Genaro Goñi, et. al. v. CA, Gaspar Vicente | G.R. No. L-27434 | Sept. 23.

1986

TOPIC: Dead Man’s Statute

FACTS:

 The 3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria (Dulce) situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas [TABACALERA].
 Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with
TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the
price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago
Villegas (later substituted by Joaquin Villegas).
 Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas
without a guaranty, private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of
TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in a document denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de
Cuenta."
 Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of
the purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by private
respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of
Hacienda Dulce for the sum of P13,807.
o This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goñi as attorney-in-
fact of Villanueva, thus: (written in Spanish)
 Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment
for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to
complete the purchase price, only this amount was debited from Vicente’s account.
o The difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva, but as no receipt
evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners.
 Petitioners allege that subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to
raise funds by selling a certain property  so he went to Vicente to rescind the contract/promise to sell
o However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been debited from Vicente’s account, it was
agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce would merely be leased to Vicente for 5
years, with the rent to be deducted from the money advanced by Vicente and any balance owing
to Villanueva would be delivered by Vicente together with the lots at the end of the stipulated
period of lease.
 In 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of
Villanueva.
o Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce were thereafter registered in the name of
Villanueva.
o The fields were also mortgaged by Villanueva to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) 
later transferred to PNB on December 16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of P334,400.0
o Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente after the 1949-1950
milling season in January and February, 1950.
 Villanueva executed a “Documento de la Venta Definitive” in favor of Villegas, covering Lot No. 314
(Hacienda Sarria)  supplemental instrument later executed by Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include
in this sale the sugar quota of the land
 On Nov. 12, 1951, Villanueva died  intestate proceedings were instituted in CFI-Negros Oriental
o Among the properties included in the inventory were fields nos. 3, 4, and 13 of Hacienda Dulce,
along with several other lots
 On the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the late Praxedes
Villanueva delivered to the heirs, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages
before the CFI against Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Villanueva
 o Vicente sought to recover filed no. 3 of Hacienda Dulce, basins his entitlement on the
contract/promise to sell executed by the late Villanueva in his favor
 [RTC DECISION]
o Ordered defendants (Petitioners in this case) to:
 Deliver to Vicente field no. 3
 Execute a formal Deed of Sale covering field nos. 3, 4, and 13
 Both parties appealed to the CA
 [CA DECISION]
o Affirmed RTC Decision. Modified only the amount of damages to be paid
 Petitioner filed a MR but was denied  Hence, this present appeal.
o One of the questions of law raised: “May respondent Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring
before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate, in
violation of Rule 130, Sec. 20?”

ISSUE:

Whether the lower courts erred in ruling for the admissibility in evidence of private respondent Vicente’s testimony?
– NO
HELD:

 Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from
testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows:
o Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot
testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
 The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon
terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the
party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving
party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.

Application to the case:

 The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the
latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection.
 The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because
they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they
are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and
make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased
might have been interested to establish, if living.
 Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined
private respondent Vicente.
o A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when
counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during
deceased's lifetime.
 o Petitioners also presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus
took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of
property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4
and 13.
o Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters
of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought
against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
 As under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person
in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party
must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent.
o The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-
in-factof Praxedes Villanueva.
o He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could
either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said
contract.
o The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of
the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the
other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the
case at bar, BECAUSE Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise
to sell.
o Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified
that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of
the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.