Concepção Do Estado Weber

Max Weber's Conception of the State
Author(s): Karl Dusza

Source: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn,
1989), pp. 71-105
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20006938
Accessed: 24-10-2016 01:42 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal of
Politics, Culture, and Society
This content downloaded from 207.162.240.147 on Mon, 24 Oct 2016 01:42:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Max Weber's Conception of the State
Karl Dusza
There is documentary and interpretive evidence to the effect that

Weber intended to write a systematic treatise on the state. His
sudden death in the summer of 1920 prevented him from realizing
his plan. Instead of a finished product, he left behind only fragments
and occasional writings (Weber 1958a) bearing, directly or indirectly,
on the problem of the state. This article is based on a larger work of
the author, in which he has attempted to reconstruct from these
fragmentary writings the planned sociology of the state. The
reconstruction has been undertaken in the belief that, contrary to
conventional interpretations dwelling upon the "types of legitimate
authority," Weber's political sociology, and current political reality
as well, can only be adequately understood by focusing on the state
as a structurally specific and historically unique organization of the
rule of men over men.
Modern political sociology in general, and its Anglo-American
variants in particular, projects a picture of politics in which there is
no place for an all-encompassing political institution such as the
state. The victorious "revolution in the behavioral sciences" rejected
the term "state" itself and everything it implied as the remnants of
an "outmoded" approach to politics. (Easton, 1953; Truman, 1955;
Eulau, 1963). The term "state" lived on in Marxism, but the class of
objects that it denoted was not identified exactly; it was used only as
a catchword for the designation of the "political superstructure,"
which, in the interpretive paradigm of Marxism, is a set of ephemeral
phenomena whose "real" organizing principles are to be found
outside their own domain: in the "economic substructure," that is.
Recent works by the so-called neo-Marxists have not gotten farther
than attributing to the state a greater degree of "autonomy" than
was proposed by Marx and Engels. (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas,
1975; Jessop, 1982).
Theoretical weakness and conceptual laxity characterize even the
studies in mainstream social science that, tinged with Marxism,
want to "bring the state back in." The term is just thrown into
scholarly pieces about "war making," the patterns of income
distribution, corporatism in Europe, the American welfare system,
International Journal of
Politics, Culture, and Society
Volume 3, Number 1, Fall 1989 71 1989 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
72 Politics, Culture, and Society
and many other topics that, in the intention of the authors, are to be
treated from the aspect of their relationship to "the state" (Evans,
Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985). There are even studies that set out
to investigate the development of the state, without making a serious
effort at defining the subject the development of which is to be
investigated (Tilly, 1975).
This article has two goals: to clarify the concept of the state as a
specific organization of political rule and thus to highlight the
background that imparts modern politics its characteristic features.
The noted political theorist, Michael Oakeshott, writes that a new
and extensive vocabulary is needed to describe what he calls the
"modern European state" (1975, pp. 319-320). But while Professor
Oakeshott has cleared a great deal of the "conceptual muddle"
writings about the state tend to get into, he has not gotten very far in
suggesting a new vocabulary. This article will not only provide this
vocabulary, but it will also show what emergent social relationships
have called for it.
This author agrees with the "behaviorists" that collective terms
like the state are empty words unless one can determine what
corresponds to them in the empirical world. But he rejects their
thesis that there is no such thing as a "state" in the sensible world of
human affairs because there are only behavior patterns there. What
about a certain pattern of behavior and the consciousness of the
existence of this pattern, hence behavior having a definite pattern,
what about this being "the state?"
This brings us directly to Max Weber. For Weber assigned to
sociology the conscious realization of the fact that every social
entity, be it a class, a status group, a religious, economic or political
body, state or empire, capitalism or barter economy, can eventually
be traced to human conduct as its ontological substance. In Weber's
words, "concepts such as 'state,' 'association,' 'feudalism,' and the
like generally indicate for sociology categories of certain kinds of
joint human action; it is therefore the task of sociology to reduce
these concepts to 'understandable' action, meaning without excep?
tion, the action of the participating individual" (Weber, 1981, p. 158).
But Weber did not stop here. One who searches in his Economy
and Society (1968) for a direct application of his outlined program
must be deeply disappointed. There is little mention in his sub?
stantive works of action and communication, of individual actors
orienting their behavior to the expectation of others. The pages of
Economy and Society depict status groups, classes, parties and
other collective units of people confronting each other in an un?
ceasing sequence of wars, conquest, subjugation and domination;
Karl Dusza 73
from the never-ceasing clashes between such groups emerge cities,

kingdoms and empires, their continued existence secured by a
mixture of brute force, unquestioned usages, and invented and
rationalized doctrines.
Now, why did Weber do the opposite of what his "methodological
individualism" would seem to suggest. Why this discrepancy, noted
by some commentators (Andreski, 1964; Mommsen, 1974), between
the program Weber assigned to sociology and its actual realization?
In fact, there is no discrepancy here. The alleged contrast in Weber
between his "action frame of reference" and the actual practice of
structural-formal analysis is not a symptom of intellectual schizo?
phrenia, but is a reflection of the very nature of social reality that
thought tries to explore. Weber was fully aware that combined action
of a plurality of individuals results in something sui generis, which
cannot be reduced to the action of the one, not even of multiple ones.
From the combination of "unit acts" there emerge ever more
complicated structures, the complexity of which at one point reaches
a degree where they appear as an objective, external bond standing
over against the acting agents. The mode, therefore, in which the
constellation of actions is constituted and sustained is more
important than the "unit acts." By virtue of coercion, legitimacy and
objectified systems of meaning, particular actions are integrated
into organized complexes, collective units. While embodied in the
action of concrete individuals, these entities exist as more or less
stable formations amid the transitory individual manifestations.
Hence the possibility of structural analysis as Weber practiced it in
Economy and Society (Winckelmann, 1966, p. 230).
Institutions as the Struggle for Power
The significance in this paradigm of the concept of the state as an

objectified structure of political rule is (or should be) obvious.
According to Weber, power and struggle are primordial components
of social life; they are the very stuff out of which politics is composed
(Weber, 1958b, pp. 78, 116; Weber, 1968, p. 55). Neither power nor
struggle exists, however, in its abstract essentiality (Freund 1968).
Embodied in concrete social actions they give rise to particular
structures in which power is institutionalized and in the framework
of which power is contested. There is thus more to politics than
"struggle for power;" there are institutional structures which,
although themselves but the resultants and the mode of organization
of social action, give concrete form and direction to political

struggle.
Weber was also aware, more than anybody else, we believe, that
like all social phenomena, political institutions are historically
changing. An adequate understanding of the politics of any histor?
ical epoch (including the one we live in) presupposes then a
knowledge of the specific institutional context in which the struggle
for power, a phenomenon that cannot be eliminated from social life,
has taken, or, is taking place. The bulk of Weber's sociology of
domination is devoted to the analysis of these institutions (Roth,
1968; Winckelmann, 1964; Winckelmann, 1965). Because of his early
death, however, exactly those components of his work remained
unfinished that would have identified the institutional matrix of
modern politics. That matrix he called "the state," which he
conceived as a historically and structurally specific organization of
the rule of men over men.
The purpose of a sociology of the state is, therefore, to identify
these structural traits, to show how the specific structures developed
in the course of history amid incessant struggles of people for the
right to command others, and to make conceptually clear how a
specific organization of political rule influences the exercise of power
as well as the struggle for its appropriation and redistribution.
Modes of Conceptualization
There are, of course, several ways in which such a complex

phenomenon as the state can be approached. The German historian
Otto Hintze lists the following "forms of appearance" of the
"modern state" (1962, p. 476):
(a) the sovereign power-state in the framework of the European

system of states;
(b) The relatively closed commercial state based on the capitalist
mode of production;
(c) the liberal legal-constitutional state with its emphasis on
individual rights and liberties;
(d) the democratic nation-state.
In his review of a handful of recent studies in which the state is

central, Stephen Krasner discerns four different conceptualizations
of the state (1984):
Karl Dusza 75
(a) the state as government, that is, as a set of personnel

occupying decisional authority in the polity;
(b) the state as an administrative apparatus and as an institu?
tionalized legal order;
(c) the state as ruling class;
(d) the state as a normative order.
Weber's conceptualization of the state covers several of the above

approaches, but it is not identical with any one of them. For Weber
the sovereign power-state tends to be identical with the nation-state,
which, regarding its internal structure, is constituted as a liberal
democratic state securing individual liberties and allowing the
voluntaristic interplay of conflicting interests. In the process of such
institutionally secured competition the personnel of highest
decisional authority is selected. This personnel, the government, has
at its disposal an administrative apparatus that functions according
to set rules. All powers of command in the political community are in
the form of official jurisdictions created and regulated by a norn^a
tive order. Consequently, the ruling class is more or less identical
with the group of persons who are incumbent in offices in Which
powers of command are vested.
The above is not, however, a definition but only a summary
paraphrase of the different aspects that are integrated in Weber's
conception of the state. The real significance of his approach is that
it aims at comprehending structural traits that cut across "forms of
appearance" and even substantive domains because they refer to the
specific modes in which social actions are interrelated. His approach
also integrates and transcends the purely "historical" in the
phenomena under investigation. For Weber, the historical specificity
of the state consists in the specificity of its organization. That is to
say, what makes the state historically unique is not its existence in a
limited period of time, but the specific mode in which political rule is
organized.
A Preliminary Definition
At the end of Chapter One of Economy and Society (1968, p. 56)

Weber identifies the state with the following characteristics:
(a) the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical

force within a given territory;
(b) centralization of the material and the ideal means of rule;

