Atp3 90x8 1 PDF

ATP 3-90.
8
MCWP 3-17.5
COMBINED ARMS COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2014
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to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 6 May 2014. Other requests for this document must
be referred to Commander, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000
MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Foreword (U)
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands
as appropriate.
ANTHONY C. FUNKHOUSER K. J. GLUECK JR.

Brigadier General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC
Commandant Deputy Commandant for
U.S. Army Engineer School Combat Development and
Integration
This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online

<https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>.
To receive publishing updates, please subscribe at
<http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp>.
It is also available at the U.S. Marine Corps Web site
at Marine Corps Doctrine at <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/>.
*ATP 3-90.8
MCWP 3-17.5
Army Techniques Publication Headquarters, Department of the Army
No. 3-90.8 Washington, DC
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Marine Corps Combat Development Command

No. 3-17.5 Quantico, VA
17 September 2014
Combined Arms Countermobility Operations

Contents
Page
PREFACE...............................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................vi
Chapter 1 COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS OVERVIEW (U) ..................................... 1-1
Assured Mobility (U) ........................................................................................... 1-1
Terrain Reinforcement(U) ................................................................................... 1-2
Obstacle Intent (U) ............................................................................................. 1-5
Obstacle Employment Principles (U)................................................................ 1-10
Roles and Responsibilites (U) .......................................................................... 1-12
Chapter 2 OBSTACLE CONTROL (U) ............................................................................... 2-1
Emplacement Authority (U) ................................................................................ 2-1
Control Measures (U) ......................................................................................... 2-2
Marking, Reporting, and Recording (U).............................................................. 2-6
Obstacle Tracking (U)......................................................................................... 2-7
Chapter 3 ACHIEVING OBSTACLE INTEGRATION (U) ................................................... 3-1
Design (U)........................................................................................................... 3-1
Planning Process (U).......................................................................................... 3-4
Siting (U) ........................................................................................................... 3-11
Resource Requirements (U) ............................................................................. 3-13
Supply Operations (U) ...................................................................................... 3-14
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 6 May 2014. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000
MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
*This publication supersedes chapter 2, FM 3-34.210, dated 27 March 2007; FM 5-102, dated 14 March 1985;
and FM 90-7, dated 29 September 1994.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 i

Contents
Chapter 4 MAINTAINING OBSTACLE INTEGRATION (U) ............................................... 4-1

Protection (U) ...................................................................................................... 4-1
Plan Improvement (U) ......................................................................................... 4-4
Transfer (U) ......................................................................................................... 4-4
Chapter 5 RESERVED OBSTACLES (U) ........................................................................... 5-1
Employment Considerations (U) ......................................................................... 5-1
Responsibilities (U) ............................................................................................. 5-1
Planning Considerations (U) ............................................................................... 5-2
Execution Matrix (U)............................................................................................ 5-4
Demolition Order (U) ........................................................................................... 5-5
Rehearsals (U) .................................................................................................... 5-5
Preconstructed Obstacles (U) ............................................................................. 5-7
Prechamber Shaft System (U) ............................................................................ 5-7
Chapter 6 SITUATIONAL OBSTACLES (U)....................................................................... 6-1
Decision and Execution (U) ................................................................................ 6-7
Chapter 7 PROTECTIVE OBSTACLES (U) ........................................................................ 7-1
Effects (U) ........................................................................................................... 7-1
Planning (U) ........................................................................................................ 7-4
Chapter 8 CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (U) .............................. 8-1
Cold Regions (U)................................................................................................. 8-1
Mountainous Areas (U) ....................................................................................... 8-2
Deserts (U) .......................................................................................................... 8-2
Jungles (U) .......................................................................................................... 8-3
Complex Terrain (U)............................................................................................ 8-3
Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART (U) ................................................................ A-1
Appendix B DEMOLITION OBSTACLES (FOUO) ............................................................... B-1
Appendix C CONSTRUCTED OBSTACLES (U) .................................................................. C-1
Appendix D OBSTACLE NUMBERING, REPORTING, AND RECORDING (U) ................. D-1
Appendix E SCATTERABLE MINES AND MINE DELIVERY SYSTEMS (FOUO) .............. E-1
Appendix F COUNTERMOBILITY PLANNING FACTORS (FOUO) ..................................... F-1
Appendix G NETWORKED MUNITIONS (FOUO) ................................................................ G-1
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
ii ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. (U) Employment of reinforcing obstacles ............................................................. 1-4
Figure 1-2. (U) Tactical obstacle effects ................................................................................. 1-6
Figure 2-1. (U) Overlay with obstacle control measures ........................................................ 2-3
Figure 2-2. (U) Obstacle-free and obstacle-restricted areas .................................................. 2-6
Figure 2-3. (U) Sample commander’s status card.................................................................. 2-8
Figure 3-1. (U) Obstacle resource factors and linear obstacle effort ..................................... 3-3
Figure 3-2. (U) Possible obstacle arrays in restricted terrain ................................................. 3-3
Figure 3-3 (U) Sample directed-obstacle execution matrix .................................................. 3-10
Figure 3-4. (U) Siting and marking the forward trace of a turn obstacle group .................... 3-12
Figure 3-5. (U) Sample obstacle-resource requirements work sheet................................... 3-15
Figure 5-1. (U) Sample reserved-obstacle execution matrix .................................................. 5-5
Figure 5-2. (FOUO) Minimum timing requirements for reserved obstacles ........................... 5-6
Figure 5-3. (U) Sample prechamber shaft system ................................................................. 5-8
Figure 5-4. (FOUO) Sample I-beam post obstacle................................................................. 5-9
Figure 5-5. (FOUO) Sample falling block obstacle ............................................................... 5-10
Figure 6-1. (U) Identification of target areas of interest .......................................................... 6-4
Figure 6-2. (U) Fires analysis and obstacle intent integration ................................................ 6-5
Figure 6-3. (U) Sample situational-obstacle execution matrix................................................ 6-8
Figure 7-1. (FOUO) Protective-obstacle bands ...................................................................... 7-2
Figure 7-2. (U) Sample overlay fires and observation analysis, obstacle integration,
and obstacle priorities ......................................................................................... 7-6
Figure 7-3. (U) Mobility requirements ..................................................................................... 7-7
Figure C-1. (FOUO) Rectangular ditch, tracked-vehicle delay time ...................................... C-3
Figure C-2. (FOUO) Triangular ditch, tracked-vehicle delay time ......................................... C-4
Figure C-3. (U) Sample T-push method ................................................................................ C-5
Figure C-4. (U) Pusher and scraper dig team ....................................................................... C-5
Figure C-5. (U) Antivehicle ditch glide paths ......................................................................... C-7
Figure E-1. (FOUO) Antipersonnel SCATMINE .....................................................................E-2
Figure E-2. (FOUO) Antivehicle SCATMINE ..........................................................................E-4
Figure E-3. (FOUO) Gator minefield ....................................................................................E-14
Figure E-4. (FOUO) Ground or air Volcano disrupt and fix minefields .................................E-16
Figure E-5. (FOUO) Ground or air Volcano turn and block minefields.................................E-17
Figure E-6. (FOUO) Fencing for a ground Volcano minefield ..............................................E-18
Figure E-7 (FOUO) Fencing for an air Volcano minefield ....................................................E-18
Figure E-8. (FOUO) MOPMS emplacement and safety zone ..............................................E-19
Figure E-9. (FOUO) MOPMS in a disrupt minefield .............................................................E-21
Figure E-10. (FOUO) MOPMS in a fix minefield ..................................................................E-22
Figure E-11. (FOUO) Site layout ..........................................................................................E-30
Figure G-1. (FOUO) Spider Networked Munitions System ................................................... G-2
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 iii

Contents
Figure G-2. (FOUO) Spider Networked Munitions System remote control station ................G-3
Figure G-3. (FOUO) Spider Networked Munitions System MCU...........................................G-4
Figure G-4. (FOUO) Trip line and grenade coverage ............................................................G-4
Tables
Introductory table-1. (U) Army/Marine Corps terms ................................................................ viii
Table 2-1. (U) Obstacle control measures ............................................................................. 2-3
Table 3-1. (U) Countermobility planning considerations within the planning process ........... 3-4
Table 3-2. (U) Sample essential countermobility tasks.......................................................... 3-8
Table 3-3. (U) Sample personnel requirements for a Class IV/V central receiving
point .................................................................................................................. 3-17
Table A-1. (U) Metric conversion chart .................................................................................. A-1
Table D-1. (U) Obstacle numbering system........................................................................... D-2
Table D-2. (U) Obstacle type codes....................................................................................... D-2
Table E-1. (FOUO) Characteristics of antipersonnel SCATMINEs ....................................... E-2
Table E-2. (FOUO) Characteristics of antivehicle SCATMINEs ............................................ E-4
Table E-3. (FOUO) Self-destruct windows............................................................................. E-7
Table E-4. (FOUO) Marking scatterable minefields ............................................................... E-9
Table E-5. (U) Coordination responsibilities .......................................................................... E-9
Table E-6. (FOUO) Safety and fragment hazard zones ...................................................... E-10
Table E-7. (FOUO) Air Volcano capabilities and limitations ................................................ E-22
Table E-8. (U) Air Volcano responsibilities .......................................................................... E-24
Table E-9. (FOUO) Timeline for executing an air Volcano mission (H-hour sequence) ...... E-25
Table F-1. (FOUO) Guidance for selecting minefield density ................................................ F-1
Table F-2. (FOUO) Planning factors for artillery-delivered scatterable minefields ................ F-1
Table F-3. (FOUO) RAAM and ADAM minefield density and size......................................... F-2
Table F-4. (FOUO) RAAM and ADAM rounds per aimpoint .................................................. F-2
Table F-5. (FOUO) Volcano planning factors ........................................................................ F-2
Table F-6. (FOUO) Air Volcano dispensing times based on air speed .................................. F-3
Table F-7. (FOUO) SCATMINE planning factors ................................................................... F-3
Table F-8. (FOUO) Single-strand barbwire marking fence .................................................... F-4
Table F-9. (FOUO) Single-row concertina wire marking fence .............................................. F-4
Table F-10. (FOUO) Countermobility work rates ................................................................... F-5
Table F-11. (FOUO) Walls ..................................................................................................... F-5
Table F-12. (FOUO) Class IV/V haul capacity ....................................................................... F-6
iv ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Preface (U)
(U) Combined Arms Countermobility Operations provides doctrine for conducting countermobility operations
across the range of military operations. This publication updates, combines, and supersedes material from
chapter 2, FM 3-34.210; FM 5-102; and FM 90-7.
(U) Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is directly linked to ADRP 3-90 and JP 3-15, and is intricately
linked to the tactics described in FM 3-90-1, FM 3-90.5, FM 3-90.6, and MCWP 3-17. Although primarily
oriented on the brigade combat team (BCT)/regimental combat team (RCT) and below, the principal audience
for Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and
staffs of a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational
doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators
throughout the Army and Marine Corps will also use this manual.
(U) Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States (U.S.), international and, in some cases, host nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels
ensure that their Soldiers and Marines operate according to the law of war and the rules of engagement (ROE).
(See FM 27-10.)
(U) Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
(U) Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart for the measurements used in this manual. For a complete
listing of preferred metric units for general use, see Fed-Std-376B.
(U) In JP 3-15, the term mine includes land and sea mines. However, Combined Arms Countermobility
Operations only addresses land mines and, therefore, uses the term mine only to refer to land mines.
(U) This publication implements and refers to the orders for the demolition guard commander and demolition
firing party commander (nonnuclear) according to STANAG 2017, chapter 5.
(U) This publication implements and specifies land mine marking, reporting, and recording requirements
according to STANAG 2036, chapter 2.
(U) In Combined Arms Countermobility Operations, the term battalion applies to a battalion, battalion task
force, battalion landing team, or reconnaissance squadron unless differences in capabilities require that a
specific organization be named. The term company refers to a company, company team, battery, or troop-size
organization.
(U) Combined Arms Countermobility Operations uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint, Army, and
Marine Corps terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which Combined Arms
Countermobility Operations is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in text and marked with
an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is
the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the
number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
(U) Combined Arms Countermobility Operations applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army
National Guard of the United States, U.S. Army Reserve, Marine Corps, and Marine Corps Reserve unless
otherwise stated.
(U) The proponent for Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.
The preparing agency is the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE). Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
65473-8929; by e-mail to <[email protected]>; or submit an
electronic DA Form 2028.
(U) Marine Corps personnel should submit suggestions and changes by e-mail to <[email protected]> or by
mail to Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, ATTN: C116, 3300 Russell Road, Suite
204, Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 v

Introduction (U)
(U) Mobility and countermobility operations are subordinate tasks or activities within the movement and
maneuver warfighting function. Mobility and countermobility operations are complementary opposites—
mobility is focused on enhancing friendly-force mobility, while countermobility is focused on degrading
enemy mobility. Both are essential in enabling a force to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the
enemy, and both are equal components within the framework of assured mobility. (See ATTP 3-
90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, for more information on assured mobility and
its focused support to the movement and maneuver warfighting function.)
(U) Countermobility operations use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to deny the
enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. It is important not to mistake countermobility operations with
other tasks or activities that may also employ obstacles. An obstacle is any impediment to movement and
maneuver, as described in Combined Arms Mobility Operations, which gives it broad meaning and diverse
application. Antiterrorism, physical security, survivability, safety, and traffic operations often employ
obstacles such as perimeter fencing, concrete walls, and vehicular barriers. However, only countermobility
operations involve tactical obstacle employment whose effects are directly linked to tactical mission tasks
(see FM 3-90-1). Another discernible difference of countermobility operations is that they are combined
arms activities conducted to directly support offensive and defensive tasks, which may be combined with
stability and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks.
(U) Countermobility operations enable combined arms forces operating anywhere along the range of
operations to shape enemy movement and maneuver and prevent the enemy from gaining a position of
advantage. In the offense, countermobility operations are conducted to isolate objectives and prevent the
enemy from repositioning, reinforcing, and counterattacking. They enable flank protection as the fight
progresses into the depth of enemy defenses or as an integrated economy-of-force effort to provide general
flank security. In the defense, countermobility operations are conducted to disrupt enemy attack formations
and assist friendly forces in defeating the enemy in detail. Obstacles help channel the enemy into
engagement areas (EAs) throughout the depth of the defense and protect the flanks of friendly forces
conducting a counterattack.
(U) The commander ensures that obstacle use is integrated with observation and fires and fully
synchronized with the concept of operations to avoid hindering friendly-force mobility. The control of
mines, networked munitions, and other man-made obstacles and accurate reporting to all units are vital to
prevent fratricide.
(U) Today’s operational environment presents numerous challenges to countermobility operations. The
enemy will seek to create advantageous conditions by conducting operations in urbanized and populated
areas to diminish the potential employment of friendly countermobility capabilities as a way of offsetting
U.S. advantages. Commanders and their staffs must realize the potential negative impacts that obstacles can
have on noncombatants, the environment, and the ability to conduct stability operations and be very
judicious in employing obstacles to create the desired effects. A key aspect of this approach is leveraging
the full capabilities of self-deactivating and self-destructing land mines (also known as nonpersistent land
mines) and networked munitions and optimizing the effects of fires where applicable.
(U) While the fundamental principles for employing obstacles have essentially remained constant over
time, the operational environment and the means for employing obstacles have significantly changed.
Changes that directly affect this manual include the—
 (U) Replacement of the battlefield operating systems with the warfighting functions.
 (U) Refinement to the movement and maneuver warfighting function in ADRP 3-90, FM 3-90-1,
and the associated tactical tasks in FM 7-15 and the OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO
3500.26A/USCG COMDTINST 3500.1B, Universal Naval Task List (UNTL).
 (U) Maturation of the term assured mobility and its framework.
 (U) Restructure of the engineer organizations and other countermobility capabilities within each
of the three types of BCTs.
vi ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Introduction
 (U) Acknowledgement of the broader combined arms context of countermobility operations

across the range of military operations.
 (U) Refinement to the framework of obstacles in Combined Arms Mobility Operations.
 (U) Changes in U.S. land mine policy, particularly the ban on the use of persistent (those that are
not self-destructing or self-deactivating) and nondetectable land mines.
 (U) Advancements in unmanned aircraft system capabilities that allow for the better observation
of remote obstacles throughout the depth of an operational area.
(U) The challenges of today’s operational environment are exacerbated by the recent U.S. ban on persistent
land mines. This creates a greater reliance on nonpersistent scatterable mines (SCATMINEs), networked
munitions, and constructed and demolition obstacles and more dependence on maneuver and mobile
defensive schemes in open terrain. More than ever before, commanders will have to take full advantage of
existing obstacles and the restrictive nature of the terrain to reduce the demands on the limited quantities of
SCATMINEs and the networked munitions available. These conditions place a premium on being able to
accurately predict when and where enemy attacks will occur so that commanders can be more precise in
how and where to employ their countermobility capabilities. With fewer obstacles, being able to neutralize
enemy obstacle reduction capabilities becomes even more important.
(U) This manual uses the term planning process to indicate the military decisionmaking process/Marine
Corps planning process and troop leading procedures.
(U) This manual uses the term mission variables to indicate the Army and Marine Corps uses of the term.
For the Army, mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). For the Marine Corps (and in joint doctrine),
mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available (METT-T).
(U) When this publication uses two terms separated by a slash (/), the first term is the Army term, the
second term is the Marine Corps term. Key differences in Army and Marine Corps terms include—
 (U) BCT/RCT.
 (U) Geospatial engineer/geographic intelligence specialist (in this manual as geospatial
engineer/geographic intelligence specialist).
 (U) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) (in
this manual as IPB).
 (U) Observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and
concealment (OAKOC)/key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, and avenues of approach (KOCOA) (in this manual as OAKOC/KOCOA).
 (U) Protection warfighting function/force protection warfighting function (in this manual as
protection/force protection warfighting function).
 (U) Running estimate/staff estimate.
 (U) Scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver (in this manual as scheme of
movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver).
 (U) Standard operating procedure (SOP)/standing operating procedure (in this manual as SOP).
 (U) Sustainment/combat service support.
 (U) Sustainment warfighting function/logistics warfighting function (in this manual as
sustainment/logistics warfighting function).
 (U) Unified action partners/interorganizational partners.
(U) Combined Arms Countermobility Operations covers the following information:
 (U) Chapter 1 provides an overview of countermobility operations and describes the obstacle
employment principles, the obstacle intent, and the roles and responsibilities for integrating and
synchronizing countermobility operations to meet the commander’s intent.
 (U) Chapter 2 discusses the obstacle control that commanders use to ensure that obstacles
effectively support current and future operations.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 vii

Introduction
 (U) Chapter 3 discusses the actions needed to achieve obstacle integration to ensure that the
employment of obstacles supports the commander’s intent and concept of operations.
 (U) Chapter 4 discusses the actions needed in maintaining obstacle integration to ensure that the
executed obstacle plan continues to support the commander’s needs throughout the duration of a
mission.
 (U) Chapter 5 describes the employment considerations, responsibilities, and planning and
execution of reserved obstacles.
execution of situational obstacles.
execution of protective obstacles.
 (U) Chapter 8 describes special environment situations that affect countermobility operations
and presents some of the factors that must be considered during planning and execution.
 (U) Appendix A is a metric conversion chart.
 (U) Appendix B provides information on demolition obstacles.
 (U) Appendix C provides information on constructed obstacles.
 (U) Appendix D provides information on obstacle numbering, reporting, and recording.
 (U) Appendix E provides information on SCATMINEs and mine delivery systems.
 (U) Appendix F provides planning factors that are commonly used in planning countermobility
operations.
 (U) Appendix G provides information on networked munitions.
(U) The development of this manual resulted in the addition and modification of some Army/Marine Corps
terms and definitions (see introductory table-1).
Introductory table-1. (U) Army/Marine Corps terms
Term Remarks
land mine New term and definition.
Definition modified. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is now the
countermobility operations
proponent manual.
directed obstacle Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is now the proponent manual.
reserved obstacle Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is now the proponent manual.
situational obstacle Combined Arms Countermobility Operations is now the proponent manual.
viii ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Chapter 1
Countermobility Operations Overview (U)
(U) This chapter provides an overview of countermobility operations. It describes the
obstacle employment principles, obstacle intent, and the roles and responsibilities for
integrating and synchronizing countermobility operations to meet the commander’s
intent.
ASSURED MOBILITY (U)

1-1. (U) Assured mobility is a framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the
ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, without interruption or delay, to
achieve the mission (ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations). Assured mobility
emphasizes and integrates proactive mobility and countermobility (and supporting protection) tasks. While
engineers are the principal staff integrators for assured mobility, other staff sections play critical roles in
ensuring the effective application of the tasks associated with assured mobility. The senior engineer staff
officer’s role within assured mobility is similar to the integrating role of the assistant chief of staff,
intelligence (G-2)/intelligence staff officer (S-2) within the IPB. Although primarily aligned with the
movement and maneuver warfighting function, assured mobility has linkages to each of the warfighting
functions and enables, and is enabled by, those functions. (See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined
Arms Mobility Operations, for more information on assured mobility and its focused support to the
movement and maneuver warfighting function.)
1-2. (U) Countermobility operations are those combined arms activities that use or enhance the
effects of natural and man-made obstacles to deny enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. The
primary purposes of countermobility operations are to shape enemy movement and maneuver and to
prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. Countermobility operations are conducted to
support forces that are operating along the range of military operations. Countermobility operations directly
support offensive and defensive tasks, but only indirectly support stability and DSCA tasks. Offensive and
defensive tasks are always combined with stability tasks; but for DSCA tasks; they are typically only
performed in support of homeland defense.
1-3. (U) In support of offensive tasks, countermobility operations are conducted to isolate objectives and
prevent enemy forces from repositioning, reinforcing, and counterattacking. They are also conducted to
enable flank protection as the fight progresses into the depth of enemy defenses or as an integrated
economy-of-force effort to provide general flank security. Countermobility operations may be required to
defend a lodgment and protect selected sites and positions from which combat power must be generated
and sustained, such as base camps. (See JP 3-18 for a discussion of forcible entry operations and
corresponding countermobility considerations.) The commander’s options for emplacing reinforcing
obstacles in the offense are often limited because of challenges in gaining early access to much of the area
of operations. This increases the importance of taking advantage of existing obstacles and the natural
restrictiveness of the terrain. It also increases the commander’s reliance on rapid obstacle emplacement
capabilities, especially remotely delivered obstacles to reinforce the terrain.
1-4. (U) In support of defensive tasks, countermobility operations are conducted to disrupt enemy attack
formations and assist friendly forces in defeating the enemy in detail, channel attacking enemy forces into
EAs throughout the depth of the defense, and protect the flanks of friendly counterattack forces. They are
also conducted to shape engagements, maximize the effects of fires, and provide close-in protection around
defensive positions to help defeat the final assault of the enemy and to prevent and warn of intrusion into
critical fixed sites such as base camps and sustainment sites. Erecting obstacles is also a critical supportive
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 1-1

Chapter 1
task to conducting denial operations. (See FM 3-90-1 for more information on denial operations.) In the
defense, earlier access to more of the area of operations typically provides commanders with the time and
information to consider a broader range of options for reinforcing the terrain. In addition to the rapid
obstacle emplacement capabilities that are often used in the offense, commanders can often use more time-
and resource-intensive techniques to reinforce the terrain for longer time periods. This may or may not be
the case in support of lodgments. Such techniques include mostly constructed obstacles and some
demolition obstacles. During a retrograde, including security force passage, the requirement for obstacle
control will typically be increased.
1-5. (U) When conducting offensive and defensive tasks in combination with stability or DSCA tasks,
avoiding the negative impacts of reinforcing obstacles on civilians is an important consideration.
Commanders rely heavily on command-detonated, self-deactivating, or nonexplosive obstacles to deny the
enemy freedom of movement and provide close-in protection. Denying enemy freedom of movement may
involve disrupting the transportation of weapons and supplies and the emplacement of explosive hazards
along roads or routes. Networked munitions are ideal when conducting countermobility and protection
tasks in support of security and defensive efforts around base camps and other critical fixed sites and
infrastructure.
1-6. (U) The conduct of countermobility operations typically involves engineers and includes proper
obstacle integration with the maneuver plan, adherence to obstacle emplacement authority, and positive
obstacle control. Combined arms obstacle integration synchronizes countermobility operations into the
concept of operations. Because most obstacles have the potential to deny the freedom of movement and
maneuver to friendly forces and enemy forces, it is critical that commanders properly weigh the risks and
evaluate the trade-offs of employing various types of obstacles. Countermobility operations include the
following tasks:
 (U) Site obstacles.
 (U) Construct, emplace, or detonate obstacles.
 (U) Mark, report, and record obstacles.
 (U) Maintain obstacle integration.
1-7. (U) The countermobility capabilities organic to the BCT/RCT are limited, and augmentation will
likely be needed to execute the full range of countermobility tasks that are needed to support mission
requirements, especially in support of defensive and selective security tasks. As countermobility
requirements are determined during mission analysis/problem framing, additional capabilities are added
through force tailoring and task organization. Resolving this dilemma hinges on—
 (U) Visualizing the operational environment.
 (U) Applying the fundamentals of assured mobility.
 (U) Anticipating the effects of the terrain and enemy intentions.
 (U) Identifying the essential countermobility (and mobility) tasks and capability shortfalls early
in the planning phase based upon the commander’s intent.
1-8. (U) Ideally, augmentation to support a deployment by a BCT/RCT will be identified by task analysis
early in the force generation cycle to allow the BCT/RCT to go through that process with critical
subordinate headquarters elements and potentially all modular units that will be in its task organization.
Many countermobility tasks are time- and asset-consuming. Ensuring that these tasks are conducted
efficiently and effectively will be critical to success. Assets needed to perform countermobility tasks are
often needed for performing mobility/survivability tasks. Prioritization is essential in mitigating these
competing demands and ensuring that the most important tasks are accomplished.
TERRAIN REINFORCEMENT(U)
1-9. (U) Commanders reinforce the terrain to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage.
They take full advantage of the natural restrictiveness of the existing terrain to minimize the time, effort,
and materiel needed to achieve the desired effects and offset the limited, available quantities of
SCATMINEs and networked munitions. Reinforcing the terrain focuses on existing and reinforcing
1-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

obstacles. These categories of obstacles provide a way for viewing the obstacle classification described in
ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations from the countermobility perspective.
EXISTING OBSTACLES (U)

1-10. (U) Existing obstacles are inherent aspects of the terrain that impede movement and maneuver.
Existing obstacles may be natural (rivers, mountains, wooded areas) or man-made (enemy explosive and
nonexplosive obstacles and structures, including bridges, canals, railroads, and embankments associated
with them). Although not specifically designed or intended as an obstacle, structures may pose as an
obstacle based on existing characteristics or altered characteristics that result from combat operations or a
catastrophic event. Structures such as bridges and overpasses present an inherent impediment to mobility
based on weight and clearance restrictions. Existing obstacles are shown on the combined obstacle overlay
developed as part of the IPB. As described in ATP 3-34.80, geospatial engineering is critical in accurately
predicting the effects that existing obstacles will have on enemy and friendly movement and maneuver.
REINFORCING OBSTACLES (U)

1-11. (U) Reinforcing obstacles are those man-made obstacles that strengthen existing terrain to achieve a
desired effect. For U.S. forces, reinforcing obstacles on land consist of land mines, networked munitions,
and demolition and constructed obstacles—
 (U) Land mines. A land mine is a munition on or near the ground or other surface area
that is designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or
vehicle. Land mines can be employed in quantities within a specific area to form a minefield, or
they can be used individually to reinforce nonexplosive obstacles. Land mines fall into the two
general categories:
 (U) Persistent. Persistent land mines are not capable of self-destructing or self-deactivating.
 (U) Nonpersistent. Nonpersistent means that they are capable of self-destructing or
self-deactivating. Land mines can be further defined as antivehicle or antipersonnel. They
can be air-, artillery-, or ground-delivered.
Note. (FOUO) See JP 3-15 and MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15, Naval Mine Warfare, for a discussion
of sea mines. As of 1 January 2011, U.S. forces are no longer authorized to employ persistent
(those that are not self-destructing or self-deactivating) or nondetectable land mines.
 (U) Networked munitions. Networked munitions is a remotely controlled, interconnected,

weapons system designed to provide rapidly emplaced ground-based countermobility and
protection capability through scalable application of lethal and nonlethal means (JP 3-15).
 (U) Demolition obstacles. Demolition obstacles are created using explosives. Examples include
bridge or other structure demolition (rubble) and road craters. (See appendix B for more
information on demolition obstacles.)
 (U) Constructed obstacles. Constructed obstacles are created without the direct use of
explosives. Examples include wire obstacles, antivehicle ditches, or similar construction that
typically involves the use of heavy equipment. (See appendix C for more information on
construction obstacles.)
1-12. (U) The use of some obstacles, specifically mines, is governed by U.S. law and policies and
international treaties or agreements. The United States regards mines as lawful weapons when employed
according to accepted legal standards. These laws and policies are complex and subject to change;
therefore, it is essential that commanders to coordinate with legal advisors when developing local ROE and
ensure that staff judge advocates review law and policies for legal sufficiency. (See JP 3-15 for more
information on the laws, agreements, and policies that are most significant to the employment of obstacles.)

Chapter 1
1-13. (U) Reinforcing obstacles are categorized as tactical and protective. As shown in figure 1-1,
reinforcing obstacles are employed as part of the movement and maneuver and protection/force protection
warfighting functions. Tactical obstacles help shape enemy maneuver and prevent the enemy from gaining
a position of advantage, while protective obstacles protect people, equipment, supplies, and facilities
against threats. In addition to countermobility operations, other tasks or activities may also employ
obstacles. Antiterrorism, physical security, survivability, safety, and traffic operations often employ
obstacles such as perimeter fencing, concrete walls, and vehicular barriers. However, only countermobility
operations involve the employment of tactical obstacles, whose effects are directly linked to tactical
mission tasks (see FM 3-90-1). The effectiveness of reinforcing obstacles is enhanced considerably when
covered by observation and fires. Commanders consider intentional or unintentional effects that reinforcing
obstacles may have on the local population and the environment and ensure that obstacles are employed in
a manner consistent with the law of war and the ROE.
The obstacle effect is the intended impact that the commander wants the obstacles and fires to
have on the enemy (tactical obstacles) or the intended outcome that the commander wants the
obstacles and fires to have with respect to safeguarding friendly assets (protective obstacles).
Figure 1-1. (U) Employment of reinforcing obstacles
Tactical Obstacles (U)

1-14. (U) The primary purposes of tactical obstacles are to shape enemy maneuver and to maximize the
effects of fires. Tactical obstacles directly attack the ability of a force to move, mass, and reinforce;
therefore, they affect the tempo of operations. Commanders integrate obstacles into the scheme of
movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver to enhance the effects of fires. Preexisting obstacles that a
unit reinforces and integrates with observation and fires may become tactical obstacles. The types of
tactical obstacles are clearly distinguished by the differences in execution criteria. The three types are—
 (U) Directed obstacles. A directed obstacle is an obstacle directed by a higher commander
as a specified task to a subordinate unit. The higher commander directs and resources these
obstacles as specified tasks to a subordinate unit. Units plan, prepare, and execute directed
obstacles during the preparation of the area of operations. Most tactical obstacles are directed
obstacles.
 (U) Situational obstacles. A situational obstacle is an obstacle that a unit plans and possibly
prepares prior to starting an operation, but does not execute unless specific criteria are

met. They are preplanned obstacles as part of a target area of interest (TAI) and provide the
commander with flexibility for emplacing tactical obstacles based on battlefield development.
 (U) Reserved obstacles. A reserved obstacle is an obstacle of any type, for which the
commander restricts execution authority . This is the Army/Marine Corps definition, which
can apply to any type of obstacle, while the joint definition in JP 3-15 limits reserved obstacles
to only demolition obstacles. The commander specifies the unit that is responsible for preparing,
guarding, and executing reserved-obstacle emplacement. Units execute them only on command
of the authorized commander or based on specific criteria identified by the commander. The
purpose of a reserved obstacle is to retain control over the mobility along an avenue of approach
(AA). Commanders use reserved obstacles when failure to maintain control over the mobility
along an AA will have disastrous effects on the current battle or future operations.
Protective Obstacles (U)

1-15. (U) Protective obstacles are employed to protect people, equipment, supplies, and facilities against
threats. Protective obstacles have two primary roles—
 (U) Defense. Protective obstacles provide friendly forces with local, close-in protection. They
prevent the enemy from delivering a surprise assault from areas close to a position and are
integrated with final protective fires (FPFs) to defeat the final assault of the enemy. Protective
obstacles are employed to defeat mounted and dismounted threats.
 (U) Security. Protective obstacles are used to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against friendly
forces and critical fixed sites (air facilities, bases or base camps, critical infrastructure,
sustainment sites). Protective obstacles that are used for security produce scalable effects that
range from lethal to nonlethal and are appropriate for the situation based on the ROE.
1-16. (U) Protective obstacles are key enablers to survivability operations, physical security, and
antiterrorism. Units on the move rely on rapidly emplaced protective obstacles that can be quickly
recovered, deactivated, or destroyed. Stationary units continuously improve their security posture. When
conducting stability or DSCA tasks, units also employ protective obstacles around critical assets or
infrastructure as part of their protection plan. (See ADRP 3-37 for more information on the use of obstacles
in supporting protection tasks that are not considered countermobility operations.)
OBSTACLE INTENT (U)

1-17. (U) Obstacle intent describes how obstacles support the commander’s concept of operations.
Obstacle intent consists of the—
 (U) Target.
 (U) Effect.
 (U) Relative location.
TARGET (U)
1-18. (U) The target is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with tactical obstacles. The
commander usually identifies the target in terms of the enemy size and type, the echelon, the AA, or a
combination of these things.
EFFECT (U)
1-19. (U) Tactical obstacles and fires—direct and indirect—manipulate the enemy in a way that supports
the commander’s intent and scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver. Obstacle effect
describes the effect that the commander wants the obstacles, combined with fires, to have on the enemy.
The obstacle effect—
 (U) Drives integration.
 (U) Focuses subordinate fires.

Chapter 1
 (U) Focuses obstacle effort.

 (U) Multiplies firepower effects.
1-20. (U) It is important to remember that obstacle effects occur because of the combined effects of fires
and obstacles, rather than from obstacles alone. Tactical obstacles produce one of the following effects (see
chapter 7 for protective obstacle effects):
 (U) Disrupt.
 (U) Turn.
 (U) Fix.
 (U) Block.
1-21. (U) Each obstacle effect is graphically represented by an obstacle effect symbol, as shown in figure
1-2. Obstacle effect symbols are used as control measures for obstacle groups and as elements of the
control measures for obstacle zones and belts as described in chapter 2. During course-of-action (COA)
development, obstacle effect symbols are also used in developing and showing the initial obstacle plan that
supports each COA.
Figure 1-2. (U) Tactical obstacle effects
1-22. (U) Obstacle effects and their symbols resemble some of the tactical mission tasks and symbols that
are described in ADRP 1-02, ADRP 3-90, FM 3-90-1, and MIL-STD-2525. However, obstacle effects and
obstacle effect symbols are different from tactical mission tasks and tactical mission task symbols. Tactical
mission task symbols are used during COA development to show information (the what or why) about a
friendly-force action. Obstacle effect symbols are used during COA development to show how obstacles
will support each COA. Obstacle effects must support tactical mission tasks, but the best way to do that
may require designating an obstacle effect that is different than the supported tactical mission task or
placing it in a different location; for example, achieving the tactical mission task fix in a specified location
may require turn or block obstacle effects in front of, behind, or adjacent to that location depending on the
effects of terrain. Similarly, the obstacle effect symbols in figure 1-2 have different orientation, meaning,
and application than the tactical mission task symbols they resemble.

Disrupt Effect (U)

1-23. (U) Disrupt is defined as—
 (U) (Army) 1. A tactical mission in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires,
terrain, and obstacles to upset and enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable,
or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attach in a piecemeal fashion. 1. An obstacle
effect focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up its formation and
tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal
effort. (FM 3-90-1)
 (U) (Marine Corps) 1. To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy’s formation and
tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause premature commitment or the piecemealing of his forces.
2. A tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and
obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to
commit prematurely or attach in piecemeal fashion. (MCRP 5-12C)
1-24. (U) The disrupt effect also helps to deceive the enemy concerning the location of friendly defensive
positions, separate combat echelons, or separate combat forces from their logistics support. To accomplish
the disrupt effect, the obstacles and fires must—
 (U) Cause the enemy to deploy early.
 (U) Slow and disrupt part of the enemy force.
 (U) Allow part of the enemy force to advance unimpeded.
1-25. (U) Obstacles must normally attack half of the targeted AA to achieve the disrupt effect. The
obstacles should not require extensive resources for construction or emplacement. Commanders normally
use the disrupt effect forward of EAs, while being careful not to inadvertently discourage the enemy from
entering the EA.
1-26. (U) Indirect fires and long-range direct fires are used to cause the enemy to change from a march
formation to a prebattle or attack formation, resulting in reduced closure speed and increased time to
engage the enemy in the EA. Generally, indirect fires alone will not force an enemy to deploy except when
dismounted.
1-27. (U) Commanders plan suppression and neutralization indirect fire targets or groups on the obstacles
in a disrupt obstacle group. Indirect fires are used with the obstacles to slow the part of the enemy force that
makes contact with the obstacles. Commanders also use every means available to disrupt enemy command
and control throughout the enemy formation. Commanders use electronic warfare, obscuration, and indirect
fires to disrupt the decision cycle of the enemy and increase the direct fire window on the unimpeded part
of the enemy force.
1-28. (U) Target reference points (TRPs) are used to mass direct fires against the part of the enemy
formation that is not impeded by obstacles and indirect fires. TRPs do not execute those fires until the
enemy force separates from its parent formation. They use direct fire weapons that can deliver a lethal
initial volley of fire. A quick volley is critical if the enemy has good command and control and can react
quickly to the disruption of its formation. Disengagement criteria are also a consideration in weapons
selection. If commanders plan a short engagement, they choose a weapon system that can fire and
maneuver without becoming decisively engaged. If they expect a long engagement, they select a weapon
system that can sustain rapid fire with sufficient survivability to support the engagement.
1-29. (U) Commanders plan fire control measures that allow for the shift of direct or indirect fires to the
enemy that are slowed by the obstacle or to the enemy bypassing the obstacle. Key leaders are positioned
where they can best assess the obstacle effect. If the enemy is rapidly breaching the obstacles, they may
shift direct fires against the enemy breaching assets. If a large force bypasses, commanders may shift all
fires against the unimpeded enemy to inflict maximum losses and then reposition friendly forces to
subsequent positions.

Chapter 1
Turn Effect (U)

1-30. (U) The turn obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy
formation from one avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach into an engagement area (FM 3-
90-1). To accomplish the turn effect, the obstacles and fires must—
 (U) Prevent the enemy from bypassing or breaching at the start of the turn.
 (U) Cause the enemy to bypass in the desired direction.
 (U) Maintain pressure on the enemy throughout the turn and exploit its exposed flank.
1-31. (U) Developing a turn obstacle requires mobility corridors and AAs that are well defined by
restricted terrain. To achieve a turn effect, the obstacles must have a subtle orientation relative to the
approach of the attacking force. The obstacles and fires allow bypasses in the direction that is desired by
the friendly scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver. Obstacles at the start of the turn are
visible to the attacking force and look more complex than those in the direction of the turn.
1-32. (U) The anchor point, the initial point of the turn, is where most turn obstacles fail. Therefore, it is
critical that the anchor point is reinforced with concentrated direct and indirect fires to achieve the turn
effect. Commanders normally anchor turn obstacle groups to restricted terrain or to a strongpoint. They
approve fire support coordination measures, which enable the focus of all available fires first at the anchor
point. When the enemy encounters the obstacle, the combination of fires, obstacles, and terrain must limit
their ability to breach or bypass at the anchor point.
1-33. (U) Commanders plan an indirect fire target or group to turn the enemy away from the anchor point.
They focus enough direct fire assets to deal with the size of the enemy force expected at that point; for
example, if an enemy company is expected at the anchor point, then at least one friendly platoon should be
allocated to mass fires at that point. If the enemy breaches the obstacle at the anchor point, the turning
effect could be lost—compromising the friendly defensive plan.
1-34. (U) The critical task in achieving the turn effect is to use obstacles and overwhelming fires to cause
the enemy to move in the direction that is desired by the friendly commander. As the engagement
progresses, the friendly force prevents enemy attempts to breach the obstacle by designating enemy
breaching assets as priority targets. Direct fire weapon systems are the primary means for destroying enemy
breaching equipment. Artillery- and aviation-delivered fires can attack individual targets, but they may be
less timely. Plan indirect fires—artillery and mortars—in front of, on top of, to the side of, and behind
obstacles to maximize their effect as combat multipliers. Developing fire control measures through the
planning of named areas of interest (NAIs), TAIs, triggers, and targets to support obstacles in the obstacle
group will make indirect fires more responsive and effective.
1-35. (U) Commanders develop a fire plan with fire control measures that allow them to shift fires as
necessary to cover the turn effect. Direct and indirect fires shift in unison to attack and maintain pressure on
the enemy force flank. Fires covering the length of the turn effect are less focused than at the turn point.
Company commanders facilitate this by assigning platoon sectors of fire between TRPs. Commanders
usually execute indirect fires in groups instead of aiming at individual targets. Direct and indirect fires
continue throughout the length and depth of the turn effect. These fires simultaneously exploit the
vulnerability created by the turn effect and protect the integrity of the obstacles.
Fix Effect (U)

1-36. (U) Fix is defined as—
 (U) (Army) A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy force from moving
any part of that force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect
that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified
area, normally an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
 (U) (Marine Corps) A method to prevent the enemy from moving any part of his forces, either
from a specific location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to
prevent their withdrawal elsewhere. (MCRP 5-12C)

1-37. (U) The fix effect allows time to acquire, target, and destroy the enemy with direct and indirect fires
throughout the depth of an EA or AA. The fix effect helps fires to defeat the enemy in detail or to gain the
necessary time for forces to reposition while inflicting maximum casualties. To accomplish the fix effect,
the obstacles and fires must—
 (U) Cause the enemy to deploy into attack formation early.
 (U) Cause the enemy to advance slowly into the EA.
 (U) Make the enemy fight in multiple directions within the EA.
1-38. (U) Commanders specify the amount of time or effect that the combined effect of fires and obstacles
must achieve. The fix effect may generate the time necessary for the defending force to break contact and
disengage as the attacking force maneuvers into the area. To achieve the fix effect, units array obstacles in
depth to cause the attacking formation to react and breach repeatedly. The obstacles must influence the
entire width of the AA, but not make the terrain impenetrable. The individual obstacles must look as if they
could be easily bypassed or reduced. A combination of obstacles that are clearly visible and others that are
unseen (such as obstacles on the reverse slope help to confuse the attacking force once it encounters the
obstacles).
1-39. (U) Commanders plan artillery- and aviation-delivered indirect fires forward of the obstacles to
suppress or neutralize the enemy. They synchronize indirect fires with long-range direct fires that cause the
enemy to deploy out of a march or a prebattle formation. Ideally, units site obstacles at the maximum fire
range of the enemy, but inside the friendly effective fire range. If the enemy is in an attack formation, this
allows obstacles and fires to attack the full frontage of the enemy.
1-40. (U) Initially, commanders orient fires on the enemy force as a whole; however, destroying enemy
breaching assets becomes increasingly important as the enemy continues to advance into the EA. To
maximize obstacle effect and inflict maximum losses on the enemy, the fire plan requires an increase in the
intensity of fires as the enemy advances. Commanders plan successive TRPs, synchronized with obstacles
closer to the battle positions (BPs), which trigger engagement by additional weapons. They vary the
intensity of fires through fire control to allow the enemy to continue a slowed advance. When the enemy
fully commits, friendly forces complete its destruction.
1-41. (U) Once the enemy commits in the EA, the fire plan causes the enemy to fight in as many directions
as possible. This serves to further slow its advance, disrupt its command and control, and reduce its ability
to mass, allowing friendly forces to provide interlocking fires with flank shots on individual targets.
Combining fires from multiple directions with the random orientation of individual obstacles further
confuses the attacker. For direct fires, commanders consider the use of TRPs and supplementary positions
to reorient fires. They also consider the use of protective obstacles to protect the force. The fire support
officer (FSO) and fire support teams plan targets to hold the enemy in the EA and FPFs on critical mobility
corridors that may let the enemy threaten friendly positions.
Block Effect (U)

1-42. (U) Block is a tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents the enemy’s
advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. Block is also an obstacle effect that integrates fire
planning and obstacle efforts to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or to prevent the
attacking force from passing through an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1) To accomplish the block effect, the
obstacles and fires must—
 (U) Prevent the enemy from bypassing or breaching the obstacles.
 (U) Maximize available standoff.
 (U) Stop enemy forward movement.
1-43. (U) Commanders consider obstacle protection when planning fire control measures. The first
mission of the overwatching force is to stop any bypassing or breaching attempt. They respond to any
attempt to breach or bypass with a quick volley of direct and indirect fires. Block obstacles stop enemy
maneuver and cause the enemy to commit breaching assets that can be destroyed by fire. Higher-level

Chapter 1
commanders may allocate other forces to the task of completing enemy destruction (such as a joint air
attack team or a ground counterattack).
1-44. (U) To support survivability, commanders position forces to provide standoff so that the force can
survive. The EA must cover the entire AA. The maximum effective range of the overwatching weapons
minus the standoff distance, limits the depth of the EA. The commander positions forces so that they can
mass interlocking fires across the entire AA. The defending force must be able to concentrate all available
fires within the obstacle group. Commanders array weapon systems in depth based on their maximum
effective ranges.
1-45. (U) The success of a block obstacle is measured by its impact on the enemy advance, not by enemy
losses. The block effect is the most resource-intensive obstacle effect to achieve and is usually only limited
to critical points on the battlefield. Normally, the mission of forces overwatching a block obstacle is to
defeat lead enemy units and cause the attacker to reconsider the deployment of follow-on forces.
Commanders cannot typically expect a force overwatching a blocking group to protect the obstacles and
defeat the enemy.
1-46. (U) Achieving the block effect requires the integration of complex obstacles—those that require
more than one reduction technique to create a lane—with intense fires to defeat the breaching effort of the
attacking force. Units array obstacles successively in a concentrated area. When the attacking force reduces
one obstacle integrated with intense fires, it encounters another obstacle integrated with intense fires.
Obstacles must defeat the mounted and dismounted breaching efforts of the attacking force. They must
span the entire width of the AA, allowing no bypass. Obstacles intended to prevent an attacking force from
using a specific AA should be readily visible to discourage further progress forward. Obstacles that are
used to prevent an attacking force from passing through an EA should be less visible to avoid discouraging
the enemy from entering the EA.
RELATIVE LOCATION (U)

1-47. (U) Relative location refers to the location of a tactical or protective obstacle in relation to maneuver
or fire control measures such as AAs, BPs, or EAs. Engineers and other countermobility planners describe
planned obstacle locations in relation to maneuver or fire control measures to help maneuver commanders
visualize linkages between obstacles, fires, and maneuver and to ensure obstacle integration.
OBSTACLE EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES (U)

1-48. (U) The basic employment principles for reinforcing obstacles are—
 (U) Support the maneuver commander’s plan.
 (U) Integrate with observation and fires.
 (U) Integrate with other obstacles.
 (U) Employ in depth.
 (U) Employ for surprise.
Note. (U) These principles are considered regardless of the type of operation being conducted.
SUPPORT THE MANEUVER COMMANDER’S PLAN (U)

1-49. (U) Reinforcing obstacles must be planned and emplaced to support the maneuver commander’s
plan, while not hindering friendly-force mobility. Obstacle plans are developed based on a thorough
understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations, enemy mobility capabilities, and the
effects of the natural terrain and existing obstacles. Only then can the true value of integrating obstacles,
observation, fires, and maneuver be realized. Obstacle control is essential in supporting the maneuver
commander’s plan.

