supremely important moment for the destinies of the world
revolution."
As you see, comrades, these facts completely refute the

picture of the situation presented here by Preobrazhensky.
Act III, or the third stage, in the history of the issue was the
period following the October plenum. The October plenum
had voted to instruct the Political Bureau that it take every
measure to ensure harmony in its work. I must state here,

comrades, that in the period following the October plenum we
took every measure to work in harmony with Trotsky, although
I must say that this proved anything but an easy task. We had
two private conferences with Trotsky, went into all questions
of economic and Party matters and arrived at certain views
on which there were no disagreements. As I reported yester
day, a sub-commission of three was set up as a continuation
of these private conferences and of these efforts to ensure
harmony in the work of the Political Bureau. This sub
commission drew up the draft resolution which subsequently
became the C.C. and C.C.C. resolution on democracy.
That is how things stood.
It seemed to us that after the unanimous adoption of the
resolution there were no further grounds for controversy, no
grounds for an inner-Party struggle. And, indeed, this was so
until Trotsky's new pronouncement, his appeal to the districts.
But Trotsky's pronouncement on the day after the publication
of the C.C. resolution, undertaken independently of the C.C.
and over its head, upset everything, radically changed the
situation, and hurled the Party back into a fresh controversy
and a fresh struggle, more acute than before. It is said that the
C.C. should have forbidden the publication of Trotsky's
article. That is wrong, comrades. It would have been a highly
dangerous step for the C.C. to take. Try and prohibit an article
of Trotsky's, already made public in the Moscow districts!
The Central Committee could not take so rash a step.
That is the history of the issue.
It follows from what has been said that the opposition has
been concerned not so much with democracy as with using the
idea of democracy to undermine the C.C.; that in the case of
the opposition we are dealing not with people who want to
76 cm ON THE OPPOSITION
help the Party, but with a faction which has been stealthily
watching the C.C. in the hope that "it may slip up, or overlook
something, and then we'll pounce on it." For it is a faction
when one group of Party members tries to trap the central
agencies of the Party in order to exploit a crop failure, a
depreciation of the chervonets or any other difficulty con
fronting the Party, and then to attack the Party unexpectedly,
from ambush, and to hit it on the head. Yes, the C.C. was
right when in October it said to you, comrades of the opposi
tion, that democracy is one thing and intriguing against the
Party quite another; that democracy is one thing and exploiting
clamour about democracy against the Party majority quite
another.
That, Preobrazhensky, is the history of the issue, about

which I did not want to speak here, but which, nevertheless,
I have been obliged to recount in deference to your persistent
desire.
The opposition has made it a rule to extol Comrade Lenin

as the greatest of geniuses. I am afraid that this praise is
insincere and that behind it, too, is a crafty stratagem: the
clamour about Comrade Lenin's genius is meant to cover up
their departure from Lenin, and at the same time to emphasise
the weakness of his disciples. Certainly, it is not for us, Com
rade Lenin's disciples, to fail to appreciate that Comrade Lenin
is the greatest of geniuses, and that men of his calibre are born
once in many centuries. But permit me to ask you, Pre
obrazhensky, why did you differ with this greatest of geniuses
on the issue of the Brest Peace? Why did you abandon and
refuse to heed this greatest of geniuses at a difficult moment?
Where, in which camp, were you then?
And Sapronov, who now insincerely and hypocritically
lauds Comrade Lenin, that same Sapronov who had the im
pudence, at one congress, to call Comrade Lenin an "ignora

mus" and "oligarch"! Why did he not support the genius
Lenin, say at the Tenth Congress, and why, if he really thinks
that Comrade Lenin is the greatest of geniuses, has he in
variably appeared in the opposite camp at difficult moments?
Does Sapronov know that Comrade Lenin, in submitting to
the Tenth Congress the unity resolution, which calls for the
expulsion of factionalists from the Party, had in mind Sapronov
among others?
Or again: why was Preobrazhensky found to be in the camp
of the opponents of the great genius Lenin, not only at the
time of the Brest Peace, but subsequently too, in the period of
the trade-union discussion? Is all this accidental? Is there not
a definite logic in it? (Preobrazhensky: "I tried to use my own

brains.")
It is very praiseworthy, Preobrazhensky, that you should

have wanted to use your own brains. But just look at the
result: on the Brest issue you used your own brains, and came
a cropper; then in the trade-union discussion you again tried
to use your own brains, and again you came a cropper; and
now, I do not know whether you are using your own brains
or borrowing someone else's, but it appears that you have
come a cropper this time too. (Laughter.) Nevertheless, I think
that if Preobrazhensky were now to use his own brains more,
rather than Trotsky's - which resulted in the letter of October
8 he would be closer to us than to Trotsky.
-
Preobrazhensky has reproached the C.C., asserting that as

long as Ilyich stood at our head questions were solved in good
time, not belatedly, for Ilyich was able to discern new events
in the embryo, and give slogans that anticipated events;
whereas now, he claims, with Ilyich absent, the Central Com
mittee has begun to lag behind events. What does Preobrazhen
sky wish to imply? That Ilyich is superior to his disciples?

But does anyone doubt that? Does anyone doubt that, com
pared with his disciples, Ilyich stands out as a veritable
Goliath? If we are to speak of the Party's leader, not a press
publicised leader receiving a heap of congratulatory messages,
but its real leader, then there is only one Comrade Lenin.
-
That is precisely why it has been stressed time and again that
in the present circumstances, with Comrade Lenin temporarily
absent, we must keep to the line of collective leadership. As
for Comrade Lenin's disciples, we might point, for example, to
the events connected with the Curzon ultimatum,¹3 which were
a regular test, an examination, for them. The fact that we

emerged from our difficulties then without detriment to our
cause undoubtedly shows that Comrade Lenin's disciples had
already learned a thing or two from their teacher. wad
Preobrazhensky is wrong in asserting that our Party did not

lag behind events in previous years. He is wrong because this
assertion is untrue factually and incorrect theoretically. Several
examples can be cited. Take, for instance, the Brest Peace.
Were we not late in concluding it? And did it not require such
facts as the German offensive and the wholesale flight of our
soldiers to make us realise, at last, that we had to have peace?
14
The disintegration of the front, Hoffmann's offensive, his
approach to Petrograd, the pressure exerted on us by the peas
ants did it not take all these developments to make us realise
that the tempo of the world revolution was not as rapid as
we would have liked, that our army was not as strong as we
had thought, that the peasantry was not as patient as some of
us had thought, and that it wanted peace, and would
acc
achieve
it by force??
Or take the repeal of the surplus-appropriation system.
Were we not late in repealing the surplus-appropriation sys
tem? Did it not require such developments as Kronstadt and

Tambov¹5 to make us understand that it was no longer possible
to retain the conditions of War Communism? Did not Ilyich
himself admit that on this front we had sustained a more
serious defeat than any we had suffered at the Denikin or

Kolchak fronts?
Was it accidental that in all these instances the Party lagged

behind events and acted somewhat belatedly? No, it was not
accidental. There was a natural law at work here. Evidently,
in so far as it is a matter not of general theoretical predictions,
but of direct practical leadership, the ruling party, standing at
the helm and involved in the events of the day, cannot immedi
ately perceive and grasp processes taking place below the sur
face of life. It requires some impulse from outside and a defi
nite degree of development of the new processes for the Party
to perceive them and orientate its work accordingly. For that
very reason our Party lagged somewhat behind events in the
past, and will lag behind them in future too. But the point
here does not at all concern lagging behind, but understanding
the significance of events, the significance of new processes,
and then skilfully directing them in accordance with the general
trend of development. That is how the matter stands if we
approach things as Marxists and not as factionalists who go
about searching everywhere for culprits.
Preobrazhensky is indignant that representatives of the C.C.
speak of Trotsky's deviations from Leninism. He is indignant,
but has presented no arguments to the contrary and has made
no attempt at all to substantiate his indignation, forgetting that
indignation is no argument. Yes, it is true that Trotsky deviates
from Leninism on questions of organisation. That has been,
and still is, our contention. The articles in Pravda entitled
"Down with Factionalism," written by Bukharin, are entirely
devoted to Trotsky's deviations from Leninism. Why has not

Preobrazhensky challenged the basic ideas of these articles?
Why has he not tried to support his indignation by arguments,
or a semblance of arguments? I said yesterday, and I must
repeat it today, that such actions of Trotsky's as setting himself
up in opposition to the Central Committee; ignoring the will of
a number of organisations that are demanding a clear answer
from him; contrasting the Party to the Party apparatus, and
the young Party members to the Party cadres; his attempt to
orientate the Party on the student youth, and his proclamation
of freedom of groups - I say that these actions are incom
patible with the organisational principles of Leninism. Why
then has Preobrazhensky not tried to refute this statement of
mine?
It is said that Trotsky is being baited. Preobrazhensky and

Radek have spoken of this. Comrades, I must say that the
statements of these comrades about baiting are altogether at
variance with the facts. Let me recall two facts so that you may
be able to judge for yourselves. First, the incident which oc
curred at the September plenum of the C.C. when, in reply to
the remark by C.C. member Komarov that C.C. members
cannot refuse to carry out C.C. decisions, Trotsky jumped up
and left the meeting. You will recall that the C.C. plenum sent
a "delegation" to Trotsky with the request that he return to
the meeting. You will recall that Trotsky refused to comply
with this request of the plenum, thereby demonstrating that he
had not the slightest respect for his Central Committee.
There is also the other fact, that Trotsky definitely refuses
to work in the central Soviet bodies, in the Council of Labour
and Defence and the Council of People's Commissars, despite

the twice-adopted C.C. decision that he at last take up his
duties in the Soviet bodies. You know that Trotsky has not as
much as moved a finger to carry out this C.C. decision. But,

indeed, why should not Trotsky work in the Council of Labour
and Defence, or in the Council of People's Commissars? Why
should not Trotsky who is so fond of talking about planning
-
- why should he not have a look into our State Planning

Commission? Is it right and proper for a C.C. member to ignore
a decision of the C.C.? Do not all these facts show that the
talk about baiting is no more than idle gossip, and that if

anyone is to be blamed, it is Trotsky himself, for his behaviour
can only be regarded as mocking at the C.C.?
Preobrazhensky's arguments about democracy are entirely
wrong. This is how he puts the question: either we have
groups, and in that case there is democracy, or you prohibit
groups, and in that case there is no democracy. In his con
ception, freedom of groups and democracy are inseparably
bound up. That is not how we understand democracy. We
understand democracy to mean raising the activity and political
understanding of the mass of Party members; we understand it
to mean the systematic enlistment of the Party membership not
only in the discussion of questions, but also in the leadership
of the work. Freedom of groups, that is, freedom of factions -
they are one and the same thing - represents an evil which
-
threatens to splinter the Party and turn it into a discussion

club. You have exposed yourself, Preobrazhensky, by defend
ing freedom of factions. The mass of Party members under
stand democracy to mean creating conditions that will ensure
active participation of the Party members in the leadership of
our country, whereas a couple of oppositionist intellectuals
understand it to mean that the opposition must be given free
dom to form a faction. You stand exposed, Preobrazhensky.
And why are you so frightened by point seven, on Party
unity? What is there to be frightened about? Point seven
reads: "In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party

and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity,
doing away with all factionalism. . . ." But are you against
"strict discipline within the Party and in Soviet work"? Com
rades of the opposition, are you against all this? Well, I did
not know, comrades, that you were opposed to this. Are you,
Sapronov and Preobrazhensky, opposed to securing maximum
unanimity and "doing away with factionalism"? Tell us frank
ly, and perhaps we shall introduce an amendment or two.
(Laughter.)
Further: "The congress authorises the Central Committee, in
case of breach of Party discipline or of a revival of factionalism,
to apply Party penalties. . . Are you afraid of this too?
Can it be that you, Preobrazhensky, Radek, Sapronov, are
thinking of violating Party discipline, of reviving factional
ism? Well, if that is not your intention, then what are you
afraid of? Your panic shows you up, comrades. Evidently, if
you are afraid of point seven of the unity resolution, you must
be for factionalism, for violating discipline, and against unity.
Otherwise, why all the panic? If your conscience is clear, if
you are for unity and against factionalism and violation of
discipline, then is it not clear that the punishing hand of the
Party will not touch you? What is there to fear then? (Voice:
"But why do you include the point, if there is nothing to
fear?")
To remind you. (Laughter, applause. Preobrazhensky: "You
are intimidating the Party.")
We are intimidating the factionalists, not the Party. Do
you really think, Preobrazhensky, that the Party and the fac
tionalists are identical? Apparently it is a case of the cap
fitting. (Laughter.) is d
Further: "And, in regard to members of the Central Com

mittee, to reduce them to the status of candidate members and
even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party.

A condition for the application of such an extreme measure to
members and candidate members of the C.C. and members of
the Central Control Commission must be the convocation of a

plenum of the Central Committee."
What is there terrible in that? If you are not factionalists,
if you are against freedom of groups, and if you are for unity,
then you, comrades of the opposition, should vote for point
seven of the Tenth Congress resolution, for it is directed solely
against factionalists, solely against those who violate the
Party's unity, its strength and discipline. Is that not clear?
I now pass to Radek. There are people who can master
and manage their tongues; these are ordinary people. There
are also people who are slaves of their tongues; their tongues
manage them. These are peculiar people. And it is to this
category of peculiar people that Radek belongs. A man who
has a tongue he cannot manage and who is the slave of his
own tongue, can never know what and when his tongue is
liable to blurt out. If you had been able to hear Radek's
speeches at various meetings, you would have been astonished
by what he said today. At one discussion meeting Radek
asserted that the question of inner-Party democracy was a triv
ial one, that actually he, Radek, was against democracy, that,
at bottom the issue now was not one of democracy, but of what
the C.C. intended to do with Trotsky. At another discussion
meeting this same Radek declared that democracy within the
Party was not a serious matter, but that democracy within the
C.C. was a matter of the utmost importance, for in his opinion
a Directory had been set up inside the C.C. And today this
same Radek tells us in all innocence that inner-Party democracy
is as indispensable as air and water, for without democracy,

it appears, leadership of the Party is impossible. Which of
these three Radeks are we to believe the first, second or
-
third? And what guarantee is there that Radek, or rather his

tongue, will not in the immediate future make new unexpected
statements that refute all his previous ones? Can one rely on
a man like Radek? Can one, after all this, attach any value to
Radek's statement, for instance, about Boguslavsky and Anto
nov being removed from certain posts out of "factional
considerations"?
I have already spoken, comrades, about Boguslavsky. . . .

As for Antonov-Ovseyenko, permit me to report the following.
Antonov was removed from the Political Department of the
Red Army by decision of the Organising Bureau of the Cen
tral Committee, a decision confirmed by a plenum of the
Central Committee. He was removed, first of all, for having
issued a circular about a conference of Party units in military
colleges and the air fleet, with the international situation,
Party affairs, etc., as items on the agenda, without the knowl
edge and agreement of the C.C., although Antonov knew that
the status of the Political Department of the Red Army is that
of a department of the C.C. He was removed from the Political
Department, in addition, for having sent to all Party units of
the army a circular concerning the forms in which inner-Party
democracy was to be applied, doing so against the will of the
C.C. and in spite of its warning that the circular must be co
ordinated with the plans of the C.C. He was removed, lastly,
for having sent to the C.C. and C.C.C. a letter, altogether in
decent in tone and absolutely impermissible in content, threat
ening the C.C. and C.C.C. that the "overweening leaders"
would be called to account.
Comrades, oppositionists can and should be allowed to hold

posts. Heads of C.C. departments can and should be allowed
to criticise the Central Committee's activities. But we cannot
allow the head of the Political Department of the Red Army,

which has the status of a department of the C.C., systematically
to refuse to establish working contact with his Central Com
mittee. We cannot allow a responsible official to trample
underfoot the elementary rules of decency. Such a comrade
cannot be entrusted with the education of the Red Army.
That is how matters stand with Antonov.
Finally, I must say a few words on the subject of whose are

the sentiments that are expressed in the pronouncements of the
comrades of the opposition. I must return to the "incident" of
Comrades Kazaryan and Martynov, students at the People's
Commissariat of Transport college. This "incident" is evidence
that all is not well among a certain section of our students,
that what they had of the Party spirit in them has already
become rotten, that intrinsically they have already broken
with the Party and precisely for that reason willingly vote for
the opposition. You will forgive me, comrades, but such peo
ple, rotten through and through from the Party standpoint,
are not to be found, and could not possibly be found, among
those who voted for the C.C. resolution. There are no such
people on our side, comrades. There are none in our ranks

who would ask: "What have we got, a dictatorship of the
proletariat or a dictatorship of the Communist Party over the
proletariat?" That is a phrase of Martov and Dan; it is a
phrase of the Socialist-Revolutionary Dni,16 and if among
you, in your ranks, there are those who take this line, then what
is your position worth, comrades of the opposition? Or there
is, for instance, the other comrade, Comrade Martynov, who
thinks that the C.C. should keep quiet while the Party units
decide. He says in effect: You, the C.C., can carry out what
we, the units, decide. But we have 50,000 Party units, and if
they are going to decide, say, the question of the Curzon
ultimatum, then we shall not arrive at a decision in two years.
That is indeed anarcho-Menshevism of the first water. These
people have lost their heads; from the Party standpoint they
are rotten through and through, and if you have them in your
faction, then I ask you, what is this faction of yours worth?
(Voice: "Are they Party members?")
Yes, unfortunately they are, but I am prepared to take every
measure to ensure that such people cease to be members of
our Party. (Applause.) I have said that the opposition voices
the sentiments and aspirations of the non-proletarian elements
in the Party and outside it. Without being conscious of it, the
opposition is unleashing petty-bourgeois elemental forces. Its
factional activities bring grist to the mill of the enemies of our
Party, to the mill of those who want to weaken, to overthrow
the dictatorship of the proletariat. I said this yesterday and
I re-affirm it today.
But perhaps you would like to hear other, fresh witnesses?
I can give you that pleasure. Let me cite, for instance, the
evidence of S. Ivanovich, a name you have all heard. Who is
this S. Ivanovich? He is a Menshevik, a former Party member,
of the days when we and the Mensheviks comprised a single
party. Later on he disagreed with the Menshevik C.C. and
became a Right-wing Menshevik. The Right-wing Mensheviks
are a group of Menshevik interventionists, and their immedi
ate object is to overthrow Soviet power, even if with the aid
of foreign bayonets. Their organ is Zarya¹7 and its editor is
S. Ivanovich. How does he regard our opposition, this Right
wing Menshevik? What sort of testimonial has he given it?
tof testimonial has he given it?
Listen to this: blood
d
"Let us be thankful to the opposition for having so luridly depicted

that horrifying moral cesspool that goes by the name of the R.C.P. Let us
be thankful to it for having dealt a serious blow, morally and organisa
tionally, to the R.C.P. Let us be thankful to it for its activities, because
they help all those who regard the overthrow of Soviet power as the
task of the Socialist parties."
There you have your testimonial, comrades of the

opposition!
In conclusion, I would like nevertheless to wish the comrades
of the opposition that this kiss of S. Ivanovich will not stick

3 kiss ofS.
to them too closely. (Prolonged applause.)
Thirteenth Conference of the Russian

Communist Party (Bolsheviks),
Bulletin, Moscow, 1924
PAUDAINI HAT
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88
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THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS to

OF THE R.C.P.(B.)18
May 23-31, 1924
REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION
May 27
Comrades, I found no objections in any of the speeches to

the Central Committee's organisational report. I take this to
mean that the congress agrees with the conclusions of that re
Menburied
port. (Applause.)
In my report, I deliberately refrained from discussing our
inner-Party disagreements. I did not touch on them because
I did not wish to re-open wounds which, so it seemed, had
healed. But since Trotsky and Preobrazhensky have touched
on these questions, making a number of inaccurate statements
and throwing down a challenge - it would not be right to be
silent. In this situation silence would not be understood.
Comrade Krupskaya has objected here to repetition of the

debate on our disagreements. I am absolutely opposed to such
repetition and that is precisely why I did not touch on the
88
THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P. (B.) 89
disagreements in my report. But since the comrades of the

opposition have brought up the subject and have thrown down
a challenge, we have no right to be silent.
In speaking of our disagreements, both Trotsky and
Preobrazhensky try to focus the attention of the congress on
one resolution, that of December 5. They forget that there is
another resolution as well, on the results of the discussion.1⁹
They forget that there has been a Party conference and that
the Central Committee's December 5 resolution was followed
by a new wave of discussion, the results of which were
appraised in a special resolution of the Thirteenth Conference.
They forget that hushing up the Thirteenth Conference cannot
but have its repercussions for the opposition.
I draw the attention of the congress to the fact that the
conference adopted one resolution on economic policy and two
on Party affairs. Why? There was one resolution, endorsed
by the entire Party and adopted by the Central Committee on
December 5, and then it was found necessary to adopt a second
resolution on the same question, on the petty-bourgeois de
viation. Why this affliction? What is the explanation? The
explanation is that the whole discussion went through two
periods. The first concluded with the unanimously adopted res
olution of December 5, and the second with the resolution on
the petty-bourgeois deviation. At that time, i.e., in the first
period, we believed that the December 5 resolution would
probably put an end to the controversy in the Party, and that
was why last time, in my report at the Thirteenth Conference,
when dealing with this period, I said that, if the opposition
had so wished, the December 5 resolution could have terminat
ed the struggle within the Party. That was what I said, and
that was what we all believed. But the point is that the discus
sion was not brought to a close with that period. After the
December 5 resolution Trotsky's letters appeared - a new

platform which raised new issues; and this ushered in a fresh
wave of discussion, more violent than the preceding one. It
was this that destroyed the opportunity of establishing peace
in the Party. This was the second period, which the opposition
ists now try to hush up and by-pass. 200
The point is that there is a vast difference between the dis

cussion in the second period and that in the first, where the
discussion found its reflection in the December 5 resolution.
That resolution did not raise the question of a degeneration of
the cadres. Trotsky, with whom we jointly framed that res
olution, did not so much as hint at a degeneration of the
cadres. Evidently, he was saving this additional issue for his
later pronouncements. Further, the December 5 resolution does
not raise the question of the student youth being the truest
barometer. This question, too, Trotsky was apparently keep
ing in reserve for fresh discussion pronouncements. In the
December 5 resolution there is nothing of the tendency to
attack the apparatus, nor of the demands for punitive meas
ures against the Party apparatus, about which Trotsky spoke at
such length in his subsequent letters. Lastly, in the December 5
resolution there is not even a hint about groups being neces
sary, although this question, the question of groups, is one on
which Trotsky spoke at great length in his subsequent letters.
There you have the immense difference between the stand
taken by the opposition prior to December 5 and the stand
its leaders took after December 5. van Hit Siva all
Now Trotsky and Preobrazhensky try to hush up and hide
their second platform, the one that figured in the second period
of the discussion, in the belief, evidently, that they can outwit
the Party. No, you will not succeed! You cannot deceive the
congress with your none-too-clever stratagems and diplomacy.
I do not doubt that the congress will state its opinion both on
the first stage of the discussion, summed up in the December 5
resolution, and on the second stage, summed up in the confer
ence resolution on the petty-bourgeois deviation.
These two resolutions are two parts of a single whole - the
discussion. And whoever thinks he can deceive the congress
by confusing these two parts is mistaken. The Party has
matured; its political understanding is at a higher level, and it
is not to be tricked by diplomacy. This the opposition fails to
understand, and that is the sum and substance of its mistake.
Let us examine who has proved right on the issues raised
in the opposition platform after December 5. Who has proved
right on the four new issues brought up in Trotsky's letters?
First issue degeneration of the cadres. We have all de
manded and continue to demand that facts be adduced to
prove that the cadres are degenerating. But no facts have

been produced, nor could they be, because no such facts exist.
And when we looked into the matter properly we all found
that there was no degeneration, but that there was undoubtedly
a deviation towards petty-bourgeois policy on the part of cer
tain opposition leaders. Who, then, has proved to be right?
Not the opposition, it would seem.
Second issue the student youth which, supposedly, is the
truest barometer. Who has proved right on this point? Again,
it would seem, not the opposition. If we look at the growth
of our Party in this period, at the admission of 200,000 new
members, it follows that the barometer must be sought not
among the student youth, but in the ranks of the proletariat,
and that the Party must orientate itself not on the student
youth, but on the proletarian core of the Party. Two hundred
thousand new members - that is the barometer.
-
Here, too,
the opposition has proved wrong.
92 GTR ON THE OPPOSITION
Third issue- punitive measures against the apparatus,

attack on the Party apparatus. Who has proved right? Again,
not the opposition. It furled its flag of attack on the apparatus
and passed to the defensive. All of you here have seen how
it tried to wriggle out, how it beat a disorderly retreat in the
fight against the Party apparatus.
Fourth issue. factions and groups. Trotsky has announced
-
that he is resolutely opposed to groups. That is all well and

good. But if we must go into the history of the issue, then
allow me to re-establish certain facts. In December a sub
commission of the Party Central Committee framed the resolu

tion published on December 5. This sub-commission consisted
of three members: Trotsky, Kamenev, Stalin. Have you noticed
that there is no mention of groups in the December 5 resolu
tion? It deals with the prohibition of factions but says nothing
about prohibiting groups. There is only a reference to the
well-known Tenth Congress resolution on Party unity. How
is this to be explained? Was it an accident? No, it was not.
Kamenev and I firmly insisted on the prohibition of groups.
Trotsky protested against their prohibition, and his protest
was tantamount to an ultimatum, for he declared that in such
a case he could not vote for the resolution. And so we confined
ourselves to a reference to the Tenth Congress resolution,
which Trotsky, apparently, had not read at the time, and which
provides not only for the prohibition of factions, but for the
prohibition of groups as well. (Laughter, applause.) At that
time Trotsky was in favour of freedom of groups. At this
congress he has praised the December 5 resolution. But in his
letter to the R.C.P.(B.) Central Committee of December 9,
that is four days after the adoption of the resolution on Party
affairs, Trotsky wrote: "I am especially alarmed by the purely
formal attitude of the Political Bureau members on the ques
tion of groups and factional formations." What do you think

of that? Here is a man who extols the resolution but who, it
turns out, is especially alarmed in his soul by the Political
Bureau's attitude on the question of groups and factions. This
does not seem to indicate that he was then in favour of pro
hibiting groups. No, Trotsky at that time was in favour of the
formation and freedom of groups.
Further, who does not remember the resolution Preob
razhensky submitted in Moscow, demanding that the ques

tion of factions, which had been decided by the Tenth Party
Congress, be given a more precise formulation in the sense of
removing some of the restrictions? Here in Moscow, everyone
remembers this. And is there anyone of you who does not
remember the newspaper articles in which Preobrazhensky
demanded that we revive the order of things which existed in
the Party at the time of the Brest Peace? Yet we know that in
the Brest period the Party was compelled to permit the exist
ence of factions -
as we all know very well. And who does not

remember that at the Thirteenth Conference, when I proposed
the simplest thing - to remind the Party membership of point
-
seven of the resolution on unity, on the prohibition of groups

who does not remember how all the oppositionists raged, in
sisting that this point should not be introduced? Consequently,
on this issue the opposition's attitude has been wholly and
entirely one of freedom for groups. It thought that it could lull
the vigilance of the Party by declaring that it was demanding
freedom not for factions, but for groups. If today we are told
that the opposition is against groups, that is all well and good.
But this certainly cannot be called an offensive on their part:
it is a disorderly retreat, it is a sign that the Central Committee
was right on this issue too.
After this review of the facts, permit me, comrades, to say

a few words on certain fundamental mistakes made by Trotsky
and Preobrazhensky in their utterances on questions of Party
organisation.
Trotsky has said that the essence of democracy can be re
duced to the question of generations. That is wrong, wrong in
principle. The essence of democracy can by no means be re
duced to that. The question of generations is a secondary one.
The life of our Party, and figures relating to it, show that the
younger generation of the Party is being drawn step by step
into the cadres the cadres are being extended from the ranks
of the youth. That always has been, and will continue to be, the
Party's line. Only those who regard our cadres as a closed
entity, as a privileged caste which does not admit new mem
bers to its ranks; only those who regard our cadres as a sort of
officer corps of the old regime which looks down on all other
Party members as "beneath its dignity," only those who want
to drive a wedge between the cadres and the younger Party
members only they can make the question of generations in
-
the Party the pivotal question of democracy. The essence of

democracy lies not in the question of generations, but in the
question of independent activity, of members of the Party
taking an active part in its leadership. It is in this way, and in
this way alone, that the question of democracy can be present
ed if, of course, we are discussing not a party with formal
democracy, but a genuinely proletarian party linked by
indissoluble bonds with the mass of the working class.
The second question. The greatest danger, Trotsky says, is
bureaucratisation of the Party apparatus. This too is wrong.
The danger resides not in this, but in the possibility of the
Party's actual isolation from the non-Party masses. You can
have a party with a democratically constructed apparatus, but
if the Party is not linked with the working class this democracy
will be worthless, it won't be worth a brass farthing. The Party
exists for the class. So long as it is linked with the class,
maintains contact with it, enjoys prestige and respect among
the non-Party masses, it can exist and develop even if it has
bureaucratic shortcomings. But in the absence of all this the
Party is doomed, no matter what kind of Party organisation
you build bureaucratic or democratic. The Party is part of
the class; it exists for the class, not for itself.
The third contention, also erroneous in principle: the Party,

Trotsky says, makes no mistakes. That is wrong. The Party
not infrequently makes mistakes. Ilyich taught us to teach the
Party, on the basis of its own mistakes, how to exercise correct
leadership. If the Party made no mistakes there would be
nothing from which to teach it. It is our task to detect these
mistakes, to lay bare their roots and to show the Party and the
working class how we came to make them and how we should
avoid repeating them in future. The development of the Party
would be impossible without this. The development of Party
leaders and cadres would be impossible without this, for they
are developed and trained in the struggle to combat and over
come their mistakes. It seems to me that this statement of
Trotsky's is a kind of compliment, accompanied by an attempt

an unsuccessful one it is true to jeer at the Party.
-
Next about Preobrazhensky. He spoke of the purge.

Preobrazhensky feels that the purge is a weapon used by the
Party majority against the opposition. Evidently he does not
approve of the methods employed in the purge. This is a ques
tion of principle. Preobrazhensky's profound mistake is his
failure to understand that the Party cannot strengthen its ranks
without periodical purges of unstable elements. Comrade
Lenin taught us that the Party can strengthen itself only if it
steadily rids itself of the unstable elements which penetrate,

and will continue to penetrate, its ranks. We would be going
against Leninism if we were to repudiate Party purges in gen
eral. As for the present purge, what is wrong with it? It is
said that individual mistakes have been made. Certainly they
have. But has there ever been a big undertaking that was free
from individual mistakes? Never. Individual mistakes may
and will occur; but in the main the purge is correct. I have
been told with what fear and trepidation some non-proletarian
elements among the intellectuals and office employees awaited
the purge. Here is a scene that was described to me: a group
of people are sitting in an office, waiting to be called before
the purging commission. It is a Party unit in a Soviet institu
tion. In another room is the purging commission. One of the
members of the Party unit comes rushing out of the commission
room, perspiring. He is asked what happened, but all he can
say is: "Let me get my breath, let me get my breath. I'm all
in." (Laughter.) The purge may be bad for the kind of people
who suffer and perspire like that; but for the Party it is a very
good thing. (Applause.) We still have, unfortunately, a cer
tain number of Party members receiving 1,000 or 2,000 rubles
a month, who are considered to be Party members but who
forget that the Party exists. I know of a Party unit at one of
the Commissariats, in which men of this type work. The mem
bers of this unit include several chauffeurs, and the unit select
ed one of them to sit on the purging commission. This evoked

no little grumbling, such as saying that a chauffeur should not
be allowed to purge Soviet big-wigs. There have been cases
like that here in Moscow. Party members who have evidently
lost contact with the Party are indignant, they cannot stomach
the fact that "some chauffeur" will put them through the purge.
Such Party members must be educated and re-educated, some
THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 97
times by expulsion from the Party. The chief thing about the
purge is that it makes people of this kind feel that there exists
a master, that there is the Party, which can call them to account
for all sins committed against it. It seems to me absolutely
necessary that this master go through the Party ranks with a
broom every now and again. (Applause.)
Preobrazhensky says: Your policy is correct, but your organ
isational line is wrong, and therein lies the basis of the possi
ble ruin of the Party. That is nonsense, comrades. That a party
with a correct policy should perish because of shortcomings in
its organisational line is something that does not happen. It
never works out that way. The foundation of Party life and
Party work resides not in the organisational forms it adopts or
may adopt at any given moment, but in its policy, in its home
and foreign policy. If the Party's policy is correct, if it has a
correct approach to the political and economic issues that are
of decisive significance for the working class - then organisa
tional defects cannot be of decisive significance; its policy
will pull it through. That has always been the case, and will
continue to be so in the future. People who fail to understand
this are bad Marxists; they forget the very rudiments of
Marxism.
Was the Party right on the issues involved in the discussion

on the economic questions and on the questions of Party
affairs? Anyone who wants to obtain an immediate, concise
answer to that should turn to the Party and the mass of the
workers and put the question: how does the mass of non-Party
workers regard the Party? Is it sympathetic or unsympathetic?
If the members of the opposition were to put the question that
way, if they were to ask themselves: how does the working
class regard the Party is it sympathetic or unsympathetic?
they would realise that the Party is on the correct path. The
Lenin Enrolment is the key to an understanding of everything

involved in the results of the discussion. If the working class
sends 200,000 of its members into the Party, selecting the
most upright and staunch, this signifies that such a party is
invincible because it has, in fact, become the elected organ of
the working class, one that enjoys the undivided confidence
of the working class. Such a party will live and strike fear into
its enemies; such a party cannot disintegrate. The trouble
with our opposition is that it did not approach Party problems
and the results of the discussion from the standpoint of the
Marxist, who appraises the weight of the Party in the light of
its influence among the masses for the Party exists for the
-
masses, and not vice versa but approached them from the
formal standpoint, from the standpoint of "pure" apparatus.
To find a simple and direct clue to understanding the results
of the discussion one must turn not to this babbling about the
apparatus, but to the 200,000 who have joined the Party and
who have demonstrated its profound democracy. References
to democracy in the speeches of the oppositionists are just
empty talk. But when the working class sends 200,000 new
members into the Party, that is real democracy. Our Party
has become the elected organ of the working class. Point me
out another such party. You cannot point one out because so
far there does not exist one. But, strange as it may seem, even
such a powerful party as ours is not to the liking of the opposi
tionists. Where on this earth will they fin a etter one? I am
afraid they will have to migrate to Mars in their search for a
better party. (Applause.)
The last question that of the opposition's petty-bourgeois
deviation; the assertion that the charge of a petty-bourgeois
deviation is unjust. Is that true? No, it is not. How did the
charge arise, what is the foundation for it? It is founded on the
fact that in their unbridled agitation for democracy in the Party

the oppositionists have unwittingly, without so desiring, served
as a sort of mouthpiece for that new bourgeoisie which does not
care a hang about democracy in our Party, but which would
like, and very much like, to obtain democracy for itself in the
country. The section of the Party which has raised such a
clamour over questions of democracy has unwittingly served
as a mouthpiece and vehicle for the agitation in the country
that emanates from the new bourgeoisie and aims at weaken
ing the dictatorship, at "broadening" the Soviet constitution
and at re-establishing political rights for the exploiters. That
is the mainspring and secret why members of the opposition,
who undoubtedly love the Party and so on and so forth, have
without themselves noticing it become a mouthpiece for ele
ments outside the Party, elements which seek to weaken and
disintegrate the dictatorship.
No wonder the sympathies of the Mensheviks and Socialist
Revolutionaries are with the opposition. Is that accidental? No,
it is not. The alignment of forces internationally is such that
every attempt to weaken the authority of our Party and the
stability of the dictatorship in our country will inevitably be
seized upon by the enemies of the revolution as a definite gain
for them, irrespective of whether such attempts are made by
our opposition or by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Men
sheviks. Whoever fails to understand this, fails to grasp the
logic of factional struggle within our Party, fails to realise that
the outcome of this struggle depends not on personalities and
desires, but on the results produced in the sum total of the
struggle between the Soviet and anti-Soviet elements. That is
the basis of the fact that in the opposition we are dealing with
a petty-bourgeois deviation.
Lenin once said about Party discipline and the unity of our
ranks: "Whoever weakens in the least the iron discipline of
the Party of the proletariat (especially during the time of its
dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against the prole
tariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 190).[¹] Is there any need to prove,
after this, that the comrades of the opposition, by their attacks
on the Moscow organisation and the Party's Central Com
mittee, have been weakening Party discipline and under
mining the foundations of the dictatorship, for the Party is
the basic core of the dictatorship?
That is why I think that the Thirteenth Conference was right
in declaring that we are dealing here with a deviation towards
petty-bourgeois policy. This is not as yet a petty-bourgeois
policy. By no means! At the Tenth Congress, Lenin explained
that a deviation is something as yet unconsummated, some
thing that has not assumed definite shape. And if you, comrades
of the opposition, do not persist in this petty-bourgeois devia
tion, in these small mistakes everything will be rectified
-
and the Party's activities will go forward. But if you do persist,

the petty-bourgeois deviation may develop into a petty
bourgeois policy. Consequently, it all depends on you, com
on you, com
rades of the opposition.
What are the conclusions? The conclusions are that we
must continue to conduct inner-Party work on the basis of

the complete unity of the Party. Look at this congress, at its
solid support of the Central Committee line - there you have
Party unity. The opposition represents an insignificant minor
ity in our Party. That our Party is united, that it will continue
to be united, is demonstrated by the present congress, by its
Hot
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. V. "Left
Wing" Communism in Germany: Leaders -Party Class Masses.
(1920)
[...].
unanimity and solidity. Whether we will have unity with that
insignificant group in the Party known as the opposition, de
pends on them. We want to work in harmony with the opposi
tion. Last year, at the height of the discussion, we said that
joint work with the opposition was necessary. We re-affirm
this here today. But whether this unity will be achieved, I do
not know, for in future unity will depend entirely on the op
position. In the present instance unity comes as the result of
the interaction of two factors, the Party majority and minority.
The majority wants united activity. Whether the minority
sincerely wants it, I do not know. That depends entirely on the
comrades of the opposition.
Conclusion. The conclusion is that we must endorse the
Thirteenth Conference resolutions and approve the activity of

the Central Committee. I do not doubt that the congress will
endorse these resolutions and approve the political and or
ganisational activity of the Central Committee. (Prolonged
applause.)
Pravda, Nos. 118 and 119, 556
May 27 and 28, 1924 Hoe

bei atliai bd
hot mes
*9%-banom knig hloqu

ved behovalier SVI Posts
ymabab bob W quong & thus do
to anglišu silt mic) vollal
veinsberg als
201
M
anhand
To
THE RESULTS OF
DUT
THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
Excerpts from the Report Delivered at the C.C., R.C.P.(B.)

Courses for Secretaries of Uyezd Party Committees
June 17, 1924
ETH
a) The opposition. Now that the question of the opposition
has been decided by the congress and the whole matter, con
sequently, is settled, one might ask: What is the opposition,
and what, essentially, was the issue involved in the discussion?
I think, comrades, that the issue was one of life or death for
the Party. Perhaps the opposition itself did not realise this,
but that is not the point. The important thing is not what
aims particular comrades or opposition groups set themselves.
The important thing is the objective results that are bound to
follow from the actions of such a group. What does declaring
war on the Party apparatus mean? It means working to destroy
the Party. What does inciting the youth against the cadres
mean? It means working to disintegrate the Party. What does
fighting for freedom of groups mean? It means attempting to
102
RESULTS OF XIII CONGRESS OF R.C.P. (B.) 103
demolish the Party, its unity. What does the effort to discredit
the Party cadres by talk about degeneration mean? It means
trying to disrupt the Party, to break its backbone. Yes, com
rades, the issue was one of life or death for the Party. And
that, indeed, explains the passion of the discussion. It also
explains the fact, unparalleled in our Party's history, that the
congress unanimously condemned the opposition platform.
The gravity of the danger welded the Party into a solid ring of
iron. so bad
It is interesting to trace the history of the opposition. We

can begin with the Seventh Party Congress, the first after the
establishment of Soviet power (in the early part of 1918). There
was an opposition at that congress, and it was headed by the
same people who led the opposition at the Thirteenth Congress.
The issue was war or peace, the Brest Peace. At that time the
opposition had one quarter of the whole congress on its side
no mean proportion. No wonder there was talk then of a
split. Foed ni
Two years later, at the Tenth Congress, the inner-Party
struggle flared up anew, this time over the trade-union issue,
and the opposition was headed by the same people. The op
position mustered one-eighth of the congress, which, of course,
was less than the quarter it had before.
Another two years passed, and a new struggle flared up at
the Thirteenth Congress, the one that has just concluded. Here,
too, there was an opposition, but it failed to muster a single
vote at the congress. This time, as you see, its showing was a
sorry one indeed.
And so, on three occasions the opposition has tried to wage
war against the Party's basic cadres. The first time at the Sev
enth Congress, the second time at the Tenth, and the third
time at the Thirteenth Congress. It met with defeat on all
these occasions, each time losing some of its following and

with every new step diminishing the strength of its army.
What do all these facts show? Firstly, that the history of our
Party in these past six years has been one of progressive rally
ing of the majority of our Party around its basic cadres. Sec
ondly, that the opposition's supporters have been steadily
breaking away from it to join the basic core of the Party and
swell its ranks. The conclusion that follows is this: it is not
precluded that from the opposition, which had no delegates

at the Thirteenth Congress (we do not have proportional rep
resentation) but which undoubtedly has followers in the
Party, a number of comrades will break away and join the
basic core of the Party, as has happened in the past.
What should our policy be with regard to these opposition
ists, or, more precisely, with regard to these former opposition
ists? It should be an exceptionally comradely one. Every
measure must be taken to help them to come over to the basic
core of the Party and to work jointly and in harmony with this
core.
Pravda, Nos. 136 and 137,

June 19 and 20, 1924
led
JOMPL
Kenyerbu mikinave
ahimong Hun
TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?
anfmitgnite
Speech Delivered at the Plenum
of the Communist Group in the A.U.C.C.T.U.
November 19, 1924

Jur
Comrades, after Kamenev's comprehensive report there is

little left for me to say. I shall therefore confine myself to
exposing certain legends that are being spread by Trotsky and
his supporters about the October uprising, about Trotsky's
role in the uprising, about the Party and the preparation for
October, and so forth. I shall also touch upon Trotskyism as a
peculiar ideology that is incompatible with Leninism, and upon
the Party's tasks in connection with Trotsky's latest literary
pronouncements.
THE FACTS ABOUT THE OCTOBER UPRISING

2
First of all about the October uprising. Rumours are being

vigorously spread among members of the Party that the Cen
105
tral Committee as a whole was opposed to an uprising in

October 1917. The usual story is that on October 10, when the
Central Committee adopted the decision to organise the
uprising, the majority of the Central Committee at first spoke
against an uprising, but, so the story runs, at that moment a
worker burst in on the meeting of the Central Committee and
said: "You are deciding against an uprising, but I tell you that
there will be an uprising all the same, in spite of everything."
And so, after that threat, the story runs, the Central Committee,
which is alleged to have become frightened, raised the ques
tion of an uprising afresh and adopted a decision to organise
it.
This is not merely a rumour, comrades. It is related by the

well-known John Reed in his book Ten Days. Reed was remote
from our Party and, of course, could not know the history of
our secret meeting on October 10, and, consequently, he was
taken in by the gossip spread by people like Sukhanov. This
story was later passed round and repeated in a number of
pamphlets written by Trotskyites, including one of the latest
pamphlets on October written by Syrkin. These rumours
have been strongly supported in Trotsky's latest literary
pronouncements. tout sele llars i tol na bas todopo
It scarcely needs proof that all these and similar "Arabian
Nights" fairy tales are not in accordance with the truth, that
in fact nothing of the kind happened, nor could have happened,
at the meeting of the Central Committee. Consequently, we
could ignore these absurd rumours; after all, lots of rumours
are fabricated in the office rooms of the oppositionists or those
who are remote from the Party. Indeed, we have ignored them
till now; for example, we paid no attention to John Reed's
mistakes and did not take the trouble to rectify them. After
Trotsky's latest pronouncements, however, it is no longer pos
PAI
TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM? 107
sible to ignore such legends, for attempts are being made now
to bring up our young people on them and, unfortunately, some
results have already been achieved in this respect. In view of
this, I must counter these absurd rumours with the actual facts.
I take the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee
of our Party on October 10 (23), 1917. Present: Lenin, Zinoviev,
Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky,
Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov. The question of the
current situation and the uprising was discussed. After the
discussion, Comrade Lenin's resolution on the uprising was put
to the vote. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 10
against 2. Clear, one would think: by a majority of 10 against
2, the Central Committee decided to proceed with the imme
diate, practical work of organising the uprising. At this very
same meeting the Central Committee elected a political centre
to direct the uprising; this centre, called the Political Bureau,
consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky,
Sokolnikov and Bubnov.
Such are the facts.

These minutes at one stroke destroy several legends. They
destroy the legend that the majority on the Central Committee
was opposed to an uprising. They also destroy the legend that
on the question of the uprising the Central Committee was on
the verge of a split. It is clear from the minutes that the op
ponents of an immediate uprising - Kamenev and Zinoviev
were elected to the body that was to exercise political
direction of the uprising on a par with those who were in
favour of an uprising. There was no question of a split, nor
could there be. Juride pila de
Trotsky asserts that in October our Party had a Right wing
in the persons of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, he says, were
almost Social-Democrats. What one cannot understand then
is how, under those circumstances, it could happen that the

Party avoided a split; how it could happen that the disagree
ments with Kamenev and Zinoviev lasted only a few days;
how it could happen that, in spite of those disagreements, the
Party appointed these comrades to highly important posts,
elected them to the political centre of the uprising, and so forth.
Lenin's implacable attitude towards Social-Democrats is suffi
ciently well known in the Party; the Party knows that Lenin
would not for a single moment have agreed to have Social
Democratically-minded comrades in the Party, let alone in
highly important posts. How, then, are we to explain the fact
that the Party avoided a split? The explanation is that in spite
of the disagreements, these comrades were old Bolsheviks who
stood on the common ground of Bolshevism. What was that
common ground? Unity of views on the fundamental questions:
the character of the Russian revolution, the driving forces of
the revolution, the role of the peasantry, the principles of
Party leadership, and so forth. Had there not been this com
mon ground, a split would have been inevitable. There was
no split, and the disagreements lasted only a few days, because,
and only because, Kamenev and Zinoviev were Leninists,
Bolsheviks.zonablyToisino bongo saw
Let us now pass to the legend about Trotsky's special role
in the October uprising. The Trotskyites are vigorously spread
ing rumours that Trotsky inspired and was the sole leader of
the October uprising. These rumours are being spread with
exceptional zeal by the so-called editor of Trotsky's works,
Lentsner. Trotsky himself, by consistently avoiding mention
of the Party, the Central Committee and the Petrograd Com
mittee of the Party, by saying nothing about the leading role
of these organisations in the uprising and vigorously pushing
himself forward as the central figure in the October uprising,
voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the rumours about

the special role he is supposed to have played in the uprising.
I am far from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role
in the uprising. I must say, however, that Trotsky did not play
any special role in the October uprising, nor could he do so;
being chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, he merely carried out
the will of the appropriate Party bodies, which directed every
step that Trotsky took. To philistines like Sukhanov, all this
may seem strange, but the facts, the true facts, wholly and
fully confirm what I say.
Let us take the minutes of the next meeting of the Central
Committee, the one held on October 16 (29), 1917. Present: the
members of the Central Committee, plus representatives of the
Petrograd Committee, plus representatives of the military
organisation, factory committees, trade unions and the rail
waymen. Among those present, besides the members of the
Central Committee, were: Krylenko, Shotman, Kalinin,
Volodarsky, Shlyapnikov, Lacis, and others, twenty-five in all.
The question of the uprising was discussed from the purely
practical-organisational aspect. Lenin's resolution on the
uprising was adopted by a majority of 20 against 2, three
abstaining. A practical centre was elected for the organisa
tional leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this
centre? The following five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky,
Bubnov, Uritsky. The functions of the practical centre: to
direct all the practical organs of the uprising in conformity
with the directives of the Central Committee. Thus, as you
see, something "terrible" happened at this meeting of the
Central Committee, i.e., "strange to relate," the "inspirer,"
the "chief figure," the "sole leader" of the uprising, Trotsky,
was not elected to the practical centre, which was called upon
to direct the uprising. How is this to be reconciled with the
current opinion about Trotsky's special role? Is not all this

somewhat "strange," as Sukhanov, or the Trotskyites, would
say? And yet, strictly speaking, there is nothing strange about
it, for neither in the Party, nor in the October uprising, did
Trotsky play any special role, nor could he do so, for he was
a relatively new man in our Party in the period of October.
He, like all the responsible workers, merely carried out the
will of the Central Committee and of its organs. Whoever is
familiar with the mechanics of Bolshevik Party leadership will
have no difficulty in understanding that it could not be other
wise: it would have been enough for Trotsky to have gone
against the will of the Central Committee to have been de
prived of influence on the course of events. This talk about
Trotsky's special role is a legend that is being spread by
obliging "Party" gossips.
This, of course, does not mean that the October uprising did
not have its inspirer. It did have its inspirer and leader, but
this was Lenin, and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin
whose resolutions the Central Committee adopted when de
ciding the question of the uprising, that same Lenin who, in
spite of what Trotsky says, was not prevented by being in hid
ing from being the actual inspirer of the uprising. It is foolish
and ridiculous to attempt now, by gossip about Lenin having
been in hiding, to obscure the indubitable fact that the inspirer
of the uprising was the leader of the Party, V. I. Lenin.
Such are the facts. dit to t
Granted, we are told, but it cannot be denied that Trotsky
fought well in the period of October. Yes, that is true, Trotsky
did, indeed, fight well in October; but Trotsky was not the
only one who fought well in the period of October. Even peo
ple like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who then stood
side by side with the Bolsheviks, also fought well. In general,

I must say that in the period of a victorious uprising, when the
enemy is isolated and the uprising is growing, it is not difficult
to fight well. At such moments even backward people become
heroes. 75009
The proletarian struggle is not, however, an uninterrupted
advance, an unbroken chain of victories. The proletarian
struggle also has its trials, its defeats. The genuine revolution
ary is not one who displays courage in the period of a victo
rious uprising, but one who, while fighting well during the
victorious advance of the revolution, also displays courage
when the revolution is in retreat, when the proletariat suffers
defeat; who does not lose his head and does not funk when the
revolution suffers reverses, when the enemy achieves success;

who does not become panic-stricken or give way to despair
when the revolution is in a period of retreat. The Left Socialist
Revolutionaries did not fight badly in the period of October,
and they supported the Bolsheviks. But who does not know
that those "brave" fighters became panic-stricken in the period
of Brest, when the advance of German imperialism drove
them to despair and hysteria? It is a very sad but indubitable
fact that Trotsky, who fought well in the period of October,
did not, in the period of Brest, in the period when the revolu
tion suffered temporary reverses, possess the courage to display
sufficient staunchness at that difficult moment and to refrain
from following in the footsteps of the Left Socialist
Revolutionaries. Beyond question, that moment was a difficult
one; one had to display exceptional courage and imperturbable
coolness not to be dismayed, to retreat in good time, to accept
peace in good time, to withdraw the proletarian army out of
range of the blows of German imperialism, to preserve the
112 MON THE OPPOSITION
peasant reserves and, after obtaining a respite in this way,

to strike at the enemy with renewed force. Unfortunately,
Trotsky was found to lack this courage and revolutionary
staunchness at that difficult moment.
In Trotsky's opinion, the principal lesson of the proletarian

revolution is "not to funk" during October. That is wrong,
for Trotsky's assertion contains only a particle of the truth
about the lessons of the revolution. The whole truth about
the lessons of the proletarian revolution is "not to funk" not

only when the revolution is advancing, but also when it is in
retreat, when the enemy is gaining the upper hand and the
revolution is suffering reverses. The revolution did not end
with October. October was only the beginning of the prole
tarian revolution. It is bad to funk when the tide of insurrec
tion is rising; but it is worse to funk when the revolution is

passing through severe trials after power has been captured.
To retain power on the morrow of the revolution is no less
important than to capture power. If Trotsky funked during
the period of Brest, when our revolution was passing through
severe trials, when it was almost a matter of "surrendering"
power, he ought to know that the mistakes committed by

Kamenev and Zinoviev in October are quite irrelevant here.
That is how matters stand with the legends about the Octo
ber uprising.
la most
THE PARTY AND THE PREPARATION

FOR OCTOBER
Let us now pass to the question of the preparation for

October.
Listening to Trotsky, one might think that during the whole

of the period of preparation, from March to October, the
Bolshevik Party did nothing but mark time; that it was being
corroded by internal contradictions and hindered Lenin in
every way; that had it not been for Trotsky, nobody knows
how the October Revolution would have ended. It is rather
amusing to hear this strange talk about the Party from Trotsky,
who declares in this same "preface" to Volume III that "the
chief instrument of the proletarian revolution is the Party,"
that "without the Party, apart from the Party, by-passing the
Party, with a substitute for the Party, the proletarian revolu
tion cannot be victorious." Allah himself would not under
stand how our revolution could have succeeded if "its chief
instrument" proved to be useless, while success was impossible,

as it appears, "by-passing the Party." But this is not the first
time that Trotsky treats us to oddities. It must be supposed that
this amusing talk about our Party is one of Trotsky's usual
oddities.
Let us briefly review the history of the preparation for

October according to periods.
1) The period of the Party's new orientation (March-April).
The major facts of this period:
a) the overthrow of tsarism;
b) the formation of the Provisional Government (dictator
ship of the bourgeoisie);
c) the appearance of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Dep
uties (dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry);
d) dual power;
e) the April demonstration;
f) the first crisis of power.
The characteristic feature of this period is the fact that there

existed together, side by side and simultaneously, both the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the pro
letariat and peasantry; the latter trusts the former, believes that
it is striving for peace, voluntarily surrenders power to the
bourgeoisie and thereby becomes an appendage of the bour
geoisie. There are as yet no serious conflicts between the
two dictatorships. On the other hand, there is the "Contact
>>20
Committee.
This was the greatest turning point in the history of Russia

and an unprecedented turning point in the history of our
Party. The old, pre-revolutionary platform of direct overthrow
of the government was clear and definite, but it was no longer
suitable for the new conditions of the struggle. It was now no
longer possible to go straight out for the overthrow of the gov
ernment, for the latter was connected with the Soviets, then
under the influence of the defencists, and the Party would
have had to wage war against both the government and the
Soviets, a war that would have been beyond its strength. Nor
was it possible to pursue a policy of supporting the Provisional
Government, for it was the government of imperialism. Under
the new conditions of the struggle the Party had to adopt a new
orientation. The Party (its majority) groped its way towards
this new orientation. It adopted the policy of pressure on the
Provisional Government through the Soviets on the ques
tion of peace and did not venture to step forward at once
from the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and
peasantry to the new slogan of power to the Soviets. The aim
of this halfway policy was to enable the Soviets to discern the
actual imperialist nature of the Provisional Government on
the basis of the concrete questions of peace, and in this way
to wrest the Soviets from the Provisional Government. But
this was a profoundly mistaken position, for it gave rise to

pacifist illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism and
hindered the revolutionary education of the masses. At that
time I shared this mistaken position with other Party comrades
and fully abandoned it only in the middle of April, when I
associated myself with Lenin's theses. A new orientation was
needed. This new orientation was given to the Party by Lenin,
in his celebrated April Theses.21 I shall not deal with these
theses, for they are known to everybody. Were there any
disagreements between the Party and Lenin at that time? Yes,
there were. How long did these disagreements last? Not more
than two weeks. The City Conference of the Petrograd organ
isation22 (in the latter half of April), which adopted Lenin's
theses, marked a turning point in our Party's development.
The All-Russian April Conference23 (at the end of April)
merely completed on an all-Russian scale the work of the
Petrograd Conference, rallying nine-tenths of the Party around
this united Party position.
Now, seven years later, Trotsky gloats maliciously over
the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks and depicts them
as a struggle waged as if there were almost two parties within
Bolshevism. But, firstly, Trotsky disgracefully exaggerates and
inflates the matter, for the Bolshevik Party lived through these
disagreements without the slightest shock. Secondly, our Party
would be a caste and not a revolutionary party if it did not
permit different shades of opinion in its ranks. Moreover, it is
well known that there were disagreements among us even
before that, for example, in the period of the Third Duma, but
they did not shake the unity of our Party. Thirdly, it will not
be out of place to ask what was then the position of Trotsky
himself, who is now gloating so eagerly over the past disagree
ments among the Bolsheviks. Lentsner, the so-called editor

of Trotsky's works, assures us that Trotsky's letters from
America (March) "wholly anticipated" Lenin's Letters from
Afar (March), which served as the basis of Lenin's April
Theses. That is what he says: "wholly anticipated." Trotsky
does not object to this analogy; apparently, he accepts it with
thanks. But, firstly, Trotsky's letters "do not in the least
resemble" Lenin's letters either in spirit or in conclusions, for
they wholly and entirely reflect Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik slogan
of "no tsar, but a workers' government," a slogan which
implies a revolution without the peasantry. It is enough to
glance through these two series of letters to be convinced of
this. Secondly, if what Lentsner says is true, how are we to
explain the fact that Lenin on the very next day after his arrival
from abroad considered it necessary to dissociate himself from
Trotsky? Who does not know of Lenin's repeated statements
that Trotsky's slogan of "no tsar, but a workers' government"
was an attempt "to skip the still unexhausted peasant move
ment," that this slogan meant "playing at the seizure of power
27
by a workers' government"?*
What can there be in common between Lenin's Bolshevik
theses and Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik scheme with its "playing

at the seizure of power"? And what prompts this passion that
some people display for comparing a wretched hovel with
Mont Blanc? For what purpose did Lentsner find it necessary
to make this risky addition to the heap of old legends about
our revolution of still another legend, about Trotsky's letters
pents
* See Lenin's Letters on Tactics, First Letter, Assessment of the Present
Situation (1917). See also the reports made at the Petrograd City Con
ference and at the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (middle
and end of April 1917).

from America "anticipating" Lenin's well-known Letters from

Afar?*
No wonder it is said that an obliging fool is more danger
ous than an enemy.
2) The period of the revolutionary mobilisation of the
masses (May-August). The major facts of this period:
a) the April demonstration in Petrograd and the forma
tion of the coalition government with the participation of
"Socialists";
b) the May Day demonstrations in the principal centres

of Russia with the slogan of "a democratic peace";
c) the June demonstration in Petrograd with the principal
slogan: "Down with the capitalist ministers!";
d) the June offensive at the front and the reverses of the
Russian army;
e) the July armed demonstration in Petrograd; the Cadet
ministers resign from the government;
f) counter-revolutionary troops are called in from the
front; the editorial offices of Pravda are wrecked; the counter
revolution launches a struggle against the Soviets and a new
coalition government is formed, headed by Kerensky;
*Among these legends must be included also the very widespread

story that Trotsky was the "sole" or "chief organiser" of the victories on
the fronts of the Civil War. I must declare, comrades, in the interest of
truth, that this version is quite out of accord with the facts. I am far
from denying that Trotsky played an important role in the Civil War.
But I must emphatically declare that the high honour of being the
organiser of our victories belongs not to individuals, but to the great
collective body of advanced workers in our country, the Russian Com
munist Party. Perhaps it will not be out of place to quote a few exam
ples. You know that Kolchak and Denikin were regarded as the principal
enemies of the Soviet Republic. You know that our country breathed
freely only after those enemies were defeated. Well. history shows that
g) the Sixth Congress of our Party, which issues the slogan

to prepare for an armed uprising;
h) the counter-revolutionary Conference of State and the
and the
general strike in Moscow;
i) Kornilov's unsuccessful march on Petrograd, the revi
talising of the Soviets; the Cadets
acc
resign and a "Directory"
is formed. be
The characteristic feature of this period is the intensification
of the crisis and the upsetting of the unstable equilibrium
between the Soviets and the Provisional Government which,
for good or evil, had existed in the preceding period. Dual
power has become intolerable for both sides. The fragile edifice
of the "Contact Committee" is tottering. "Crisis of power"
and "ministerial re-shuffle" are the most fashionable catch
words of the day. The crisis at the front and the disruption in
the rear are doing their work, strengthening the extreme flanks
and squeezing the defencist compromisers from both sides.
The revolution is mobilising, causing the mobilisation of the
JUSSU
both those enemies, i.e., Kolchak and Denikin, were routed by our troops
in spite of Trotsky's plans.
1) Kolchak. This is in the summer of 1919. Our troops are advancing
against Kolchak and are operating near Ufa. A meeting of the Central
Committee is held. Trotsky proposes that the advance be halted along
the line of the River Belaya (near Ufa), leaving the Urals in the hands
of Kolchak, and that part of the troops be withdrawn from the Eastern
Front and transferred to the Southern Front. A heated debate takes
place. The Central Committee disagrees with Trotsky, being of the

opinion that the Urals, with its factories and railway network, must not
be left in the hands of Kolchak, for the latter could easily recuperate
there, organise a strong force and reach the Volga again; Kolchak must
first be driven beyond the Ural range into the Siberian steppes, and only
after that has been done should forces be transferred to the South.
The Central Committee rejects Trotsky's plan. Trotsky hands in his

counter-revolution. The counter-revolution, in its turn, is spur

ring on the revolution, stirring up new waves of the revolu
tionary tide. The question of transferring power to the new
class becomes the immediate question of the day.
Were there disagreements in our Party then? Yes, there
were. They were, however, of a purely practical character, de
spite the assertions of Trotsky, who is trying to discover a
"Right" and a "Left" wing in the Party. That is to say, they
were such disagreements as are inevitable where there is vig
P
orous Party life and real Party activity. disat

