Reyes Amicus
Reyes Amicus
Reyes Amicus
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General
WHITNEY H. LIPSCOMB
Deputy Attorney General
SCOTT G. STEWART
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JUSTIN L. MATHENY
ANTHONY M. SHULTS
Deputy Solicitors General
MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205-0220
scott.stewart@ago.ms.gov
(601) 359-3680
Counsel for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI
CURIAE .......................................................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................3
ARGUMENT ...............................................................4
I. When Agency Action Pushes Constitutional
Boundaries, Judicial Review Of That Action Is
Searching—Not Deferential ...............................4
A. The Constitution Establishes A Limited
Federal Government And Leaves Power
With—And Accountable To—The People .....4
B. Federal Agencies Present Special Dangers To
The Constitutional Design ............................6
C. Because Agencies Present Special Dangers,
This Court Has Been Searching—Not
Deferential—In Reviewing Agency Action
That Pushes Constitutional Boundaries ......9
II. The FDA’s Actions Push Constitutional
Boundaries And Thus Warrant Searching
Judicial Review .................................................12
A. The FDA’s Actions Undercut The Separation
Of Powers .....................................................12
B. The FDA’s Actions Erode Federalism .........14
ii
C. The FDA’s Actions Rob From The People
Decisions Of Great Importance ...................17
CONCLUSION ..........................................................19
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (per curiam)
.......................................................... 7, 8, 10, 11, 17
Bond v. United States,
564 U.S. 211 (2011) ................................................5
Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) ........................................4, 5, 8
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022)........................ 13, 15, 17, 19
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ..............................................10
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ................................7
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) ...................................... 6-9, 18
Freytag v. Commissioner,
501 U.S. 868 (1991) ................................................6
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) .................. 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) ............................ 5, 6, 8, 11, 16
Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
471 U.S. 707 (1985) ..............................................14
INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) ...................................... 4-7, 14
iv
New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) .................................... 5, 6, 8, 9
NFIB v. OSHA,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) (per curiam) ...... 9, 10, 11, 14
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) ..............................................13
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) ..............................................18
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) ..............................................11
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ..............................................10
West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022).......................... 9, 10, 12, 14
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) ................................................5
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7...................................................6
U.S. Const. amend. X ..................................................6
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 1461 ........................................................13
18 U.S.C. § 1462 ........................................................14
18 U.S.C. § 1531 ........................................................13
136 Stat. 49 (2022) ....................................................13
Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-1 .......................................15
v
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-45 ................................15, 16
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-103 ....................................15
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-107 ....................................15
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-729.1 .............................15
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.063..............15
Other Authorities
Abortion Justice Act of 2023,
H.R. 4303, 118th Cong. (2023) ...........................13
Alice Miranda Ollstein & Lauren Gardner,
Retail Pharmacies Can Now Offer
Abortion Pill, FDA Says,
Politico (Jan. 3, 2023) ..........................................16
Caroline Kitchener,
Blue-State Doctors Launch Abortion Pill
Pipeline Into States With Bans,
Wash. Post (July 19, 2023) ..................................16
John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust (1980).............................8
Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker,
Delegation and Time,
105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931 (2020) ................................7
Pam Belluck,
More Women Who Are Not Pregnant Are
Ordering Abortion Pills Just in Case,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 2, 2024) ....................................16
Ronald A. Cass,
Rulemaking Then and Now:
From Management to Lawmaking,
28 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 683 (2021) .........................7
vi
States Choose Life Act of 2023,
H.R. 4414, 118th Cong. (2023) ............................13
The Federalist No. 47
(James Madison) ................................................ 4-5
Women’s Health Protection Act of 2023,
S. 701, 118th Cong. (2023)...................................13
Women’s Public Health and Safety Act,
S. 471, 118th Cong. (2023)...................................13
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST
OF AMICI CURIAE
This case challenges the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration’s actions adopting an elective-
abortion policy that Congress could never pass, that
States have rejected, and in which the American
people had no say. The FDA claims that this Court
“owe[s] significant deference” to those actions and
should review them “deferential[ly].” FDA Br. 34, 44.