1-50. (U) Commanders should be aware of other forces operating in and around their operational area and
ensure that their plans are integrated with all units and forces in the area. Conventional land forces and
special operations forces may be operating in proximity to each other to accomplish the joint force
commander’s mission. These two forces can assist and complement each other with mutual support so they
can achieve an objective, which might not otherwise be attainable. These operations require integration and
synchronization to avoid interference in each other’s missions. In this respect, control measures take on an
added significance. Exchanging liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional and special
operations forces further enhances integration. (See JP 3-05 for more information on special operations.)
INTEGRATE WITH OBSERVATION AND FIRES (U)

1-51. (U) The primary purpose for integrating obstacles with fires is to enhance the effectiveness of those
fires. Obstacles and fires are interdependent in achieving the desired effects. With rare exceptions,
obstacles that are not covered by fire are little more than a nuisance to the leading elements of an attacking
force. While obstacles and fires may be observed or unobserved, the optimization of the obstacle and
associated fires typically occurs when an obstacle is observed or monitored. Unmanned aircraft systems
and unattended ground sensors allow for observation of reinforcing obstacles employed remotely or beyond
the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Plans for obstacles, observation, and fires must be developed in
unison to ensure they are mutually supportive. Reinforcing obstacle employment is most effective in
supporting EAs, in terms of the effects achieved in relation to effort expended, where threat maneuver is
already restricted and slowed by the natural terrain, thereby increasing the engagement opportunities for
direct and indirect fires.
1-52. (U) The maneuver commander or leader who is responsible for EA identification and development
and the supporting engineer and fire support planners work together to ensure that obstacles and fires are
employed to create the desired effects. The leaders on the ground and supporting staffs must communicate
throughout the siting, emplacement, and rehearsal process to ensure proper obstacle integration. Leaders
focus on positioning obstacles, which will complement the fires from tanks and antiarmor missile systems
at the farthest effective range based on visibility conditions. Observed indirect fires are also used in
conjunction with obstacles against threat vehicles and personnel in the open. Observation and the
adjustment of fires are essential in maximizing the effectiveness of indirect fires. At the same time, fires
serve to protect the obstacle by making it costly to breach or bypass. Ideally, obstacles are also positioned
where an enemy breaching force is not offered good cover and concealment.
INTEGRATE WITH OTHER OBSTACLES (U)

1-53. (U) Individual reinforcing obstacles are optimized when sited and designed to tie in with existing
obstacles and with each other. Taking advantage of existing obstacles reduces the assets and time needed to
rapidly establish an effective obstacle system. The effective reinforcement of existing obstacles in a portion
of an EA or across a defensive sector allows limited countermobility resources to be concentrated where
their capabilities can be optimized.
1-54. (U) Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with each other to ensure that the combined effects of each
individual obstacle are mutually supportive and to create the overall intended effect of the obstacle system;
for example, an uncoordinated concentration of individual obstacles along the approach to an EA that is
intended to disrupt the enemy may actually result in achieving an unintended block or turn effect—
essentially defeating the purpose of the EA.
EMPLOY IN DEPTH (U)

1-55. (U) Obstacles employed in depth cause the enemy to repeatedly respond to obstacles and disrupt the
timing and tempo of an attack, tax enemy command and control, deplete obstacle reduction assets, and
increase exposure to fires and losses from multiple engagements that ultimately degrade the will to fight.
Obstacles must not be located so close together that only a single enemy response is required.

Chapter 1
1-56. (U) Commanders use operational or battlespace frameworks to conceptually organize operations.
Staffs use these frameworks to help identify and analyze obstacle requirements in depth during mission
analysis/problem framing. (See ADRP 3-0 and MCDP 1-0.)
EMPLOY FOR SURPRISE (U)

1-57. (U) Using obstacles to obtain surprise is one means that is available to the commander to retain a
degree of initiative even when defending. The SCATMINEs permit rapid obstacle emplacement throughout
a unit area of operations, confronting the attacker with a completely new situation almost instantly. The
self-destruct feature of SCATMINE also provides surprise; for example, a friendly counterattack may be
launched through an area that was mined and then self-destructed.
1-58. (U) Other ways to achieve surprise include—
 (U) Camouflaging obstacles or using phony obstacles to mask recognizable patterns or the extent
of the obstacle system.
 (U) Suddenly detonating concealed obstacles in front of or within an attacking enemy formation.
 (U) Repairing reduced obstacles between enemy echelons.
1-59. (U) An obvious pattern of obstacles can divulge locations of units and weapons. Avoiding readily
discernible, repetitive obstacle patterns by varying the type, design, and location degrades enemy ability to
predict how friendly obstacles are employed. This complicates enemy ability to plan for and ultimately
reduce obstacles.
1-60. (U) The employment for surprise may also include allowing an enemy to discern actual obstacles
linked to phony obstacles as part of a deception. A good deception must also have enough reality in it to
cause the enemy to accept it as truth.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITES (U)

1-61. (U) Responsibilities for executing countermobility tasks can be broadly divided into two entities:
emplacing unit and owning unit. This framework helps commanders assign responsibilities for obstacle
execution to subordinate units. The responsibilities of each may vary based on the type of obstacle and the
situation.
1-62. (U) The primary mission of the emplacing unit is to emplace the obstacle group. Depending on the
types of obstacles, this may involve construction, demolition, or the use of SCATMINE delivery systems or
networked munitions. Because proper obstacle emplacement often requires specialized engineer equipment
or expertise, the emplacing unit is often an engineer unit. Nonengineer units can emplace some obstacles,
but may require the technical supervision of an engineer. In the case of demolition obstacles, the emplacing
unit is also known as the demolition firing party. The emplacing unit transfers the emplaced or prepared
obstacle to the owning unit to formally acknowledge the transfer of responsibilities.
1-63. (U) The owning unit has the overall responsibility for the obstacle group and ensures that it is
properly integrated with observation and fires and protected. The owning and emplacing units typically
share responsibility for providing security during emplacement and ensuring proper obstacle siting. The
owning unit may designate a subordinate unit as the guard force in certain situations, such as executing a
reserved obstacle. In the case of demolition obstacles, the guard force is also known as the demolition
guard. The owning unit is also responsible for removing the obstacle, including clearing and properly
disposing of waste material when it is no longer needed and as the tactical situation allows.
1-64. (U) Countermobility roles and responsibilities within command posts may vary at different echelons
and should be prescribed in unit SOPs. Although primarily aligned under the movement and maneuver
warfighting function, countermobility tasks or activities also enable the protection/force protection
warfighting function, such as the employment of protective obstacles to protect critical infrastructure, base
camps, and other physical assets. While the focus of protection/force protection activities is on protecting
personnel and assets, they are complementary to activities supporting movement and maneuver. (See
ADRP 3-37 for more information on protection.)

COMMANDER (U)
1-65. (U) The challenging and unpredictable nature of operational environments requires that commanders
at every echelon thoroughly understand countermobility requirements and issue clear intent, guidance, and
prioritization for any countermobility tasks conducted by or in support of their unit. The commander uses
the construct of essential tasks for mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability (M/CM/S) to prioritize
actions and concentrate countermobility efforts. Commanders must understand their countermobility
requirements across the range of military operations and the capabilities of available assets to perform
countermobility operations within the area of operations. The commander—
 (U) Provides focus through the essential tasks for countermobility during planning and
preparation.
 (U) Enforces obstacle tracking (marking, reporting, and recording) during execution.
 (U) Continuously assesses countermobility requirements based on threat and vulnerability
assessments and the effectiveness of reinforcing obstacles against current and future threats.
Notes.
1. (U) See FM 3-34 for additional information about essential tasks for M/CM/S.
2. (U) See appendix D for more information on obstacle numbering, reporting, and recording.
1-66. (U) In addition to the responsibilities that are shared by commanders, engineer commanders at every
echelon must also completely understand the capabilities and requirements of the supported unit and
understand how best to integrate engineers as part of combined arms operations. The engineer commander
ensures that obstacles are properly planned and executed to achieve the desired effects. The engineer
commander works together with the appropriate engineer staff officer to ensure that the countermobility
effort is synchronized and meets the needs of the supported unit.
ENGINEER STAFF OFFICER (U)

1-67. (U) The engineer staff officer is typically the senior engineer officer on staff. The engineer staff
officer is the principal integrator of countermobility operations within the staff. The engineer staff officer is
responsible for—
 (U) Coordinating engineer assets and operations for the BCT/RCT, including engineer support to
countermobility operations.
 (U) Advising the commander on the full range of countermobility capabilities available to the
force.
 (U) Developing recommended essential tasks for M/CM/S.
 (U) Making recommendations on the priority of engineer effort based on the commander’s
guidance.
 (U) Making recommendations on engineer task organization and determining if additional assets
are needed to execute the anticipated countermobility tasks.
 (U) Integrating countermobility guidance and tasks into mission orders and monitoring
execution.
 (U) Tracking planned and emplaced friendly reinforcing obstacles, entering them into the
friendly reinforcing obstacle database, and graphically displaying them on the combined obstacle
overlay as part of the mobility portion of the common operational picture (COP) (real-time
modified combined obstacle overlay [MCOO]).
 (U) Coordinating through the G-2/S-2 for geospatial information and products needed to form
the real-time MCOO.
 (U) Working together with the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3)/operations staff officer
(S-3) and FSO to ensure obstacles are integrated with fires and observation.

Chapter 1
 (U) Coordinating with the G-3/S-3 for the security and protection of emplacing units during
obstacle emplacement, to include—
 (U) Planning air and missile defense and counterfire for Class IV/V supply points and
obstacle emplacing sites.
 (U) Implementing fratricide-avoidance measures to protect emplacing units operating
forward of defending units.
 (U) Coordinating with the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4)/logistics staff officer (S-4) to
ensure that the right amount of Class IV/V obstacle material is provided at the right place and at
the right time to enable efficient and timely obstacle emplacement.
 (U) Monitoring and assessing the execution of countermobility tasks, and making
recommendations on required adjustments.
 (U) Identifying shortfalls based on countermobility requirements, and making recommendations
in support of requests for augmentation of the necessary assets.
 (U) Serving as the staff expert on enemy obstacle reduction capabilities and working together
with the G-2/S-2 in templating obstacle reduction high-value targets (HVTs) within maneuver
formations on the enemy situation template to facilitate targeting.
 (U) Coordinating future countermobility requirements, to include—
 (U) Marking obstacle areas for follow-on clearing operations.
 (U) Conducting transfer of unexecuted reserved obstacles.
 (U) Identifying shortfalls and requesting augmentation as necessary for task execution.
 (U) Requesting replacement or sustainment of expended or committed Class IV/V obstacle
material.
OTHER STAFF OFFICERS (U)

1-68. (U) The G-3/S-3 is the coordinating staff officer for all matters concerning tactical operations. The
G-3/S-3 maintains overall responsibility for integrating and synchronizing countermobility efforts within
the scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver based on recommendations from the engineer
staff officer. The G-3/S-3 makes time-sensitive recommendations to the commander on requests for
immediate countermobility support from subordinate units.
1-69. (U) The G-2/S-2 provides information on enemy capabilities and expected enemy COAs to allow the
engineer and other planners to plan and resource the type and amount of Class IV/V obstacle material
needed to achieve the desired obstacle effects. The G-2/S-2 is also responsible for the geospatial engineer
team that is organic down to the brigade level in Army units and works together with the engineer staff
officer in generating the geospatial information and the products needed to facilitate situational
understanding, enable decisionmaking, and help the staff realize the combined effects on friendly
countermobility and enemy mobility efforts as part of IPB.
1-70. (U) The G-4/S-4 is responsible for planning and coordinating logistics support for countermobility
operations. This includes the delivery of fuel and Class IV/V obstacle material. The G-4/S-4 coordinates for
the establishment of logistics sites and materials issued to forward units based on the mission.
Countermobility missions are often very resource-intensive. Early coordination between the engineer staff
officer and the G-4/S-4 is essential to ensure that adequate types and quantities of obstacle material and
transportation assets are available to support the mission. The G-4/S-4 also identifies the countermobility
requirements that are needed to enable sustainment/combat service support activities, to include protective
obstacles around logistics sites and base camps.
1-71. (U) To facilitate protective obstacle integration in support of critical infrastructure and fixed-site
protection, commanders may need to designate a staff lead or protection coordinator who has the
experience to integrate risk management and other integrating processes. The staff leader or protection
coordinator participates in various forums to facilitate the continuous integration of protection tasks into the
operations process. The provost marshal is typically a major contributor to the planning and resourcing of

protective obstacles in support of critical asset protection and physical security. (See ADRP 3-37 for more
information on protection and the respective staff responsibilities.)
1-72. (U) The chief of fires or FSO is responsible for integrating and synchronizing fires with the obstacle
plan through the planning and targeting processes. This staff officer is the technical expert on emplacing
artillery-delivered SCATMINEs.

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Chapter 2
Obstacle Control (U)
(U) Commanders exercise obstacle control to ensure that emplaced obstacles support
the concept of operations and do not interfere with future operations. Commanders
establish obstacle control by—delegating or withholding emplacement authority;
restricting types or locations of obstacles through obstacle control measures; and
marking, reporting, recording, and tracking obstacles. The degree of obstacle control
varies with each echelon, dependending on the situation. High levels of obstacle
control will always be necessary when units need to conduct a passage of lines. A
lack of obstacle control can allow obstacles to interfere with the higher commander’s
concept of operations or allow limited obstacle resources to be used ineffectively.
Excessive or unclear obstacle control can complicate the bottom-up refinement of
obstacle and fire plans, which is necessary at the lower tactical levels.
EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY (U)

2-1. (U) Obstacle emplacement authority is the authority to emplace reinforcing obstacles. Geographic
combatant commanders have the authority to emplace obstacles in their areas of responsibility within the
ROE. They may delegate emplacement authority to subordinate commanders, down to the lowest echelon
necessary to allow for maximum flexibility in executing tactical missions, while ensuring that the
employment of reinforcing obstacles is consistent with the ROE and supportive of current and future
operations. Commanders consider the particular system characteristics, including inherent hazards that it
might pose to friendly forces and civilians and the ROE in determining the emplacement authority for
SCATMINEs. The duration of SCATMINE employment is a primary consideration in determining the
extent to which emplacement authority should be delegated. When used as protective obstacles, specifically
the Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), higher commanders typically delegate emplacement authority
to the commanders of small units (platoon or company/team) and base camps. The commander’s guidance
on emplacement authority is stated in the unit operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD).
Additional information is included in attached engineer and fires annexes as necessary.
2-2. (U) Commanders use obstacle control measures and other specific guidance or orders to grant or
withhold obstacle emplacement authority to subordinate commanders and provide obstacle control; for
example, a commander may withhold authority by shaping obstacle control measures within the area of
operations of a subordinate unit so that a specific area is not included, such as a counterattack axis, to
ensure the freedom of movement and maneuver of other units in that area. Likewise, the commander may
also state in an order that a specific area, such as a counterattack axis, is an obstacle-restricted area.
2-3. (U) Subordinate commanders who desire to emplace an obstacle outside a zone, belt, or group must
submit a report of intention for that obstacle. The report doubles as a request when units initiate it at levels
below emplacement authority. Units do not submit the report if the higher headquarters grants emplacement
authority. Commanders give the authorization to emplace obstacles when they establish obstacle control
measures. As an exception, units do not submit reports of intention for directed obstacles that are part of an
OPLAN or OPORD approved by the obstacle emplacement authority.
2-4. (U) Commanders and staffs consider time, width, and depth when planning for obstacle control; for
example, a commander may use an on-order obstacle zone to give a subordinate obstacle emplacement
authority only after a certain time or event. Likewise, a commander may direct that only SCATMINEs with
a certain self-destruct time or networked munitions with on and off features can be emplaced in a specific

Chapter 2
area. Maneuver control measures can aid in focusing the width and depth of obstacle control measures.
Typical graphics that may be used include—
 (U) Unit boundaries and phase lines (PLs).
 (U) Battle handover lines and forward edges of the battle area.
 (U) Lines of departure and lines of contact.
 (U) Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs), no-fire areas, and coordinated fire lines.
 (U) Passage lanes and corridors.
 (U) Counterattack axis and movement routes.
 (U) Objectives, future BPs, and AAs.
2-5. (U) Obstacle control planning is guided by—
 (U) Supporting current operations.
 (U) Maximizing subordinate flexibility.
 (U) Facilitating future operations.
 (U) Supporting current operations
2-6. (U) Commanders use obstacle control to focus obstacle effort where it will clearly support their
intent and concept of operations. They also use obstacle control to ensure that obstacles will not interfere
with current operations or limit their ability to respond to unforeseen situations.
MAXIMIZE SUBORDINATE FLEXIBILITY (U)

2-7. (U) Commanders use the minimum obstacle control measures required to successfully complete the
mission while providing subordinate units with obstacle intent, which offers the flexibility, needed to
ensure obstacle effectiveness in supporting the assigned missions. Commanders employ obstacles based on
an assessment of risk and opportunity. The degree of control is typically greater in the mobile defense or in
areas of operation where forces will need to conduct a passage of lines or use terrain that was previously
defended.
FACILITATE FUTURE OPERATIONS (U)

2-8. (U) The ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and gain and maintain a position of relative
advantage hinges on the freedom of movement and maneuver. This need for assured mobility drives the
need for obstacle control to facilitate future operations. Commanders usually withhold emplacement
authority or use restrictions to ensure that obstacles do not interfere with future movement or maneuver; for
example, restricting obstacles within a counterattack axis or along a movement route that is used to
reposition forces, to include retrograde operations or passage of lines. However, commanders may focus
obstacle efforts to develop a situation that will support future operations.
CONTROL MEASURES (U)

2-9. (U) Obstacle control measures are specific measures that simplify the granting of obstacle-emplacing
authority while providing obstacle control (FM 3-90-1). Table 2-1 summarizes some considerations for
using obstacle control measures.
2-10. (U) Figure 2-1 shows the obstacle control measure graphics. Obstacle control measures are—
 (U) Zone.
 (U) Belt.
 (U) Group.
 (U) Restriction.

Table 2-1. (U) Obstacle control measures

Obstacle Specific Size of Enemy AA/Mobility Corridor
Control Echelon Obstacle
Measure Effect Armored Light
Optional; not
Zone Division and corps Division/brigade Brigade/battalion
normally used
Optional;
Belt Brigade and regiment Brigade/battalion Battalion/company
normally used
Battalion, brigade,
Group regiment, division, Mandatory Battalion/company Company/platoon
corps
Corps, division,
Restriction brigade, regiment, NA NA NA
battalion
Legend:
AA avenue of approach
NA not applicable
Figure 2-1. (U) Overlay with obstacle control measures
2-11. (U) As shown in figure 2-1, obstacle control measures are drawn with lines that contain angular
points or spikes. These spikes not only provide a unique visual feature, but they also allow a zone or belt to
be adjoined to, and slightly offset from, an existing boundary or PL. This allows an obstacle control
measure to cover the same area without obscuring maneuver control graphics when multiple overlays are
displayed. Obstacle zones, belts, and groups are labeled with alphanumeric designators, which form part of
the 16-character obstacle number that is given to each individual obstacle.
OBSTACLE ZONES (U)

2-12. (U) Corps and division commanders use obstacle zones as a graphic control measure to grant
obstacle emplacement authority to subordinate brigade/regimental commanders. Obstacle zones are based
on defined enemy AAs and are aligned with subordinate brigade/regimental areas of operations—typically
a BCT/RCT but could be a maneuver enhancement brigade or any other unit with an area of operations.

Chapter 2
2-13. (U) Commanders may assign more than one obstacle zone to the area of operations of a subordinate
unit using other graphic control measures, such as PLs, within the boundary of the unit to define the
geographical limits of the zone. If a commander designates the entire area of operations of the unit as an
obstacle zone, then another obstacle control measure for that unit is unnecessary.
2-14. (U) Obstacle zones do not cross brigade/regimental boundaries. Commanders assign each obstacle
zone to a single subordinate unit to ensure a unity of effort. This keeps tactical obstacle responsibility along
the same lines as control of direct and indirect fires. This normally does not create a vulnerability or gap on
the boundary between adjacent units since commanders base areas of operations and obstacle zones on
defined AAs. Adjacent units may, on rare occasion, cover the same AA, but obstacle zones still do not
cross unit boundaries. To ensure a unity of obstacle effort where obstacle zones meet along unit boundaries,
the commander designates a contact point for obstacle coordination between the adjacent units.
2-15. (U) Commanders normally do not assign intent to an obstacle zone to afford the subordinate
commander flexibility in using obstacles. Commanders may prioritize obstacle zones to aid their staff in
planning and resourcing obstacles. Staffs resource obstacle zones by anticipating how subordinate units
will likely employ obstacles within each zone based on their own mission analysis/problem framing.
OBSTACLE BELTS (U)

2-16. (U) Brigade/regimental commanders use obstacle belts as a graphic control measure to grant obstacle
emplacement authority to subordinate battalion commanders. They use obstacle belts to further focus the
obstacle effort in supporting their intent and concept of operations. Obstacle belts are placed within
assigned obstacle zones to ensure that obstacles will not interfere with the higher commander’s scheme of
movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver.
2-17. (U) Brigade/regimental commanders plan obstacle belts to attack the maneuver of enemy
brigade-/regimental-size units. They plan and allocate belts against brigade-/regimental-size AAs based on
battalion mobility corridors. This is consistent with brigade level planning, which allocates companies
against battalion mobility corridors and task-organizes battalion-size units to defeat enemy
brigades/regiments. As with obstacle zones, light infantry units defending against mechanized forces focus
obstacle belts one echelon down.
2-18. (U) As with obstacle zones, obstacle belts do not cross unit boundaries and a single subordinate unit
is responsible for each belt. Commanders may assign more than one belt to a subordinate unit. Battalion
commanders cannot plan or emplace obstacles outside brigade-/regimental-directed obstacle belts.
Commanders use the same techniques for obstacle zones to ensure coordination along unit boundaries and
may designate entire battalion areas of operations as obstacle belts. Unlike zones, brigade/regimental
commanders normally assign intent to each obstacle belt to provide purpose and direction. Assigning
obstacle intent to each belt and prioritizing belts help the staff plan and resource obstacles. It also facilitates
subordinate unit obstacle planning. When brigade/regimental commanders assign an obstacle effect, they
ensure that obstacles within the belt complement the brigade/regimental fire plan. The combination of
obstacle belts with specified obstacle effects is the commander’s obstacle intent. It conveys the effect that
must be achieved by fires and obstacles (obstacle effect) against a specific enemy (target) within the
defined belt (relative location) to subordinate commanders.
2-19. (U) Obstacle belts refine the area authorized for tactical obstacles; however, they still give battalion
commanders the latitude needed to develop detailed obstacle plans based on direct fire planning. The
brigade/regimental commander’s obstacle intent is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Assigning a specific
obstacle effect to a belt does not dictate that all obstacle groups within that belt must have the same effect,
as long as the combined effects of those obstacle groups achieve the intended overall effect of the belt.

Note. (U) The commander at the corps, Marine expeditionary force, division, or
brigade/regimental level may authorize emplacement authority for certain types of protective
obstacles outside obstacle zones or belts. Normally, the commander will authorize company
commanders and base camp or base cluster commanders to emplace protective obstacles within
500 meters of their positions (this is mission variable dependent). The commander usually limits
the types of obstacles that a unit may use for protective obstacles that are outside obstacle
control measures; for example, allowing only wire- and command-detonated antipersonnel
mines outside of control measures for protective obstacles and requiring that minefields be
fenced on all sides to prevent fratricide.
OBSTACLE GROUPS (U)

2-20. (U) Obstacle groups are one or more individual obstacles that are grouped together to produce a
specific obstacle effect. Commanders use obstacle groups to direct the emplacement of tactical obstacles
and ensure that they support the unit scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver. In most
cases, battalion commanders designate obstacle groups, but higher-level commanders may also designate
them. Commanders plan obstacle groups within the limits of their obstacle emplacement authority. Very
few obstacle groups are planned above the battalion level because of the need for detailed integration with
the fire plan.
2-21. (U) Obstacle groups usually attack the maneuver of enemy battalions. Commanders normally plan
obstacle groups along enemy battalion AAs as defined by company mobility corridors. They may plan a
group along a company-size AA. This is especially true for friendly light forces. Unlike obstacle zones or
belts, obstacle groups are not areas, but are general locations where obstacles will be emplaced.
Commanders normally show obstacle groups using the obstacle effect symbols. If exact obstacle locations
are necessary based on the situation, commanders may show individual obstacle symbols in addition to an
obstacle effect symbol. When given a belt with an assigned intent, the battalion commander can plan
obstacle groups with different obstacle effects as long as the combined effect of those obstacles will
achieve the intended overall effect of the belt.
2-22. (U) Obstacle groups provide a greater degree of control on the emplacement of tactical obstacles, but
they are still general enough to allow for minor adjustments to the location of individual obstacles, based
on the reality of the terrain, to achieve the desired effects; for example, a commander may move a fix
obstacle group and direct fire TRPs a few hundred meters to avoid having them masked by rolling terrain.
However, a major change to the location of an obstacle group requires the approval of the commander who
directed the obstacle group. An obstacle group serves a function similar to a BP. A group does not give the
exact location of obstacles within the group just as a BP does not show the exact location of a subordinate
unit weapon system. The maneuver company commander and the emplacing unit leader, usually an
engineer, coordinate directly to ensure that the positioning of weapon systems and obstacles is mutually
supportive.
2-23. (U) Obstacle group responsibility falls along the same lines as fire control. Normally, company team
fire plans are relatively simple, massing the fires of the company team on a single AA at a time. Simplicity
is essential to ensuring that company team commanders can focus on maximizing the effects of their
assigned obstacle groups. A battalion commander generally does not assign a company team more than two
obstacle groups to allow it to mass fires. In some cases, more than one company team may be required to
cover a single obstacle group, depending on its size and the intended effect. In these instances, the
commander who is responsible for establishing the EA is also in charge of integrating the obstacle group
with fires. Normally, the battalion commander or S-3 plays a significant role in building and synchronizing
an EA that is covered by two or more companies.
2-24. (U) Obstacle groups, resource factors, and standard individual obstacles are the basis for estimating
obstacle resource requirements at the battalion level. These tools help the commander allocate the
necessary resources to each obstacle group, EA, or company BP. These tools also aid the staff in

Chapter 2
identifying critical shortfalls and planning for the distribution and resupply of Class IV/V obstacle material
within the battalion area of operations.
OBSTACLE RESTRICTIONS (U)

2-25. (U) Obstacle restrictions are an important tool for providing obstacle control. Commanders at all
levels may use obstacle restrictions to provide additional obstacle control and limit the specific types of
obstacles used. These restrictions ensure that subordinates do not use obstacles with characteristics that
impair current and future operations. They also help commanders focus the use of limited resources for the
main effort by restricting their use elsewhere. Commanders may also use restrictions to prevent
subordinates from emplacing obstacles in a certain area. Subordinate commanders may increase, but not
decrease the level of restrictions established by the higher commander.
2-26. (U) Obstacle restrictions may be written or shown graphically as long as they are clear. Obstacle
restrictions can be shown graphically using an obstacle-restricted area, as shown in figure 2-2, or written
with a reference to an existing graphic control measure. Obstacle restricted areas are a command and
control measure used to limit the type or number of obstacles within an area (JP 3-15). Obstacle-restricted
areas designate the area where a specific restriction is enforced. Obstacle-free areas are a special case of the
obstacle-restricted area and are used to ensure that an area is completely free of reinforcing obstacles. Any
obstacle-restricted area may have a specific time period when the restriction is in place. Some examples of
obstacle restrictions include—
 (U) Placing an obstacle-restricted area within a zone or belt.
 (U) Designating a counterattack axis, passage lane, or other maneuver control measure as an
obstacle-free area.
 (U) Stating that no obstacles are permitted within a certain distance of a main supply route,
movement corridor, passage lane, or restricted target.
 (U) Establishing obstacle-free areas or no-later-than self-destruct times for SCATMINEs within
a specific area such as an objective, a planned BP, or an area bounded by PLs.
Legend:
SEP September
Figure 2-2. (U) Obstacle-free and obstacle-restricted areas
MARKING, REPORTING, AND RECORDING (U)

2-27. (U) Commanders are responsible for marking, reporting, and recording friendly reinforcing obstacles
within their areas of operations. This section briefly discusses these requirements. The details for
performing these tasks are presented in appendix D. (See FM 3-34.210 for information on marking,
reporting, and recording explosive hazards.)

OBSTACLE MARKING (U)

2-28. (U) Minefield marking is a requirement under international agreements to which the United States is
a party (including standardization agreements [STANAGs]). Commanders must make every attempt to
mark minefields as soon as the tactical situation allows so that friendly forces and civilians are prevented
from accidentally entering minefields. Commanders decide whether to mark other obstacles besides
minefields that pose a hazard to people based on risk assessment. (See JP 3-15 and STANAG 2036 for
more information.)
OBSTACLE REPORTING (U)

2-29. (U) An obstacle report is an oral, electronic, or written communication concerning obstacle activities.
The combatant commander or the joint force commander specifies the format for obstacle reports that
subordinate units will use.
OBSTACLE RECORDING (U)

2-30. (U) Obstacle records document the location, design, and other pertinent aspects of friendly
reinforcing obstacles. Accurate obstacle records prevent fratricide, facilitate obstacle clearing, and protect
against liability claims. Requirements and procedures for obstacle recording should be consistent and
clearly articulated in OPLANs, OPORDs, and SOPs.
OBSTACLE TRACKING (U)

2-31. (U) Tracking friendly reinforcing obstacles consists of the following components:
 (U) Tracking obstacle emplacement and expending Class IV/V obstacle material, and
completing key milestones as part of the unit timeline (delivery of obstacle material, completion
of obstacle siting, start and completion times for emplacing each obstacle group).
 (U) Collating obstacle reports.
 (U) Disseminating collated information to unified action partners/interorganizational partners
that the obstacles may affect.
 (U) Maintaining records that identify the location and composition of friendly reinforcing
obstacles to facilitate future planning and eventual obstacle removal (to include clearing,
reusing, or disposing obstacle material) after the end of hostilities or when an obstacle is no
longer needed.
2-32. (U) Each echelon tracks obstacle effort two levels down. Corps and divisions track the status of
obstacle belts that are being worked by battalions. Brigades/regiments track the status of obstacle groups,
and battalions track the status and location of each individual obstacle. The G-3/S-3 is responsible for
tracking the emplacement of friendly reinforcing obstacles as part of the mobility portion of the COP
(real-time MCOO). The G-3/S-3 is assisted by the engineer and fire support staffs. Obstacle reports go
upward through the owning unit, emplacing unit, and engineer channels, if, for example, the emplacing unit
is an artillery or aviation unit. Reinforcing obstacle information, including SCATMINE self-destruct times
and safety zones, is entered into the friendly reinforcing obstacle database and graphically shown on the
combined obstacle overlay. Obstacle locations are entered into the database as precisely as possible, using
8-digit grid coordinates at a minimum. This provides enough information for immediate planning concerns.
The obstacle database is continuously updated as additional information becomes available to facilitate
future planning and eventually obstacle clearance.
2-33. (U) During the preparation or obstacle emplacement phase, command posts (especially emplacing
and engineer unit command posts) need to maintain many details for each obstacle. Most commanders need
only a few pieces of critical information to track the status of the supporting obstacle effort. Figure 2-3,
page 2-8, is a sample commander’s status card, which is a way for commanders to track this critical
information. The commander’s status card shows the relative location of each obstacle group, the intended
effect, the number of executed obstacles versus the number of planned obstacles, and the expected start and

Chapter 2
completion times of each group. The commander’s status card is also useful for tracking the survivability
effort. (See ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6, Survivability Operations for more information.)
As of 5 February 2014
Legend:
BCT brigade combat team
CAB combined arms battalion
CM countermobility
COMP completed
EXEC executed
FIST-V fire support team vehicle
hr hour
MB block minefield
MF fix minefield
MT turn minefield
MTR mortar
OBST obstacles
PLAN planned
SURV survivability
VOL Volcano
Figure 2-3. (U) Sample commander’s status card
2-34. (U) The commander can also use regular updates to support timely decisions to adjust the effort
based on friendly and enemy criteria that was determined during the planning process. Some examples of
adjustments may include reallocating Class IV/V obstacle material and shifting blade assets or obstacle
emplacement systems such as the Volcano.

Chapter 3
Achieving Obstacle Integration (U)
(U) Obstacle integration is the actions that commanders and staffs apply to ensure
that the employment of obstacles supports the commander’s intent and concept of
operations. Obstacle integration transcends all warfighting functions and occurs at all
echelons. This chapter is focused on the planning and preparation activities that are
needed to achieve obstacle integration. It describes obstacle design and the
integration of obstacles that occurs during the planning process and the obstacle
siting that occurs as part of EA development. It also discusses how the obstacle plan
is resourced and how Class IV/V obstacle material is supplied to emplacing units.
DESIGN (U)
3-1. (U) Obstacle design is tailoring the reinforcing obstacle characteristics of width, depth, and
composition and the array of individual obstacles within obstacle groups to best achieve the desired
obstacle effect. Obstacle design incorporates the obstacle employment principles in matching friendly
obstacle emplacement means against enemy obstacle reduction means to achieve a specific effect, while
considering the natural effects of the terrain.
3-2. (U) Obstacle design maximizes the use of standard obstacle designs. Standard obstacle designs
provide a solid start point that can be quickly tailored to a particular situation based on mission variables.
Standard obstacle designs exist for most obstacles. For scatterable minefields, there are standard designs in
terms of size and density that are used to achieve each of the obstacle effects. For other obstacle types,
adapting standard designs to achieve specific effects requires additional analysis and a better understanding
of enemy characteristics, especially obstacle reduction capabilities, and terrain and weather effects.
3-3. (U) A general rule for designing an obstacle is that the obstacle does not need to be more difficult to
reduce than the existing obstacle into which it ties into. If the threat can reduce the existing obstacle in 10
minutes, then it would be wasteful to construct a reinforcing obstacle there that would require 40 minutes to
breach. The effort and resources used to obtain the additional 30 minutes of delay time can be better used
elsewhere. Although it may be difficult to estimate the delay or breaching time associated with a particular
obstacle, observing this rule helps optimize available resources.
WIDTH (U)
3-4. (U) The emplacing unit uses standard obstacle designs as a starting point and then tailors the width of
each individual obstacle for the exact location that it will occupy as part of obstacle siting. When added
together, the combined width of each individual obstacle within an obstacle group should closely equal the
estimated total linear effort that was calculated by using obstacle resource factors.
3-5. (U) The design width for point obstacles is typically the distance between two existing obstacles and
not the actual width of a road or highway through the existing obstacle. In open terrain, an individual
obstacle with a 250-meter width is an appropriate-sized building block for mounted threats. This is based
on an enemy armored company of 12 to 18 combat vehicles that may have a probable frontage of 500
meters when deployed, which assumes that at least half of the frontage of the enemy company will
encounter the obstacle; therefore, achieving a disrupt effect at a minimum. For dismounted threats, a typical
march formation for a company-size enemy force may have a frontage of 40 to 200 meters. Using 200
meters as the upper limit, the designed obstacle must target at least half of the frontage of the enemy
company, which is 100 meters.

Chapter 3
DEPTH (U)
3-6. (U) Obstacles must have enough depth to counter the enemy obstacle reduction capabilities to create
significant effects. The depth is directly related to the obstacle effect that is being sought. For a disrupt or
fix effect, the obstacle should require the enemy to expend at least one reduction asset; for example, an
obstacle should be at least 130 meters in depth if the enemy has mine-clearing line charges. For a turn or
block effect, the depth must be increased to cause the enemy to expend more obstacle reduction assets. The
depth may be decreased if the enemy is not equipped with mine-clearing line charges. The depth can be
decreased even more if the enemy does not have mechanical obstacle reduction assets and is reliant on
manual obstacle reduction methods.
3-7. (U) Dismounted threats typically rely on employing grapnel hooks, hand-emplaced explosives,
bangalore torpedoes, and portable explosive line charges. A 45-meter depth would require multiple uses of
those assets and would have a significant impact on any dismounted obstacle reduction attempt.
COMPOSITION (U)
3-8. (U) Composition is the number and type of individual obstacles within an obstacle group that will
create the desired effect. For minefields, composition specifically refers to minefield density (the number of
mines within a minefield) and the types of mines used (antivehicle or antipersonnel). For networked
munitions, composition includes the munitions types that are being employed. For constructed obstacles,
composition includes the type of material from which the obstacle is constructed. The composition of
obstacles is based on the available resources, type of enemy force that is being targeted and its means for
obstacle reduction, desired effect, and ROE. For obstacles that are intended for long-term use, such as those
used around base camps and other fixed sites, other considerations include the—
 (U) Durability against the elements.
 (U) Sustainability.
 (U) Ability to move or reuse the obstacle to provide flexibility and cost savings.
3-9. (U) Different types of reinforcing obstacles are combined to produce complex obstacles that will
require the enemy to employ more than one reduction technique (explosive, mechanical, or physical) to
create a lane. Employing complex obstacles improves the overall effectiveness of an obstacle group by
complicating attempted breaching efforts. Whether the targeted enemy force is mostly mounted or
dismounted will drive the appropriate combination of antivehicle and antipersonnel obstacles. The use of
antipersonnel obstacles, particularly antipersonnel mines, can disrupt dismounted obstacle reduction efforts,
but it will have little effect against an enemy that relies mostly on mounted obstacle reduction assets.
Although U.S. antivehicle SCATMINEs have an inherent antidisturbance capability, that alone may not
prevent a dismounted enemy force from moving through or attempting a manual breach of an antivehicle
scatterable minefield. Therefore, they are normally only used against an anticipated mounted enemy force
or combined with antipersonnel SCATMINEs. (See appendix E for SCATMINEs and mine delivery
systems.)
INDIVIDUAL OBSTACLE ARRAY (U)

3-10. (U) Individual obstacle array is the arrangement of individual obstacles within an obstacle group to
achieve the desired effect. Obstacle resource factors, shown in figure 3-1, only provide an estimate of the
total linear obstacle effort that is required to achieve a specific effect. One continuous obstacle that is 500
meters long in an AA that is 1,000 meters wide, does not automatically yield a disrupt effect. Although,
each obstacle group control measure is specifically drawn to help guide the array of individual obstacles
within the group, as demonstrated in figure 3-1, it is up to the emplacing-unit leaders on the ground to
determine how best to orient, sequence, and space individual obstacles to achieve the desired effect based

on on-site conditions. Effectively doing so is as much art as science. It requires an understanding of the
natural effects of the—
 (U) Terrain.
 (U) Enemy characteristics.
 (U) Effectiveness of friendly weapon systems employed in a certain area.
Figure 3-1. (U) Obstacle resource factors and linear obstacle effort
3-11. (U) Tailored geospatial products are used to help visualize terrain effects and facilitate planning.
Obstacle siting, when conducted as part of EA development, is critical to the effective array of individual
obstacles within EAs.
3-12. (U) Predicting the exact effect that an individual obstacle or a group of obstacles in tandem will have
on the enemy is challenging in open or unrestricted terrain and even more so in restricted terrain. A one-
point obstacle on a single roadway passing through restricted terrain can produce different obstacle effects
depending on the size and formation of the enemy force, its obstacle reduction capabilities and primary
vehicle composition, and bypass availability. In these situations, leaders must determine the exact capacity
of mobility corridors and predict how the enemy will likely adjust its formation or scheme of maneuver to
negotiate the restricted terrain. Figure 3-2 shows possible obstacle arrays in restricted terrain.
Figure 3-2. (U) Possible obstacle arrays in restricted terrain

Chapter 3
PLANNING PROCESS (U)

3-13. (U) Countermobility operations are planned by incorporating the obstacle employment principles
within the planning process. The senior engineer staff officer is the primary staff integrator for
countermobility operations and works together with other staff members to ensure the inclusion and
integration of all warfighting functions. Countermobility requirements and the tasks necessary to fulfill
them are synchronized primarily through integrating processes and continuing activities. (See ADRP 5-0
and MCWP 5-1 for a discussion of the planning process and the framework for integrating the actions of
the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others.) Table 3-1 provides some of the necessary
countermobility planning considerations that are linked to the planning process steps.
Table 3-1. (U) Countermobility planning considerations within the planning process
MDMP Steps MCPP Steps Countermobility Planning Considerations
• Request geospatial information and terrain-visualization products (mobility
corridors, combined obstacle overlays) to help understand terrain effects.
Receipt of the • Request intelligence products on enemy mobility capabilities.
mission • Update running estimates/staff estimates, including the status of friendly
countermobility assets.
• Understand the unit mission, commander’s intent, and scheme of

movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver two levels up.
• Identify obstacle control measures from higher headquarters.
• As part of the initial IPB—
 Evaluate the terrain and weather effects on enemy mobility and
friendly countermobility capabilities.
 Identify possible EAs, attack or counterattack routes, choke points,
Problem and other opportunities offered by the terrain.
framing  Assess enemy mobility capabilities (including manpower, equipment,
and materials, and determine strengths and weaknesses).
Mission  Determine enemy avenues of approach and likely enemy COAs
analysis based on threat patterns, intentions, terrain, and time available.
 Identify specified and implied countermobility tasks, recommend
essential countermobility tasks, determine obvious shortfalls in assets
available, and initiate requests for augmentation as early as possible
during planning.
 Gather information on applicable laws, policies, and ROE that pertain
to the obstacle employment.
 Develop information requirements that are related to countermobility
operations, such as enemy mobility capabilities, and recommend
initial CCIR.
 Integrate information requirements into the information collection plan.
• Array obstacle effect symbols in support of each COA based on the
commander’s initial intent and planning guidance.
• Identify areas that require obstacle restrictions (counterattack routes,
movement corridors).
• Plan tentative obstacle zones, belts, groups, and/or individual obstacles,
COA COA as appropriate that will achieve the desired effects.
development development • Refine essential countermobility tasks as necessary.
• Determine obstacle resource requirements, including manpower,
equipment, and Class IV/V obstacle material for the initial obstacle plan for
each COA.
• Allocate countermobility assets based on identified requirements and
troop-to-task analysis.