Trotsky is wrong in asserting that the April demonstration
in Petrograd gave rise to disagreements in the Central Com
mittee. The Central Committee was absolutely united on this
question and condemned the attempt of a group of com
rades to arrest the Provisional Government at a time when
the Bolsheviks were in a minority both in the Soviets and in

the army. Had Trotsky written the "history" of October not
according to Sukhanov, but according to authentic documents,
OME
resignation. The Central Committee refuses to accept it. Commander

in-Chief Vatsetis, who supported Trotsky's plan, resigns. His place is
taken by a new Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev. From that moment
Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Eastern Front.
2) Denikin. This is in the autumn of 1919. The offensive against
Denikin is not proceeding successfully. The "steel ring" around Mamon
tov (Mamontov's raid) is obviously collapsing. Denikin captures Kursk.
Denikin is approaching Orel. Trotsky is summoned from the Southern
Front to attend a meeting of the Central Committee. The Central Com
mittee regards the situation as alarming and decides to send new military
leaders to the Southern Front and to withdraw Trotsky. The new military
leaders demand "no intervention" by Trotsky in the affairs of the Southern
Front. Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Southern
Front. Operations on the Southern Front, right up to the capture of
Rostov-on-Don and Odessa by our troops, proceed without Trotsky.
Let anybody try to refute these facts.
he would easily have convinced himself of the error of his

assertion.
Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that the attempt,

"on Lenin's initiative," to arrange a demonstration on June
10 was described as "adventurism" by the "Right-wing" mem
bers of the Central Committee. Had Trotsky not written ac
cording to Sukhanov he would surely have known that the
June 10 demonstration was postponed with the full agreement
of Lenin, and that he urged the necessity of postponing it in
a big speech he delivered at the well-known meeting of
the Petrograd Committee (see minutes of the Petrograd
Committee 25).
Trotsky is absolutely wrong in speaking about "tragic" dis

agreements in the Central Committee in connection with the
July armed demonstration. Trotsky is simply inventing in
asserting that some members of the leading group in the Cen
tral Committee "could not but regard the July episode as a
harmful adventure." Trotsky, who was then not yet a member
of our Central Committee and was merely our Soviet parlia
mentary, might, of course, not have known that the Central
Committee regarded the July demonstration only as a means
of sounding the enemy, that the Central Committee (and
Lenin) did not want to convert, did not even think of con
verting, the demonstration into an uprising at a time when
the Soviets in the capitals still supported the defencists. It is
quite possible that some Bolsheviks did whimper over the
July defeat. I know, for example, that some of the Bolsheviks
who were arrested at the time were even prepared to desert
our ranks. But to draw inferences from this against certain
supposed "Rights," supposed to be members of the Central
Committee, is a shameful distortion of history.
Trotsky is wrong in declaring that during the Kornilov days

a section of the Party leaders inclined towards the formation
of a bloc with the defencists, towards supporting the Provi
sional Government. He, of course, is referring to those same
alleged "Rights" who keep him awake at night. Trotsky is
wrong, for there exist documents, such as the Central Organ
of the Party of that time, which refute his statements. Trotsky
refers to Lenin's letter to the Central Committee warning
against supporting Kerensky; but Trotsky fails to understand
Lenin's letters, their significance, their purpose. In his letters
Lenin sometimes deliberately ran ahead, pushing into the fore
front mistakes that might possibly be committed, and criticising
them in advance with the object of warning the Party and of
safeguarding it against mistakes. Sometimes he would even
magnify a "trifle" and "make a mountain out of a molehill"
for the same pedagogical purpose. The leader of the Party,
especially if he is in hiding, cannot act otherwise, for he must
see further than his comrades-in-arms, he must sound the
alarm over every possible mistake, even over "trifles." But
to infer from such letters of Lenin's (and he wrote quite a
number of such letters) the existence of "tragic" disagree
ments and to trumpet them forth means not to understand
Lenin's letters, means not to know Lenin. This, probably,
explains why Trotsky sometimes is wide of the mark. In short:
there were no disagreements in the Central Committee during
the Kornilov revolt, absolutely none.
After the July defeat disagreement did indeed arise between
the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the
future of the Soviets. It is known that Lenin, wishing to con
centrate the Party's attention on the task of preparing the
uprising outside the Soviets, warned against any infatuation
with the latter, for he was of the opinion that, having been
122 MON THE OPPOSITION
defiled by the defencists, they had become useless. The Central

Committee and the Sixth Party Congress took a more cautious
line and decided that there were no grounds for excluding the
possibility that the Soviets would revive. The Kornilov revolt
showed that this decision was correct. This disagreement,
however, was of no great consequence for the Party. Later,
Lenin admitted that the line taken by the Sixth Congress had
been correct. It is interesting that Trotsky has not clutched at
this disagreement and has not magnified it to "monstrous"
proportions. minciacions
A united and solid party, the hub of the revolutionary

mobilisation of the masses such was the picture presented
by our Party in that period.
3) The period of organisation of the assault (September
October). The major facts of this period:
a) the convocation of the Democratic Conference and the
collapse of the idea of a bloc with the Cadets;
b) the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets go over to the side
She
of the Bolsheviks; la
c) the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region;26 the
Petrograd Soviet decides against the withdrawal of the troops;
d) the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising
and the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee
of the Petrograd Soviet; Maloka
ane) the Petrograd garrison decides to render the Petrograd
Soviet armed support; a network of commissars of the
M
Rev
olutionary Military Committee is organised; SUBA
f) the Bolshevik armed forces go into action; the members
of the Provisional Government are arrested;
g) the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet takes power; the Second Congress of Soviets sets up
the Council of People's Commissars.
The characteristic feature of this period is the rapid growth

of the crisis, the utter consternation reigning among the ruling
circles, the isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Men
sheviks, and the mass flight of the vacillating elements to the
side of the Bolsheviks. A peculiar feature of the tactics of
the revolution in this period must be noted, namely, that the
revolution strove to take every, or nearly every, step in its
attack in the guise of defence. Undoubtedly, the refusal to
allow the troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd was an im
portant step in the revolution's attack; nevertheless, this attack
was carried out under the slogan of protecting Petrograd from
possible attack by the external enemy. Undoubtedly, the for
mation of the Revolutionary Military Committee was a still
more important step in the attack upon the Provisional Gov
ernment; nevertheless, it was carried out under the slogan of
organising Soviet control over the actions of the Headquarters
of the Military Area. Undoubtedly, the open transition of the
garrison to the side of the Revolutionary Military Committee
and the organisation of a network of Soviet Commissars
marked the beginning of the uprising; nevertheless, the revolu
tion took these steps under the slogan of protecting the Pet
rograd Soviet from possible action by the counter-revolution.
The revolution, as it were, masked its actions in attack under
the cloak of defence in order the more easily to draw the
irresolute, vacillating elements into its orbit. This, no doubt,
explains the outwardly defensive character of the speeches,
articles and slogans of that period, the inner content of which,
none the less, was of a profoundly attacking nature.
Were there disagreements in the Central Committee in that
period? Yes, there were, and fairly important ones at that.
I have already spoken about the disagreements over the up
rising. They are fully reflected in the minutes of the meetings
of the Central Committee of October 10 and 16. I shall, there

fore, not repeat what I have already said. Three questions
must now be dealt with: participation in the Pre-parliament,
the role of the Soviets in the uprising, and the date of the
uprising. This is all the more necessary because Trotsky, in
his zeal to push himself into a prominent place, has "inad
vertently" misrepresented the stand Lenin took on the last two
questions.
Undoubtedly, the disagreements on the question of the Pre

parliament were of a serious nature. What was, so to speak,
the aim of the Pre-parliament? It was: to help the bourgeoisie
to push the Soviets into the background and to lay the founda
tions of bourgeois parliamentarism. Whether the Pre-parlia
ment could have accomplished this task in the revolutionary
situation that had arisen is another matter. Events showed
that this aim could not be realised, and the Pre-parliament

itself was a Kornilovite abortion. There can be no doubt,
however, that it was precisely this aim that the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries pursued in setting up the Pre-parlia
ment. What could the Bolsheviks' participation in the Pre
parliament mean under those circumstances? Nothing but
deceiving the proletarian masses about the true nature of the
Pre-parliament. This is the chief explanation for the passion
with which Lenin, in his letters, scourged those who were in
favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament. There can be no
doubt that it was a grave mistake to have taken part in the
Pre-parliament.
It would be a mistake, however, to think, as Trotsky does,
that those who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parlia
ment went into it for the purpose of constructive work, for
the purpose of "directing the working-class movement" "into
the channel of Social-Democracy." That is not at all the case.
It is not true. Had that been the case, the Party would not
have been able to rectify this mistake "in two ticks" by de
monstratively walking out of the Pre-parliament. Incidentally,
the swift rectification of this mistake was an expression of our
Party's vitality and revolutionary might.
And now, permit me to correct a slight inaccuracy that has
crept into the report of Lentsner, the "editor" of Trotsky's
works, about the meeting of the Bolshevik group at which a
decision on the question of the Pre-parliament was taken.
Lentsner says that there were two reporters at this meeting,
Kamenev and Trotsky. That is not true. Actually, there were
four reporters: two in favour of boycotting the Pre-parliament
(Trotsky and Stalin), and two in favour of participation
(Kamenev and Nogin).
Trotsky is in a still worse position when dealing with the
stand Lenin took on the question of the form of the uprising.
According to Trotsky, it appears that Lenin's view was that
the Party should take power in October "independently of
and behind the back of the Soviet." Later on, criticising this
nonsense, which he ascribes to Lenin, Trotsky "cuts capers"
and finally delivers the following condescending utterance:
"That would have been a mistake." Trotsky is here uttering
a falsehood about Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin's views
on the role of the Soviets in the uprising. A pile of documents
can be cited, showing that Lenin proposed that power be
taken through the Soviets, either the Petrograd or the Moscow
Soviet, and not behind the back of the Soviets. Why did Trots
ky have to invent this more than strange legend about Lenin?
" the
Norstand
is Trotsky
taken
by in a better
the Central
analyses
position Committee
whenand
he "Leni on the ques
tion of the date of the uprising. Reporting the famous meeting
of the Central Committee of October 10, Trotsky asserts that
at that meeting "a resolution was carried to the effect that the
uprising should take place not later than October 15." From
this it appears that the Central Committee fixed October 15
as the date of the uprising and then itself violated that deci
sion by postponing the date of the uprising to October 25. Is
that true? No, it is not. During that period the Central Com
mittee passed only two resolutions on the uprising - one on
October 10 and the other on October 16. Let us read these
resolutions.
The Central Committee's resolution of October 10:
"The Central Committee recognises that the international position of

the Russian revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, which is an
extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world
socialist revolution, and the threat of peace between the imperialists
with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the
military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie
and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the
fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets - all
this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of
popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and,
finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair
(the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to
Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.)- all this places
an armed uprising on the order of the day.
"Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that
the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party
organisations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all
practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the
withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions of the people in Moscow
and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view."27
The resolution adopted by the conference of the Central

Committee with responsible workers on October 16:
* Obviously, this should be "a separate peace." - J. St.

"This meeting fully welcomes and wholly supports the Central Com
mittee's resolution, calls upon all organisations and all workers and
soldiers to make thorough and most intense preparations for an armed
uprising and for support of the centre set up by the Central Committee
for this purpose, and expresses complete confidence that the Central
Committee and the Soviet will in good time indicate the favourable
moment and the suitable means for launching the attack."28
You see that Trotsky's memory betrayed him about the

date of the uprising and the Central Committee's resolution on
the uprising.
Trotsky is absolutely wrong in asserting that Lenin under
rated Soviet legality, that Lenin failed to appreciate the great
importance of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets taking
power on October 25, and that this was the reason why he
insisted that power be taken before October 25. That is not
true. Lenin proposed that power be taken before October 25
for two reasons. Firstly, because the counter-revolutionaries
might have surrendered Petrograd at any moment, which
would have drained the blood of the developing uprising, and
so every day was precious. Secondly, because the mistake
made by the Petrograd Soviet in openly fixing and announcing
the day of the uprising (October 25) could not be rectified in
any other way than by actually launching the uprising before
the legal date set for it. The fact of the matter is that Lenin
regarded insurrection as an art, and he could not help knowing
that the enemy, informed about the date of the uprising (owing
to the carelessness of the Petrograd Soviet) would certainly
try to prepare for that day. Consequently, it was necessary to
forestall the enemy, i.e., without fail to launch the uprising
before the legal date. This is the chief explanation for the
passion with which Lenin in his letters scourged those who
made a fetish of the date October 25. Events showed that
Lenin was absolutely right. It is well known that the uprising
was launched prior to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

It is well known that power was actually taken before the
opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was
taken not by the Congress of Soviets, but by the Petrograd
Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military Committee. The Con
gress of Soviets merely took over power from the Petrograd
Soviet. That is why Trotsky's lengthy arguments about the
importance of Soviet legality are quite beside the point.
A virile and mighty party standing at the head of the rev
olutionary masses who were storming and overthrowing bour
geois rule such was the state of our Party in that period.
That is how matters stand with the legends about the prep
aration for October.
III
TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?
We have dealt above with the legends directed against the

Party and those about Lenin spread by Trotsky and his sup
porters in connection with October and the preparation for it.
We have exposed and refuted these legends. But the question
arises: For what purpose did Trotsky need all these legends
about October and the preparation for October, about Lenin
and the Party of Lenin? What is the purpose of Trotsky's new
literary pronouncements against the Party? What is the sense,
the purpose, the aim of these pronouncements now, when the
Party does not want a discussion, when the Party is busy with
a host of urgent tasks, when the Party needs united efforts to
restore our economy and not a new struggle around old ques
tions? For what purpose does Trotsky need to drag the Party
back, to new discussions?
Trotsky asserts that all this is needed for the purpose of

"studying" October. But is it not possible to study October
without giving another kick at the Party and its leader Lenin?
What sort of a "history" of October is it that begins and ends
with attempts to discredit the chief leader of the October
uprising, to discredit the Party, which organised and carried
through the uprising? No, it is not a matter here of studying
October. That is not the way to study October. That is not
the way to write the history of October. Obviously, there is
a different "design" here, and everything goes to show that
this "design" is that Trotsky by his literary pronouncements
is making another (yet another!) attempt to create the condi
tions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism. Trotsky needs
"desperately" to discredit the Party, and its cadres who carried
through the uprising, in order, after discrediting the Party, to
proceed to discredit Leninism. And it is necessary for him to
discredit Leninism in order to drag in Trotskyism as the "sole"
"proletarian" (don't laugh!) ideology. All this, of course (oh,
of course!) under the flag of Leninism, so that the dragging
operation may be performed "as painlessly as possible."
That is the essence of Trotsky's latest literary pronounce
ments.
That is why those literary pronouncements of Trotsky's

sharply raise the question of Trotskyism.
And so, what is Trotskyism?
Trotskyism possesses three specific features which bring it
into irreconcilable contradiction with Leninism.
b What are these features?
Firstly. Trotskyism is the theory of "permanent" (uninter

rupted) revolution. But what is permanent revolution in its
Trotskyist interpretation? It is revolution that fails to take
the poor peasantry into account as a revolutionary force.
Trotsky's "permanent" revolution is, as Lenin said, "skipping"

the peasant movement, "playing at the seizure of power." Why
is it dangerous? Because such a revolution, if an attempt had
been made to bring it about, would inevitably have ended
in failure, for it would have divorced from the Russian prole
tariat its ally, the poor peasantry. This explains the struggle
that Leninism has been waging against Trotskyism ever since
1905.FASTON
How does Trotsky appraise Leninism from the standpoint
of this struggle? He regards it as a theory that possesses "anti
revolutionary features." What is this indignant opinion about
Leninism based on? On the fact that at the proper time Lenin
ism advocated and upheld the idea of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and peasantry. "<blogginb"
But Trotsky does not confine himself to this indignant opin
ion. He goes further and asserts: "The entire edifice of Lenin
ism at the present time is built on lies and falsification and
bears within itself the poisonous elements of its own decay"
(see Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze, 1913). As you see, we have
before us two opposite lines.
Secondly. Trotskyism is distrust of the Bolshevik Party
principle, of the monolithic character of the Party, of its hostili
ty towards opportunist elements. In the sphere of organisa
tion, Trotskyism is the theory that revolutionaries and oppor
tunists can co-exist and form groups and coteries within a
single party. You are, no doubt, familiar with the history of
Trotsky's August bloc, in which the Martovites and Otzovists,
the Liquidators and Trotskyites, happily co-operated, pretend
ing that they were a "real" party. It is well known that this
patchwork "party" pursued the aim of destroying the Bolshevik
Party. What was the nature of "our disagreements" at that
time? It was that Leninism regarded the destruction of the
August bloc as a guarantee of the development of the proletar

ian party, whereas Trotskyism regarded that bloc as the basis
for building a "real" party.
Again, as you see, we have two opposite lines.
Thirdly. Trotskyism is distrust of the leaders of Bolshe
vism, an attempt to discredit, to defame them. I do not know
of a single trend in the Party that could compare with Trotsky
ism in the matter of discrediting the leaders of Leninism or
the central institutions of the Party. For example, what should
be said of Trotsky's "polite" opinion of Lenin, whom he
described as "a professional exploiter of every kind of back
wardness in the Russian working-class movement" (ibid.)?
And this is far from being the most "polite" of the "polite"
opinions Trotsky has expressed.
How could it happen that Trotsky, who carried such a
nasty stock-in-trade on his back, found himself, after all, in
the ranks of the Bolsheviks during the October movement?
It happened because at that time Trotsky abandoned (actually
did abandon) that stock-in-trade; he hid it in the cupboard.
Had he not performed that "operation," real co-operation with
him would have been impossible. The theory of the August
bloc, i.e., the theory of unity with the Mensheviks, had already
been shattered and thrown overboard by the revolution, for
how could there be any talk about unity when an armed strug
gle was raging between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks?
Trotsky had no alternative but to admit that this theory was
useless.
The same misadventure "happened" to the theory of per

manent revolution, for not a single Bolshevik contemplated
the immediate seizure of power on the morrow of the February
Revolution, and Trotsky could not help knowing that the Bol
sheviks would not allow him, in the words of Lenin, "to play
at the seizure of power." Trotsky had no alternative but rec

ognise the Bolsheviks' policy of fighting for influence in the
Soviets, of fighting to win over the peasantry. As regards the
third specific feature of Trotskyism (distrust of the Bolshevik
leaders), it naturally had to retire into the background owing
to the obvious failure of the first two features.
Under those circumstances, could Trotsky do anything else

but hide his stock-in-trade in the cupboard and follow the Bol
sheviks, considering that he had no group of his own of any
significance, and that he came to the Bolsheviks as a political
eh
individual, without an army? Of course, he could not!
What is the lesson to be learnt from this? Only one: that
prolonged collaboration between the Leninists and Trotsky
is possible only if the latter completely abandons his old stock
in-trade, only if he completely accepts Leninism. Trotsky
writes about the lessons of October, but he forgets that, in
addition to all the other lessons, there is one more lesson of
October, the one I have just mentioned, which is of prime im
portance for Trotskyism. Trotskyism ought to learn that lesson
of October too. Lubi
It is evident, however, that Trotskyism has not learnt that

lesson. The fact of the matter is that the old stock-in-trade
of Trotskyism that was hidden in the cupboard in the period

of the October movement is now being dragged into the light
again in the hope that a market will be found for it, seeing that
the market in our country is expanding. Undoubtedly, Trots
ky's new literary pronouncements are an attempt to revert to
Trotskyism, to "overcome" Leninism, to drag in, implant, all
the specific features of Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism is
not a mere repetition of the old Trotskyism; its feathers have
been plucked and it is rather bedraggled; it is incomparably
milder in spirit and more moderate in form than the old Trots
kyism; but, in essence, it undoubtedly retains all the specific

features of the old Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does not
dare to come out as a militant force against Leninism; it
prefers to operate under the common flag of Leninism, under
the slogan of interpreting, improving Leninism. That is be
cause it is weak. It cannot be regarded as an accident that the
appearance of the new Trotskyism coincided with Lenin's
departure. In Lenin's lifetime it would not have dared to take
this risky step.
What are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism?
1) On the question of "permanent" revolution. The new
Trotskyism does not deem it necessary openly to uphold the
theory of "permanent" revolution. It "simply" asserts that
the October Revolution fully confirmed the idea of "per
manent" revolution. From this it draws the following conclu
sion: the important and acceptable part of Leninism is the
part that came after the war, in the period of the October Rev
olution; on the other hand, the part of Leninism that existed
before the war, before the October Revolution, is wrong and
unacceptable. Hence, the Trotskyites' theory of the division
of Leninism into two parts: pre-war Leninism, the "old,"
"useless" Leninism with its idea of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and peasantry, and the new, post-war, October
Leninism, which they count on adapting to the requirements
of Trotskyism. Trotskyism needs this theory of the division of
Leninism as a first, more or less "acceptable" step that is
necessary to facilitate further steps in its struggle against
Leninism.
eps in its st
But Leninism is not an eclectic theory stuck together out of
diverse elements and capable of being cut into parts. Leninism
is an integral theory, which arose in 1903, has passed the test of
three revolutions, and is now being carried forward as the

battle-flag of the world proletariat.
"Bolshevism," Lenin said, "as a trend of political thought and as a
political party, has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism
during the whole period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why
it was able to build up and to maintain under most difficult conditions
the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat" (see Vol.
XXV, p. 174).[1]
Bolshevism and Leninism are one. They are two names for
one and the same thing. Hence, the theory of the division of
Leninism into two parts is a theory intended to destroy Lenin
ism, to substitute Trotskyism for Leninism.
Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this
grotesque theory.uit
2) On the question of the Party principle. The old Trots
kyism tried to undermine the Bolshevik Party principle by
means of the theory (and practice) of unity with the Menshe
viks. But that theory has suffered such disgrace that nobody
now even wants to mention it. To undermine the Party prin
ciple, present-day Trotskyism has invented the new, less
odious and almost "democratic" theory of contrasting the old
cadres to the younger Party members. According to Trotsky
ism, our Party has not a single and integral history. Trotskyism
divides the history of our Party into two parts of unequal
importance: pre-October and post-October. The pre-October
part of the history of our Party is, properly speaking, not
history, but "pre-history," the unimportant or, at all events,
not very important preparatory period of our Party. The
post-October part of the history of our Party, however, is real,
genuine history. In the former, there are the "old," "pre
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. II. One

of the Fundamental Conditions for the Bolsheviks' Success. (1920)
historic," unimportant cadres of our Party. In the latter there

is the new, real, "historic" Party. It scarcely needs proof that
this singular scheme of the history of the Party is a scheme to
disrupt the unity between the old and the new cadres of our
Party, a scheme to destroy the Bolshevik Party principle.
Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this
grotesque scheme.
3) On the question of the leaders of Bolshevism. The old
Trotskyism tried to discredit Lenin more or less openly, with
out fearing the consequences. The new Trotskyism is more
cautious. It tries to achieve the purpose of the old Trotskyism
by pretending to praise, to exalt Lenin. I think it is worth
while quoting a few examples.
The Party knows that Lenin was a relentless revolutionary;
but it knows also that he was cautious, that he disliked reckless
people and often, with a firm hand, restrained those who were
infatuated with terrorism, including Trotsky himself. Trotsky
touches on this subject in his book On Lenin, but from his
portrayal of Lenin one might think that all Lenin did was
"at every opportunity to din into people's minds the idea
that terrorism was inevitable." The impression is created
that Lenin was the most bloodthirsty of all the bloodthirsty
Bolsheviks.
For what purpose did Trotsky need this uncalled-for and

totally unjustified exaggeration?
The Party knows that Lenin was an exemplary Party man,
who did not like to settle questions alone, without the leading
collective body, on the spur of the moment, without careful
investigation and verification. Trotsky touches upon this
aspect, too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that
of Lenin, but of a sort of Chinese mandarin, who settles im
portant questions in the quiet of his study, by intuition.
Do you want to know how our Party settled the question

of dispersing the Constituent Assembly? Listen to Trotsky:1
"Of course, the Constituent Assembly will have to be
dispersed,' said Lenin, 'but what about the Left Socialist
Revolutionaries?'
"But our apprehensions were greatly allayed by old Natan

son. He came in to 'take counsel' with us, and after the first
few words he said:
"We shall probably have to disperse the Constituent

Assembly by force.'
'Bravo!' exclaimed Lenin. 'What is true is true! But will
your people agree to it?'

"Some of our people are wavering, but I think that in the
end they will agree,' answered Natanson."
That is how history is written.
Do you want to know how the Party settled the question
Chi
about the Supreme Military Council? Listen to Trotsky:
'Unless we have serious and experienced military experts
we shall never extricate ourselves from this chaos,' I said to
Vladimir Ilyich after every visit to the Staff.

""That is evidently true, but they might betray us. .
''Let us attach a commissar to each of them.'

66
"Two would be better,' exclaimed Lenin, and strong

handed ones. There surely must be strong-handed Commu
nists in our ranks.'
Furnit"That is how the structure of the Supreme Military Council

arose."
That is how Trotsky writes history.

Why did Trotsky need these "Arabian Nights" stories
derogatory to Lenin? Was it to exalt V. I. Lenin, the leader
of the Party? It doesn't look like it. shog
The Party knows that Lenin was the greatest Marxist of

our times, a profound theoretician and a most experienced
revolutionary, to whom any trace of Blanquism was alien.
Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But the
portrait he paints is not that of the giant Lenin, but of a dwarf
like Blanquist who, in the October days, advises the Party
"to take power by its own hand, independently of and behind
the back of the Soviet." I have already said, however, that
there is not a scrap of truth in this description.
Why did Trotsky need this flagrant . . inaccuracy? Is
.
this not an attempt to discredit Lenin "just a little"?
Such are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism.
What is the danger of this new Trotskyism? It is that Trots
kyism, owing to its entire inner content, stands every chance
of becoming the centre and rallying point of the non
proletarian elements who are striving to weaken, to disinte
grate the proletarian dictatorship.
You will ask: what is to be done now? What are the Party's
immediate tasks in connection with Trotsky's new literary

pronouncements?
Trotskyism is taking action now in order to discredit Bol
shevism and to undermine its foundations. It is the duty of
the Party to bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend.
There is talk about repressive measures against the opposi
tion and about the possibility of a split. That is nonsense, com
rades. Our Party is strong and mighty. It will not allow any
splits. As regards repressive measures, I am emphatically
opposed to them. What we need now is not repressive meas
ures, but an extensive ideological struggle against renascent
Trotskyism.
138 SM ON THE OPPOSITION ST
to We did not want and did not strive for this literary discus
sion. Trotskyism is forcing it upon us by its anti-Leninist
pronouncements. Well, we are ready, comrades. sloven
er sich
Pravda, No. 269,
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November 26, 1924
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of the Party? I maiyalatorT
DOW
nottuloyed abricslong
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
AND THE TACTICS
OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS
Preface to the Book "On the Road to October"
THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SETTING

FOR THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
Three circumstances of an external nature determined the
comparative ease with which the proletarian revolution in

Russia succeeded in breaking the chains of imperialism and
thus overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie.
Firstly, the circumstance that the October Revolution began
in a period of desperate struggle between the two principal
imperialist groups, the Anglo-French and the Austro-German;
at a time when, engaged in mortal struggle between themselves,
these two groups had neither the time nor the means to devote
serious attention to the struggle against the October Revolu
tion. This circumstance was of tremendous importance for the
139
October Revolution, for it enabled it to take advantage of the

fierce conflicts within the imperialist world to strengthen and
organise its own forces.
Secondly, the circumstance that the October Revolution
began during the imperialist war, at a time when the labouring
masses, exhausted by the war and thirsting for peace, were
by the very logic of facts led up to the proletarian revolution
as the only way out of the war. This circumstance was of
extreme importance for the October Revolution, for it put
into its hands the mighty weapon of peace, made it easier for
it to link the Soviet revolution with the ending of the hated
war, and thus created mass sympathy for it both in the West,
among the workers, and in the East, among the oppressed
don
peoples.
Thirdly, the existence of a powerful working-class move
ment in Europe and the fact that a revolutionary crisis was
maturing in the West and in the East, brought on by the
protracted imperialist war. This circumstance was of inesti
mable importance for the revolution in Russia, for it ensured
the revolution faithful allies outside Russia in its struggle
against world imperialism.
But in addition to circumstances of an external nature, there
were also a number of favourable internal conditions which
facilitated the victory of the October Revolution.

Of these conditions, the following must be regarded as the
chief ones:
Firstly, the October Revolution enjoyed the most active sup
port of the overwhelming majority of the working class in
Russia. latama
Secondly, it enjoyed the undoubted support of the poor

peasants and of the majority of the soldiers, who were thirsting
for peace and land.
OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND TACTICS 141
Thirdly, it had at its head, as its guiding force, such a tried

and tested party as the Bolshevik Party, strong not only by
reason of its experience and discipline acquired through the
years, but also by reason of its vast connections with the labour
ing masses.
Fourthly, the October Revolution was confronted by ene

mies who were comparatively easy to overcome, such as the
rather weak Russian bourgeoisie, a landlord class which was
utterly demoralised by peasant "revolts," and the compromis
ing parties (the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries),
which had become completely bankrupt during the war.
Fifthly, it had at its disposal the vast expanses of the young
state, in which it was able to manoeuvre freely, retreat when
circumstances so required, enjoy a respite, gather strength, etc.
Sixthly, in its struggle against counter-revolution the Oc
tober Revolution could count upon sufficient resources of
food, fuel and raw materials within the country.
The combination of these external and internal circum
stances created that peculiar situation which determined the

comparative ease with which the October Revolution won its
victory.
This does not mean, of course, that there were no unfavour
able features in the external and internal setting of the October
Revolution. Think of such an unfavourable feature as, for ex
ample, the isolation, to some extent, of the October Revolution,

the absence near it, or bordering on it, of a Soviet country on
which it could rely for support. Undoubtedly, the future rev
olution, for example, in Germany, will be in a more favourable
situation in this respect, for it has in close proximity a powerful
Soviet country like our Soviet Union. I need not mention so
unfavourable a feature of the October Revolution as the

absence of a proletarian majority within the country.
But these unfavourable features only emphasise the tre
mendous importance of the peculiar internal and external con
ditions of the October Revolution of which I have spoken
above.
These peculiar conditions must not be lost sight of for a

single moment. They must be borne in mind particularly in
analysing the events of the autumn of 1923 in Germany. Above
all, they should be borne in mind by Trotsky, who draws an
unfounded analogy between the October Revolution and the
revolution in Germany and lashes violently at the German
ferment
Communist Party for its actual and alleged mistakes.
WE
"It was easy for Russia," says Lenin, "in the specific, historically
very special situation of 1917, to start the socialist revolution, but it
will be more difficult for Russia than for the European countries to
continue the revolution and carry it through to the end. I had occasion
to point this out already at the beginning of 1918, and our experience of
the past two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this view.
Such specific conditions, as(1) the possibility of linking up the Soviet
revolution with the ending, as a consequence of this revolution, of the
imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an
incredible degree; (2) the possibility of taking advantage for a certain
time of the mortal conflict between two world-powerful groups of im
perialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy;
the possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly
owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of
communication;(4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic
revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the pro
letariat was able to take the revolutionary demands of the peasant party
(the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the majority of the members of which
were definitely hostile to Bolshevism) and realise them at once, thanks to
the conquest of political power by the proletariat - such specific conditions
do not exist in Western Europe at present; and a repetition of such
or similar conditions will not come so easily. That, by the way, apart
from a number of other causes, is why it will be more difficult for
Western Europe to start a socialist revolution than it was for us" (see
Vol. XXV, p. 205). [¹]
These words of Lenin's should not be forgotten.
II
TWO SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE OCTOBER

REVOLUTION OR OCTOBER AND
TROTSKY'S THEORY OF "PERMANENT"

diorstodilyUN REVOLUTION
There are two specific features of the October Revolution

which must be understood first of all if we are to comprehend
the inner meaning and the historical significance of that
revolution.
What are these features?
Firstly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat was

born in our country as a power which came into existence on
the basis of an alliance between the proletariat and the labour
ing masses of the peasantry, the latter being led by the pro
letariat. Secondly, the fact that the dictatorship of the
proletariat became established in our country as a result of
the victory of socialism in one country - a country in which
capitalism was little developed while capitalism was pre
-
served in other countries where capitalism was more highly

developed. This does not mean, of course, that the October
Revolution has no other specific features. But it is precisely
these two specific features that are important for us at the
present moment, not only because they distinctly express the
Linow
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VII.

Should We Participate in Bourgeois Parliaments? (1920)
essence of the October Revolution, but also because they bril

liantly reveal the opportunist nature of the theory of "per
manent revolution."
Let us briefly examine these features.

The question of the labouring masses of the petty bour
geoisie, both urban and rural, the question of winning these
masses to the side of the proletariat, is highly important for
the proletarian revolution. Whom will the labouring people
of town and country support in the struggle for power, the
bourgeoisie or the proletariat; whose reserve will they become,
the reserve of the bourgeoisie or the reserve of the proletariat
on this depend the fate of the revolution and the stability
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolutions in France
in 1848 and 1871 came to grief chiefly because the peasant
reserves proved to be on the side of the bourgeoisie. The
October Revolution was victorious because it was able to
deprive the bourgeoisie of its peasant reserves, because it was

able to win these reserves to the side of the proletariat, and
because in this revolution the proletariat proved to be the
only guiding force for the vast masses of the labouring people
of town and country.
He who has not understood this will never understand either
the character of the October Revolution, or the nature of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, or the specific characteristics of

the internal policy of our proletarian power.
The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a govern
mental top stratum "skilfully" "selected" by the careful hand
of an "experienced strategist," and "judiciously relying" on
the support of one section or another of the population. The
dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance between the
proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the
purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory
of socialism, on the condition that the guiding force of this

alliance is the proletariat.
Thus, it is not a question of "slightly" underestimating or
"slightly" overestimating the revolutionary potentialities of
the peasant movement, as certain diplomatic advocates of "per
manent revolution" are now fond of expressing it. It is a
question of the nature of the new proletarian state which arose
as a result of the October Revolution. It is a question of the
character of the proletarian power, of the foundations of the
dictatorship of the proletariat itself.
"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a special form
of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working
people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the
petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia,
etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance
aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression
of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at
restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolidation
of socialism" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).
And further on:
"The dictatorship of the proletariat, if we translate this Latin, scientific,

historical-philosophical term into simpler language, means the following:
"Only a definite class, namely, the urban workers and the factory,
industrial workers in general, is able to lead the whole mass of the
toilers and exploited in the struggle for the overthrow of the yoke of
capital, in the process of the overthrow itself, in the struggle to maintain
and consolidate the victory, in the work of creating the new, socialist
social system, in the whole struggle for the complete abolition of classes"
(see Vol. XXIV, p. 336). [²]
Such is the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat given

by Lenin.
[¹] Lenin, Foreword to the Published Speech "Deception of the People

with Slogans of Freedom and Equality." (1919)
[2] Lenin, A Great Beginning. (1919)

One of the specific features of the October Revolution is the

fact that this revolution represents a classic application of
Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Some comrades believe that this theory is a purely "Russian"
theory, applicable only to Russian conditions. That is wrong.
It is absolutely wrong. In speaking of the labouring masses of
the non-proletarian classes which are led by the proletariat,
Lenin has in mind not only the Russian peasants, but also the
labouring elements of the border regions of the Soviet Union,
which until recently were colonies of Russia. Lenin constantly
reiterated that without an alliance with these masses of other
nationalities the proletariat of Russia could not achieve victory.

In his articles on the national question and in his speeches at
the congresses of the Comintern, Lenin repeatedly said that the
victory of the world revolution was impossible without a
revolutionary alliance, a revolutionary bloc, between the pro
letariat of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of
the enslaved colonies. But what are colonies if not the op
pressed labouring masses, and, primarily, the labouring masses

of the peasantry? Who does not know that the question of
emancipating the colonies is essentially a question of eman
cipating the labouring masses of the non-proletarian classes
from the oppression and exploitation of finance capital?
But from this it follows that Lenin's theory of the dictator
ship of the proletariat is not a purely "Russian" theory, but a
theory which necessarily applies to all countries. Bolshevism
is not only a Russian phenomenon. "Bolshevism," says Lenin,
is "a model of tactics for all" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 386).[¹]
[1] Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky. What
Is Internationalism? (1918)
Such are the characteristics of the first specific feature of

the October Revolution.
How do matters stand with regard to Trotsky's theory of

"permanent revolution" in the light of this specific feature of
the October Revolution?
We shall not dwell at length on Trotsky's position in 1905,

when he "simply" forgot all about the peasantry as a revolu
tionary force and advanced the slogan of "no tsar, but a work
ers' government," that is, the slogan of revolution without the
peasantry. Even Radek, that diplomatic defender of "per
manent revolution," is now obliged to admit that "permanent
revolution" in 1905 meant a "leap into the air" away from
reality. Now, apparently everyone admits that it is not worth
while bothering with this "leap into the air" any more.
Nor shall we dwell at length on Trotsky's position in the
period of the war, say, in 1915, when, in his article "The Strug
gle for Power," proceeding from the fact that "we are living
in the era of imperialism," that imperialism "sets up not the
bourgeois nation in opposition to the old regime, but the pro
letariat in opposition to the bourgeois nation," he arrived at
the conclusion that the revolutionary role of the peasantry was
bound to subside, that the slogan of the confiscation of the
land no longer had the same importance as formerly. It is well
known that at that time, Lenin, examining this article of
Trotsky's, accused him of "denying" "the role of the peas
antry," and said that "Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal
labour politicians in Russia who understand 'denial' of the
role of the peasantry to mean refusal to rouse the peasants to
revolution!" (See Vol. XVIII, p. 318.) [¹]
[1] Lenin, On the Two Lines in the Revolution. (1915)

Let us rather pass on to the later works of Trotsky on this

subject, to the works of the period when the proletarian dic
tatorship had already become established and when Trotsky
had had the opportunity to test his theory of "permanent rev
olution" in the light of actual events and to correct his errors.
Let us take Trotsky's "Preface" to his book The Year 1905,
written in 1922. Here is what Trotsky says in this "Preface"
concerning "permanent revolution":
"It was precisely during the interval between January 9 and the
October strike of 1905 that the views on the character of the revolutionary
development of Russia which came to be known as the theory of 'per
manent revolution' crystallised in the author's mind. This abstruse term
represented the idea that the Russian revolution, whose immediate
objectives were bourgeois in nature, could not, however, stop when these
objectives had been achieved. The revolution would not be able to solve
its immediate bourgeois problems except by placing the proletariat in
power. And the latter, upon assuming power, would not be able to
confine itself to the bourgeois limits of the revolution. On the contrary,
precisely in order to ensure its victory, the proletarian vanguard would
be forced in the very early stages of its rule to make deep inroads not
only into feudal property but into bourgeois property as well. In this
it would come into hostile collision not only with all the bourgeois group
ings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of its revolu
tionary struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasantry with
whose assistance it came into power. The contradictions in the position
of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelmingly
peasant population could be solved only on an international scale, in the
care, in th
arena of the world proletarian revolution."*
That is what Trotsky says about his "permanent revolution."

One need only compare this quotation with the above quota
tions from Lenin's works on the dictatorship of the proletariat
to perceive the great chasm that separates Lenin's theory of
the dictatorship of the proletariat from Trotsky's theory of
"permanent revolution."
*My italics. - J. St.

Lenin speaks of the alliance between the proletariat and the

labouring strata of the peasantry as the basis of the dictatorship
of the proletariat. Trotsky sees a "hostile collision" between
"the proletarian vanguard" and "the broad masses of the
peasantry."
Lenin speaks of the leadership of the toiling and exploited
masses by the proletariat. Trotsky sees "contradictions in the
position of a workers' government in a backward country with
an overwhelmingly peasant population."
According to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength pri
marily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself.
According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found only
"in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."
But what if the world revolution is fated to arrive with
some delay? Is there any ray of hope for our revolution?

Trotsky offers no ray of hope, for "the contradictions in the
position of a workers' government . . . could be solved only
in the arena of the world proletarian revolution." Ac
cording to this plan, there is but one prospect left for our rev
olution: to vegetate in its own contradictions and rot away
while waiting for the world revolution.
What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to
Lenin?
The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which rests

on an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses
of the peasantry for "the complete overthrow of capital" and
for "the final establishment and consolidation of socialism."
What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to
Trotsky?
The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which comes
"into hostile collision" with "the broad masses of the peas
antry" and seeks the solution of its "contradictions" only "in

the arena of the world proletarian revolution."
What difference is there between this "theory of permanent
revolution" and the well-known theory of Menshevism which
repudiates the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat?
Essentially, there is no difference.
de n
There can be no doubt at all. "Permanent revolution" is
not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities

of the peasant movement. "Permanent revolution" is an
underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the
repudiation of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
Trotsky's "permanent revolution" is a variety of Menshe
vism.
t
This is how matters stand with regard to the first specific
feature of the October Revolution.
What are the characteristics of the second specific feature of

the October Revolution?
In his study of imperialism, especially in the period of the

war, Lenin arrived at the law of the uneven, spasmodic, eco
nomic and political development of the capitalist countries.
According to this law, the development of enterprises, trusts,
branches of industry and individual countries proceeds not
evenly - not according to an established sequence, not in such
-
a way that one trust, one branch of industry or one country is

always in advance of the others, while other trusts or countries
keep consistently one behind the other but spasmodically,
-
with interruptions in the development of some countries and

leaps ahead in the development of others. Under these circum
stances the "quite legitimate" striving of the countries that
have slowed down to hold their old positions, and the equally
"legitimate" striving of the countries that have leapt ahead to
seize new positions, lead to a situation in which armed clashes

among the imperialist countries become an inescapable neces
sity. Such was the case, for example, with Germany, which
half a century ago was a backward country in comparison with
France and Britain. The same must be said of Japan as com
pared with Russia. It is well known, however, that by the
beginning of the twentieth century Germany and Japan had
leapt so far ahead that Germany had succeeded in overtaking
France and had begun to press Britain hard on the world
market, while Japan was pressing Russia. As is well known,
it was from these contradictions that the recent imperialist war
arose.
This law proceeds from the following:

1) "Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial op
pression and of the financial strangulation of the vast majority
of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced'
countries" (see Preface to French edition of Lenin's Imperial
HOICION
ism, Vol. XIX, p. 74);[¹].[1]
2) "This 'booty' is shared between two or three powerful

world robbers armed to the teeth (America, Britain, Japan),
who involve the whole world in their war over the sharing
of their booty" (ibid.);
3) The growth of contradictions within the world system of
financial oppression and the inevitability of armed clashes lead
to the world front of imperialism becoming easily vulnerable
to revolution, and to a breach in this front in individual coun
tries becoming probable;
4) This breach is most likely to occur at those points, and
in those countries, where the chain of the imperialist front is
12201103
[1] Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Preface to
the French and German Editions. (1920)
weakest, that is to say, where imperialism is least consolidated,

and where it is easiest for a revolution to expand; dome
5) In view of this, the victory of socialism in one country,
even if that country is less developed in the capitalist sense,
while capitalism remains in other countries, even if those coun
tries are more highly developed in the capitalist sense - is
quite possible and probable.
Such, briefly, are the foundations of Lenin's theory of the
proletarian revolution.
What is the second specific feature of the October Revolu
MARSHAL
tion?
3.0
The second specific feature of the October Revolution lies
in the fact that this revolution represents a model of the prac
tical application of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.
He who has not understood this specific feature of the
October Revolution will never understand eith he interna
tional nature of this revolution, or its colossal international

might, or the specific features of its foreign policy.
14
"Uneven economic and political development," says Lenin, "is an
absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible
first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The
victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists
and organised its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest
of the world, the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed
classes of other countries, raising revolts in those countries against the
capitalists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed force
against the exploiting classes and their states." For "the free union of na
tions in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stub
born struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states" (see Vol.
XVIII, pp. 232-33).[¹]
The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian

revolution can begin - if it is to begin anywhere at all, accord
[1] Lenin, The United States of Europe Slogan. (1915)

ing to their theory only in industrially developed countries,

and that the more highly developed these countries are indus
trially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism.
Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of
socialism in one country, and one in which capitalism is little
developed at that, is excluded as something absolutely im
probable. As far back as the period of the war, Lenin, taking
as his basis the law of the uneven development of the imperial
ist states, opposed to the opportunists his theory of the proletar
ian revolution about the victory of socialism in one country,
even if that country is one in which capitalism is less developed.
It is well known that the October Revolution fully confirmed
the correctness of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolution.
How do matters stand with Trotsky's "permanent revolu
tion" in the light of Lenin's theory of the victory of the proletar
ian revolution in one country?
Let us take Trotsky's pamphlet Our Revolution (1906).
Trotsky writes:
"Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the work
ing class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to
transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we
cannot doubt for an instant."
What does this quotation mean? It means that the victory

of socialism in one country, in this case Russia, is impossible
"without direct state support from the European proletariat,"
i.e., before the European proletariat has conquered power.
What is there in common between this "theory" and Lenin's
thesis on the possibility of the victory of socialism "in one
capitalist country taken separately"?
Clearly, there is nothing in common.
But let us assume that Trotsky's pamphlet, which was
published in 1906, at a time when it was difficult to determine
the character of our revolution, contains inadvertent errors

and does not fully correspond to Trotsky's views at a later
period. Let us examine another pamphlet written by Trotsky,
his Peace Programme, which appeared before the October Rev
olution of 1917 and has now (1924) been republished in his
book The Year 1917. In this pamphlet Trotsky criticises Lenin's
theory of the proletarian revolution about the victory of
socialism in one country and opposes to it the slogan of a
United States of Europe. He asserts that the victory of social
ism in one country is impossible, that the victory of socialism
is possible only as the victory of several of the principal coun
tries of Europe (Britain, Russia, Germany), which combine
into a United States of Europe; otherwise it is not possible at
all. He says quite plainly that "a victorious revolution in Rus
sia or in Britain is inconceivable without a revolution in Ger
many, and vice versa."
"The only more or less concrete historical argument," says Trotsky,

"advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was formulated
in the Swiss Sotsial-Demokrat (at that time the central organ of the
Bolsheviks J. St.) in the following sentence: 'Uneven economic and
political development is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the
Sotsial-Demokrat draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is
possible in one country, and that therefore there is no reason to make
the dictatorship of the proletariat in each separate country contingent
upon the establishment of a United States of Europe. That capitalist
development in different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrover
tible argument. But this unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The
capitalist level of Br Austria, Germany or France is not identical.
But in comparison with Africa and Asia all these countries represent
capitalist 'Europe,' which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That
no country in its struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought
which it is useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of
concurrent international action may not be replaced by the idea of
temporising international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we
begin and continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our
initiative will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if
this should not occur, it would be hopeless to think -as historical ex

perience and theoretical considerations testify that, for example, a
revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe,
or that a socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world."
H
As you see, we have before us the same theory of the
simultaneous victory of socialism in the principal countries of
Europe which, as a rule, excludes Lenin's theory of revolution
about the victory of socialism in one country.
It goes without saying that for the complete victory of social
ism, for a complete guarantee against the restoration of the old
order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several coun
tries are necessary. It goes without saying that, without the
support given to our revolution by the proletariat of Europe,
the proletariat of Russia could not have held out against
the general onslaught, just as without the support given by
the revolution in Russia to the revolutionary movement in
the West the latter could not have developed at the pace
at which it has begun to develop since the establishment of
the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. It goes without saying
that we need support. But what does support of our revo
lution by the West-European proletariat imply? Is not the
sympathy of the European workers for our revolution, their
readiness to thwart the imperialists' plans of intervention
is not all this support, real assistance? Unquestionably it is.
Without such support, without such assistance, not only from
the European workers but also from the colonial and depend
ent countries, the proletarian dictatorship in Russia would
have been hard pressed. Up to now, has this sympathy and
this assistance, coupled with the might of our Red Army and
the readiness of the workers and peasants of Russia to defend
their socialist fatherland to the last has all this been suffi
-
cient to beat off the attacks of the imperialists and to win us

the necessary conditions for the serious work of construction?
Yes, it has been sufficient. Is this sympathy growing stronger,

or is it waning? Unquestionably, it is growing stronger. Hence,
have we favourable conditions, not only for pushing on with
the organising of socialist economy, but also, in our turn, for
giving support to the West-European workers and to the
oppressed peoples of the East? Yes, we have. This is eloquent
ly proved by the seven years' history of the proletarian dicta
torship in Russia. Can it be denied that a mighty wave of
labour enthusiasm has already risen in our country? No, it can
10
not be denied.
After all this, what does Trotsky's assertion that a revolu
tionary Russia could not hold out in the face of a conservative
Europe signify?
It can signify only this: firstly, that Trotsky does not appre
ciate the inherent strength of our revolution; secondly, that
Trotsky does not understand the inestimable importance of the
moral support which is given to our revolution by the workers
of the West and the peasants of the East; thirdly, that Trotsky
does not perceive the internal infirmity which is consuming
imperialism today. ya hotel
Carried away by his criticism of Lenin's theory of the pro

letarian revolution, Trotsky unwittingly dealt himself a smash
ing blow in his pamphlet Peace Programme which appeared
in 1917 and was republished in 1924.
But perhaps this pamphlet, too, has become out date and
has ceased for some reason or other to correspond to Trotsky's
present views? Let us take his later works, written after the
victory of the proletarian revolution in one country, in Russia.
Let us take, for example, Trotsky's "Postscript," written in
1922, for the new edition of his pamphlet Peace Programme.
Here is what he says in this "Postscript":
"The assertion reiterated several times in the Peace Programme that

a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national
bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the
nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a con
clusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has
held out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country
at that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other,
more advanced, more civilised countries will be truly capable of perform
ing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically
and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the crea
tion of a socialist society. . . . As long as the bourgeoisie remains in
power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our
struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreements with the
capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that
these agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic
ills, to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist
economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the
proletariat in the major European countries."
Thus speaks Trotsky, plainly sinning against reality and

stubbornly trying to save his "permanent revolution" from
final shipwreck.
It appears, then, that, twist and turn as you like, we not
only have "not arrived," but we have "not even begun to
arrive" at the creation of a socialist society. It appears that
some people have been hoping for "agreements with the capi
talist world," but it also appears that nothing will come of these
agreements, for, twist and turn as you like, "real progress of
a socialist economy" will not be possible until the proletariat
has been victorious in the "major European countries."
Well, then, since there is still no victory in the West, the
only "choice" that remains for the revolution in Russia is:
either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state.
It is no accident that Trotsky has been talking for two years
now about the "degeneration" of our Party.

It is no accident that last year Trotsky prophesied the

"doom" of our country.
How can this strange "theory" be reconciled with Lenin's
theory of the "victory of socialism in one country"?
How can this strange "prospect" be reconciled with Lenin's
view that the New Economic Policy will enable us "to build
the foundations of socialist economy"?
How can this "permanent" hopelessness be reconciled, for
instance, with the following words of Lenin:
"Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract

picture, or an icon. We still retain our old bad opinion of icons. We
have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must find our
way. This is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me to
conclude by expressing the conviction that, difficult as this task may be,
new as it may be compared with our previous task, and no matter how
many difficulties it may entail, we shall all not in one day, but in the
-
course of several years - all of us together fulfil it whatever happens so

that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 366). [¹]
Tre Pict
How can this "permanent" gloominess of Trotsky's be rec
onciled, for instance, with the following words of Lenin:
"As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of pro
duction, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this
proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the
assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc. is not this
all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society from the
co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked
down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the
right to look down upon as such now, under the NEP? Is this not all
that is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet
the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and suffi
cient for this building" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392). [2] Ento
=
[1] Lenin, Speech at a Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet. November
20, 1922.
[2] Lenin, On Co-operation. (1923)

It is plain that these two views are incompatible and cannot

in any way be reconciled. Trotsky's "permanent revolution"
is the repudiation of Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolu
tion; and conversely, Lenin's theory of the proletarian revolu
tion is the repudiation of the theory of "permanent revolution."
Lack of faith in the strength and capacities of our revolution,
lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the Russian pro
letariat that is what lies at the root of the theory of "per
L
manent revolution."
Hitherto only one aspect of the theory of "permanent rev
olution" has usually been noted - lack of faith in the revolu
-
tionary potentialities of the peasant movement. Now, in

fairness, this must be supplemented by another aspect. lack
of faith in the strength and capacity of the proletariat in Russia.
What difference is there between Trotsky's theory and the
ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism in
one country, and in a backward country at that, is impossible
without the preliminary victory of the proletarian revolution
"in the principal countries of Western Europe"?
Essentially, there is no difference.
There can be no doubt at all. Trotsky's theory of "perma
nent revolution" is a variety of Menshevism.
Of late rotten diplomats have appeared in our press who
try to palm off the theory of "permanent revolution" as some
thing compatible with Leninism. Of course, they say, this theory
proved to be worthless in 1905; but the mistake Trotsky made
was that he ran too far ahead at that time, in an attempt to
apply to the situation in 1905 what could not then be applied.
But later, they say, in October 1917, for example, when the
revolution had had time to mature completely, Trotsky's
theory proved to be quite appropriate. It is not difficult to
guess that the chief of these diplomats is Radek. Here, if you

please, is what he says:
"The war created a chasm between the peasantry, which was striving
to win land and peace, and the petty-bourgeois parties; the war placed
the peasantry under the leadership of the working class and of its
vanguard, the Bolshevik Party. This rendered possible, not the dictator
hip of the king class and peasantry, but the dictatorship of the
working class relying on the peasantry. What Rosa Luxemburg and
Trotsky advanced against Lenin in 1905 (i.e., "permanent revolution" -
J. St.) proved, as a matter of fact, to be the second stage of the historic
development."
HOW
Here every statement is a distortion.