(c) planned distribution of the powers of command among various
"organs" (a rational constitution);
(d) an administrative and legal order which claim binding
authority not only over the members of the state, the citizens,
but to a large extent over all actions taking place within its
area of jurisdiction;
(e) subjection to change of this order through "legislation"
(Satzung);
(f) organized activities oriented to the enforcement and reali?
zation of this order (an administrative staff);
(g) regulation of the competition for political offices and selection
of the bearers of rulership according to established rules.
These historically dominant characteristics can be expressed, and

actually are expressed by Weber, in more abstract terms; in those
"basic sociological terms," namely, by which Weber in Part One of
Economy and Society attempts to conceptualize the objectively
possible structural forms of complexes of social action. The purpose
of increased abstraction is to bring out the pure organizational traits
of the state as a specific structure of political rule.
Thus by applying the concept Anstalt, a quasi-corporative com?
pulsory institution, to the state, Weber means to emphasize the
impersonality of political rule, the character of its order (established
rules), the mode of the validity of this order (compulsory), the ration?
al distribution of the powers of command (jurisdictions), hence their
organization as a system of offices. The term Betrieb refers to the
exercise of the powers of command as a continuous, persistent
sphere of activity (Geschaeft) adapted to day-to-day needs (routin
ized). It implies, then, the existence of a bureaucratic administrative
apparatus. Linking the static concept of Anstalt with the dynamic
concept of Betrieb?Anstaltsbetrieb or Betriebsanstalt?suggests
that as a state political rule is a continuous activity of a plurality of
men, specified by set rules, and exercising the powers of command
not on the basis of personal authority and according to their own
whim, but on the basis of impersonal norms established by enact?
ment. In other words, the capacity of an individual to issue
commands binding on others does not have its source in his person,
but is derived from a normatively defined set of impersonal "compe?
tences." As a state, political power is depersonalized and rule bound.
The exercise of power is an office. To acquire the incumbency of an
office (or offices) is what political struggle in the state is about.
Karl Dusza 77
Those, therefore, for whom the notion of the state as a set of formal
arrangements is of no significance because, as they say, "no causal
relationship exists between the structure of the governmental
mechanism and the actual location of power" (Loewenstein, 1957, p.
26) are patently wrong. It follows analytically from what was said
above and it can also be ascertained empirically that in the modern
state there is a strong correlation between the normatively assigned
and actual possession of power. While the realization of one's will
despite the resistance of the other, which is Weber's definition of
power, can take place on different grounds and in different ways,
that kind of power which works with authoritative command
supported by the threat or application of physical violence is
inseparably linked in the modern state to a legitimate office created
by the normative-legal order of the political community. That this
order itself is the outcome of past struggles between different forces
in the community is another matter. Once established, the system of
normatively anchored powers acquires a life of its own and limits,
even determines, the forms and the resolution of conflicts in the
political community (Krasner, 1984, p. 225; Skocpol, 1985, p. 21).
Historical Uniqueness and Structural Specificity
More will be said below how (and how not) the structural form of
the political community designated as "state" constrains and
conditions the struggle for and the exercise of political power. Before
we get there we have to gain a clearer picture of what the state is than
is provided by the above outline of its chief characteristics. The term
"state" will here be used without any qualifier, for the reason that, as
was said above, what it signifies is a historically unique and
structurally specific organization of political rule. The past has
known a great variety of political formations: fortress kingdom,
aristocratic polis, citizen polis, bureaucratic city monarchy, liturgy
monarchy, bureaucratic empire, warrior communism, sacral king?
ship, urban signoria, Staendestaat, etc. (Weber, 1976a). All these are
historical instances of political organization, that is to say, institu?
tionalized forms of the regulation of the interrelation of the
inhabitants of a given territory by the threat or application of
physical force (Weber, 1968, p. 901). But none of them is a "state."
"For our purposes it remains expedient to use the term 'state' in a
narrower way," Weber writes (1968, p. 1142). What he means is not
just that for the purposes of a particular mode of analysis it is

appropriate to restrict the use of a specific concept for specific
phenomena. This would only mean that in an alternative theoretical
framework it would be justifiable to use the term in its indiscriminate
meaning. But concepts in general, and concepts designating political
reality in particular, are not neutral terms. "All political concepts,
images, and terms," writes Carl Schmitt, "have a polemical mean?
ing. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a
specific situation" (1976, p. 30).
The "state" is markedly a time- and condition-bound concept. In
fact, the singularity and historical novelty of the form of political
organization we are dealing with is implied by the historical novelty
of the very term with which it came to be signified. There is
considerable controversy among specialists as to the origins of the
term "state" (Dowdal, 1923; Kern, 1949; Meyer, 1950; Mager, 1968;
Skalweit, 1975; Mansfield, 1983). To us the most plausible explana?
tion is that the "state" is derived from the Latin status, a term which
in Roman Antiquity denoted a person's legal position. During the
final phases of the middle Ages, status had acquired a broader
meaning by its tranference from a person to a legally organized body
of men. (This also had precedence in Roman usage, as Ulpian's
expression status reiRomanae indicates.) In late medieval and early
modern political usage status denoted the form of government or
constitution. Thus Thomas Aquinas, in connection with the
Aristoteleian concepts of aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy,
spoke of status optimatum, status paucorum, and status popularis.
Likewise Jean Bodin distinguished between ?tat populaire and etat
royal, and Hobbes wrote of status monarchicus, status demo
craticus, and status mixus. But for the designation of the body politic
as such, Bodin used res publica and Hobbes used civitas. The first
traces of the modern usage of the term appeared during the Italian
renaissance in the wake of the development of the institution of
podesta. Thepodesta was a political entrepreneur who, in possession
of a power-apparatus, sold his services to a city or a prince. This
apparatus and its proper use in the maintenance or acquisition of
political rule came to be designated by the word stato, most
prominently in Machiavelli's writings. It was, however, only in the
political parlance of the nineteenth century that "state" acquired the
meaning of the supreme political authority within a precisely
defined territory. This meaning grew out of a pertinent political
reality characterized by the sovereignty of the ruler, the territorial
validity of his rule, the existence of permanent military and
administrative bodies, the separation of the private sphere and the
Karl Dusza 79
public sphere, the opposition of political power, having either the

form of princely rule or that of a unitary public power separate from
both the ruler and the ruled, to "civil society" (Riedel 1975).
Approximations to some of these conditions or rudiments of the
individual traits characteristic of the state may be found in histor?
ically earlier political formations. But, Weber says, "no matter how
many beginnings may be found in the past, in its full development
all this is specifically modern" (Weber, 1958c, p. 295). Applying the
term "state" generically presents, then, the danger that either the
characteristics of the current form of political rule are carried over
into other historical epochs, or, to avoid this fallacy, the analysis
remains on such a level of generality that concrete differences will
not count. The result is the the same in both cases: the specific,
inherent reality of phenomena under investigation remain hidden.
This fallacy was especially characteristic of the "general theories
of the state" mass-produced in Weber's times in Germany (and
France, one should add) as well as of the "origin of the state" theories
(Beyer 1931). While Weber moved with ease in the conceptual
universe of Staatslehre, he opposed its claims that its concepts had
timeless and universal validity. He held that what the "theories of
the state" referred to was a unique historical phenomenon. For this
same reason, Weber attributed little significance to contemporary
theories of the "origins of the state." What Engels, Oppenheimer and
countless others saw as the origins of the state, Weber understood as
the emergence of political rule as a separate structure in the
undifferentiated conditions of a primitive community (1968, pp.
901-902). According to Weber the state developed out of patrimonial
and feudal structures of domination?both historically advanced
and differentiated forms of the rule of men over men.
The way, however, Weber understands the historic positional
value of the state is not that of historiography. Weber was well aware
of what a philosopher termed the "history locked in the object"
(Adorno, 1983, p. 295), but he delivered this history in a way he held
to be specifically sociological. From a sociological viewpoint, the
historical specificity of social phenomena, as sets of social actions,
consists in the specific structural forms that those actions take. On
the other hand, specific structures, as particular modes of the
organization of social actions, can develop only in the medium of
history, the mode of Being of human reality (Kurt H. Wolff, 1950, p.
16). The sociologically relevant history, however, is not progression
in time. Time is only the neutral medium in which the empirical
manifoldness of social life develops. Weber's grandiose disregard for
"dates," his practice of specifying time and place by vague ex
pressions like "at the beginning of English constitutional history"

(1968, p. 724) and particularly his practice of relating to each other
events centuries apart, are not symptoms of his lack of historical
sense, but stem from his sociological perspective. From "actual
history" Weber abstracts in such a way that only those aspects of it
are noted and drawn into analysis that contribute to the emergence
and consolidation of specific contents and structural forms of social
action.
The Emergence of the State
Given the specific structural characteristics of the state, its

formation can be understood as involving:
(1) monopolization of the use of legitimate force,