Table 3-1. (U) Countermobility planning considerations within the planning process
(continued)
MDMP Steps MCPP Steps Countermobility Planning Considerations
• War-game the task organization of countermobility assets. Consider
the attrition of assets resulting from maintenance problems or combat
COA war- actions and the efforts needed to repair and/or redistribute assets.
COA analysis
gaming • War-game (action/reaction) the enemy use of mobility and
countermobility assets that will impact the friendly scheme of
movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver.
• Analyze and evaluate advantages and disadvantages for each COA
in relation to the ability to—
 Execute countermobility tasks.
COA
 Employ situational obstacles based on time-distance factors,
comparison
range fans, and emplacement and arming times.
COA  Reinforce or repair obstacles and counter enemy obstacle
comparison reduction efforts.
and decision
• Gain approval for—
 Changes to essential countermobility tasks.
COA approval  Recommended priorities of effort and support.
 Requests for countermobility augmentation to be sent to higher
headquarters.
Orders • Refine obstacle control measures for the approved COA, and
development complete the obstacle overlay.
Orders • Integrate countermobility tasks within the OPLAN or OPORD.
production, • Ensure that the task organization of countermobility assets is
dissemination, accurate and clear, to include the necessary instructions for effecting
and transition Transition linkup.
• Ensure the quality and completeness of subordinate unit instructions
for performing countermobility tasks.
Note. The Army uses the MDMP, and the Marine Corps uses the MCPP. The processes are similar,
although the steps are different. The MDMP is described in FM 6-0, and the MCPP is described in MCWP
5-1.
Legend:
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
COA course of action
EA engagement area
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
MCPP Marine Corps planning process
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP military decisionmaking process
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
ROE rules of engagement
3-14. (U) Commanders at each level use plans and orders to provide subordinates with the necessary
obstacle intent and obstacle control needed to support their intent and concept of operations, and those of
the higher commander, while providing the necessary flexibility that enables bottom-up obstacle
refinement. At each level, obstacle planning builds on the obstacle plan from higher echelons in an
echeloned effect.
3-15. (U) At corps level, obstacle planning primarily centers on obstacle control and obstacle restriction
development. The corps develops obstacle restrictions to ensure that division obstacles do not interfere with

Chapter 3
the corps’ scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver and future operations. The corps plans
reserved, situational, or directed-obstacle groups only as necessary to support the corps concept of
operations. In very rare instances, the corps may plan directed-obstacle groups.
3-16. (U) At the division level, obstacle planning is focused on planning obstacle zones to give subordinate
units obstacle emplacement authority. Divisions also use restrictions with the obstacle zones to ensure that
subordinate unit obstacles do not interfere with corps or division level operations. Divisions plan reserved
or situational obstacle groups to support the scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver of
the division and corps. The planning of directed-obstacle groups is rare at the division and corps levels.
3-17. (U) At the brigade and regimental level, obstacle planning is focused on planning obstacle belts to
give obstacle emplacement authority to battalions. Brigades/regiments also use obstacle restrictions. They
frequently plan situational obstacle groups and reserved-obstacle groups. Directed-obstacle group planning
is more common at the division level; however, it is still rare.
3-18. (U) At the battalion level, obstacle planning is focused on planning obstacle groups that are executed
at the company level. Most of these obstacle groups are directed obstacles, but they can also be reserved
and situational obstacles. Battalions may use restrictions, but normally do not because of the level of detail
that is inherent within the battalion obstacle plan. At the company level and for selected base camps,
obstacle planning focuses on the detailed design and siting plans to execute the directed, situational, and
reserved-obstacle groups that are planned at higher levels.
RECEIPT OF MISSION/PROBLEM FRAMING (U)

3-19. (U) Upon receipt of the mission, the staff gathers existing geospatial information and geospatial
products for the area of operations and the area of interest. Products may include standard products (maps
and studies, reports) and tailored products (mobility corridors, combined obstacle overlays). The staff also
gathers available intelligence products on enemy mobility capabilities (ways and means), threat patterns,
and any available information on existing natural and man-made obstacles.
3-20. (U) Commanders and staff sections immediately begin updating their running estimates/staff
estimates upon receipt of the mission. The engineer running estimate/staff estimate is the primary source of
information about friendly countermobility capabilities. Such capabilities are primarily a function of the
availability and status of the Class IV/V obstacle material, engineer units, obstacle emplacement equipment
and systems, and time. Engineers use this information and planning factors to develop a rough estimate of
the linear obstacle effort that is possible. This estimate provides the basis for generating feasible obstacle
plans to support each COA. (See appendix F for countermobility planning factors.)
MISSION ANALYSIS/PROBLEM FRAMING (U)

3-21. (U) As part of IPB, which begins during mission analysis/problem framing and continues throughout
the operations process, the staff focuses on understanding the terrain and the enemy and determining where
best to reinforce the terrain to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. (See FM 2-
01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace for more information on IPB.)
3-22. (U) Commanders and staffs analyze the terrain using the five military aspects of terrain expressed as
OAKOC/KOCOA. The staff evaluates the effects of terrain and weather on friendly countermobility and
enemy mobility capabilities. The engineer staff officer coordinates with the G-2/S-2 for geospatial
engineering support in analyzing the terrain and generating geospatial information and the corresponding
terrain visualization products to help form the mobility portion of the COP (real-time MCOO). (See ATP
3-34.80 for information on geospatial engineering.)
3-23. (U) The staff develops an understanding of enemy mobility capabilities (ways and means) to forecast
specific enemy mobility actions by analyzing—
 (U) Vehicle and equipment performance characteristics.
 (U) Enemy engineering units (manpower, equipment, and materials).
 (U) Threat patterns.

 (U) Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

 (U) Support mechanisms in consideration of terrain effects and available resources to forecast
specific enemy mobility actions.
3-24. (U) During mission analysis/problem framing and the initial IPB, the staff attempts to—
 (U) Determine where reinforcing obstacles can be maximized based on existing natural and
man-made obstacles.
 (U) Identify and assess enemy mobility capabilities (strengths and vulnerabilities) based on
vehicle and equipment performance characteristics and the effects of terrain based on weather.
 (U) Identify emerging threats and TTP.
 (U) Predict enemy mobility intentions and actions.
 (U) Determine and prioritize information requirements that are fulfilled through information
collection, including engineer reconnaissance, geospatial intelligence, requests for information,
and reachback.
 (U) Identify enemy mobility HVTs, and recommend high-payoff targets (HPTs).
3-25. (U) Information requirements that are important to the commander are nominated as commander’s
critical information requirements as described in ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1. Some examples of
countermobility-related information requirements include—
 (U) Enemy obstacle reduction capabilities and TTP.
 (U) Composition, capabilities, and strength of enemy engineer units.
 (U) Operational status and location of selected friendly countermobility assets (friendly-force
information requirements).
 (U) Details about existing natural and man-made obstacles, to include identifying potential
enemy points of breach and bypass.
3-26. (U) Obtaining information on existing obstacles may require a combination of information collection
assets. Committing engineers or specific engineer reconnaissance teams as part of the reconnaissance effort
can improve the technical information collection on obstacles. Engineers can provide technical insight on
the restrictive nature of an obstacle and the ease of breaching or bypassing potential reinforcing obstacles at
a particular location. FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4, Engineer Reconnaissance, describes the capabilities,
limitations, and employment considerations of engineer reconnaissance teams.
3-27. (U) During the initial IPB that occurs during mission analysis/problem framing, a situation template
is developed for each enemy COA to graphically depict the expected disposition of enemy forces based on
threat templates and the effects of the operational environment. The engineer staff officer is the staff expert
on enemy mobility capabilities and terrain visualization and works together with the G-2/S-2 and other staff
members in templating enemy AAs based on enemy mobility capabilities and terrain and weather effects.
Any unknowns about the enemy mobility effort become information requirements (possibly priority
intelligence requirements) and are synchronized and integrated into the information collection plan.
3-28. (U) As part of mission analysis/problem framing, the staff analyzes the unit mission, commander’s
intent, scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver, and scheme of protection/scheme of force
protection two levels up to identify specified and implied countermobility tasks. Each staff section may
generate countermobility requirements as a result of analyzing the situation from its own perspective. The
staff engineer officer focuses on the higher headquarters scheme of engineer support and obstacle plan,
including overlays and execution matrixes, to identify countermobility requirements or tasks. From these
tasks, combined with the maneuver commander’s guidance, the staff collectively develops recommended
essential tasks for countermobility.
3-29. (U) Essential countermobility tasks are those tasks that the unit must conduct to meet the
commander’s intent and accomplish the mission. The staff recommends essential countermobility tasks
during the mission analysis brief. At the conclusion of the mission analysis brief, the commander approves
the essential countermobility tasks that are considered relevant. The staff determines obvious shortfalls in
countermobility assets (including units, Class IV/V obstacle material, and special equipment) based on the

Chapter 3
current task organization and initiates requests for augmentation as early in the planning phase as possible
to facilitate early movement and the timely arrival and linkup of augmenting units. The staff makes
assumptions on expected augmentation to facilitate the continuation of planning. (See FM 6-0 and MCWP
5-1 for more information on using assumptions.) A fully developed, essential countermobility task has a
task and purpose. Table 3-2 shows sample essential countermobility tasks.
Table 3-2. (U) Sample essential countermobility tasks
Essential Countermobility Task 1
Task: On order, emplace obstacle group A1C to
Purpose: Protect the flank of BP 2-6.
block enemy AA#3.
Task: Emplace reserved obstacle on bridge at grid Purpose: Allow rearward passage of delay force
coordinate RS 12345678. and defense along PL DODGERS.
Task: Emplace protective obstacles around base Purpose: Prevent hostile actions against the base
camp at grid coordinate RS 12345678. camp.
Legend:
BP battle position
PL phase line
COURSE-OF-ACTION DEVELOPMENT (U)

3-30. (U) After essential countermobility tasks are approved, planners integrate them into COA
development and refine them as necessary. Planners develop associated methods to complete the essential
countermobility tasks by allocating resources and recommending priorities based on the commander’s
initial intent and planning guidance. Examples of countermobility-specific planning guidance that
commanders may provide include priorities for blade assets between mobility, countermobility, and
survivability and priorities for artillery and aviation assets that can deliver SCATMINEs. In developing
their initial intent and planning guidance, commanders often meet with key staff members. Engineers can
use obstacle effect symbols sketched on a map or overlay to facilitate their discussions with commanders
and other staff members. These discussions should aim at helping commanders understand and visualize
how obstacles can support the commander’s desired tactical mission tasks given the existing terrain and
resources available, including time, for emplacing obstacles.
3-31. (U) Planners develop an initial obstacle plan for each COA based on the—
 (U) Obstacle intent, control, and resourcing that is articulated in the higher headquarters plan or
order.
 (U) Commander’s initial intent and planning guidance, to include specified tactical mission
tasks.
 (U) Obstacle effort that is possible based on available resources.
3-32. (U) As each COA is developed, planners array obstacle effect symbols to show where the obstacle
effects (turn, block, fix, and disrupt) are desired. Obstacle effect symbols are drawn roughly to scale to
depict the actual amount of area that is being covered and allow planners to better visualize the total linear
obstacle effort required. Before arraying obstacle effect symbols, planners must understand the current
running estimate of total obstacle effort that is possible based on available resources and work rates. While
arraying obstacle effect symbols, planners should avoid exceeding the total obstacle effort that is possible.
This is the same approach applied if arraying forces when the number of friendly forces being arrayed does
not exceed the forces available. If obstacle requirements exceed capabilities, then the COA must be
modified to remain feasible or additional resources must be requested and assumed available to allow
planning to continue.

3-33. (U) As obstacle effect symbols are arrayed, planners annotate the resources required for each one on
the obstacle resource requirements work sheet. The use of this work sheet helps planners maintain a
running total of the resources required to execute the obstacle plan for each COA. Planners use it to allocate
the appropriate obstacle resources (manpower, equipment, and material) to subordinate units. Concurrently,
planners also begin completing directed-, situational-, and reserved-obstacle execution matrixes as
applicable. These matrixes are finalized after COA approval and included as attachments to OPLANs and
OPORDs.
3-34. (U) As COA sketches and statements and the associated maneuver control graphics (unit boundaries,
and PLs) are completed, planners develop the appropriate obstacle zones, belts, or groups based on the
arrayed obstacle effect symbols. They also identify requirements for obstacle-restricted areas based on
planned movement routes or a counterattack axis. A zone or belt may be designated for an area that
contains more than one type of obstacle effect symbol. In this case, planners must determine whether an
effect symbol is needed and, if so, which symbol best conveys the overall intent for the zone or belt. For
groups, each arrayed obstacle effect symbol becomes its own control measure. In certain situations, to
ensure that a specific effect is achieved at a specific location, a directed-obstacle group or individual
obstacle may be used; for example, creating an obstacle at a critical bridge or choke point along a high-
speed AA. An individual obstacle symbol may be included on the obstacle overlay if that specific location
is supported by detailed reconnaissance.
COURSE-OF-ACTION ANALYSIS/WARGAMING (U)

3-35. (U) Wargaming is critical to testing, refining, and adapting the countermobility plan that supports
each COA. This includes—
 (U) Validating the composition and command and support relationships of units that are
performing countermobility tasks.
 (U) Refining countermobility tasks that will be executed by subordinate units.
 (U) Identifying decision points (DPs) and triggers for critical countermobility tasks such as
emplacing situational obstacles, executing reserved obstacles, closing lanes through obstacles,
and repairing or reinforcing reduced obstacles.
 (U) Refining commander’s critical information requirements and other information requirements
and incorporating them into the information collection plan.
 (U) Refining maneuver and fire support plans to ensure obstacle integration.
 (U) Refining the sustainment/logistics plan to ensure effective obstacle resourcing.
3-36. (U) The staff should identify critical events or aspects of countermobility tasks and ensure that, at a
minimum, those tasks are wargamed when time for more extensive wargaming is limited. Some examples
of critical actions associated with countermobility tasks include—
 (U) Responding to the loss of critical countermobility assets, such as Volcano systems.
 (U) Executing reserved obstacles.
 (U) Timing and synchronizing the requirements for employing situational obstacles.
 (U) Passing through and closing obstacle lanes.
 (U) Repairing or reinforcing reduced obstacles.
3-37. (U) Once war-gaming and COA refinement are completed, the staff finalizes the task organization.
The staff ensures that the command and support relationships of countermobility assets allow them to
remain responsive to the commander’s needs as unforeseen situations arise and that their effects can be
massed at the right time and location to achieve the desired results.
COURSE-OF-ACTION COMPARISON AND APPROVAL/COMPARISON AND DECISION (U)

3-38. (U) The staff compares the advantages and disadvantages of each COA based on the evaluation
criteria that were developed before the war game. Considerations include the ability to employ situational
obstacles and counter enemy obstacle reduction efforts and any impacts that the associated obstacle plan

Chapter 3
may have on current and future operations. Once the staff has determined which COA will be
recommended to the commander, the engineer staff officer may focus on refining the supporting obstacle
plan to help ensure the timely completion of the engineer annex. After selecting a COA, the commander
issues the final planning guidance. For countermobility operations, this guidance may include priorities for
engineer support and critical SCATMINE systems being used to employ situational obstacles.
ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION/ORDERS DEVELOPMENT (U)

3-39. (U) The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of
operations and providing the necessary detailed information required by subordinate units for execution.
Most of the details needed for executing the obstacle plan are provided in the obstacle overlay and the
supporting obstacle execution matrixes that are included as attachments to the engineer annex to the
OPLAN or OPORD. Once the maneuver control graphics for the selected COA are finalized, the tentative
obstacle control measures (zones, belts, groups, and obstacle-restricted areas) that were created during
COA development and refined during war-gaming can be completed to produce the obstacle overlay. Other
detailed information that subordinate units will need that is not provided in the obstacle overlay and
obstacle execution matrixes is placed elsewhere within or as an attachment (appendix, tab, or exhibit) to the
engineer annex or another annex as appropriate. Attachments are prepared in a form that best portrays the
information, such as text, a matrix, a trace, an overlay, an overprinted map, or a table. (See FM 6-0 and
MCWP 5-1 for more information on orders and attachments to orders.)
3-40. (U) The countermobility-related outputs that are generated as a result of mission planning include—
 (U) Obstacle overlay.
 (U) Directed-obstacle (see figure 3-3), reserved-obstacle (see chapter 5), and situational-obstacle
(see chapter 6) execution matrixes.
 (U) Initial information requirements and the information collection plan.
 (U) Identified enemy mobility HVTs and recommended HPTs.
 (U) Task organization of countermobility assets and the Class IV/V obstacle material
distribution plan based on the obstacle resource requirements work sheet.
 (U) Obstacle priorities.
Directed-Obstacle Execution Matrix
Material/Assets
Emplacing Unit
Responsibility
Lane Location
Lane Closure
Owning Unit
Instructions
Required
Obstacle
Location
Location
Number
Material
Priority
Special
Effect
Class Link-up
-1 x with
Vol- IV/V
A/1- Lane supply secu-
1/411 1/A/1- cano rity
A1D- RS1- 23 alpha point at
Dis- 23 escort
SV- 234- 1 engin (RS1- - 40 x grid
rupt Infan- Infan- at BP-
001 5678 eer 234- canis-
try try RS 12- 1 at
5678) ter
3456- 01-09-
DP 7 78 00-
SEP
Legend:
BP battle position
DP decision point
SEP September
Figure 3-3 (U) Sample directed-obstacle execution matrix

SITING (U)
3-41. (U) Obstacle siting confirms or modifies the exact location and design for each planned obstacle
based on the actual terrain and the refinement of the observation and fire plan that occurs at the lowest
level. Obstacle siting ensures that each individual obstacle or obstacle group is—
 (U) Properly oriented in relation to an actual mobility corridor.
 (U) Tied into the natural restrictiveness of the terrain.
 (U) Able to be covered by fire to achieve the desired effect.
 (U) Positioned on suitable terrain that allows for obstacle emplacement and proper obstacle
performance.
3-42. (U) Obstacle siting is an extension of the planning process and occurs primarily at the lower tactical
levels. It is a key task for achieving obstacle integration that occurs as part of the fourth step of the EA
development process. The EA development process is critical to optimizing the fires of all available
weapon systems and achieving the commander’s intent. The steps below represent a way to build an EA:
 (U) Step 1. Identify likely enemy AAs.
 (U) Step 2. Determine likely enemy scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver.
 (U) Step 3. Determine where to kill the enemy.
 (U) *Step 4. Plan and integrate obstacles.
 (U) *Step 5. Emplace weapon systems to include the preparation of fighting positions.
 (U) *Step 6. Plan and integrate observation and indirect fires.
 (U) Step 7. Conduct an EA rehearsal.
Note. (U) Although the steps are listed sequentially, the steps marked by an asterisk (*) should
be completed simultaneously.
3-43. (U) The EA development process provides added focus on planning and preparing for a specific
engagement. Although shown as a single step within the EA development process, step 4 is an iterative
process that is initiated during planning and continually refined throughout obstacle siting and EA
rehearsal.
3-44. (U) Obstacle siting is a support rehearsal that is focused on the integration of obstacles and fires. It is
considered a support rehearsal because it supports the EA rehearsal that occurs as the last step in the EA
development process. Obstacle siting occurs as early during the process as possible because of the assets
and time required for emplacing obstacles and constructing fighting positions. Obstacle siting can begin as
soon as the commander establishes the EA and identifies tentative positions for key weapons. Ideally, most
weapons will be in place and dug-in before obstacle siting; however, obstacle emplacement should not be
delayed because all systems are not on-site or in place. Normally, well-marked fire control measures and
one known position per maneuver platoon (not dug in) are the minimum required to effectively begin
obstacle siting.
3-45. (U) Because of their interdependence, obstacle emplacement and fighting position construction are
completed concurrently. Once the maneuver commander decides how the enemy will attack and where to
mass fires to accomplish the tactical task, tentative locations for obstacles and weapon systems can be
determined. The positioning of obstacles and weapon systems are interdependent and must be planned and
refined in unison. Automated mapping applications should be used to create terrain visualization products
(such as those that depict fields of fire and lines of sight) to save time in planning and preparing EAs. These
products help identify suitable locations for weapon systems and obstacles based on the terrain. This
improves the quality of tentative plans and helps reduce the amount of adjustments that may be needed
based on the results of on-the-ground reconnaissance.
3-46. (U) Effective obstacle siting relies on collaboration between the emplacing unit leader (typically an
engineer), the fire support team, and the responsible maneuver company commander to ensure that the
combination of fires and obstacles will achieve the intended effect. All must devote enough time to the

Chapter 3
siting effort, since it represents the final adjustments to obstacle location and fire control planning before
obstacle emplacement.
3-47. (U) Obstacle siting begins by clearly marking the tentative locations for obstacles and weapon
systems and the direct fire control measures that were developed during planning. A siting party, consisting
of members of the emplacing unit, marks the leading edge or forward trace (enemy side) of individual
obstacles or obstacle groups. The obstacle markers facilitate obstacle siting and emplacement. While
marking the obstacles, the siting party makes necessary adjustments to the planned position or orientation
of the obstacle based on the actual terrain and the intent of the obstacle. Adjustments that are made are
reported to the emplacing unit leader to ensure that the obstacle overlay or display remains current and
available for those participating in obstacle siting.
3-48. (U) Depending on the situation, obstacle groups can be marked as a whole instead of marking each
individual obstacle. This is generally the case for turning and block obstacle groups, which typically
contain several individual obstacles grouped closely together. In these instances, the identification of the
leading edge or forward trace of the obstacle group is usually sufficient for obstacle siting. For disrupt and
fix obstacles, or point obstacles in broken or restricted terrain, each individual obstacle may need to be
marked. Figure 3-4 shows how the forward trace of a turn obstacle group may be sited and marked. The
items used for marking the obstacle (stakes, pickets) must be easily identifiable without compromising
operations security (OPSEC). Although obstacle emplacement may occur at night or during limited
visibility, it is preferable to conduct obstacle siting during daylight if risks to OPSEC can be mitigated.
Legend:
BP battle position
EA engagement area
TRP target reference point
Figure 3-4. (U) Siting and marking the forward trace of a turn obstacle group

3-49. (U) While marking the obstacles, the siting party may concurrently perform other preparation or site
layout tasks that are also needed for obstacle emplacement, including marking Volcano minefield
centerlines and start and end points, confirming routes for entering or exiting the emplacement site, and
laying out Class IV/V supply points.
3-50. (U) Once the tentative obstacles are marked and required adjustments to the obstacle overlay have
been made, the maneuver commander, the emplacing unit leader, and the fire support team colocate near
the weapons covering the obstacle. The emplacing-unit leader may lead off the obstacle siting by updating
the maneuver commander on any changes to the obstacle plan, based on the actual terrain, and pointing out
any key features of the obstacle plan (such as anchor points) that may warrant particular focus.
3-51. (U) When possible, all tanks, fighting vehicles, and other crew-served weapons of the unit (one per
platoon minimum) should occupy their positions and participate in the siting process. All participants in the
siting process typically use a common radio net to facilitate communications during siting. The emplacing-
unit leader may elect to move with the simulated enemy force as long as there is communication with the
supported maneuver commander.
3-52. (U) When directed to do so, a simulated enemy force consisting of vehicles or individuals from the
supported unit, emplacing unit, or both deploys into a formation of similar frontage as the expected enemy
and moves into the EA, simulating an enemy attack as visualized by the maneuver commander. By
assuming the expected enemy formation, the simulated enemy force helps confirm the probability of
encountering an obstacle and war-games the effects of obstacles on the enemy formation as a whole; for
example, determining if an array of disrupt obstacles inadvertently creates a block effect.
3-53. (U) As the simulated enemy moves through the EA, participants in the BP observe their sectors as
indicated by the direct fire control markers or TRPs. Each vehicle moves forward and stops at a
predetermined interval (for example, 100 meters) or until it encounters an obstacle. As vehicles encounter
marked obstacles, they communicate with the observers to ensure that they can be seen and are covered by
fire. They may be directed to travel back and forth along the forward trace of the obstacle as necessary to
ensure that they are visible along the entire obstacle frontage. Leaders make note of dead space or
unexpected gaps. Markers for obstacles, fire control measures, and weapon positions are then adjusted as
necessary. Once obstacle markers and TRPs have been adjusted, the necessary information is then
annotated on range cards. FSOs should also participate in this process to confirm observer plans. The siting
process may reveal the need for other fire control measures.
3-54. (U) If time is available and the risks to OPSEC can be mitigated, obstacle siting may be conducted
more than once to war-game different enemy formations, approaches, or reactions to obstacles; for
example, breaching or bypassing. With today’s digital capabilities, another option for reducing OPSEC
risks is creating a digital terrain model and conducting a virtual drive-through of the EA.
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS (U)

3-55. (U) Estimating obstacle resource requirements determines the manpower, equipment, Class IV/V
obstacle material, and time needed to achieve the desired obstacle effects. Because countermobility
missions are typically very resource-intensive, the resources required must be identified as early as possible
to facilitate timely execution. Effective obstacle resourcing relies on a top-down estimating/bottom-up
refinement approach. Planners at each echelon estimate the obstacle resources that are required based on
their array of obstacle effect symbols and the anticipated needs of subordinate units. These estimates and
the distribution of obstacle resources are then adjusted based on the exact requirements for individual
obstacles identified at the company level.
3-56. (U) In situations where the time for planning is severely limited or it is impractical to ascertain the
obstacle needs of subordinate units, planners may allocate Class IV/V obstacle material based solely on
subordinate unit obstacle-emplacing capability. This technique for allocating obstacle material may also be
useful when there is an inability to make timely adjustments to the task organization of countermobility
assets within subordinate units; for example, when conducting an unexpected hasty defense. This technique
is based on the logic that emplacing units can only expend a certain amount of obstacle material in a given

Chapter 3
amount of time based on work rates, travel, obstacle siting and marking, resupply, and maintenance.
Therefore, each subordinate unit is only supplied with an amount of obstacle material that it can reasonably
be expected to expend within a certain amount of time.
3-57. (U) As obstacle effect symbols are arrayed, forming the initial obstacle plan that supports each COA,
planners perform the following steps using the sample obstacle resource requirements work sheet shown in
figure 3-5:
 (U) Step 1. Identify the obstacle effect symbol that is needed to support the commander’s intent
and concept of operations.
 (U) Step 2. Measure the width of the enemy AA being influenced.
 (U) Step 3. Determine the total linear obstacle effort that is required to achieve the intended
effect by multiplying the AA width by the appropriate obstacle effect resource factor as shown
in figure 3-1, page 3-3.
 (U) Step 4. Determine the linear contribution of scatterable minefields, antivehicle ditching, or
other obstacles types that equal the total linear obstacle effort required in step 3.
 (U) Step 5. Calculate the primary resources that are required (Class IV/V obstacle material,
platoon hours, and blade team hours) for each obstacle type using planning factors and standard
obstacle designs. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, and appendix F for
troop and equipment work rates and other planning factors that are then adjusted based on
mission variables and individual unit capabilities.)
 (U) Step 6. As COA development progresses and obstacle zones, belts, and groups are created,
planners determine the total resources that are required for each one, as appropriate, and
determine any shortfalls based on available resources. Shortfalls are mitigated by using other
obstacles types that are not constrained by resources; therefore, reducing the number of obstacles
required and mitigating the risk or requesting more resources or augmentation from the higher
headquarters.
3-58. (U) Once resource requirements are determined for each zone, belt, or group, planners allocate the
appropriate platoons, equipment, and Class IV/V obstacle material to fulfill each requirement based on
available resources. Planners convert the platoon hours required into the platoons required based on the
actual time available. Planners then task-organize the appropriate obstacle-emplacing assets within the
supported maneuver unit to enable task execution. If requirements exceed capabilities, the staff must adjust
the plan, inform the commander where risks must be assumed, or request augmentation. If platoon hours
are the limiting factor, other sources of manpower (such as nonengineer units or contractors are considered
for employment). If a certain obstacle material or obstacle emplacement system is the limiting factor,
consider using another obstacle type.
SUPPLY OPERATIONS (U)

3-59. (U) The ability to emplace obstacles in an efficient and timely manner depends on the ability to get
the right amount and type of Class IV/V obstacle material to the emplacing unit at the right place and right
time. The forward positioning of large quantities of obstacle material helps to facilitate efficient obstacle
emplacement, but it also incurs risk. Forward-positioned obstacle material is more susceptible to enemy
interference and it may have to be abandoned or destroyed based on the urgency of a tactical situation.
Most emplacing units and the maneuver units being supported lack sufficient organic haul capacity to allow
the required amounts of obstacle material to remain uploaded on tactical vehicles until obstacle
emplacement is completed. In developing the Class IV/V obstacle material supply plan, planners must
balance supply and demand to avoid an oversupply or undersupply of obstacle material to the emplacing
unit. Oversupplying risks to combat loss, underutilization, and waste; while undersupplying risks the timely
completion of the obstacle plan. Planners estimate the rate that obstacle material will be expended, based
on subordinate unit obstacle-emplacing capability, in determining the optimal rate that obstacle material
should be distributed forward. Unit obstacle-emplacing capability is based on standard work rates that are
adjusted based on operational factors, equipment maintenance status, and the level of training or
experience.

Obstacle Resource Requirement Work Sheet

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Class
Linear Number or
IV/V PHs/BTHs
obstacle meters of Total Total
AA width and/or required on
Zone Belt Effect RF effort obstacles resources resources
(meters) equip- emplace-
required required (by required/belt required/zone
ment ment time
(meters) type)
required
2x
400-meter dozers (1
5 BTH
AV ditch blade
5 BTH
team 5 BTH
2 PH
4 x road 10- by 2 PH 2 PH
1 x Volcano
craters (30 40-pound 2 x Volcano
1 Disrupt 0.5 2,000 1,000 (80 canisters)
meters) crater (280
10- by 40-
charges canisters)
pound crater
2 x Volcano 80 1 hour 10- by 40-
charges
disrupt MF canisters (with travel) pound crater
A (550 charges
meters) 60 X
2 Fix 1.0 1,500 1,500 5 x Volcano 200 2 hours 1 x Volcano ADAM/RAAM
fix MF canisters (with travel) (200 rounds
(1,400 canisters) (FSO
meters) determines
3 Fix 1.0 1,000 1,000 5, 200- by 60 60 rounds exact
200-meter rounds (low angle) requirements)
ADAM/ (low
RAAM MF angle)
Legend:
ADAM area denial artillery munition
AV antivehicle
BTH blade team hour
FSO fire support officer
MF minefield
PH platoon hour
RAAM remote antiarmor mine
RF resource factor
Figure 3-5. (U) Sample obstacle-resource requirements work sheet
3-60. (U) Class IV/V obstacle material is a maneuver unit responsibility. It is requested and delivered
through the supply channels of the supported maneuver unit. The G-4/S-4 is responsible for planning and
executing logistic requirements for countermobility operations and works closely with the engineer staff
officer. Early coordination between logistic and engineer planners is essential to ensure that adequate types
and quantities of obstacle material and transportation assets are available to fulfill obstacle supply
requirements. Initial estimates of what, where, and how much obstacle material is needed or can be
emplaced based on the estimated work rates are determined as early as possible during planning. These
estimates are then refined based on the results of subordinate unit obstacle planning and performance
during execution. During execution, the progress of obstacle emplacement efforts is monitored through unit
reporting to confirm the expected expenditure of obstacle material. This allows potentially unused obstacle
material to be redistributed or cross-leveled to fulfill otherwise unresourced requirements.
3-61. (U) Most BCT/RCT units will deploy with a limited amount of Class IV/V obstacle material that is
part of their basic load, which is usually carried on tactical vehicles. As the situation requires, additional
obstacle material is delivered to brigade/regimental support areas as expeditionary support packages from
pre-positioned stocks or from the continental United States. These support packages are configured into
combat-configured loads (CCLs) and are put on pallets or in containers to facilitate throughput (delivery
without repackaging) to unit ammunition transfer and holding points or directly to Class IV/V supply
points. Throughput allows supplies to bypass one or more echelons in the distribution system to minimize

Chapter 3
handling, speed up delivery, and allow obstacle material to be pushed as far forward as possible to support
timely obstacle emplacement.
3-62. (U) Logistic and engineer planners work closely in developing controlled supply rates for Class IV/V
obstacle material. Controlled supply rates limit the issue of items that are in short supply. Commanders
establish priorities and use controlled supply rates to control the allocation of limited or critical obstacle
material.
3-63. (U) Leaders do the following when conducting obstacle supply operations:
 (U) Plan for lost, damaged, and destroyed obstacle material.
 (U) Maintain an emergency supply of Class IV/V obstacle material when possible.
 (U) Minimize the amount of shipping and packaging material going forward to reduce volume,
maximize haul capacity, and help relieve the burden of waste disposal on emplacing units.
 (U) Maximize the use of locally procured obstacle material, which meets military specifications
to reduce costs and/or transportation requirements.
 (U) Develop and use CCLs to push logistic to the obstacle site.
 (U) Ensure that authorized ammunition-handling procedures and safety distance requirements
are used at Class IV/V supply points.
 (U) Conduct resupply during limited visibility conditions when possible to prevent enemy
detection.
 (U) Plan for the security and defense of transportation assets and Class IV/V points.
 (U) Account for the manpower, equipment, and time needed for handling obstacle material, to
include offloading, uncrating, inspecting, configuring, and uploading.
CLASS IV/V SUPPLY POINT (U)

3-64. (U) A Class IV/V supply point is any point where obstacle material is received, configured, and/or
temporarily stockpiled in preparation for further distribution or emplacement. Class IV/V supply points are
placed where best needed to support the timely supply of obstacle material to obstacle sites. The location of
supply points and the resupply method used depend in part on the type, amount, availability, and haul
capacity of transportation assets. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A , Engineer Field Data for haul capacity
for various types of vehicles.)
3-65. (U) Leaders consider the following when choosing locations for Class IV/V supply points:
 (U) Proximity to obstacle sites. Supply points should be located as close to the point of demand
as possible. They should be centrally located to support multiple obstacle sites to minimize the
number of supply points needed.
 (U) Traffic circulation. Select areas that offer sufficient space for vehicles to enter, load,
unload, and exit without interfering with the loading and unloading of other vehicles.
 (U) Protection. A Class IV/V supply point should be located where it can be protected. Select
areas that offer natural cover and concealment to help avoid detection and protect against
artillery and air attack. Remove, hide, or bury residue as part of OPSEC.
3-66. (U) Early during planning, the BCT/RCT S-4 working with the engineer staff officer determines the
initial location for at least one Class IV/V supply point within each area of operations of the maneuver
battalion to serve as that unit’s central receiving point of obstacle material being pushed forward by higher
echelons (throughput). From this central receiving point, obstacle material may be further distributed to
other Class IV/V supply points or directly to an obstacle site for immediate emplacement. This central
receiving point is also where throughput is reconfigured into usable packages, if not already built as CCLs,
based on the requirements for each obstacle group. If the obstacle material has not already been configured,
a dedicated engineer representative and the necessary manpower from the supported maneuver battalion
must be on-site to perform this task. Table 3-3 shows a sample of the personnel required for operating a
Class IV/V supply point that serves as a central receiving point for throughput. If more than one of these

points is necessary, based on the size of the battalion area of operations, that battalion may require
augmentation to allow it to simultaneously operate each one.
Table 3-3. (U) Sample personnel requirements for a Class IV/V central receiving point
Personnel Responsibilities
• Maintain tactical control of all personnel working at the supply point and
Battalion S-4 or S-4 NCOIC accountability of Class IV/V obstacle material.
• Coordinate for materials handling equipment.
• Supervise the organization of Class IV/V obstacle material into packages

Battalion engineer staff to support the obstacle groups.
officer representative • Provide technical assistance on Class IV/V supply point setup and
munition uncrating and inspection.
One infantry squad1 • Download incoming Class V trucks.
One infantry squad1 • Download incoming Class IV trucks.
One infantry squad1 • Upload outgoing Class IV/V trucks.
Two infantry squads1 • Uncrate and inspect munitions.
Support platoon leader or • Provide support for the cross-loading of Class IV/V material.
Sergeant
Infantry squad1 • Provide local security for the Class IV/V supply point.
1
The number of infantry squads or equivalent-size elements from a supported unit. The amount of support
needed varies greatly depending on amount and type of obstacle material and the availability of material-
handling equipment. An engineer unit may have to provide gauntlet gloves to handle wire if infantry squads do
not have them.
Legend:
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
S-4 logistic staff officer
3-67. (U) Determining this central receiving point early during planning allows for early initiation of
throughput and timely delivery of obstacle material to the emplacing units. This location may be refined
based on subordinate unit obstacle planning, while throughput is in transit or still uploaded. If throughput is
unable to be forwarded all the way to a battalion Class IV/V supply point, then it becomes a BCT/RCT
responsibility to deliver that obstacle material where needed.
3-68. (U) Once throughput has been offloaded at the central receiving point, the maneuver battalion is
responsible for further distributing it throughout its area of operations. This responsibility is normally
shared with the emplacing unit since neither one typically has enough organic transportation assets to
accomplish the task by itself. A dedicated maneuver battalion S-4 representative should be positioned at the
receiving throughput of each supply point to track the receipt of the obstacle material of the battalion. The
necessary material-handling equipment must also be on-site to off load the bulk quantities of obstacle
material being received.
Note. (U) Units can dramatically improve their obstacle emplacement capability by providing
manpower other than engineers to handle Class IV/V or prepackaged CCLs.
3-69. (U) Units must develop a plan to recover any unused Class IV/V obstacle material at any supply
point when it is no longer needed or destroy those materials if it must be abandoned based on tactical

Chapter 3
urgency. The triggers for recovering the supply point may be based on friendly or enemy events and should
be addressed during war-gaming and included in the plan or order.
RESUPPLY METHODS (U)

3-70. (U) The two methods for obstacle material resupply are—
 (U) Supply point or service station.
 (U) Tailgate.
Supply Point (U)

3-71. (U) The supply point, or service station, resupply method requires the emplacing unit to return to the
Class IV/V supply point each time it resupplies. Munitions are prepared and inspected at the supply point
as they are being loaded onto an emplacing vehicle or a mine-delivery system.
3-72. (U) Several considerations may drive supply point resupply use. If there are no additional
transportation assets to transport obstacle material forward from the Class IV/V supply point, the supply
point resupply method may be the only viable technique. The obstacle group must be close enough to the
supply point so that any other method is less efficient. The advantages and disadvantages are as follows:
 (U) Advantages.
 (U) Minimizes the unloading and loading of material.
 (U) Requires minimal augmentation of transportation assets.
 (U) Allows manpower and equipment to be massed at a single supply point.
 (U) Streamlines control and accountability of obstacle material.
 (U) Disadvantages.
 (U) Requires more movement of the emplacing unit, which may take away from
emplacement time.
 (U) Requires that the emplacing unit move in and out of the area where the obstacles are
being emplaced; therefore, increasing the risk of fratricide.
 (U) Disrupting the emplacement of individual obstacles when emplacing vehicles cannot
carry enough material to start and complete the obstacle. This causes the emplacing vehicles
to stop work, reload, and pick up where they left off.
 (U) Requires that a larger Class IV/V supply point (capable of receiving mass quantities of
obstacle material) and multiple platoons load simultaneously.
Tailgate (U)
3-73. (U) When using the tailgate resupply method, obstacle material is transported directly from the Class
IV/V supply point to the emplacing unit at the obstacle site. Obstacle material is transported using the
emplacing unit and/or supported maneuver unit transportation assets.
3-74. (U) There are overriding conditions that drive the decision to use the tailgate resupply method. If
obstacle emplacement is being conducted during limited visibility, the tailgate resupply method is the
primary resupply method. It minimizes the disruption of emplacement and the chance of fratricide as
emplacing-unit vehicles move back into the work area after reloading. Secondly, tailgate resupply is the
primary method used when establishing a hasty defense or when the situation is unclear and an attack can
happen at any time. Since obstacle material remains loaded until it is transferred to an emplacing vehicle,
the tailgate resupply method enables the emplacing unit to quickly break contact without risking a loss of
obstacle material to the enemy. The tailgate resupply method is the preferred method for light forces. The
advantages and disadvantages are as follows:
 (U) Advantages.
 (U) Minimizes the loading and unloading of obstacle material.
 (U) Allows the emplacing unit to rapidly break contact in the event of enemy attack without
losing obstacle material to the enemy.

 (U) Minimizes the movement of emplacing-unit vehicles in and out of the obstacle, which is
especially beneficial during limited visibility conditions.
 (U) Disadvantages.
 (U) Requires augmentation by high-capacity transportation assets capable of offsetting the
loss in turnaround time if the vehicle has to wait at the obstacle site.
 (U) Results in inefficient use of transportation assets.
 (U) Becomes more difficult to linkup obstacle transport assets with the emplacing unit since
the emplacing-unit personnel continue emplacement.
 (U) Causes the organizing of obstacle packages to be conducted concurrently with loading.
3-75. (U) With the palletized loading system (PLS), there is a temptation to deliver the racks of material
directly to each obstacle site. Doing so creates a miniature Class IV/V supply point at every obstacle site,
which causes the required actions at a Class IV/V supply point to be accomplished at multiple sites. This
includes uncrating and inspecting munitions, organizing obstacle packages, and maintaining overall
accountability of Class IV/V obstacle material. All of these would occur at the forward edge of the main
battle area within the EAs. Additionally, the unit would have to coordinate recovery of the dispersed racks.
This is generally impossible to manage effectively. The best technique is to integrate the PLS trucks with
the other transportation assets as part of the planned resupply operation. Corps and division PLS trucks are
used locally to support either supply point or tailgate resupply methods.
COMBAT-CONFIGURED LOADS (U)

3-76. (U) Obstacle resource planning, delivery, and emplacement are facilitated by CCLs. Some units
choose to use CCLs of standard obstacle packages. The CCLs are established as part of the unit SOP. This
technique works well when a unit has the opportunity to prepare the CCLs before deployment or during
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration as part of their basic load. They are typically
designed around a particular transportation asset to maximize that asset’s haul capacity. The packages
themselves are designed to take advantage of the vulnerabilities and tactics of a known threat in a given
area of operations.
3-77. (U) During extended operations, it becomes difficult to continue to coordinate and configure the
CCLs because—
 (U) The unit may not be able to provide the expertise or supervision to configure the CCLs
correctly in the corps support area.
 (U) The transportation units may not always use the same assets, resulting in a loss of CCL
integrity as the load is adjusted for a different asset; for example, a CCL configured for a PLS
truck may actually be sling-loaded to the requesting unit by a medium or heavy-lift helicopter.
 (U) It becomes difficult to combine Class IV/V obstacle material into a complete CCL before its
arrival at a Class IV/V supply point due to the different supply and transportation procedures.

Chapter 4
Maintaining Obstacle Integration (U)
(U) Emplaced reinforcing obstacles may cease to fully support the commander’s
intent and concept of operations. This ineffectiveness can result from damage or
other changes to the obstacles caused by enemy action, weather effects, animals,
civilians, or even inadvertent action by friendly forces. It can also result from
changes in the situation such as changes to the surrounding terrain, the enemy
situation, the mission, or the friendly situation. Preventing such changes from
occurring, and correcting them if they do, requires vigilant attention to the following
activities: obstacle protection, obstacle plan improvement, and obstacle transfer.
PROTECTION (U)
4-1. (U) Over time, the integrity and effectiveness of obstacles can be compromised or degraded by
various factors such as weather, animal or civilian disturbance, and enemy action. Obstacle protection
preserves the integrity and effectiveness of emplaced obstacles. Obstacle protection is achieved through the
following tasks:
 (U) Control obstacle access.
 (U) Deny obstacle information to the enemy.
 (U) Defeat enemy, obstacle reduction capabilities and efforts.
 (U) Repair and maintain obstacles.
 (U) Protect the emplacing or maintaining unit.
4-2. (U) Establishing obstacle ownership and ensuring continuous observation of emplaced obstacles are
critical to obstacle protection. Commanders establish obstacle ownership by assigning responsibilities for
obstacle groups to subordinate units and having them explain their obstacle coverage plan during
rehearsals.
CONTROL OBSTACLE ACCESS (U)

4-3. (U) Some obstacles are vulnerable to damage or disturbance by civilians or even friendly forces; for
example, someone may inadvertently wander into a minefield and trigger one or more mines, reducing the
density and future effectiveness of the minefield. A log crib may be dismantled for firewood, or a wire
obstacle may be dismantled for scrap metal. Controlling access to obstacles can help protect obstacles from
such damage or disturbance. It can also help defeat enemy obstacle reduction efforts. Access control also
helps protect civilians and friendly forces from hazardous obstacles.
4-4. (U) Examples of access control measures include marking obstacles, installing fences around
obstacles, establishing roadblocks and traffic control points along approaches to obstacles, or assigning a
force to guard one or more obstacles or obstacle groups. Some obstacles may not require any access
control. The measures employed, if any, will vary depending on obstacle vulnerability, operation
importance, and available assets.
DENY OBSTACLE INFORMATION TO THE ENEMY (U)

4-5. (U) The enemy can be expected to focus information collection efforts on obtaining obstacle
information. Denying such information to the enemy for as long as possible will inhibit enemy ability to
breach, reduce, or bypass obstacles. Denying this information as long as possible requires a coordinated

Chapter 4
effort that encompasses various interrelated activities (counterreconnaissance, OPSEC, camouflage,

concealment, military deception).
Counterreconnaissance (U)
4-6. (U) Friendly forces conduct counterreconnaissance to prevent the enemy from gathering information
on friendly preparations. The information collection plan addresses obstacle protection as part of the
counterreconnaissance effort. The information collection plan must provide the necessary information to
enable counterreconnaissance forces to find and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. (See FM 3-90-1
for more information on counterreconnaissance.)
4-7. (U) Units use combat outposts, observation posts, and roving patrols to prevent the enemy
reconnaissance of friendly obstacles. This not only prevents the enemy from gaining detailed information
about the obstacles, but also prevents a small enemy force from covertly breaching the obstacle before the
main attack. Surveillance assets (such as unmanned aircraft systems, ground surveillance radars, and
remote sensors) are used to detect infiltrating enemy forces who are attempting reconnaissance or covert
obstacle breaches.
Operations Security (U)

4-8. (U) The staff determines some specific obstacle information to be essential elements of friendly
information. Examples of obstacle-related essential elements of friendly information include the—
 (U) Location and number of lanes.
 (U) Location of the edge of SCATMINE safety zones.
 (U) Location of Class IV/V supply points.
4-9. (U) Upon approval by the commander, OPSEC measures are developed and implemented to protect
the essential elements of friendly information; for example, the commander might direct that obstacles only
be emplaced at night.
Camouflage and Concealment (U)

4-10. (U) Camouflage and concealment can be effective measures for denying obstacle information to the
enemy. (See ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6, Survivability Operations, for additional information about the
camouflage and concealment of obstacles.)
Military Deception (U)

4-11. (U) Military deception can also be used to deny obstacle information to the enemy. Military
deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead enemy military, paramilitary, or violent extremist
organization decision makers, thereby causing the enemy to take specific actions (or inactions) that will
contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Military deception enables obstacle
protection by presenting enemy forces with false information. This false information thereby causes the
enemy forces to expend ordnance or resources on nonthreatening targets. (For more information on military
deception see FM 3-13 and JP 3-13.4.)
4-12. (U) One technique of military deception that can be particularly effective is the use of phony
obstacles. Phony obstacles are objects or alterations to the terrain that give the appearance or present the
same signature as a real obstacle, but only require minimal resources (manpower, time, and material) to
emplace. Phony obstacle employment is a deception technique. Phony obstacles can mislead the enemy as
to the true pattern and extent of the friendly obstacle system and help achieve surprise. They can be used in
combination with real obstacles to mask shortages in obstacle resources or obstacle intent; however, this
incurs risk that commanders must consider. Phony obstacles succeed best against an enemy that has already
encountered real obstacles, particularly mines, and has become sensitive to mines or more adverse to risk
averse.

Maintaining Obstacle Integration (U)
4-13. (U) Phony obstacles help support the overall obstacle protection effort by confusing enemy
reconnaissance and breaching elements on actual obstacle locations. Phony obstacles can cause an enemy
to wastefully expend or commit obstacle reduction assets where obstacles do not exist. Phony obstacles
may allow the enemy to recognize them as phony obstacles, when the intent is to cause the enemy to
commit to that approach and then close it with SCATMINEs or other rapidly emplaced obstacles.
4-14. (U) An obvious obstacle pattern can divulge friendly unit and weapon locations. Examples of phony
obstacles include minefield marking where no minefield exists or shallow excavations combined with loose
soil berms made to resemble an antivehicle ditch.
4-15. (U) Phony obstacle success depends on the enemy state of mind. To be successful, this technique
normally requires that the unit establish a precedent. Highly visible minefield markings in a disrupt
obstacle group in forward areas provide the enemy with a visual cue concerning minefields. Using the same
markings without minefields in a fix obstacle group may cause the enemy to assume that there is an actual
minefield where none exists.
DEFEAT ENEMY, OBSTACLE REDUCTION CAPABILITIES (U)

4-16. (U) The early identification and destruction of enemy, obstacle reduction equipment in depth, along
with enemy command and control vehicles, ensure maximum effectiveness of obstacles. Destroying enemy
armored breaching vehicles and tanks with attached mine plows or rollers degrades the obstacle reduction
capability of the enemy. This increases the time for the friendly force to engage and destroy other combat
vehicles. Units identify HPTs in enemy formations and establish the priority of engagement by friendly
weapon systems.
4-17. (U) The engineer staff officer is the staff expert on enemy obstacle reduction (mobility) capabilities
and works with the G-2/S-2 and other staff members in identifying and templating enemy mobility HVTs
within maneuver formations and identifying likely enemy points of breach to facilitate targeting. (See FM
3-60 for information on the targeting process.)
REPAIR AND MAINTAIN OBSTACLES (U)

4-18. (U) Units develop contingency plans to repair obstacles. Units rely on rapid repair methods, such as
using SCATMINEs or pre-positioning obstacle material that can be emplaced by hand, to close lanes that
were reduced by the enemy. Units must plan, resource, and rehearse obstacle repair contingencies. Obstacle
repair is required—
 (U) When a patrol detects enemy covert breach attempts in tactical obstacles.
 (U) Between enemy echelons.
 (U) During a lull in the battle.
4-19. (U) Obstacles used in protecting base camps, sustainment sites, and other critical fixed sites may
typically be longer-lasting and require more maintenance to ensure that they can withstand exposure to the
elements. Exposure to the elements over time can reduce the integrity of obstacle material and reduce its
effectiveness. Obstacle maintenance should be included as part of base camp master plans and prioritized
based on obstacle criticality.
PROTECT THE EMPLACING OR MAINTAINING UNIT (U)

4-20. (U) This task enhances, and is enhanced by, the performance of the other obstacle protection tasks.
The owning unit is responsible for providing the necessary protection to the emplacing or maintaining unit.
The enemy will attempt to interfere with efforts to emplace or maintain obstacles, and it will seek to
observe these actions to gain obstacle information that should be denied if possible. Units emplacing or
maintaining obstacles are often exposed and more vulnerable to enemy attacks. There is also increased risk
to fratricide while working within EAs and forward of BPs, especially during limited visibility. (See ADRP
3-37 for information on avoiding fratricide and other protection tasks.)

Chapter 4
4-21. (U) Depending on the threat situation, local security requirements can impact the ability of the
emplacing or maintaining unit to focus on its primary mission of emplacing, maintaining, or repairing
obstacles. Augmenting the emplacing or maintaining unit with manpower other than engineers to fulfill
security requirements will improve its capability to emplace or maintain obstacles. To increase the
survivability of the emplacing or maintaining unit, the maneuver commander should consider establishing
critical friendly zones at obstacle sites and Class IV/V supply points.
PLAN IMPROVEMENT (U)

4-22. (U) Assessment drives the need to improve the obstacle plan. Assessment is the determination of the
progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Reinforcing
and existing obstacles that comprise the obstacle plan are monitored to identify changes, conditions, or
activities that could impact their effectiveness. Commanders prioritize the obstacles that comprise their
obstacle plan to focus assessment. Prioritization is based on certain things, such as the importance of the
effect of the obstacle in supporting the concept of operations, the criticality of the force or asset being
protecting, and the vulnerability or susceptibility of the obstacle. (See ADRP 5-0 and MCWP 5-1 for more
information on assessment.) Obstacle plans are continuously improved to—
 (U) Counter new or newly identified threats and enemy TTP resulting from continuous threat
and vulnerability assessments.
 (U) Support new or adjusted protection or defense plans.
 (U) Incorporate new or improved obstacles or countermobility TTP.
TRANSFER (U)
4-23. (U) Certain actions must occur when an obstacle is turned over or transferred to ensure that obstacle
effectiveness or integration is not degraded. Once an obstacle group is completed, the emplacing unit
conducts obstacle transfer with the owning unit. The details for obstacle transfer (including the who, what,
when, and where) are established between the emplacing and owning units during obstacle siting.
Sometimes, the owning unit may subsequently transfer ownership of an obstacle to another unit as part of a
relief or unit rotation. Obstacle transfer ensures that the commander who is gaining ownership of the
obstacle is familiar with the obstacle characteristics and features and that the responsibilities for
maintaining obstacle integration are understood. In addition to the information presented in obstacle
records, demolition target folders, and transfer reports (if applicable), leaders who conduct obstacle transfer
should consider providing the following information to the leader of the unit that is gaining ownership of
the obstacle:
 (U) Features or characteristics of the obstacle, such as the—
 (U) Obstacle data, including obstacle number, grid location, and emplacement date and
time.
 (U) Dimensions and composition.
 (U) Anchor points.
 (U) Lane-marking data.
 (U) Intended effect.
 (U) Strengths and weaknesses.
 (U) Updates on friendly and enemy activities near the obstacle.
 (U) Likely areas for enemy observation and likely enemy points of breach.
 (U) Fire control measures.
 (U) Detailed instructions, along with demonstrations as necessary, for—
 (U) Closing lanes and gaps.
 (U) Repairing and maintaining obstacles.
 (U) Removing, clearing, dismantling, disabling, or disarming obstacles.
 (U) Reusing or properly disposing of recovered obstacle material.

Chapter 5
Reserved Obstacles (U)
(U) This chapter describes the procedures for planning, preparing, and executing
reserved obstacles. Unlike directed obstacles, the authority to execute reserved
obstacles is reserved or restricted by the commander. Reserved obstacles are similar
to situational obstacles and are sometimes misrepresented as situational obstacles.
The primary difference is that reserved obstacles are used when it is vital to prevent
the premature closure of a mobility corridor. Reserved obstacles allow the
commander to retain control over the execution of obstacles affecting such vital
mobility corridors. (Since demolition obstacles are often used for reserved obstacles,
this chapter adopts procedures that mirror those for nonnuclear demolitions on land
as described in FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions.)
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (U)

5-1. (U) The emplacement of reserved obstacles usually requires the commitment of several units, making
these units unavailable for use elsewhere. Commanders must commit an emplacing unit, often an engineer
unit, to prepare and execute obstacle emplacement. Normally, commanders also assign a maneuver unit as
a guard unit to protect the obstacle and the emplacing unit while on-site. The commander must conclude
that the reserved-obstacle group is so critical that unit commitment to protect and execute the obstacle
outweighs the combat potential of those units in other areas.
5-2. (U) The commander must clearly identify the criteria for executing the obstacle. Reserved obstacles
require detailed coordination and synchronization to ensure their success. Controlling the execution of
reserved obstacles used for closing lanes, especially during a retrograde (see FM 3-90-1), is critical. Lane
closures must be synchronized with the entire operation to prevent friendly forces from being impeded or
trapped between the obstacle and the enemy. The responsibility for executing reserved obstacles that are
used to close lanes is often transferred between units. This further complicates lane synchronization efforts
and places even more importance on the need for detailed coordination and instructions, and rehearsals.
5-3. (U) Units prepare reserved obstacles early in the preparation phase because they are a critical part of
the plan, but they do not execute them until so directed according to the demolition order. Units may use a
reserved obstacle to close a lane in a larger obstacle. Obstacles that are used for rapid lane closure are often
demolition obstacles or mines. Networked munitions are well suited for such uses because they can be
rapidly activated and deactivated as required. However, the type of obstacle used is only limited by
imagination and ingenuity. (See appendix G for more information on networked munitions.)
RESPONSIBILITIES (U)
5-4. (U) Key persons involved in the execution of a reserved obstacle are the—
 (U) Authorized commander.
 (U) Guard force commander or demolition guard commander if the obstacle is a demolition
obstacle.
 (U) Emplacing-unit commander or demolition firing party commander if the obstacle is a
demolition obstacle.

Chapter 5
AUTHORIZED COMMANDER (U)

5-5. (U) The authorized commander has obstacle emplacement authority and the overall responsibility for
the obstacle. Orders for obstacle emplacement are given by the authorized commander. If the obstacle is a
demolition obstacle, which is often the case, the authorized commander signs and issues the demolition
order and gives the order to fire the demolition. The authorized commander—
 (U) Establishes the criteria and procedures for executing the obstacle. Typically, the authority to
execute is withheld until the authorized commander determines that the criteria have been met.
The authorized commander may also specify certain conditions under which the guard force
commander may order the execution of the obstacle without receiving an execution order from
the authorized commander.
 (U) Determines the need for distinct guard and emplacing units. If a small guard force can
protect the obstacle site, the authorized commander may choose to combine the duties of the
guard force and the emplacing unit. In this case, the guard force commander and the emplacing-
unit commander are the same person. If the reserved obstacle requires an engineer technical
expert on-site to ensure obstacle execution, then the emplacing unit is distinct from the guard
force.
 (U) Designates the requirement for an overwatching force, if necessary. An overwatching force
may be required to cover the obstacle with fires to achieve the intended effect. This may be a
subsequent mission for the guard force or may be an existing force in the case of lane closures.
 (U) Ensures proper reporting, clearance of friendly forces before execution, and accurate
obstacle tracking.
GUARD FORCE COMMANDER (U)

5-6. (U) The guard force, which is called the demolition guard for a demolition obstacle, protects the
obstacle site and emplacing unit. The guard force commander is usually a commissioned or
noncommissioned officer. The guard force commander—
 (U) Secures the obstacle site.
 (U) Gives the emplacing-unit commander the order to execute the obstacle based on the criteria
that the authorized commander has established. For demolition obstacles, this order is in writing.
EMPLACING-UNIT COMMANDER (U)

5-7. (U) The emplacing unit, which is called the demolition firing party for a demolition obstacle, is
responsible for technical preparation and execution of the obstacle. The emplacing-unit commander is the
leader of the emplacing unit and could be an engineer officer or noncommissioned officer, unless the
commander determines that there is no need for an engineer technical expert on-site. The emplacing-unit
commander—
 (U) Executes the obstacle when the guard force commander orders him to do so.
 (U) Inspects and repairs the obstacle, as required.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS (U)

5-8. (U) The commander and staff may determine the requirement for a reserved-obstacle group during
COA development or analysis. The commander may receive a requirement for a reserved-obstacle group
from a higher commander as a specified task. If so, the staff identifies the requirement during mission
analysis/problem framing.
5-9. (U) If the commander decides to retain control over mobility along an AA, one technique that can be
used is designating specific lanes (with associated reserved obstacles) to be kept clear of obstacles until
obstacle release is given. Obstacle release restricts subordinate units from emplacing obstacles, which
affects mobility in the lanes. All such obstacles automatically become reserved obstacles with execution
being under the control of the commander who designated the lanes. Once the restriction is in place, the

commander must decide how long the restriction will remain in effect and whether or not the mobility
corridor should be closed once, the restriction is lifted.
5-10. (U) The commander must consider the effect of the premature loss of mobility along an AA; for
example, if a reconnaissance unit is withdrawing under pressure through a brigade/regimental sector,
premature loss of mobility along the AA may slow or even stop reconnaissance unit withdrawal. The
division commander may specifically task the brigade/regimental commander to ensure that the
reconnaissance unit withdrawal lanes are clear until the reconnaissance unit has withdrawn. This allows the
brigade/regimental commander to determine the need for reserved obstacles.
5-11. (U) Another technique for retaining control over mobility along an AA is for the commander to use
reserved obstacles. There are two options for using reserved obstacles:
 (U) If specific obstacle sites are obvious, such as bridges across a major river, the commander
may designate and control those sites as reserved obstacles. This requires detailed planning by
the staff and coordination down to the executing unit.
 (U) If obstacle sites are not obvious, the commander may specify that obstacles along the
withdrawal lanes become reserved targets. Subordinate units then conduct detailed planning to
determine where lane closures may be required. Lane closure is often part of a larger obstacle
group, which supports subordinate schemes of maneuver. A report of intention is submitted to
the restricting headquarters to obtain authority for the group. If approved, the higher
headquarters prepares a demolition order, if applicable, and issues it to the requesting
headquarters.
ADDITIONAL FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS (U)

5-12. (U) Once the commander makes a decision about reserved-obstacle needs, the staff examines the
situation template. It is used to determine the—
 (U) Size of the guard force required.
 (U) Requirement to secure the obstacle by fire or occupation.
 (U) Size of the obstacle required.
 (U) Obstacle type that will be most effective.
5-13. (U) The expected threat determines the size of the guard force. The threat and terrain dictate whether
the guard force must secure the site by occupation or whether they can do so from a distance by fire. The
terrain that determines AA size may determine obstacle size. The obstacle reduction capability of the
enemy may determine the most effective obstacle; for example, if the enemy does not have organic assault
bridging, then antivehicle ditches and road craters may be the best obstacle.
FIRES ANALYSIS (U)

5-14. (U) The staff analyzes the COA to determine the—
 (U) Obstacle location relative to subordinate unit positions.
 (U) Ability of the unit to cover the reserved-obstacle group by fire following the execution.
 (U) Subordinate unit that is most likely to be assigned to the guard force mission.
5-15. (U) The best spot for an obstacle may not be the best spot to bring overwhelming combat power.
When the unit uses the reserved obstacle to close a lane in a properly planned, directed obstacle, the
reserved obstacle is already integrated with fires. However, in some cases, a higher commander or the
terrain dictates a reserved-obstacle site. A reserved obstacle that was directed by higher headquarters may
require the subordinate unit to adjust its positions to cover the obstacle by fire. In some terrain, there may
be only a few sites where a commander can use reserved obstacles to control mobility along an AA. This
terrain is usually dominated by an existing obstacle of some type (river, canal, canyon). If the decision is
made to use a reserved obstacle, the commander repositions forces to ensure that the obstacle is covered by
fire.

Chapter 5
OBSTACLE INTENT INTEGRATION (U)

5-16. (U) The staff places the reserved-obstacle group relative to the terrain and friendly maneuver
graphics to support the COA. When employed as an independent obstacle, the desired obstacle effect of a
reserved obstacle is to block. When used to close a lane in a directed-obstacle group, the commander uses
the reserved obstacle to complete the desired effect in the group. The commander may use fires and
reserved obstacles to achieve any of the tactical obstacle effects. The staff indicates the location of reserved
obstacles by using obstacle effect symbols, or in many cases, an individual obstacle symbol if the
commander intends to use a specific obstacle type and annotates them as reserved obstacles on the obstacle
overlay. The staff uses the array of obstacles or obstacle control measures two levels down to develop the
appropriate obstacle control measures.
OBSTACLE PRIORITIES (U)

5-17. (U) Reserved obstacles are usually high-priority obstacles. Because a reserved obstacle is critical to
the plan, units should emplace reserved obstacles early in the preparation phase.
MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS (U)

5-18. (U) The commander’s decision to use reserved obstacles is based on a COA analysis and the
requirement to retain control over the mobility along an AA, if determined necessary. An additional
consideration is the establishment of procedures for traffic control and lane marking as described in ATTP
3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations. After the commander decides on a COA, the
staff conducts further detailed planning for the reserved obstacles. This detailed planning involves
designing and resourcing the reserved-obstacle group.
OBSTACLE DESIGN AND RESOURCING (U)

5-19. (U) To properly plan obstacles, the staff must determine the—
 (U) Available obstacle assets.
 (U) Type of obstacle that will create the desired effect.
5-20. (U) The staff makes these determinations by reexamining the facts and assumptions for the mission.
The staff limits its consideration of available assets to those that can be quickly executed when the
execution order is received. Demolition obstacles, preconstructed obstacles, SCATMINEs, and networked
munitions are examples of quickly executed obstacles.
5-21. (U) If the commander decides to use SCATMINEs, the staff ensures that the asset directed to
emplace the reserved obstacle is available for the mission at the required time. The obstacle emplacement
unit is dedicated to the reserved obstacle. The staff identifies potential situations where SCATMINE assets
may not be available and ensures that the commander understands any risk that is associated with their
nonavailability.
DECISION AND EXECUTION (U)

5-22. (U) The staff prepares orders and provides information on reserved obstacles on the scheme-of-
obstacles overlay, in a reserved-obstacle execution matrix, and in a demolition order (if applicable) for the
unit with the guard force mission.
EXECUTION MATRIX (U)

5-23. (U) The obstacle execution matrix for reserved-obstacle groups is shown in figure 5-1. It is similar to
other obstacle execution matrixes.

Reserved-Obstacle Execution Matrix
Emplacing Asset
Emplacing Unit
NAI (Observing
and Location
Unit) and DP
Owning Unit
Commander
Commander
Instructions
Obstacle
Location
Number
Priority
Special
Trigger
Guard
Firing
Effect
A1CB RS Block 1 1/311 A/1- Raider Dragon Pas- NA Eng- See
A001 12345- Eng- 23 16 26 sage ineer demo-
678 ineer Infan- of squad lition
try cover- in BP order
ing 1-2 serial
force number
at PL 001.
Iron
Legend:
BP battle position
DP decision point
NA not applicable
NAI named area of interest
PL phase line
Figure 5-1. (U) Sample reserved-obstacle execution matrix
5-24. (U) Typical information shown on the matrix includes—

 (U) Zone, belt, or group designation and individual obstacle numbers.
 (U) Location, effect, and priority of the group.
 (U) Designation of emplacing and owning units.
 (U) Designation of the firing party and guard force commanders (if applicable).
 (U) Emplacing asset and its location.
 (U) Special instructions for each group, as necessary.
DEMOLITION ORDER (U)

5-25. (U) When a reserved obstacle is a demolition obstacle, a written demolition order is issued when
time and conditions permit. The format for a demolition order can be used for any obstacle, not just
demolitions, and is especially useful for reserved obstacles. (See FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives
and Demolitions, and STANAG 2017 for more information about demolition orders.)
REHEARSALS (U)
5-26. (U) Reserved obstacles require detailed coordination and execution. The successful execution of
reserved obstacles depends on preparation as much as planning. Conducting rehearsals is a key preparation
activity. The focus of the rehearsal is to confirm timing requirements. Units should conduct this rehearsal
as part of a larger rehearsal with minimal simulation. (See figure 5-2, page 5-6.) Timing requirements are
considered during the rehearsal, including the time required—
 (U) For the guard force commander to notify the emplacing-unit commander to execute the
target.
 (U) To execute the target.
 (U) For SCATMINE arming and duration, if applicable.

Chapter 5
1. The enemy is moving at 30 kilometers per hour and will cover 500 meters per minute.
2. In the minute that it takes the guard force commander to notify the emplacing-unit
commander, the enemy will have progressed 500 meters.
3. In the 2 minutes that the emplacing-unit commander needs to execute the reserved road
crater, the enemy will have progressed an additional 1,000 meters.
4. The DP and its associated NAI for executing the reserved obstacle must be placed at least
1,500 meters away from the obstacle. (The exact distance required must also consider the
time required for collecting the required information from the NAI, getting that information to
the decisionmaker, and making the decision.
Legend:
BP battle position
DP decision point
m meters
TAI target area of interest
Figure 5-2. (FOUO) Minimum timing requirements for reserved obstacles
5-27. (U) The guard force and the emplacing unit rehearse notification procedures using communication
methods (wire, radio). They rehearse the time required to receive notification and move to the firing point
under all conditions.
5-28. (U) The emplacing-unit commander and the guard force commander calculate how long it will take
to execute the obstacle. The full rehearsal includes a rehearsal of the backup plan and considerations for
execution in reduced visibility (smoke, darkness, fog). Once these times are determined through rehearsal,
the emplacing-unit commander informs the guard force commander.
5-29. (U) Another time consideration is the arming and duration times for demolitions or SCATMINEs. If
SCATMINEs are used, the arming and duration times can be a significant factor; for example, it takes 2
minutes for a MOPMS-dispensed mine to arm. The maximum duration on MOPMS is about 13 hours from
the time the mines are armed, assuming that the mines are recycled three times. It is important not to
execute this and similar systems too late or too early.
5-30. (U) During the rehearsal, the guard force commander also locates the DP for executing the obstacle
according to emergency firing orders. Emergency firing orders may not require a physical DP, but may
require execution of the obstacle based on enemy or friendly actions that the guard force commander
cannot see. If so, the guard force commander confirms with the authorized commander how the information
that drives the decision to execute the obstacle will be received.
5-31. (U) If early execution is required to prevent imminent enemy capture of the obstacle site, the guard
force commander makes assumptions about how much combat power is required to retain control of the
site. The guard force commander also considers the time requirements for execution and selects a DP that
will allow enough time to transmit the execution order and execute the obstacle.
5-32. (U) If execution is based on a certain size of an enemy force reaching the obstacle site, the guard
force commander uses the time required for obstacle execution and works backward to locate the DP to

execute the obstacle. Ideally, the point should be clearly marked with a TRP. This spot may change based
on visibility conditions.
5-33. (U) If the reserved obstacle is also a lane, the coordination required is similar to the coordination
required to conduct a passage of lines as described in FM 3-90-1. The guard force commander must know
the—
 (U) Number of vehicles to expect.
 (U) Near- and far-recognition signals.
 (U) Passage time.
5-34. (U) Another important element to consider during the rehearsal is the commitment of assets,
especially if the assets have other missions; for example, artillery assets must be available to fire a reserved
remote antiarmor mine (RAAM) or area-denial artillery munition (ADAM) obstacle. During the rehearsal,
the staff verifies the availability of the asset and identifies additional situations where the asset may not be
available. It ensures that the executing unit understands the commander’s priorities.
PRECONSTRUCTED OBSTACLES (U)

5-35. (U) Preconstructed obstacles are obstacles that are prepared in advance to facilitate rapid
emplacement once hostilities begin. These obstacles are generally designed and constructed so that they do
not impede vehicular traffic until executed. Preconstructed obstacles generally have—
 (U) Shafts sunk into the roadway at critical areas (cuts, fills, defiles), which can later be loaded
with demolitions to create road craters.
 (U) Shafts constructed for installation of steel beams instead of demolitions.
 (U) Bridges constructed with hollow demolition chambers in piers and abutments.
 (U) Tunnels with planned cavities for demolition placement.
 (U) Massive concrete blocks suspended above or beside the roadway at selected locations so that
they can be dropped into the roadway when needed.
5-36. (U) Many preconstructed obstacles require significant amounts of time and resources; therefore, they
are most often used in long-term defensive applications such as border defense and base or facility defense.
5-37. (U) Once a location is selected as part of planning, a request is forwarded through military channels
to the HN defense ministry. The HN will then evaluate the request. If accepted, the HN is responsible for
constructing the obstacle and the demolition storage site, if one is required.
5-38. (U) The unit responsible for the area of operations in which the preconstructed obstacle is located
prepares a demolition target folder on the obstacle. Following preparation, the unit provides a copy of the
demolition target folder to the responsible emplacing unit.
PRECHAMBER SHAFT SYSTEM (U)

5-39. (U) The prechamber shaft system in figure 5-3, page 5-8, consists of an array of several individual
demolition shafts that are designed to permit the rapid execution of crater obstacles. The demolition shafts
are constructed of concrete pipe and located on roads, railroads, and bridge abutments.
5-40. (U) Individual demolition shafts that comprise the system are 4 to 6 meters deep and 60 centimeters
in diameter. The shafts are installed either vertically or at an angle, and a steel shaft cover that resembles a
sewer manhole cover closes each shaft. Two detonation cord conduits are installed in a straight line from
the interior of the demolition shafts to a metal covered box installed in the embankment or curbstones of
the road. These conduits are provided to accommodate the main and reserve firing systems.

Chapter 5
Legend:
1 shaft cover
2 traverse bar
3 detonating cord conduits with nylon pull ties
4 cover box with lockable lids
Figure 5-3. (U) Sample prechamber shaft system
5-41. (U) The unit may store the required demolition material for a prechamber shaft system in a nearby
bunker complex earmarked for sole use at its designated obstacle site. The prestocked demolition material
consists of everything needed to execute the obstacle, to include demolition materials and special tools.
BEAM POST OBSTACLE (U)

5-42. (FOUO) The beam post obstacle shown in figure 5-4 is designed for blocking roads at defiles without
destroying the pavement. A typical obstacle consists of steel I-beam posts inserted into preconstructed
shafts in the road width, which prevents the movement of all vehicles—wheeled and armored. A minimum
of two, double rows of shafts must be preconstructed into a concrete foundation. Within each double row,
the individual shafts must also be staggered. Each I-beam post shaft is 80 centimeters deep and has a steel
cover. The I-beam post is constructed of sectional steel, and it is 2.2 meters long and weighs 216 kilograms.
When inserted into the shaft, the I-beam post will extend 1.4 meters above the road surface. Each steel I-
beam post is equipped with locking devices that prohibit the enemy from pulling it out of the shaft.

Figure 5-4. (FOUO) Sample I-beam post obstacle
DEMOLITION FIXTURES IN BRIDGES (U)

5-43. (U) Demolition fixtures in bridges permit the destruction of such targets by expediting the
installation procedures and simultaneously allowing the friendly use of the bridge. The unit responsible for
the area of operations prepares a demolition target folder for each bridge that is equipped with a demolition
fixture. The primary types of bridge fixtures include—
 (U) Charge-mounting brackets. Charge-mounting brackets are sheet metal rails that are
permanently mounted to the base of the supporting columns of a bridge. They are used to
facilitate the placement of cutting charges and to ensure their secure attachment.
 (U) Demolition chambers. Demolition chambers are cavities that are built in the intermediate
support columns and abutments of bridges. These types of fixtures are secured by a locked metal
access panel. Demolition chambers are designed to accommodate large quantities of
conventional munitions, cratering charges, and satchel charges.
 (U) Demolition galleries. Demolition galleries are constructed in very large bridges. The
galleries lead under the abutments of bridges or under the roadway and terminate in a demolition
chamber or cavity. Because of the large quantities of explosives necessary to destroy large
targets, the galleries are constructed to allow the uninhibited movement of personnel carrying
munitions to the chambers. Bridge fixtures of this nature have permanently installed, electrical
firing circuits through a series of conduits, usually from one chamber to the next. The main and
reserve firing systems end in a distribution box located at the abutments.
PRECONSTRUCTED OBSTACLE CONSIDERATIONS (U)

5-44. (U) In restricted terrain, such as Korea, preconstructed obstacles are extremely effective. For
example, the terrain in Korea is rugged and has narrow armor approaches between mountains. The need for
rapidly emplaced antiarmor obstacles, coupled with restricted terrain make preconstructed obstacles an
excellent choice.
5-45. (U) Varying types of preconstructed obstacles are found in Korea, and the majority is the falling
block type that is shown in figure 5-5, page 5-10. These large concrete blocks are suspended above or
beside the roadway. Demolitions are stored nearby to blow the concrete block supports when the

Chapter 5
appropriate alert measure has been received and the tactical situation permits. The Korean government
constructs preconstructed obstacles, and the Republic of Korea Army maintains and executes them.
Figure 5-5. (FOUO) Sample falling block obstacle
5-46. (U) Other types of in-place obstacles are tank walls, mined areas, and obstacles at selected river-
crossing sites. Preconstructed obstacles are key to the defense because they are properly located and can be
executed quickly with minimal manpower. Tactical considerations and advantages of preconstructed
obstacles are numerous; for example, they—
 (U) Reduce the logistic burden.
 (U) Reduce obstacle manpower requirements.
 (U) Enable maneuver plans to be prepared for in advance.
 (U) Assist in BP location.
5-47. (U) Once the unit installs the demolition, the obstacle can be immediately executed or delayed to fit
the tactical situation. Preconstructed obstacles are complementary to other types of reinforcing obstacles.

Chapter 6
Situational Obstacles (U)
(U) This chapter describes the procedures needed for planning, preparing, and
executing situational obstacles. Unlike directed obstacles, a situational obstacle is not
executed unless specific criteria are met. Units normally plan several situational
obstacles that rely on the same assets for emplacement. This allows the commander
to shift assets to the location where they are needed the most, based on the situation.
Situational obstacles are similar to reserved obstacles and may sometimes be
misrepresented as reserved obstacles. The primary difference between situational
obstacles and reserved obstacles is that situational obstacles are preplanned obstacles
as part of a TAI and require unique planning techniques. Situational obstacles provide
the commander with the flexibility for emplacing tactical obstacles based on the
development of the situation.

6-1. (U) Situational obstacles can incorporate any type of obstacle that can be employed within the time
required. Although the U.S. ban on persistent land mines has resulted in a greater reliance on SCATMINEs
to fulfill tactical obstacle requirements, the limited duration of SCATMINEs (after their activation) makes
them most suitable for use as situational obstacles. Situational obstacles are used to get inside the decision
cycle of the enemy or react promptly to unexpected situations. Situational obstacles help units retain
flexibility in quickly adapting to changing circumstances. Planners must ensure that situational obstacles
support the maneuver commander’s synchronization matrix, decision support template, or branches and
sequels. The following should be considered in addition to the obstacle employment principles:
 (U) Identifying the need for a situational obstacle.
 (U) Planning for the appropriate resources.
 (U) Planning for the obstacle.
 (U) Identifying obstacle execution triggers.
 (U) Withholding the execution of the obstacle until needed.
IDENTIFY THE NEED (U)

6-2. (U) Commanders may use situational obstacles to support their branches or sequels since obstacle
resources are only expended upon execution. Situational obstacles may be used to—
 (U) Attack an enemy vulnerability.
 (U) Exploit success.
 (U) Isolate enemy forces.
 (U) Protect friendly forces on the move.

Chapter 6
Situational Obstacles in the Defense (U)

6-3. (U) In the defense, the focus of situational obstacles is to help negate the initial advantage of freedom
of action (where, when, and how to attack) of the attacker. Some possible uses of situational obstacles in
the defense are to—
 (U) Close obstacle gaps or repair previously reduced obstacles.
 (U) Reinforce existing obstacles.
 (U) Support the defeat of potential penetrations in echelon support/rear areas.
 (U) Protect the flanks of counterattack forces.
 (U) Separate attacking enemy echelons.
 (U) Support supplementary BPs.
 (U) Support shaping operations in depth.
Situational Obstacles in the Offense (U)

6-4. (U) In the offense, the need for situational obstacles is identified based on enemy reactions to
friendly actions. The flexibility of situational obstacles helps reduce risk, maintain the initiative, and
preserve the freedom of action. Some possible uses of situational obstacles in the offense are to—
 (U) Interdict the commitment of enemy reserves in conjunction with close combat attack and
close air support (CAS).
 (U) Assist ground forces in defeating enemy counterattacks.
 (U) Block enemy withdrawal or escape routes in conjunction with an envelopment.
 (U) Isolate adjacent enemy forces to prevent them from supporting each other.
 (U) Prevent the enemy from repositioning.
 (U) Support the transition to a hasty defense.
PLAN FOR THE APPROPRIATE RESOURCES (U)

6-5. (U) Obstacle emplacement is often resource-intensive. In most situations, situational obstacles must
be able to be rapidly emplaced but still achieve the intended effect. This makes SCATMINEs or networked
munitions ideal for use as situational obstacles. However, situational obstacles can incorporate any type of
obstacle that can be employed within the time required. The staff analyzes the target, the relative location,
and the desired effect to determine the size and type of situational obstacle needed to meet the
commander’s intent. The staff considers the—
 (U) Size of the obstacle required to achieve the intended effect.
 (U) Location of the obstacle.
 (U) Accuracy and timeliness of combat reporting, especially regarding NAIs.
 (U) Available resources by echelon and the priority of emplacement.
 (U) Accuracy of the emplacement asset.
 (U) Trigger for obstacle execution and the DP.
 (U) Time for the enemy to move from the NAI to the TAI.
 (U) Time to commit the obstacle emplacement asset to the TAI.
 (U) Time for the asset to emplace the obstacle.
 (U) Arming and self-destruct time for SCATMINEs.
 (U) Time required for units to cover the TAI with fires.
 (U) Availability of the obstacle emplacement asset and the secondary effects on the obstacle plan
when that asset is expended, damaged, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.
6-6. (U) The staff considers the feasibility and suitability of using obstacle assets based on the size and
location of the obstacle required and the requirement for accuracy when emplacing the obstacle; for
example, locations far forward of friendly positions or behind enemy positions may eliminate the

possibility of using ground-delivered SCATMINEs. The large size requirements of an obstacle could
preclude the use of RAAM/ADAM based on availability. The accuracy required may also eliminate
RAAM, ADAM, or Gator as an option. The risk of collateral damage or fratricide may preclude the use of
hazardous obstacles, such as SCATMINEs, or require the use of mitigating measures. The effect of terrain
conditions on the obstacle should also be considered; for example, muddy areas or hard-surfaced roads can
reduce the effectiveness of SCATMINEs.
PLAN THE OBSTACLE (U)

6-7. (U) Commanders and staffs identify situational obstacles that can affect enemy maneuver in each
COA during the planning process. It is imperative that situational obstacles are planned as part of a
combined arms team. Engineers should not plan situational obstacles without coordination and
synchronization with maneuver and fires planners.
6-8. (U) Situational obstacles are not normally used to attack targets of opportunity. The time required to
commit the asset and integrate the obstacle with fires normally exceeds the window of opportunity against
a target. Also, the use of obstacle emplacement assets (such as RAAM/ADAM) against a target of
opportunity may waste a valuable asset that the commander might need later during the battle.
Mission Analysis/Problem Framing (U)

6-9. (U) The staff gathers facts and develops assumptions during mission analysis/problem framing. As
part of the facts and assumptions, the staff—
 (U) Estimates the capability of the enemy to tactically avoid or reduce obstacles.
 (U) Identifies potential obstacle locations based on choke points, terrain restrictions, and
possible enemy COAs.
 (U) Estimates the capability of friendly forces to cover obstacle-related NAIs and TAIs with
observation and fires.
 (U) Considers assets available for emplacing situational obstacles.
 (U) Considers assets from higher or adjacent headquarters that may be available to support
information collection or obstacle emplacement.
 (U) Analyzes the higher headquarters plan to identify specified or implied tasks to emplace
situational obstacles.
Course-of-Action Development and Analysis/War-gaming (U)

6-10. (U) During COA development, the staff identifies specific actions or areas where situational
obstacles can support the COA concept. The staff develops detailed obstacle plans, which are then refined
during COA analysis/war-gaming.
6-11. (U) The staff uses the MCOO, situation template, and event template to assist in situational-obstacle
planning. The staff develops the situation template and event template as part of the initial IPB that occurs
during mission analysis/problem framing and adjusts both templates as necessary during COA analysis. As
the staff war-games a COA, they—
 (U) Develop an event template that depicts NAIs that allow the staff to confirm or deny a
particular enemy COA based on the identification of an enemy activity or the lack of enemy
activity.
 (U) Use the situation template to identify areas where fires and maneuver can influence the
enemy and designate those areas as TAIs on the decision support template.
 (U) Identify DPs where the commander must decide to commit fires, forces, and/or obstacle
assets to influence the enemy at the TAI.
6-12. (U) Every TAI will not necessarily require, or be an appropriate location for, a situational obstacle. In
some cases, the time that it takes the enemy to travel from an NAI to a TAI will be so short that triggering
situational-obstacle emplacement based on enemy action may be impossible. If NAI or TAI location cannot

Chapter 6
be adjusted to allow sufficient time for the emplacement of a situational obstacle, the staff may recommend
that a directed obstacle be used. The staff focuses on terrain where situational obstacles can be supported
by friendly fire and maneuver as shown in figure 6-1.
Legend:
OP observation post
Figure 6-1. (U) Identification of target areas of interest
Fires Analysis (U)

6-13. (U) The staff analyzes a TAI in the same manner that EAs are analyzed. They identify the weapon
system range and its effect to determine locations within a TAI where they can integrate the effects of the
fires and the obstacles. The chief of fires or FSO includes other staff officers (air liaison officer, the staff
aviation officer) in planning to ensure the integration and synchronization of fires with the obstacle plan.
Obstacle Priorities (U)

6-14. (U) The commander prioritizes situational obstacles with more flexibility than reserved obstacles.
Normally, the commander plans for the same obstacle emplacement asset in several TAIs, with the
expectation that the enemy target will appear in only one. However, the unit controlling the obstacle
emplacement capability must understand which obstacle has priority should the situation call for the same

asset in different locations at the same time. The priority of each obstacle is linked to the HPT list and
should be depicted in the situational-obstacle execution matrix. Figure 6-2 shows the fires analysis and
obstacle intent integration.
Legend:
BP battle position
Figure 6-2. (U) Fires analysis and obstacle intent integration
Mobility Considerations (U)

6-15. (U) The commander considers the impact that situational obstacles have on current and future
operations. At a minimum, the commander should consider the impact on the—
 (U) Higher headquarters scheme of movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver.
 (U) Branches and sequels.
 (U) Specified and implied tasks for follow-on forces.
 (U) Obstacle-restricted areas.
 (U) Civilians.
6-16. (U) The commander ensures synchronization, a unity of effort, and support to the concept of
operations. The commander also considers obstacle control measures that are imposed by the higher
commander’s order. As with any tactical obstacle, situational-obstacle employment is authorized only
within the higher commander’s obstacle control measures unless the subordinate unit obtains approval to
put obstacles outside the control measure.
IDENTIFY OBSTACLE EXECUTION TRIGGERS (U)

6-17. (U) Triggers for situational obstacles are event-based, not time based; for example, the identification
of enemy reserves attempting to reposition during an attack. Triggers may be based on friendly or enemy
actions. Situational obstacles are typically triggered by enemy actions during the defense and enemy
reactions during the offense. Effective triggers are linked to a detailed trigger-observer plan that is part of
the information collection plan and is included in the synchronization matrix or decision support template.
The entire staff, not engineers only, helps develop situational-obstacle triggers and the observer plan.