It is not true that the war "rendered possible, not the
dictatorship of the working class and peasantry, but the dicta
torship of the working class relying on the peasantry." Actual
ly, the February Revolution of 1917 was the materialisation of
the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, interwoven
in a peculiar way with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. ann
It is not true that the theory of "permanent revolution,"
which Radek bashfully refrains from mentioning, was advanced
in 1905 by Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. Actually, this
theory was advanced by Parvus and Trotsky. Now, ten
months later, Radek corrects himself and deems it necessary
to castigate Parvus for the theory of "permanent revolution."
But in all fairness Radek should also castigate Parvus' partner,
Trotsky.reds
It is not true that the theory of "permanent revolution,"
which was brushed aside by the 1905 revolution, proved to be
correct in the "second stage of the historic development," that
is, during the October Revolution. The whole course of the
October Revolution, its whole development, demonstrated
and proved the utter bankruptcy of the theory of "permanent
revolution" and its absolute incompatibility with the founda

tions of Leninism.
Honeyed speeches and rotten diplomacy cannot hide the

yawning chasm which lies between the theory of "permanent
revolution" and Leninism.
III
.
CERTAIN SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE TACTICS
OF THE BOLSHEVIKS DURING THE PERIOD
OF PREPARATION FOR OCTOBER
In order to understand the tactics pursued by the Bolsheviks

during the period of preparation for October we must get a
clear idea of at least some of the particularly important fea
tures of those tactics. This is all the more necessary since in
numerous pamphlets on the tactics of the Bolsheviks precisely
these features are frequently overlooked.
What are these features?
First specific feature.) If one were to listen to Trotsky, one Stralezy

would think that there were only two periods in the history of
the preparation for October: the period of reconnaissance and
the period of uprising, and that all else comes from the evil
one. What was the April demonstration of 1917? "The April
demonstration, which went more to the 'Left' than it should
have, was a reconnoitring sortie for the purpose of probing the

disposition of the masses and the relations between them and
the majority in the Soviets." And what was the July demon
stration of 1917? In Trotsky's opinion "this, too, was in fact
another, more extensive, reconnaissance at a new and higher
phase of the movement." Needless to say, the June demonstra
tion of 1917, which was organised at the demand of our Party,
should, according to Trotsky's idea, all the more be termed a

"reconnaissance." To thois
This would seem to imply that as early as March 1917, the

Bolsheviks had ready a political army of workers and peasants,
and that they did not bring this army into action for an
uprising in April, or in June, or in July, but engaged merely
in "reconnaissance," it was because, and only because, "the
information obtained from the reconnaissance" at the time was
unfavourable.
IT..B...
Needless to say, this oversimplified notion of the political
tactics of our Party is nothing but a confusion of ordinary
military tactics with the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks.
Actually, all these demonstrations were primarily the result
of the spontaneous pressure of the masses, the result of the fact
that the indignation of the masses against the war had boiled
over and sought an outlet in the streets.
Actually, the task of the Party at that time was to shape and
to guide the spontaneously arising demonstrations of the
masses along the line of the revolutionary slogans of the
Bolsheviks.
Actually, the Bolsheviks had no political army ready in

March 1917, nor could they have had one. The Bolsheviks built
still had up such an army (and had finally built it up by October 1917)
faith of only in the course of the struggle and conflicts of the classes
were between April and October 1917, rough the April demonstra
deceived tion, the June and July demonstrations, the elections to the
district and city Dumas, the struggle against the Kornilov
by M. 4& revolt, and the winning over of the Soviets. A political army
SR.
is not like a military army. A military command begins a war
with an army ready to hand, whereas the Party has to create its
army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of class
conflicts, as the masses themselves become convinced through

their own experience of the correctness of the Party's slogans
and policy.
Of course, every such demonstration at the same time threw
a certain amount of light on the hidden inter-relations of the
forces involved, provided certain reconnaissance information,
but this reconnaissance was not the motive for the demonstra
tion, but its natural result.
In analysing the events preceding the uprising in October

and comparing them with the events that marked the period
from April to July, Lenin says:
"The situation now is not at all what it was prior to April 20-21,
June 9, July 3, for then there was spontaneous excitement which we,
as a party, either failed to perceive (April 20) or tried to restrain and
shape into a peaceful demonstration (June 9 and July 3). For at that
time we were fully aware that the Soviets were not yet ours, that the
peasants still trusted the Lieber-Dan-Chernov course and not the Bolshe
vik course (uprising), and that, consequently, we could not have the
majority of the people behind us, and hence, an uprising was premature"
(see Vol. XXI, p. 345). [¹]
It is plain that "reconnaissance" alone does not get one very

far.dalo
Obviously, it was not a question of "reconnaissance," but of
the following:
1) all through the period of preparation for October the
Party invariably relied in its struggle upon the spontaneous
upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement;
2) while relying on the spontaneous upsurge, it maintained
its own undivided leadership of the movement;
3) this leadership of the movement helped it to form the
mass political army for the October uprising; th
[1] Lenin, Letter to Comrades. (1917)
4) this policy was bound to result in the entire preparation

for October proceeding under the leadership of one party, the
Bolshevik Party;
5) this preparation for October, in its turn, brought it about
that as a result of the October uprising power was concentrated
Tot
in the hands of one party, the Bolshevik Party.
Thus, the undivided leadership of one party, the Commu
nist Party, as the principal factor in the preparation for October
such is the characteristic feature of the October Revolution,
such is the first specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks

in the period of preparation for October.
It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of Bolshe
vik tactics the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in
the conditions of imperialism would have been impossible.
In this the October Revolution differs favourably from the
revolution of 1871 in France, where the leadership was divided
between two parties, neither of which could be called a Com
munist party.
strategy
egy Second specific feature. The preparation for October thus
actually proceeded under the leadership of one party, the Bolshevik
should be
Party. But how did the Party carry out this leadership, along
a tactic what line did the latter proceed? This leadership proceeded
along the line of isolating the compromising parties, as the
most dangerous groupings in the period of the outbreak of the
revolution, the line of isolating the Socialist-Revolutionaries
and Mensheviks.
implice
a
general What is the fundamental strategic rule of Leninism?
It is the recognition of the following:
rule.
1) the compromising parties are the most dangerous social
support of the enemies of the revolution in the period of the
approaching revolutionary outbreak;
unclear рабславал то
whether thin
that situation, or whether generally appliable

OCTOBER
REVOLUTION AND TACTICS 165
2) it is impossible to overthrow the enemy (tsarism or the

bourgeoisie) unless these parties are isolated; LR
3) the main weapons in the period of preparation for the
revolution must therefore be directed towards isolating these
parties, towards winning the broad masses of the working
people away from them.
In the period of the struggle against tsarism, in the period 1904-17
of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905
16), the most dangerous social support of tsarism was the
liberal-monarchist party, the Cadet Party. Why? Because it
was the compromising party, the party of compromise between
tsarism and the majority of the people, i.e., the peasantry as
a whole. Naturally, the Party at that time directed its main
blows at the Cadets, for unless the Cadets were isolated there
could be no hope of a rupture between the peasantry and

tsarism, and unless this rupture was ensured there could be no
hope of the victory of the revolution. Many people at that
time did not understand this specific feature of Bolshevik
strategy and accused the Bolsheviks of excessive "Cadetopho
bia"; they asserted that with the Bolsheviks the struggle
against the Cadets "overshadowed" the struggle against the
principal enemy - tsarism. But these accusations, for which
there was no justification, revealed an utter failure to under
stand the Bolshevik strategy, which called for the isolation of
the compromising party in order to facilitate, to hasten the
victory over the principal enemy.
It scarcely needs proof that without this strategy the
hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic rev
olution would have been impossible.
In the period of preparation for October the centre of grav- 1917 Feb
Oct
ity of the conflicting forces shifted to another plane. The
tsar was gone. The Cadet Party had been transformed from
a compromising force into a governing force, into the ruling

force of imperialism. Now the fight was no longer between
tsarism and the people, but between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. In this period the petty-bourgeois democratic
parties, the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Men
sheviks, were the most dangerous social support of imperialism.
[ Why? Because these parties were then the compromising par
ties, the parties of compromise between imperialism and the
labouring masses. Naturally, the Bolsheviks at that time
directed their main blows at these parties, for unless these
parties were isolated there could be no hope of a rupture
between the labouring masses and imperialism, and unless
this rupture was ensured there could be no hope of the victory
of the Soviet revolution. Many people at that time did not
understand this specific feature of the Bolshevik tactics and
accused the Bolsheviks of displaying "excessive hatred"
towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and of
"forgetting" the principal goal. But the entire period of prep

aration for October eloquently testifies to the fact that only
by pursuing these tactics could the Bolsheviks ensure the
victory of the October Revolution.
The characteristic feature of this period was the further rev
olutionisation of the labouring masses of the peasantry, their
disillusionment with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Men
sheviks, their defection from these parties, their turn towards

rallying directly around the proletariat as the only consistently
revolutionary force, capable of leading the country to peace.
The history of this period is the history of the struggle between
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, on the one hand,
and the Bolsheviks, on the other, for the labouring masses of

the peasantry, for winning over these masses. The outcome
of this struggle was decided by the coalition period, the
Kerensky period, the refusal of the Socialist-Revolutionaries

and the Mensheviks to confiscate the landlords' land, the fight
of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to continue
the war, the June offensive at the front, the introduction of
capital punishment for soldiers, the Kornilov revolt. And
they decided the issue of this struggle entirely in favour of the
Bolshevik strategy; for had not the Socialist-Revolutionaries
and Mensheviks been isolated it would have been impossible
to overthrow the government of the imperialists, and had this
government not been overthrown it would have been impos
sible to break away from the war. The policy of isolating the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks proved to be the
only correct policy.
Thus, isolation of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolution
ary parties as the main line in directing the preparations for
October - such was the second specific feature of the tactics
of the Bolsheviks.
It scarcely needs proof that without this feature of the tactics

of the Bolsheviks, the alliance of the working class and the
labouring masses of the peasantry would have been left hanging
in the air.
It is characteristic that in his The Lessons of October
Trotsky says nothing, or next to nothing, about this specific

feature of the Bolshevik tactics.
Third specific feature.) Thus, the Party, in directing the Tacti

preparations for October, pursued the line of isolating the
Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, of winning the
broad masses of the workers and peasants away from them.
But how, concretely, was this isolation effected by the Party
- in what form, under what slogan? It was effected in the form
of the revolutionary mass movement for the power of the
Soviets, under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!", by
means of the struggle to convert the Soviets from organs for

mobilising the masses into organs of the uprising, into organs
of power, into the apparatus of a new proletarian state power.
Why was it precisely the Soviets that the Bolsheviks
seized upon as the principal organisational lever that could
facilitate the task of isolating the Mensheviks and Socialist
Revolutionaries, that was capable of advancing the cause of
the proletarian revolution, and that was destined to lead the
millions of labouring masses to the victory of the dictatorship
of the proletariat?
What are the Soviets?
ante cut
"The Soviets," said Lenin as early as September 1917, "are a new
state apparatus, which, in the first place, provides an armed force of
workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people,
as was the old standing army, but is most closely bound up with the
people. From the military standpoint, this force is incomparably more
powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary standpoint, it
cannot be replaced by anything else. Secondly, this apparatus provides
a bond with the masses, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so
indissoluble, so readily controllable and renewable, that there was nothing
even remotely like it in the previous state apparatus. Thirdly, this
apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject
to recall at the will of the people without any bureaucratic formalities,
is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourthly, it pro
vides a close contact with the most diverse professions, thus facilitating
the adoption of the most varied and most profound reforms without
bureaucracy. Fifthly, it provides a form of organisation of the vanguard,
i.e., of the most politically conscious, most energetic and most progressive
section of the oppressed classes, the workers and peasants, and thus
constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed
classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead the entire vast mass of these
classes, which has hitherto stood quite remote from political life, from
history. (Sixthly, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of parlia
mentarism with the advantages of immediate and direct democracy, i.e.,
to unite in the persons of the elected representatives of the people both
legislative and executive functions. Compared with bourgeois parliamen
tarism, this represents an advance in the development of democracy which

is of world-wide historic significance.
"Had not the creative spirit of the revolutionary classes of the people
given rise to the Soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would be
a hopeless affair, for the proletariat undoubtedly could not retain power
with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus
immediately" (see Vol. XXI, pp. 258-59).[¹]
That is why the Bolsheviks seized upon the Soviets as the

principal organisational link that could facilitate the task of
organising the October Revolution and the creation of a new,
powerful apparatus of the proletarian state power.
From the point of view of its internal development, the
slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" passed through two stages:
the first (up to the July defeat of the Bolsheviks, during the
period of dual power), and the second (after the defeat of the
Kornilov revolt).
During the first stage this slogan meant breaking the bloc
of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the
Cadets, the formation of a Soviet Government consisting of

Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (for at that time the
Soviets were Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik), the
right of free agitation for the opposition (i.e., for the Bolshe
viks), and the free struggle of parties within the Soviets, in
the expectation that by means of such a struggle the Bolsheviks
would succeed in capturing the Soviets and changing the com
position of the Soviet Government in the course of a peaceful
development of the revolution. This plan, of course, did not
signify the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it undoubtedly
facilitated the preparation of the conditions required for en
suring the dictatorship, for, by putting the Mensheviks and
[1] Lenin, Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power? (1917)

170 ON THE OPPOSITION O
Socialist-Revolutionaries in power and compelling them to

carry out in practice their anti-revolutionary platform, it
hastened the exposure of the true nature of these parties, has
tened their isolation, their divorce from the masses. The July
defeat of the Bolsheviks, however, interrupted this develop
ment, for it gave preponderance to the generals' and Cadets'
counter-revolution and threw the Socialist-Revolutionaries and
Mensheviks into the arms of that counter-revolution. This
compelled the Party temporarily to withdraw the slogan "All
Ang midda Power to the Soviets!", only to put it forward again in theSovial
con
plasents ditions of a fresh revolutionary upsurge. Petrograd
The defeat of the Kornilov revolt ushered in the (second
stage. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" became again
the immediate slogan. But now this slogan had a different
meaning from that in the first stage. Its content had radically
changed. Now this slogan meant a complete rupture with
imperialism and the passing of power to the Bolsheviks, for
the majority of the Soviets were already Bolshevik. Now this
slogan meant the revolution's direct approach towards the
dictatorship of the proletariat by means of an uprising. More
than that, this slogan now meant the organisation of the dic
tatorship of the proletariat and giving it a state form.
The inestimable significance of the tactics of transforming
the Soviets into organs of state power lay in the fact that they
caused millions of working people to break away from im
perialism, exposed the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary
parties as the tools of imperialism, and brought the masses by
a direct route, as it were, to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Thus, the policy of transforming the Soviets into organs of
state power, as the most important condition for isolating the
compromising parties and for the victory of the dictatorship of
the proletariat - such is the third specific feature of the tactics

of the Bolsheviks in the period of preparation for October.
Fourth specific feature. The picture would not be complete tastes
if we did not deal with the question of how and why the Bol
sheviks
for the
werevast
able tomasses
,
transform
into their
(
slogans
Party
which
slogans
pushed
into
the slogansrevoluti(opty)
nрожівку)
forward; how and why they succeeded in convincing not only
the vanguard, and not only the majority of the working class,
but also the majority of the people, of the correctness of their
policy.
The point is that for the victory of the revolution, if it is
really a people's revolution embracing the masses in their
millions, correct Party slogans alone are not enough. For the
victory of the revolution one more necessary condition is re
quired, namely, that the masses themselves become convinced
through their own experience of the correctness of these slo
gans. Only then do the slogans of the Party become the slogans
of the masses themselves. Only then does the revolution
really become a people's revolution. One of the specific
features of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period of prep
aration for October was that they correctly determined the
paths and turns which would naturally lead the masses to the
Party's slogans to the very threshold of the revolution, so to
speak thus helping them to feel, to test, to realise by their
-
own experience the correctness of these slogans. In other

words, one of the specific ures of the tactics of the Bolshe
viks is that they do not confuse leadership of the Party with
leadership of the masses; that they clearly see the difference
between the first sort of leadership and the second; that they,
therefore, represent the science, not only of leadership of the
Party, but of leadership of the vast masses of the working
people.
A graphic example of the manifestation of this feature of

Bolshevik tactics was provided by the experience of convening
and dispersing the Constituent Assembly.
It is well known that the Bolsheviks advanced the slogan of
a Republic of Soviets as early as April 1917. It is well known
that the Constituent Assembly was a bourgeois parliament,
fundamentally opposed to the principles of a Republic of
Soviets. How could it happen that the Bolsheviks, who were
advancing towards a Republic of Soviets, at the same time
demanded that the Provisional Government should immediate
ly convene the Constituent Assembly? How could it happen
that the Bolsheviks not only took part in the elections, but
themselves convened the Constituent Assembly? How could it
happen that a month before the uprising, in the transition from
the old to the new, the Bolsheviks considered a temporary
combination of a Republic of Soviets with the Constituent
Assembly possible?
noThis "happened" because: 51
1) the idea of a Constituent Assembly was one of the most

popular ideas among the broad masses of the population;
2) the slogan of the immediate convocation of the Consti
tuent Assembly helped to expose the counter-revolutionary
nature of the Provisional Government;
3) in order to discredit the idea of a Constituent Assembly

in the eyes of the masses, it was necessary to lead the masses
to the walls of the Constituent Assembly with their demands
for land, for peace, for the power of the Soviets, thus bringing
them face to face with the actual, live Constituent Assembly;
4) only this could help the masses to become convinced
through their own experience of the counter-revolutionary
nature of the Constituent Assembly and of the necessity of
dispersing it;
5) all this naturally presupposed the possibility of a tempo

rary combination of the Republic of Soviets with the Con
stituent Assembly, as one of the means for eliminating the
Constituent Assembly;
6) such a combination, if brought about under the condition
that all power was transferred to the Soviets, could only signify
the subordination of the Constituent Assembly to the Soviets,
its conversion into an appendage of the Soviets, its painless
extinction.
It scarcely needs proof that had the Bolsheviks not adopted

such a policy the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly would
not have taken place so smoothly, and the subsequent actions
of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks under the
slogan "All Power to the Constituent Assembly!" would not

have failed so signally.
"We took part," says Lenin, "in the elections to the Russian bourgeois
parliament, the Constituent Assembly, in September-November 1917. Were
our tactics correct or not? . . . Did not we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have
more right in September-November 1917 than any Western Communists to
consider that parliamentarism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of
course we had, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments have
existed for a long or a short time, but how far the broad masses of the
working people are prepared (ideologically, politically and practically)
to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the bourgeois-democratic par
liament (or allow it to be dispersed). That, owing to a number of special
conditions, the working class of the towns and the soldiers and peasants
of Russia were in September-November 1917 exceptionally well prepared
to accept the Soviet system and to disperse the most democratic of bour
geois parliaments, is an absolutely incontestable and fully established
historical fact. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did not boycott the Con
stituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before the proletariat
conquered political power and after" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 201-02). [1]
[¹]Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VII. Should

We Participate in Bourgeois Parliaments? (1920)
Why then did they not boycott the Constituent Assembly?

Because, says Lenin:
"participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks

before the victory of a Soviet Republic, and even after such a victory, not
only does not harm the revolutionary proletariat, but actually helps it to
prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dis
ersed; it elps their successful dispersal, helps to make bourgeois
parliamentarism 'politically obsolete' (ibid.).
It is characteristic that Trotsky does not understand this

feature of Bolshevik tactics and snorts at the "theory" of com
bining the Constituent Assembly with the Soviets, qualifying
it as Hilferdingism.
He does not understand that to permit such a combination,
accompanied by the slogan of an uprising and the probable
victory of the Soviets, in connection with the convocation of the
Constituent Assembly, was the only revolutionary tactics,
which had nothing in common with the Hilferding tactics of
converting the Soviets into an appendage of the Constituent
Assembly; he does not understand that the mistake committed
by some comrades in this question gives him no grounds for
disparaging the absolutely correct position taken by Lenin and
the Party on the "combined type of state power" under certain
conditions (cf. Vol. XXI, p. 338).[¹]
He does not understand that if the Bolsheviks had not
adopted this special policy towards the Constituent Assembly

they would not have succeeded in winning over to their side
the vast masses of the people; and if they had not won over
these masses they could not have transformed the October
uprising into a profound people's revolution.
[1] Lenin, Letter to Comrades. (1917)

It is interesting to note that Trotsky even snorts at the words

"people," "revolutionary democracy," etc., occurring in articles
by Bolsheviks, and considers them improper for a Marxist to
use.
Trotsky has evidently forgotten that even in September

1917, a month before the victory of the dictatorship of the pro
letariat, Lenin, that unquestionable Marxist, wrote of "the
necessity of the immediate transfer of the whole power to
the revolutionary democracy headed by the revolutionary pro
letariat" (see Vol. XXI, p. 198).[¹]
Trotsky has evidently forgotten that Lenin, that unques
tionable Marxist, quoting the well-known letter of Marx to
30
Kugelmann³0 (April 1871) to the effect that the smashing of the
bureaucratic-military state machine is the preliminary condi
tion for every real people's revolution on the continent, writes
in black and white the following lines:
"Particular attention should be paid to Marx's extremely profound

remark that the destruction of the bureaucratic-military state machine is
'the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution. This con
cept of a 'people's' revolution seems strange coming from Marx, and
the Russian Plekhanovites and Mensheviks, those followers of Struve who
wish to be regarded as Marxists, might possibly declare such an expression

to be a 'slip of the pen' on Marx's part. They have reduced Marxism
to such a state of wretchedly liberal distortion that nothing exists for
them beyond the antithesis between bourgeois revolution and proletarian
revolution and even this antithesis they interpret in an extremely life
-
less way.
"In Europe, in 1871, there was not a single country on the continent
in which the proletariat constituted the majority of the people. A peo
ple's' revolution, one that actually brought the majority into movement,
could be such only if it embraced both the proletariat and the peasantry.
These two classes then constituted the people. These two classes are
[1] Lenin, Marxism and Insurrection. A Letter to the Central Com

mittee of the R.S.D.L.P. (1917)
united by the fact that the 'bureaucratic-military state machine' oppresses,

crushes, exploits them. To break up this machine, to smash it - this is
truly in the interest of the 'people,' of the majority, of the workers and
most of the peasants, this is the preliminary condition' for a free alliance
between the poor peasants and the proletarians, whereas without such an
alliance democracy is unstable and socialist transformation is impossible"
(see Vol. XXI, pp. 395-96).[¹]
These words of Lenin's should not be forgotten.

Thus, ability to convince the masses of the correctness of
the Party slogans on the basis of their own experience, by
bringing them to the revolutionary positions, as the most im
portant condition for the winning over of the millions of
working people to the side of the Party - such is the fourth
specific feature of the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the period
of preparation for October.
I think that what I have said is quite sufficient to get a clear
a cica
idea of the characteristic features of these tactics.
IV
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AS THE BEGINNING

OF AND THE PRE-CONDITION FOR THE
WORLD REVOLUTION
There can be no doubt that the universal theory of a simul

taneous victory of the revolution in the principal countries of
Europe, the theory that the victory of socialism in one country
is impossible, has proved to be an artificial and untenable
theory. The seven years' history of the proletarian revolution
[1] Lenin, The State and Revolution. Chapter III. The State and
Revolution. Experience of the Paris Commune of 1871. Marx's Analysis.
1. Wherein Lay the Heroism of the Communards' Attempt? (1917)
in Russia speaks not for but against this theory. This theory
is unacceptable not only as a scheme of development of the
world revolution, for it contradicts obvious facts. It is still
less acceptable as a slogan, for it fetters, rather than releases,
the initiative of individual countries which, by reason of certain
historical conditions, obtain the opportunity to break through
the front of capital independently; for it does not stimulate an
active onslaught on capital in individual countries, but encour
ages passive waiting for the moment of the "universal denoue
ment"; for it cultivates among the proletarians of the different
countries not the spirit of revolutionary determination, but the

mood of Hamlet-like doubt over the question as to "what if
the others fail to back us up?" Lenin was absolutely right in
saying that the victory of the proletariat in one country is the
"typical case," that "a simultaneous revolution in a number of
countries" can only be a "rare exception" (see Vol. XXIII,
P. 354).[¹]
But, as is well known, Lenin's theory of revolution is not
limited only to this side of the question. It is also the theory
of the development of the world revolution.* The victory of
socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revo
lution which has been victorious in one country must regard
itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for
hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries. For
the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case
Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and
progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the same time the
beginning of and the pre-condition for the world revolution.
*See "The Foundations of Leninism" in my collection Problems of
Leninism. - J. St.
[¹] Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.
Can There Be Equality Between the Exploited and the Exploiter? (1918)
Undoubtedly, the paths of development of the world revolu

tion are not as plain as it may have seemed previously, before
the victory of the revolution in one country, before the ap
pearance of developed imperialism, which is "the eve of the
socialist revolution." For a new factor has arisen the law -
of the uneven development of the capitalist countries, which

operates under the conditions of developed imperialism, and
which implies the inevitability of armed collisions, the general
weakening of the world front of capital, and the possibility of
the victory of socialism in individual countries. For a new
factor has arisen the vast Soviet country, lying between the
-
West and the East, between the centre of the financial exploita
tion of the world and the arena of colonial oppression, a
country which by its very existence is revolutionising the whole
world.
All these are factors (not to mention other less important

ones) which cannot be left out of account in studying the paths
108
of development of the world revolution.
Formerly, it was commonly thought that the revolution
would develop through the even "maturing" of the elements of
socialism, primarily in the more developed, the "advanced,"
countries. Now this view must be considerably modified.
184.24
"The system of international relationships," says Lenin, "has now taken
a form in which one of the states of Europe, viz., Germany, has been
enslaved by the victor countries. Furthermore, a number of states, which
are, moreover, the oldest states in the West, find themselves in a posi
tion, as the result of their victory, to utilise this victory to make a
number of insignificant concessions to their oppressed classes - concessions
which nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries
and create some semblance of 'social peace.'
"At the same time, precisely as a result of the last imperialist war, a
number of countries - the East, India, China, etc. - have been com
pletely dislodged from their groove. Their development has definitely
shifted to the general European capitalist lines. The general European
ferment has begun to affect them, and it is now clear to the whole world
that they have been drawn into a process of development that cannot
but lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism."
In view of this fact, and in connection with it, "the West-European
capitalist countries will consummate their development towards social
ism
not as we formerly expected. They are consummating it not
by the even 'maturing' of socialism in them, but by the exploitation of
some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries
to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation
of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of
the first imperialist war, the East has definitely come into revolutionary
movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the
world revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXVII, pp. 415-16).[¹]
dividual hintha lass
If we add to this the fact that not only the defeated countries
and colonies are being exploited by the victorious countries,
but that some of the victorious countries are falling into the
orbit of financial exploitation at the hands of the most power
ful of the victorious countries, America and Britain; that the
contradictions among all these countries are an extremely im

portant factor in the disintegration of world imperialism; that,
in addition to these contradictions, very profound contradic
tions exist and are developing within each of these countries;
that all these contradictions are becoming more profound and
more acute because of the existence, alongside these countries,
of the great Republic of Soviets if all this is taken into con
sideration, then the picture of the special character of the in
ternational situation will become more or less complete.
Most probably, the world revolution will develop by the
breaking away of a number of new countries from the system of
the imperialist states as a result of revolution, while the pro
letarians of these countries will be supported by the proletariat
of the imperialist states. We see that the first country to break
[1] Lenin, Better Fewer, But Better. (1923)

away, the first victorious country, is already being supported

by the workers and the labouring masses of other countries.
Without this support it could not hold out. Undoubtedly, this
support will increase and grow. But there can also be no
doubt that the very development of the world revolution, the
very process of the breaking away from imperialism of a
number of new countries will be the more rapid and thorough,
the more thoroughly socialism becomes consolidated in the first
victorious country, the faster this country is transformed into
a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into
a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism.
While it is true that the final victory of socialism in the first
country to emancipate itself is impossible without the combined
efforts of the proletarians of several countries, it is equally true
that the unfolding of the world revolution will be the more
rapid and thorough, the more effective the assistance rendered
by the first socialist country to the workers and labouring
masses of all other countries.
In what should this assistance be expressed?
It should be expressed, firstly, in the victorious country

achieving "the utmost possible in one country for the
development, support and awakening of the revolution in all
countries" (see Lenin, Vol. XXIII, p. 385).[¹]
It should be expressed, secondly, in that the "victorious pro
letariat" of one country, "having expropriated the capitalists
and organised its own socialist production, would stand up...
against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting
to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising
revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the
[¹] Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.

What Is Internationalism? (1918)
event of necessity coming out even with armed force against

the exploiting classes and their states" (see Lenin, Vol. XVIII,
PP. 232-33). [¹]
The characteristic feature of the assistance given by the
victorious country is not only that it hastens the victory of the
proletarians of other countries, but also that, by facilitating
this victory, it ensures the final victory of socialism in the first
victorious country.
Most probably, in the course of development of the world
revolution, side by side with the centres of imperialism in in
dividual capitalist countries and with the system of these coun
tries throughout the world, centres of socialism will be created
in individual Soviet countries and a system of these centres
throughout the world, and the struggle between these two
systems will fill the history of the unfolding of the world
revolution.
For, says Lenin, "the free union of nations in socialism is impossible

without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist
republics against the backward states" (ibid.).
The world significance of the October Revolution lies not

only in the fact that it constitutes a great beginning made by
one country in causing a breach in the system of imperialism
and that it is the first centre of socialism in the ocean of im
perialist countries, but also in that it constitutes the first stage

of the world revolution and a mighty base for its further
development.
Therefore, not only those are wrong who forget the interna
tional character of the October Revolution and declare the
victory of socialism in one country to be a purely national, and

only a national, phenomenon, but also those who, although
they bear in mind the international character of the October

Revolution, are inclined to regard this revolution as something
passive, merely destined to accept help from without. Actually,
not only does the October Revolution need support from the
revolution in other countries, but the revolution in those coun
tries needs the support of the October Revolution in order to
accelerate and advance the cause of overthrowing world
imperialism.glly
December 17, 1924
J. Stalin, On the Road to October,
GIZ, 1925
Mes sito
660
sdn Jronisan a eljus
JUL
Mhand umeloh
NE
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)31
January 17, 1925
Comrades, on the instructions of the Secretariat of the Cen
tral Committee I have to give you certain necessary informa

tion on matters concerning the discussion and on the resolutions
connected with the discussion. Unfortunately, we shall have
to discuss Trotsky's action in his absence because, as we have
been informed today, he will be unable to attend the plenum
owing to illness. Son lae Bite
You know, comrades, that the discussion started with
Trotsky's action, the publication of his The Lessons of
October.
The discussion was started by Trotsky. The discussion was

forced on the Party.
The Party replied to Trotsky's action by making two main
charges. Firstly, that Trotsky is trying to revise Leninism;
secondly, that Trotsky is trying to bring about a radical change
in the Party leadership.
183
Trotsky has not said anything in his own defence about these
charges made by the Party.
It is hard to say why he has not said anything in his own
defence. The usual explanation is that he has fallen ill and has
not been able to say anything in his own defence. But that is
not the Party's fault, of course. It is not the Party's fault if
Trotsky begins to get a high temperature after every attack he
makes upon the Party.
Now the Central Committee has received a statement by
Trotsky (statement to the Central Committee dated January
15) to the effect that he has refrained from making any pro
nouncement, that he has not said anything in his own defence,
because he did not want to intensify the controversy and to
aggravate the issue. Of course, one may or may not think that
this explanation is convincing. I, personally, do not think that
it is. Firstly, how long has Trotsky been aware that his attacks
upon the Party aggravate relations? When, precisely, did he
become aware of this truth? This is not the first attack that
Trotsky has made upon the Party, and it is not the first time
that he is surprised, or regrets, that his attack aggravated rela
tions. Secondly, if he really wants to prevent relations within
the Party from deteriorating, why did he publish his The
Lessons of October, which was directed against the leading
core of the Party, and was intended to worsen, to aggravate
relations? That is why I think that Trotsky's explanation is
quite unconvincing.
A few words about Trotsky's statement to the Central
Committee of January 15, which I have just mentioned, and
which has been distributed to the members of the Central
Committee and the Central Control Commission. The first
thing that must be observed and taken note of is Trotsky's

statement that he is willing to take any post to which the Party
WH
PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. OF R.C.P. (B.) 185
appoints him, that he is willing to submit to any kind of control

as far as future actions on his part are concerned, and that he
thinks it absolutely necessary in the interests of our work that
he should be removed from the post of Chairman of the Revo
lutionary Military Council as speedily as possible.
All this must, of course, be taken note of.
As regards the substance of the matter, two points should be

noted: concerning "permanent revolution" and change of the
Party leadership. Trotsky says that if at any time after October
he happened on particular occasions to revert to the formula
"permanent revolution," it was only as something appertaining
to the History of the Party Department, appertaining to the
past, and not with a view to elucidating present political tasks.
This question is important, for it concerns the fundamentals of
Leninist ideology. In my opinion, this statement of Trotsky's
cannot be taken either as an explanation or as a justification.
There is not even a hint in it that he admits his mistakes. It
is an evasion of the question. What is the meaning of the state

ment that the theory of "permanent revolution" is something
that appertains to the History of the Party Department? How
is this to be understood? The History of the Party Depart
ment is not only the repository, but also the interpreter of
Party documents. There are documents there that were valid
at one time and later lost their validity. There are also docu
ments there that were, and still are, of great importance for
the Party's guidance. And there are also documents there
of a purely negative character, of a negative significance, to
which the Party cannot become reconciled. In which category
of documents does Trotsky include his theory of "permanent
revolution"? In the good or in the bad category? Trotsky said
nothing about that in his statement. He wriggled out of the
question. He avoided it. Consequently, the charge of revis

ing Leninism still holds good.
Trotsky says further that on the questions settled by the
Thirteenth Congress he has never, either in the Central Com
mittee, or in the Council of Labour and Defence, and certainly
not to the country at large, made any proposals which directly
or indirectly raised the questions already settled. That is not
true. What did Trotsky say before the Thirteenth Congress?
That the cadres were no good, and that a radical change in
the Party leadership was needed. What does he say now, in
his The Lessons of October? That the main core of the Party
is no good and must be changed. Such is the conclusion to be
drawn from The Lessons of October. The Lessons of October
was published in substantiation of this conclusion. That was
the purpose of The Lessons of October. Consequently, the
charge of attempting to bring about a radical change in the
Party leadership still holds good.
In view of this, Trotsky's statement as a whole is not an
explanation in the true sense of the term, but a collection of
diplomatic evasions and a renewal of old controversies already
settled by the Party.
That is not the kind of document the Party demanded
from Trotsky.
Obviously, Trotsky does not understand, and I doubt
whether he will ever understand, that the Party demands from
its former and present leaders not diplomatic evasions, but an
honest admission of mistakes. Trotsky, evidently, lacks the
courage frankly to admit his mistakes. He does not understand
that the Party's sense of power and dignity has grown, that
the Party feels that it is the master and demands that we
should bow our heads to it when circumstances demand. That
is what Trotsky does not understand.
PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. OF R.C.P.(B.) 187
How did our Party organisations react to Trotsky's action?

You know that a number of local Party organisations have
passed resolutions on this subject. They have been published
in Pravda. They can be divided into three categories. One
category demands Trotsky's expulsion from the Party. Another
category demands Trotsky's removal from the Revolutionary
Military Council and his expulsion from the Political Bureau.
The third category, which also includes the last draft resolu
tion sent to the Central Committee today by the comrades
from Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and the Ukraine, demands
Trotsky's removal from the Revolutionary Military Council
and his conditional retention in the Political Bureau.
Such are the three main groups of resolutions on Trotsky's

action.
The Central Committee and the Central Control Commis
sion have to choose between these resolutions.
That is all I had to tell you about matters concerning the

discussion.
J. Stalin, Trotskyism.
Moscow, 1925
de
nim xix
nur bro p
goldal to salom a initt vous! rin Y
bediting 200
duj babi.
Minimal Rep
enfor fins bubul ante
THE RESULTS OF THE WORK
um OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Activists of

mmo the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)
Ma Alopia
May 9, 1925
plaani 140
In view of
Comrades, I do not think there is any point in examining

here in detail the resolutions adopted at the Fourteenth Con
ference of our Party.32 That would take up a great deal of
time, and besides, there is no need to do so. I think it will be
enough to note the main lines that stand out in these resolu
tions. That will enable us to emphasise the main conclusions
of the resolutions that were adopted. And this, in its turn,
will facilitate a further study of these resolutions.
If we turn to the resolutions we shall find that the diverse
questions touched upon in them can be reduced to six main
groups of questions. The first group consists of questions
concerning the international situation. The second group
consists of questions concerning the immediate tasks of the
Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. The third group
188
WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF R.C.P. (B.) 189
consists of questions concerning the immediate tasks of the

communist elements in the colonial and dependent countries.
The fourth group consists of questions concerning the fate of
socialism in our country in connection with the present interna
tional situation. The fifth group consists of questions concern
ing our Party policy in the countryside and the tasks of Party
leadership under the new conditions. And, lastly, the sixth
group consists of questions concerning the vital nerve of all
our industry, namely, the metal industry.
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
What is new and specific in the international situation,

which, in the main, determines the character of the present
period?
The new feature that has revealed itself lately, and which
has laid its impress upon the international situation, is that
the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb, that a certain lull
has set in, which we call the temporary stabilisation of capital
ism, while at the same time the economic development and
political might of the Soviet Union are increasing.sk W
What is the ebb of the revolution, the lull? Is it the beginning
of the end of the world revolution, the beginning of the liquida
tion of the world proletarian revolution? Lenin said that the
victory of the proletariat in our country ushered in a new
epoch, the epoch of world revolution, an epoch replete with
conflicts and wars, advances and retreats, victories and defeats,
an epoch leading to the victory of the proletariat in the major
capitalist countries. Does the fact that the revolution in
Europe has begun to ebb mean that Lenin's thesis concerning
a new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, no longer holds

good? Does it mean that the proletarian revolution in the
West has been cancelled?
No, it does not.
The epoch of world revolution is a new stage of the revolu
tion, a whole strategic period, which will last for a number of
years, perhaps even a number of decades. During this period
there can and must be ebbs and flows of the revolution.
Our revolution passed through two stages, two strategic

periods, in the course of its development, and after October it
entered a third stage, a third strategic period. The first stage
(1900-17) lasted over fifteen years. The aim then was to
overthrow tsarism, to achieve the victory of the bourgeois
democratic revolution. During that period we had a number
of ebbs and flows of the revolution. The tide of revolution
flowed in 1905. That tide ended with the temporary defeat of
the revolution. After that we had an ebb, which lasted a
number of years (1907-12). Then the tide flowed anew, be
ginning with the Lena events (1912), and later it ebbed again,
during the war. In 1917 (February) the tide began to flow
once again and it culminated in the victory of the people over
tsarism, the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.
With each ebb the Liquidators asserted that the revolution
was done for. After ebbing and flowing several times, how
ever, the revolution swept on to victory in February 1917.
The second stage of the revolution began in February 1917.
The aim then was to extricate the country from the imperialist
war, to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to achieve the victory
of the proletarian dictatorship. That stage, or strategic period,
lasted only eight months, but these were eight months of pro
found revolutionary crisis, during which war and economic
ruin spurred on the revolution and quickened its pace to the
utmost. Precisely for that reason, those eight months of rev

olutionary crisis can and should be counted as being equal to
at least eight years of ordinary constitutional development.
That strategic period, like the preceding one, was not marked
by a steady rise of the revolution in a straight ascending line,
as the philistines of revolution usually picture it, but by alter
nating ebbs and flows. During that period we had an immense
rise in the tide of the revolutionary movement in the days of
the July demonstration. Then the revolutionary tide ebbed
after the July defeat of the Bolsheviks. The tide flowed again
immediately after the Kornilov revolt and it carried us to the
victory of the October Revolution. The Liquidators of that
time talked of the complete liquidation of the revolution after
the July defeat. After passing through a number of trials and
ebbs, however, the revolution, as is known, culminated in the
victory of the proletarian dictatorship.
After the October victory we entered the third strategic
period, the third stage of the revolution, in which the aim is
to overcome the bourgeoisie on a world scale. How long this
period will last it is difficult to say. At all events, there is no
doubt that it will be a long one, and there is no doubt also
that it will contain ebbs and flows. The world revolutionary
movement at the present time has entered a period of ebb of
the revolution, but, for a number of reasons, of which I shall
speak later, the tide must turn again, and it may end in the
victory of the proletariat. On the other hand, it may not end
in victory, but be replaced by a new ebb, which in its turn is
bound to be followed by another rise in the tide of the rev
olution. The present-day Liquidators say that the lull that
has now set in marks the end of the world revolution. But
they are mistaken, just as they were mistaken before, in the
periods of the first and second stages of our revolution, when
they regarded every ebb of the revolutionary movement as

the utter defeat of the revolution.
Such are the fluctuations within each stage of the revolu

tion, within each strategic period.
What do those fluctuations show? Do they show that
Lenin's thesis about the new epoch of world revolution has
lost, or may lose, its significance? Of course not! They merely
show that, usually, revolution develops not in a straight ascend
ing line, not in a continuously growing upsurge, but in zigzags,
in advances and retreats, in flows and ebbs, which in the
course of development steel the forces of the revolution and
prepare for its final victory.pimise
Such is the historical significance of the present ebb of the
revolution, the historical significance of the lull we are now
experiencing.
But the ebb is only one aspect of the matter. The other
aspect is that simultaneously with the ebb of the revolution
in Europe we have the impetuous growth of the economic
development of the Soviet Union and its increasing political
might. In other words, we have not only the stabilisation of
capitalism; we also have the stabilisation of the Soviet system.
Thus, we have two stabilisations: the temporary stabilisation
of capitalism and the stabilisation of the Soviet system. A
certain temporary equilibrium between these two stabilisa
tions has been reached - such is the characteristic feature of
the present international situation. aloar
But what is stabilisation? Is it not stagnation? And if it

means stagnation, can that term be applied to the Soviet
system? No. Stabilisation is not stagnation. Stabilisation is
the consolidation of a given position and further development.
World capitalism has not only consolidated itself in its present
position; it is going on and developing further, expanding its
WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF R.C.P.(B.) 193
sphere of influence and increasing its wealth. It is wrong to

say that capitalism cannot develop, that the theory of the
decay of capitalism advanced by Lenin in his Imperialism³3
precludes the development of capitalism. Lenin fully proved
in his pamphlet Imperialism that the growth of capitalism
does not cancel, but presupposes and prepares the progressive
decay of capitalism.
Thus, we have two stabilisations. At one pole capitalism is
becoming stabilised, consolidating the position it has achieved
and developing further. At the other pole the Soviet system is
becoming stabilised, consolidating the positions it has won
and advancing further along the road to victory.
? That is the essence of the question.
Why are there two stabilisations, one parallel with the
other? Why are there two poles? Because there is no longer a
single, all-embracing capitalism in the world. Because the
world has split into two camps the capitalist camp, headed
-
by Anglo-American capital, and the socialist camp, headed by

the Soviet Union. Because the international situation will to
an increasing degree be determined by the relation of forces

between these two camps.
Thus, the characteristic feature of the present situation is
not only that capitalism and the Soviet system have become
stabilised, but also that the forces of these two camps have
reached a certain temporary equilibrium, with a slight ad
vantage for capital, and hence, a slight disadvantage for the
revolutionary movement; for, compared with a revolutionary
upsurge, the lull that has now set in is undoubtedly a dis
advantage for socialism, although a temporary one.
What is the difference between these two stabilisations?
Where does the one and where does the other lead to?
194 LOSS ON THE OPPOSITION
Stabilisation under capitalism, while temporarily strengthen

ing capital, at the same time inevitably leads to the ag
gravation of the contradictions of capitalism: a) between the
imperialist groups of the various countries; b) between the
workers and the capitalists in each country; c) between im
perialism and the peoples of all colonial countries.
Stabilisation under the Soviet system, however, while
strengthening socialism, at the same time inevitably leads to
an alleviation of contradictions and to an improvement in the
relations: a) between the proletariat and the peasantry in our
country; b) between the proletariat and the colonial peoples
of the oppressed countries; c) between the proletarian dictator
ship and the workers of all countries.
The fact of the matter is that capitalism cannot develop with
out intensifying the exploitation of the working class, without
a semi-starvation existence for the majority of the working
people, without intensifying the oppression of the colonial and
dependent countries, without conflicts and clashes between
the different imperialist groups of the world bourgeoisie. On
the other hand, the Soviet system and the proletarian dictator
ship can develop only if there is a continuous rise in the mate
rial and cultural level of the working class, if there is a
continuous improvement in the conditions of all the working
people in the Land of Soviets, if the workers of all countries
draw closer and closer together and unite, if the oppressed
peoples of the colonial and dependent countries rally around
the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.
The path of development of capitalism is the path of im
poverishment and a semi-starvation existence for the vast
majority of the working people, while a small upper stratum
of these working people is bribed and pampered.cloudw
The path of development of the proletarian dictatorship,

on the contrary, is the path of continuous improvement in the
welfare of the vast majority of the working people.
Precisely for this reason the development of capitalism is
bound to create conditions which aggravate the contradictions
of capitalism. Precisely for this reason capitalism cannot
resolve these contradictions.
Of course, if there were no law of the uneven development

of capitalism, leading to conflicts and wars between the cap
italist countries on account of colonies; if capitalism could
develop without exporting capital to backward countries,
countries where raw materials and labour are cheap; if the
surplus capital accumulated in the "metropolises" were used
not for export of capital, but for seriously developing agricul
ture and for improving the material conditions of the peas
antry; and lastly, if this surplus were used for the purpose of
raising the standard of living of the entire mass of the working
class, there would be no intensification of the exploitation of
the working class, no impoverishment of the peasantry under
capitalism, no intensification of oppression in colonial and
dependent countries, and no conflicts and wars between
capitalists.
But then, capitalism would not be capitalism.
The whole point is that capitalism cannot develop without
aggravating all these contradictions, and without thereby de
veloping the conditions which, in the final analysis, facilitate
the downfall of capitalism.
an The whole point is that the dictatorship of the proletariat,
on the contrary, cannot develop further without creating the
conditions which raise the revolutionary movement in all
countries to a higher stage and prepare for the final victory
of the proletariat.pisils
Such is the difference between the two stabilisations.

That is why the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be either
lasting or firm.
Let us now examine the question of the stabilisation of
capitalism concretely.
In what way has the stabilisation of capitalism found con
crete expression?
Firstly, in the fact that America, Britain and France have
temporarily succeeded in striking a deal on the methods of
robbing Germany and on the scale on which she is to be robbed.
In other words, they have struck a deal on what they call the
Dawesation of Germany. Can that deal be regarded as being
at all durable? No, it cannot. Because, firstly, it was arrived
at without reckoning with the host, i.e., the German people;
secondly, because this deal means imposing a double yoke upon
the German people, the yoke of the national bourgeoisie and
the yoke of the foreign bourgeoisie. To think that a cultured
nation like the German nation and a cultured proletariat like
the German proletariat will consent to bear this double yoke
without making repeated serious attempts at a revolutionary
upheaval means believing in miracles. Even such an essentially
reactionary fact as the election of Hindenburg as President,34
leaves no doubt that the Entente's temporary deal directed
against Germany is unstable, ridiculously unstable.
Secondly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found expres
sion in the fact that British, American and Japanese capital
have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal about the divi
sion of spheres of influence in China, that vast market for
international capital, about the methods for plundering that
country. Can that deal be regarded as being at all durable?
Again, no! Firstly, because the partners to it are fighting, and
will fight to the death, over the division of the spoils; secondly,
because that deal was struck behind the back of the Chinese
people, who have no wish to submit to the laws of the alien

robbers, and will not do so. Does not the growth of the revolu
tionary movement in China show that the machinations of the
foreign imperialists are doomed to failure?
Thirdly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found expression
in the fact that the imperialist groups of the advanced countries
have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal about mutual
non-intervention in the plunder and oppression of "their"
respective colonies. Can that deal, or that attempt at a deal,
be regarded as being at all durable? No, it cannot. Firstly,
because each imperialist group is striving, and will go on
striving, to snatch a piece of the others' colonies; secondly,
because the pressure the imperialist groups exercise in the
colonies and the policy of oppression they pursue there only
serve to steel and revolutionise those colonies and thereby
intensify the revolutionary crisis. The imperialists are trying
to "pacify" India, to curb Egypt, to tame Morocco, to tie Indo
China and Indonesia hand and foot, and are resorting to all
sorts of cunning devices and machinations. They may succeed
in achieving some "results" in this respect, but there can
scarcely be any doubt that these machinations will not, and
cannot, suffice for long.
Fourthly, the stabilisation of capitalism may find expression
in an attempt on the part of the imperialist groups of the
advanced countries to strike a deal concerning the formation
of a united front against the Soviet Union. Let us assume that
the deal comes off. Let us assume that they succeed in
establishing something in the nature of a united front by
resorting to all sorts of trickery, including the scoundrelly
forgeries in connection with the explosion in Sofia,35 etc. Are
there any grounds for assuming that a deal directed against
our country, or stabilisation in this sphere, can be at all du

rable, at all successful? I think that there are no such grounds.
Why? Because, firstly, the threat of a capitalist united front
and united attack would act like a gigantic hoop that would
bind the whole country around the Soviet Government more
tightly than ever before and transform it into an even more
impregnable fortress than it was, for instance, during the in
vasion of the "fourteen states." Recall the threat of an inva
sion by fourteen states uttered by the notorious Churchill. You

know that the mere utterance of that threat was enough to unite
the entire country around the Soviet Government against the
imperialist vultures. Because, secondly, a crusade against the
Land of Soviets would certainly set in motion a number of
revolutionary key points in our enemies' rear, which would
disintegrate and demoralise the ranks of imperialism. There
can scarcely be any doubt that a host of such key points have
developed of late, and they bode imperialism no good. Be
cause, thirdly, our country no longer stands alone; it has allies
in the shape of the workers in the West and the oppressed
peoples in the East. There can scarcely be any doubt that war
against the Soviet Union will mean for imperialism that it will
have to wage war against its own workers and colonies. Need
less to say, if our country is attacked we shall not sit with folded
arms; we shall take all measures to unleash the revolutionary
lion in all countries of the world. The leaders of the capitalist
countries cannot but know that we have some experience in
this matter. Sol
Such are the facts and considerations which show that the
stabilisation of capitalism cannot be durable, that this stabilisa
tion signifies the creation of conditions that lead to the defeat
of capitalism, while the stabilisation of the Soviet system, on
the contrary, signifies the continuous accumulation of condi
tions that strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, raise the rev

olutionary movement in all countries and lead to the victory
of socialism.
This fundamental antithesis between the two stabilisations,

capitalist and Soviet, is an expression of the antithesis between
the two systems of economy and government, between the
capitalist system and the socialist system.
Whoever fails to understand this antithesis will never
understand the basic character of the present international
situation.
Such is the general picture of the international situation at

the present time.
II
THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTIES IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES
I pass to the second group of questions.

The new and specific feature of the present position of the
Communist Parties in the capitalist countries is that the period
of the flow of the revolutionary tide has given way to a period
of its ebb, a period of lull. The task is to take advantage of
the period of lull that we are passing through to strengthen
the Communist Parties, to Bolshevise them, to transform them
into genuine mass parties relying on the trade unions, to rally
the labouring elements among the non-proletarian classes,
above all among the peasantry, around the proletariat, and
lastly, to educate the proletarians in the spirit of revolution
and proletarian dictatorship. ek he
I shall not enumerate all the immediate tasks that confront

the Communist Parties in the West. If you read the resolu
200 04 ON THE OPPOSITION
tions on this subject, especially the resolution on Bolshevisation

passed by the enlarged plenum of the Comintern,36 it will not
be difficult for you to understand what these tasks are
concretely.lands brindahul sid
I should like to deal with the main task, with that task
confronting the Communist Parties in the West, the elucida
tion of which will facilitate the fulfilment of all the other
immediate tasks.
What is that task?
That task is to link the Communist Parties in the West with
the trade unions. That task is to develop and bring to a

successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to
see that all Communists without fail join the trade unions, to
work systematically in them for combining the workers in a
united front against capital, and in this way to create the
conditions that will enable the Communist Parties to have
the backing of the trade unions. SAI
If this task is not carried out it will be impossible to trans

form the Communist Parties into genuine mass parties or to
create the conditions necessary for the victory of the proletariat.
The trade unions and parties in the West are not what the
trade unions and the Party are here in Russia. The relations
between the trade unions and the parties in the West are
quite different from those that have been established here
in Russia. In our country the trade unions arose after the
Party, and around the Party of the working class. Trade unions
had not yet arisen in our country when the Party and its or
ganisations were already leading not only the political but
also the economic struggle of the working class, down to small
and very small strikes. That, mainly, explains the exceptional
prestige of our Party among the workers prior to the February
Revolution, in contrast to the rudimentary trade unions which
then existed here and there. Real trade unions appeared in

our country only after February 1917. Before October we
already had definitely formed trade-union organisations, which
enjoyed tremendous prestige among the workers. Already at
that time Lenin said that without trade-union support it would
be impossible either to achieve or to maintain the dictatorship
of the proletariat. The most powerful development of the
trade unions in our country was reached after the capture
of power, particularly under the conditions of NEP. There is
no doubt that our powerful trade unions now constitute one
of the chief supports of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The
most characteristic feature of the history of the development
of our trade unions is that they arose, developed and became
strong after the Party, around the Party, and in friendship with
Alboin
the Party.
The trade unions in Western Europe developed under

entirely different circumstances. Firstly, they arose and be
came strong long before working-class parties appeared.
Secondly, there it was not the trade unions that developed
around the working-class parties; on the contrary, the working
class parties themselves emerged from the trade unions. Third
ly, since the economic sphere of the struggle, the one that is
closest to the working class, had already been captured, so to
speak, by the trade unions, the parties were obliged to engage
mainly in the parliamentary political struggle, and that could
not but affect the character of their activities and the impor
tance attached to them by the working class. And precisely
because the parties there arose after the trade unions, precisely
because the trade unions came into being long before the
parties, and in fact became the proletariat's principal fortresses
in its struggle against capital - precisely for that reason, the
parties, as independent forces that did not have the backing

of the trade unions, were pushed into the background. P
From this it follows, however, that if the Communist Parties
want to become a real mass force, capable of pushing the
revolution forward, they must link up with the trade unions
and get their backing. lad
Failure to take this specific feature of the situation in the

West into account means leading the cause of the communist
movement to certain doom.
Over there, in the West, there are still individual "Commu
nists" who refuse to understand this specific feature and
continue to make play with the anti-proletarian and anti
revolutionary slogan: "Leave the trade unions!" It must be said
that nobody can dom
do more harm to the communist movement in
the West than these and similar "Communists." Regarding
the trade unions as an enemy camp, these people contemplate
"attacking" them from without. They fail to understand that
if they pursue such a policy the workers will indeed regard
them as enemies. They fail to understand that the trade un
ions, whether good or bad, are regarded by the rank-and-file
worker as his fortresses, which help him to protect his wages,
hours, and so forth. They fail to understand that such a policy,
far from facilitating, hinders Communists from penetrating
among the vast working-class masses.noin
The average rank-and-file worker may say to such "Com
munists": "You are attacking my fortress. You want to wreck
the organisations that took me decades to build, and are trying
to prove to me that communism is better than trade-unionism.
I don't know, perhaps your theoretical arguments about com
munism are right. How can I, an ordinary working man, grasp
the meaning of your theories? But one thing I do know: I
have my trade-union fortresses; they have led me into the strug
gle, they have protected me, well or ill, from the attacks of the
capitalists, and whoever thinks of destroying these fortresses
wants to destroy my own cause, the workers' cause. Stop
attacking my fortresses, join the trade unions, work in them
for five years or so, help to improve and strengthen them. In
the meantime I shall see what sort of fellows you are, and if
you turn out to be real good fellows, I, of course, will not
refuse to support you," and so forth.
That is the attitude, or approximately the attitude, of the
average rank-and-file workers in the West today towards the
anti-trade-unionists.
Whoever fails to understand this specific feature of the

mentality of the average worker in Europe will understand
nothing about the position of our Communist Parties at the
present time.
Wherein lies the strength of Social-Democracy in the West?
In the fact that it has the backing of the trade unions.
Wherein lies the weakness of our Communist Parties in the
West?
In the fact that they have not yet linked up with the trade
unions, and certain elements in these Communist Parties do
not wish to link up with them.

Hence, the main task of the Communist Parties in the West
at the present time is to develop and bring to a successful con

clusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to see that all
Communists without exception join the trade unions, to work
in them systematically and patiently for uniting the working
class against capital, and in this way to enable the Communist
Parties to have the backing of the trade unions.
Such is the meaning of the decisions of the enlarged plenum
of the Comintern concerning the immediate tasks of the Com
munist Parties in the West at the present time.
204
ON THE OPPOSITION
THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST

ELEMENTS IN THE COLONIAL AND
DEPENDENT COUNTRIES
I pass to the third group of questions.

The new features in this sphere are the following: in tog
a) owing to the increase in the export of capital from the
advanced to the backward countries, an increase encouraged
by the stabilisation of capitalism, capitalism in the colonial
countries is developing and will continue to develop at a
rapid rate, breaking down the old social and political con
ditions and implanting new ones;
b) the proletariat in these countries is growing and will
continue to grow at a rapid rate;
c) the revolutionary working-class movement and the rev
olutionary crisis in the colonies are growing and will continue
to grow;
d) in this connection, there is a growth, which will con

tinue, of certain strata of the national bourgeoisie, the richest
and most powerful strata, which, fearing revolution in their
countries more than they fear imperialism, will prefer a deal
with imperialism to the liberation of their countries from im
perialism and will thereby betray their own native lands (India,
Egypt, etc.);
e) in view of all this, those countries can be liberated from
imperialism only if a struggle is waged against the compromis
ing national bourgeoisie;
f) but from this it follows that the question of the alliance
between the workers and peasants and of the hegemony of
the proletariat in the industrially developed and developing
p
colonies is bound to become an urgent one, as it did before

the first revolution in Russia in 1905. ina
Until now the situation has been that the East was usually
spoken of as a homogeneous whole. It is now obvious to
everybody that there is no longer a single, homogeneous East,
that there are now capitalistically developed and developing
colonies and backward and lagging colonies, and they cannot
all be measured with the same yardstick.
Until now the national-liberation movement has been re
garded as an unbroken front of all the national forces in the
colonial and dependent countries, from the most reactionary

bourgeois to the most revolutionary proletarians. Now, after
the national bourgeoisie has split into a revolutionary and an
anti-revolutionary wing, the picture of the national movement
is assuming a somewhat different aspect. Parallel with the
revolutionary elements of the national movement, compromis
ing and reactionary elements which prefer a deal with im
perialism to the liberation of their countries are emerging from
the bourgeoisie.
Hence the task of the communist elements in the colonial
countries is to link up with the revolutionary elements of the

bourgeoisie, and above all with the peasantry, against the bloc
of imperialism and the compromising elements of "their own"
bourgeoisie, in order, under the leadership of the proletariat,
to wage a genuinely revolutionary struggle for liberation from
imperialism.
Only one conclusion follows: a number of colonial countries
are now approaching their 1905.
The task is to unite the advanced elements of the workers
in the colonial countries in a single Communist Party that will
be capable of leading the growing revolution.
206 SE ON THE OPPOSITION
Here is what Lenin said about the growing revolutionary

movement in the colonial countries as far back as 1922:
"The present 'victors' in the first imperialist massacre are unable to

vanquish even a small, insignificantly small, country like Ireland; they
are not even able to unravel the tangle they have got themselves into in
financial and currency questions. And India and China are seething.
They have a population of over seven hundred million. With the sur
rounding Asiatic countries quite like them they account for more than
half the population of the world. In these countries, 1905 is approaching,
irresistibly and with ever increasing speed, but with this essential and
enormous difference: in 1905 the revolution in Russia could still (at the
outset at any rate) proceed in isolation, that is to say, without immediately
drawing other countries into the revolution, whereas the revolutions that
are growing in India and China are already being drawn, and have been
drawn, into the revolutionary struggle, into the revolutionary movement,
into the international revolution" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 293).[¹]
The colonial countries are on the threshold of their 1905 -

2
such is the conclusion.
the col
Such is also the meaning of the resolutions on the colonial
question adopted by the enlarged plenum of the Comintern.
mimoso
THE FATE OF SOCIALISM IN

THE SOVIET UNION
I pass to the fourth group of questions.

So far I have spoken about the resolutions of our Party con
ference on questions directly concerning the Comintern. We
shall now pass to questions which directly concern both the
Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.), and thus serve as a link between
the external and internal problems.
[1] Lenin, On the Tenth Anniversary of "Pravda." (1922)

How will the temporary stabilisation of capitalism affect

the fate of socialism in our country? Does that stabilisation
mark the end, or the beginning of the end, of the building of
socialism in our country?
Is it at all possible to build socialism by our own efforts in
our technically and economically backward country if capital
ism continues to exist in the other countries for a more or less
prolonged period?
Is it possible to create a complete guarantee against the
dangers of intervention, and hence, against the restoration of
the old order of things in our country, while we are encircled
by capitalism, and, at the present moment, by stabilised cap
italism at that?
All these are questions which inevitably confront us as a

result of the new situation in the sphere of international rela
tions, and which we cannot ignore. They demand a precise
and definite answer. 14 18 56 855 mil voit schaf
Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One
group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between
the proletariat and the peasantry. The other group consists of
the external contradictions that exist between our country, as
the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands
of capitalism. 00
Let us examine these two groups of contradictions
separately.
That certain contradictions exist between the proletariat
and the peasantry cannot, of course, be denied. It is sufficient
to recall everything that has taken place, and is still taking
place, in our country in connection with the price policy for
agricultural produce, in connection with the price limits, in
connection with the campaign to reduce the prices of manufac
tured goods, and so forth, to understand how very real these
208 LA ON THE OPPOSITION OF
contradictions are. We have two main classes before us: the
proletarian class and the class of private-property-owners, i.e.,

the peasantry. Hence, contradictions between them are inevi
table. The whole question is whether we shall be able by our
own efforts to overcome the contradictions that exist between
the proletariat and the peasantry. When the question is asked:
can we build socialism by our own efforts? what is meant is:
can the contradictions that exist between the proletariat and
the peasantry in our country be overcome or not?
Leninism answers that question in the affirmative: yes, we
can build socialism, and we will build it together with the
peasantry under the leadership of the working class.
What is the basis, the grounds, for such an answer?
The grounds are that, besides contradictions between the
proletariat and the peasantry, there are also common interests
between them on fundamental problems of development,
interests which outweigh, or, at all events, can outweigh,
those contradictions, and are the basis, the foundation, of the
alliance between the workers and the peasants. thines
to What are those common interests?
The point is that there are two paths along which agriculture
can develop: the capitalist path and the socialist path. The
capitalist path means development by impoverishing the
majority of the peasantry for the sake of enriching the upper
strata of the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The socialist path,
on the contrary, means development by a continuous improve
ment in the well-being of the majority of the peasantry. It is
in the interest of both the proletariat and the peasantry, partic
ularly of the latter, that development should proceed along
the second path, the socialist path, for that is the peasantry's
only salvation from impoverishment and a semi-starvation
existence. Needless to say, the proletarian dictatorship, which
holds in its hands the main threads of economic life, will take
all measures to secure the victory of the second path, the
socialist path. It goes without saying, on the other hand, that
the peasantry is vitally interested in development proceeding
along this second path.
Hence the community of interests of the proletariat and the
peasantry which outweighs the contradictions between them.
That is why Leninism says that we can and must build a
complete socialist society together with the peasantry on the
basis of the alliance between the workers and the peasants.
That is why Leninism says, basing itself on the common
interests of the proletarians and the peasants, that we can and
must by our own efforts overcome the contradictions that exist
between the proletariat and the peasantry.
That is how Leninism regards the matter.
But, evidently, not all comrades agree with Leninism. The
following, for example, is what Trotsky says about the con
tradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry:
"The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a
backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population could be
solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world prole
tarian revolution" (see preface to Trotsky's book The Year 1905).
In other words, it is not within our power, we are not in a

position, by our own efforts to overcome, to eliminate the in
ternal contradictions in our country, the contradictions between
the proletariat and the peasantry, because, it appears, only as
a result of a world revolution, and only on the basis of a world
revolution, can we eliminate those contradictions and, at last,
build socialism.

Needless to say, this proposition has nothing in common

with Leninism.
The same Trotsky goes on to say:

tate
"Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the work
ing class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to
transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we
cannot doubt for an instant" (see Trotsky's Our Revolution, p. 278).
In other words, we cannot even dream of maintaining power

for any length of time unless the Western proletariat takes
power and renders us state support.
Further:
THE
"It would be hopeless to think ... that, for example, a revolution

ary Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe" (see
Trotsky's Works, Vol. III, Part I, p. 90).
In other words, it appears that not only are we unable to

build socialism, but we cannot even hold out albeit for a brief
period "in the face of a conservative Europe," although the

whole world knows that we have not only held out, but have
repulsed a number of furious attacks upon our country by a
conservative Europe.
And lastly:
"Real progress of a socialist economy in Russia," says Trotsky, "will

become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major
European countries" (ibid., p. 93).
Clear, one would think.

omrades,
I have quoted these passages, com in order to contrast
them with passages from the works of Lenin, and thus to en
able you to grasp the quintessence of the question of the pos
sibility of building a complete socialist society in the land of

the proletarian dictatorship, which is surrounded by capital

ist states.
Let us now turn to passages from the works of Lenin.

Here is what Lenin wrote as far back as 1915, during the
imperialist war:
"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of

capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible, first in several
or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious pro
letariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised
its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world,
the capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other
countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in
the event of necessity, coming out even with armed force against the
exploiting classes and their states." Because "the free union of
nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and

stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states"
(see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).[¹]
In other words, the land of the proletarian dictatorship,

which is surrounded by capitalists, can, it appears, not only
by its own efforts eliminate the internal contradictions between
the proletariat and the peasantry, but can and must, in addi
tion, build socialism, organise its own socialist economy and
establish an armed force in order to go to the aid of the
proletarians in the surrounding countries in their struggle to
overthrow capital.
Such is the fundamental thesis of Leninism on the victory
of socialism in one country.

Lenin said the same thing, although in a slightly different
way, in 1920, at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in connection
with the question of the electrification of our country:
"Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole coun

try. Otherwise, the country will remain a small peasant country, and

212 ON THE OPPOSITION SHOW
we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism,

not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows
this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic
base is transformed from a small peasant base into a large-scale indus
trial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our
industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon
the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve final*
victory" (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47). [¹]
S
In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the technical

difficulties connected with the building of socialism in our
country, but he did not by any means draw from this the absurd
conclusion that "real progress of a socialist economy in Russia
will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in
the major European countries"; on the contrary, he was of
the opinion that we could by our own efforts surmount those
difficulties and achieve "final victory," i.e., build complete
socialism.
Escal.
And here is what Lenin said a year later, in 1921:
Ingy
"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and
victory on a world scale* is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions,
which are growing, are delayed)" ("Outline and Synopsis of the Pam
phlet The Tax in Kind," 1921- see Vol. XXVI, p. 313).
In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the political dif

Mond
ficulties connected with the building of socialism in our
country, but he did not by any means draw from this the false
conclusion that "without direct state support from the Europe
an proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to
maintain itself in power"; on the contrary, he was of the opin
ion that, given a correct policy towards the peasantry, we
THIN

[¹] Lenin, Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. December 22-29,
1920. 2. Report on the Work of the Council of People's Commissars.
December 22.
would be quite able to ensure "victory on a world scale,"

meaning that we could build complete socialism.
But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry? A
correct policy towards the peasantry is something that depends
wholly and entirely upon us, and upon us alone, as the Party
which directs the building of socialism in our country.
Lenin said the same thing, but still more definitely, in 1923,
in his notes on co-operation:
"As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of produc
tion, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this
assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc. - is not this
right to look down upon as such now, under the NEP? Is this not all
that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?* This is not
yet the building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and
sufficient for this building" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392). [¹]
In other words, under the dictatorship of the proletariat

we possess, it appears, all that is needed to build a complete
socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we
can and must overcome them by our own efforts.
As regards the objection that the relative economic back
wardness of our country precludes the possibility of building
socialism, Lenin attacked and refuted it as something incom
patible with socialism:
Elly
"Infinitely hackneyed is the argument," says Lenin, "that they learned
by rote during the development of West-European Social-Democracy,
namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, that, as certain 'learned'
* My italics. - J. St.

gentlemen among them express it, the objective economic prerequisites for
socialism do not exist in our country" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 399).[¹]
10
Had it been otherwise, there was no point in taking power

in October and carrying out the October Revolution. For if
the possibility and necessity of building a complete socialist
society is precluded for some reason or other, the October Rev
olution becomes meaningless. Anyone who denies the pos
sibility of building socialism in one country must necessarily
deny that the October Revolution was justified; and vice versa,
anyone who has no faith in the October Revolution cannot
admit the possibility of the victory of socialism in the con
ditions of capitalist encirclement. The connection between
lack of faith in October and denial of the socialist potentialities
in our country is complete and direct.
"I know," says Lenin, "that there are, of course, sages who think they
are very clever and even call themselves Socialists, who assert that power
should not have been seized until the revolution had broken out in all
countries. They do not suspect that by speaking in this way they are
deserting the revolution and going over to the side of the bourgeoisie.
To wait until the toiling classes bring about a revolution on an inter
national scale means that everybody should stand stock-still in expecta
tion. That is nonsense" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).[2]
That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of
the first order, with the internal contradictions, with the ques
tion of the possibility of building socialism in the conditions
of capitalist encirclement.
Let us now pass to the contradictions of the second order,
to the external contradictions that exist between our country,
[1] Lenin, Our Revolution. (1923)

[2] Lenin, Report on Foreign Policy Delivered at a Joint Meeting of
the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet.
May 14, 1918.
.) 215
as the country of socialism, and all the other countries, as the

countries of capitalism.
What are these contradictions?
They are that, as long as capitalist encirclement exists, there

is bound to be the danger of intervention by the capitalist
countries, and as long as such a danger exists, there is bound
to be the danger of restoration, the danger of the capitalist
order being re-established in our country.
Can those contradictions be fully overcome by one country?
No, they cannot; for the efforts of one country, even if that
country is the land of the proletarian dictatorship, are insuffi
cient for the purpose of fully guaranteeing it against the danger
of intervention. Therefore, a full guarantee against interven
tion, and hence the final victory of socialism, are possible only
on an international scale, only as a result of the joint efforts
of the proletarians of a number of countries, or still better
-
- only as a result of the victory of the proletarians in a number

of countries.
What is the final victory of socialism?

The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against
attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, for
any serious attempt at restoration can take place only with
serious support from outside, only with the support of interna
tional capital. Therefore, the support of our revolution by the
workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the work
ers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for
fully guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts
at intervention and restoration, a necessary condition for the
final victory of socialism.
"As long as our Soviet Republic," says Lenin, "remains an isolated
borderland of the entire capitalist world, just so long will it be quite
ludicrously fantastic and utopian to hope . . for the disappearance of
.
all danger. Of course, as long as such fundamental opposites remain,

dangers will remain too, and we cannot escape them" (see Vol. XXVI,
P. 29). [1]
And further:
"We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the
existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for
a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end"
(see Vol. XXIV, p. 122). [2]
banda
That is why Lenin says that:
M
"Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and only by
the joint efforts of the workers of all countries" (see Vol. XXIII, P. 9).[3]
m SATE, P
That is how the matter stands with the contradictions of the

second order.
Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which

can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with
the second group of contradictions, the solution of which
requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries,
commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either
either a
He is
muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist.
An example of such confusion is provided by a letter I
received from a comrade in January this year on the question
of the victory of socialism in one country. He writes in
perplexity:
[1] Lenin, Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. December 22-29,

1920. 2. Report on the Work
M
of the Council of People's Commissars. De
cember 22.
UÉ J Dow
[2] Lenin, Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March
March 18-23, 1919.
2. Report of the Central Committee. March 18.
the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet.
May 14, 1918. bul

"You say that the Leninist theory. . . is that socialism can triumph
in one country. I regret to say that I have not found in the relevant
passages of Lenin's works any references to the victory of socialism in
one country."
DEIRA A
The trouble, of course, is not that this comrade, whom I
regard as one of the best of our young student comrades, "has
not found in the relevant passages of Lenin's works any refer
ences to the victory of socialism in one country." He will read
and, some day, will at last find such references. The trouble
is that he confused the internal contradictions with the external
contradictions and got entirely muddled up in this confusion.
Perhaps it will not be superfluous to inform you of the answer
I sent to this comrade's letter. Here it is:
"The point at issue is not complete victory, but the victory of social
ism in general, i.e., driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking
power, repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning to build a
socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat in one country can be fully
successful; but a complete guarantee against restoration can be ensured
only by the joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries.'
"It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution
in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat of Russia,
obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians of other countries,
but in the absence of victory in several countries, 'cannot hold out in
the face of a conservative Europe.' That is not Marxism, but the most
ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and whatever else you please. If
Trotsky's theory were correct, Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert
NEP Russia into socialist Russia, and that we have all that is necessary
for building a complete socialist society'* (see the article "On Co
operation"), would be wrong.
"The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the attempt
to regard the victorious proletarian country as something passive, capable
only of marking time until the moment when assistance comes from the
victorious proletarians in other countries. Let us assume that the Soviet
system will exist in Russia for five or ten years without a revolution
taking place in the West; let us assume that, nevertheless, during that
* All italics mine. - J. St.

1
218 CD ON THE OPPOSITION
period our Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a

socialist economy under the conditions of NEP - do you think that dur
ing those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in
collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist economy?
It is enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous is the
theory that denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.
"But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? No, it
does not ... . for as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will
always be the danger of military intervention" (January 1925).
1997: 67
That is how the matter stands with the question of the fate
of socialism in our country from the standpoint of the well
known resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party.
ai I
V Slope of the
and does
THE PARTY'S POLICY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
I pass to the fifth group of questions.

Before passing to the resolutions of the Fourteenth Con
ference dealing with the Party's policy in the countryside, I
should like to say a few words about the hullabaloo raised by
the bourgeois press in connection with the criticism which our
Party has made of our own shortcomings in the countryside.
The bourgeois press leaps and dances and assures all and
sundry that the open criticism of our own shortcomings is a
sign of the weakness of the Soviet power, a sign of its disinte
gration and decay. Needless to say, all this hullabalco is
thoroughly false and mendacious.
Self-criticism is a sign of our Party's strength and not of
its weakness. Only a strong party, which has its roots in life
and is marching to victory, can afford the ruthless criticism of
its own shortcomings that it has permitted, and always will
permit, in front of the whole people. A party which hides
the truth from the people, which fears the light and fears
criticism, is not a party, but a clique of impostors, whose doom
is sealed. Messieurs the bourgeois measure us with their own
yardstick. They fear the light and assiduously hide the truth
from the people, covering up their shortcomings with ostenta
tious proclamation of well-being. And so they think that we
Communists, too, must hide the truth from the people. They
fear the light, for it would be enough for them to permit
anything like serious self-criticism, anything like free criticism
of their own shortcomings, to cause the downfall of the bour
geois system. And so they think that if we Communists permit
self-criticism, it is a sign that we are surrounded and that the
ground is slipping from under our feet. Those honourable
gentlemen, the bourgeois and Social-Democrats, measure us
with their own yardsticks. Only parties which are departing
into the past and whose doom is sealed can fear the light and
fear criticism. We fear neither the one nor the other, we do
not fear them because we are a party that is in the ascendant,

that is marching to victory. That is why the self-criticism that
has been going on for several months already is a sign of our
Party's immense strength, and not of its weakness, it is a
means of consolidating and not of disintegrating the Party.
Let us now pass to the question of the Party's policy in the
countryside.
What new facts are to be noted in the countryside in con
nection with the new internal and international situation?
I think that four chief facts are to be noted:
1) the change in the international situation and the slowing
down of the tempo of the revolution, which compel us to
choose the least painful, although slower, methods of draw
ing the peasantry into socialist construction, of building social
ism together with the peasantry;
2) the economic progress in the countryside and the process

of differentiation among the peasantry, which call for the
elimination of the survivals of War Communism in the
Vivals of
countryside;
3) the political activity of the peasantry, which requires

that the old methods of leadership and administration in the
countryside be changed;
4) the elections to the Soviets, which revealed the indubita
ble fact that in a number of districts in our country the middle

peasants were found to be on the side of the kulaks against
the poor peasants.
In view of these new facts, what is the Party's main task
in the countryside? 000 ke most ad
Proceeding from the fact that differentiation is going on in
the countryside, some comrades draw the conclusion that the
Party's main task is to foment class struggle there. That is
wrong. That is idle talk. That is not our main task now. That
is a rehash of the old Menshevik songs taken from the old
Menshevik encyclopedia.
To foment class struggle in the countryside is not by any
means the main task at present. The main task at present is to
rally the middle peasants around the proletariat, to win them
over to our side again. The main task at present is to link up
with the main masses of the peasantry, to raise their material
and cultural level, and to move forward together with those
main masses along the road to socialism. The main task is to
build socialism together with the peasantry, without fail to
gether with the peasantry, and without fail under the leadership
of the working class; for the leadership of the working class
is the basic guarantee that our work of construction will pro
ceed along the path to socialism.
That is now the Party's main task.
Perhaps it will not be superfluous to recall Ilyich's words

on this subject, the words he uttered at the time NEP was
introduced, and which remain valid to this day:
"The whole point now is to advance as an immeasurably wider and
larger mass, and only together with the peasantry" (see Vol. XXVII,
P. 272).[¹]
And further:
aliban
"Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file toiling peas
ants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, more slowly
than we imagined, but in such a way that the entire mass will actually
move forward with us. If we do that we shall in time get such an
acceleration of progress as we cannot dream of now" (ibid., pp. 231-32). [2]
In view of this, two main tasks confront us in the

countryside.
1) Firstly, we must see to it that peasant economy is

included in the general system of Soviet economic develop
ment. Formerly things proceeded in such a way that we had
two parallel processes: the town went its own way and the
country went its way. The capitalist strove to include peasant
economy in the system of capitalist development, but that
inclusion took place through the impoverishment of the peasant
masses and the enrichment of the upper stratum of the peas
antry. As is known, that path was fraught with revolution.
After the victory of the proletariat the inclusion of peasant
economy in the general system of Soviet economic develop
ment must be brought about by creating conditions that can
promote the progress of our national economy on the basis of
[1] Lenin, Speech in Closing the Eleventh Congress of the Russian

Communist Party (Bolsheviks). April 2, 1922.
[2] Lenin, Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)
to the Eleventh Party Congress. March 27, 1922.
a gradual but steady improvement of the welfare of the

majority of the peasants, that is, along a road which is the
very opposite to the one along which the capitalists led the
peasantry and proposed that they should go prior to the
revolution. 155
But how is peasant economy to be included in the system
of economic construction? Through the co-operatives. Through
the credit co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives, consumers'
co-operatives and artisans' co-operatives.
Such are the roads and paths by which peasant economy
must be slowly but thoroughly drawn into the general system
of socialist construction.
2) The second task consists in gradually but steadily pur

suing the line of eliminating the old methods of administra
tion and leadership in the countryside, the line of revitalising
the Soviets, the line of transforming the Soviets into genuinely
elected bodies, the line of implanting the principles of Soviet
democracy in the countryside. Ilyich said that the proletarian
dictatorship is the highest type of democracy for the majority
of the working people. Ilyich said that this highest type of
democracy can be introduced only after the proletariat has
taken power and after we have obtained the opportunity of
consolidating this power. Well, this phase of consolidating
the Soviet power and of implanting Soviet democracy has
already begun. We must proceed along this path cautiously
and unhurriedly, and in the course of our work we must create
around the Party a numerous body of activists consisting of
non-Party peasants.
While the first task, the task of including peasant economy
in the general system of economic construction, makes it pos
sible for us to put the peasantry in joint harness with the
proletariat on the road of building socialism, the second task,

the task of implanting Soviet democracy and revitalising the
Soviets in the countryside, should make it possible for us to
reconstruct our state apparatus, to link it with the masses of
the people, to make it sound and honest, simple and inex
pensive, in order to create the conditions that will facilitate
the gradual transition from a society
3
with a dictatorship of the
proletariat to communist society. nijed
Such are the main lines of the resolutions adopted by the
Fourteenth Conference of our Party on the question of our
Party's policy in the countryside. isu
Hence, the methods of Party leadership in the countryside
must change accordingly. nuola tol "alogs"
We have people in the Party who assert that since we
have NEP, and since capitalism is beginning to be temporarily
stabilised, our task is to pursue a policy of the utmost pressure
both in the Party and in the state apparatus, pressure so strong
as to make everything creak. I must say that such a policy
would be wrong and fatal. What we need now is not the
utmost pressure, but the utmost flexibility in both policy and
organisation, the utmost flexibility in both political and or
ganisational leadership. Unless we have that we shall be
unable to remain at the helm under the present complicated
conditions. We need the utmost flexibility in order to keep
the Party at the helm and to ensure that the Party exercises
OBL
complete leadership.
Further. The Communists in the countryside must refrain
from improper forms of administration. We must not rely
merely on giving orders to the peasants. We must learn to
explain to the peasants patiently the questions they do not
understand, we must learn to convince the peasants, sparing
neither time nor effort for this purpose. Of course, it is much
224
LOTS ON THE OPPOSITION HOW
easier and simpler to issue an order and leave it at that, as

some of our Volost Executive Committee Chairmen often do.
But not all that is simple and easy is good. Not long ago, it
appears, when the representative of a Gubernia Committee
asked the secretary of a volost Party unit why there were no
newspapers in his volost, the answer was given: "What do we
want newspapers for? It's quieter and better without them.
If the peasants begin reading newspapers they will start asking
all sorts of questions and we shall have no end of trouble with
them." And this secretary calls himself a Communist! It
scarcely needs proof that he is not a Communist, but a calamity.
The point is that nowadays it is utterly impossible to lead with
out "trouble," let alone without newspapers. This simple truth
must be understood and assimilated if we want the Party and
the Soviet power to retain the leadership in the countryside.
Further. To lead, nowadays, one must be a good manager,
2007
one must be familiar with and understand economic affairs.
Merely talking about "world politics," about Chamberlain and
MacDonald, will not carry one very far now. We have entered
the period of economic construction. Hence, the one who can
lead is one who understands economic affairs, who is able to
give the peasant useful advice about economic development,
who can give the peasant assistance in economic construction.
To study economic affairs, to be directly linked with economic
affairs, to go into all the details of economic construction
such is now the of the Communists in the countryside.
he task
Unless they do that, it is no use even dreaming of leadership.
It is now impossible to lead in the old way, because the
peasants are displaying more political activity, and it is neces
sary that this activity should assume a Soviet form, that it
should flow through the Soviets and not past them. A leader
is one who revitalises the Soviets and creates a peasant active

around the Party in the countryside.
It is impossible to lead in the old way nowadays, because
the economic activity of the rural population has increased,
and it is necessary that this activity should assume the form
of co-operation, that it should flow through the co-operatives
and not past them. A leader is one who implants a co-operative
communal life in the countryside.
Such, in general, are the concrete tasks of Party leadership
in the countryside.
Ta
VI
bad siunii
bayong pels THE METAL INDUSTRY
I pass to the last group of questions dealt with at the Four

teenth Conference of our Party.
What is new and specific in our economic leadership?
It is that our economic plans have begun to lag behind the
actual development of our economy, they turn out to be in
adequate and quite often fail to keep pace with the actual
growth of our economy.
A striking expression of this fact is our state budget. You
know that in the course of half a year we were obliged to re
vise our state budget three times owing to rapid increases in
the revenue side of our budget not foreseen in our estimates.
In other words, our estimates and our budget plans failed to
keep pace with the increase in state revenues, as a result of
which the state treasury found itself with a surplus. That
means that the sap of economic life in our country is surging
upward with irresistible force, upsetting all the scientific plans
of our financial experts. That means that we are experiencing
an upsurge of economic and labour activity, at least as power

ful as that which America, for example, experienced after the
Civil War. sijom of 17
The growth of our metal industry can be taken as the most
striking expression of this new phenomenon in our economic
life. Last year the output of the metal industry amounted to
191,000,000 pre-war rubles. In November last year the annual
output plan for 1924-25 was fixed at 273,000,000 pre-war rubles.
In January this year, in view of the discrepancy between that
figure and the actual growth of the metal industry, the plan
was revised and the figure brought up to 317,000,000. In April
this year, even this enlarged plan proved to be unsound and, as
a consequence, the figure had to be raised again, this time to
350,000,000. Now we are told that this plan has also proved
to be inadequate, for it will have to be enlarged once again
and the figure raised to 360-370 millions. al 2007
In other words, the output of the metal industry this year
has almost doubled compared with that of last year. That is
apart from the colossal growth of our light industry, of the
growth of our transport system, fuel industry, and so forth.
What does all this show? It shows that as regards the or
ganisation of industry, which is the chief basis of socialism,
we have already entered the broad high road of development.
As regards the metal industry, the mainspring of all industry,
the period of stagnation has passed, and our metal industry
now has every opportunity of going ahead and flourishing.
Comrade Dzerzhinsky is right in saying that our country can
and must become a land of metal.
The enormous importance of this fact both for the internal

development of our country and for the international revolu
tion scarcely needs proof.
There is no doubt that, from the standpoint of our internal

development, the development of our metal industry and the
significance of its growth are colossal, for this development
means the growth of our entire industry and of our economy
as a whole, for the metal industry is the chief basis of industry
as a whole, for neither light industry, nor transport, nor the
fuel industry, nor electrification, nor agriculture can be put on
their feet unless the metal industry is powerfully developed.
The growth of the metal industry is the basis of the growth
of industry as a whole, and of our national economy as a
whole. 20
Here is what Lenin says about "heavy industry," meaning
by that mainly the metal industry: den
"The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant
farms - that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light
industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods - that, too,
is not enough; we also need heavy industry. And to put it in good
condition will require many years of work."
And further:
TOUC
"Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be

able to build up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed
altogether as an independent country" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 349).[¹]
As for the international significance of the development of

our metal industry, we may say that it is immeasurable. For
what is the surging growth of the metal industry under the
proletarian dictatorship if not direct proof that the proletariat
is capable not only of destroying the old, but also of building
the new, that it is capable of building by its own efforts a new
industry, and a new society free from the exploitation of man
[¹] Lenin, Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of
the World Revolution. (1922)
228 ON THE OPPOSITION O
by man? To prove this in actual fact and not from books

means advancing the cause of the international revolution
surely and finally. The pilgrimages of West-European work
ers to our country are not accidental. They are of enormous
agitational and practical significance for the development of
the revolutionary movement throughout the world. The fact
that workers come here and probe every corner at our factories
and works shows that they do not believe books, but want to
convince themselves by their own experience that the pro
letariat is capable of building a new industry, of creating a
new society. And when they convince themselves of this, you
may be sure that the cause of the international revolution will
make enormous strides forward. Ri
"At the present time," says Lenin, "we are exercising our main
influence on the international revolution by our economic policy. All
eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers
in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggera
tion. . . . That is the field to which the struggle has been transferred
on a world-wide scale. If we solve this problem, we shall have won
on an international scale surely and finally. That is why questions of
economic construction assume absolutely exceptional significance for us.
On this front we must win victory by slow, gradual - it cannot be fast
but steady progress upward and forward"* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11).[¹]
do Such is the international significance of the growth of our

industry in general, and of our metal industry in particular.cop
At the present time we have an industrial proletariat of
about 4,000,000. A small number, of course, but it is something
to go on with in building socialism and in building up the
defence of our country to the terror of the enemies of the
per awibri
*All italics mine. - J. St.
[1] Lenin, Tenth All-Russian Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). May 26-28,

tous ho
1921. 5. Speech in Closing the Conference. May 28.
proletariat. But we cannot and must not stop there. We need

15-20 million industrial proletarians, we need the electrifica
tion of the principal regions of our country, the organisation
of agriculture on co-operative lines, and a highly developed
metal industry. And then we need fear no danger. And then
we shall triumph on an international scale.
The historical significance of the Fourteenth Conference lies
precisely in the fact that it clearly mapped the road to that
great goal.
And that road is the right road, for it is Lenin's road, and
it will lead us to final victory.
Such, in general, are the results of the work of the Four
teenth Conference of our Party.
Pravda, Nos. 106 and 107,

May 13, 1925 Mene
wong sonder
os danni nga man som h
gliday co shinech
oftwaplecsy drid
Isanal in tamilvnts fo
blodeonised sist
099.
banelo rals vilaid, ho A paintings to

gada babu ape ba e TubiJag
Ven
Isas 918
THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS BA
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)37
loow December 18-31, 1925 Holis
REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE POLITICAL

REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
December 23
Comrades, I shall not answer separately the notes on partic

ular questions, because the whole of my speech in reply to
the discussion will in substance be an answer to these notes.
Nor do I intend to answer personal attacks or any verbal
thrusts of a purely personal character, for I think that the con
gress is in possession of sufficient material with which to verify
the motives of those attacks and what is behind them.
Nor shall I deal with the "cave men," the people who
gathered somewhere near Kislovodsk and devised all sorts of
schemes in regard to the organs of the Central Committee.
Well, let them make schemes, that is their business. I should
only like to emphasise that Lashevich, who spoke here with
aplomb against politics of scheming, was himself found to be
230
FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 231
one of the schemers and, it turns out, at the "cave men's" con
ference near Kislovodsk he played a role that was far from
unimportant. Well, so much for him. (Laughter.)
I pass to the matter in hand.
1. SOKOLNIKOV AND THE DAWESATION

OF OUR COUNTRY
First of all, a few rejoinders. First rejoinder - to Sokolni

kov. He said in his speech: "When Stalin indicated two gener
al lines, two lines in the building of our economy, he misled
us, because he should have formulated these two lines different
ly, he should have talked not about importing equipment, but
about importing finished goods." I assert that this statement
of Sokolnikov's utterly exposes him as a supporter of Shanin's
theses. I want to say that here Sokolnikov in point of fact
speaks as an advocate of the Dawesation of our country. What
did I speak about in my report? Did I speak about the ex
ports and imports plan? Of course not. Everybody knows that
we are obliged at present to import equipment. But Sokolnikov
converts this necessity into a principle, a theory, a prospect of
development. That is where Sokolnikov's mistake lies. In
my report I spoke about two fundamental, guiding, general
lines in building our national economy. I spoke about that in
order to clear up the question of the ways of ensuring for our
country independent economic development in the conditions
of capitalist encirclement. In my report I spoke about our
general line, about our prospects as regards transforming our
country from an agrarian into an industrial country. What is
an agrarian country? An agrarian country is one that exports
agricultural produce and imports equipment, but does not
itself manufacture, or manufactures very little, equipment
232 LED ON THE OPPOSITION
(machinery, etc.) by its own efforts. If we get stranded at the

stage of development at which we have to import equipment
and machinery and do not produce them by our own efforts, we
can have no guarantee against the conversion of our country
into an appendage of the capitalist system. That is precisely
why we must Pret
steer a course towards the development of the
production of the means of production in our country. Can
it be that Sokolnikov fails to understand such an elementary
thing? Yet it was only about this that I spoke in my report.
What does the Dawes Plan demand? It demands that Ger
many should pump out money for the payment of reparations

from markets, chiefly from our Soviet markets. What follows
from this? From this it follows that Germany will supply us
with equipment, we shall import it and export agricultural
produce. We, i.e., our industry, will thus find itself tethered
to Europe. That is precisely the basis of the Dawes Plan. Con
cerning that, I said in my report, in so far as it affects our coun
try, the Dawes Plan is built on sand. Why? "Because," I said,
"we have not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian
country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, in
cluding Germany," because, "we ourselves will manufacture
machinery and other means of production." The conversion of
our country from an agrarian into an industrial country able to
produce the equipment it needs by its own efforts - that is
-
the essence, the basis of our general line. We must so arrange

things that the thoughts and strivings of our business execu
tives are directed precisely towards this aspect, the aspect of
transforming our country from one that imports equipment into
one that manufactures this equipment. For that is the chief
guarantee of the economic independence of our country. For
that is the guarantee that our country will not be converted
into an appendage of the capitalist countries. Sokolnikov
FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. (B.) 233
refuses to understand this simple and obvious thing. They,

the authors of the Dawes Plan, would like to restrict us to the
manufacture of, say, calico; but that is not enough for us, for
we want to manufacture not only calico, but also the machinery
needed for manufacturing calico. They would like us to restrict
ourselves to the manufacture of, say, automobiles; but that
is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only au
tomobiles, but also the machinery for making automobiles.
They want to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, shoes; but
that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only
shoes, but also the machinery for making shoes. And so on,
and so forth.
That is the difference between the two general lines; and

that is what Sokolnikov refuses to understand.
To abandon our line means abandoning the tasks of social

ist construction, means adopting the standpoint of the Dawesa
tion of our country.
2. KAMENEV AND OUR CONCESSIONS
TO THE PEASANTRY
Second rejoinder to Kamenev. He said that by adopting

-
at the Fourteenth Party Conference the well-known decisions

on economic development, on revitalising the Soviets, on elim
inating the survivals of War Communism, on precise regula
tion of the question of renting and leasing land and hiring
labour, we had made concessions to the kulaks and not to the
peasants, that these are concessions not to the peasantry, but
to the capitalist elements. Is that true? I assert that it is not
true; that it is a slander against the Party. I assert that a
Marxist cannot approach the question in that way; that only
a Liberal can approach the question in that way.
What are the concessions that we made at the Fourteenth

Party Conference? Do those concessions fit into the framework
of NEP, or not? Undoubtedly they do. Perhaps we expanded
NEP at the April Conference? Let the opposition answer: Did
we expand NEP in April, or not? If we expanded it, why did
they vote for the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference? And
is it not well known that we are all opposed to an expansion of
NEP? What is the point, then? The point is that Kamenev has
got himself mixed up; for NEP includes permission of trade,
capitalism, hired labour; and the decisions of the Fourteenth
Conference are an expression of NEP, which was introduced
when Lenin was with us. Did Lenin know that in the first
stages, NEP would be taken advantage of primarily by the

capitalists, the merchants, the kulaks? Of course he knew. But
did Lenin say that in introducing NEP we were making con
cessions to the profiteers and capitalist elements and not to the
peasantry? No, he did not and could not say that. On the
contrary, he always said that, in permitting trade and capital
ism, and in changing our policy in the direction of NEP, we
were making concessions to the peasantry for the sake of
maintaining and strengthening our bond with it; since under
the given conditions, the peasantry could not exist without
trade, without some revival of capitalism being permitted;
since at the given time we could not establish the bond in any
way except through trade; since only in that way could we
strengthen the bond and build the foundations of a socialist
economy. That is how Lenin approached the question of con
cessions. That is how the question of the concessions made in
April 1925 should be approached.
Allow me to read to you Lenin's opinion on this subject.
This is how he substantiated the Party's transition to the new
policy, to the policy of NEP, in his address on "The Tax in
Kind" at the conference of secretaries of Party units of the

Moscow Gubernia:
"I want to dwell on the question how this policy can be reconciled
with the point of view of communism, and how it comes about that the
communist Soviet state is facilitating the development of free trade. Is
this good from the point of view of communism? In order to answer
this question we must carefully examine the changes that have taken
place in peasant economy. At first the position was that we saw the
whole of the peasantry fighting against the rule of the landlords. The
landlords were equally opposed by the poor peasants and the kulaks,
although, of course, with different intentions: the kulaks fought with
the aim of taking the land from the landlords and developing their
own farming on it. It was then that it became revealed that the kulaks
and the poor peasants had different interests and different aims. In the
Ukraine, even today, we see this difference of interests much more clearly
than here. The poor peasants could obtain very little direct advantage
from the transfer of the land from the landlords because they had neither
the materials nor the implements for that. And we saw the poor peasants
organising to prevent the kulaks from seizing the land that had been
taken from the landlords. The Soviet Government assisted the Poor
Peasants' Committees that sprang up in Russia and in the Ukraine. What

was the result? The result was that the middle peasants became the
predominant element in the countryside.... The extremes of kulaks
and poor peasants have diminished; the majority of the population has
come nearer to the position of the middle peasant. If we want to raise
the productivity of our peasant economy we must first of all reckon with
the middle peasant. It was in accordance with this circumstance that the
Communist Party had to mould its policy. Thus, the change in the
policy towards the peasantry is to be explained by the change in the
position of the peasantry itself. The countryside bas become more middle
peasant, and in order to increase the productive forces we must reckon
with this"* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 304-05).[¹]
[1] Lenin, Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting of Sec

retaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) Cells of Moscow
and Moscow Gubernia. April 9, 1921.
236
UUD ON THE OPPOSITION O
And in the same volume, on page 247,[¹] Lenin draws the

general conclusion:
"We must build our state economy in relation to the economy of the
middle peasants, which we have been unable to transform in three
years, and will not be able to transform in ten years."
In other words, we introduced freedom of trade, we permit

ted a revival of capitalism, we introduced NEP, in order to
accelerate the growth of productive forces, to increase the
quantity of products in the country, to strengthen the bond with
the peasantry. The bond, the interests of the bond with the
peasantry as the basis of our concessions along the line of
NEP such was Lenin's approach to the subject.
Did Lenin know at that time that the profiteers, the capital
ists, the kulaks would take advantage of NEP, of the conces
sions to the peasantry? Of course he did. Does that mean
that these concessions were in point of fact concessions to the
profiteers and kulaks? No, it does not. For NEP in general,
and trade in particular, is being taken advantage of not only
by the capitalists and kulaks, but also by the state and co
operative bodies; for it is not only the capitalists and kulaks
who trade, but also the state bodies and co-operatives; and
when our state bodies and co-operatives learn how to trade,
they will gain (they are already gaining!) the upper hand over
the private traders, linking our industry with peasant economy.
What follows from this? It follows from this that our con
cessions proceed basically in the direction of strengthening our
bond, and for the sake of our bond, with the peasantry.

U Leata Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8-16, 1921.
6. Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Ap
propriation System. March 15.
Whoever fails to understand that, approaches the subject not

as a Leninist, but as a Liberal.
ber
3. WHOSE MISCALCULATIONS?
Third rejoinder to Sokolnikov. He says: "The con

siderable losses that we have sustained on the economic front
since the autumn are due precisely to an overestimation of
our forces, to an overestimation of our socialist maturity, an
overestimation of our ability, the ability of our state economy,
to guide the whole of the national economy already at the pres
ent time." alialo maine mala
It turns out, then, that the miscalculations in regard to pro

curement and foreign trade I have in mind the unfavourable
balance of trade in 1924-25- that those miscalculations were
due not to the error of our regulating bodies, but to an over
estimation of the socialist maturity of our economy. And it
appears that the blame for this rests upon Bukharin, whose
"school" deliberately cultivates exaggerated ideas about the
socialist maturity of our economy. zam
Of course, in making speeches one "can" play all sorts of
tricks, as Sokolnikov often does. But, after all, one should
know how far one can go. How can one talk such utter non
sense and downright untruth at a congress? Does not Sokolni
kov know about the special meeting of the Political Bureau
held in the beginning of November, which procurement and
foreign trade were discussed, at which the errors of the regu
lating bodies were rectified by the Central Committee, by the
majority of the Central Committee, which is alleged to have
overestimated our socialist potentialities? How can one talk
such nonsense at a congress? And what has Bukharin's
"school," or Bukharin himself, to do with it? What a way of
behaving to blame others for one's own sins!

-
Does not
Sokolnikov know that the stenographic report of the speeches

delivered at the meeting of the Central Committee on the
question of miscalculations was sent to all the Gubernia Party
Committees? How can one fly in the face of obvious facts?
One "can" play tricks when making speeches, but one should
know how far one can go.
4. HOW SOKOLNIKOV PROTECTS
THE POOR PEASANTS
Fourth rejoinder - also to Sokolnikov. He said here that he,

as People's Commissar of Finance, don't you see, strives in
every way to ensure that our agricultural tax is collected in
proportion to income, but he is hindered in this, he is hindered
because he is not allowed to protect the poor peasants and to
curb the kulaks. That is not true, comrades. It is a slander
against the Party. The question of officially revising the agri
cultural tax on the basis of income - I say officially, because
actually it is an income tax this question was raised at the
plenum of the Central Committee in October this year, but
nobody except Sokolnikov supported the proposal that it be
raised at the congress, because it was not yet ready for pres
entation at the congress. At that time Sokolnikov did not
insist on his proposal. But now it turns out that Sokolnikov is
not averse to using this against the Central Committee, not in
the interests of the poor peasants, of course, but in the interests
of the opposition. Well, since Sokolnikov talks here about the
poor peasants, permit me to tell you a fact which exposes the
actual stand taken by Sokolnikov, this alleged thoroughgoing
protector of the poor peasants. Not so long ago, Comrade
Milyutin, People's Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R.,
took a decision to exempt poor peasant farms from taxation in

cases where the tax amounts to less than a ruble. From Com
rade Milyutin's memorandum to the Central Committee it is

evident that the total revenue from taxation of less than a
ruble, taxation which irritates the peasantry, amounts to about

300-400 thousand rubles for the whole of the R.S.F.S.R., and
that the cost alone of collecting this tax is only a little less than
the revenue from it. What did Sokolnikov, this protector of
the poor peasants, do? He annulled Comrade Milyutin's de
cision. The Central Committee received protests about this
from fifteen Gubernia Party Committees. Sokolnikov would
not give way. The Central Committee had to exercise pressure
to compel Sokolnikov to rescind his veto on the absolutely
correct decision of the People's Commissar of Finance of the
R.S.F.S.R. not to collect taxes of less than a ruble. That is what
Sokolnikov calls "protecting" the interests of the poor peasants.

And people like that, with such a weight on their conscience,
have the what's the mildest way of putting it? - the audac
-
ity to speak against the Central Committee. It is strange,

comrades, strange.
mar
A
5. IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE OR SLANDER?
Lastly, one more rejoinder. I have in mind a rejoinder to

the authors of A Collection of Materials on Controversial
Questions. Yesterday, A Collection of Materials on Contro
versial Questions, only just issued, was secretly distributed
here, for members of the congress only. In this collection it
is stated, among other things, that in April this year I received
a delegation of village correspondents and expressed sympathy
with the idea of restoring private property in land. It appears
that analogous "impressions" of one of the village correspond
240 (0240 ON THE OPPOSITION TALION
ents were published in Bednota;38 I did not know about these

"impressions," I did not see them. I learned about them in
October this year. Earlier than that, in April, the Riga news
agency, which is distinguished from all other news agencies
by the fact that it fabricates all the false rumours about us,
had circulated a similar report to the foreign press, about which
we were informed by our people in Paris, who telegraphed to
the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs demanding that
it be refuted. At the time I answered Comrade Chicherin,
through my assistant, saying: "If Comrade Chicherin thinks it
necessary to refute all kinds of nonsense and slander, let him
refute it" (see archives of the Central Committee).
Are the authors of this sacramental "Collection" aware of
all that? Of course they are. Why, then, do they continue to
circulate all kinds of nonsense and fable? How can they, how
can the opposition, resort to the methods of the Riga news agen
cy? Have they really sunk so low as that? (A voice: "Shame!")
Further, knowing the habits of the "cave men," knowing
that they are capable of repeating the methods of the Riga news
agency, I sent a refutation to the editorial board of Bednota.
It is ridiculous to refute such nonsense, but knowing with whom
I have to deal, I, for all that, sent a refutation. Here it is:
"To the Editorial Board of Bednota.

FH "Comrade editor, recently I learned from some comrades that in a
sketch, published in Bednota of 5/IV, 1925, of a village correspondent's
impressions of an interview with me by a delegation of village corre
spondents, which I had not the opportunity to read at the time. it is
reported that I expressed sympathy with the idea of guaranteeing owner
Iship of land for 40 years or more, with the idea of private property in
land, etc. Although this fantastic report needs no refutation because of
its obvious absurdity, nevertheless, perhaps it will not be superfluous to
ask your permission to state in Bednota that this report is a gross mistake
and must be attributed entirely to the author's imagination.
"J. Stalin"
th Are the authors of the "Collection" aware of this letter?

Undoubtedly they are. Why, then, do they continue to circu
late tittle-tattle, fables? What method of fighting is this? They
say that this is an ideological struggle. But no, comrades, it is
not an ideological struggle. In our Russian language it is called
20
simply slander.
Permit me now to pass to the fundamental questions of
principle. countab
6. CONCERNING NEP
The question of NEP. I have in mind Comrade Krupskaya

and the speech she delivered on NEP. She says: "In essence,
NEP is capitalism permitted under certain conditions, capital
ism that the proletarian state keeps on a chain. ." Is that
true? Yes, and no. That we are keeping capitalism on a chain,
and will keep it so as long as it exists, is a fact, that is true.
But to say that NEP is capitalism that is nonsense, utter
-
nonsense. NEP is a special policy of the proletarian state aimed

at permitting capitalism while the commanding positions
are held by the proletarian state, aimed at a struggle between
the capitalist and socialist elements, aimed at increasing the
role of the socialist elements to the detriment of the capitalist
elements, aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over
the capitalist elements, aimed at the abolition of classes and
the building of the foundations of a socialist economy.
Whoever fails to understand this transitional, dual nature of
NEP departs from Leninism. If NEP were capitalism, then
NEP Russia that Lenin spoke about would be capitalist Russia.
But is present-day Russia a capitalist country and not a country
that is in transition from capitalism to socialism? Why then,
did Lenin not say simply: "Capitalist Russia will be socialist
242 ON T
ON THE OPPOSITION
Russia," but preferred a different formula: "NEP Russia will

become socialist Russia"? Does the opposition agree with
Comrade Krupskaya that NEP is capitalism, or does it not? I
think that not a single member of this congress will be found
who would agree with Comrade Krupskaya's formula. Com
rade Krupskaya (may she forgive me for saying so) talked
utter nonsense about NEP. One cannot come out here in
defence of Lenin against Bukharin with nonsense like that.

Teve
7. CONCERNING STATE CAPITALISM
Connected with this question is Bukharin's mistake. What

was his mistake? On what questions did Lenin dispute with
Bukharin? Lenin maintained that the category of state capital
ism is compatible with the system of the proletarian dictator
ship. Bukharin denied this. He was of the opinion, and with
him the "Left" Communists, too, including Safarov, were of
the opinion that the category of state capitalism is incompatible
with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin was
right, of course. Bukharin was wrong. He admitted this
mistake of his. Such was Bukharin's mistake. But that was in
the past. If now, in 1925, in May, he repeats that he disagrees

with Lenin on the question of state capitalism, I suppose it is
simply a misunderstanding. Either he ought frankly to with
draw that statement, or it is a misunderstanding; for the line
he is now defending on the question of the nature of state
industry is Lenin's line. Lenin did not come to Bukharin; on
the contrary, Bukharin came to Lenin. And precisely for that
reason we back Bukharin. (Applause.)
The chief mistake of Kamenev and Zinoviev is that they
regard the question of state capitalism scholastically, undialec
tically, divorced from the historical situation. Such an approach

to the question is abhorrent to the whole spirit of Leninism.
How did Lenin present the question? In 1921, Lenin, knowing
that our industry was under-developed and that the peasantry
needed goods, knowing that it (industry) could not be raised at
one stroke, that the workers, because of certain circumstances,
were engaged not so much in industry as in making cigarette
lighters in that situation Lenin was of the opinion that
the best of all possibilities was to invite foreign capital, to set
industry on its feet with its aid, to introduce state capitalism
in this way and through it to establish a bond between Soviet
power and the countryside. That line was absolutely correct
at that time, because we had no other means then of satisfying
the peasantry; for our industry was in a bad way, transport
was at a standstill, or almost at a standstill, there was a lack,
a shortage, of fuel. Did Lenin at that time consider state
capitalism permissible and desirable as the predominant form
in our economy? Yes, he did. But that was then, in 1921. What
about now? Can we now say that we have no industry, that
transport is at a standstill, that there is no fuel, etc.? No, we
cannot. Can it be denied that our industry and trade are
already establishing a bond between industry (our industry)
and peasant economy directly, by their own efforts? No, it can
not. Can it be denied that in the sphere of industry "state
capitalism" and "socialism" have already exchanged roles, for
socialist industry has become predominant and the relative im
portance of concessions and leases (the former have 50,000
workers and the latter 35,000) is minute? No, it cannot.
Already in 1922 Lenin said that nothing had come of conces
sions and leases in our country.
What follows from this? From this it follows that since 1921,
the situation in our country has undergone a substantial change,
that in this period our socialist industry and Soviet and co

operative trade have already succeeded in becoming the pre
dominant force, that we have already learned to establish a
bond between town and country by our own efforts, that the
most striking forms of state capitalism - concessions and
leases have not developed to any extent during this period,
-
that to speak now, in 1925, of state capitalism as the predomi

nant form in our economy, means distorting the socialist nature
of our state industry, means failing to understand the whole
difference between the past and the present situation, means
approaching the question of state capitalism not dialectically,
but scholastically, metaphysically.
Would you care to hear Sokolnikov? In his speech he said:
Tid
"Our foreign trade is being conducted as a state-capitalist enterprise....
Our internal trading companies are also state-capitalist enterprises. And
I must say, comrades, that the State Bank is just as much a state-capitalist
enterprise. What about our monetary system? Our monetary system is
based on the fact that in Soviet economy, under the conditions in which
socialism is being built, there has been adopted a monetary system which
is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy."
That is what Sokolnikov says. ugh od

Soon he will go to the length of declaring that the People's
Commissariat of Finance is also state capitalism. Up to now
I thought, and we all thought, that the State Bank is part of the
state apparatus. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that
our People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, not counting the
state-capitalist institutions that encompass it, is part of the
state apparatus, that our state apparatus is the apparatus of a
proletarian type of state. We all thought so up to now, for the
proletarian state is the sole master of these institutions. But
now, according to Sokolnikov, it turns out that these institu
tions, which are part of our state apparatus, are state-capitalist
institutions. Perhaps our Soviet apparatus is also state capital

ism and not a proletarian type of state, as Lenin declared it to
be? Why not? Does not our Soviet apparatus utilise a "mone
tary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist
economy?" Such is the nonsense a man can talk himself into.
Permit me first of all to quote Lenin's opinion on the nature

and significance of the State Bank. I should like, comrades, to
refer to a passage from a book written by Lenin in 1917. I have
in mind the pamphlet: Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?
in which Lenin still held the viewpoint of control of industry
(and not nationalisation) and, notwithstanding that, regarded
the State Bank in the hands of the proletarian state as being
nine-tenths a socialist apparatus. This is what he wrote about
the State Bank: ansmqolave
"The big banks are the 'state apparatus' we need for bringing about
socialism, and which we take ready-made from capitalism; our task here
is merely to lop off what capitalistically distorts this excellent apparatus,
to make it still bigger, still more democratic, still more all-embracing.
Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single State Bank, the
biggest of the biggest, with branches in every volost, in every factory,
will already be nine-tenths of the socialist apparatus. That will be nation
wide book-keeping, nation-wide accounting of the production and distribu
tion of goods, that will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the
skeleton of socialist society" (see Vol. XXI, p. 260).
vid
Compare these words of Lenin's with Sokolnikov's speech
and you will understand what Sokolnikov is slipping into. I
shall not be surprised if he declares the People's Commissariat
of Finance to be state capitalism.
What is the point here? Why does Sokolnikov fall into such
to 3
errors?
The point is that Sokolnikov fails to understand the dual

nature of NEP, the dual nature of trade under the present
conditions of the struggle between the socialist elements and
the capitalist elements; he fails to understand the dialectics of

development in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship,
in the conditions of the transition period, in which the methods
and weapons of the bourgeoisie are utilised by the socialist
elements for the purpose of overcoming and eliminating the
capitalist elements. The point is not at all that trade and the
monetary system are methods of "capitalist economy." The
point is that in fighting the capitalist elements, the socialist
elements of our economy master these methods and weapons
of the bourgeoisie for the purpose of overcoming the capitalist
elements, that they successfully use them against capitalism,
successfully use them for the purpose of building the socialist
foundation of our economy. Hence, the point is that, thanks
to the dialectics of our development, the functions and purpose
of those instruments of the bourgeoisie change in principle,
fundamentally; they change in favour of socialism to the
detriment of capitalism. Sokolnikov's mistake lies in his
failure to understand all the complexity and contradictory
nature of the processes that are taking place in our economy.
Permit me now to refer to Lenin on the question of the his
torical character of state capitalism, to quote a passage on the
question as to when and why he proposed state capitalism as
the chief form, as to what induced him to do that, and as to
precisely under what concrete conditions he proposed it. (A
MTV UOT LIE
voice: "Please do!")
Thin
"We cannot under any circumstances forget what we very often ob
serve, namely, the socialist attitude of the workers in factories belonging
to the state, where they themselves collect fuel, raw materials and produce,
or when the workers try properly to distribute the products of industry
among the peasantry and to deliver them by means of the transport
system. That is socialism. But side by side with it there is small econ
omy, which very often exists independently of it. Why can it exist
independently of it? Because large-scale industry has not been restored,
because the socialist factories can receive only one-tenth, perhaps, of

what they should receive; and in so far as they do not receive what they
should, small economy remains independent of the socialist factories. The
incredible state of ruin of the country, and the shortage of fuel, raw
materials and transport facilities, lead to small production existing sep
arately from socialism. And I say: Under these circumstances, what is
state capitalism? It will mean the amalgamation of small production.
Capital amalgamates small production, capital grows out of small pro
duction. It is no use closing our eyes to this fact. Of course, freedom
of trade means the growth of capitalism; one cannot get away from it.
And whoever thinks of getting away from it and brushing it aside is
only consoling himself with words. If small economy exists, if there is
freedom of exchange, capitalism will appear. But has this capitalism
any terrors for us if we hold the factories, works, transport and foreign
trade in our hands? And so I said then, and will say now, and I think
it is incontrovertible, that this capitalism has no terrors for us. Con
cessions are capitalism of that kind"* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 306).[¹]
That is how Lenin approached the question of state

capitalism.
In 1921, when we had scarcely any industry of our own,
when there was a shortage of raw materials, and transport
was at a standstill, Lenin proposed state capitalism as a means
by which he thought of linking peasant economy with industry.
And that was correct. But does that mean that Lenin regarded
this line as desirable under all circumstances? Of course not.
He was willing to establish the bond through the medium of
state capitalism because we had no developed socialist in
dustry. But now? Can it be said that we have no developed
state industry now? Of course not. Development proceeded
along a different channel, concessions scarcely took root, state
industry grew, state trade grew, the co-operatives grew, and
Finatics m
*All italics mine. - J. St.
Elpoji
[1] Lenin, Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting of Sec
retaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) Cells of Moscow
and Moscow Gubernia. April 9, 1921.
the bond between town and country began to be established

through socialist industry. We found ourselves in a better
position than we had expected. How can one, after this, say
that state capitalism is the chief form of managing our
economy? Tanpa malo
The trouble with the opposition is that it refuses to under
stand these simple things.
8. ZINOVIEV AND THE PEASANTRY
The question of the peasantry. I said in my report, and

speakers here have asserted, that Zinoviev is deviating in the
direction of underestimating the middle peasants; that only
recently he definitely held the viewpoint of neutralising the
middle peasants, and is only now, after the struggle in the
Party, trying to go over to, to establish himself on, the other
viewpoint, the viewpoint of a stable alliance with the middle
peasants. Is all that true? Permit me to quote some documents.
In an article on "Bolshevisation," Zinoviev wrote this year:
Lov
"There are a number of tasks which are absolutely common to all the
Parties of the Comintern. Such, for example, are . . . the proper ap
proach to the peasantry. There are three strata among the agricultural
population of the whole world, which can and must be won over by us
and become the allies of the proletariat (the agricultural proletariat, the
semi-proletarians - the small-holder peasants and the small peasantry who
do not hire labour). There is another stratum of the peasantry (the
middle peasants), which must be at least neutralised by us"* (Pravda,
January 18, 1925).
kebutbert
That is what Zinoviev writes about the middle peasantry
six years after the Eighth Party Congress, at which Lenin re
jected the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants and sub

stituted for it the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle

peasants. Bakayev asks, what is there terrible about that? But
I will ask you to compare Zinoviev's article with Lenin's thesis
on staking on the middle peasants and to answer the question:
Has Zinoviev departed from Lenin's thesis or not. . . ? (A
voice from the hall: "It refers to countries other than Russia."
Commotion.) It is not so, comrade, because in Zinoviev's
article it says: "tasks which are absolutely common to all the
Parties of the Comintern." Will you really deny that our
Party is also a part of the Comintern? Here it is directly stated:
"to all the Parties." (A voice from the benches of the Lenin
grad delegation: "At definite moments." General laughter.)
Compare this passage from Zinoviev's article about neutral
isation with the passage from Lenin's speech at the Eighth
Party Congress in which he said that we must have a stable
alliance with the middle peasants, and you will realise that
there is nothing in common between them.
It is characteristic that after reading these lines in Zinoviev's
article, Comrade Larin, that advocate of "a second revolution"
in the countryside, hastened to associate himself with them. I
think that although Comrade Larin spoke in opposition to
Kamenev and Zinoviev the other day, and spoke rather well,
this does not exclude the fact that there are points on which
we disagree with him and that we must here dissociate our
selves om him. Here is the opinion Comrade Larin expressed
about this article of Zinoviev's:
"The proper approach to the peasantry' from the point of view of

the common tasks of all the Parties of the Comintern was quite cor
rectly formulated by its chairman, Zinoviev" (Larin, The Soviet Country
side, p. 80).

I see that Comrade Larin protests, saying that he makes a

reservation in his book about his disagreeing with Zinoviev
in so far as Zinoviev extends the slogan of neutralising the
middle peasants to Russia as well. It is true that in his book
he makes this reservation and says that neutralisation is not
enough for us, that we must take "a step farther" in the direc
tion of "agreement with the middle peasants against the
kulaks." But here, unfortunately, Comrade Larin drags in his
scheme of "a second revolution" against kulak domination,
with which we disagree, which brings him near to Zinoviev
and compels me to dissociate myself from him to some extent.
As you see, in the document I have quoted, Zinoviev speaks
openly and definitely in favour of the slogan of neutralising the
middle peasants, in spite of Lenin, who proclaimed that neu
tralisation was not enough, and that a stable alliance with the
middle peasants was necessary.
The next document. In his book Leninism, Zinoviev, quot
ing from Lenin the following passage dating from 1918: "With
the peasantry to the end of the bourgeois-democratic revolu
tion; with the poor, the proletarian and the semi-proletarian
section of the peasantry, forward to the socialist revolution!",
draws the following conclusion:
"The fundamental. . . problem that is engaging our minds at the

present moment . is elucidated fully and to the end in the above
quoted theses of Lenin's. To this nothing can be added, not a single word
can be subtracted.* Here everything is said with Ilyich's terseness and
explicitness, concisely and clearly, so that it simply asks to be put into
a textbook" (Leninism, p. 60).
Such, according to Zinoviev, is the exhaustive characterisa

tion of the peasant question given by Leninism. With the

peasantry as a whole against the tsar and the landlords that

is the bourgeois revolution. With the poor peasants against
the bourgeoisie that is the October Revolution. That is all
-
very well. It gives two of Lenin's slogans. But what about

Lenin's third slogan - with the middle peasants against the
kulaks for building socialism? What has become of Lenin's
third slogan? It is not in Zinoviev's book. It has disappeared.
Although Zinoviev asserts that "to this nothing can be added,"
nevertheless, if we do not add here Lenin's third slogan about
a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the
middle peasants, we run the risk of distorting Lenin, as Zinov
iev distorts him. Can we regard it as an accident that Lenin's
third slogan, which is our most urgent slogan today, has disap
peared, that Zinoviev has lost it? No, it cannot be regarded as
an accident, because he holds the viewpoint of neutralising
the middle peasants. The only difference between the first and
second document is that in the first he opposed the slogan of
a stable alliance with the middle peasants, while in the second
he kept silent about this slogan.
The third document is Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy
of the Epoch." I am speaking of the original version of that

article, which does not contain the changes and additions that
were made later by members of the Central Committee. The
characteristic feature of that article is that, like the second
document, it is completely silent about the question of the
middle peasants and, evading this most urgent question, talks
about some kind of indefinite, Narodnik equality, without
pointing to the class background of equality. You will find in
it the rural poor, the kulaks, the capitalists, attacks on Bukha
rin, Socialist-Revolutionary equality, and Ustryalov; but you
will not find the middle peasants or Lenin's co-operative plan,
although the article is entitled "The Philosophy of the Epoch."
252 (1215 ON THE OPPOSITION
When Comrade Molotov sent me that article (I was away at

the time), I sent back a blunt and sharp criticism. Yes, com
rades, I am straightforward and blunt; that's true, I don't
deny it. (Laughter.) I sent back a blunt criticism, because it
is intolerable that Zinoviev should for a whole year systemati
cally ignore or distort the most characteristic features of Lenin
ism in regard to the peasant question, our Party's present-day
slogan of alliance with the bulk of the peasantry. Here is the
answer that I sent then to Comrade Molotov:
"Zinoviev's article "The Philosophy of the Epoch' is a distortion of the

Party line in the Larin spirit. It treats of the Fourteenth Conference,
but the main theme of this conference - the middle peasants and the
co-operatives - is evaded. The middle peasants and Lenin's co-operative
plan have vanished. That is no accident. To talk, after this, about a
'struggle around the interpretation of the decisions of the Fourteenth
Conference -- means pursuing a line towards the violation of those deci
sions. To mix up Bukharin with Stolypin, as Zinoviev does - means
slandering Bukharin. On such lines it would be possible to mix up with
Stolypin even Lenin, who said: 'trade, and learn to trade.' At the
present time the slogan about equality is Socialist-Revolutionary dema
gogy. There can be no equality so long as classes exist, and so long as
skilled and unskilled labour exist (see Lenin's State and Revolution). We
must speak not about an indefinite equality, but about abolishing classes,
about socialism. To say that our revolution is 'not classical' means
slipping into Menshevism. In my opinion, the article must be thoroughly
revised in such a way that it should not bear the character of a platform
for the Fourteenth Congress.
jefe to saurant sin retomado
"J. Stalin
de 1o ESAIL
"September 12, 1925"
I am ready to defend the whole of this today. Every word,

every sentence. gnitolog
One must not speak about equality in a principal leading
article without strictly defining what kind of equality is meant
- equality between the peasantry and the working class,
equality among the peasantry, equality within the working
class, between skilled and unskilled workers, or equality in

the sense of abolishing classes. One must not in a leading
article keep silent about the Party's immediate slogans on work
in the countryside. One must not play with phrases about
equality, because that means playing with fire, just as one must
not play with phrases about Leninism while keeping silent
about the immediate slogan of Leninism on the question of the
peasantry.
Such are the three documents: Zinoviev's article (January
1925) in favour of neutralising the middle peasants, Zinoviev's
book Leninism (September 1925), which kept silent about
Lenin's third slogan about the middle peasants, and Zinoviev's
new article "The Philosophy of the Epoch" (September 1925),
which kept silent about the middle peasants and Lenin's co
operative plan. w bobri ust
Is this constant wobbling of Zinoviev's on the peasant ques

tion accidental?
You see that it is not accidental.

