Harmonizing Similarities

Elias G.
Saba
Harmonizing Similarities
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Authenticated
Download Date | 10/19/19 10:37 PM
Islam – Thought, Culture,
and Society
Volume 1

Authenticated
Elias G. Saba
Harmonizing
Similarities
A History of Distinctions Literature in Islamic Law

Authenticated
ISBN 978-3-11-060405-4
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-060579-2
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-060439-9
ISSN 2628-4286
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019946400
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Cover image: © Calligraphy by Osman Özçay. With friendly permission.
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
www.degruyter.com

Authenticated
Acknowledgements
This book is the fruit of years of intellectual labor. I have been fortunate to have
had the help, guidance, and friendship of a great many people and institutions.
This book is a refined and improved version of my dissertation. Paul M. Cobb and
Jamal J. Elias provided exceptional help and mentoring during my graduate stud-
ies, as I wrote my dissertation, and having continued to do so in the following
years. My dissertation advisor, Joseph E. Lowry, was an exemplary advisor. He
provided constant encouragement and detailed critique.
This study would not have been possible without the help of a variety of
grants. The Mellon-Mays Fellowship has provided years of financial support
and provided me with a community that has been key to my academic success.
I am also grateful for a residency at the American Center for Oriental Research
through an ACOR-CAORC grant during which I was able to conduct much of
the research that guided this book. At the University of Pennsylvania, I was
able to succeed thanks to a Benjamin Franklin Fellowship, the Foreign Language
and Area Studies Fellowship, a fellowship from the Communication within the
Curriculum program, a Janet Lee Stevens Fellowship, and a grant from the Dig-
ital Humanities Forum.
I am grateful to the BRAIS – De Gruyter Prize 2018 committee for honoring
my work. As I have refined this monograph, I have benefitted greatly from the
help of Robert Gleave and A. Kevin Reinhart. Marc Herman and Nicolai Sinai
provided wonderfully detailed feedback on the majority of this book. I also
wish to thank Sophie Wagenhofer, Katrin Mittmann, and André Horn at De
Gruyter for all of their editorial assistance.
I am grateful as well to those who have read sections of this work and/or
have helped me refine my arguments. In particular, I thank Ṣalāḥ Abū al-Ḥājj,
Roger M. A. Allen, Jeffery Arsenault, Kameliya Atanasova, Carolyn Baugh, Joel
Blecher, Carolyn Brunelle, Talya Fishman, Angela Giordani, Ari Gordon, Camer-
on Hu, Ali Karjoo-Ravary, Nicholas Harris, Renata Holod, Murad Idris, Matt Kee-
gan, Susan MacDougall, Christian Mauder, Christian Müller, Tilman Neuschild,
David S. Powers, Raha Rafii, Yossef Rapoport, Ryan Rittenberg, Noel Rivera, Ma-
riam Sheibani, Thomas Levi Thompson, and Amir Toft. I also wish to thank my
colleagues at Grinnell College for their help and encouragement. In particular, I
wish to thank Shanna Benjamin, Caleb Elfenbein, and Karla Erickson.
I also thank the helpful and accommodating staffs at the British Library, the
Bibliothèque nationale de France, the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, the Suleyma-
niye Library in Istanbul, the Leiden University Libraries, the Garrett Library at
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-001

Authenticated
VI Acknowledgements
Princeton University, and the staff at the New York Public Library, particularly
Thomas Lannon.
Finally, I thank Eiren Shea for unwavering emotional, intellectual, and edi-
torial help during every stage of this book.

Authenticated
Contents
Introduction 1
Legal Background 3
A Note on Genre 6
The Role of Genre in Islamic Law 8
Chapter Overview 12
Chapter One:
What Is a Legal Distinction? 16
Defining Legal Distinctions 17
Premodern Definitions 17
Modern Understandings 31
Justifications for Legal Distinctions 36
Conclusion 41
Chapter Two:
A General History of Distinctions 43
Furūq in Medicine 45
Furūq in Philology 54
Early Lexicographical Activity 58
Books of Farq 61
Farq and the Arabic Alphabet 69
Farq and Furūq in Other Fields 73
Farq in Philosophy 74
Farq in Ethics 76
Farq in Law 77
Conclusions 79
Chapter Three:
Jadal as a Source for Legal Writings: The Cases of Khilāf and Furūq 81
Disputation and Distinction 82
Farq in Theological Disputation 84
Farq in Legal Disputation 87
Disputational Theory and Practice (Khilāf) 94
Disputation in Furūq 103
Conclusion 108

Authenticated
VIII Contents
Excursus: The Logic of Legal Distinctions 110

Understanding Lexicographic Distinctions 112
Understanding Legal Distinctions 114
Concluding Thoughts 117
Chapter Four:
Riddles and Entertainment 119
Literary Salons, Learning, and Culture 121
Literature and Practice of Legal Riddles 132
Legal Distinctions as Play 141
The Merging of Alghāz and Furūq 144
Separating Riddles and Distinctions: The Case of Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Asnawī 148
Conclusion 154
Chapter Five: A Bibliographic Survey of the Distinctions Genre 157

Narrative Listing of Furūq Works 165
The Fourth/Tenth Century 166
The Fifth/Eleventh Century 167
The Sixth/Twelfth Century 171
The Seventh/Thirteenth Century 172
The Eighth/Fourteenth Century 177
The Ninth/Fifteenth Century 180
The Tenth/Sixteenth Century 182
Works of Indeterminate Date 183
Historical and Geographical Trends 185
A Note on Manuscripts 187
Conclusion 191
Conclusion 194
Appendix I:
Bibliography of Furūq Works by Madhhab 198
Shāfiʿī 198
Ḥanafī 203
Mālikī 206
Ḥanbalī 210
Shi’i Works 212
Works Incorrectly Said to Be of Legal Distinctions 212

Authenticated
Contents IX
Appendix II:
Chronological Furūq Bibliography 215
Third/Ninth Century 215
Fourth/Tenth Century 215
Fifth/Eleventh Century 215
Sixth/Twelfth Century 216
Seventh/Thirteenth Century 216
Eighth/Fourteenth Century 216
Ninth/Fifteenth Century 217
Tenth/Sixteenth Century 217
Unknown 217
Appendix III:
The Manuscripts of Furūq-A: Table of Contents 218
Appendix IV:
The Manuscripts of Furūq-B (Najm al-Dīn Naysābūrī, attrib.): Table of
Contents 221
Works Cited 225

Manuscripts 225
Printed Sources 226
Index 243

Authenticated
Authenticated
Introduction
What is the social history of Islamic legal literature? The answer to this question
remains unclear. Even though the history and development of Islamic law have
long formed the subject of extensive scholarly study, scholars have not discussed
the rhetoric or aesthetics of law’s literature. Most of the study of Islamic law has
tended to focus on the legal system that is described in works of Islamic law, at
the expense of the way that this system is expressed. Yet, change and dynamism
in Islamic law also occurs through the ways in which legal knowledge is pack-
aged, organized, and presented; in other words, through development and
change in literary features, such as genre. A focus on Islamic law as a field of
learning rather than as part of a legal system requires a greater focus on its lit-
erary characteristics.
Modern scholarship has generally divided the history of Islamic law into
three periods: “early,” “middle,” and “modern.” Most scholars have focused
on the rise and early development of the Islamic legal tradition or the transition
to multiple modern, national ones that selectively incorporate concepts from Is-
lamic law. This division parallels the prevailing periodization of the history of Is-
lamic societies generally. Marshall Hodgson divided that history into three broad
periods, which he labeled “the Classical Age,” “the Middle Periods,” and “Gun-
powder Empires and Modern Time.”¹ Until recently, the middle periods have
been sorely understudied. Wael Hallaq, arguably the leading western scholar
of Islamic law, has referred to this post-formative period, from approximately
1250 to 1800, as “a virtual terra incognita.”² This lack of scholarly attention is
due to a belief that this period was one of legal and cultural stagnation. The
scholars who do study this period, however, have shown that Islamic law under-
went remarkable changes.
The misunderstanding about a so-called “middle period” of Islamic law re-
lates, at least in part, to a misconception about the very nature of Islamic legal
change. In arguments about development or lack thereof, scholars have attempt-
ed to look for changes or development in either the substantive rules of Islamic
law (furūʿ al-fiqh) or in legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). Since Islamic law is understood
as a legal system, it makes sense to look for development to occur in manuals of
substantive laws or in the theoretical writings on legal interpretation. Furūʿ al-
 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, 3
vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
 Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 1.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-002

Authenticated
2 Introduction
fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh are not the two halves of Islamic law, however; they are only
two genres of Islamic legal literature.³ In addition, Islamic law can also be under-
stood as a scholarly discipline, concerned with the production and organization
of a specific kind of knowledge. According to this understanding, promulgation
of new substantive rules and advancements in legal theory are only two possible
kinds of development.
This book traces the history of one understudied genre, that of legal distinc-
tions, al-furūq al-fiqhiyya—the comparison of apparently similar fact-patterns
that lead to different legal outcomes. Examining thirty-six works that belong
to this genre, composed over a period of approximately six hundred years, allows
us to understand the social and intellectual trends that drove the rhetoric of this
genre. The beginnings of this genre can confidently be dated to the fourth/tenth
century, though the earliest such work remains to be identified. The fifth/elev-
enth century saw a surge in works addressing legal distinctions, and the genre
flourished in the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries. Books of
legal distinctions were written in all four Sunni schools of law, although it
found greatest currency in the Shāfiʿī school. In general, Shi’i jurists did not
compose works of legal distinctions, although an early work is attributed to
the Shi’i jurist Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. third/ninth c.) and another
work is attributed to the Zaydī author ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī al-
Yamanī (d. 777/1375 – 76).⁴ The genre seems to have been particularly popular
in large urban centers, with an original point of focus in Abbasid Baghdad
and later in Mamluk Cairo. The manuscripts of books of legal distinctions
show that these works were copied and recopied often and circulated widely.
This study emphasizes one literary manifestation of Islamic law. In particu-
lar, it looks to expand the study of genre within Islamic legal writing by carrying
out a history of one particular genre. The genre of legal distinctions has received
little scholarly attention. Nevertheless, its history is an important part of the de-
velopment of Islamic law. This study shows the genre to be a valuable rubric for
locating the relevance of later Islamic legal literature, and in particular high-
lights the intellectual and social background from which this genre emerged
and the specific ways in which the genre of legal distinctions adapted to chang-
ing social patterns that affected the consumption of Islamic legal knowledge.
 Admittedly, they may be the most important genres in Islamic legal literature. A legal system,
of course, is made up of much more than legal theory and substantive laws. In addition, a legal
system would need at least courts, a state, and enforcement mechanics. See Joseph Raz, The
Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1980).
 Unfortunately, neither work is extant.

Authenticated
Legal Background 3
Furūq literature offered a venue that allowed jurists to adapt the law in new
packaging as a response to social demand for new and different forms of legal
knowledge.
Legal Background
The Middle Periods of Islamic history witnessed the downfall of caliphal hegem-
ony as well as the rise of non-Arabic Islamic culture. These political changes
have led scholars to describe this period as one of scholarly stasis and cultural
decadence. In the realm of Arabic literature, for example, the idea that Arabic
writing entered a period of steep decline around the thirteenth century had
been accepted for well over a century. R.A. Nicholson already took this as a
given in his Literary History of the Arabs published in 1907, when he refers to cul-
tural production in Arabic after the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258 as “a mel-
ancholy conclusion to a glorious history.”⁵ Ensuing scholarship assumed that it
is possible to identify the precise moment the age of decline began and argued
for various moments. In the Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, M.M. Badawi
argued that the alleged decline began early in the sixteenth century and ended
in the late nineteenth, declaring that “[t]he period is no doubt characterized by
the absence of creativity and loss of vigour.”⁶ While the period of supposed de-
cline is shrinking in size, Badawi does not question the decline narrative. It is
only very recently that scholars of Arabic literature have begun to study this pe-
riod in earnest. Joseph Lowry and Devin Stewart describe the period between
1350 and 1850 as “a period of time almost uniformly dismissed by scholars of
Arabic literature as lacking in literary achievements.”⁷ Their volume, which sur-
veys some major figures of this period, marks a radical shift in the reassessment
of cultural production in Arabic.⁸
 Reynold A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1907), 442.
 Muhammad M. Badawi, “Introduction,” in Modern Arabic Literature: The Cambridge History of
Arabic Literature, ed. Muhammad M. Badawi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
 Joseph E. Lowry and Devin J. Stewart, “Introduction,” in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography
1350 – 1850, ed. Joseph E. Lowry and Devin J. Stewart (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 1.
 More recently, Thomas Bauer has put forth a convincing case for ambiguity as a central aes-
thetic notion in Arabic literature. The tolerance for, and even delight in, ambiguity was a central
motivator of scholarly writing. See Thomas Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere
Geschichte des Islams (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2011).

Authenticated
4 Introduction
Joseph Schacht, perhaps the most important twentieth-century scholar of Is-

lamic law, reinforced this broad narrative of decline as the dominant conception
of Islamic law. He held that creative development within Islamic law came to an
abrupt stop around the middle of the fourth/tenth century. At this time, legal cre-
ativity ossified into a state of total rigidity, or as he called it, “ankylose.”⁹ As evi-
dence for the lack of creativity during this period, Schacht has pointed to several
factors: the rise of commentary traditions, a decline in innovative legal reason-
ing, and, most importantly, a discursive commitment to adhering diligently to al-
ready-established legal interpretations, known in Arabic as taqlīd. ¹⁰ Schacht’s
interpretation of Islamic law amounts to the dismissal of the majority of Islamic
legal history.
In a well-known article, Wael Hallaq challenged Schacht’s ideas by adducing
evidence of many legal scholars who, after the tenth century, offered new and
inventive legal interpretations. His findings “suggest [that] developments in pos-
itive law, legal theory, and the judiciary have indeed taken place.”¹¹ Elsewhere,
Hallaq looked at the development of Islamic law through the incorporation of
legal responsa, fatwas, into legal compendia, demonstrating the adaptability
of Islamic law well into its supposed period of rigidity.¹² The suggestion that gen-
res otherwise assumed to signify ossification in fact signify innovation chal-
lenged scholars to integrate new discourses to identify development and creativ-
ity within the history of Islamic law. Baber Johansen and David S. Powers have
both demonstrated in greater detail how legal change and creativity were ex-
pressed through such responsa. Johansen argues that fatwas were not “chiefly
responsible,” but rather that commentaries on legal compendia also played a
major role in changing legal doctrine.¹³ Powers, meanwhile, argues that post-
classical authors did adhere to already-established legal interpretations, “or,
what we might call, adherence to the rule of law.”¹⁴
 Joseph Schacht, “Classicisme, traditionalisme et ankylose dans la loi religieuse de l’Islam,” in

Classicisme et déclin culturel dans l’histoire de l’Islam, ed. Robert Brunschvig and G.E. von Gru-
nebaum (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1977).
 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 71.
 Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 16 (1984), 33.
 Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,”
Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994): 29 – 65.
 Baber Johansen, “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change,” in Islam and Public Law:
Classical and Contemporary Studies, ed. Chibli Mallat (London: Graham and Trotman, 1993),
30 – 31.
 David S. Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300 – 1500 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002), 94.

Authenticated
Legal Background 5
Sherman Jackson rejects Schacht’s assertion of “ossification,” seeing the

constraints of the tradition as an impetus for legal creativity, more so than
what was possible without these limitations: “In fact, it may not be at all incor-
rect to say that taqlīd represents a more rather than less advanced phase of legal
development.”¹⁵ Jackson interprets this respect for legal tradition as the param-
eters within and through which later jurists display their intellectual creativity.
Norman Calder takes this idea to an extreme, arguing that Islamic law is, in
fact, not law for this world at all, but rather a “brilliant imitation of reality,
sharply characterised, precisely delineated, charmingly evocative.”¹⁶ With this
statement, Schacht’s formulation of Islamic legal history has been turned on
its head. Taqlīd does not mark a nadir of any kind, but rather the beginning
of an opening within legal literature for concern with the aesthetics of the
law, and of the maturation of the craft of legal writing.
As previously noted, this scholarly debate is incomplete. It deals only with
three genres of legal writing: legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), legal compendia (fiqh),
and responsa (fatwas). There are other post-formative genres of legal writing
that remain almost entirely unexplored. They include works on legal distinctions
(furūq), cognate and similar legal cases (al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir), legal maxims
(qawāʿid), legal riddles (al-alghāz al-fiqhiyya), and more. These genres are, fur-
ther, interrelated. Many books, such as al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Ibn Nujaym
(d. 970/1563), contain extensive sections on all three of these topics. To date,
there has been little scholarship dealing with any of these other genres. More sig-
nificantly, the subject of this book, al-furūq al-fiqhiyya, has received almost no
scholarly attention in the Western academy. Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn and Necmittin
Kızılkaya have, however, each written monographs, in Arabic and Turkish re-
spectively, surveying the distinctions genre.¹⁷
This genre is, in fact, quite understudied: there are just two articles in Euro-
pean languages dealing specifically with such books and only a handful of men-
tions of them in other research. The first of the two articles on this subject, by
 Sherman Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-
Dīn al-Qarāfī (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 227.
 Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era, ed. Colin Imber (Cambridge: Cam-
 Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya:
muqawwamātuhā shurūṭuhā nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā; dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya tārīkhiyya
(Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1419/1998); Necmettin Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar: Furûk
literatürü üzerine bir inceleme (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2016); in addition, see Muḥammad Abū
l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris, “al-Dirāsa,” in Abū l-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī, al-Furūq al-
fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992).

Authenticated
6 Introduction
Joseph Schacht, was published in 1926. In this article, Schacht alludes to the po-
tential importance of the genre of legal distinctions, but most of his comments
are about the condition of two manuscripts.¹⁸ The next article on this topic
was published in 2000 by Wolfhart Heinrichs. Again, rather than analyzing
furūq literature, he primarily provides an annotated bibliography of some
furūq works. He repeats the call for its study and asserts that legal distinctions
should be studied along with two other similar genres: legal maxims and cog-
nate and similar cases. Such research “will lead to a fairer assessment of later
Islamic legal culture.”¹⁹ Since Heinrichs wrote his article, there has been work
done on the “cousins” of furūq literature—cognate and similar legal cases (al-
ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir), and legal maxims (qawāʿid)—but little on the furūq litera-
ture itself.
A Note on Genre
The idea of genre inspired the analysis in this study. It is therefore important to
discuss what I mean by the word “genre” and how I use this term. While genres
are commonly thought of passively, as “groups of works that belong together be-
cause they stand in the same tradition,”²⁰ genres are really the products of agen-
cy, of those who bring the texts together and those who construct and determine
the contours of a tradition. In the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics,
Max Cavitch explains that “[t]he practice of grouping individual texts into dis-
tinct categories, called genres, is common to writers and readers of all periods.”²¹
Both authors and audiences play a role in determining the genre of a work with
the result that shifting conceptions of different genres emerge over time.
The understanding of genre relied on in this study draws in part on formalist
understandings. A formalist interpretation of genre, as explained by Tzvetan To-
dorov, is based on the idea of genre as a category or groupings to which texts can
 Schacht is primarily concerned with presenting two manuscripts within this genre, one at-
tributed to a Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī (d. ?) and another by al-Sāmarrī (d. 545/1150). Joseph
Schacht, “Aus zwei arabischen Furūq-Büchern,” Islamica 2 (1926): 505 – 37.
 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law: Remarks on the Furūq Literature,” in Studies in
Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth Volume I: Hunter of the East; Arabic and Semitic Studies,
ed. Ian Richard Netton, 332– 44 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 340.
 Alastair Fowler, “Genre,” in Encyclopedia of Literature and Criticism, ed. Martin Coyle et al.
(Detroit: Gale Research, 1990), 151.
 Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 4th ed., s.v. “Genre” (Max Cavitch). Italics
added.

Authenticated
A Note on Genre 7
be ascribed. Tzvetan Todorov’s ideas about genre are useful because of the
change and dynamism that he detects in literary genres. On the origins of a
genre, one of the central questions of the first part of this book, Todorov writes:
“Where do genres come from? Quite simply from other genres. A new genre is
always the transformation of an earlier one, or of several: by inversion, by dis-
placement, by combination.”²² Genres should not be seen as static or stable,
but rather as constantly changing. A genre can undergo change in itself, or it
can change into a new genre. Todorov sees the origin of the novel arising from
a massive series of generic transformations, arguing that “[t]he difficulty of
the study of the ‘origin of the novel…’ arises only from the infinite embedding
of speech acts with others.”²³ Only a finite number of transformations, or embed-
ded speech acts, can be accounted for. While it may not be possible to capture all
of the transformations that gave way to the creation of a new genre, this method-
ology is quite useful for understanding Islamic legal genres.
Genre should also be understood as a Wittgensteinian language game,²⁴
meaning that “language [is] to be understood as an activity,”²⁵or “recurrent
acts of play in time.”²⁶ This line of reasoning allows us to think of genre as a con-
tinuous activity, always open to change and improvisation, rather than a rigid
category. A genre thus consists of “family resemblances,” not “defining charac-
teristics.”²⁷ Each genre is beholden to its particular rules and these rules are li-
able to change over time, as the game plays out in a series of social and intellec-
tual contexts. Understanding genre as a game is particularly useful when looking
at premodern Arabic writers. These writers clearly had ideas of genres, as is evi-
dent in the title of works, the allusions made through titles of works, the ways
authors used introductions to contextualize a given book, and in discussions
of literature in prosopographical works. A flexible understanding of genre is nec-
essary to study the life of any Islamic legal genre, as these were elaborated over
centuries, across a wide geography, and by several authors belonging to different
schools of thought. If one thinks of genre as a continuous activity, it is not sur-
prising to find one set of genres in an early period evolving in multiple ways.
 Tzvetan Todorov, Genres in Discourse, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1990), 15.
 Todorov, Genres, 26.
 Fowler, “Genre,” 157.
 Hans Sluga, Wittgenstein (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 60.
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M.
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 68e, ¶519.
 Fowler, “Genre,” 157.

Authenticated
8 Introduction
Genres can splinter off into new genres and genres can change their rules to
adapt to new activities.
The Role of Genre in Islamic Law
This study builds on recent attempts by scholars to explore the full archive of
Islamic law, a trend that has enabled scholars to better understand the develop-
ment of Islamic law and the way Islamic legal thinking has transitioned into
modernity.²⁸ These works, however, are not explicit attempts at studying genre
broadly speaking. Rather, notions about specific genres and their function in Is-
lamic law seem to guide much of the research they undertake. As Ahmad Ahmad
notes, for instance, “[i]n fact, I am not aware of much treatment by Western
scholars of any of the particular juristic genres that make up the corpus of Islam-
ic legal writings as genres in their own right.”²⁹ A treatment of particular juristic
genres in their own right requires the existence of identifiable genres.
One issue that immediately arises when attempting to study one particular
genre is how to define the criteria for inclusion in and exclusion from the
genre, or, in other words, how to recognize works as being part of one genre. Pre-
vious studies have used a variety of methods for grouping works into genres.
Ahmad himself seems to be confident of his ability to recognize a genre when
he sees one, even though he does not tell us how he identifies specific genres.³⁰
Similarly, Intisar Rabb does not state her criteria explicitly, but it is clear from
looking at her overview of the genre of legal maxims that she classifies works
based on their content.³¹ Another approach, taken by Khadiga Musam appears
to be classification by title.³²
 In particular, I am indebted to Ahmad A. Ahmad’s Structural Interrelations, which analyzed

works of al-takhrīj and al-qawāʿid, Ahmed El Shamsy’s “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law,” on the
ḥāshiya literature, Intisar Rabb’s Doubt in Islamic Law, on al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya, and Khadiga
Musa’s “Legal Maxims as a Genre of Islamic Law,” a study of al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya and al-
ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir.
 Ahmad A. Ahmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of
Six Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 45.
 Although he does note that “focusing on the significance of these different types of Islamic
legal writing is more valuable than squeezing them into identifiable genres”; Ahmad, Structural
Interrelations, 17.
 Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit: Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, 7th–16th centuries,” (Ph.D. Diss.,
Princeton University, 2009), 458 – 82.
 Khadiga Musa, “Legal Maxims as a Genre of Islamic Law: Origins, Development, and Signif-
icance of al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyya,” Islamic Law and Society 21 (2014): 325 – 65. This is also the ap-

Authenticated
Ahmed El Shamsy has recently discussed legal genre in a study devoted to

“the emergence of the ḥāshiya [supercommentary] genre in Islamic legal litera-
ture.”³³ While El Shamsy does not include a theoretical discussion of genre or
the role of genre in Islamic law, he attempts to state parameters for the genre
of the ḥāshiya. The characteristic features of the genre include “an exercise in
a specific kind of erudition,”³⁴ “a linguistic preoccupation,”³⁵ “the sheer scholas-
ticism of many of the ḥāshiya authors’ concerns,”³⁶ and “its [very concise] Arabic
style.”³⁷ The characteristics that El Shamsy describes are useful, but too broad as
they apply to more than just the ḥāshiya texts. His list leaves out the most obvi-
ous shared feature of supercommentaries, a formal consideration, namely, that a
ḥāshiya is a commentary on a previous commentary. This formal characteristic
seems to be what El Shamsy is using in identifying works belonging to this
genre, even though it is not part of his list of “characteristic features.”
Wittgenstein’s idea of a language game is particularly useful for the study of
Islamic legal literature: instead of looking for rigid characteristics, one should
look for the kinds of rules that each genre follows qua game.³⁸ Rules establish
the parameters of a particular game and can be, but are not necessarily, strict
or rigid. Certain games, such as chess, may have a detailed list of clearly defined
unbending rules. Other games, however, such as playing with a ball, do not have
any explicit or strict rules, but follow rules nonetheless.³⁹ The different features
or characteristics can be thought of as limits within which genres can play. An
adherence to certain rules, which may be both unwritten and flexible, makes
genres recognizable, but perhaps indescribable.⁴⁰ Unwritten but recognizable
proach taken by Devin Stewart in his studies on Islamic legal theory. Devin J. Stewart, “Muḥam-
mad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-aḥkām and the Genre of Uṣūl al-Fiqh in Ninth-Cen-
tury Baghdad,” in ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies,
Cambridge 6 – 10 July 2002, ed. James Montgomery, 321– 49 (Leuven: Peeters, 2004).
 Ahmed El Shamsy, “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of the Shāfiʿī Literature,” Oriens 41
(2013), 290.
 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya,” 296 – 97.
 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya,” 297.
 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya,” 297.
 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya,” 298.
 Sluga, Wittgenstein, 61; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical
Investigations”: Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper & Row,
1965), 25 – 26.
 Sluga, Wittgenstein, 78 – 79; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 83.
 Here, the comparison with playing a game of passing a ball is particularly relevant. Passing a
ball is a completely informal game, the rules of which can be malleable, but are generally intui-
tive to the participants. The rules of this game are never stable and cannot be definitively estab-
lished, but those playing will nevertheless adhere to them during a particular game.

Authenticated
10 Introduction
rules that authors and readers participated in suggest as well that they were
aware of generic conventions.
The articles by Ahmad, El Shamsy, Musa, and Rabb also provide evidence
for the usefulness of thinking about genre as a language-game. Genre is not
just a function of packaging or presentation, but has profound consequences
on understanding the content of a work and the context to which it may be re-
sponding. Both El Shamsy and Rabb find evidence of legal content being shaped
by genre: they find thought and language conforming to the rules of particular
language games. El Shamsy suggests that the development of supercommenta-
ries was a way for jurists to cope with and comprehend the enormity of the
legal literary tradition, “a product of the logical development of a discipline.”⁴¹
In seeing supercommentaries as a sort of end-point for a legal tradition commit-
ted to commentary, jurists were free to elaborate on any and all aspects of these
texts. The rules for a supercommentary seem to allow for a great degree of free-
dom so long as the commentator follows a particular kind of text from start to
finish. It was not simply the legal content that was important, but also the lin-
guistic and intellectual concerns of the authors of these texts—they respond to
these texts as scholars in addition to their responses as jurists. Rabb, meanwhile,
finds that the maxim, “Avoid capital punishment in cases of doubt (idraʾū l-
ḥudūd bi-l-shubuhāt),” underwent change as it moved from one genre to another.
She argues that “[t]he sources indicate that the differences in the form of the
maxim in the early period were a matter not of sequence, but of genre.”⁴² The
changes inherent in this maxim were less of a function of historical than of lit-
erary context. The maxim changed as it played different generic games.⁴³
 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya,” 303.

 Rabb, “Doubt’s Benefit,” 61.
 This maxim, which Rabb calls the ḥudūd maxim, appears almost from the start of Islamic
legal literature. It is found, for instance, in works of substantive law such as the Kitāb al-
Āthār by Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804) and the Kitāb al-Kharāj of Abū
Yūsuf (d. 182/798). The maxim also appears in the Muwaṭṭaʾ of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), in
the recension of Yaḥyā ibn Yaḥyā l-Laythī (d. 234/848). Similarly, we can find the doubt
canon in the the Risāla of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), a legal-theoretical
work, and even in works of hadith such as the Muṣannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/827), the
Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), and the Shi‘i Qaḍāyā amīr al-muʾminīn ʿAlī ibn Abī
Ṭālib by Ibrāhīm ibn Hāshim al-Qummī (d. mid-third/ninth c.). Across these different types of
literature, the ḥudūd maxim makes subtle, but noticeable difference in wording, scope, and
source. The maxim is not always considered Prophetic, but slowly acquires status as a prophetic
hadith over time. In its early history, the maxim is more amenable to changes in wording and
interpretation; once the maxim becomes codified and included in works of qawāʿid, its role
in Islamic law is stable and understood. See Intisar A. Rabb, “Islamic Legal Maxims as Substan-

Authenticated
One of the benefits of studying Islamic law from the vantage point of genre is
that jurists seem to have seen themselves as participating in established genres,
or discursive traditions. Despite the absence of a term for “genre” in the classical
Arabo-Islamic tradition, several words in Classical Arabic, including bāb, ʿilm,
and nawʿ, track this concept. Moreover, the concept of genre has proved produc-
tive for scholars who have used it as an analytical framework. Not all of the gen-
res of Islamic legal literature are commensurate with one another, nor does it
make sense to analyze them in a similar fashion. Not all genres function in a sim-
ilar way. El Shamsy’s study of supercommentaries necessitates his analytical
focus on the formal features of a work.⁴⁴ Rabb, meanwhile, alerts us to the im-
portance of content. It may seem obvious that content plays a role in the deter-
mination of genre, yet it is an important point that has been obscured in studies
of Islamic law. Musa’s focus on titles, meanwhile, reveals yet another way to
think about genre. Title was one of the few explicit ways that premodern authors
had of announcing their participation in one genre or another. Why and how this
was accomplished may not always be straightforward, but titles should not be
dismissed.
One result that can already be seen from treatments of genre is the overem-
phasis given to two genres of Islamic law, substantive rules (furūʿ al-fiqh) and
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh).⁴⁵ It can seem, at times, that all Islamic legal writing
can be included in one of these two rubrics. As Rabb writes, “[m]ost studies
of Islamic law tend to portray a bipartite arrangement [of substantive legal
rules and formalist jurisprudence].”⁴⁶ Such a portrayal leaves no room for
legal literature that exists outside of this framework. Ahmad comes to a similar
conclusion, claiming that legal distinctions and maxims “are but two examples
of Islamic legal writing that cannot be subsumed under the rubrics of fiqh and
uṣūl al-fiqh.”⁴⁷ The present study adds to this trend in recent research attempting
to overcome the uṣūl-furūʿ dichotomy.
It is not completely clear how and why authors chose to write in one genre
instead of another, nor how and why genres were created, flourished, or waned.
By tracing these issues for one particularly understudied tradition within Islamic
tive Canons of Construction: Ḥudūd-Avoidance in Cases of Doubt,” Islamic Law and Society 17
(2010): 63 – 125; and idem, Doubt in Islamic Law, 48 – 66.
 El Shamsy presumably takes these formal features as a given feature of supercommentary,
and are not included in his list of generic considerations.
 See also Ahmad, Structural Interrelations, 16.
 Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law, 20.
 Ahmad, Structural Interrelations, 29.

Authenticated
12 Introduction
law, this study suggests avenues of exploration that can be applied to other types
of Islamic legal literature.
Chapter Overview
This history of the genre of legal distinctions is composed of four chapters and
an excursus. Chapter One begins by asking what a legal distinction is, and what
a book of legal distinction looks like. The theoretical question of the nature of a
legal distinction is not one seriously taken up by the classical tradition. I have
found only three such discussions, which are examined in this first chapter.
The earliest and most in-depth is found in al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, also known as
Kitāb al-Furūq, by ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī (d. 438/1047), but there are also brief
analyses in ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal by Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316)
and al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid by Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392). From
this survey, several aspects of legal distinctions emerge: the specific form of
the comparison carried out in a legal distinction; its relationship to analogical
reasoning; and the importance of formal disputation to the creation of the
field of legal distinctions. The chapter then pursues this question from a different
angle, by looking at books of legal distinctions themselves. The chapter closes
with a look at the justifications given in books of legal distinctions for the com-
position of such works.
Having explored the definitions of this genre, the second chapter takes a
wider view, looking at the literature on distinctions in the Arabic tradition gen-
erally. This second chapter focuses primarily on the genres of distinctions in lin-
guistics and in medicine as parallels to the genre of legal distinctions. Distinc-
tions in linguistics focused either on differentiating between letters of the
Arabic language, often on phonological grounds, or on lexicographic distinc-
tions in the sense of semantic differentiation between near-synonyms. This chap-
ter finds that the genre of lexicographic distinctions was an important precursor
to legal distinctions; it may perhaps even be said to establish some rules of the
language game that is the genre of legal distinctions regarding the organization
and presentation of information. In medicine, differential diagnostics also has a
certain resonance with the genre of legal distinctions. This conclusion is compli-
cated by the fact that although classical bio-bibliographical works seem to attest
to a small but extant genre of distinctions works in medicine, only one work of
this genre has survived, in various manuscripts and attributed to a variety of au-
thors. Little, therefore, can be said about the genre or its conventions. Finally, the
chapter closes by discussing other areas of intellectual inquiry that appear to
have traditions of distinctions writing, such as ethics and philosophy. These

Authenticated
Chapter Overview 13
works on distinctions, however, are not genres specific to these disciplines, but
rather what I term applied lexicographic distinctions, by which I mean a work of
lexicographic distinctions as applied to the technical vocabulary of a specific
scholarly discipline—a comparison of words for the soul, for instance, or of giv-
ing advice and reprimanding. These works of applied lexicographic distinctions
are important since they are found in almost all areas of Arabo-Islamic scholar-
ship, and relevant to this study since they are even found in the field of law, but
they are not examples of works of legal distinctions.
With these foundations in place, the third chapter looks for precursors to
legal distinctions within other genres of Islamic law. Here, I locate one of the ori-
gins of legal distinctions, the discussions in manuals of disputation theory (ʿilm
al-jadal) on a particular method of objection labeled farq (“distinction”). Farq, as
a formal technique, is found in manuals of legal disputation, but not in manuals
for disputations in philosophy or theology. It is an objection to the applicability
of a legal rationale (ʿilla) of one legal ruling to a second ruling. A farq-objection
is used to trap a debate opponent into admitting that his statement for the case
at hand contradicts a known doctrine held by him or his legal school. Books of
legal distinctions can be seen as attempts to organize possible farq-objections
and the information necessary to overcome them. In this sense, farq-objections
are used “offensively” in order to demonstrate contradictions while the genre of
legal furūq contain the information necessary to defend oneself against such ob-
jections, thereby presenting a legal school’s substantive doctrines as coherent in
terms of the rationales that underlie them.⁴⁸
After studying the disputational background of legal distinctions, a brief ex-
cursus analyzes in detail the logic of legal distinctions. This section attempts to
define the relationship between lexicographic distinctions and legal distinctions
in terms of the analytical framework employed in each genre. Although the res-
onances between these two genres are clear, there are significant differences in
the reasoning employed in legal and lexicographic distinctions and, consequent-
ly, in the rules that each genre attempts to follow. In differentiating between
near-synonyms, the genre of lexicographical distinctions is based on a funda-
mental similarity between the two words being compared. Legal distinctions,
however, aim to demonstrate the fundamental dissimilarity between the two
legal scenarios being compared. The analysis in this section establishes some
of the rules that govern the genre of legal distinctions.
 Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Joseph Lowry, Introduction to The Epistle on Legal
Theory by Mụ hammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, ed. and trans. Joseph E. Lowry (New York: New
York University Press, 2013), xviii–ix.

Authenticated
14 Introduction
Having established some of the parameters of the genre of legal distinctions,

Chapter Four turns to works that potentially complicate our understanding of the
genre of legal distinctions. In particular, this chapter studies the intersection be-
tween the genres of legal distinctions and that of legal riddles (al-alghāz al-
fiqhiyya). There are obvious parallels between these two genres, and each of
them seems to have affected the other, with some works of legal riddles being
almost indistinguishable from works of legal distinctions and some works of
legal distinctions presenting distinctions couched in the rhetorical style of rid-
dles. This chapter locates the impetus for this convergence in the proliferation
of venues at which legal knowledge could be performed—teaching sessions, lit-
erary salons, and the court of the ruler—and a growing taste, particularly in the
Mamluk period in Cairo (seventh/thirteenth – tenth/sixteenth centuries), for the
aesthetics of riddles. The role of performance is also important as it connects
changes in literary style with social practice and different reading publics.
Finally, Chapter Five is a narrative bibliography of all known works of legal
distinctions. The bibliographical work carried out in this chapter builds on pre-
vious catalogs. My survey locates thirty-six works that belong to this genre, and
identifies the fifth/eleventh century and the seventh/thirteenth through eighth/
fourteenth centuries as the peak period of composition in this genre. Chapter
Five also discusses three books of legal distinctions, one Shāfiʿī and two Ḥanafī,
that have various dubious attributions but no known author. In spite of the un-
certainty about the authors of the two Ḥanafī works, they clearly belong to the
genre and were copied and circulated to the same extent as other works in the
genre whose authors are more easily identifiable.
The genre of al-furūq al-fiqhiyya presents a good subject for a case study of
the emergence and maturation of a new and distinct genre in Islamic legal liter-
ature. A study of this genre ties the intellectual history of Islamic law together
with the social display and consumption of Islamic legal knowledge. Specifical-
ly, it shows that the need for books of legal distinctions arose in part from the
popularity of legal disputation and the usefulness of these works in overcoming
farq-objections, which were common in the context of formal disputations. It
also demonstrates a close link between legal distinctions and distinctions in
other scholarly fields.
Taken together, these chapters demonstrate the way that legal writing was
fully enmeshed in social and intellectual trends. The rise of legal distinctions
treatises was due to the popularity of legal disputation—a kind of performance
of legal knowledge. The shift in this genre towards a rhetoric of riddles tracks
the popularity of posing and solving riddles in intellectual gatherings. The com-
position and production of particular books of law was a result of changing

Authenticated
Chapter Overview 15
trends in the ways that legal knowledge was consumed by a certain educated
public.
At the same time, this study reminds us that these literary changes in Islamic
law were part of larger aesthetic trends. The rise of legal distinctions treatises
closely follows the rise of lexicographical distinctions and perhaps medical dis-
tinctions. Changes in the aesthetics of scholarship during the Mamluk period are
seen to operate in legal texts as well. These changes highlight that the literature
of Islamic law was, in part, a literary endeavor subject to the same changes in
aesthetic and rhetorical interest as other disciplines. For jurists in late Mamluk
and early Ottoman Cairo, the form of Islamic legal writing was as important
as their content. Understanding this literary dimension will help us to better un-
derstand their works, but also the ways in which they understood and concep-
tualized the discipline of Islamic law.

Authenticated
Chapter One: What Is a Legal Distinction?
This book explores the genre of legal distinctions in Islamic legal literature. Be-
fore formal works of legal distinctions appeared, however, authors writing in
Arabic expressed abiding interest in other kinds of distinctions (sg. farq, pl.
furūq), an interest that undoubtedly helped shape the legal genre at issue in
this study. At least three distinct threads contributed to the rise of treatises ad-
dressed to legal distinctions: (i) the organization and systematization of substan-
tive legal doctrine, (ii) the use of distinctions in non-legal contexts, and (iii) the
use of farq as an objection in formal disputation (ʿilm al-jadal). This chapter fo-
cuses on the first of these threads, the organization and systematization of sub-
stantive legal doctrine. The following two chapters will address the second and
third of these threads, respectively. Before delving into legal distinctions as a
kind of natural result of the systematization of legal knowledge, however, this
chapter addresses the issue of what legal distinctions are and how premodern
jurists conceived of legal distinctions as both a concept and a genre.
While legal distinctions treatises abound in both print and manuscript, dis-
cussions of legal distinctions are quite scarce, in both the premodern tradition
and in the modern scholarly study of Islamic law. Legal distinctions are both
a genre of Islamic legal literature and a concept within Islamic law. In the
words of the scholar Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn, legal distinctions treatises list pairs
of “legal problems that are similar in appearance, but contradictory in their rul-
ing” (aḥkām tatashābahu ṣuwaruhā wa-takhtalifu aḥkāmuhā) and explain the
distinctions that lead to the contradictory rulings.¹ First appearing in the Ḥanafī,
Mālikī, and Shāfiʿī (but not Ḥanbalī) schools of law in the early fifth/eleventh
century, these small legal works endeavored to show the inherent harmony gov-
erning the doctrinal complexities present in Islamic schools of law.²
In order to understand the purpose of these texts, this chapter will define the
scope of legal distinctions (al-furūq al-fiqhiyya) and offer a typological explana-
tion of their functions. My discussion relies on both premodern and modern dis-
cussions of legal distinctions. As a concept, legal distinctions seem to play the
role of a kind of doctrinal gatekeeper, certain doctrines are preferred over others.
Legal distinctions also play a role in legal disputation (jadal), as mentioned in
the premodern discussions.
 Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: muqawwamātuhā

shurūṭuhā nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā; dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya tārīkhiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat al-
Rushd, 1419/1998), 14– 15.
 Ḥanbalī works of legal distinctions first appear in the seventh/thirteenth century.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-003

Authenticated
After exploring premodern and modern definitions of legal distinctions, this

chapter analyzes the ways in which works of legal distinctions are introduced. In
these introductory comments, authors generally repeat similar themes alluding
to the importance of their works for students of Islamic law. Legal distinctions
are presented to us as supplementary works available to students. The discus-
sions that elucidate the differences between two similar fact-patterns makes
these works beneficial to law students. Given the reality of legal complexity, dis-
tinctions help to systematize and organize legal knowledge. Taken together, a rel-
atively clear definition of legal distinctions emerges. As a genre, these texts con-
tain comparisons of legal rulings and the legal reasoning undergirding these
rulings.
Defining Legal Distinctions
Premodern works of legal distinctions are rarely self-conscious, that is, they do
not explicitly discuss precisely what legal distinctions are. For us, however, it is
important to understand what a legal distinction is and how it functions before
analyzing the history of the genre of legal distinctions. First, this section covers
premodern understandings of legal distinctions, focusing on three discussions,
by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī (d. 438/1047), Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d.
716/1316), and Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392). These three discussions
all focus on the relationship between legal distinctions and legal disputation,
a topic to which we shall return in Chapter Three, as well as the resolution of
apparent doctrinal inconsistencies. We then turn to twentieth-century discus-
sions of legal distinctions in the writings of Joseph Schacht, Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn,
Wolfhart Heinrichs, and Necmettin Kızılkaya. Taken together, these understand-
ings of legal distinctions will guide our explorations throughout this book.
Premodern Definitions
Ironically, the paucity of premodern definitions of what constitutes a legal dis-

tinction appears to suggest a widespread and shared understanding of the
topic among both authors and their readers. There is no need to spend time de-
fining a concept if everyone already understands it. Indeed, works of legal dis-
tinctions themselves all share a similar conceptual framework and organization.
This means that works of legal distinctions are recognizable, both in the way that
they organize legal distinctions and in the rhetoric through which they present
legal distinctions. That this shared understanding of legal distinctions can be

Authenticated
18 Chapter One: What Is a Legal Distinction?
seen from the earliest works in this genre suggests that the concept of legal dis-
tinctions predates the composition of legal distinctions treatises. Nevertheless,
the discussions on the nature of legal distinctions that are preserved provide im-
portant insight into the way that legal distinctions have been understood histor-
ically.
Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī
The earliest theoretical discussion of legal distinctions appears in a work of legal

distinctions by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, the father of the more fa-
mous Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū l-Maʿālī l-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085). His al-Farq wa-l-
jamʿ, alternatively known as Kitāb al-Furūq, begins with a lengthy introduction
detailing his theory of legal distinctions. Al-Juwaynī’s discussion is unique in
its depth and breadth. He offers a threefold typology of legal distinctions. I
shall explain this typology briefly, and then provide examples and further expla-
nation of each type.
The first type of distinctions obtains when “there are two issues on which the
legal school does not disagree, which have a similar appearances but a contra-
dictory ruling.”³ What this means is a comparison of different laws that only ap-
pear to contradict, but do not, in fact, contradict.⁴ This is the most basic and
common kind of legal distinction, both in al-Juwaynī’s treatise and in the
genre of legal distinctions generally. The second and third type of distinction
are rarer and both consider uncertainty regarding which legal consideration is
favored in the madhhab. The second type of distinctions obtains “when two
questions arise that appear to be the same and al-Shāfiʿī [(d. 204/820)] gave a
categorical response to one of the questions and made the other ruling depend-
ent on some factor” (qaṭaʿa qawlahu bi-jawābihi fī iḥdāhimā wa-ʿallaqa qawlahu
bi-l-ukhrā).⁵ This type of distinction involves understanding the particularities of
the substantive doctrine of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the eponym of the
 Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 3 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥ-
mān ibn Salāmah ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1424/2004), 1:39. An yuṣādifa
masʾalatayn lam yakhtalif al-madhhab fīhima wa-lā fī wāḥida minhuma wa-l-ṣūra mutashābiha
wa-l-ḥukmān mukhtalifān.
 While the rulings contradict, the laws do not contradict since the appearance or fact-pattern
are not equivalent. The nonequivalence of the issues removes the ground for comparison be-
tween them. They are simply different rulings for different issues. Since they are different and
cannot be compared, they cannot contradict each other.
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39 – 41.

Authenticated
Shāfiʿī school. The distinction rests on those statements that al-Shāfiʿī stated as
unconditional and those that he said were conditional. Finally, the third type of
distinction is that in which “two questions come up which appear to be the same
and our legal scholars have mentioned two legal considerations for one of them
but given a categorical response for the other” (tajtamiʿu masʾalatān dhakara
mashāyikhunā wajhayn fī iḥdāhima wa-qaṭaʿū l-qawl fī l-ukhra).⁶ This is similar
to the second type of distinction, except that it requires a familiarity with the
doctrine of school authorities after al-Shāfiʿī.
Although this last group is by far the least common type of distinction, al-
Juwaynī spends the most time describing it. There are two subdivisions within
this third type: (a) “the two different considerations have equivalent weight”
(an yaqwā kull wāḥid min al-wajhayn)⁷ and (b) “one of the two considerations
is weakened by the indicant in the case on which there is no disagreement”
(an yaḍʿufa aḥad al-wajhayn bi-dalīl al-masʾala allatī lam takhtalifū fīhā).⁸ The
first subdivision decides between two rulings with equal epistemological
value, that is, when there does not seem to be any criterion for preferring one
ruling over another. The second evaluates two cases with different rulings and
different epistemic values. Al-Juwaynī seems to be asking the following: how
should a jurist measure a ruling reached by consensus that applies only indirect-
ly to the case at hand as opposed to a directly relevant ruling on which there is
no consensus?
Let us consider this classification more closely. The first type of legal distinc-
tion addresses a mistaken identity. In this case, the accusation involves two en-
tirely separate legal issues, which have different rulings attached to them. In
these cases, there is no disagreement. The supposed contradiction only arises
when someone wrongly supposes two different issues to be the same legal
issue. Al-Juwaynī argues that this is the most common kind of distinction, a
claim evidenced by other legal distinctions treatises.⁹ Al-Juwaynī gives the fol-
lowing example of this type of distinction:
A ritual prayer is invalid if it is begun with a temporally prior intention, unless this inten-
tion is coterminous with the beginning of the prayer (anna l-ṣalāt lā taṣiḥḥu bi-niyya
mutaqaddama ḥattā takūna l-niyya muqtarana bi-awwalihā).
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.

 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39. He says the furūq of this kind are “practically infinite”
(naẓāʾir hādhā l-qism akthar min an yuḥṣā).

Authenticated
A fast, however, is valid even if the intention to fast was made prior to the start of the fast
(wa-yaṣiḥḥu l-ṣawm wa-in kānat al-niyya mutaqaddama ʿalā l-ṣawm bi-l-zamān).
The distinction between these is the possibility to follow the statement of intention directly
by the prayer and the clear inability to follow the statement of intention directly by the
fast.¹⁰
In this example, the doctrinal difference centers on making an intention to per-

form a ritual act. In the first situation, one must make a mental resolution to pray
in the moment before praying. In the second situation, one may make a mental
resolution to fast long before the start of the fast. These two situations appear
similar since they both involve affirming one’s intention to perform a ritual
duty. The rulings, however, seem contradictory because the allowable time be-
tween resolving to perform the duty and performing the duty differs. Confusion,
according to a-Juwaynī, rests on the assumption that all ritual duties are legally
similar; that is, confusion arises from assuming that the rules regulating ritual
prayer are equivalent to those regulating ritual fasting. Only by first thinking
that the acts of prayer and fasting must be alike can one err in this regard. Al-
Juwaynī’s distinction between these cases endeavors to show that these two rul-
ings are not incongruent; it is the cases themselves that are dissimilar.
The next two kinds of distinction proposed by al-Juwaynī operate differently.
These distinctions require determining correct precedent. Here, the apparently
distinct situations really are similar in some way, and resolving the incongruity
results from determining the relevant precedential opinions. Al-Juwaynī cites a
case in which al-Shāfiʿī gives apparently conflicting opinions:
Al-Shāfiʿī, may God be pleased with him, had two rulings in regard to a hired worker (al-ajīr
al-mushtarik) in cases when the capital is destroyed while in his possession.
One ruling is that the worker is liable for the value of the capital (ḍāmin). The other is that
he is exempt from any liabilities (barīʾ ʿan al-ḍamāʾin).
Thus, if someone hires a man as a worker to perform work in his workshop and something
is destroyed while in the worker’s possession, al-Shāfiʿī has stated categorically (qaṭaʿa al-
qawl) that he is not liable, even though both of them are laborers.¹¹
According to al-Juwaynī, al-Shāfiʿī said that a hired worker both is and is not li-
able for damages to the goods with which he is working. Al-Juwaynī presents
these statements without further explanation or information. He does not con-
textualize this information nor explain where it was that al-Shāfiʿī made these
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39.

 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:40.

Authenticated
statements, in what text, on what basis, etc. He simply presents this contradic-
tion as a known fact, although he will later offer a partial contextualization.
Al-Juwaynī is addressing an audience expected to be familiar with the Shāfiʿī
legal school and its doctrines such that the aforementioned matters do not
need to be explained in full. This exposition, however, makes clear not only
the contradiction inherent in al-Shāfiʿī’s doctrine, but also how it manifests itself
in an applied setting.
Next, Al-Juwaynī seeks to resolve the contradiction between the two rules,
writing:
The distinction between them is that an independent laborer (al-ajīr al-mushtarik) has pos-
session of the countervalue that corresponds to the price of his labor. Thus, he can be held
liable for the destruction of the good. A worker in a workshop, however, is not in sole pos-
session, but rather the owner of the workshop has possession (al-yad) of what is in his
workshop. Thus, the destruction of something in the possession of the worker (fī yad al-
ajīr) is like the death of a slave in the possession of his owner (fī yaday sayyidihi) through
phlebotomy or cupping during an operation. The phlebotomist is not liable.¹²
Al-Juwaynī distinguishes between two types of workers, arguing that an inde-

pendent laborer is not equivalent to an employee in a workshop (al-ajīr fī l-
ḥānūt) when it comes to damages. The former is liable for damages because
he has the goods in his sole possession (al-yad lahu), while the latter is exempt
because the goods remain in the store and therefore in the possession of the
storeowner (al-yad li-ṣāḥib al-ḥānūt). Al-Juwaynī asserts that the determinant
of liability in these situations is possession, not the legal status of the laborer
as a hired worker.¹³ In other words, whoever possess the goods is responsible
for damages, not the one who committed the damage.
Al-Juwaynī compares this legal issue to the non-liability of a doctor when
treating someone’s slave. The doctor is not responsible for any damages to the
slave because damages happen while the slave is in the care and custody of
his master (fī yaday sayyidihi). This physician is thus legally equivalent to a
worker in a shop. Despite the implicit general rule, that liability for damages
due to negligence falls on whoever has possession of the damaged good, al-Ju-
waynī does not state such a general rule explicitly. Al-Juwaynī’s discussion is
not concerned with a systematic elaboration of doctrine, but rather with distin-
guishing between certain cases and positing an analogy between others. Indeed,
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:40 – 41.

 Indeed, this may also explain the seeming inconsistency in labelling one worker the worker
in a workshop rather than a hired worker (al-ajīr al-mushtarak). This seeming incongruity also
explains why I translate this term, al-ajīr al-mushtarak, differently in this passage.

Authenticated
it seems that al-Juwaynī locates an instance of apparent doctrinal contradiction

in the work of al-Shāfiʿī and then resolves this contradiction through an appeal
to the prevailing interpretations of the Shāfiʿī madhhab.
Although al-Juwaynī clears away the contradiction as a part of the authori-
tative doctrine of the Shāfiʿī legal school, his explanation ignores the potentially
contradictory nature of the two statements attributed to al-Shāfiʿī. While there
are several possibilities for harmonizing al-Shāfiʿī’s two statements, al-Juwaynī
seems uninterested in undertaking this specific task. Instead, his concern is
with the coherence of the Shāfiʿī madhhab as developed over the centuries by
later jurists. It may be the case that al-Juwaynī sees Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shā-
fiʿī’s substantive doctrine and the doctrinal elaborations of the legal school that
bears his name as extensions of each other, such that resolving apparent contra-
dictions found in the doctrine of the Shāfiʿī school implicitly performs the same
work for the doctrine of its eponym. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that al-Ju-
waynī’s interest lies primarily in the Shāfiʿī madhhab as an elaborated scholar-
ly-legal institution rather than in explicitly defending the specific doctrines of
Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī. In other words, the authority or validity of the
madhhab as expressed here lies in the rationality of its doctrine and is not
tied to the explicit words and writings of its assumed founder.¹⁴
In this discussion, al-Juwaynī is concerned with establishing the absolute co-
herence of the doctrine attributed to Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī. His discus-
sion therefore avoids instances in which al-Shāfiʿī’s doctrine may actually con-
tradict. In part, this is a generic constraint; legal distinctions treatises serve to
show the lack of internal doctrinal contradiction, and admitting the possibility
of such contradiction would defeat the purpose of the treatise. For al-Juwaynī
in this work, the fact that Shāfiʿī scholars have found a way to harmonize al-Shā-
fiʿī’s statements is sufficient to show that al-Shāfiʿī’s doctrine is not inconsistent
or at odds with itself.
The third category in al-Juwaynī’s heuristic is similar to the second. Instead
of focusing on the teachings and doctrines of al-Shāfiʿī and the interpretations
thereof, however, this category is concerned with the teachings and writings of
other scholars affiliated with the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Since the first subcategory
 Al-Juwaynī may have seen this distinction as trivial, since a legal school can be seen as a
large-scale hermeneutic project to harmonize, expand, and perfect the ideas of its eponym.
The way in which the madhhab is defended, however, is noteworthy. In other words, al-Shāfiʿī’s
doctrine and the doctrines of his students as recorded in writing seem to have been less impor-
tant than the interpretations of those doctrines elaborated by the later Shāfiʿī madhhab.

Authenticated
here is equivalent to category two above, al Juwaynī omits a fuller discussion of

it.¹⁵
Al-Juwaynī’s discussion of his second subcategory (namely, that one of two
seemingly contradictory realings turns out to be weaker than the other) is worth
quoting in full because it reveals a great deal about how ramified legal thought
had become already by the fifth/eleventh century. Al-Juwaynī defines this subca-
tegory, but refrains from quoting any particular examples of this topic, perhaps
because of their relative infrequency. It remains unclear whether we can infer
from the lack of examples here that this particular sub-type was more theoretical
than practical in his eyes.¹⁶
The second subcategory obtains when the applicability of one of the two considerations is
weakened by an indicant in the unanimously agreed-upon case. Maintaining a clear dis-
tinction then becomes impossible. In such a situation, one should strive to deem the weak-
er of the two considerations untenable and dismiss it, rather than strive to discover the
basis for a distinction and rationalizing it, not even by extrapolating from the two consid-
erations on the basis of the unanimous accepted ruling. Wayward speculation and farfetch-
ed extrapolations are rampant in this category. Expending great energy on invalidating
weaker considerations is more important than both wayward speculation and rampant pro-
liferation in authoritative legal considerations and extrapolating from them.¹⁷ When we
come across examples of this subcategory, we shall mention them but we have already ex-
plained the reasoning in these cases.¹⁸
Here, legal distinctions have become a methodology for reining in the growth of
authoritative school doctrine. As the Shāfiʿī legal school developed, jurists con-
tinued to elaborate substantive law based on the doctrine and method laid out
by Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī. The more jurists pronounced their own partic-
ular opinions, the more unwieldy the totality of Shāfiʿī doctrine became. Al-Ju-
 In other words, this subcategory is fully equivalent to category two, except the harmoniza-
tion techniques are not applied to the substantive doctrine of al-Shāfiʿī, but rather to consider-
ations of prominent Shāfiʿī jurists. Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.
 It was, perhaps, aspirational as well.
 This statement should be understood as promoting the rigor of the madhhab in order to pre-
vail in a legal disputation, not necessarily as related to the desirability of ijmāʿ.
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41. I give a full transliteration of this passage because of the
subtle ways it discusses legal epistemology and legal elaboration: al-qism al-ākhir an yaḍʿufa
aḥad al-wajhayn bi-dalīl al-masʾala llatī lam yakhtalifū fīhā. fa-yataʿadhdharu l-farq al-wāḍiḥ
fa-shtaghil fī mithl hādhā l-mawḍiʿ bi-tazyīf aḍʿaf al-wajhayn wa-isqāṭihi. wa-lā tashtaghil bi-
ltimās al-farq fa-yataʿadhdharu wa-lā bi-takhrīj al-wajhayn fī l-masʾala l-mujmaʿ ʿalayhā. wa-fī
hādhā l-qism yakthuru l-taʿassuf wa-l-takhrījāt al-mustaḍʿafa. wa-ṣarf al-ʿināya ilā isqāṭ baʿḍ
al-wujūh al-ḍaʿīfa awlā min al-taʿassuf wa-l-wulūʿ bi-stikthār al-wujūh wa-takhrījihā. wa-idhā
ntahaynā ilā amthilat hādhā l-qism dhakarnāhā wa-mahhadnā hādhihī l-ṭarīqa fīhā in shāʾ allāh.

Authenticated
waynī seems to suggest that legal distinctions are one way to slow this growth
and that constraining the doctrinal growth of the school is a better use of jurists’
time than developing their own particular doctrine.
Extrapolation (takhrīj) seems to have been one of, if not the, primary method
of legal derivation after the onset of the so-called “regime of taqlīd.”¹⁹ The for-
malization of Islamic law involved the formalization of distinct legal schools fol-
lowing the doctrine of their eponyms, Abū Ḥanīfa l-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit (d. 150/
767), Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, and Aḥmad
ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855).²⁰ Taqlīd can perhaps be understood best as a discursive
commitment to adhering diligently to already established legal interpretations
set out by the earliest figures in a legal school. Discursive adherence implied
a shift away from labeling one’s own juristic techniques as ijtihād, independent
legal reasoning, since one’s legal reasoning should occur within the established
bounds of the legal school.
Operating under the regime of taqlīd imposed certain strictures on jurists. In-
stead of independent legal reasoning, jurists called their reasoning extrapolation
(takhrīj), based on the writings of previous authorities.²¹ Later jurists based their
reasoning and interpretations on the works of earlier master jurists. Extrapolat-
 The idea of taqlīd has long been a subject of scholarly attention. Taqlīd, in this context, re-
fers to the faithfulness on the part of jurists to the juristic authority of earlier jurists. On taqlīd,
see Sherman Jackson, “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-For-
mative Theory: Muṭlaq and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī,” Islamic Law
and Society 3.2 (1996): 165 – 92; Mohammad Fadel, “The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the
Mukhtaṣar,” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 (1996): 193 – 223; Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, Pragmatism in
Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015),
1– 30. On takhrīj, see Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43 – 56; idem, “Takhrīj and the Construction of Juristic Au-
thority,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 317– 35;
and Ahmad A. Ahmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study
of Six Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1– 4, 49 – 72. See also
Talal Al-Azem’s recent work in which he argues for the importance of tarjīḥ, a process of rule-
formation, through which precedential opinions are created and established, Talal Al-Azem,
Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
 Christopher Melchert locates the emergence of the legal schools in the fourth/tenth century.
In his account, Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918) established the Shāfiʿī school, Abū Bakr al-Khallāl (d.
311/923) established the Ḥanbalī school, and Abū Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) established the
Ḥanafī school. All three of these figures lived in Baghdad. The Mālikī school had a double his-
tory, according to Melchert. In al-Andalus, it was established by ʿĪsā ibn Dīnār (d. 212/827– 28)
and Yaḥya ibn Yaḥya al-Laythī (d. 234/849) in Toledo. The Eastern Mālikī school was established
by Abū Bakr al-Abharī (d. 375/986) in Baghdad but only lasted seventy-five years. Christopher
Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th–10th centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
 Hallaq, Authority, 43 – 56; Ahmed, Structural Interrelations, 1– 4, 57– 59, 189 – 92.

Authenticated
ing on the basis of earlier jurists gave later jurists a way to elaborate on substan-
tive law and engage in legal reasoning. At the same time, they could argue that
they were remaining within the institutional confines of their respective legal
school. Modern scholars have tended to view this methodology as a kind of dec-
adence, although recent scholarship has challenged this narrative of taqlīd as
decay. More productively, taqlīd may be understood as a discursive, rather
than practical, move, and may even described as merely amounting to “adher-
ence to the rule of law,”²² or as Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim puts it, “legal conform-
ism.”²³ Thus, taqlīd helps establish predictable rules.²⁴
Extrapolating new opinions based on previous ones poses a problem for the
discursive adherence expected in taqlīd. The problem is not merely the exercise
of legal reasoning, but rather the infinite potential that extrapolation holds.²⁵ Al-
Juwaynī utilizes the logic of legal distinctions in order to impose limits on doc-
trinal growth. This subset of distinctions serves to limit the speculative extrapo-
lation, underscoring the importance of expending energy invalidating the weak
points of legal doctrine.²⁶ By ensuring that Shāfiʿī legal doctrine is coherent, ra-
tionally derived, and appropriately citing source texts, al-Juwaynī is preparing
Shāfiʿī jurists for formalized disputation (jadal) in which they can demonstrate
the soundness and correctness of their school doctrine. Discussing distinctions
in the context of disputations allows al-Juwaynī to present his distinctions
both as ways to overcome the accusation of farq qua contradiction and potential-
ly to make this charge himself against other Shāfiʿī jurists.
This treatment shows that, for al-Juwaynī, determining the distinguishing
features—drawing a distinction—between what appear to be similar cases is
helpful for resolving apparent contradictions. This comparative approach can
 David S. Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300 – 1500 (Cambridge: Cam-
 Ibrahim, Pragmatism, 10.
 See, among others, Wael Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Sub-
stantive Law,” Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994): 29 – 65; and more recently, idem, Sharīʿa: Theory,
Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Sherman Jackson,
Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (Leiden:
Brill, 1996); and Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era, ed. Colin Imber (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), among many other works.
 Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, “The Codification Episteme in Islamic Juristic Discourse between In-
ertia and Change,” Islamic Law and Society 22 (2015): 157– 220.
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41. A concern for controlling the growth of legal doctrine was
a recurring topic in post-formative Islamic legal writing. See Hallaq, Authority, 236 – 41; and Nor-
man Calder, “al-Nawawī’s Typology of Muftis and Its Significance for a General Theory of Islamic
Law,” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 (1996), 137– 64, especially 137– 43.

Authenticated
also provide a method for reasoning through different kinds of ambiguous or un-
certain legal issues. In his view, thinking through legal distinctions acts as a de-
fensive and pedagogical intellectual maneuver serving to justify the doctrine of a
particular legal school, by teaching the rationales for specific points of legal doc-
trine.
Al-Juwaynī’s classification establishes a hierarchy between different types of
legal distinctions. His hierarchy can be read in two separate ways. First, it helps
him organize the different kinds of furūq according to epistemic criteria. The first
type of legal distinction, between actually different, but apparently similar is-
sues, involves no epistemic conflict, but clarifies the scope of applicability of
two different laws. The second type, involving clear and ambiguous statements
made by al-Shāfiʿī considers the opinions of the school’s eponym; as the founder
of the legal school to which the rest of the Shāfiʿī jurists adhere, his opinions
enjoy epistemic authority over those of other jurists. And the third type tackles
disagreements between later jurists, which carry the least authority. For the read-
er of his work, applying earlier rulings forms an essential part of the academic
formation of a jurist.
In fact, this typology also tracks the educational formation of a jurist. The
first type of distinction is the simplest. These involve understanding the correct
ruling to apply to a particular situation. The second type is more complex and
involves knowing how to judge between various foundational statements and
doctrines. The third type is more specific and involves judging between the doc-
trine of previous scholarly authorities. In this way, al-Juwaynī’s scheme progress-
es from a basic understanding of substantive law to that of the founder to that of
the universe of different Shāfiʿī jurists.
Al-Juwaynī’s typology pertains to the contents of his work, but more broadly
seeks to classify Shāfiʿī doctrine. Furūq can serve to constrain doctrinal growth
and thereby minimize the accusations of contradictions that may be lobbed at a
a Shāfiʿī jurist in the course of a formal disputation (mujādala or munāẓara).
These were not merely hypothetical objections but instead correspond to the
very ones found in recordings of real disputations and paradigmatic accounts
in writing.²⁷ Thus, al-Juwaynī seeks to preempt accusations of contradiction by
arguing that an opponent does not understand (i) the scope of applicability of
seemingly overlapping rules, (ii) the nuances of al-Shāfiʿī’s vast legal doctrine,²⁸
 On legal debates, see Chapter Three.

 The history of al-Shāfiʿī’s substantive legal doctrine is complex. Not only was his writing pre-
served and transmitted in slightly different versions by his students, but he is also said to have
produced a version of his legal doctrine in Iraq and a different and revamped version in Egypt,
the so-called old (al-qadīm) and new (al-jadīd) doctrines. For more on this issue, see Ahmed El

Authenticated
or (iii) how to reason through competing statements of substantive law by later

Shafiʿī authorities. In other words, according to al-Juwaynī, non-Shāfiʿīs could
accuse a Shāfiʿī of contradiction because the non-Shāfiʿī did not understand
how to make the complexity inherent in the substantive doctrine of the Shāfiʿī
legal school coherent. Of course, it should not be surprising for a Shāfiʿī scholar
to claim that others do not understand the depth and complexity of Shāfiʿī doc-
trine. Nevertheless, al-Juwaynī’s claim helps clarify the role of furūq in regulating
school doctrine and in inter-madhhab disputation.
Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī
A second discussion of furūq appears in Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī’s manual for legal
disputation, ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal. ²⁹ This discussion, too, is couched
in the terms of legal dialectics. Al-Ṭūfī’s discussion of furūq appears in the sec-
tion titled “Counter-Objections Based on Qiyās.” The seventeenth kind of dispu-
tational objection based on qiyās is distinction (farq), which I refer to as a farq-
objection. In his presentation, a farq-objection “discovers a characteristic in ei-
ther the precedent case or the instant case that entails a specific legal ruling
(ibdāʾ waṣf fī l-aṣl aw al-farʿ yunāsibu mā khtaṣṣa bihi min al-ḥukm).”³⁰ In
other words, a farq-objection is a claim to a legally compelling similarity—a
shared legal rationale—between two cases of law. Unlike al-Juwaynī’s discussion,
al-Ṭūfī understands furūq as primarily a disputational maneuver related to the
proper exercise of legal reasoning. He continues his discussion with an explana-
tion of how to recognize when a farq-objection may be lodged in a disputation.
“The necessary condition for a distinction is that the two fact-patterns share mul-
tiple legally relevant characteristics, otherwise the difference between the two
cases is a fundamental difference and an objection based on distinction
would be ineffective.”³¹ According to this statement, in order to use a farq-objec-
tion, one must compare two situations that share several relevant characteristics.
The similarities shared by two fact-patterns invite comparison and allow the pos-
sibility that they may be treated the same way legally. This discussion guides par-
ticipants in debates in overcoming objections.
Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
 I discuss the relationship between distinctions and disputation in Chapter Three.
 Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī l-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, ed. Wolfhart
Heinrichs (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1408/1987), 71.
 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 71.

Authenticated
It may seem that al-Ṭūfī’s understanding of furūq is fundamentally different

from that of al-Juwaynī. Al-Juwaynī is only partly interested in disputation, and
focuses as well on the potential of furūq for disambiguating substantive legal
doctrine. Despite the explicit focus on disputation, al-Ṭūfī’s analysis is actually
quite similar to al-Juwaynī’s. The shared characteristics that enable comparison
are legal rationales (ʿilal) that result in similar rulings. The differing characteris-
tic (al-fāriq), however, is the actual legal rationale that gives one of the two com-
pared fact-patterns a legal outcome distinction from the original fact-pattern.
This is very similar to al-Juwaynī’s first type of legal distinction, which involves
distinguishing between two fact-patterns that share only a superficial resem-
blance. Further, even though al-Ṭūfī’s discussion appears in the context of guide-
lines for formal legal disputations, he addresses the larger subject of legal furūq
by offering a list of the treatises written on this subject. “Scholars have written
many treatises on the distinctions between rulings (al-furūq bayn al-aḥkām).”³²
The treatises he lists are those discussed in this study, including al-Juywaynī’s
al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq. ³³ He seems to understand these texts as an extension of distinc-
tions qua disputational objections.
Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī
Finally, the Shāfiʿī scholar Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī includes a short discussion of
legal distinctions in his al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid. Noting that “the law has many
subdisciplines” (al-fiqh anwāʿ), the author addresses “knowledge of assimilation
and distinction” (maʿrifat al-jamʿ wa-l-farq).³⁴ In his recounting, “among the best
works written on this topic is the treatise by the scholar Abū Muḥammad [ʿAb-
dallāh] al-Juwaynī.”³⁵ This is a telling account in that al-Zarkashī cites al-Juway-
nī’s treatise as one of the two principal legal distinctions treatises in the course
of his discussion.
Al-Zarkashī seeks to detail the literature related to legal distinctions, writing:
 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 72.

 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 72– 73.
 Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Bahādur al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid, 3 vols., ed. Taysīr
Fāʾiq Aḥmad Maḥmūd and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn
al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982), 1:69. In this phrase, distinction refers to distinguishing between appa-
rently similar cases that are governed by distinct legal rationales. Assimilating refers to bringing
together similar cases that are governed by the same legal rationale, that is, to assimilate differ-
ent cases under one overarching rationale.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69.

Authenticated
The second type of knowledge is knowledge of how to assimilate and distinguish between
cases. This was the basis for most of the disputations among the early scholars, so much so
that one of them said, “Law is nothing other than distinction and assimilation” (al-fiqh farq
wa-jamʿ).³⁶ Among the best works written on this topic are the treatises by the renowned
Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī and Abū l-Khayr ibn Jamāʿa l-Maqdisī [(d. 480/1086)]. Any dis-
tinction that can be drawn between two cases is effective as long as the cases cannot be
conjecturally assimilated to each other (kull farq bayn masʾalatayn muʾaththir mā lam
yaghlib ʿalā l-ẓann anna l-jāmiʿ aẓhar).³⁷ The Imam [al-Zarkashī] said, “It is not sufficient
to draw distinctions merely on the basis of one’s whims. Rather, if two cases can be assimi-
lated to each other in a way that seems more probable than drawing a distinction between
them, then one should rule on the basis that they share a similarity. If the two cases are at
odds, however, they should be held to be distinct.”³⁸ The Imam also said, “Understand this
well, for it is one of the foundations of the religion (qawāʿid al-dīn).”³⁹
Al-Zarkashī, accordingly, foregrounds the centrality of legal distinctions within

Islamic law. He dutifully lists al-farq wa-l-jamʿ (distinctions and assimilation)
second in his list of subdisciplines of Islamic law. His subdisciplines are: (i)
“knowledge of the substantive laws, both those mentioned explicitly in revela-
tion and those known through legal reasoning”;⁴⁰ (ii) “al-farq wa-l-jamʿ”;⁴¹ (iii)
“the building of legal cases one on the other such that they all result from
one underlying principle”;⁴² (iv) “difficult questions (al-muṭāraḥāt), i. e., obscure
questions that are used to test one’s intellect”;⁴³ (v) “sophistical argumentation”
(? mughālaṭāt);⁴⁴ (vi) “examinations” (mumtaḥināt);⁴⁵ (vii) “riddles”;⁴⁶ (viii)
“legal strategems”;⁴⁷ (ix) “knowledge of individual scholars, [namely,] what spe-
 The source of this aphorism is perhaps Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī. See Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam
al-jadhal, 71. See also Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 333.
 This statement should draw to mind al-Ṭūfī’s insistence on the importance of shared char-
acteristics.
 This statement is quite similar to al-Juwaynī’s discussion of the typology of legal distinc-
tions. In particular, this statement is reminiscent of his final type, wherein a jurist ought to com-
pare the particular considerations held by prominent jurists of the Shāfiʿī school.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:69 – 70. Specifically, al-Zarkashī says, “bināʾ al-masāʾil baʿḍahā
ʿalā baʿḍ li-jtimāʿihā fī maʾkhadh wāḥid.” On the concept of legal scaffolding, see Sherman Jack-
son, “Taqlīd.”
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:70 – 71.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71.

Authenticated
cific considerations each took on issues of substantive law”;⁴⁸ and (x) “knowl-
edge of the specific precepts (ḍawābiṭ) that assimilate and the maxims on
which legal theory and substantive law depend.”⁴⁹ This list, which al-Zarkashī
uses to situate his work on legal maxims (qawāʿid), provides a fascinating in-
sight into the prevailing conceptions of Islamic law in the ninth/fifteenth centu-
ry.
Al-Zarkashī sees distinctions as a core component of Islamic law. Moreover,
he sees distinctions as an area of knowledge separate from the knowledge of
substantive law, which he refers to here as “rulings on legal cases” (aḥkām al-
ḥawādith). Al-Zarkashī’s list is also curious in that it does not use the terms
furūʿ and uṣūl, the traditional bipartite division of Islamic law and legal writing,
to denote broad categories of legal discourse.⁵⁰ It furthermore underscores the
importance of al-Juwaynī’s treatise on legal distinctions to the Shāfiʿī school
and the centrality of disputations in the early rise of legal distinctions, at least
for the Shāfiʿī madhhab. Al-Ṭūfī also makes a strong connection between legal
distinctions treatises and farq as a kind of objection made in a legal disputation.
Still, al-Zarkashī’s discussion adds little to our understanding of what legal dis-
tinctions are.
These are the only three theoretical discussions of the genre of legal distinc-
tions of which I am aware. Al-Juwaynī and al-Zarkashī are interested in discus-
sing legal distinctions as a methodology of legal argumentation and legal rea-
soning. For them, the focus in this field is on resolving apparent
contradictions. These three surveys of the place of legal distinctions are all
brief. They do not discuss the relationship between theoretical understandings
of legal distinctions and legal distinctions treatises nor do they provide informa-
tion as to where and how legal distinctions texts were used.
 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71.

 Al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71. Here, ḍawābiṭ are understood to relate to one particular field of
legal knowledge (purity, sales contracts, oaths, etc.). A jurist can know which ḍawābiṭ assimilate
when the jurist knows which ḍawābiṭ relate to similar fields of legal knowledge.
 At the end of his entry on ḍawābiṭ and qawāʿid, al-Zarkashī says “These are the true foun-
dations of the law” (wa-huwa uṣūl al-fiqh ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa) (al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:71). Dividing
Islamic Law into either furūʿ or uṣūl seems to be traditional in the Western study of Islamic law,
but it may not be a reflection of the ways in which the Islamic legal tradition has always under-
stood itself. I hope to return to this in a future publication.

Authenticated
Modern Understandings
Most modern definitions and discussions of legal distinctions are quite limited in
scope, although some offer a more substantial understanding of the role and his-
tory of legal distinctions than the premodern discussions. The majority of mod-
ern discussions appear in editors’ introductions to printed editions of works of
legal distinctions. These introductory essays typically list major works of legal
distinctions and their authors, offering a short lexicographical discussion of
the root f-r-q and its morphological derivates. These works tend to overlap
with each other and provide a mostly descriptive discussion of a literary
genre.⁵¹ This section, instead, will deal with the major modern studies of legal
distinctions, beginning with Joseph Schacht’s important 1926 article, and then
the works by Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn, Wolfhart Heinrichs, and most recently Necmit-
tin Kızılkaya.
Joseph Schacht wrote what seems to have be the first modern treatment of
legal distinctions treatises.⁵² Written in the early twentieth century, Schacht’s
short article is more concerned with introducing works of legal distinctions
and understanding their role within Islamic law. His article is not directly engag-
ed with studying the genre or the concept of legal distinctions.⁵³ In attempting to
describe works of legal distinctions, he only repeats the definition given by the
classical tradition, “the outward findings of the cases are similar, but the legal
assessments differ.”⁵⁴ Already, however, Schacht dismisses works such as Ibn
Taymiyya’s al-Farq al-mubīn bayn al-ṭalāq wa-l-yamīn as not truly fitting into
the genre of legal distinctions.⁵⁵
Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn’s al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: muqawwamātuhā
shurūṭuhā nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā; dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya tārīkhiyya consti-
 The major exception here is Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” in Abū
l-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū
Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992).
 Joseph Schacht, “Aus zwei arabischen Furūq-Büchern,” Islamica 2 (1926): 505 – 37.
 He also provides lengthy excerpts in Arabic from the distinctions treatises entitled al-Furūq
ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal by Ibn Sunayna (d. 616/1219) and Kitāb al-Furūq at-
tributed to Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī to demonstrate the rhetoric of the genre. I discuss the
work by al-Naysābūrī in Chapter Five, pp. 190 – 91.
 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 512: “die ihrem äußeren Tatbestande nach gleich, in ihrer juris-
tischen Beurteilung aber verschieden sind.”
 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 511. See also below and Chapter Two, pp. 77– 79. In this study,
such works are termed applied lexicographical distinctions and are understood as a separate,
though related, form of legal writing.

Authenticated
tutes the first systematic study of the concept of legal distinctions.⁵⁶ Al-Bāḥusayn
provides a brief theoretical discussion of the kinds of furūq writing that differs
significantly from that of al-Juwaynī. Al-Baḥusayn finds two different kinds of
distinctions in legal writing, legal distinctions (al-furūq al-fiqhiyya) and legal-the-
oretical distinctions (al-furūq al-uṣūliyya). In his understanding, legal distinc-
tions focus on correctly determining the legal principles and rationales (al-
ʿilal) on which rulings are based. Understanding the relevant legal rationale al-
lows a jurist to rule on other cases by following the ruling in the example case. It
seems, then, from al-Bāḥusayn’s explanations that legal distinctions serve as a
kind of test for the correct exercise of legal analogies (qiyās). His discussion em-
phasizes the role of legal distinction as a kind of natural progression of the or-
ganization and systematization of legal doctrine.
Al-Bāḥusayn explains that writings on legal distinction have taken different
forms.⁵⁷ He lists two matters on which all legal distinctions treatises agree and a
few in which they differ. According to him, all legal distinctions treatises discuss
individual laws and the distinction(s) between them ‒ sometimes they also dis-
cuss shared characteristics (al-jāmiʿ) ‒ and they all “follow the traditional legal
organization.”⁵⁸ According to al-Bāḥusayn, however, they differ in their particu-
lar content. He sees four kinds of works that address legal distinctions: (i) some
works discuss only substantive laws that are similar outwardly but have conflict-
ing rulings and the distinctions between them (dhikr al-furūʿ al-fiqhiyya
l-mutashābiha fī l-ṣūra wa-l-mukhtalifa fī l-ḥukm maʿ bayān al-farq
baynahumā);⁵⁹ (ii) some discuss maxims (qawāʿid) and precepts (ḍawābiṭ) in ad-
dition to a discussion of legal distinctions;⁶⁰ (iii) some address distinctions relat-
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya.

 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 79 – 82.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 79.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 79 – 81. He gives the following as examples of this kind of
work: al-Furūq by Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī (d. 570/1174– 75), ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā
fī l-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Wansharīsī (d. 914/1508), al-Furūq al-
fiqhiyya by Abū l-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī l-Dimashqī (d. fifth/eleventh c.), and Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī
l-farq bayn al-masāʾil by ʿAbd al-Rahīm al-Zarīrānī (d. 741/1341).
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 81– 82. He gives the following as examples of this kind of
work: Kitāb al-Munāqaḍāt fī l-ḥaṣr wa-l-istithnāʾ by Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Fattākī (d. 448/
1056 – 57) and al-Istighnāʾ fī l-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ by Badr al-Dīn al-Bakrī (d. ninth/fifteenth c.). Al-
Bakrī’s treatise is also known by the title al-Iʿtināʾ fī l-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ. It has been published
twice, once under each name. Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr al-Bakrī, al-Istighnāʾ fī l-farq wa-l-
istithnāʾ, ed. Saʿūd ibn Musʿad ibn Musāʿid al-Thubaytī (Mecca: Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad
al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1988) and
ibid., al-Iʿtināʾ fī l-farq wa-l-istihnāʾ: Kitāb yabḥathu fī qawāʿid al-fiqh al-islāmī wa-furūʿihi, ed.

Authenticated
ed to a specific legal issue;⁶¹ and (iv) some larger works devote one section to
legal distinctions.⁶²
One noteworthy feature of al-Bāḥusayn’s book is his discussion of the func-
tion of legal distinctions, in which he explains, normatively, how legal distinc-
tions treatises ought to work.⁶³ His methodology here is interesting. First, he as-
sumes that legal distinctions function in one of two ways. The first is “a
distinction between the precedent case and the instant case (al-aṣl wa-l-farʿ),
or between a case resulting from an analogy and the principal case (al-maqīs
wa-l-maqīs ʿalayhi).”⁶⁴ Here, legal distinctions function as a measure to control
legal analogy and there is little difference between drawing a legal distinction
and analyses of individual exercises of analogical reasoning. This is, perhaps,
an overdetermination of the importance of analogical reasoning to the develop-
ment and spread of substantive legal doctrine.
The second way in which al-Bāḥusayn claims that legal distinctions function
is by elucidating “a distinction between a descriptive characteristic and a rule
(al-waṣf wa-l-ḥukm).”⁶⁵ This second category, he says, overlaps with the first,
and is related to the applicability of a specific ruling to a particular situation.
Here, the descriptive characteristic is something broader than a legal rationale.
He gives the example of the permissibility of ẓihār divorce for Muslims and non-
Muslims (al-dhimmī). He says that the descriptive characteristic is the permissi-
bility of divorce, the rule is the permissibility of ẓihār, the precedent case of that
of the Muslim, and the instant case of the the dhimmī. In short, Muslims are per-
mitted to divorce and also to divorce via ẓihār. Dhimmīs are also allowed to di-
vorce, so one may think that they are allowed to divorce via ẓihār. This distinction
ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwad (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
1991).
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 82. Al-Bāḥusayn does not give any examples, but it seems
that he is referring to the kinds of works that contain what I term applied linguistic distinctions,
see Chapter Two.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 82. Al-Bāḥusayn also does not give an example of this
kind of treatise, but rather says that it happens in “texts on legal maxims (muʾallafāt fī l-
qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya).” This kind of discussion can be found in, for example, al-Ashbāh wa-l-
Naẓāʾir of Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī (d. 970/1563).
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 35 – 58.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 40.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 40.

Authenticated
has been drawn along the lines of a descriptive characteristic—Muslim or

dhimmī—but the actual legal rationale is left unstated.⁶⁶
His discussion of this second type of distinction, however, focuses only on
distinctions as they appear in manuals of legal disputation (jadal), not in
legal distinctions treatises. He treats both kinds of distinctions as if they were
equivalent, even though the purpose of referring to a distinction in disputation
is different from doing so in distinctions treatises.⁶⁷ In disputation, a farq-objec-
tion is an attempt to trap one’s debate opponent in a doctrinal contradiction.
One party makes a claim about the legality of one fact-pattern; the other party
introduces a seemingly analogous fact-pattern with a different legal ruling.
The similarity between the two cases, which al-Bāḥusayn refers to as the shared
waṣf, is a surface-level similarity that may or may not be relevant to the legal ra-
tionale that engendered the original legal rule.⁶⁸ In a furūq treatise, a series of
comparisons between apparently similar fact-patterns that engender differing
rulings are brought forward in order to show the lack of doctrinal contradictions
within a particular legal school. The analysis in books of distinctions focuses on
seeing past the irrelevant situational similarities and highlighting the clearly dis-
tinct legal rationale in each fact-pattern. Al-Bāḥusayn assimilates a farq in the
context of disputation and a farq in the context of the genre of legal distinctions
in spite of their inherent dissimilarities. It is worth nothing that his discussion
does not quote from any legal distinctions treatise, neither to supplement the
theoretical component nor to give substantive examples.⁶⁹
The second section of al-Bāḥusayn’s book is on legal-theoretical distinc-
tions. These distinctions are, according to him, entirely different from substantive
legal distinctions.⁷⁰ His categorization parallels one made in the present study,
which understands legal distinctions to be different from what I term applied lex-
 While a ẓihār divorce is legally permissible, it is disapproved and requires a penance. The
penance of non-Muslims is not accepted in Islamic law, and therefore ẓihār divorce is not appli-
cable to non-Muslims.
 See Chapter Three.
 As discussed in Chapter Three, the way to overcome a farq-objection is to elucidate the dis-
tinct legal rationales in each of the two different fact-patterns. At some level, the equivalence in
descriptive characteristics is a red herring since the only legally relevant equivalence is in the
legal rationale.
 The paucity of such discussions is likely the major reason for this lacuna.
 This is a point on which Schacht, al-Bāḥusayn, Heinrichs, and Kızılkaya all agree. The pre-
sent study also understands an important categorical distinction between these two kinds of
works.

Authenticated
icographical distinctions. Al-Bāḥusayn’s legal-theoretical distinctions are rough-

ly equivalent to what I term an applied lexicographical distinction.⁷¹
Wolfhart Heinrichs sees legal distinctions as part of a larger complex of “in-
ductive” reasoning in Islamic law, in conjunction with “qawāʿid [legal maxims],
and asbhāh wa naẓāʾir [cognate and similar legal cases].”⁷² He contrasts these
three categories of inductive reasoning based on existing substantive laws
with uṣūl al-fiqh, which he calls “a deductive and hermeneutical procedure try-
ing to establish juridical determinations (aḥkām) by deducing them from a cor-
rect interpretation of the sources (Qur’an, Sunna, etc.).”⁷³ For Heinrichs, furūq is
a productive branch of knowledge for so-called muqallids in that works on furūq
allow us to see “the muqallid as a thinking jurisprudent, not just a parrot.”⁷⁴ His
understanding of furūq as one part of a larger complex of understudied produc-
tive areas of Islamic law is useful. While al-Juwaynī discusses the use of distinc-
tions for limiting the juristic production of rules, Heinrichs’ statements neverthe-
less correspond to how jurists after al-Juwaynī understood the field of
distinctions and related activities.
Finally, Necmettin Kızılkaya takes a more expansive view of legal distinc-
tions. In his monograph, he contextualizes furūq literature within a broad schol-
arly context, looking beyond the confines of Islamic law. Kızılkaya’s study is a
survey of legal distinctions as a concept. In his analysis, furūq is one method
for analyzing Islamic law, and he relates it to hermeneutic tools such as ẓāhir
vs. bāṭin, mabnā vs. maʿnā, and ṣūra vs. ḥukm. ⁷⁵ The concept of furūq in Islamic
law, of course, is also related to furūq in other disciplines.⁷⁶ For Kızılkaya, per-
haps the most important feature of furūq literature is the way that it tracks the
development of juristic authority and the rise and fall of ijtihād. ⁷⁷ The majority
of his monograph, however, consists of brief discussions of the furūq literature
as he sees it, with comments on all legal distinctions treatises and their au-
thors.⁷⁸
 See Chapter Two, pp. 77– 79 and Excursus, pp. 110 – 112.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 335. As discussed in the introduction, al-ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir refers to a genre of legal writing.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 335.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 340.
 Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar: Furûk literatürü üzerine bir inceleme (Istanbul: İz Yayın-
cılık, 2016), 28 – 32.
 Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 33 – 48.
 Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 89 – 120.
 Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 121– 208.

Authenticated
We learn from all of the above discussions of distinctions, however, that

legal distinctions treatises focus on apparently conflicting substantive laws with-
in one madhhab. It is not necessarily problematic that two different legal schools
will have different rulings for particular actions. This kind of normative plural-
ism was a well-accepted reality within Islamic law.⁷⁹ In and of itself, disagree-
ments across legal schools does not engender the supposed systemic contradic-
tions brought about by conflicting laws within one and the same legal school.
Authors of furūq works are concerned, rather, with explaining legal contradic-
tions that arise within a given school’s doctrine.
Reading only the furūq literature, one may assume that, properly under-
stood, a specific madhhab does not have any internal doctrinal contradictions.
This, of course, is inconsistent with the understood history of Islamic law, in
which differences and contradictions are widely acknowledged and even cele-
brated.⁸⁰ This outlook, in which contradictions or inconsistencies are a problem
to be resolved, should not be imputed to those jurists who contributed to the
genre of legal distinctions but rather understood to be a constraint of furūq writ-
ing.⁸¹ ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, as a scholar, certainly understood the doctrinal dis-
agreements among jurists in the Shāfiʿī school. As an author of a work of furūq,
however, his text must largely look past these disagreements to present a harmo-
nious vision of the Shāfiʿī madhhab. While we may understand the function of
legal distinctions, the reasons why jurists wrote works in this genre is addressed
in the next section.
Justifications for Legal Distinctions
Legal distinctions treatises do not generally begin with a theoretical discussion

of legal distinctions; instead, many authors introduce their works by saying that
they are writing in response to a request from students or others interested in
Islamic law. While such apologetic introductions are a common trope of medie-
val Arabic writing, the recurrence of these formulas remains instructive. More-
over, an examination of these justifications can give us insight into what it
was that motivated jurists to write works of legal distinctions.
The earliest authors of these works portray the study of legal distinctions as
a way to understand the subtleties of a school’s doctrine and emphasize the im-
 EI2 s.v. “Ikhtilāf” (Joseph Schacht).

 See Wael Hallaq, Authority.
 Using Wittgenstein’s terminology, it may also be said that assuming that one’s madhhab is
doctrinally harmonious is a rule of the game of legal distinctions.

Authenticated
portance of such unprecedented works on these grounds; that is, as a kind of

natural result from the systematization of the legal school. Al-Juwaynī’s intro-
duction is noteworthy in this regard, in that he approaches the topic as if it
were a new subject with which the reader is not necessarily familiar. He starts
by saying:
Legal problems can resemble each other outwardly but have contrasting outcomes (qad
tatashābahu ṣuwaruhā wa-takhtalifu aḥkāmhuhā) because of legal rationales (ʿilal) that re-
quire different rulings. Those who seek true answers cannot do so without careful study of
these legal rationales, which necessitates distinguishing what needs to be distinguished
and assimilating what needs to be assimilated. Thus, through God’s will, may He be exalt-
ed, and His providence, we have collected legal issues and distinctions in this treatise,
some of which are more obscure than others.⁸²
Al-Juwaynī begins his treatise by introducing the topic of legal distinctions with
both a definition and a justification of the need for studying distinctions: distinc-
tions enable one to understand legal rules with precision. It is clear that he sees
legal distinctions as a way of understanding the intricacies of the doctrines of
the Shāfiʿī school, but cannot take his audience’s knowledge of the concept or
genre of distinctions as a given. This implies that al-Juwaynī understood himself
to be among the first Shāfiʿī scholars, if not the first member of the school, to
write a treatise on legal distinctions.⁸³ Al-Juwaynī’s detailed explanation of
legal distinctions and his lack of reference to similar works is circumstantial evi-
dence of the primacy of his work in the genre of legal distinctions. His view, how-
ever, that legal distinctions are a way of understanding the intricacies of Islamic
law or of a legal school’s doctrine is echoed in other works of this genre.
The introduction to al-Nukat wa-l-furūq by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī (d. 466/
1073 – 74) is similar. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, however, adds a mention of the intended au-
dience of his work:
A student of Mālikī law asked me for help in collecting the particular legal questions from
al-Mudawwana and al-Mukhtalaṭa ⁸⁴ that novice and beginning students need to learn, to-
 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37.

 There are some reports in the biographical tradition ascribing a treatise of legal distinctions
to Ibn Surayj, although it is unlikely that he wrote such a work. See Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī,
Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1970), 109.
 Al-Mudawwana and al-Mukhtalaṭa are two of the foundational texts of the Mālikī legal
school. Both texts were compiled by the Mālikī scholar Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd (d. 240/855). Al-
Mudawwana contains legal opinions from the school’s eponym, Mālik ibn Anas, with some ad-
ditions by Mālikī scholars from Ibn al-Qā sim (d. 191/806) through Saḥnūn. Al-Mukhtalaṭa pri-
marily contains opinions going back to Saḥnūn himself. See Miklos Muranyi, Die

Authenticated
gether with issues that I find important to understand, distinctions between legal issues,
and the differences between the rulings that would otherwise be impossible for students
to know.⁸⁵
In introducing his treatise with this claim, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq notes that the intended
audience for his work are students who are still learning the law. This should not
necessarily be understood to mean something akin to first-year or introductory
students, but rather that the treatise is not aimed at fully formed jurists. ʿAbd
al-Ḥaqq’s treatise is intended to be a part of legal education, as a supplement
to the existing works of law. From his description, it could be of use to students
studying formally in a madrasa or informally in study circles.⁸⁶
ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s al-Nukat wa-l-furūq is an early treatise in the genre of legal
distinctions in which the author signals that this is a new form of legal compo-
sition. Nevertheless, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq asserts that the existence of distinctions be-
tween similar laws has long been a part of Islamic law; “most of what I discuss,”
he writes, “is what I learned from my own teachers in their study circles
(majālis).”⁸⁷ This trope of modesty suggests that the study of legal distinctions,
or perhaps a comparison of similar points of substantive doctrine, formed a
part of Mālikī legal study before ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī. His work, however, is
the first Mālikī text in which this activity finds literary expression.⁸⁸
The need to address students appears throughout the furūq literature. Abū
Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī (d. fifth/eleventh c.) says that he wrote his legal dis-
Rechtsbücher der Qairawāners Saḥnūn B. Saʿīd: Entstehungsgeschichte und Werküberlieferung

(Stuttgart: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, 1999), 1– 22.
 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣiqillī, al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana: Qism
al-ʿibādāt, ed. Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb, (PhD Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā,
1416/1996), 148; idem, Kitāb al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana wa-l-Mukhtalaṭa, 2
vols., ed. Abū Faḍl al-Dimyāṭī Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī (Casablanca: Markaz al-Turāth al-Thaqāfī; Beirut:
Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009), 1:23.
 The Mālikī scholar Ibn Farḥūn reiterates the importance of ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s work for students.
He says that this “is a useful treatise for developing scholars who show promise (al-nāshiʾīn min
ḥudhdhāq al-ṭalaba).” Although this seems to complement ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq’s words, Ibn Farḥūn
continues this with the following sentence: “It is said that he later regretted writing this work
(nadama baʿda dhālika ʿalā taʾlīfihi), and that he withdrew many of the citations and comments
he included therein, and corrected much of what he said.” ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq was reported to have
said: “Were I able to collect the work again and hide it, I would do so (law qadartu ʿalā jamʿihi
wa-ikhfāʾihi la-faʿaltu).” See Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab fī maʿrifat aʿyān
ʿulamāʾ al-madhhab, 2 vols., no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), 1:174.
 ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī, al-Nukat wa-l-furūq, 149; ed. Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī, 1:24.
 It could very well be the case that interest in legal distinctions is part of a response to a great-
er necessity to have ready responses to charges of farq in formal disputation, but this is not stat-
ed by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq.

Authenticated
tinctions treatise, again after being asked to do so, because “for someone who so
wishes, memorizing them is very difficult since they cannot find a treatise dedi-
cated to them but rather have to find them among multitudes of different trea-
tises (taḍāʿīf al-kutub).”⁸⁹ Much later, Ibn Sunayna (d. 616/1219), who wrote
one of the first Ḥanbalī legal distinctions treatises, echoes this theme. He states
that he is writing his treatise in response to “repeated requests from one of his
colleagues (baʿḍ aṣḥābinā).”⁹⁰ He likewise aims to address conflicting laws
that make up the substance of legal distinctions and clarify “their legal indicants
and rationales (adillatahā wa-ʿilalahā), to explain to a jurist the derivations of
legal rulings (ṭuruq al-aḥkām) so that his legal reasoning (qiyāsuhu) for substan-
tive rules might be in accordance with legal-theoretical principles (al-uṣūl) and
so that they might form a coherent system (muttasiq al-niẓām).”⁹¹ Consistent
with al-Juwaynī, he asserts that the importance of understanding legal distinc-
tions is not simply about understanding the scope of applicability of individual
substantive laws, but also about refining one’s understanding of the legal theo-
retical-underpinnings of Islamic law. In other words, legal distinctions treatises
help jurists to understand how legal rationales (ʿilal) and analogical reasoning
(qiyās) are applied. Legal distinctions provide an opportunity to reason back-
wards from very specific situations to the rationales behind those rules.
Social demand is not the only reason given, of course, for writing legal dis-
tinctions treatises. Often authors cite the need for a way to learn and understand
obscure or difficult points of law. The Ḥanafī jurist Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-
Karābīsī (d. 570/1174– 75), for instance, says about his legal distinctions treatise:
These are legal issues (masāʾil) which I collected from treatises, questions regarding which
the authorities of our madhhab have not agreed upon standard rulings and exceptions
(laysa fīhā qiyās wa-lā stiḥsān illā khilāf mashhūr bayn aṣḥābinā) … I intended to single
out these cases, to aid in their memorization (li-yusahhila ḥifẓahā).⁹²
The Shāfiʿī Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī (d. 772/1370) takes a similar approach, al-
though he situates his treatise within an existing legal-literary genre. He ex-
plains: “I have seen that other Shāfiʿī scholars have written texts (li-aṣḥābinā
 Abū l-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza
Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992), 62.
 Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh ibn Sunayna al-Sāmarrī, Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-
Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, ed. Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā (Riyadh: Dār
al-Ṣamīʿī, 1418/1997), 115.
 Al-Sāmarrī, Kitāb al-Furūq, 115.
 Asʿad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī, 2 vols., ed. Muḥammad Ṭumūm and ʿAbd al-Sattār
Abū Ghudda (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982), 1:133.

Authenticated
taṣānīf) about this subject (maʿnā) and I have discovered many tomes by them.
Some are written exclusively on this topic, while others encompass a broader
focus.”⁹³ Al-Asnawī, writing within an already well-defined literary tradition,
can no longer claim to be writing on legal distinctions because of the lack of
such treatises. Instead, al-Asnawī says: “This topic (bāb) is very wide, encom-
passing both minimal and maximal discussions of issues, so I asked God for
guidance in writing a treatise about this subject (maʿnā), following the above-
mentioned scholars.”⁹⁴ In other words, he is consciously adopting the model
set out by his predecessors and participating in a pre-existing tradition.
Muḥammad al-Baqqūrī (d. 707/1307– 08) is in a position similar to that of al-
Asnawī, participating in well-established tradition, influenced in the Mālikī
school by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) and his Furūq. Al-Qarāfī’s work
is peculiar in that it is titled al-Furūq, but is not a work about legal distinctions
at all.⁹⁵ Because of his importance within Mamlūk juristic culture and in the
Mālikī legal school, it nevertheless became the focal point for further writings
on legal distinctions among Mālikī scholars. Thus, al-Baqqūrī says the following
in introducing his commentary on al-Qarāfī’s text: “When I studied [al-Qarāfī’s]
al-Furūq …, it became clear to me that al-Qarāfī, may God have mercy on him,
was unable to organize it in a reader-friendly fashion because the work was pub-
lished while he was still composing it and copies were distributed in this state.
This stopped him from being able to change the text.”⁹⁶ To solve this problem
that al-Baqqūrī saw in al-Qarāfī’s text, he composed his own work, an abridged
and reorganized presentation of al-Qarāfī’s work. The relative lack of organiza-
tion and clarity is a problem that other Mālikī scholars also saw in al-Qarāfī’s
work; they therefore position their commentaries on his Furūq as correctives.
A final an example from a treatise attributed to one Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Bakr
al-Naysābūrī (d. ?) exhibits a new idealized audience.⁹⁷ It is not clear exactly who
this Najm al-Dīn is, but his work, too, actively participates in an existing genre.
Based on the rhetoric and style of the introduction, it is clear that Najm al-Dīn
wrote this work when the genre of legal distinctions was already recognized
and established. Najm al-Dīn wrote his treatise, he claims, in response to
 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq, 2 vols., ed. Naṣr
al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007), 2:7.
 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:9.
 See al-Bāḥusayn, 146; Kızılkaya, 177– 83; and Chapter Five, pp. 175.
 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Baqqūrī, Tartīb al-Furūq wa-khtiṣārihā, 2 vols., ed. ʿUmar ibn
ʿAbbād (Morocco: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1414/1994), 1:19.
 This work has yet to be edited; I have found eight manuscripts of this work, see Appendix IV.

Authenticated
Conclusion 41
a colleague [who] asked me to write a treatise on legal issues that agree in their structure
but differ in their rulings, [a treatise] that is concise but effective in its presentation, easy to
understand and hard to disagree with, a treatise that can be relied on in study circles
(yastadilluhu fī l-majālis) and from which you can find guidance in schools (yastaḍīʾ bihi
min al-madāris).⁹⁸
Tellingly, the audience for this treatise is still students, both in study circles or
salons, majālis, and formal contexts, law colleges. This treatise prepares them
for conversations about Islamic law. One of the things that this demonstrates,
however, is how the genre of legal distinctions could and did respond to a chang-
ing reading public. No longer was it only students who desired to read these trea-
tises, but also interested non-jurists who sought access to highly specialized and
erudite legal knowledge.⁹⁹
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to answer the question: what is a legal distinction?
Through an examination of premodern definitions, we saw that legal distinctions
were understood to be useful in two ways. First, legal distinctions were a partic-
ular tool to refine and harmonize a legal school’s doctrine and were deemed to
play a role in formal disputations. As will be seen in Chapter Three, the signifi-
cance of disputations is likely understated in these discussions. We also ob-
served widespread agreement about the nature of legal distinctions. The three
premodern discussions analyzed are complementary and present similar pic-
tures of legal distinctions. The lack of interest in defining legal distinctions, how-
ever, is perhaps stronger evidence of a shared understanding of legal distinctions
in the premodern period.
The apologetic introductions to works of legal distinctions give us a different
angle from which to answer the question of what a legal distinction is. In these
discussions, we see these treatises as a result of the growing complexity of Islam-
 See Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī, Kitāb al-Furūq, MS Giresun Yazmalar 44, Suleymaniye Library,
Istanbul, 1b. Other manuscripts of this work have a number of variants in this last line. Giresun
Yazmalar 44 does not dot the consonantal skeleton of yastadilluhu fī l-majālis, such that it might
also be read as yusnad lahu fī l-majālis (relied on in study circles), although this latter reading
seems less probable. In Joseph Schacht’s article, which includes a partial transcription of Leiden
Or. 481, 3a, this passage reads: yastahziʾu bihā fī l-majālis wa-yastaḍīʿu bihā fī l-madāris, and in
Anon., Kitāb al-Furūq, MS Halet Efendi 780, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 2b, li-yantafiʿa bihā
fī l-majālis wa-yastaghnī ʿan al-madāris.
 I discuss this issue at length in Chapter Five.

Authenticated
ic legal knowledge. Works of legal distinctions serve to shore up knowledge

about the particularities of substantive doctrine among students. Presumably,
then, a legal distinction is a tool for those studying Islamic law. The comparison
found in a legal distinction is a review of two legal rulings, but also a review of
how broad legal rules or precepts can and ought to be applied. Through the
study of works of legal distinctions, students can review their knowledge of Is-
lamic law.
More recently, scholars of Islamic law have understood legal distinctions pri-
marily in relationship to the exercise of analogical reasoning. While this under-
standing is similar to premodern definitions, it shifts the relevance of legal dis-
tinctions from the domain of substantive law to that of legal theory. While
premodern discussions focus on fact-patterns and rulings, modern definitions
center of the correct application of a legal rationale (ʿilla). This subtle difference
perhaps hints at the multiplicity of factors that led to the development of legal
distinctions. Further, the importance of furūq in legal disputation is omitted by
almost all modern discussion. As the next chapters will show, the earliest history
of legal distinctions is complex. Several threads, such as a general scholarly in-
terest in the concept of furūq, the increasing interest in legal disputation, and the
development of substantive law, all came together to push forward the popular-
ity of legal distinctions.

Authenticated
Chapter Two: A General History of Distinctions
Having discussed the rise of legal distinctions as a part of the systematization of
Islamic law, this chapter looks at the use of distinctions in non-legal contexts.
The most prominent books of distinctions outside of legal writings dealt primar-
ily with philology (both grammar, naḥw, and lexicography, lugha) and medicine.
Scholars have identified these fields as possible sources for the development of
al-furūq al-fiqhiyya. ¹ Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris identify addi-
tional parallel phenomena, in other fields although these might be limited to
specific books such as al-Farq bayn al-naḥw wa-l-manṭiq by Abū l-ʿAbbās
Aḥmad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Sarakhsī (d. 286/899)² and Taṣarruf al-ʿibād wa-l-farq
bayn al-khalq wa-l-iktisāb by Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013).³
It is helpful to consider these last writings to be applied lexicographic distinc-
tions, by which I mean works of lexicographic distinctions applied to the tech-
nical vocabulary of particular subfields. Each of these genres, medicine, lan-
guage, and law, functions according to its own logic.
This chapter aspires to a thorough survey of the history and function of non-
legal furūq. ⁴ My focus here lies primarily on philological works, since these make
up the majority of the non-legal furūq writing. I shall briefly discuss the medical
works addressing differential diagnostics (al-furūq bayn al-amrāḍ), although it is
unclear whether these works form a literary tradition. Viewing these works as a
whole shows that al-furūq al-fiqhiyya represent a transformation of linguistic
 See Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” in Abū Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī l-
Dimashqī, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār
al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992), 26 – 43; and Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law: Remarks on the
Furūq Literature,” in Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth Volume I: Hunter of the East;
Arabic and Semitic Studies, ed. Ian Richard Netton (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 1:332– 44. Heinrichs’s
discussion relies heavily on Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris.
 They refer to him as Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Sarakhsī. Abū l-Ajfān and Abū
Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 29.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 29 – 30.
 Two studies have mentioned non-fiqh precedents for the tradition of legal distinctions, but
they only allude to potential connections. Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris say that “furūq appeared
in all scholarly disciplines to better distinguish, classify, and better explain” (Abū l-Ajfān and
Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 28). They do not, however, provide an in-depth analysis of the connections
between furūq in various fields. Heinrichs, meanwhile, is forthright in stating that his study “is
no more than a preliminary characterisation of the notion and function of furūq…” (Heinrichs,
“Structuring the Law,” 340). Both studies, therefore, raise similar historical questions but do not
attempt to answer them.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-004

Authenticated
44 Chapter Two: A General History of Distinctions
furūq. ⁵ Rather than a case of direct influence by which jurists can be said to de-
finitively take form or function from lexicographical works, exploring these gen-
res shows that the concept of distinctions was adapted by scholars for a variety
of purposes in the fourth/tenth century, precisely when legal distinctions rose to
prominence. Books of distinctions in these two disciplines, and in medicine, are,
however, similar in terms of organization, presentation, and methodology.⁶ It
thus appears that the rise of lexicographic distinctions is related to the rise of
legal distinctions. Perhaps legal distinctions drew on lexicographic distinctions,
or perhaps the two genres arose simultaneously responding to similar intellectu-
al and cultural trends.
Pursuing a historical epistemology of distinctions-thinking generally uncov-
ers a shifting conceptualization of farq and furūq as modes of analysis across dif-
ferent disciplines.⁷ Once established, the twin ideas of farq and furūq further in-
spired related works. Lexicographic distinctions focus on the subtle distinction
in meaning or connotation between apparent synonyms. As works that seeming-
ly reject synonymy and that serve as thesauruses, they operate on both a practi-
cal and theological level. As discussed in Chapter One, legal distinctions focus
on the subtle distinctions between apparently similar legal cases and function
for analysis of both substantive law and legal theory. Medical books on distinc-
tions—handbooks to be used for differential diagnostics—analyze the ambigu-
 For a full discussion of the concept of distinctions and what I refer to as distinctions-thinking,
see the Excursus.
 The similarities between these two genres are clear from an initial reading; further study, how-
ever, shows that the various furūq genres only share an organizational scheme: case A, case B,
and a comparison. This similarity can be thought of as a further rule of distinctions writing.
While the mode of comparison between them appears similar, a detailed comparison reveals
these modes of comparison to be quite different.
 Historical epistemology, as used in this chapter, refers to the “study of epistemological con-
cepts as objects that evolve and mutate”; see Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 9. Historical epistemology understands that “fundamental
epistemic concepts and standards are subject to historical change”; see Uljana Feest and Tho-
mas Sturm, “What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors’ Introduction,” Erkenntnis 75
(2011): 290. In other words, it is a methodology that tries to understand the historical contingen-
cy of knowledge and knowledge standards. I take the drawing of distinctions—comparison—as
an epistemic concept that helps to divide objects of knowledge and establish their identities. In
part, this chapter attempts to show how the idea of a comparison “evolve[d] and mutate[d]” in
response to various social and intellectual currents. Note that the seventy-fifth volume of
Erkenntnis, in which the article by Feest and Sturm is published, is devoted to historical episte-
mology. For more on historical epistemology, see Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality:
Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2002).

Authenticated
ously similar symptoms of different underlying diseases. Interestingly, these

works of medical furūq lack discussion of medical treatment or theoretical anal-
ysis of maladies.⁸
Lexicographic works served as thesauruses, prominently demanded by
chancery secretaries and other writers. They additionally made implicit theolog-
ical claims about the cultural superiority of Arabs and the ontological superiority
of Arabic. Thus, books of lexicographic distinctions provide examples to argue
for the perfection of the Arabic language and its lack of redundancies (i. e., syn-
onyms). Lexicographers thus showed that comparing two similar words can lead
to the establishment of firm boundaries between them. In fields other than lex-
icography, scholars could use the technique of lexicographic distinctions pro-
ductively, in order to coin new terms and cement definitions in disciplines as di-
verse as ethics, Sufism, philosophy, and law.
This chapter discusses the three major trends of distinctions literatures out-
side of legal distinctions. It begins with a brief discussion of the practical man-
uals of medical distinctions. It then discusses practical and theoretical distinc-
tions in the domains of lexicography and phonology. Finally, I discuss the
productive genre of applied lexicographic distinctions. Although the genre of ap-
plied lexicographic distinctions has not, to my knowledge, been named previ-
ously, works belonging to it are found in abundance in almost all premodern
fields of Arabo-Islamic scholarship.
Furūq in Medicine
Medical authors may have been the first to produce books of furūq, which they
did in order to foster differential diagnostics. Their books describe illnesses with
similar symptoms and discuss the ways to distinguish between them to diagnose
a patient correctly. The scant survival of these works may testify to their relative
lack of prominence in the premodern period.⁹
 It is possible that the texts of medical diagnosis implicitly argued for the possibility of induc-
tion as a tool of diagnosis. Understanding when induction was appropriate in medical reasoning
was an important concern of Galen and later taken up by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. See Richard Walzer,
Introduction to Galen on Medical Experience: First Edition of the Arabic Version with English
Translation and Notes by R. Walzer, ed. and trans. Richard Walzer (London: Oxford University
Press, 1947).
 Peter E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-Smith state that discussions of differential diagnostics
was often included in works of medical ethics. See Peter E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-
Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 86, 89.

Authenticated
Indeed, there seem to have only been four works of differential diagnostics
composed in the premodern Arabic tradition, by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925 or
323/935), Ibn al-Jazzār (d. 369/979), Aḥmad ibn Asʿad ibn Ḥalwān al-Dimashqī,
also known as Ibn al-ʿĀlima (d. 652/1254), and Yūsuf ibn Ismāʿīl al-Kutubī (d.
ca 754/1353).¹⁰ One book on differential diagnostics has been published, in
two editions, one attributing the work to Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and the other attrib-
uting the same work to Ibn al-Jazzār.¹¹ Ibn Ḥalwān’s treatise and that of Ibn al-
Kutubī survive in manuscript, although both are still unpublished.¹² Interesting-
ly, the published text is identical to that attributed to Ibn Ḥalwān in MS Ayasofya
4838, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul and also to the text attributed to Ibn al-
Kutubī in MS Ahmet III 2120, also in the Suleymaniye.¹³
 According to Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Ibn al-ʿĀlima was unrivalled in formal disputation (lā
yalḥiquhu fī l-jadal). Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa mentions this work with the title Kitāb al-Tadqīq fī l-
jamʿ wa-l-tafrīq (Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 266). On Ibn al-ʿĀlima, see Aḥmad ibn al-
Qāsim Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, ed. Nizār Riḍā (Beirut: Dār Makta-
bat al-Ḥayāt, [1965]), 757– 58; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh al-islām
wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-aʿlām, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-
ʿArabī, 1419/1999), 48:115 – 16, 224. On Ibn al-Kutubī, see Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām
qāmūs tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-l-nisāʾ min al-ʿarab wa-l-mustaʿribīn wa-l-mustashriqīn, 15th
printing (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 2002), 8:217; and GAL S2:218. I discuss Ibn al-Jazzār
and al-Rāzī below.
 See Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Kitāb Mā l-fāriq aw al-Furūq aw Kalām fī l-furūq bayn al-amrāḍ, ed.
Salmān Qaṭāya (Aleppo: Jāmiʿat Ḥalab, Maʿhad al-Turāth al-ʿIlmī l-ʿArabī, 1398/1978) and Ibn
al-Jazzār, al-Furūq bayn ishtibāhāt al-ʿilal, ed. Ramziyya l-Aṭraqjī (Baghdad: Wizā rat al-Taʿlīm
al-ʿĀ lī wa-l-Baḥ th al-ʿIlmī, Jā miʿat Baghdā d, Bayt al-Ḥ ikma, 1989).
 Ibn al-ʿĀlima’s manuscript appears to survive in a collection (majmūʿa) of medical texts. This
manuscript is housed in the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul, MS Ayasofya 4838, Suleymaniye
Library, Istanbul; a microfilm of this manuscript can be found at the University of Utah, reel
190 of the Levey microfilm collection. Ibn al-Kutubī’s work is also housed in the MS Ahmet
III 2120, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul and Levey reel 131, University of Utah Library. This
work is not, however, the Kitāb Mā lā yasaʿu l-ṭabīb jahluhu, a treatise on pharmacology. See
Ibn al-Kutubī, Mā lā yasaʿu l-ṭabīb jahluhu, MS Mansuri Collection R128.3.I127 1682, Library of
Congress, Washington DC, available online http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/amed/amed0001/
2001/200149140/200149140.pdf, accessed January 27, 2019.
 The main difference between the published texts and that found in the Ayasofya manuscript
is that the text in MS Ayasofya 4838, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul begins with a statement spe-
cifically attributing the book to “Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Abī l-Faḍl Asʿad ibn Ḥalwān al-Ṭabīb”
(MS Ayasofya 8438, 109b). Neither al-Rāzī nor Ibn al-Jazzār are identified as the author in their
respective texts. Ibn Ḥalwān’s manuscript is found in a collected volume (majmūʿ), the title page
of which reads: “This is a collection (majmūʿ) of medical texts. The first book is Tadbīr al-amrāḍ
al-ḥādda by Hippocrates, also containing the book Asrār al-nisāʾ by Galen and al-Furūq by Ibn
Ḥalwān Ṭabīb.” This is followed by a table of contents showing the nine books that make up this
medical collection. It is striking that Ibn Ḥalwān is identified as the author three times in this

Authenticated
Examination of medical furūq suggests the precedence of these works to

other writings on distinctions. More importantly, the earliest bio-bibliographic
writings do not uniformly refer to the works of Ibn al-Jazzār and al-Rāzī by
the title Kitāb al-Furūq, suggesting that furūq had not yet taken hold as a mean-
ingful concept for medicine in the fourth/tenth century. That is, the word furūq
had not yet emerged as a technical concept but rather continued to be a word
used in its plain-sense meaning of “differences.” While the term furūq, in the
field of medicine, would eventually come to mean “differential diagnostics,”
the word by itself was not enough to convey this meaning during the time of
al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Jazzār. Thus, early bio-bibliographical sources only inconsis-
tently refer to al-Rāzī or Ibn al-Jazzār’s books as Kitāb al-Furūq, employing a va-
riety of other titles, such as al-Furūq bayn al-ʿilal or al-ʿIlal al-mushkila. The va-
riety of possible titles indicate that the term furūq had not yet become a stable
marker of a literary genre. Consequently, this points to the difficulty in under-
standing the content of works based on title alone, as the term furūq had not
yet come to mean “differential diagnostics.”
It appears that only one treatise of differential diagnostics has survived, al-
though the manuscript tradition and the printed editions attribute this work to a
variety of different authors. Salmān Qaṭāya was the first to edit and publish the
work in question in 1978. In his edition, he attributes the text to al-Rāzī on the
basis of in-text citations of al-Rāzī’s works, the general style of the writing, bio-
bibliographic sources, and the manuscript evidence.¹⁴ Ramziyya l-Aṭraqjī, who
edited this work in 1989, however, attributes it to Ibn al-Jazzār. In a preface to
that edition, ʿĀdil al-Bakrī dismisses Qaṭāya’s attribution, arguing that the writ-
manuscript, and that his book was prominent enough to be included in the sentence summariz-
ing the collection. The manuscript is missing a few folios after the introduction. The first page of
the distinctions text is 109b, which ends in the middle of the introduction, but page 110a is in the
middle of chapter one, section one (al-maqāla l-ūlā l-faṣl al-awwal). Based on the available evi-
dence, it is difficult to ascertain who the author of this work is. MS Ahmet III 2120 is largely iden-
tical to both the published texts MS Ayasofya 4838. The attribution to Ibn al-Kutubī is found only
in a note on the title page of the manuscript, The note reads: “A book by the author of Mā lā
yasaʿu on differential diagnosis (min taṣnīfāt ṣāḥib Mā lā yasaʿu fī al-farq bayn al-amrāḍ al-
mushtabiha). I hope to address this question in a future study.
 Qaṭāya bases his edition on the manuscript of this work found in the Wellcome Historical
Medical Library. Interestingly, Ibn Sīnā is listed as the author of this manuscript on its title
page. A.Z. Iskandar, who compiled the catalogue of Arabic works in the Wellcome collection,
rejects this attribution and posits instead that this work was written by al-Rāzī. Qaṭāya does
not mention Iskandar’s attribution in his introduction. See A.Z. Iskandar, A Catalogue of
Arabic Manuscripts on Medicine in the Wellcome Historical Medical Library (London: The Well-
come Historical Medical Library, 1967), 67.

Authenticated
ing style is not necessarily similar to that of al-Rāzī, but rather indicative of med-
ical writing practices in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. He dismisses
the three citations of al-Rāzī’s other works as evidence of his authorship, assert-
ing that the author “in these three places … speaks of al-Rāzī in the third person,
as a critic of al-Rāzī correcting al-Rāzī’s views and opinions (muṣaḥḥiḥan lahu
ārāʾahu wa-mustadrikan ʿalayhi aqwālahu).”¹⁵ Al-Bakrī assumes that if al-Rāzī
were citing himself, he would not take an oppositional approach to his earlier
writings. Al-Bakrī continues, “This is not the language of someone speaking
about himself; the author says, ‘In his book, al-Rāzī says … but I say’ (fa-huwa
yaqūlu qāla l-Rāzī fī kitābihi kadhā … wa-aqūlu kadhā).”¹⁶ Al-Bakrī is content
that this argument disproves the attribution to al-Rāzī. He also rejects the possi-
bility that the author of this work is Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Abī l-Faḍl ibn al-
ʿĀlima, since he lived much later than the ninth century, and al-Bakrī under-
stands this treatise to be an early work.
Al-Bakrī’s claim of an early date for the work is based on the author’s claim
at the beginning that “my predecessors have not written a book like this one”
(lam yasbaq ilā mithlihi man taqaddama).¹⁷ Al-Bakrī concludes that, “based on
this, what is most probable is that this work was written by Ibn al-Jazzār al-Qayr-
awānī.”¹⁸ Al-Bakrī credits the editor of this text, Ramziyya l-Aṭraqjī, with this at-
tribution and appears quite convinced. He does not explain why he considers
only these three names as possible authors, but it is likely due to the paucity
of authors who are said in the biographical literature to have written works on
differential diagnostics. This work appears to be the earliest book on differential
diagnostics. Al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Jazzār are both remembered as having written a
book on differential diagnostics. Since more sources point to al-Rāzī as the au-
thor of this text, I shall discuss in brief his importance to the history of Islamic
medicine; many of the tropes found in biographies of al-Rāzī, however, appear in
biographies of Ibn al-Jazzār as well.¹⁹
 ʿĀdil al-Bakrī, “Taqdīm al-kitāb,” in Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, ‫ﺏ‬.

 Al-Bakrī, “Taqdīm,” ‫ﺏ‬. Ellipsis in the original.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 2; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 14.
 Al-Bakrī, “Taqdīm,” ‫ﺝ–ﺏ‬.
 The earliest biography about Ibn al-Jazzār comes from Ibn Juljul. Ibn Juljul’s biographical
entry does not cite any specific information on Ibn al-Jazzār’s writings, although it does mention
that Ibn al-Jazzār came from a family of physicians (ṭabīb ibn ṭabīb wa-ʿammuhu ṭabīb). As with
al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Jazzār’s biography reads like a hagiography. The sources tell us that Ibn al-Jazzār
abstained from earthly pleasures and occupied himself with intellectual and religious pursuits.
“He would participate in funerals and weddings, but would not eat at the receptions.” Similarly,
Ibn al-Jazzār, we are told, provided treatment to the nephew of al-Qāḍī l-Nuʿmān (d. 364/974) for
an unspecified illness. Once he recuperated, al-Qāḍī l-Nuʿmān sent a messenger to Ibn al-Jazzār

Authenticated
Heinrichs uses this work to argue for the importance of medical furūq as a
parallel genre to works on legal distinctions, writing:
The medicinal parallel, embodied in such works as Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s (d. 313/925), seems
much more convincing. Here the term furūq designates the element or elements which, in a
syndrome of mostly similar symptoms, allow the differential diagnostics of the illness at
hand. In the way in which two or more cases are similar in appearance but distinguishable
by a crucial element of difference, the medicinal and the legal situation have much in com-
mon, and the differential diagnostics of the physician would yield a fitting metaphor for the
work of the faqīh as a mufarriq. ²⁰
Heinrichs further claims that the parallel between medicine and law “seems
much more convincing [than that between lexicography and law].” However,
he fails to address the impact of this “medicinal parallel” on law, nor does
the parallel as such tell us much about the history of these genres or the ways
they may have impacted each other. One cannot disagree with Heinrichs that dif-
ferential diagnostics—the topic of furūq in medicine—appears a “fitting meta-
phor” for furūq in law, but there is no evidence that the resemblance is more
than superficial.²¹
Following Heinrichs lead, the analysis of this book of medical distinctions
titled al-Furūq helps fill in these gaps. Qaṭāya emphasizes that this text should
be used for diagnosis. “It is clear that [the author’s] interest in this field
(hādhihi l-nāḥiya),” he writes, “comes from the difficulty of practicing this
craft [i. e., medicine,] daily and his confronting the difficulties and complications
of differential diagnostics (al-tashkhīṣ al-tafrīqī).”²² Since this work proclaims it-
self to be the first treatise written on the topic of differential diagnostics, Qaṭāya
is satisfied with attributing this work to al-Rāzī.²³
with “fine clothes and 300 gold coins.” Ibn al-Jazzār thanked the messenger, but sent him back
with the gifts. Although he was said to live a simple life, he left behind twenty-five qinṭars of
books and 24,000 dinars. See Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 481 and Sulaymān ibn
Ḥassān ibn Juljul, Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Cairo: Imprimerie de l’In-
situt Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1955), 88.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 334– 35.
 In other words, given that the tradition of differential diagnostics is unknown outside of one
work with uncertain authorial attribution and therefore from an uncertain date, it is difficult to
talk with any degree of confidence about influence.
 Salmān Qaṭāya, “Taṣdīr” in Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, Kitāb Mā l-fāriq aw al-Furūq aw Kalām fī l-
furūq bayn al-amrāḍ, ed. Salmān Qaṭāya (Aleppo: Jāmiʿat Ḥalab, Maʿhad al-Turāth al-ʿIlmī l-
ʿArabī, 1398/1978), ‫ﺩ‬.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 2; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 14.

Authenticated
Abū Bakr Zakariyyāʾ al-Rāzī’s work on differential diagnosis is remembered

by at least three titles, Kitāb Mā l-fāriq, al-Furūq, and Kalām fī l-furūq bayn al-
amrāḍ. ²⁴ The biographical sources also tell us much about his vast bibliography.
The earliest sources on al-Rāzī are Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 380/990) and Ibn Juljul (d.
after 384/994– 95), on which both the later Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248) and Ibn Abī
Uṣaybiʿa (d. 668/1270) rely.²⁵ Ibn Juljul gives a bibliography of the works written
by al-Rāzī but does not mention the Furūq nor any work that could be construed
as the Furūq. Ibn al-Nadīm, however, lists a book entitled al-Risāla fī l-ʿilal al-
mushkila, which could very well refer to this book.²⁶ This is the only mention
of a likely title that is roughly contemporaneous with al-Rāzī’s life. Ibn Abī Uṣay-
biʿa also attributes to al-Rāzī a work with a similar title, the Risāla fī l-ʿilal al-
mushkila wa-ʿudhr al-ṭabīb wa-ghayr dhālika, ²⁷ although he additionally ascribes
a Kalām fī l-furūq bayn al-amrāḍ to him.²⁸ Finally, Ibn al-Qifṭī also lists the Risāla
fī l-ʿilal al-mushkila. ²⁹ It is also worth noting that al-Rāzī is credited with another
work, on distinguishing ominous dreams from other kinds of dreams, the Kitāb
al-Farq bayn al-ruʾyā l-mundhira wa-sāʾir ḍurūb al-ruʾyā, though it does not ap-
pear to have survived.³⁰
None of these authors discusses the contents of these works, so only circum-
stantial evidence links the book under discussion to al-Rāzī. If the Risāla fī l-ʿilal
al-mushkila does refer to the extant work on differential diagnostics, then it pre-
 The printed edition of this work is based on three manuscripts. The first, entitled, Mā l-fāriq,
is an undated copy found in the Wellcome collection in London likely from the eighteenth cen-
tury according to Qaṭāya, the second is in the Malek National Library in Tehran apparently with
no title and also dating from around the eighteenth century, and the third is a version from the
Public Awqāf Library in Baghdad with the title Kitāb al-Furūq bayn al-ishtibāhāt fī l-ʿilal, which
dates from Ramaḍān 1220/1805 (pp. ‫)ﺯ–ﻭ‬.
 Abū l-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (d. ca. 440/1048) also wrote a bio-bibliography of al-Rāzī, but he
does not mention this work therein.
 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist li-l-Nadīm, 2 vols., ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-
Furqān li-l-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1430/2009), 2.1:312. The title of this book can be translated as A
Treatise on Ambiguous Illnesses.
 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:319. The title of this book can be translated as A Treatise
on Ambiguous Illnesses, an Excuse for the Physician, and More.
 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:321. The title of this book can be translated as A Work on
the Distinctions between Illnesses.
 Ibn al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīkh al-ḥukamāʾ wa-huwa Mukhtaṣar al-zūzanī al-musammā bi-l-Muntakhabāt
al-multaqaṭāt min Kitāb Ikhbār al-ʿulamāʾ bi-akhbār al-ḥukamāʾ (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthan-
nā, 196[?]), 277.
 Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 1:315 – 16; Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:308; Ibn al-Qifṭī,
Taʾrīkh, 273. The title of this book can be translated as The Difference between Dreams of
Premonition and Other Kinds of Dreams.

Authenticated
dates the furūq tradition in lexicography and law by approximately a century. Its
later reception may perhaps explain why later authors referred to it as Kitāb al-
Furūq, as these later authors were familiar with a formal furūq genre and poten-
tially recognized this work as a part of it. Nevertheless, they included the alter-
nate title Risāla fī l-ʿilal al-mushkila in their bibliographies, since it is attested in
the earliest bibliographic works in this form.³¹ It was thus only later scholars, fa-
miliar with furūq as a literary genre, who referred to it as Kitāb al-Furūq.
The genre of medical furūq is difficult to discuss in detail or with any certain-
ty because of all the works listed in this genre by the bibliographical tradition
only one has survived. The work under consideration here aims to provide a
handbook for practicing physicians. The author claims explicitly that his book
is to be used in this way, as a diagnostic manual. In describing his approach,
he says:
I have seen that the doctors of today only know about maladies what they can imagine on
the basis of books, and the symptoms and causes (bi-dalāʾilihi wa-asbābihi) mentioned
therein. These symptoms and causes, may, however, be shared between illnesses and ill-
nesses can resemble one another. The aspirations of physicians fall short of comprehensive
knowledge of how to engage in syllogistical and inferential thinking using the principles
and rules of medicine (bi-l-qiyās wa-l-istikhrāj min al-uṣūl wa-l-qawāʿid). I have therefore
seen a need to compose a book on causes, symptoms, and illnesses that are similar to
each other. I gather here every two that resemble each other or are shared between illness-
es, and then I distinguish (ufarriqu) between them.³²
This work, as the author describes in the introduction, served as a practical

handbook for diagnosis. It is organized as a series of questions and answers.
The book itself has five chapters, each with several subsections consisting of
numbered pairs of illnesses between which the author distinguishes.³³ Salmān
Qaṭāya states that this work is split up “according to the organization followed
at that time.”³⁴ Each of the book’s five chapters cover different parts of the
body:³⁵ (1) the parts of the head (ajzāʾ al-raʾs);³⁶ (2) the respiratory system
 A similar trend is seen with works of lexicographic distinction, see below.

 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 1– 2; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 14.
 The manuscripts of this work were all copied much later than al-Rāzī’s life. It is therefore
unclear when the numbering system was introduced into this text. The numbering is added
to the margins of the Ibn Ḥalwān manuscript in the same hand that copied the text. It is includ-
ed in the main text of the two published editions.
 Qaṭāya, “Taṣdīr,” ‫ﺡ‬.
 There is an interesting parallel with works of lexicographic distinction, which are also par-
tially organized by parts of the body.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 29 – 85; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 27– 45.

Authenticated
(ālāt al-tanaffus);³⁷ (3) the stomach, the liver, the spleen, the kidneys, the blad-
der, and the reproductive system (al-maʿida wa-l-kabd wa-l-ṭiḥāl wa-l-kulā wa-l-
mathāna wa-ālāt al-tanāsul);³⁸ (4) the whole body (al-badan kulluhu);³⁹ and (5)
pulse and urine (al-nabaḍ wa-l-bawl).⁴⁰ Each pair of maladies is introduced
with the phrase “What is the distinction between [X] and [Y] (mā l-farq bayn
[kadhā] wa-[kadhā])?” The answer to the question, the elucidation of the distinc-
tion, is introduced with “The answer is (wa-l-jawāb) …”
In contrast to lexicographical distinctions, which focus exclusively on the
differences and take the similarities for granted, the author of the text discussed
here undertakes to offer a complete comparison. He begins by explaining the
similarities between the comparands and then explains the distinctions in detail.
He often offers more than one distinction and, consonant with the work’s stated
purpose, his explanation of the distinction seeks to assist physicians in diagnos-
ing illnesses. The distinctions that he highlights are limited to diagnosis, and the
author does not elaborate in great length by explaining the treatments required
for each illness or by describing how the symptoms in question came about.
The practical nature of the book helps elucidate resonances with the lexico-
graphical and legal traditions. First, let us consider the author’s definition of
what a distinction is. “As for a distinction (al-farq),” he writes, “it is that through
which things with similar characteristics can be distinguished, when a cause
(ḥukm) has been affirmed in one thing and denied in the other, once it [the
farq] merges with one particular thing.”⁴¹ A distinction occurs only through
the process of comparison between two similar things that are in reality differ-
ent. The distinction relies on the affirmation of one characteristic and the result-
ing denial of the other characteristic. He continues:
Once you understand the realities of an issue, the question of distinction refers to differen-
ces in reality only in one regard, namely: with respect to the fact that there is something
shared between the comparands. An example for this is the fact that animate and inani-
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 87– 128; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 45 – 58.

 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 129 – 231; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 59 – 90.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 233 – 63; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 90 – 99.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 265 – 99; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 99 – 108.
 “Ammā l-farq fa-huwa mā bihi l-tamyīz bayn al-dhawāt al-mushtabaha ʿind ilḥāq ḥukm wa-
nafyihi ʿan al-ākhar baʿd ijtimāʿihi fī amr khāṣṣ,” al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 23. This passage is curtailed
in the printed edition attributed to Ibn al-Jazzār: “As for distinction, it is what is used to distin-
guish between two things that resemble each other” (ammā l-farq fa-huwa mā yumtāzu bihi aḥad
al-shayʾayn al-mutashābihayn ʿan al-ākhar), Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 26. In both of these quota-
tions, farq can be understood as distinction or as distinguishing characteristic, a term usually
denoted as fāriq.

Authenticated
mate bodies share the feature of being bodies, since both occupy three dimensions. No one
asks about the distinction between animate and inanimate bodies unless one had no
knowledge of what differentiates the one from the other.⁴²
In bringing out the example of the animate and the inanimate, the author resorts
to a principle of predication. Here, a body serves as the object of which anite-
mateness and inanitemateness can be predicated. Anitemateness and inanite-
mateness are two contradictory predicates and therefore cannot simultaneously
exist in one body. Nevertheless, animate and inanimate bodies have in common
that they are both bodies. The author compares these similarities to medical dis-
tinctions, evidently because the latter are not as evident or less widely known.
The main text of the work then follows the framework outlined above, pre-
senting all of these distinctions in the form of a question. One such question is:
“What is the distinction between a stroke occurring from matter blocking the in-
terior of the brain (al-mādda l-sādda li-buṭūn al-dimāgh) and that occurring from
a tumor (waram) therein?”⁴³ The author explains that while these two disorders
are indeed alike in the way they “outwardly manifest themselves (ishtarakā fī l-
ḥaqīqa),” their underlying “cause” (sabab) and “the manner in which the illness
results from it” (kayfiyyat wujūb al-ḥukm ʿanhu) differ, both of which he expands
upon in detail.⁴⁴ As for the difference in cause, he says: “It is evident. One is a
blockage (sadda), while the other a tumor.”⁴⁵ A stroke resulting from a blockage
to the brain, he says, occurs as this blockage occurs, that is, the symptoms occur
suddenly and severely, “in one moment” (dafʿatan). A stroke resulting from a
tumor, however, happens “gradually.” As the tumor grows, we are told, the
vital spirit (al-rūḥ al-nafsāniyya) is slowly prevented from spreading through
the body. It is the blockage of the vital spirit, which, presumably, is the direct
cause of the stroke. Lastly, a stroke caused by a tumor is often accompanied
by a fever, whereas a stroke resulting from sudden a blockage is not. The physi-
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 23; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 26. Once again, the Ibn al-Jazzār edition gives
an abbreviated definition, “Once you understand the realities of an issue, the question of dis-
tinction does not refer to differences in reality.” The language used by the author here is highly
reminiscent of the technical terminology used in discussions of disputation. I reproduce the ver-
sion attributed to al-Rāzī here to highlight these similarities: wa-suʾāl al-farq lā yaruddu ʿalā l-
mukhtalifāt bi-l-ḥaqīqa baʿd al-ʿilm bi-ḥaqāʾiqihā illa min wajh waqaʿa baynahumā fīhi min al-
ishtirāk wa-dhālika ka-shtirāk al-ḥayawān aw al-jamād bi-tawassuṭ al-jism fī kawn kull wāḥid
minhumā dhā abʿād thalātha fa-lā yusʾalu bi-mā l-farq bayn al-ḥayawān wa-l-jamād illā maʿ
ʿadam al-ʿilm bi-l-mumayyiz li-kull wāḥid minhumā ʿan al-ākhar.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 37; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 30.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 37; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 30.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 37; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 30.

Authenticated
cian thus has the tools to diagnose these different kinds of strokes, looking at the
onset of the stroke and the presence of fever. There is no discussion, however, of
the different treatments necessitated by these distinct illnesses.
Medical works of distinctions are thus narrowly tailored, focused on the im-
mediate phenomenon that presents itself, apparently lacking any broader theo-
logical import. On the other hand, lexicographic furūq books utilized discrete
lexicographic problems to tackle theological debates about the nature of Arabic.
Consider the way in which the author lays out his explanations in the following
example, as well as the kind of information that he includes and what he leaves
out.
What is the distinction between the sediment found in urine that is the result of illnesses in
the liver and that which is the result of illnesses of the kidneys?
The answer: They are similar in reality (ishtarakā fī l-ḥaqīqa), but they differ in what they
indicate (iftaraqā fī madlūlihimā) and how they are deduced. That sediment which comes
from the liver is redder (ashaddu ḥamratan), while that which comes from the kidney leans
more towards yellow. It is also possible that that from the kidneys is black. In the case of
liver ailments, urine is never opaque (al-bawl lā takūnu maʿ al-awwal naḍījan), while kidney
ailments can result in opaque urine.⁴⁶ The distinction is fully realized with the other symp-
toms of liver failure or the symptoms of pain in the kidneys.⁴⁷
The author again gives detailed explanations of the illnesses to aid in diagnosis.
His discussion focuses on the specific ways in which liver and kidney ailments
manifest themselves in urine. He does not discuss how to treat liver or kidney
ailments, but gives the information that is sufficient for a diagnosis.
The author’s claim that his work should serve as a diagnostic manual is evi-
dent in the distinctions themselves; the claim is no mere trope with which the
author begins his book. In general, however, the paucity of books on medical di-
agnosis generally precludes the conclusion that they had a significant impact on
the genre of legal distinctions.
Furūq in Philology
Situating the rise of legal furūq within the context of the earlier development of
distinctions-thinking in Arabic linguistic and lexicographic fields underscores
 I am unsure of the precise meaning of naḍīj in this context; it appears to denote “opaque” or
“turbid”; see Max Neuberger, “The Early History of Urology,” trans. David Riesman, Bulletin of
the Medical Library Association 25, no. 3 (1937): 156. I thank Dr. Paulina Giusti for this reference.
 Al-Rāzī, Mā l-fāriq, 293; Ibn al-Jazzār, al-Furūq, 106.

Authenticated
the interconnectedness of law and grammar. Tracts of linguistic distinctions first

developed from the study of obscure and rare Arabic words, and subsequently
spilled over into other aspects of language, such as the semantic comparison
(farq) of similar or synonymous words. Driven in part by theological concerns,
semantic comparisons, in turn, led to more complex distinctions-thinking re-
garding the well-known question of synonyms in Arabic, a more robust way of
explaining differences between words. Tracing the practical and polemical
uses of lexicographical distinction literature from its earliest appearance to its
apotheosis in the Kitāb al-Furūq by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. ca. 400/1009 – 10) un-
covers a variety of tools, first found in this genre, that helped shape legally-in-
clined works of furūq.
Linguistic farq was a part of Arabic philological study from its earliest days.
While the precise origins of Arabic linguistics remain uncertain, it is possible to
outline a rough lineage of early books of distinction. These works are of two
types: distinction in lexicography, and distinction between the letters of the Ara-
bic alphabet. Lexicographic farq concern different words that appear to have the
same meaning, i. e., synonyms. Lexicographers sought to uncover the nuances
between these words, primarily by identifying different contexts in which each
word may be employed. Unlike physicians, premodern Arabic philologists
focus on analyzing words (signifiers) and their meanings (signifieds), rather
than only on what underlies them (such as illnesses in the medical case). The
distinctions they make are about the implicit connotations of known words,
not the explicit manifestations of undiagnosed illnesses.
The earliest precursors to books on distinctions tackle gharīb and nawādir,
words with obscure or rare usages. In essence, these lexical lists attempt to de-
lineate the edges of the Arabic lexicon. These works, in turn, led to books that
compare specialized vocabulary, e. g., for the body parts or for the life-cycles
of animals and humans, often titled Khalq al-insān. Books on Khalq al-insān
were also known by the title Kitāb al-Farq. These books are direct forerunners
to lexical works with the word furūq in their titles. Not only is there a direct con-
nection between their titles, in that the title Kitāb al-Farq uses the singular and
Kitab al-Furūq the plural, but there is a further connection in terms of content.
The logic of distinguishing, however, that operates in books of farq is quite dif-
ferent from that found in books of furūq.
A typical example of a linguistic furūq book is Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s al-Furūq
al-lughawiyya. This book consists of easily recognizable entries of linguistic furūq
(i. e., two or more apparent synonyms and a discussion of their semantic differ-
ence), and evinces a well-developed scholarly tradition in lexicographical dis-
tinctions by the fourth/tenth century. This rhetorical style became so character-
istic of the genre that much of the same organization, presentation, and content

Authenticated
remains evident even as late as the seventeenth-century furūq work by İsmail

Hakkı Bursevi (d. 1137/1725), which was composed with completely different
goals, namely, to reinforce the knowledge of Arabic among non-Arab elites in
the Anatolian peninsula.⁴⁸ The fact that al-ʿAskarī’s al-Furūq al-lughawiyya con-
stitutes a mature form of the genre indicates that, by the author’s time, lexico-
graphical furūq writing had evolved into a stable literary genre. Earlier works
on distinction focused, by contrast, on the activity of distinguishing, as ex-
pressed by the title Kitāb al-Farq. Moreover, works in the genre of linguistic
furūq began to function as a kind of thesaurus. By finding a word in a book of
lexicographic distinctions, one could also find words with a similar, if not equiv-
alent, meaning. Finally, early examples of furūq works were motivated in part by
theological concerns about the nature of the Arabic language.
Adab al-kātib, a manual for chancery secretaries written by Ibn Qutayba (d.
276/889), already includes a section on furūq that functions as a thesaurus.⁴⁹ Ibn
Qutayba understood the importance of distinctions between near-synonyms,
suggesting that the ability to draw lexicographical distinctions was desired
knowledge for secretaries writing for the state bureaucracy, whether for commu-
nicating with other secretaries or showcasing their profound erudition. In addi-
tion, the tradition of linguistic furūq was an extension of early lexicographical
concern with the study of aḍdād (contronyms, i. e. words that can mean one
thing and its opposite), abdāl (phonologically or semantically related letter
pairs), and “obscure” and “rare” terms (gharīb and nawādir), treatises of
which centered around synonym groupings (e. g., sections on distinct words
for sword, camel, or horse).⁵⁰ It is likely that the practical aspect of linguistic
furūq was the primary factor that led to its enduring use.
While thesauric works focus on semantic differences, furūq books also oper-
ate on a theological level. In this sense, these works participate in discussions
about the relationship between God and Arabic as the language of God’s revela-
tion. As such, works of linguistic furūq can also function polemically. Thus, al-
 There are many surviving manuscripts of this work. It is also available in a lithograph edi-
tion, İsmail Hakkı Bursevi, al-Furūq, no ed. (Dersaʻādet: Şirket-i Ṣaḥḥāfīye-ʼi ʻOsmanīye, 1308/
1890 – 91); online at https://archive.org/details/furqbursal00smaiuoft, accessed May 2, 2019.
 A section in this work is entitled “Chapters on Distinctions” (abwāb al-furūq). Ibn Qutayba,
Adab al-kātib, ed. Muḥammad al-Dālī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1967), 144– 62.
 These two words, gharīb and nawādir, are often said to refer to different kinds of words,
gharīb to obscure usages of known words and nawādir to rare words. In reality, however,
there is a great deal of overlap in the use of these terms. For an example of this kind of
work, see al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad ibn Khālawayh, Names of the Lion, trans. David Larsen (Seattle:
Wave Books, 2017).

Authenticated
ʿAskarī’s al-Furūq al-lughawiyya seeks to demonstrate the differences between

supposed synonyms in order to demonstrate the perfection of the Arabic lan-
guage. The theological debate over the existence of synonyms in Arabic went
to the heart of contentions about the nature of Arabic. In establishing subtle dif-
ferences between similar words, the authors of these works seek to disprove the
existence of complete synonymy in Arabic, and, by extension, superfluous ele-
ments in the language of God’s revelation.
Since, in his view, Arabic contains no redundancies, it must be a perfect lan-
guage. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī makes this point explicitly:
The proof that a difference in expressions and words requires a difference in meaning is the
following. A noun is a word that refers to a concept denoted. When you indicate a concept
once, it is understood. A second or third indication, therefore, does not convey additional
meaning. He who established the Arabic language (wāḍiʿ al-lugha) is wise (ḥakīm) and did
not include that which does not convey any meaning … Any two words that are used for one
concept or entity in one language (kull ismayn yajriyāni ʿalā maʿnā min al-maʿānī aw ʿayn
min al-aʿyān fī lugha wāḥida)—each one of these words—requires a difference in meaning
that the other does not require. Otherwise, the second word would be redundant and there
would be no need for it.⁵¹
This theological claim constitutes the purpose of al-ʿAskarī’s book. The theolog-
ical and polemical concerns expressed in the lexicographical furūq genre sug-
gests that a similar set of concerns can be found within the legal tradition. An
interesting case here is the text al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf (“Distinctions in
Meaning and the Impossibility of Synonymy”) by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d.
ca. 298/910). While the title suggests a strong interest in the denial of synonymy,
the work consists of a brief introduction and the presentation of lexicographic
distinctions. Not all authors of works of lexicographic distinctions were primarily
interested in denying synonymy. Yet even among authors who accepted Arabic
synonymy, theological interests remained primary. The acceptance or rejection
of synonymy was implicit in lexicographic distinctions as a literary enterprise.⁵²
 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq al-lughawiyya, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Salīm (Cairo: Dār al-
ʿIlm wa-l-Thaqāfa, 1998), 22. While it is possible to interpret his statement as applying to all lan-
guages, in the context of a book on Arabic synonyms it is clear that he is interested in particular
in the status of Arabic.
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Juyūshī (Cairo:
al-Nahār, 1998).

Authenticated
Early Lexicographical Activity
Arabic philology, a field that embraced grammar, phonology, and lexicography,

was one of the first scholarly disciplines to develop in the early Muslim commu-
nity. While each of these areas was to become a discrete discipline during the
Abbasid era, they began as three “tracks” within a single discipline, known in-
terchangeably as “naḥw” or “lugha.” Practitioners of one field, therefore, could
be referred by contemporaneous sources as engaging in either discipline.⁵³ As
a result, later labels placed on earlier figures are frequently unhelpful in under-
standing earlier periods: an author called a “grammarian” (naḥwī) may not have
been involved exclusively or even primarily with grammar, but may also have
practiced lexicography. Given the breadth of study, factors driving development
in one field must have influenced the other. It was only once these fields became
separate disciplines that differences emerged between a naḥwī and a lughawī.
Accordingly, the discussion here tries to focus on a broad range of philological
activity.
Contemporary scholarship has disproportionately focused on early grammar
instead of early lexicography. Moreover, even research on lexicography has tend-
ed to narrowly look at comprehensive dictionaries, such as the Kitāb al-ʿAyn by
Khalīl ibn Aḥmad (d. ca. 170/786) or Kitāb al-Jīm by Abū ʿAmr al-Shaybānī (d.
ca. 206/821), rather than at specialized dictionaries or lexica, such as dictionar-
ies of plants, lists of arabicized words (al-muʿarrab), books of homonyms, and so
on.⁵⁴ Recently, Ramzi Baalbaki has divided the history of Arabic lexicography
into three different areas: (i) early lexicographical efforts, (ii) specialized lexica,
and (iii) comprehensive lexica.⁵⁵
Baalbaki shows that the early Arabic lexicographical tradition was con-
cerned to gather the Arabic lexicon and organizing its words into a useable lin-
 Monique Bernards, “Grammarians’ Circle of Learning: A Social Network Analysis,” in

ʿAbbasid Studies II: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Leuven, 28 June–1 July
2004, ed. John Nawas (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2010), 144
n. 2. See also Michael Carter, “Arabic Grammar,” in Cambridge History of Arabic Literature:
Religion, Learning and Science in the ʿAbbāsid Period, eds. M.J.L. Young et al. (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990), 118 – 38.
 On comprehensive dictionaries, see especially John Haywood, Arabic Lexicography: Its
History and Its Place in the General History of Lexicography (Leiden: Brill, 1965); Stefan Wild,
Das Kitāb al-ʿain und die arabische Lexicographie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965); and Ḥusayn
Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿarabī: nashʾatuhu wa-taṭawwuruhu, expanded ed., 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār Miṣr,
1408/1988). For further discussion, see Ramzi Baalbaki, The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition:
From the 2nd/8th to the 12th/18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2014), vii–x.
 See Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition.

Authenticated
Early Lexicographical Activity 59
guistic resource.⁵⁶ As part of these efforts, lexicographers made explicit efforts to

collect and explain obscure words and usages. Michael Carter views this activity
as a “forerunner” of the comprehensive dictionaries of the fourth/tenth century
and sees the earliest activity as consisting of “entirely secular word-lists, names
of animals, meteorological features, near-homonyms, difficult genders and mor-
phologies, etc.”⁵⁷
Despite Carter’s claims that these word-lists were “entirely secular,” leading
to the lack of interest in this project on the part of those concerned with the
Qur’an, many these works demonstrate certain theological tendencies.⁵⁸ In
fact, the field of lexicography as a whole was hardly secular. Rather, it began,
at least in part, as an attempt to understand the language of the Qur’an, thereby
endowing it with a religious character that remained an enduring part of Arabic
lexicography. While lexicography was not solely used to advance theological ar-
guments, its religious underpinning cannot be ignored. The theological character
of specialized word-lists encouraged a consideration of lexicographic furūq in
their theological contexts, which played an important part in the emergence of
furūq.
Some of the earliest scholarly lexicographical activity focused on “obscure
words and rare usages” (al-gharīb wa-l-nawādir).⁵⁹ One impetus for collecting
gharīb material was a concern with understanding and explaining the Arabic
language of the Qur’an. This concern is particular evident among those scholars
who used their scholarship to push for particular interpretations of the Qur’an.
Not all philologists, however, agreed with the exegetical explorations of their
colleagues.⁶⁰
The point to note in this discussion is not whether or not any particular
strain of lexicography was theological, but rather that lexicography could be
used to serve a theological agenda or to demonstrate theological claims. Of
course, not every lexicographer pursued lexicography out of piety or theological
commitments to further the understanding of Islam’s sacred text. It may be pos-
sible that Carter’s analysis of the early activity as being overtly secular is correct,
but those works nonetheless retained an importance for later and more theolog-
ically inclined lexicographers. In this sense, the theological motive was one of
the primary factors that drove lexicography. The disagreement over the legitima-
 Haywood, Arabic Lexicography, 12– 19.

 Michael Carter, “Lexicography, Medieval,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, 2 vols., ed.
Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (London: Ashgate, 1998), 2:467.
 Carter, “Lexicography, Medieval,” 467.
 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 63.
 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 41.

Authenticated
cy of lexicographers interpreting the Qur’an points to the fact that lexicographers

were, in fact, involved in religious debates.⁶¹
Most of the lexical data found in works of distinctions was recorded by phi-
lologists performing “fieldwork,” to use an anachronistic term. Lexicographers
would go to the desert and collect linguistic data from nomadic Bedouins,
who “provided much of the raw material for the early monographs that dealt
with ġ arīb and nawādir or with specific semantic fields.”⁶² Nomadic Bedouins
were chosen because of their supposedly complete knowledge of Arabic since
they were “pure Arabs,” untainted by urban cosmopolitan life. Bedouins lived
only among other Arabs, the thinking went, and would presumably speak an un-
adulterated form of Arabic. Indeed, the amount of linguistic data gathered by the
lexicographers is remarkable.⁶³
The collection of these words was done as a way of recording the scope of
the Arabic language. It was not a guide to correct usage per se, a goal pursued
by works of furūq proper. In fact, Thābit ibn Abī Thābit (fl. third/ninth c.), in his
Kitāb al-Farq, says: “Occasionally, one of these words is used in place of anoth-
er … for reasons of poetic necessity.”⁶⁴ This concession to poetic license, howev-
er, was exceptional, in Thābit’s eyes, and only occurred under linguistic “duress”
in order to fit poetic meter. As works of gharīb grew in the third/ninth century,
authors sought new ways to organize them. The very category of gharīb already
represents a certain level of sorting and classifying information. Only particular
words are chosen as gharīb. Such collections were not attempting to capture the
entire Arabic language, nor did they attempt, as other books do, to document so-
lecisms (laḥn) or list contronyms (aḍḍād).
 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 41.

 Baalbaki, Arabic Lexicographical Tradition, 20. Monique Bernards, however, has argued
strongly against this view. While the Arabic sources are intent on informing us that both lexicog-
raphers and grammarians gathered their data through exhaustive travel, she notes that bio-
graphical sources do not provide any support for this idea. The idea of travelling for knowledge
(al-ṭalab fī l-ʿilm), in her view, was primarily a literary trope, not a lived reality. See Monique
Bernards, “Ṭalab al-ʿIlm amongst the Linguists of Arabic during the ʿAbbāsid Period,” in
ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6 – 10 July
2002, ed. J.E. Montgomery: (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2004).
 We learn from such informants, for example, that the word shifa refers to a human’s lips,
while mishfar to those of a camel, those of hoofed animals are called jaḥfal but for animals
with cloven-hoofs the correct term is either miqamma or miramma. Some sources record this
word as marimma, see Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon in Eight Parts, 8 vols.,
reprint (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1968), s.v. “marimma,” 1:1152. Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, Kitāb
al-Farq, ed. Ḥātim Ṣaliḥ al-Ḍāmin (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1408/1988), 18.
 Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, Kitāb al-Farq, 20.

Authenticated
Books of Farq 61
Words identified as gharīb and nawādir were organized thematically, alpha-

betically, or sometimes not at all; such organizational rubrics were similar to
those employed in other specialized lexica. Books would be alphabetized in a
variety of different ways: sometimes according to the first letter of the trilateral
root of the term, sometimes according to the final letter within the root, some-
times according to the abjadī ordering of the Arabic alphabet, and sometimes ac-
cording to the alifbāʾī sequence.⁶⁵ As Tilman Seidensticker writes: “Many books
on ʾaḍdād did not order the words treated; [Abū Ṭayyib] al-Luġawī groups them
according to the first radical; and aṣ-Ṣaġānī (d. 650/1252) uses a fully alphabet-
ical arrangement. Books on homonyms were also composed from the beginning
of the ninth century,” though they do not have clear discernible ordering pat-
terns.⁶⁶ Since it is the books of farq that are of primary interest to this study,
their organizational patters will be examined in more detail.
Books of Farq
The thematic organization of linguistic books of farq is directly relevant to the

furūq tradition. As gharīb works spread, their focus narrowed, often addressing
particular areas of the Arabic language. Specifically, gharīb works began to draw
from scriptural and related material, as in collections of gharīb al-Qurʾān (ob-
scure words found in the Qur’an) and gharīb al-ḥadīth (obscure words found
in the hadith). In addition, gharīb scholarship collected words related to less re-
ligious topics, such as plants (nabāt), horses (khayl), insects (ḥasharāt) or the
physical constitution of humans (khalq al-insān). These topical gharīb books
served as repositories of lexical data for particular subject areas.
Early books on farq are not direct comparisons of apparent synonyms. In this
way, farq books are quite different from those of lexicographical furūq, and
should be considered more of a sub-genre of works on the body parts and
life-stages of animals. These farq works focus on explaining various technical
terms for the body and life-cycle, not on clarifying distinctions between closely
related words. As an example, the Kitāb al-Farq fī l-lugha written by Abū ʿAlī
Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr (d. 206/821), better known as Quṭrub, is divided
into the following sections, as given by Khalīl Ibrāhīm al-ʿAṭiyya and Ramaḍān
ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, who edited the critical edition of this work. Their edition, from
 For more on alphabetization, see Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, s.v. “Lex-
icography: Classical Arabic” (Tilman Seidensticker), 3:30 – 37.
 Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, s.v. “Lexicography: Classical Arabic, 7. Spe-
cialized Lexica” (Tilman Seidensticker), 3:34.

Authenticated
1987, is based on a manuscript from the early fourth/tenth century manuscript

housed in Vienna (a very early date for the manuscript of an Arabic book).
While these division titles are not Quṭrub’s, they provide insight into the way
this work is indeed organized.⁶⁷
1) Divisions of the Body

2) Birth, Pregnancy, and Terms for Offspring
3) Voices and Cries of Humans, Animals, and Birds
4) Sounds of Humans, Animals, and Birds
5) Groups of Humans and Animals
6) Death of Humans and Animals⁶⁸
While the division of this work is relatively straightforward, the author neverthe-
less offers a deliberate structure, dividing the body from head to toe and tracing
an individual from birth to death. Note that these lexicographic precursors to lex-
icographic furūq focus not on making a distinction, but take for granted that dis-
tinctions occur, i.e. that words are different. Within each broad category, Quṭrub
assumes a diversity of distinct terms corresponding to different animals. The un-
derstanding that drives works of farq is the inherent similarity of synonyms.
Later books on furūq understanding an inherent dissimilarity and seek to resolve
potential confusion that may arise about the meaning of a term.
Curiously, interest in insects seems to have driven the earliest of the farq
works. Ḥusayn Naṣṣār explains that this may be due to the Qur’an’s mentions
of insects (ḥasharāt), suggesting that the early lexicographers may have been
driven by a hermeneutic need.⁶⁹ Naṣṣār points out that such works were at
first standalone treatises, but later authors incorporated their own writing on
this topic as chapters or sections of encyclopedic works like Ibn Qutayba’s
Adab al-kātib and Fiqh al-lugha by al-Thaʿālabī (d. 429/1039). Much of this farq
 This work has been edited and published twice. The first publication, by Rudolf Geyer in
1888, was based on an incomplete manuscript, with the title Mā khālafa fīhi l-insān al-bahīm
fī asmāʾ al-wuḥūsh wa-ṣifātihi. Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn Mustanīr Quṭrub, Das Kitāb al-wuḥūš
von al-ʾAṣmaʿi mit einem Paralleltexts von Quṭrub, ed. Rudolf Geyer (Vienna: F. Tempsky.
1888). More recently, Khalīl Ibrāhīm ʿAṭiyya and Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb have published a
critical edition of this work. Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr Quṭrub, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. Kha-
līl Ibrāhīm al-ʿAṭiyya and Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb (Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 1987).
 Quṭrub, Kitāb al-Farq, 28, see pp. 32– 34 for a description of the Vienna manuscript.
 Naṣṣār, al-Muʿjam al-ʿarabī, 100. In particular, Naṣṣār refers to the mentions of ants (Q al-
Naml 27:18), bees (Q al-Nahl 16:68), flies (Q al-Ḥajj 22:73), scorpions (Q al-ʿAnkabūt 29:41), lo-
custs (Q al-Aʿrāf 7:133, Q al-Qamar 54:7), and gnats (Q al-Baqara 2:26).

Authenticated
Books of Farq 63
writing focuses on clarifying and distinguishing animal terms. They exhibit fea-
tures that later writers adopted in lexicographic and legal works of furūq.
The lexicographer Abū Ziyād al-Kilābī (d. ca. 200/815 – 16) appears to have
written the first work of lexicographic distinction (al-farq).⁷⁰ Shortly thereafter,
Quṭrub wrote his al-Farq fī l-lugha, which is the earliest surviving work on lin-
guistic distinction. The earliest examples of works on linguistic distinction (al-
farq) are concerned to distinguish rare words used for the limbs, appendages,
and actions of humans versus other animal and insect groups. Quṭrub’s al-
Farq fī l-lugha is quite similar to the other contemporaneous works titled Kitāb
al-Farq of both al-Aṣmaʿī (d. ca. 213/828) and Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, both of
which are alternatively titled Khalq al-insān. ⁷¹ The entries themselves are group-
ed around body parts so that, for instance, they all start with bāb al-fam (Chapter
on Mouths), followed by bāb al-anf (Chapter on Noses), bāb al-ẓufur (Chapter on
Nails), and so on.
Each chapter dismisses apparent synonyms by arguing that words with sim-
ilar denotation actually refer to distinct kinds or classes of animal. Thābit ibn Abī
Thābit states this explicitly in his introduction:
This book covers those parts of the body for which there are different words when referring
to humans, four-legged domestic animals, wild animals, and more. This is also a book that
agrees with al-Aṣmaʿī, Ibn al-Aʿrābī, Abū ʿUbayd, Abū Naṣr and other scholars.⁷²
The tradition of farq writing was passed down from teacher to student. Thābit
ibn Abī Thābit’s book is nearly identical to that of his teacher al-Aṣmaʿī. Thābit
quotes al-Aṣmaʿī verbatim for long passages—usually with attribution. Quṭrub’s
book is arranged in largely the same way as al-Aṣmaʿī’s. The organization of the
Kitāb al-Alfāẓ by Ibn al-Sikkīt (d. 244/858), on the other hand, differs significant-
ly, and its structure is hardly self-explanatory. While the arrangement of some
sections is occasionally intuitive, connections between sections is frequently
confounding. For instance, the first two chapters address wealth (al-ghinā wa-
l-khiṣb) and poverty (al-faqr wa-l-jadb), while the next two treat groups
(jamāʿa) and battalions (katāʾib). Both of these pairs are logically related—
 Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, “Kitāb al-Farq li-Ibn Fāris wa-turāth al-farq fī l-ʿarabiyya,” in
Kitāb al-Farq by Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī, ed. Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb (Cairo: Maktabat al-
Khātimī 1402/1982), 42. Ibn al-Nadīm also credits Abū Ziyād as the earliest philologist to write
on distinctions, Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 1.1:118 – 90. The entry on Abū Ziyād is on 1.1:121.
 ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Qurayb al-Aṣmaʿī, Kitāb al-Farq, ed. Ṣabīḥ al-Tamīmī (Beirut: Dār Usāmah,
1987).
 Thābit ibn Abī Thābit, Kitāb al-Farq, 17.

Authenticated
wealth and poverty are antonyms; groups and battalions are near-synonyms—
but the logic that puts wealth and poverty next to groups and battalions is
not clear.
Unlike other authors, Ibn al-Sikkīt does accept synonymy in Arabic. For ex-
ample, in the section Bāb mā lā budda minhu he lists synonyms for the phrase lā
budda minhu, “there is no way out; one must do something.” It begins on the
authority of al-Aṣmaʿī: “There is no ḥumma from that nor a rumma. That is to
say, there is no escape from this.”⁷³ The author’s putting the terms ḥumma
and rumma in apposition (badal) suggests their semantic equivalence; Ibn al-
Sikkīt uses one to stand for the other. Similarly, Quṭrub, author of the earliest
surviving work on distinctions, does seem to believe in the existence of synon-
ymy in the Arabic language. Jalal al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) quotes him as as-
serting that “the Arabs used (awqaʿat) two words for one denotation to prove the
breadth of their language (kalāmihim).”⁷⁴ This contrasts with the concern exhib-
ited by many authors of works of linguistic distinctions to celebrate the perfec-
tion of the Arabic language.
Problems abound in the surviving manuscripts of these early works, preclud-
ing us from reaching general conclusions about their structure, contents, and ob-
jectives. Since the extant manuscripts are usually from centuries after the au-
thor’s lifetime, we cannot know whether the original organization of these
earliest works is preserved. “The preserved manuscripts may turn out to be
half a millennium later than their originals and, though this may not be indicat-
ed in the manuscripts themselves, they may have undergone various recensions
and redactions during this time.”⁷⁵ Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila is correct in doubting
the provenance of the organization. Not only can works be changed as they un-
dergo copying and recopying, but there is still controversy over the nature of the
earliest Arabic books as such. We do not know to what extent they were given a
final redaction by the author, to what extent they could be considered authored
 “Lā ḥumma min dhālika wa-lā rumma, ayy lā budda minhu,” Yaʿqūb ibn Isḥāq ibn Sikkīt,
Kitāb al-Alfāẓ: Aqdam muʿjam fī l-maʿānī, ed. Fakhr al-Dīn Qabbāwa (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān
Nāshirūn, 1998), 183.
 Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lugha wa-anwāʿihā, 2 vols, ed. Muḥammad
Aḥmad Jād al-Mawlā Bek, Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī
(Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-Turāth, n.d.), 1:400.
 Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, “al-Aṣmaʿī, Early Arabic Lexicography, and Kutub al-Farq,”
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften 16 (2005): 141.

Authenticated
Books of Farq 65
works, and to what extent were they more open and receptive to further change
and emendation.⁷⁶
Kutub al-Furūq al-Lughawiyya
In the fourth/tenth century, the new concept of furūq emerges among lexicogra-
phers. Earlier books of farq focus on nawādir and gharīb (obscure and rare usag-
es) limiting themselves, in the style of Kitāb al-Alfāẓ, to singular topics or
themes. But by the time that al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī composes his Furūq wa-
manʿ al-tarāduf in the third/ninth century, the term furūq is no longer synony-
mous with rare or strange lexical usages, but is starting to be driven by concerns
about synonymy. A change in terminology accompanied this increased focus on
synonymy. These works of distinctions are, for the first time, given titles that in-
clude the term furūq. This is not the same as the title Kitāb al-Farq fī l-lugha, em-
ployed by Quṭrub, al-Aṣmaʿī, and Thābit ibn Abī Thābīt, among others, which
only use the word in the singular. While these new treatises continued the var-
ious traditions within lexicographic scholarship, they develop a separate,
more solidified concept of furūq, and evince stronger theological impulses.
Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s Kitāb al-Furūq fī l-lugha was among the earliest exemplars
of this move, a work that highlights the theological stakes in this genre.⁷⁷
Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī
Abū Hilāl al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAskarī was a prolific author, but was hardly
prominent in his own time. According to George Kanazi, “our information about
Abū Hilāl is very meagre, uninteresting and lacking in detail, because the early
 See Gregor Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read, trans.
Shawkat M. Toorawa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). The Kitāb al-ʿAyn of Khalīl
ibn Aḥmad is a pertinent example; many passages in this book seem to have been written by Ibn
Durayd. See Ramzi Baalbaki, “Kitāb al-ʿAyn and Jamharat al-Lugha,” in Early Medieval Arabic:
Studies on al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad, ed. Karin C. Ryding (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 1998).
 It is possible that the title Kitāb al-Furūq was a later addition to the text. The manuscript
record and the bio-bibliographic tradition, however, all refer to it by either Kitāb al-Furūq or
a slight variation on this title: Kitāb al-Furūq al-lughawiyya or al-Furūq fī l-lugha. Even if al-
ʿAskarī himself did not title the text in this way, the tradition quickly recognized it as a work
of distinctions and consistently referred to it as such.

Authenticated
sources mentioning him are very few.”⁷⁸ In part, this obscurity can be ascribed to
confusion with his similarly named teacher, Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbdallāh
al-ʿAskarī (d. 382/993). Biographers often failed to distinguish between teacher
and student, rendering any complicating the reconstruction of the student’s bi-
ography. In order to understand the contribution of Abū Hilāl, a brief reconsid-
eration of both two figures is worthwhile.
According to Kanazi, “[a]s early as the year 510 A.H.[/1116 – 17]), al-Silafī
could point to a confusion between the two ʿAskarīs, Abū Aḥmad (293 –
382 A.H.) and Abū Hilāl (d. after 400 A.H.).”⁷⁹ Al-Silafī refers to Abū Ṭāhir
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Silafī, a noted hadith scholar and grammarian.⁸⁰
He is quoted in Yāqūt’s Muʾjam al-udabāʾ as blaming confusion between these
figures on their similar names, stating that “it is likely that one was mentioned
when the other was meant.”⁸¹ In fact, in order to resolve this misunderstanding,
al-Silafī had to consult Abū l-Muẓaffar Muḥammad ibn Abī l-ʿAbbās al-Abīwardī
(d. 507/1113), the foremost contemporary linguist (al-raʾīs) in Hamadan.⁸² It is not
clear that al-Silāfī was able to resolve his confusion, since “[t]he information
provided by al-Silafī seems to be inaccurate in one place at least.”⁸³ This
means that even al-Silafī’s account is already prone to uncertainty regarding
the two al-ʿAskarīs.
Circumstantial evidence for the theological ideas of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī
does, however, point to his affiliation with Muʿtazilī theology. Kanazi, who be-
 George Kanazi, Studies in the Kitāb aṣ-Ṣināʿatayn of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (Brill: Leiden, 1989),
1.
 Kanazi, Studies, 2. See also their respective entries in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edi-
tion. Both entries are written by Beatrice Gruendler. While she devotes 1,158 words to Abū
Aḥmad, Abū Hilāl received about half that number, 680 words. EI3 s.v. “al-ʿAskarī, Abū
Aḥmad” (Beatrice Gruendler) and EI3 s.v. “al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl” (Beatrice Gruendler).
 Al-Silafī was born in Isfahan, travelled to Baghdad for his education, and then to Tyre and
Alexandria where he settled. He was a well-known scholar and teacher. He was born in 472/
1079 – 80 or 478/1085 – 86 and died on 5 Rabīʿ II, 576 / 8 August, 1180. Al-Silafī himself merits
only a short biography in Ibn Khallikān’s Wafayāt al-Aʿyān. See Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn
Muḥammad ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut:
Dār Ṣādir, 1398/1978), 1:105 – 107, no. 44; see also Mac-Guckin de Slane, trans., Ibn Khallikan’s
Wafayat al-A’yan wa Anba’ Abna’ al-Zaman (M. de Slane’s English Translation), vol. 1, ed. S. Moi-
nul Haq (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1961), 152– 56.
 Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī l-Rūmī, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ: Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb, 7 vols., ed.
Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993), 2:918.
 On al-Abīwardī, see EI3, s.v. “al-Abīwardī, Abū al-Muẓaffar Muḥammad” (Geert Jan van Geld-
er) and Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ, 5:2360 – 76.
 Kanazi, Studies, 2 n. 11.

Authenticated
Books of Farq 67
lieves “that Abū Hilāl belonged to the Muʿtazilites,”⁸⁴ bases this conclusion pri-
marily on three passages in Abū Hilāl’s oeuvre. First, Abū Hilāl claims that Wāṣil
ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 131/748 – 49) was the first Muslim to write on theology (kalām), of-
fering a lengthy defense of his intellectual originality.⁸⁵ Second, Abū Hilāl hints
at Muʿtazilī leanings in his Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn. In a discussion concerning the
use of proofs (al-baṣar bi-l-ḥujja), he mentions the createdness of the Qur’an,
one of the central tenets of the Muʿtazila. “Someone,” he writes, “asked Abū
ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb [d. 303/915 – 16], ‘What proof is there that
the Qur’an is created?’ ‘God could create something like it,’ he answered.”⁸⁶ Fi-
nally, in the introduction to that book, he further mentions his commitment to
the principle of “the reward and punishment in the afterlife (al-waʿd wa-l-
waʿīd),” another central tenet in Muʿtazilī theology.⁸⁷ In a study of his literary
theory, Amal al-Mashāyikh also infers from Abū Hilāl’s style of argumentation
and his preference for badīʿ that he was a Muʿtazilī.⁸⁸
The biographical dictionaries tell us the names of many of Abū Hilāl’s teach-
ers and students but provide no substantial information about them, perhaps, as
Kanazi suggests, “due to their Shīʿite or Muʿtazilite sympathies.”⁸⁹ This lack of
information holds true for all of Abū Hilāl’s teachers, save the aforementioned
Abū Aḥmad al-ʿAskarī, about whom little is known with confidence. We do
know, however, that “Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿīd al-ʿAskarī
(293 – 382/906 – 93) was a prolific author and the leading scholar of his day in ha-
dith, lugha, and adab.”⁹⁰ Importantly, he was accused of being a Muʿtazilī.⁹¹ We
 Kanazi, Studies, 14.

 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Kitāb al-Awāʾil, ed. Muḥammad al-Miṣrī and Walīd Qaṣṣāb, 2 vols.
(Damascus: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1975), 2:134– 38. Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ was the
theologian credited with founding the Muʿtazila school of theology. See EI2, s.v. “Wāṣil b.
ʿAṭāʾ” (Josef van Ess).
 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn al-kitāba wa-l-shiʿr, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī
and Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm ([Cairo:] Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1371/1952), 14.
 Al-ʿAskarī, al-Ṣināʿatayn, 2. For more on the “promised good and the promised evil,” see Ri-
chard M. Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila
in the Classical Period (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1978).
 Amal al-Mashāyikh, Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī nāqidan (Amman: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 2002), 72,
296. This claim is somewhat unclear. Badīʿ refers to the liberal use of figures of speech and para-
nomasia in writing. It was first espoused by “modern” (muḥdath) poets in the third/ninth and
fourth/tenth centuries and later adopted by most Arabic writers. See EI3, s.v. “badīʿ” (Geert
Jan van Gelder) and Suzanne P. Stetkevych, Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ʿAbbāsid Age
(Leiden: Brill, 1991).
 Kanazi, Studies, 9.
 EI3, s.v. “al-ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad” (Beatrice Gruendler).

Authenticated
also know that he and the Buyid Vizier al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995) were in
close contact.⁹² Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād was “a tireless champion of [Basran] Muʿtazili
rationalism.”⁹³ Abū Aḥmad was one of Abū Hilāl’s main teachers, if not his most
important one.⁹⁴
Abū Hilāl taught many students, although little is known about most of
them. One of his students, Abū Saʿd Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAlī l-Rāzī l-Sammām, is men-
tioned as having been a prominent Muʿtazilī. We know from the Siyar aʿlām al-
nubalāʾ of Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) that he travelled widely in
search of knowledge. “He was an authority on different readings of the Koran,
on ḥadīth and fiqh. He had a deep knowledge of the Ḥanafite and Shafiʿite
schools of law, and was at the same time one of the leading scholars of the Muʿ-
tazila.”⁹⁵ However circumstantial, this likewise points to Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s
inclination towards Muʿtazilī theology.⁹⁶
Furthermore, later readers interpreted his works within a Muʿtazilite frame-
work, a view that seems to gain support from the Kitāb al-Furūq. His discussion
of the absence of complete synonymy in Arabic—a principle that he applies to
language in general—resonates with a Muʿtazilī inclination to deny the existence
of synonymy in the Arabic, as the language of God’s revelation. Regarding the
lack of synonymy in Arabic, he writes:
 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa-l-umam, ed. Sabīl Zakkār (Beirut: Dār al-
Fikr, 1415/1995 – 96), 4265/9:43. Curiously, Ibn al-Jawzī includes al-Ḥasan’s death notice in the
chapter on the year 387/997, and mentions a story told by Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yaḥyā ibn ʿAlī l-
Tabrīzī about an encounter al-Tabrīzī had with Abū l-Ḥasan. This story mentions that Abū l-
Ḥasan passed away on 8 Dhū l-Ḥijja 379 / 9 March 990.
 Kanazi, Studies, 5. See also Muḥsin al-Ḥusaynī l-ʿĀmilī, Aʿyān al-Shīʿa, 28 vols., ed. Ḥasan al-
Amīn and Muḥsin al-Amīn (Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1998) 8:216.
 Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. “Ebn ʿAbbād, Esmāʾīl, al-Ṣāheb Kāfī al-Kofāt” (Maurice Pomer-
antz). According to the entry in EI2, “[s]ome Shīʿīs like Ibn Bābūya … claim [Ibn ʿAbbād] as
one of them,” and ʿAbd al-Jabbār accused him of being Shi’i as well. His Muʿtazilism, however,
does not seem to have been in doubt; see EI2, s.v. “Ibn ʿAbbād” (Claude Cahen and Charles Pel-
lat). See also Maurice A. Pomerantz, Licit Magic: The Life and Letters of al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād (d.
385/995), (Leiden: Brill, 2017).
 Kanazi, Studies, 7.
 Kanazi, Studies, 9, citing Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Siyar aʿlām al-
nubalāʾ, 25 vols., ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ and Muḥammad Taʿyīm al-ʿAraqsūsī (Beirut: Muʾassa-
sat al-Risāla, 1317/1996), 18:55 – 60.
 In addition, ʿAskar Mukram, Abū Hilāl’s hometown, was the center of the “Jubbāʿī school” of
Muʿtazilī theology, see EI2, “Muʿtazila” (Daniel Gimaret). Josef van Ess claims that Abū Hilāl was
“vermutlich Muʿtazilit.” His only citation for this claim, however, is Kanazi’s book cited here.
Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte
des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, 6 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991– 97), 4:246.

Authenticated
The creator of the Arabic language is wise (wāḍiʿ al-lugha ḥakīm). He did not include in it
that which does not convey meaning … Every two words that are used for one concept or
entity in one language, each one of these words requires a difference in meaning that the
first does not entail. Otherwise, the second word would be redundant and there would be
no need for it.⁹⁷
Abū Hilāl argues that the creator of the Arabic language, presumably God, cre-
ated a perfect language, which, in order to be perfect, cannot have two signifiers
for one and the same signified.⁹⁸ Otherwise, one of these two signifiers would be
redundant and could be removed from the language without any loss. Such re-
dundancy would thus signify imperfection.
Other strong theological overtones run throughout Abū Hilāl’s biography
and works. While it seems likely that Abū Hilāl was a Muʿtazilī, he was not ex-
plicitly engaged in systematic theological debate, but rather invoked theological
postulates in order to resolve linguistic questions and to further lexicographical
analysis.⁹⁹ The implicit theological underpinnings of works like Abū Hilāl’s con-
stitute a nexus with, if not a direct influence on, the theological aspects of the
furūq of the jurists. Indeed, Abū Hilāl himself says of his own work on furūq:
“I turned my discussions in it [this work] towards (wa-jaʿaltu kalāmī fīhi ʿalā)
what is found in God’s scripture, what is common in the words of the jurists
and theologians (al-fuqahāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn), and the rest of the discussions
of the learned (wa-sāʾir miḥwārāt al-nās).”¹⁰⁰
Farq and the Arabic Alphabet
Grammarians and lexicographers undertook similar distinction-thinking regard-

ing phonetic distinctions between individual letters, most notably between the
letters ḍād and ẓāʾ. Distinctions between individual letters, like questions of syn-
onym, often had theological implications. The correct spelling and pronuncia-
tion of the letters of the Qur’an had to be ensured for many purposes. Distin-
guishing between these two letters was more than just a lexicographical or
 Abū Hilāl, Furūq, 22.

 While Abū Hilāl is not explicit in identifying God as the creator of the Arabic language, his
use of the singular in this passage is suggestive of this interpretation.
 Many contemporary intellectual works made implicit theological or philosophical claims in
the context of other discussions. See James E. Montgomery, “Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb
al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175 – 207,” Parts 1– 4, Middle Eastern Literatures 11.2 (2008); 12.1 (2009);
12.2 (2009); 12.3 (2009).
 Abū Hilāl, Furūq, 21.

Authenticated
phonological endeavor: the ḍād was imagined as pivotal to the self-understand-

ing of Arabic as a unique language. As Jonathan Brown notes, “[w]ritings on the
difference between ḍād and ẓāʾ or lists of [ḍ] – [ẓ] minimal pairs¹⁰¹ constitute a
long-lived genre in Arabic philology and belles-lettres.”¹⁰² These works, however,
focused primarily on understanding the ḍād, not the ẓāʾ, due to the centrality of
the letter ḍād in understandings of the Arabic language. Philologists believed
that Arabic was the only language containing the letter ḍād. For this reason, Ara-
bic was referred to as “the language of the ḍād” (lughat al-ḍād). In dictionaries,
for instance, the main discussion of the letter ḍād centers on its place within the
Arabic language. The Tāj al-ʿarūs says: “The ḍād is exclusive to the Arabs (li-l-
ʿarab khāṣṣatan), i. e., it is exclusive to their language and it is not found in
the languages of non-Arabs (lughāt al-ʿajam). This is the truth on which everyone
agrees (aṭbaqa ʿalayhi al-jamāhīr).”¹⁰³
In spite of this identification of the Arabic language with the letter ḍād, the
pronunciation of this letter has always been a source of doubt and discomfort.
Many Arabic letters, it seems, have no stable pronunciation, and the ḍād is in
fact one of the most often confused letters in the Arabic alphabet. The many pro-
nunciations of ḍād was not just a feature of spoken Arabic, but of other Semitic
languages as well. Scholars of Old South Arabian, for instance, have stated that
the ḍād/ẓāʾ distinction was already fading during the Late Antique period. This
can be seen in inscriptions, where the two graphemes are somewhat interchang-
able.¹⁰⁴ This graphic merger suggests a phonological merging of the two letters in
South Arabian, a phenomenon established with more certainty for spoken Ara-
bic in the “classical” period.¹⁰⁵
 Minimal pairs are words that only differ in one letter. In this case, reference is to words that
are spelled the same save that a ḍād is being replaced by a ẓāʾ or vice-versa.
 Jonathan A. C. Brown, “New Data on the Delateralization of Ḍād and its Merger with Ẓāʾ in
Classical Arabic: Contributions from Old South Arabic and the Earliest Islamic Texts on Ḍ / Ẓ
Minimal Pairs,” Journal of Semitic Studies 52.2 (2007): 345.
 Muḥammad Murtaḍā l-Ḥusaynī l-Zabīdī, Tāj al-ʿarūs min jawāhir al-Qāmūs, ed. ʿAbd al-Sat-
tār Aḥmad Farrāj et al., 40 vols. (Kuwait: Maṭbaʿat Ḥukūmat al-Kuwayt 1970), 8:315 – 16. See,
however, Abū l-Fatḥ ʿUthmān ibn Jinnī, Sirr ṣināʿat al-iʿrāb, ed. Ḥasan Hindāwī (Damascus:
Dār al-Qalam, 1985), 1:214– 15, where he says that “the ḍād is found in non-Arabic languages
in rare cases” (lā tūjidu fī kalām al-ʿajam illā fī qalīl).
 Stefan Weninger, “More Sabaic minuscule texts from Munich,” Proceedings of the Seminar
for Arabian Studies 32 (2002), 218; Christian Julien Robin, “Les inscriptions de l’arabie antique et
les études arabe” Arabica 68.4 (2001), 534.
 David Cohen, “Koiné, langues communes et dialectes arabes,” Arabica 9.2 (1962), 135.
Ahmad Al-Jallad has also found evidence in Safaitic inscriptions in a shift in the pronunciation
of this consonant in Old Aramaic and Safaitic in the Southern Levant. See Ahmad Al-Jallad,

Authenticated
Jonathan Brown, in a 2007 article, divides medieval writings on ḍād and ẓāʾ
into four groups:
(1) “Wordsmithing,” that is, a written performance in which the author laments the current
level of people’s Arabic as a way of launching into a discussion of beautiful poetry.¹⁰⁶ This
includes statements in treatises such as “Such a word is written with a ḍād, which can be
seen from the following poem.”
(2) Philological writings, focusing on teasing out the precise distinction in signification be-
tween synonymous words like ʿaḍḍa and ʿaẓẓa (“to grab with the teeth, to bite”), which,
while likely dialectic variants: “People say (yuqāl), ‘A matter that distresses me has reached
me, i. e., it torments me’ (warada ʿalayya amr ʿaẓẓanī yaʿnī ʿaḍḍanī).”¹⁰⁷
(3) Phonological books that discuss the proper way to pronounce these letters when reciting
the Qur’an.¹⁰⁸
(4) A category comprised of only one example, the book al-Rawḥa fī l-ẓāʾ wa-l-ḍād by by al-
Jarbādhqānī (fl. 370/980), which covers all three of the preceding areas. “The work is ex-
haustive rather than practical or enjoyable,” says Brown.¹⁰⁹ Brown considers it to form a
separate group, although al-Rawḥa can also been seen as an anthology of the three previ-
ous categories.
Let us consider an example of this literature. Al-Ṣāhib ibn ʿAbbād’s discussion of

these two letters is about distinguishing ḍād from ẓāʾ both in speaking and spell-
ing. According to Brown’s categorization, this work is closest to a work of
wordsmithing, wherein al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād concerns himself with [ḍ] – [ẓ] min-
imal pairs as a prelude to citation of beautiful poetry. He claims, however, to en-
vision something close to a full confusion between the letters, “because of the
closeness of these letters for listeners (taqārub ajnāsihima fī l-masāmiʿ) … and
the confusion of the correct way to write them (iltibās ḥaqīqat
kitābatihimā).”¹¹⁰ In discussing the importance of elucidating and understanding
the distinction between the two letters, al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād says: “Do you not
understand that if you said, ‘qarraẓtu al-rajul wa-qarraḍtuhu’ (‘I praised the
man and denigrated him’), that taqrīẓ (‘eulogizing’) is your praise of him and
“New Evidence from a Safaitic Inscription for a Late Velar/Uvular Realization of *ṣ́ in Aramaic,”
Semitica 58 (2016): 257– 70.
 Brown, “New Data,” 351– 52.
 Abū l-Qāsim Ismāʿīl al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād, al-Farq bayn al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ, ed. Muḥammad
Ḥasan Āl Yā Sīn (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Nahḍa and al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, 1377/1958), 4.
 Brown, “New Data,” 352.
 Brown, “New Data,” 352.
 Al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād, al-Farq bayn al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ, 3.

Authenticated
taqrīḍ (‘denigration’) is disparagement and faultfinding?”¹¹¹ It is curious that al-

Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād chooses this distinction, since qarraẓa means “to praise”
whereas qarraḍa can mean either “to denigrate” or “to praise.”¹¹² That is to
say that qarraẓa and qarraḍa can mean the same thing, thus rendering the dis-
tinction between the ẓāʾ and ḍād in these words negligible, depending on the
speaker’s intent.
The ḍād had a particular importance to early Muslim communities. What
was it about this issue that drew the attention of Muslim scholars? Brown sees
a strong theological component at work:
Although philologists might have enjoyed such harmless dialectical curiosities, the actual
phonological identity of a word was sacrosanct. In the language of God’s revelation, each
word and the root from which it was formed possessed a specific meaning inherently ap-
propriate for the thing it indicated. As it became widely established in Arabic linguistic
theory, ‘the assumption in language is the absence of synonymy (al-aṣl fī l-lugha ʿadam
al-tarāduf);’ each root had a unique meaning. After all, for most great Muslim linguistic
theorists, language was the result of divine inspiration and not human convention.¹¹³
Brown distinguishes between two different levels on which these texts are oper-
ating. On one level, he finds the medieval philologists “enjoy[ing] dialectical cu-
riosities.” Such writing seems to represent a large percentage of the writing on
ḍād-ẓāʾ pairs. Al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād’s discussion of, for instance, ʿaḍḍa and
ʿaẓẓa fits this description. Distinguishing between these two words provides
scholars with an opportunity to attempt to control and delineate the parameters
of Arabic—the second and third groups in Brown’s list—and to engage in another
reading of the poetic tradition.
Brown argues convincingly that this approach has theological objectives. As-
signing particular meanings to individual words reaffirms the divine nature of
the Arabic language as found in the Qur’an, God’s speech. The claim is not
that these scholars were motivated exclusively or even primarily by this theolog-
ical impetus, but that such writing about the distinction between the ḍād and the
ẓāʾ has a theological component. In particular, the divine nature of Arabic and
the associated belief in the absence of synonymy motivates the exploration of
distinction in words and letters alike. The search for an underlying consisten-
cy—here a direct one-to-one correspondance between signifier and signified—
 Al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād, al-Farq bayn al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ, 3.

 Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. “qarraḍa.”
 Brown, “New Data,” 365.