(a) expropriation of the autonomous bearers of political rule,
(b) appropriation of the material means of power,
(c) its concentration in the hands of a "supreme ruler;"
(2) Vergesellschaftung of the exercise of political rule, that is,
(a) the creation of a body of officials,
(b) whose continuous activities,
(c) regulated by set rules,
(d) serve as transmitters of the will of the supreme ruler;
(3) fusion of autonomous power-blocks into an all-encompassing
compulsory association with
(a) a territorial basis,
(b) a unitary legal order,
(c) a unitary public power (Staatsgewalt), and
(d) a system of relationships of direct obedience to and
protection by the public power;
(4) the transfer of the fullness of powers from the person of the
ruler to an impersonal institution, which,
(a) as the embodiment of the will of the politically united
people (Volk, nation),
(b) expressed by the mediation of representative bodies,
(c) becomes the bearer and trustee of all prerogatives of
command and physical coercion.
This scheme serves only heuristic and expository purposes. It

identifies, in the form of ideal-typical representation, certain general
tendencies in the development of the organization of political rule
Karl Dusza 81
that led to the formation of the state. It does not suggest "historical
laws" in the sense of Hegelian-Marxian philosophy: concrete
phenomena are not their emanations, nor do they prevail by
necessity against "historical accidents" (Weber, 1949, pp. 102-103).
The formation of a structure of political rule we call "the state" was a
sequence of "accidents" neither guaranteed nor guided by the
Absolute Spirit or by Objective History. The lines of development
ideal-typically imputed to the empirical historical process are not
even components of an evolutionary scheme suggesting a standard
sequence of developments that every political community has to
pass through. Political entities constituted as quasi-corporative
compulsory associations (Anstalten) with continuous operation and
with the monopoly of legitimate violence, viz., states, are the product
of a wholly individual historical process of what Weber calls the
Occidental world (1976b, p. 16-17).
Weber underscores a number of features in European con?
stitutional history which were "typically relevant" in this respect:
(a) the settlement of barbarian tribes with a characteristic

political organization (war-lords, warrior-kingship, military
retinue, popular assemblies);
(b) the nature of Occidental feudalism ("free feudalism" based on
contract; fealty and fief combined), which resulted in the
appropriation of the powers of command by "officials" and
enfeoffed lords;
(c) the evolving dualism of the Estates and the prince;
(d) the nature of Occidental Christianity (devoid of magic);
(e) the quasi-corporative, institutional (anstaltliche) organiza?
tion and cosmopolitan character of the Catholic Church;
(f) the conflict between Imperium and Sacerdotium;
(g) the nature of the Occidental city as a "sworn fraternity" and
an autonomous community (civitates superiorem non
recognescentes);
(h) the largely uninhibited development of capitalistic interests;
(i) the rational character of Canon law and Roman law.
Unlike its Oriental forms, patrimonialism in the Occident meant

the basis of the power of the many great and petty lords, and not the
unconditional supremacy of one central ruler. The latter also derived
his power from his status as a patrimonial lord, but for this same
reason he was confronted by other patrimonial "lords in their own
right" or attached to him by the ties of vassalage. The ruler's power
was thus restricted from the very beginning. For all the efforts to
restore the unity of the Occidental world in the form of an imperial

overlordship, a multi-centered political body came into being, the
constituent parts of which were set on a course of independent
development. The rulers of the individual territorial-political units
increasingly asserted their independence from the imperial overlord
and related to each other as equals. The ensuing struggles between
the polities accelerated the internal centralization of power and
strengthened the position of the territorial rulers, who, by the
beginning of the modern era, emerged as national kings. Even as
national kings, however, the rulers everywhere were confronted by
the Estates. Their modus vivendi was institutionalized in the form of
a Staendestaat: a system of mutual constraints between the ruler
and the meliores et maiores constituted as corporative associations.
These unique features of European constitutional development set
the stage for the decisive drama of "state-building:" the struggle for
power between the prince and the estates, and between the rising
territorial political bodies. In general, Weber interprets the develop?
ment of the structures of political domination as a dynamic process
the substance of which is the clashes between competing powers.
The history of politics is for Weber basically this: on the one hand,
the institutionalization of the powers of command (typical organiza?
tional forms); on the other hand, the emergence of power-blocs and
the competition of the powerful either (a) to transform their socially
pre-eminent position into political prerogatives, or (b) to acquire
political prerogatives in addition to their social ones, or (c) to acquire
the incumbency of political offices (typical conflicts). "Typical
organizational forms" and "typical conflicts" are, however, only
two aspects of one and the same process: it is in the medium of
conflicts between the powerful, in their struggle about the allocation,
appropriation, expropriation, and redistribution of power that the
institutions develop. The latter are but the resultants and modes of
organization of particular conflicts between political actors.
The "heroic age" of the development of the modern state is
represented by the ruler's drive to monopolize the material and ideal
means of rulership and to assert the royal supremacy vis-a-vis the
Estates. In these struggles the ruler was able to draw on the many
prerogatives and resources pertaining exclusively to royal lordship,
such as
(a) his protective powers (royal mundeburdium, king's peace, ban

on feuds and private armies);
(b) his powers as a military leader (Heerban);
(c) his status as a feudal overlord (dominus ligius ante omnes);
Karl Dusza 83
(d) his resources as the greatest landlord (the royal domain);

(e) the regalia (power of taxation, tolls, and various monopolies).
The struggle of the ruler against the Estates resulted everywhere,

Weber claims, in the resurgence of patriomonialism: a princely
bureaucracy and a standing army, supported by compulsory and
systematic taxation, were created, which were destined to dissolve
the Staendestaat (1968, p. 1087). The king came to be regarded as
embodying in his person the whole realm, in whose hands was
concentrated the fullness of powers; he, therefore, did not tolerate
powers not derived from his sovereign will. "Sovereignty" thus came
to mean not just a particular form or quality of political authority,
but political authority itself, "in its own essential substance"
(Gierke, 1934, pp. 41-42).
This political authority resides in the king as the famous, though
fictitious, slogan "l'Etat, c'est moi" makes clear. It expresses,
however, not simply the absolutistic claims of the ruler, which is
implied already by the very concept of sovereignty, but the "repre?
sentative" character of the latter; the idea, namely, that in his
person the king, as the supreme earthly authority, absorbs the whole
body politic. In the?assuredly real?words of Louis XIV: "The king
represents the nation as a whole, and no individual represents
another individual against the king. Consequently, all power, all
authority resides in the king . . . The nation is not embodied in
France: it resides in its entirety in the person of the king" (Jellinek,
1905, p. 658).
Subsequent developments concern the decoupling of summum
Imperium from the person of the ruler and its attachment to the body
politic as such, conceived as an impersonal entity of corporative
nature. This qualitative leap in the realm of ideas was prepared by a
number of real life developments, among others, by the fact that the
princely bureaucracy had outgrown its creator and had acquired a
life of its own. The administrative machinery and the standing
army, which remained as stable formations amid the coming and
going of particular rulers, became the visible embodiments of the
unity of the realm. The idea of the transpersonality of the political
association emerged, finding its ultimate expression in the juristic
concept of the personality of the state. It demolished the repre?
sentative-patrimonial conception of rulership by separating the
sovereignty of the state from the sovereignty of the ruler. The ruler
and all physical persons or groups of persons came to be regarded as
mandatories, "organs," of the state, the latter being the subject and
the bearer of all prerogatives of rulership.
The State: A Quasi-Corporate, Compulsory Institution
Neither the publicistic theories of the Middle Ages nor the natural
law theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries conceived
the political commonwealth in terms of an abstract, legal person
(Gierke, 1958; Gierke, 1934; Haefelin, 1959, pp. 24-66). The conception
of the unity of the body politic in the natural law theories is based on
the medieval doctrine of contract and aims either at attacking
princely sovereignty or at legitimizing it. In neither case is the
political association conceived as an impersonal entity separated
from and posited above all its members. For Althusius, Grotius, and
Locke, the civitas is identical with the community of citizens, the
populus. For Hobbes, the unity of the civitas is represented by the
person of the ruler (in monarchies) or by that of the rulers (in
aristocracies and democracies) (Quaritsch, 1970, p. 477; Gierke, 1934,
p. 137).
The State as a Legal Person
Only in nineteenth century German Staatslehre is the conception

of the state as a legal personality, and hence as the subject of the
prerogatives of rulership, elaborated in all its details, becoming the
foundation?pro or contra?of theoretical discussions of the state
and politics in Germany, France, and Italy (Haefelin, 1959, p. 66).
The concrete political motives underlying these juristic theories
are most varied; they stemmed as much from legitimist-monarchical
convictions as from liberal-democratic ideologies (Quaritsch, 1970,
p. 487; Emerson, 1928, p. 51). Still, a conception that attributed a
separate, juristic personality to the Herrschaftsverband as such,
and thus asserted the separateness of the ruler and the state, not
only undermined the monarchical conception of the absorptive
representative character of the ruler, but implied the subjection to
legal-normative legitimation and regulation of the exercise of the
powers of rulership (Thoma, 1926, p. 749; H. J. Wolff, 1933, vol. 1, pp.
2-3). The state thus came to be conceived not just as a system of
power relationships but as a complex of empowerments, of duties
and rights, in short, as a system of legal relations. The unity of the
Herrschaftsverband is given both by its organization and by its
normative embodiment, the legal order.
The abstract concept of the state as a legal personality may cover
the most varied institutional arrangements (Regierungstypen;
Karl Dusza 85
systems of government). It is equally valid for a constitutional