Recently, in a speech delivered by Zinoviev in Leningrad on
the report of the Central Committee, he at last made up his
mind to speak in favour of the slogan of a stable alliance with
the middle peasants. That was after the struggle, after the
friction, after the conflicts in the Central Committee. That is
all very well. But I am not sure that he will not repudiate it
later on. For, as facts show, Zinoviev has never displayed the
firmness of line on the peasant question that we need.
(Applause.)909,bling d
Here are a few facts illustrating Zinoviev's vacillations on
the peasant question. In 1924, at a plenum of the Central Com
mittee, Zinoviev insisted on a "peasant" policy of organising
non-Party peasant groups, at the centre and in the localities,
with a weekly newspaper. That proposal was rejected because
of the objections raised in the Central Committee. Shortly

before that, Zinoviev had even boasted that he had a "peasant
deviation." Here is what he said, for example, at the Twelfth
Congress of the Party: "When I am told: You have a 'devia
tion, you are deviating towards the peasantry I answer:
Yes, we should not only 'deviate' towards the peasantry and
its economic requirements, but bow down and, if need be,
kneel down before the economic requirements of the peasant
who follows our proletariat." Do you hear: "deviate," "bow
down," "kneel down." (Laughter, applause.) Later, when
things improved with the peasantry, when our position in the
countryside improved, Zinoviev made a "turn" from his in
fatuation, cast suspicion upon the middle peasants and pro
claimed the slogan of neutralisation. A little later he made a
new "turn" and demanded what was in point of fact a revi
sion of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference ("The Phi
losophy of the Epoch") and, accusing almost the whole of the
Central Committee of a peasant deviation, began to "deviate"
more emphatically against the middle peasants. Finally, just
before the Fourteenth Congress of the Party he once more made
a "turn," this time in favour of alliance with the middle peas
ants and, perhaps, he will yet begin to boast that he is again
ready to "adore" the peasantry.
What guarantee is there that Zinoviev will
WEE
not vacillate once
again?
But, comrades, this is wobbling, not politics. (Laughter,
applause.) This is hysterics, not politics. (Voices: "Quite
right!")
We are told that there is no need to pay special attention to
the struggle against the second deviation. That is wrong. Since
there are two deviations among us Bogushevsky's deviation
-
and Zinoviev's deviation - you must understand that Bogu

shevsky is not to be compared with Zinoviev. Bogushevsky is

done for. (Laughter.) Bogushevsky does not have an organ of
the press. But the deviation towards neutralising the middle
peasants, the deviation against a stable alliance with the
middle peasants, the Zinoviev deviation, has its organ of the
press and continues to fight against the Central Committee to
this day. That organ is called Leningradskaya Pravda.39 For
what is the term "middle-peasant Bolshevism" recently con
cocted in Leningrad, and about which Leningradskaya Pravda
foams at the mouth, if not an indication that that newspaper
has departed from Leninism on the peasant question? Is it not
clear, if only from this circumstance alone, that the struggle
against the second deviation is more difficult than the struggle
against the first, against Bogushevsky's deviation? That is why,
being confronted by such a representative of the second devia
tion, or such a defender and protector of the second deviation,
as Leningradskaya Pravda, we must adopt all measures to
make the Party specially prepared to fight that deviation, which
is strong, which is complex, and against which we must con
centrate our fire. That is why this second deviation must be
the object of our Party's special attention. (Voices: "Quite
right!" Applause.)
9. CONCERNING THE HISTORY

OF THE DISAGREEMENTS
Permit me now to pass to the history of our internal struggle

within the majority of the Central Committee. What did our
disaccord start from? It started from the question: "What is
to be done with Trotsky?" That was at the end of 1924. The
group of Leningrad comrades at first proposed that Trotsky
be expelled from the Party. Here I have in mind the period
of the discussion in 1924. The Leningrad Gubernia Party

Committee passed a resolution that Trotsky be expelled from
the Party. We, i.e., the majority on the Central Committee, did
not agree with this (voices: "Quite right!"), we had some
struggle with the Leningrad comrades and persuaded them to
delete the point about expulsion from their resolution. Shortly
after this, when the plenum of the Central Committee met and
the Leningrad comrades, together with Kamenev, demanded
Trotsky's immediate expulsion from the Political Bureau, we
also disagreed with this proposal of the opposition, we obtained
a majority on the Central Committee and restricted ourselves
to removing Trotsky from the post of People's Commissar of
Military and Naval Affairs. We disagreed with Zinoviev and
Kamenev because we knew that the policy of amputation was
fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of
amputation, the method of blood-letting and they demanded -
blood was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate one

limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third
what will we have left in the Party? (Applause.)
This first clash within the majority on the Central Committee
was the expression of the fundamental difference between us
on questions of organisational policy in the Party. Magi
The second question that caused disagreements among us
was that connected with Sarkis' speech against Bukharin.
That was at the Twenty-First Leningrad Conference in Janu
ary 1925. Sarkis at that time accused Bukharin of syndicalism.
Here is what he said:
adt nidjiw
"We have read in the Moscow Pravda Bukharin's article on worker
and village correspondents. The views that Bukharin develops have no

supporters in our organisation. But one might say that such views, which
in their way are syndicalist, un-Bolshevik, anti-Party, are held even by a
number of responsible comrades (I repeat, not in the Leningrad organisa
tion, but in others). Those views treat of the independence and extra
territoriality of various mass public organisations of workers and peasants

in relation to the Communist Party" (Stenographic Report of the Twenty
First Leningrad Conference).
That speech was, firstly, a fundamental mistake on Sarkis'

part, for Bukharin was absolutely right on the question of the
worker and village correspondent movement; secondly, it was,
not without the encouragement of the leaders of the Leningrad
organisation, a gross violation of the elementary rules of com
radely discussion of a question. Needless to say, this circum
stance was bound to worsen relations within the Central
Committee. The matter ended with Sarkis' open admission of

his mistake in the press.
This incident showed that open admission of a mistake is
the best way of avoiding an open debate and of eliminating
disagreements internally.
The third question was that of the Leningrad Young Com
munist League. There are members of Gubernia Party Com
mittees here, and they probably remember that the Political
Bureau adopted a decision relating to the Leningrad Gubernia
Committee of the Young Communist League, which had tried
to convene in Leningrad almost an all-Russian conference of
the Young Communist League without the knowledge and
consent of the Central Committee of the youth league. With
the decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P. (B.) you are familiar. We
could not permit the existence, parallel with the Central Com
mittee of the Young Communist League, of another centre,
competing with and opposing the first. We, as Bolsheviks,
could not permit the existence of two centres. That is why the
Central Committee considered it necessary to take measures to
infuse fresh blood into the Central Committee of the youth
league, which had tolerated this separatism, and to remove
Safarov from the post of leader of the Leningrad Gubernia

Committee of the Young Communist League.
This incident showed that the Leningrad comrades have a
tendency to convert their Leningrad organisation into a centre
of struggle against the Central Committee.
The fourth question was the question, raised by Zinoviev,
of organising in Leningrad a special magazine to be called
Bolshevik, the editorial board of which was to consist of Zi
noviev, Safarov, Vardin, Sarkis and Tarkhanov. We did not
agree with this and said that such a magazine, running parallel
with the Moscow Bolshevik, would inevitably become the
organ of a group, a factional organ of the opposition; that such
a step was dangerous and would undermine the unity of the
Party. In other words, we prohibited the publication of that
magazine. Now, attempts are being made to frighten us with
the word "prohibition." But that is nonsense, comrades. We
are not Liberals. For us, the interests of the Party stand above
formal democracy. Yes, we prohibited the publication of a
factional organ, and we shall prohibit things of that kind in
future. (Voices: "Quite right! Of course!" Loud applause.)
This incident showed that the Leningrad leadership wants
to segregate itself in a separate group.
Next, the question of Bukharin. I have in mind the slogan
"enrich yourselves." I have in mind the speech Bukharin de
livered in April, when he let slip the phrase "enrich your
selves." Two days later the April Conference of our Party
opened. It was I who, in the Conference Presidium, in the pres
ence of Sokolnikov, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Kalinin, stated
that the slogan "enrich yourselves" was not our slogan. I do not
remember Bukharin making any rejoinder to that protest.
When Comrade Larin asked for the floor at the conference, to
speak against Bukharin, I think, it was Zinoviev who then

demanded that no speeches be permitted against Bukharin.

However, after that, Comrade Krupskaya sent in an article
against Bukharin, demanding that it be published. Bukharin,
of course, gave tit for tat, and, in his turn, wrote an article
against Comrade Krupskaya. The majority on the Central
Committee decided not to publish any discussion articles, not
to open a discussion, and to call on Bukharin to state in the
press that the slogan "enrich yourselves" was a mistake; Bukha
rin agreed to that and later did so, on his return from holiday,
in an article against Ustryalov. Now, Kamenev and Zinoviev
think they can frighten somebody with the "prohibition" bo
gey, expressing indignation like Liberals at our having prohib
ited the publication of Comrade Krupskaya's article. You
will not frighten anybody with that. Firstly, we refrained from
publishing not only Comrade Krupskaya's article, but also
Bukharin's. Secondly, why not prohibit the publication of
Comrade Krupskaya's article if the interests of Party unity
demand that of us? In what way is Comrade Krupskaya dif
ferent from every other responsible comrade? Perhaps you
think that the interests of individual comrades should be placed
above the interests of the Party and its unity? Are not the
comrades of the opposition aware that for us, for Bolsheviks,
formal democracy is an empty shell, but the real interests of
the Party are everything? (Applause.)
Let the comrades point to a single article in the Party's
Central Organ, in Pravda, that directly or indirectly approves
of the slogan "enrich yourselves." They cannot do so, because
no such articles exist. There was one case, the only one, when
Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article by Stetsky, in
which he tried to justify the "enrich yourselves" slogan in a
mild and barely perceptible way. But what happened? The
very next day the Secretariat of the Central Committee called
the editorial board of that newspaper to order in a special letter

signed by Molotov, Andreyev and Stalin. That was on June
2, 1925. Several days later, the Organising Bureau of the Cen
tral Committee, with the full consent of Bukharin, adopted a
resolution to the effect that the editor of that newspaper be
removed. Here is an excerpt from that letter:
"Moscow, June 2, 1925. To all the members of the editorial board of

Komsomolskaya Pravda.
"We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetsky's articles 'A
New Stage in the New Economic Policy' evoke doubts. In those articles,
in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to the slogan 'enrich
yourselves. That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it gives rise to a
whole series of doubts and misunderstandings and has no place in a
leading article in Komsomolskaya Pravda. Our slogan is socialist accu
mulation. We are removing the administrative obstacles to an improve
ment of the welfare of the countryside. That operation will undoubtedly
facilitate all accumulation, both private-capitalist and socialist. But the
Party has never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan.". . .
Is the opposition aware of all these facts? Of course it is.

In that case, why don't they stop baiting Bukharin? How much
longer are they going to shout about Bukharin's mistake?
I know of mistakes made by some comrades, in October
1917, for example, compared with which Bukharin's mistake is
not even worth noticing. Those comrades were not only mis
taken then, but they had the "audacity," on two occasions, to
violate a vital decision of the Central Committee adopted
under the direction and in the presence of Lenin. Nevertheless,
the Party forgot about those mistakes as soon as those comrades
admitted them. But compared with those comrades, Bukharin
committed an insignificant error. And he did not violate a
single Central Committee decision. How is it to be explained
that, in spite of this, the unrestrained baiting of Bukharin still
continues? What do they really want of Bukharin?
1o That is how the matter stands with Bukharin's mistake.

Next came the question of Zinoviev's article "The Philoso
phy of the Epoch" and Kamenev's report at the meeting of the
Moscow Plenum in the autumn of this year, at the end of the
summer -
a question which also strained our internal Party

relations. I spoke about this in my speech and I shall not
repeat myself. The issue then was "The Philosophy of the
Epoch," the mistakes in that article, how we rectified those
mistakes, Kamenev's mistakes in connection with the Central
Statistical Board's balance of output of grain and fodder, how

Kamenev credulously accepted the C.S.B.'s figure of 61 per
cent as being the proportion of the market grain in the hands
of the upper groups of the peasantry, and how, later, under
pressure of our comrades, he was obliged to rectify his mistake
in a special statement he made in the Council of Labour and
Defence, and which was published in the newspapers, to the
effect that more than half of the market grain was in the hands
of the middle peasants. All this undoubtedly strained our
relations.
Then came questions connected with the October Plenum -

new complications, where the opposition demanded an open
discussion, where the question of Zalutsky's so-called "Ther
midor" came up, and at the end of all this the Leningrad Con
ference, which on the very first day opened fire on the Central
Committee. I have in mind the speeches delivered by Safarov,
Sarkis, Shelavin and others. I have in mind Zinoviev's speech,
one of his last speeches at the close of the conference, in which
he called upon the conference to wage war against the Moscow
comrades and proposed that a delegation be elected consisting
of people who were willing to fight the Central Committee.
That is how it was. And that is precisely why the Bolshevik
workers Komarov and Lobov were not included in the
Leningrad delegation (they refused to accept the platform of

struggle against the Central Committee). Their places in the
delegation were filled by Gordon and Tarkhanov. Put
Gordon and Tarkhanov in one scale and Komarov and Lobov
in the other, and any unbiassed person will say that the former
are not to be compared with the latter. (Applause.) What were
Lobov and Komarov guilty of? All they were guilty of was that
they refused to go against the Central Committee. That was
their entire guilt. But only a month before that, the Leningrad
comrades nominated Komarov as first secretary of their or
ganisation. That is how it was. Was it so or not? (Voices from
the Leningrad delegation: "It was! It was!") What could have
happened to Komarov in a month? (Bukharin: "He degener
ated in a month.") What could have happened in a month to
bring it about that a member of the Central Committee, Koma
rov, whom you yourselves nominated as first secretary of your
organisation, was kicked out of the Secretariat of the Leningrad
Committee, and that it was not considered possible to elect
him as a delegate to the congress? (A voice from the Leningrad
benches: "He insulted the conference." A voice: "That's a lie,
Naumov!" Commotion.)
10. THE OPPOSITION'S PLATFORM

Tirons
Let us now pass to the platform advanced by Zinoviev and

Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich. It is time to say some
thing about the opposition's platform. It is rather an original
one. Many speeches of different kinds have been delivered
here by the opposition. Kamenev said one thing, he pulled
in one direction; Zinoviev said another thing, he pulled in
another direction; Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth. But
in spite of the diversity, all were agreed on one thing. On what
were they agreed? What indeed is their platform? Their plat

form is reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
-
The only thing they have in common and that completely unites
them is the question of the Secretariat. That is strange and
ridiculous, but it is a fact.
This question has a history. In 1923, after the Twelfth Con
gress, the people who gathered in the "cave" (laughter) drew
up a platform for the abolition of the Political Bureau and for
politicising the Secretariat, i.e., for transforming the Secretar
iat into a political and organisational directing body to consist
of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. What was the idea behind that
platform? What did it mean? It meant leading the Party
without Kalinin, without Molotov. Nothing came of that
platform, not only because it was unprincipled at that time,
also the I mentioned, it
is impossible to lead the Party at the present time. To a ques
tion sent to me in writing from the depths of Kislovodsk I
answered in the negative, stating that, if the comrades were
to insist, I was willing to clear out without a fuss, without a
discussion, open or concealed, and without demanding guar
antees for the rights of the minority. (Laughter.)
That was, so to speak, the first stage.
And now, it appears, the second stage has been ushered in,
opposite to the first. Now they are demanding not the po
liticisation, but the technicalisation of the Secretariat; not the
abolition of the Political Bureau, but full powers for it.
Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into a simple
technical apparatus is really convenient for Kamenev, perhaps
we ought to agree to it. I am afraid, however, that the Party
will not agree to it. (A voice: "Quite right!") Whether a
technical Secretariat would prepare, whether it would be capa
ble of preparing, the questions it would have to prepare both
264 LT ON THE OPPOSITION
for the Organising Bureau and for the Political Bureau, I have
my doubts. Intres On vits
But when they talk about a Political Bureau with full pow
ers, such a platform deserves to be made into a laughing-stock.
Hasn't the Political Bureau full powers? Are not the Secretar
iat and the Organising Bureau subordinate to the Political
Bureau? And what about the plenum of the Central Com
mittee? Why does not our opposition speak about the plenum
of the Central Committee? Is it thinking of giving the Political
Bureau fuller powers than those possessed by the Plenum?
10 No, the opposition is positively unlucky with its platform,
or platforms, concerning the Secretariat.
pobed myotraig
11. THEIR "DESIRE FOR PEACE"
angi,
What is to be done now, you will ask; what must we do
to extricate ourselves from the situation that has been created?
This question has engaged our minds all the time, during the
congress as well as before it. We need unity of the Party ranks
- that is the question now. The opposition is fond of talking
about difficulties. But there is one difficulty that is more
dangerous than all others, and which the opposition has created
for us the danger of confusion and disorganisation in the
Party. (Applause.) We must above all overcome that difficulty.
We had this in mind when, two days before the congress, we
offered the opposition terms of a compromise agreement aimed
at a possible reconciliation. Here is the text of our offer:
CLEANE
"The undersigned members of the Central Committee believe that the

preparation for the Party congress by a number of leading comrades of
the Leningrad organisation was conducted contrary to the line of the
Central Committee of the Party and in opposition to the supporters of
this line in Leningrad. The undersigned members of the Central Com
mittee regard the resolution of the Moscow Conference as being absolutely

correct both in substance and in form, and believe that it is the Central
Committee's duty to rebuff all tendencies that run counter to the Party
line and disorganise the Party.
"However, for the sake of maintaining the unity of the Party, peace
within the Party, of averting the possible danger of alienating the Lenin
grad organisation, one of the best organisations in the R.C.P., from the
Party's Central Committee the undersigned consider it possible, if the
congress endorses the Central Committee's distinct and clear political line,
to make a number of concessions. With this in view we make the follow
ing proposals:
"1. In drafting the resolution on the Central Committee's report, to

take the resolution of the Moscow Conference as a basis, but to tone
down some of its formulations.
"2. The publication in the newspapers, or in bulletins, of the letter

of the Leningrad Conference and of the Moscow Committee's reply to
that letter to be regarded as inexpedient in the interests of unity.d
"3. Members of the Political Bureau are not to speak against
each other at the congress.
"4. In speeches at the congress, to dissociate ourselves from Sarkis
(on regulating the composition of the Party) and from Safarov (on state
capitalism).
"5. The mistake in connection with Komarov, Lobov and Moskvin
to be rectified by organisational measures.
"6. The Central Committee's decision to include a Leningrad com
rade in the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be put into effect
Astituto
immediately after the congress.
"7. With the view to strengthening connection with the Central Organ,
one Party worker from Leningrad to be included in the editorial board
of the Central Organ.
"8. In view of the incompetence of the editor of Leningradskaya
Pravda (Gladnev), to recognise the need to replace him by a more com
petent comrade by agreement with the Central Committee.
Dren
"Kalinin, Stalin, Molotov, Dzerzhinsky, and others.
TECH Bloody
"December 15, 1925"
That is the compromise we offered, comrades. mad

But the opposition was unwilling to come to an agreement.

Instead of peace, it preferred an open and fierce struggle at
the congress. Such is the opposition's "desire for peace."
12. THE PARTY WILL ACHIEVE UNITY
In the main, we still adhere to the viewpoint of that docu

ment. In our draft resolution, as you know, we have already
toned down some of the formulations in the interests of peace
in the Party.
We are against amputation. We are against the policy of
amputation. That does not mean that leaders will be permitted
with impunity to give themselves airs and ride roughshod over
the Party. No, excuse us from that. There will be no obeisances
to leaders. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.) We stand for
unity, we are against amputation. The policy of amputation
is abhorrent to us. The Party wants unity, and it will achieve
it with Kamenev and Zinoviev, if they are willing, without
them if they are unwilling. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)
What is needed for unity? That the minority should submit
to the majority. Without that there is no unity of the Party,
nor can there be.
We are opposed to the publication of a special discussion
sheet. Bolshevik has a discussion section. That will be quite
enough. We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by
discussions. We are a Party that is governing a country - do
not forget that. Do not forget that every disaccord at the top
finds an echo in the country that is harmful to us, not to speak
of the effect it has abroad.
The organs of the Central Committee will probably remain

in their present shape. The Party is hardly likely to agree to
break them up. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.) The
Political Bureau has full powers as it is, it is superior to all

the organs of the Central Committee except the plenum. But
the supreme organ is the plenum that is sometimes forgot
-
ten. Our plenum decides everything, and it calls its leaders to

order when they begin to lose their balance. (Voices: "Quite
right!" Laughter. Applause.)
There must be unity among us, and there will be if the
Party, if the congress displays firmness of character and does
not allow itself to be scared. (Voices: "We won't. We are
seasoned people.") If any of us go too far, we shall be called
to order that is essential, that is necessary. To lead the
Party otherwise than collectively is impossible. Now that Ilyich
is not with us it is silly to dream of such a thing (applause), it
is silly to talk about it.
Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the Party,
unity in the organs of the Central Committee, with the minority
submitting to the majority that is what we need now.
-
As regards the Leningrad communist workers, I have no

doubt that they will always be in the front ranks of our Party.
With them we built the Party, with them we reared it, with
them we raised the banner of the uprising in October 1917,
with them we defeated the bourgeoisie, with them we com
bated, and will combat, the difficulties in the path of our work
of construction. I am sure that the Leningrad communist work
ers will not lag behind their friends in the other industrial
centres in the struggle for iron, Leninist unity in the Party.
(Stormy applause. The "Internationale" is sung.) billy
Pravda, Nos. 291, 292 and 296,

December 20, 22 and 29, 1925
SETTIN
Simm hand-Por lo ponch

a) sus u 16107–10 sed magnahque ods
(
mambollit ban zahlroso abbab munale d
aureola qual stanu nied ads padw ab10
to remmit avelqzib,
et lasti wille son

Golfan sri Hade
CONCERNING QUESTIONS qooq bonusa
OF LENINISM snde mambre co
Deivando
DEDICATED TO THE LENINGRAD
ORGANISATION OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. STALIN
I
pemadini sinu
I taula
THE DEFINITION OF LENINISME KA

I was in th
The pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism contains a

definition of Leninism which seems to have received general
recognition. It runs as follows:
Jadi andamos Dive ban keind
"Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian
revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of
the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictator
"40
ship of the proletariat in particular."
plane ata nj
Is this definition correct?
I think it is correct. It is correct, firstly, because it correctly

indicates the historical roots of Leninism, characterising it as
Marxism of the era of imperialism, as against certain critics
of Lenin who wrongly think that Leninism originated after
the imperialist war. It is correct, secondly, because it correctly
268
notes the international character of Leninism, as against Social

Democracy, which considers that Leninism is applicable only to
Russian national conditions. It is correct, thirdly, because it
correctly notes the organic connection between Leninism and
the teachings of Marx, characterising Leninism as Marxism of
the era of imperialism, as against certain critics of Leninism
who consider it not a further development of Marxism, but
merely the restoration of Marxism and its application to Rus
sian conditions.
All that, one would think, needs no special comment.

Nevertheless, it appears that there are people in our Party
who consider it necessary to define Leninism somewhat differ
ently. Zinoviev, for example, thinks that: (V2)
"Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialist wars and of the world
revolution which began directly in a country where the peasantry pre
dominates."
What can be the meaning of the words underlined by Zi

noviev? What does introducing the backwardness of Russia,
its peasant character, into the definition of Leninism mean?
It means transforming Leninism from an international pro
letarian doctrine into a product of specifically Russian
conditions.
It means playing into the hands of Bauer and Kautsky, who

deny that Leninism is suitable for other countries, for countries
in which capitalism is more developed.
It goes without saying that the peasant question is of very
great importance for Russia, that our country is a peasant
country. But what significance can this fact have in characteris
ing the foundations of Leninism? Was Leninism elaborated
only on Russian soil, for Russia alone, and not on the soil of
imperialism, and for the imperialist countries generally? Do
such works of Lenin as Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capi
270 PM ON THE OPPOSITION
talism,33 The State and Revolution, The Proletarian Revolu
tion and the Renegade Kautsky,42 "Left-Wing" Communism,

an Infantile Disorder,43 etc., apply only to Russia, and not
to all imperialist countries in general? Is not Leninism the
generalisation of the experience of the revolutionary move
ment of all countries? Are not the fundamentals of the theory
and tactics of Leninism suitable, are they not obligatory, for
the proletarian parties of all countries? Was not Lenin right
when he said that "Bolshevism can serve as a model of tactics
for all"? (See Vol. XXIII, p. 386.) [¹] Was not Lenin right
when he spoke about the "international significance* of Soviet
power and of the fundamentals of Bolshevik theory and
tactics"? (See Vol. XXV, pp. 171-72.) [2] Are not, for example,
the following words of Lenin correct?
"In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariat must inevitably differ

in certain specific features from that in the advanced countries, owing
to the very great backwardness and petty-bourgeois character of our coun
try. But the basic forces and the basic forms of social economy - are
-
the same in Russia as in any capitalist country, so that these specific

features can relate only to what is not most important"* (see Vol. XXIV,
P. 508).[3]
But if all that is true, does it not follow that Zinoviev's
nombros
definition of Leninism cannot be regarded as correct?
How can this nationally restricted definition of Leninism
JIROS QUE
be reconciled with internationalism?

podhiw asoy 11
16949
[1] Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.

What Is Internationalism? (1918)
[2] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. I. In What

Sense Can We Speak of the International Significance of the Russian
Revolution? (1920)
inal ata
[3] Lenin, Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat. (1919)
t II
THE MAIN THING IN LENINISM

S
In the pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism, it is stated:

"Some think that the fundamental thing in Leninism is the peasant
question, that the point of departure of Leninism is the question of the
peasantry, of its role, its relative importance. This is absolutely wrong.
The fundamental question of Leninism, its point of departure, is not the
peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
of the conditions under which it can be achieved, of the conditions under
which it can be consolidated. The peasant question, as the question of
the ally of the proletariat in its struggle for power, is a derivative
question."44
Is this thesis correct?
I think it is correct. This thesis follows entirely from the

definition of Leninism. Indeed, if Leninism is the theory and
tactics of the proletarian revolution, and the basic content of
the proletarian revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat,
then it is clear that the main thing in Leninism is the question
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the elaboration of this
question, the substantiation and concretisation of this question.
Nevertheless, Zinoviev evidently does not agree with this
thesis. In his article "In Memory of Lenin," he says:
berdajt
"As I have already said, the question of the role of the peasantry is
the fundamental question* of Bolshevism, of Leninism."
As you see, Zinoviev's thesis follows entirely from his wrong

definition of Leninism. It is therefore as wrong as his definition
of Leninism.
Is Lenin's thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is

the "root content of the proletarian revolution" correct? (See

Vol. XXIII, p. 337.) [¹] It is unquestionably correct. Is the

thesis that Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian
revolution correct? I think it is correct. But what follows from
this? From this it follows that the fundamental question of

Leninism, its point of departure, its foundation, is the ques
tion of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Is it not true that the question of imperialism, the question
of the spasmodic character of the development of imperialism,
the question of the victory of socialism in one country, the
question of the proletarian state, the question of the Soviet
form of this state, the question of the role of the Party in the
system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question of
the paths of building socialism that all these questions were
elaborated precisely by Lenin? Is it not true that it is precisely
these questions that constitute the basis, the foundation of the
idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not true that
without the elaboration of these fundamental questions, the
elaboration of the peasant question from the standpoint of the
dictatorship of the proletariat would be inconceivable?
It goes without saying that Lenin was an expert on the
peasant question. It goes without saying that the peasant ques
tion as the question of the ally of the proletariat is of the
greatest significance for the proletariat and forms a constituent
part of the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. But is it not clear that if Leninism had not been
faced with the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, the derivative question of the ally of the proletariat,
the question of the peasantry, would not have arisen either?
Is it not clear that if Leninism had not been faced with the
[1] Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.

How Kautsky Transformed Marx into an Ordinary Liberal. (1918)
practical question of the conquest of power by the proletariat,

the question of an alliance with the peasantry would not have
arisen either?
Lenin would not have been the great ideological leader of

the proletariat that he unquestionably is he would have
-
been a simple "peasant philosopher," as foreign literary philis

tines often depict him had he elaborated the peasant
-
question, not on the basis of the theory and tactics of the dicta
torship of the proletariat, but independently of this basis, apart
from this basis. Isdi
bu One or the other:
Either the peasant question is the main thing in Leninism,

and in that case Leninism is not suitable, not obligatory, for
capitalistically developed countries, for those which are not
peasant countries.
Or the main thing in Leninism is the dictatorship of the
proletariat, and in that case Leninism is the international
doctrine of the proletarians of all lands, suitable and obligatory
for all countries without exception, including the capitalistically
developed countries.
Here one must choose.
III
To
THE QUESTION OF "PERMANENT"
REVOLUTION
In the pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism, the "theory

of permanent revolution" is appraised as a "theory" which
underestimates the role of the peasantry. There it is stated:
M
"Consequently, Lenin fought the adherents of 'permanent' revolution,
not over the question of uninterruptedness, for Lenin himself maintained
the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they under

estimated the role of the peasantry, which is an enormous reserve of the
proletariat."45
This characterisation of the Russian "permanentists" was

considered as generally accepted until recently. Nevertheless,
although in general correct, it cannot be regarded as exhaustive.
The discussion of 1924, on the one hand, and a careful analysis
of the works of Lenin, on the other hand, have shown that
the mistake of the Russian "permanentists" lay not only in

their underestimation of the role of the peasantry, but also in
their underestimation of the strength of the proletariat and
its capacity to lead the peasantry, in their disbelief in the
idea of the hegemony of the proletariat.
That is why, in my pamphlet The October Revolution and
the Tactics of the Russian Communists (December 1924), I
broadened this characterisation and replaced it by another,
more complete one. Here is what is stated in that pamphlet:
"Hitherto only one aspect of the theory of 'permanent revolution' has

usually been noted - lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of
the peasant movement. Now, in fairness, this must be supplemented by
another aspect lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the pro
-
letariat in Russia."46
This does not mean, of course, that Leninism has been or is

opposed to the idea of permanent revolution, without quota
tion marks, which was proclaimed by Marx in the forties of
the last century.47 On the contrary, Lenin was the only Marxist
who correctly understood and developed the idea of permanent
revolution. What distinguishes Lenin from the "permanentists"
on this question is that the "permanentists" distorted Marx's
idea of permanent revolution and transformed it into lifeless,
bookish wisdom, whereas Lenin took it in its pure form and
made it one of the foundations of his own theory of revolu
tion. It should be borne in mind that the idea of the growing

over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist
revolution, propounded by Lenin as long ago as 1905, is one
of the forms of the embodiment of Marx's theory of permanent
revolution. Here is what Lenin wrote about this as far back
as 1905:
"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just to the

extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised
proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for un
interrupted revolution.* We shall not stop halfway.
"Without succumbing to adventurism or going against our scientific
conscience, without striving for cheap popularity, we can and do say only
one thing: we shall put every effort into assisting the entire peasantry
to carry out the democratic revolution in order thereby to make it easier
for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as quickly as possible, to
the new and higher task
- the socialist revolution" (see Vol. VIII,
PP. 186-87). [¹]
And here is what Lenin wrote on this subject sixteen years

later, after the conquest of power by the proletariat:
"The Kautskys, Hilferdings, Martovs, Chernovs, Hillquits, Longuets,

MacDonalds, Turatis, and other heroes of Two-and-a-Half' Marxism
were incapable of understanding. the relation between the bourgeois

democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolutions. The first grows over
into the second.* The second, in passing, solves the questions of the
first. The second consolidates the work of the first. Struggle, and
struggle alone, decides how far the second succeeds in outgrowing the
first" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 26). [2]
I draw special attention to the first of the above quotations,

taken from Lenin's article entitled "The Attitude of Social

[1] Lenin, The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant
Movement. (1905) 20
[2] Lenin, The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution. (1921)

Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement," published on

September 1, 1905. I emphasise this for the information of
those who still continue to assert that Lenin arrived at the
idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolu

tion into the socialist revolution, that is to say, the idea of
permanent revolution, after the imperialist war. This quota
tion leaves no doubt that these people are profoundly mistaken.
IV
THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
What are the characteristic features of the proletarian rev

olution as distinct from the bourgeois revolution?
The distinction between the proletarian revolution and the
bourgeois revolution may be reduced to five main points.
1) The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there
already exist more or less ready-made forms belonging to
the capitalist order, forms which have grown and matured
within the womb of feudal society prior to the open revolu
tion, whereas the proletarian revolution begins when ready
made forms belonging to the socialist order are either absent,
or almost absent.
2) The main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in
seizin power and making it conform to the already existing
bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian
revolution consists, after seizing power, in building a new,
socialist economy.
3) The bourgeois revolution is usually consummated with
the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the
seizure of power is only the beginning, and power is used as
a lever for transforming the old economy and organising the

new one.
4) The bourgeois revolution limits itself to replacing one

group of exploiters in power by another group of exploiters, in
view of which it need not smash the old state machine; whereas
the proletarian revolution removes all exploiting groups from
power and places in power the leader of all the toilers and
exploited, the class of proletarians, in view of which it cannot
manage without smashing the old state machine and substitut
ing a new one for it.
5) The bourgeois revolution cannot rally the millions of the
toiling and exploited masses around the bourgeoisie for any
length of time, for the very reason that they are toilers and
exploited; whereas the proletarian revolution can and must
link them, precisely as toilers and exploited, in a durable alli
ance with the proletariat, if it wishes to carry out its main task
of consolidating the power of the proletariat and building a
new, socialist economy.
Here are some of Lenin's main theses on this subject:
"One of the fundamental differences between bourgeois revolution and
socialist revolution," says Lenin, "is that for the bourgeois revolution,
which arises out of feudalism, the new economic organisations are grad
ually created in the womb of the old order, gradually changing all the
aspects of feudal society. Bourgeois revolution was confronted by only
one task - to sweep away, to cast aside, to destroy all the fetters of the
preceding society. By fulfilling this task every bourgeois revolution ful
fils all that is required of it: it accelerates the growth of capitalism.
"The socialist revolution is in an altogether different position. The
more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, has
proved to be the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult
it is for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations.
To the tasks of destruction are added new tasks of unprecedented dif
ficulty organisational tasks" (see Vol. XXII, p. 315).[1]
-
[1] Lenin, Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 6-8, 1918. 1. Re

port on War and Peace. March 7.
"Had not the popular creative spirit of the Russian revolution," con
tinues Lenin, "which had gone through the great experience of the year
1905, given rise to the Soviets as early as February 1917, they could not
under any circumstances have seized power in October, because success
depended entirely upon the existence of ready-made organisational forms
of a movement embracing millions. These ready-made forms were the
Soviets, and that is why in the political sphere there awaited us those
brilliant successes, the continuous triumphant march, that we experienced;
for the new form of political power was ready to hand, and all we had
to do was, by passing a few decrees, to transform the power of the
Soviets from the embryonic state in which it existed in the first months
of the revolution into a legally recognised form which has become estab
lished in the Russian state - i.e., into the Russian Soviet Republic" (ibid.).
"But two problems of enormous difficulty still remained," says Lenin,
"the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphant march which
our revolution experienced in the first months . . (ibid.). Aramal
"Firstly, there were the problems of internal organisation, which con
front every socialist revolution. The difference between socialist revolu
tion and bourgeois revolution lies precisely in the fact that the latter
finds eady-made forms of apita relationships, while Soviet power
proletarian power. does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we
leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which,
strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and
hardly touched agriculture. The organisation of accounting, the control
of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole of the state economic
mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that
works in such a way that hundreds of millions of people are guided by
a single plan such was the enormous organisational problem that rested
on our shoulders. Under the present conditions of labour this problem
could not possibly be solved by the 'hurrah' methods by which we were
able to solve the problems of the Civil War" (ibid., p. 316). [¹] 418
"The second enormous difficulty ... was the international question.
The reason why we were able to cope so easily with Kerensky's gangs,
why we so easily established our power and without the slightest difficulty
passed the decrees on the socialisation of the land and on workers' con
trol, the reason why we achieved all this so easily was only that a for
tunate combination of circumstances protected us for a short time from
[1] Ibid.
international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might

of its capital, with its highly organised military technique, which is a
real force, a real fortress of international capital, could in no case, under
no circumstances, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because
of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the
capitalist class which is embodied in it - it could not do so because of
commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this
sphere a conflict is inevitable. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of the
Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity of solv
ing the international tasks. the necessity of calling forth an international
revolution" (see Vol. XXII, p. 317). [¹]
Such is the intrinsic character and the basic meaning of the

proletarian revolution.
Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order
be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictator
ship of the proletariat?
Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be
carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois
democracy, which is adapted to the rule of the bourgeoisie,
means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost
normal human understanding, or has grossly and openly
repudiated the proletarian revolution.
This thesis must be emphasised all the more strongly and
categorically for the reason that we are dealing with the pro
letarian revolution which for the time being has triumphed
only in one country, a country which is surrounded by hostile
capitalist countries and the bourgeoisie of which cannot fail
to receive the support of international capital.
That is why Lenin says that:
"The emancipation of the oppressed class is impossible not only with

out a violent revolution, but also without the destruction
[1] Ibid.
280 MIMUS ON THE OPPOSITION
of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class"
(see Vol. XXI, p. 373).[¹]
"First let the majority of the population, while private property still
exists, i.e., while the rule and yoke of capital still exists, express them
selves in favour of the party of the proletariat, and only then can and
should the party take power-so say the petty-bourgeois democrats who
call themselves 'Socialists' but who are in reality the servitors of the
bou oisie"* (see Vol. XXIV, p. 647).[2]
"We say:* Let the revolutionary proletariat first overthrow the bour
geoisie, break the yoke of capital, and smash the bourgeois state apparatus,
then the victorious proletariat will be able rapidly to gain the sympathy
and support of the majority of the toiling non-proletarian masses by
satisfying their needs at the expense of the exploiters" (ibid.).
Joxa
"In order to win the majority of the population to its side," Lenin
says further, "the proletariat must, in the first place, overthrow the
bourgeoisie and seize state power; secondly, it must introduce Soviet
power and smash the old state apparatus to bits, whereby it immediately
undermines the rule, prestige and influence of the bourgeoisie and petty
bourgeois compromisers over the non-proletarian toiling masses. Thirdly,
it must entirely destroy the influence of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois
compromisers over the majority of the non-proletarian toiling masses by
satisfying their economic needs in a revolutionary way at the ex
pense of the exploiters" (ibid., p. 641). [³]
100
Such are the characteristic features of the proletarian

revolution.
What, in this connection, are the main features of the dic

tatorship of the proletariat, once it is admitted that
Ch the
lao
Hinugo ziliqas
ach byingan
[1] Lenin, The State and Revolution. Chapter I. Class Society and the
State. 1. The State as the Product of the Irreconcilability of Class Antag
onisms. (1917)
[2] Lenin, The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of
the Proletariat. VI. (1919)
[³] Lenin, The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of

the Proletariat. IV. (1919)
dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic content of the

proletarian revolution?
Here is the most general definition of the dictatorship of the
proletariat given by Lenin:
sib.adi, to shi and bibertnog such acharloin anth
"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not the end of the class struggle,
but its continuation in new forms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is
the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory and has
seized political power, against the bourgeoisie, which although vanquished
has not been annihilated, has not disappeared, has not ceased its resistance,
has increased its resistance" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311). [1]
Arguing against confusing the dictatorship of the proletariat

with "popular" government, "elected by all," with "non-class"
government, Lenin says:
the firm des
"The class which took political power into its hands did so knowing
that it took power alone.* That is a part of the concept dictatorship of
the proletariat. This concept has meaning only when this one class knows
that it alone is taking political power in its hands, and does not deceive
itself or others with talk about 'popular' government, 'elected by all,
sanctified by the whole people'" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 286). [2]
noThis does not mean, however, that the power of one class,
the class of the proletarians, which does not and cannot share
power with other classes, does not need aid from, and an
alliance with, the labouring and exploited masses of other
classes for the achievement of its aims. On the contrary. This
power, the power of one class, can be firmly established and

exercised to the full only by means of a special form of alliance
between the class of proletarians and the labouring masses of
long side to aldesonati da to nois00
[1] Lenin, Foreword to the Published Speech "Deception of the People
[2] Lenin, Speech Delivered at the All-Russian Congress of Transport
Workers. March 27, 1921.
the petty-bourgeois classes, primarily the labouring masses of

the peasantry. bloxq
What is this special form of alliance? What does it consist
in? Does not this alliance with the labouring masses of other,
non-proletarian, classes wholly contradict the idea of the dic
tatorship of one class?
This special form of alliance consists in that the guiding
force of this alliance is the proletariat. This special form of
alliance consists in that the leader of the state, the leader in
the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is one party,

the party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists,
which does not and cannot share leadership with other parties.
As you see, the contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming
one.
"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin, "is a special form

of class alliance between the proletariat, the vanguard of the working
people, and the numerous non-proletarian strata of working people (the
petty bourgeoisie, the small proprietors, the peasantry, the intelligentsia,
etc.), or the majority of these; it is an alliance against capital, an alliance
aiming at the complete overthrow of capital, at the complete suppression
of the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of any attempt on its part at
restoration, an alliance aiming at the final establishment and consolida
tion of socialism. It is a special type of alliance, which is being built
up in special circumstances, namely, in the circumstances of fierce civil
war; it is an alliance of the firm supporters of socialism with the latter's
wavering allies and sometimes with 'neutrals' (then instead of an agree
ment for struggle, the alliance becomes an agreement for neutrality), an
alliance between classes which differ economically, politically, socially and
ideologically"* (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).[1] long loais silt
In one of his instructional reports, Kamenev, disputing this
conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, states:
[¹] Lenin, Foreword to the Published Speech "Deception of the People

"The dictatorship is not an alliance of one class with another."
I believe that Kamenev here has in view, primarily, a pas

sage in my pamphlet The October Revolution and the Tactics
of the Russian Communists, where it is stated:
"The dictatorship of the proletariat is not simply a governmental top

stratum 'skilfully' 'selected' by the careful hand of an 'experienced strate
gist,' and 'judiciously relying' on the support of one section or another
of the population. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the class alliance
between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry for the
purpose of overthrowing capital, for achieving the final victory of social
ism, on the condition that the guiding force of this alliance is the
1948
proletariat."
I wholly endorse this formulation of the dictatorship of

the proletariat, for I think that it fully and entirely coincides
with Lenin's formulation, just quoted.
quI assert that Kamenev's statement that "the dictatorship is
not an alliance of one class with another," in the categorical
form in which it is made, has nothing in common with Lenin's
theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
I assert that such statements can be made only by people
who have failed to understand the meaning of the idea of the
bond, the idea of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry,
the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat within this alliance.
Such statements can be made only by people who have failed
to understand Lenin's thesis:
"Only an agreement with the peasantry* can save the socialist revolu
tion in Russia as long as the revolution in other countries has not taken
place" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238). [1]

[1] Lenin, Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8-16, 1921. 6. Report
on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation
System. March 15.
Such statements can be made only by people who have

failed to understand Lenin's thesis:
"The supreme principle of the dictatorship* is the maintenance of the

alliance of the proletariat and peasantry in order that the proletariat may
retain its leading role and state power" (ibid., p. 460). [¹]
Pointing out one of the most important aims of the dictator

ship, the aim of suppressing the exploiters, Lenin says:
"The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more nor less

than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or
regulations and resting directly on the use of force" (see Vol. XXV,
P. 441). [2]
"Dictatorship means note this once and for all, Messrs. Cadets -
unrestricted power, based on force and not on law. In time of civil war
any victorious power can be only a dictatorship" (see Vol. XXV, p. 436). [³]
But of course, the dictatorship of the proletariat does not

mean only the use of force, although there is no dictatorship
without the use of force.
"Dictatorship," says Lenin, "does not mean only the use of force,
although it is impossible without the use of force; it also means the organi
sation of labour on a higher level than the previous organisation" (see
Vol. XXIV, p. 305). [4]
"The dictatorship of the proletariat . . . is not only the use of force
against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force. The economic
foundation of this revolutionary use of force, the guarantee of its effec
tiveness and success is the fact that the proletariat represents and creates
a higher type of social organisation of labour compared with capitalism.

[1] Lenin, Third Congress of the Communist International. June 22
July 12, 1921. 4. Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. July 5.
[2] Lenin, A Contribution to the History of the Question of the
Dictatorship. (1920)
[3] Ibid.
[4] Lenin, First All-Russian Congress on Adult Education. May 6-19,
1919. 2. Deception of the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality.
May 19. V.
This is the essence. This is the source of the strength and the guarantee
of the inevitable complete triumph of communism" (see Vol. XXIV,
PP. 335-36).[1]
"Its quintessence (i.e., of the dictatorship - J. St.) is the organisation
and discipline of the advanced detachment of the working people, of its
vanguard, its sole leader, the proletariat, whose object is to build socialism,
to abolish the division of society into classes, to make all members of
society working people, to remove the basis for any exploitation of man
by man. This object cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a
fairly long period of transition from capitalism to socialism, because the
reorganisation of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes
in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit
of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois conduct of economy can be overcome
only by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an
entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the period of transi
tion from capitalism to socialism" (ibid., p. 314).[2]
Such are the characteristic features of the dictatorship of the

proletariat.
Hence the three main aspects of the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
1) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat for the
suppression of the exploiters, for the defence of the country,
for the consolidation of the ties with the proletarians of other
lands, and for the development and victory of the revolution
in all countries.
2) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat in order

to detach the labouring and exploited masses once and for
all from the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the alliance of the
proletariat with these masses, to draw these masses into the
work of socialist construction, and to ensure the state leader
ship of these masses by the proletariat.
ansm
[1] Lenin, A Great Beginning. (1919)
[2] Lenin, Greetings to the Hungarian Workers. (1919)
3) The utilisation of the rule of the proletariat for the

organisation of socialism, for the abolition of classes, for the
transition to a society without classes, to a socialist society.
The proletarian dictatorship is a combination of all these
three aspects. No single one of these aspects can be advanced
as the sole characteristic feature of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. On the other hand, in the circumstances of capital
ist encirclement, the absence of even one of these features is
sufficient for the dictatorship of the proletariat to cease being
a dictatorship. Therefore, not one of these three aspects can
be omitted without running the risk of distorting the concept
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only all these three
aspects taken together give us the complete and finished con
cept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 1.500.Eu?
The dictatorship of the proletariat has its periods, its special

forms, diverse methods of work. During the period of civil
war, it is the forcible aspect of the dictatorship that is most
conspicuous. But it by no means follows from this that no
constructive work is carried on during the period of civil war.
Without constructive work it is impossible to wage civil war.
During the period of socialist construction, on the other hand,
it is the peaceful, organisational and cultural work of the
dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc., that are most conspicuous.
But, again, it by no means follows from this that the forcible
aspect of the dictatorship has ceased to exist or can cease to
exist in the period of construction. The organs of suppression,
the army and other organisations, are as necessary now, at the
time of construction, as they were during the period of civil
war. Without these organs, constructive work by the dictator
ship with any degree of security would be impossible. It should
not be forgotten that for the time being the revolution has
been victorious in only one country. It should not be forgotten
that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the danger of

intervention, with all the consequences resulting from this
danger, will also exist.
THE PARTY AND THE WORKING CLASS IN

THE SYSTEM OF THE DICTATORSHIP
OF THE PROLETARIAT
I have dealt above with the dictatorship of the proletariat

from the point of view of its historical inevitability, from the
point of view of its class content, from the point of view of
its state nature, and, finally, from the point of view of the
destructive and creative tasks which it performs throughout
the entire historical period that is termed the period of transi
tion from capitalism to socialism.
Now we must say something about the dictatorship of the
proletariat from the point of view of its structure, from the
point of view of its "mechanism," from the point of view of
the role and significance of the "transmission belts," the "le
vers," and the "directing force" which in their totality consti
tute "the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Lenin),
and with the help of which the daily work of the dictatorship of
the proletariat is accomplished.
What are these "transmission belts" or "levers" in the sys
tem of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What is this "direct

ing force"? Why are they needed? ST
The levers or transmission belts are those very mass or

ganisations of the proletariat without the aid of which the
dictatorship cannot be realised.
The directing force is the advanced detachment of the pro

letariat, its vanguard, which is the main guiding force of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. de Hiw asgnab
The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers,
and this directing force, because without them, in its strug
gle for victory, it would be a weaponless army in face of
organised and armed capital. The proletariat needs these or
ganisations because without them it would suffer inevitable
defeat in its fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in its
fight for the consolidation of its rule, in its fight for the building
of socialism. The systematic help of these organisations and
the directing force of the vanguard are needed because in the
absence of these conditions it is impossible for the dictatorship
of the proletariat to be at all durable and firm.
What are these organisations?
Firstly, there are the workers' trade unions, with their central
and local ramifications in the shape of a whole series of or

ganisations concerned with production, culture, education, etc.
These unite the workers of all trades. They are non-Party or
ganisations. The trade unions may be termed the all-embracing
organisation of the working class, which is in power in
our country. They are a school of communism. They promote
the best people from their midst for the work of leadership in
all branches of administration. They form the link between
the advanced and the backward elements in the ranks of the
working class. They connect the masses of the workers with

the vanguard of the working class.
Secondly, there are the Soviets, with their numerous central
and local ramifications in the shape of administrative, econom
ic, military, cultural and other state organisations, plus the
innumerable mass associations of the working people which
have sprung up of their own accord and which encompass these
organisations and connect them with the population. The

Soviets are a mass organisation of all the working people of
town and country. They are a non-Party organisation. The
Soviets are the direct expression of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. It is through the Soviets that all measures for
strengthening the dictatorship and for building socialism are
carried out. It is through the Soviets that the state leadership
of the peasantry by the proletariat is exercised. The Soviets
connect the vast masses of the working people with the van
guard of the proletariat.nu
Thirdly, there are the co-operatives of all kinds, with all
their ramifications. These are a mass organisation of the work
ing people, a non-Party organisation, which unites the working
people primarily as consumers, and also, in the course of time,
as producers (agricultural co-operatives). The co-operatives
acquire special significance after the consolidation of the dic
tatorship of the proletariat, during the period of extensive
construction. They facilitate contact between the vanguard
of the proletariat and the mass of the peasantry and make
it possible to draw the latter into the channel of socialist
construction.
Fourthly, there is the Youth League. This is a mass or

ganisation of young workers and peasants; it is a non-Party
organisation, but is linked with the Party. Its task is to help
the Party to educate the young generation in the spirit of
socialism. It provides young reserves for all the other mass
organisations of the proletariat in all branches of administra
tion. The Youth League has acquired special significance since
the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the
period of extensive cultural and educational work carried on
by the proletariat.
Lastly, there is the Party of the proletariat, its vanguard.

Its strength lies in the fact that it draws into its ranks all the
best elements of the proletariat from all the mass organisations
of the latter. Its function is to combine the work of all the mass
organisations of the proletariat without exception and to direct

their activities towards a single goal, the goal of the emancipa
tion of the proletariat. And it is absolutely necessary to com
bine and direct them towards a single goal, for otherwise unity
in the struggle of the proletariat is impossible, for otherwise
the guidance of the proletarian masses in their struggle for
power, in their struggle for building socialism, is impossible.
But only the vanguard of the proletariat, its Party, is capable
of combining and directing the work of the mass organisations
of the proletariat. Only the party of the proletariat, only the
Communist Party, is capable of fulfilling this role of main
leader in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Upah
Why?
"... because, in the first place, it is the rallying centre of the finest
elements in the working class, who have direct connections with the non
Party organisations of the proletariat and very frequently lead them;
because, secondly, the Party, as the rallying centre of the finest members
of the working class, is the best school for training leaders of the working
class, capable of directing every form of organisation of their class;
because, thirdly, the Party, as the best school for training leaders of the
working class, is, by reason of its experience and prestige, the only organi
sation capable of centralising the leadership of the struggle of the prole
tariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organisation of the
working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the
Party with the class" (see The Foundations of Leninism).
The Party is the main guiding force in the system of the

dictatorship of the proletariat.
"The Party is the highest form of class organisation of the
proletariat" (Lenin).
To sum up: the trade unions, as the mass organisation of

the proletariat, linking the Party with the class primarily in the
sphere of production; the Soviets, as the mass organisation of
the working people, linking the Party with the latter primarily
in the sphere of state administration; the co-operatives, as the
mass organisation mainly of the peasantry, linking the Party
with the peasant masses primarily in the economic sphere, in
the sphere of drawing the peasantry into the work of socialist
construction; the Youth League, as the mass organisation of
young workers and peasants, whose mission it is to help the
vanguard of the proletariat in the socialist education of the
new generation and in training young reserves; and, finally,
the Party, as the main directing force in the system of the dic
tatorship of the proletariat, whose mission it is to lead all these
mass organisations such, in general, is the picture of the
"mechanism" of the dictatorship, the picture of "the system of
the dictatorship of the proletariat."
Without the Party as the main guiding force, it is impossible
for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all durable and
firm.
Thus, in the words of Lenin, "taken as a whole, we have
a formally non-communist, flexible and relatively wide, and

very powerful proletarian apparatus, by means of which the
Party is closely linked with the class and with the masses, and
by means of which, under the leadership of the Party, the
dictatorship of the class is exercised" (see Vol. XXV, p. 192). [¹]
Of course, this must not be understood in the sense that the
Party can or should take the place of the trade unions, the
Soviets, and the other mass organisations. The Party exercises
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VI.

Should Revolutionaries Work in Reactionary Trade Unions? (1920)
the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it exercises it

not directly, but with the help of the trade unions, and through
the Soviets and their ramifications. Without these "transmis
sion belts," it would be impossible for the dictatorship to be

at all firm.
einmanal din
"It is impossible to exercise the dictatorship," says Lenin, "without
having a number of 'transmission belts' from the vanguard to the mass
of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass of the working
people" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 65).[1]
"The Party, so to speak, draws into its ranks the vanguard of the
proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Without a foundation like the trade unions the dictatorship cannot be
exercised, state functions cannot be fulfilled. And these functions have
to be exercised through* a number of special institutions also of a new

type, namely, through* the Soviet apparatus" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 64). [²]
The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here,

in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the pro
letariat, for example, is the fact that not a single important
political or organisational question is decided by our Soviet
and other mass organisations without guiding directives from
the Party. In this sense it could be said that the dictatorship
of the proletariat is, in essence, the "dictatorship" of its van
guard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force
of the proletariat. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at
the Second Congress of the Comintern:50
*
My italics. J. St. ALTRO 10
[1] Lenin, The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's
Mistakes. Speech Delivered at a Joint Meeting of Communist Delegates
to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Communist Members of the All-Russian
Central Council of Trade Unions and Communist Members of the Moscow
Gubernia Council of Trade Unions. December 30, 1920.
[2] Ibid.
"Tanner says that he stands for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but
the dictatorship of the proletariat is not conceived quite in the same way
as we conceive it. He says that by the dictatorship of the proletariat we
mean, in essence, the dictatorship of its organised and class-conscious
minority.
"And, as a matter of fact, in the era of capitalism, when the masses of
the workers are continuously subjected to exploitation and cannot develop
their human potentialities, the most characteristic feature of working-class
political parties is that they can embrace only a minority of their class.
A political party can comprise only a minority of the class, in the same
way as the really class-conscious workers in every capitalist society con
stitute only a minority of all the workers. That is why we must admit
that only this class-conscious minority can guide the broad masses of the
workers and lead them. And if Comrade Tanner says that he is opposed
to parties, but at the same time is in favour of the minority consisting of
the best organised and most revolutionary workers showing the way to
the whole of the proletariat, then I say that there is really no difference
between us" (see Vol. XXV, p. 347).[1]
But this, however, must not be understood in the sense that
a sign of equality can be put between the dictatorship of the

proletariat and the leading role of the Party (the "dictatorship"
of the Party), that the former can be identified with the latter,
that the latter can be substituted for the former. Sorin, for
example, says that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the

dictatorship of our Party." This thesis, as you see, identifies
the "dictatorship of the Party" with the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Can we regard this identification as correct and
yet remain on the ground of Leninism? No, we cannot. And
for the following reasons:
Firstly. In the passage from his speech at the Second Con
gress of the Comintern quoted above, Lenin does not by any
MARCAL
* My italics.-J. St.
[1] Lenin, Second Congress of the Communist International. July 19
August 7, 1920. 2. Speech on the Role of the Communist Party. July 23.
means identify the leading role of the Party with the dictator
ship of the proletariat. He merely says that "only this class
conscious minority (i.e., the Party - J. St.) can guide the broad
masses of the workers and lead them," that it is precisely in this
sense that "by the dictatorship of the proletariat we mean, in
essence, the dictatorship of its organised and class-conscious
minority."
To say "in essence" does not mean "wholly." We often say

that the national question is, in essence, a peasant question.
And this is quite true. But this does not mean that the national
question is covered by the peasant question, that the peasant
question is equal in scope to the national question, that the
peasant question and the national question are identical. There
is no need to prove that the national question is wider and
richer in its scope than the peasant question. The same must
be said by analogy as regards the leading role of the Party
and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the Party
carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this sense
the dictatorship of the proletariat is, in essence, the "dictator
ship" of its Party, this does not mean that the "dictatorship of
the Party" (its leading role) is identical with the dictatorship of
the proletariat, that the former is equal in scope to the latter.
There is no need to prove that the dictatorship of the pro
letariat is wider and richer in its scope than the leading role
of the Party. The Party carries out the dictatorship of the pro
letariat, but it carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat,
and not any other kind of dictatorship. Whoever identifies the
leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat
substitutes "dictatorship" of the Party for the dictatorship of
the proletariat.
*My italics.-J. St.

Secondly. Not a single important decision is arrived at by

the mass organisations of the proletariat without guiding
directives from the Party. That is perfectly true. But does that
mean that the dictatorship of the proletariat consists entirely
of the guiding directives given by the Party? Does that mean
that, in view of this, the guiding directives of the Party can
be identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of
course not. The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the
guiding directives of the Party plus the carrying out of these
directives by the mass organisations of the proletariat, plus
their fulfilment by the population. Here, as you see, we have
to deal with a whole series of transitions and intermediary
steps which are by no means unimportant elements of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence, between the guiding
directives of the Party and their fulfilment lie the will and
actions of those who are led, the will and actions of the class,
its willingness (or unwillingness) to support such directives, its

ability (or inability) to carry out these directives, its ability (or
inability) to carry them out in strict accordance with the
demands of the situation. It scarcely needs proof that the
Party, having taken the leadership into its hands, cannot but
reckon with the will, the condition, the level of political con
sciousness of those who are led, cannot leave out of account
the will, the condition, and level of political consciousness of

its class. Therefore, whoever identifies the leading role of
the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes
the directives given by the Party for the will and actions of
the class.
Thirdly. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin,

"is the class struggle of the proletariat, which has won victory
and has seized political power" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 311).[¹]

How can this class struggle find expression? It may find ex
pression in a series of armed actions by the proletariat against
the sorties of the overthrown bourgeoisie, or against the inter
vention of the foreign bourgeoisie. It may find expression in
civil war, if the power of the proletariat has not yet been con
solidated. It may find expression, after power has already been
consolidated, in the extensive organisational and constructive
work of the proletariat, with the enlistment of the broad masses
in this work. In all these cases, the acting force is the pro
letariat as a class. It has never happened that the Party, the
Party alone, has undertaken all these actions with only its own
forces, without the support of the class. Usually it only directs
these actions, and it can direct them only to the extent that it
has the support of the class. For the Party cannot cover, cannot
replace the class. For, despite all its important leading role,
the Party still remains a part of the class. Therefore, whoever
identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of
the proletariat substitutes the Party for the class.
Fourthly. The Party exercises the dictatorship of the pro
letariat. "The Party is the direct governing vanguard of the
proletariat; it is the leader" (Lenin).51 In this sense the Party
takes power, the Party governs the country. But this must not
be understood in the sense that the Party exercises the dictator
ship of the proletariat separately from the state power, without
the state power; that the Party governs the country separately
from the Soviets, not through the Soviets. This does not mean
that the Party can be identified with the Soviets, with the state
[1] Lenin, Foreword to the Published Speech "Deception of the People

power. The Party is the core of this power, but it is not and
cannot be identified with the state power.
"As the ruling Party," says Lenin, "we could not but merge
the Soviet 'top leadership' with the Party 'top leadership' --
in our country they are merged and will remain so" (see
Vol. XXVI, p. 208). This is quite true. But by this Lenin
by no means wants to imply that our Soviet institutions as a
whole, for instance our army, our transport, our economic
institutions, etc., are Party institutions, that the Party can
replace the Soviets and their ramifications, that the Party can
be identified with the state power. Lenin repeatedly said that
"the system of Soviets is the dictatorship of the proletariat,"
and that "the Soviet power is the dictatorship of the proletar
iat" (see Vol. XXIV, pp. 15, 14); [2] but he never said that the
Party is the state power, that the Soviets and the Party are one
and the same thing. The Party, with a membership of several
hundred thousand, guides the Soviets and their central and
local ramifications, which embrace tens of millions of people,
both Party and non-Party, but it cannot and should not sup
plant them. That is why Lenin says that "the dictatorship is
exercised by the proletariat organised in the Soviets, the pro
letariat led by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks"; that "all
the work of the Party is carried on through the Soviets, which
embrace the labouring masses irrespective of occupation" (see
[]
[¹] Lenin, Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8-16, 1921. 2. Report
on the Political Work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8.
[2] Lenin, First Congress of the Communist International. March 2-6,

1919. 2. Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat. March 4.
Vol. XXV, pp. 192, 193); [¹] and that the dictatorship "has to
be exercised . through* the Soviet apparatus" (see Vol.
.
.
XXVI, p. 64). [²] Therefore, whoever identifies the leading
role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat sub
stitutes the Party for the Soviets, i.e., for the state power.
Fifthly. The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat is a
state concept. The dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily
includes the concept of force. There is no dictatorship without
the use of force, if dictatorship is to be understood in the
strict sense of the word. Lenin defines the dictatorship of the
proletariat as "power based directly on the use of force" (see
Vol. XIX, p. 315). [³] Hence, to talk about dictatorship of the
Party in relation to the proletarian class, and to identify it with
the dictatorship of the proletariat, is tantamount to saying that
in relation to its class the Party must be not only a guide, not
only a leader and teacher, but also a sort of dictator employing
force against it, which, of course, is quite incorrect. Therefore,
whoever identifies "dictatorship of the Party" with the dic
tatorship of the proletariat tacitly proceeds from the assump
tion that the prestige of the Party can be built up on force
employed against the working class, which is absurd and quite
incompatible with Leninism. The prestige of the Party is
sustained by the confidence of the working class. And the
confidence of the working class is gained not by force - force

[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VI.
Should Revolutionaries Work in Reactionary Trade Unions? (1920)
[2] Lenin, The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's
Mistakes. Speech Delivered at a Joint Meeting of Communist Delegates
to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Communist Members of the All-Russian
Central Council of Trade Unions and Communist Members of the Moscow
Gubernia Council of Trade Unions. December 30, 1920.
[³] Lenin, The "Disarmament" Slogan. I. (1916)
only kills it -
but by the Party's correct theory, by the Party's

correct policy, by the Party's devotion to the working class,
by its connection with the masses of the working class, by
its readiness and ability to convince the masses of the cor
rectness of its slogans.
What, then, follows from all this?
From this it follows that:
1) Lenin uses the word dictatorship of the Party not in

the strict sense of the word ("power based on the use of force"),
but in the figurative sense, in the sense of its undivided
leadership.ir
2) Whoever identifies the leadership of the Party with the
dictatorship of the proletariat distorts Lenin, wrongly attribut
ing to the Party the function of employing force against the
working class as a whole.
3) Whoever attributes to the Party the function, which it
does not possess, of employing force against the working class
as a whole, violates the elementary requirements of correct
mutual relations between the vanguard and the class, between
the Party and the proletariat.
Thus, we have come right up to the question of the mutual
relations between the Party and the class, between Party and
non-Party members of the working class.
Lenin defines these mutual relations as "mutual confidence*
between the vanguard of the working class and the mass of
the workers" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).[¹]
What does this mean?
*
My italics. - J. St.
[1] Lenin, Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8-16, 1921. 5. Speech
on the Trade Unions. March 14.
It means, firstly, that the Party must closely heed the voice
of the masses; that it must pay careful attention to the rev
olutionary instinct of the masses; that it must study the practice
of the struggle of the masses and on this basis test the correct
ness of its own policy; that, consequently, it must not only
teach the masses, but also learn from them. Wa
It means, secondly, that the Party must day by day win the
confidence of the proletarian masses; that it must by its policy
and work secure the support of the masses; that it must not
command but primarily convince the masses, helping them to
realise through their own experience the correctness of the
policy of the Party; that, consequently, it must be the guide,
the leader and teacher of its class. th
To violate these conditions means to upset the correct mutual

relations between the vanguard and the class, to undermine
"mutual confidence," to shatter both class and Party discipline.
"Certainly," says Lenin, "almost everyone now realises that the Bolshe
viks could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half
months, let alone two and a half years, without the strictest, truly iron
discipline in our Party, and without the fullest and unreserved support of
the latter by the whole mass of the working class,* that is, by all its
thinking, honest, self-sacrificing and influential elements, capable of leading
or of carrying with them the backward strata" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173). [1]
"The dictatorship of the proletariat," says Lenin further, "is a stubborn
struggle bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and eco
nomic, educational and administrative against the forces and traditions
of the old society. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a
most terrible force. Without an iron party tempered in the struggle,

without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given
[¹] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. II. One

class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of

the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully" (see
Vol. XXV, p. 190). [1]
But how does the Party acquire this confidence and support
of the class? How is the iron discipline necessary for the dic
tatorship of the proletariat built up within the working class;
on what soil does it grow up?
Here is what Lenin says on this subject:
"How is the discipline of the revolutionary party of the proletariat
maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? Firstly, by the
class consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the
revolution, by its stamina, self-sacrifice and heroism. Secondly, by its
ability to link itself with, to keep in close touch with, and to a certain
extent, if you like, to merge with the broadest masses of the working
people* primarily with the proletarian, but also with the non-proletarian,
labouring masses. Thirdly, by the correctness of the political leadership
exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and
tactics, provided that the broadest masses have been convinced through
their own experience of this correctness. Without these conditions, disci
pline in a revolutionary party that is really capable of being the party of
the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and
transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these con
ditions, attempts to establish discipline inevitably become a cipher, an
empty phrase, mere affectation. On the other hand, these conditions can
not arise all at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard
won experience. Their creation is facilitated only by correct revolutionary
theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only
in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly
revolutionary movement" (see Vol. XXV, p. 174). [²]
And further:
[¹] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. V. "Left

Wing" Communism in Germany: Leaders Party- Class - - Masses.
(1920)
[2] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. II. One

"Victory over capitalism requires the correct correlation between the

leading, Communist, Party, the revolutionary class. the proletariat - and
the masses, i.e., the working people and exploited as a whole. Only the
Communist Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class,
if it contains all the best representatives of that class, if it consists of fully
class-conscious and devoted Communists who have been educated and
steeled by the experience of stubborn revolutionary struggle, if this Party

has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class
and, through it, with the whole mass of exploited, and if it has succeeded
in inspiring the complete confidence of this class and this mass* - only such
a party is capable of leading the proletariat in the most ruthless, resolute
and final struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand,
only under the leadership of such a party can the proletariat develop the
full might of its revolutionary onslaught and nullify the inevitable apathy
and, partly, resistance of the small minority of the labour aristocracy
corrupted by capitalism, and of the old trade-union and co-operative
leaders, etc. - only then will it be able to display its full strength, which,
owing to the very economic structure of capitalist society, is immeasurably
greater than the proportion of the population it constitutes" (see Vol.
XXV, p. 315). [¹]
From these quotations it follows that: miedm

1) The prestige of the Party and the iron discipline within
the working class that are necessary for the dictatorship of the
proletariat are built up not on fear or on "unrestricted" rights
of the Party, but on the confidence of the working class in the
Party, on the support which the Party receives from the work
ing class.
2) The confidence of the working class in the Party is not
acquired at one stroke, and not by means of force against the
working class, but by the Party's prolonged work among the
masses, by the correct policy of the Party, by the ability of the
[1] Lenin, Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of
the Communist International. 1. The Essence of the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat and of Soviet Power. (1920)
Party to convince the masses through their own experience of

the correctness of its policy, by the ability of the Party to secure
the support of the working class and to take the lead of the
masses of the working class.
3) Without a correct Party policy, reinforced by the experi
ence of the struggle of the masses, and without the confidence
of the working class, there is not and cannot be real leadership
by the Party.
4) The Party and its leadership, if the Party enjoys the
confidence of the class, and if this leadership is real leadership,
cannot be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat,
because without the leadership of the Party (the "dictatorship"
of the Party), enjoying the confidence of the working class, it
is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to be at all
firm.
Without these conditions, the prestige of the Party and iron

discipline within the working class are either empty phrases
or boastfulness and adventurism.
It is impossible to counterpose the dictatorship of the pro
letariat to the leadership (the "dictatorship") of the Party. It
is impossible because the leadership of the Party is the prin
cipal thing in the dictatorship of the proletariat, if we have
in mind a dictatorship that is at all firm and complete, and
not one like the Paris Commune, for instance, which was
neither a complete nor a firm dictatorship. It is impossible
because the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership
of the Party lie, as it were, on the same line of activity, operate
in the same direction.
"The mere presentation of the question," says Lenin, 'dictatorship of

66
the Party or dictatorship of the class? dictatorship (Party) of the leaders

or dictatorship (Party) of the masses?' testifies to the most incredible and
hopeless confusion of thought. . . . Everyone knows that the masses are
divided into classes. . . ; that usually, and in the majority of cases, at

least in modern civilised countries, classes are led by political parties;
that political parties, as a general rule, are directed by more or less stable
groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced
members, who are elected to the most responsible positions and are called
leaders. To go so far. . . as to counterpose, in general, dictator
ship of the masses to dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculously absurd and
stupid" (see Vol. XXV, pp. 187, 188).[¹]
That is absolutely correct. But that correct statement pro

ceeds from the premise that correct mutual relations exist
between the vanguard and the masses of the workers, between
the Party and the class. It proceeds from the assumption that
the mutual relations between the vanguard and the class
remain, so to say, normal, remain within the bounds of "mutual
confidence."
But what if the correct mutual relations between the van
guard and the class, the relations of "mutual confidence"

between the Party and the class are upset? enigbalb
What if the Party itself begins, in some way or other, to
counterpose itself to the class, thus upsetting the foundations
of its correct mutual relations with the class, thus upsetting the
foundations of "mutual confidence"?
Are such cases at all possible?

uile legis
Yes, they are.
bution ni
They are possible:
enonton
1) if the Party begins to build its prestige among the
masses, not on its work and on the confidence of the masses,
but on its "unrestricted" rights;
2) if the Party's policy is obviously wrong and the Party
is unwilling to reconsider and rectify its mistake;

Wing" Communism in Germany: Leaders - Party - Class Masses. (1920)
-
3) if the Party's policy is correct on the whole but the

masses are not yet ready to make it their own, and the Party
is either unwilling or unable to bide its time so as to give the
masses an opportunity to become convinced through their own
experience that the Party's policy is correct, and seeks to
impose it on the masses.
The history of our Party provides a number of such cases.
Various groups and factions in our Party have come to grief
and disappeared because they violated one of these three con
ditions, and sometimes all these conditions taken together.
But it follows from this that counterposing the dictatorship
of the proletariat to the "dictatorship" (leadership) of the
Party can be regarded as incorrect only:
1) if by dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working
class we mean not a dictatorship in the proper sense of the
word ("power based on the use of force"), but the leadership
of the Party, which precludes the use of force against the
working class as a whole, against its majority, precisely as
Lenin meant it;
2) if the Party has the qualifications to be the real leader
of the class, i.e., if the Party's policy is correct, if this policy
accords with the interests of the class;
3) if the class, if the majority of the class, accepts that
policy, makes that policy its own, becomes convinced, as a
result of the work of the Party, that that policy is correct, has
confidence in the Party and supports it.
The violation of these conditions inevitably gives rise to a
conflict between the Party and the class, to a split between
them, to their being counterposed to each other.
Can the Party's leadership be imposed on the class by force?
No, it cannot. At all events, such a leadership cannot be at all
durable. If the Party wants to remain the Party of the pro
letariat it must know that it is, primarily and principally, the

guide, the leader, the teacher of the working class. We must
not forget what Lenin said on this subject in his pamphlet
The State and Revolution:
"By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of

the proletariat, which capable of taking power and of leading the whole
people to socialism, of directing and organising the new order, of being
the teacher, the guide, the leader* of all the toilers and exploited in build
ing up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie"
(see Vol. XXI, p. 386).[¹]
Can one consider the Party as the real leader of the class if
its policy is wrong, if its policy comes into collision with the
interests of the class? Of course not. In such cases the Party,
if it wants to remain the leader, must reconsider its policy,
must correct its policy, must acknowledge its mistake and
correct it. In confirmation of this thesis one could cite, for
example, such a fact from the history of our Party as the

period of the abolition of the surplus-appropriation system,
when the masses of workers and peasants were obviously dis
contented with our policy and when the Party openly and
honestly decided to reconsider this policy. Here is what Lenin
said at the time, at the Tenth Party Congress, on the question
of abolishing the surplus-appropriation system and introducing
the New Economic Policy:
"We must not try to conceal anything, but must say straightforwardly
that the peasantry is not satisfied with the form of relations that has been
established with it, that it does not want this form of relations and will
not go on living in this way. That is indisputable. It has definitely
expressed this will. This is the will of the vast mass of the labouring

[1] Lenin, The State and Revolution. Chapter II. The State and
Revolution. The Experience of 1848-51. 1. The Eve of Revolution. (1917)
population. We must reckon with this; and we are sufficiently sober

politicians to say straightforwardly: Let us reconsider our policy towards
the peasantry"* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 238).[¹]
Can one consider that the Party should take the initiative
and leadership in organising decisive actions by the masses
merely on the ground that its policy is correct on the whole, if
that policy does not yet meet the confidence and support of
the class because, say, of the latter's political backwardness;
if the Party has not yet succeeded in convincing the class of
the correctness of its policy because, say, events have not yet
matured? No, one cannot. In such cases the Party, if it wants
to be a real leader, must know how to bide its time, must
convince the masses that its policy is correct, must help the
masses to become convinced through their own experience that
this policy is correct.
"If the revolutionary party," says Lenin, "has not a majority in the
advanced detachments of the revolutionary classes and in the country,
an uprising is out of the question" (see Vol. XXI, p. 282). [2]
"Revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority
of the working class, and this change is brought about by the political
experience of the masses" (see Vol. XXV, p. 221). [3] pilog
"The proletarian vanguard has been won over ideologically. That is
the main thing. Without this not even the first step towards victory can
be made. But it is still a fairly long way from victory. Victory cannot
be won with the vanguard alone. To throw the vanguard alone into the
decisive battle, before the whole class, before the broad masses have
taken up a position either of direct support of the vanguard, or at least
*
My italics. J. St.
[1] Lenin, Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8-16, 1921. 6. Report
on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation
System. March 15.
[2] Lenin, Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power? (1917)
[3] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. IX. "Left
Wing" Communism in Great Britain. (1920)
of benevolent neutrality towards it, and one in which they cannot possibly
support the enemy, would be not merely folly but a crime. And in order
that actually the whole class, that actually the broad masses of the work
ing people and those oppressed by capital may take up such a position,
propaganda and agitation alone are not enough. For this the masses must
have their own political experience" (ibid., p. 228). [1] Leal bas
We know that this is precisely how our Party acted during

the period from Lenin's April Theses to the October uprising
of 1917. And it was precisely because it acted according to
these directives of Lenin's that it was successful in the uprising.
Such, basically, are the conditions for correct mutual rela
tions between the vanguard and the class. Louth.m
What does leadership mean when the policy of the Party
is correct and the correct relations between the vanguard and
the class are not upset? amwood de Shitin
Leadership under these circumstances means the ability to

convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's policy; the
ability to put forward and to carry out such slogans as bring
the masses to the Party's positions and help them to realise
through their own experience the correctness of the Party's
policy; the ability to raise the masses to the Party's level of
political consciousness, and thus secure the support of the
masses and their readiness for the decisive struggle.
Therefore, the method of persuasion is the principal method

of the Party's leadership of the working class.
"If we, in Russia today," says Lenin, "after two and a half years of
unprecedented victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente,
were to make 'recognition of the dictatorship' a condition of trade-union
membership, we should be committing a folly, we should be damaging
our influence over the masses, we should be helping the Mensheviks. For
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. X. Some

Conclusions. (1920)
the whole task of the Communists is to be able to convince the backward
elements, to be able to work among them, and not to fence themselves off
from them by artificial and childishly 'Left' slogans" (see Vol. XXV,
P. 197). [1]
This, of course, must not be understood in the sense that
the Party must convince all the workers, down to the last man,
and that only after this is it possible to proceed to action, that
only after this is it possible to start operations. Not at all!
It only means that before entering upon decisive political ac
tions the Party must, by means of prolonged revolutionary
work, secure for itself the support of the majority of the masses
of the workers, or at least the benevolent neutrality of the
majority of the class. Otherwise Lenin's thesis, that a necessary
condition for victorious revolution is that the Party should win
over the majority of the working class, would be devoid of
all meaning.
Well, and what is to be done with the minority, if it does
not wish, if it does not agree voluntarily to submit to the will
of the majority? Can the Party, must the Party, enjoying the
confidence of the majority, compel the minority to submit
to the will of the majority? Yes, it can and it must. Leadership
is ensured by the method of persuading the masses, as the
principal method by which the Party influences the masses.
This, however, does not preclude, but presupposes, the use of
coercion, if such coercion is based on confidence in the Party
and support for it on the part of the majority of the working
class, if it is applied to the minority after the Party has con
vinced the majority. ani Froge van
It would be well to recall the controversies around this
subject that took place in our Party during the discussion on
[¹] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VI. Should

Revolutionaries Work in Reactionary Trade Unions? (1920)
the trade-union question. What was the mistake of the opposi

tion, the mistake of the Tsektran,52 at that time? Was it that
the opposition then considered it possible to resort to coercion?
No! It was not that. The mistake of the opposition at that
time was that, being unable to convince the majority of the
correctness of its position, having lost the confidence of the
majority, it nevertheless began to apply coercion, began to
insist on "shaking up" those who enjoyed the confidence of
the majority.
Here is what Lenin said at that time, at the Tenth Con
gress of the Party, in his speech on the trade unions:

UDOVE Gill
"In order to establish mutual relations and mutual confidence between
the vanguard of the working class and the masses of the workers, it was
necessary, if the Tsektran had made a mistake to correct this mis
take. But when people begin to defend this mistake, it becomes a source
of political danger. Had not the utmost possible been done in the way
of democracy in heeding the moods expressed here by Kutuzov, we would
have met with political bankruptcy. First we must convince, and then
coerce. We must at all costs first convince, and then coerce.* We were
not able to convince the broad masses, and we upset the correct relations
between the vanguard and the masses" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 235).[¹]
tuft
Lenin says the same thing in his pamphlet On the Trade
Unions:53
"We applied coercion correctly and successfully only when we were

able to create beforehand a basis of conviction for it" (ibid., p. 74).
sinn
And that is quite true, for without those conditions no lead

ership is possible. For only in that way can we ensure unity of
action in the Party, if we are speaking of the Party, or unity
of action of the class, if we are speaking of the class as a whole.
[¹] Lenin, Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 8-16, 1921. 5. Speech
on the Trade Unions. March 14.
Without this there is splitting, confusion and demoralisation

in the ranks of the working class.
Such in general are the fundamentals of correct leadership
of the working class by the Party.
Any other conception of leadership is syndicalism, anarch
ism, bureaucracy - anything you please, but not Bolshevism,
not Leninism
The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be counterposed
to the leadership ("dictatorship") of the Party if correct mutual
relations exist between the Party and the working class,
between the vanguard and the masses of the workers. But
from this it follows that it is all the more impermissible to
identify the Party with the working class, the leadership ("dic
tatorship") of the Party with the dictatorship of the working
class. On the ground that the "dictatorship" of the Party can
not be counterposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, Sorin
arrived at the wrong conclusion that "the dictatorship of the
proletariat is the dictatorship of our Party."
But Lenin not only speaks of the impermissibility of such
counterposition, he also speaks of the impermissibility of
counterposing "the dictatorship of the masses to the dictator
ship of the leaders." Would you, on this ground, have us iden
tify the dictatorship of leaders with the dictatorship of the
proletariat? If we took that line, we would have to say that
"the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our
leaders." But it is precisely to this absurdity that we are led,
properly speaking, by the policy of identifying the "dictator
ship" of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .
Where does Zinoviev stand on this subject?
In essence, Zinoviev shares Sorin's point of view of identify
ing the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of
the proletariat - with the difference, however, that Sorin
expresses himself more openly and clearly, whereas Zinoviev

"wriggles." One need only take, for instance, the following
passage in Zinoviev's book Leninism to be convinced of this:
Dila
"What," says Zinoviev, "is the system existing in the U.S.S.R. from the
standpoint of its class content? It is the dictatorship of the proletariat.
What is the direct mainspring of power in the U.S.S.R.? Who exercises
the power of the working class? The Communist Party! In this sense,
we have the dictatorship of the Party. What is the juridical form of
power in the U.S.S.R.? What is the new type of state system that was
created by the October Revolution? The Soviet system. The one does
not in the least contradict the other."
That the one does not contradict the other is, of course,
correct if by the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the
working class as a whole we mean the leadership of the Party.
But how is it possible, on this ground, to place a sign of equality
between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the "dictator
ship" of the Party, between the Soviet system and the "dicta
torship" of the Party? Lenin identified the system of Soviets
with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he was right, for
the Soviets, our Soviets, are organisations which rally the
labouring masses around the proletariat under the leadership
of the Party. But when, where, and in which of his writings
did Lenin place a sign of equality between the "dictatorship"
of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, between
the "dictatorship" of the Party and the system of Soviets, as
Zinoviev does now? Neither the leadership ("dictatorship") of
the Party nor the leadership ("dictatorship") of the leaders
contradicts the dictatorship of the proletariat. Would you, on
this ground, have us proclaim that our country is the country
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is to say, the country
of the dictatorship of the Party, that is to say, the country of the

dictatorship of the leaders? And yet the "principle" of iden

tifying the "dictatorship" of the Party with the dictatorship of
the proletariat, which Zinoviev enunciates surreptitiously and
uncourageously, leads precisely to this absurdity. na b
In Lenin's numerous works I have been able to note only
five cases in which he touches, in passing, on the question of
the dictatorship of the Party. 30 15915
The first case is in his controversy with the Socialist
Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, where he says:
"When we are reproached with the dictatorship of one party, and
when, as you have heard, a proposal is made to establish a united socialist
front, we reply: 'Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand by it, and
cannot depart from it, for it is that Party which, in the course of decades,
has won the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial
proletariat' (see Vol. XXIV, p. 423). [¹]
""
The second case is in his "Letter to the Workers and Peas
ants in Connection with the Victory over Kolchak," in which

he says:
"Some people (especially the Mensheviks and the Socialist
Revolutionaries - all of them, even the 'Lefts' among them) are trying to
scare the peasants with the bogey of the 'dictatorship of one party,' the
Party of Bolsheviks, Communists.
"The peasants have learned from the instance of Kolchak not to be
afraid of this bogey.
"Either the dictatorship (i.e., iron rule) of the landlords and capitalists,
or the dictatorship of the working class" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 436). [2]
The third case is Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of
the Comintern in his controversy with Tanner. I have quoted
it above.*
*See this volume, p. 293. Ed.

-
csal
[1] Lenin, Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Workers in
Education and Socialist Culture. July 31, 1919.
[2] Lenin, Letter to the Workers and Peasants in Connection with the
Victory over Kolchak. (1919)
314 MOM ON THE OPPOSITION
The fourth case is a few lines in the pamphlet "Left-Wing"

Communism, an Infantile Disorder. The passages in question
have already been quoted above.*
And the fifth case is in his draft outline of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, published in the Lenin Miscellany, Volume
III, where there is a sub-heading "Dictatorship of One Party"
(see Lenin Miscellany, Vol. III, p. 497). Ferds
It should be noted that in two out of the five cases, the last
and the second, Lenin puts the words "dictatorship of one

party" in quotation marks, thus clearly emphasising the in
exact, figurative sense of this formula. add wat op
It should also be noted that in every one of these cases, by
the "dictatorship of the Party" Lenin meant dictatorship ("iron
rule") over the "landlords and capitalists," and not over the
working class, contrary to the slanderous fabrications
Londroom
of
Kautsky and Co.
It is characteristic that in none of his works, major or sec
ondary, in which Lenin discusses or merely alludes to the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the Party in the
system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is there any hint
whatever that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dicta
torship of our Party." On the contrary, every page, every line
of these works cries out against such a formula (see The State
and Revolution, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade
Kautsky, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder,
etc.). 102 46 mesen ez
Even more characteristic is the fact that in the theses of the
Second Congress of the Comintern54 on the role of a political

party, which were drawn up under the direct guidance of
Lenin, and to which Lenin repeatedly referred in his speeches
* See this volume, pp. 300-01, 303-04, 307-09. - Ed.

as a model of the correct formulation of the role and tasks of
the Party, we find not one word, literally not one word, about
dictatorship of the Party.
What does all this indicate?
It indicates that:
a) Lenin did not regard the formula "dictatorship of the

Party" as irreproachable and exact, for which reason it is very
rarely used in Lenin's works, and is sometimes put in quotation
marks;
b) on the few occasions that Lenin was obliged, in contro
versy with opponents, to speak of the dictatorship of the Party,
he usually referred to the "dictatorship of one party," i.e., to
the fact that our Party holds power alone, that it does not share
power with other parties. Moreover, he always made it clear
that the dictatorship of the Party in relation to the working
class meant the leadership of the Party, its leading role;
c) in all those cases in which Lenin thought it necessary to
give a scientific definition of the role of the Party in the system
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he spoke exclusively of
the leading role of the Party in relation to the working class
(and there are thousands of such cases);
d) that is why it never "occurred" to Lenin to include the
formula "dictatorship of the Party" in the fundamental resolu
tion on the role of the Party - I have in mind the resolution
adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern;
e) the comrades who identify, or try to identify, the "dic
tatorship" of the Party and, therefore, the "dictatorship of
the leaders" with the dictatorship of the proletariat are wrong
from the point of view of Leninism, and are politically short
sighted, for they thereby violate the conditions for correct
mutual relations between the vanguard and the class.
This is apart from the fact that the formula "dictatorship of

the Party," when taken without the above-mentioned reserva
tions, can give rise to quite a number of dangers and political
set-backs in our practical work. This formula, taken without
reservations, says, as it were:
a) to the non-Party masses: don't dare to contradict, don't
dare to argue, for the Party can do everything, for we have the
dictatorship of the Party;
b) to the Party cadres: act more boldly, tighten the screw,

there is no need to heed what the non-Party masses say, we
have the dictatorship of the Party; Ainars
c) to the top leadership of the Party: you may indulge in
the luxury of a certain amount of complacency, you may even
become conceited, for we have the dictatorship of the Party,
and, "consequently," the dictatorship of the leaders.
It is opportune to call attention to these dangers precisely
at the present moment, in a period when the political activity
of the masses is rising, when the readiness of the Party to heed
the voice of the masses is of particular value to us, when at
tention to the requirements of the masses is a fundamental
precept of our Party, when it is incumbent upon the Party to
display particular caution and particular flexibility in its policy,
when the danger of becoming conceited is one of the most
serious dangers confronting the Party in its task of correctly
leading the masses.
One cannot but recall Lenin's golden words at the Eleventh
Congress of our Party:
"Among the mass of the people we (the Communists - J. St.) are after
all but a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we prop
erly express what the people are conscious of. Unless we do this the
Communist Party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not
lead the masses, and the whole machine will collapse" (see Vol. XXVII,
P. 256).[1]
"Properly express what the people are conscious of" - this

is precisely the necessary condition that ensures for the Party
the honourable role of the principal guiding force in the
system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
VI
THE QUESTION OF THE VICTORY OF

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY
The pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism (May 1924, first

edition) contains two formulations on the question of the
victory of socialism in one country. The first of these says:
ma nu
"Formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered
impossible, on the assumption that it would require the combined action
of the proletarians of all or at least of a majority of the advanced countries
to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie. Now this point of view no longer
fits in with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such
a victory, for the uneven and spasmodic character of the development of
the various capitalist countries under the conditions of imperialism, the
development within imperialism of catastrophic contradictions leading to
inevitable wars, the growth of the revolutionary movement in all countries
of the world - all this leads, not only to the possibility, but also to the
necessity of the victory of the proletariat in individual countries" (see
The Foundations of Leninism55).
This thesis is quite correct and needs no comment. It is

directed against the theory of the Social-Democrats, who re
gard the seizure of power by the proletariat in one country,
[1] Lenin, Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 27-April 2,

1922. 2. Political Report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.).
March 27. nilalm
without the simultaneous victory of the revolution in other

countries, as utopian.
But the pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism contains a
second formulation, which says:
"But the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and establishment
of the power of the proletariat in one country does not yet mean that
the complete victory of socialism has been ensured. The principal task of
socialism the organisation of socialist production - has still to be ful
filled. Can this task be fulfilled, can the final victory of socialism be
achieved in one country, without the joint efforts of the proletarians in
several advanced countries? No, it cannot. To overthrow the bourgeoisie
the efforts of one country are sufficient; this is proved by the history of
our revolution. For the final victory of socialism, for the organisation of
socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of a peasant
country like Russia, are insufficient; for that, the efforts of the proletarians
of several advanced countries are required" (see The Foundations of
Leninism, first edition56).
This second formulation was directed against the assertions

of the critics of Leninism, against the Trotskyists, who declared
that the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, in
the absence of victory in other countries, could not "hold out
in the face of a conservative Europe."
To that extent but only to that extent this formulation
- -
was then (May 1924) adequate, and undoubtedly it was of

some service.
Subsequently, however, when the criticism of Leninism in
this sphere had already been overcome in the Party, when a
new question had come to the fore the question of the pos
sibility of building a complete socialist society by the efforts of
our country, without help from abroad the second formula -
tion became obviously inadequate, and therefore incorrect.

What is the defect in this formulation?
Its defect is that it joins two different questions into one: it

joins the question of the possibility of building socialism by the
efforts of one country -

- which must be answered in the affirm
ative with the question whether a country in which the

-
dictatorship of the proletariat exists can consider itself fully

guaranteed against intervention, and consequently against the
restoration of the old order, without a victorious revolu
tion in a number of other countries - which must be answered
in the negative. This is apart from the fact that this formula
tion may give occasion for thinking that the organisation of a
socialist society by the efforts of one country is impossible
which, of course, is incorrect.
On this ground I modified and corrected this formulation
in my pamphlet The October Revolution and the Tactics of
the Russian Communists (December 1924); I divided the ques
tion into two into the question of a full guarantee against
the restoration of the bourgeois order, and the question of the
possibility of building a complete socialist society in one coun
try. This was effected, in the first place, by treating the "com
plete victory of socialism" as a "full guarantee against the
restoration of the old order," which is possible only through
"the joint efforts of the proletarians of several countries"; and,
secondly, by proclaiming, on the basis of Lenin's pamphlet
On Co-operation,57 the indisputable truth that we have all
that is necessary for building a complete socialist society
(see The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian
Communists).*
It was this new formulation of the question that formed the
basis for the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth
Party Conference "The Tasks of the Comintern and the

"58 which examines the question of the victory of
R.C.P.(B.),"
* This new formulation of the question was substituted for the old one
in subsequent editions of the pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism. -
Ed.
socialism in one country in connection with the stabilisation of

capitalism (April 1925), and considers that the building of
socialism by the efforts of our country is possible and necessary.
This new formulation also served as the basis for my
pamphlet The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Confer
ence of the R.C.P.(B.) published in May 1925, immediately
after the Fourteenth Party Conference.
With regard to the presentation of the question of the victory
of socialism in one country, this pamphlet states:
"Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group con
sists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and
the peasantry (this refers to the building of socialism in one country -
J. St.). The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist
between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries,
as lands of capitalism (this refers to the final victory of socialism
J. St.)." "Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions,
which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the
second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts
of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against
Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist" (see
The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) 59).
On the question of the victory of socialism in our country,

122
the pamphlet states: Malbatt
"We can build socialism, and we will build it together with the peas
antry under the leadership of the working class" . . . for "under the
dictatorship of the proletariat we possess all that is needed to build
a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal difficulties, for we can
and must overcome them by our own efforts" (ibid.60).
or to Jim
On the question of the final victory of socialism, it states:
"The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee against attempts at

intervention, and hence against restoration, for any serious attempt at
restoration can take place only with serious support from outside, only
with the support of international capital. Therefore, the support of our
revolution by the workers of all countries, and still more the victory of the
workers in at least several countries, is a necessary condition for fully

guaranteeing the first victorious country against attempts at intervention
and restoration, a necessary condition for the final victory of socialism"
(ibid.61).

It is well known that this question was treated in the same
spirit in my pamphlet Questions and Answers (June 1925) and
in the political report of the Central Committee to the Four
teenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 62 (December 1925).
C M
Such are the facts.indat adı

These facts, I think, are known to all the comrades, includ
ing Zinoviev.
If now, nearly two years after the ideological struggle in
the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at the
Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it
possible in his reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party
Congress (December 1925) to dig up the old and quite inade
quate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written in April
1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided
question of the victory of socialism in one country then this L
peculiar trick of his only goes to show that he has got com
pletely muddled on this question. To drag the Party back
after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the
Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a

plenum of the Central Committee, means to become hopeless
ly entangled in contradictions, to have no faith in the cause of
building socialism, to abandon the path of Lenin, and to
acknowledge one's own defeat.
What is meant by the possibility of the victory of socialism in
MOD ATM
one country?
It means the possibility of solving the contradictions between
the proletariat and the peasantry by means of the internal
forces of our country, the possibility of the proletariat seizing

power and using that power to build a complete socialist society
in our country, with the sympathy and the support of the pro
letarians of other countries, but without the preliminary victory
of the proletarian revolution in other countries. no analo,
Without such a possibility, building socialism is building

without prospects, building without being sure that socialism
will be completely built. It is no use engaging in building so
cialism without being sure that we can build it completely,
without being sure that the technical backwardness of our
country is not an insuperable obstacle to the building of a
complete socialist society. To deny such a possibility means
disbelief in the cause of building socialism, departure from
Leninism.
What is meant by the impossibility of the complete, final

victory of socialism in one country without the victory of the
revolution in other countries?
It means the impossibility of having a full guarantee against

intervention, and consequently against the restoration of
the bourgeois order, without the victory of the revolution
in at least a number of countries. To deny this indisputable
thesis means departure from internationalism, departure from
Leninism.
"We are living," says Lenin, "not merely in a state, but in a system of
states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperial
ist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph
in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions
between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.
That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to, and will
hold sway, it must prove this by its military organisation also" (see Vol.
XXIV, p. 122). [¹]
[1] Lenin, Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 18-23, 1919. 2. Report
of the Central Committee. March 18. žuls
"We have before us," says Lenin in another passage, "a certain equilib
rium, which is in the highest degree unstable, but an unquestionable, an
indisputable equilibrium nevertheless. Will it last long? I do not know
and, I think, it is impossible to know. And therefore we must exercise
very great caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson
to be learned from our governmental activities during the past year, the
lesson which all the workers and peasants must learn, is that we must be
on the alert, we must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes
and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must
remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from every manner
of invasion" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 117).[¹]

Where does Zinoviev stand as regards the question of the
victory of socialism in one country?
Listen:
"By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition

of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class,
in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat." . . . "In order to get a
clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the U.S.S.R., in the year
1925," says Zinoviev further, "we must distinguish between two things:
1) the assured possibility of engaging in building socialism - such a possi
bility, it stands to reason, is quite conceivable within the limits of one
country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e.,
the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society."
What can all this signify?

It signifies that by the final victory of socialism in one coun
try Zinoviev understands, not a guarantee against intervention
and restoration, but the possibility of completely building
socialist society. And by the victory of socialism in one country
Zinoviev understands the kind of building socialism which
cannot and should not lead to completely building socialism.
Building at haphazard, without prospects, building socialism
[¹]Lenin, Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. December 23-28, 1921.

1. The Home and Foreign Policy of the Republic. LA
324 K ON THE OPPOSITION
although completely building a socialist society is impossible

such is Zinoviev's position.
To engage in building socialism without the possibility of
completely building it, knowing that it cannot be completely
built- such
-
are the absurdities in which Zinoviev has in
volved himself.
But this is a mockery of the question, not a solution of it!

Here is another extract from Zinoviev's reply to the discus
sion at the Fourteenth Party Congress:
Fun
"Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far
as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: 'Is it
possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies,
to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?' And
he answers: 'On the basis of all that has been said we have the right to
say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite of the fact
that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being we are the
only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we shall completely
build socialism' (Kurskaya Pravda, No. 279, December 8, 1925). Is this the
Leninist method of presenting the question," Zinoviev asks, "does not this
smack of national narrow-mindedness?"*
Thus, according to Zinoviev, to recognise the possibility

of completely building socialism in one country means adopt
ing the point of view of national narrow-mindedness, while to
deny such a possibility means adopting the point of view of
internationalism.
But if that is true, is it at all worth while fighting for victory

over the capitalist elements in our economy? Does it not follow
from this that such a victory is impossible?sord ellas
Capitulation to the capitalist elements in our economy
that is what the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of argument
leads us to.
vola
And this absurdity, which has nothing in common with

Leninism, is presented to us by Zinoviev as "internationalism,"
as "100 per cent Leninism"!
I assert that on this most important question of building
socialism Zinoviev is deserting Leninism and slipping to the
standpoint of the Menshevik Sukhanov.
Let us turn to Lenin. Here is what he said about the victory
of socialism in one country even before the October Revolu
tion, in August 1915:
odi
"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of
capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or
even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat
of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own
socialist production,* would stand up against the rest of the world, the
capitalist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other coun
tries, raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the
event of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting
classes and their states" (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33).[1]
What is meant by Lenin's phrase "having . . . organised

socialist production" which I have stressed? It means that the
proletariat of the victorious country, having seized power, can
and must organise socialist production. And what does to
"organise socialist production" mean? It means completely
building a socialist society. It scarcely needs proof that this
clear and definite statement of Lenin's requires no further
comment. Otherwise Lenin's call for the seizure of power by
the proletariat in October 1917 would be incomprehensible.
You see that this clear thesis of Lenin's, in comparison with
Zinoviev's muddled and anti-Leninist "thesis" that we can
NOVORO

engage in building socialism "within the limits of one country,"

99
although it is impossible to build it completely, is as different

from the latter as the heavens from the earth.
The statement quoted above was made by Lenin in 1915,

before the proletariat had taken power. But perhaps he modi
fied his views after the experience of taking power, after 1917?
Let us turn to Lenin's pamphlet On Co-operation, written in
1923.
"As a matter of fact," says Lenin, "state power over all large-scale
means of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the
alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small
peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc.. -
is not this all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society
from the co-operatives, from the co-operatives alone, which we formerly
looked down upon as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have
the right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that
is necessary for building a complete socialist society? This is not yet the
building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient for
this building"* (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).
In other words, we can and must build a complete socialist

society, for we have at our disposal all that is necessary and
sufficient for this building. endlactal edt je jeimarlons
I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.
Compare this classical thesis of Lenin's with the anti
Leninist rebuke Zinoviev administered to Yakovlev, and you
will realise that Yakovlev was only repeating Lenin's words
about the possibility of completely building socialism in one
country, whereas Zinoviev, by attacking this thesis and casti
gating Yakovlev, deserted Lenin and adopted the point of
view of the Menshevik Sukhanov, the point of view that it is
impossible to build socialism completely in our country owing
to its technical backwardness.

by One can only wonder why we took power in October 1917 if

we did not count on completely building socialism. I
We should not have taken power in October 1917 - this is
the conclusion to which the inherent logic of Zinoviev's line of
argument leads us.
I assert further that in the highly important question of the
victory of socialism Zinoviev has gone counter to the definite
decisions of our Party, as registered in the well-known resolu
tion of the Fourteenth Party Conference "The Tasks of the
Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged
Plenum of the E.C.C.I."
Let us turn to this resolution. Here is what it says about the
victory of socialism in one country:

"The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise to the
constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of economic pres
sure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the only guaran
tee of the final victory of socialism, i.e., the guarantee against restoration,*
is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries. . . ." "Lenin
ism teaches that the final victory of socialism, in the sense of a full guaran
tee against the restoration of bourgeois relationships, is possible only on
an international scale. . . ." "But it does not follow* from this that it is
impossible to build a complete socialist society in a backward country like
Russia, without the 'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed tech
nically and economically" (see the resolution64).
As you see, the resolution interprets the final victory of

socialism as a guarantee against intervention and restoration,
in complete contrast to Zinoviev's interpretation in his book
Leninism.
As you see, the resolution recognises the possibility of build

ing a complete socialist society in a backward country like
b*My italics. - J. St. Adol

Russia without the "state aid" of countries more developed

technically and economically, in complete contrast to what
Zinoviev said when he rebuked Yakovlev in his reply to the
discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress.
How else can this be described if not as a struggle on Zi
noviev's part against the resolution of the Fourteenth Party
Conference? W
Of course, Party resolutions are sometimes not free from

error. Sometimes they contain mistakes. Speaking generally,
one may assume that the resolution of the Fourteenth Party
Conference also contains certain errors. Perhaps Zinoviev
thinks that this resolution is erroneous. But then he should say
so clearly and openly, as befits a Bolshevik. For some reason or
other, however, Zinoviev does not do so. He preferred to
choose another path, that of attacking the resolution of the
Fourteenth Party Conference from the rear, while keeping si
lent about this resolution and refraining from any open criti
cism of the resolution. Zinoviev evidently thinks that this will
be the best way of achieving his purpose. And he has but one
purpose, namely - to "improve" the resolution, and to amend
Lenin "just a little bit." It scarcely needs proof that Zinoviev
has made a mistake in his calculations.
What is Zinoviev's mistake due to? What is the root of this

mistake?
The root of this mistake, in my opinion, lies in Zinoviev's

conviction that the technical backwardness of our country is
an insuperable obstacle to the building of a complete socialist
society; that the proletariat cannot completely build socialism
owing to the technical backwardness of our country. Zinoviev
and Kamenev once tried to raise this argument at a meeting
of the Central Committee of the Party prior to the April Party
Conference.65 But they received a rebuff and were compelled
to retreat, and formally they submitted to the opposite point of

view, the point of view of the majority of the Central Com
mittee. But although he formally submitted to it, Zinoviev
has continued to wage a struggle against it all the time. Here
is what the Moscow Committee of our Party says about this
"incident" in the Central Committee of the R.C.P. (B.) in
its "Reply" to the letter of the Leningrad Gubernia Party
Conference:66
"Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated

the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due to
our technical and economic backwardness unless an international revolution
comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the members of
the Central Committee, think that we can build socialism, are building it,
and will completely build it, notwithstanding our technical backwardness
and in spite of it. We think that the work of building will proceed far
more slowly, of course, than in the conditions of a world victory; never
theless, we are making progress and will continue to do so. We also
believe that the view held by Kamenev and Zinoviev expresses disbelief in
the internal forces of our working class and of the peasant masses who
follow its lead. We believe that it is a departure from the Leninist
position" (see "Reply").
This document appeared in the press during the first sittings

of the Fourteenth Party Congress. Zinoviev, of course, had
the opportunity of attacking this document at the congress. It
is characteristic that Zinoviev and Kamenev found no argu
ments against this grave accusation directed against them by
the Moscow Committee of our Party. Was this accidental?
I think not. The accusation, apparently, hit the mark. Zinoviev
and Kamenev "replied" to this accusation by silence, because
they had no "card to beat it."bibi gelado
The "New Opposition" is offended because Zinoviev is
accused of disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in
our country. But if after a whole year of discussion on the
question of the victory of socialism in one country; after
330 MAMIN ON THE OPPOSITION
Zinoviev's viewpoint has been rejected by the Political Bureau

of the Central Committee (April 1925); after the Party has
arrived at a definite opinion on this question, recorded in the
well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Party Conference
(April 1925) if, after all this, Zinoviev ventures to oppose the
-
point of view of the Party in his book Leninism (September

1925), if he then repeats this opposition at the Fourteenth Party
Congress how can all this, this stubbornness, this persistence
in his error, be explained if not by the fact that Zinoviev is
infected, hopelessly infected, with disbelief in the victory of
socialist construction in our country?
It pleases Zinoviev to regard this disbelief of his as inter
nationalism. But since when have we come to regard depar
ture from Leninism on a cardinal question of Leninism as
internationalism? wole
Will it not be more correct to say that it is not the Party but
Zinoviev who is sinning against internationalism and the in
ternational revolution? For what is our country, the country
"that is building socialism," if not the base of the world revolu
tion? But can it be a real base of the world revolution if it is
incapable of completely building a socialist society? Can it re

main the mighty centre of attraction for the workers of all
countries that it undoubtedly is now, if it is incapable of achiev
ing victory at home over the capitalist elements in our economy,
the victory of socialist construction? I think not. But does it
not follow from this that disbelief in the victory of socialist
construction, the dissemination of such disbelief, will lead to
our country being discredited as the base of the world revolu

tion? And if our country is discredited the world revolutionary
movement will be weakened. How did Messrs. the Social
Democrats try to scare the workers away from us? By preach

ing that "the Russians will not get anywhere." What are we
beating the Social-Democrats with now, when we are attract

ing a whole series of workers' delegations to our country and
thereby strengthening the position of communism all over the
world? By our successes in building socialism. Is it not obvious,
then, that whoever disseminates disbelief in our successes
in building socialism thereby indirectly helps the Social
Democrats, reduces the sweep of the international revolution
ary movement, and inevitably departs from internationalism?
You see that Zinoviev is in no better position in regard to

his "internationalism" than in regard to his "100 per cent
Leninism" on the question of building socialism in one country.
That is why the Fourteenth Party Congress rightly defined
the views of the "New Opposition" as "disbelief in the cause
967
of socialist construction," as "a distortion of Leninism."
al
VII
THIN TUE
THE FIGHT FOR THE VICTORY OF
SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
I think that disbelief in the victory of socialist construction

is the principal error of the "New Opposition." In my opinion,
it is the principal error because from it spring all the other
errors of the "New Opposition." The errors of the "New
Opposition" on the questions of NEP, state capitalism, the
nature of our socialist industry, the role of the co-operatives
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the methods of fight
ing the kulaks, the role and importance of the middle peasantry
-
all these errors are to be traced to the principal error of the
opposition, to disbelief in the possibility of completely build
ing a socialist society by the efforts of our country.
What is disbelief in the victory of socialist construction in

our country?
It is, first of all, lack of confidence that, owing to certain
conditions of development in our country, the main mass
of the peasantry can be drawn into the work of socialist
construction.
It is, secondly, lack of confidence that the proletariat of our

country, which holds the key positions in our national economy,
is capable of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the
work of socialist construction.
It is from these theses that the opposition tacitly proceeds

in its arguments about the paths of our development no
matter whether it does so consciously or unconsciously.
Can the main mass of the Soviet peasantry be drawn into the
To
work of socialist construction?
In the pamphlet The Foundations of Leninism there are two

main theses on this subject:
1) "The peasantry in the Soviet Union must not be confused with the
peasantry in the West. A peasantry that has been schooled in three revo
lutions, that fought against the tsar and the power of the bourgeoisie side
by side with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat, a
peasantry that has received land and peace at the hands of the proletarian
revolution and by reason of this has become the reserve of the prole
tariat such a peasantry cannot but be different from a peasantry which
during the bourgeois revolution fought under the leadership of the liberal
bourgeoisie, which received land at the hands of that bourgeoisie, and in
view of this became the reserve of the bourgeoisie. It scarcely needs
proof that the Soviet peasantry, which has learnt to appreciate its political
friendship and political collaboration with the proletariat and which owes
its freedom to this friendship and collaboration, cannot but represent
exceptionally favourable material for economic collaboration with the
proletariat."
2) "Agriculture in Russia must not be confused with agriculture in the
West. There, agriculture is developing along the ordinary lines of capital
ism, under conditions of profound differentiation among the peasantry,
with large landed estates and private capitalist latifundia at one extreme
and pauperism, destitution and wage slavery at the other. Owing to this,
disintegration and decay are quite natural there. Not so in Russia. Here
agriculture cannot develop along such a path, if for no other reason than
that the existence of Soviet power and the nationalisation of the principal
instruments and means of production preclude such a development. In
Russia the development of agriculture must proceed along a different path,
along the path of organising millions of small and middle peasants in
co-operatives, along the path of developing in the countryside a mass co
operative movement supported by the state by means of preferential credits.
Lenin rightly pointed out in his articles on co-operation that the develop
ment of agriculture in our country must proceed along a new path, along
the path of drawing the majority of the peasants into socialist construction
through the co-operatives, along the path of gradually introducing into
agriculture the principles of collectivism, first in the sphere of marketing
and later in the sphere of production of agricultural products. . . .
"It scarcely needs proof that the vast majority of the peasantry will
eagerly take this new path of development, rejecting the path of private
capitalist latifundia and wage slavery, the path of destitution and ruin."68
Are these theses correct?
I think that both theses are correct and incontrovertible for
the whole of our construction period under the conditions of

NEP.
They are merely the expression of Lenin's well-known theses

on the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry, on the
inclusion of the peasant farms in the system of socialist de
velopment of our country; of his theses that the proletariat
must march towards socialism together with the main mass
of the peasantry, that the organisation of the vast masses of the
peasantry in co-operatives is the high road of socialist construc
tion in the countryside, that with the growth of our socialist
industry, "for us, the mere growth of co-operation is identical
... with the growth of socialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396). [¹]

Indeed, along what path can and must the development of

peasant economy in our country proceed?
Peasant economy is not capitalist economy. Peasant econ
omy, if you take the overwhelming majority of the peasant
farms, is small commodity economy. And what is peasant
small commodity economy? It is economy standing at the
cross-roads between capitalism and socialism. It may develop
in the direction of capitalism, as it is now doing in capitalist
countries, or in the direction of socialism, as it must do here, in
our country, under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Whence this instability, this lack of independence of peasant
economy? How is it to be explained? WASTAN
It is to be explained by the scattered character of the peas

ant farms, their lack of organisation, their dependence on the
towns, on industry, on the credit system, on the character of
the state power in the country, and, lastly, by the well-known
fact that the countryside follows, and necessarily must follow,
the town both in material and in cultural matters.
The capitalist path of development of peasant economy

means development through profound differentiation among
the peasantry, with large latifundia at one extreme and mass
impoverishment at the other. Such a path of development is
inevitable in capitalist countries, because the countryside, peas
ant economy, is dependent on the towns, on industry, on credit
concentrated in the towns, on the character of the state power
- and in the towns it is the bourgeoisie, capitalist industry, the
capitalist credit system and the capitalist state power that hold
sway. Briz
Is this path of development of peasant farms obligatory for

our country, where the towns have quite a different aspect,
where industry is in the hands of the proletariat, where trans
port, the credit system, the state power, etc., are concentrated
in the hands of the proletariat, where the nationalisation of the

land is a universal law of the country? Of course not. On the
contrary. Precisely because the towns do lead the countryside,
while we have in the towns the rule of the proletariat, which
holds all the key positions of national economy -
precisely for
this reason the peasant farms in their development must pro
ceed along a different path, the path of socialist construction.
What is this path?
It is the path of the mass organisation of millions of peasant
farms into co-operatives in all spheres of co-operation, the path
of uniting the scattered peasant farms around socialist in
dustry, the path of implanting the elements of collectivism
among the peasantry at first in the sphere of marketing agricul
tural produce and supplying the peasant farms with the prod
ucts of urban industry and later in the sphere of agricultural
production.
And the further we advance the more this path becomes
inevitable under the conditions of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, because co-operative marketing, co-operative
supplying, and, finally, co-operative credit and production
(agricultural co-operatives) are the only way to promote the
welfare of the countryside, the only way to save the broad
masses of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.
It is said that our peasantry, by its position, is not socialist,
and, therefore, incapable of socialist development. It is true,
of course, that the peasantry, by its position, is not socialist.
But this is no argument against the development of the peasant
farms along the path of socialism, once it has been proved that
the countryside follows the town, and in the towns it is social
ist industry that holds sway. The peasantry, by its position, was
not socialist at the time of the October Revolution either, and
it did not by any means want to establish socialism in our

country. At that time it strove mainly for the abolition of the

power of the landlords and for the ending of the war, for the
establishment of peace. Nevertheless, it followed the lead of
the socialist proletariat. Why? Because the overthrow of the
bourgeoisie and the seizure of power by the socialist prole
tariat was at that time the only way of getting out of the
imperialist war, the only way of establishing peace. Because
there was no other way at that time, nor could there be any.
Because our Party was able to hit upon that degree of the com
bination of the specific interests of the peasantry (the over
throw of the landlords, peace) with, and their subordination to,
the general interests of the country (the dictatorship of the
proletariat) which proved acceptable and advantageous.
to the peasantry. And so the peasantry, in spite of its non
socialist character, at that time followed the lead of the social
ist proletariat.
The same must be said about socialist construction in our
country, about drawing the peasantry into the channel of this

construction. The peasantry is non-socialist by its position.
But it must, and certainly will, take the path of socialist de
velopment, for there is not, and cannot be, any other way of
saving the peasantry from poverty and ruin except the bond
with the proletariat, except the bond with socialist industry,
except the inclusion of peasant economy in the common chan
nel of socialist development by the mass organisation of the
peasantry in co-operatives.
But why precisely by the
one
mass organisation of
OF
theFpeasantry
in co-operatives? i suolu l
Because in the mass organisation in co-operatives "we have
found that degree of the combination of private interest, pri
vate trading interest, with state supervision and control of
this interest, that degree of its subordination to the general
interests" (Lenin)69 which is acceptable and advantageous to

the peasantry and which ensures the proletariat the possibility
of drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the work of
socialist construction. It is precisely because it is advantageous
to the peasantry to organise the sale of its products and the
purchase of machines for its farms through co-operatives, it is
precisely for that reason that it should and will proceed along
the path of mass organisation in co-operatives.
What does the mass organisation of peasant farms in co
operatives mean when we have the supremacy of socialist
industry? ng gawin pa
It means that peasant small commodity economy abandons
the old capitalist path, which is fraught with mass ruin for the
peasantry, and goes over to the new path of development, the
path of socialist construction.
This is why the fight for the new path of development of
peasant economy, the fight to draw the main mass of the peas
antry into the work of socialist construction, is the immediate
task facing our Party. 503 18
The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), therefore, was

right in declaring:
T MORA
"The main path of building socialism in the countryside consists in
using the growing economic leadership of socialist state industry, of the
state credit institutions, and of the other key positions in the hands of the
proletariat to draw the main mass of the peasantry into co-opcrative
organisation and to ensure for this organisation a socialist development,
while utilising, overcoming and ousting its capitalist elements" (see Reso
lution of the Congress on the Report of the Central Committee 70).
The profound mistake of the "New Opposition" lies in the

fact that it does not believe in this new path of development of
the peasantry, that it does not see, or does not understand, the
absolute inevitability of this path under the conditions of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. And it does not understand this
because it does not believe in the victory of socialist construc

tion in our country, it does not believe in the capacity of our
proletariat to lead the peasantry along the path to socialism.
Hence the failure to understand the dual character of NEP,
the exaggeration of the negative aspects of NEP and the
treatment of NEP as being mainly a retreat.
Hence the exaggeration of the role of the capitalist elements
in our economy, and the belittling of the role of the levers of our
socialist development (socialist industry, the credit system, the
co-operatives, the rule of the proletariat, etc.).
Hence the failure to understand the socialist nature of our
state industry, and the doubts concerning the correctness of

Lenin's co-operative plan.
Hence the inflated accounts of differentiation in the coun
tryside, the panic in face of the kulak, the belittling of the role
of the middle peasant, the attempts to thwart the Party's policy
of securing a firm alliance with the middle peasant, and, in
general, the wobbling from one side to the other on the question
of the Party's policy in the countryside.
Hence the failure to understand the tremendous work of the
Party in drawing the vast masses of the workers and peasants

into building up industry and agriculture, revitalising the
co-operatives and the Soviets, administering the country,
combating bureaucracy, improving and remodelling our state
apparatus - work which marks a new stage of development
and without which no socialist construction is conceivable.
Hence the hopelessness and consternation in face of the

difficulties of our work of construction, the doubts about the
possibility of industrialising our country, the pessimistic chatter
about degeneration of the Party, etc.
Over there, among the bourgeoisie, all is going on fairly
well, but here, among the proletarians, things are fairly bad;
unless the revolution in the West takes place pretty soon, our
cause is lost such is the general tone of the "New Opposi
tion" which, in my opinion, is a liquidationist tone, but which,
for some reason or other (probably in jest), the opposition
tries to pass off as "internationalism."
NEP is capitalism, says the opposition. NEP is mainly a
retreat, says Zinoviev. All this, of course, is untrue. In actual
fact, NEP is the Party's policy, permitting a struggle between
the socialist and the capitalist elements and aimed at the
victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements.
In actual fact, NEP only began as a retreat, but it aimed at
regrouping our forces during the retreat and launching an
offensive. In actual fact, we have been on the offensive for
several years now, and are attacking successfully, developing

our industry, developing Soviet trade, and ousting private
capital.
But what is the meaning of the thesis that NEP is capitalism,
that NEP is mainly a retreat? What does this thesis proceed
from?
It proceeds from the wrong assumption that what is now

taking place in our country is simply the restoration of cap
italism, simply a "return" to capitalism. This assumption alone
can explain the doubts of the opposition regarding the socialist
nature of our industry. This assumption alone can explain the
panic of the opposition in face of the kulak. This assumption.
alone can explain the haste with which the opposition seized
upon the inaccurate statistics on differentiation in the peasant
ry. This assumption alone can explain the opposition's special
forgetfulness of the fact that the middle peasant is the central
figure in our agriculture. This assumption alone can explain
the underestimation of the importance of the middle peasant
and the doubts concerning Lenin's co-operative plan. This

assumption alone can serve to "substantiate" the "New Op
position's" disbelief in the new path of development of the
countryside, the path of drawing it into the work of socialist
construction.
As a matter of fact, what is taking place in our country now

is not a one-sided process of restoration of capitalism, but a
double process of development of capitalism and development
of socialism -
a contradictory process of struggle between the

socialist and the capitalist elements, a process in which the
socialist elements are overcoming the capitalist elements. This
is equally incontestable as regards the towns, where state in
dustry is the basis of socialism, and as regards the countryside,
where the main foothold for socialist development is mass
co-operation linked up with socialist industry.
The simple restoration of capitalism is impossible, if only
for the reason that the proletariat is in power, that large-scale
industry is in the hands of the proletariat, and that transport
and credit are in the possession of the proletarian state.
Differentiation in the countryside cannot assume its former
dimensions, the middle peasants still constitute the main mass
of the peasantry, and the kulak cannot regain his former
strength, if only for the reason that the land has been national
ised, that it has been withdrawn from circulation, while our
trade, credit, tax and co-operative policy is directed towards
restricting the kulaks' exploiting proclivities, towards promot
ing the welfare of the broad mass of the peasantry and levelling
out the extremes in the countryside. That is quite apart from
the fact that the fight against the kulaks is now proceeding not
only along the old line of organising the poor peasants against
the kulaks, but also along the new line of strengthening the
alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasants with the

mass of the middle peasants against the kulaks. The fact
that the opposition does not understand the meaning and
significance of the fight against the kulaks along this second
line once more confirms that the opposition is straying towards
the old path of development in the countryside the path of -
capitalist development, when the kulaks and the poor peasants

constituted the main forces in the countryside, while the middle
peasants were "melting away."
Co-operation is a variety of state capitalism, says the opposi
tion, citing in this connection Lenin's pamphlet The Tax in
71
Kind; and, consequently, it does not believe it possible to
utilise the co-operatives as the main foothold for socialist de
velopment. Here, too, the opposition commits a gross error.
Such an interpretation of co-operation was adequate and
satisfactory in 1921, when The Tax in Kind was written, when
we had no developed socialist industry, when Lenin conceived
of state capitalism as the possible basic form of conducting
our economy, and when he considered co-operation in conjunc
tion with state capitalism. But this interpretation has now
become inadequate and has been rendered obsolete by history,
for times have changed since then: our socialist industry has
developed, state capitalism never took hold to the degree ex
pected, whereas the co-operatives, which now have over ten
million members, have begun to link up with socialist industry.
How else are we to explain the fact that already in 1923, two
years after The Tax in Kind was written, Lenin began to re
gard co-operation in a different light, and considered that "co
operation, under our conditions, very often entirely coincides
with socialism" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396).[¹]

How else can this be explained except by the fact that dur
ing those two years socialist industry had grown, whereas
state capitalism had failed to take hold to the required extent,
in view of which Lenin began to consider co-operation, not in
conjunction with state capitalism, but in conjunction with so
cialist industry?
The conditions of development of co-operation had changed.
And so the approach to the question of co-operation had to be
changed also.
k
Here, for instance, is a remarkable passage from Lenin's
pamphlet On Co-operation (1923), which throws light on this
14504 Supe
matter:
EM
"Under state capitalism,* co-operative enterprises differ from state capi

talist enterprises, firstly, in that they are private enterprises and, secondly,
in that they are collective enterprises. Under our present system,* co
operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they
are collective enterprises, but they do not differ* from socialist enterprises
if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong
to the state, i.e., the working class" (see Vol. XXVII, p. 396). [¹]
In this short passage two big questions are solved. Firstly,

that "our present system" is not state capitalism. Secondly,
that co-operative enterprises taken in conjunction with "our
system" "do not differ" from socialist enterprises.
I think it would be difficult to express oneself more clearly.
Here is another passage from the same pamphlet of Lenin's:
66
'. . . for us, the mere growth of co-operation (with the 'slight' excep
tion mentioned above) is identical with the growth of socialism, and at the
same time we must admit that a radical change has taken place in our
whole outlook on socialism" (ibid.).