Chapter 6
6-18. (U) Time-distance analysis ensures that the established trigger for a situational obstacle adequately
reflects the time needed for execution. Time considerations include the time required for—
 (U) Making the decision to execute the obstacle.
 (U) Implementing the decision to execute the obstacle.
 (U) Emplacing, arming, and covering the obstacle by fire before the enemy arrives at the TAI.
6-19. (U) Geospatial engineers/geographic intelligence specialists can help planners realize time-distance
factors based on movement rates associated with on- and off-road mobility predictions. The commander
must ensure that the time it takes the enemy to travel from the NAI to the TAI is longer than the time
needed to emplace the situational obstacle and to mass fires in the TAI, while also ensuring that the
obstacle has not reached its self-destruct time if SCATMINEs are used.
6-20. (U) Time-distance analysis is conducted using the following steps:
 (U) Step 1. Identify the TAI and the obstacle intent. This includes target, location, and effect,
based on the situation template.
 (U) Step 2. Calculate the time needed to decide on and execute the obstacle. This includes travel
time for the emplacing asset, emplacement time, arming time, and the time needed to cover the
obstacle. This step also includes the time needed to report the trigger, consider and make the
decision, confirm asset availability, and communicate the decision to the emplacing unit. The
limiting factor for the time required may actually be the time to integrate maneuver and fires.
Planners must have a realistic appreciation for the time required to initiate certain actions and the
physical and procedural constraints under which units operate.
 (U) Step 3. Identify the NAI or friendly-force criteria for the obstacle and confirm that it meets
time-distance requirements. The NAI is used to confirm or deny that an enemy action will
trigger obstacle emplacement.
 (U) Step 4. Identify the DP. The DP is selected along the targeted AA so that if the enemy
reaches that point, there will be just enough time to successfully execute the obstacle so it will
have the intended effect. If the order to execute the situational obstacle is not given before the
enemy passes the DP, there will not be enough time to successfully emplace the obstacle to have
the intended effect. This point is calculated based on emplacement, arming, travel, and
communication and decision time.
6-21. (U) Once the unit verifies the total time required for executing the situational obstacle, it compares
this time with the time required for enemy movement from the NAI to the TAI. If the time to execute
exceeds the enemy movement time, the unit will need to modify the emplacement plan or move the NAI.
The unit may change obstacle design (such as reducing the density of a scatterable minefield) to reduce
emplacement time. The unit may change the DP location by accepting the risk, and putting the DP farther
out than the NAI, and deciding to execute the obstacle based on a probable enemy action. The unit can also
change the number or location of emplacement assets (such as increasing the number of firing batteries for
a RAAM/ADAM or positioning emplacing systems closer to the obstacle location).
6-22. (U) Included in the calculation for emplacement time, is the time required to integrate fires and
maneuver with the obstacle. The unit ensures that the time requirements allow it to synchronize the effects
of the obstacle with fires on the enemy in the EA created for the TAI.
6-23. (U) The staff must select an obstacle design and an emplacement asset that can meet the time
requirements. The availability of an emplacement asset is a major consideration. The staff identifies other
mission requirements that may compete for the same asset; for example, artillery may not be able to fire
RAAM/ADAM at the expected point in the battle because of other mission requirements.
6-24. (U) The staff also determines who will observe the event that triggers obstacle execution. The unit
must clearly identify primary and alternate observers. If situational obstacles are tasked to subordinate
units, they must have the observation platform to identify the target. The unit must also identify clear and
concise execution criteria and ensure that communication links are understood. Control procedures should
be clearly established.

6-25. (U) The staff relies on the expertise of special staff officers, depending on the assets needed, to
emplace the obstacle. The engineer staff officer works closely with the air liaison officer or the air mission
commander in planning the delivery of air Volcano mines in the right configuration to achieve the desired
effect. When planning an RAAM/ADAM, the FSO is involved to ensure that the delivery assets are in
position at the right place and time with the right mix of ammunition to emplace the obstacle.
WITHHOLD THE EXECUTION OF THE OBSTACLE UNTIL NEEDED (U)

6-26. (U) The commander withholds the execution of a situational obstacle until the obstacle effect is
required. The execution is controlled using the triggers in the decision support template and matrix.
Commanders and staffs consider that the obstacle assets, once committed, are no longer available to
support other missions. They also consider that SCATMINEs have a self-destruct time. Emplacing the
obstacle too early may result in self-destruction of the mines before the enemy arrives.
DECISION AND EXECUTION (U)

6-27. (U) The staff provides subordinate units with information on the situational obstacle plan in the
obstacle overlay and the situational-obstacle execution matrix. Tasks to subordinate units or the operational
execution matrix refer the appropriate subordinate units to the situational-obstacle matrix.
OBSTACLE OVERLAY (U)

6-28. (U) The staff uses the obstacle effect symbol and the specific individual obstacle symbol since the
commander normally intends to use a specific type of individual obstacle. This ensures that the emplacing
unit and the force attacking the enemy in the TAI understand the intent of the obstacle.
SITUATIONAL-OBSTACLE EXECUTION MATRIX (U)

6-29. (U) The situational-obstacle execution matrix shown in figure 6-3, page 6-8, is similar to other
obstacle execution matrixes. Information that is normally shown on the matrix includes the—
 (U) Obstacle number.
 (U) Obstacle location (to include TAI designation and grid coordinates), target, effect, and
priority.
 (U) Emplacing unit and overwatching unit.
 (U) Obstacle trigger.
 (U) Obstacle NAI and DP.
 (U) Emplacing asset and its source.
 (U) Unit responsible for observing and reporting on the NAI.
 (U) Special instructions for each group, if any.
REHEARSALS (U)
6-30. (U) After the order is published, rehearsals are conducted to confirm the timing requirements and
ensure that all persons involved in the obstacle execution understand their responsibilities. There may be
several different support rehearsals at several different levels; for example, a task force and an artillery
battalion rehearsal might include the same RAAM/ADAM target. An air Volcano minefield might be
covered during a rehearsal and the aviation unit rehearsal. The execution of situational obstacles should
also be included in a combined arms rehearsal.

Chapter 6
Situational-Obstacle Execution Matrix
Unit) and DP
Owning Unit
Instructions
(Observing
Emplacing
Emplacing
Asset and
Obstacle
Location
Location
Number
Priority
Special
Trigger
Effect
Unit
NAI
A1CS003 RS- Disrupt 1 A/877 1-23 Enemy NAI (B/1- Engineer See demo-
345678- Artillery Infantry counter- 23 squad in lition order
90 attack Infantry) BP 1-2 serial
along DP 7 number
AA 4 001.
Legend:
AA assembly area
BP battle position
DP decision point
Figure 6-3. (U) Sample situational-obstacle execution matrix
6-31. (U) The intent of the rehearsal is to synchronize the obstacle execution. The unit verifies and refines
the timing requirements considered during obstacle design. The unit verifies the time required for the
enemy to move from the NAI to the TAI. This may be accomplished by actually moving subordinate units
from the NAI to the TAI at the projected movement rate of the enemy. Alternatively, geospatial
engineers/geographic intelligence specialists can help planners estimate realistic movement times based on
the movement rates that are associated with on- and off-road mobility predictions as described in ATP
3-34.80. The unit modifies the movement rate based on expected weather and light conditions and may
need to adjust the location of the observation platform that is observing the NAI, based on the terrain or
expected weather or light conditions. The location of the NAI may require marking with a TRP.
6-32. (U) The unit confirms the actual obstacle emplacement time. This time may be determined by an
actual physical rehearsal; for example, the unit might drive a ground Volcano system along the obstacle
trace on a similar piece of terrain to determine how long it will take to emplace it.
6-33. (U) Another important element to consider during the rehearsal is asset availability. The staff must
ensure that the assets necessary to emplace the situational obstacle are available for the mission. A logistic
rehearsal identifies who supplies the obstacle material (such as Volcano canisters) and where these
individuals are located. A logistic rehearsal also specifies what the reload plan is for the emplacing asset.
During the logistic rehearsal, it is very important to determine asset availability and the potential situations
where the asset may not be available. The priorities for all emplacing assets must be very clear.

Chapter 7
(U) This chapter describes employment considerations and how protective obstacles
are integrated within the planning process. Protective obstacles protect the emplaced
location by warning, mitigating, and preventing hostile actions and effects.
EFFECTS (U)
7-1. (U) Commanders use protective obstacle effects to convey their intent and facilitate protective
obstacle planning and design. The protective obstacle effects are—
 (U) Warning. This effect provides early warning of an intrusion and/or warns intruders that they
are entering a restricted area. Examples of this effect are fences and other antipersonnel barriers
that can be enhanced with electronic or visual signaling devices (such as trip flares).
 (U) Mitigation. This effect reduces the negative impacts of hostile action at a specified location
against the personnel, resources, and facilities being protected. An example of this effect is the
blast protection that a concrete barrier or soil-filled container can have against an explosive
hazard.
 (U) Prevention. This effect prevents hostile actions at a specified location against the personnel,
resources, and facilities being protected. An example of this effect is the placement of an
obstacle at an adequate distance to prevent a threat from employing a certain weapon at its
effective range.
7-2. (U) Some devices used as protective obstacles are capable of achieving more than one effect; for
example, networked munitions are capable of achieving the effects through the man-in-the-loop interface
and the ability to employ various types of lethal and nonlethal munitions. Other objects, such as concrete
barriers or T-walls, can produce mitigation and prevention effects; for example, T-walls can prevent enemy
observation or access into a specific area while also mitigating blast effects.

7-3. (U) The obstacle employment principles apply equally to tactical and protective obstacles. However,
there are a few other considerations that apply when employing protective obstacles. These considerations
are described below.
DURATION (U)
7-4. (U) Protective obstacles that are employed in support of shorter-duration defense or security tasks
(such as during a transition from the offense or a temporary halt while on the move) must be capable of
being rapidly emplaced and recovered or destroyed. Protective obstacles that support longer-duration
defense or security tasks at fixed sites (such as base camps or sustainment sites) are generally more
permanent in nature and usually require greater resource expenditure. Devices or materials that are used for
protective obstacles in this role must be maintainable in a cost-effective manner and be longer-lasting to
withstand the elements; for example, units employing obstacle systems that rely on battery power should
consider more efficient power sources (such as the use of solar-powered battery rechargers or hard-wiring
into commercial or prime power).

Chapter 7
EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY (U)

7-5. (U) The emplacement authority for protective obstacles is normally not tied to the obstacle control
measures for tactical obstacles. Higher commanders authorize subordinate commanders to emplace
protective obstacles outside of obstacle zones, belts, and groups with minimal restrictions. The owning unit
is normally the emplacing unit. Engineers provide technical expertise and equipment as required.
Commanders focus engineer effort on tactical obstacles. Units must employ the necessary protection
measures to avoid fratricide and prevent negative impacts on noncombatants.
PROTECTIVE-OBSTACLE BANDS (FOUO)

7-6. (FOUO) Leaders use bands around the defensive position or secured site to help analyze the
defended area, prioritize efforts, and organize the arrangement of protective obstacles. (See figure 7-1.)
Units adjust the location of each band based on mission variables. The protective-obstacle bands are—
 (FOUO) Heavy-weapons band.
 (FOUO) Light-weapons band.
 (FOUO) Perimeter band.
 (FOUO) Internal band.
Figure 7-1. (FOUO) Protective-obstacle bands
7-7. (FOUO) Some additional considerations for protective-obstacle designs are employment in depth
and obstacle protection. Protective obstacles do not seriously inhibit an assault unless these obstacles
overload or exhaust enemy obstacle reduction capabilities. This requires complex obstacles employed in
depth to cause the enemy to employ more than one type of reduction asset. It is difficult to construct a
continuous array of protective obstacles from the heavy-weapons band through the internal band. However,
units can construct successive bands of obstacles, with each focused on a specific threat. This requires the
enemy to continually deploy and regroup in an area of intensive fires until friendly forces can destroy the
enemy or force its withdrawal.
Heavy-Weapons Band (FOUO)

7-8. (FOUO) The heavy-weapons band is farthest from position and is about 300 to 500 meters away.
Obstacles in this band deny the enemy a position from which it can support assaulting forces by fire.

Tactical obstacles often tie into protective obstacles in this band. Primary threat considerations are heavy
weapons (a tank or infantry fighting vehicle main guns, heavy or medium, handheld antitank (AT)
weapons, heavy machine guns). Another consideration is the location of possible enemy assault or support
by-fire positions. Units design protective obstacles that are integrated with direct and indirect fires to defeat
the expected enemy. If the unit is a light infantry company team, the greatest threat in the heavy weapons
band may be main-gun fire from a tank or infantry-fighting vehicle; therefore, the unit designs obstacles
that can help defeat this threat (such as antivehicle minefields in potential attack-by-fire positions). If the
unit is a tank company team, the greatest threat in this band may be a dismounted infantry that is armed
with medium AT weapons. The unit may design obstacles that include MOPMS and wire to defeat this
threat.
Light-Weapons Band (FOUO)

7-9. (FOUO) The light-weapons band is typically located 30 to 300 meters away. The focus of obstacles
in this band is on breaking up enemy assault formations and denying attack-by-fire positions for enemy
small arms or light AT weapons. The primary threat considerations are small arms; light, handheld AT
weapons; grenade launchers; and possible assault positions for dismounted, infiltration forces. Other
considerations include vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices or mounted assaults. Like the heavy-
weapons band, light-weapons band obstacles may be tied into tactical obstacles and FPFs. This commonly
occurs in restricted terrain where direct fire EAs are small and direct fire engagements are close. Another
example is the protective obstacles around a block-obstacle group; for example, the company team
commander ensures that the tactical and protective obstacles support each other.
7-10. (FOUO) In the light-weapons band, dismounted units may use antivehicle minefields or munition
fields to help defeat mounted assaults. Dismounted units may also use wire roadblocks or other constructed
antivehicle obstacles to defeat moving-vehicle threats, such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.
Dismounted units may also incorporate self-destruct antipersonnel minefields and wire obstacles to help
break up enemy dismounted formations. Mounted units generally design light-weapons band obstacles to
defeat dismounted enemy infiltration forces and, as in the heavy-weapons band, to deny positions for
dismounted forces with light AT weapons.
Perimeter Band (FOUO)

7-11. (FOUO) This band lies between the light-weapons band and the defending unit and defines the
perimeter of the unit position. It extends from the fighting or protective positions out to about 30 meters.
Protective-obstacle considerations within the perimeter band focus on defeating dismounted threats. The
primary threat considerations are hand-thrown grenades or other explosive charges and small arms fire.
Both mounted and dismounted units use wire obstacles and possibly MOPMS and command-detonated
claymores. These obstacles help prevent enemy forces and other threats from entering the unit position.
Internal Band (FOUO)

7-12. (FOUO) This band is the area within the position of the defending unit. Protective obstacles within
this band are used to protect against hostile actions within the perimeter. The size of the internal band
depends on the size of the position. Protective obstacles in the internal band help break up the actual unit
position and prevent the enemy from moving within the position or gaining access to critical sites. Units
can do this by putting protective obstacles throughout the position, and segmenting it into irregular
sections. This causes the attacker to breach repeatedly once on the position enhancing the ability of the
defender to counterattack, maximize defensive fires, provide time to reorganize, or conduct retrograde
operations. Obstacles in this band are usually wire or other constructed antipersonnel and antivehicle
obstacles. Units do not normally use mines within their position because of the fratricide risk.
OBSTACLE MARKING, REPORTING, RECORDING, AND TRACKING (U)

7-13. (U) Units report, record, and track protective obstacles as described in appendix D. Unlike tactical
obstacles, owning units recover protective obstacles or transfer them to a relieving unit before leaving an

Chapter 7
area. If forced to abandon protective obstacles based on the urgency of a situation, units report obstacle
locations to higher and adjacent units as necessary to avoid fratricide.
7-14. (U) Units mark protective minefields on all four sides. (Units mark lanes and gaps according to
ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations.) Commanders decide whether to mark
other inherently dangerous obstacles based on the risk assessment. (Protective minefields are recorded
using a scatterable minefield record [SCATMINEREC] as shown in JP 3-15. Protective munition fields are
recorded using a DA Form 1355-1 [Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record] as shown in FM 3-34.210.)
Units also depict protective minefields and munition fields on their sector sketches. If the minefield or
munition field is transferred to another unit, the transferring unit leader briefs the receiving unit leader and
provides the necessary obstacle records. If the minefield or munition field is abandoned unexpectedly, the
unit forwards the record to higher headquarters.
7-15. (U) Units report protective obstacles through their chain of command to their brigade/regimental
level headquarters. If the higher headquarters has authorized the use of protective obstacles in the ROE,
tactical SOP, or OPORD, subordinate units are not required to submit a report of intention. Units establish
SOPs for reporting initiation, progress, and completion of protective obstacles to the battalion level.
7-16. (U) Individual units emplace and remove their own protective obstacles. Therefore, it is usually not
necessary for the emplacing unit to turn over the obstacle to the overwatching force. If a nonorganic
emplacing unit, such as an engineer platoon, emplaces the protective obstacle, the emplacing unit transfers
the obstacle.
7-17. (U) The continuous overwatch of protective obstacles is critical. In those areas where dead space
exists, units use other means of early warning and monitoring, such as flares, remote sensors, and ground
surveillance radars. These measures ensure that an infiltrating force cannot enter the area undetected. The
unit also has the responsibility to assist other friendly units from straying into the protective obstacles, thus
preventing fratricide.
7-18. (U) Units change lane and gap locations periodically to keep the enemy from finding them. Units
plan and rehearse lane closure. Lanes and gaps are weak points in protective obstacles, so units consider
allocating increased direct and indirect fires to cover them.
7-19. (U) Obstacle camouflage depends on obstacle siting. Large protective obstacle systems are not easy
to conceal by siting alone; however, when units take advantage of the terrain and locate protective obstacles
in the folds of the terrain, around blind curves on high-speed AAs, or on the reverse slope of a hill, units are
less visible to an attacker. To aid in camouflaging protective obstacles from aerial observation, units avoid
regular geometric layouts of protective obstacle systems. Camouflage and deception can be enhanced with
phony obstacles that are used to confuse the attacker as to the exact location and extent of the protective
obstacle system.
7-20. (U) Company command posts track the completion and location of protective obstacles by including
them on the company sector sketch. Companies forward these sketches to the battalion command post
where they are consolidated. The brigade/regimental command post is the repository for protective
minefield or munition field records. Companies report any changes that are made to protective obstacles. It
is important that they report removal or forced abandonment of minefields or munition fields. The
command post continuously updates the task force sector sketch, destroys minefield or munition field
records for recovered minefields or munition fields, and forwards minefield or munition field records to
brigade/regimental level. The brigade/regimental command post forwards minefield or munition field
records to corps level for any abandoned minefields or munition fields. Tracking obstacle removal and
obstacles remaining on the dirty battlefield is as critical as tracking obstacle emplacement.
PLANNING (U)
7-21. (U) Protective obstacle planning occurs primarily at the company and base camp or base cluster
commander level. Units with staffs use the military decisionmaking process/Marine Corps Planning
process, while small unit leaders use troop-leading procedures. (See FM 6-0 and MCWP 5-1 for more
information.)

MISSION ANALYSIS/PROBLEM FRAMING (U)

7-22. (U) Leaders evaluate the area around their positions out to about 500 meters (mission variable
dependent) using maps and terrain visualization products initially, followed by on-the-ground
reconnaissance. Some considerations include the—
 (U) Likelihood of an assault against the position.
 (U) Type of enemy force that can, and is most likely to, operate in the area.
 (U) Mounted and dismounted approaches into or within the position.
 (U) Enemy weapon system capabilities based on terrain effects and threat tactics for conducting
close assault.
 (U) Dead space and natural lines of drift for an attacker.
 (U) Possible assault positions and vantage points that favor an attacker.
7-23. (U) During mission analysis/problem framing, leaders analyze their vulnerabilities and capabilities.
Some of the considerations for this analysis include the—
 (U) Type and quantity of subordinate units and critical assets and their importance to current or
future missions.
 (U) Capability of subordinate units to construct protective obstacles based on manpower,
equipment, materials, and other resources.
 (U) Vulnerability of subordinate units to the templated enemy assault.
 (U) Level of protective obstacle effort required for each subordinate unit and system.
COURSE-OF-ACTION DEVELOPMENT (U)

7-24. (U) As COAs or options are developed, units identify likely areas or subordinate units where
protective obstacles may be needed. More detailed planning occurs after COA approval or as the plan is
completed. During war-gaming, leaders identify any additional requirements or likely areas for protective
obstacles as necessary. Leaders refine the protective obstacle plan by focusing on—
 (U) Fires and observation.
 (U) Obstacle integration.
 (U) Obstacle priorities.
 (U) Mobility requirements.
 (U) Obstacle design and resourcing.
7-25. (U) Leaders analyze the areas within each band to determine the locations where they can integrate
obstacles with fires and observation against an assaulting enemy. They consider direct and
indirect fire weapon systems, obstacle use, and available methods for maintaining observation (including
remote sensors). This analysis may show that observation post locations must change to ensure that
constant observation of the obstacles occurs, especially in support of stability or DSCA tasks. The
identification of locations where fires, observation, and obstacles can be integrated helps leaders to focus
obstacle planning. Leaders can sketch these areas on an overlay to further aid in planning.
7-26. (U) Based on the identification of locations where obstacles can be integrated with observed fires,
leaders can sketch a trace of the proposed obstacle bands. These traces represent where the unit may
emplace obstacles in each band without specifying individual obstacle types or actual locations.
7-27. (U) Leaders assign a priority for obstacles by band and annotate this on the planning overlay. They
consider the vulnerability of subordinate units and systems based on the type of enemy expected; for
example, a light infantry company team expecting an assault by a mounted enemy force would probably
assign first priority to the light-weapons band. A unit involved in peacekeeping operations in a position
where the primary threat is a potentially hostile group of unarmed civilians would set a different priority. It
would likely choose to construct obstacles in the perimeter band first to prevent civilians from making
physical contact with the unit. (Figure 7-2, page 7-6, is a sample overlay that is annotated with the fires and
observation analysis, obstacle integration, and obstacle priorities.)

Chapter 7
Figure 7-2. (U) Sample overlay fires and observation analysis, obstacle integration,
and obstacle priorities
7-28. (U) Leaders identify mobility requirements to determine the need for lanes or gaps to be left in
obstacles. Mission variables are considered to determine if these areas remain open, closed on order, or
closed with the defender able to open the lane. The on-off-on feature of networked munitions makes them
well suited for lanes. Units use lanes or gaps to allow—
 (U) Patrols to enter and leave the position.
 (U) Counterattack and/or reaction forces to move through the position.
 (U) Logistic and support traffic to enter and leave the position.
7-29. (U) Units change lane and gap locations periodically to keep the enemy from finding them. They
plan and rehearse lane closure. Lanes and gaps are weak points in protective obstacles, so units consider
allocating increased direct and indirect fires to cover them. The lanes and gaps must be disseminated to all
levels and overwatched as a protective measure to prevent fratricide.
7-30. (U) Normally, the locations of lanes on vehicle routes are fixed, complicating the ability of the
defender to change its location. One technique is to plan multiple vehicle lanes and alternate the lanes that
are open at any time. When alternating the opening and closing of lanes, units can also change the method
and the material used to close lanes.
7-31. (U) When units can establish only one lane, they develop redundant methods for closing the lane.
Other obstacles can be built parallel to the lane to contain any vehicles that penetrate the lane. Figure 7-3
provides an example of the identified mobility requirements annotated on the planning overlay.
7-32. (U) Units design and resource obstacles within each band to accomplish the following:
 (U) Counter the expected threat.
 (U) Enhance direct and indirect fires and observation.
 (U) Support the commander’s intent.
7-33. (U) Ideally, units construct obstacles in all four bands and tie the obstacles together to ensure that
there are no bypasses.

Figure 7-3. (U) Mobility requirements
OBSTACLE SITING (U)

7-34. (U) Once a unit occupies its position, it sites protective obstacles as part of its priorities of work.
Units use the same technique for siting tactical obstacles as described in chapter 3. As units normally
emplace their own protective obstacles, the emplacing party from the unit can play the role of the enemy.
The unit uses the siting drill to determine the location of the dead space.

Chapter 8
Considerations for Special Environments (U)
(U) This chapter describes situations that further complicate countermobility
operations and presents some of the factors that must be considered during planning
and execution. Special or complex environments exhibit extreme or unusual terrain
and weather characteristics. The ones specifically addressed in this chapter are cold
regions, mountainous areas, desert and extremely hot areas, jungles and forests, and
complex terrain.
COLD REGIONS (U)

8-1. (U) Cold regions of the world are characterized by deep snow, permafrost, seasonally frozen ground,
frozen lakes and rivers, glaciers, long periods of extremely cold temperatures, and extended periods of
daylight and darkness. These conditions can also be found in mountainous areas. Even areas with moderate
climates can experience severe winters, producing the same constraints on operations as found in cold
regions. Operations in cold regions are affected by wind and the possibility of thaw during warming
periods. Ice or snow melt can cause significant water level and current changes in streams, rivers, and
lakes—potentially causing flooding in low areas in short periods. (See ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D,
Cold Region Operations, for more information on operations in the cold-region environment.)
8-2. (U) The following terrain characteristics and their effects on countermobility operations should be
considered:
 (U) Slope. Slope is one of the most important natural obstacles that can be used in a cold region
environment. A steep slope is an obstacle to mounted and dismounted forces even under normal
conditions. When covered by deep snow or ice, it becomes much harder to surmount. The
bogging-down action and the loss of traction caused by deep snow frequently creates obstacles
out of slopes that might otherwise be easily overcome.
 (U) Snow. Heavy snow may reduce the effectiveness of SCATMINEs. Magnetic mines are not
significantly affected by snow, although cold weather decreases battery life. Snow deeper than
10 centimeters will increase the percentage of mines that will come to rest on their edges. This is
between 5 and 15 percent under normal conditions. When employing RAAM or ADAM or in
more than 10 centimeters of snow or mud, high-angle fire should be used and the number of
mines increased. Scatterable antipersonnel mines may be less effective in snow because the
deployment of trip wires is hindered. The melting snow may also cause the mines to change
positions and malfunction. Avalanches, which may be artificially created using explosives, make
excellent obstacles for blocking passes and roads. Wire obstacles are an easy and effective way
to reinforce snow-covered obstacles.
 (U) Permafrost. Permafrost is perennially frozen ground. The annual thaw depth, from 0.3 to
1.5 meters, is called the active layer. Digging, even in summer, is nearly impossible.
 (U) Hydrology. In the summer, lakes, rivers, and swamps of cold-climate regions provide
formidable obstacles to armor and personnel. In the winter, when these bodies of water are
frozen to sufficient depth, they provide excellent AAs. Ice breaching denies the enemy use of
frozen waterways as an AA. Explosives may be used to blow gaps in the ice of lakes and rivers,

Chapter 8
making it impassable to enemy personnel and armor. Creating ice by pouring water on road
grades will seriously hamper vehicular traffic. (See Cold Region Operations for details on
placing explosive charges in ice.)
 (U) Vegetation. The vegetation could range from nil on the high arctic tundra to heavy forests as
in the forests of northern Canada or Norway. Forested areas may provide an abundance of
natural materials for the construction of obstacles such as log cribs and abatis.
MOUNTAINOUS AREAS (U)

8-3. (U) Terrain is the primary factor that affects operations in mountainous regions. Mountains are
commonly classified as low or high, based on their elevation. Low mountains have an elevation of 300 to
900 meters, and high mountains have elevations usually exceeding 900 meters. Mountainous areas are
characterized by rugged and poorly trafficable terrain, steep slopes, and valleys. Movement is normally
canalized along the valleys, and lateral, cross-country movement is difficult. In the mountains, areas can be
barren of vegetation while other parts are covered by thick forests. Rivers and watercourses are often deep
and fast-flowing. If a river is slow-moving, it is usually because it is a major river in a valley. The climate
in mountainous areas can vary widely, depending on the geographical location. Mountainous areas are
often subject to heavy precipitation, in the form of rain or snow. Abrupt temperature changes or heavy
precipitation, particularly during short periods, can dramatically increase water current in mountain streams
and rivers.
8-4. (U) Reinforcing obstacles are particularly effective in mountainous terrain because of the
compartmented terrain and already limited road and trail networks that often make bypassing difficult.
However, constructing obstacles can be very costly in terms of time, material, transportation assets, and
labor. Personnel operating in mountainous areas can be affected by the altitude, which can result in reduced
work rates or altitude sickness. Dismounted personnel also have to work harder climbing up and down the
slopes. Accident rates can increase due to minor injuries, sprains, and bone breaks when moving and
working in the rough terrain. At certain times of the year, the hazards from exposure to high winds, cold,
and rain are severe. Road widths and load capacity may limit the size and type of vehicles that can be used.
Moving up and down steep roads will increase movement times. Off-road mobility may be difficult.
Communications may be difficult due to the interference by the mountains.
8-5. (U) It is often easy to create effective obstacles in mountains by cratering roads, fully or partially
destroying bridges, inducing rockslides and avalanches, and creating abatis in forested areas. Together with
the natural ruggedness of mountains, obstacles can be effectively employed to deny the enemy terrain and
delay and impede enemy movement. Units must exercise extreme caution when employing demolitions to
create obstacles near snow- and rock-covered slopes because they can cause dangerous rockslides,
avalanches, and secondary fragmentation. (See FM 3-97.6 and TC 3-97.61 for more information on
mountain operations.)
8-6. (U) SCATMINEs and networked munitions are best laid along the relatively narrow approaches
suited for vehicular movement. In mountainous terrain, SCATMINEs may be used more frequently than
constructing obstacles to conserve engineer resources and preserve the flexibility of the maneuver
commander when short-duration obstacles are required. Artillery- and air-delivered SCATMINEs are
especially useful in delaying follow-on forces moving through mountains. The employment of air Volcano
is limited at higher altitudes.
DESERTS (U)
8-7. (U) Deserts are extensive, arid, treeless environments that suffer from a severe lack of rainfall and
possess extreme daily temperature fluctuations. The terrain is sandy with boulder-strewn areas, mountains,
dunes, deeply eroded valleys, areas of rock and shale, and salt marshes. Any amount of precipitation can
cause sudden and significant increases in water flow, particularly in dried-up lake beds, marshes, river
channels, gullies, or wadis. Camouflage, concealment, light, and noise disciplines are important
considerations in desert terrain. Target acquisition and observation are relatively easy in desert terrain. The
extreme heat in desert areas can be debilitating, resulting in heat casualties and reduced work rates while

Considerations for Special Environments (U)
conducting countermobility operations. Units must plan for increased water requirements for drinking and
hygiene. (See FM 90-3/FMFM 7-27, Desert Operations for more information on desert operations.)
8-8. (U) Due to the mobility that is inherent in desert operations, obstacles must be extensive and used in
conjunction with other obstacles. Isolated point obstacles, such as road craters, are often easily bypassed.
Opportunities for bridge destruction are rare, and local materials for expedient obstacles are scarce.
Minefields and antivehicle ditches are the primary means of creating antivehicle obstacles in the desert.
8-9. (U) Antivehicle ditches require extensive preparations, but they are effective when adequate
preparation time is available and competing demands for blade assets do not compromise survivability
efforts. Determining where digging is possible, especially in rocky plateau deserts, is difficult since
bedrock may only be covered by a thin layer of sand or gravel. In sandy areas, ditches are less effective
since they can easily be filled in. Because antivehicle ditches are difficult to conceal, they must be dug so
that they do not outline a defensive front or flank. They must be covered by fire and reinforced with other
obstacles to prevent their use by enemy infantry as ready-made trenches. The hot weather and dust will
affect the maintenance of blade assets. This could include more frequent filter changes and other increased
maintenance. Blade edges may wear more rapidly in dry, abrasive soil and rocks.
8-10. (U) SCATMINEs offer many advantages in desert environments. They can be rapidly and remotely
emplaced without much manpower, and they preserve maneuver flexibility for friendly forces by
self-destructing.
JUNGLES (U)
8-11. (U) Jungles are humid, tropical areas with a dense growth of trees and vegetation. Visibility is
typically less than 30.5 meters, and areas are sparsely populated. The difficulty of movement through
jungle growth limits mounted operations. Good roads are rare and are usually narrow, winding, and
incapable of supporting sustained military traffic. High temperatures combined with high humidity can
become debilitating, resulting in heat casualties and reduced work rates while conducting countermobility
operations. Units must plan for increased water requirements for drinking and hygiene. (See FM 90-5 for
more information.)
8-12. (U) The jungle is an effective obstacle to vehicles. Reinforcing obstacles are normally employed as
point obstacles along roads, bridges, trails, and patches of cleared ground. The jungle lends itself to the use
of mines, networked munitions, Claymore munitions, and booby traps. The characteristics of the jungle
cause emplacement to be comparatively easy and detection to be extremely difficult. antipersonnel mines
can be effectively employed in jungles because of the propensity for dismounted movement.
COMPLEX TERRAIN (U)

8-13. (U) Countermobility operations are enabled and challenged when conducted in complex terrain.
Unlike deserts, mountains, and jungles, which confront units with a limited variety of fairly uniform
recurring terrain features, the urban environment is an ever-changing mix of natural and man-made
features. Operations in urban areas restrict maneuver and are time-consuming. A built-up area compares
closely with a fortified area because it provides an environment, which is easily converted to a fortified
area. For these reasons, conditions favor the defender. Ready-made strongpoints exist with good cover and
concealment. The attacker is easily canalized and surprised. Fields of fire and observation are dramatically
reduced. Units in urban areas are vulnerable to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks
because of the relative lack of dispersion and mobility.
8-14. (U) Obstacles must be planned in depth, starting well forward of an urban area to delay and canalize
the enemy. Possibilities for obstacles are unlimited in complex terrain, although the greater presence of
civilians and risk of collateral damage must be considered. The objective will be to deny the enemy
freedom of rapid advance through the built-up area. Obstacles, covered by fire, will accomplish this. Mines,
networked munitions, wire, craters, and rubble all create effective obstacles. Streets are barricaded to halt
tanks at the optimum range of AT weapons. As enemy vehicles are disabled, they too will become

Chapter 8
obstacles as streets are clogged. Since the enemy will probably be forced to dismount in order to continue
the attack, antipersonnel type obstacles must be integrated throughout the obstacle plan.
ARTILLERY-DELIVERED SCATTERABLE MINES (U)

8-15. (U) Using RAAM or ADAM in complex terrain involves the following four specific problem areas:
 (U) Obstacle siting. Accurate siting is extremely critical due to the typically restrictive AAs and
may be futile due to the difficulty in adjusting artillery rounds in an environment that obscures
observation. Further, buildings tend to create unmined shadow zones.
 (U) Performance. RAAM/ADAM may not survive impact with buildings or paved surfaces.
 (U) Detectability. SCATMINEs on bare and lightly covered surfaces are easily detected. This
allows the enemy to quickly find unmined passageways or pick through lightly seeded areas.
Emplacing RAAM/ADAM on top of or immediately in front of an advancing enemy when
enhanced with fires may achieve the desired obstacle effect.
 (U) Density. Hard-surfaced areas cause SCATMINEs to bounce and roll, making it difficult to
achieve the desired density and intended effect. Some air- or artillery-delivered SCATMINEs,
especially antivehicle mines, will land on top of buildings and are ineffective.
AIR VOLCANO (U)

8-16. (U) The primary advantage of the air Volcano system is its capability to site and emplace minefields
accurately. This depends on the maneuverability of the helicopter over the selected terrain and the proper
coordination between ground forces and aviation support. Disadvantages include the vulnerability of the
emplacing helicopter and the impact of hard surfaces on deployed mines.
GROUND VOLCANO (U)

8-17. (U) The primary advantages of ground Volcano are that it is organic to Army combat engineer units,
is more readily available, and can be more accurately sited and emplaced than air- or artillery-delivered
SCATMINEs. Some primary considerations that may degrade ground Volcano in complex terrain include
the requirement to emplace minefields before the enemy attacks in order to reduce system vulnerability.
This makes the minefield detectable and provides more reaction time for the enemy to alter its scheme of
movement and maneuver/scheme of maneuver. Also, the delivery of mines depends on terrain trafficability.
The prime mover and the launch vehicle must be able to negotiate the terrain over which mines are to be
dispensed.
MODULAR PACK MINE SYSTEM (U)

8-18. (U) The MOPMS is ideally suited for employment in urban terrain. The module can be hidden from
enemy view, and the mines can be dispensed after attackers are committed to a route of advance.
Additionally, mines can be emplaced rapidly under enemy fire. In contrast to other SCATMINEs, which
automatically self-destruct after a certain number of hours, the mines dispensed by a MOPMS can be self-
destructed on command.
GATOR (U)
8-19. (U) The Gator is sometimes considered for employment in urban terrain. When considered, the Gator
presents the same challenges as artillery-delivered and air Volcano mine systems.
UNDERGROUND PASSAGEWAYS (U)

8-20. (U) Subways, sewers, cellars, and utility tunnels provide protected movement routes for dismounted
forces. In large cities where underground systems are numerous and complex, limited manpower may
dictate that defending forces employ obstacles to block key underground passageways with wire, rubble, or
antipersonnel munitions.

Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart (U)
(U) Table A-1 is a metric conversion chart. A complete listing of preferred metric
units for general use is contained in Fed-Std-376B.
Table A-1. (U) Metric conversion chart
U.S. Units Multiplied By Equals Metric Units
Feet 0.30480 Meters
Inches 2.54000 Centimeters
Inches 0.02540 Meters
Inches 25.40010 Millimeters
Miles (statute) 1.60934 Kilometers
Miles per hour 0.04470 Meter per second
Pounds 0.45359 Kilograms
Yards 0.91440 Meters
Miles per hour 0.86897 Knots per hour
Metric Units Multiplied By Equals U.S. Units
Centimeters 0.39370 Inches
Kilometer 0.62137 Miles
Meters per second 2.23700 Miles per hour
Meters 3.28080 Feet
Meters 39.37000 Inches
Meters 1.09361 Yards
Millimeters 0.03937 Inches
Kilograms 2.20460 Pounds
Knots per hour 1.50779 Miles per hour
Legend:
U.S. United States
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 A-1

Appendix B
Demolition Obstacles (FOUO)
(U) Demolition obstacles are created using explosives. Demolitions can be used in
many ways to create obstacles, limited only by the imagination. This appendix
describes the most common demolition obstacles. (TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A
Engineer Field Data, and FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions,
are key references and provide specifics for creating demolition obstacles.)
BRIDGE DESTRUCTION (U)

B-1. (FOUO) The use of existing bridges is critical to the mobility of a military force, especially bridges
spanning nonfordable rivers and streams. Demolishing bridges causes the enemy to search for a suitable
bypass, such as another bridge or ford site at a different location, or expend bridging assets to maintain its
momentum. For maximum effectiveness, the gap produced should exceed the assault bridging capability of
the enemy by 5 meters (about 25 meters for planning purposes). Bridge destruction cannot be accomplished
haphazardly. There are several very important factors that must be considered and planned, such as—
 (U) The extent of destruction.
 (U) Time and date to demolish.
 (U) Coordination.
 (U) Resources.
 (U) The effects on the local population.
 (U) The impact on friendly maneuver.
B-2. (U) There is no standard planning factor for the destruction of bridges because of the many variables
that impact the materials and the manpower required. The maneuver commander decides whether to order a
complete or partial bridge demolition. A complete bridge demolition leaves nothing of the old structure,
while a partial demolition saves the near side spans and abutments. A partial demolition permits easier
reconstruction of the bridge. Select the method of attack that achieves the tactical purpose and expends the
least amount of resources. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data and FM 3-34.214/MCRP
3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions.)
B-3. (U) A unit may have to execute a gap-crossing operation to overcome destroyed bridge obstacles.
Bridge replacement can require a major construction mission. The loss of a bridge impacts the local
civilians and may disrupt future friendly operations. Because of these considerations, commanders
normally designate bridges as reserve targets to be executed only when specific criteria are met.
ROAD CRATERS (U)

B-4. (U) A road crater is an effective obstacle on roads or other high-speed movement routes. Road craters
cause the enemy to use earthmoving equipment, blade tanks, or mechanical bridging assets. There are three
types of road craters—hasty, deliberate, and relieved-face (shown in TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer
Field Data). The planning factors and material requirements for road craters are detailed in Engineer Field
Data and FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions.
B-5. (U) To be effective, road craters must be too wide for tracked vehicles to span and too deep and
steep-sided for any vehicle to pass through. Road craters will not stop tanks indefinitely. A tank, making
repeated attempts to traverse the crater, can loosen soil from the slopes of the crater, filling the bottom and
reducing the depth and angle of the slope of the crater. Road craters are effective antivehicle obstacles if a
tank requires three or more passes to traverse the crater, thereby providing enough time for AT weapons to
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 B-1

Appendix B
destroy the tank. Road craters should be large enough to tie into existing or other reinforcing obstacles at
each end.
B-6. (U) The effectiveness of road craters can be improved by placing log hurdles on either side, digging
the face of the hurdle vertically on the friendly side, reinforcing the site with scatterable antivehicle mines,
filling the crater with water, or using other means to further delay enemy armor. Creating road craters at a
45° angle to the direction of approach will increase the tendency of a tracked vehicle to slip sideways and
ride off its track. To achieve sufficient obstacle depth, place craters in multiple or single rows and combine
them with other obstacles, such as a bridge demolition, to make them complex obstacles. When creating
more than one row of craters, space them far enough apart so that they cannot be spanned by a single
vehicle-launched bridge.
B-7. (U) The hard-surfaced pavement of roads and airfields is breached with explosives so that the holes
may be dug for cratering charges. Permafrost and ice can be as hard as solid rock and requires special
procedures for blasting or cratering. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data and FM 3-
34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions, for more information.)
HASTY ROAD CRATER (U)

B-8. (FOUO) A hasty road crater is emplaced when time and explosives are limited. It is less effective
than a deliberate crater. The hasty cratering method produces a V-shaped crater that is about 2 meters deep,
and 6 to 7 meters wide with side slopes of 25° to 35°.
DELIBERATE ROAD CRATER (U)

B-9. (FOUO) A deliberate road crater is emplaced when more time and explosives are available. It is
wider and deeper than a hasty crater and more effective. The deliberate cratering method produces a
V-shaped crater that is almost 2.5 meters deep and 8 to 9 meters wide with side slopes of 30° to 37°.
RELIEVED-FACE ROAD CRATER (U)

B-10. (FOUO) This method produces a crater that is more effective against modern tanks than the hasty or
deliberate crater, but it requires even more time and explosives to create. This technique produces a
trapezoidal-shaped crater that is almost 2.5 meters deep and 8 to 9 meters wide with unequal side slopes.
The exact shape of the crater depends on the type of soil.
ANTIVEHICLE DITCHES (U)

B-11. (U) Explosives can create ditches rapidly. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data and
FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions, for several methods of creating ditches with
explosives and mechanical means.)
ABATIS (U)
B-12. (U) An abatis is a vehicular obstacle constructed by falling trees on both sides of a road, trail, gap, or
defile so that they fall, interlocked, toward the expected direction of the enemy approach. Abatis are only
effective if available trees are large enough to stop the enemy force. Abatis can be useful on roads and
narrow movement routes within heavily wooded areas. Abatis can be created using demolitions or
mechanical means such as large tracked vehicles, winches, and chain saws. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-
17A, Engineer Field Data and FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions, for information
on constructing abatis.)
B-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Appendix C
Constructed Obstacles (U)
(U) Constructed obstacles are created with manpower and/or equipment and without
the direct use of explosives. They can be constructed using numerous designs, limited
only by the imagination. This appendix describes the most commonly constructed
obstacles (wire obstacles, tetrahedrons, hedgehogs, antivehicle ditches, log obstacles,
preconstructed obstacles, and phony obstacles). (TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A Engineer
Field Data is a key reference and provides details for creating constructed obstacles.)
WIRE OBSTACLES (U)

C-1. (U) Wire obstacles typically target the dismounted threat. Triple standard concertina is a common
wire obstacle; however, there are other types (such as double-apron fence, tanglefoot, and 11-row
antivehicle obstacle). A double-apron obstacle is manpower- and material-intensive, and units typically use
it only for protective obstacles for static locations. Tanglefoot obstacles work well in tall grass or along a
low-water line. An 11-row antivehicle obstacle is an extremely effective wire obstacle against vehicles.
(See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, for details on constructing these wire obstacles.)
TETRAHEDRONS, HEDGEHOGS, AND OTHER BARRIERS (U)

C-2. (U) Tetrahedrons and hedgehogs target the mounted threat. Tetrahedrons are pyramids with a
triangular base and are normally about 1.5 meters in height on each side. Tetrahedrons are fabricated from
steel beams or concrete. Hedgehogs are constructed from three or four steel beams joined in the middle.
Both of these obstacles are effective in restricted terrain. Units commonly use them in urban areas. Their
ability to completely stop light vehicles makes them ideal for use as protective obstacles around fixed sites.
Other types of barriers include the Jersey barrier, concrete tetrahedron and cubes, and heavy-equipment tire
obstacles. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, for more detailed information.)
ANTIVEHICLE DITCHES (U)

C-3. (U) Units can use equipment to alter terrain to create constructed obstacles, such as an antivehicle
ditch. An antivehicle ditch, when properly sited and constructed, can be effective against wheeled and some
tracked vehicles. Antivehicle ditches require the enemy to use bridging or blade assets to reduce the
obstacle, which takes time. This canalizes enemy forces and causes follow-on elements to stack up, slow
down, or stop, and become vulnerable to fires.
C-4. (U) Antivehicle ditches are most effective when combined with other types of obstacles to create
complex obstacles. This causes the enemy to use different types of obstacle reduction assets; for example,
when combined with a minefield, the antivehicle ditch can disrupt the employment of tank plows and other
minefield reduction assets. Likewise, the minefield can disrupt the employment of blade assets needed for
reducing the antivehicle ditch.
C-5. (U) Antivehicle ditches are designed against a specific type of vehicle. The targeted vehicle or design
vehicle is determined based on the composition of the enemy force. Properly sized antivehicle ditches
ensure the optimal expenditure of resources; for example, a narrower, shallower ditch constructed with
equipment other than dozers (such as backhoes and ditching machines) might be adequate for certain
wheeled vehicles. The design specifications for antivehicle ditches are based on the type and capability of
the excavation equipment that will be used for construction, soil conditions, and the targeted vehicle’s
performance capability.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 C-1

Appendix C
C-6. (U) Antivehicle ditches should complement existing obstacles, to include—

 (U) Slopes greater than 35°.
 (U) Steps more than 1.5 meter high.
 (U) Ravines, gullies, and ditches wider than 3 meters.
 (U) Swamps and marshes more than 1 meter deep.
 (U) Forests having trees more than 21 centimeters in diameter.
 (U) Forests having 15° slopes and trees more than 11 centimeters in diameter.
 (U) Built-up areas.
C-7. (U) The construction of antivehicle ditches is time- and equipment-intensive. Maximum use should
be made of the terrain. Also, use the shortest antivehicle ditch or ditch system possible that allows the
overwatching force to properly develop an EA. An antivehicle ditch alone is not an adequate obstacle and
will not stop a determined attacker. Additional procedures to increase antivehicle ditch effectiveness are
to—
 (U) Locate the antivehicle ditch within the maximum effective range of AT weapons from
covered and concealed firing positions.
 (U) Preplan artillery and air strikes in antivehicle ditch areas. Artillery and air strikes cause the
enemy to button up and slow down while attempting to reduce the ditch, making it more
vulnerable to direct fire.
 (U) Emplace antivehicle SCATMINEs on both friendly and enemy sides of the ditch, especially
in loose soil material and the ditch bottom to multiply effectiveness. Even the smallest ditch will
strip mine plows and rollers from the front of the attacking force, thus making the enemy more
vulnerable to mines on the friendly side of the ditch.
 (U) Place concertina wire or water in the ditch to hamper dismounted enemy forces maneuvering
in the ditch or attempting to reduce the ditch by hand. Wire and water can also degrade the
ability of wheeled and some tracked vehicles to transit through a ditch that has been reduced.
 (U) Anchor the ends of antivehicle ditches into restricted terrain or existing obstacles, such as
steep slopes, wooded areas, and man-made structures, to prevent them from being easily
bypassed. After completing the ditch, access ramps used during construction should be removed
or blocked to deny enemy access.
C-8. (U) Anitvehicle ditches are often used to supplement turn or block obstacle groups. Units normally
do not use antivehicle ditches for disrupt- or fix-obstacle groups because of the time and equipment
requirements. Typically, there is a trade-off between digging antivehicle ditches and digging survivability
positions or performing mobility tasks requiring the same assets.
C-9. (U) Time, materials, and manpower can be saved by reinforcing existing gullies or ditches rather
than constructing new ones. One method is to excavate along natural drainage or contour lines to create a
sidehill cut ditch. Since mud can further degrade mobility, it is beneficial if the ditch can be made to retain
water. Reinforce the ditch with wire or other antipersonnel obstacles to discourage use by dismounted
enemy forces. Depending on the soil type, and in situations where the ditch must last for longer periods of
time such as around critical fixed sites, the sides of ditches may have to be reinforced to prevent them from
crumbling and becoming less effective too rapidly. Continuous direct fire should cover the ditch and cause
the enemy to deploy before reaching the ditch. SCATMINEs on probable approach routes can further slow
vehicular movement. There are two basic antivehicle ditch designs: rectangular and triangular. (See TM 3-
34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data.)
C-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

RECTANGULAR DITCHES (U)

C-10. (U) The following parameters apply to rectangular ditch construction (see figure C-1):
 (FOUO) The width should be at least 3.3 meters to exceed the self-bridging capability of tanks.
 (FOUO) The depth should be at least 1.5 meters in firm soil and greater than 1.6 meters in sand
to achieve more than a disrupt effect against vehicles that do not have the aid of bridging or
earthmoving equipment.
 (FOUO) A rectangular ditch should have a 1- to 2-meter berm on its friendly side. This serves to
increase obstacle height, decrease traction to crossing tanks, greatly impede crossing with scissor
type bridges, and keep the enemy from pushing the soil back into the ditch without exposing its
dozers or tanks with plows.
Figure C-1. (FOUO) Rectangular ditch, tracked-vehicle delay time
TRIANGULAR DITCHES (U)

C-11. (FOUO) The following parameters apply to triangular ditch construction (see figure C-2, page C-4):
 (FOUO) The entrance slope is not critical in determining the effectiveness of triangular ditches.
 (FOUO) The wall is constructed as steep as possible.
 (FOUO) A tank cannot breach a 1.5-meter-deep ditch in hard clayey soils under most conditions.
 (FOUO) A triangular ditch 1.2 meters deep in hard soil will only disrupt the enemy.
 (FOUO) A triangular ditch in sand must be greater than 1.8 meters deep to achieve more than a
disrupt effect.
 (FOUO) The spoil must be spread loosely on the enemy side, rather than as a berm, to deny the
use of a triangular antivehicle ditch as a fighting position for the attacking armor. This will also
reduce tank traction when approaching the ditch.

Appendix C
Figure C-2. (FOUO) Triangular ditch, tracked-vehicle delay time
ANTIVEHICLE DITCH CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES (U)

C-12. (U) Units use earthmoving equipment, such as the armored combat earthmover (ACE), dozers,
scrapers, and bucket loaders for antivehicle ditching. Generally, the equipment is much more effective if it
is used in teams rather than alone. ACEs, dozers, and scrapers are most effective. Some typical team
configurations are—
 (U) Two ACEs or two dozers.
 (U) One ACE and two scoop loaders.
 (U) Two or more scrapers used in tandem.
 (U) One ACE or one dozer and two scrapers used in tandem.
 (U) Two or more scrapers (some may have to be used as pushers).
C-13. (U) This list is not all-inclusive. Units should practice and experiment using various equipment and
operator combinations to determine what works best for their area given the equipment that is available.
Operators may have to rip frozen or extremely hard soil with dozer-mounted rippers before digging.
C-14. (U) The following are the recommended methods for antivehicle ditch construction using organic
engineer equipment:
 (U) Two ACEs or two dozers as a team. In step 1 of figure C-3, Vehicle 1 will start the ditch,
push a load 9 to 10 meters from the start point, and then back up to start the cut again. In step 2,
Vehicle 2 will push the load away from the ditch to form a berm as Vehicle 1 is backing up. The
team continues performing in this manner to construct the ditch. This T-push method is suitable
for the construction of antivehicle ditches in all soil types.
 (U) One dozer, one scoop loader, and one grader as a team. This method is performed the
same as the previous method except that the loader is Vehicle 2 in figure C-3. The grader is
available to keep the berm straight and built up. After the ditch is constructed and if time
permits, the berm can then be further shaped. Normally, this method is less productive than the
first method. Again, the unit may employ more than one team to construct the ditch.
 (U) Two or more scrapers in tandem as a team. Using scrapers in tandem as a team is an
excellent method of antivehicle ditch construction. Some of the scrapers are used as pushers to
assist in loading. Each loaded scraper travels the full length of the antivehicle ditch and exits
toward the friendly side of the ditch to spread the load and form the berm. The unit can also use
a grader to shape and smooth the berm to reduce operator fatigue. This method uses only

horizontal construction assets and may free other blade assets such as ACEs, dozers, and bucket
loaders to perform other missions. (See figure C-4.)
 (U) Scrapers and ACEs or dozers in tandem as a team. This method uses scrapers as
earthmovers and usually requires a pusher (such as an ACE, dozer, or scraper) to assist loading
of the scrapers. As the pusher and scraper exit the ditch, the scraper turns toward the friendly
side to dump the load along the berm. The pusher turns to the enemy side and proceeds back to
the beginning of the ditch to push another scraper. This method produces excellent results but
requires training to reduce idle equipment time spent waiting for a pusher or a scraper. (See
figure C-4.)
Figure C-3. (U) Sample T-push method
Figure C-4. (U) Pusher and scraper dig team

Appendix C
CONSIDERATIONS (U)
C-15. (U) The basic production data of estimated construction times is shown in figure C-5 for a 1.5- by
3.3-meter ditch using the teams indicated. These production rates are based on field tests. No significant
differences exist between the construction of a triangular or a rectangular ditch. Valid test data does not
exist for equipment combinations other than those listed. Additionally, units may emplace phony
antivehicle ditches of shallow depth to deceive enemy reconnaissance. These are usually used as part of an
overall deceptive position. The following are additional considerations when conducting antivehicle
ditching operations:
 (U) Operator training. Operator training is an absolute must to obtain maximum production.
Units must determine production factors based on actual training data. Staff engineers adjust
these rates for a given mission based on the quantity and type of equipment available, the
maintenance status, soil and light conditions, and the condition of the operators. One blade team
should be able to dig about 100 meters of ditch in 3 hours. It is possible to use blade assets in
support of the countermobility effort early in an operation while the supported unit is not
prepared to initiate the survivability effort. However, it is a waste of effort to emplace a ditch
that was not sited as part of the EA development process.
 (U) Construction at night. Antivehicle ditching can be accomplished under blackout
conditions. However, production will not be as great, and certain precautions need to be taken.
Equipment operators need an object such as a flashlight with red lens to orient on and facilitate
the digging of a straight ditch. Also, night vision devices, if available, are excellent for operators
to use. Scraper operators particularly need to have a guide or light to lead them out of the ditch
and prevent turning out early and overturning. Night operations must be used to emplace the
number of antivehicle ditches that will probably be necessary. Commanders should recognize
this fact and train under conditions of darkness.
 (U) Construction using equipment and explosives. When encountering hard soils or rocky
ground to be excavated, rippers used to loosen and break the soil aid in excavation and are the
most economical. Should the rippers be unable to loosen the material for excavation, preblasting
or the use of demolitions could be employed using shaped cratering, line, or buried tamped
explosive charges to break up the ground. This technique will shatter the material enough to
make excavation easier and thereby raising production rates. An advantage to be considered is
that preblasting allows less powerful pieces of equipment, like the tractor/scraper, to dig ditches
out of previously hard material.
C-16. (U) Should the tactical situation dictate that dozers be used for other tasks, preblasting may make it
possible to excavate with scoop loaders. With dozers, preblasting may substantially increase production
rates and decrease downtime. Preblasting also decreases wear and tear on machines.
LOG OBSTACLES (U)

C-17. (U) There are many different types of log obstacles that can be constructed using local materials. Log
obstacles are most effective when the lack of a bypass causes the enemy to reduce them. Although they are
time and labor intensive and locations for their employment are limited, log obstacles do not require much
logistic support. Log obstacles can be constructed entirely by hand. The availability of chain saws and
bucket loaders or backhoes will significantly reduce construction time. Log obstacles can and should be
used in conjunction with other obstacles to increase their stopping power.
LOG HURDLES (U)

C-18. (U) Units construct log hurdles, as shown in TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, by
placing logs across a road and anchoring the logs to the ground. Log hurdles increase the effectiveness of
other obstacles by slowing enemy vehicles and making them more vulnerable to weapon fire. They are
constructed using logs greater than 25 centimeters in diameter. The size of the logs will dictate if the
hurdles should be constructed of single logs or multiple logs tied together. On level ground, log hurdles will
not stop tanks but will slow them down.

Legend:
ACE armored combat earthmover
Figure C-5. (U) Antivehicle ditch glide paths
LOG CRIBS (U)

C-19. (U) Log cribs, as shown in TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data, are point obstacles
constructed of logs and filled with earth. This obstacle is used effectively where standing timber is
available and where the obstacle cannot be readily bypassed. Unless substantially built, obstacles of this
type are not effective against heavy tracked vehicles. Units strengthen cribs by filling them with earth
excavated from the enemy side of the crib. Log hurdles in front of a log crib will force vehicles to reduce
speed and add to the effectiveness of the roadblock.
LOG POSTS (U)

C-20. (U) Log posts, as shown in Engineer Field Data, create a point obstacle constructed by burying log
posts in the ground, either vertically or at a slight angle toward the enemy. Posts are among the best
antivehicle obstacles because each post presents reduction problems to the attacker. There are no fast
methods of reducing a belt of posts. Normally, the attacker will try to bypass such an obstacle. Therefore,
post obstacles should be placed where bypass requires much time and effort. The effect of post-type
obstacles can be improved and the obstacles made more difficult to reduce by weaving spirals of barbed
wire among the posts. SCATMINEs can also be used to make the obstacle more difficult to reduce.

Appendix D
Obstacle Numbering, Reporting, and Recording (U)
(U) This appendix provides the details for numbering, reporting, and recording
obstacles. The obstacle numbering system is used to help facilitate the tracking of
friendly and enemy reinforcing obstacles. (See FM 3-34.210 for information on
marking, reporting, and recording explosive hazards.)
NUMBERING (U)
D-1. (U) When a reinforcing obstacle is planned or an existing one is discovered, it is given a tracking
number that provides basic information. This information may include country, unit, type of obstacle,
status, and location. The obstacle numbering system has two primary purposes:
 (U) To provide units a method of recording, organizing, and tracking emplaced and discovered
obstacles.
 (U) To provide a record of emplaced and discovered obstacles to follow-on units or
organizations for situational awareness or possible clearance.
D-2. (U) The obstacle numbering system applies to both friendly and enemy reinforcing obstacles. Once
emplaced or discovered, all obstacles have the same impact for reporting requirements and must be
accounted for and cleared once hostilities have ended. The tracking of enemy obstacles can facilitate
pattern analysis to predict possible mobility challenges as part of the predict on fundamental of assured
mobility described in ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations.
D-3. (U) The United States is a member of several military alliances, most notably the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. To achieve greater interoperability, the nations in these alliances have agreed to the
obstacle numbering system described in the bullets below and table D-1, page D-2. This obstacle
numbering system consists of 16 alphanumeric characters that are subdivided into six fields. The obstacle
number is designated by the headquarters that discovers it or authorizes its emplacement, and the obstacle
number provides the following information:
 (U) The country responsible for the initial placement.
 (U) The headquarters that authorized or discovered the emplaced obstacle.
 (U) The obstacle zone/belt/group.
 (U) The obstacle type.
 (U) The obstacle number.
 (U) The obstacle status.
D-4. (U) The two-letter code for the obstacle type shown in field D only provides a general description of
the type of obstacle. Specific details about the type of obstacle should be referenced in the individual
obstacle report; for example, an RAAM/ADAM minefield would only be indicated as SF. The delivery
means, mine type, and other details will be found in the obstacle report. (See table D-2, page D-2.)
D-5. (U) SCATMINEs will be given an S status in the F field once it reaches its self-destruct or self-
neutralizing time. This lets units know that a hazard still exists even though it may be greatly reduced. A
scatterable minefield will not be given a C status unless the area has been physically cleared.
D-6. (U) Units establish an SOP that details how they track obstacles and disseminate obstacle
information and intelligence. All reinforcing obstacles (whether enemy, friendly, or unknown) are tracked
using the same system.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 D-1

Appendix D
Table D-1. (U) Obstacle numbering system

A B C D E F
L L L L N N N L N L L L N N N L
Sample:
U S A D 0 5 5 A 1 C S V 0 0 1 P
Note. The letters L and N represent placeholders for letters and numbers, respectively. An asterisks (*) is
used to denote unknown or nonapplicable information.
Field Description
A three-letter identifier of the authorizing or discovering nation according to STANAG 1059.
A
Note. Use * for unknown.
B A one-letter code that distinguishes the unit type, followed by the three-digit unit designation
number for the authorizing or discovering headquarters. The unit type is as follows:
• B for brigade, battalion, or squadron.
• C for corps.
• D for division.
• M for Marine air-ground task force.
• R for regiment.
• * for unknown.
C A three-character alphanumeric that indicates the obstacle zone/belt/group.
D A two-letter code indicating the type of obstacle.
A unique, sequential, three-digit number within the area of operations, by obstacle type; for
E
example, 001 is the first obstacle of this type within this grid location.
A one-letter code that indicates the obstacle status—
• A for active.
• B for breached.
• C for cleared.
• E for emplaced, but inactive.
F
• I for in progress.
• P for planned.
• S for self-destructing and/or self-neutralizing.
• X for canceled.
• * for unknown.
Legend:
STANAG standardization agreement
Table D-2. (U) Obstacle type codes

M—Minefield
MC Chemical
MH Hasty protective
MN Nonstandard
MO Point
MP Protective
MQ Nuisance
MS Standard pattern
MU Dummy or decoy
D-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Table D-2. (U) Obstacle type codes (continued)

W—Wire Obstacle
WA Double-apron
WC Concertina
WF Tanglefoot
WG General-purpose, barbed tape
WN Nonstandard or unspecified
WR Roadblock
WT Triple standard
S—Scatterable Minefield
SF Area denial artillery munition/remote antiarmor mine
SG Gator
SM Modular Pack Mine System
SV Volcano
SW Scatterable mines (generic)
A—Miscellaneous
AB Abatis
AC Chemical by explosives
AD Antivehicle ditch
AF Thermobaric or flame
AH Log hurdle
AL Log crib or log obstacle
AM Movable obstacle (car, bus)
AN Expedient, nonstandard obstacle
AP Post obstacle (hedgehog, tetrahedron)
AR Rubble
AV Antivehicle
AW Earthwork (berms, parapets, dunes, pits)
T—Booby Traps
TA Booby-trapped area
TB Booby-trapped bodies
TE Booby-trapped equipment
TM Booby-trapped materiel
TP Booby-trapped passage or confined space
TS Booby-trapped structure
TV Booby-trapped vehicle
H—Hand-Emplaced Munitions
HC Claymore
HH Hornet or wide-area mine
HO Other
HS Spider
I—Improvised Explosive Devices
ID Directional, special-purpose explosive hazard
IO Omnidirectional, special-purpose explosive hazard
[Pending Date] ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 D-3

Appendix D
Table D-2. (U) Obstacle type codes (continued)

B—Bridge Demolition
BA Abutment
BC Abutment and span
BS Span
R—Road Crater
RD Deliberate
RH Hasty
RM Mined
U—Unexploded Explosive Ordnance
UC Chemical, unexploded explosive ordnance hazard
area
UH Unexploded explosive ordnance hazard area
UN Nuclear hazard area
REPORTING (U)
D-7. (U) The emplacing-unit commander submits obstacle reports through operations channels to the
G-3/S-3 of the owning headquarters. Information from obstacle reports is rapidly distributed as necessary to
ensure that friendly forces are not negatively impacted by emplaced or discovered obstacles. Information
from obstacle reports is integrated with other obstacle information and intelligence to help form the
mobility portion of the COP (real-time MCOO).
D-8. (U) The format and frequency of obstacle reports are stated in unit SOPs. Nonstandard reports are
listed in Annex R of the OPLAN or OPORD.
D-9. (U) Units submit the following reports for friendly reinforcing obstacles:
 (U) Report of intention.
 (U) Report of initiation.
 (U) Report of completion.
REPORT OF INTENTION (U)

D-10. (U) The requirement for a report of intention depends on the use of obstacle control measures. A
report of intention is unnecessary if the higher headquarters has designated obstacle control measures, since
the authorization to install obstacles within that area is already given. If an obstacle control measure is not
provided, then units must submit a report of intention before planning to emplace an obstacle. For
SCATMINEs, a scatterable minefield request (SCATMINEREQ) is used to request authority to plan
emplacement of a scatterable minefield. The SCATMINEREQ is submitted in enough time to allow it to be
staffed and approved or disapproved at the appropriate level. Once approved, the emplacing unit must still
receive release authority before emplacing the minefield. This is normally done by submitting a scatterable
minefield warning (SCATMINEWARN) before execution, typically about 30 minutes in advance, to allow
the higher commander to acknowledge and approve the release. Once the minefield is emplaced, a
SCATMINEREC is prepared and submitted to register the minefield.
D-11. (U) The report of intention doubles as a request when units initiate it at levels below emplacement
authority. The report includes the following:
 (U) Type of obstacle.
 (U) Obstacle target and effect.
 (U) Composition of the scatterable minefield or munition field to be emplaced.
 (U) Location of obstacle.
 (U) Description of how the obstacle will be marked, if applicable.
D-4 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

 (U) Proposed start and completion times.

 (U) Location and the width of lanes and gaps and how they will be marked.
REPORT OF INITIATION (U)

D-12. (U) A report of initiation is used by the emplacing unit to inform the owning unit that emplacement
has begun and that the area is no longer safe for friendly movement and maneuver. The report specifies the
time that emplacement began and identifies the location and target numbers of obstacles. For scatterable
minefields, a SCATMINEWARN is used to notify affected units that SCATMINEs will be emplaced. The
SCATMINEWARN report provides affected units with the necessary warning to plan and execute their
operations. Emplacing units send the report to the owning unit before they have emplaced mines. The
G-3/S-3 is responsible for ensuring dissemination of the report to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units
through operational channels. (A sample SCATMINEWARN format is shown in JP 3-15.)
REPORT OF COMPLETION (U)

D-13. (U) A report of completion is used by the emplacing unit to inform the owning unit that the obstacle
is complete and functional. If required, units follow a report of completion with a completed DA Form
1355-1 (shown in FM 3-34.210) or a scatterable minefield report and SCATMINEREC (shown in JP 3-15).
ADDITIONAL REPORTS (U)

D-14. (U) The following additional reports may be required:
 (U) Report of progress. While obstacles are being emplaced, the commander may require
periodic reports to monitor the status of work being completed.
 (U) Report of transfer. A commander transfers obstacle responsibility to another commander
with a report of transfer. Both commanders sign this report.
RECORDING (U)
D-15. (U) Obstacle recording is an electronic or written communication that documents the emplacement
and description of an obstacle. The commander specifies obstacle-recording responsibilities and procedures
in plans, orders, and SOPs, and ensures that they conform with higher authority. Although SCATMINEs
have a self-destruct capability, scatterable minefields are still recorded to facilitate the clearing of possible
unexploded explosive ordnance or duds. Since the exact location of each individual SCATMINE within a
scatterable minefield is unknown, safety zones are determined and recorded based on corner points or aim
points, depending on the emplacing system. Units use the SCATMINEREC shown in JP 3-15 to report and
record friendly scatterable minefields. Units use the DA Form 1355-1 shown in FM 3-34.210 to record
munition fields.
D-16. (U) Obstacle records contain pertinent information about individual obstacles to include such things
as—
 (U) Location of obstacle.
 (U) Type of obstacle.
 (U) Composition of the obstacle, to include the number and type of SCATMINEs or networked
munitions emplaced, if applicable.
 (U) Location and width of lanes and gaps, if applicable.
 (U) Description of any marking, if applicable.
[Pending Date] ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 D-5

Appendix E
Scatterable Mines and Mine Delivery Systems (FOUO)
(FOUO) This appendix consists of two sections. The first section describes all
SCATMINE systems currently used by U.S. forces. The second section is dedicated
to the air Volcano system.
SECTION I –SCATTERABLE MINES (FOUO)

E-1. (U) SCATMINEs offer commanders a means for rapidly responding to changes in the situation and
emplacing obstacles in areas beyond friendly lines, in contaminated areas, or in areas where it is physically
impossible based on terrain or time-distance limitations. They are also nonpersistent mines with variable
self-destruct times, which allow them to be emplaced in areas that will later be needed by friendly forces,
such as a counterattack axis or an objective. SCATMINEs may be air-, artillery-, or ground-delivered.
Because of their responsiveness, lethality, and depth at which they can be employed, they are a critical
asset for enabling assured mobility.
E-2. (U) If not positively controlled, these same characteristics can also negatively impact friendly
maneuver and cause fratricide. Inadequate control also prevents these limited, critical assets from being
used at the right place and at the right time to maximize their effectiveness. As with all obstacles, the
engineer staff is the primary staff integrator for scatterable minefields. Based on the concept of operations
and the desired obstacle intent, the engineer staff determines the minefield location, size, composition,
density, emplacement, and self-destruct times. With this information and a thorough understanding of the
available systems, the engineer staff officer then works closely with the appropriate staff members in
making recommendations to the commander on the type of SCATMINEs to employ and the means of
delivery.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS (U)

E-3. (U) Most U.S. SCATMINEs have similar characteristics. Arming mechanisms, arming times, and
self-destruct times of SCATMINEs differ based on the dispensing system. To be responsive and effective,
SCATMINE employment typically needs to be preplanned.
ANTIPERSONNEL MINES (FOUO)

E-4. (FOUO) There are two general categories of antipersonnel SCATMINEs—wedge-shaped and
cylindrical (see figure E-1, page E-2, and table E-1, page E-2):
 (FOUO) Wedge-shaped. The M67 and the M72 antipersonnel SCATMINEs are wedge-shaped
and dispensed from an ADAM projectile, which is a special 155-millimeter artillery munition.
 (FOUO) Cylindrical. The M74; bomb, live unit (BLU)-92/B; the M77; and the Volcano
antipersonnel SCATMINEs are cylindrical in shape. Cylindrical antipersonnel SCATMINEs kill
enemy personnel through the combined effects of blast and fragmentation. The charge detonates
upon actuation and shatters the metal casing of the mine to produce metal fragments. These
fragments are propelled upward and outward from the mine and produce lethal effects to a
distance of 15 meters. Each mine has eight trip wires (four on the top and four on the bottom)
that deploy after ground impact up to 12 meters from the mine. Trip wires are similar in
appearance to very fine thread. They are olive drab green in color and weighted at the free end.
A tension of 405 grams applied to one trip wire is enough to create a break in the electrical
circuit and cause the mine to detonate.
[Pending Date] ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 E-1

Appendix E
Legend:
cm centimeter(s)
Figure E-1. (FOUO) Antipersonnel SCATMINE
Table E-1. (FOUO) Characteristics of antipersonnel SCATMINEs
Number of Mines
Delivery System
Antidisturbance
Diameter/Width
Height/Length
Arming Time
self-destruct
Mine Weight
Explosive
Warhead
Percent
Weight
DODIC
Time
Fuze
Mine
45
155-mm Bounding 36 per
sec 21 g 6.7 5.9
M67 artillery D502 Trip wire fragmen- 20 4 hr 414 g M731
or 2 RDX cm cm
(ADAM) tation projectile
min
45
155-mm Bounding 36 per
sec 21 g 6.7 5.9
M72 artillery D501 Trip wire fragmen- 20 48 hr 414 g M692
or 2 RDX cm cm
(ADAM) tation projectile
min
1 per M87
canister
40 Trip wire Some 420 g for
155-mm Blast
to or anti- 24 hr or Com- 1.40 Volcano 6.6 12
M74 artillery K151 fragmen-
60 magnetic distur- longer position kg or 36 per cm cm
(ADAM) tation
sec influence bance B4 M731
projectile
for ADAM
E-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Table E-1. (FOUO) Characteristics of antipersonnel SCATMINEs (continued)
Number of Mines
Delivery System
Antidisturbance
Diameter/Width
Height/Length
Arming Time
self-destruct
Mine Weight
Explosive
Warhead
Percent
Weight
DODIC
Time
Fuze
Mine
408 g
U.S. Air K291 Blast 4 hr 22 per
BLU- 2 Com- 1.6 14.7 12
Force K292 Trip wire fragmen- 100 48 hr CBU-89/B
92/B min position kg cm cm
(Gator) K293 tation 15 day dispenser
B4
U.S. 408 g
Navy/ K133 Blast 4 hr 15 per
BLU- 2 Com- 1.6 14.7 12
Marine K295 Trip wire fragmen- 100 48 hr CBU-78/B
92/B min position kg cm cm
Corps K301 tation 15 day dispenser
(Gator) B4
4 hr (re- 540 g
Blast 4 per
2 cycle up Com- 1.44 12
M77 MOPMS K022 Trip wire fragmen- 0 M131 6 cm
min to 3 position kg cm
tation dispenser
times) B4
408 g
Blast 4 hr
Vol- Ground/ 4 Com- 1.6 1 per M87 6.6 12
K045 Trip wire fragmen- 0 48 hr
cano air min position kg canister cm cm
tation 15 day
B4
Legend:
BLU bomb, live unit
CBU cluster bomb unit
cm centimeter
DODIC Department of Defense identification code
g gram(s)
hr hour(s)
kg kilogram(s)
min minute(s)
mm millimeter(s)
MOPMS Modular Pack Mine System
RDX cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine
sec second(s)
U.S. United States
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 E-3

Appendix E
ANTIVEHICLE MINES (FOUO)

E-5. (FOUO) All antivehicle SCATMINEs have similar functional characteristics. (See figure E-2.) They
are cylindrical in shape and contain cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX) explosive as the main charge.
The characteristics of each antivehicle SCATMINE are summarized in table E-2.
Legend:
cm centimeter(s)
Figure E-2. (FOUO) Antivehicle SCATMINE
Table E-2. (FOUO) Characteristics of antivehicle SCATMINEs

self-destruct Time
Explosive Weight
Number of Mines
Delivery System
Antidisturbance
Diameter/Width
Height/Length
Arming Time
Mine Weight
Warhead
Percent
DODIC
Fuze
Mine
45
9 per
M70 155-mm sec Magnetically M-S 585 g 1.7 61 127
D509 20 4 hr M741
RAAM artillery or induced plate RDX kg mm mm
projectile
2 min
45 807 g
9 per
M73L 155-mm sec Magnetically M-S Com- 46.5 61 127
D503 20 48 hr M718
RAAM artillery or induced plate position kg mm mm
projectile
2 min A5
U.S. Air K291 4 hr 72 per
BLU- Magnetically M-S 594 g 1.9 6.6 14.7
Force K292 2 min NA 48 hr CBU-89/B
91/B induced plate RDX kg cm cm
(Gator) K293 15 day dispenser
U.S.
Navy/ K133 4 hr 45 per
BLU- Magnetically M-S 594 g 1.9 6.6 14.7
Marine K295 2 min NA 48 hr CBU-78/B
91/B induced plate RDX kg cm cm
Corps K301 15 day dispenser
(Gator)
4 hr
17 per
Magnetically M-S (recycle 585 g 1.7 66 121
M76 MOPMS K022 2 min NA M131
induced plate up to 3 RDX kg mm mm
dispenser
times)

Table E-2. (FOUO) Characteristics of antivehicle SCATMINEs (continued)
Delivery System
Antidisturbance
Diameter/Width
Height/Length
Arming Time
self-destruct
Mine Weight
Number of
Explosive
Warhead
Percent
Weight
DODIC
Mines
Time
Fuze
Mine
5 per M87
2 min 4 hr canister;
Volca- Ground/ Magnetically M-S 594 g 1.9 6.6 12.1
K045 30 NA 48 hr 6 per
no air induced plate RDX kg cm cm
sec 15 day M87A1
canister
Legend:
BLU bomb, live unit
cm centimeter(s)
DODIC Department of Defense identification code
g gram(s)
hr hour(s)
kg kilogram(s)
M-S Miznay-Schardin
min minute(s)
mm millimeter(s)
NA not applicable
sec second(s)
U.S. United States
E-6. (FOUO) Antivehicle SCATMINEs use a self-forging fragmentation or explosively formed penetrator
that is created on both sides of the mine so that it will successfully attack the target while lying on either
side to produce a full-width kill. In simple terms, a metal plate is formed into a high-velocity slug that
punches a hole in the belly of a vehicle. The effect produces a mobility kill against the engine, track, or
drive train of the vehicle; or it produces a catastrophic kill when the onboard ammunition is ignited and the
crew is killed or incapacitated or when the primary weapon system of the vehicle is destroyed. To function
effectively, the mine requires a certain standoff between the vehicle and the target. Mines must be nearly
perpendicular to the target. When activated solely by contact with the target vehicle wheels or tracks, the
mine usually causes a mobility kill because most of the energy is absorbed by the wheels or tracks.
E-7. (FOUO) The magnetic fuze is designed to detonate as the magnetic field changes over the mine. The
warhead is bidirectional, meaning that it can fire from the top or the bottom. Antihandling devices are built
into 20 percent of M70 and M73 mines. Although the Volcano, the M76, and the BLU-91/B mines do not
have antihandling devices, they have an inherent antihandling capability since they may detonate when
moved because the mine may sense a significant change from its original orientation.
E-8. (FOUO) Due to their small size, the reduced explosive, and the possibility of landing with an
improper orientation on their side or at an angle, an armored vehicle will not always be destroyed after
encountering an antivehicle SCATMINE. Further, the effectiveness of SCATMINEs in water obstacles is
reduced even more, because 5 centimeters of water interferes with the formation of the explosively formed
penetrator. Although the blast wave is accentuated by underwater placement, attacking hatches and covers,
mining banks and approaches are recommended instead.

Appendix E

E-9. (U) The paragraphs below describe employment considerations for SCATMINEs. These
considerations include—
 (U) Rapid emplacement.
 (U) Remote emplacement.
 (U) Flexibility.
 (U) Efficiency.
 (U) Extensive coordination, integration, and control.
 (U) Effects of terrain.
RAPID EMPLACEMENT (U)

E-10. (U) SCATMINEs can be rapidly emplaced to provide commanders with flexibility in responding to
sudden changes in the situation and to best exploit enemy vulnerabilities. The commander can use
SCATMINEs to maintain or regain the initiative by acting faster than the enemy.
REMOTE EMPLACEMENT (U)

E-11. (U) All artillery- and air-delivered SCATMINEs are remotely emplaced. This enables commanders
to emplace obstacles in locations where ground emplacement would be impossible or too hazardous.
Artillery-delivered is the safest method, but includes other trade-offs since it commits artillery that might
be firing other missions.
FLEXIBILITY (U)
E-12. (U) Given their widespread applications, SCATMINEs can fulfill many tactical requirements;
however, they are a limited resource. Upon expiration of the self-destruct time, the minefield no longer
poses a significant hazard and the commander can move through the area that was previously denied to
enemy or friendly forces. In many cases, the self-destruct period may be set at only a few hours. This
feature allows for effective counterattacks to the flank and rear areas of the enemy.
EFFICIENCY (U)
E-13. (U) SCATMINEs can be emplaced by a variety of delivery methods—fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters, artillery, man pack, or ground vehicles. They satisfy the high-mobility requirements of modern
warfare with less manpower, equipment, and tonnage that are needed for emplacing persistent minefields.
EXTENSIVE COORDINATION, INTEGRATION, AND CONTROL (U)

E-14. (U) Because SCATMINEs are a very dynamic weapon system, great care must be taken to ensure
that proper coordination is made with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. To prevent friendly
casualties, affected units must be notified of the location and duration of scatterable minefields.
E-15. (U) Artillery- and air-delivered SCATMINEs cannot be emplaced with the same accuracy as ground-
delivered SCATMINEs or hand-emplaced networked munitions. Remotely delivered SCATMINE systems
are only as accurate as conventional artillery-delivered or tactical aircraft-delivered munitions.
E-16. (U) Given their widespread applications, SCATMINEs can fulfill many tactical requirements;
however, they are limited resources. Target requests must be carefully evaluated and a priority system must
be established as part of the targeting process to ensure that SCATMINEs are used effectively. Controlled
supply rates will likely be a constraint in most operations.

EFFECTS OF TERRAIN (FOUO)

E-17. (FOUO) Between 5 and 15 percent of SCATMINEs will come to rest on their edges; mines with
spring fingers will be in the lower percentile. If there is mud or snow more than 10 centimeters deep, the
number will be in the higher percentile. When employing RAAM or ADAMs in more than 10 centimeters
of snow or mud, high-angle fire should be used and the number of mines increased. Antipersonnel mines
may be less effective in snow, because the deployment of trip wires is hindered. The melting of the snow
may also cause the mines to change positions and detonate.
E-18. (FOUO) Hard-surfaced areas (such as paved roads and rocky surfaces) can cause mines to bounce
and roll, making it difficult to achieve the desired mine density or probability of encounter. ADAM/RAAM
may not survive initial impact with a paved surface.
LIFE CYCLE (FOUO)

E-19. (FOUO) All U.S. SCATMINEs, once activated, have a limited active life that varies based on the
type of system and the self-destruct time that is selected. For safety reasons, SCATMINEs must receive
two arming signals at launch. One signal is usually physical (spin, acceleration, or unstacking), and the
other is electronic. This same electronic signal activates the self-destruct time of the mine.
E-20. (FOUO) Mines start their safe-separation countdown or arming time when they receive arming
signals. This allows the mines to come to rest after dispensing and allows the mine dispenser to exit the
area safely. Table E-1, page E-2, and table E-2, page E-4, show arming times for individual SCATMINEs.
E-21. (FOUO) Mines are armed after the arming-time expires. The first step in arming is a self-test to
ensure proper circuitry. About 0.5 percent of mines fail the self-test and self-destruct immediately. After
the self-test, mines remain active until they are detonated or their self-destruct time expires, whichever
occurs first. Mines actually self-destruct at 80 to 100 percent of their self-destruct time. The time period
from when the mines begin to self-destruct and when they finish is called the self-destruct window as
shown in table E-3. No mines should remain active after the self-destruct time has been reached. The
probability of a live mine existing past its self-destruct time is 1 in 10,000. Any mines found after the self-
destruct time must be treated as an unexploded explosive ordnance; for example, mines with a 4-hour self-
destruct time will actually start self-destructing at 3 hours and 12 minutes. When the 4-hour self-destruct
time is reached, no unexploded mines should exist.
Table E-3. (FOUO) Self-destruct windows
Self-Destruct Time Self-Destruct Window Begins
4 hours 3 hours 12 minutes
48 hours 38 hours 24 minutes
5 days 4 days
15 days 12 days
DENSITY (FOUO)
E-22. (FOUO) To create the desired obstacle effect, a minefield must contain a certain amount of mines
within a specific area. This ratio is referred to as minefield density. Minefield density is expressed as linear
or area. Linear density is expressed as the average number of mines per meter of minefield frontage. Area
density is expressed as the average number of mines per square meter. Area density is most commonly used
for SCATMINE systems. Since SCATMINE systems employ a preset combination of antivehicle and
antipersonnel mines, the area density includes both; for example, a scatterable minefield with an area
density of 0.006 mine per square meter may have an antivehicle density of 0.004 antivehicle mine per
square meter and an antipersonnel density of 0.002 antipersonnel mine per square meter. Due to the varying
dimensions of scatterable minefields that can be created by the

Appendix E
different employment device types, the exact density of a scatterable minefield cannot be determined.
However, an estimate of the average density can be determined by using the following formulas:
 (FOUO) Linear density equals the number of mines divided by the minefield front.
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠
= 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟)
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡
 (FOUO) Area density equals the number of mines divided by the minefield area.
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠
= 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟)
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 × 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
 (FOUO) Area density can be converted to linear density by multiplying the area density by the
minefield depth.
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟) × 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ = (𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟)
Note. (U) Converting area density to linear density is not always accurate due to the space
between the minefield strips.
Example. (FOUO)
𝐴 650 𝑏𝑦 200– 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 564 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 (432 𝐴𝑉 𝑎𝑛𝑑 132 𝐴𝑃)
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦: 564 ÷ (200 × 650) = 0.004 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝐴𝑉 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦: 432 ÷ (200 × 650) = 0.003 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝐴𝑃 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦: 132 ÷ (200 × 650) = 0.001 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦: 564 ÷ 650 = 0.87 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝐴𝑉 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦: 432 ÷ 650 = 0.67 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝐴𝑃 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦: 132 ÷ 650 = 0.2 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟
CONTROL (U)
E-23. (U) Controlling the employment of SCATMINEs can be challenging due to the coordination needed
to emplace them and because the physical boundary of a scatterable minefield is often not clearly defined.
These conditions require positive control to ensure that all friendly units know where SCATMINEs have
been emplaced and when they will self-destruct.
E-24. (FOUO) The maneuver unit that is responsible for the area of ground in which the minefield is
emplaced is also responsible for marking the minefield and other obstacles as necessary. This requires
direct coordination between elements of the maneuver unit, usually the engineer staff officer, and the
emplacing unit. Scatterable minefields are marked, as the tactical situation allows. (See Engineer Field
Data and FM 3-34.210 for methods of marking.) It is unrealistic to expect units to mark scatterable
minefields emplaced forward of the FLOT. For this reason, it is critical that coordination be conducted with
all units that may be affected by the employment of SCATMINEs. A SCATMINEWARN will be sent to
the affected units before the emplacement of the minefield. Units operating near these minefields must
know the calculated safety zones contained in SCATMINEWARNs and use extreme caution.
E-25. (FOUO) Commanders may choose to remove scatterable minefield markings once the self-destruct
time has expired; however, there is a chance that some mines will fail to self-destruct and will continue to
present a hazard until the area has been cleared. Commanders may decide to mark individual minefields in
an obstacle group or to mark the group as a whole. Depending on the size and location of the minefields,
either technique may have the advantage of using fewer resources or labor. Marking can be resource- and

labor-intensive and must be planned. A technique to maintain high obstacle productivity rates is to augment
emplacing units with additional manpower and equipment to assist in emplacing perimeter fences around
obstacles. The manner of marking should be standardized and placed within unit SOPs. (See table E-4 for
more information on marking scatterable minefields.)
Table E-4. (FOUO) Marking scatterable minefields
Minefield Location Marking
Enemy forward area Unmarked
Friendly forward area Sides and rear marked
Friendly support/rear area All sides marked
E-26. (U) The responsibilities for employing SCATMINEs are outlined in table E-5. The engineer staff
officer has primary staff responsibility for integrating the planning and employment of SCATMINEs and
works closely with other staff members. The chief of fires or FSO is involved in planning artillery-
delivered RAAM and ADAM, the air liaison officer is involved in planning Gator, and the aviation officer
is involved in planning air Volcano.
Table E-5. (U) Coordination responsibilities
Element Responsibilities
Engineer staff • Plan and coordinate the minefield location, size, composition, density, self-
officer destruct time, safety zone, and emplacement time with the appropriate staff
members.
• Track planned and emplaced scatterable minefields (including safety zones)
as part of the mobility portion of the COP.
Movement and
maneuver • Maintain the COP (input planned and emplaced scatterable minefields).
cell/maneuver • Designate the emplacing unit within plans and orders.
cell • Receive SCATMINERECs and disseminate information (SCATMINEWARN) to
higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
• Archive (or forward as directed) SCATMINE reports and records.
Fires cell • Calculate safety zones for air- and artillery-delivered scatterable minefields.
• Calculate Class V requirements for air- and artillery-delivered scatterable
minefields, and coordinate supply and distribution with the logistic staff officer.
Emplacing unit • Coordinate for the resupply of Class IV/V obstacle material to emplace (and
mark as required) scatterable minefields.
• Calculate the safety zone.
• Emplace the scatterable minefield.
• Report the amount of Class V supplies or material expended.
• Prepare and forward the scatterable minefield report and record to the
authorizing commander through appropriate channels.
Legend:
COP common operational picture
SCATMINE scatterable mine
SCATMINEREC scatterable minefield record
SCATMINEWARN scatterable minefield warning
SAFETY ZONES (FOUO)

E-27. (FOUO) A safety zone is an area where a stray or outlying mine has a chance of landing and lying to
rest. The commander must prevent friendly forces from maneuvering into the safety zone during the life

Appendix E
cycle of the minefield. Depending on its specific location on the battlefield, safety zone may be marked
with a fence.
FRAGMENT HAZARD ZONES (FOUO)

E-28. (FOUO) If an antivehicle mine that is oriented on its side self-destructs, the explosively formed
penetrator can theoretically travel 610 meters. This is the maximum fragment hazard zone; however, the
chances of being struck are negligible at this distance. Tests indicate that the acceptable risk distance is 235
meters from the outer edges of the safety zone of the minefield. This fragment hazard zone is also
associated with the Gator and MOPMS antivehicle mines. When the MOPMS is employed as a protective
obstacle, commanders must be made aware of the fragment hazard zone. Use table E-6 to determine safety
zones and fragment hazard zones.
Table E-6. (FOUO) Safety and fragment hazard zones
System Safety Zone Fragment Hazard Zone
500 to 1,500 meters from
235 meters from the outside
ADAM/RAAM aim points (depends on
dimensions of the safety zone
delivery factors)
Gator 925 by 475 meters 1,395 by 945 meters
235 meters from the start and
Ground Volcano 1,150 by 160 meters
stop points and the centerline
235 meters from the start and
Air Volcano 1,315 by 200 meters
stop points and the centerline
55 meters to the front and
235 meters from the outside
MOPMS sides and 20 meters to the
dimensions of the safety zone
rear of each container
Legend:
REMOTE ANTIARMOR MINES AND AREA DENIAL ARTILLERY

MUNITIONS (U)
E-29. (FOUO) The M741 (short-duration) and the M718 (long-duration) RAAM are artillery-delivered
antivehicle mines. Each RAAM round contains nine mines. The M741/M741A1 round contains M70
antivehicle mines with 4-hour self-destruct times, and the M718/M718A1 round contains M73 antivehicle
mines with 48-hour self-destruct times. The self-destruct times are preset during the manufacturing process
and cannot be changed. The RAAM mine uses a self-forging fragmentation warhead, has a magnetic-
influence fuze, weighs 1.7 kilograms, and has a small cylindrical shape that is 12 centimeters in diameter
by 6 centimeters in height.
E-30. (FOUO) RAAM and ADAM are delivered by a 155-millimeter howitzer. There are no special
modifications or adaptations necessary for the firing system. Mines are contained within a projectile and
are dispensed while the projectile is in the air. The maximum range for employing RAAM or ADAM
munitions is about 18,000 meters for the M109- or M777-series howitzers.
E-31. (FOUO) The M692 (long-duration) and the M731 (short-duration) ADAM projectiles deliver
antipersonnel mines with different self-destruct times. Each ADAM round contains 36 mines. The
M731/M731A1 round contains M72 antipersonnel mines with 4-hour self-destruct times and the
M692/M692A1 round contains M67 antipersonnel mines with 48-hour self-destruct times. Self-destruct
times are preset during the manufacturing process and cannot be changed.
E-32. (FOUO) The wedge-shaped ADAM is a bounding fragmentation mine that deploys up to seven
tension-activated trip wires 6 meters away from the mine. After ground impact, trip wires are released and

the mine is fully armed. The ADAM contains a metal-jacketed sphere that is filled with 21 grams of
Composition A5 as its main charge. A liquid-explosive propelling charge positions itself at the bottom of
the sphere after impact with the ground. When the mine is jarred or tilted or when one of its trip wires
receives a tension of at least 405 grams, the sphere propels upward 0.6 to 2.4 meters and detonates. The
lethal casualty radius is between 6 and 10 meters.
E-33. (FOUO) The new model RAAM and ADAM mines, designated by an A1 suffix, have a 45-second
arming time. The older models have a 2-minute arming time. The new model RAAM has a built-in feature
that defeats magnetic, signature-duplicating breaching devices.
EMPLOYMENT (U)
E-34. (U) The RAAM and ADAM systems were designed to provide a flexible, rapid-response mine
capability. These systems provide the maneuver commander with the capability to emplace mines directly
on top of, in front of, or behind enemy forces. This is one of their greatest advantages. Their responsiveness
allows the mission to be executed quickly and allows the commander to effectively influence a rapidly
changing battlefield. They also allow the commander to emplace minefields while maintaining maximum
standoff from the target. In short, their emplacement does not require committing any force, ground or air,
forward. RAAM and ADAM systems may be used in support of the defense or offense as follows:
 (U) Defense.
 (U) Develops targets for long-range, direct fire engagement.
 (U) Closes gaps and lanes in other obstacles.
 (U) Delays or disrupts attacking forces.
 (U) Denying the enemy unrestricted use of selected areas.
 (U) Disrupts movement and commitment of follow-on forces.
 (U) Disrupts and harassing enemy command and control, logistic (excluding medical), and
staging areas.
 (U) Reinforces existing obstacles or reconstructs reduced tactical obstacles.
 (U) Disrupts or delays gap crossings.
 (U) Offense.
 (U) Protects flanks along AAs.
 (U) Suppresses and disrupts enemy security elements once contact has been made.
 (U) Hinders the withdrawal of enemy forces.
 (U) Hinders the ability of the enemy to reinforce an objective area.
E-35. (FOUO) The time and the number of rounds required to install effective RAAM and ADAM limit
their use in support of other fire missions. Due to the large footprint created when the minefield is fired,
many mines will scatter outside the planned minefield area. It is necessary to plot the safety zone in order
to prevent fratricide. The fires cell is responsible for plotting the safety zone. The engineer staff officer
ensures that the safety zone is included for each planned and emplaced scatterable minefield and entered
into the mobility portion of the COP.
EMPLACEMENT (U)
E-36. (FOUO) RAAM and ADAM mining missions are requested through normal artillery support
channels using a SCATMINEREQ. Although the actual numbers vary based on the unit and the mission, a
typical basic load for an artillery battalion consists of about 24 RAAM (short self-destruct time) and 32
ADAM rounds per artillery piece.
Note. (FOUO) The rounds with long self-destruct times are normally used for preplanned targets
and are issued from an ammunition transfer holding point or ammunition supply point on a
mission-by-mission basis.

