G.R. No.

122646 March 14, 1997 In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent
Judge Teh "dismissed without prejudice" the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratix of the Intestate "on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special
Estate of the late NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners, proceeding are different." Accordingly, the lower court found it unnecessary
vs. to discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss.6 Upon denial of
HON. ANGELITO C. TEH respondents. petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on
pure questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due course to the petition.
FRANCISCO, J.:
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation
On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of
intestate estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before its jurisdiction over the whole case?
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for "reconveyance
of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA
preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.1 Paragraphs 2 7691 provides:
and 3 of said complaint states:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate original jurisdiction:
Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife
of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29, 1993; (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as
the judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;2 (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of property
Private respondents filed on January 21, 19953 their "answer with motion to involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .
dismiss"4 alleging among others that the complaint states no cause of action
and that petitioner's demand had already been paid.5 On February 17, 1995, xxx xxx xxx
private respondents filed another pleading entitled "motion to dismiss"
invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, (4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestat . . . .
laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction,
private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the
ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions, petitioner
Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as
administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the
complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings,
petitioner's husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the testate and intestate . . . (emphasis ours).
appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that
place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to
Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is
over the case. cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions
"incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of their judicial
administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings responsibility.
(Section 1 of Rule 737) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over
petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14,
proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the court is ordered to immediately proceed with the disposition of the case in
allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its accordance with this Decision.
jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuse jurisdiction with
venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-958 provides that SO ORDERED.
actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the
property is located, in this case, — Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's
deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects
only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.9

Second, the cases cited 10 by private respondents are not at point as they
involve settlement of estate where the probate court was asked to resolve
questions of ownership of certain properties.In the present suit, no
settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve
settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a
jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for reconveyance. The
Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit
rather than dismiss the entire case.

Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide

questions of ownership or title to property 11 is not applicable in this case,
because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas
was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure.12 Moreover, the instant action for
reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court. 13 Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the
reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was
improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged
lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or

petitions filed before them, just so they can comply with their administrative
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005 On February 18, 1984, Paz died.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
JR., Petitioners,
vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent. On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by
Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the
DECISION Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail
the September 24, 20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case: whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.3 representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4 Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication
and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds
for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s name and to
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she
issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual,
named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
be awarded to them.
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.7
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father,
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed,
Portugal Sr., is valid?
Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155
sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.10
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel
of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial
contested by plaintiffs. court’s ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to
this Court’s following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.16 (Underscoring supplied) Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572,
before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action
citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18 is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held: illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
bar.
is essential to the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog,
GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced,
xxx testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and
heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right underscoring supplied).
to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein.
However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong
(ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter,
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was
it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a
Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between
cause of action.
the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan
Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two women during his
plaintiffs’ cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was
have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cariño
2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
supplied). was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court
undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
(TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be the
legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. pronouncements in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and
civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution the name of Leonila.
of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise
directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration prayed for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to
be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of
proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits
x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows;
that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,22 thus affirmed the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the
trial court’s dismissal of the case. determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling,
they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate
court to have erred when In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they
I. can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication
and of the TCT issued in her name.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it
failed to state a cause of action. In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein
petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the
II. estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the
the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which
Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The
evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The
.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as
Petitioners thus prayed as follows: heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it— the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal heirs of the On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27 (Italics in the original; Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
underscoring supplied). appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court’s
findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner
Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right." highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special decedent."
proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should
Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only
and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it
by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; [p]roceeding."
and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was
spouse of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who
administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera. was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding,
Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly reconsider the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the
purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC,
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa. for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said
incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, judgment.
following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to
among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April
to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate]
proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the
should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32 that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate Explained this Court:
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co- As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent. (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs.
daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in
testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of
court directed that the records of the case be archived. the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-
and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar,
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107,
the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her. March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’
agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial. continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.

Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,
order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right Portugal, is valid;
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can
no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran
his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased. 3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.40
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of
therein.37 the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate
or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased. No costs. SO ORDERED.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light
of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no

compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render
a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:
G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008 Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his
minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their
EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners, predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera
vs. PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, respondents. Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned ½ pro-indiviso share in
the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that Spouses
DECISION Cabrera were survived by two daughters – Graciana, who died single and
without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of
respondent Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’ rights and took
PUNO, C.J.:
possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During her
lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land.
Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and
September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled "Peter B. Enriquez, Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June
et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of the Regional Trial 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez
the complaint filed by the respondents herein.1 (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the
sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. parcel of land.4
1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in
Talisay, Cebu.2 When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land,
they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1)
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in
Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit
who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned ¼
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the
April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes
the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of
portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of
the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and
and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of
property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T- Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing
8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for
the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. damages. 5 They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of
T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4) the subject property.6
TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion
Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the
Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and
Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can not
Archimedes C. Villaluz.3
demand the partition of the real property without first being declared as legal the consideration of a case.17 Thus, a plaintiff’s right to institute an ordinary
heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.
but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.7
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an
trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case.8 The Motion for ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18 or
Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly denied.9 nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents
related thereto,19 this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of
Hence this petition. heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the
exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court had the occasion to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of
Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents. circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination
of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said
We answer in the affirmative. special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has
lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of
wrong.10 A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a
the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.11
belonging to the estate of the deceased.22
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for
prosecute and defend an action in court.12 A real party in interest is the one
the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one
Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the
entitled to the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to be considered a real interest,
right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto
must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere
Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to
interest.14 A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a
annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case
legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in interest
of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario23 is applicable in
when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had
legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the
violated the legal right of the former.15 The purpose of the rule is to protect
transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty
persons against undue and unnecessary litigation.16 It likewise ensures that
Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the
the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in
petitioners’ predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to in a special proceeding is necessary. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition
them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled: is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it —
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned No costs.
Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased SO ORDERED.
couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance.24

In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations,
have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in
the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have
themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As
such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause
of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in
interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint,
it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought
to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of
the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that
they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such
heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,25 the Court held that it would be superfluous to

still subject the estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed
because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left
by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have
already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent.
In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this case shows that
the only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot,
and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any
evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it
appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in
this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under
the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a determination of the
rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009 required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners, On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished
A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents. proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
DECISION proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
TINGA, J.: Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
inaccurate.
Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No.
95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2 for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not
to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to
of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound
favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as
her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned courts.
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City
courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower
to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of
procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
Proceedings.13 claims.