[1] Ibid. d
Obviously, the pamphlet On Co-operation gives a new ap

praisal of the co-operatives, a thing which the "New Opposi
tion" does not want to admit, and which it is carefully hushing
up, in defiance of the facts, in defiance of the obvious truth,
in defiance of Leninism.
Co-operation taken in conjunction with state capitalism is

one thing, and co-operation taken in conjunction with socialist
industry is another.
From this, however, it must not be concluded that a gulf lies
between The Tax in Kind and On Co-operation. That would,
of course, be wrong. It is sufficient, for instance, to refer to
the following passage in The Tax in Kind to discern im
mediately the inseparable connection between The Tax in
Kind and the pamphlet On Co-operation as regards appraisal
of the co-operatives. Here it is: Malon alm
"The transition from concessions to socialism is a transition from one
form of large-scale production to another form of large-scale production.

The transition from small-proprietor co-operatives to socialism is a transi
tion from small production to large-scale production, i.e., it is a more
complicated transition, but, if successful, is capable of embracing wider
masses of the population, is capable of pulling up the deeper and more
tenacious roots of the old, pre-socialist* and even pre-capitalist relations,
which most stubbornly resist all 'innovations'" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 337).[¹]
Lanbide allotg
From this quotation it is evident that even during the time
of The Tax in Kind, when we had as yet no developed socialist
industry, Lenin was of the opinion that, if successful, co
operation could be transformed into a powerful weapon
[1] Lenin, The Tax in Kind. The Tax in Kind, Free Trade and Con
cessions. (1921)
in the struggle against "pre-socialist," and, hence, against capi

talist relations. I think it was precisely this idea that subse
quently served as the point of departure for his pamphlet On
Co-operation.
But what follows from all this?
From all this it follows that the "New Opposition" ap

proaches the question of co-operation, not in a Marxist way,
but metaphysically. It regards co-operation not as a historical
phenomenon taken in conjunction with other phenomena, in
conjunction, say, with state capitalism (in 1921) or with socialist
industry (in 1923), but as something constant and immutable,
as a "thing in itself."
Hence the mistakes of the opposition on the question of
co-operation, hence its disbelief in the development of the
countryside towards socialism through co-operation, hence its
turning back to the old path, the path of capitalist develop
ment in the countryside.
Such, in general, is the position of the "New Opposition"
on the practical questions of socialist construction.
There is only one conclusion: the line of the opposition,
so far as it has a line, its wavering and vacillation, its disbe
lief in our cause and its consternation in face of difficulties,
lead to capitulation to the capitalist elements of our economy.

For, if NEP is mainly a retreat, if the socialist nature of
state industry is doubted, if the kulak is almost omnipotent,
if little hope can be placed in the co-operatives, if the role
of the middle peasant is progressively declining, if the new
path of development in the countryside is open to doubt, if
the Party is almost degenerating, while the revolution in the
West is not very near - then what is there left in the arsenal
of the opposition, what can it count on in the struggle against
the capitalist elements in our economy? You cannot go into

>>72
battle armed only with "The Philosophy of the Epoch."
It is clear that the arsenal of the "New Opposition," if it
can be termed an arsenal at all, is an unenviable one. It is not
an arsenal for battle. Still less is it one for victory.
It is clear that the Party would be doomed "in no time" if
it entered the fight equipped with such an arsenal; it would
simply have to capitulate to the capitalist elements in our
economy.
That is why the Fourteenth Congress of the Party was

absolutely right in deciding that "the fight for the victory of
socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. is the main task of our
Party"; that one of the necessary conditions for the fulfilment

of this task is "to combat disbelief in the cause of building
socialism in our country and the attempts to represent our
enterprises, which are of a 'consistently socialist type' (Lenin),
as state capitalist enterprises"; that "such ideological trends,
which prevent the masses from adopting a conscious attitude
towards the building of socialism in general and of a socialist
industry in particular, can only serve to hinder the growth of
the socialist elements in our economy and to facilitate the
struggle of private capital against them"; that "the congress
therefore considers that wide-spread educational work must
be carried on for the purpose of overcoming these distortions
of Leninism" (see Resolution on the Report of the Central
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)73).
The historical significance of the Fourteenth Congress of
the C.P.S.U.(B.) lies in the fact that it was able radically to
expose the mistakes of the "New Opposition," that it rejected
their disbelief and whining, that it clearly and precisely
indicated the path of the further struggle for socialism, opened
346 M2TMIMELI ON THE OPPOSITION M03
before the Party the prospect of victory, and thus armed the
proletariat with an invincible faith in the victory of socialist
construction.
ne ai lie lensaus ne bomo od no

January 25, 1926
ofned not lansa
J. V. Stalin, Concerning Questions of Leninism,

Moscow and Leningrad, 1926
ainsmols seilariqas Autotqala
membnoss
ne srls to 289ano dussion
argit ora" and goibit Mightclosbloeds

To lest ods ai A.2.2.U ni noissumanoo sailaisios
inomlitlut odi 101 anoitibno to no qual
gnibllud to ho
21gm938 ihmilsisda
300 3052101
(in) ag seileipoa tha

ghost faoigólosbi Houz" dedi: "aperiqasino sailetiqas stata as
abinis auoisenoos gnisqobis mon adamam sirahasonlw
dailione e lo bas Insonog ni malleisbe to nibilued ads abowod
lo thwong sih obaid or ove vlno naselooming Pinzobai
adi sisulis os bus monossomolseilaisé d
82912000 do Jadi modi ninys Daigao 316ving distajiona
um row lanoitcoubs basaga-obiw esbian63 91815
enoitrouaib sends goi brava lo zoqui ho bonito d

Is er to quod no illos play in to
Somm
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bonego nailsio 101 slgguna dut od to dreq di bambibi
OFE
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN UNITY
COMMITTEE*74
Speech Delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee

ob and the Central Control Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.)75
July 15, 1926
Comrades, we are passing through a period of the accumula

tion of forces, a period of winning over the masses and of
preparing the proletariat for new battles. But the masses are
in the trade unions. And in the West the trade unions, the
majority of them, are now more or less reactionary. What,
then, should be our attitude towards the trade unions? Should
we, can we, as Communists, work in the reactionary trade

unions? It is essentially this question that Trotsky put to us
in his letter recently published in Pravda. There is nothing
new, of course, in this question. It was raised before Trotsky
by the "ultra-Lefts" in Germany, some five years ago. But
Trotsky has seen fit to raise it again. How does he answer it?
Permit me to quote a passage from Trotsky's letter:
*The speech is given here in abbreviated form.
347
"The entire present 'superstructure of the British working class, in

all its shades and groupings without exception, is an apparatus for putting
a brake on the revolution. This presages for a long time to come the
pressure of the spontaneous and semi-spontaneous movement on the frame
work of the old organisations and the formation of new, revolutionary
organisations as the result of this pressure" (see Pravda, No. 119, May 26,
1926).
It follows from this that we ought not to work in the "old"

organisations, if we do not want to "retard" the revolution.
Either what is meant here is that we are already in the period
of a direct revolutionary situation and ought at once to set up
self-authorised organisations of the proletariat in place of the
"old" ones, in place of the trade unions — which, of course, is
incorrect and foolish. Or what is meant here is that "for a
long time to come" we ought to work to replace the old trade

unions by "new, revolutionary organisations."
This is a signal to organise, in place of the existing trade
unions, that same "Revolutionary Workers' Union" which the
"ultra-Left" Communists in Germany advocated some five
years ago, and which Comrade Lenin vigorously opposed in
his pamphlet "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder.
It is in point of fact a signal to replace the present trade
unions by "new," supposedly "revolutionary" organisations, a
signal, consequently, to withdraw from the trade unions.
Is that policy correct? It is fundamentally incorrect. It is
fundamentally incorrect because it runs counter to the Leninist
method of leading the masses. It incorrect because, for all
their reactionary character, the trade unions of the West are
the most elementary organisations of the proletariat, those
best understood by the most backward workers, and therefore
the most comprehensive organisations of the proletariat. We
cannot find our way to the masses, we cannot win them over
if we by-pass these trade unions. To adopt Trotsky's stand
ANGLO-RUSSIAN UNITY COMMITTEE 349
point would mean that the road to the vast masses would be
barred to the Communists, that the working-class masses
would be handed over to the tender mercies of Amsterdam,76
to the tender mercies of the Sassenbachs and the Oudegeests."7
The oppositionists here have quoted Comrade Lenin. Allow
me, too, to quote what Lenin said:
Sul.vo moni
"We cannot but regard also as ridiculous and childish nonsense the
pompous, very learned, and frightfully revolutionary talk of the German
Lefts to the effect that Communists cannot and should not work in reac
tionary trade unions, that it is permissible to turn down such work, that
it is necessary to leave the trade unions and to create without fail a
brand-new, immaculate 'Workers' Union' invented by very nice (and,
probably, for the most part very youthful) Communists" (see Vol. XXV,
PP. 193-94).[1]
And further:
"We wage the struggle against the 'labour aristocracy' in the name of
the masses of the workers and in order to win them to our side; we
wage the struggle against the opportunist and social-chauvinist leaders in

order to win the working class to our side. To forget this most elementary
and most self-evident truth would be stupid. And it is precisely this
stupidity that the German 'Left' Communists are guilty of when, because
of the reactionary and counter-revolutionary character of the trade-union
top leadership, they jump to the conclusion that - we must leave the trade
unions!! that we must refuse to work in them!! that we must create new,
artificial forms of labour organisation!! This is such unpardonable stupid

ity that it is equivalent to the greatest service the Communists could
render the bourgeoisie" (ibid., p. 196). [2]
I think, comrades, that comment is superfluous.

This raises the question of skipping over the reactionary
character of the trade unions in the West, which has not yet
been outlived. This question was brought forward at the
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VI. Should

[2] Ibid.
rostrum here by Zinoviev. He quoted Martov and assured us

that the point of view opposed to skipping over, the point of
view that it is not permissible for Marxists to skip over and
ignore the backwardness of the masses, the backwardness and
reactionariness of their leaders, is a Menshevik point of view.
I affirm, comrades, that this unscrupulous manoeuvre of
Zinoviev's in citing Martov is evidence of one thing only -
Zinoviev's complete departure from the Leninist line.
I shall endeavour to prove this in what follows. PI
Can we, as Leninists, as Marxists, at all skip over and ignore

a movement that has not outlived its day, can we skip over
and ignore the backwardness of the masses, can we turn our
back on them and pass them by; or ought we to get rid of such
features by carrying on an unrelaxing fight against them among
the masses? That is one of the fundamental questions of
communist policy, one of the fundamental questions of Lenin
ist leadership of the masses. The oppositionists spoke here
of Leninism. Let us turn to the prime source, to Lenin.
It was in April 1917. Lenin was in controversy with Kame
nev. Lenin did not agree with Kamenev, who overestimated
the role of petty-bourgeois democracy. But Lenin was not in
agreement with Trotsky either, who underestimated the role
of the peasant movement and "skipped over" the peasant
movement in Russia. Here are Lenin's words:
"Trotskyism says: 'No tsar, but a workers' government.' That is in

correct. The petty bourgeoisie exists, and it cannot be left out of account.
But it consists of two sections. The poorer section follows the working
class" (see Lenin's speech in the minutes of the Petrograd Conference of
April 1917, p. 1778). D
"Now, if we were to say, 'no tsar, but a dictatorship of the proletariat,'
that would be skipping over the petty bourgeoisie" (see Lenin's speech in
the minutes of the All-Russian Conference of April 1917, p. 7679).
A

And further:
"But are we not incurring the danger of succumbing to subjectivism, of

desiring to skip over' the uncompleted bourgeois-democratic revolution -
which has not yet outlived the peasant movement to a socialist revolu
tion? I should be incurring that danger if I had said: 'No tsar, but a
workers' government.' But I did not say that; I said something else. . . .
I absolutely insured myself in my theses against any skipping over the
peasant movement, or the petty-bourgeois movement generally, which has
not yet outlived its day, against any playing at the 'seizure of power' by
a workers' government, against Blanquist adventurism in any shape or
form, for I pointed directly to the experience of the Paris Commune"* (see
Vol. XX, p. 104). [¹]
That is clear, one would think. The theory of skipping over

a movement which has not outlived its day is a Trotskyist
theory. Lenin does not agree with this theory. He considers
it an adventurist one.
And here are a few more quotations, this time from other
writings from those of a "very prominent" Bolshevik whose
-
name I do not want to mention for the present, but who also
takes up arms against the skipping-over theory. blous
"In the question of the peasantry, which Trotsky is always trying to
'skip over,' we would have committed the most egregious blunders. In
stead of the beginnings of a bond with the peasants, there would now be
thoroughgoing estrangement from them."
Further:
"Such is the 'theoretical' foundation of Parvusism and Trotskyism. This

'theoretical' foundation was later minted into political slogans, such as:
'no tsar, but a workers' government.' This slogan sounds very plausible
now that after a lapse of fifteen years we have achieved Soviet power in
alliance with the peasantry. No tsar- that's fine! A workers' govern
ment- better still! But if it be recalled that this slogan was put forward
*My italics.-J. St.

[1] Lenin, Letters on Tactics. First Letter, Assessment of the Present
Situation. (1917)
352 ON THE OPPOSITIONMA
in 1905, every Bolshevik will agree that at that time it meant 'skipping
over' the peasantry altogether."
Further:
"But in 1905 the 'permanentists' wanted to foist on us the slogan:

'Down with the tsar and up with a workers' government!' But what about
the peasantry? Does it not stare one in the face, this complete non
comprehension and ignoring of the peasantry in a country like Russia?
If this is not 'skipping over' the peasantry, then what is it?"
Further:
"Failing to understand the role of the peasantry in Russia, 'skipping

over the peasantry in a peasant country, Trotskyism was all the more
incapable of understanding the role of the peasantry in the international
revolution."
Who, you will ask, is the author of these formidable passages

against Trotskyism and the Trotskyist skipping-over theory?
The author of these formidable passages is none other than
Zinoviev. They are taken from his book Leninism, and from
his article "Bolshevism or Trotskyism?"
puspie
How could it happen that a year ago Zinoviev realised the
anti-Leninist character of the skipping-over theory, but has
ceased to realise it now, a year later? The reason is that he
was then, so to speak, a Leninist, but has now got himself hope
lessly bogged, with one leg in Trotskyism and the other in
Shlyapnikovism, in the "Workers' Opposition."80 And here
he is, floundering between these two oppositions, and com
pelled now to speak here from this rostrum, quoting Martov.
Against whom is he speaking? Against Lenin. And for whom
is he speaking? For the Trotskyists.
To such depths has Zinoviev fallen.
It may be said that all this concerns the question of the peas
antry, but has no bearing on the British trade unions. But that
is not so, comrades. What has been said about the unsuitability
in politics of the skipping-over theory has a direct bearing on

the trade unions in Britain, and in Europe generally; it has a
direct bearing on the question of leadership of the masses, on
the question of the ways and means of emancipating them from
the influence of reactionary, reformist leaders. Pursuing their
skipping-over theory, Trotsky and Zinoviev are trying to skip
over the backwardness, the reactionariness of the British trade
unions, trying to get us to overthrow the General Council from
Moscow, without the British trade-union masses. But we
affirm that such a policy is stupidity, adventurism; that the

reactionary leaders of the British trade-union movement must
be overthrown by the British trade-union masses themselves,
with our help; that we must not skip over the reactionary
character of the trade-union leaders, but must help the British
trade-union masses to get rid of it.
You will see that there certainly is a connection between
policy in general and policy towards the trade-union masses.
Has Lenin anything on this point?
Listen to this:
e trade
"The trade unions were a tremendous step forward for the working
class in the early days of capitalist development, as marking the transition
from the disunity and helplessness of the workers to the rudiments of class
organisation. When the highest form of proletarian class association began
to develop, viz., the revolutionary party of the proletariat (which will not
deserve the name until it learns to bind the leaders with the class and the
masses into one single indissoluble whole), the trade unions inevitably
began to reveal certain reactionary features, a certain craft narrowness,
a certain tendency to be non-political, a certain inertness, etc. But the
development of the proletariat did not, and could not, proceed anywhere
in the world otherwise than through the trade unions, through interaction
between them and the party of the working class' (see Vol. XXV,
P. 194).[¹]
[1] Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. VI. Should

354 TT ON THE OPPOSITION
And further:
"To fear this 'reactionariness,' to try to avoid it, to skip over* it, is
the height of folly, for it means fearing that role of the proletarian van
guard which consists in training, educating, enlightening and drawing into
the new life the most backward strata and masses of the working class
and peasantry" (ibid., p. 195).
*
That is how matters stand with the skipping-over theory as

applied to the trade-union movement.
Zinoviev would have done better not to come forward here
quoting Martov. He would have done better to say nothing
about the skipping-over theory. That would have been much
better for his own sake. There was no need for Zinoviev to
swear by Trotsky: we know as it is that he has deserted Lenin

ism for Trotskyism.
That is how matters stand, comrades, with the Trotskyist
theory of skipping over the backwardness of the trade unions,

the backwardness of the trade-union movement, and the back
wardness of the mass movement in general. ImH
Leninism is one thing, Trotskyism is another.
This brings us to the question of the Anglo-Russian Com
mittee. It has been said here that the Anglo-Russian Com
mittee is an agreement, a bloc between the trade unions of our
country and the British trade unions. That is perfectly true.
The Anglo-Russian Committee is the expression of a bloc, of
an agreement between our unions and the British unions, and
this bloc is not without its political character.
This bloc sets itself two tasks. The first is to establish con
tact between our trade unions and the British trade unions,
to organise a united movement against the capitalist offensive,

to widen the fissure between Amsterdam and the British trade

union movement, a fissure which exists and which we shall

widen in every way, and, lastly, to bring about the conditions
essential for ousting the reformists from the trade unions and
for winning over the trade unions of the capitalist countries
to the side of communism.
The second task of the bloc is to organise a broad movement

of the working class against new imperialist wars in general,
and against intervention in our country by (especially) the
most powerful of the European imperialist powers, by Britain
in particular. nning bin
The first task was discussed here at adequate length, and,
therefore, I shall not dwell upon it. I should like to say a few
words here about the second task, especially as regards in
tervention in our country by the British imperialists. Some of
the oppositionists say that this second task of the bloc between
our trade unions and the British is not worth talking about,
that it is of no importance. Why, one asks? Why is it not
worth talking about? Is not the task of safeguarding the
security of the first Soviet Republic in the world, which is
moreover the bulwark and base of the international revolution,
a revolutionary task? Are our trade unions independent of

the Party? Is our view that of the independence of our trade
unions - that the state is one thing, and the trade unions an
other? No, as Leninists, we do not and cannot hold that view.
It should be the concern of every worker, of every worker
organised in a trade union, to protect the first Soviet Republic
in the world from intervention. And if in this the trade unions
of our country have the support of the British trade unions,

although they are reformist unions, is that not obviously
something to be welcomed?
Those who think that our unions cannot deal with state
matters go over to the standpoint of Menshevism. That is the

standpoint of Sotsialistichesky Vestnik.81 It is not one we can

accept. And if the reactionary trade unions of Britain are
prepared to join with the revolutionary trade unions of our
country in a bloc against the counter-revolutionary imperialists
of their country, why should we not welcome such a bloc? I
stress this aspect of the matter in order that our opposition may
at last understand that in trying to torpedo the Anglo-Russian
Committee it is playing into the hands of the interventionists.
Hence, the Anglo-Russian Committee is a bloc of our trade
unions with the reactionary trade unions of Britain, the object
of which is, firstly, to strengthen the connections between our
trade unions and the trade-union movement of the West and
to revolutionise the latter, and, secondly, to wage a struggle

against imperialist wars in general, and intervention in
particular.
But and this is a question of principle are political
-
--
blocs with reactionary trade unions possible at all? Are such

blocs permissible at all for Communists?
This question faces us squarely, and we have to answer it
here. There are some people - our oppositionists who con
sider such blocs impossible. The Central Committee of our

Party, however, considers them permissible.
The oppositionists have invoked here the name of Lenin.
3D-UPA TEMO
Let us turn to Lenin:
lat
"Capitalism would not be capitalism if the 'pure' proletariat were not
surrounded by a mass of exceedingly motley intermediate types between
the proletarian and the semi-proletarian (who earns his livelihood in part
by the sale of his labour power), between the semi-proletarian and the
small peasant (and the petty artisan, handicraft worker and small pro
prietor in general), between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and
so on, and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed
and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to place of
birth, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. And from all
this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity for the vanguard of the
proletariat, for its class-conscious section, for the Communist Party, to
resort to manoeuvres, arrangements and compromises with the various
groups of proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small
proprietors. The whole point lies in knowing how to apply these tactics
in order to raise, and not lower, the general level of proletarian political
consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win" (see Vol.
XXV, p. 213). [¹]
And further:
"That the Hendersons, Clyneses, MacDonalds and Snowdens are hope

lessly reactionary is true. It is equally true that they want to take power
into their own hands (though, incidentally, they prefer a coalition with the
bourgeoisie), that they want to 'rule' on the old bourgeois lines, and that
when they do get into power they will unfailingly behave like the Scheide
manns and Noskes. All that is true. But it by no means follows that to
support them is treachery to the revolution, but rather that in the interests
of the revolution the working-class revolutionaries should give these gen
tlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support" (ibid., pp. 218-19). [2]
Hence, it follows from what Lenin says that political agree

ments, political blocs between the Communists and reactionary
leaders of the working class are quite possible and permissible.
Let Trotsky and Zinoviev bear this in mind.
But why are such agreements necessary at all?
In order to gain access to the working-class masses, in order
to enlighten them as to the reactionary character of their
political and trade-union leaders, in order to sever from the
reactionary leaders the sections of the working class that are
moving to the Left and becoming revolutionised, in order,
consequently, to enhance the fighting ability of the working
class as a whole.
. No
[¹] Lenin, Compromises
"Left-Wing"
? ( 1920
) Communism,
VIII an Infantile Disorder.
[2] Ibid., IX. "Left-Wing" Communism in Great Britain.
Accordingly, such blocs may be formed only on two basic

conditions, viz., that we are ensured freedom to criticise the
reformist leaders, and that the necessary conditions for sever
ing the masses from the reactionary leaders are ensured.
Here is what Lenin says on this score:
HIRR
"The Communist Party should propose a 'compromise' to the Hender
sons and Snowdens, an election agreement: let us together fight the
alliance of Lloyd George and the Conservatives, let us divide the parlia
mentary seats in proportion to the number of votes cast by the workers
for the Labour Party or for the Communists (not at the elections, but in
a special vote), and let us retain complete liberty of agitation, propaganda
and political activity. Without this last condition, of course, we cannot
agree to a bloc, for it would be treachery; the British Communists must
absolutely insist on and secure complete liberty to expose the Hendersons
and the Snowdens in the same way as (for fifteen years, 1903-17) the
Russian Bolsheviks insisted on and secured it in relation to the Russian
Hendersons and Snowdens, i.e., the Mensheviks" (see Vol. XXV, p. 223). [¹]
And further:
nich
"The petty-bourgeois democrats (including the Mensheviks) inevitably
vacillate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between bourgeois
democracy and the Soviet system, between reformism and revolutionism,
between love for the workers and fear of the proletarian dictatorship,
etc. The correct tactics for the Communists must be to utilise these
vacillations, not to ignore them; and to utilise them calls for concessions
to those elements which turn towards the proletariat whenever and to
-
the extent that they turn towards the proletariat - in addition to fighting
those who turn towards the bourgeoisie. The result of the application of
correct tactics is that Menshevism has disintegrated, and is increasingly
disintegrating in our country, that the stubbornly opportunist leaders are
being isolated, and that the best of the workers and the best elements
among the petty-bourgeois democrats are being brought into our camp"*
(see Vol. XXV, pp. 213-14). [2]

[1] Ibid., IX. "Left-Wing" Communism in Great Britain.
[2] Ibid., VIII. No Compromises?
There you have the conditions without which no blocs
or agreements with reactionary trade-union leaders are

permissible.
Let the opposition bear that also in mind.
The question arises: Is the policy of our trade unions in
conformity with the conditions Comrade Lenin speaks of?
I think that it is in full conformity. In the first place, we
have completely reserved for ourselves full freedom to criticise
the reformist leaders of the British working class and have
availed ourselves of that freedom to a degree unequalled by
any other Communist Party in the world. In the second place,
we have gained access to the British working-class masses and
strengthened our ties with them. And in the third place, we
are effectively severing, and have already severed, whole sec
tions of the British working class from the reactionary leaders.
I have in mind the rupture of the miners with the leaders of
the General Council.
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev have studiously avoided

saying anything here about the conference of Russian and
British miners in Berlin and about their declaration.82 Yet,
surely, that is a highly important fact of the recent period.

Richardson, Cook, Smith, Richards- what are they? Op
portunists, reformists. Some of them are called Lefts, others
Rights. All right! Which of them are more to the Left is
something history will decide. It is very difficult for us to
make this out just now the waters are dark and the clouds
-
thick. But one thing is clear, and that is that we have severed
these vacillating reformist leaders, who have the following of
one million two hundred thousand striking miners, from the
General Council and linked them with our trade unions. Is
that not a fact? Why does the opposition say nothing about it?
Can it be that it does not rejoice at the success of our policy?

And when Citrine now writes that the General Council and
he are agreed to the Anglo-Russian Committee being con

vened, is that not a result of the fact that Schwartz and Akulov
have succeeded in winning over Cook and Richardson, and

that the General Council, being afraid of an open struggle
with the miners, was therefore forced to agree to a meeting
of the Anglo-Russian Committee? Who can deny that all
these facts are evidence of the success of our policy, that all
this is evidence of the utter bankruptcy of the policy of the
opposition?
Hence, blocs with reactionary trade-union leaders are per

missible. They are necessary, on certain conditions. Freedom
of criticism is the first of them. Our Party is observing this
condition. Severance of the working-class masses from the
reactionary leaders is another condition. Our Party is observ
ing this condition too. Our Party is right. The opposition is
wrong.
The question arises: What more do Zinoviev and Trotsky

want of us?
What they want is that our Soviet trade unions should

either break with the Anglo-Russian Committee, or that they,
acting from here, from Moscow, should overthrow the General
Council. But that is stupid, comrades. To demand that we,
acting from Moscow, and by-passing the British workers'
trade unions, by-passing the British trade-union masses, by
passing the British trade-union officials, skipping over them,
that we, acting from here, from Moscow, should overthrow
the General Council is not that stupid, comrades?
-
They demand a demonstrative rupture. Is it difficult to

understand that if we did that, the only result would be our
own discomfiture? Is it difficult to understand that in the
event of a rupture we lose contact with the British trade-union

movement, we throw the British trade unions into the embraces
of the Sassenbachs and Oudegeests, we shake the foundations
of the united front tactics, and we delight the hearts of the
Churchills and Thomases, without getting anything
to
in return
except discomfiture?
Trotsky takes as the starting point of his policy of theatrical
gestures, not concrete human beings, not the concrete workers
of flesh and blood who are living and struggling in Britain, but
some sort of ideal and ethereal beings who are revolutionary
from head to foot. Is it difficult, however, to understand that
only persons devoid of common sense take ideal, ethereal
beings as the starting point of their policy?
That is why we think that the policy of theatrical gestures,
the policy of overthrowing the General Council from Moscow,
by the efforts of Moscow alone, is a ridiculous and adventurist
and de
policy.
The policy of gestures has been the characteristic feature of
Trotsky's whole policy ever since he joined our Party. We
had a first application of this policy at the time of the Brest
Peace, when Trotsky refused to sign the German-Russian
peace agreement and countered it with a theatrical gesture,
believing that a gesture was enough to rouse the proletarians
of all countries against imperialism. That was a policy of
gestures. And, comrades, you know very well how dear that
gesture cost us. Into whose hands did that theatrical gesture
play? Into the hands of the imperialists, the Mensheviks, the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and all who were then trying to
strangle the Soviet power, which at that time was not firmly
established.
Now we are asked to adopt the same policy of theatrical
gestures towards the Anglo-Russian Committee. They demand
a demonstrative and theatrical rupture. But who would benefit

from that theatrical gesture? Churchill and Chamberlain,
Sassenbach and Oudegeest. That is what they want. That is
what they are waiting for. They, the Sassenbachs and Oude
geests, want us to make a demonstrative break with the British
labour movement and thus render things easier for Amsterdam.
They, the Churchills and Chamberlains, want the break in
order to make it easier for them to launch intervention,
to provide themn with a moral argument in favour of the

interventionists.
These are the people into whose hands our oppositionists

are playing.
isd
No, comrades, we cannot adopt this adventurist course.
But such is the fate of "ultra-Left" phrasemongers. Their
phrases are Leftist, but in practice it turns out that they are
aiding the enemies of the working class. You go in on the
Left and come out on the Right. alog
No, comrades, we shall not adopt this policy of theatrical

gestures we shall no more adopt it today than we did at the
-
time of the Brest Peace. We shall not adopt it because we

do not want our Party to become a plaything in the hands of
our enemies. 199
First published in the book: jina la la

J. Stalin, On the Opposition,
Articles and Speeches, 1921-27,
Moscow and Leningrad, 1928
Men
Livad tid dunes
piwokt
THE OPPOSITION BLOC
IN THE C.P.S.U. (B.)
Theses for the Fifteenth All-Union Conference

of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Adopted by the Conference and
Endorsed by the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)83
The characteristic feature of the present period is the

intensification of the struggle between the capitalist countries
and our country, on the one hand, and between the socialist
elements and the capitalist elements within our country, on
the other.
While the attempts of world capital to encircle our country

economically, to isolate it politically, to establish a masked
blockade, and, lastly, to exact outright vengeance for the help
given by the workers of the U.S.S.R. to the workers engaged
in struggle in the West and to the oppressed peoples in the
East, are creating difficulties of an external order, the fact
that our country has passed from the period of restoration to
a period of the reconstruction of industry on a new technical
basis, and the consequent intensification of the struggle be
tween the capitalist and socialist elements in our economy, are
creating difficulties of an internal order.
363
The Party is aware of these difficulties and is in a position

to overcome them. It is already overcoming them with the
aid of the vast masses of the proletariat, and is confidently
leading the country along the road to socialism. But not all
sections of our Party believe in the possibility of further prog
ress. There are sections in our Party numerically small, it
is true which, being scared by the difficulties, are a prey
-
to weariness and wavering, fall into despair and cultivate a

spirit of pessimism, are infected by disbelief in the creative
powers of the proletariat, and are coming to have a capitulatory
mentality.
In this sense, the present period of radical change is to some
extent reminiscent of the period of radical change of October
1917. Just as then, in October 1917, the complicated situation
and the difficulties of the transition from a bourgeois to a
proletarian revolution engendered in one section of the Party
vacillation, defeatism and disbelief in the possibility of the
proletariat taking power and retaining it (Kamenev, Zinov
iev), so now, in the present period of radical change, the
difficulties of the transition to the new phase of socialist con
struction are engendering in certain circles of our Party vacil
lation, disbelief in the possibility of the socialist elements in our
country being victorious over the capitalist elements, disbelief
in the possibility of victoriously building socialism
alsi
in
in
the
un
U.S.S.R.
The opposition bloc is an expression of this spirit of pessi

mism and defeatism in the ranks of one section of our Party.
The Party is aware of the difficulties and is in a position
to overcome them. But to fight these difficulties successfully
requires, above all, that the pessimistic spirit and defeatist
mentality in the ranks of one section of the Party shall be
overcome.
OPPOSITION BLOC IN THE C.P.S.U. (B.) 365
In its statement of October 16, 1926, the opposition bloc

renounces factionalism and dissociates itself from openly
Menshevik groups inside and outside the C.P.S.U.(B.); but at
the same time it declares that in principle it maintains its
former stand, that it does not renounce its errors in matters
of principle, and that it will defend these erroneous views
3 VIC
within the limits permitted by the Party Rules.
It follows from this that the opposition bloc intends to go
on cultivating a spirit of pessimism and capitulation in the
Party, intends to go on propagating its erroneous views in the
Party.
Hence, the immediate task of the Party is to expose the
untenability in principle of the basic views of the opposition
bloc, to make it clear that they are incompatible with the
principles of Leninism, and to wage a determined ideological
struggle against the opposition bloc's errors in matters of prin
ciple with a view to overcoming them completely.
THE PASSING OVER OF THE "NEW OPPOSITION"
TO TROTSKYISM ON THE BASIC QUESTION

OF THE CHARACTER AND PROSPECTS
OF OUR REVOLUTION
The Party holds that our revolution is a socialist revolution,

that the October Revolution is not merely a signal, an impulse,
a point of departure for the socialist revolution in the West,
but that at the same time it is, firstly, a base for the further
development of the world revolutionary movement, and,
secondly, it ushers in a period of transition from capitalism to
socialism in the U.S.S.R. (dictatorship of the proletariat), dur
ing which the proletariat, if it pursues a correct policy towards

the peasantry, can and will successfully build a complete social
ist society, provided, of course, the power of the international
revolutionary movement, on the one hand, and the power of
the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., on the other, are great enough
to protect the U.S.S.R. from armed imperialist intervention.
Trotskyism holds an entirely different view of the character
and prospects of our revolution. In spite of the fact that in
October 1917 the Trotskyists marched together with the Party,
they held, and still hold, that in itself, and by its very nature,
our revolution is not a socialist one; that the October Revolu
tion is merely a signal, an impulse, a point of departure for
the socialist revolution in the West; that if the world revolu
tion is delayed and a victorious socialist revolution in the
West does not come about in the very near future, proletarian
power in Russia is bound to fall or to degenerate (which is one
and the same thing) under the impact of inevitable clashes
between the proletariat and the peasantry.
Whereas the Party, in organising the October Revolution,
held that "the victory of socialism is possible first in several or
even in one capitalist country taken separately," and that "the
victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the
capitalists and organised its own socialist production," can
and should stand up "against the rest of the world, the capital
ist world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other
countries, raising revolts in those countries against the capital
ists, and in the event of necessity coming out even with armed
force against the exploiting classes and their states" (Lenin,
Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33)[¹]. the Trotskyists, on the other hand,
-
although they co-operated with the Bolsheviks in the October

period, held that "it would be hopeless to think . . . that, for

example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a
conservative Europe" (Trotsky, Vol. III, Part I, p. 90, Peace
Programme, first published in August 1917).
Whereas our Party holds that the Soviet Union possesses
"all that is necessary and sufficient" "for the building of a
complete socialist society" (Lenin, On Co-operation), the
Trotskyists, on the contrary, hold that "real progress of a social
ist economy in Russia will become possible only after the
victory of the proletariat in the major European countries"
(Trotsky, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 93, "Postscript" to Peace Pro
gramme, written in 1922).
Whereas our Party holds that "ten or twenty years of cor
rect relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale
is assured" (see Lenin's plan of his pamphlet The Tax in
Kind), the Trotskyists, on the contrary, hold that the pro
letariat cannot have correct relations with the peasantry until
the victory of the world revolution; that, having taken power,
the proletariat "would come into hostile collision not only with
all the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat
during the first stages of its revolutionary struggle, but also
with the broad masses of the peasantry with whose assistance
it came into power," and that "the contradictions in the posi
tion of a workers' government in a backward country with an
overwhelmingly peasant population can be solved only on an
international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian
revolution" (Trotsky, in the "Preface," written in 1922, to his
book The Year 1905). hah ishlati 103 bqochga
The conference notes that these views of Trotsky and his
followers on the basic question of the character and prospects
of our revolution are totally at variance with the views of our
Party, with Leninism.
The conference considers that these views minimising the

-
historical role and the importance of our revolution as a base

for the further development of the world revolutionary move
ment, and tending to weaken the determination of the Soviet
proletariat to go on building socialism, and therefore to hinder
the unleashing of the forces of international revolution -
thereby run counter to the principles of genuine inter
nationalism and to the fundamental line of the Communist
International.
The conference considers that these views of Trotsky and

his followers directly approximate to the views of Social
Democracy, as represented by its present leader, Otto Bauer,
who asserts that "in Russia, where the proletariat is only a
small minority of the nation, it can maintain its rule only
temporarily," that "it must inevitably lose it again as soon as
the peasant masses of the nation are culturally mature enough
to take power into their own hands," that "the temporary rule
of industrial socialism in agrarian Russia is only a beacon
summoning the proletariat of the industrial West to battle,"
and that "only with the conquest of political power by the
proletariat of the industrial West can the rule of industrial
socialism be durably established" in Russia (see O. Bauer,
Bolshevism or Social-Democracy?, in German).
The conference therefore qualifies these views of Trotsky
and his followers as a Social-Democratic deviation in our
Party on the basic question of the character and prospects of

our revolution.
The principal fact in the development of inner-Party rela
tions in the C.P.S.U.(B.) since the Fourteenth Congress (which
condemned the basic views of the "New Opposition") is that
the "New Opposition" (Zinoviev, Kamenev), which formerly
contended against Trotskyism, against the Social-Democratic
deviation in our Party, has now gone over to the ideological

standpoint of Trotskyism, that it has wholly and completely
surrendered to Trotskyism the positions, common to the Party,
to which it formerly adhered, and is now coming out with as
much ardour for Trotskyism, as it formerly came out against
it.
The "New Opposition's" passing over to Trotskyism was

determined by two main circumstances:
a) the weariness, vacillation, and spirit of pessimism and
defeatism, alien to the proletariat, among the adherents of the
"New Opposition" in face of the new difficulties of the present
period of radical change; furthermore, Kamenev's and Zinov
iev's present vacillation and defeatism arose not by accident,
but as a repetition, a recurrence of the vacillation and pessi
mism which they displayed nine years ago, in October 1917, in
face of the difficulties of that period of radical change;
b) the complete defeat of the "New Opposition" at the
Fourteenth Congress, and the resulting endeavour to unite
at all costs with the Trotskyists, in order, by combining the
two groups - the Trotskyists and the "New Opposition"
to compensate for the weakness of these groups and their isola
tion from the proletarian masses, all the more because the
ideological views of Trotskyism fully harmonised with the
present spirit of pessimism of the "New Opposition." blod
To this, too, must be attributed the fact that the opposition
bloc has become a rallying centre for all the miscellaneous
bankrupt trends inside and outside the C.P.S.U. (B.) which
have been condemned by the Party and the Comintern from
the "Democratic Centralists" and the "Workers' Opposition"
in the C.P.S.U.(B.) to the "ultra-Left" opportunists in Ger
many and the Liquidators of the Souvarine variety86 in France.
Hence the unscrupulousness in choice of means and unprin

cipledness in policy which form the basis of the bloc of the
Trotskyists and the "New Opposition," and without which
they could not have brought together these diverse anti-Party
trends.
Thus, the Trotskyists, on the one hand, and the "New Op

position," on the other, quite naturally joined forces on the
common platform of a Social-Democratic deviation and an
unprincipled union of diverse anti-Party elements in the fight
against the Party, thereby forming an opposition bloc which
represents something like a recurrence - in a new form - of
-
the August Bloc (1912-14).

Botteg
mnog and
II
dzidz, mam
THE PRACTICAL PLATFORM OF
THE OPPOSITION BLOC
The practical platform of the opposition bloc is a direct

sequel to the basic error of this bloc on the character and
prospects of our revolution.
The major features of the opposition bloc's practical plat
form may be summed up in the following principal points:
a) Questions of the international movement. The Party
holds that the advanced capitalist countries are, on the whole,
in a state of partial, temporary stabilisation; that the present
period is an inter-revolutionary one, making it incumbent on
the Communist Parties to prepare the proletariat for the com
ing revolution; that the offensive launched by capital in a vain
effort to consolidate the stabilisation cannot but evoke an
answering struggle on the part of the working class and the

uniting of its forces against capital; that the Communist Parties
OPPOSITION BLOC IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 371
must intervene in this intensifying class struggle and turn the

attacks of capital into counter-attacks of the proletariat, with a
view to establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat; that in
order to achieve these aims the Communist Parties must win
over the vast masses of the working class which still adhere to
the reformist trade unions and the Second International; that,
consequently, united front tactics are necessary and obligatory
for the Communist Parties.
The opposition bloc starts out from entirely different prem

ises. Having no faith in the internal forces of our revolu
tion, and falling into despair owing to the delay of the world
revolution, the opposition bloc slips away from the basis of a
Marxist analysis of the class forces of the revolution to one
consisting of "ultra-Left" self-deception and "revolutionary"
adventurism; it denies the existence of a partial stabilisation
of capitalism and, consequently, inclines towards putschism.
Hence the opposition's demand for a revision of the united
front tactics and the break-up of the Anglo-Russian Committee,
its failure to understand the role of the trade unions and its
call to replace the latter by new, "revolutionary" proletarian

organisations of its own invention.
Hence the opposition bloc's support of the "ultra-Left" rant
ers and opportunists in the Communist International (in the
German Party, for example).
The conference considers that the policy of the opposition
bloc in the international sphere is not in conformity with the
interests of the international revolutionary movement.
b) The proletariat and the peasantry in the U.S.S.R. The
Party holds that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is
the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry
in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and
state power" (Lenin, Vol. XXVI, p. 460);[¹] that the prole

tariat can and should be the leader of the main mass of the
peasantry in the economic sphere, in the sphere of socialist

construction, just as in October 1917 it was the leader of the
peasantry in the political sphere, in overthrowing the power of
the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the prole
tariat; that industrialisation of the country can be carried out
only if it is based upon a steady improvement of the material
conditions of the majority of the peasantry (the poor and
middle peasants), who constitute the principal market for our
industry, and that, therefore, our economic policy (price policy,
tax policy, etc.) must be such as strengthens the bond between
industry and peasant economy and maintains the alliance be
tween the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.
The opposition bloc starts out from entirely different
premises. Abandoning the fundamental line of Leninism in
the peasant question, not believing that the proletariat can
be the leader of the peasantry in the work of socialist construc
tion, and regarding the peasantry in the main as a hostile
environment, the opposition bloc proposes economic and fi
nancial measures capable only of disrupting the bond between
town and country, of shattering the alliance between the work
ing class and the peasantry, and thus undermining all pos
sibility of real industrialisation. Such, for example, are: a) the
opposition's proposal to raise the wholesale prices of manu
factured goods, which would be bound to lead to an increase
of retail prices, to the impoverishment of the poor peasants and
a considerable section of the middle peasants, to a contraction
of the home market, to discord between the proletariat and
COL
[1] Lenin, Third Congress of the Communist International. June 22
July 12, 1921. 4. Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P. July 5.
the peasantry, to a fall in the exchange rate of the chervonets

and, in the final analysis, to a decline in real wages; b) the
opposition's proposal that the peasantry should be taxed to
the maximum, which would be bound to result in a rift in
the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

The conference considers that the policy of the opposition
bloc towards the peasantry is not in conformity with the in
terests of the country's industrialisation and of the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
c) A fight against the Party apparatus under the guise of
fighting bureaucracy in the Party. The Party takes as its start
ing point that the Party apparatus and the mass of the Party
members constitute an integral whole, that the Party apparatus
(Central Committee, Central Control Commission, oblast
Party committees, gubernia committees, okrug committees,

uyezd committees, bureaus of Party units, etc.) embodies the
leading element of the Party as a whole, that the Party appara
tus comprises the finest members of the proletariat, who may
be and should be criticised for errors, who may be and should
be "freshened up," but who cannot be vilified without the risk
of disrupting the Party and leaving it defenceless.
The opposition bloc, on the other hand, starts out by counter
posing the mass of the Party members to the Party apparatus,
tries to minimise the leading role of the Party apparatus, reduc
ing its functions to registration and propaganda, incites the
mass of the Party members against the Party apparatus, and
thus discredits the latter, weakening its position in regard to
leading the state.
The conference considers that this policy of the opposition
bloc, a policy which has nothing in common with Leninism, can
only result in the Party being disarmed in its fight against
bureaucracy in the state apparatus, for a real transformation
of this apparatus, and hence for strengthening the dictatorship

of the proletariat. Antimbly
d) A fight against the "regime" in the Party under the

guise of fighting for inner-Party democracy. The Party takes as
its starting point that "whoever weakens in the least the iron
discipline of the Party of the proletariat (especially during the
time of its dictatorship), actually aids the bourgeoisie against
the proletariat" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 190);[¹] that inner-Party
democracy is necessary not in order to weaken and shatter
proletarian discipline in the Party, but in order to strengthen
and consolidate it, and that without iron discipline in the
Party, without a firm regime in the Party, backed by the sym
pathy and support of the vast masses of the proletariat, the
dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible. IO)
The opposition bloc, on the other hand, starts out by counter
posing inner-Party democracy to Party discipline, confuses free
dom of groups and factions with inner-Party democracy, and
tries to make use of such democracy to shatter Party discipline
and undermine the unity of the Party. It is natural that the
opposition bloc's call for a fight against the "regime" in the
Party, which leads in practice to advocacy of freedom of groups
and factions in the Party, should be a call that is taken up with
fervour by the anti-proletarian elements in our country as a
means of salvation from the regime of the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
The conference considers that the fight of the opposition bloc
against the "regime" in the Party, a fight which has nothing in
common with the organisational principles of Leninism, can
only result in undermining the unity of the Party, weakening
Yo quidem addud pilon & old
Wing" Communism in Germany: Leaders - Party-Class - Masses. (1920)
the dictatorship of the proletariat and unleashing the anti

proletarian forces in the country that are striving to undermine
and shatter the dictatorship.
bOne of the means chosen by the opposition bloc for dis
rupting Party discipline and aggravating the struggle within
the Party is the method of an all-Union discussion, such as it
tried to force upon the Party in October of this year. While
considering it necessary that questions of disagreement should
be freely discussed in the theoretical journals of our Party, and
while recognising the right of every Party member freely to
criticise shortcomings in our Party work, the conference at the
same time calls attention to the words of Lenin, who said that
our Party is not a debating society but the fighting organisation
of the proletariat. The conference considers that an all-Union
discussion may be recognised as necessary only on condition:
a) that such necessity is recognised by at least several local
Party organisations of a gubernia or oblast level; b) that there
is not a sufficiently firm majority in the Central Committee on
major questions of Party policy; c) that, although there may
be a firm majority holding a definite opinion in the C.C., the
latter nevertheless considers it necessary to test the correctness
of its policy through a general Party discussion. Moreover, in
all such cases an all-Union discussion may be begun and carried
through only after a decision of the C.C. to that effect.
The conference notes that not one of these conditions existed
when the opposition bloc demanded the opening of an all

Union discussion.
The conference therefore considers that the Central Com

mittee of the Party acted quite rightly in deciding that a dis
cussion was inexpedient and in condemning the opposition bloc
for its attempt to force upon the Party an all-Union discussion
on issues which had already been decided by the Party.
Summing up its analysis of the practical platform of the

opposition bloc, the conference finds that this platform marks
the opposition bloc's departure from the class line of the pro
letarian revolution on cardinal issues of international and
home policy.
III
THE "REVOLUTIONARY" WORDS ANDslide

OPPORTUNIST DEEDS OF THE
OPPOSITION BLOC
It is a characteristic feature of the opposition bloc that,

being in fact the expression of a Social-Democratic deviation
in our Party, and advocating what is in fact an opportunist
policy, it tries, nevertheless, to clothe its pronouncements in
revolutionary phraseology, to criticise the Party "from the
Left" and to disguise itself in a "Left" garb. The reason for
this is that the communist proletarians, to whom the opposi
tion bloc is chiefly trying to appeal, are the most revolutionary
proletarians in the world, and that, having been brought up
in the spirit of revolutionary traditions, they would simply not
listen to critics who are avowed Rights; and so, in order to
palm off its opportunist wares, the opposition bloc is compelled
to clap a revolutionary label on them, being well aware that
only by such a ruse can it attract the attention of the revolu
tionary proletarians. pion
But since, nevertheless, the opposition bloc is the vehicle of
a Social-Democratic deviation, since in fact it advocates an
opportunist policy, its words and its deeds must inevitably
conflict. Hence the inherently contradictory nature of the
activities of the opposition bloc. Hence the divergence between

its words and its deeds, between its revolutionary phrases and
its opportunist actions.
The opposition noisily criticises the Party and the Comintern
"from the Left," and at the same time it calls for a revision of
the united front tactics, the break-up of the Anglo-Russian

Committee, withdrawal from the trade unions and their re
placement by new, "revolutionary" organisations, thinking that

all this will advance the revolution, whereas in fact the result
would be to aid Thomas and Oudegeest, sever the Communist
Parties from the trade unions, weaken the position of world
communism and, consequently, retard the revolutionary move
ment. In words "revolutionaries," but in deeds - abettors
-
of the Thomases and Oudegeests.

The opposition with much clamour "dresses down" the
Party "from the Left," and at the same time it demands the
raising of wholesale prices of manufactured goods, thinking
thereby to accelerate industrialisation, whereas in fact the
result would be to disorganise the home market, shatter the
bond between industry and peasant economy, cause a fall in
the exchange rate of the chervonets and in real wages, and,
consequently, wreck all possibility of industrialisation. In
words industrialisers, but in deeds - abettors of the op
-
ponents of industrialisation.
The opposition accuses the Party of being unwilling to fight
against bureaucracy in the state apparatus, and at the same
time it proposes that wholesale prices should be raised,
evidently thinking that raising wholesale prices has no bearing
on the question of bureaucracy in the state apparatus, whereas
in fact it turns out that the result must be completely to bureau
cratise the state economic apparatus, since high wholesale
378 10 02 ON THE OPPOSITION
prices are the surest means for causing industry to wilt, for
converting it into a hothouse plant and for bureaucratising the
economic apparatus. In words opponents of bureaucracy,
-
but in deeds advocates and promoters of bureaucratising the

-
state apparatus.
The opposition raises a hue and cry against private capital,
and at the same time it proposes that state capital should be
withdrawn from the sphere of circulation, for the benefit
of industry, thinking thereby to undermine private capital,
whereas in fact the result would be to strengthen private cap
ital in every way, since the withdrawal of state capital from
circulation, which is private capital's principal sphere of opera
tion, cannot fail to put trade completely under the control of
private capital. In words - a fight against private capital, but
in deeds aid for private capital.
-
dhi odi
The opposition raises a cry about degeneration of the Party

apparatus, but in fact it turns out that when the Central Com
mittee raises the question of the expulsion of one of the
Communists who have really degenerated, Mr. Ossovsky, the
opposition displays maximum loyalty to this gentleman and
votes against his expulsion. In words opponents of degener
-
ation, but in deeds abettors and defenders of degeneration.

-
The opposition raised a cry about inner-Party democracy,

and at the same time it demanded an all-Union discussion,
thinking thereby to put inner-Party democracy into effect,

whereas in fact it turned out that, by forcing a discussion upon
the overwhelming majority of the Party on behalf of a tiny
minority, the opposition was guilty of an act of gross violation
of all democracy. In words for inner-Party democracy, but
in deeds the violation of the fundamental principles of all
democracy.id =
In the present period of acute class struggle, there can be

only one of two possible policies in the working-class move
ment: either the policy of Menshevism, or the policy of Lenin
ism. The attempts of the opposition bloc to occupy a middle
position between these two opposite lines, under cover of
"Left," "revolutionary" phraseology and while intensifying
criticism of the C.P.S.U.(B.), were bound to lead, and have
actually led, to the opposition bloc slithering into the camp

of the opponents of Leninism, into the camp of Menshevism.
The enemies of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the Comintern know
just what value is to be attached to the "revolutionary"
phraseology of the opposition bloc. Paying no attention to it,
therefore, as being of no significance, they unanimously praise
the opposition bloc for its unrevolutionary deeds, and take up
the opposition's slogan of a fight against the main line of the
C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern as their own slogan. It cannot
be considered accidental that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and
the Cadets, the Russian Mensheviks and the German "Left"
Social-Democrats have all found it possible to express openly

their sympathy with the fight of the opposition bloc against
our Party, since they calculate that this fight will lead to a
split, and that a split will unleash the anti-proletarian forces
in our country, to the glee of the enemies of the revolution.
The conference considers that the Party must pay special
attention to tearing off the "revolutionary" mask from the
opposition bloc and showing up the latter's opportunist nature.
The conference considers that the Party must protect the
unity of its ranks like the apple of its eye, considering that
the unity of our Party is the chief antidote to all counter
revolutionary attempts on the part of the enemies of the
revolution.
IV
Upo
CONCLUSIONS
Summing up the stage of the inner-Party struggle that

has been passed through, the Fifteenth Conference of the
C.P.S.U.(B.) notes that in this struggle the Party has shown its
immense ideological growth, it has unhesitatingly rejected the
basic views of the opposition and has scored a swift and
decisive victory over the opposition bloc, compelling the latter
publicly to renounce factionalism and to dissociate itself
from the openly opportunist groups inside and outside the
C.P.S.U.(B.).
The conference notes that the attempts of the opposition
bloc to force a discussion upon the Party and undermine its
unity have resulted in the Party masses rallying still more
solidly around the Central Committee, thus isolating the op
position and ensuring real unity in the ranks of our Party.d
The conference considers that only with the active support
of the broad mass of the Party members was the Central Com
mittee able to achieve these successes, that the activity and
political understanding displayed by the Party masses in the
struggle against the disruptive work of the opposition bloc are
the best proofs that the Party is functioning and developing on
the basis of genuine inner-Party democracy.
Fully approving the policy of the Central Committee in its
struggle to ensure unity, the conference considers that the next
tasks of the Party should be:
1) To see to it that the minimum conditions arrived at as
necessary for the unity of the Party shall be actually observed.

2) To wage a determined ideological struggle against the
Social-Democratic deviation in our Party, explaining to the
masses the erroneousness of the basic views of the opposition
bloc and bringing to light the opportunist content of these

views, whatever the "revolutionary" phrases under which they
are disguised.
3) To work to ensure that the opposition bloc acknowl
edges the erroneousness of its views.
4) To safeguard the unity of the Party in every way,
checking all attempts to revive factionalism and to violate
discipline.
Pravda, No. 247, AVEC TA MAAR HT

October 26, 1926
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THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION LIE

IN OUR PARTY
Report Delivered at the Fifteenth All-Union

Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.)87 in its
November 1, 1926
THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT
OF THE OPPOSITION BLOC
Comrades, the first question that has to be dealt with in the

report concerns the formation of the opposition bloc, the stages
of its development, and, lastly, its collapse, which has already
begun. This theme, in my opinion, is essential as an introduc
tion to the substance of the theses on the opposition bloc.
Already at the Fourteenth Party Congress Zinoviev gave
the signal for rallying all the opposition trends and for uniting
them into a single force. You, comrades, who are delegates
at this conference probably remember that speech of Zinov
iev's. There cannot be any doubt that such a call was bound
382
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY 383
to meet with a response among the Trotskyists, who from the

very first held the opinion that groups should be more or less
unrestricted, and that they should more or less unite for the
purpose of carrying on a fight against the basic line of the
Party, with which Trotsky had long been dissatisfied.
That was the preparatory work, so to speak, for the forma
tion of the bloc.
1. THE FIRST STAGE
The opposition took the first serious step towards forming

a bloc at the time of the April plenum of the Central Commit
tee,88 in connection with Rykov's theses on the economic situa
tion. Full understanding between the "New Opposition" and
the Trotskyists had not yet been reached at that time, but that
in the main the bloc was already formed of that there could
be no doubt. Comrades who have read the verbatim report
of the April plenum will know that that is quite true. In the
main, the two groups had already managed to come to an
understanding, but there were reservations, owing to which
they were obliged to submit two parallel series of amendments
to Rykov's theses, instead of common amendments of the
whole opposition. One series of amendments came from the
"New Opposition," headed by Kamenev, and the other series
from the Trotskyist group. But that in the main they were
hitting at the same mark, and that the plenum was already say
ing that they were reviving the August Bloc in a new form, is
an undoubted fact. de re
What were the reservations made at that time?
Here is what Trotsky said then:
"I consider the defect of Comrade Kamenev's amendments is that they,

as it were, treat differentiation in the countryside to a certain extent
independently of industrialisation. Yet the significance and social im

portance of peasant differentiation and its tempo are determined by the
progress and tempo of industrialisation in relation to the countryside as
a whole."
trece aloging
A reservation of no little importance.
dadu diw
In reply to this, Kamenev in his turn made a reservation
Jan
in regard to the Trotskyists:
"I am not able," he said, "to associate myself with that part of them
(i.e., Trotsky's amendments to Rykov's draft resolution) which assesses
the past economic policy of the Party, which I supported one hundred
per cent."
The "New Opposition" was not pleased at Trotsky criticis

ing the economic policy which Kamenev had directed during
the preceding period. And Trotsky, for his part, was not
pleased at the "New Opposition" separating the question of
peasant differentiation from the question of industrialisation.
Was HIHIGHE mol qona ting
oval odvr abaoJduph ouod

sult mellett sthu 2. THE SECOND STAGEl Inqa od to
w do piem
The second stage was the July plenum of the Central Com
mittee.⁹9 At that plenum we already had a formally established
bloc, a bloc without reservations. Trotsky's reservations had
been withdrawn and shelved; so had Kamenev's. Now they
already had a joint "declaration," which is well known to you
all, comrades, as an anti-Party document. Such were the
characteristic features of the second stage in the development
of the opposition bloc. da gni
The bloc was constructed and given shape in that period

not only on the basis of a mutual withdrawal of amendments,
but also on the basis of a mutual "amnesty." We had at that
time Zinoviev's interesting statement to the effect that the
opposition, its main core in 1923 - in other words, the Trotsky
-
ists was right regarding the degeneration of the Party, that

is, the main plank of the practical platform of Trotskyism,
which follows from its fundamental line. On the other hand,
we had the no less interesting statement of Trotsky's to the

effect that his The Lessons of October which had been lev
-
elled specifically against Kamenev and Zinoviev as the

Party's "Right wing" that was now repeating the October
errors had been a mistake, that the beginning of the Right
deviation in the Party and of the degeneration had to be
ascribed not to Kamenev and Zinoviev, but to, let us say,
Stalin.
Here is what Zinoviev said in July of this year:

SALON
"We say that there can now be no doubt whatever that, as the evolu
tion of the directing line of the faction (i.e., the majority of the Central
Committee) has shown, the main core of the 1923 opposition correctly
warned against the danger of a shift from the proletarian line, and against
the ominous growth of the apparatus regime." evalilor sisda hod
In other words, Zinoviev's recent assertions, and the resolu
tion of the Thirteenth Congress,90 stating that Trotsky was
revising Leninism, and that Trotskyism was a petty-bourgeois
deviation, were all a mistake, a misunderstanding, and
that the danger lay not in Trotskyism, but in the Central
Committee.
That is a most unprincipled "amnesty" of Trotskyism.

On the other hand, Trotsky declared in July:
"There is no doubt that in The Lessons of October I associated the
opportunist shifts in policy with the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev.
As experience of the ideological struggle in the Central Committee tes
tifies, that was a gross mistake. This mistake is to be explained by the
fact that I had had no opportunity of following the ideological struggle
among the seven and of ascertaining in time that the opportunist shifts
proceeded from the group headed by Comrade Stalin, in opposition to
Comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev."
This means that Trotsky was publicly repudiating his much

talked-of The Lessons of October, thereby issuing an
"amnesty" to Zinoviev and Kamenev in return for the
"amnesty" he had received from them.
A direct and unconcealed unprincipled deal!
Hence, a withdrawal of the April reservations and a mutual
"amnesty" at the expense of the principles of the Party -
these were the factors which determined the full shaping of
the bloc, as an anti-Party bloc.
3. THE THIRD STAGE 11M2
The third stage in the development of the bloc was the

opposition's open attacks on the Party at the end of September
and in the beginning of October of this year in Moscow and
Leningrad, the period when the leaders of the bloc, having
had their holidays in the South and gained fresh vigour, re
turned to the centre and launched a direct attack on the Party.
Before passing from underground forms to open forms of
struggle against the Party, they, it appears, declared here in
the Political Bureau (I myself was away from Moscow at the
time): "We'll show you. We are going to address workers'
meetings; let the workers decide who's right. We'll show
you!" And they began to make the rounds of the Party units.
But, as you know, the outcome of this move was deplorable
for the opposition. You know that they suffered defeat. You
know from the press that both in Leningrad and Moscow,
both in the industrial and in the non-industrial areas of the
Soviet Union, the opposition bloc met with a determined re

buff from the mass of the Party members. How many votes
it received and how many were cast for the Central Commit
tee, I shall not repeat here; you know that from the press.
One thing is clear: that the expectations of the opposition bloc

were not fulfilled. From that moment the opposition made a
turn in favour of peace in the Party. The opposition's defeat,
evidently, did not fail to have its effect. That was on October
4, when the opposition submitted to the Central Committee
its statement about peace, and when for the first time, after
the abuse and assaults, we heard words from the opposition
resembling the words of Party people it was time to stop
"inner-Party strife" and to organise "joint work." 10.
Thus the opposition was compelled by its defeat to face the

question that the Central Committee had repeatedly called
upon it to face L
the question of peace in the Party.
Naturally, the Central Committee, true to the directives of
the Fourteenth Congress on the need for unity, readily agreed
to the opposition's proposal, although it knew that the proposal
was not altogether sincere.
4. THE FOURTH STAGE
The fourth stage was the period when the opposition leaders
drew up their "statement" of October 16 of this year. It is
usually described as a capitulation. I shall not describe it in
tatement is evidence not
sharp terms, but it is clear that the statement
of any victories of the opposition bloc, but of its defeat. I
shall not recount the history of our negotiations, comrades. A
verbatim record of the negotiations was made, and you
can learn all about them from it. I should like to dwell on
one incident alone. The opposition bloc wanted to declare in

the first paragraph of its "statement" that it still adhered to
its views, and not simply that, but that it adhered to its old
opinions in their entirety." We tried to persuade the
opposition bloc not to insist on this. Why? For two reasons.
388 YEM ON THE OPPOSITION
Firstly, for the reason that if the opposition, having re

nounced factionalism and with it the theory and practice of
freedom of factions, had dissociated itself from Ossovsky,
the "Workers' Opposition," and the Maslow-Urbahns group,
that meant that it had renounced not only factional methods
of struggle, but also some of its political opinions. Could the
opposition bloc say after this that it still adhered to its erro
neous views, to its ideological opinions, "in their entirety"?
in the
Of course not. Ten-Treoni
and Secondly, we told the opposition that it was not in its own
interest to shout that they, the oppositionists, adhered to their
old opinions, and "in their entirety" at that, since the workers
would have every justification for saying: "So the opposition
ists want to go on scrapping! That means they haven't been
whacked enough yet and will have to be given some more."
(Laughter, cries: "Quite right!") However, they did not agree
with us and only accepted the proposal to delete the words
"in their entirety," retaining the phrase about adhering to their
old opinions. Well, they have made their bed and will have
to lie in it. (Voices: "Quite right!")
An
5. LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF BLOCS
IN THE PARTY
BA
Zinoviev said recently that the Central Committee's con
demnation of their bloc was unwarranted, since supposedly
Ilyich had approved in general of blocs in the Party. I must
say, comrades, that Zinoviev's statement is totally at variance
with Lenin's position. Lenin never approved of blocs in the
Party indiscriminately. Lenin was in favour only of revolu
tionary blocs, based on principle, against the Mensheviks,
Liquidators and Otzovists. Lenin always fought against un
principled and anti-Party blocs in the Party. Does not every

one know that for three years Lenin fought against Trotsky's
August Bloc, as being an anti-Party and unprincipled bloc,
until complete victory over it was achieved? Ilyich was never
in favour of blocs indiscriminately. He was in favour only
of such blocs in the Party as were based on principle, in the
first place, and, in the second place, had the purpose of strength
ening the Party against the Liquidators, against the Menshe
viks, against vacillating elements. The history of our Party
knows of one such bloc, the bloc of the Leninists and the
Plekhanovists (this was in 1910-12) against the bloc of the Liqui
dators when the anti-Party August Bloc was formed, which
included Potresov and other Liquidators, Alexinsky and other
Otzovists, and which was headed by Trotsky. There was one
bloc, an anti-Party bloc, the unprincipled and adventurist
August Bloc; and there was another bloc, the bloc of the Lenin
ists with the Plekhanovists, that is, the revolutionary Menshe
viks (at that time Plekhanov was a revolutionary Menshevik).
That is the kind of bloc that Lenin recognised. And we all
recognise such blocs.
If a bloc within the Party enhances the fighting capacity of
the Party and helps it to advance, we are for such a bloc. But
your bloc, worthy oppositionists can it be said that this bloc
-
of yours enhances the fighting capacity of our Party? Can it be

said that this bloc of yours is based on principle? What princi
ples unite you with the Medvedyev group, let us say? What
principles unite you with, let us say, the Souvarine group in
France or the Maslow group in Germany? What principles
unite you, the "New Opposition," who only recently regarded
Trotskyism as a variety of Menshevism, with the Trotskyists,
who only recently regarded the leaders of the "New Opposi
tion" as opportunists?
And then, can it be said that your bloc works in the interest
and for the good of the Party, and not against the Party? Can
it be said that it has enhanced the fighting capacity and revolu
tionary spirit of our Party even one iota? Why, all the world
now knows that during the six or eight months your bloc has
existed you have been trying to drag the Party back, back to
"revolutionary" phrasemongering and unprincipledness, that
you have been trying to disintegrate the Party and reduce it
to a state of paralysis, to split it.
No, comrades, there is nothing in common between the op
position bloc and the bloc which Lenin concluded with the
Plekhanovists in 1910 against the opportunists' August Bloc.
On the contrary, the present opposition bloc is in the main
reminiscent of Trotsky's August Bloc both by its unprinci
pledness and by its opportunist basis.d
Thus, in forming such a bloc, the oppositionists have depart
ed from the basic line which Lenin strove to pursue. Lenin
always told us that the most correct policy is a policy based on
principle. The opposition, on the contrary, when it banded
itself together in one group, decided that the most correct
policy is an unprincipled policy.
For that reason the opposition bloc cannot exist for long; it
is inevitably bound to disintegrate and fall to pieces. old my
Such are the stages of development of the opposition bloc.
6. THE PROCESS OF DECOMPOSITION OF

=lgis
THE OPPOSITION BLOC
What is the state of the opposition bloc today? It may be

described as a state of gradual disintegration, as a state of the
gradual falling away of its component elements, as a state of
decomposition. That is the only way the present state of the
opposition bloc can be described. And that was only to be

expected, because an unprincipled bloc, an opportunist bloc,
cannot exist for long within the ranks of our Party. We already
know that the Maslow-Urbahns group is falling away from the
opposition bloc. Yesterday we heard that Medvedyev and
Shlyapnikov have recanted their errors and are leaving the bloc.
We know, further, that there is also a rift within the bloc, that
is, between the "new" opposition and the "old," and it should
make itself felt at this conference.
It turns out, therefore, that they formed a bloc, and formed

it with great pomp, but the result has been the opposite of
what they expected from it. Arithmetically, of course, they
should have obtained an increase, for adding forces together
should yield an increase; but the oppositionists forgot that,
besides arithmetic, there is also algebra, and that in algebra
adding forces together does not always result in an increase
(laughter), because the result depends not only on adding
forces together, but on the signs that stand in front of the
items. (Prolonged applause.) It turns out that they are good at
arithmetic but bad at algebra, with the result that by adding
their forces together, far from having increased their army,
they have reduced it to a minimum, to a state of collapse.
Wherein lay the strength of the Zinoviev group?
In the fact that it waged a determined fight against the fun
damentals of Trotskyism. But as soon as the Zinoviev group
gave up its fight against Trotskyism, it, so to speak, emasculat
ed itself, rendered itself powerless.
Wherein lay the strength of the Trotsky group?
In the fact that it waged a determined fight against the errors
of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917 and against the
repetition of those errors today. But as soon as the Trotsky
392 THAI UOMON THE OPPOSITION
group gave up its fight against the Zinoviev-Kamenev devia

tion, it emasculated itself, rendered itself powerless.be
The result is the adding together of emasculated forces.
(Laughter, prolonged applause.)
Obviously, nothing was to be got from this but discomfiture.
Obviously, the more honest elements of Zinoviev's group were
bound after this to part ways with Zinoviev, just as the better
elements among the Trotskyists were bound to desert Trotsky.
desert Trotsky
7. WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION BLOC

COUNTING ON?
Tr ndw
What are the prospects of the opposition? What are they

counting on? I think that they are counting on a deterioration
of the situation in the country and in the Party. Just now they
are winding up their factional activity, because the times are
"hard" for them. But if they do not renounce their fundamen
tal views, if they have decided to adhere to their old opinions,
it means that they will temporise, wait for "better times,"
when they have accumulated strength and are again in a posi
tion to come out against the Party. Of that there can be no
doubt whatever. Va
Recently, one of the oppositionists who had come over to
the side of the Party, a worker named Andreyev, gave us some
interesting information about the opposition's plans which it
is necessary, in my opinion, to mention at this conference. Here
is what Comrade Yaroslavsky told us in his report at the
October plenum of the Central Committee and the Central
Control Commission:
PAGILIO.. izogis
"Andreyev, who had been active in the opposition for a fairly long
time, in the end arrived at the conviction that he could not work with
it any longer. What chiefly decided him was two things he had heard
the opposition say: the first was that it had found itself up against a
'reactionary' mood of the working class, and the second was that the
economic situation had proved not so bad as it had thought."
I think that Andreyev, formerly an oppositionist and now

pro-Party, has disclosed what the opposition believes at heart
but does not venture to say aloud. It evidently senses that the
economic situation is now better than it anticipated, and that
the mood of the workers is not as bad as it would have liked
it to be. Hence their policy of temporarily winding up their

"work." It is clear that if later on the economic situation be
comes somewhat more tense as the oppositionists are con

-
vinced it will and the mood of the workers deteriorates as
a result -
as they are also convinced it will they will lose
-
no time in resuming their "work," in resuming their old ideo

logical opinions, which they have not abandoned, and in
launching an open fight against the Party.
Such, comrades, are the prospects of the opposition bloc,
which is disintegrating, but which has not yet disintegrated
completely, and perhaps will not do so soon unless there is a
determined and ruthless fight by the Party.
But since they are preparing for a struggle, and are only
waiting for "better times" to resume their open fight against
the Party, the Party must not be caught napping. Hence the
tasks of the Party are: to wage a determined ideological strug
gle against the erroneous views of the opposition, to which it
still adheres; to expose the opportunist nature of these ideas
no matter what "revolutionary" phraseology is used to disguise
them; and to work in such a way that the opposition is com
pelled to renounce its errors for fear of being routed utterly
and completely.
394 Tim And ON THE OPPOSITION bot
THE PRINCIPAL ERROR OF
THE OPPOSITION BLOC
I pass to the second question, comrades, that of the principal

error of the opposition bloc on the basic question of the charac
ter and prospects of our revolution.
The basic question on which the Party and the opposition
bloc are divided is that of the possibility of the victory of
socialism in our country, or, what is the same thing, that of the
character and prospects of our revolution.
That is not a new question: it was more or less thoroughly
discussed, by the way, at the conference of April 1925, the
Fourteenth Conference. Now, in a new situation, it has sprung
up again and we shall have to consider it closely. And since
at the recent joint meeting of the plenums of the Central Com
mittee and the Central Control Commission, Trotsky and
Kamenev levelled the charge that the theses on the opposition
bloc set forth their views incorrectly, I am compelled in my
report to adduce a number of documents and quotations con
firming the basic propositions of the theses on the opposition
bloc. I apologise in advance, comrades, but I am compelled to
do this.
We are faced with three questions:

1) Is the victory of socialism possible in our country, bearing
in mind that it is so far the only country of the dictatorship of
the proletariat, that the proletarian revolution has not yet been
victorious in other countries, and that the tempo of the world
revolution has slowed down? Loomady
2) If this victory is possible, can it be called a complete

victory, a final victory?
3) If such a victory cannot be called final, then what con

ditions are necessary in order that it may become final?
Such are the three questions which are combined in the
general question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in
one country, that is to say, in our country.
1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
How did the Marxists answer this question formerly, in the

forties, say, or in the fifties and sixties of the last century, in
the period in general when monopoly capitalism did not yet
exist, when the law of uneven development of capitalism had
not yet been discovered and could not have been discovered,
and when, consequently, the question of the victory of social
ism in individual countries was not yet presented from the
angle from which it was presented subsequently? At that time
all of us, Marxists, beginning with Marx and Engels, were of
the opinion that the victory of socialism in one country taken
separately was impossible, that for socialism to be victorious,
a simultaneous revolution was necessary in a number of coun
tries, at least in a number of the most developed, civilised coun
tries. And at the time that was correct. In illustration of this
view, I should like to quote a characteristic passage from

Engels' outline The Principles of Communism, where the
question is put in the sharpest possible form. This outline sub
sequently served as the basis for the Communist Manifesto.
It was written in 1847. Here is what Engels says in this outline,
which was published only a few years ago:
"Can this revolution (i.e., the proletarian revolution - J. St.) take place
in one country alone?
"Answer: No. Large-scale industry has, by the very fact that it has
created a world market, bound all the nations of the earth, and notably
the civilised nations, so closely together, that each depends on what is

happening in the others. Further, in all the civilised countries it has
evened up social development to such an extent that in all of them the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat have become the two decisive classes of
society, and the struggle between them the major struggle of our times.
Therefore, the communist revolution will not be simply a national revolu
tion, but will take place simultaneously in all the civilised countries, that
is, at least in England, America, France and Germany. In each of these
countries it will develop faster or more slowly depending on which has
the more developed industry, the bigger accumulation of wealth, or the
greater productive forces. It will therefore be slowest and hardest to
accomplish in Germany, and fastest and easiest in England. It will also
have a big influence on the other countries of the world, and will com
pletely change and greatly accelerate their previous course of develop
ment. It is a universal revolution, and therefore will have a universal
terrain"* (F. Engels, The Principles of Communism. See Kommunisti
chesky Manifest, State Publishing House, 1923, p. 317).
That was written in the forties of the last century, when

monopoly capitalism did not yet exist. It is characteristic that
there is not even a mention here of Russia; Russia is left out
altogether. And that is quite understandable, since at that

time Russia with its revolutionary proletariat, Russia as a revo
lutionary force, did not yet exist and could not have existed.
Was what is said here, in this quotation, correct in the con
ditions of pre-monopoly capitalism, in the period when Engels
wrote it? Yes, it was correct.
Is this opinion correct now, in the new conditions, the con

ditions of monopoly capitalism and proletarian revolution?
No, it is no longer correct.
In the old period, the period of pre-monopoly capitalism,
the pre-imperialist period, when the globe had not yet been
divided up among financial groups, when the forcible redivi
sion of an already divided world was not yet a matter of life
batermo
or death for capitalism, when unevenness of economic develop

ment was not, and could not be, as sharply marked as it became
later, when the contradictions of capitalism had not yet reached
that degree of development at which they convert flourishing
capitalism into moribund capitalism thus opening up the pos
sibility of the victory of socialism in individual countries -
in that old period the formula of Engels was undeniably

correct. In the new period, the period of the development of
imperialism, when the unevenness of development of the cap
italist countries has become the decisive factor in imperialist
development, when inevitable conflicts and wars among the
imperialists weaken the imperialist front and make it possible
for it to be breached in individual countries, when the law of
uneven development discovered by Lenin has become the start
ing point for the theory of the victory of socialism in individual
countries in
-
these conditions the old formula of Engels
becomes incorrect and must inevitably be replaced by another
formula, one that affirms the possibility of the victory of social
ism in one country.
Lenin's greatness as the continuer of the work of Marx and
Engels consists precisely in the fact that he was never a slave
to the letter of Marxism. In his investigations he followed the
precept repeatedly uttered by Marx that Marxism is not a
dogma, but a guide to action. Lenin knew this and, drawing
a strict distinction between the letter and the essence of Marx
ism, he never regarded Marxism as a dogma but endeavoured

to apply Marxism, as a fundamental method, in the new cir
cumstances of capitalist development. Lenin's greatness
consists precisely in the fact that he openly and honestly,
without any hesitation, raised the question of the necessity for
a new formula about the possibility of the victory of the pro
letarian revolution in individual countries, undeterred by the
fact that the opportunists of all countries would cling to the old
formula and try to use the names of Marx and Engels as a
screen for their opportunist activity. cond and sold
On the other hand, it would be strange to expect of Marx
and Engels, geniuses though they were, that they, fifty or sixty
years prior to developed monopoly capitalism, should have
been able to foresee accurately all the potentialities of the class
struggle of the proletariat which have shown themselves in
the period of monopoly, imperialist capitalism.
And this was not the first instance where Lenin, basing
himself on the method of Marx, continued the work of Marx
and Engels without clinging to the letter of Marxism. I have
in mind another and similar instance namely, the question
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We know that on this
question Marx expressed the opinion that the dictatorship of
the proletariat as the smashing of the old state apparatus,
T
and the creation of a new one, of a new, proletarian state

is an essential stage in the advance towards socialism in the
continental countries making an exception in the case of Eng
land and America, since in those countries, Marx said, milita
rism and bureaucracy were weakly developed, or not devel
oped at all, and, consequently, some other, "peaceful" path of
transition to socialism was possible. That was quite correct in
the seventies. (Ryazanov: "It was not correct even then.") I
think that in the seventies, when militarism was not so devel
oped in England and America as it became subsequently, that

proposition was absolutely correct. You may convince your
selves of that from the chapter in Comrade Lenin's pamphlet
The Tax in Kind⁹¹ where he says that in the seventies in Eng
land it was not excluded that socialism might develop by way
of an agreement between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
of that country, where the proletariat constituted the majority
and where the bourgeoisie was accustomed to making compro

mises, where militarism was weak, and where bureaucracy was
weak. But while that proposition was correct in the seventies
of the last century, it became incorrect after the nineteenth
century, in the period of imperialism, when England became
no less bureaucratic and no less, if not more, militaristic than
any of the countries of the continent. Comrade Lenin therefore

says in his pamphlet The State and Revolution that Marx's
reservation as regards the continent is now invalid,⁹2 since
new conditions have arisen which render superfluous the ex
ception made in the case of England.
Lenin's greatness consists precisely in the fact that he did
not allow himself to be held prisoner by the letter of Marxism,
that he was able to grasp the essence of Marxism and use it
as a starting point for developing further the teachings of Marx
and Engels.
That, comrades, is how the question of the victory of the
socialist revolution in individual countries stood in the pre
imperialist, pre-monopoly period of capitalism.
2. LENINISM OR TROTSKYISM?
251, ENS
Lenin was the first Marxist who made a really Marxist

analysis of imperialism, as a new and last phase of capitalism,
who presented the question of the possibility of the victory of
socialism in individual capitalist countries in a new way and
answered it in the affirmative. I have in mind Lenin's pamphlet
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. I have in mind
also his article "The United States of Europe Slogan," which
appeared in 1915. I have in mind the controversy between
Trotsky and Lenin over the slogan of a United States of
Europe, or of the whole world, in which Lenin first advanced
the thesis that the victory of socialism in one country is possible.

Here is what Lenin wrote in that article:
Im
"As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the
World would hardly be a correct one, firstly, because it merges with
socialism; secondly, because it may give rise to a wrong interpretation
in the sense of the impossibility of the victory of socialism in a single
country and about the relation of such a country to the rest. Uneven
economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism.
Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in
one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that
country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own socialist
production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist
world, attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries,
raising revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event
of necessity coming out even with armed force against the exploiting
classes and their states." . . . For "the free union of nations in socialism
is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle
of the socialist republics against the backward states" (see Vol. XVIII,
PP. 232-33). [1]
That is what Lenin wrote in 1915.

What is this law of uneven development of capitalism whose
operation under the conditions of imperialism leads to the
possibility of the victory of socialism in one country?
Speaking of this law, Lenin held that the old, pre-monopoly
capitalism has already passed into imperialism; that world
economy is developing in the conditions of a frenzied struggle
between the leading imperialist groups for territory, markets,
raw materials, etc.; that the division of the world into spheres
of influence of imperialist groups is already completed; that
the development of the capitalist countries does not proceed
evenly, not in such a way that one country follows after another
or advances parallel with it, but spasmodically, through some
countries which had previously outstripped the others being
CAROON
[1] Lenin, The United States of Europe Slogan. (1915) TE

pushed back and new countries advancing to the forefront;

that this manner of development of the capitalist countries
inevitably engenders conflicts and wars between the capitalist
powers for a fresh redivision of an already divided world; that
these conflicts and wars lead to the weakening of imperialism;
that owing to this the world imperialist front becomes easily
liable to be breached in individual countries; and that, because
of this, the victory of socialism in individual countries becomes

possible.
We know that quite recently Britain was ahead of all the
other imperialist states. We also know that Germany then
began to overtake Britain, and demanded a "place in the sun"
at the expense of other countries and, in the first place, at the
expense of Britain. We know that it was precisely as a result
of this circumstance that the imperialist war (1914-18) arose.
Now, after the imperialist war, America has spurted far ahead
and outdistanced both Britain and the other European powers.
It can scarcely be doubted that this contains the seeds of new
great conflicts and wars.
The fact that in consequence of the imperialist war the im
perialist front was breached in Russia is evidence that, in the
present-day conditions of capitalist development, the chain of
the imperialist front will not necessarily break in the country
where industry is most developed, but where the chain is weak
est, where the proletariat has an important ally - such as the
peasantry, for instance in the fight against imperialist rule,
as was the case in Russia.
It is quite possible that in the future the chain of the impe
rialist front will break in one of the countries. -
India, say -
where the proletariat has an important ally in the shape of a
powerful revolutionary liberation movement.
ing
In affirming the possibility of the victory of socialism in one

country, Lenin, as we know, was in controversy with Trotsky,
in the first place, and also with the Social-Democrats.
How did Trotsky react to Lenin's article and to his thesis
that the victory of socialism is possible in one country?
Here is what Trotsky wrote then (in 1915) in reply to Lenin's
article:
"The only more or less concrete historical argument," says Trotsky,

"advanced against the slogan of a United States of Europe was for
mulated in the Swiss Sotsial-Demokrat (at that time the central organ
of the Bolsheviks, where Lenin's above-mentioned article was printed
J. St.) in the following sentence: 'Uneven economic and political devel
opment is an absolute law of capitalism.' From this the Sotsial-Demokrat
draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in one
country, and that therefore there is no reason to make the dictatorship
of the proletariat in each separate country contingent upon the establish
ment of a United States of Europe. That capitalist development in
different countries is uneven is an absolutely incontrovertible argument.
But this unevenness is itself extremely uneven. The capitalist level of
Britain, Austria, Germany or France is not identical. But in comparison
with Africa and Asia all these countries represent capitalist 'Europe,'
which has grown ripe for the social revolution. That no country in its
struggle must 'wait' for others, is an elementary thought which it is
useful and necessary to reiterate in order that the idea of concurrent
international action may not be replaced by the idea of temporising
international inaction. Without waiting for the others, we begin and
continue the struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative
will give an impetus to the struggle in other countries; but if this should
not occur, it would be hopeless to think as historical experience and
-
theoretical considerations testify - that, for example, a revolutionary

Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe, or that a
socialist Germany could exist in isolation in a capitalist world"* (see
Trotsky's Works, Vol. III, Part 1, pp. 89-90).
That is what Trotsky wrote in 1915 in the Paris newspaper

Nashe Slovo,⁹3 the article being subsequently reprinted in
linhovrd
Russia in a collection of Trotsky's articles entitled Peace

Programme, first published in August 1917. Doniy
You see that in these two passages, Lenin's and Trotsky's,

two entirely different theses stand contrasted. Whereas Lenin
considers that the victory of socialism in one country is possible,
that the proletariat when it has seized power can not only re
tain it, but can even go further, having expropriated the capital
ists and organised a socialist economy, so as to render effective
support to the proletarians of capitalist countries, Trotsky, on
the contrary, considers that if a victorious revolution in one
country does not very soon call forth a victorious revolution
in other countries, the proletariat of the victorious country
will not be able even to retain power (let alone organise a
socialist economy); for, Trotsky says, it is hopeless to think
that a revolutionary government in Russia can hold out in the
face of a conservative Europe.
These are two entirely different points of view, two entirely
different lines. With Lenin, a proletariat which has taken
power represents a most active force displaying the highest
initiative, which organises a socialist economy and goes further
and supports the proletarians of other countries. With Trotsky,
on the contrary, a proletariat which has taken power becomes
a semi-passive force which requires immediate assistance in the
shape of an immediate victory of socialism in other countries,
and which feels itself, as it were, in a temporary encampment
and in peril of immediately losing power. But if the victory of
the revolution in other countries should not ensue immediately
-what then? Then, chuck up the job. (A voice from the
audience: "And run to cover.") Yes, and run to cover. That
is perfectly correct. (Laughter.)
It may be said that this divergence between Lenin and
Trotsky is a thing of the past, that later, in the course of the
work, it might have been reduced to a minimum and even

wiped out altogether. Yes, it might have been reduced to a
minimum and even wiped out. But, unfortunately, neither of
these things happened. On the contrary, this divergence re
mained in full force right down to Comrade Lenin's death. It
exists even now, as you can see for yourselves. I affirm that,
on the contrary, this divergence between Lenin and Trotsky,
and the controversy it gave rise to, continued all the time;
articles on the subject by Lenin and Trotsky appeared one after
another, and the concealed controversy continued, it is true,
without mention of names.
Here are some facts on this score.
In 1921, when we introduced NEP, Lenin again raised the

question of the possibility of the victory of socialism, this time
in the more concrete form of the possibility of laying a socialist
foundation for our economy along the lines of NEP. You will
recall that when NEP was introduced in 1921, Lenin was
SEEN
accused by a section of our Party, especially by the "Workers'
Opposition," that, by introducing NEP, he was swerving from
the path of socialism. It was evidently in reply to this that
Lenin repeatedly declared in his speeches and articles of that
time that we were introducing NEP not as a departure from
our course, but as a continuation of it under the new conditions,
with a view to laying "a socialist foundation for our economy,"

"together with the peasantry," and "under the leadership of
the working class" (see Lenin's The Tax in Kind and other
articles on the subject of NEP). MIT Sada suly
As though in reply to this, Trotsky, in January 1922, publish

ed a "Preface" to his book The Year 1905, where he declared
that in our country building socialism together with the peas
antry was unfeasible, because the life of our country would be
a series of hostile collisions between the working class and the

peasantry until the proletariat was victorious in the West.
Here is what Trotsky said in his "Preface":
"Having assumed power, the proletariat would come into hostile colli
sion* not only with all the bourgeois groupings which supported the
proletariat during the first stages of its revolutionary struggle, but also
with the broad masses of the peasantry with whose assistance it came
into power. The contradictions in the position of a workers' govern
ment in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population
can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world
proletarian revolution" (Trotsky, in the "Preface," written in 1922, to
his book The Year 1905).
Here, too, as you see, two different theses stand contrasted.

Whereas Lenin grants the possibility of laying a socialist
foundation for our economy together with the peasantry and
under the leadership of the working class, Trotsky, on the
contrary, holds that it is impossible for the proletariat to lead
the peasantry and for them to work together in laying a socialist
foundation, since the political life of the country will be a series
of hostile collisions between the workers' government and the
peasant majority, and that these collisions can only be solved
in the arena of the world revolution.
Further, we have Lenin's speech at the plenary meeting of
the Moscow Soviet a year later, in 1922, when he again reverts
to the question of building socialism in our country. He says:
JOSEZONE
"Socialism is no longer a matter of the distant future, or an abstract
picture, or an icon. We still retain our old bad opinion of icons. We
have dragged socialism into everyday life, and here we must find our
way. This is the task of our day, the task of our epoch. Permit me
to conclude by expressing the conviction that, difficult as this task may
be, new as it may be compared with our previous task, and no matter
how many difficulties it may entail, we shall all not in one day, but

in the course of several years all of us together fulfil it whatever

happens so that NEP Russia will become socialist Russia" (see Vol.
XXVII, p. 366). [1] watera
As though in answer to this, or perhaps in explanation of
what he had said in the passage from him quoted above,
Trotsky published in 1922 a "Postscript" to his pamphlet Peace
Programme, where he says:
"The assertion reiterated several times in the Peace Programme that
a proletarian revolution cannot culminate victoriously within national
bounds may perhaps seem to some readers to have been refuted by the
nearly five years' experience of our Soviet Republic. But such a con
clusion would be unwarranted. The fact that the workers' state has held
out against the whole world in one country, and a backward country at
that, testifies to the colossal might of the proletariat, which in other,
more advanced, more civilised countries will be truly capable of perform
ing miracles. But while we have held our ground as a state politically
and militarily, we have not arrived, or even begun to arrive, at the
creation of a socialist society. As long as the bourgeoisie remains
in power in the other European countries we shall be compelled, in our
struggle against economic isolation, to strive for agreement with the
capitalist world; at the same time it may be said with certainty that these
agreements may at best help us to mitigate some of our economic ills,
to take one or another step forward, but real progress of a socialist
economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the
proletariat in the major European countries" (see Trotsky's Works, Vol.
III, Part 1, pp. 92-93).
Here, too, as you see, two antithetical theses, Lenin's and

Trotsky's, stand contrasted. Whereas Lenin considers that
we have already dragged socialism into everyday life and that,
in spite of the difficulties, we are fully in a position to turn NEP
*
My italics. J. St.
[1] Lenin, Speech at a Plenary Session of the Moscow Soviet. Novem
ber 20, 1922.

Russia into socialist Russia, Trotsky, on the contrary, believes

that not only are we unable to turn present Russia into socialist
Russia, but that we cannot even achieve real progress of social
ist economy until the proletariat is victorious in other countries.
Lastly, we have Comrade Lenin's notes in the shape of the
articles On Co-operation and Our Revolution (directed
against Sukhanov) which he wrote before his death, and which
have been left to us as his political testament. These notes are
remarkable for the fact that in them Lenin again raises the
question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in our
country, and gives us formulations which leave no room for
any doubt whatever. Here is what he says in his notes Our
Revolution: HORANYES LEY FR
"... Infinitely hackneyed is the argument that they (the heroes of
the Second International - J. St.) learned by rote during the development
of West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe
for socialism, that, as certain 'learned' gentlemen among them express it,
the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our
country. And to none of them does it occur to ask himself: But what
about a people that found itself in a revolutionary situation such as that
created during the first imperialist war? Might it not, under the influence
of the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that offered
it some chance, at least, of securing conditions, not quite ordinary, for
the further development of its civilisation?
"If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism
(although nobody can say just what that definite 'level of culture' is),
why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for the definite
level of culture in a revolutionary way, and then, on the basis of the
workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to
overtake the other nations? .
"You say that civilisation is necessary for the creation of socialism.

Very good. But why could we not first create such prerequisites of
civilisation in our country as the expulsion of the landlords and the
Russian capitalists, and then start moving towards socialism? In what
books have you read that such variations of the customary historical
procedure are impermissible or impossible?" (See Vol. XXVII, pp. 399

401.)[1] orel Stringthis
And here is what Lenin says in the article On Co
operation:
"As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means of pro
duction, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this
assured leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, etc. - is not this
right to look down upon as such now, under NEP? Is this not all that is
necessary for building a complete socialist society?
ofall t
This is not yet the
building of socialist society, but it is all that is necessary and sufficient
for this building"* (see Vol. XXVII, p. 392).[²]
And so, we have in this way two lines on the basic question
of the possibility of victoriously building socialism in our coun
try, of the possibility of the victory of the socialist elements in
our economy over the capitalist elements - for, comrades, the
-
possibility of the victory of socialism in our country means

nothing more nor less than the possibility of the victory of the
socialist elements in our economy over the capitalist elements
we have the line of Lenin and Leninism, in the first place,
and the line of Trotsky and Trotskyism, in the second place.
Leninism answers this question in the affirmative. Trotskyism,
on the contrary, denies the possibility of the victory of social
ism in our country through the internal forces of our revolution.
While the first line is the line of our Party, the second line is an
approximation to the views of Social-Democracy.
*
My italics throughout. - J. St.
[1] Lenin, Our Revolution. (1923) Moversi baha

[2] Lenin, On Co-operation. (1923) hy ook valloid
That is why it is said in the draft theses on the opposition

bloc that Trotskyism is a Social-Democratic deviation in our
Party.
But from this it follows incontestably that our revolution is
a socialist revolution, that it represents not only a signal, an
impulse, a starting point for the world revolution, but also a
base, a necessary and sufficient base, for the building of a com
plete socialist society in our country.
And so, we can and must defeat the capitalist elements in
our economy, we can and must build a socialist society in our
country. But can that victory be termed complete, final? No,
it cannot. We can defeat our capitalists, we are in a position
to build and complete the building of socialism, but that does
not mean that we are in a position by doing so to guarantee the
land of the dictatorship of the proletariat against dangers from
outside, against the danger of intervention, and, consequently,
of restoration, re-establishment of the old order. We are not
living on an island. We are living within a capitalist encircle

ment. The fact that we are building socialism, and thereby
revolutionising the workers of the capitalist countries, cannot
but evoke the hatred and enmity of the whole capitalist world.
To think that the capitalist world can look on indifferently at
our successes on the economic front, successes which are revolu
tionising the working class of the whole world, is to harbour
an illusion. Therefore, so long as we remain within a capitalist
encirclement, so long as the proletariat is not victorious in a
number of countries at least, we cannot regard our victory
as final; consequently, no matter what successes we may achieve
in our constructive work, we cannot consider the land of the
dictatorship of the proletariat guaranteed against dangers

from outside. Therefore, to achieve final victory we must
ensure that the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by
a socialist encirclement, that the proletariat is victorious at

least in several other countries. Only then can our victory be
regarded as final.
That is why we regard the victory of socialism in our coun
try not as an end in itself, not as something self-sufficient, but
as an aid, a means, a path towards the victory of the proletar
ian revolution in other countries. YONI
Here is what Comrade Lenin wrote on this score:
"We are living," Lenin says, "not merely in a state, but in a system
of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with
imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other
must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful
collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be
inevitable. That means that if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants
to, and will hold sway, it must prove this by its military organisation
also" (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122).[1¹]
Turfs to boal
It follows from this that the danger of armed intervention
exists, and will continue to exist for a long time to come. de
Whether the capitalists are just now in a position to under
take serious intervention against the Soviet Republic is another
question. That remains to be seen. Here much depends on
the behaviour of the workers of the capitalist countries, on their
sympathy for the land of the proletarian dictatorship, on how
far they are devoted to the cause of socialism. That at the
present time the workers of the capitalist countries cannot sup
port our revolution with a revolution against their own capital
ists is so far a fact. But that the capitalists are not in a position
to rouse "their" workers for a war against our republic is also
a fact. And to make war on the land of the dictatorship of the
proletariat without the workers is something which capitalism
[1] Lenin, Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). March 18-23, 1919.

2. Report of the Central Committee. March 18. Tus
cannot do nowadays without incurring mortal risk. That is

evident from the numerous workers' delegations which come
to our country to verify our work in building socialism. It is
evident from the profound sympathy which the working class
of the whole world cherishes for the Soviet Republic. It is on
this sympathy that the international position of our republic
now rests. Without it we should be having now a number of
fresh attempts at intervention, our constructive work would
be interrupted, and we should not be having a period of
UPO pre
"respite."
But if the capitalist world is not in a position to undertake
armed intervention against our country just now, that does not
mean that it will never be in a position to do so. At any rate,
the capitalists are not asleep; they are doing their utmost to
weaken the international position of our republic and to pre
pare the way for intervention. Therefore, neither attempts at
intervention, nor the consequent possibility of the restoration
of the old order in our country, can be regarded as excluded.
Evangs
Hence Lenin is right in saying:
EHITUMBONTO biratenmad-albbum rolovcıl u suzin
"As long as our Soviet Republic remains an isolated borderland of
the entire capitalist world, just so long will it be quite ludicrously fan
tastic and utopian to hope . . for the disappearance of all danger. Of
.
course, as long as such fundamental opposites remain, dangers will remain

too, and we cannot escape them" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 29). [¹]
That is why Lenin says:

"Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and only by the
joint efforts of the workers of all countries" (see Vol. XXIII, p. 9).[2]
[1] Lenin, Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. December 22-29,

1920. 2. Report on the Work of the Council of People's Commissars.
December 22.

the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet. May
14, 1918.
And so, what is the victory of socialism in our country?

It means achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat and
completely building socialism, thus overcoming the capitalist
elements in our economy through the internal forces of our
revolution. Idque of: Ba
And what is the final victory of socialism in our country?

It means the creation of a full guarantee against intervention
and attempts at restoration, by means of a victorious socialist
revolution in several countries at least.
While the possibility of the victory of socialism in one coun

try means the possibility of resolving internal contradictions,
which can be completely overcome by one country (meaning
by that, of course, our country), the possibility of the final
victory of socialism implies the possibility of resolving the ex
ternal contradictions between the country of socialism and the
capitalist countries, contradictions which can be overcome only
as the result of a proletarian revolution in several countries.
Anyone who confuses these two categories of contradictions
is either a hopeless muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist.
Such is the basic line of our Party.
3. THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOURTEENTH HAT
CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)
This line of our Party was first officially formulated in the

resolution of the Fourteenth Conference on the international
situation, the stabilisation of capitalism, and the building of
socialism in one country. I consider that resolution one of the
most important documents in the history of our Party, not only
because it represents a grand demonstration in support of the
Leninist line on the question of building socialism in our coun
try, but also because it is at the same time a direct condemna

tion of Trotskyism. I think that it would not be superfluous to
mention the most important points of this resolution, which,
strangely enough, was adopted on the report of Zinoviev.
(Commotion in the ball.) teimuth hals own
f
Here is what the resolution says about the victory of social
ism in one country:
"Generally, the victory of socialism in one country (not in the sense
of final victory) is unquestionably possible."*94
gipsa
On the question of the final victory of socialism, the resolu
tion says:
... The existence of two directly opposite social systems gives rise
to the constant menace of capitalist blockade, of other forms of eco
nomic pressure, of armed intervention, of restoration. Consequently, the
only guarantee of the final victory of socialism, i.e., the guarantee against
¹95
restoration, is a victorious socialist revolution in a number of countries."
And here is what the resolution says about building a com

plete socialist society, and about Trotskyism:
"It by no means follows from this that it is impossible to build a

complete socialist society in a backward country like Russia without the
'state aid' (Trotsky) of countries more developed technically and eco
nomically. An integral part of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution
is the assertion that 'real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will
become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major
European countries' (Trotsky, 1922) -- an assertion which in the present
period condemns the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to fatalistic passivity.
In opposition to such 'theories,' Comrade Lenin wrote: 'Infinitely hackneyed
is the argument that they learned by rote during the development of
West-European Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for
socialism, that, as certain "learned" gentlemen among them express it,
the objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in our
country' (Notes on Sukhanov)." (Resolution of the Fourteenth Con
52
ference of the R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the

R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I."96)
I think that these basic points of the Fourteenth Conference

resolution need no explanation. It could not have been put
more clearly and definitely. Particularly deserving of attention
is the passage in the resolution which places Trotskyism on a
par with Sukhanovism. And what is Sukhanovism? We know
from Lenin's articles against Sukhanov that Sukhanovism is
a variety of Social-Democracy, of Menshevism. This needs to
be especially stressed in order that it may be understood why
Zinoviev, who defended this resolution at the Fourteenth Con
ference, later departed from it and adhered to the standpoint

of Trotsky, with whom he has now formed a bloc.
Further, in connection with the international situation the
resolution notes two deviations from the basic line of the Party
which might be a source of danger to the latter.
Here is what the resolution says about these dangers:
"In connection with the existing situation in the international arena,

two dangers may threaten our Party in the present period: 1) a deviation
towards passivity, arising from too broad an interpretation of the stabilisa
tion of capitalism to be observed here and there, and from the slowing
down of the tempo of the international revolution the absence of a
sufficient impulse to energetic and systematic work in building a socialist
society in the U.S.S.R. despite the slowing down of the tempo of the
international revolution, and 2) a deviation towards national narrow
mindedness, forgetfulness of the duties of international proletarian revolu
tionaries, an unconscious disregard for the intimate dependence of the
fate of the U.S.S.R. on the international proletarian revolution, which
is developing, although slowly, a failure to understand that not only
does the international movement need the existence, consolidation and
strengthening of the first proletarian state in the world, but also that the
dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. needs the aid of the in
ternational proletariat." (Resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the
R.C.P.(B.) on "The Tasks of the Comintern and the R.C.P. (B.) in Con
nection with the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.")
It is clear from this quotation that in speaking of the first

deviation the Fourteenth Conference had in mind the devia
tion towards disbelief in the victory of socialist construction

in our country, a deviation prevalent among the Trotskyists.
Speaking of the second deviation, the conference had in mind
the deviation towards forgetfulness of the international pros
pects of our revolution which to a certain extent prevails
among some of our officials in the field of foreign policy, who
sometimes tend to go over to the standpoint of establishing
"spheres of influence" in dependent countries.
By stigmatising both these deviations, the Party as a whole
and its Central Committee declared war on the dangers arising
from them.
Such are the facts.
How could it happen that Zinoviev, who put the case for
the Fourteenth Conference resolution in a special report, sub
sequently departed from the line of this resolution, which is
at the same time the line of Leninism? How could it happen
that, on departing from Leninism, he hurled at the Party the
ludicrous charge of national narrow-mindedness, using it as a
screen to cover up his departure from Leninism? - a trick
which I shall endeavour to explain to you now, comrades.
4. THE PASSING OVER OF THE "NEW OPPOSITION"

TO TROTSKYISM MAN
The divergence between the present leaders of the "New

Opposition," Kamenev and Zinoviev, and the Central Com
mittee of our Party over the question of building socialism in
our country first assumed open form on the eve of the Four
teenth Conference. I am referring to one of the meetings of
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the eve of
416 ON THE OPPOSITION ECHTADOS
the conference, where Kamenev and Zinoviev attempted to

advocate a peculiar point of view on this question, one that has
nothing in common with the line of the Party and in all funda
mentals coincides with the position of Sukhanov. pi
Lo Here is what the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)
wrote in this connection in reply to the statement of the former
Leningrad top leadership in December 1925, that is, seven
months later:
M 24192
"Recently, in the Political Bureau, Kamenev and Zinoviev advocated
the point of view that we cannot cope with the internal difficulties due
to our technical and economic backwardness unless an international rev
olution comes to our rescue. We, however, with the majority of the
members of the Central Committee, think that we can build socialism,
are building it, and will completely build it, notwithstanding our tech
nical backwardness and in spite of it. We think that the work of
building will proceed far more slowly, of course, than in the conditions
of a world victory; nevertheless, we are making progress and will con
tinue to do so. We also believe that the view held by Kamenev and
Zinoviev expresses disbelief in the internal forces of our working class
and of the peasant masses who follow its lead. We believe that it is a
departure from the Leninist position" (see "Reply").
I must observe, comrades, that Kamenev and Zinoviev did

not even attempt to refute the Moscow Committee's statement,
which was printed in Pravda during the early sittings of the
Fourteenth Congress, thereby tacitly admitting that the charges
the Moscow Committee levelled against them correspond to
the facts.
At the Fourteenth Conference itself, Kamenev and Zinoviev

formally acknowledged the correctness of the Party's line as
regards building socialism in our country. They were evidently
compelled to do so because their standpoint had found no
sympathy among the members of the Central Committee. More
than that, as I have already said, Zinoviev even put the case
for the Fourteenth Conference resolution - which, as you have -
had the opportunity to convince yourselves, expresses the line

of our Party in a special report at the Fourteenth Con
ference. But subsequent events showed that Zinoviev and
Kamenev had supported the Party line at the Fourteenth Con
ference only formally, outwardly, while actually continuing to
adhere to their own opinion. In this respect, the appearance
in September 1925 of Zinoviev's book Leninism constituted an
"event" which drew a dividing line between the Zinoviev who
put the case for the Party line at the Fourteenth Conference
and the Zinoviev who has departed from the Party line, from
Leninism, for the ideological position of Trotskyism.
Here is what Zinoviev writes in his book:
"By the final victory of socialism is meant, at least: 1) the abolition

of classes, and therefore 2) the abolition of the dictatorship of one class,
in this case the dictatorship of the proletariat.". . . "In order to get a
clearer idea of how the question stands here, in the U.S.S.R., in the
year 1925," says Zinoviev further, "we must distinguish between two things:
1) the assured possibility of engaging in building socialism such a pos
sibility, it stands to reason, is quite conceivable within the limits of one
country; and 2) the final construction and consolidation of socialism, i.e.,
the achievement of a socialist system, of a socialist society" (see Zinoviev's
Leninism, pp. 291 and 293).
Here, as you see, everything is muddled up and turned

upside down. According to Zinoviev, what is meant by victory
-
that is, the victory of socialism in one country is having -
the possibility of building socialism, but not the possibility of

completely building it. To engage in building, but with the
certainty that we shall not be able to complete what we are
building. That, it appears, is what Zinoviev means by the
victory of socialism in one country. (Laughter.) As to the
question of completely building a socialist society, he confuses
it with the question of final victory, thus demonstrating his com
plete lack of understanding of the whole question of the victory
418 THAT JUG ON THE OPPOSITION
of socialism in our country. To engage in building a socialist

economy, knowing that it cannot be completely built - that is
the depth to which Zinoviev has sunk.
It need hardly be said that this attitude is totally at variance
with the fundamental line of Leninism on the question of build
ing socialism. It need hardly be said that such an attitude,
which tends to weaken the proletariat's will to build socialism
in our country, and therefore to retard the outbreak of the
revolution in other countries, turns upside down the very
principles of internationalism. It is an attitude which directly
approaches, and extends a hand to, the ideological position of
Trotskyism. andwiltwillegaprak He Donn
The same must be said of Zinoviev's statements at the
Fourteenth Congress in December 1925. Here is what he said

there, criticising Yakovlev:
"Take a look, for instance, at what Comrade Yakovlev went so far
as to say at the last Kursk Gubernia Party Conference. He asks: 'Is

it possible for us, surrounded as we are on all sides by capitalist enemies,
to completely build socialism in one country under such conditions?'
And he answers: 'On the basis of all that has been said we have the
right to say not only that we are building socialism, but that in spite
of the fact that for the time being we are alone, that for the time being
we are the only Soviet country, the only Soviet state in the world, we
shall completely build socialism' (Kurskaya Pravda, No. 279, December 8,
1925). "Is this the Leninist method of presenting the question," Zinoviev
asks, "does not this smack of national narrow-mindedness?"* (Zinoviev,
Reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress.)
og sitr
It follows that, because Yakovlev in the main upheld the
line of the Party and of Leninism, he has earned the charge
of national narrow-mindedness. It follows that to uphold the
Party line, as formulated in the Fourteenth Conference resolu
tion, is to be guilty of national narrow-mindedness. People
*My italics. - J. St. orain

would say of that: what a depth to sink to! Therein lies the
whole trick that Zinoviev is playing, which consists in levelling
the ludicrous charge of national narrow-mindedness at the
Leninists in an endeavour to cover up his own departure from
Leninism.
The theses on the opposition bloc are therefore telling the

exact truth when they assert that the "New Opposition" has
passed over to Trotskyism on the basic question of the possibil
ity of the victory of socialism in our country, or on what is
the same thing the question of the character and prospects

of our revolution.
It should be observed here that, formally, Kamenev holds

a somewhat special position on this question. It is a fact that
both at the Fourteenth Party Conference and at the Fourteenth
Party Congress, Kamenev, unlike Zinoviev, publicly pro
claimed his solidarity with the Party line on the question of
building socialism in our country. Nevertheless, the Fourteenth
Party Congress did not take Kamenev's statement seriously,
did not take his word for it, and in its resolution on the Central
Committee's report it included him in the group of people who

had departed from Leninism. Why? Because Kamenev refused,
saw no need, to back his statement of solidarity with the Party
line with action. And what does backing his statement with
action mean? It means breaking with those who are waging a
fight against the Party line. The Party knows plenty of cases
where people who declared in words their solidarity with the
Party at the same time continued to maintain political friend
ship with elements who were waging a fight against the Party.
Lenin used to say in cases like this that such "supporters" of
the Party line are worse than opponents. We know, for exam
ple, that in the period of the imperialist war Trotsky repeatedly
professed his solidarity with, and loyalty to, the principles of
internationalism. But Lenin called him at that time an "abettor

of the social-chauvinists." Why? Because, while professing
internationalism, Trotsky at the same time refused to break
with Kautsky and Martov, Potresov and Chkheidze. And
Lenin, of course, was right. Do you want your statement to be
taken seriously? - then back it with action, and give up politi
cal friendship with people who are waging a fight against the
Party line.
That is why I think that Kamenev's statements about his
solidarity with the Party line on the question of building
socialism cannot be taken seriously, seeing that he declines to
back his word with action and continues to remain in a bloc
with the Trotskyists.
5. TROTSKY'S EVASION. SMILGA. RADEK

Ad los id
All this, it may be said, is good and correct, but are there no
grounds or documents showing that the leaders of the opposi
tion bloc would not be unwilling to turn away from the Social
Democratic deviation and return to Leninism? Take, for exam
ple, Trotsky's book Towards Socialism or Capitalism? Is not
this book a sign that Trotsky is not unwilling to renounce his
errors of principle? Some even think that Trotsky in this book
really has renounced, or is trying to renounce, his errors of
principle. I, sinner that I am, suffer from a certain scepticism
on this point (laughter), and I must say that, unfortunately,
such assumptions are absolutely unwarranted by the facts.
Here, for instance, is the most salient passage in Trotsky's
Towards Socialism or Capitalism?
qanunturil
"The State Planning Commission (Gosplan) has published a tabulated
summary of the 'control' figures for the national economy of the U.S.S.R.
in the year 1925-26. All this sounds very dry and, so to speak, bureau
cratic. But in these dry statistical columns and the almost equally dry
and terse explanations to them, we hear the splendid historical music
of growing socialism" (L. Trotsky, Towards Socialism or Capitalism?,
Planovoye Khozyaistvo Publishing House, 1925, p. 1).
ba contato Ling
What is this "splendid historical music of growing social

ism"? What is the meaning of this "splendid" phrase, if it has
any meaning at all? Does it give an answer, or even a hint of
an answer, to the question whether the victory of socialism is
possible in our country? One might have spoken of the histori
cal music of growing socialism both in 1917, when we overthrew
the bourgeoisie, and in 1920, when we ejected the intervention
ists from our country. For it really was the splendid historical
music of growing socialism when we overthrew the bourgeoisie
in 1917 and drove out the interventionists and thereby furnished
the whole world with splendid evidence of the strength and
might of growing socialism in our country. But has it, can it
have, any bearing at all on the question of the possibility of
victoriously building socialism in our country? We can, Trotsky
says, move towards socialism. But can we arrive at socialism?
-
- that is the question. To move towards socialism knowing

that you cannot arrive there is that not folly? No, comrades,
Trotsky's "splendid" phrase about the music and the rest of
it is not an answer to the question, but a lawyer's subterfuge
and a "musical" evasion of the question. (Voices from the
audience: "Quite right!")
I think that this splendid and musical evasion of Trotsky's
may be put on a par with the evasion he resorted to in his
pamphlet The New Course, when defining Leninism. Please
listen to this:
"Leninism, as a system of revolutionary action, presumes a revolution

ary instinct trained by reflection and experience which, in the social
sphere, is equivalent to muscular sensation in physical labour" (L. Trotsky,

The New Course, Krasnaya Nov Publishing House, 1924, p. 47).
Leninism as "muscular sensation in physical labour." New

and original and very profound, is it not? Can you make head
or tail of it? (Laughter.) All that is very colourful and musical,
and, if you like, even splendid. Only one "trifle" is lacking:
a simple and understandable definition of Leninism.
It was just such instances of Trotsky's special fondness for
musical phrases that Lenin had in mind when he wrote, for
example, the following bitter but truthful words about him:
it fondatio
"All that glitters is not gold. There is much glitter and sound in
Trotsky's phrases, but they are meaningless" (see Vol. XVII, p. 383).[¹]
Ju mirum
So much for Trotsky's Towards Socialism or Capitalism?,
which was published in 1925. słońw sib
As to more recent times, 1926, for instance, we have a docu
ment signed by Trotsky of September 1926 which leaves no
doubt whatever that he continues to adhere to his view, which
has been repudiated by the Party. I have in mind Trotsky's

letter to the oppositionists.
Here is what this document says:
"The Leningrad opposition promptly raised the alarm at the slurring
over of differentiation in the countryside, at the increase of the kulaks
and the growth of their influence not only on the elemental economic
processes, but also on the policy of the Soviet Government; at the fact
that in the ranks of our own Party there has arisen, under Bukharin's
patronage, a school of theory which clearly reflects the pressure of the
elemental forces of the petty bourgeoisie in our economy; the Leningrad
opposition vigorously opposed the theory of socialism in one country, as
"**
being a theoretical justification of national narrow-mindedness.
[1] Lenin, Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity.

I. "Factionalism." (1914)
(From the appendices to the verbatim report of the sittings of the Po

litical Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U. (B.), October 8 and 11, 1926, on the
question of the inner-Party situation.)
201
Here, in this document signed by Trotsky, everything is
admitted: the fact that the leaders of the "New Opposition"
have deserted Leninism for Trotskyism, and the fact that
Trotsky continues to adhere fully and unreservedly to his old
position, which is a Social-Democratic deviation in our Party.
Well, and what about the other leaders of the opposition
bloc Smilga or Radek, for example? These people, I think,
-
are also leaders of the opposition bloc. Smilga and Radek

don't they rank as leaders? How do they appraise the position
of the Party, the position of Leninism, on the question of build
UP
ing socialism in our country?
Here is what Smilga, for instance, said in September 1926
in the Communist Academy:
"I affirm," he said, "that he (Bukharin - J. St.) is completely under

the sway of the rehabilitation ideology, that he takes it as proven that the
economic backwardness of our country cannot be an obstacle to com
pletely building a socialist system in Russia. ..
consider that,
inasmuch as we are engaged in socialist construction, we are certainly
building socialism. But, the question arises: Does the rehabilitation
period furnish any basis for testing and revising the cardinal tenet of
Marxism and Leninism, which is that socialism cannot be completely built
in one, technically backward country?"* (Smilga's speech in the Com
munist Academy on the control figures, September 26, 1926.)
That, as you see, is also a "position" which fully coincides

with Mr. Sukhanov's on the basic question of the character
and prospects of our revolution. Is it not true that Smilga's
position fully corresponds with Trotsky's, which I have called,
and rightly called, the position of a Social-Democratic devia
tion? (Voices: "Quite right!")

Can the opposition bloc be held answerable for such pro

nouncements of Smilga's? It can, and must. Has the opposition
bloc ever attempted to repudiate Smilga? No, it has not. On
the contrary, it has given him every encouragement in his pro
nouncements in the Communist Academy.
Then there is the other leader, Radek, who, along with
Smilga, delivered a speech in the Communist Academy and re
duced us to "dust and ashes." (Laughter.) We have a docu
ment which shows that Radek scoffed and jeered at the theory
that socialism can be built in our country, called it a theory of
building socialism "in one uyezd," or even "in one street."
And when comrades in the audience interjected that this theory
is "Lenin's idea," Radek retorted:
"You haven't read

read Lenin very carefully. If Vladimir Ilyich were
alive today he would say that it is a Shchedrin idea. In Shchedrin's The
Pompadours there is a unique pompadour who had the idea of building
liberalism in one uyezd" (Radek's speech in the Communist Academy).
Can Radek's vulgar liberalistic scoffing at the idea of build

ing socialism in one country be regarded as anything but a
complete rupture with Leninism? Is the opposition bloc an
swerable for this vulgar sally of Radek's? It certainly is. Why,
then, does it not repudiate it? Because the opposition bloc has
no intention of abandoning its position of departure from
Leninism.
Whetunz. 90 100 13
6. THE DECISIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF199
THE PROSPECTS OF OUR CONSTRUCTIVE WORK
Chin Frais
It may be asked: Why all these disputes over the character
and prospects of our revolution? Why these disputes over what
will or may happen in the future? Would it not be better to

cast all these disputes aside and get down to practical work?
I consider, comrades, that such a formulation of the question
is fundamentally wrong.
We cannot move forward without knowing where we are to
move to, without knowing the aim of our movement. We
cannot build without prospects, without the certainty that hav
ing begun to build a socialist economy we can complete it.
Without clear prospects, without clear aims, the Party cannot
direct the work of construction. We cannot live according
to Bernstein's prescription: "The movement is everything, the
aim is nothing." On the contrary, as revolutionaries, we must
subordinate our forward movement, our practical work, to the
basic class aim of the proletariat's constructive work. If not,
we shall certainly and inevitably land in the quagmire of
opportunism.
Further, if the prospects of our constructive work are not
clear, if there is no certainty that the building of socialism can
be completed, the working masses cannot consciously partici
pate in this constructive work, and cannot consciously lead the
peasantry. If there is no certainty that the building of socialism
can be completed, there can be no will to build socialism. Who
wants to build knowing that he cannot complete what he is
building? Hence, the absence of socialist prospects for our con
structive work certainly and inevitably leads to the proletariat's
will to build being weakened.
Further, if the proletariat's will to build socialism is weak
ened, that is bound to have the effect of strengthening the
capitalist elements in our economy. For what does building
socialism mean, if not overcoming the capitalist elements in
our economy? Pessimistic and defeatist sentiments in the

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I. Two Methods of Approach to the Mass of the

II. Conscious Democracy and Forced "Democracy"

THE PARTY'S TASKS. Report Delivered at an En

Discussion a Sign of the Party's Strength

Causes of the Discussion 14

The Causes of the Defects 17

How Should the Defects in Internal Party Life Be

THE DISCUSSION, RAFAIL, THE ARTICLES BY

A NECESSARY COMMENT (Concerning Rafail) 45

THE THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.

I. Report on Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs,

II. Reply to the Discussion, January 18 69

THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.),

I. The Facts About the October Uprising 105

II. The Party and the Preparation for October

III. Trotskyism or Leninism? 128

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE TACTICS T

I. The External and Internal Setting for the October HT

II. Two Specific Features of the October Revolution

III. Certain Specific Features of the Tactics of the

IV. The October Revolution as the Beginning of and

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM OF THE

CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE R.C.P.(B.),

THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOUR

TEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P. (B.).

Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Activists of the

I. The International Situation 189

II. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Parties

in the Capitalist Countries 199

III. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Elements

in the Colonial and Dependent Countries 204

IV. The Fate of Socialism in the Soviet Union 206

V. The Party's Policy in the Countryside 218

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.

(B.), December 18-31, 1925 230

Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the

2. Kamenev and Our Concessions to the Peasantry 233

3. Whose Miscalculations? 237

4. How Sokolnikov Protects the Poor Peasants 238

6. Concerning NEP 241

7. Concerning State Capitalism 242

10. The Opposition's Platform 262

II. The Main Thing in Leninism 271

III. The Question of "Permanent" Revolution 273

IV. The Proletarian Revolution and the Dictatorship HT

V. The Party and the Working Class in the System

VI. The Question of the Victory of Socialism in One

VII. The Fight for the Victory of Socialist Construction 331

III. The "Revolutionary" Words and Opportunist

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEVIATION IN OUR

PARTY. Report Delivered at the Fifteenth All-Union

7. What Is the Opposition Bloc Counting on? 392

II. The Principal Error of the Opposition Bloc 394

1. Preliminary Remarks 40 TAMBOR 395

4. The Passing Over of the "New Opposition" to

7. The Political Prospects of the Opposition Bloc 427

III. The Political and Organisational Errors of the

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE REPORTE