Authenticated
Farq and Furūq in Other Fields 73
is a theme that runs throughout almost all of the literature examined in this
study.
Farq and Furūq in Other Fields
Although medicine and linguistics were the primary fields that embraced distinc-
tions-thinking, works on distinctions appear in a variety of other scholarly disci-
plines. Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris mention that writings in furūq “flourished in
all of the sciences.”¹¹⁴ In particular, their survey shows treatises in the fields
of philology, medicine, logic, grammar, and theology.¹¹⁵ Most of the works that
they cite, however, are not extant or are of dubious attribution.¹¹⁶ The paucity
of information about many works of distinctions outside the fields of lexicogra-
phy and law make it difficult to write a precise and detailed general history of
this kind of writing. As evidence of the flourishing of furūq writing in medicine,
Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris cite Ibn al-Jazzār’s Farq bayn al-ʿilal, a work also
known as al-Furūq. As discussed above, the treatise published under this
name is also attributed to other individuals in both manuscript and printed ed-
itions.¹¹⁷ It remains, in my understanding, unclear whether one can say that Ibn
al-Jazzār wrote a book of furūq or what this book looked like. The uncertainties
surrounding this work may primarily indicate the occasional unreliability of the
major bio-bibliographic sources used by Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, Ḥājjī Khalī-
fa’s Kashf al-ẓunūn and al-Ziriklī’s al-Aʿlām, rather than about furūq writing itself.
There are, however, similar inconsistencies, in other scholarly traditions, such as
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 28.

 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 29 – 30.
 For instance, in a footnote to their discussion of al-Farq bayn al-naḥw wa-l-manṭiq by Abū l-
ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Sarakhsī, they cite Ḥājjī Khalīfa (d. 1067/1657) and his Kashf
al-ẓunūn (Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 30n24). They also mention, however, that there is
an entry for al-Sarakhsī in al-Ziriklī’s al-Aʿlām which does not mention the existence of this
work. Al-Ziriklī bases his entry on information in Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Akhbār al-ḥukamāʾ, Yāqūt’s
Muʿjam al-buldān, and al-Dhahabī’s Siyar al-Nubalāʾ. Neither al-Dhahabī nor Yāqūt lists any
work by this al-Sarakhsī. Ibn al-Qifṭī notes several works by al-Sarakhsī, but not the al-Farq
bayn al-naḥw wa-l-manṭiq. See Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 1:205; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī,
Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ, 19:147– 48; Shihāb al-Dīn Yāqūt ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-
buldān, 7 vols, no ed. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1397/1977), 3:209; and Ibn al-Qifṭī, Akhbār al-
ḥukamāʾ, 77.
 In this instance, Ziriklī bases his entry on Ibn al-Jazzār on Yāqūt’s Muʿjam al-udabāʾ and al-
Dhahabī’s Siyar al-aʿlām wa-l-nubalāʾ. There is no mention of this work neither in either al-Dha-
habī’s Siyar al-aʿlām nor in Yāqūt’s Muʿjam al-udabāʾ. See al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 1:85 – 86; al-Dha-
habī, Siyar, 15:561– 62; Yāqūt, Muʿjam al-udabāʾ, 1:187– 88.

Authenticated
the putatively early proto-Sufi book on distinctions, the Bayān al-farq bayn al-
ṣadr wa-l-qalb wa-l-fuʾād wa-l-lubb, attributed to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. Bayān
al-farq is clearly a work of applied lexicographic distinctions, but its date of com-
position remains unclear.¹¹⁸
Surveying furūq writing in these other fields shows that these writings do not
represent new forms of distinctions-thinking, but should be considered disci-
pline-specific versions of applied lexicographic furūq. That is to say, they apply
the logic of lexicographic furūq—distinguishing between apparently synonymous
words—for their own purposes. As such, these works do not represent new mo-
dalities of drawing distinctions or of making comparisons. The widespread use of
the technique of drawing distinctions shows the impact of this lexicographic
method in many others disciplines.
Farq in Philosophy
One early philosophical work of distinction belongs to the philosopher and pol-
ymath Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (d. ca. 300/912– 13), namely, the Risāla fī l-farq bayn al-
rūḥ wa-l-nafs. ¹¹⁹ As its title indicates, this work focuses on the distinction be-
tween spirit (rūḥ) and soul (nafs). Perhaps as a trope, Qusṭā ibn Lūqā states
that he wrote this work is written in response to a query: “You, may God grant
you honor, asked about the difference between the spirit and the soul, and
 Yusūf Marʿī questions this attribution, although he does not expound on his reasons for
doing so in Yūsuf Marʿī, ed., Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa-l-qalb wa-l-fuʾād wa-l-lubb al-
mansūb li-Abī ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī l-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (Amman: al-Markaz al-Malikī
li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 2009).
 There is some disagreement about the author of this text. According to ʿAlī Muḥammad
Isbir, there is unanimity among the classical sources that Qusṭā ibn Lūqā is the author of this
text (Isbir, ed. Risāla fī l-farq, 19 – 20). Louis Cheikho, on the other hand, attributes it to Ḥunayn
ibn Isḥāq, because Cheikho’s edition is a diplomatic transcription of the manuscript in the Khā-
lidiyya Library in Jerusalem, which attributes this text, cautiously, to Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. Cheikho
was the first to publish the Arabic of this text, but he mentions that it has been translated sev-
eral times into Latin, always with the ascription to Qusṭā ibn Lūqā. The manuscript begins with
the title, and then states “composed by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq al-ʿAbbādī for Muḥammad ibn Mūsā l-
Munajjim. There has been disagreement regarding this. A group of scholars says that it is by Ḥu-
nayn and another group that says it was written by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā for ʿĪsā ibn [Farrukhān
Shāh]” (Cheikho, ed. Risāla fī l-farq, 245 – 46). See Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, Risāla fī l-farq bayn al-
nafs wa-l-rūḥ, ed. Louis Cheikho, repr. in Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq: Texts and Studies, ed. Fuat Sezgin
et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe University, 1999), and Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla fī l-farq bayn al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs, ed. ʿAlī
Muḥammad Isbir (Damascus: Dār al-Yanābīʿ, 2006).

Authenticated
Farq in Philosophy 75
what the ancients had to say on this.”¹²⁰ Qusṭā’s method is rather straightfor-
ward: he discusses the concepts of the spirit and the soul, defines them, and fi-
nally explains them in detail to draw out their differences. He begins with the
spirit, which he understands to be of two kinds, the animal spirit (al-rūḥ al-
ḥayawānī) and the vital spirit (al-rūḥ al-nafsānī).¹²¹ The first section of this epistle
is on the animal spirit. He commences with a definition: “Know that the spirit is
a subtle substance that spreads throughout the human body.”¹²² Qusṭā continues
by elaborating on the definition, providing a clear description of the animal spi-
rit and its functions. We learn that the animal spirit resides in the heart, and then
in the next section, on the vital spirit, we learn that “it is emitted by the brain
(yanbūʿahu al-dimāgh).”¹²³ He then continues to describe the vital spirit, its loca-
tion and its functions. “What we have said is true, namely, that the spirit resides
in the cavities of the brain (tajwīfāt al-dimāgh) and that it performs different ac-
tions.”¹²⁴ Qusṭā follows with a short section on the soul, wherein he explains that
it cannot really be defined: “Describing the soul according to its true nature is
difficult, nearly impossible (muʿtāṣ jiddan). The proof of this is the disagreement
among the generations of philosophers, i. e., Plato, Aristotle, Thales, and Chrys-
ippus,¹²⁵ and likewise philosophers after them.”¹²⁶ Qusṭā follows this with three
sections on the soul, one on the definition of the soul according to Plato, another
on how the soul moves the body and how this occurs (al-kalām ʿalā taḥrīk al-nafs
li-l-badan ʿalā ayy jiha huwa), and finally one on the faculties of the soul (quwā l-
nafs). These long discussions serve to establish the concepts being discussed and
to explain the nuances behind the two concepts, soul and spirit.
Qusṭā’s application of distinctions-thinking is entirely lexicographical. In
comparing the two concepts, soul and spirit, Qusṭā emphasizes their technical
definitions. From an understanding of these definitions, he believes, the distinc-
tion between soul and spirit becomes apparent. As seen above, this comparison
based on definitions is the marker of lexicographic distinctions. This is why I
propose to describe this style of distinction an applied lexicographic distinction.
 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla, 37; Cheikho, ed., 248.

 Cheikho’s introduction to this work says “With rūḥ, [the author] means that which the
Greeks knew as πνεὑμα and the Byzantines as spiritus.” Cheikho also defines rūḥ ḥayawānī as
“esprit vital” and rūḥ nafsānī as “esprit animal.” See Cheikho, ed., 245.
 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla, 41; Cheikho, ed., 249.
 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla, 48; Cheikho, ed., 251.
 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla, 55; Cheikho, ed., 253.
 In both editions, this name is rendered Kharūstas. ʿAlī Muḥammad Isbir explains that this
is a mistake, and that the correct classical Arabic name for this philosopher is either Kharusibus
or Karsūbūs. In modern Arabic, Chryssipus is normally given as Kharīsībūs.
 Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Risāla, 57; Cheikho, ed., 254.

Authenticated
Farq in Ethics
Applied lexicographic distinctions, as a style of analysis, also appear in the field

of ethics in al-Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa wa-l-taʿyīr by Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī (d. 795/
1393). This work, too, exemplifies the approach of applied lexicographic distinc-
tions as a style of analysis in Arabic letters. “This is a comprehensive yet abridg-
ed discussion on the difference between giving advice and reprimanding,” writes
Ibn Rajab. “They both share a meaning in that they both mean to say something
to someone what that person does not want said (kilā minhumā dhikr li-l-insān
bimā yakrahu dhikrahu).” ¹²⁷ Both in giving advice and in reprimanding, one per-
son tells someone else the correct course of action or behavior. This is their
shared characteristic. Ibn Rajab continues: “The distinction between these con-
cepts can be confusing for a lot of people.” Ibn Rajab aims to dispel such con-
fusion. The idea underpinning his work is that giving advice is a virtue, but that
reprimanding others is a vice. In other words, the two concepts are similar in
their outward appearance, but near opposites in their intention. For this reason,
it is important to clarify the distinction between these two similar concepts, to
ensure proper understanding of advice and reprimand.
Much as we see with Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Ibn Rajab begins with definitions:
“Know that saying something to someone that they do not want said is prohib-
ited, if the intention behind it is only to disparage, blame, and fault (al-dhamm
wa-l-ʿayb wa-l-naqṣ).”¹²⁸ Ibn Rajab does not explicitly tell the reader at the outset
what he seeks to define, although it quickly becomes clear that he means to de-
fine reprimanding, taʿyīr. Ibn Rajab next adds another definition: “If, however,
there was a benefit (maṣlaḥa) for the majority of Muslims, or even for just one
of them (li-ʿāmmat al-muslimīn aw khāṣṣa li-baʿḍihim) and the intention behind
talking to this person was to bring about this benefit, then it is not prohibited.
Indeed, it is a recommended act.”¹²⁹ Again, Ibn Rajab does not explicitly identify
this statement with giving advice, but it is clear from context to what he refers.
The reader thus knows that naṣīḥa is a virtue and taʿyīr a vice. From this begin-
ning, Ibn Rajab makes his argument by showing various examples of others who
have said or held that giving advice is a commendable act while reprimanding is
not. He brings up the example of hadith transmitters inquiring about and mak-
ing sure of the probity of other transmitters (al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl), accepting the re-
ports of worthy transmitters while disavowing reports of less trustworthy author-
 Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī, al-Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa wa-l-taʿyīr, ed. Najam ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (Dam-
ascus: Dār al-Maʾmūn li-l-Turāth, 1405[/1980]), 25.
 Ibn Rajab, al-Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa, 25.
 Ibn Rajab, al-Farq bayn al-nasīḥa, 25.

Authenticated
Farq in Law 77
ities. He also cites examples from the hadith reinforcing the idea of giving advice
and condemning reprimanding. He closes out his treatise with a warning that
God will give everyone a just recompense.
As with Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, Ibn Rajab uses distinction-thinking as a way of in-
vestigating a particular discipline, in his case ethics. In so doing, both authors
narrow their focus to a discussion of technical terms. Conversely, physicians,
and jurists do not simply analyze words but uncover subtle differences between
illnesses and legal rulings, respectively. Like the lexicographers, the analysis of
Ibn Rajab and Qusṭā ibn Lūqā is based on definitions. The distinctions that they
discuss help them explain fundamental differences between two concepts that
outwardly resemble each other.
Farq in Law
Many legal works embrace the approach found in works of applied lexicographic
distinctions. A late example is the work on legal principles called Furūq al-uṣūl,
attributed to Kemalpaşazade (Ibn Kamāl Pāsha, d. 940/1534). Like the aforemen-
tioned works on philosophy and ethics, Kemalpaşazade compares a series of
pairs of uṣūl, legal principles or precepts, all drawn between individual items
of legal technical language. In this sense, they are all applied lexicographic dis-
tinctions. Among the uṣūl he compares, for instance, are the “necessary condi-
tion” (al-sharṭ al-lāzim) and the “optional condition” (al-sharṭ al-ghayr al-
lāzim);¹³⁰ “restricting the reading of a revealed source” (takhṣīṣ al-naṣṣ) and “re-
stricting the application of a legal cause” (takhṣīṣ al-ʿilla);¹³¹ and “literal lan-
guage” (ḥaqīqa) and “figurative language” (majāz).¹³² In Kemalpaşazade’s
case, as in other works of applied lexiciographic distinctions, he transfers the
strategy from lexicographic distinctions to technical legal terminology.
Kemalpaşazade introduces each pair of contrasting uṣūl with the phrase,
“another distinction, between (wa-farq ākhar bayn)…” He then explains the rel-
evant concepts, occasionally offering examples of how they are applied. For in-
stance, he says:
Another distinction, between restriction (al-takhṣīṣ) and exception (al-istithnāʾ): We say: The
indication of restriction can either be coupled (muqtarinan) with a modified phrase or be
 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Mubārak (Beirut: Dār
Ibn Ḥazm, 2009), 65.
 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 72.
 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 91.

Authenticated
postponed (mutarākhiyan) because restriction is understood on its own. Exception, howev-

er, is not understood on its own because it is the completion of a phrase. If you said, for
instance, “I owe that person ten dinars minus one,” they would be owed nine. If you
said, however, “I owe that person ten dinars,” and then paused, and later said “Minus
one,” you would owe him ten.¹³³
Both takhṣīṣ and istithnāʾ limit the applicability of a revealed source, which may
result in confusion. The distinction between them, he explains, is that a takhṣīṣ
obtains when one clause establishes a fact or rule and then a second clause re-
stricts the first, but istithnāʾ occurs when a single clause both establishes a fact
or rule and restricts its scope at once. The distinction that Kemalpaşazade draws
is between these two technical terms in legal theory. They are not laws or judg-
ments themselves.
The phrases given in the above example demonstrate the fact that an excep-
tion needs to be directly connected to the clause it affects. The first phrase con-
sists of one sentence. The exceptive clause “minus one” is connected to the
clause “I owe that person ten dinars.” The exceptive clause gains meaning
through its connection to the rest of the sentence. The second phrase, with a
pause between the two clauses, is an example of a failed exceptive phrase.
The pause indicates the completion of a sentence, and the exceptive phrase
“minus one” is therefore understood on its own, unconnected to the statement
“I owe that person ten dinars.” This phrase understood on its own bears no
meaning, and, therefore, does not affect the previous clause.
The way in which Kemalpaşazade deals with the terms al-naṣṣ al-mujmal
and al-naṣṣ al-mufassar will serve as a further example. Here he distinguishes
between the epistemological status of laws that are established by consensus.¹³⁴
Specifically, he discusses the emergence of consensus about the meaning of
Qur’anic passages. Certain passages require additional explanation, and the cer-
tainty of the rule that results from these passages, correspondingly, is of lower
epistemological status. This is not the situation for a Qur’anic passage whose
meaning is self-evident. When a consensus is reached on such verses, the result-
ing rule acquires the epistemological status of the Qur’an itself. In the case of
self-evident verses, the consensus is then merely pro forma, since (in theory)
there no interpretation is necessary in order to understand the divinely intended
law. Since no interpretation is necessary, it is as if the law results directly from
the Qur’an. In the case of verses needing explanation, however, any resulting
legal interpretation emerges from the consensus on the explanation. For this rea-
 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 76.

 Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, 98.

Authenticated
Conclusions 79
son, it is attributed to the consensus. In this treatise, Kemalpaşazade uses only

applied lexicographic distinctions. His analysis is centered purely on the correct
understanding of technical legal terms; unlike works studied in upcoming chap-
ters, he does not compare two legal problems and their outcomes—that is, he
does not use the techniques of legal distinctions.
Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed the different genres in which distinctions literature
flourished, as well as possible motivations and impulses for this kind of writing.
Although physicians may have been writing about differential diagnostics from
an early date, a genre called furūq first flourished in lexicography. In both disci-
plines, the structure and organization of writing is strikingly similar. The possible
chronological priority of the medical distinctions literature may have paved the
way for lexicographic works of this sort. Alternatively, their overlapping styles
could be due to broader factors that led intellectuals in the Islamic world to
seek to classify varieties of knowledge in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centu-
ries. These two genres also highlight potential uses for this kind of writing; med-
ical works served as manuals for practitioners, and lexicographic works quickly
moved from practical thesauruses to being fraught with theological concerns.
Medical distinctions involve a general symptom that has two potential caus-
es, each being due to a different underlying disease. Lexicographic distinctions
involve a general concept that is initially thought to be signified equally by two
different words, upon which it is shown that the two words actually signify two
different aspects of the concept in question. One difference between the medical
and the lexicographic texts is that a symptom is visible whereas a concept
thought to be signified equally by two words is an abstraction. Perhaps the
more important difference is that the two differentiated diseases are different dis-
eases whereas the two aspects of the concept in lexicography are conceptually
related in some way. The way in which two illnesses are compared is not easily
transferrable between fields of knowledge, as was the comparison between two
words or technical terms.
As will made clear in the excursus, legal distinctions form yet a third kind of
comparison. The style of reasoning used in works of legal distinctions is not sim-
ply a straightforward comparison, as it is in works distinguishing letters, words,
or diseases. Rather, legal distinctions treat two specific legal problems and the
legal reasoning that gives rise to the judgement applied in each of the two
legal cases. Before discussing the genre of legal distinctions, however, we

Authenticated
must turn towards the development of the concept of legal distinctions and the
way that distinctions operated in formal legal disputations.

Authenticated
Chapter Three: Jadal as a Source for Legal
Writings: The Cases of Khilāf
and Furūq
The previous chapter explored the rise of a distinct mode of literary and intellec-
tual production that self-consciously referred to itself as furūq, tracing the epis-
temological history of the concepts of farq and furūq to uncover the ways that
distinctions-thinking operated in separate but related scholarly disciplines.
This chapter follows a different thread in the early history of legal distinctions,
turning more narrowly to look at the explicit legal background to the works on
legal distinctions. As in Chapter Two, the discussion follows scholarly deploy-
ment of the distinct terms farq and furūq in the era before the genre of furūq
emerged. These two terms arose in legal discourse as part of a theory of dialec-
tics, known as disputation theory (ʿilm al-jadal), but were transformed in observ-
able ways before the genre of furūq came into being as a self-conscious and dis-
tinct category of legal writing.
This chapter first examines the idea of distinction (farq) in early discussions
of dialectics, noting that specialists in various disciplines used the term farq in
handbooks of dialectics. The term farq was often placed besides or within the
category of counter-objection (muʿāraḍa). A questioner would use the technique
of farq-objection during a formal disputation in an attempt to show how the re-
spondent’s opinion on a given case is contradictory to another opinion he held
in a closely related case. This technique was labelled farq because it asking a
question: “What is the distinction between…?” (mā l-farq bayn…).
As Walter E. Young has demonstrated, dialectics were pervasive in early Mus-
lim scholarly circles and constituted the arena in which legal thoughts and con-
cepts were “forged.”¹ In the course of such formalized disputations, many core
concepts and ideas of law were developed and refined. The concept of distinc-
tion also played a prominent role in the early Islamic legal discourse about dia-
lectics. After demonstrating the uses of the term distinction and etymologically
related words – i. e. words derived from the same linguistic root (f-r-q) – I turn
once more to ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī’s al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, which contains repeated
and sustained dialectical argumentation. My analysis here demonstrates how
al-Juwaynī envisioned and wrote his book as part of an existing tradition of ju-
ristic dialectic.
 Walter E. Young, The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law
(Cham: Springer, 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-005

Authenticated
82 Chapter Three: Jadal as a Source for Legal Writings: The Cases of Khilāf and Furūq
Disputation and Distinction
Dialectics (jadal) in the Arabo-Islamic tradition were a rigorous and formalized

“method for attaining truth” through adversarial inquisition.² Larry B. Miller has
explained that dialectics was “synonymous with question and answer,” and it
could serve as a way to package and manipulate ideas and theories.³ Young
has recently labeled dialectics a “forge” in which both theoretical concepts
and substantive law were formed. In Young’s words, “[t]he exigencies of dialec-
tical debate provided key motives, and forged key structures, elements, princi-
ples, and concepts for” many juristic disciplines.⁴
Disputation did not arise in the Islamic world in the field of law, however.
Rather, as Miller shows, theology was the field in which formal Arabic dialectic
began. Miller argues that this theological undertaking then quickly spread to
philosophy and jurisprudence. Young takes issue with Miller’s genealogical
model, claiming that dialectics constituted a broad academic interest in its ear-
liest stages.⁵ Both Miller and Young agree about the importance of ʿilm al-jadal
for Islamic knowledge in general and for Islamic law in particular.
A survey of theoretical writings on dialectics serves to trace the ways in
which the term “distinction” was used therein. While the word “distinction”
(farq) became a formalized concept in theoretical writings on legal dialectics,
it is also worth considering the various occurrences of the word farq in theolog-
ical dialectics as well as other words derived from the same root, i. e., afraqa,
iftaraqa, mufāriq, etc.
Miller argues that dialectical theory emerged at the time of Ibn al-Rēwandī
(fl. fourth/tenth c.).⁶ Ibn al-Rēwandī’s book, unfortunately, has not survived.
 Larry B. Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam
From the Tenth Through Fourteenth Centuries” (Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 1984), 24.
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 15. The importance of Muslim dialectics for the sic-et-non
method of Christian scholastics and the connections of Muslim dialectics to medieval European
scholastic culture have been noted and discussed in George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges:
Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981),
245 – 53.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 2.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 2– 3, 27– 32.
 This scholar’s name is given variously as Ibn al-Rāwandī, Ibn al-Rīwandī, or Ibn al-Rēwendī.
Miller gives it consistently as Ibn al-Rīwandī, although al-Rāwandī appears to be the more com-
mon form. See EI2, s.v. “Ibn al-Rāwandī or al-Rēwendī” (P. Kraus and G. Vajda), where he is re-
ferred to as Ibn al-Rāwandī throughout. I prefer al-Rēwandī, as in Josef van Ess, Theologie und
Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen
Islam, 6 vols. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991– 97).

Authenticated
Disputation and Distinction 83
Miller calls attention to the earliest extant manuals of disputation as either con-
tinuous with or refutations of Ibn al-Rēwandī. Among these early scholars are
the Jewish Qaraite Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī (fl. 4th/10th c), Muṭahhar ibn Ṭāhir al-
Maqdisī (fl. ca. 355/965 – 66), and Ibn Ḥazm al-Ẓāhirī (d. 456/1064). While Miller
believes that these texts reflect an exclusively theological mode of dialectic,
Young has shown that many of these works could also be considered juristic.
For example, Young says that al-Madqisī’s Badʾ fī l-tārīkh does not describe theo-
logical jadal, but jadal more generally, which encompasses theological and jurid-
ical dialectic.⁷
Miller claims that the earliest dialectical discussions were theological in na-
ture. Young, however, argues that the earliest sources for dialectic can already be
seen in some of the earliest books devoted to Islamic law. Young gives convincing
arguments for correspondence between the dialectical techniques found in al-
Shāfiʿī’s Ikhtilāf al-ʿirāqiyyīn and those recorded in later handbooks. Much of
his evidence is compelling, but it only shows that formalized conceptions of di-
alectical techniques existed before written handbooks of these techniques. Mill-
er’s argument that theological discourse was the original site of dialectical theo-
ry seems to me the most compelling. In addition to the evidence supplied by
Miller, other scholars have also shown a robust tradition of theological disputa-
tion in the late antique eastern Mediterranean. Most notably, Michael Cook has
called attention to Christian Syriac theological texts that contain blueprints for
disputations with other religious groups that are highly reminiscent of Arabic
theological texts.⁸
Young is correct to underscore that medieval Muslim scholars were “poly-
maths wearing ‘many hats,’” thus showing the inherent cross-disciplinarity of
these early scholars.⁹ I nevertheless prefer the term “theological” to describe
early writings on jadal, for two reasons. First, this category retains explanatory
power for these books, even if the books do aim to cover more than theology.
Miller convincingly shows the ways in which these scholars reacted against or
were influenced by Ibn al-Rēwandī, a theologian. As responses to an argument
from theology, these disputation handbooks served as sites of theological disa-
 Walter E. Young, “The Dialectical Forge: Proto-System Juridical Disputation in the Kitāb
Ikhtilāf al-ʿIrāqiyyīn.” 2 vols. (PhD Diss., McGill University, 2012), 1:23 – 25.
 The general framework is a blueprint structured by a back and forth presented with the terms
“if they say …, we reply …” See Michael A. Cook, “The Origins of ‘Kalām,’” Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies 43.1 (1980): 32– 43. See also C. H. Becker, “Christliche Polemik
und islamische Dogmenbildung,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete 26 (1912):
171– 95.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 13.

Authenticated
greement. Second, these theoretical works on disputations were all written in

roughly the same time period, in the early fourth/tenth century, before scholars
began composing theoretical works on dialectic that were embedded within a ju-
ristic context. That is to say, the authors of these works were all in conversation
with each other and involved in theology.
Farq in Theological Disputation
Based on the sources quoted by Miller, the theological tradition uses the term
farq to designate a form of muʿāraḍa, counter-objection.¹⁰ Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb
al-Qirqisānī, a Qaraite scholar, discusses dialectical method in his book Kitāb
al-Anwār wa-l-marāqib. Al-Qirqisānī repeatedly quotes a certain unnamed Mus-
lim scholar as the authority on dialectical theory. Miller shows that this scholar
is Ibn al-Rēwandī.¹¹ Al-Qirqisānī also includes a short discussion of the rules for
dialectic, going through the kinds of questions one should ask and the correct
ordering of the questions. Significantly, he most often uses the verb faraqa
(“to distinguish,” “to draw a distinction”) to contrast two different positions.
In describing how to refute someone else’s position, al-Qirqisānī says one
ought to say: “I concede that your rationale (ʿillataka) necessitates this opinion,
but it also necessitates that you apply it to something that comes more quickly to
mind … Therefore, either show how the two cases are both true or both false, or
explain how they differ (wa-illā fa-fruq baynahumā).”¹² Al-Qirqisānī does not give
us a proper definition of the strategy of farq, suggesting that for him farq was not
a formalized technique. Nevertheless, he describes a particular kind of objection
in which the questioner attempts to catch the respondent in a contradiction. The
questioner would finish by asking the respondent to explain the difference, or to
distinguish, between two views held by the latter.
Al-Qirqisānī uses the word farq again in discussing the styles of objections
(sg. muʿāraḍa) used by some theologians (qawm min al-mutakallimīn). Although
al-Qirqisānī does not explicitly categorize distinction as a specific technique, he
 Miller uses the term “counter-objection” to translate this word. Young renders this term as
“counter-indication.” I discuss the specific relationship between farq and muʿāraḍa below;
note that some authors explicitly subsume farq under muʿāraḍa, while other authors use
these two terms refer to separate categories.
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 24.
 Yaʿqūb ibn Isḥāq al-Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār wal-marāqib: Code of Karaite law, ed. Leon
Nemoy (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939), 1:472; translation based on
Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 23.

Authenticated
Farq in Theological Disputation 85
nevertheless alludes to an idea strikingly similar to formal disputational farq. He

offers the following counterfactual:
If a Muslim were to say, “I affirm the prophecy (nubuwwa) of Moses based on the unani-
mous agreement (iṭbāq) of the Jews on the validity of his prophecy,” then he must neces-
sarily (lazimahu) affirm the prophecy of Aaron because of the Jews’ unanimous agreement
on his prophecy. If this person were then to deny Aaron’s prophecy while still affirming that
of Moses, he would be distinguishing (qad faraqa) between them [incorrectly], in affirming
Moses while rejecting Aaron, in spite of the equivalent proofs for affirming their prophe-
cies.¹³
In this example, al-Qirqisānī envisions a debate between a Muslim and a Jew. By

accepting the agreement of the Jews as a valid indicator of Moses’s prophecy, the
imagined Muslim would also have to accept their agreement as a valid indicator
of the prophecy of Aaron, since the Jews are also in agreement that Aaron was a
prophet. Once the Muslim has accepted the unanimous agreement of the Jews as
certain proof in one case, he must accept their unanimous agreement as certain
proof in any case.¹⁴ Here, however, the Muslim disputant accepts the opinion of
the Jews for the prophecy of Moses, but not for that of Aaron. He has distinguish-
ed between them without any basis. In so doing, the Muslims has found himself
in a contradiction.
 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wal-marāqib, 1:475.

 The passage seems to imply that Muslims do not generally accept the prophecy of Aaron. The
actual status of Aaron in the Qur’an is not clear cut. The Qur’an names Aaron in its listing of
prophets twice, once in Q al-Nisāʾ 4:163 and again in Q al-Anʿām 6:84. At the same time, the re-
lationship between Moses and Aaron was likened to that between Muḥammad and ʿAlī, who was
decidely not a prophet. In a hadith report, Muḥammad say, “ʿAlī, you are to me like Aaron to
Moses, but there shall be no Prophet after me.” The implication of this hadith is that ʿAlī’s elo-
quence was helpful in spreading Muḥammad’s message, just as Aaron’s eloquence helped
Moses communicate with Pharaoh. See EI3, s.v. “Aaron” (Andrew Rippin). It may be the case,
however, that al-Qirqisānī wants to make a point about counterfactuals, namely, that the
rules of logic still obtain. In this case, the logical tool used is the reductio ad absurdum
(ilzām). Lastly, Miller suggests that perhaps this passage is an argument that the counter-objec-
tion argument is a form of question and answer. The Ashʿarī theologian Ibn al-Fūrak (d. 406/
1016) gives an equivalent discussion between two disputants about Muḥammad and Jesus. Mill-
er, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 34– 35; Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt al-
Shaykh Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī Imām Ahl al-Sunna, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Sāyiḥ (Cairo:
Maktabat li-l-Thaqāfa l-Dīniyya, 1425/2005), 318. I thank Daniel Frank for help understanding
this passage.

Authenticated
The use of the term farq in this passage is instructive.¹⁵ The respondent, the
Muslim, makes two statements that are at odds with each other. The first state-
ment accepts something—the unanimous agreement of the Jews—as certain
proof, the second statement rejects the certainty of that proof. It thus appears
that the respondent has contradicted himself. The questioner can thus claim
that the respondent has “distinguished incorrectly,” that he has been inconsis-
tent in his reasoning. The text employs the term farq in describing this inconsis-
tency. Farq is not used precisely to refer to a particular kind of objection that has
been lodged, but rather to the opportunity presented to the questioner to use the
respondent’s own reasoning to demonstrate that the rationale adduced by the
respondent involves him in a contradiction.¹⁶
Based on al-Qirqisānī’s discussion, it is clear that the term farq had not yet
crystallized into a technical term, as he often uses faṣl and farq synonymously.
Nevertheless, his theory of farq and faṣl is similar to the technique which is later
found books of legal disputation called farq. Al-Qirqisānī’s thirty-third chapter in
his al-Anwār wa-l-marāqib, for example, is “On a question of distinction (faṣl)
and that it requires that there be two answers.”¹⁷ This chapter explicates how
questions that elicit distinctions (faṣl) work, and how, in order to be a valid dis-
putational technique, such questions must be asked in regard to issues that have
two different and contradictory answers. The author begins this chapter by say-
ing, “Know that when you ask about the distinction between two things (al-farq
bayn shayʾayn), that you have already distinguished between them (faraqta
 Al-Qirqisānī uses this term two more times in this discussion with a similar meaning. He con-
tinues this discussion by stating, “One must also ask him (wajaba ayḍan an yuqāl lahu), ‘What is
the distinction (mā l-farq) between you and someone who affirms the prophecy of Aaron while
denying that of Moses?’” (al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wal-marāqib, 1:475). This question aims to show
the untenable position of the Muslim in attempting to affirm the prophecy of Moses while reject-
ing that of Aaron. In the example, the inverse opinions of the second scenario rest on the same
faulty logic as that of the Muslim and are on their face absurd. Al-Qirqisānī uses the phrase mā l-
farq (“What is the distinction?”) throughout this paragraph. He also uses the term mufāriq (“dis-
tinction”), however, to denote the distinguishing trait that follows the verbs farq and iftirāq. He
also makes mention of tafriqa (distinction) in a similar context: “Whoever rules (ḥakama) in dis-
puted issues with a distinction must be asked for proof (kull man ḥakama fī mawāḍiʿ al-ikhtilāf
bi-l-jamʿ [wa-fī mawāḍiʿ al-jamʿ] bi-l-tafriqa fa-l-muṭālaba bi-l-burhān wājib ʿalayhi).” See al-Qir-
qisānī, al-Anwār wal-marāqib, 1:478.
 Miller discusses an equivalent example used by Muslim theologians, with Muḥammad and
Jesus taking the place of Moses and Aaron. Although the end of this passage is not a question,
“it could easily be turned into one.” Some theologians even argued that such a statement is one
that asks for a reply (istikhbār) and thus could be considered a question (suʾāl). See Miller, “Is-
lamic Disputation Theory,” 34– 35.
 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wal-marāqib, 1:480.

Authenticated
baynahumā) as being either affirmed or denied.”¹⁸ The terms faṣl and farq are
thus synonymous; the chapter on faṣl starts with the verb faraqa. For al-Qirqisā-
nī, distinction is a dialectical maneuver that involves affirming one position
while simultaneously invalidating another. He says, “When you distinguish be-
tween two things (faraqta baynahumā), you deny one of them and affirm the
other.”¹⁹ This logic is demonstrated in the example of the prophecy of Aaron
and Moses, when the questioner is poised to ask farq-based counterfactual ques-
tions that could only be answered through affirmation or denial: Does the Mus-
lim believe in the unanimous agreement of the Jews as a valid proof or not? This
same logic, however, does not carry over into later books of legal distinction,
which are not aimed at denying one thing or the other, but instead aim at deny-
ing the very contradiction itself.
Farq in Legal Disputation
In handbooks of legal dialectics, discussions of farq become more formalized

than in theological guides to disputation. Discussions of farq in legal dialectics
echo, in large part, al-Qirqisānī’s understanding of the concept of distinction,
but the legal works give greater prominence to the word farq as a technical
term. As a result, the term loses its plain-sense meaning of “distinguish” or “dif-
ference,” as traced in the previous chapter, and instead comes to refer to a par-
ticular method of dialectical argumentation. The dialectical method of a farq-ob-
jection is a procedure of argumentation.
Farq, often understood as a subset of muʿāraḍa (“counter-objection”), refers
to one kind question and answer procedure of argumentation, not only to one
kind of comparison. A counter-objection can take issue with any aspect of the
respondent’s legal reasoning regarding the legal situation in question. A farq
is a particular kind of counter-objection because it relates specifically to the
legal rationale (ʿilla) under consideration. Young discusses why farq was seen
to be a subset of the broader category of counter-objection: “[I]n establishing
a charge of farq, [the questioner] claims an opposing ʿilla … which he then
links to a different aṣl … in which [the questioner’s] counter-ʿilla occasions the
opposite to [the respondent’s] ḥukm.”²⁰ The farq is not a simply difference be-
 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wal-marāqib, 1:480.

 Al-Qirqisānī, al-Anwār wal-marāqib, 1:481.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 179.

Authenticated
tween two things, but rather the assertation of a fundamental distinction in ra-
tionale between two cases.
This process can be best understood through an example. A typical case is
provided by the Andalusian Mālikī jurist, Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081), who
explains farq in the context of a Mālikī scholar debating a Ḥanafī scholar:
Mālikī: “Whoever kills someone with a blunt object shall be punished by retaliation. This is
the case since the killer has unlawfully killed someone who is socially equal with an object
that will likely kill him, and this deserves retaliatory punishment, just as if the killer had
used a sharp object.”
Ḥanafī: “A sharp object is something that is used for the ritual slaughter of animals. It is
because of this that we say that retaliation is required for a crime committed using such
an object. The legal issue at hand, the blunt object, is not comparable, since animals can-
not be slaughtered with a blunt object. This means that there is no punishment by retali-
ation for a murder committed with a blunt object, such as a small stick.”²¹
In this example, the Mālikī jurist attempts to explain why the Mālikī madhhab
imposes a retaliatory punishment on murder committed with both a blunt object
and a sharp object. The Mālikī treats both killings as equal, as the type of weap-
on is of little consequence when considering intentional homicide, a tort war-
ranting qiṣāṣ. The club, he argues, is a deadly weapon similar to a knife and
thus its wielder deserves the same legal treatment as the knife-wielding killer.
The Ḥanafī responds by drawing a distinction between these two weapons.
For the Ḥanafī, murder with a knife is a more serious offense, presumably be-
cause the knife is prima facie a deadly weapon but a club is not. The use of kni-
ves to slaughter animals suggests that their primary purpose is killing. This de-
fault usage allows the jurist to distinguish between the presumed intent when
they are used in cases of murder. For the Ḥanafī, a knife is evidence of clear in-
tent for homicide and therefore leads to a charge of murder. A club, meanwhile,
only allows for a charge of manslaughter, because the intent of the perpetrator
cannot be clarified by recourse to the weapon. The everyday use of these objects
provides insight into their legal functions; in formal terms, the ʿilla at work is the
normal use of the object. Knives are used for killing living beings, while clubs are
not normally used in this way.
At this point, the Ḥanafī seems to have made a more convincing argument
than the Mālikī. In effect, the Mālikī claimed that these cases are equivalent be-
 Sulaymān ibn Khalaf al-Bājī, Kitāb al-Minhāj fī tartīb al-ḥijāj, ed. ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī (Beirut:
Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1987), 203, ¶460. This section is also translated in Young, Dialectical
Forge, 179 – 80.

Authenticated
cause striking someone with either a sharp or a blunt object will likely result in
their death. In this sense, they are similar and the presumed intent of the killer is
equivalent. The Ḥanafī, however, disagrees. According to him, the cases are dis-
tinct and not at all similar. The distinction, in his view, lies in the legal rationale
that is used to determine intent. Due to the separate underlying rationales, the
two kinds of killing are legally distinct, and therefore they occasion different
punishments.
This brief back and forth is the exercise of a farq-objection. The Ḥanafī ap-
pears to have bested the Mālikī in this dispute. The Mālikī jurist presents a ra-
tional legal argument for retaliation. The Ḥanafī argues that the Mālikī is incor-
rect in his legal reasoning and posits a different consideration for the application
of retaliation. The Ḥanafī seems to have the upper hand and to have gained an
advantage through a more nuanced understanding of Islamic law. The Ḥanafī’s
response to the Mālikī is the farq-objection. Al-Bājī, himself a Mālikī, would not
allow a Ḥanafī to win this dispute, and he continues by explaining how this ob-
jection is to be overcome. Al-Bājī’s idealized response, of course, involves the
Mālikī undermining the distinction drawn by the Ḥanafī.²²
Al-Bājī’s presentation of a farq-objection and the way to overcome this ob-
jection is characteristic of manuals of legal disputation. Many other jurists de-
vote whole chapters to distinction in their dialectics handbooks. Imām al-Ḥara-
mayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), for instance, titles the twelfth chapter of his al-
Kāfiya fī l-jadal “On Answering a Distinction” (fī l-jawāb ʿan al-farq). His discus-
sion focuses on the use of farq as a disputational technique, however, not as a
category of legal writing and analysis. A farq, in his mind, describes a particular
objection to be overcome and the method for doing so. Al-Juwaynī writes:
Know that to ask about the first term in an analogy, regarding its impossibility or inconsis-
tency (min al-manʿ wa-l-naqḍ), invalid construction (fasād al-waḍʿ), lack of consistent ap-
plicability (ʿadam al-taʾthīr), inversion of the conclusion (qalb), and counter-objection
(muʿāraḍa), is to ask about distinction (al-farq). This kind of objection can be responded
to using any of the above rubrics.²³
 Al-Bājī, Minhāj, 203, ¶460.

 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, al-Kāfiya fī l-jadal, ed. Fawqiyya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd (Cairo:
Maṭbaʿat Īsā l-Bābī l-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakāʾuhu, 1399/1979), 322. The translation of the technical
terms is largely adapted from the terms used by Miller. He translates ʿadam al-taʾthīr as “inef-
fective ratio legis” (Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 120 – 22) and qalb as “methodos kata
peritropēn” (Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 122 – 27). In his discussion of manʿ, he does
not give a definitive translation of the term (Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 113 – 18). On
the terms, “naqḍ,” “fasād al-waḍʿ,” and “muʿāraḍa,” see Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,”
127– 29, 118 – 20, and 133 – 34.

Authenticated
According to al-Juwaynī, if one’s opponent draws attention to the non-transfer-

ability of a legal rationale, which amounts to a charge of farq, one may respond
by referring to any one of the above-listed hermeneutic tools.
Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī states that a farq is “a counter-objection to the rationale
(ʿilla) of the principal case” and that “it is the most legally specific (afqah) ob-
jection that can occur in a debate since the legal issue inherent in the problem
becomes known in this way.”²⁴ In other words, a farq is an objection based on a
perceived incompatibility between the operative rationale in two legal cases.
Lodging a farq-objection requires specific knowledge of legal rationales and
how they operate. Likewise, overcoming a farq-objection requires a jurist to re-
interpret the applicability of a particular legal rationale to multiple cases.
Because of the important role of the rationale in a farq-objection, al-Bājī cat-
egorizes all objections based on a legal rationale as farq. Al-Bājī’s comprehensive
account of distinction addresses two kinds of farq that may be employed in dis-
putations. The first type claims that the two cases should be treated with refer-
ence to two different fact-patterns that result in two different outcomes due to
two different legal rationales, a “clean break” between the two cases.²⁵ The sec-
ond type of farq objects to the legal rationale at work in the case brought in the
objection, but on different ground. Here, the questioner claims directly that the
secondary case is a derived case while the original case is a principal case.²⁶ The
questioner then states that the two primary cases are distinct. This means that
there is a disagreement over the correct ʿillas to apply to the case at hand.
One party wishes to treat both cases with the same ʿilla, while the other part in-
sists on the applicability of two different ʿillas. The objection focuses on the cor-
rect rationale that applies to a particular case.²⁷ These two styles of farq operate
with a related, but distinct, form of logic. In each of these, the contention of the
questioner revolves around the precise relationships between similar cases with
similar legal rationales.
 Al-Bājī, al-Minhāj, 201, ¶456. Translation adapted from Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,”
130.
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 132.
 The ruling in a principal case (aṣl) is drawn directly from a revealed source. A legal rationale
(ʿilla) may be deduced from the ruling in a principal case. The ruling of a derived case (farʿ), also
called the instant case, is determined by the correct application of a legal rationale derived from
a primary case. In the first type of farq, the questioner refers to two sets of primary cases, derived
cases, and legal rationales. In the second type of farq, there is one principal case and one ration-
ale that are contrasted to a principal case, a derived case, and a legal rationale.
 Al-Bājī, Minhāj, 202, ¶457; see also Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,”132.

Authenticated
Farq thus became a formalized and highly elaborate technique in legal dis-
putation. Whereas the term had been used informally in theological or philo-
sophical disputation, it became a fully formed technique in handbooks of
legal disputation. Understanding how to use farq offensively and how to over-
come a farq-objection became a necessary part of successfully competing in a
legal disputation. Attaining this knowledge required a thorough knowledge of
substantive law, legal theory, and the connections between them. The formaliza-
tion of farq thus relied upon an already elaborated system of legal thought and
an established tradition of disputation. In this sense, it is not a surprise that the
term farq appears in disputation manuals at the same time that doctrines of dis-
tinct Islamic legal schools were formalized.
Miller finds that authors incorporated this technique in the dialectical man-
uals of the fourth/tenth century. He notes, however, that muʿāraḍa was an “old
technique” that predated the systematization of disputation theory.²⁸ Young con-
firms this finding, noting that dialectical strategies similar not only to muʿāraḍa,
but also farq, and that other techniques appear in early works of Islamic sub-
stantive law as well. “[A]s a dialectical move employing verbs and nouns of
root f-r-q, it [farq] is ubiquitous throughout the Umm … Whatever the date we
may consider farq to have crystallized as a uniform technical term, its practice
and teaching as a dialectical move stretch back at least to the second century
H.”²⁹ Although Young does not find explicit discussions of farq in al-Shāfiʿī’s
al-Umm, he nevertheless finds instances of disputation within this text in
which scholars employ questions and responses akin to later, formal techniques
of farq.
The field of dialectics in Islamic intellectual culture, jadal, draws heavily on
the Greek Aristotelian tradition.³⁰ While there seems to have been be a tradition
of dialectics before the introduction of Aristotle into the Arabo-Islamic heritage,
jadal quickly incorporated many of the formal features of the Aristotelian tradi-
tion once the Aristotelian corpus had become available in Arabic translation.
Early juristic dialectics appear to be fairly free of Aristotelian influences,
“[b]ut after jurisprudence had assimilated the techniques of theological dialec-
tic, its own theory became influenced by logical terminology and techniques.”³¹
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 33.

 Young, Dialectical Forge, 180.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 188 – 213; Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 107, 264– 65; Miller, “Islamic
Disputation Theory,” 1– 4, 52– 77.
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” iii. Miller’s study carefully shows how the Arabo-Islam-
ic tradition of disputation existed independently of Aristotle, adopted Aristotelian techniques
and frameworks, and then transformed into a fully formalized system called “methods of inves-

Authenticated
Part of this pre-Aristotelian tradition involved some aspects of the counter-objec-

tion (muʿāraḍa), but Miller argues that there is a general category of muʿāraḍa
that is part of the “native” pre-systematic techniques of disputation.³² As the ex-
isting styles of disputation were formalized, muʿāraḍa needed to be incorporated
into the formal system “the arguments brought forth cloud[ed] the difference be-
tween it and distinction (faṣl, farq).”³³ Distinction is often, but not always, pre-
sented as a a subcategory of muʿāraḍa, the latter being a notion that preceded
Aristotelian influence. Miller seems to situate the concept of distinction as
part of the dialectical tradition based on the work of Aristotle, although he
does not elaborate on this point.
Young also seems to suggest a parallel between farq and one of the refuta-
tions offered by Aristotle in his Sophistical Refutations, specifically Aristotle’s ad-
vice to “look for contradictions between the answerers’ views and either his own
statements or the views of those whose words and actions he admits to be right
or those who are generally held to bear a like character and to resemble them.”³⁴
Young draws parallels between these techniques and inconsistency (naqḍ), con-
tradictions with the Qur’an, hadith, or scholarly consensus, and “with charges of
contradicting the substantive law or method of one’s own juristic madhhab.”³⁵
While Young does not use the term farq in this discussion, the technique of eval-
uating Qur’an, hadith, and legal questions seems to be dialectical farq. This in-
terpretation of Young’s position only requires understanding Aristotle’s state-
ment “those whose works and actions [the questioner] admits to be right” as
applying, in legal disputations, to the assumption that a disputant understands
the doctrines of his particular legal school to be correct. Based on this statement,
then, it seems possible that farq developed as a formal technique of disputation
in connection with the reception of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations. This sup-
position, however, follows naturally from the understanding that any participant
in a legal disputation is an adherent to a particular legal school and defending
the view of his school.
tigation (ādāb al-baḥth).” See also Mehmet Karabela, “The Development of Dialectic and Argu-
mentation Theory in Post-Classical Islamic Intellectual History,” (PhD Diss., McGill University,
2011).
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 38.
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 38; Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:31n46.
 Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations. On Coming-to-be and Passing Away. On the Cosmos,
trans. by E.S. Forster and D.J. Furley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 85. See
also Young, Dialectical Forge, 211– 12.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 213.

Authenticated
Although farq is usually understood as a subcategory of muʿāraḍa, the ques-

tion of the status of farq with regard to muʿāraḍa is not clear cut. Miller claims
that while some of his primary sources portray muʿāraḍa as a broad category
under which farq can be subsumed, other theorists see them as two distinct
kinds of counter-objection.³⁶ Young understands farq as wholly subsumed
under the concept of muʿāraḍa and rejects the possibility of them being distinct
kinds of objections.³⁷ He argues, based on Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī and al-Bājī, that a
proper muʿāraḍa entails the construction of a new legal analogy. Farq involves
invoking a new legal case that is seemingly related to the case at hand by way
of the legal rationale. It is the applicability of this rationale that is at stake in
a farq-objection. Since farq is one of the techniques through which a new anal-
ogy is constructed, it must be subsumed under muʿāraḍa, a broader category en-
compassing all techniques in which a counter-analogy is created.³⁸
In other words, Young believes that the muʿāraḍa was a disputational tech-
nique that existed prior to the emergence of the technique of farq. He holds, how-
ever, that the process of farq itself is and only can be a subsection of muʿāraḍa.
Certainly, the strategy of farq involves the comparison of a new set of facts with
the legal discussion at hand. To take the above example, the Mālikī and the
Ḥanafī argue about the legal status of murder using a blunt object and a
sharp object. For the Mālikī, the two weapons are alike in their legal rationale
(ʿilla), since weapons are immaterial for determining intent. They are also simi-
lar, in his view, in the legal ruling that results from the rationale, the imposition
of retaliatory killing. The Ḥanafī scholar, who makes the case for a distinction
(farq), produces a counter-analogy. For him, the two weapons are incompatible
and disanalogous, the correct analogy hinges on the use of a sharp-weapon, not
on the intent of the attacker. Therefore, there are two legal outcomes in the two
cases, one being the imposition of qiṣāṣ for the sharp object and the other being
the non-imposition of qiṣāṣ for the blunt object. This result is what Young calls
the counter-ḥukm. Young claims, therefore, that this is simply one of the many
kinds of counter-objection (muʿāraḍa), and that farq is subsumed within the cat-
egory of counter-objections, which is both a broader category and an older one.
While Young’s argument that farq is exclusively a subsection of muʿāraḍa is con-
vincing on the face of it, he fails to address those scholars who treat farq as a
 Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 130 – 31.

 Both Miller and Young agree that muʿāraḍa was a particularly Arab, pre-jadal technique.
Miller, “Islamic Disputation Theory,” 37– 38; Young “Dialectical Forge,” 1:31n46; idem,
Dialectical Forge, 180.
 Young, Dialectical Forge, 176 – 82.

Authenticated
separate disputational category. Nevertheless, these two concepts, muʿāraḍa and

farq, are clearly quite closely related.
Disputational Theory and Practice (Khilāf)
Furūq was not the only genre of legal writing that arose from the larger world of
dialectics. Indeed, the relationship between these two disciplines, furūq and
jadal, has gone relatively unnoticed.³⁹ The relationship between khilāf, compar-
isons of disputed legal points across (or within) madhhabs, and dialectics is
much more widely understood. Young claims that disputation had a profound
effect on the entirety of Islamic legal literature, arguing that every genre of
pre-modern Islamic legal writing is influenced by the practice or theory of dia-
lectics, but that of these genres, khilāf, has been impacted most clearly.⁴⁰
While Young shows that many Islamic legal concepts were elaborated within dis-
putational contexts, the development of legal genres and their particular connec-
tions to jadal in legal contexts remain unclear. The legal genre most clearly re-
lated to disputation, however, is that of khilāf, also referred to as ikhtilāf. ⁴¹ In
such contexts, khilāf does not refer to a particular technical term or style of dis-
putation but to the act of disputation itself, especially when used in the context
of a literary genre.
Joseph Schacht describes ikhtilāf “as a technical term, the differences of
opinion amongst authorities of religious law, both between the several schools
and within each of them.”⁴² Elsewhere, he describes the compilation of works
of ikhtilāf as “comparative accounts of the doctrines of several schools
(ikhtilāf, ‘disagreement’).”⁴³ The books reflecting discussions between schools
relate to (real or imagined) discussions between schools on particular points
of law. In part, their purpose was to show which school was superior. The
books that Schacht refers to as “simple handbooks” are books that attempt to
 There is a discussion of this connection in both Young, Dialectical Forge and Necmettin
Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar: Furûk literatürü üzerine bir inceleme (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık,
2016). Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb hints at such a connection as well. Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-
Ḥabīb, “al-Muqadimma,” in ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana
qism al-ʿibādāt, ed. Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb (PhD Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-
Qura, 1416/1996), 79 – 81.
 Young, “Dialectical Forge,” 1:70.
 These two terms seem to be used synonymously in the tradition to refer to contradictory
legal opinions which cannot be harmonized.
 EI2 s.v. “Ikhtilāf” (Joseph Schacht).
 Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 114.

Authenticated
establish a given opinion as prevalent within a particular school. Authors of

these works also sought to catalog and resolve disagreements in order to “arrive
at consensus on any doctrine of practice.”⁴⁴ Paradoxically, however, by catalog-
ing instances of disagreement, works of khilāf can also serve as permanent evi-
dence of disagreement, or the lack of consensus, on particular issue. In this way,
khilāf works serve to permanently upset the epistemological certainty that arises
from consensus and lead only to probable certainty.⁴⁵
In this respect, furūq and khilāf are almost opposite genres and concepts.
Works of khilāf function offensively, seeking to establish the validity of one opin-
ion at the expense of another. They achieve this through dialectical argumenta-
tion. Furūq works, on the other hand, function defensively, seeking to show how
two seemingly contradictory opinions are in fact mutually consistent. Furūq
works exist to harmonize laws, while works of khilāf exist to bring out legal dis-
sonance. Although both of these genres emerged from the tradition of legal dis-
putation, khilāf and furūq serve different goals. As such, these genres also dis-
cuss different sets of substantive doctrine. The doctrine discussed in works of
furūq is, in reality, not contradictory; the doctrine discussed in works of khilāf
is, in reality, contradictory.
Looking at this from a dialectical perspective, the “farq” of furūq constitutes
a kind of counter-objection designed to overcome such objections. The question-
er attempts to catch the proponent in a contradiction—upholding a certain ʿilla
in one case, but unable to do so in another—by bringing up a separate legal
problem and its ruling. The proponent responds by explaining the subtle distinc-
tion between both apparently “contradictory” cases. The connection between
farq and jadal becomes evident upon only upon a close study of the dialectic tra-
dition.
The connection between khilāf and jadal, however, is readily apparent:
works of khilāf put disputational theory into practice.⁴⁶ Many of the treatises
that make up al-Shāfiʿī’s collected works, Kitāb al-Umm, are works that exempli-
fy khilāf-dialectics. This includes the Ikhtilāf al-ʿiraqiyyīn, Ikhtilāf Mālik wa-l-
 Makdisi, Rise of College, 107.

 Joseph E. Lowry, “Is There Something Postmodern About Uṣūl Al-Fiqh? Ijmāʿ, Constraint, and
Interpretive Communities,” in Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor of
Bernard Weiss, ed. A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014), 285 – 316.
 Some works of legal disputation may reflect records of actual disputations. Other works,
which only reflect theoretical records of disputation, can still be understood as a practical ap-
plication of dialectical theory.

Authenticated
Shāfiʿī, and parts of his famed Risāla. ⁴⁷ This genre seems to have been particu-
larly prominent in early periods of Islamic law; Wael Hallaq attributes the abun-
dance of contradictory opinions to the informal institutional context in which
early jurists operated. The prevalence of too many individual jurists exercising
their own opinion “explains the plurality of opinion in Islamic law, known as
khilāf or ikhtilāf,” which in turn explains the popularity of the khilāf genre.⁴⁸
In this early context, before affiliation with a legal school was the norm, a plu-
rality of opinions arose and were reflected in writing.⁴⁹ When formulated in this
manner, legal dialectics seem to be almost identical to the discipline of khilāf. ⁵⁰
One might then see the works of khilāf as records of formal disputation ad-
hering to particular rules and strictures, and works about ʿilm al-jadal, the sci-
ence of disputation, as the theoretical science describing the rules thereof.
This seems to be Young’s implicit understanding of the dialectical tradition.
His criticism of Miller’s dating of the tradition stems from his belief that khilāf
works represent a well-developed and in-use theory of dialectics that is only
later canonized by the books that Miller studies. This division between the
works of disputation in practice (khilāf) and disputation in theory (jadal) also
has a certain resonance with the distinction between legal compendia (furūʿ),
which catalog substantive laws, and works of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), which
describe the procedures for deriving the substantive law found in legal compen-
dia.
This brief survey of khilāf and its relationship with disputation shows an in-
timate connection between the sciences of khilāf and jadal. While most, if not all,
genres of Islamic legal writing are indebted to an early and vigorous disputation-
al environment, khilāf seems particularly tied to disputation. This debt has long
been recognized and the two fields of inquiry, khilāf and jadal, have often been
 The Ikhtilāf al-ʿiraqiyyīn is the disputational work studied by Young in his Dialectical Forge.
The Ikhtilāf Mālik wa-l-Shāfiʿī addresses disputed points of doctrine between Mālik and al-Shā-
fiʿī. See Ahmed El Shamsy, “al-Shāfiʿī’s Written Corpus: A Source-Critical Study” Journal of the
American Oriental Society 132.2 (2012): 199 – 210. See also Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, The
Epistle on Legal Theory: A Translation of al-Shāfiʿī’s Risālah, trans. Joseph E. Lowry (New
York: New York University Press, 2013), ¶¶133 – 34, ¶¶430 – 33, ¶¶510 – 21, and ¶¶634– 49,
among other examples.
 Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 82.
 EI2 s.v. “Ikhtilāf” (Schacht).
 It also should be noted, as mentioned above, that the history of formalized disputation also
tracks closely with the history of formalized theology, especially the defensive apologetic tradi-
tion of kalām. See Cook, “Origins of Kalām.”

Authenticated
conflated.⁵¹ Although khilāf and jadal do have an important connection, khilāf

also served a purpose beyond that of dialectics—as a tool to impede the forma-
tion of consensus. As George Makdisi mentions, “Ijma’, consensus, had its coun-
terpart in khilaf, disagreement, difference of opinion. This situation gave rise,
very early in Islam, to the need for codifying all opinion on which there was dis-
agreement among the authoritative doctors.”⁵² Consensus, once formed, confer-
red a high epistemological status on a given result of legal interpretation. It was
therefore important to catalog formal expressions of disagreement in order to
prevent the erroneous formation of a consensus.
Aron Zysow explains the somewhat counterintuitive relationship between
consensus and disputation:
Consensus is a substitute for the infallible guidance of the Prophet. It is as close as one can
come to the renewal of the Prophetic Mission which has come to an end with Muḥammad …
At the same time, however, the uniqueness of the Prophet must be preserved. Through con-
sensus, ordinary Muslims must not gain prerogatives that surpass those of the Prophet.⁵³
Both consensus and disputation generate correct legal doctrine. Voicing dissent
helped halt the formation of consensus. Khilāf thus became a forum for structur-
ing a clear and convincing dissent. Therefore, disputation can also serve to clar-
ify which matters are known with certainty, since certainty should only be con-
ferred in the presence of unanimity. Cases of khilāf thus engender only
probabilistic knowledge instead of certain knowledge.
The connection between these two disciplines, khilāf and jadal has long
been noted. George Makdisi mentions this connection in Rise of Colleges and
quotes Ḥājjī Khalīfa (d. 1068/1657) making exactly this point. “Hajji Khalifa iden-
tified ‘ilm al-khilaf, the science of differences of opinion, of controversy, with
jadal, dialectic, which was itself a part of mantiq, logic, adding: ‘except that
this science (jadal) is applied particularly to religious matters’, —religious, as
distinct from ‘foreign sciences.’”⁵⁴ Indeed, Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s discussion of ʿilm al-
khilāf reads like a discussion of dialectic itself. He explicitly equates the two,
 This conflation perhaps signals a need to differentiate legal dialectic from philosophical and
theological dialectic.
 Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 106.
 Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal
Theory (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013), 236.
 Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, 110, quoting Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-
funūn, ed. Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge (Istanbul: Milli Eğ itim Basımevi, 1971),
1:721: “ʿilm al-khilāf … wa-huwa l-jadal alladhī huwa qism min al-manṭiq illā annahu khuṣṣa bi-
l-maqāyīs al-dīniyya.”

Authenticated
“ʿIlm al-khilāf … is dialectics (wa-huwa al-jadal).”⁵⁵ He also mentions that the

people involved in khilāf are either “the respondent” (al-mujīb) or questioner
(al-sāʾil),” the two protagonists found in works of disputation.⁵⁶ For Ḥājjī Khalīfa,
there seems to be no substantial difference between these two fields.
Much of Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s information regarding the scholarly disciplines
comes from the Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn
Ṭaşköprüzāde (d. 968/1561), a work that, in turn, owes a debt of gratitude to
the Irshād al-qāṣid ilā asnā l-maqāṣid by Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348). Jan Just Wit-
kam points to this connection when he says that Ḥājjī Khalīfa “probably did not
use the Irs̆ād al-Qāṣid (although he was familiar with the text and knew Ṭaşkö-
prüzāde’s debt to it), but he was highly dependent on, among other works, Ṭaş-
köprüzāde’s encyclopedia, which he quotes on numerous occasions.”⁵⁷ This flow
of bibliographic knowledge, from the relatively unknown Ibn al-Akfānī to the
monumental work by Ḥājjī Khalīfa deserves greater study,⁵⁸ given that “[f]rom
Kātib C̆ elebī [i. e. Ḥājjī Khalīfa] the line [of knowledge transmission] goes straight
to the great bibliographical surveys which are the product of Arabic studies in
Western Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries: Ahlwardt’s catalogue of the Ber-
lin manuscript collection and Brockelmann’s History of Arabic Literature.”⁵⁹
These three works—Ibn al-Akfānī, Ṭaşköprüzāde, and Ḥājjī Khalīfa—should be
seen as a cohesive tradition, a multigenerational current in Islamicate biblio-
graphical writing.
The discussion of khilāf in this bibliographic tradition shows that these au-
thors disagree about what exactly the discipline of khilāf entails. As mentioned,
Ḥājjī Khalīfa identifies this science with disputation. In his Miftāḥ al-saʿāda,
Ṭaşköprüzāde includes two separate discussions of both jadal and khilāf. The
first discussions occurs in a section on the “Sciences that protect one from
error in debate and learning.”⁶⁰ The second mention jadal and khilāf occurs in
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721.

 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721.
 Januarius Justus Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348) and his bibliography of the sciences,”
Manuscripts of the Middle East 2 (1987), 40.
 In particular, Witkam’s study shows how Ibn al-Akfānī’s Irshād al-qāṣid served as the node of
transmission for some of the earlier classifications of the sciences, including works by Ibn Sīnā,
al-Farābī, Ibn al-Nadīm and al-Shahrastānī. See Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” 39.
 Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” 40.
 Aḥmad ibn Muṣtafā Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-
ʿulūm, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405/1985), 1:283. The other disciplines that he
lists alongside khilāf and jadal in this section are “rules for studying” (ʿilm ādāb al-dars) and
the “science of speculation” (ʿilm al-naẓar).

Authenticated
his section on the “Sciences of legal theory.”⁶¹ His understandings and discus-
sions of both jadal and khilāf are almost indistinguishable. In the first discus-
sion, he states that “the principles (mabādiʾ) of khilāf are derived from the sci-
ence of jadal; jadal acts as the substance and khilāf as the form it takes.”⁶²
Ṭaşköprüzāde however, maintains a strict distinction between these two scien-
ces, although he laments the ignorance of scholars of his time, in which this
has been largely forgotten, “to the point,” he says, “that students of our time
do not comprehend the difference between khilāf, jadal, and munāẓara.”⁶³
In categorizing khilāf alongside jadal, Ṭaşköprüzāde likewise suggests that
these two disciplines be treated as separate fields. Of disputation, he says:
It is the science that investigates the ways through which one confirms any situation he so
wishes (ibrām ayy waḍʿ urīda) or attacks any situation that may arise (hadm ayy waḍʿ kāna).
This is one of the branches of speculation and the foundation of this science is disagree-
ment (wa-mabnī l-ʿilm al-khilāf). Khilāf is based on disputation, which is one part of the in-
vestigations of logic, although it is specific to the religious sciences.⁶⁴
This section on disputation is similar in many ways to Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s discussion

of khilāf, even though it treats a different discipline. Both authors mention the
close connection of khilāf to the religious sciences as well as to the field of logic.
What, then, is the science of khilāf according to Ṭaşköprüzāde?
Ṭaşköprüzāde provides two definitions. First, he says, “it is the science that in-
vestigates the different ways of applying deductive reasoning from particular and
general indicants.”⁶⁵ Khilāf is, therefore, unconcerned with defending or attack-
ing particular opinions or viewpoints, but directly tied to differing interpreta-
tions of legal indicants. In other words, khilāf here is inseparable from its specif-
ic legal context. This point is reaffirmed in the second definition, from his
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 2:556. The other disciplines that he lists alongside khilāf
and jadal in this section are the “science of speculation” (ʿilm al-naẓar) and the “science of de-
bate” (ʿilm al-munāẓara).
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:283. In the previous discussion of jadal and khilāf, he
says, “the distinction between khilāf and jadal is in the form and substance. Jadal investigates
the substance of the disputational proofs (mawādd al-adilla l-khilāfiyya) while khilāf investigates
their forms (ṣuwarihā)” (Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 2:556).
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:283.
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:281. The discussion of jadal in legal theory is almost iden-
tical. “It is the confirmation of any situation that may arise (ithbāt ayy waḍʿ kāna) or an attack
against any situation that may arise (hadm ayy waḍʿ kāna). It is one of the rational sciences (al-
ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya) although it is also a branch of the science of legal theory” (Ṭaşköprüzāde,
Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 2:555).
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:283.

Authenticated
chapter on uṣūl al-fiqh. “It is the disputation that occurs between the adherents
of the legal schools (bayn aṣḥāb al-madhāhib al-farʿiyya), such as Abū Ḥanīfa, al-
Shāfiʿī and their peers.”⁶⁶ Not only is khilāf intrinsically legal, but it is the dispu-
tation that is exclusively based on the extrapolated reasoning of the founders of
the legal schools.
Ṭaşköprüzāde closes his discussion by stating that “it is possible to place the
science of disputation and khilāf within the branches of the discipline of legal
theory.”⁶⁷ Ṭaşköprüzāde categorizes khilāf as falling under the rubric of legal
theory, while Ḥājjī Khalīfa considers khilāf to be part of substantive law or law
in general. The latter does not mention that it is part of uṣūl al-fiqh, instead re-
ferring to the necessity of “knowing the qawāʿid by means of which one under-
stands the derivation of positive laws” and “memorizing those disputed laws.”⁶⁸
While khilāf requires the knowledge of substantive doctrine and of the relation-
ships between substantive doctrine and first-order principles, Ṭaşköprüzāde
clearly notes that it does not require understanding how to deduce positive
laws; that is the work of a mujtahid. Someone involved in khilāf need only be
able to understand the work, teachings, and writings of a mujtahid.
Ibn al-Akfānī, the third author of this bibliographic group, offers another ap-
proach. Ibn al-Akfānī does not consider khilāf to be an independent science and
thus has no entry for khilāf. Rather, he sees khilāf as a subdiscipline of jadal and
mentions khilāf in his entry on disputational theory. Of ʿilm al-jadal, he says:
The Science of Disputation. A science through which the following is known: how to pre-
sent legal proofs, refute doubt, impugn legal proofs (qawādiḥ al-adilla), and structure
points in a khilāf debate. The science of disputation came about from jadal which is a
part of logic, but it is restricted to religious investigations. There are many methods of dis-
putation, but the best of them (ashbahuhā) is al-ʿAmīdī’s method.⁶⁹
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 2:556. Amthāl refers to the eponyms of the legal schools.
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, 1:284.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721.
 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Sāʿid al-Anṣārī, Ibn al-Akfānī l-Ḥakīm al-Mutaṭayyib, Irshād al-
qāṣid ilā asnā l-maqāṣid fī anwāʿ al-ʿulūm, ed. ʿAbd al-Munʿim Muḥammad ʿUmar and Aḥmad
Ḥilmī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, [1990]), 163; Januarius Justus Witkam, ed., De
egyptische arts Ibn al-Akfānī (gest. 749/1348) en zijn indeling van de wetenschappen (Leiden: Ter
Lugt Pers, 1989), 44, ll.580 – 83. This final statement is a reference to the work of Rukn al-Dīn
Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAmīdī (d. 615/1218), a Central Asian scholar who wrote two
works on legal disputation, al-Ṭarīqa l-ʿamīdiyyah fī-l-khilāf wa-l-jadal and Irshād al-ṭarīqa.
See also the praise for al-ʿAmīdī and his method in Ibn Khaldūn, Taʾrīkh Ibn Khaldūn al-
musammā Dīwān al-mubtadaʾ wa-l-khabar fī taʾrīkh al-ʿarab wa-l-barbar wa-man ʿāṣarahum
min dhawī l-shaʾn al-akbar, 8 vols, ed. Khalīl Shaḥāda and Suhayl Zakkār (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr,

Authenticated
For Ibn al-Akfānī, not only is khilāf a religious science, but so is the science of
disputation itself. He makes this point explicit in his entry, and this categoriza-
tion is reaffirmed through his categorization. Ibn al-Akfānī presents a clear hier-
archy of the sciences: for him, jadal belongs to the science of norms (ʿilm al-
nawāmīs) or the legal sciences (al-ʿulūm al-sharʿiyya). These sciences, in turn,
fall under what he calls the “the highest order of the religious sciences (ʿilm
aʿlā; al-ʿilm al-ilāhī),” which itself is a part of “the speculative philosophical sci-
ences (al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya al-naẓariyya).” The speculative philosophical scien-
ces themselves are a part of “philosophical sciences, or what is studied for its
own sake (al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya; mā yakūnu maqṣūdan li-dhātihi),” as opposed
to the ancillary sciences.
These three bibliographers present different conceptions of disputation and
khilāf. They also present quite different histories, uses, and identities of these sci-
ences. For Ḥājjī Khalīfa, the technical term khilāf is of great importance. He de-
votes an entry to this discipline, but view this discipline as interchangeable with
disputation.⁷⁰ For Ḥājjī Khalīfa, the legal takes precedence over the philosophi-
cal or the speculative. Disputation is purely a branch of legal studies. For
Ṭaşköprüzāde, khilāf and disputation are distinct sciences, although they are
both concerned with discovering truth. In this sense, they correspond to what
both Miller and Young find to be the chief aim of early dialectical theory, attain-
ing and refining knowledge. Ṭaşköprüzāde would certainly not approve of Ḥājjī
Khalīfa’s definition, as he laments those who conflate khilāf and jadal. As for Ibn
al-Akfānī, he presents jadal as important, but subsumes khilāf entirely under
jadal. For him, it is only jadal that matters, and it matters because of its relation-
ship to both law and philosophy.
Modern scholars draw connections between the three bibliographical works
in large part because of shared themes. Witkam says, “Ṭaşköprüzāde devised his
own division of the sciences, but he incorporated much of Ibn al-Akfānī’s text
within the framework of his [Miftāḥ].”⁷¹ This statement is paralleled in Gerhard
Endress’s study of encyclopedias in the Arabic tradition. Endress says that Ibn
al-Akfānī’s work “became the model” for Ṭaşköprüzāde because they “both pre-
sent the ‘highest aim’, al-maqṣad al-asnā, attained by Muslim scholarship in the
1981), 1:579; idem, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 3 vols., trans. Franz Rosenthal
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), 3:33 – 34.
 This may result from his work’s vision of scholarship and scholarly life as entirely book-cen-
tered. Kashf al-ẓunūn focuses almost exclusively on texts as the primary form of intellectual cap-
ital, although such a focus is not necessarily indicative of Ottoman views of knowledge more
broadly.
 Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” 40.

Authenticated
later Middle Ages in uniting both traditions, the Islamic and the Hellenistic.”⁷²
Ḥājjī Khalīfa later used Ṭaşköprüzāde as a model for his own work. This borrow-
ing is detectable even in their discussions of khilāf and jadal; in spite of the dis-
tinct approaches taken by each of the three authors, there are verbatim passages
shared between all three works.
The most straightforward example of this borrowing is in Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s dis-
cussion of jadal, which entry begins with a long quotation from Ṭaşköprüzāde’s
Miftāh al-saʿāda and ends with the phrase “as in (kadhā fī) the Miftāḥ al-
saʿāda.”⁷³ Ḥājjī Khalīfa adds, however, that it is not farfetched to say that ʿilm
al-jadal is the same thing as ʿilm al-munāẓara, the very statement lamented by
Ṭaşköprüzāde as ignorance. Another obvious borrowing by Ḥājjī Khalīfa is the
claim that disputation is a part of logic, although devoted primarily for religious
sciences.⁷⁴
The connection drawn by these bibliographers between khilāf and jadal is
largely framed in terms of debating difference between the Sunni legal schools,
although later khilāf treatises sometimes focus on rulings disputed within
schools. Al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifat al-rājiḥ min al-khilāf ʿalā madhhab al-imām al-
mubajjal Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Sulaymān al-
Mardāwī (d. 885/1480 – 81) is a well-known example of a work of khilāf written
within a legal school. The author is concerned to explain and clarify the khilāf
found in the Muqniʿ of Muwaffaq al-Dīn ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223). Al-Mardāwī’s
interest lies in illustrating some of the conflicting opinions given by Ibn Qudāma
and explaining which ones are more reliable. He praises the Muqniʿ as one of the
“most useful and greatest” books in the Ḥanbalī school, “however,” he writes
“[Ibn Qudāma] gives conflicting opinions on some issues without giving prefer-
ence to either (aṭlaqa fī baʿḍ al-masāʾil al-khilāf min ghayr al-tarjīḥ). Weak and
sound opinions thus appear alike to those who contemplate this book (fa-
 Gerhard Endress, “The Cycle of Knowledge: Intellectual Traditions and Encyclopaedias of

the Rational Sciences in Arabic Islamic Hellenism,” in Organizing Knowledge: Encyclopaedic
Activities in the Pre-Eighteenth Century Islamic World, ed. Gerhard Endress (Leiden; Boston:
Brill, 2006), 133.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:579 – 80.
 The phrase is found in all three texts, but not with identical wording. Ibn al-Akfānī says, “al-
jadal alladhī huwa aḥad ajẓāʾ al-manṭiq lakinnahu khuṣṣiṣa bi-l-mabāḥith al-dīniyya” (Ibn al-
Akfānī, Irshād al-qāṣid, 163). In Ṭaşköprüzāde, the phrase is “al-jadal alladhī huwa aḥad ajzāʾ
mabāḥith al-manṭiq lakinnahu khuṣṣa bi-l-ʿulūm al-dīniyya” (Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda,
1:281). Ḥājjī Khalīfa quotes this phrase in his entry on jadal, on 1:579. In his entry on khilāf,
he says, “wa-huwa l-jadal alladhī huwa qism min al-manṭiq illā annahu khuṣṣa bi-l-maqāṣid al-
dīniyya” (Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:721).

Authenticated
shtabaha ʿalā l-nāẓir fīhi l-ḍaʿīf min al-ṣaḥīḥ).”⁷⁵ Al-Mardāwī seeks to determine
which opinions are dependable (muʿtamad, madhhab) and which are not. Inter-
estingly, in his introduction he gives a detailed explanation of the formulations
that Ibn Qudāma uses that lead to confusion over the correct doctrine.⁷⁶ Khilāf
could thus be a way of voicing and, perhaps, resolving disagreements—in keep-
ing with its historical connection with dialectics.
Although khilāf and jadal evolved alongside of and by means of interactions
with each other, furūq seems to leave most of its argumentative history behind,
in so far as the genre of furūq operates with primarily implicit links to the history
of farq as a formal disputational maneuver. Nevertheless, the disputational back-
ground of farq can be understood to be present, even if normally latent, through-
out works of legal distinctions.
Disputation in Furūq
In Chapter One, we mentioned the connection between legal disputation and the
contents of al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī
(d. 438/1047). Here, we shall look in more detail at the ways that al-Juwaynī pres-
ents disputations in this work. This analysis explores not only the moments of
disputation, but how the discussion in al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq maps on to the theoret-
ical discussions of farq that are included in manuals of legal disputation. Al-
though al-Juwaynī himself did not write a manual of legal disputation, he was
certainly familiar with disputational theory and practice.⁷⁷
In some explanation of the distinctions between seemingly contradictory
laws in this work, al-Juwaynī follows his explanation of the distinction with a
blueprint for a disputation. For example, in he writes in the chapter on purity
that “Some of the scholars in our school distinguished (faṣala) between mineral
salt (al-milḥ al-jabalī) and sea salt (al-milḥ al-māʾī) dissolving in water. They hold
that it is permissible to perform ablutions with water that has sea salt dissolved
in it, but it is not permissible with water that has mineral salt.”⁷⁸ Al-Juwaynī ex-
plains that the distinction rests on the underlying substance of the salt: sea salt
is coagulated water and is thus equivalent to water (māʾ fī l-aṣl), and, therefore,
 Alāʾ al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Sulaymān al-Mardāwī, al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifat al-rājiḥ min al-
khilāf ʿalā madhhab al-imām al-mubajjal Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, 12 vols., ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid
al-Faqī (Cairo: Maṭbūʿat al-Sunna l-Muḥammadiyyah, 1374/1955), 1:3.
 Mardāwī, al-Inṣāf, 1:4– 13.
 Ṭaşköprüzāde, Miftāh al-saʿāda, 1:282.
 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:56 – 57.

Authenticated
pure. Mineral salt, however, is not made of water and is thus a polluting sub-
stance.⁷⁹
After giving a detailed explanation of this idea and the legal distinction aris-
ing from the difference between these kinds of salt, al-Juwaynī includes a brief
example of dialectic. “If someone says,” he writes, “‘But even mineral salt is coa-
gulated water (māʾ inʿaqada). All salt is just water in its essence (mā min milḥ illā
wa-l-māʾ aṣluhu).’ We respond, ‘The matter is not all the same, as you have de-
scribed it (laysa l-amr ʿalā hādhihi l-jumla).’”⁸⁰ Al-Juwaynī thus inscribes dialec-
tical argumentation into his discussion of a distinction. This is a simple argu-
ment, with only one objection and one counterobjection, but it nevertheless
brings to the fore the disputational framework in which works of legal distinc-
tions could be used. These “mini-disputations” regularly feature in al-Juwaynī’s
book. In al-Juwaynī’s chapter on ritual purity, we find them in twenty-two of the
172 distinctions in this work.⁸¹ This short model disputation, as the others, tracks
closely with the farq-objection of the jadal-theorists.
A farq-objection is a dialectical technique focused on the correct application
of a legal rationale through analogical reasoning. In the above discussion, the
first term in the analogy would be the salt water. In terms of building a legal
qiyās, the fact-pattern can be thought of as follows: the precedent (aṣl) is sea
salt. The ruling (ḥukm) is that it is ritually pure. The legal rationale (ʿilla) for
this ruling is that the sea salt is nothing more than water in a different physical
state and that water is pure in its essence. In this comparison, then, the instant
case (farʿ) is that of mountain salt. When one tries to apply the legal rationale
(ʿilla) of the precedent to the instant case, it turns out to be inappropriate.
Salt found in a cave is simply not water in a different physical state; legally
speaking it is an entirely different substance. Therefore, the rationale is not
found in the second case, the precedent ruling cannot apply to it, and the ruling
for mountain salt becomes that it is not ritually pure. It is not coagulated water;
it is something else.
As discussed above, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī insisted that “asking
about the first term in an analogy … is asking about a distinction.”⁸² His father,
ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, likewise distinguishes between these two cases by implic-
itly appealing to a lack of applicability, what al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī refers to as
“ʿadam al-taʾthīr” (lack of consistent applicability) in his manual of disputation.
 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:57.

 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:57.
 My count of the distinctions follows the enumeration done by the editor ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Mazīnī.
 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, al-Kāfiya, 322, see also above p. 89.

Authenticated
When al-Bājī calls farq, “the most legally specific kind of objection,” he does this
because it deals exclusively with the legal rationale (ʿilla) underlying legal rul-
ings.⁸³ All of these discussions explicitly connect farq, legal analogies, and cor-
rectly connecting a precedent case with an instant case through the application
of a legal rationale. A disagreement and ensuing disputation about the lack of
applicability of the legal rationale in one ruling to another is exactly what is de-
scribed in al-Juwaynī’s text.
One more example illustrates the connection between furūq and dialectic. In
this same chapter on purity, al-Juwaynī says:
If a person defecates, performs an ablution with sand, then wipes himself, his ablution is
not valid. Were, however, a person to defecate, perform an ablution with water, and then
wipe themselves without touching the anus or vagina, their ablution is valid. Al-Shā fiʿī
took an explicit position in favor of both rulings (al-masʾalatā n manṣ ū ṣ atā n) in the recen-
sion of al-Rabīʿ ibn Sulaymān [(d. 270/883)].⁸⁴
In this situation, the al-Juwaynī draws a distinction between normal ablutions,

wuḍūʾ, and special dispensation made for an ablution with sand, tayammum.
The latter is only allowed when there is not enough pure water available to per-
form the normal ablution, and, as a special dispensation, does not purify in the
same way as wuḍūʾ. This, claims al-Juwaynī, is the “clearest of the distinctions
between them.” Al-Juwaynī starts with a general statement about wuḍūʾ and
tayammum. In a way, he is using the definition of these two terms to create an
initial distinction between these two scenarios. He then explains the implication
of these definitions: “Wuḍūʾ is more purifying (aqwā) and tayammum is less pu-
rifying (aḍʿaf).”⁸⁵ This distinction is clear, ritual purification with water is more
purifying than a ritual purification with sand.
There is, however, another distinction between these two situations.
Tayammum is only permissible where water cannot be found, and searching
for water after the tayammum renders it ineffective. Tayammum can only be
done when there is no water to be found, not as a substitute for finding
water. Searching for water after the tayammum “voids his ablution, whether he
finds water or not.”⁸⁶ Searching for water does not void an ablution in cases
of wuḍūʾ, since an ablution with water is routine and a lack of water was not
an issue. This issue, however, is not necessarily so simple, and al-Juwaynī men-
 Al-Bājī, Minhāj, 201, ¶456.

 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:118.
 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:118.
 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:118.

Authenticated
tions a disagreement in this regard and provides the following example of a dis-
putation.
If, however, someone says, “Is it not sufficient to use rocks for wiping [i. e., and not have
recourse to water]?”
We say, “Yes, but there are two kinds of required duties: an actual, required duty (wājib
mutaʿayyan) and a substitute duty (wājib mutamaththil). A required duty, for example, is
a rich person freeing a slave as a penance for a ẓihār divorce.⁸⁷ An example of a substitute
duty is a rich person freeing a slave as a penance for breaking an oath. Both of these ac-
tions are characterized as required. Similarly, when a man defecates, the required duty is
that he wipe himself with water, and the substitute duty is to do so with stones. If someone
who has performed tayammum is then required to search for water because of an external
impurity, his tayammum becomes void.”
If someone then says, “Is it not the case that, were he to have completed his tayammum
with an impurity on his backside, you would consider his tayammum void because of his
having to search for water to clean this impurity?”
We reply, “This impurity is different than impurity from excrement, because the impurity
from excrement is the one that originally necessitated the ablution, either wuḍūʾ or
tayammum. Any impurity which necessitates an ablution is assigned a particular set of
legal rules and is unlike any other. Do you not agree that when he completes his
tayammum, it is not permissible for him to begin his prayer as long as he does not wipe
himself, and that he should begin his prayer with an impurity which was on his backside?
This is the case, although usually we would prefer he perform the prayer again at a later
time.”⁸⁸
This second distinction between wuḍūʾ and tayammum is much more detailed.
Because it rests on a fine point of law, there is greater ground for disagreement
between the two cases distinguished by al-Juwaynī. Indeed, the speaker’s disa-
greement does not lie on any distinction between wuḍūʾ and tayammum, but
rather on the ancillary issue of the impurities related to defecation and wiping
the anus. The first objection reported by al-Juwaynī focuses on the requirements
for wiping the anus after defecation. Al-Juwaynī’s discussion of the distinction
implies that water is required for this, and the objection is that water is not re-
quired, as using clean rocks can be sufficient. This would make al-Juwaynī’s dis-
tinction meaningless, since wiping does not necessarily require searching for
 Ẓihār refers to a legally valid, but detestable, form of divorce. The husband repudiates his
wife by comparing her to his mother by uttering the formula “You are to me like my mother’s
back (anti ʿalayya ka-ẓahr ummī).” With this formula, the husband causes an immediate divorce.
Since this is a valid formula, the divorce takes hold, but, since according to the jurists it is im-
moral, the husband is required to make penance.
 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:118 – 20.

Authenticated
water. Al-Juwaynī counters, however, by creating a hierarchy of distinctions. He

thus introduces the concept of wājib mutamaththil, a stand-in or substitute duty.
Yes, one can sometimes wipe with rocks instead of water, but that is only when
water is not available. This situation still calls for searching for water, which ren-
ders the tayammum void.
A final objection continues in a similar vein. The imagined questioner notes
that if someone performs tayammum with an impurity on his body, he would still
have to search for water to clean this impurity, but the tayammum is nevertheless
valid. Implicit in this charge is that al-Juwaynī contradicts himself in the way he
treats tayammum and the search for water, as the questioner has found an exam-
ple in which the person who performs a valid tayammum was and still is in
search of water, but does not have a problematic initial ablution. Al-Juwaynī re-
sponds to this by making a further distinction between these impurities. The im-
purity on one’s backside can be ignored for purposes of prayer if the affected
person performs a tayammum. In other words, for the purposes at hand, he is
considered legally pure in spite of the presence of actual impurity on his person.
Therefore, the need to search for water is not urgent and this does not render his
tayammum void. After defecation, however, the impurity that arises is directly a
result of the defecation. It is the same act that both engenders the need for water
for purification and, separately, the need for water for wiping. Since one act
brings about both circumstances, and both require water, an impure individual
cannot perform tayammum first and search for water later. One should perhaps
search for water, use rocks for wiping, and then perform tayammum.
Again, this disputation connects to descriptions of farq found in manuals of
disputation in a straightforward manner. The questioner doubts the situation
(fasād al-waḍʿ)⁸⁹ set up by ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī. Al-Juwaynī counters this
using the first distinction, explaining why the situation is, in fact, as he de-
scribes. The second objection is an attempt to draw out a contradiction (naqḍ)
in al-Juwaynī’s reasoning, another strategy found in the manuals of disputation
discussed above. The questioner then mentions what he finds to be an equiva-
lent situation with a divergent ruling, to show al-Juwaynī why he is wrong. Al-Ju-
waynī then distinguishes these two situations and overcomes this objection by
showing the coherence in his thought and the lack of commensurability between
these two kinds of impurity. This typical case shows jadal at work in a book of
legal distinctions.
Al-Juwaynī’s al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq does not clarify the relationship between ac-
tual legal disputations, the theory of legal disputation, and the list of particular
 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, al-Kāfiya, 322.

Authenticated
counter-objection furūq compiled by Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī. Neverthe-

less, al-Juwaynī sees his book as contributing to an advanced, and highly speci-
alized, legal debate, one in which jurists defend all positions of their legal
school. Al-Juwaynī even alludes to such a scenario at the beginning of his
book, when he states, “Legal issues may have similar appearances but different
rulings because of legal rationales (ʿilal) that require different rulings.”⁹⁰
He also comments that his predecessors wrote some works “on this topic” (fī
hādha l-bāb) but that it was restricted to a “very limited number of cases.”⁹¹ This
is to say, al-Juwaynī was not the first jurist to write on the subtle distinctions be-
tween apparently contradictory legal rulings. From this terse statement, it is un-
clear whether al-Juwaynī is referencing standalone treatises of legal distinctions
—similar works which have not survived—or to passages within substantive legal
treatises that discuss these subtle differences. It was al-Juwaynī’s goal, however,
to be exhaustive, and in this he was certainly successful when one considers the
legacy and popularity of his work.
Conclusion
The dialectical context in which Islamic law arose as a scholastic activity was
instrumental in the rise of legal distinctions as a form of legal writing. As dialec-
tic became both formalized and institutionalized, new forms and rules of argu-
mentation developed. One such form of argumentation was the objection by way
of distinction (farq, faṣl). In disputation, positing a distinction was one of several
procedures for objecting to an opponent’s statement. It constituted a particular
way of locating and utilizing a potential contradiction in an opponent’s reason-
ing, based on their reliance on specific rationales (ʿilal) in particular cases. It
went right to the heart of the legal matter, and, therefore, must have been a pow-
erful tool in disputation. Books of legal distinctions thus incorporated much of
the logic that went into the disputational farq-objection.
There are two key differences between these understandings of farq, howev-
er. First, disputational-farq was a particular procedure in a disputation, to be in-
troduced and countered in predetermined ways. In a disputation, farq referred to
a challenging question: What is the distinction between this case and that case?
In this way, farq challenged someone to prove they did not hold contradictory
opinions. Works of furūq, however, understand farq as a kind of comparison fo-
 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37.

 ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:37.

Authenticated
Conclusion 109
cused solely on distinguishing between two apparently contradictory laws. In

other words, works of furūq contain correct answers to the questions of a farq-ob-
jection. Second, disputational farq was a strategy for showing contradiction—a
method to show an inconsistency—but books of legal furūq assume that a
school’s doctrine is internally consistent. In almost perfect opposition to dispu-
tational farq, books of furūq prove that there is no contradiction in the law, or,
more specifically, in the rulings discussed in these works. Thus, it appears
that legal furūq arose first as a blueprint for defending against farq in disputa-
tion, but quickly took on a literary and aesthetic life of its own.
This impetus for writing works of legal furūq stands in stark contrast to the
impetus behind khilāf. Khilāf continues the argumentative style of disputation
and the genre of khilāf is motivated by the idea that the law, as developed within
and between the legal schools, will inevitably lead to disagreement and contra-
diction. Authors of khilāf works might have particular understandings of what is
correct, and thus privilege one ruling or understanding over others, but those au-
thors also lay bare the potential inconsistences and disagreements found at the
deeper level of legal justifications found in fiqh. These inconsistencies are exact-
ly what legal furūq seeks to remedy.

Authenticated
Excursus: The Logic of Legal Distinctions
We have already discussed the rise of distinctions as a concept in the Arabic in-
tellectual tradition and seen that distinctions arose as a concept based on, but
distinct from, that of distinction. The Arabic plural term furūq signals a different
kind of reasoning from that of the singular farq. The change from farq to furūq
can be seen by looking at the titles of books in various fields, particularly lexi-
cography. Books titled farq and furūq both dealt with synonyms, but each word
gestured toward a different conceptual approach. Farq books are organized
around broad conceptual groupings—such as the parts of the body or the stages
of the life-cycle. Synonyms in books of farq are therefore distinguished based on
their applicability to the conceptual grouping. Furūq books, on the other hand,
compare apparent synonyms to tease out (or, create) minute differences between
them. The organization of these two types of books is thus radically different. A
different logic for discussing synonymy or the lack thereof results in a different
organization of information.
Chapter Two explored the difference between these two approaches and the
correlation between the use of farq or furūq in the title and the organization of a
book. Here, I detail logic particular to works of lexicographical and legal distinc-
tions in order to highlight the conceptual difference between these two applica-
tions of “distinctions-thinking.” This excursus also interrogates the logic at work
in each of these disciplines to show how these distinctions are fundamentally
different. While similar motives may have fostered the emergence furūq treatises
and farq treatises, the two genres involved different intellectual activities.
This difference between the singular and plural use of “distinction” is par-
ticularly relevant for legal distinctions, where the singular farq is used to denote
an applied linguistic distinction, while the plural furūq is used, almost exclusive-
ly, to denote legal distinctions. Chapter Two discussed works that address dis-
tinction based on the lexicographic model, such as al-Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa wa-
l-taʿyīr by Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī (d. 795/1393) or al-Farq bayn al-ḥadd wa-l-taʿzīr
by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). These kinds of works do not address laws, but
legal concepts.¹ Therefore, they explain the meaning of each of specific terms
or concepts in its plain-sense or normal usage (fī l-lugha, lughatan) and in its
technical legal meaning. They also discuss references in the Qur’an and the ha-
 Among the many kinds of treatises devoted to one particular distinction, there are many on
the distinction between bribes and gifts. See, for instance, ʿAbd al-Ghanī l-Nābulusī, Taḥqīq
al-qaḍiyya fī l-farq bayn al-rishwa wa-l-hadiya, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil
Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Cairo: Maktabat al-Zahrāʾ, 1412/1991).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-006

Authenticated
Excursus: The Logic of Legal Distinctions 111
dith that inform the legal meaning the concept under consideration, and when
these meanings apply. Through these layers of meaning, the distinction between
two concepts is established.
Works of applied lexicographical distinctions do not explain the
difference(s) between two laws (farʿs or ḥukms). Instead, these works distinguish
between technical terms within Islamic law. Legal distinctions, however, operate
with a unique logic, distinct from distinctions in lexicography. The difference be-
tween farq and furūq, as will be seen, is similar to the difference between legal
theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) in general and a discussion a specific tool of legal reasoning
(aṣl).² These two Arabic terms are related both conceptually and etymologically,
of course, but this is only a surface similarity. The simple relationship between
the names masks a complex conceptual relationship between both terms.
Books on legal furūq do not adopt a lexical framework, but instead employ a
framework whereby laws take the place that words would in linguistic works. In
so doing, they also transform the concept of “distinction” itself. In a linguistic
distinction, authors juxtapose two words in order to offer their “true” meaning.
This explanation provides the distinction between the two signifiers. The role of
minute distinctions could be easily integrated into theological presumptions
about the language of God’s revelation. Lexicographic distinctions enabled the
establishment of differentiations in language, so that supposed synonyms
came to complement and expand the semantic scope of Arabic. But, in this con-
ception, Arabic was not God’s only perfect creation, the rejection of synonymity
could easily be transferable to Islamic law. Arabic grammar and Islamic law are
the two matrices which God instituted and therefore, jurists implicitly argued
grammar and law could be comparable in this manner.
A legal distinction does not contrast two signifiers, but two fact-patterns and
two legal rulings. The legal rulings themselves must be carefully detailed, and
the particularities of the fact-patterns to which they refer, explained. In this
way, the discussion of the fact-pattern, its legal ruling, and the rationale that
connects that fact-pattern to that ruling clarifies the distinction between the
two rulings. The reasoning used produces differences between the legal ration-
ales that undergird the two different legal problems. These rationales are not al-
ways readily apparent in the ruling itself, but are a product of the jurist’s trained
mind. This is how the jurists transformed concept of distinction. They moved
from simply comparing of two linguistic definitions to comparing underlying
legal rationales. In lexicography, the distinction involves the relationship be-
 See Devin Stewart, “Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence, al-Wuṣūl ilā
maʿrifat al-uṣūl,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

Authenticated
112 Excursus: The Logic of Legal Distinctions
tween signifier and signified, while in law, the distinction involves the relation-
ship between a fact-pattern, a ruling, and a legal rationale that binds them to-
gether.³
Understanding Lexicographic Distinctions
Clarifying the components of any lexicographic comparison will enable a better

understanding of how a lexicographic distinction works. A straightforward ex-
ample of a linguistic distinction comes from Adab al-kātib by Ibn Qutayba (d.
276/889), a manual for chancery secretaries. This work covers all the material
considered necessary for being a competent secretary, and much of this work
is focused on proper writing. As part of this effort, Ibn Qutayba includes a sec-
tion on lexicographic distinctions (abwāb al-furūq) in his work. Ibn Qutayba
does not explicitly discuss most elements of this comparison, but they are crucial
for understanding the intellectual work that he undertook. In this example, Ibn
Qutayba discusses two words that are, apparently, thought to be synonyms for
the word “skin” (jild): adama and bashara. “The visible side of a person’s skin
—from his head and the rest of his body—is called bashara and the interior
side is called adama.”⁴ This distinction compares two signifiers, bashara and
adama. The general signified of both words is skin (jild). Although Ibn
Qutayba attempts to show that these two words are not synonymous, their com-
parison obviously depends on a pre-existing idea of synonymity. This assump-
tion of equivalence is what suggests comparison. The first component of this
analysis rests on the supposed conflation of the terms, that is, as referring to
the same referent.
In addition to the general concept being discussed, linguistic distinctions
also present two near-synonyms that refer to different varieties subsumed
under a general concept. The author of a work on lexicographic distinctions
 It is worth explaining, in brief, the logic of a distinction in medicine. In medicine, the surface
similarity between the two comparands (symptoms) invites a comparison. The comparison re-
veals that the underlying causes of the comparands (illnesses) are radically different. Once
fully understood, the two symptoms are understood to be caused by different illnesses and
share no more than a mere surface coherence. In this regard, they may be seen as similar to
legal distinctions. Our analysis of distinctions in medicine, differential diagnostics, relies entire-
ly on one book with dubious attribution. While intriguing, more evidence of the spread and chro-
nology of differential diagnostics is needed before drawing strong conclusions about its role in
the history of legal distinctions.
 Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Muslim ibn Qutayba, Adab al-kātib, ed. Muḥammad al-Dālī
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1981), 144.

Authenticated
Understanding Lexicographic Distinctions 113
then clears up the confusion of the referents through exposition. In this case, Ibn
Qutayba resolves the confusion between the two words adama and bashara. He
explains exactly what each one means so that the reader understands that each
word, in fact, has a different referent.
The same analysis can be applied to the lexicographic pairs discussed in al-
Furūq al-lughawiyya by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. ca. 400/1009 – 10). He says:
The distinction between mithl and naẓīr: Two mithls are fully complementary in their es-
sence (takāfaʾā fī l-dhāt), as mentioned above.⁵ A naẓīr, meanwhile, is that which corre-
sponds to another in regard to similar actions of which they are capable. For example, a
grammarian (al-naḥwī) is the naẓīr of another grammarian, even if what they say or
write about grammar is different. It is not correct to say (lā yuqāl), “a grammarian is a
mithl of another grammarian,” because equivalence (tamāthul) refers, in reality, to the
most characteristic attributes which are the essence.⁶
In this example, the words mithl and naẓīr appear as the two specific signifiers.
These two words both refer to equivalence or interchangeability. The distinction
between them is not as straightforward as that between adama and bashara.
Nevertheless, Abū Hilāl says, they are indeed different. Mithl, which he describes
briefly, refers to equivalence in the very essence of a thing. A naẓīr, however, is a
resemblance between two things, one of which can fulfill the function of the
other; naẓīr refers to a superficial or functional equivalence, not an essential
equivalence.
In Abū Hilāl’s example, a grammarian is a naẓīr of another grammarian
since they have equivalent training and qualifications. One can perform the func-
tion of the other as they are functionally equivalent even if their ideas or output
differ. They are not mithl, however, since each grammarian is a different person,
so their essences are not interchangeable. Thus, naẓīr and mithl are different
words. Even if they convey similar meanings, these two words are not really syn-
onyms.
Linguistic distinctions function through the combination of three signifieds,
one general and two specific. The two specific signifieds are stated explicitly in
the comparison—adama and bashara or mithl and naẓīr. The general signified is
never explicitly stated. Instead, it is implied through the very act of comparison.
Ibn Qutayba’s comparison functions when the reader understands that the im-
plied signifier is skin; Abū Hilāl’s when the reader understands the implied sig-
 Here, al-ʿAskarī is referring to his first discussion of the meaning of the word, on page 154, in
which he says: “Two mithls are two things that are equivalent in their essence” (al-mithlayn mā
takāfaʾa fī l-dhāt).
 Al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq, 155.

Authenticated
nifier is equivalence. With these three elements in place, the author then ex-
plains each of the specific signifiers so that the relationship between the three
signifiers is made clear. Both specific signifieds are related to the general signi-
fied, but different from each other. The close relationship between the three sig-
nifieds is real; while they are not identical, the difference between them is sub-
tle.
The resonances of a framework in which linguistic and legal relations are
seen to be highly congruent, can also be found in works of uṣūl al-fiqh. Éric
Chaumont argues that this is one of the foundations upon which Abū Isḥāq
al-Shīrāzī bases his al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, writing “the language of legal dis-
course is formally identical to the language of the Arabs.”⁷ Legal furūq provide
a different perspective about how jurists relate the fields of grammar and Islamic
law. While Chaumont’s comparison involves discursive similarities between law
and grammar, the example of comparative furūq allows for a one-to-one compar-
ison of the structure of legal and grammatical tools of reasoning. I showed in
Chapter Three that the genre of legal distinctions arises as an extension and con-
tinuation of the disputational technique of distinction. Distinction as a method
for objecting in formal disputations was specific to the field of legal disputation,
with al-Bājī going as far as to call it “the most legal of objections.”⁸ This state-
ment might help us understand the intellectual background behind legal distinc-
tions, but it also raises the question of the relationship between legal disputation
and distinctions writing in disciplines other than law. Writing about subtle but
important distinctions between related elements arose slightly earlier in lexicog-
raphy than in law. The documented interrelations between law and lexicography
suggest that there were relationships and exchange between these disciplines
beyond what appears in the historical record.
Understanding Legal Distinctions
The relationships that exist between the signifiers in a lexicographic distinction

are not similar to the relationships found in the comparisons known as legal dis-
tinctions. Legal distinctions function rather in a different manner. Legal distinc-
tions compare two fact-patterns that seem similar, but are actually distinct, if not
incomparable. The potential contradiction inherent in legal distinctions is re-
 Éric Chaumont, “Préface” in Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh; le Livre des Rais illuminant les
fondements de la compréhsion de la Loi; Traité de théorie légale musulmane, trans. Éric Chaumont
(Berkeley, Robbins Collection, 1999), 23.
 Al-Bājī, al-Minhāj, 201 ¶456.

Authenticated
Understanding Legal Distinctions 115
solved by explaining that two rulings are not contradictory, but rather apply to
completely different fact-patterns. Any potential confusion between the two fact-
patterns results from a failure to understand the reasoning behind the ruling,
which is what the distinction explains. An example from the Kitāb al-Furūq of
Asʿad al-Karābīsī (d. 570/1174– 75) helps to illustrate this point.
Abū Ḥanīfa [(d. 150/767)] says, “If a worm exits the body through one of the two excretory
passages, the anus or the urethra (aḥad al-sabīlayn), it nullifies a minor ablution. If it exits
through a wound, however, it does not.”
The distinction is that the worm is always somewhat moist and this moisture is slightly im-
pure. Slight impurity, if it exits the body through one of the two excretory passages, nulli-
fies a minor ablution. As for a worm exiting through a wound, it is also always somewhat
moist. This moisture, too, is slightly impure. Slight impurity, if it exits the body through
somewhere other than one of two passages, does not nullify impurity. In addition, the
worm is an animal and is therefore assumed to be pure. A pure thing, such as air, if it
exits through one of the two passages, necessarily nullifies a minor ablution. If, however,
it exits through somewhere other than one of the two passages, it does not nullify a minor
ablution, such as with tears and sweat.
Muḥammad ibn Shujāʿ [Ibn al-Thaljī, (d. 266/880)] distinguished between these cases in an-
other way. The worm that exits through a wound is generated from flesh. Therefore, it is
akin to a piece of flesh separating from the body without bleeding and not through the
two passages. If such a thing were to happen, it would not nullify a minor ablution. The
worm exiting through a wound is equivalent to a piece of skin detaching from the body
without bleeding. As for a worm that exits from one of the two passages, however, it is gen-
erated from impurity. If only this impurity exited the body, it would invalidate a minor ablu-
tion. The same holds for whatever is generated from this impurity whenever it exits the
body.⁹
A legal distinction is composed of two (or more) fact-patterns and their associ-
ated ruling. These can be labelled Fact-Pattern 1, Fact-Pattern 2, Ruling 1, Ruling
2, etc., for each fact-pattern and ruling. In this example, the two laws treat in-
stances of a worm exiting the human body. Fact-Pattern 1 deals with a worm ex-
iting the body through the urethra or the anus; Fact-Pattern 2 deals with a worm
exiting the body through a wound. These situations resemble each other; in Ara-
bic the resemblance is referred to as al-tashābuh fī l-ṣūra (similarity in form). The
apparent contradiction lies in the ruling. In Ruling 1, a minor ablution is nulli-
fied, but in Ruling 2, a minor ablution is not nullified. If Fact-Pattern 1 and
Fact-Pattern 2 are indeed similar, then confusion arises about their opposing rul-
ings. The author offers a distinction that rests on the fact that a worm that exits
through the urethra or anus is, legally, not comparable to a worm that exits
 Asʿad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq, 1:34– 35.

Authenticated
through a wound. The reasoning behind the substantive law resolves the appa-
rent contradiction.
Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s comparison is unlike the comparisons in lexicographical
distinctions, in which the compared words are ultimately similar. Asʿad al-
Karābīsī offers two ways to distinguish between these two cases. In both, how-
ever, the upshot is that these cases are not analogous. In some way, the confu-
sion that leads these cases to look the same results from a lack of knowledge of
the underlying rationale of the two rulings. In order to resolve the confusion, the
reader must better understand the reasoning that generates the rules.
Lexicographic distinctions are grouped together based on a shared general
signification between two signifiers. The difference lies in the specific significa-
tion between the two. In a sense, however, it is correct to group the two signifiers
together. Book of legal distinctions explain why it is wrong to group two such
situations together.
A further example displays the kind of reasoning at work in legal distinc-
tions. Asʿad al-Karābīsī writes:
Someone makes a gift of a female slave, and then wants her to be returned. The recipient
says, “You gifted her to me when she was a minor, but now she has come of age and in-
creased in value.” If the donor accuses him of lying (kadhdhabahu), the presumption is
in favor of the donor (al-qawl qawl al-wāhib).
Had the gift been land, however, the situation would be different. The recipient says, “You
gifted it to me and it was barren and empty, but I planted in it and built some structures on
it.” If the donor contradicts him, the presumption is in favor of the recipient.
The common fact-pattern in both instances is a gift that the donor wishes to have
returned. Fact-Pattern A involves the court proceeding in which testimony is eli-
cited concerning return of the gift of a female slave, while Fact-Pattern B is a pro-
ceeding eliciting testimony about the return of a gift of land.¹⁰ It appears that the
two situations are identical, since they both involve testimony concerning the re-
turn of a gift. Ruling A, however, results in the testimony of the donor of the girl
being accepted over that of the recipient, while Ruling B results in is the testimo-
ny of the recipient of the land being accepted over that of the donor. As with the
previous example, each ruling is the mirror opposite of the other.
The discussion of the distinction sheds light on why this seeming contradic-
tion exists. Al-Karābīsī continues:
 It seems likely that there is a missing fact here, namely that the recipient in each case wants
compensation for the return of the gift since he claims that what he is returning is more than
what he received.

Authenticated
Concluding Thoughts 117
The distinction is that, in the case of the female slave, the capital asset (al-ʿayn) is a single
thing. This is demonstrated by the fact that it is invalid to designate a price for the gift (ifrād
al-thaman bi-l-hiba). The donor did not claim it was a gift of two things, but rather he claim-
ed that he gifted one thing. He also claimed the right to take back his gift. The standard
ruling grants him the right of return. Therefore, if the recipient wants to nullify this
right, he should not be believed.
Land is not like this. Because it consists of two capital assets, it is permissible to designate
each of these as the gift. The recipient is then able to claim that the gift was both things,
while the donor insists that it was only one. There is no obvious fact to contradict the re-
cipient’s designation of the gift as two. He could have both built and planted during this
period. Therefore, the presumption is in favor of the recipient. It is as if the recipient
had said, “You have gifted me (wahabta minnī) both of these slaves,” but the donor replies,
“No, I have gifted you only one of them.” In this situation, the presumption goes to the re-
cipient. This situation with the two slaves is like the situation with the gift of land.
Here, the gift contract differs in each situation. There is not one law that applies
to all gifts, rather, the particular assets gifted impact how the gift contract is con-
strued, even if this contract exists only implicitly. The gift contract for a slave
woman entails the person herself. Therefore, the intended asset of the gift was
clear, even if it was left underspecified. The fact that the slave is a single asset
leaves no room for doubt as to this intention. In the case of land, however,
the gift is not quite so simple. A gift of land consists of both the use of the
land to build structures and the use of the land for agriculture. The fact that
land is composed of two separate assets opens room for doubt as to the exact
asset intended to be gifted: the use of land for building, the use of the land
for agriculture, or farm. There is, therefore, a clear distinction between both
fact-patterns, thus settling the apparent contradiction. Resolving seeming incon-
gruities within a school’s doctrine was the methodology common to all works of
legal distinctions.
Concluding Thoughts
How should we understand the genre of legal distinctions? As seen in Chapter

Two, there seem to be strong parallels between the genre of legal distinctions
and the genre of lexicographic distinctions. The two can be thought of as parallel
genres and both share a similar method of organizing information. Indeed, at a
surface level, it can appear that legal distinctions simply borrow an organiza-
tional style from the already existing genre of lexicographic distinctions. Yet
we have seen here that the logic which undergirds both genres is actually
quite distinct, despite these surface similarities. Given the chronological prece-

Authenticated
dence of furūq works in lexicography, it seems that jurists chose to borrow gener-
ic conventions from lexicographers. In adapting this genre, however, the neces-
sities of legal reasoning altered its inherent logic.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the reasoning of legal distinctions conforms
well with the theoretical explanations of farq-objections in handbooks of legal
disputation. The logic of legal distinctions can be understood neatly within
the context of a disputation and disputation theory. Even without the formal
analysis of disputation theory, the comparisons in works of legal distinctions
are clear and dialectic. It may seem that we can understood books of legal dis-
tinction exclusively as operating within the field of legal disputation. This as-
sumption, however, forces us to revisit the relationship between the genres of
lexicographic and legal distinctions. If legal distinctions are the logical result
of a kind of disputation, then it might be said that lexicographic distinctions bor-
rowed this genre from Islamic law, or perhaps from Islamic legal thinking. This
second explanation seem textually satisfying, yet is chronologically inconsistent
with the evidence available to us.

Authenticated
Chapter Four: Riddles and Entertainment
In the previous chapters, this book examined three strands of legal thinking that
contributed to the rise in distinctions writing. We saw that the use of the term
furūq to describe legal treatises served to signal the existence of the genre of
legal distinctions. We also saw that the structure and organization of treatises
in this genre set it apart from other kinds of legal writing. There are, however,
also books in the Arabo-Islamic heritage that read nearly identically to the
legal distinctions treatises examined in earlier chapters but self-identify as be-
longing to genres other than legal distinctions. Many of these works fall under
the ambit of what is termed legal riddles (al-alghāz al-fiqhiyya). The existence
of these books underscores the elasticity of legal distinctions as a genre, and
challenges our understanding of the consistency of legal genres. This elasticity
is also present in some of the other “secondary” genres of Islamic law, that is,
all genres except for legal theory, legal compendia, and legal digests, including,
among other genres: legal maxims (al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya), purposes of the law
(maqāṣid al-sharīʿa), and cognate and similar legal cases (al-ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir). This chapter explores the porous boundary between legal furūq and
legal riddles, showing the importance of social practice to the development,
and partial convergence, between between these modes of thinking. In particu-
lar, the performance of legal knowledge in literary salons (majālis) fostered a de-
mand for a particular packaging of this information, and books of riddles and
distinctions converged, in part, as a way to satisfy this particular demand.
This trend begins early in the history of legal distinctions, in the fifth/eleventh
century, but seems to become a dominant paradigm in Mamluk Cairo.
The modern academic study of the Arabo-Islamic heritage has essentially
overlooked the study of riddles as a form of scholarly rhetoric both in Islamic
law and in a variety of other scholarly disciplines. As a rhetorical field, the prac-
tice of riddles in Arabic encompasses activities described by the term alghāz, in
addition to various other terms that refer to riddles including: muʿammayāt,
aḥājī, and imtiḥān. These terms may indicate slightly different activities and dif-
ferent kinds of texts, but there does appear to be a discursive commitment to dif-
ferentiating between these genres. There are important relationships between
riddles and dialectical question and answer.
One of the assumptions made throughout this study is that unified groups,
which I refer to as call “genres,” exist within Islamic legal literature, and that the
term “genre” can be applied to works of legal distinctions. This study has differ-
entiated between the concept of legal distinctions, a way of legal reasoning, and
the genre of legal distinctions, a way of organizing legal information into books.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-007

Authenticated
120 Chapter Four: Riddles and Entertainment
In the previous chapters, I described legal distinctions as a concept, with a dis-

tinct genealogy, epistemology, and logic. I have also shown how closely the con-
cept of legal distinctions tracks with the genre of legal distinctions. This chapter
demonstrates, however, that the genre of legal distinctions impinged on and was
impinged on by other closely related kind of legal writing. It attempts, in part, to
understand this genre in the broader context of Islamic legal literature.
The discussion of the histories of legal distinctions in the previous chapters
was, to a certain extent, tautological. I assumed an outline of the history of legal
distinctions and that there exist prehistories for legal distinctions, that is, various
trends that contributed to the development of the concept of a legal distinction.
Allowing for a multiplicity of origins for this concept has granted us insight into
the complex intellectual world from which distinctions emerged. There are clear
intertextual relationships between books of lexicographic, medical, and legal
distinctions, which highlight the shared intellectual world of these scholarly pur-
suits. At the same time, I clarified the connections between legal disputation and
the development of legal distinctions, both in terms of legal reasoning and in
terms of the content of books of distinction.
Books of legal distinctions represent a certain stage of development and re-
finement in the history of Islamic legal writing and in the science of Islamic law.
Nevertheless, the previous chapters focused on books of legal distinctions as an
ending point. While this focus is useful for an analysis of legal distinctions, it is
nevertheless convenient to claim that the concept I term “legal distinctions” ach-
ieves its full realization in the genre of legal distinctions and that the genre rep-
resents the maturation of the concept, but this is not necessarily the case. In fact,
one of the claims I have made is that the concept of legal distinctions can be
found outside of the context of books of legal distinctions, for instance in
texts of disputation or in works that are only partially devoted to legal distinc-
tions. What makes a book of legal distinctions unique is that it consists almost
entirely of these distinctions; a fact which has been seen repeatedly in the
works examined in previous chapters. What, however, of works that seemingly
fit this criterion in their contents but do not announce themselves as works of
legal distinctions?
This chapter will answer this question through an analysis of works of legal
riddles. The coming together of writing on legal distinctions and legal riddles is a
noteworthy development in the history of Islamic legal literature. In fact, riddles
increasingly take on the form of legal distinctions and legal distinctions take on
the presentation style of riddles. This trend, which can be seen almost from the
beginning of the writing of distinctions, reaches its height during the Mamluk
period, especially in Cairo. While both genres overlapped, they did not converge
completely. Nevertheless, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether certain

Authenticated
legal books belong to the genre of distinctions or to that of riddles or how this
difference is indeed meaningful. A case in point is manuscript Esad Efendi
884 in the Suleymaniye Library, which is a collection (majmūʿ) of works on
legal riddles. The table of contents on the first page states, “The following
books of Ḥanafī legal riddles (alghāz) are included in this codex…”¹ Yet, two
of the three works in this collection are works of legal distinctions entitled
Kitāb al-Furūq. ²
In this chapter, I first trace the tradition of literary and intellectual salons in
Arabo-Islamic culture, with a particular focus on their style and popularity in
Mamluk Cairo, as the spread of riddles accompanies the spread of salons.
Then, I introduce the art of legal riddles and the practice of solving legal riddles.
Due to the paucity of scholarship on legal riddles, this chapter offers a prelimi-
nary exploration of this style of writing and an initial analysis of its underlying
logic. Next, I highlight the convergence between works of riddles and distinc-
tions, a trend that peaked in Mamluk Cairo, and discuss the implications of
this for our understanding of genre. In this chapter, I focus on the history of
majālis—literary salons, study circles, and more—in Arabo-Islamic culture,
then follow the tradition of legal riddles, focusing on the way in which legal rid-
dles package the information of Islamic law. I conclude with a look the coming
together of riddles and distinctions of and some of the implications of this con-
vergence.
Literary Salons, Learning, and Culture
Examining the social context in which legal knowledge was performed is crucial
to understanding the motivations for changes in legal literary aesthetics.³ Almost
all of this knowledge performance, however, took place in venues referred to as
 MS Esad Efendi 884, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 1a.

 MS Esad Efendi 884, 1a. The two works, according to this table of contents, are Kitāb al-Furūq
li-l-Imām al-Farghānī and Kitāb al-Furūq. The first work in this collection is simply entitled Kitāb
al-Tahdhīb.
 Links between social realities and the writing of books of Islamic law can yield interesting
conclusions in most areas of Islamic law. For instance, David Vishanoff argues that al-
Shāfiʿī’s Risāla can be best understood as a composite work made up of three separate treatises
combined into one work. The second and third treatises, according to Vishanoff, represent actual
dialogues between al-Shāfiʿī and his critical contemporaries. Importantly, Vishanoff understands
from this that the Risāla was therefore composed and disseminated over time and in parts. See
David R. Vishanoff, “A Reader’s Guide to al-Shāfiʿī’s Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla),” Islam
and Christian-Muslim Relations 28.3, 245 – 69.

Authenticated
majālis. Majālis (sg. majlis; teaching sessions, literary gatherings, salons) were a
widespread phenomenon in the premodern Islamic world, which undoubtedly
took on different forms and functions over a broad geographic and chronological
scope. George Makdisi suggests that the term majlis was used by scholars to refer
to all sorts of scholastic gatherings. He thus speaks of “literary clubs” for the “in-
stitutionalized learning” of medicine, philosphy, and philosophical theology;⁴
“humanist circles” for the study of belles-lettres (adab);⁵ and “academies” at-
tended by grammarians.⁶
In the Encyclopaedia of Islam, majālis are described as places “where polit-
ical and judicial decisions were adopted, plaintiffs, panegyrists and other visi-
tors gathered, and questions of literature or law were debated.”⁷ Of particular in-
terest for this study are the sessions in which “questions of literature or law were
debated.” In order to see why books of legal riddles were produced and the rea-
sons for their merging with books of legal distinctions, it is necessary to analyze
the contexts in which Islamic law was discussed publicly. “In these public audi-
ences, plaintiffs and petitioners were present, but poets and scholars … also par-
ticipated.”⁸ The term majlis thus could refer to almost any gathering of people,
the court of a sovereign, a teaching-session, a poetry reading, or even a gathering
of friends. Majlis was the most popular term for scholastic gatherings outside of
the madrasa context.⁹ The following discussions, however, focus only on schol-
arly and literary gatherings.¹⁰
Although majālis differed across time and space, several constants should
be kept in mind. The first is that majālis were held both at the court of the
ruler, for example the sultan or caliph, and in non-courtly contexts. The differ-
ence between these two kinds of majālis is not necessarily in the activities con-
 George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West: With Special
Reference to Scholasticism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 60 – 61.
 Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, 61.
 Makdisi, Rise of Humanism, 61.
 EI2 s. v. “madjlis” (ed.), citing R. Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale sous les Ḥafṣides des
origines à la fin du XV siècle (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1940 – 47), 2:37.
 EI2 s. v. “madjlis” (ed.).
 It is possible that teaching hospitals as well should be exempted along with madrasas, but the
precise terminology associated with the teaching of medicine falls outside the scope of the pre-
sent study. See as well the detailed discussion of the semantic range of the premodern term
majlis in George Makdisi, Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982), 10 – 12; idem, Rise of Humanism, 60 – 64.
 It should not be missed that the disputations discussed in Chapter Three also happened in
venues referred to as majālis. In this chapter, however, I refer primarily to gatherings that were
not venues for formal disputation.

Authenticated
ducted therein, but in the stakes of the performance. As will be seen, courtly
majālis were moments to compete for patronage, either direct patronage to com-
pose works or indirect patronage through lucrative governmental appointments.
Non-courtly majālis were important settings for the discussion, evaluation, and
spread of books, ideas, and scholarly reputations. As literary and intellectual
salons, participants in the majālis sought to display the depth and scope of
their knowledge and impress and entertain other participants.¹¹
The convergence of riddles and distinctions began in Abbasid times and
peaked during the Mamluk and Ottoman periods. There has been research con-
ducted on the literary salons of the Abbasid period and scholarly salons in Otto-
man urban centers, yet much less is known about the majālis of the Mamluk era.
This section will look first at Abbasid-era majālis, and then turn towards early
Ottoman majālis in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean. We shall then investi-
gate the majālis of Mamluk Egypt, assuming certain continuities with both Ab-
basid and Ottoman practice.¹²
According to Samer Ali, literary salons “proliferated in the [third/]ninth cen-
tury, enabling more littérateurs to cultivate the adab skills needed to participate,
socialize, and gain personal influence.”¹³ For him, literary salons, referred to as
mujālasa rather than majālis during this period, were occasions for scholars to
embed themselves within literary communities and learn the skills necessary
to garner patronage.¹⁴ Régis Blachère likewise characterizes the salon in this pe-
riod as having “a high standing, no one could hope for public admiration if he
were not a man of the world, an agreeable conversationalist, having a sharp
mind and quick with wordplay, skilled in creating situations which he could
 I use the term literary salon to refer to gatherings of intellectuals to discuss intellectual mat-
ters, including but not limited to literature (adab).
 This assumption of continuity is, for now, provisional. We shall see that these is some evi-
dence of this continuity. This study takes this position based on the idea that non-courtly majālis
were organized and primarily attended by local participants. The transition from Mamluk to Ot-
toman rule did not involve mass movement of people. Those who participated in majālis in
Egypt in the time immediately before and immediately after the Ottoman conquest were the
same people.
 Samer Ali, Arabic Literary Salons in the Islamic Middle Ages (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame
University Press, 2010), 192.
 Ali also argues that literary salons were sites in which a shared historical memory was cre-
ated and cemented. I do not address this aspect of salons directly in this chapter, but it reaffirms
the importance of literary salons as sites of knowledge production, not just sites for the display
of knowledge.

Authenticated
turn to his advantage.”¹⁵ The skills cultivated by attending and performing in

such salons allowed scholars “to impress one’s audience, in fidelity to shared
standards of competence,” impacting how much “adab-type speaking” was
structured.¹⁶
These skills helped communicate knowledge beyond the immediate setting,
as there was a continuity in the patterns of knowledge production in most types
of intellectual salons.¹⁷ Connections between courtly and private salons suggest
the existence of a broad intellectual community, which maintained certain stand-
ards and expectations for what constituted knowledge or artistic production and
for the forms in which it ought to be expressed.
Literary salons focused on topics beyond language and literature. L.E. Good-
man finds that recognizing the debates occurring between Muḥammad ibn Za-
kariyyāʾ al-Rāzī (d. ca. 312/925 or 323/925) and Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad al-Rāzī (d.
ca. 322/934) is crucial to understand how these philosophers presented their
ideas, both in person and in their works. The contours of philosophical debates
and philosophical writing do not necessarily align in all respects with literary de-
bates. For instance, Goodman finds philosophical majālis to be “informal gath-
erings … not public performances of a formal nature.”¹⁸ The literary salons dis-
cussed by Samer Ali have a much more formal context, particularly those majālis
that involved the recitation of poetry. Even so, both literary and philosophical
sessions were high-level scholarly exchanges between socially significant mem-
bers of society.
 Régis Blachère, Un poète arabe du IVe siècle de l’Hégire (Xe siècle de J.-C.): Abou ṭ-Ṭayyib al-
Motanabbî (Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1935), 130. Translation based on citation in EI2 s.v.
“madjlis” (ed.).
 Ali, Arabic Literary Salons, 192. The impact that live performance had on the composition
and content of adab and poetry should not be understated. Performance mattered a great
deal in Arabic literature and also, as Dominic P. Brookshaw has shown, for Persian poetry in
medieval Iran as well. Joel Blecher has found references to scenes from majālis in Ibn Ḥajar
al-ʿAsqalānī’s hadith commentary al-Fatḥ al-bārī fī Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. See Dominic P. Brookshaw,
“Palaces, Pavilions, and Pleasure-Gardens: The Context and Setting of the Medieval Majlis,”
Middle Eastern Literatures 6.3 (2003): 199 – 223; and Joel Blecher, “Ḥadīth Commentary in the
Presence of Students, Patrons, and Rivals: Ibn Ḥajar and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī in Mamluk Cairo,”
Oriens 41 (2013): 261– 87.
 The continuities between different kinds of salons, point to shared societal standards of
knowledge and knowledge presentation, in spite of potential differences between salons held
in various contexts.
 Their informal nature sets this debates apart from the formal disputations discussed in
Chapter Three. L.E. Goodmann, “Rāzī vs Rāzī – Philosophy in the Majlis,” in The Majlis:
Interreligious Encounters in Medieval Islam, ed. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Mark R. Cohen, Sasson
Somekh, and Sidney Griffith (Harrasowitz Verlag: 1999), 101.

Authenticated
The most important observation in these two discussions is the parallel be-
tween the intellectual activity of the majlis and the written intellectual record.¹⁹
Cultural context affects literary production and intellectual production is related
to a certain kind of social life. Indeed, there are parallels here with the tradition
of formal disputation discussed in Chapter Three that was enshrined in a variety
of text, most notably in the genre of khilāf. Further, the existence of intellectual
majālis among various social strata signals the potential relevance of intellectual
production to different social groups, including merchants, scholars, and polit-
ical elites. This is particularly important for intellectual trends in the Mamluk
Sultanate. These trends include (i) the role of imported Mamluks—primarily
from Northwest Asia—and their children in seeking education, (ii) the expansion
of majālis to include a wider spectrum of socioeconomic classes, and (iii) the ris-
ing interest in solving riddles in these majālis.
The role of the Mamluks themselves was crucial for the cultural history of
the Mamluk Sultanate. Mamluks were enslaved young boys, primarily Qipchaks
and Circassians, brought to Cairo to be trained as part of the ruling military class.
As imported youths striving for a career in the military or government bureauc-
racy, the Mamluks and their children represented a new bloc of people for whom
education and learning became an important social goal. Since the children of
the Mamluks could not follow in the footsteps of their fathers into the military,
the Mamluks sought to educate their children, focusing primarily on “Arabic, cal-
ligraphy, and the fundamentals of religious sciences.”²⁰ These fields comprised
the basis for the education and the cultural lives that they developed as adults.
Ulrich Haarman emphasizes the importance of “the cultural life [found] in the
houses of the lowly Mamluk private soldiers (jundī) who often quite understand-
ably sought and found comfort for a disappointing military and public career in
the bliss of piety, poetry, and scholarship.”²¹ While many of them may have
found only “bliss” in pursuing intellectual activities, others were able to use
this to achieve renown. Intellectual and literary interests, of course, were
 Goodman says that “[t]he language … of the debate is rapid fire and conversational.” A
“rapid fire and conversational” tone is not indicative of most philosophical writing, suggesting
certain discontinuities between the presentation of philosophical activity in in-person interac-
tions and writing. Goodman, “Rāzī vs Rāzī,” 101.
 Ulrich Haarman, “Arabic in Speech, Turkish in Lineage: Mamluks and Their Sons in the In-
tellectual Life of Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria,” Journal of Semitic Studies 33.1 (1988),
86 – 87.
 Haarman, “Arabic in Speech,” 85 – 86.

Authenticated
found among more than just the professional scholars, with some Mamluks
being known “as authors of good verse and as literary entertainers.”²²
As other intellectuals of the time, certain Mamluks and their children attend-
ed majālis and were known for “sponsor[ing] salons that included both Turkish
and Arabic entertainment.”²³ At the same time, the breadth of learning at salons
served the professional lives of the non-military elite. Carl Petry reminds us that
“[t]he literary skills [a member of the civilian elite] acquired qualified him for a
wide range of careers, and one of the characteristic features of the man of learn-
ing was his multicompetence—his ability to hold positions in diverse occupation-
al fields at the same time.”²⁴ These factors led to an expansion of the ways in
which socially diverse groups interacted with and consumed knowledge.²⁵ This
can be seen, in part, in the participation of a non-scholarly, middle class artisans
at the public reading of books. Konrad Hirschler has documented their presence
at the readings of Taʾrīkh madinat Dimashq by Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 571/1176). In his
study of the reading notes on manuscripts of this work, he finds that “[c]onsider-
able numbers of craftsmen, traders and other non-scholars not only interacted …
in these readings with the scholarly world, but the various sources show that
their participation started to be taken seriously.”²⁶ The social life of Mamluk
Cairo and Damascus thus valued learning and knowledge.²⁷
Helen Pfeifer has shown the recurrence of majālis in accounts of scholarly
networks in the sixteenth century, especially in exchanges between scholars
from the Mamluk Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire. “In general,” she writes
“these particular majālis can be thought of as by-invitation-only gatherings at-
tended by well-to-do Muslim men for the purpose of social and intellectual ex-
change.”²⁸ Because of the importance of Mamluk Cairo and Damascus as centers
 Haarman, “Arabic in Speech,” 95.

 Margaret Larkin, “Popular Poetry in the Post-Classical Period,” in Cambridge History of
Arabic Literature: Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period, ed. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221.
 Carl F. Petry, The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1981), 312.
 It is possible that a similar trend could be found earlier, but it is documented clearly for the
first time in the Mamluk Empire. This is due, in part, to the mass-movement of scholars resulting
from the Mongol invasions and the rise of Cairo as the major center of Arabic learning.
 Konrad Hirschler, The Written Word in the Medieval Arabic Lands: A Social and Cultural
History of Reading Practices (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 69.
 The accessibility of learning and the exposure to knowledge production and performance in
non-urban areas remains unclear.
 Helen Pfeifer, “Encounter after the Conquest: Scholarly Gatherings in 16th-Century Ottoman
Damascus,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47 (2015), 221.

Authenticated
of learning in the period before the sixteenth century, knowledge of Arabic and
the Arabic tradition was foundational to these gatherings, all the more so in light
of the prevalence of non-Arab elites among the Mamluks and the Ottomans.²⁹
These salons “were an integral part of elite travel … and functioned as key ven-
ues in which men from different parts of the empire encountered one another.”³⁰
They served as meeting points for travelling elites, and were also opportunities
for local scholarly communities to interact with outside communities in the form
of travelling scholars.³¹ The social place of these majālis in the Ottoman period is
reminiscent of that in the Abbasid-period majālis: in both cases majālis served as
venues for the movement of scholars and ideas.
Pfeifer also shows that in late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, lit-
erary salons were venues for book circulation and served as a way for books to
acquire positive reviews.³² Salons became an initial venue for book publication,
a semi-public way of introducing a book to a scholarly audience who could judge
its merit. In this way, the stakes of the salon were high, and scholars needed to
impress audiences. Poets similarly used literary salons to circulate their poetry.
In this way, “[t]he majlis also played a vital role in the dissemination of poems:
scholars commented on them, musicians were inspired by them and listeners
spread their renown.”³³
Due to their high social standing, salons also cultivated friendships and so-
cial networks. As Pfeifer tells us, the scholar and biographer al-Ḥasan al-Būrīnī
(d. 1024/1615) “was widely appreciated for his ability to captivate salon audien-
ces: ‘he was never at a scholarly majlis without being its nightingale.’”³⁴ More
importantly, authors of biographical dictionaries relied on literary salons for in-
formation about contemporaries.³⁵ However, it is hard to know exactly what tran-
spired, even at elite salons. While primary sources occasionally describe salons,
full transcripts or lengthy detailed recounting of the exchanges or conversations
are rare.
 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 221.

 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 221
 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 223.
 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 229.
 Brookshaw, “Palaces,” 200.
 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 230, quoting Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, Luṭf al-samar wa-qaṭf al-thamar
min tarājim aʿyān al-ṭabaqāt al-ūlā min al-qarn al-ḥādī ʿashr, ed. Maḥmūd al-Shaykh (Damascus:
Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1981), 359. Ḥasan al-Būrīnī was a Shāfiʿī jurist, biog-
rapher, and poet and studied with Abū l-Barakāt Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī (d. 984/1577) in Cairo.
 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 230 – 31.

Authenticated
An important facet of majālis is their often-contentious nature. Inasmuch as

salons were venues for the public display of knowledge, they were also opportu-
nities to prove the superiority of one’s own knowledge. Pfeifer stresses “the com-
petitive nature of salons,” a spirit of competition sharply distinguishes literary
salons from other venues for knowledge-performance, such as a study circle.³⁶
The Fatḥ al-bārī, the commentary by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449) on
the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870), provides an example of the importance of
social settings for the production and display of knowledge in ninth/fifteenth
century Mamluk Cairo.
Al-Fatḥ al-bārī was a text that took form in study circles and subsequently
used by the author in salons. The Fatḥ in particular shows this history of conten-
tion and demonstrates how important majālis were to the study of hadith. In the
words of Joel Blecher, this book “emerged amidst the discussion of the Ṣaḥīḥ in
the live presence of his [Ibn Ḥajar’s] students.”³⁷ Coming from this background,
al-Fatḥ was formed through al-ʿAsqalānī’s exchanges with his students. Once
parts of this book emerged as a written commentary, these discussions move
from oral to written, from the majlis to the text. The text, however, was also
used in later majālis, when the information moved from text back to majlis.
Blecher has located a particularly compelling case of this interchange, from
majlis to text and back, in a series of exchanges between Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī
and Shams al-Dīn al-Harawī (d. 829/1426), a rival for a Shāfiʿī judgeship who had
recently arrived at the Cairo court. At a gathering in the Sultan’s garden, Ibn
Ḥajar challenged al-Harawī to determine who had greater mastery of hadith.
Ibn Ḥajar solved a vexing question related to the nature of the “everlasting
shade in heaven” in Q Raʿd 13:35. With this superior knowledge and understand-
ing of the Qur’an, Ibn Ḥajar bested al-Harawī, thus guaranteeing himself a judge-
ship, a moment he later recounted in al-Fatḥ al-Bārī. ³⁸ This episode demon-
strates the way in which knowledge moved from book and forth between then
majlis and written book, creating a reciprocal relationship between written
knowledge and performed knowledge.³⁹
 Pfeifer, “Encounter,” 233.

 Blecher, “Ḥadīth Commentary,” 266, see also 265 – 68.
 This session is remembered in Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-bārī, 18 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
ibn Bāz (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1970), 2:143 – 44, citation from Blecher, “Ḥadīth Commentary,”
278 – 80, where he translates the relevant passage.
 The process through which this book has been described in detail by Joel Blecher. He de-
scribes how Ibn Ḥajar would first compose this work in private, but “continued to contemplate
and shape his understanding of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī in the presence of students during his ongoing

Authenticated
The encounter between Ibn Ḥajar and Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥarawī involved in-
terpretation of the Qur’an and hadith. Similar episodes relating to Islamic law
are less commonly found. Surviving transcripts of Maluk-era salons are carefully
edited and only indirectly represent the discussions that took place. Neverthe-
less, they provide an interesting glimpse into how knowledge was performed
at the court of the Sultan. Salons of the Sultan al-Qanṣūh Ghawrī (r. 1501– 16),
for example, discussed Islamic law, using riddles as a vehicle for legal discus-
sions.⁴⁰ This record of the majālis at the court of al-Ghawrī are one of the few
records we have of a courtly majālis and one of the few direct transcripts of
any majālis involved in legal discussions. Although there are many primary sour-
ces that recount majālis or summarize their proceedings, they do not provide a
detailed description of the goings-on in any one majlis.
In two articles on Mamluk prose, Muhsin al-Musawi has similarly shown a
connection between the active intellectual culture and the composition of
books during the Mamluk Sultanate. “The sheer variety of prose-writing,” he
writes, “attests to the existence of a dynamic culture characterized by the active
involvement of littérateurs, widespread networks and a magnanimous devotion
to the world of writing.”⁴¹ The importance of both littérateurs and social net-
works to the production and consumption of knowledge also explains, according
to al-Musawi, the prevalence of encyclopedic writing during this period: “Islamic
medievalists usually focused on the compendium as a treasury of knowledge;
the compiler is thus a producer who aims to provide readers with a reservoir
which would otherwise by inaccessible in its original form, found in scattered
books.”⁴² Al-Musawi places the author acting as compiler as the driving force be-
hind book composition; however, it is just as likely that competing demands
from readers shaped texts. Given the prominence of majālis in Mamluk culture,
the role of social networks in the spread and dissemination of books, and the
importance of majālis towards opinion shaping, the possibility that authors
shaped books with the public in mind cannot be overlooked. Market forces
were, of course, not the only elements of scholarly production, but they can
meetings with them,” that is, in a teaching-majlis. Joel Blecher, Said the Prophet of God: Hadith
Commentary Across a Millenium (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 52.
 Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Sharīf, Nafāʾis majālis al-sulṭāniyya fī ḥaqāʾiq asrār al-Qurʾāniyya,
MS Ahmet III 2680, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, 60.
 Muhsin al-Musawi, “Pre-Modern Belletristic Prose,” in Cambridge History of Arabic
Literature: Arabic Literature in the Post-Clasical Period, ed. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 132.
 Muhsin al-Musawi, “The Medieval Islamic Literary World-System: The Lexicographic Turn,”
Mamluk Studies Review, 17 (2013), 52.

Authenticated
be seen in how books of legal distinction respond to public demand in a partic-

ular kind of legal knowledge.
Literary salons in Mamluk Egypt were so commonplace that al-Khalīl ibn
Aybak al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363) composed a parodistic commentary set in a fiction-
al literary gathering. This commentary, Ikhtirāʿ al-khurāʿ, is a commentary on two
nonsense verses of Arabic poetry.⁴³ The frame of the story in which the Ikhtirāʿ
takes places demonstrates an idealized majlis. “Abū Khurāfah [the protagonist of
the story] narrates that he was at a party one night with a number of other peo-
ple—an evening of the literary folk … They are sitting around chatting about lit-
erature, reciting lines for each other.”⁴⁴ When the guests hear Abu Khurāfah’s
nonsense lines, they struggle to understand the beauty he sees in this poetry,
so they propose finding a commentary. The scene invented by al-Ṣafadī, though
a caricature, represents a possible example of the literary salons. We see a group
of educated elites (ẓurafāʾ) gathered together discussing poetry. These figures are
not presented as scholars, but nevertheless enjoy intellectual and literary activ-
ities. They vie to impress each other through their knowledge of beautiful poetry,
and seek the aesthetic pleasure of hearing and understanding it.⁴⁵
The majlis remained a site for knowledge-performance after the end of Mam-
luk power. As we learn from Nelly Hanna’s work on Ottoman Cairo, salons con-
tinued to be an important part of life from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.
Hanna focuses on the salon as part of middle-class and elite intellectual ex-
change, noting that it included, “the diverse forms existing for the transmission
of learning and knowledge such as the spread of a book culture, the coffeehouse,
the literary salon—and their significance for our understanding of the way that
the middle-class culture was shaped during [this] period.”⁴⁶ By this period, the
majlis was one of several significant social venues for knowledge-performance.⁴⁷
Majālis continued to cover a wide variety of topics, including dhikr (Sufi recita-
tion sessions), literary salons, arenas for music, chess, and other scholarly en-
deavors that discussed fiqh or tafsīr. ⁴⁸
 Kelly Tuttle has studied this work in her dissertation, see Kelly Tuttle, “Expansion and Di-
gression: A Study in Mamlūk Literary Commentary” (PhD Diss., University of Pennsylvania,
2013), 79 – 108.
 Tuttle, “Expansion and Disgression,” 85 – 86.
 Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, Ikhtirāʿ al-khurāʿ, ed. Fārūq Asalīm (Damacus: Ittiḥād al-Kuttāb
al-ʿArab[, 2000]).
 Nelly Hanna, In Praise of Books: A Cultural History of Cairo’s Middle Class, Sixteenth to
Eighteenth Century (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004), 14.
 Hanna, In Praise of Books, 73.
 Hanna, In Praise of Books, 73.

Authenticated
These middle-class majālis constituted extensions of the “popular poetry”

salons in Mamluk Cairo attended by “patrons and consumers who hail, if not
from the lower classes, at least from what might be considered a kind of petite
bourgeoisie.”⁴⁹ In speaking of “popular” scholarly culture, I refer to activities in
which the participants were not only observers but had opportunities to be per-
formers as well. It is this potential for participation that offered attendees an op-
portunity to demonstrate their knowledge.⁵⁰
Modern discussions of “middle-class salons” and “the rise of popular poet-
ry” involving some members of the “merchant class” remain vague due to a lack
of information about what exactly occurred during these meetings. For instance,
it seems likely that someone who could be described as a “middle class mer-
chant” possessed less familiarity with religious sciences than professional schol-
ars, merchants could have been familiar with relevant areas of laws, such as con-
tract and commercial law. In other words, any discussion of a specialized
intellectual topic such as fiqh or hadith criticism at a salon probably did not
carry the same level of sophistication as a majlis at the court of the Sultan.
This does not mean, however, that such topics were not discussed in non-elite
or non-courtly salons, in addition to various kinds of poetry and literature.
Other evidence circumstantial points to a transference between oral and
written exchanges in majālis. As mentioned in Chapter One, the distinctions
book attributed to Najm al-Dīn al-Naysābūrī states that it is was meant to be
used in majālis. In one manuscript of this work, the author says: “A colleague
(baʿḍ ikhwānī) asked me to write a book … that you can consult during discus-
sions in majālis (yastadilluhu fī l-majālis) and from which you can find guidance
in schools (yustaḍīʾa bihi min al-madāris).”⁵¹ This is a strange passage, and it
seems to have given copyists trouble as well, as no two manuscript witnesses
provide the same reading.⁵² The juxtaposition of majālis and madāris in this con-
text, in addition to providing a rhyme, perhaps indicates that the majālis are not
 Larkin, “Popular Poetry,” 193 – 94.

 These broad phenomena have been studied in some detail, but there is still need for study of
more specific contexts, see Jonathan P. Berkey, “Popular Culture under the Mamluks: A Historio-
graphical Survey,” Mamluk Studies Review 9.2 (2005): 133 – 46; and Boaz Shoshan, Popular
Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
 MS Giresun Yazmalar 44, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 1b.
 The Giresun Yazmalar manuscript, in general, is written in an exceptionally clear hand with
full diacritical marks, i. e. with both dots and vowels markers (al-ḥarakāt). The phrase
yastadilluhu fī l-majālis, however, has only the consonantal skeleton without any diacritical
marks. The other reading of this phrase could be yasnadu lahu fī l-majālis, depended upon in
majālis.