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they
"copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square
the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market
value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be,
deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16 interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in
varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3,
Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76,
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17 of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which
requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule
of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of
proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either
practicable, applicable to special proceedings." satisfied or provided for.

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the
court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the
it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil
86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded of its jurisdiction.
in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending
review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death. Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the
closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be
they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce
intestate proceedings? a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action
Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first
reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to
the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property
proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be
earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at
a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been omitted]
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took
cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed
intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can
an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later,
intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always
Court affirmed such action. been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that decision on their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody
but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent
claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that
the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a
against it. petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every
every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the
the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or intestate proceedings. We said:
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if
the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
sought by petitioners. the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of
the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means
were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved. 1awphi1

intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent

or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested
parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor purpose.
or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize
the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted enunciated in this decision.
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the costs.
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her SO ORDERED.
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true

inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We
do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did
delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the
assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under
Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the
estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,

the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek
with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a
creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such
relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007 (a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a
certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner, should be dismissed?
vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-
Administratrix, Respondent. (b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate
proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time
DECISION of its filing thereat?

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: (c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be

dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the service and filing by registered mail?2
the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated
January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003. Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate
proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a
The undisputed facts are as follows. written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees
upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7,
2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although
approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of
belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement Court.3
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties. The petition is imbued with merit.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of not entirely correct.
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated
April 9, 2003. Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court
govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall
following questions: be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the
in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are shopping.
applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case. On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a
shopping? lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
The Court rules in the affirmative. reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction
over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds
and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the
present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held
1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary thus:
or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent
are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the
exceptions.5 discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper;
Appeals,6 the Court explained thus: and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if
service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some
a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than
which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed.
from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly
other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers. (Emphasis and italics supplied) 1âwphi1

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon,
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service
as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was
written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in not done personally "might have been superfluous."
the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of
"whenever practicable". procedure has been allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the
adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the in not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule,
and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City,
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed
the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be
consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion
involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied) the interest of substantial justice.

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of
exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13: deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue
by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on money
pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:
that in the present case, personal service would not be
practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and Herrera:
expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might
have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and vs.
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON., respondents.
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the DE LEON, JR., J.:
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De
Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the
the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in Resolution 4 which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
the interest of substantial justice.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
the Rules of Court.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo
and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age. 1âwphi1.nêt

No pronouncement as to costs.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several
SO ORDERED. real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at
No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio
Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros,
Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with
the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of
the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said
petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the
order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as
order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio
mentioned therein. Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court
issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after
March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse
days within which to file their opposition to the petition. was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993
seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file petition for certiorari in its Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996.
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was
grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not likewise dismissed.12
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the
immediate inhibition of the presiding judge. The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus: questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for
the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to
merits thereof; the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is
their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They
proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are
immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding; indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the X X X

persons of the oppositors;
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or
Presiding Judge; extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the
properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon
and advantage xxx. which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration
X X X of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left
by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt
estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx. to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio
Manalo, to wit;
X X X
PRAYER
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were
compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this
and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and Honorable Court:
engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as
and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to
xxx.13 petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of
the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO
that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have
that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that
No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed
involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of
The instant petition is not impressed with merit. P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO
proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the MANALO.18
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain
and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein
petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the
The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials,
the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an
apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil
seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à- actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code. person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil
purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that
dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is
delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that
settlement of estate. lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
stranger.25
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626
were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being
a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à- sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no
vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of
as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in 63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
necessarily include special proceedings. recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the the probate court.1âw phi 1.nêt

invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal
of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit: merit, Costs against petitioners.

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same SO ORDERED.
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
vs. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children. 1âw phi 1.nêt

ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO –

MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of
ROSARIO, respondent.. Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
BUENA, J.: children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
the heirs? area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.3
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion
of which declares: On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443
to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court
107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
No costs. misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
"So ordered."
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed,
in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle
may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
petitioner's property. appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the
case."
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a
decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8 We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete and special proceedings, in this wise:
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale; wrong.

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
New Civil Code; rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a "XXX

donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
deceased." establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
decision ratiocinating, inter alia: between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand
of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings,
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property
as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on expounds further:
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for
that purpose. XXX" "It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
 equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings "Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of
commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased
instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
upon notice."10 provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which inheritance."12
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court. In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
exercise of its limited jurisdiction. limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to "which may be waived".15
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated
of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings". the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and decide the question of ownership.16
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court
so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the "In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher. an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which
 does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied) In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio.
EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due vs. AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO, oppositors-appellants.
taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property CONCEPCION, J.:
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject
to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed
the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
the legitimes.19 November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of
Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are
present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San
of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed
This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on

November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
lack of merit. inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
SO ORDERED. administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce the
and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus
had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast
No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This
bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where untenable.lawphil.net

the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City
of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute left appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice
ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and
seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even have a more effective treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not
slept in said house at España Extention. commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health",
even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I,
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy pp. 172-173; see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;
(70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-
settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with
Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then,
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A
another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952,
conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando,
choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates
therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public,
Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract
Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis,
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or
had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando,
narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently. Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate
full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including
appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, said appellee, were represented on that occasion and would have objected
petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart
despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of the from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to
appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to reside . . . for the rest establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and
immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by the lower court or the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions.
by the evidence of record. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted
to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the
in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants
The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would
the records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on take part therein "only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of
because until now the personality of the oppositors has not been dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of
established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between the
case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court
oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they said, addressing appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the
maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.) jurisdiction of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the
oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused
admitted in evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the conclusion of
intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that
however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain
deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the trial Judge that these proceedings should be dismissed." Thus, appellants specially
sustained appellee's objection thereto stating: made of record that they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and felt that appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
it seems that you are now trying to prove the status of your client;
you are leading so that. The main point here is your contention that At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not
the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been
allowed you to cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the
status of the oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time to of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other
declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.) words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence
and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the consideration.
domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but,
when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the
on account of the question of venue raised by him. We find ourselves unable Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953,
the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of . . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
"Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal
was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order appears on the record.
dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court
on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are
Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before
and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive
marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda.
proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the
First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the
in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding
section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of
bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should,
the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's
case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of petition.
Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts
with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is
denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla,
parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident
decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for
the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of
first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts
then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking
cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because
the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the
Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the
court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976 While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the
Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
Vl, petitioners, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
vs. misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