The FDA is wrong. This Court gives agencies
deference on matters of special agency competence, on
granular questions requiring technical expertise, and
on issues over which an agency enjoys clear authority.
But this Court does not defer when an agency tests
constitutional boundaries.
That is because federal agencies present special
risks to the constitutional design. Our Constitution
establishes a limited federal government and leaves
power over important issues with the people.
Agencies imperil that design. Where the Constitution
separates the national government’s powers, agencies
seek to concentrate power. The Constitution vests
lawmaking authority—the power to make national
policy—in a vigorous Congress. But federal executive
agencies now routinely exert broad lawmaking power
and impose major national policies. The Constitution
also divides power between the national government
and state governments. Federalism prevents the
national government from wielding so much power
that it can trample liberty and keeps most power with
state governments that the people can better hold
accountable. Federal agencies undercut this
framework. They regularly adopt policies that thwart
state laws—without the public accountability that
2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Our Constitution establishes a limited federal
government that leaves most power with—and
accountable to—the people. Federal agencies present
special risks to that design. So when agency action
pushes constitutional bounds, this Court’s review of
that action is searching—not deferential. The FDA’s
actions here push constitutional bounds. Those
4
ARGUMENT
I. When Agency Action Pushes Constitutional
Boundaries, Judicial Review Of That Action
Is Searching—Not Deferential.
This Court often decides challenges to agency
action. At times this Court reviews such action
deferentially. But that is not so when agency action
bristles against the constitutional design. When that
happens, this Court’s review is searching.
302. The FDA made this decision even though the risk
of complications increases with gestational age. E.g.,
J.A. 165, 171, 197, 209-12. And it did so even though
abortion becomes increasingly problematic as
pregnancy progresses. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
162-63 (1973) (interests in protecting “the health of
the pregnant woman” and “the potentiality of human
life” “grow[ ] in substantiality” as pregnancy
progresses). Last, the FDA cast aside safety
measures. When the FDA approved mifepristone, it
recognized the drug’s risks and imposed measures to
mitigate those risks. J.A. 225-32. But the FDA has
dispensed with many of those measures. It now
condones use of mifepristone without a physician
prescriber, without assessing gestational age, without
reporting of non-fatal adverse events, and without
any in-person visits to a doctor—the “primary tool for
ensuring the safe distribution and use of
mifepristone.” FDA Pet. App. 229a. At every turn—in
approving mifepristone, expanding its use, and
dropping safeguards around it—the FDA acted
without buy-in from, or accountability to, the people.
For decades, then, the FDA has seized control over
one of the most important, contested issues of our
time. The agency has denied the people a say,
“through their elected leaders,” on fraught and
consequential questions of policy. Free Enterprise
Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). Its actions
have short-circuited “an earnest and profound
debate” on the “morality, legality, and practicality” of
chemical abortion—including whether to allow it and
how to regulate it. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249. And
those actions have undermined state laws on abortion
that strike a balance among the competing interests,
are the results of hard-fought democratic processes,
19
CONCLUSION
The Court should exercise searching—not
deferential—review over the FDA’s actions, hold that
those actions are unlawful, and affirm the judgment
below.
Respectfully submitted.
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General
WHITNEY H. LIPSCOMB
Deputy Attorney General
SCOTT G. STEWART
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JUSTIN L. MATHENY
ANTHONY M. SHULTS
Deputy Solicitors General
MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE
P.O. Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205-0220
scott.stewart@ago.ms.gov
(601) 359-3680
Counsel for Amici Curiae
JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General
State of Tennessee
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General
State of Texas
SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General
State of Utah
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
State of West Virginia
BRIDGET HILL
Attorney General
State of Wyoming