Appendix E
E-37. (U) Once the proper authorization has been received to employ the mines, requests for RAAM and
ADAM are processed in the same way as other requests for fire support, including targets of opportunity.
Enough time must be allocated for processing the request and completing the firing procedures. This
ensures that the enemy has not moved out of the target area before execution. The use of RAAM and
ADAM for preplanned fires requires close coordination among the G-3/S-3, the engineer staff officer, and
FSO. Coordination should also be made with the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 during the development of the
decision support template to identify the proper NAIs, TAIs, trigger points, and DPs.
E-38. (U) There are two critical aspects when emplacing RAAM and ADAM minefields. They are—
 (U) Designing the minefield to achieve the required effect.
 (U) Ensuring technical correctness of resourcing and delivering the minefield.
E-39. (U) The following discussion provides general guidance for designing the minefield to achieve the
desired effect and for determining the safety zone to assess the impact on maneuver. ATP 3-09.30 serves as
the primary source for technically resourcing and delivering artillery-delivered minefields.
E-40. (U) RAAM and ADAM minefields can be emplaced to achieve disrupt, fix, turn, and block effects
based on the obstacle employment principles. The engineer staff officer is responsible for deciding the
required location, the density, the size, the composition, and the duration of the minefield based on the
tactical-obstacle plan and the obstacle restrictions of the higher headquarters. The engineer staff officer
provides this information to the FSO.
E-41. (U) The FSO determines all the technical aspects for delivering the minefield, such as the number of
rounds required per aim point, the number of aim points required, the size of the safety zone, and the time
required to emplace the mines. There are a wide variety of factors involved in determining the number of
rounds, the size of the safety zone, and the emplacement time. These factors are the range-to-target time,
the battery-to-minefield angle, the high- or low-angle trajectory, and the method of firing (observer adjust
or meteorological data plus velocity error transfer). The FSO must tell the engineer staff officer whether the
minefield mission is feasible. Feasibility is based on the number of rounds available, the scheme of fires,
and the availability of cannons.
E-42. (U) The engineer staff officer is primarily concerned with two technical aspects of delivery provided
by the FSO: the safety zone and the emplacement time. The engineer staff officer uses the safety zone and
the minefield duration to assess the impact of the minefield on the scheme of movement and
maneuver/scheme of maneuver. The engineer staff officer depicts the safety zone on the obstacle overlay.
The engineer staff officer also uses the safety zone to identify requirements for minefield marking if the
unit leaves or turns over the area before the self-destruct time. The engineer staff officer and the FSO use
the emplacement time to synchronize the delivery of the minefield with the tactical plan.
GATOR (U)
E-43. (FOUO)The Gator has a longer range than any other SCATMINE system. It provides a means to
rapidly emplace minefields anywhere that can be reached by tactical aircraft. The Gator is produced in two
versions: the U.S. Air Force cluster bomb unit (CBU)-89/B system that contains 94 mines (72 antivehicle
and 22 antipersonnel) per dispenser and the U.S. Navy CBU-78/B system that contains 60 mines (45
antivehicle and 15 antipersonnel) per dispenser.
E-44. (FOUO) The mines used with the Gator are the BLU-91/B antivehicle mine and the BLU-92/B
antipersonnel mine. They are similar to the mines used with the Volcano system. The mines are capable of
three field-selectable self-destruct times: 4 hours, 48 hours, and 15 days. Both mine types are encased in a
plastic, square-shaped protective casing that is designed to aid dispersion and lessen ground impact upon
delivery.
E-45. (FOUO) The mines are contained inside tactical-munitions dispensers that are attached under the
wings of high-performance, fixed-wing aircraft. The tactical-munitions dispenser is a U.S. Air Force
dispenser that was designed for common use with cluster munitions. The tactical-munitions dispenser is
released in the air and allowed to fall free. Four linear charges along the edge of the tactical-munitions
dispenser cut the outer casing, and the mines are aerodynamically dispersed. The maximum delivery speed

is 800 knots at altitudes of 75 to 1,500 meters. The area of minefield coverage depends on the number of
munitions carried, the aircraft speed and altitude, and the altitude where the fuze functions and opens the
dispenser. The average area covered is about 200 by 650 meters.
EMPLOYMENT (U)
E-46. (U) Gator missions are primarily used at long range to disrupt, fix, turn, or block enemy forces
beyond the FSCL. The coordination for attacks beyond the FSCL is through the air tasking order, so
potential Gator missions must be identified as early as possible for nomination. Gator munitions are well
suited for placing minefields on specific concentrations of enemy forces, such as artillery, logistic, and
command and control, and supporting attacks on the enemy in depth beyond the range of conventional
artillery.
E-47. (U) Gator minefields are typically employed in conjunction with deep joint fires. They may also be
employed in conjunction with CAS and covered by close indirect and direct fire systems. Typical mining
missions include—
 (U) Isolating objectives.
 (U) Countering the positioning or repositioning of air defense artillery and artillery fires.
 (U) Denying terrain.
 (U) Disrupting and disorganizing support activities.
 (U) Inflicting personnel and equipment losses.
E-48. (U) The extended range of the Gator system, together with its speed and responsiveness, makes it one
of the most influential weapons systems for operations in depth. The primary limitations of the Gator are
the availability of high-performance aircraft to emplace the mines and the relative ineffectiveness of the
system on units in a column. During any conflict, aircraft will be in high demand and will not always be
immediately available for a Gator mission when required. The Gator is well suited to support contingency
operations and amphibious landing operations in an immature theater when there is less danger to friendly
forces or HN assets.
EMPLACEMENT (U)
E-49. (FOUO) As a fixed wing aircraft-delivered munition, Gator is a joint force air component
commander asset. Aircraft dropping Gator can support the joint force air component commander’s theater-
wide air interdiction mission or can operate in direct support of a ground commander within that
commander’s area of operations. Normally, Gator is used during air interdiction missions and is controlled
by the joint air operations center either outside ground areas of operations or beyond the FSCL. If ground
commanders require Gator inside their area of operations, the assigned tactical air control party will
coordinate for interdiction or conduct final control if Gator is dropped using CAS procedures. Missions
requiring Gator mines should be requested as early as possible (no later than 36 hours in advance). If
immediate Gator missions are a ground commander priority, the joint force air component commander can
place Gator sorties on air or ground alert. Normally, Gator missions are approved by the senior operational
ground force commander; however, Gator sorties can be distributed down to battalion level. The same
records and reports applicable to other SCATMINE systems are used with the Gator mine system. Close
cooperation and coordination among the G-3/S-3, the engineer staff officer, and the air liaison officer are
required for planning and executing Gator missions.
E-50. (FOUO) As with artillery-delivered minefields, the engineer staff officer is primarily responsible for
identifying the minefield location, size, orientation, duration, and density. Minefield density is varied by
changing the orientation of the minefield with respect to the target AA. Figure E-3, page E-14, shows how
minefield orientation is changed to achieve a fix or block effect. Normally, the Gator is employed as a fix
obstacle with a front of 650 meters. Emplacing a fix-obstacle group along a battalion AA (1,500 meters)
requires two Gator sorties, each delivering one minefield. Each Gator minefield would have a front of 650
meters and a depth of 200 meters. The minefields would be delivered at different locations so that the group
covers the entire AA and affects the entire enemy battalion.

Appendix E
Legend:
AP antipersonnel
AV antivehicle
m meter(s)
Figure E-3. (FOUO) Gator minefield
VOLCANO (U)
E-51. (U) The Volcano multiple-delivery mine system can be dispensed from the air or on the ground. It
can be mounted on any of the family of medium tactical vehicles, an M548 tracked cargo carrier, a heavy
expanded mobile tactical truck, a palletized load system flat rack, or UH-60 Black Hawk.
EMPLOYMENT (FOUO)
E-52. (FOUO) The primary mission of the Volcano is to provide friendly forces with the capability to
emplace large minefields rapidly under varied conditions. The average time to emplace one ground
Volcano load (160 canisters) is 10 minutes. The Volcano can be rapidly attached to air or ground vehicles.
It is used to emplace tactical obstacles; reinforce existing obstacles; close lanes, gaps, and defiles; protect
flanks; and deny probable enemy air defense, artillery, or other projected sites. Volcano minefields are
ideal for providing flank protection of advancing forces and for operating in concert with aviation and
ground units on flank guard or screen missions. The responsiveness of Volcano, more so for air Volcano,
also makes it ideal for disrupting mounted Level III threats to critical fixed sites such as base camps and
logistic sites. The Volcano-dispensing vehicle is vulnerable to direct and indirect fire and must be
protected, especially when employed close to, or forward of, the FLOT.
E-53. (FOUO) The Volcano uses modified Gator mines and consists of four components: the M87-series
mine canister, an M139 dispenser, the dispenser control unit (DCU), and the vehicle-specific mounting
hardware (the aircraft also requires a jettison kit).
M87-Series Mine Canister (FOUO)

E-54. (FOUO) The M87 mine canister is prepackaged with five antivehicle mines, one antipersonnel mine,
and a propulsion device inside a tube housing. The M87A1 mine canister is prepackaged with six

antivehicle mines and no antipersonnel mines. The mixture of mines is fixed and cannot be altered in the
field. The mines in each canister are electrically connected with a web that functions as a lateral dispersion
device as the mines exit the canister. Spring fingers mounted on each mine prevent it from coming to rest
on its edge. All canisters are capable of dispensing mines with 4-hour, 48-hour, and 15-day self-destruct
times. The self-destruct times are selected before dispensing and do not require a change or modification to
the mine canister. The arming times are 2 minutes 30 seconds for antivehicle mines and 4 minutes for
antipersonnel mines. The reload time for an experienced four-man crew is about 20 minutes, not including
movement time to the reload site.
M139 Dispenser (FOUO)

E-55. (FOUO) The M139 dispenser consists of an electronic DCU and four launcher racks. Four racks can
be mounted on a vehicle, and each rack can hold 40 M87-series mine canisters. The racks provide the
structural strength and mechanical support required for launch and provide the electrical interface between
the mine canisters and the DCU. Mounting hardware secures the racks to the vehicle or the aircraft.
Mounting hardware for the Black Hawk includes a jettison subassembly to propel the Volcano racks and
canisters away from the aircraft in the event of an emergency.
E-56. (FOUO) The operator uses the DCU to control the dispensing operation electronically from within
the carrier vehicle. The DCU provides controls for the arming sequence, the delivery speed, and the setting
of mine self-destruct times. The DCU allows the operator to start and stop mine-dispensing at anytime. A
counter on the DCU indicates the number of remaining canisters on each side of the carrier.
E-57. (FOUO) Mines are dispensed from their canisters by an explosive propelling charge. For ground
vehicles, the mines are dispensed 25 to 60 meters from the vehicle at ground speeds of 8 to 90 kilometers
per hour. For aircraft, mines are dispensed 35 to 70 meters from the line of flight. The aircraft flies at a
minimum altitude of 5 feet and speeds of 20 to 120 knots. It can deliver up to 960 mines per sortie.
EMPLACEMENT (FOUO)
E-58. (FOUO) Air and ground Volcano systems emplace a minefield with an average antivehicle linear
density of 0.72 mine per meter and an antipersonnel linear density of 0.14 mine per meter. These densities
may vary slightly since some mines will fail the arming sequence and self-destruct 2 to 4 minutes after
dispensing.
E-59. (FOUO) Additionally, some mines may not orient correctly, will not deliver their full mine effect,
and will not produce a catastrophic kill. The probability of failing the arming sequence and disorienting is
relatively small and does not appreciably degrade minefield lethality. For tracked vehicles, the antivehicle
density yields more than an 80 percent probability of encounter. Volcano antivehicle mines do not have
antihandling devices, but they are highly sensitive to any movement once they are armed. Any attempt to
remove the mines will likely result in detonation.
Site Layout (FOUO)

E-60. (FOUO) Site layout is basically the same for air and ground Volcano minefields. The start and end
points of the strip centerline are marked based on the minefield front and the number of strips. For a ground
Volcano minefield, guide markers are placed along the path of the centerline but are offset left to allow the
host vehicle to remain on the centerline. The number of guide markers used depends on the terrain and the
visibility. Guide markers are not required for an air Volcano minefield because the pilot of the emplacing
helicopter will use the start and end points of the centerline as reference points. If on-the-ground obstacle
siting is not possible based on the planned location, engineer and aviation planners must rely on reports
from information collection assets or geospatial intelligence to determine easily recognizable terrain
features or landmarks. These are used to identify start and end points and allow for precise placement.
Control points and markers for air Volcano are described in this appendix. When using a ground delivery
system, minefield marking must leave a gap along each centerline for vehicle entrance and exit.

Appendix E
Disrupt and Fix Volcano Minefields (FOUO)

E-61. (FOUO) Figure E-4 shows the emplacement pattern for standard disrupt and fix minefields using the
ground or air Volcano. Disrupt and fix minefields use only one centerline to give a minefield depth of
120 meters (ground) or 140 meters (air), not including the safety zone. The strip centerline is 277 meters
(ground) or 278 meters (air) long. The host vehicle moves toward the start point, achieving and maintaining
the ground or air speed selected on the DCU. The operator depresses the launch switch on the DCU when
the vehicle passes the start marker and stops dispensing mines when the vehicle passes the end marker. The
operator dispenses 40 canisters (20 on each side) along the centerline for a total of 200 antivehicle and 40
antipersonnel mines for one disrupt or fix minefield. One full load of ground or air Volcano emplaces four
disrupt or fix minefields. For ground emplacement, the vehicle moves out of the minefield, marks the exit,
and waits a minimum of 4 minutes before approaching the minefield. This delay allows faulty mines to
self-destruct.
Legend:
CL centerline
m meter(s)
Figure E-4. (FOUO) Ground or air Volcano disrupt and fix minefields
Turn and Block Volcano Minefields (FOUO)

E-62. (FOUO) Turn and block minefields shown in figure E-5 are emplaced using the same basic
procedures as those used for disrupt and fix minefields. However, turn and block minefields use two strip
centerlines along a front of 555 meters (ground) or 557 meters (air). During site layout, centerlines are
separated by at least 320 meters for both ground and air delivery. This gives a total minefield depth of 440
meters (ground) or 460 meters (air). The operator dispenses 80 canisters along each centerline (40 on each
side); therefore, turn and block minefields require a total Volcano load of 160 canisters (800 antivehicle
and 160 antipersonnel mines). One full load of ground or air Volcano employment will emplace one turn or
block minefield. when possible, two ground Volcanoes are employed simultaneously on turn and block
minefields. When only one ground delivery system is used, the crew must wait 4 minutes after dispensing
the first strip before dispensing the second strip. This allows mines that fail the arming sequence to self-
destruct. For air delivery, two sorties are also optimal; however, one aircraft can be used by making two
side-by-side passes.

Legend:
CL centerline
m meter(s)
Figure E-5. (FOUO) Ground or air Volcano turn and block minefields
MARKING (FOUO)
E-63. (FOUO) Air and ground Volcano minefield marking (fencing) is shown in figure E-6 and figure E-7,
page E-18. The limits of Volcano minefields are marked before emplacement if the situation allows. If the
mines have not self-destructed, the minefield is marked before the unit leaves the area or turns it over to
another unit. Minefield marking must include the safety zone, which is 40 meters from the start and end
points and 80 meters to the left and right of the centerline.
E-64. (FOUO) Fencing for ground Volcano minefields is emplaced 80 meters beyond the centerline of the
minefield and 40 meters from the start and stop points. (See figure E-6.) Fencing should be no closer than
20 meters from the nearest mine. Air Volcano minefields emplaced in enemy territory are not normally
marked by fencing; however, in friendly territory they are marked with fencing to protect friendly
personnel.
E-65. (FOUO) Fencing is installed before the minefield is emplaced, and it is located 100 meters from the
centerline of the minefield and 100 meters from the start and end points. (See figure E-7.) If marking and/or
fencing of minefields is not possible based on the tactical situation, and there is a presence of civilians,
commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate impacts on the local population.

Appendix E
Legend:
m meter(s)
Figure E-6. (FOUO) Fencing for a ground Volcano minefield
Legend:
CL centerline
m meter(s)
Figure E-7 (FOUO) Fencing for an air Volcano minefield

MODULAR PACK MINE SYSTEM (U)

E-66. (FOUO) MOPMS is a man-portable, 162-pound, suitcase-shaped mine dispenser that can be
emplaced anytime before dispensing mines. The dispenser contains 21 mines (17 antivehicle and 4
antipersonnel). The mines have leaf springs along their outer circumference that are designed to push the
mines into proper orientation if they land on their side.
E-67. (U) MOPMS may be employed as a tactical or protective obstacle. When employed as a protective
obstacle it is reported like any other protective obstacle; however, when employed as a tactical obstacle it is
reported as a scatterable minefield. Emplacement authority for MOPMS is usually granted to maneuver
company commanders and base camp commanders. Commanders at the higher levels restrict the use of
MOPMS only as necessary to support their operations.
E-68. (FOUO) Each dispenser contains seven tubes with three mines in each tube. When dispensed, an
explosive-propelling charge at the bottom of each tube expels mines through the container roof. Mines are
propelled 35 meters from the container in a 180° semicircle. The resulting density is 0.01 mines per square
meter. The safety zone around one container is 55 meters to the front and sides and 20 meters to the rear.
(See figure E-8.)
Legend:
M meter
Figure E-8. (FOUO) MOPMS emplacement and safety zone
E-69. (FOUO) Mines are dispensed on command using an M71 remote control unit (RCU) or an electronic
initiating device. Once mines are dispensed, they cannot be recovered or reused. If mines are not dispensed,
the container may be disarmed and recovered for later use.
E-70. (FOUO) The RCU can recycle the 4-hour self-destruct time of the mines three times, for a total
duration of about 13 hours. Mines with a 4-hour self-destruct time will begin to self-destruct at 3 hours and
12 minutes. All active mines must be recycled within 3 hours of the initial launch or last recycle. This
feature makes it possible to keep the minefield emplaced for longer periods, if necessary. The RCU can
also self-destruct mines on command, allowing a unit to counterattack or withdraw through the minefield,
as necessary, rather than waiting until the self-destruct time has expired. The RCU can control up to 15
MOPMS containers or groups of MOPMS containers from a distance of 300 to 1,000 meters via separate

Appendix E
pulse coded frequencies. Coded frequencies defeat threat electronic countermeasures that are directed
against the system.
E-71. (FOUO) If the M71 RCU is unavailable, a direct-wire link is used in conjunction with an M32, M34,
or M57 blasting machine. By using the M32 10-cap blasting machine, one MOPMS dispenser can be
detonated at a maximum range of 1,000 meters. The M34 50-cap blasting machine can detonate one
MOPMS at a maximum range of 3,000 meters. Due to internal resistance, the maximum range is decreased
by 400 meters for each additional MOPMS connected in a series. The M57 (claymore-type) firing device
can fire only one MOPMS at a maximum range of 100 meters. When controlled by direct wire, MOPMS
dispensers cannot be command-detonated, and the self-destruct time cannot be recycled with the RCU.
DANGER (FOUO)
(FOUO) The MOPMS dispenser has seven launch tubes. If all
seven tubes are not visible after deployment, mines are jammed
in the tubes. In this event, clear the area and notify explosive
ordnance disposal. The dispenser is considered to be unexploded
explosive ordnance; do not attempt to recover the dispenser.
Failure to comply could result in immediate personal injury or
damage to equipment.
EMPLOYMENT (U)
E-72. (FOUO) The MOPMS provides a self-contained, on-call minefield emplacement capability for all
forces. It can be command-detonated, reused if the mines are not dispensed, and directly emplaced to
provide complete and certain coverage of small or critical targets. The ability to command-detonate mines
or extend their self-destruct time provides an added flexibility not currently available with other
SCATMINE systems. With its unique characteristics, the MOPMS is ideally suited for the following
minefield missions:
 (U) Emplacing hasty protective minefields.
 (U) Emplacing deliberate protective minefields (cases emplaced, but mines not dispensed).
 (U) Emplacing nuisance minefields on trails, crossing sites, landing zones, drop zones, and road
junctions.
 (U) Emplacing tactical disrupt and fix minefields.
 (U) Closing gaps and lanes in existing minefields.
 (U) Closing counterattack routes temporarily.
 (U) Supporting ambushes.
 (U) Supporting operations in built-up areas and other close terrain.
E-73. (FOUO) When the MOPMS is used to close lanes, the container is positioned and dispensed by
personnel in an overwatch position from a safe standoff. The MOPMS is ideally suited for creating a small
disrupt obstacle in support of engineers executing a reserved demolition target. Engineers prepare the
reserved target for demolition and emplace several MOPMS units on the enemy side, just out of target
range. When the last forward element passes through the target, the firing party detonates the charges. If
something goes wrong or the firing party needs more time, MOPMS mines can be dispensed to disrupt the
enemy before it reaches the target.
E-74. (FOUO) The MOPMS provides light and special forces with a versatile, compact system for
emplacing nuisance minefields. It can be used in a variety of operations and environments. MOPMS cannot
be transported long distances by hand because of its weight, so its use is limited.

EMPLACEMENT (U)
E-75. (FOUO) MOPMS dispensers are issued as standard Class V munitions and are drawn from an
ammunition transfer holding point or ammunition supply point on a mission-by-mission basis. RCUs are an
organizational issue of equipment to engineer and maneuver units. Due to the weight of the system, it is
transported by vehicle, as close as possible to the emplacement site, where it can easily be hand-emplaced
by four individuals using the four foldout carrying handles.
E-76. (U) To ensure that the minefield will be dispensed in the proper location, the container should be
carefully sited by the unit leader. Several containers can be used together to provide a greater area of
coverage or a higher mine density. If mines are not dispensed immediately, containers should be
camouflaged and, if possible, buried. When placed in sand or snow, brace the containers to prevent them
from moving during mine dispensing. Designate a firing point that gives the operator clear observation of
the area to be mined. Firing systems must be inspected according to MOPMS operating instructions. If
mines are dispensed immediately, remove empty containers, when possible, to avoid revealing the
minefield location.
E-77. (FOUO) The MOPMS can be employed to emplace disrupt and fix tactical minefields. Emplacement
procedures are the same as for protective minefields above. However, MOPMS containers are arranged in a
specific pattern to achieve the necessary depth, front, and density. Once the minefield is marked, including
the safety zone, MOPMS containers are arranged as shown in figure E-9 for a disrupt minefield. The safety
zone is 55 meters from the front and sides and 20 meters from the rear of the container. The disrupt
minefield uses four MOPMS containers spaced 70 meters apart to give a minefield front of 280 meters.
Other MOPMS containers are offset from the baseline by 35 meters to give the minefield a depth of
70 meters. All containers are fired using the same RCU or firing device.
Four MOPMS are required
Legend:
m meter(s)
Figure E-9. (FOUO) MOPMS in a disrupt minefield
E-78. (FOUO) Figure E-10, page E-22, shows the arrangement of MOPMS containers for a fix minefield.
The basic layout is the same as the disrupt minefield; however, the fix minefield has one additional
MOPMS placed 70 meters forward of the baseline to act as an irregular outer edge. This gives the same
280-meter minefield front but increases the minefield depth to 115 meters. MOPMS can be used to
construct turn and block tactical minefields using the obstacle employment principles; however, turn and
block minefields require more containers than are normally available to a unit.

Appendix E
Legend:
m meter(s)
Figure E-10. (FOUO) MOPMS in a fix minefield
SECTION II – AIR VOLCANO (U)

E-79. (U) Although mine emplacement is not as precise as ground systems, air Volcano minefields can be
emplaced more accurately and avoid some of the danger inherent in minefields delivered by artillery or jet
aircraft. Employing the air Volcano does potentially incur added risk because the helicopter is extremely
vulnerable while flying at the steady altitude, speed, and path required to emplace the minefield.
CAPABILITIES (U)
E-80. (FOUO) The total weight of the air Volcano system is 1,517 pounds (empty) or 6,413 pounds
(loaded). An aircraft will typically be close to its maximum gross weight when it contains the Volcano
system and a full crew. Based on weather and environmental conditions, the aircraft may be required to
execute the mission without a full fuel load, thus reducing en route time. The emplacing aircraft can
maintain a speed of 80 to 90 knots for 90 to 120 kilometers, depending on the wind and the temperature.
(See table E-7.)
Table E-7. (FOUO) Air Volcano capabilities and limitations
Planning
Cruise Fuel Maximum
Combat
Pressure Maximum Speed Burn Endurance Range
Temperature Radius
Altitude Weight (knots/ Rate (hour + (nautical
(°C) (nautical
(feet) (pounds)1 kilometers (pounds minutes)2 miles/
miles/
per hour) per hour) kilometers)3
kilometers)4
80/148 966 1 + 57 154/285
+20 22,000 90/166 1,040 1 + 48 160/296 60/111
100/182 1,145 1 + 35 158/292
0
80/148 975 1 + 56 156/289
+30 22,000 90/166 1,045 1 + 48 160/296 59/109
100/182 1,160 1 + 34 156/289

Table E-7. (FOUO) Air Volcano capabilities and limitations (continued)

Planning
Cruise Maximum
Fuel Burn Combat
Pressure Maximum Speed Endurance Range
Temperature Rate Radius
Altitude Weight (knots/ (hour + (nautical
(° Celsius) (pounds (nautical
(feet) (pounds)1 kilometers minutes)2 miles/
per hour) miles/
per hour) kilometers)3
kilometers)4
80/148 995 1 + 53 150/277
0 +40 21,600 90/166 1,055 1 + 45 156/289 58/107
100/1,825 1,175 1 + 33 154/285
80/148 960 1 + 58 157/290
+20 22,000 90/166 1,060 1 + 45 157/290 60/111
100/182 1,155 1 + 35 158/292
80/148 1,000 1 + 28 117/217
2,000 +30 21,000 90/166 1,045 1 + 23 124/229 45/83
100/1,825 1,175 1 + 12 120/222
80/148 1,005 1 + 21 28/52
+40 20,000 90/1,665 1,075 1 + 19 29/53 7/13
100/1,825 1,150 1 + 16 27/49
Note. This is based on a UH-60 with an aircraft torque factor of 97.5 foot pounds.
1
This is the maximum weight for deep operations only; no interdiction capability.
2
The endurance includes a 20-minute fuel reserve.
3
This does not compensate for winds. This is the maximum range line-of-sight distance.
4
These are the general planning figures used for time-on-target missions and include compensation for 10-knot
winds; makeup for lost time; and a 5-minute, on-station time.
5
Operation at this air speed may be limited to 30 minutes due to target limits.
The following are limitations:
• The flight crew cannot operate the door gun with the air Volcano system installed.
• Aircraft cannot be flown with full tanks above 30°C and 2,000-foot-pressure altitudes.
• Aircraft may require a rolling takeoff and landing, depending on ambient weather conditions.
Legend:
UH utility helicopter
E-81. (FOUO) Two air Volcano aircraft should be used, one primary and one backup. The requirement for
security aircraft depends on the mission variables, but security should be used whenever possible.
EMPLOYMENT (U)
E-82. (U) Employing the air Volcano is part of a combined arms operation. Success relies on trained
aircrew supported by early, detailed planning and mission coordination.
RESPONSIBILITIES (U)
E-83. (U) The responsibilities for planning division level air Volcano missions are shown in table E-8, page
E-24.
Planning and Preparation (U)

E-84. (FOUO) Whereas ground Volcano is organic to some Army combat engineer units in the echelon
above the BCT, air Volcano relies on aviation assets for emplacement and requires additional coordination
and control measures. The same general considerations that apply to air assault operations and air

Appendix E
movements also apply to air Volcano missions. Air Volcano planning is similar to that for a team insertion
or small air assault using the reverse planning sequence. The resulting OPORD must contain defined
triggers based on friendly events or enemy actions. (See ATTP 3-18.12 for information on air assault
operations and FM 3-04.113 for information on air movements.)
Table E-8. (U) Air Volcano responsibilities
Position Responsibilities
• Approve air Volcano employment (requests from brigades/regiments) and
Division integrating it within the concept of operations. The division commander may
commander delegate air Volcano approval authority to brigade/regimental commanders.
• Plan and integrating the employment of air Volcano to support the concept
of operations.
• Collate and coordinate air Volcano requests from subordinate units.
• Determine minefield specifications.
• Enter planned and emplaced air Volcano minefields, including safety zones,
Division engineer
into the division obstacle overlay as part of the mobility portion of the COP.
staff officer
• Estimate requirements for mine canisters and coordinating them through
the logistic staff officer.
• Coordinate with the G-3 for the dissemination of SCATMINEWARN to
adjacent and subordinate units before the minefield is emplaced and 1 hour
before the self-destruct sequence of the minefield is initiated.
• Recommend approval for target nominations developed by the division
targeting working group.
• Submit division-approved air Volcano target nominations to the operations
Chief of fires
staff officer.
• Coordinate SEAD, CAS, close combat attack, and electronic attack in
support of division-directed air Volcano missions.
• Coordinate with the aviation staff officer or aviation brigade liaison officer to
determine the feasibility or constraints of executing nominated air Volcano
Operations staff missions.
officer • Synchronize and coordinating airspace for air Volcano missions.
• Submit requests for airspace coordinating measures to higher headquarters
along with the division-approved target list.
• Mount and loading (and reloading) the air Volcano system.
• Coordinate forward arming and refueling points to support air Volcano
missions.
• Prepare and submit SCATMINEWARNs.
• Submit minefield emplacement data (dispensing time, start and end point
Emplacing unit coordinates, and canisters fired) to the division engineer staff officer for
completion of SCATMINE reports.
• Coordinate air routes and corridors.
• Request SEAD and security escort aircraft.
• Conduct team and crew mission briefs.
Legend:
CAS close air support
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

Air Volcano Requests (U)

E-85. (U) The division engineer staff officer develops and coordinates air Volcano missions and integrates
them into the concept of operations through the planning and targeting processes. Requests or nominations
from brigades/regiments are collated by the engineer staff officer and coordinated with the staff or the
target working group. Ideally, air Volcano requests should be submitted 96 hours before the desired
emplacement time. (See table E-9.)
E-86. (U) During planning, the—
 (U) Staff or targeting working group validates the targets based on the situation template and
recommends approval to the commander.
 (U) Chief of fires, upon approval, turns the target numbers and the air requirements over to the
G-3 air, who adds the targets to the request for airspace coordinating measures.
 (U) Chief of fires plans and coordinates the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and CAS
requirements.
 (U) G-3 issues a warning order to the emplacing unit so that it can be prepared to execute the air
Volcano mission.
 (U) Division issues a fragmentary order to direct the execution of the air Volcano mission.
Table E-9. (FOUO) Timeline for executing an air Volcano mission (H-hour sequence)
Time Tasks
• Identify requirements or receive requests for air Volcano minefields.
• Analyze the situation (the decide component of decide, detect, deliver, and assess
methodology).
• Determine the obstacle intent (target, effect, relative location).
H-96+00 • Determine system and aircraft availability.
• Determine threat and proposed ingress and egress routes.
• Submit CAS or SEAD requests for enemy air defense artillery sites along ingress
and egress routes.
• Develop the plan and integrate within the concept of operations.
• Issue a warning order to the emplacing unit.
• Conduct an air mission coordination meeting.
• Conduct an intelligence update on the enemy situation, and pass down to the
executing unit.
H-72+00
• Submit additions or changes to the CAS or SEAD request to the fires cell for the
enemy air defense artillery sites.
• Post the air Volcano mission in the airspace control order.
• Disseminate the scatterable minefield warning.
• Mount the system. The system takes 3 to 4 hours with a crew of three on a hard
H-48+00 surface. The time is doubled in a field environment and requires three or four
personnel to assist in loading.
• Conduct detailed mission analysis/problem framing and planning. Issue a warning
order to the attack assets. Include in the warning order the—
 Suspense time for mission planning and upload completion.
 Time and location of the air mission brief.
H-24+00  Minefield location and type.
 Establishment of the command and support relationship.
 Face-to-face coordination with the attack assets.
 Identity of liaison officers planning multiple routes to the minefield.

Appendix E
Table E-9. (FOUO) Timeline for executing an air Volcano mission (H-hour sequence)
(continued)
Time Tasks
 Identity of liaison officers coordinating with engineer and air defense elements
H-24+00 and the fires cell for support. (Volcano resupply and other logistic support is
(continued) coordinated with the logistic staff officer.)
 Intelligence update.
H-20+00 • Integrate the Volcano into aviation brigade execution matrix.
• Confirm the factors to be evaluated during the air Volcano condition check.
Factors to consider include—
 Weather.
 Threat suppression along the route.
 Attack support.
 FLOT crossing coordination completion.
 FLOT initial crossing point.
 SEAD fire coordination.
H-8+00  Mines available.
 Integration into execution matrix.
 Crews updated on the air defense artillery threat.
 Backup system and aircraft available.
 CAS coordination.
 Rehearsal completion with attack assets.
 Intelligence update.
 Close-operation mission, including the location of friendly forces and the type
of marking and when it will be in place.
• Conduct an air mission brief.
H-6+00
• Conduct rehearsal after the brief.
• Link up of aviation assets. Fly to the forward-area refueling point or tactical
assembly area for mine upload. Remember that—
 Loading canisters takes 1 to 3 hours with a crew of four to eight. Time varies
H-4+00 greatly based on whether or not the canisters are in shipping containers.
 The loading time in a field environment is decreased if one pad is dedicated to
air Volcano aircraft loading and arming.
H-0+30* • Cross the FLOT. Include in the aircraft report the—
(*estimate  SEAD fired.
depends on  CAS sorties.
flight time)
• Emplace minefield, submit minefield reports, and enter the self-destruct time and
H-hour safety zone into the friendly reinforcing obstacle database and display on the
combined obstacle overlay.
Legend:
FLOT forward line of own troops
Logistic Requirements (U)

E-87. (U) The engineer staff officer calculates Class IV/V requirements, verifies quantities of those
materials on hand, and submits requests to the G-4/S-4 to fulfill any shortfalls. Volcano munitions are
transported and handled in the same manner as other Class V mines and explosives. The engineer staff
officer, the aviation officer, the G-3/S-3, and other staff members as required, coordinate the location where

the emplacing aircraft will be loaded and fueled. The aviation officer provides the amount of flight time
available and the fuel required, and is prepared to discuss emplacement times based on Volcano locations.
The details of the logistic plan are completed during an air mission coordination meeting. (See ATP 3-
04.94 for more information on Volcano arming operations.)
Integration Within the Concept of Operations (U)

E-88. (U) The engineer, aviation, and FSOs work together with the G-3/S-3 to incorporate the obstacle
employment principles to ensure the air Volcano mission is integrated into the schemes of movement and
maneuver/maneuver and fires. If the air Volcano is being employed as a situational obstacle, the triggers
and DPs and the supporting information collection tasks should be addressed in air mission coordination
meeting.
E-89. (U) Attack aviation assets, indirect fires, and electronic attack assets are methods of providing
security for air Volcano missions since the target area may be in the direct line of sight of the enemy
formation. Security may require SEAD missions to get the air Volcano aircraft across the FLOT when
traveling both to and from the target location. All air Volcano missions require planning, designation, and
control during the execution of air corridors or routes. The air Volcano aircraft may be employed
individually or with security or escort aircraft. The use of attack helicopter-64 or observation helicopter-
58D as security aircraft allows units to develop the situation and helps place minefields in the proper
location to assist inbound attack aircraft or fires. If the air Volcano aircraft is not provided security aircraft,
ground forces may have to assist with indirect fires or other assets to provide covering fires. The fires cell
coordinates and executes fires in support of air Volcano missions. The chief of fires, the engineer staff
officer, and the G-3 air coordinate to ensure that the airspace control order supports the mission and the
planned SEAD fires.
Method of Control (FOUO)

E-90. (U) The positive control of an air Volcano mission requires detailed coordination and a redundancy
of control techniques to minimize errors in minefield size and location. The method of control used during
emplacement must compensate for poor visibility, wind speed and direction, and navigational errors. Units
use the following control techniques and include them as part of flight planning and preflight to ensure the
emplaced minefield meets the specifications developed during planning:
 (U) Visual identification. This control technique focuses on the visual identification of
minefield emplacement. As part of the preparation for an air Volcano minefield, an engineer
element erects airfield panel markers to mark start and end points. This provides a visual signal
for the engineer and the air mission commander to start and stop firing Volcano canisters. The
pilot depresses the launch switch over the first marker to start firing and depresses it again over
the second marker to stop firing. This control technique is good for open terrain with adequate
visibility and little canopy coverage.
 (U) Azimuth/time lapse. This control technique focuses on when to start and stop firing
Volcano canisters while flying at a predetermined speed along a particular azimuth from a
known start point. The air speed of the UH-60 and the type of minefield determines the amount
of time it takes to emplace a minefield. The air Volcano has six air speed settings: 20, 30, 40, 55,
80, and 120 knots.
 (FOUO) Azimuth/canisters fired. This control technique focuses on tracking and stopping the
number of mine canisters being fired from the start point along a predetermined azimuth. A
digital readout on the DCU (for the left and right side) shows the number of canisters remaining.
The pilot stops firing when the required number of canisters has been fired. Using the disrupt-
minefield example shown in figure E-4, page E-16, the UH-60 starts the mission with a full load
(80 canisters on each side of the aircraft). The pilot initiates (depresses the launch switch) at the
identification of the Volcano start marker or the grid location on the ground. The pilot depresses
the launch switch a second time after 20 canisters have been expended on each side. The DCU
counts down from the total number of canisters. When the DCU displays 60 right/60 left, the

Appendix E
pilot depresses the launch switch to end the firing process. Ideally, the timing of delivery and the
number of canisters fired are done simultaneously. As the crew chief counts
down the timer, the pilot and the crew chief monitor the number of canisters remaining on the
DCU digital readout.
 (U) Doppler/Global Positioning System (GPS). This control technique, which is the most
accurate, focuses on when to start and stop firing Volcano canisters using the aircraft navigation
system. This set provides the present position or destination in latitude and longitude (degrees
and minutes) or grid coordinates. As part of the preparation for the Volcano minefield, eight-
digit grid coordinates are needed to determine the approach points and the limits of the
minefield. These coordinates are provided to the air mission commander during the air mission
brief. The pilot enters the grid coordinates into the Doppler or GPS on the primary and the
backup aircraft. During execution, the air mission commander monitors the Doppler or GPS and
determines the time to the target, when to initiate firing, and when to terminate firing. This
technique is particularly useful in desert or flat featureless terrain where map
navigation/confirmation is ineffective.
Control Points and Markers (U)

E-91. (U) Engineer and aviation planners work together to develop the necessary control points and
markers needed for emplacing air Volcano minefields. This includes the following:
 (U) Initial point is an easily identifiable terrain feature used to direct the emplacing helicopter to
the planned minefield location.
 (U) Approach markers allow the aircraft to set the altitude, the speed, and the final orientation to
the minefield. The approach marker can also be a terrain feature.
 (U) Start and end points should be marked with man-made devices, such as VS-17 panels.
During limited visibility, start and end points should be marked with infrared at night and visible
strobe during day. Prominent terrain features and landmarks should still be used to identify start
and end points.
Air Mission Coordination Meeting (U)

E-92. (U) The purpose of the air mission coordination meeting is to complete coordination between the
headquarters directing the emplacement of the air Volcano minefield and the aviation unit emplacing it.
The air mission coordination meeting is a critical event in synchronizing obstacle emplacement. It is an
operations officer level meeting involving key staff members that follows the development of the ground
tactical plan. The end result of the air mission coordination meeting is a finalized air movement plan,
upload site, air routes, and detailed obstacle emplacement information. (See ATTP 3-18.12 and FM
3-04.113 for more information on conducting the air mission coordination meeting.)
Air Mission Brief (U)

E-93. (U) An air mission brief refers to the written product and the briefing. (See FM 3-04.113 for details
on the air mission brief format). The air mission brief is an adjunct to the division or BCT/RCT OPORD
and is typically published as an appendix to the operations annex. On receipt of the division warning order,
the emplacing unit begins planning and aircraft preparation. Aircrews, with staff assistance, plan routes,
SEAD, en route fire support, attack reconnaissance aircraft security, CAS, and airspace deconfliction.
E-94. (U) The air mission brief is the last coordination meeting of the key participants in the air Volcano
mission. It occurs no later than H-6 in the operational timeline. In addition to the briefing format and

content detailed in FM 3-04.113, it should include the following information that is specific to air Volcano
missions:
 (U) Method of control for minefield emplacement—visual identification, azimuth/time lapse,
azimuth/canisters fired, and Doppler/GPS.
 (U) Location and details of the air Volcano Class IV/V supply point.
 (U) Description of approach markers and markings for start and end points.
EXECUTION (U)
E-95. (U) Execution of an air Volcano mission includes loading and arming, and emplacing.
Considerations for each are identified below.
Loading (FOUO)
E-96. (FOUO) When loading the Volcano mine system, the launcher rack functions as the carrier and
launcher platform for 40 mine canisters. The rack has 40 keyholes for mine canisters, a green latch that
latches the mine canister to the rack, and a red latch that arms the mine canisters. The rack has two
electrical receptacles—one for the connector and one for the launcher rack cable from the DCU. While
looking at the canister side of the rack, rows are 1 through 4 from bottom to top and columns are 1 through
10 from left to right.
E-97. (FOUO) The site used for loading the Volcano aircraft should be a large, open area that is clear of
obstacles. Because fully loaded Volcano aircraft approach maximum gross weight, the site should have a
hard surface. If a hard surface is unavailable, inspect the ground to ensure that it is firm enough to support
the weight of the aircraft. Perforated steel planking or two pieces of 1-inch plywood (4 by 4 feet) may be
used as a field-expedient surface in soft areas. Concentrations of nonessential personnel or frequently
traveled vehicular routes should not be within 1,000 meters of the site. This distance is based on the total
weight of explosives and the safe fragmentation distance and is found in FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L,
Explosives and Demolitions. When using the M88 training canisters, the minimum distance is 30 meters.
Two fire extinguishers and a grounding rod must be available at the arming point. This equipment is
provided by personnel who deliver the mines. All personnel involved in the arming will receive a safety
brief that includes—
 (U) Ammunition handling and inspection procedures.
 (U) Loading procedures.
 (U) Emergency procedures and rendezvous points.
Arming (FOUO)
E-98. (FOUO) During the arming of the Volcano mine system, the following emergency procedures should
be followed:
 (FOUO) Fire. In the event of a fire away from the mines, attempt to contain or extinguish the
fire by any available means. If the fire is near the mines or in them, clear the area to a minimum
distance of 1,000 meters and notify firefighting personnel immediately.
Note. (U) When using M88 training canisters, clear the area to a minimum distance of 30 meters.
 (FOUO) Accidental discharge. If there is an accidental discharge, immediately clear the area to
a distance of 610 meters and notify explosive ordnance disposal. The mines arm about
2 1/2 minutes after firing. When using M88 training canisters, terminate arming until the
problem can be identified and corrected.
 (FOUO) Failure to fire. If it fails to fire, remove the canister from the aircraft, place it in the
dud pit, and notify explosive ordnance disposal immediately.

Appendix E
Note. (U) When using M88 training canisters, remove the canister from the aircraft, separate it
from the other canisters, repack it, and return it to the ammunition supply point.
E-99. (FOUO) When performing a site layout, berming of the site is not required for a tactical arming
point. (See figure E-11). The following rules apply when the site is located next to a refueling point:
 (FOUO) A minimum of 1,000 meters must exist between arming points and refueling points
when the total quantity of explosives is less than 600 kilograms. For quantities greater than 600
kilograms, see FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions.
Note. (FOUO) Each M87 canister contains 3.4 kilograms of explosives; a full load (160
canisters) contains 550 kilograms of explosives.
 (FOUO) The refueling point for armed aircraft must be located at least 375 meters from other
aircraft refueling points.
 (FOUO) Parked, armed aircraft must be at least 36 meters from other armed aircraft to prevent
the detonation of explosives on adjacent aircraft. This distance will not prevent damage to
adjacent aircraft; a 130-meter distance is required to prevent damage by fragments and to ensure
that the aircraft remains operational.
 (FOUO) A dud pit (bermed when possible) for damaged or misfired ammunition should be
established beyond the ammunition points.
Figure E-11. (FOUO) Site layout
E-100. (FOUO) After the mission is complete, the aircraft returns to the arming point for dearming. Spent
canisters should be discarded at least 30 meters from the aircraft, at the 4 and 8 o’clock positions. Live
canisters should be returned to the ammunition supply points for future use or repackaging. Canisters that
misfire should be placed in the dud pit.
E-101. (FOUO) The crew members will ensure that the air Volcano is installed properly, that all
installation checks are completed, and that mine canister pallets are loaded as directed by the pilot or the
SOP. The flight crew conducts ground checks according to the checklist in TM 1-1520-237-10 to confirm
proper operation of the air Volcano before takeoff.

Emplacing (U)
E-102. (U) If the threat situation allows, the aircrew makes a pass to confirm the minefield end points and
the actual ground conditions. In a high-threat situation, the aircrew may have to emplace the minefield on
the first pass.
E-103. (U) Before arrival at the target area and during the equipment check, the crew chief turns on the
DCU power control switch, verifies that no malfunctions were indicated during the initial built-in test, and
turns off the DCU power control switch. After completion of the run-up with the aircraft at flight idle, the
crew chief turns on the DCU power control switch. The pilot annotates information about the minefield
emplacement, including the—
 (U) Start/end grid coordinates of each pass.
 (U) Travel speed of each pass.
 (U) Direction of travel of the aircraft of each pass.
 (U) Number of tubes discharged per pass.
 (U) Changes to the aircraft track that deviate from the travel direction.
E-104. (U) The crew of the emplacing aircraft reports initiation and completion times and exact start and
end point coordinates to the engineer staff officer of the directing unit. Engineers prepare the
scatterable-minefield report and record and forward them to the G-3/S-3 who provides the information to
higher headquarters and subordinate units through operational channels. The engineer staff officer also
provides this information to the engineer staff officer at higher headquarters.

Appendix F
Countermobility Planning Factors (FOUO)
(FOUO) This appendix provides planning factors that are commonly used in planning
and designing reinforcing obstacles. It is intended to supplement the planning
considerations that are presented throughout this manual. TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A,
Engineer Field Data is a key reference for countermobility planning factors.
SCATTERABLE-MINE PLANNING FACTORS (FOUO)

F-1. (FOUO) The paragraphs below provide planning factors for each type of SCATMINE system used
by U.S. forces. (See appendix B for the SCATMINE systems capabilities.)
F-2. (FOUO) Table F-1 provides guidance on scatterable minefield densities typically used for achieving
each tactical obstacle effect.
Table F-1. (FOUO) Guidance for selecting minefield density
Effect Density Probability of Encounter Linear Density
Disrupt Low 40–50 percent 0.4 to 0.5 mine per meter
Fix Medium 50–60 percent 0.5 to 0.6 mine per meter
Turn High 75–85 percent 0.9 to 1.1 mines per meter
More than 1.1 mines per
Block High More than 85 percent
meter
ARTILLERY-DELIVERED SCATTERABLE MINEFIELDS (FOUO)

F-3. (FOUO) Table F-2 shows planning factors for artillery-delivered scatterable minefields.
Table F-2. (FOUO) Planning factors for artillery-delivered scatterable minefields
Self-
System Minefield Size Destruct Arm Time Emplacement Time*
Times
RAAM/ADAM Disrupt: 4 or 48 45 seconds 5 minutes for 200 m X 200 m
Note. total mines = 200 m X 200 m hours (use 1
400 m X 400 m = Fix: minute for 20 minutes for 400 m X 400 m
4 X 200 m X 200 m = 200 m X 200 m planning)
1 X 200 m X 800 m
Turn :
400 m X 400 m
Block:
400 m X 400 m
* Emplacement time may vary based on a wide variety of factors.
Legend:
M meter(s)
F-4. (FOUO) Table F-3, page F-2, provides the size and density of artillery-delivered SCATMINEs. (See
FM 6-20-40 for detailed information on designing artillery-delivered scatterable minefields.)
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 F-1

Appendix F
Table F-3. (FOUO) RAAM and ADAM minefield density and size
Obstacle RAAM ADAM Width Depth
Effect Area1 Linear2 Area1 Linear2 (meters) (meters)
Disrupt 0.001 0.2 0.0005 0.1 200 200
Fix 0.002 0.4 0.0005 0.1 200 200
Turn 0.002 0.8 0.0010 0.4 400 400
Block 0.004 0.6 0.0020 0.8 400 400
1
Area density: mines per square meter.
2
Linear density: mines per meter.
Legend:
F-5. (FOUO) Table F-4 shows the number of rounds required for each aimpoint to achieve the desired
density.
Table F-4. (FOUO) RAAM and ADAM rounds per aimpoint
High-Angle RAAM Low-Angle RAAM High- or Low-Angle ADAM

Desired
0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.0005 0.001 0.002
density
Rounds per
24 48 96 6 12 24 3 6 12
aimpoint
Legend:
VOLCANO MINEFIELDS (FOUO)

F-6. Table F-5 provides planning factors for Volcano minefields.
Table F-5. (FOUO) Volcano planning factors
Self-Destruct
Minefield Size Arm Time Emplacement Time
Times
Turn or Block: 4 hours, 48 hours, 2.5 minutes AV 10 minutes per
• Ground 15 days 4 minutes AP 1,100 meters
555 X 440 Air: 54 seconds (use
(160 1 minute for
canisters) planning)
Volcano • Air: 557 X
1 Load = 460 (160
160 canisters canisters)
containing Fix or Disrupt:
960 mines • Ground
(800 AV/160 277 X 120
AP) (40
canisters)
• Air 278 X
140
• (40
canisters)
F-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Table F-5. (FOUO) Volcano planning factors (continued)

Legend:
AP antipersonnel
AV antivehicle
M meter(s)
F-7. (FOUO) Table F-6 provides information on air Volcano minefields. (See FM 3-04.113 for additional
information.)
Table F-6. (FOUO) Air Volcano dispensing times based on air speed
Disrupt and Fix Turn and Block 160 Canisters per
Air Speed Setting
Minefields Minefields Load
20 knots 27 seconds 54 seconds 108 seconds
55 knots 9 seconds1 18 seconds 39 seconds
80 knots 6 seconds1 13 seconds1 27 seconds
1 1
Width of minefield (meters) 278.8 557.5 1,115
Number of passes per minefield 1 22 1
Number of canisters per pass 40 80 160
1
Problematic airspeed/time combination for Volcano dispensing.
2
Black Hawks operating in pairs can emplace turn and block minefields in one pass, firing 80
canisters each.
Example: The unit is emplacing an air Volcano disrupt minefield. The UH-60 is traveling at 40 knots
(this is entered on the DCU), and the pilot initiates (depresses the launch switch) at the identification
of the Volcano start marker or the grid location on the ground. The pilot depresses the launch switch
a second time after 13 seconds have elapsed.
Legend:
DCU dispenser control unit
MODULAR PACK MINE SYSTEM (FOUO)

F-8. (FOUO) Table F-7 provides planning factors for the MOPMS.
Table F-7. (FOUO) SCATMINE planning factors
Emplacement
Self-Destruct Arm Time
Minefield Size
Times Time (not including
marking fence)
MOPMS Individual: 70 m X 35 m (1 MOPMS) 4 hours 2 5 minutes/squad
(emplacement Disrupt: 280 m X 70 m (4 MOPMS) (can be minutes 20 minutes/squad
without Fix: 280 m X 105 m (5 MOPMS) recycled 3 25 minutes/squad
marking times for a total
fence) of 13 hours)
Legend:
m meter(s)

Appendix F
CONSTRUCTED OBSTACLE PLANNING FACTORS (FOUO)

F-9. (FOUO) Table F-8, table F-9, table F-10, and table F-11 provide planning factors to use when
planning constructed obstacles. (See TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A, Engineer Field Data.)
Table F-8. (FOUO) Single-strand barbwire marking fence
Long Mine
Number Barbed
Frontage Depth Perimeter Picket Sign
Intent System of RPH Wire
(m) (m) (m) (per (per
Sides (Roll)
10 m) 15 m)
Turn or Volcano 4 555 320 1,830 9.00 5 183 122
Block
Fix or Volcano 4 277 120 874 4.25 2 88 59
Disrupt
Fix or Volcano 4 1,100 120 2,520 12.00 7 252 168
Disrupt
1,100 m
Fix MOPMS 4 280 105 850 4.00 3 85 57
Disrupt MOPMS 4 280 70 780 3.75 2 78 52
Note. Wire obstacles emplaced on asphalt or concrete surfaces require some type of pavement breaking
equipment, such as a moil point. Add 2 additional minutes per picket.
Legend:
m meter(s)
RPH real platoon hours
Table F-9. (FOUO) Single-row concertina wire marking fence

Mine
Long
Number Sign
Frontage Depth Perimeter Concertina Picket
Intent System of RPH (per
(m) (m) (m) Roll (per
Sides 15
15 m)
m)
Turn or Volcano 4 555 320 1,830 5.50 122 122 122
Block
Fix or Volcano 4 277 120 874 2.65 59 59 59
Disrupt
Fix or Volcano 4 1,100 120 2,520 7.50 168 168 168
Disrupt
1,100 m
Fix MOPMS 4 280 105 850 2.55 57 57 57
Disrupt MOPMS 4 280 70 780 2.35 52 52 52
Note. Wire obstacles emplaced on asphalt or concrete surfaces require some type of pavement breaking
equipment, such as a moil point. Add 2 additional minutes per picket.
Legend:
m meter(s)
RPH real platoon hours

Table F-10. (FOUO) Countermobility work rates

DEUCE
Task Dozer 7 Blade Team ACE Blade Team Blade
Team
12.5 m
AV ditch 43.75 m per hour 31.25 m per hour
per hour
Berm D9 5.75 hour/100 m
(Values are figured per D7 8.75 hour/100 m
NA NA
individual platform not per ACE 10.5 hour/100 m
blade team.) DEUCE 12.75 hour/100 m
300 m requires 160 long
pickets, 4 short pickets, 4
Triple standard concertina 2.4 real hours/platoon/300 m NA
reels barbed wire, 59 rolls
concertina
Marking fence (single-strand
2.4 real hours/platoon/500 m NA NA
barbed wire)
Marking fence (single-roll
2.4 real hours/platoon/800 m NA NA
concertina)
Hasty road crater
5 X 40-lb crater charges,
50 lbs TNT, 5 X 40-lb
Road crater 3.6 real hours/squad shaped charges, 60.9-m NA
detonating cord, 6.0-m
time fuse, 4 fuse igniters,
nonelectric blasting caps
Concertina road block 2.4 real hours/squad NA NA
Bridge demolition (massive) 4.8 real hours/2 squads NA NA
Bridge demolition (steel) 2.4 real hours/squad NA NA
Legend:
AV antivehicle
m meter(s)
DEUCE deployable universal combat earth mover
TNT trinitrotoluene
lb pound
Table F-11. (FOUO) Walls

Task Emplacement Time Equipment/Personnel Notes
Jersey barrier 5 min/barrier Forklift, fire team None
HEMMT crane or
Jersey barrier 8 min/barrier None
Crane, fire team
Includes Colorado,
Texas, Alaska, Scud
Bunker,
T-wall 10 min/barrier Crane, squad
T-wall, or any other large
piece of moveable
concrete
T-wall, Texas, and Cannot download other
8 min/barrier Crane, squad, forklift
Colorado barrier walls with forklift

Appendix F
Table F-11. (FOUO) Walls (continued)

Task Emplacement Time Equipment/Personnel Notes
8- to 10-man crew
31 cell/hr (47.275 m/hr)
8 ft-HESCO® (Mil 10) 5 yd loader, squad preferred, add times for
1 cell=1.525 m
double stack
8 ft-HESCO (Mil 10) 15 cell/hr (22.875 m/hr) 2.5 yd loader, squad See above
8 ft-HESCO (Mil 10) 7 cell/hr (10.675 m/hr) HMEE, squad See above
72 cell/hr (79.92 m/hr)
4 ft-HESCO (Mil 1) 5 yd loader, squad See above
1 cell=1.11 m
4 ft-HESCO (Mil 1) 54 cell/hr (59.94 m/hr) 2.5 yd loader, squad See above
4 ft-HESCO (Mil 1) 18 cell/hr (19.98 m/hr) HMEE, squad See above
435 cell/hr (265.35 Add times for double
2 ft-HESCO (Mil 5) 2.5 yd loader, squad
m/hr) 1 cell=0.61 m stack
217 cell/hr (132.37
2 ft-HESCO (Mil 5) HMEE, squad See above
m/hr)
2 ft-HESCO (Mil 5) 90 cell/hr (54.9 m/hr) Bobcat®, squad See above
Legend:
ft foot(feet)
HEMMT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
m meter(s)
HMEE high mobility engineer excavator
min minute(s)
hr hour(s)
yd yard(s)
OTHER PLANNING FACTORS (FOUO)

F-10. (FOUO) Table F-12 provides other planning factors to consider when planning countermobility
operations.
Table F-12. (FOUO) Class IV/V haul capacity
Vehicle Concertina Wire1 MOPMS Volcano Mine
HMMWV
1,124 kg, 6 cu m 2.00 15.00 1.00
M1078 2.5-ton LMTV

2,250 kg, 13.4 cu m 4.00 30.00 2.00
M1083 5-ton MTV (cargo)

4,500 kg, 15.6 cu m 8.00 61.00 5.00
M1090 5-ton MTV (dump)

4,500 kg, 3.8 cu m 2.00 23.00 3.00
HEMTT cargo truck

9,000 kg, 15 cu m 8.00 94.00 10.00

Table F-12. (FOUO) Class IV/V haul capacity (continued)
Vehicle Concertina Wire* MOPMS Volcano Mine
12-ton S&T
10,800 kg, 24.5 cu m 13.00 148.00 12.00
40-ton lowboy
36,000 kg, 49.3 cu m 27.00 308.00 30.0
M548 cargo
5,400 kg, 14.9 cu m 18.00 74.00 6.0
M1077 PLS flat rack

14,900 kg, 17.6 cu m 9.00 110.00 11.00
Number of mines per box NA 21.00 240.00
Weight per box (kg) 531.00 73.00 833.00
Size of box (cu m) 1.80 0.16 1.60

*
The number of concertina = bundles; 1 bundle = 40 rolls
Legend:
cu cubic
HEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose, wheeled vehicle
kg kilogram(s)
LMTV light-medium tactical vehicle
m meter(s)
MTV medium tactical vehicle
PLS palletized loading system
S&T supply and transport

Appendix G
Networked Munitions (FOUO)
(FOUO) This appendix describes the capabilities of networked munitions. It also
describes the Spider Networked Munitions System, which is the baseline networked
munitions system for U.S. ground forces.
CAPABILITIES (FOUO)
G-1. (FOUO) Networked munitions are recoverable, reusable, and scalable. Existing fields may be
reseeded and will accept added munitions into the network. Field sizes may vary from small, hasty
protective fields to larger tactical fields. Networked munitions have self-destruct and/or self-deactivating
features.
G-2. (FOUO) Networked munitions support assured mobility by providing the following capabilities:
 (FOUO) Detect and neutralize enemy forces.
 (FOUO) Cover gaps and dead space, reinforce existing obstacles, and shape enemy maneuver.
 (FOUO) Provide economy of force.
 (FOUO) Protect friendly forces and critical assets (such as base camps and logistic sites).
 (FOUO) Provide immediate, selective engagement.
 (FOUO) Allow a single operator to control a suite of scalable lethal and nonlethal effects from a
safe distance.
G-3. (FOUO) The employment of networked munitions capabilities enhances situational awareness by
leveraging the network and various employment means. Networked munitions support seamless transitions
from one focused task to another. Since commanders are able to exercise positive control over the
detonation of networked munitions, the risk of impeding friendly-force mobility is greatly reduced. Hence,
the authority for emplacement may be pushed down to lower tactical levels. The main features of
networked munitions are—
 (FOUO) Remote control.
 (FOUO) On-off-on.
 (FOUO) Command-destruct.
 (FOUO) Variable self-destruct features.
 (FOUO) Selectable lethal or nonlethal effects.
 (FOUO) Tamper alert.
 (FOUO) Situational awareness.
 (FOUO) Field or munition status.
 (FOUO) Field or munition location.
 (FOUO) Early warning of approaching enemy forces.
 (FOUO) Cue other fire systems.
 (FOUO) Hand emplacement.
SPIDER NETWORKED MUNITIONS SYSTEM (U)

G-4. (FOUO) The baseline Spider Networked Munitions System with its organic miniature grenades and
its option for controlling attached claymores provides a safe, effective alternative to persistent
antipersonnel land mines. Future increments of the Spider Networked Munitions System are envisioned to
include control of attached antivehicle munitions as a safe, effective alternative to persistent antivehicle
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 G-1

Appendix G
land mines. The Spider Networked Munitions System is considered a weapon system, not a mine. It does
not require any special release authority to be employed; rather, its use is controlled by applicable ROE just
like other weapon systems. The Spider Networked Munitions System System shown in figure G-1 is a man-
portable, remote-controlled, protection and area denial munition. The Spider Networked Munitions System
consists of a remote control station (RCS), a repeater, and munition control units (MCUs). The repeater is a
relay device used to extend the control range in difficult terrain. Each MCU contains six miniature grenade
launchers (MGLs) that provide the organic lethality for the Spider Networked Munitions System. In
addition to the MGLs, the M18A1 claymore and the M5 modular crowd control munition can be attached
and controlled by the MCU. The RCS is capable of transferring munition field information to information
systems to rapidly update the COP. Control of a Spider Networked Munitions System field may be passed
from one RCS to another over the air. The Spider Networked Munitions System is an alternative for legacy,
persistent antipersonnel land mines and does not result in residual risks to people after hostilities have
ended.
Figure G-1. (FOUO) Spider Networked Munitions System
G-5. (FOUO) The Spider Networked Munitions System is supported by a precision lightweight GPS
receiver; a simple key loader; and a universal, serial bus-compatible, removable media device. Each of
these items is included within the table of organization and equipment but is not part of the Spider
Networked Munitions System. They are considered to be an associated support item of equipment for the
Spider Networked Munitions System.
REMOTE CONTROL STATION (FOUO)

G-6. (FOUO) The RCS shown in figure G-2 consists of an RCU, a radio or RCU transceiver, and an
antenna. The RCS is used to emplace Spider Networked Munitions System components that comprise a the
system obstacle and monitor and control the functioning of the munitions in the obstacle during, and
subsequent to, hostilities. When using a repeater, the Spider Networked Munitions System operator can
control munition fields up to 1,500 meters. Using a variable height antenna mast gives the Spider
Networked Munitions System operator a munition field control range of up to 8,000 meters.
G-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Legend:
COMSEC communications security
DAGR defense advanced Global Positioning System receiver
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below
GPS Global Positioning System
PLGR precise, lightweight Global Positioning System receiver
RCUT remote control unit transceiver
RF resource factor
SW software
TOC tactical operations center
USB universal serial bus
Figure G-2. (FOUO) Spider Networked Munitions System remote control

station
MUNITION CONTROL UNIT (FOUO)

G-7. (FOUO) The Spider Networked Munitions System MCU provides the obstacle control capability by
accepting commands to control the functioning of the attached munitions. The MCU uses six replaceable
MGLs to deliver the lethal effects of the Spider Networked Munitions System. The Spider Networked
Munitions System can also deliver lethal and nonlethal effects from the MCUs by attaching munition
adapter modules in the place of MGLs. The munition adapter modules allow Spider Networked Munitions
System to produce any effect that can be initiated with a blasting cap, such as claymores, modular crowd
control munitions, and demolitions. An intruder detection capability is provided by the use of replaceable
extended-range trip line sensor (ERTS) modules, standard trip wires, and embedded sensors to prevent
weapon system tampering. The MCU can be safely and rapidly recovered, reloaded (with grenades, ERTS,
trip wires, and fresh batteries), and deployed. (See figure G-3, page G-4.)

Appendix G
Legend:
ERTS extended-range trip line sensor
MGL miniature grenade launcher
Figure G-3. (FOUO) Spider Networked Munitions System MCU
MINIATURE GRENADE LAUNCHERS (FOUO)

G-8. (FOUO) Each MCU can hold up to six removable MGLs. The MGLs are numbered clockwise, 1
through 6 (sectors), starting from the launcher nearest the arrow marking on top of the MCU. They are
secured to the MCU with a ball lock electrical connector. From each MCU, the six MGLs can be fired
individually, in selected groups, or all at once. Additionally, from a field of MCUs, MCUs can be fired
individually, in preselected groups, or all at once. The launched grenade travels 5 to 7 meters along its trip
line axis and detonates in the air (airburst) at a height of 2 meters. The grenade has a burst radius of 10
meters, making one MCU capable of providing lethal coverage over a 25-meter diameter as shown in figure
G-4.
Legend:
m meter
Figure G-4. (FOUO) Trip line and grenade coverage

EXTENDED-RANGE TRIP LINE SENSOR (FOUO)

G-9. (FOUO) The ERTS module enables the remote deployment of six trip lines. The ERTS provides a
silent-intrusion (from the perspective of the enemy), detection capability alerting the RCS operator of the
enemy presence in the munition field. The ERTS module is located on top of the battery cover and can be
serviced (removed and replaced) in the field or removed for transport. The trip lines are numbered
clockwise, 1 through 6 (sectors), starting from the first MGL launcher located in a clockwise direction from
the arrow marking on top of the MCU. The expected life of a deployed trip line is no more than 14 days.
When deployed, the trip lines travel 10 to 12 meters along an axis corresponding to the six launch azimuths
of the grenades providing about 20 to 24 meters of ERTS trip line diameter coverage. They do not have to
be deployed until the tactical situation calls for their deployment.
Trip Lines (FOUO)

G-10. (FOUO) Standard military trip lines can be attached to six hardwired trip line toggles located around
the exterior of the MCU. The hardwired trip lines are hand-emplaced to support long-term emplacement
scenarios. When used, they provide minimum ground coverage of 20-plus meters.
Ground Anchors and Stakes (FOUO)

G-11. (FOUO) There are three built-in stakes on the MCU, which can be positioned vertically to anchor the
MCU in hard terrain or positioned horizontally to steady the MCU when surface-laid. Long nails, spikes, or
rebar can also be used as necessary for additional stability.
Employment Concept (FOUO)

G-12. (FOUO) The Spider Networked Munitions System can serve as a protective obstacle and a tactical
obstacle. As a protective obstacle, it provides early warning with its trip line sensors and it provides
mitigate and/or prevent effects through proper emplacement of its suite of lethal and nonlethal munitions
tied in with terrain and integrated with observation and fires. The ability of the Spider Networked
Munitions System to control and initiate demolitions allows it to provide tactical obstacle effects in
restricted terrain by remotely creating road craters and abatis obstacles, and destroying bridges.
Protective Obstacle (FOUO)

G-13. (FOUO) The baseline Spider Networked Munitions System is primarily employed as a protective
obstacle. When combined with observation and fires, the Spider Networked Munitions System provides
units the protective obstacle effects of warn, mitigate, and prevent. The Spider Networked Munitions
System provides an easily transportable, flexible protective obstacle system a small unit can rapidly
emplace. MCUs with trip lines and a varied suite of antipersonnel munitions effects and can control these
from safe distances out to and beyond the heavy weapons band at 500 meters with coverage over a large
area. It is also particularly well suited to provide protective obstacles for base camp defense. The emplaced
MCUs can be integrated into the base camp defense by collocating the RCU in the command post with all
the sensor feeds coming in from the targeting and surveillance systems. The Spider Networked Munitions
System provides near-immediate lethal and/or nonlethal obstacle effects from the outer security area of the
base camp all the way to the FPFs around the internal perimeter.
Tactical Obstacle (FOUO)

G-14. (FOUO) The Spider Networked Munitions System can be employed as a tactical obstacle against
maneuvering dismounted formations to disrupt, fix, turn, or block when integrated with direct and/or
indirect fires. Additionally, the Spider Networked Munitions System can create tactical obstacles in
restricted terrain by initiation of demolition obstacles (road craters, bridge charges, abates). Spider
Networked Munitions System antipersonnel munitions may also be used to protect tactical antivehicle
obstacles from dismounted breaching attempts and provide warning to defenders that personnel are in the
tactical obstacle.

Appendix G
Emplacement Guidelines for Munition Control Units and Attached Munitions (FOUO)
G-15. (FOUO) The exact composition and pattern of the munition field are generally at the discretion of the
owning unit. The following guidelines generally apply:
 (FOUO) When emplacing MCUs with MGLs, the minimum distance between Spider Networked
Munitions System MCUs is 20 meters.
 (FOUO) When emplacing MCUs with attached munitions such as claymores or demolitions,
space MCUs and munitions in accordance with the effects of those munitions.
 (FOUO) When emplacing MCUs with MGLs, the minimum distance between Spider Networked
Munitions System MCUs and a perimeter fence (if used) is 20 meters.

Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, Marine Corps, and joint
definitions. Where Army/Marine Corps and joint definitions differ, (Army/Marine
Corps) precedes the definition. Terms for which Combined Arms Countermobility
Operations is the proponent manual are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent
manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AT antitank
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
attn attention
BCT brigade combat team
BLU bomb, live unit
BP battle position
CCL combat-configured load
COA course of action
COMDTINST commandant instruction
DA Department of the Army
DC District of Columbia
DCU dispenser control unit
DP decision point
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
EA engagement area
EH European helicopter
EMO electronic media only
ERTS extended range trip line sensor
fed federal
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual
FMFM fleet Marine force manual
FPF final protective fire
FOUO for official use only
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSO fire support officer
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
GPS Global Positioning System
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 Glossary-1

Glossary
HN host nation
HPT high-payoff target
HVT high-value target
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JP joint publication
Jr junior
KOCOA key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and
concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach (Marine
Corps)
MCDP Marine Corps doctrinal publication
M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability
MCO Marine Corps order
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCU munition control unit
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available (Marine Corps)
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
METT-TC
available-time available and civil considerations (Army)
mil military
MSCoE Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
No. number
NWP Naval warfare publication
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key
terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (Army)
OPLAN operation plan
OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations instruction
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
PL phase line
PLS palletized loading system
RCS remote control station
RCT regimental combat team
RCU remote control unit
ROE rules of engagement
S-2 intelligence staff officer
S-3 operations staff officer
S-4 logistics staff officer
SCATMINEREC scatterable minefield record
SCATMINEREQ scatterable minefield request
Glossary-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

Glossary
SOP standing operating procedure

STANAG standardization agreement
std standard
TC training circular
TM technical manual
TRP target reference point
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U unclassified
UNTL universal Naval task list
U.S. United States
USA United States Army
USCG United States Coast Guard
USMC United States Marine Corps
SECTION II – TERMS
block
A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents the enemy’s advance in a
direction or along an avenue of approach. Block is also an obstacle effect that integrates fire planning
and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or prevent the attacking
force from passing through an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
*countermobility operations
(joint) The construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, distrupt, and destroy the
enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. (JP 3-34)
(Army/Marine Corps) Those combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and
man-made obstacles to deny enemy freedom of movement and maneuver.
*directed obstacle
An obstacle directed by a higher commander as a specified task to a subordinate unit.
disrupt
(Army) 1. A tactical mission in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and
obstacles to upset and enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable, or cause enemy
forces to commit prematurely or attach in a piecemeal fashion. 1. An obstacle effect focuses fire
planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its
timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort (FM 3-90-1).
(Marine Corps) 1. To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy’s formation and tempo,
interrupt his timetable, or cause premature commitment or the piecemealing of his forces. 2. A tactical
mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset
an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or
attach in piecemeal fashion (MCRP 5-12C).
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 Glossary-3

Glossary
fix
(Army) A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy force from moving any part of
that force from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fire
planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified area, normally an
engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
(Marine Corps) To prevent the enemy from moving any part of his forces, either from a specific
location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal
for use elsewhere. (MCRP 5-12C)
*land mine
A munition on or near the ground or other surface area that is designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.
networked munitions
Remotely controlled, interconnected, weapons system designed to provide rapidly emplaced
ground-based countermobility and protection capability through scalable application of lethal and
nonlethal means. (JP 3-15)
obstacle restricted areas
A command and control measure used to limit the type or number of obstacles within an area. (JP
3-15)
*reserved obstacle
(Army/Marine Corps) Obstacles of any type, for which the commander restricts execution authority.
*situational obstacle
An obstacle that a unit plans and possibly prepares prior to starting an operation, but does not execute
unless specific criteria are met.
turn
1. A tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy force from one avenue of approach or
movement corridor to another. 2. A tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle
effort to divert an enemy formation from one avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or
into an engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
Glossary-4 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at <www.apd.army.mil>.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ATP 3-04.94. Army Techniques Publication for Forward Arming and Refueling Points.
26 January 2012.
ATP 3-09.30. Techniques for Observed Fire. 2 August 2013.
ATP 3-34.80. Geospatial Engineering. 23 June 2014.
ATTP 3-18.12. Air Assault Operations. 1 March 2011.
FM 3-04.113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 7 December 2007.
FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 2 April 2014.
FM 3-34.210. Explosive Hazards Operations. 27 March 2007.
FM 3-60. The Targeting Process. 26 November 2010.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume 1. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-90.5. The Combined Arms Battalion. 7 April 2008.
FM 3-90.6. Brigade Combat Team. 14 September 2010.
FM 3-97.6. Mountain Operations. 28 November 2000.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 6-20-40. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy).
5 January 1990.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM 90-5. Jungle Operations. 16 August 1982.
TC 3-97.61. Military Mountaineering. 26 July 2012.
TM 1-1520-237-10. Operator’s Manual for UH-60A Helicopter, UH-60L Helicopter, and EH-60A
Helicopter. 25 September 2009.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-05. Special Operations. 16 July 2014.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 References-1

References
JP 3-13.4. Military Deception. 26 January 2012.

JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 17 June 2011.
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 30 June 2011.
MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS

MCDP 1-0. Marine Corps Operations. 9 August 2011.
MCRP 5-12C. Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. 16 November 2011.
MCWP 3-17. Engineering Operations. 14 February 2000.
MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 24 August 2010.
MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
ATP 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6. Survivability Operations. 28 June 2013.
ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8. Combined Arms Mobility Operations. 10 August 2011.
ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D. Cold Region Operations. 28 January 2011.
FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009.
FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008.
FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L. Explosives and Demolitions. 11 July 2007.
FM 90-3/FMFM 7-27. Desert Operations. 24 August 1993.
MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15. Naval Mine Warfare, Volume I. September 2010.
OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO 3500.26A/USCG COMDTINST 3500.1B. Universal Naval Task List
(UNTL). 20 January 2007.
TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A. Engineer Field Data. 17 October 2013.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Fed-Std-376B. Preferred Metric Units for General Use by the Federal Government. 27 January 1993.
MIL-STD-2525. Detection of Common Warfighting Symbology, Air Symbols. September 2011.
STANAG 1059 (Edition 8). Letter Codes for Geographical Entities. 19 February 2004.
STANAG 2017 (Edition 4). Orders to the Demolition Guard Commander and Demolition Firing Party
Commander (Non-Nuclear). 28 January 1999.
STANAG 2036 (Edition 6). Land Mine Laying, Marking, Recording and Reporting Procedures.
27 January 2005.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) Web site
<www.apd.army.mil>.
DA Form 1355-1. Hasty Protective Row Minefield Record.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
References-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

References
WEB SITES
Army Knowledge Online, Doctrine and Training Publications Web site,
<https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html>, accessed on 9 May 2014.
Army Publishing Directorate, Army Publishing Updates Web site,
<http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp>, accessed on 9 May 2014.
Marine Corps Doctrine, Marine Corps Doctrine Web site, < https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/> ,
accessed 9 May 2014.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
ATP 3-37.2. Antiterrorism.3 June 2014.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
ATTP 3-06.11. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 10 June 2011.
FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 26 October 2006.
FM 3-20.96. Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron. 12 March 2010.
FM 3-90.61. The Brigade Special Troops Battalion. 22 December 2006.
MCO 3900.15B. Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System. 10 March 2008.
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 References-3

Index
Entries are by page number.
A D M
abatis. See also log obstacles. DA Form 1355-1, 7-4, D-5 MCOO, modified combined
ADAM, area denial artillery demolition obstacles, B-1 obstacle overlay, 1-13, 2-7, 3-6,
munition, 5-7, 8-1, 8-4, E-7, E- abatis, B-2 6-3, D-4
10, E-11, See also artillery- bridges, B-1 minefield, 2-7
delivered scatterable mine road craters, B-1 marking, 2-7
system. demolition order, 5-1, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5 mines
antivehicle ditches, B-2, C-1, C-4 denial operations, 1-1 antipersonnel, E-1
area density, E-7 antivehicle, E-4
directed obstacle land mines, 1-3
artillery-delivered scatterable mine execution matrix, 3-10
system, E-6 mission analysis, 3-4
directed obstacles, 2-1, 5-3, 6-4
assured mobility, 1-1 definition, 1-4 mission variables, ix, 3-14, 7-2, 7-
definition, 1-1 6, E-23
disrupt
definition, 1-7 MOPMS, Modular Pack Mine
B System, 5-6, 8-4, E-19
beam post obstacle, 5-8 disrupt effect, 1-7, 3-1, 3-2, C-3
N
block E
definition, 1-9 networked munitions, G-1
emplacing unit, 1-12, 5-2, D-4, E- definition, 1-3
block effect, 1-9, 3-2, E-12, E-13 9, E-24, E-25
execution authority, 1-5 O
C
existing obstacles, 1-3 obstacle classification, 1-3
Class IV/V obstacle material, 3-14
expedient obstacles, 8-3 obstacle control, 2-1
Class IV/V supply point, 3-16
obstacle control measures, 2-2
combined obstacle overlay, 1-3, 1- F belts, 2-4
13, 2-7, 3-6 fix definition, 2-2
commander, 1-13 definition, 1-8 groups, 2-5
authorizing, 1-5, 2-1, 2-5, 5-2, fix effect, 1-9, 3-2 restrictions, 2-6
7-2 zones, 2-3
responsibilities, 1-13, 2-6, 3- G obstacle database, 1-13, 2-7, E-
11, 5-2, D-5 Gator, 8-4, E-12 26
commander’s intent, 1-2, 1-10, 3- obstacle design, 3-1
4, 3-7, 3-8, 3-11, 3-14, 6-2, 7-6 I
IPB, intelligence preparation of the obstacle effects, 1-6, See also
commander’s planning guidance, protective obstacles, effects.
3-4, 3-8, 3-10 battlefield/battlespace, 1-3, 1-
14, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 6-3 block, 1-9
complex obstacles, 1-10, 3-2, 7-2, disrupt, 1-7, 3
B-2, C-1 L fix, 1-8
constructed obstacles, C-1 land mine symbol, 1-6
definition, 1-3 turn, 1-8
countermobility operations, 1-1, 3-
9 land mines, 1-3, 6-1, G-1, G-2 obstacle emplacement authority,
definition, 1-1 2-1
linear density, E-7
in support of defense of civil obstacle employment principles,
authorities, 1-1 log obstacles. See also abatis.
1-10, 3-1, 3-4, 7-1, E-12, E-21,
in support of stability cribs, C-7
E-27
operations, 1-1 hurdles, C-6
posts, C-7 obstacle execution matrix, 5-4
in the defense, 1-1, 1-2
in the offense, 1-1, 1-2 obstacle integration, 3-1, 4-1
planning considerations, 1-13 achieving, 3-1
17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 Index-1

Index
maintaining, 4-1 course-of-action analysis, 3-9 marking, E-8

obstacle intent, 1-5 course-of-action development, MOPMS, Modular Pack Mine
3-8 System, E-19
obstacle marking, 2-7 mission analysis, 3-6 reporting and recording, E-9,
obstacle material, 3-14, 3-16, 3-18 prechamber shaft system, 5-7 E-31
obstacle numbering, D-1 request, E-6
preconstructed obstacles, 5-7, 5-9 safety zones, E-9
obstacle overlay, 3-5, 3-9, 3-10, 5- problem framing. See planning. Volcano, E-14
4, 6-7, E-12, E-24
progress reports. See reports. warning, E-9, E-24, E-25
obstacle planning, 4-4
protective obstacles, 1-5 scatterable minefield. See
obstacle protection, 4-1, 7-2 bands, 7-2 SCATMINE, scatterable mine.
obstacle recording, 2-7, D-5 effects, 7-1 situational obstacle
obstacle reporting, 2-7, D-4 employment considerations, 7- definition, 1-4
1 execution matrix, 6-7
obstacle resource factors, 3-1, 3-2
planning, 7-4 planning, 6-3
obstacle resourcing, 3-9, 3-13
determining obstacle resource R situational obstacles, 6-1
requirements, 3-13 RAAM, remote antiarmor mine, 5- special environments, 8-1
obstacle restrictions, 2-6, 3-4, 3-5, 7, 8-1, 8-4, E-7, E-10, E-11 cold regions, 8-1
E-12 deserts, 8-2
rectangular ditches, C-3
obstacle-free areas, 2-6 jungles, 8-3
reinforcing obstacles, 1-3 mountains, 8-2
obstacle-restricted areas, 2-1,
2-6, 6-5 reports, D-4 urban, 8-3
of completion, D-5 Spider Networked Munitions
obstacle resupply, 3-18
of initiation, D-5 System, G-1, G-2, G-5, G-6
supply point, 3-18
of intention, D-4
tailgate, 3-18 T
of progress, D-5
obstacle siting, 1-12, 2-7, 3-1, 3-3, of transfer, D-5 tactical obstacles, 1-4
3-11, 7-4, 7-7, 8-4
reserved obstacles, 5-1 terrain analysis, 1-2, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4,
obstacle tracking, 2-7 definition, 1-5 3-6, 3-7, 6-3, 6-8, 8-1, E-6
obstacle transfer, 4-4 execution matrix, 5-4 triangular ditches, C-3
obstacle-free areas, 2-6 planning, 5-2
turn
obstacle-restricted areas, 2-1, 2-6, road crater, B-1 definition, 1-8
6-5 S
definition, 2-6 V
SCATMINE, scatterable mine, E-1 Volcano
operational environment, 1-2, 1- antipersonnel, E-1
13, 3-7 air, 8-4, E-14, E-22
antivehicle, E-4 ground, 8-4, E-14
owning unit, 1-12 control, E-8 marking, E-17
emplacement authority, 2-1 planning, E-23
P employment considerations, E- resupply, E-26
planning, 7-4 6
planning process fragment hazard zones, E-10
Gator, E-12
Index-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

ATP 3-90.8
MCWP 3-17.5
17 September 2014
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1425108
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number (IDN) 115848, requirements for ATP 3-90.8.
PCN 143 000175 00 PIN: 104645–000

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ATP 3-90.

COMBINED ARMS COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ANTHONY C. FUNKHOUSER K. J. GLUECK JR.

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Combined Arms Countermobility Operations

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 i

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 4 MAINTAINING OBSTACLE INTEGRATION (U) ............................................... 4-1

ii ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 iii

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

iv ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 v

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

vi ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

 (U) Acknowledgement of the broader combined arms context of countermobility operations

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 vii

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

viii ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSURED MOBILITY (U)

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 1-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1-2 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EXISTING OBSTACLES (U)

REINFORCING OBSTACLES (U)

 (U) Networked munitions. Networked munitions is a remotely controlled, interconnected,

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 1-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Tactical Obstacles (U)

1-4 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Protective Obstacles (U)

OBSTACLE INTENT (U)

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 1-5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

 (U) Focuses obstacle effort.

Figure 1-2. (U) Tactical obstacle effects

1-6 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Disrupt Effect (U)

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 1-7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Turn Effect (U)

Fix Effect (U)

1-8 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 17 September 2014

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Block Effect (U)

17 September 2014 ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5 1-9

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RELATIVE LOCATION (U)

OBSTACLE EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES (U)