MARTIN, J.: In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, Luzon.
means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed. On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition
for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original
time, she moved petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the
On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in special administratrix.
lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash qualification made by the court that the administration of the
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
and real properties making up the state of the deceased." possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of
the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
supplementation petition of May 18,1973. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973,
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
(3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental
administratrix of the estate.
motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
Garcia has no relation. view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973,
of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove
jurisdiction, and improper venue. the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the
(a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G.
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special Fule, and to the court.
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order jurisdiction.
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name 19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February
of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
"married to Amado Garcia." special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted
the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27- upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death the office.
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time
of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of
Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. 19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and reconsideration.
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court
or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.
viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
still pending before the Court. situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on
First Instance of Laguna. the court to grant letters of administration. 3

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
12,1976. specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as
the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
issued on February 9, 1976.
power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
hereinafter stated. cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise convenience to the parties. 5
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna,
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of
First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
"venue." 6 papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11 subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima
as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be
proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent. emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but
temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion 5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior
reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly
of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad 6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
ownership of a property. 18 Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-
42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia obligations is hereby upheld. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No.
Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973 The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a
new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
vs. court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA the said court, giving as reasons the following:

TEEHANKEE, J.: It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the
in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic
subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion petition for the issuance of letters of administration.2
for Reconsideration.
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow: the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition
with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila
testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said
Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner
Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to
Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu. Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964,
the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of
Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila
Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to
death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon
nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu
City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition
court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
proceedings in the appellate courts.
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof
at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province
of Cebu. Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and
Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and
assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction
that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court
jurisdiction and/or improper venue. was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration
dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing
over an intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the
follows: hearing in their absence.

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City
and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their
Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the
should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in
testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed
the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.6
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be
entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of
the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and
and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates,
residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that
himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also
center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15
this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all
all others.5 formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, follows:
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and
Q-7898. the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from
proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein
that: and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement costs.
of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition
is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues for review on certiorari.
of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether
or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death. The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate
court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q- testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is
the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
another court. Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April
Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the
for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and
to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes
only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of
At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition
depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge. and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due
execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse
following considerations: — decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of
the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have
down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio &
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act
provides: No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in
the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter,
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600,
residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the
73)8 new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
vs. Co Ho9 as follows: jurisdiction.

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore,
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
exclusion of all other courts. estate.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by
and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, exclusion of all other courts.
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it
in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit
in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by 4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to
the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
venue.
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left
of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14 jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against
said proceedings is raised too late. 16
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this
case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations 5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly
6344," 15 thus: given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from
said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate provides:
to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in ... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor. of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining record. (Rule 73)
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on
laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of
the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the
1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a
Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396
an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and ... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance,
all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires
airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue
of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955. notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting
the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition
and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is
and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction."
practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect
be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before
the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court comment."
should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its
contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after 8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of
years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the
Quezon City. decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule
73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and
for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament
province." and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as
a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole 9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the
court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu
and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner- doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
widow had their conjugal domicile. of venue, not of jurisdiction.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City
entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as
73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
conjugal estate with the decedent. revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by
dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never dismissed. No costs.
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
DECISION Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
be issued to her.
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28,
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence
December 14, 1973. 6 showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998,
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions the dispositive portion of which states:
for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion. REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
the facts and law on which it was based. physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
Judge Paul T. Arcangel. administration was properly filed in Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively. First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of respondent. Thus –
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the The petition lacks merit.
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the
marriage. case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x 33 [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals. light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36 is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
Laguna. it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is
to file the petition for letters of administration. a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
of administration.
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
one place and domicile in another. foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid the divorce. Thus:
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly the bond of the former marriage."
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition
for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to Articles 35, 37, and 38.
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added) On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, 26. As so amended, it now provides:
it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
other." 56 under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
effect.
xxxx
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited Legislative Intent
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the
Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
discussed, to wit: valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
Brief Historical Background
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1aw phi 1.net Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its xxxx

continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case. will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that
Court, 68 the Court stated: there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In office. 71
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through described the property regime under this provision as follows:
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. be equal.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by xxxx
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
indirect or contingent. 75 the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, xxx
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
unless the contrary is proven. 77 Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.
court for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati,
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000 Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The
order reads:
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs. On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of
PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent. the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning,
copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.
----------------------------- and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officer's Return, dated 04
September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called
G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000 for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written
opposition was ever filed and on motion of petitioner, he was
allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on
Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and the witness stand and was directly examined by the Court through
PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to
Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents. determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the
subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that
petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress,
MENDOZA, J.:
menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his
Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth he was neither forced nor influenced by any other person in signing
and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that it.
petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr.
Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced
involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.
that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament
(Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows: Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last
Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3)
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7",
City, filed a petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-
61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos 3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the
sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and duly
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-
 15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament, On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3"). designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch
Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named as sole legatee 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.3
and devisee of petitioner's properties, real and personal,
approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the
Reyes Phillips was designated as executor and to serve as such other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the
without a bond. 1âwphi 1.nêt issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same
purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
substantially established the material allegations contained in his
petition. The Last Will and Testament having been executed and Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch
attested as required by law; that testator at the time of the execution 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special
of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate.
Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear
or threats; that it was in writing and executed in the language known On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
and understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special
and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence of administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew
the testator and of another; that the testator and all the attesting and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence of
witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp.
and that the testator has intended that the instrument should be his Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending; that
Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate; that
private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate;
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of
petition for the allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Dr. De Santos.
Santos is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case
1996. before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had
intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention. Petitioner
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of petitioner's motion for
the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order intervention.
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996,
returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground
that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61
Santos pending before said court. The order reads: to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch
began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others,
transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed as
related with a case before this Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial Court
with the information that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the
DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before this Branch. proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City is but one court.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner
under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office
lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on of the Court Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V.
16 February 1996 and has become final. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de
Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein
Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's motion for
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion
withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the
could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a separate case under Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any
case (No. 4343). right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
Case No. M-4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch
61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a 1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61
separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its
included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.