monarchy and a republic. Common to both is impersonal character
of the exercise of political rule given by the distinctiveness and unity
of public power. There are, however, marked differences between the
two Staatstypen as to what component of the political community is
elevated to the rank of a distinct legal personality embodying the
interdependency and integration of concrete institutions.
The principal difference concerns the relation of the state and the
nation (nation, Volk). In French legal theory, influenced by the
republicanism of Rousseau, the state is the juristically personified
"people," the legal form of the "nation" as a politically and mentally
united plurality of individuals. "The powers of the state belong to the
nation," wrote the famous French jurist, Carre de Malberg (1920, p.
13). In the equally striking words of Esmein: "The state is the legal
personification of the nation; it is the subject and the basis of public
authority" (1927, p. 1).
In the German Staatslehre of the nineteenth century, corres?
ponding to constitutional reality, the Volk is just an element, an
"organ" among other "organs," of the state. As mere organs, neither
the Volk nor the ruler is sovereign. Sovereignty belongs to the state
as such. The state is the holder of all sovereign powers, it is a
Herrschaftsverband, the organizational embodiment and unifi?
cation of the capacities of rulership. It is this organization which is
personified as an ideal unity, and not the Volk or the ruler (H. J.
Wolff, 1933, vol. 1, p. 435).
Weber's conception of the state as principally a Machtapparat, an
apparatus of power, is rooted in this perspective. It was not by
chance that from the vast conceptual armory of the legally oriented
Staatslehre Weber picked the term Anstalt and, integrating it into
his system of sociological terms (soziologische Kategorienlehre),
applied it for the designation of the structural form of the state. The
use of Anstalt (a quasi-corporative, compulsory institution) rather
than Koerpershaft (corporation), is intended to emphasize that the
state is not the embodiment of the united will of the people, but an
instrument of power, of which the people is more the object than the
subject (Weber, 1968, p. 645).
A review of the meanings in which nineteenth-century juris?
prudence used the terms Anstalt and corporation will make the
above distinction more precise (H. J. Wolff, 1933, vol. 1, pp. 1-87).
Where an association of persons is to be endowed with juristic
personality, it can be constructed in two possible ways: as a
Koerperschaft and as an Anstalt. Common to both is the hypo
statization of the abstract unity of the association, the fact, namely,
that "a perceptively not experienceable unity of wills is transformed

into a person transcending the individual members" (Gierke, 1954,
p. 968). The result is a separation of the legal sphere of the members
as individuals from the legal sphere of the association. The legal
relations of the latter do not affect the individual members but are
imputed to the separately constituted associational unit.
The differences between Anstalt and Koerperschaft concern the
criteria of associational membership as well as the source of
associational will. As a corporation (Koerperschaft) the body of
members is constituted as a fixed group of persons (Weber, 1968, p.
707). These persons, who acquire the status of membership according
to fixed rules, are as a whole the source and "carriers" of associ?
ational will, the administration of which is carried on by virtue of
their mandate.
By contrast, the Anstalt has no organized body of members but
only "organs" by which it is represented and which operate on
behalf of a group of people determined according to certain objective
criteria or according to the discretion of the organs (Weber, 1968, pp.
707-708). These people are not the "carriers" of the juristic person,
but are the passive object (the Destinaere) of the activity of its
organs. They may have some influence on the management of the
affairs of the Anstalt, but this influence is not founded normatively.
According to Gierke, the difference between Anstalt and
Koerperschaft stems from the dualism of fellowship
(Genossenschaft) and lordship (Herrschaft) (1954, pp. 958-971). To
the former corresponds the concept of Koerperschaft, to the latter
that of Anstalt. In a Koerperschaft it is the empirically existing
unity of the members that is transformed into an imaginary unity
and constituted as a person. In an Anstalt it is the empirical lord and
his will that are transformed into a legal person. The corporation
is then a fellowship, the legal form of the associated wills of the
members, while the Anstalt is a Herrschaftsverband, the legal
organizational form of the exercise of some kind of rulership.
When Weber adopted the term Anstalt and integrated it into his
sociology, he stripped it of its legal-technical meanings, but retained
its essential characteristic as a concept expressing the very principle
of political domination: organized force confronting individuals, the
"compulsory members of the association," as if from the outside. As
an Anstalt, the state is considered not as the embodiment of the
unified will of its constituent parts, but as a specific organization of
the control and administration ofthat will, however generated. The
functional and organizational aspects and not the substance or the
goals of political power step thus into the foreground. The principal
Karl Dusza 87
actors in this perspective are not the totality of the members of the
political community, but the office-holders, "the rulers and their
staffs." It is in their normatively regulated acts that the existence of
a political association, as a cause and effect complex, can be
experienced directly.
The Monopoly of Legitimate Physical Violence
The fusion of all prerogatives of command and physical coercion

in a "unitary public power" and the formation of a relationship of
direct obedience to and protection by the public power, have created
a basis for political power that contrasts sharply with conditions
that prevailed in Europe up to the Age of Absolutism. Nowhere is
this contrast sharper than with respect to the conditions and
organization of violence as the specific means of political domina?
tion. An association that monopolizes legitimate physical force and
maintains this monopoly in a definite area of the earth's surface has
not always been here, but is a late product of history.
The political bodies of the Occidental Middle Ages were so
constituted that none of their constituent parts had the right, not to
mention the capacity, to issue commands binding on all members,
and none of them had the exclusive right to back up commands by
physical force. The right to violence was diffused all over the
political association, so that, as Brunner puts it, "every member
owned part of the executive power" (1965, p. 55). Not only was there
no monopoly of force by the prince, but he who by status qualifi?
cations was denied the right to bear arms, was excluded from the
political association. The latter was not a group of persons subject to
an order sustained by the force-monopoly of an "impersonal organi?
zation" (Anstalt), but was an "association of persons" exercising
rulership as a personal right, including the right to violence (Weber,
1968, pp. 643, 670, 712, 843).
By singling out the monopoly of legitimate violence as the chief
characteristic of the state, Weber clearly separates the latter from
the political associations that historically preceded it. But that same
characteristic sets the state apart from all other concurrently
existing associations. The state, Weber says, differs from all other
associations with respect to the drastic nature of its means of
ultimate control, viz. physical violence. The state is today the only
association that successfully claims the right to apply physical force
in the maintenance of its order (Weber, 1968, pp. 54-56, 904; Weber,
1958b, p. 78; Weber, 1958d, p. 334). Other associations may apply

physical force only to the extent permitted, more precisely, prescribed
by the state. No individual has this right on his own. He can
legitimately resort to violence only in his capacity as a repre?
sentative, an "organ," of the state.
The monopolization of violence by the coercive apparatus of the
state has been accompanied, then, by the spread of pacification, i.e.,
the gradual separation of those aspects of the relations between men
that are based on force, from the rest of human relations (Weber,
1981, p. 173). "When a monopoly of force is formed," writes Norbert
Elias, "pacified social spaces are created which are normally free
from acts of violence" (1982, p. 236). The relations between men
acquire that pacifistic-moralistic character that is considered the
very essence of social living. But this "radical moralization" of the
communal life is only possible because the threat of physical force,
as the ultimate guarantor of the order of the community, has been
"confined to barracks" and from "this storehouse it breaks out only
in extreme cases" (Elias, 1982, p. 238). Violence is banned, taken out,
so to speak, from human relations, not in order to get rid of it forever,
but to transfer it into a separate sphere. Force is not eliminated from
society, but is deposited and stored in a separate domain of its own,
from which it might and does spread out into the whole community.
As an association that has the monopoly of force, the state is the
supreme authority within a definite territorial area. Weber is rather
equivocal on this point, claiming that "the assumption that a state
'exists' only if the coercive means of the political community are
superior to all other communities, is not sociological" (1968, p. 316).
He refers, among other things, to ecclesiastical law, which is valid
independently of the state and can even come to conflict with state
law, as happened, for example, in Bismarck's Germany.
To put Weber's dictum concerning the supremacy of the state's
power into proper perspective we have to recall his definition of law
as a system of norms for the enforcement of which some kind of
coercive apparatus is available. Not all law is state-law, but all those
norms that are enforced by some agency are "law." Now since the
exercise of physical coercion has become the monopoly of the
political community, the enforcement by any other association of its
own autonomously created norms is reduced to "psychological
coercion" in the broadest sense of the term. While this kind of
coercion, for instance, ostracism, can be as effective as direct
physical coercion, it has limits in two important respects: it can be
directed only against the "associational members," and it does not
include any kind of punishment. With respect to the former: if the
Karl Dusza 89
member quits the association, it loses its jurisdiction over him. With
respect to the latter: the breach of associational norms is a "crime"
only if it is stipulated by state-law, and can, accordingly, be
punished as such only by the state. Any other association than the
state has, then, only limited jurisdiction over an always precisely
delimited plurality of individuals (Weber, 1968, pp. 695, 699, 904).
The validity of associational norms is based, so to speak, on the
principle of personality, while the validity of state-law is based on
the principle of territoriality. Concerning the difference in the type of
coercion: an association has Disziplinaergewalt, disciplinary power;
the state has Herrschergewalt, in principle unconditional and
irresistible power (Jellinek 1905, p. 415).
According to Jellinek, the character of state-power as Herrschen is
the criterion that distinguishes the state from any other association.
To Jellinek's concept of Herrschergewalt corresponds Weber's force
monopoly of the state. It is because the state has arrogated to itself
the right to physical coercion that it is an "irresistible power" able to
enforce its norms unconditionally. It does not have to invoke the
power of other associations, but is able to generate by itself the
necessary powers and set them in motion by its own autonomous
will. The concept of sovereignty expresses basically this: negatively,
the opposition of the state-power to the power of other associations;
positively, the autonomous and autocephalous character of the
state. The power of the state is a General- und Blankovollmacht, a
generalized and systematic potential to create the ever necessary
means and competence to the enforcement of its rules (Krueger, 1964,
p. 829).
Political Rule and Legal Norms
The monopoly of physical violence is the defining attribute of the

state. It is, however, not the only attribute. In fact, the monopoly of
physical violence makes sense only if it is considered as a component
of a particular constellation of characteristics that are constitutive
for the state. "Territory" is one of these additional characteristics
and is closely related to the monopoly of force. That is to say, the
state's monopoly of force is valid only within the confines of a
definite territorial area. This territorial area is the Staatsgebiet, a
precisely defined space within which the state is authorized to
perform coercive acts (Kelsen, 1961, p. 46). In this respect the
sovereignty of the state means the sovereignty of the state-power as
the supreme and exclusive territorial ordering power (Heller, 1963,

