Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196741               July 17, 2013
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (Now known
as TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE AND
ENTERPRISE ZONE AUTHORITY), Petitioner, 
vs.
MARCOSA A. SABANDAL-HERZENSTIEL,
PEDRO TAPALES, LUIS TAPALES, and ROMEO
TAPALES,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the January 11, 2011
Decision2 and April 14, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals, Cebu City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
03888 which declared respondent Marcosa A.
Sabandal-Herzenstiel (Sabandal-Herzenstiel) as the
lawful possessor of Lot No. 2574, situated in Brgy.
Basdiot, Moalboal, Cebu (subject property).
The Facts
Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (now Tourism
Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority)
(petitioner) is the owner of the subject property and
other parcels of land located in Brgy. Basdiot,
Moalboal, Cebu since February 12, 1981 when it
bought the same from Tri-Island Corporate Holdings,
Inc. (Tri-Island).4 It had then been in actual, physical,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the
subject property and had declared the same for
taxation purposes. Sometime in 1997, however,
respondents Pedro Tapales, Luis Tapales, Romeo
Tapales (Tapaleses), and SabandalHerzenstiel
(respondents) by force, strategy and stealth entered
into the 2,940 square meter portion of the subject
property, on which they proceeded to cut down
some coconut trees, introduced improvements and
fenced the area. Petitioner made demands to
vacate, the last of which was through a letter5 dated
January 5, 1998, which respondents ignored,
prompting the filing of a forcible entry
complaint6 against them before the 12th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-Alcantara-Badian-
Alegria, Cebu (MCTC), docketed as Civil Case No.
118, on March 18, 1998.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Tapaleses
acknowledged that the subject property had already
been sold by its administrator, Josefina Abrenica, to
Tri-Island.7 They, however, claimed that the sale was
tainted with force and intimidation and hence void,
including the subsequent transactions covering the
same property.8 Notwithstanding the sale, they
remained in actual and physical possession of the
subject property and even introduced improvements
thereon. Consequently, absent any proof of prior
possession on the part of petitioner, they claimed
that the forcible entry complaint must necessarily be
dismissed.9
The MCTC Ruling
On April 13, 2007, the MCTC rendered a
Decision10 (MCTC Decision) ordering respondents
to: (a) vacate the subject property and remove all
the improvements introduced therein; (b) pay
petitioner, jointly and severally, the amount of
₱2,000.00 as monthly rental from the date of judicial
demand, i.e., March 18, 1998, until they have
effectively vacated the premises; and (c) pay the
costs of suit.
The MCTC declared that petitioner is the lawful
owner of the subject property and had been in prior
possession thereof as shown by the following: (a)
the deed of sale dated February 12, 1981; (b) the
tax declarations issued in its name; and (c) its act of
leasing portions of the subject property to others in
the exercise of its right of ownership and
possession.11 In contrast, respondents failed to
substantiate their claim of ownership and
possession. Neither have they established any
relationship with Abrenica, the previous owner of the
subject property.12 On the other hand, Sabandal-
Herzenstiel never claimed to be the owner of the
same and even acknowledged petitioner’s
ownership when she offered to buy back the land.13
The RTC Ruling
On January 30, 2008, respondents' appeal to the
RTC was dismissed for their failure to file a
memorandum on appeal as required under Section
7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court (Rules).14 Their
motion for reconsideration was similarly denied in an
Order dated April 23, 2008.15
Only Sabandal-Herzenstiel elevated the matter
before the CA via a petition for review under Rule 42
of the Rules.
The CA Ruling
On January 11, 2011, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision,16 nullifying and setting aside the rulings of
both the MCTC and RTC, and declaring Sabandal-
Herzenstiel as the lawful possessor of the subject
property.17
It held that while the RTC correctly dismissed
respondents’ appeal for failure to submit their
memorandum on appeal within the prescribed
period, it should have relaxed the rules on procedure
in the interest of substantial justice and for a full
determination of the rights of the parties taking into
account the subsequent compliance of the
respondents.18
On the merits, the CA found petitioner to have failed
to establish prior possession of the subject
property19 and rebut respondents’ claim of continued
physical possession in spite of the sale of the
subject property to Tri-Island during which,
Sabandal-Herzenstiel leased and converted the
property into a resort.20
Petitioner moved for reconsideration21 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution22 dated April 14,
2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether
or not the respondents may be lawfully ejected from
the subject property.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove
that he was in prior possession of the disputed
property and that the defendant deprived him of his
possession by any of the means provided for in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force,
intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.23
In this case, respondents failed to establish their
prior and continued possession of the subject
property after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981.
On the contrary, they even admitted in their answer
to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion
over the same by instituting caretakers and leasing
portions thereof to third persons.24 Suffice it to state
that possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.25 Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion to
be well-founded, the MCTC properly adjudged
petitioner to have prior possession over the subject
property as against Sabandal-Herzenstiel, who
never claimed ownership or possession thereof.26
Petitioner’s supposed failure to describe in detail the
manner of respondents’ entry into the subject
property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence states
that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the
exclusion of the lawful possessor – as petitioner had
sufficiently demonstrated – would necessarily imply
the use of force. As held in Estel v. Heirs of
Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.:28
x x x Unlawfully entering the subject property and
excluding therefrom the prior possessor would
necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that
is necessary. In order to constitute force, the
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.
No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is,
thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged
that the possession of the subject property was
wrested from them through violence and force.29
And in David v. Cordova:30
x x x The foundation of a possessory action is really
the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a
person who has entered without right. The words "by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include
every situation or condition under which one person
can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If
a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight,
under the very eyes of the person already clothed
with lawful possession, but without the consent of
the latter, and there plants himself and excludes
such prior possessor from the property, the action of
forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be
maintained, even though no force is used by the
trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied
from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground
and excluding the other party.31
Similarly, in Arbizo v. Santillan,32 it has been held
that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed
premises, erecting a structure thereon, and
excluding therefrom the prior possessor would
necessarily imply the use of force, as in this
case.1âwphi1
In fine, the Court upholds the findings and
conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging petitioner to be
the lawful possessor of the subject property, square
as they are with existing law and jurisprudence.
Accordingly, the CA’s ruling on the merits must
perforce be reversed and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
January 11, 2011 Decision and April 14, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 03888 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The April 13, 2007 Decision of the 12th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moalboal-Alcantara-
Badian-Alegria, Cebu in Civil Case No. 118 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL JOSE PORTUGAL
CASTILLO PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice