This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a dispute over ownership of land. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant breached an agreement to sell them land. The defendant invoked rules protecting testimony regarding communications with deceased persons since the original agreement was with their predecessor who had passed away. However, the court found the defendant had waived these protections by cross-examining the plaintiff and filing a counterclaim. The court also did not find the reasons provided by the plaintiff for not taking the land earlier to be credible. Based on the close relationship between the original parties, the court believed the agreement was for a verbal lease rather than a written contract of sale. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant.
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a dispute over ownership of land. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant breached an agreement to sell them land. The defendant invoked rules protecting testimony regarding communications with deceased persons since the original agreement was with their predecessor who had passed away. However, the court found the defendant had waived these protections by cross-examining the plaintiff and filing a counterclaim. The court also did not find the reasons provided by the plaintiff for not taking the land earlier to be credible. Based on the close relationship between the original parties, the court believed the agreement was for a verbal lease rather than a written contract of sale. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant.
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a dispute over ownership of land. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant breached an agreement to sell them land. The defendant invoked rules protecting testimony regarding communications with deceased persons since the original agreement was with their predecessor who had passed away. However, the court found the defendant had waived these protections by cross-examining the plaintiff and filing a counterclaim. The court also did not find the reasons provided by the plaintiff for not taking the land earlier to be credible. Based on the close relationship between the original parties, the court believed the agreement was for a verbal lease rather than a written contract of sale. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant.
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of the Philippines case regarding a dispute over ownership of land. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant breached an agreement to sell them land. The defendant invoked rules protecting testimony regarding communications with deceased persons since the original agreement was with their predecessor who had passed away. However, the court found the defendant had waived these protections by cross-examining the plaintiff and filing a counterclaim. The court also did not find the reasons provided by the plaintiff for not taking the land earlier to be credible. Based on the close relationship between the original parties, the court believed the agreement was for a verbal lease rather than a written contract of sale. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant.
VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitionersappellants, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondentsappellees. Evidence The privilege to invoke the Dead Mans Statute is waived by the defendant where (a) he crossexamines the plaintiff and (b) he files a counterclaim against the plaintiff.Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners crossexamined private respondent Vicente. A waiver occurs when plaintiffs deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative crossexamined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceaseds lifetime. It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the
counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13.
Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person. Same The Survivorship Disqualification Rule cannot be invoke where defendant testifies as to communications made or contracts entered into with the agent of the decedent while latter was _______________ *
SECOND DIVISION.
223
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 23, 1986
223
Goi vs. Court of Appeals
alive.Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse
party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goi as attorneyinfact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and
respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently
registered in Villanuevas name and mortgaged 224
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Goi vs. Court of Appeals
with the RFC. Villanueva likewise executed a deed of sale
covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title of said lots. If it were true that he made demands on Villanueva for the surrender of field no. 3 as well as the execution of the corresponding deed of sale, he should have, upon refusal of the latter to do so, immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter, instituted an action for recovery, or as previously observed, caused his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title. Considering that field no. 3, containing an area of three (3) hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, is the biggest among the three lots, an ordinary prudent man would have taken these steps if he honestly believed he had any right thereto. Yet, private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact such inaction persisted even during the pendency of the intestate proceedings wherein he could have readily intervened to seek exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the inventory of properties of the late Praxedes Villanueva. Same Same Same Same Same.The reason given by
private respondent Vicente that field no. 3 was not delivered to
him together with fields nos. 4 and 13 because there were small sugar cane growing on said field at that time belonging to TABACALERA, might be taken as a plausible explanation why he could not take immediate possession of lot no. 3, but it certainly could not explain why it took him four years before instituting an action in court, and very conveniently, as petitioners noted, after Villanueva had died and at the time when the verbal contract of lease was about to expire. Same Same Same Close relatives may plausibly find it unnecessary to reduce a novated written agreement into writing. Both the trial and appellate courts chose to believe in the contract/promise to sell rather than the lease agreement, simply because the former had been reduced to writing, while the latter was merely verbal. It must be observed, though, that the contract/promise to sell was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney infact of the late Praxedes Villanueva, an indication, to our mind, that final arrangements were made by petitioner Goi in the absence of Villanueva. It was therefore natural for private respondent Vicente to have demanded that the agreement be in writing to erase any doubt of its binding effect upon Villanueva. On the other hand, the verbal lease agreement 225
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 23, 1986
225
Goi vs. Court of Appeals
was negotiated by and between Villanueva and private
respondent Vicente themselves. Being close friends and relatives it can be safely assumed that they did not find it necessary to
reduce the same into writing.
APPEAL by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioners appellants. San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Office for respondentsappellees. FERNAN, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 27800R entitled, Gaspar Vicente, PlaintiffAppellant, vs. Genaro Goi, et. al., DefendantsAppellants as well as from the resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The factual backdrop is as follows: The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessorininterest of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in a document denominated as
Report of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Opinions of the Judges Thereof, in the Case of Dred Scott versus John F.A. Sandford
December Term, 1856.