pp. 244-246).
To be an "ordering power" the state needs be more than just a
monopoly of force. Given the nature of action, as conduct oriented
to a meaning, political rule implies the imposition of an order
(Ordnung) and specific guarantees of its validity as an actual object
of action-orientation. Duration and effectiveness of power can only
be secured through the creation of such objectified system of mean?
ings, to which the power-holders normally orient their actions and
in the name of which they demand obedience from the power
addressees (Weber, 1968, pp. 56, 652, 904; Heller, 1931, p. 304).
The peculiar nature of such an objectified system of meanings as a
"rational legal order" and the structural form of the political
community designated as "state" are most intimately interrelated
(Weber, 1968 pp. 655, 809, 846,957). Modern law is "rational" in the
sense that it is planned and is created intentionally, and is therefore
determinate in its meaning, calculable in its impact and infinite in
its applicability. It thus makes possible the "most precise and
practical guidance and regulation of political activity, the least
fallible weighing and balancing of the behavior which constitutes
and activates political power" (Heller, 1931, p. 304). By virtue of its
technical attributes law lends persistence and continuity in time to
the "evanescent and ever-changing manifestations of power"
(Heller, 1931, p. 304) and transforms the empirical constellation of
powers into a normatively structured whole, into a hypothetically
gapless system. The legal order contains authoritative pronounce?
ments as to the residence and incidence of political power. It
determines in a normative, hence generally binding, form the
organs of the political community, the mode of their creation, their
mutual relationship, the circle of their competence, as well as the
status of the individual in his relation to the political community
(Weber, 1968, pp. 642, 644, 652; Jellinek, 1904, p. 491; Loewenstein,
1957, p. 127; Wheare, 1956, pp. 46-75).
This normative plan of dominancy relations is the legal con?
stitution as distinguished from the factual and empirically ascertain
able distribution of power in a community (Loewenstein, 1961).
Constitution in the latter sense, as a characteristic pattern of
subordination, coordination, and superordination of people in
relation to each other, obtains for every political community. But
constitution in the sense of a normative, ideal, planned, and
systematic ordering of the powers of command and of the conditions
of obedience is peculiar to the modern state as a quasi-corporative,
compulsory association.
Karl Dusza 91
The Separation of the Private Sphere and the Public Sphere
The idea that the political community can be created intentionally,

that it can be organized as a unitary system of precisely defined
competences, was necessarily remote from the nature of patrimonial
and feudal structures of domination. Political rule was segmented
into a multitude of overlapping powers appropriated by various
individuals by virtue of special privileges. It was in the juxtaposition
and in the mutual limitation of one holder of privileges with the
power of another one that the political community was constituted.
This rigid structure of "acquired rights" was not amenable to
abstract regulation (Weber, 1968, pp. 1040, 1099). Accordingly,
throughout the Middle Ages constitutio was used either in the sense
of Aristotle's politeia ("a way of life" of the polis), or as denoting, on
the model of Ulpian's definition, certain imperial enactments, such
as the two "constitutions" of Frederick II, concerning the rights of
the spiritual and secular princes, or the Constitutio of Louis the
Bavarian asserting the independence from the Papal Curia of the
election of the emperor (Meisner, 1962).
The modern connotation of the term, referring to a systematic,
comprehensive plan of the total structure of the body politic,
emerged in the wake of the formation of power-centers strong
enough to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of particularistic
powers and to draw these powers into the field of the center's
autonomous operation. As the absolutist prince absorbed in his
person all powers of rulership and regarded every instance of its
exercise as emanating from his own sovereign will, the body politic
came increasingly to be viewed as an objective, calculated, and
willed political entity.
On the other hand, in the wake of the concentration of power in the
hands of the absolutist prince and of its bureaucracy, political
authority, as Habermas puts it, "consolidated into a concrete
opposition for those who were merely subject to it" (Habermas, 1983,
p. 32). The latter became "private individuals," excluded from public
authority and constituting a politically neutral population, the
publikum, subject to the supervision and care of the bureaucratic
political authority (Kern, 1949, p. 54). The "civil society," which
since antiquity had been conceived as including both the community
of citizens (polis, civitas) and the political constitution, the "common
wealth" (koinon, res publica), in other words, as being a politically
constituted society (status civilis sive politicus), fell apart into its
constituent components. In contrast to the status politicus, mani?
fested in the continuous activities of permanent administrative
bodies serving public purposes, stands now the status civilis, the
realm of "private affairs," of concerns and activities, that is, which
are not connected directly with the exercise of political authority
(Riedel, 1975, pp. 746-747).
The evolving dualism of the private sphere and the political-public
sphere has given rise to the idea that political rule cannot be ascribed
to the individual power-holders as pertaining to their persons, but
must be ascribed to the political community or to the institution as
such. The individual power-holder, even if he is in the highest
position, is thus no longer identical with the man who possesses
authority in his own right. The right to exercise the powers of
command is detached from the person and is incorporated into the
political association, conceived as an impersonal entity of corpora?
tive nature, an Anstalt. The latter is the bearer of all sovereign
prerogatives, the bearer and trustee of "office power," and the acting
individuals are only its officials. Whoever holds power holds it as a
trustee of the impersonal and compulsory association, and wields
the powers of command on behalf of this association, on behalf of the
state (Weber, 1958c, p. 295; Weber, 1958, p. 670). The official is not
the personal servant of a ruler, as he was under feudal and
patrimonial authority, but a servant of the state, or of the public, a
"public servant," whose activities are devoted to impersonal and
functional purposes. This position of the official finds expression in
that his activities are in the nature of a "duty," of a "specific fealty"
to the purpose of the office (Weber, 1968, p. 959).
Political Rule as an Office
The term officium, signifying the legal and factual separation of

the private sphere from the public sphere, the separation of private
rights from official duties, is of Roman origin, bequeathed to modern
public law through the mediation of medieval Canon Law. In the
usage of Roman lawyers (Berger, 1953), officium referred to specific
moral duties originating, for example, in family relationships or
friendship (officium amicitiae); it also referred to the duties con?
nected with the defense of another person's interests (officium
tutoris, officium curatoris). In public law, officium denoted the duties
of persons employed in public service as well as the office of a
magistrate together with its personnel. The term was also applied to
provincial offices and officials, and in particular to provincial
governors.
Karl Dusza 93
The Romanist conception of "office" as a set of impersonal duties

and obligations lived on in the canonical institute known as an
ecclesiastical or sacred office (Heintschel, 1956). Although, as
Heintschel writes, it has never been defined precisely and has had
various connotations at different times of history, the concept of an
ecclesiastical office has indicated, after the end of the charismatic
epoch of the early Church, a clear separation of the duty of carrying
out Christ's commission of leading mankind to salvation from the
personality of those who have taken this task on themselves (1956,
p. 57).
According to Weber, it was here that the legal construction of
organizations had its point of departure (1968, p. 829). "For the
decisive fact is the separation of charisma from the person and its
linkage with the institution and, particularly, with the office"
(Weber, 1968, p. 1164). The Church ceased to be a community of
personally charismatic individuals, and became the bearer and
trustee of an office charisma. The "trust fund" of eternal blessings,
though offered to everyone, could thus be administered only by
certain qualified individuals, by a professional priesthood. As an
institution to which charismatic sanctity had been transferred, the
Catholic Church was the first quasi-corporative, compulsory asso?
ciation (Weber, 1968, pp. 829,1166).
Still, the concept of the Anstalt was not fully developed in the
purely legal sense until the period of the modern state. The technical
needs of administration led to the establishment as a separate
juristic person of the state with its heteronomous and hetero
cephalous organs. To separate the powers of command at the
disposal of the incumbent of an office from his private sphere, to vest
these powers in the institution as such, and to imply that the exercise
of these powers is subject to legal regulation?these are the concrete
grounds for the emergence of the conception of the state as a legal
person. The concept of the state as a juristic person is a legal
technical instrument to bestow on specific individuals definite
rights and obligations, to impute the actions of these individuals to
the state, to give expression to the unity of the actions of the
individuals, and to indicate that the state as an institution has an
existence beyond and above the individuals who exercise specific
functions as official duties (Weber, 1968, p. 670).
The political association thus is considered not as a mere aggre?
gate of individuals, but as a system of offices which exists inde?
pendently of the individuals who are incumbents of the offices and
which has, so to speak, a life of its own. "Organ of the state" is the
technical-legal term by which the independence from the individuals
of the functions to be performed by the state as well as the possibility

of their being transmitted pro partibus indivisis are expressed. A
"state-organ" is a complex of competences, an organized set of
empowerments, duties, and obligations?defined without regard to
persons?to perform a function on behalf of the political community
(Ross, 1961; H. J. Wolff, 1970, pp. 42-58). The organs are created by
the legal order, which not only defines the competences, i.e. circum?
scribes the sphere of obligations to perform duties, provides the
incumbent with the necessary powers, and subjects the use of the
means of compulsion to definite conditions, but also creates the
basis of their legitimacy (Weber, 1968, pp. 52-54, 218). "A modern
government exercises its functions as a legitimate jurisdiction,
which means legally that it is regarded as resting on authorization
by the constitutional norms of the state" (Weber, 1968, p. 644).
Given, however, that even impersonal functions can only be per?
formed by individual persons, the legal order also defines under
what conditions, by virtue of what qualifications, and through
what specific procedures an individual can acquire the competence
to act as an organ of the state. The specific function of public law is to
create the criteria by which specific actions of specific individuals
can be qualified as actions of the state so as to distinguish them from
actions of private individuals. From this aspect, the modern state
can be viewed as a consociation of bearers of certain defined imperia,
whose legitimacy to give commands rests upon rules that are
rationally established by enactment (Satzung): by agreement or by
imposition (Weber, 1968, p. 652). Thus, even though the "will of the
state" is but the will of concrete people, not every kind of will can
produce binding commands, but only a will possessed of certain
characteristics, a will authorized by the law and assigned to a
particular office (d'Entreves, 1967, p. 81).
Because of this, power in the modern state appears as something
impersonal. "Orders are given in the name of the impersonal norm,
rather than in the name of a personal authority" (Weber, 1958c, p.
295). The person commanding is himself subject to an impersonal
order and can give commands only in the form of norms. Obedience
is thus given not to the person, but to norms which are purposefully
thought out, enacted and announced with formal correctness (Weber,
1968, p. 217).
Limitation of Political Rule
Political power in the state is thus inherently subject to a two-fold

limitation. There is in the first place the limitation of power as
Karl Dusza 95
determined by law. It is inherent in the very notion of political rule as

an Imperium vested in an office and exercised according to, and in
the name of, generally binding norms. Such norms, Weber writes,
act as restraints upon the Imperium within the sphere in which they
obtain: "The power holder may issue only commands of a certain
type, or he may issue all sorts of commands except in certain cases or
subject to certain conditions" (1968, p. 652).
The requirement that the exercise of power be in conformity with
law implies certain principles for the state's organization and for the
exercise of powers vested in it. In a strict legal sense, however, it does
not establish any rights of the individuals subject to power. Legality
only implies duties of the government, duties which, because of the
very nature and telos of state-power, can be, and, in fact, are
frequently disregarded. The state is engaged, in the first place, in a
permanent struggle for power with other polities, in which respect its
"absolute end is to safeguard or change the external and internal
distribution of power" (Weber, 1958d, p. 334; Weber, 1980). Besides
the effectuation of this primary concern, the state pursues other
concrete objectives as well, objectives of an ethical, utilitarian, social
welfare, or some other kind. "In the final analysis," Weber claims,
"the whole course of the state's inner political functions, of justice
and administration, is repeatedly and unavoidably regulated by the
objective pragmatism of 'reasons of state'" (Weber, 1958d, p. 334).
From this point of view, to the state "the individual and his interests
are in the legal sense objects rather than bearers of rights" (Weber,
1968, p. 641).
The perception of this has given rise to the idea that a boundary
line between the sphere of the state and of the individual must be
drawn, a boundary line which the state cannot overstep, and behind
which the individual is protected from any intervention by public
authority (Loewenstein, 1958, p. 315). The inviolability of this area is
given legal expression by the incorporation into the positive legal
order of certain "fundamental liberties" and "rights of man" as
personal rights, that is, as claim norms of the members of the state
over against the state as a whole (Jellinek, 1901; Jellinek, 1905, p.
398).
A third type of restraint is created in the so-called "constitutional
states" by the separation of powers. In this case it is not only norms,
but specific social relationships and groups, and their functions,
which limit authority. One Imperium conflicts with another
Imperium, and the extent of authority of the one limits the extent of
authority of the other (Weber, 1968, p. 652).
The division of powers may take different forms, among which the
following three are the principal kinds: a) it involves a plurality of
incumbents of the same office, or a number of persons in offices

whose spheres of authority are directly competing; b) it involves
coll?gial decision, in which case a governmental act is only legiti?
mate when it has been produced by the cooperation of a plurality of
people according to rationally determined rules; c) it involves not
merely the separation of spheres of jurisdiction but also of ultimate
powers (Weber, 1968, pp. 271-273).
Collegiality in the exercise of the ultimate powers of rulership
implies specific bodies which either are governmental agencies or
which directly influence (limit) governmental agencies. Such
limiting agencies have the following principal functions: a) a
monopoly of the creation of rules which govern the exercise of
political authority completely, or at least of those rules which limit
the independent authority of the bearers of the powers of command;
b) supervision of adherence to the rules, if need be through an
inquiry; and c) a monopoly of the granting of the means which are
necessary of the governmental function (Weber, 1968, pp. 271-272).
According to Weber, "the functionally specific separation of
powers is not wholly a modern phenomenon" (1968, p. 282). As
historical precursors, Weber cites the division of ultimate powers in
the societas Christiana between an independent political authority
and an independent hierocratic authority, the separation of the
spheres of competence of the different Roman magistracies, and the
demarcation of military command as a separate "office" in the
patrimonial states of the Orient, in China, Persia, the empire of the
Caliphs, and the Ottoman Empire (1968, pp. 282, 279, 1025-1031).
"But in these cases," Weber writes, "the concept of separation of
powers loses all precision" (1968, p. 283).
The limitation of patrimonial political authority by an estate-type
division of powers, characteristic of the medieval Occident, approxi?
mates the modern conception more closely. The appropriation of
governing powers and of the means of administration by privileged
groups, the competition among privileges, feudal claims, and other
appropriated rights turned Occidental feudalism into a kind of
constitutional government (Weber, 1968, pp. 652-653, 1082). The
extent of the ruler's power was restricted by the subjects' exemptions,
immunities, and privileges, whether these were granted or sanctified
by tradition. The system of estates gave some permanency to these
relations, in that it combined both separation and limitation of
powers with corporative-institutional structures. But this type of
distribution of powers was based on contracts between the prince
Karl Dusza 97
and the estates, which was both inimical to functional regulation

and excluded the larger segment of the community.
"The rational, formally enacted constitutional form of the sepa?
ration of powers," Weber claims, "is entirely a modern phenomenon"
(1968, p. 283). It developed on the basis of a unique constellation of
historical circumstances, such as the financial needs of the prince
made acute by the permanency of conflict between the European
polities; the necessity for him to secure financing through the
consent of privileged persons assembled in estates; the rise of
capitalistic interests capable of providing the prince with the needed
provisions, but in turn demanding a share in political power; the
emergence in the wake of the disintegration of feudal seigneuries of a
new plebeian stratum, which increasingly asserted its claim to be
included into the political community; the articulation of the
demands of the "fourth estate" in the form of a radical republi?
canism, which transformed the medieval idea of contract into the
ethical-metaphysical concept of volont? gen?rale given legal
political expression in the doctrine of the people as the pouvoir
constituant; and last but not least the rationalistic spirit of the
eighteenth century, filled by a belief that the mechanical laws of
nature are transferrable to the social-political world and that
through the agency of reason a balanced political community can be
created by the functional separation of powers (Loewenstein, 1961,
p. 436; d'Entreves, 1967, p. 144).
What Weber calls a "rational constitution" is thus nothing else
than a system of rules?enacted, announced and promulgated
according to formally correct procedures?which subjects the
dynamics of political power to normative regulation and which, by
dividing powers in terms of their functionally objective character,
controls, limits, and constrains the exercise of rulership. It is the
coexistence of limitation of power and separation of powers on the
basis of the distribution of competence among its various organs
which so distinctively characterizes the modern state. "Indeed,"
Weber says, "this modern state is essentially characterized by the
following criteria: it is a consociation (anstaltsmaessige
Vergesellschaftung) of bearers of certain defined imperia; these
bearers are selected according to rationally enacted rules; their
imperia are delimitated from each other by general rules of
separation of powers; and internally each of them finds the
legitimacy of its power of command defined by set rules of limitation
ofpower"(1968,p.652).
The Struggle for Power and Purposive-Rational Formalism
In light of the preceding analysis we can say that the modern

constitutional state represents a gigantic historical experiment in
transforming the brute facticity of force, inherent in political rule,
into a normatively founded and regulated relationship of domina?
tion where "the legitimacy of authority rests upon the legality of
general rule" (Weber, 1958c, p. 299). Still, it would be an enormous
naivete to think that in the modern state every instance of the
exercise of power and all struggles about its allocation and redistribu?
tion are but a series of actions channeled by norms, hence peaceful
and calculable. The normative regulation of political rule has limits.
In the liberal postulate of the rule of law politics is more or less
identical with the creation of norms for the exercise of power and
their application in the forms of adjudication and administration.
To Weber, the domain of politics is much wider. It contains not only
the orderly discharge of the functions of domination, but includes all
those actions and projects which, from whatever motives, aim at the
appropriation, allocation, or redistribution of positions from which
commands binding on others and supported by coercive means can
be issued. That the unavoidable struggle of the often irreconcilable
ideal and material interests does not normally lead to the mutual
annihilation of the competing parties is a result of many factors, the
most important of which is the institutional set up of the modern
constitutional state. In it, the potentially life-and-death struggle of
competing interests is transformed into a pacified competition for
electoral votes and into a normatively regulated, and hence,
calculable coercive threat by those in power (Weber, 1981, p. 173). But
even this regulated competition for the legally defined seats of
power, a form of political struggle which only reduces but does not
wholly eliminate the appeal to the use of force, can and actually does
create "unstable and consequence-laden situations," which are too
unpredictable to be fully subjected to standard regulation (Poggi,
1978, p. 7).
It is therefore exactly at the critical junctures of the life of a
political community that norms are unable to determine the course
of political action. This weakness of norms comes to the fore most
obviously during so-called emergency situations that lead to the
establishment of "crisis government." Loewenstein writes that "it is
impossible to find accurate legal criteria for what constitutes a crisis
or emergency situation . . ." (1957, p. 219). The courts are, then, not
qualified to decide whether there is an emergency situation,
Karl Dusza 99
warranting the introduction of "crisis government." The decision

that a crisis has occurred is a "political" one, a problem decided upon
and solved according to the empirical constellation of power in the
political community (Loewenstein, 1957, pp. 217-227).
Even under normal conditions, situations and conflicts may
develop for the solution of which the legal constitution does not offer
normative guidelines. In fact, such situations arise exactly because
the constitution contains such "legal vacua." It is an empirically
ascertainable fact that the modern constitutional state brought
about a "closer practical coincidence" between the normatively
assigned and the actual possessor of power than before had been
possible (Emerson, 1928, p. 257). Still, the conception of the legal
constitution of the state as a closed and gapless system of norms that
provides a normative solution for every eventuality emerging in the
exercise of, or in the struggles about, power is a mere juristic fiction.
The most fundamental questions concerning the distribution of
power either cannot be normatively regulated or they are left
intentionally unregulated by law. According to Weber:
This was done simply because the interested party or parties who
exercised the decisive influence on the drafting of the constitution in
question expected that he or they would ultimately have sufficient
power to control, in accordance with their own desires, that portion of
social action which, while lacking a basis in any enacted norm, yet
had to be carried on somehow (1968, p. 330).
Another limit to the extent of the normative regulation of power is

set by the fact that the hierarchy of the organs of the state has a
bottom and a top. That is to say, the order of positions of the powers
of command in terms of subordination and superordination must
necessarily end with an organ or organs above which no earthly
authority stands. Thus, while the adherence by any organ lower
than the highest level organ to its normatively defined competence
is guaranteed factually and legally by the control superordinate
organs exercise over it, in case the highest organs are unwilling to or
incapable of practicing the functions assigned to them by the
constitution, no legally constituted unit of power is at hand to
enforce the norm. If, therefore, we mean by law a set of norms
guaranteed by a coercive organization, it is evident that with
reference to the apex of power hierarchy we can speak of the
normative regulation of power only in a very limited sense. Effective
constraints on the exercise of power by the highest organs of the
state are set not so much by legal norms as by the mutual limitation
of the power of one organ by the opposing power of another organ.

Such constraints, however, do have a normative character in that
the status of the individual organs is based on the constitutional
division of powers.
In the confines of their constitutionally defined jurisdiction, the
organs can exercise their power more or less freely, according to their
own discretion. The self-determining character of the acts of the
highest organs is juristically expressed in that their competences are
defined in terms of the ultimate powers that accrue to them, rather
than in terms of specific actions that they must undertake. The legal
norms by which an organ is constituted prescribe not what the organ
must do but what it can do. In other words, an organ is not simply a
bundle of precisely delimited functions, but is a set of competences,
of legally secured capacities, to perform the necessary tasks on
behalf of the political organization.
Such free activity is especially characteristic of that segment of
the unitary public power which is called "the government." The
function to be undertaken by this organ, namely, the modulation
and articulation of overall policy, is by its very nature inimical to
detailed and formal regulation. This is most obvious in the sphere of
foreign policy. The exigencies of "world politics" resulting from the
competition between sovereign polities require that the government
be allowed a free space to articulate its reaction to the demands of the
situation. But even in the domain of domestic politics, the compe?
tition of organized interests, given more or less free rein in a
constitutional-democratic state, and the necessity for the govern?
ment to respond to the articulated needs of political groups, or to
articulate a policy in anticipation of latent needs, make the regula?
tion in minute detail of the activities of the highest executive organs
impossible.
To this sphere of free activity, political action proper, stands
opposed administration as Herrschaft im Alltag, which functions on
the basis of the formal rules of a bureaucratic order. It is oriented
toward the satisfaction of ongoing, routine, calculable needs with
ordinary, routinized means. Nevertheless, there is an element of free
activity even in this sphere of minutely regulated, precisely circum?
scribed competences. Administration is not mechanical application
of general rules to particular cases, mere implementation of policies
set by the government. It is none of these, not simply because each
individual case has peculiar qualities transcending the formalized
rules designed to guide the discharge of administrative duties, but
for more important reasons.
Karl Dusza 101
The decisive basis for the existence in administration of a political

element is created by the institutional set-up of the modern constitu?
tional state; by the fact, namely, that in a parliamentary democracy
the administrative heads, the ministers, are selected by and are
responsible to the parliament, viz., the representative body of the
political forces in a community. They are, then, at the same time
administrators, the heads of a complex of routinized activities, and
politicians, the leaders of parliamentary factions, who, on the one
hand, mediate the demands of their factions to the cabinet, and, on
the other hand, represent the government vis-a-vis the factions
(Guilleaume, 1967; Redslob, 1918; Salter, 1952). Administration,
therefore, cannot take place solely according to the requirements of
purposive-rationality, but takes place in a political field, where the
purposes to which administrative activity is oriented are largely
defined by the demands of social forces articulated by the political
parties in the parliament. These articulated needs, however, must be
brought into harmony with each other in order that they may be
satisfied according to the requirements of purposive-rationality, the
sine qua non of orderly administration.
This strain between purposive-rational formalism and political
functions is more characteristic of the modern state than the much
discussed dualism of bureaucracy and political leadership. A rigid
separation of administration and government obtains more promi?
nently in absolutistic political bodies than in the modern state.
Political leadership in the former rested with the monarch, who,
although listening to the expert advice of his cabinet, made his
decisions on the basis of his autonomous will. The task of the
cabinet, a body of men composed of princely advisors and of the
heads of administrative resorts, consisted in the implementation of
the manifestations of the princely will by translating them into the
language of purposive-rational action and transmitting them in
the form of administrative directives, to specialized administrative
agencies. The determination of policies and their execution were
thus clearly separated both with respect to personnel and to the
tasks involved. They were all the more separated since well into the
nineteenth century government was concerned first of all with the
management of foreign affairs, viz., with the management of the
state in its relation to other states. Politics meant here principally
"world politics," decisions and activities oriented to the maintenance
or change of the distribution of power between sovereign states. The
maintenance of internal order was not politics but mere admini?
stration (Guilleaume, 1967).
The democratization of politics, namely, the expropriation by a

collegiate body of the powers of the monarch as political leader, the
constitutional empowerment of the parliament to participate in the
formulation of policies, and the incorporation into the political
process of larger and larger segments of the population through the
extension of the suffrage, has changed the relation of government
and administration. Though the management of foreign affairs does
not lose its importance, its weight as well as the way it is carried out
change considerably. It still remains a sphere of largely discre?
tionary activity, but since the personnel to carry it out is selected in a
process of competition between domestic political forces, the govern?
ment must give an account of the result of their activities to the
forces that put them into the position of leadership. The constellation
of internal forces becomes thus as significant as the constellation of
power between states. Domestic affairs take on an added signifi?
cance because the government aims not only at securing the power
of the state vis-a-vis other states, but pursues objectives of a
utilitarian or ethical kind postulated by the very forces on the
support of which its power is based.
The intertwining of the tasks of policy determination, policy
implementation, and of securing the support of politically signifi?
cant segments of the population gives modern political life its
special dynamics. It is the basis of the major or minor, but in any
case perpetual, excitements that the newspapers bring us day to day.
Governments fall not only because there are momentous changes in
the empirical constellation of political forces, but because they are
incapable of meeting the articulated and ever-changing needs of
political factions, or because they do not manage to ensure the
support for their policies of the politically significant segments of
the population represented by the parties in the parliament.
The fact that the purposive-rationality of government and admini?
stration is perpetually hampered by the requirement of assuring the
consent of parliamentary factions as well as of public opinion by
negotiation, persuasion, and manipulation, is responsible for the
presence of a modicum of governmental inefficiency in all consti?
tutional democracies. The elimination of this inefficiency in electoral
democracies is both impossible and undesirable. As long as the
institutional set-up of the exercise of political power and the
mechanisms of political will-formation are such that they make
possible the articulation and mediation of the demands of various
segments of the political community, there will be dissension,
competition, and conflict. This is what pluralism means. Its only
Karl Dusza 103
alternative is the suppression of conflicting interests by totalitarian

rule. Here political goals, instead of being the outcome of the
competition and conflicts between pluralistic groups, are set by one
particular group and are implemented by a mixture of sheer
manipulation and of the naked violence of coercive means. The
apparent harmony of interests, goals, and policy outcomes is thus
nothing else than the necessary manifestation of "the pacifism of
social impotence under the tutelage of the only really inescapable
power: the bureaucracy in state and economy" (Weber, 1968, p. 1403).
References
Adorno, Theodor W. (1983). Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New

York: Continuum.
Andreski, Stanislav. (1964). Method and Substantive Theory in Max Weber. British
Journal of Sociology 15:1-18.
Berger, Adolf. (1953). Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law. Philadelphia:
American Philosophical Society.
Beyer, Bruno. (1931). "Zur Frage der Enstehung der Staaten." Zeitschrift fuer die
gesamte Staatswissenschaft 69:1-50.
Brunner, Otto. (1965). Land und Herrschaft. 5th ed. Vienna: Rohrer.
Carre de Malberg, Raymod. (1920). Contribution a la th?orie gen?rale de l'Etat, vol. 1.
Paris: Tennin.
Dowdall, H.C. (1923). "The Word 'State'". Law Quarterly Review 39:98-125.
Elias, Norbert. (1982). The Civilizing Process, vol. 2, Power and Civility. New York:
Pantheon.
Emerson, Rupert. (1928). State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany, New Haven:
Yale University Press.
d'Entreves, Alexander Passerin. (1967). The Notion of the State. Oxford: Clarendon.
Esmein, Adhemar. (1927). Elements de droit constitutionnel fran?ais et compare,
vol. 1, 8th ed. Revised by Henry Nezard. Paris: Soci?t? anonyme du Recueil Sirey.
Eulau, Heinz. (1963). The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random
House.
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds. (1985). Bringing the
State Back In. Cambridge: The University Press.
Freund, Julien. (168). "Der Staat und das Politische." Studium Generale 21:675-691.
Gierke, Otto von. (1954). Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vol. 2 Geschichte des
Deutschen KoerperSchaftsbegriffs. Graz: Akademische Druck- un Verlagsanstalt.
-(1934). Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800. Translated with
an Introduction by Ernest Barker. Cambridge: The University Press.
-(1958). Political Theories of the Middle Age. Translated with Introduction by
F. W. Maitland. Camridge: The University Press.
Guilleaume, Emil. (1967). "Das Kabinettssystem." Pp. 426-438 in Strukturwandel der
Modernen Regierung, edited by Theo Stammen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgemeinschaft.
Habermas, Juergen. (1983). Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit. 14th Ed. Darmstadt
und Neuwied: Luchterhand.
Haefelin, Ulrich. (1959). Die Rechtspersoenlichkeit des Staates, vol. 1,
Dogmengeschichtliche Darstellung. Tuebingen: Mohr.
Heintschel, D. E. (1956). The Medieval Concept of an Ecclesiastical Office.

Washington: Catholic University of America.
Heller, Hermann. (1931). "Political Power." Pp. 300-305 in Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences. New York: Macmillan.
-(1931) "Staat." Pp. 609-616 in Handwoerterbuch der Soziologie, edited by
Alfred Vierkandt. Stuttgart: Emke.
-(1963). Staatslehre. 3d ed. Edited by Gerhart Niemayer. Leiden: Sijthoff.
Hintze, Otto. (1962). Staat und Verfassung. 2d., enl. ed. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht.
Jellinek, Georg. (1905). Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin: Haering.
-(1901). The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens. A Contribution
to Modern Constitutional History. Translated by Max Max Farrand. New York:
Holt.
Jessop, Bob. (1982). The Capitalist State. Marxist Theories and Methods. New York:
New York University Press.
Kelsen, Hans. (1961). General Theory of Law and the State. Translated by Anders
Wedberg. New York: Russell & Russell.
Kern, Ernst. (1949). Moderner Staat und Staatsbegriff. Hamburg: Rechts- und
Staatswissenschaftlicher Verlag.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1984). "Approaches to the State. Alternative Conceptions and
Historical Dynamism." Comparative Politics 16:223-246.
Krueger, Herbert. (1964) Allgemeine Staatslehre. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Loewenstein, Karl. (1957). Political Power and the Governmental Process. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
-(1961). "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsrealitaet." Pp. 430-480 in Karl
Loewenstein, Beitraege zur Staatssoziologie. Tuebingen: Mohr.
Mager, Wolfgang. (1968). Zur Enstehung des modernen Staatsbegriffs. Mainz:
Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur.
Mansfield, Jr., Harvey C. (1983). "On the Impersonality of the Modern State. A
Comment on Machiavelli's Use of Stato." American Political Science Review
77:849-857.
Meisner, Heinrich Otto. (1962). Verfassung, Verwaltung, Regierung in neuerer Zeit.
Berlin: Akademie.
Meyer, Arnold O. (1950). "Zur Geschichte des Wortes Staates." Welt as Geschichte
10:229-239.
Miliband, Ralph. (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.
Mommsen, Wolfgang. (1974). The Age of Bureaucracy. Perspectives on the Political
Sociology of Max Weber. New York: Harper and Row.
Oakeshott, Michael. (1975). "The Vocabulary of a Modern European State." Political
Studies, 23:319-341, 410-414.
Poulantzas, Nicos. (1975). Political Power and Social Classes. London: NLB.
Quaritsch, Helmut. (1970). Staat und Souveraenitaet, vol. 1, Die Grundlagen.
Frankfurt: Athenaeum.
Poggi, Gianfranco. (1978). The Development of the Modern State. Stanford: The
University Press.
Redslob, Robert. (1918). Die parliamentarische Regierung. Tuebingen: Mohr
Riedel, Manfred. (1975). "Gesellschaft, b?rgerliche." Pp. 718-800 in Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe, vol. 2. Stuttgart: Klett.
Ross, Alf. (1961). "On the Concepts 'State' and 'State Organs' in Constitutional Law."
Scandinavian Studies in Law 5:111-129.
Roth, Guenther. (1968). "Introduction." Pp. xxvii-civ in Max Weber, Economy and
Society. New York: Bedminster.
Salter, Arthur. (1952). Parliament?A Survey. London: Allen & Un win.
Schmitt, Carl. (1976). The Concept of the Political. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press.
Karl Dusza 105
Skalweit, Stephan. (1975). Der 'moderne Staat/ Ein historischer Begriff und seine
Problematik. Opladen: Westdeutscher.
Skocpol, Theda. (1985). "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research." Pp. 3-37 in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans,
Dietrich Ruschemeyer and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: The University Press.
Stammen, Theo, ed. (1967). Strukturwandel der modernen Regierung. Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Thoma, Richard. (1926). "Staat (Allgemeine Staatslehre)." Pp. 724-756 in
Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, vol. 7, 4th ed. Jena: Fischer.
Tilly, Charles, ed. (1975). The Formation of National States in Western Europe.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Truman, David B. (1955). "The Impact on Political Science of the Revolution in the
Behavioral Sciences." Pp. 202-231 in Research Frontiers in Politics and
Government. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
Weber, Max. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Translated and Edited by
Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press.
-(1958a). Gesammelte Politische Schriften. 2d ed., enl. Edited by Johannes
Winckelmann. Tuebingen: Mohr.
-(1958b). "Politics as a Vocation." Pp. 77-128 in From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology, edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York:
Oxford University Press. (Hereafter Essays)
-(1958c). "The Social Psychology of the World Religions." Pp. 267-301 in
Essays.
-(1958d). "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions." Pp. 323-359
in Essays.
-(1958e). "The Tree Types of Legitimate Rule." Translated by Hans H. Gerth.
Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4:1-11.
-(1968). Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich.
New York: Bedminster.
-(1976a). The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations. Translated by R. I.
Frank. London: NLB.
-(1976b). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by
Talcott Parsons. New York: Scribner's.
-(1980). "The National State and Economic Policy." Translated by Keith
Tribe. Economy and Society 9:420-449.
-(1981). "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology." Translated by Edith
Graber. Sociological Quarterly 22:145-180.
Wheare, K. C. (1956). Modern Constitutions. London: Oxford University Press.
Winckelmann, Johannes. (1964). "Max Webers historische und soziologische
Verwaltungsforschung." Annali della Fondazione Italiana per la Storia
Amministrativa 1 27-67.
-(1965). "Max Weber?Das Soziologische Werk." Koelner Zeitschrift fuer
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 17:743-790.
-(1966). "Max Webers Verstaendnis von Mensch und Gesellschaft." Pp.
195-243 in Max Weber, Gedaechtnisschrift, edited by Karl Engisch, Bernhard
Pfister, Johannes Winckelmann. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Wolff, Hans J. (1933) Organschaft und Juristische Person. 2 vols. Berlin: Heymanns.
-(1970). Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 2, Organizations- und Dienstrecht. 3d ed.,
rev. and enl. Munich: Beck.
Wolff, Kurt H., ed. (1950). The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press.

Concepção Do Estado Weber

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Concepção Do Estado Weber

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Concepção Do Estado Weber

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Max Weber's Conception of the State

Author(s): Karl Dusza

There is documentary and interpretive evidence to the effect that

from the never-ceasing clashes between such groups emerge cities,

Institutions as the Struggle for Power

The significance in this paradigm of the concept of the state as an

of social action, give concrete form and direction to political

There are, of course, several ways in which such a complex

(a) the sovereign power-state in the framework of the European

In his review of a handful of recent studies in which the state is

(a) the state as government, that is, as a set of personnel

Weber's conceptualization of the state covers several of the above

At the end of Chapter One of Economy and Society (1968, p. 56)

(a) the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical

(b) centralization of the material and the ideal means of rule;

These historically dominant characteristics can be expressed, and

Historical Uniqueness and Structural Specificity

just that for the purposes of a particular mode of analysis it is

public sphere, the opposition of political power, having either the

pressions like "at the beginning of English constitutional history"

The Emergence of the State

Given the specific structural characteristics of the state, its

(1) monopolization of the use of legitimate force,

This scheme serves only heuristic and expository purposes. It

(a) the settlement of barbarian tribes with a characteristic

Unlike its Oriental forms, patrimonialism in the Occident meant

restore the unity of the Occidental world in the form of an imperial

(a) his protective powers (royal mundeburdium, king's peace, ban

(d) his resources as the greatest landlord (the royal domain);

The struggle of the ruler against the Estates resulted everywhere,

The State: A Quasi-Corporate, Compulsory Institution

The State as a Legal Person

Only in nineteenth century German Staatslehre is the conception

systems of government). It is equally valid for a constitutional

that "a perceptively not experienceable unity of wills is transformed

The Monopoly of Legitimate Physical Violence

The fusion of all prerogatives of command and physical coercion

1958b, p. 78; Weber, 1958d, p. 334). Other associations may apply

Political Rule and Legal Norms

The monopoly of physical violence is the defining attribute of the

the supreme and exclusive territorial ordering power (Heller, 1963,

The Separation of the Private Sphere and the Public Sphere

The idea that the political community can be created intentionally,

Political Rule as an Office

The term officium, signifying the legal and factual separation of

The Romanist conception of "office" as a set of impersonal duties

of the functions to be performed by the state as well as the possibility

Limitation of Political Rule

Political power in the state is thus inherently subject to a two-fold

determined by law. It is inherent in the very notion of political rule as

incumbents of the same office, or a number of persons in offices

and the estates, which was both inimical to functional regulation

The Struggle for Power and Purposive-Rational Formalism

In light of the preceding analysis we can say that the modern

warranting the introduction of "crisis government." The decision

Another limit to the extent of the normative regulation of power is

of the power of one organ by the opposing power of another organ.

The decisive basis for the existence in administration of a political

The democratization of politics, namely, the expropriation by a