It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must 2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 65)
be approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches. acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
filed by (private) respondent.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos
appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) 3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of
the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later
recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the 4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing
proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated: her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court
— Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings
involving the same restate estate of the decedent is still pending with the Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61. lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-
Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:
Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle
v. Manalo,8 he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee,
fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may,
pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private respondent's jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
petition for issuance of letters testamentary. or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The contention has no merit. The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
the formalities prescribed by law.9
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills.
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud,
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does
living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.10 not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be
corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides: lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to
decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under
duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death.
death shall govern. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if
he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death would be in order.11
be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court. There decedent, or of the location of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as
is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
RTC-Makati that — Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define
the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed
that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which
had been partitioned and distributed. the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases
though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
until the latter's death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby
manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.12 be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene,
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
cites Rule 73, §1 which states:
convenience to the parties.
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P.
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
with each other.14
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, §1 applies insofar as the venue of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading
case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:15
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the
Appeals, it was held:13 Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the
totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested
in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch,
jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to only an allegation of the probable value and character of the
the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in
continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that the course of the settlement of the estate.16
Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice,
the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different Rule 79, §1 provides:
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of
the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, administration. — Any person interested in a will may state in writing the
the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named
Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon
of the court. notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at
the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction
over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343. Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and
issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, direct, not merely incidental or contingent.17
as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the
matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
Appeals held: succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the
decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or
the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which
has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of
decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
said heirs.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —
raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to
intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in
the estate or the will, and the private respondent has none.
Moreover, the ground cited in the private respondent's opposition, (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency
to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires (3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will.
Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.18 during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator's will. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based
on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator SO ORDERED.
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to
respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a

necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner
he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his
confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of
his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of
the right to dispose.

Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to

give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the
estate.20 None of these circumstances is present in this case.

Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping

when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were
still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the
same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was
filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating
his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated. 1âwphi1.nêt

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed
by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the
purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put
into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963 Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of
deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter
vs. alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10,
ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents. 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which
evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners. memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the
Romerico F. Flores for respondents. executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties
disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him
BARRERA, J.: exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes
had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral
heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of
the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that
question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
as follows:
stipulation of facts.1äw phï1.ñët

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that
on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal
was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was
character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in
admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor
Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void
of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed
the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife
Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio
Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia
namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or
mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls
under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate
spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate
does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in
of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause.
In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to
directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of
last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband
mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of exclusively?
the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased
Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of
properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had
filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and
previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is
Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not
and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can
"without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the
for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960. case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection
petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari. (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the
possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of
declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived".
generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not
the rule. over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs
of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts.
question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the
proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of
its final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party
them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his
when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties
(Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute.
and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are
judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and
of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no
prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232). interests of third parties are affected.4

In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the
within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself,
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties
which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very
her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time
parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without
widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow
her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of
to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and
is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners formalities similar to a will.
and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the
testator. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance
with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves ordered.
to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination
of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by
the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones
who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as
part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or
substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them
must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same
proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do,
on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it
for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct,
entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words,
by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands
(upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband),
petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court —
and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw
either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.
Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to
complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
G.R. No. 120880 June 5, 1997 estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings
on probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc.
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner, No. 10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents. Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary
TORRES, JR., J.: injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to
—
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again
assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February
requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition assails the 22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP Revenue;
No. 31363, where the said court held:
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax
assessments and estate tax assessment, are already final and III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection
(u)nappealable-and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real properties covered by
resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the Notices of Sale.
National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and
separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any Decision 2 on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for
other tax remedies instituted by the government. estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the
deceased President Marcos have already become final and unappealable,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent
Injunction. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

No pronouncements as to costs. WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered

DISMISSING the petition for Certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and
SO ORDERED. Injunction.

More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, No pronouncements as to cost.
the former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the
settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are SO ORDERED.
still unresolved, the latter issue being now before this Court for resolution.
Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of appellate court's decision, assigning the following as errors:
Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy
of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION,
SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD
ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PETITIONER.
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE LATE SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS POSSESS
PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE THE POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO
PROCEEDING PRECISELY PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S
PART OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF ARBITRARY METHOD OF COLLECTING THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY
THE PROBATE COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER COURTS ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF LEVY.
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY adopted:
DECIDING THAT SINCE THE TAX ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND
HIS PARENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE, On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in
THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER, On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct
PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL MANNER investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the
AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX COLLECTION IS SOUGHT TO BE late president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said
ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER AND DE GUZMAN. audit team concluded its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26,
THUS, RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY 1991. The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written
CONSIDERED THE MERITS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as well as
PETITION: several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all in
violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued beyond the period
provided in the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68. Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning the late President's and 84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section
ownership or interests in several properties (both personal and real) make 252 — a & b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable of
exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents' assessment The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and
of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and Sale are filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income
premature, confiscatory and oppressive. Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the
Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's compulsory heirs, was never years 1982 to 1985.
notified, much less served with copies of the Notices of Levy, contrary to the
mandate of Section 213 of the NIRC. As such, petitioner was never given an On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax
opportunity to contest the Notices in violation of his right to due process of assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate of the late
law. president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos);
(2) Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and
Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the
Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata
P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and (counsel of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR and requesting
1986); (3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to that they be duly notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest
FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in of their client Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II, as well as the interest of the
the amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and late president — copies of the aforesaid notices were, served on April 7,
P6,376.60 Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1993 and on June 10, 1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and
1982 to 1985). their counsel of record, "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and
Serapio Law Office".
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency
estate and income tax assessments were all personally and constructively Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby
served on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda of the City Hall of Tacloban City. The public auction for the sale of the
Marcos (through her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at eleven (11) parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no
No. 204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the Petition). bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the government.
Likewise, copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II were also personally and constructively On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II filed the
served upon him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
known address at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
Juan, M.M. (Annexes "J" and "J-1" of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal injunction.
Assessment notices were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos
c/o petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement
Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her of tax laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount importance for the
duly authorized representative or counsel), to a conference, was furnished sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and
the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel — but to no avail. should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs. negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to
Marcos and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the
of said assessments. taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the
common good, may be achieved. 3
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of
levy on real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said
— to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses tax obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of
Marcos. the Court's inquiry.

On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of
for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes. properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void
for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were upon the estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos 4 is
again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by
Sections 205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased,
person, as in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a
claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator Well-settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and
to pay the amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot limited jurisdiction.
be effected through any other means.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is
from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective,
taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by
by the probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this the very parties invoking its authority.
regard, petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The
Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that: In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Collector of prospective heirs before final adjudication; 5 to determine who are the heirs
Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the petitioner-appellant is of the decedent; 6 the recognition of a natural child; 7 the status of a woman
good authority on the proposition that the court having control over the claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; 8 the legality of disinheritance
administration proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented of an heir by the testator; 9 and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of
by the government for taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the hereditary rights. 10
tax should it find that the assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal,
due and collectible. And the rule laid down in that case must be understood The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of
in relation to the case of Collector of Customs vs. Haygood, supra., as to the the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying
procedure to be followed in a given case by the government to effectuate upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies,
the collection of the tax. Categorically stated, where during the pendency of without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the
judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for supposed will of the deceased.
taxes is presented by the government, the court has the authority to order
payment by the administrator; but, in the same way that it has authority to The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as
order payment or satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the follows:
same. While there are cases where courts are required to perform certain
duties mandatory and ministerial in character, the function of the court in a
Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not directly
case of the present character is not one of them; and here, the court cannot
involve the administration of a decedent's estate, although it may be viewed
be an organism endowed with latitude of judgment in one direction, and
as an incident to the complete settlement of an estate, and, under some
converted into a mere mechanical contrivance in another direction.
statutes, it is made the duty of the probate court to make the amount of the
inheritance tax a part of the final decree of distribution of the estate. It is not
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect against the property of decedent, nor is it a claim against the estate as such,
internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate but it is against the interest or property right which the heir, legatee, devisee,
proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the etc., has in the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under some
assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or controversy between the
the same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding between the state and the person
income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be who owes the tax on the inheritance. However, under other statutes it has
presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should been held that the hearing and determination of the cash value of the assets
be paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to and the determination of the tax are adversary proceedings. The proceeding
decide whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. has been held to be necessarily a proceeding in rem. 11
In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, is amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy,
executive in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax,
Code attests to this: is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or
transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner of
Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau. — The powers and duties of the Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
Bureau of Internal Revenue shall comprehend the assessment and
collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in
enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith, probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued
Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the
effect to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was
this Code or other laws. required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the
Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez 12 that the court recognized the liberal the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for
treatment of claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent. estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.
Such taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of
non-claims, and this is justified by the necessity of government funding, On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or
immortalized in the maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial
government. Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae — taxes are the sinews of the administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any
state. party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid.
Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after This provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate
administration is opened, need not be submitted to the committee on claims court which approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its control over the
administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the
showing that the taxes have been assessed against the estate. estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper
administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings
extends so far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
the heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. — When the Commissioner of Internal
Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should
deceased, can be collected from the heirs even after the distribution of the be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period
properties of the decedent. They are exempted from the application of the to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required
statute of non-claims. The heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner
share in the inheritance. 13 shall issue an assessment based on his findings.

Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for
One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be
prescribed by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the having been issued beyond the period allowed by law, are thus void and of
assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and no effect. 15
unappealable.
We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the
corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become
the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; final, executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As the summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the
inserted by P.D. 1773) NIRC.

Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the
required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of
questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse the NIRC, which pertinently provides:
into finality, and prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon
the properties left by President Marcos. Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and
collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or
been validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without
been done in violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the
latter is enforced may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the falsity, fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has
finality of the former, because the Government does not have the unbridled become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken
discretion to enforce collection without regard to the clear provision of law." 14 cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.

Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38- xxx xxx xxx
68, implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act
5203), the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued (c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of
beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and void: limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a
proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the tax.
. . . the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes O to NN of Annex C of
this Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were still issued by xxx xxx xxx
respondents well beyond the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 38-68. These Notices of Levy were issued only on 22 February The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to
1993 and 20 May 1993 when at least seventeen (17) months had already contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's
lapsed from the last service of tax assessment on 12 September 1991. As cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return,
no notices of distraint of personal property were first issued by respondents, the tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and
the latter should have complied with Revenue Memorandum Circular No. any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within
38-68 and issued these Notices of Levy not earlier than three (3) months nor three years following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax
later than six (6) months from 12 September 1991. In accordance with the assessment had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default
Circular, respondents only had until 12 March 1992 (the last day of the sixth as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no
month) within which to issue these Notices of Levy. The Notices of Levy,
reason why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any proof is upon the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is
objection against the assessment should have been pursued following the erroneous. Failure to present proof of error in the assessment will justify the
avenue paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of judicial affirmance of said assessment. 18 In this instance, petitioner has not
internal revenue taxes. pointed out one single provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit
Team which gave rise to the questioned assessment, which bears a trace of
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's attack on the assessment bears mainly on the
questioning the late president's ownership or interests in several properties alleged improbable and unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But
(both real and personal) make the total value of his estate, and the mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the
consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at assessments made.
this time. Thus, respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their
issuance of the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised,
points out the pendency of Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with
0141, which were filed by the government to question the ownership and the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described
interests of the late President in real and personal properties located within earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the
and outside the Philippines. Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the pretext of grave abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the
properties levied upon by the BIR in the collection of estate taxes upon the petitioner reflects his disregard or even repugnance of the established
decedent's estate were among those involved in the said cases pending in institutions for governance in the scheme of a well-ordered society. The
the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these cases are subject tax assessments having become final, executory and enforceable,
relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the decedent has pending the same can no longer be contested by means of a disguised protest. In
cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax the main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or
assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate. remedy. 19 This judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the
absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of government.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's total
assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates from On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the
the findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its petitioner, we find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound
resolution of 20 September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the and resilient to petitioner's attacks.
uncertainty on the part of the Government as to the total value of the estate
of the late President. Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) — both alleging/claiming lack of notice — We
find, after considering the facts and circumstances, as well as evidences,
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the assessment that there was sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments,
of estate tax which had already become final and unappealable. levy and sale, sent to herein petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as
well as to his mother Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to
determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the
of Internal Revenue, 16 whose determinations and assessments are caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last known address, on August 26,
presumed correct and made in good faith. 17 The taxpayer has the duty of 1991 and September 12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessment
proving otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the personally given to the caretaker of petitioner also at his last known address
performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an on September 12, 1991 — the subsequent notices given thereafter could no
assessment based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does longer be ignored as they were sent at a time when petitioner was already
not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of here in the Philippines, and at a place where said notices would surely be
called to petitioner's attention, and received by responsible persons of . . . Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the
sufficient age and discretion. property upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the
levy shall be mailed to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon or city where the property is located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if
Mrs. Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the
Batasan Pambansa, Q.C. (Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210, business in respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the
Comment/Memorandum of OSG). Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated occupant of the property in question.
October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a conference relative to her tax
liabilities, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos — Dean Antonio xxx xxx xxx
Coronel (Annex "B", p. 211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were also
served upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja, The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of
Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office", on April 7, 1993 distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7,
and June 10, 1993. Despite all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a 1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his
finger to protest the assessments, (upon which the Levy and sale of office at the Batasang Pambansa. 21 We cannot therefore, countenance
properties were based), nor appealed the same to the Court of Tax Appeals. petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process. Where there was an
opportunity to raise objections to government action, and such opportunity
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother) was disregarded, for no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression
and it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite then becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of government. He who
several opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to comes to court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints
the Court of Tax Appeals, — the tax assessments subject of this case, upon his name, but ridicules the very structure of established authority.
which the levy and sale of properties were based, could no longer be
contested (directly or indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari. 20 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be AFFIRMED in all respects.
nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the
petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has SO ORDERED.
an interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties
should have been served upon him.

We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the

delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent,
and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased.
In the same vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late
president and his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it
follows that service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax
delinquencies upon the petitioner is not required by law, as under Section
213 of the NIRC, which pertinently states:

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 134100 September 29, 2000 provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING, respondents. 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

DECISION When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court
MENDOZA, J.: in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse. The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner
was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of
The facts are as follows:
her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel
spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in default.
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial,
fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The
unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of
stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00, payable in two installments of
₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on
June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision4 rendered on July 10,
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must
and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom
prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail the action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy,
to pay the balance. wherein the Supreme Court held:

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.2 She of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however,
based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and
the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon
the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT JARING.7

xxx xxx xxx The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co.
(Underlining added) First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the
avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure
contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for
Insurance, Inc. v. David: the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the
his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The
husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file
death, her liability is independent of and separate from her husband's; she this case against petitioner.
may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim
against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed
decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).5 the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art.
1998.6 Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors: 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for ¾

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.8
SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING
DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD automatically dissolved9 and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the
BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM. settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which
states:
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage is
SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in
intestate proceedings of either. his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30)
days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request
As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no that administration be granted to some other person.14
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are based
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart
to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was one
settlement of estate proceedings.11 Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in
a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal Manuel Co.
partnership property is void.12
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection
v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the
complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving
by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the
dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the enforcement of the entire obligation.
ground that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership
and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership, It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which
Appeals did in this case, that since the defendant was also a party to the is primarily bound for its repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for
obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being
an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership
holding that ¾ and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be
the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still
surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against inapplicable to this case.
said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The
proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against
1âw phi 1

the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner's
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not the issuance of letters of administration18 or for the allowance of
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the
from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads:22
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively 2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period
pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE
estate and not to any other court. THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount
private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner,
₱50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them to wit:
jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code
provides: A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract;
and
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one
and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00) Pesos
right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire to be paid on June 30, 1989.
compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
obligation requires solidarity. the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 should be divided
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00.
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the
debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
being considered distinct from one another.20 Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate
obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held
jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of SO ORDERED.
their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that
they have become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar, there is no allegation
that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the
term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by
private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long
before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
G.R. No. 144915 February 23, 2004 The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein,
was in the will appointed as the executor.
CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and
ANSELMO MANGULABNAN, petitioners During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her
vs. BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent. will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was
docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
DECISION
By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the paragraph five of her will in this wise:
1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
Decision dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, "In re: Petition for UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan,
the Probate of the Codicil (Will) of Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Nueva Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No.
Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G. Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and NT-47089, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO
Edgardo Camaya." P. MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking
HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at ipamana
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA at JUAN
wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson nagaapellidong PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.
Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will MANGULABNAN, sa magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi
reads: bawat isa sa kanila.

IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng
kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, aking HULING HABILIN ay aking pinagtitibay na muli.
may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa x x x3 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988,
aking APO na si ANSELMO ay aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, the testatrix died.
sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of
LOT NO. TITLE NO. KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in
view of the codicil which modified the testator’s will.
288-A NT-47089 Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the
3348-A 100629 Poblacion (2) p. 2 Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552
(the partition case).
3349-B 100630 Poblacion (3) p. 2
On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition
xxx1 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) case,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
defendant to deliver the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT- the following manner:
47089.
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the
However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo Mangulabnan
that the partition is without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in dated February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in
accordance with the Rules of Court, [P]alacios vs. Catimbang Palacios cited favor of the intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed
by the plaintiff: Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-
216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-
"After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not named intervenors as NULL and VOID and of no force and effect; and,
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death.
Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of
he should die before he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the
probate proceedings after the testator’s death would be in order." corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino,
married to Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and residing at San Lorenzo,
question should be protected meaning to say that the tenants should not be Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age,
ejected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Filipino, widow and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia
R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and residing at San
On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan
Ecija a petition5 for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. with full personal circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5)
Proc. No. 218. each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina Reyes dated June 27,
1973.11
On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order6 setting the
petition for hearing and ordering the publication of said order. The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and
Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said decision
but it was denied by Order12 of February 28,1996.
On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case,
Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No.
288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his name. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners) raised the following errors:
Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a
Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991.8 TCT No. NT-215750 was thus 1. THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE
cancelled and TCT No. NT-2164469 was issued in the name of the FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE RULES, THE LAW, AND THE
Camayas. AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision10 in Sp. Proc. No. 218
admitting the codicil to probate and disposing as follows: 2. THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL
BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE SAME BY PARTITION IN A CIVIL CASE
WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS FINALITY AND
THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A QUESTIONABLE In Cuizon v. Ramolete, 17 this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a
CODICIL. probate court, to wit:

3. THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
OPPOSITOR VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to
SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13 determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
By Decision14 of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
court. and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following cannot do so.
issues:
xxx
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null
and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
deed of sale; and possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
2. Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
the codicil. excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate
court has no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the
sale and titles of petitioners;15 and that the probate court can only resolve Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
the following issues: declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having
had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
1. Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will
and testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
identity[;]
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title
2. Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,
execution[; and]
petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and
3. Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the void.
execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of
capacity.16 As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to
probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is
not allowed by law;18 and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005
for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.19
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
Petitioners’ first argument does not persuade. AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, Petitioners,
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that
the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
probate of the codicil." The rights of the prevailing parties in said case
were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil. Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the
people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is
petitioners’ titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of
petitioners Camayas’ claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their
enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful. loved one.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr.,
herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent,
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and
No. 53757 affirming the January 16, 1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The
Branch 35, of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMED with Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional
MODIFICATION. Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for
partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles;
The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED, but the 1) declaration as null and his motion for reconsideration.
and void of Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued on February
7, 1991 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo The facts are undisputed.
Mangulabnan, the February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
him in favor of the intervenors - herein petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an
Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00,
March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their
Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate two minor children.
of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R.
Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of
approved codicil are SET ASIDE, without prejudice to respondent and his administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the
co-heirs’ ventilation of their right in an appropriate action. estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.

SO ORDERED.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate
opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that
letters of administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the
a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6 inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a scheduled.
compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the
preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.7 On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the
estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8 "On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the
declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her
son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator. opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a
and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both were co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the partnership venture.’"
requisite bond.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were
filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court. Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied
Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory. petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor claim of ownership.
children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not
motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate
or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises
court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in special and limited jurisdiction.16
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved
for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and
not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion." provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, "x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
of error: determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may
"I. RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE resolve title."
LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED
EXPEDITIOUSLY. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s
II. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether
FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this
INTESTATE COURT. case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the
THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on
intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12
properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate? of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low
valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to
submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of
to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, Miguelita’s estate.
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties. Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure
a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of
mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory. ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has
court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
1996, thus:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest in the action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
estate and hence, should be given her day in Court." because the probate court cannot do so."22

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of
set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly
true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) belonging to Miguelita's estate.
properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in
the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a "Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this
provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese
respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take
Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus: A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a right?
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita
law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
A: Yes, sir.
property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title
is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember
when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the any more the amount.
persons named in the title. x x x"
xxxxxx
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration
Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence: Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one
half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A: Yes, sir.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among
accordance with law." you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late
husband?
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to
present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We A: If I only knew that this will happen…
quote her testimony, thus:
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24 Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her
death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner
She further testified as follows: herein and their two minor children.28

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish
stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or
abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional
Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29
done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are
agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
basis, is that right? Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby
REVERSED.
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
SO ORDERED.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land
located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po
ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong

iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties

listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis
of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing
that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted
to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were
"business partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to
be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early
on that if the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then
G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006 "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-
heirs have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner, forms a large part of the estate.
vs. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Respondents.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Opposition3 attaching thereto the Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the
This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin
dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by
dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3,
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of
2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from
dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the
on the ground that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No.
the decedent, Elena Lising. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner’s adoption by Elena Lising
and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition 436 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of
for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption decree
late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed was recorded as follows:
as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she
was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for
as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares
Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal
respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio. obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7
municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of
jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the
Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of
be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising,
settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs.1 and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband, On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary
Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on
the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an petitioner’s opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a
administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered
passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco the parties to submit memoranda thereon.11 On July 22, 1999, the case was
is unfit to serve as administrator of Lising’s estate because of her deemed submitted for resolution.12
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree Administrator22 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true
docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the determination and appraisal of the decedent’s universal estate. It was
adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be
Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the appointed special administrator as he was "an experienced and able person
adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mother supposedly connived with the in the management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and
court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
Santos spouses and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in
a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge
special proceedings. petitioner with falsification of public documents per resolution dated January
5, 2001.23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the Regional State Prosecutor.
suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP
No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the
No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule appointment of a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of
47 of the Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory court, Atty. Saguyod.24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds
on March 8, 2000.17 that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of
special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be
praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC
that the petition be dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26
Motion19 filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate
resolution of her opposition. On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed
the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal
On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition complaint against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for
stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents
also informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion
petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property
alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner
docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016. converted the basement of Lising’s residence into a billiard hall without
authority of the special administrator.28
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000
deferring resolution of petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002,
pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the the dispositive part of which reads:
meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all
of the properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order from WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from
this Court. conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent.
The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession
of the listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos
be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same. Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court, "imputations of
irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
SO ORDERED.29 cloud of doubt."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15,
was denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also 2005,34 hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco’s petition for review in
the criminal case.30 A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO
Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the 39.35
September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE
she had the right to possess and use the decedent’s property, title over MERITS.36
which automatically passed on to her upon the latter’s death. Moreover, the
special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an The petition is meritorious.
inventory of the decedent’s estate.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification
constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered
challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by
of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the
appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings. RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the
issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that
resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. said public officers perform.37
Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court
as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public
reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and document38 required by law to be entered into the public records, the official
his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty. repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting
Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court
could not therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s which rendered the judgment.
properties.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the
operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner
clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of
the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the petitioner’s adoption.
facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the
overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not resolution of the petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss
cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its the petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered. matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for
resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed before
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of
Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the
proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is it.42 This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure
void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for
as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is
challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204
long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim should be dismissed.
any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed. Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s
second assigned error.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No.
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like 204 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is
them x x x, claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, DISMISSED.
cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact
that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first SO ORDERED.
cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as
long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid.
(Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily

exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere
collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue
would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant
case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical
G.R. No. L-44602 November 28, 1938 SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or
Fausta Macasaquit, plaintiff-appellant, intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the
vs. ESPERANZA TAÑEDO, assisted by her husband Felipe Mamaual, provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and
and BARTOLOME QUIZON, Deputy Sheriff of Tarlac, defendants- partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally
appellees. capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of
proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.
AVANCENA, C.J.:
In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale
property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by this
were also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable against the conjugal Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities
cent per annum. On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the
will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.
her properties. Upon the commencement of the corresponding probate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section
Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176,
deceased. this court, in the case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the
amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the institution of
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
pending, Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of
Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these
of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense that they cannot
the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta be availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic
Macasaquit, the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff. situation would result if conjugal property were administered, liquidated and
distributed at the same time in a testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary
action for liquidation and partition of property. Consequently, the
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit having been instituted, the
brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property
liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to
described in the complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta
Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any
Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.
other proceeding for the same purpose.
lawphi1.net

The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.

Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the
case of Cruz vs. De Jesus (52 Phil., 870) said that when the marriage is
The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the
instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 reading: husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the
testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there be any debts to
be paid. This doctrine has been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the
Gala (58 Phil., 881). purposes of that case.

From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to
against Eulalio Calma for the payment of the sums of P948.34 and P247, the costs. So ordered. Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and
which wee debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Eulalio Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta
Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to the administratrix Maria
Calma appointed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.
Hence, this being an indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no G.R. No. L-2263 May 30, 1951
complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio Calma, who had
already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this
PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y.
amount had to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
OCAMPO, MAURO Y. OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y. OCAMPO, plaintiffs-
Macasaquit.
appellees,
vs.
Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES
Code of Civil Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of POTENCIANO, defendants.
properties of deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, defendants-
claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appellants.
appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action
against the judicial administratrix.
REYES, J.:
On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included
This is an appeal by certiorari form a decision of the Court of Appeals.
among the inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of
Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it
should, under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes
testamentary proceedings. of this appeal, it appears that on February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo,
married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative,
Conrado Potenciano, and the latter's wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale
We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the
with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,5000, a town a lot with a house as
conjugal property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be
strong materials standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed
brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against
another document, making it appear that, for an annual rental of P300,
said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the
which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price,
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the
the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the
manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.
redemption period.
Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint,
The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the
made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio
poblacion of Biñan, Laguna, and in the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
worth between 20 and 25 pesos. Though registered in the name of Ocampo
property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to allegations and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto Ocampo
another year," but several extensions were granted, with the vendor paying and Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.
part of the principal in addition to interests. The last extension granted was
for year from February 3, 1937, and the period having elapsed without the When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a
repurchase having been made, Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with somewhat different view and rendered judgment declaring:
the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, on
the strength which the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title no. (a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and
18056 in the name of Potenciano and his wife. This, however, did not close Conrado Potenciano was one of mortgage, with interest at the rate of 12 per
the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo cent per annum;
and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon for
(b) That the "option to purchase" and the "contract of lease" (Exhibit E and
the same period of time at annual rental of P300 which, as may again be
E-1) were validly executed by defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding
noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price. On or about
upon the property in litigation;
February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to
Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to
cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, (c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of
deposited the money in court and brought an action in her own name and as one-half of the same from their deceased mother Rufina Reyes;
judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel
Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated in her (d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption
name and that of her husband. (retracto legal) of the other half of the property belonging to their father
Conrado Potenciano;
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a
cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father (e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in
to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their litigation within the time she had to do so;
deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share
passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in (f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made
the same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in payment of the
redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for property in question, was in accordance with the law and relieved the heirs
which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on the fifth of the spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price;
day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's complaint. To meet
these allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the (g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding
intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect, that the pacto de retro sale deed of conveyance, sufficient in law to transfer the title of the property in
in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the litigation to the heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz
rental contract thrown in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that Yatco; and
the option agreement for the repurchase of the property within five years
from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental for that period in an (h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of
amount equal to an annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also title No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate
meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto
tender of payment was valid, the same having been made within the Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by appellees of the corresponding
extended period. The Court of First Instance, after trial, upheld these
fees and the registration in his office of the deed of conveyance mentioned loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal
in the next preceding paragraph. currency (Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,* 45 O.G. [Supp. 9] 229),
the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which
This judgment that is now before us for review. is that of relieving the debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code;
Limkako vs. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)
First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not
disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the
Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an appellants Victor Potenciano and Lourdes Potenciano and that the Court of
equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, Appeals erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they
the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both having inherited one-half of it from their mother and acquired the other half
them, to consolidate title in themselves over the property given as security. from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-
The consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this case was, therefore, owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these
null and void. appellants acquired nothing.

The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was Wherefore, with the modifications of the judgment below, let judgment be
superseded, through novation, by the option agreement for the repurchase entered, declaring the obligation evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby
of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this war held to be mere contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage, already
error because Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer
the death of his wife. To this contention we have to agree. The Court of certificate of title No. 18056 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of
Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto Ocampo
as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by and Paz Yatco upon payment of the corresponding fees. With costs against
appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of its view are the appellants.
now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution
of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the
partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176
(approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of
either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 324).

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the

option agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of time
for the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in the mind of the parties the
real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or
equitable mortgage, though as is usual in these cases, it was given the form
of sale with right to repurchase.

It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of
payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of