Authenticated
study sessions, and that the interest in works of distinctions came from non-
scholastic contexts.
Of the seven witnesses to this text, four omit this introduction entirely, de-
spite the remarkable similarities between these seven texts otherwise.⁵³ The
other three manuscripts of this text with an introduction are MS Halet Efendi
780, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul; MS Yazma Baǧışlar 1187, Suleymaniye Li-
brary, Istanbul; and MS Or. 481, Leiden University Libraries, Leiden. Here, MS
Halet Efendi 780 and MS Yazma Baǧışlar 1187 read “to benefit from during
majālis while doing without school training (li-yantfiʿa bihā fī l-majālis wa-
yastaghnā ʿan al-madāris).”⁵⁴ The Leiden manuscript has a third reading for
this text. This text reads “to entertain with in majālis and to learn from in schools
(yastahziʾu bihā fī l-majālis wa-yastaḍīʿu bihā fī l-madāris).”⁵⁵ In all three of these
texts, the text and the meaning of this phrase are different. The second variant
presents law colleges as unimportant; instead of offering the book as a sort of
cheat-sheet for Islamic law, it obviates the requirement of a complete formal
legal education. The Leiden manuscript sees itself as a source of entertainment
and a supplement to this education. In all of these readings, however, majālis
and madāris are paralleled, suggesting that they each refer to different venues
for the learning and performance of legal knowledge.
Literature and Practice of Legal Riddles
Legal distinctions were always closely related to legal riddles. The tradition of
posing and solving legal riddles serves largely as play and entertainment, and
authors in this tradition justify their works as worthwhile diversions. In one
book of legal riddles, the Mālikī jurist Ibn Farḥūn (d. 799/1397) cites a proverb
by ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) as an apology for the practice of posing riddles:
“Divert the soul on occasion, for it rusts just as metal does.”⁵⁶ A diversion, in this
case, creating riddles, serves to refresh and enliven the soul. Ibn Farḥūn contin-
ues his defense of posing riddles by discussing a prophetic hadith found in al-
 I discuss this text in Chapter Five, pp. 188 – 90.

 MS Halet Efendi 780, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 1b; MS Yazma Baǧışlar 1187, Suleyma-
niye Library, Istanbul, 84b. MS YB1187 has a slight variant in the second clause, reading:
“yantafiʿu bihā fī l-majālis wa-yastaghnā bihā ʿan al-madāris,” “to benefit from this book in sal-
ons and not need school training because of it.”
 MS Or. 481, Leiden University Libraries, Leiden, 3a.
 Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ, ed. Muḥammad
Abū l-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth[, 1980]), 62– 63.

Authenticated
Bukhārī’s al-Ṣaḥīḥ and in the Muwaṭṭaʾ of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), among
other hadith collections:
Ismāʿīl [ibn Abī Uways (d. 226/840 – 41)] said: Mālik [ibn Anas] related to me, on the author-
ity of ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar [(d. 73/693)], the following:
The Messenger of God, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, said, “There is a tree
whose leaves never fall. It is, indeed, like a Muslim (wa-hiya mathal al-muslim). Tell me,
what is it?”
People’s thoughts turned to the desert trees, but it occurred to me that it was the date-palm
(al-nakhla), nevertheless I shied away from responding.
“O, Messenger of God, will you tell us what it is?” we asked.
“It’s the date-palm,” he replied.
I talked to my father [ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 24/644)] about what I had thought and he
said, “I would have liked nothing better than for you to have said that to him (la-an
takūna qultahā aḥabbu ilayya min an takūna lī kadhā wa-kadhā).”⁵⁷
In this example, Muḥammad himself participates in the act of creating riddles,

posing a question to a crowd gathered before him. If Muḥammad sanctions
this activity, then it must be meritorious. At the same time, this story ends
with a father’s gentle chiding of his son for not having hazarded a guess, a con-
firmation that riddles are a meritorious activity in which to engage. While this
aspect of the story does not involve Muḥammad directly, this tradition approved
legal riddles as an edifying activity. ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, one of the Sunni ‘right-
ly-guided caliphs,’ longed for his son to answer correctly because he saw it as an
opportunity to impress Muḥammad and demonstrate his son’s wit. Asking and
answering questions no longer functions only as a tool for scholars to hone
their skills, but as an activity for people to partake in entertainment. Drawing
on the examples of the Prophet and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Ibn Farḥūn legitimates
scholarly entertainment. In starting his book in this fashion, Ibn Farḥūn draws
on earlier models of legal riddles in order to establish a precent, which he can
then follow.
One general contemporary account of riddles explains that riddles are exer-
cises in wordplay, punning, or the use of metaphors and imagery. “Typically, an
intentionally misleading question presents an enigma that can be resolved only
by a clever ‘right’ answer.”⁵⁸ In the question that Muḥammad poses in the above
 Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī, Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, “Kitāb al-ʿIlm,” s.v. “Bāb al-ḥayāʾ fī l-
ʿilm.”
 Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, s.v. “Riddles” (Andrew Welsh and Eric J. Re-
ttberg).

Authenticated
account, the comparison between believers and trees supplies the misleading
question, and the answer of the palm-tree, the clever solution. This template
holds true for linguistic riddles as well as for legal riddles. Riddles are seemingly
simple questions with elusive answers or opaque statements, which invite the
participation of the reader or listener. Books of riddles seek to provoke curiosity
and intellectual engagement on the part of readers or an audience. Discerning
the answer becomes a test of skill, but falling short still allows readers to con-
template the answer and enjoy the play in the relationship between the riddle
and the correct response.
Posing riddles is an inherently social activity involving at least one person to
pose the question and someone else to attempt an answer. Riddles obtain their
value by exploiting a knowledge disparity between the one posing the riddle and
the audience, enabling status-enhancement on the part of the figure in power
and those who know the correct solution. Riddles thrived as a textual genre in
which a book’s narrator assumes the role of questioner or riddler. Ḥājjī Khalīfa
(d. 1067/1657), for example, sees alghāz as primarily a textual genre, writing, “It
is the science from which the precise and more or less unknown meaning of
words are known.”⁵⁹ For him, alghāz is a science, i. e., a textual tradition. Indeed,
the very inclusion of alghāz as a written genre in its own right in the bibliograph-
ic work written by Ḥājjī Khalīfa signals the importance of riddles as a mode of
writing in the classical tradition.⁶⁰
In spite of this importance, scholars have only recently begun to analyze rid-
dles as a serious form of Arabo-Islamic literature.⁶¹ This lacuna leaves many un-
derexplored problems, such as the major works or authors within this field, or
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:149.

 Interestingly, riddles do not seem to have been a popular genre within Persian writing. In
fact, Seyed-Gohrab says that there are “no such collections [of riddles], and riddles are scattered
throughout poetric dīvāns, “ A. A. Seyed-Gohrab, “The Art of Riddling in Classical Persian Po-
etry,” Edebiyat 12 (2001), 15. In his study, he finds that riddles as a literary technique were
quite important in Persian literature, particularly within the qaṣīda form and that it “may, in
fact, be regarded as a legacy of Middle Persian literature” (Seyed-Gohrab, “Art of Riddling,”
31). It is peculiar that books of riddles were very popular in Arabic but found no real currency
in Persian.
 See, for instance, Thomas Bauer’s entry in EI3 on Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Azharī, a grammar-
ian from fifteenth century Egypt. In this entry, Bauer discusses al-Azharī’s writings, but the al-
Alghāz al-naḥwiyya (The Grammatical Riddles) is mentioned only in passing. “Several works of
al-Azharī were published in early prints that are hardly accessible today or are still in manu-
script, among them al-Alghāz al-naḥwiyya (“Grammatical riddles”), probably printed in Cairo
1281/1864.” In part, the lack of study of riddles is due to the lack of printed editions. EI3 s.v.
“al-Azharī, Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh” (Thomas Bauer).

Authenticated
the relationship between riddles and other forms of knowledge and entertain-
ment. As implied by Ḥājjī Khalīfa, riddles encompass legal topics as well as lin-
guistic or lexicographic issues. Muḥammad Sālimān’s recent study of Arabic rid-
dles focuses exclusively on linguistic riddles, both grammatical and
lexicographic.⁶² There are, however, also books of riddles in other scholarly dis-
ciplines, including law.⁶³ Indeed, the history of legal riddles in the Arabic tradi-
tion ought to also include literary (adab) works that recount the figure of the Ju-
rist of the Arabs (faqīh al-ʿarab).⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the specific motives for telling
and recording legal riddles remains to be discovered.
Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh, the editors of Ibn Farḥūn’s
work on legal riddles, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ, suggest that
riddles helped jurists develop a more complete understandings of substantive
law and are helpful for memorizing obscure points of law.⁶⁵ More than merely
producing knowledge, riddles were also a social practice in which professionals
and cultural elites enhanced their own status. Against Abū l-Ajfān and Baṭīkh, it
 Muḥammad Sālimān, Fann al-alghāz ʿind al-ʿarab wa-maʿhu l-Lafẓ al-lāʾiq wa-l-maʿnā l-rāʾiq;
al-Alghāz al-naḥwiyya; al-Ṭāʾir al-maymūn fī ḥall lughz al-Kanz al-madfūn, ed. Muḥammad
Sālimān (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 2012).
 See EI2 s.v. “Lughz” (Mohamed Bencheneb).
 The faqīh al-ʿarab seems to be a trickster figure prominent in early Islamic writings. He
makes appearances in the maqāma collection of al-Harīrī, particularly the thirty-second
maqāma, al-maqāma l-ṭībiyya, but also in such works as Futyā faqīh al-ʿarab by the lexicogra-
pher Aḥmad ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004). Ibn al-Jawzī includes a refutation of fatwas issued by the
faqīh al-ʿarab in his Tablīs Iblīs. The existence of this figure signals us towards intersections
of intellectual play and Islamic law that seem to prefigure a more formalized genre of riddles
within the textual world of Islamic law. This history remains to be written. The existence of a
jurist-figure in works of adab and the collections of his fatwas may grant us insight into contest-
ations over legal authority and the status required to interpret the Qur’an and hadith, in a man-
ner similar that discussed in to Joseph E. Lowry, “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
on Interpretation, Authority, and the Structure of the Law,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 128 (2008): 25 – 40 and idem, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba:
A Reconsideration,” Islamic Law and Society 11 (2004): 1– 41. See also, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila,
Maqama: A History of a Genre (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002), 157– 58, 269 – 70, 344. I thank
Matthew L. Keegan for alerting me to the importance of the faqīh al-ʿarab for the history of
legal riddles and for these references. Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs
Iblīs, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1403[/1983]), 123; Abū Muḥammad al-Qāsim ibn ʿAlī
l-Ḥarīrī, Maqāmāt al-Ḥarīrī (Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, 1873), 325 – 48; Abū l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad
ibn Fāris al-Lughawī, Kitāb Futya faqīh al-ʿarab, ed. Ḥusayn ʿAlī Maḥfūẓ in Majallat al-
Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī l-ʿArabī 33.3 (1377/1958): 441– 66; 33.4 (1377/1958): 633 – 56.
 Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh, “Dirāsa tamhīdiyya,” in Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm
ibn Farḥūn al-Mālikī, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān
and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth; Tunis: al-Maktaba al-ʿAtīqa[, 1980]), 37.

Authenticated
seems likely that social practices led to the composition of these books, rather
than the composition of a genre of books altering existing social practices.
While the word lughz (pl. alghāz) seems to be the most commonly used word
to describe the act of asking and solving riddles, it also competes with other
terms such as uḥjiya (pl. aḥājī), muʿammā (pl. muʿammayāt), muʿāyat (pl.
muʿāyāt), imtiḥān (pl. imtiḥānāt) and even al-asʿila wa-l-ajwiba. Some authors ar-
gued for strong distinctions between these terms. Ibn Farḥūn, for example, re-
lates each term to a different branch of learning. According to the Algerian schol-
ar Mohamed Bencheneb, the lughz and uḥjiya are both riddles in the style of
question and answer, while the muʿammā is a riddle without the question and
answer. ⁶⁶ The word muʿāmmā, however, can also be used to mean a code or se-
cret writing.⁶⁷ The works discussed by Bencheneb on riddles and puzzles are pri-
marily lexicographical or linguistic. “The enigma [(lughz)] is generally in verse,
and characteristically is in an interrogative form.”⁶⁸ A riddle demands to be
solved, the answer almost certainly involving a play on words or a double-enten-
dre. All three styles of riddles are generally, but not always, in verse.
These three terms for riddles do not seem to have a particular relevance in
the legal realm. Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar finds no difference be-
tween the various terms for riddles: alghāz, muʿammā, uḥjiya, in al-Jurjānī’s
work of legal riddles. Al-Jurjānī’s book, al-Bashar says, “is not a book of
alghāz in the technical meaning of the word (al-maʿnā l-muṣṭalaḥ ʿalayhi),
even though it is counted among these works and considered one of them.
The author, may God have mercy on him, had a different goal with this
book.”⁶⁹ Further, al-Bashar discounts the idea of riddles as a genre: “It did not
become an independent branch of legal studies at all,” he explained, “even if
some scholars dedicated books to this topic.”⁷⁰ Despite this claim, there are
many extant books of legal riddles.
The riddles in such books are generally presented in dialogue form. Ibn Far-
ḥūn’s book forms a series of consecutive simulated dialogs. Each riddle is intro-
duced with a conditional protasis, the phrase, “If you were to ask… (fa-in qulta),”
and the answer provides the apodosis, “I would reply… (wa-qultu).” The dia-
logues are blueprints, similar to the inclusion of disputations in some books
 EI2 s.v. “Lughz” (Mohamed Bencheneb).

 See EI2 s.v. “Muʿammā” (Clifford E. Bosworth).
 EI2 s.v. “Lughz” (Mohamed Bencheneb).
 Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar “al-Muqaddima,” in Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn
Muḥammad al-Jurjānī, “Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh ʿalā madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī,” ed. Ibrāhīm
ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar (PhD Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1415[/1994]), 37.
 Al-Bashar, “al-Muqaddima,” 37.

Authenticated
of legal distinctions.⁷¹ Given the importance of riddles at majālis, the dialogic

presentation in these works was likely a blueprint for or perhaps representation
of performance. Arriving at the solution to a legal riddle involves a high degree
of sophisticated legal and linguistic education. Fortunately for the reader, these
books also provide solutions. In this way, a book of riddles prepares one for par-
ticipation in a majlis and simulates an actual majlis. The book poses questions
for the reader to answer. The reader can attempt to solve the riddle and then ver-
ify their answer with the one provided in the text. The possibility for enjoyment
comes through attempting and, perhaps, succeeding to solve the puzzle, or fail-
ing to solve it, through understanding the solution to the puzzle on reading it.
The Ḥanafī jurist Ibn al-Shiḥna (d. 882/1515 – 16) wrote a typical work of this
genre, al-Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya fī alghāz al-ḥanafiyya. Most of the riddles he
posed begin with the conditional, “If someone were to say…” (in qīla…) and
the solution to the riddle is introduced with the formula “the reply is… (wa-l-
jawāb…).”⁷² He seems to have come up with the majority of these riddles, though
he also includes riddles from a book titled al-Tahdhīb fī dhihn al-labīb by a cer-
tain Ibn al-ʿIzz.⁷³ The daunting riddles from al-Tahdhīb have different phrasing
than those in al-Dhakhāʾir and are also followed by their solutions.⁷⁴ Generally,
solving the riddles involves either thorough mastery of substantive law, a mas-
tery of the Arabic language and linguistic interpretation, or both. For instance,
Ibn al-Shiḥna asks:
Question (fa-in qīla): Which wells cannot be used for ablutions until one bucketful of water
has been poured out from it?
Answer (fa-l-jawāb): Any well containing a bucket that has previously been used to draw
water from a well has sufficiently impure water that it may not be used for ablutions. Per-
forming ablutions with the water from such a well is only permitted once one bucketful of
water has been poured out from it. This ruling is applied in a proportionally consistent
 See Chapter Three.

 See ʿAbd al-Barr ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Shiḥna, Alghāz al-ḥanafiyya li-Ibn al-Shiḥna l-
musammā al-Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya fī alghāz al-ḥanafiyya, ed. Fāṭima Shihāb (Cairo: al-Makta-
ba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2014).
 I believe this refers to Abū l-Maḥāsin ʿAlī ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī l-ʿIzz (d. 792/1389).
See Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, al-Fihris al-shāmil li-l-turāth al-ʿarabī l-islāmī l-makhṭūṭ, 2nd ed.
(Amman: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, n.d.), 41:29. See also Markaz al-Malik al-Fayṣal li-l-Buḥūth
wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyyah, Khizānat al-turāth: Fihris shāmil li-ʿanāwīn al-makhṭūṭāt wa-
amākinihā wa-arqām ḥifẓihā fī maktabāt al-ʿālam, no. 5919, CD-ROM. The Khizānat al-turāth cat-
alog is also available online at al-Maktaba al-Shāmila, http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-
5678, accessed December 1, 2018.
 He discusses his use of Ibn al-ʿIzz’s work on page 3. For an example, see below.

Authenticated
manner; the number of buckets of water poured out should be equivalent to the number of
times the impure bucket was used.⁷⁵
This riddle consists of a difficult legal question, the solution to which rests on
knowing the details of purity law. Water in a well is pure but can be tainted
by the addition of impurities. This riddle asks why or how a well may be purified
by extracting exactly one bucket of water. In order to solve the riddle, one has to
know purity law, the status of water in a well, its potential pollutants, and the
remedies for the pollution, detailed intricacies of substantive law.
Other riddles require an exercise in linguistic interpretation, as in one riddle
cited from Ibn al-ʿIzz, whose answer is provided by Abū Ḥanīfa himself: “It is
said that someone asked Abū Ḥanīfa, ‘What do you think about someone who
says to his wife, ‘I do not wish for Heaven, nor do I fear Hell. I eat carrion
and blood. I take the word of (uṣaddiqu) Jews and Christians and I loathe God
(abghuḍu l-ḥaqq)…”⁷⁶ The man continues in this way making statement after
statement, all of which appear to repudiate his Muslim faith. Instead of answer-
ing the question, however, Abū Ḥanīfa gauges the opinions of his companions.
“They all respond,” the story continues, “‘the one who says this is an infidel!’
Upon hearing this, Abū Ḥanīfa smiled and said, ‘No, he is a true believer
(muʾmin)!’”⁷⁷ How can this be?
The answer, supplied by Abū Ḥanīfa, involves a prodigious act of linguistic
interpretation. His solution reinterprets every one of the speaker’s statements in
order to show how each aligns with proper behavior and belief. Further, not only
is this person shown to be a Muslim in good standing, but Abū Ḥanīfa demon-
strates that this speaker has attained a high level of religious knowledge and
piety. Abū Ḥanīfa explains each one of the speaker’s sentences as having a
pious meaning, thus, “I do not wish for Heaven, nor do I fear Hell” means
that he wishes for and fears their Creator, “I eat carrion and blood” means
that he eats fish and locusts and liver and spleen.⁷⁸ After reading Abū Ḥanīfa’s
explanations, the reader is compelled to agree with Abū Ḥanīfa’s assessment
that the speaker is indeed a true believer.⁷⁹
In this explanation, Abū Ḥanīfa interprets the phrase “‘I do not wish for
Heaven…” as implying an elided phrase (al-ḥadhf). The speaker’s full meaning,
according to this interpretation, is “I do not wish for Heaven, I wish for God,” but
 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 8.

 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 199.
 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 199.
 Ibn al-Shiḥna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 190.
 Ibn al-Shihna, Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya, 199 – 200.

Authenticated
the speaker elides the second clause. In interpreting the second statement in this
manner, Abū Ḥanīfa reads it favorably, with a presumption of legality. His read-
ing of the second clause is similarly receptive. Only animals that have been rit-
ually slaughtered are permissible for eating; the consumption of blood is never
acceptable. In spite of this, Abū Ḥanīfa understands that this statement is not
about eating carrion and blood, but rather an allusion to a statement a made
by the Prophet Muḥammad. “There are two kinds of carrion and two kinds of
blood that have been made licit for us. The carrion is fish and locust, the
blood, liver and spleen.”⁸⁰ The statement is therefore to be understood as a spe-
cific reference to this prophetic hadith and not as a general statement about diet-
ary practice. In making this allusion, the speaker is demonstrating his own
knowledge of the Prophetic tradition. His words not only echo those of the
Prophet, but this hadith is also used as an authoritative prooftext in legal discus-
sions of what is permissible to eat.⁸¹ He is quoting Muḥammad, and quoting him
in a correct context. All of the speaker’s statements are interpreted in this fash-
ion by Abū Ḥanīfa and the deep religious learning of the speaker is brought to
the fore.
These are two examples of the kind of reasoning and presentation found in
works of legal riddles, showing that the legal content of riddles makes books of
riddles serious legal works and that the reader must have a strong grounding in
substantive doctrine, legal theory, and the Arabic language in order to solve
many of the riddles presented in these books. A reader lacking the knowledge
to answer a riddle can also learn about the law by reading these works. These
examples also highlight the degree to which jurists could indulge in intellectual
play. These books witness moments of sustained pleasure in the intricacies of Is-
lamic law and legal theory. At the same time, they remain serious works of Islam-
ic law. By citing the example of Abū Ḥanīfa, the eponym of a legal school, Ibn
Shiḥna argues for the legitimacy of riddles, but also demonstrates the posing
and solving riddles is activity in which the eponymous founder of the legal
school participated.
 See ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartīb al-sharāʾiʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIl-
miyya, 1406/1998), 5:58. This hadith appears in Ibn Mājah in his chapter on ṣayd, and his chap-
ter on Foods (aṭʿima), in Sunan Abī Dāwūd in the chapter on Foods (aṭʿima), in Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ
on the Description of the Prophet (ṣifat al-nabī), and in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, see
Arent Jan Wensinck, Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane: les six livres, le Musnad
d’al-Dārimī, le Muwatta’ de Mālik, le Musnad de Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (Leiden: Brill, 1933), 1:226.
 See al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, 5:58; al-Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al-Uzjandī Qāḍīkhān, Sharḥ al-
Ziyādāt (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2005/1426), 5:2117.

Authenticated
My understanding of play in the context of Islamic law is inspired by the

work of Norman Calder, particularly his Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical
Era. ⁸² Calder’s discussion of play develops from his understanding of Islamic
law as a stable set of rules and relationships, which jurists constantly attempt
to reinvent and redescribe. For him, “play” is in many ways the primary literary
feature of Islamic law: “the most characteristic features of development through
time are those that reflect, not an interest in new rules, but a self-reflective inter-
est in the tradition itself and in the modes of expressing inherited rules.”⁸³ Ac-
cordingly, any development in Islamic law might occur as a literary or rhetorical
innovation, as a legal innovation, or both. In this legal context, play can involve
two activities, a rich linguistic analysis and the pursuit of stylistic refinement
and organizational clarity. Calder has emphasized the importance of the devel-
opment of rhetorical features of Islamic legal writing. “Real measurable develop-
ment, implying a process that is more or less continuous through time and in a
definable direction, can be distinguished only in relation to organisational tech-
nique, linguistic presentation, and syntactical virtuosity.”⁸⁴ In Calder’s telling,
this aspect of legal thinking made the study of law “a joy and delight” for pre-
modern jurists.⁸⁵ Calder’s emphasis on the aesthetic dimensions of legal litera-
ture reminds us that classical Islamic juriprudence (fiqh) was both a project to
understand the theory and doctrine of Islamic law, a divinely inspired set of
norms, and the variety of literary representations of this law.⁸⁶
 See also, however, the discussion of Calder’s earlier ideas about play in Islamic law in the
“Alta Discussion” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2006),
413 – 14.
 Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era, ed. Colin Imber (Cambridge: Cam-
 Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, 35.
 Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, 86.
 Calder is convincing in his analysis in terms of the genres that he studies, the mabsūṭ and the
mukhtaṣar. Other scholars, however, have shown doctrinal development in other genres of Is-
lamic legal writing. In particular, Baber Johansen has demonstrated how Ottoman legal com-
mentaries showed important changes in substantive law. Other studies have also shown devel-
opment occurring in fatwa literature. Wael Hallaq discusses development from a theoretical
standpoint and David S. Powers and Yosef Rappaport have demonstrated this from a social his-
torical perspective. These important studies do not undermine Calder’s conclusions for the two
genres he studies nor his general approach to Islamic legal texts. See Baber Johansen, “Legal
Literature and the Problem of Change,” in Islam and Public Law: Classical and Contemporary
Studies, ed. Chibli Mallat, 29 – 47 (London: Graham and Trotman); idem, The Islamic Law on
Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants’ Loss of Property Rights under the Hanafite Doctrine (London:
Croom Helm, 1988); Wael Hallaq “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Substan-
tive Law,” Islamic Law and Society 1 (1994): 29 – 65; David S. Powers, Law, Society, and Culture in

Authenticated
This kind of intellectual play is witnessed in both books of legal riddles and
books of legal distinctions. For Calder, play facilitates the improvement of legal
information. He discusses how play is used to increase the precision of legal lan-
guage and clarify the relationship between laws and ideas. In riddles, of course,
the play works differently, rendering the law at first ambiguous or obscure, only
clarifying it through the answer. Both steps demand a high degree of linguistic
play and the creative exploration of linguistic and legal issues. The intellectual
dexterity involved in solving a riddle make this activity an enjoyable way to
hone a legal mind. Ibn Farḥūn even makes a statement to this effect in the in-
troduction to his book on legal riddles: “[I]t is necessary for a scholar to test
his colleagues by asking them the most obscure questions possible (al-masāʾil
al-ʿawīṣāt) to test their minds’ ability to clarify difficult questions (muʿaḍḍalāt)
and decipher obscure questions (al-mushkilāt).”⁸⁷ Ibn Farḥūn thus implies that
some of the most obscure questions possible are to be found in the form of
legal riddles, and that solving legal riddles helps maintain a sharp mind.
It was not only legal riddles, however, where some of these obscure ques-
tions were to be found. Many works of legal distinctions packaged law as riddles
or quasi-riddles, comparing laws in ways that seem at first confusing or even un-
intelligible, but which through prolonged comparison actually reveals a straight-
forward distinction, much like riddles present a straightforward situation in an
intentionally obscure or complex fashion. The relationship between riddles and
distinctions as legal concepts was hardly a one-way affair, as the reasoning of
legal distinctions showed became a compelling way of presenting legal riddles.
Legal Distinctions as Play
The style of presentation of legal riddles proved useful to authors of works of

legal distinctions. In addition, the form and logic of legal distinctions were
equally useful for the presentation of legal riddles. Many works of legal distinc-
tions, particularly those written in Mamluk Cairo, adopt the rhetorical style of
the riddle-form, and vice-versa.
The influence of riddles on legal distinctions can be seen clearly in the chap-
ter on legal distinctions in Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. The first section
the Maghrib, 1300 – 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Yossef Rapoport,
Marriage, Money, and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
 Ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ, 64.

Authenticated
of this chapter focuses on his discussion of ritual purity.⁸⁸ The first distinction in
this section reads, “If one piece of animal dung (buʿra) falls into a well, it does
not render the water impure. However, if half a piece of animal dung (naṣfuhā)
falls into a well, it does render the water impure.”⁸⁹ This distinction seems to
challenge the most basic laws of logic: how can a greater amount of an impure
substance be less impure than a lesser amount? Like a riddle, this logical affront
prods the reader to reflect, to understand how these two situations can result.
The next distinction is just as confusing: “It is not incumbent on a man to
help his sick wife perform her minor ablutions, but it incumbent on him to
help his sick slaves, male or female, perform their minor ablutions.”⁹⁰ Again,
this situation seems to defy common sense, as privileging the religious duties
of one’s slaves over one’s wife contravenes the expected social order. Not only
would this devalue marriage relative to slavery and concubinage, but this dis-
tinction also seems to place the religious needs of an enslaved person above
those of a free person. Again, this distinction stokes a sense of curiosity in the
reader, highlighting what is to come. Because the distinction seems so absurd,
the reader expects the author to resolve this discomfort. Ibn Nujaym must resolve
both the contradiction between the laws compared and the seeming incongruity
between these substantive laws and common sense. The anticipation established
by the comparison and the resolution thereof through the discussion of the dis-
tinction borrows from the presentation style of riddles, which aims to entertain
the reader or audience.
In the case of animal dung falling into a well, Ibn Nujaym explains that a
lesser quantity is more polluting than a greater quantity because when “one
piece of animal dung falls into the well, it is covered by an outer crust, which
prevents the pollutants from spreading, whereas this is not the case with half
of a piece.”⁹¹ This explanation functions on two separate levels. First, on stylistic
 Ibn Nujaym claims that all of his distinctions come from the “the legal distinction work writ-
ten by Imām al-Karābīsī titled Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī.” The reference to al-Karābīsī likely refers to
Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī’s book, al-Furūq. The Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī, however, refers to
a work by a different author, the Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī l-furūq by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-
Maḥbūbī (d. 630/1232– 33), also known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal. It is unclear how or why
Ibn Nujaym conflates these two works. His discussion in fact follows the Talqīḥ of al-Maḥbūbī,
as is also confirmed by the commentary tradition. Modern sources agree on the date of al-Maḥ-
būbī’s death, but I am unable to find a premodern source attesting to this date.
 Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Ibrāhīm ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir with Aḥmad ibn
Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, no ed. (Bei-
rut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1985/1405), 4:285.
 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4:286.
 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4:285.

Authenticated
grounds, it accounts for the absurdity involved in the phrasing of the compared
fact patterns. Contrary to the presentation, Ibn Nujaym does not say that less vol-
ume of pollutant pollutes more, but that the two different volumes operate in
dissimilar fashions. Second, this proposal draws on rules regarding ritual purity,
where a pollutant can impact a pure substance by penetrating it. The lesser vol-
ume of a pollutant thus seeps more easily into the well water, whereas the great-
er quantity is imagined to be more controlled, and, therefore, less able to dissi-
pate.
The case of performing ablutions for another turns on similar logic. Ibn Nu-
jaym explains, “The distinction is that the slave is his property and the slave’s
upkeep is incumbent upon him, whereas his wife is not his property.”⁹² The re-
quirement for helping a slave with their ablution, then, forms part of the require-
ment for the upkeep (iṣlāḥ) of one’s property. Since the slave in this example is
Muslim, part of the owner’s responsibility is to assist her to perform religious du-
ties. There is no such responsibility regarding a man’s wife, since she is not his
property. The initial formulation of the proposed contradiction indicates that a
man has a greater religious duty to a slave than to his wife, in effect, a form
of linguistic play on the part of the author. The resolution of the distinction re-
solves the apparent contradiction by turning to duties arising as a result of prop-
erty ownership.
While the explanations that Ibn Nujaym offers in his comparisons are pro-
vocative, his explanation of the distinction between the compared laws places
them within the standard doctrinal parameters of Islamic law. Further, the rea-
soning that he proposes makes the seeming incongruity clear and shows the out-
comes to be logical. With the rationale presented, the strange case of the conflict-
ing laws no longer appears absurd, but rather as an anomaly, which results from
normal processes of legal reasoning. Indeed, these comparisons are only surpris-
ing because of the way each fact-pattern was written by Ibn Nujaym.
Ibn Nujaym’s writing was both playful and didactic, appearing within a work
that served as a comprehensive survey of Ḥanafī law in the sixteenth century. In
many ways, his book offers a snapshot of contemporary fiqh. The chapters in his
book treat: (i) general principles (al-qawāʿid al-kulliya), (ii) useful remarks on
points of law (al-fawāʾid), (iii) harmonization and distinction (al-jamʿ wa-l-
farq),⁹³ (iv) riddles (al-alghāz), (v) legal stratagems (ḥiyal), (vi) distinctions (al-
 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4:286.

 This section is not on legal distinctions, even though its title suggests it may be so. It instead
consists of comparisons of different legal ideas or concepts, rather than specific comparisons of
laws and their outcomes. For instance, topics treated include “The Differences between the
Minor and Major Ablutions,” “The Differences between Wiping over a Shoe (masḥ al-khuff)

Authenticated
furūq), and (vii) stories and correspondence (al-ḥikāyāt wa-l-murāsalāt). Taken

together, they bespeak the widespread sense of intellectual play among elite ju-
rists. In fact, only the second chapter, on fawāʾid, corresponds to a traditional,
straightforward topics of Islamic law.
The Merging of Alghāz and Furūq
Ibn Nujaym’s legal distinctions are clearly reminiscent of legal riddles. This ge-
neric influence, however, went in both directions. In many works of legal riddles,
jurists wrote books whose content reflects the genre of legal distinctions, but ti-
tles whose indicate that they are works of legal riddles.
Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh is a clear example of this
convergence. Ostensibly a book about legal riddles, it has almost always been
received by readers as a book of legal distinctions. The term al-muʿāyāt in the
title denotes a particular kind of riddle, but should probably be understood
here as a synonym for alghāz. ⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the majority of this work does
not consist of riddles, but of legal distinctions. One manuscript even titles this
work Kitāb al-Furūq li-l-Jurjānī (al-Jurjānī’s Distinctions Treatise).⁹⁵
Al-Jurjānī writes in the introduction to this work:
The following are questions fit to be asked as riddles or to test someone’s knowledge. I pre-
sent them organized by legal topic to increase the usefulness of this book and to make con-
sulting it easier.⁹⁶
The majority of the legal puzzles in this work juxtapose pairs of seemingly con-
tradictory legal rulings. Ibrāhīm al-Bashar, who edited this work, summarizes its
contents as follows: “(i) legal distinctions, (ii) legal maxims and precepts (al-
and Washing the Foot,” and “The Differences between Menstruation and Childbirth (al-nifās).” It
is more reminiscent of a work of applied lexicographic distinctions. See Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh
wa-l-naẓāʾir, 3:287– 479, 4:5 – 286.
 Further research into riddles need to be conducted before this statement can be made with
confidence.
 This manuscript is catalogued under Fiqh Shāfiʿī 915, I thank Noha Abou Khatwa with help-
ing me identify the accession number of this manuscript. It is also the manuscript used in the
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya edition of this work, see Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt fī l-ʿaql aw al-Furūq, ed. Muḥammad Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
1993), 14– 15.
 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 144.

Authenticated
qawāʿid wa-l-ḍawābiṭ),⁹⁷ and (iii) legal riddles, but the primary topic of the book
is [legal distinctions].”⁹⁸ In fact, one could understand that all three categories
are, in this text, actually types of riddles.
Al-Jurjānī’s use of distinctions introduces yet another function for legal dis-
tinctions, as a vehicle for asking hard questions. Previously, we have seen dis-
tinctions function as specific objections within formalized disputation, as a
method for highlighting the relationship between substantive law, and a genre
through which to organize Islamic legal knowledge. Other Shāfiʿī scholars ac-
cepted, to a degree, al-Jurjānī’s statement and read this work as primarily ad-
dressing riddles through the form of distinctions; for examples, Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba
says that the Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt “included different kinds of ways to test some-
one’s knowledge (al-imtiḥān), such as riddles, distinctions, and exceptions
from legal precepts.”⁹⁹
The distinctions that al-Jurjānī provides are largely indistinguishable from
those in other books of legal distinctions, and would not be out of place in
them. For example, one legal distinction from his chapter on prayer is typical
of the distinctions genre.
If, while praying, someone decides to stop his prayer, the prayer is nullified, even if he does
not actually stop it.
If, however, while reciting the Qur’an, someone decides to stop his recitation, it is not nul-
lified as long as he does not stop reciting.
The distinction between these two is that prayer requires an intention to pray and becomes
void by any action that negates this intention. Thus, a prayer is nullified by the mere inten-
tion of stopping it. Reciting the Qur’an, however, does not require such intention, thus it is
not nullified by the intention of stopping.
The hajj is not treated according to this principle, for it is not nullified by an action that
negates the intention to perform it. Because of this, a hajj is not voided by an intention
of stopping.¹⁰⁰
This passage compares the role of intention in two ritual acts, prayer and Qur’an
recitation. The distinction between these two acts lies in their connection to the
 These two terms comprise one category.

 Al-Bashar, “Muqaddima,” 91.
 Ibn Qadi Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 4 vols., ed. al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm Khān (Beirut: Dār
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407[/1986), 1:260.
 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 191. Compare also with the discussion of ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, see
above, Ch. 1, pp. 26 – 27. See also Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ
wa-l-farq, 3 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāmah ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl,
1424/2004), 1:39.

Authenticated
required intentionality. Prayer is completely invalid without intention, yet a rec-

itation from the Qur’an is still ritually valid even without prior intention. Al-
Jurjānī then introduces a third ritual act, the hajj pilgrimmage. The status of
the hajj pilgrimage is perplexing, as it seems to fit with both camps. It requires
intention to begin, but it does not require a continuous intention throughout.
But how did the use of distinctions work in a book of legal riddles? In part,
al-Jurjānī is less interested the kind of presentation and logic followed by distinc-
tions, but, instead, formulates his claims in a more interactive manner, as a rid-
dle to be solved or a question to be answered. The primary difference here is its
potential for performance in a majlis; its packaging emphasizes the paradoxical
nature of ritual. Since the book primes the reader to look for moments of contem-
plation, the riddle inherent in this distinction is readily apparent. Al-Jurjānī asks
the reader to provide the distinguishing characteristic.
The use of legal maxims and precepts (al-qawāʿid wa-l-ḍawābiṭ) in al-Jurjā-
nī’s book should be understood similarly. Al-Jurjānī’s use of maxims and pre-
cepts follows a set pattern. He first states a broad precept or maxim, then lists
the exceptions to it. One example, from the chapter on ritual purity, starts by
stating a puzzle through a legal maxim, “Water can never remain pure inside
of an impure container.” This maxim expresses a general truth about Shāfiʿī
legal doctrine: pure water becomes contaminated in an impure container. As
happens with general truths, “there, however, are two exceptions.”¹⁰¹ Knowing
these exceptions serve as the solution to the puzzle.
The first exception is a container made from the skin of carrion. When a lot of water (māʾ
kathīr) is poured into it, the water does not become impure. The second is a pure vessel
from which a dog has drunk. When a lot of water (māʾ kathīr) has been poured into it,
the water does not become impure. The water in these cases is pure, but the vessel is im-
pure.¹⁰²
The underlying rationale for both exceptions is that pouring a large quantity of
water into these vessels renders the water pure. In these two situations, although
the vessel is impure, this impurity is not legally relevant given enough pure
water within it. It is as though the vessel becomes purified when a lot of
water is poured into it because of the purifying nature of water. As a result,
water in such a vessel can be pure and remain so, even though the impurity in-
herent to the container remains.
 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 151.

 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 151.

Authenticated
Finally, al-Jurjānī includes a small number of more typical riddles (alghāz) in

this work. A straightforward riddle presents a complex scenario, sometimes in
question-and-answer form, such as one regarding inheritance: “A deceased per-
son leaves behind a group of heirs that includes men and women. He leaves
them 600 gold coins. One of his heirs receives exactly one gold coin.”¹⁰³ The sol-
ution to this riddle is to describe the make-up of the heirs such that this situation
could take place. The solution demands knowledge of the makeup of the heirs,
such that the Qur’anically prescribed inheritance laws grant one of them exactly
one coin, one six-hundredth of the inheritance. This math problem requires a full
understanding of the shares owed to each heir. Al-Jurjānī provides the solution:
“The solution is that he leaves behind a wife, a mother, two daughters, twelve
brothers, and one sister. His sister gets one gold coin. The remainder, after the
required shares to his mother, sister, and daughters, is twenty-five gold coins.
His brothers get twenty-four gold coins, and the sister is left with one.”¹⁰⁴ This
solution creates a precise group of heirs such that one of them is entitled to ex-
actly one gold coin. This question can also be understood as asking that one de-
vise a situation in which an heir is entitled to receive one six-hundredth of the
estate.¹⁰⁵
We can see how al-Jurjānī manipulates these legal forms—distinctions, max-
ims, precepts, and riddles—to highlight both the enigmatic nature of particular
legal doctrines and the overall coherence of the law. The riddles (alghāz) in
this work operate in similarly ways as the distinctions and exceptions to maxims
and adages. Of course, the different forms of riddles that he uses allow him to
present the information in different ways. In the context of his book, which
aims to provoke the reader into contemplating the intricacies of Islamic law,
the general maxim serves no purpose without enumerating the exceptions to
it. The exceptions, as seen above, are the specific situations that simultaneously
serve to prove the validity of the rule and establish its limits. In contrast, the rid-
dle is the statement of a highly specific situation, both a set of actions and a set
 Al-Jurjānī tells us that “[t]his question is known as the ‘Question of the Gold Coins (al-
dīnāriyyah).’” Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 560.
 Al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt, 560.
 See Noel J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), 35 – 39. The division of shares is as follows. Since the deceased has children, his
wife gets one eighth. His mother receives one sixth. His daughters each receive one third,
since there are multiple daughters and the man had no sons. The sum of the inheritance
given to his vertical relations is 23/24 of his wealth, or 575 dinars. The rest of his heirs should
then split one twenty-fourth of his inheritance, 25 dinars, with the sister receiving half of a broth-
er’s share. The brothers each receive two gold coins, leaving one gold coin for the sister.

Authenticated
of outcomes. The riddle’s formulation attracts the attention of the reader, who
attempts to understand how it is that the situation described can come about.
The legal problem in a lughz provides the necessary information to solve a
legal puzzle, but leaves unstated the particularities that make the outcomes
match the situation. The specificity of the situation in the above riddle is a
sharp contrast to his statement of a general rule, “water can never remain
pure inside of an impure container.” The latter provides an underdetermined
statement that could be used as part of an argument in support of a particular
legal ruling. In this sense, distinctions and riddles both serve to elucidate specif-
ic situations while the exceptions to general rules reinforce broader legal frame-
works. In al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt, the difference between distinctions and riddles
is minimized.
Separating Riddles and Distinctions: The Case of Jamāl al-Dīn

al-Asnawī
There is a clear convergence between riddles and distinctions writing in the
Mamluk period. This convergence was, of course, neither complete nor ubiqui-
tous, as not all books of legal distinctions adopted the logic and style of riddles
and not all books of riddles adopted the logic and style legal distinctions. Jamāl
al-Dīn al-Asnawī (d. 772/1370), a Shāfiʿī jurist who lived in Cairo, was one figure
who only partially embraced the coming together of riddles and distinctions. He
studied religious sciences, including law, grammar, and the rational sciences,
which earned him the post of lector and recitation in 727/1327. He taught at var-
ious law colleges around Cairo and tafsīr at the Ibn Ṭūlūn Mosque. Eventually,
he began working with the Treasury as a market inspector, though he withdrew
from this job to dedicate himself to teaching and writing. His scholarly fame in
Cairo grew and he became “one of the primary religious authorities.”¹⁰⁶
The biographical tradition tells us that al-Asnawī was an influential scholar.
Reports refer to him as the leader of the Shāfiʿī scholars of his time (shaykh al-
Shāfiʿiyya) and the author important books.¹⁰⁷ Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba says that
“[m]any people studied closely with him; the majority of the scholars from all
of Egypt were his students (akthar ʿulamāʾ al-diyār al-miṣriyya ṭalabatuhu).”¹⁰⁸
 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 3:98 – 99.

 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 3:100.
 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 3:100.

Authenticated
Separating Riddles and Distinctions: The Case of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī 149
While these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, they paint a picture of al-
Asnawī as a leading intellectual figure. Among his many works, al-Asnawī wrote
a book of legal distinctions, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq,
and a book of legal riddles, Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil fī alghāz al-masāʾil. ¹⁰⁹
Due to his prominent status as a Shāfiʿī and his involvement in shaping the
intellectual outlook of scholars in Mamluk Cairo, his views on riddles and dis-
tinction are of particular interest. His participation in both genres shows that
they had become vehicles for literary and pedagogical expression, at least for
the Shāfiʿī school.¹¹⁰ His book on legal distinctions follows the model of ʿAbdal-
lāh al-Juwaynī.¹¹¹ Unsurprisingly, al-Asnawī mentions al-Juwaynī’s work and sit-
uates his book within a Shāfiʿī legal tradition. Al-Asnawī’s book continues the
traditional presentation of seemingly contradictory laws and reflects the dispu-
tational origins of legal distinctions by including extended discussions designed
to counter potential objections. Even so, his disputations are much more elabo-
rate than those included by al-Juwaynī, as can be seen from the following pas-
sage on fasting, which concerns, at least initially, the use of the siwāk, a partic-
ular kind of twig used to clean one’s teeth for ritual purification:
The common ruling in our school is that it is reprehensible for someone fasting to use a
siwāk in the afternoon (baʿd al-zawāl). This is due to the hadith in which Muḥammad
says “The scent (al-khulūf) of someone’s breath is sweeter to God than the scent of the
siwāk.” This is told on the authority of Abū Hurayra and is in both the Saḥīḥ of Muslim
and of al-Bukhārī.¹¹² Khulūf, with a ḍamma on the khāʾ, means change or alteration. The
legally salient issue (wajh al-dalāla), as al-Rāfiʿī said,¹¹³ is that the evidence of worship
is affirmed by the scent.¹¹⁴ Because of this, getting rid of the scent is reprehensible.
 See Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil’s introductory volume to Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī,
Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq, 2 vols., ed. Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad
Wāṣil (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007), esp. 1:161– 94.
 Being the head of the Shāfiʿī school in the capital of the sultanate undoubtedly gave al-As-
nawī’s views special importance. The legal system in Mamluk Cairo was complex, but the Mam-
luk Sultanate privileged the Shāfiʿī school over the other legal schools. See Joseph H. Escovitz,
The Office of Qāḍī al-Quḍāt in Cairo under the Baḥrī Mamlūks (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag,
1984).
 See the discussion of this work on Chapter One.
 The hadith is in al-Bukhārī’s Sạḥīḥ in two chapters, Fasting (ṣawm) and Clothing (libās).
The hadith is in the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim in his chapter on Fasting (ṣiyām). It is also found in Tir-
midhī’s Jāmiʿ, Nisāʾī’s Sunan, Ibn Mājah Sunan, Dārimī’s Sunan, Mālik’s Muwaṭṭaʾ, and the
Musnad of Ạhmad ibn Ḥanbal. See Wensinck, Handbook, 2:69.
 This refers to the famous Shāfiʿī jurist, ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al-Rāfiʿī (d. 623/1226).
Along with Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), al-Rāfiʿī was one of the two most important
Shāfiʿī jurists in the Mamlūk period. See El Shamsy, “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of
Shāfiʿī Literature,” Oriens 41 (2013); 292– 93.

Authenticated
Moreover, we also avoid the siwāk before the afternoon, because the change in breath most
often occurs because of food, not because of fasting, as al-Rāfiʿī says. This necessitates the
distinction between someone who has a meal before daybreak and someone who does not,
as well as a distinction between someone who eats something at night and someone who,
because of a malady or an illness, does not. Due to this, al-Ṭabarī,¹¹⁵ who wrote a commen-
tary on al-Tanbīh, says if the scent of his mouth is altered in the afternoon because of some
other reason, such as sleeping and the like, his use of the siwāk is not reprehensible.
It is said, however, that a siwāk is not reprehensible for someone who is fasting until after
the afternoon prayer, as the above-mentioned al-Ṭabarī related.
Others, however, hold that it is never reprehensible (lā yukrahu muṭlaqan). This was men-
tioned in al-Nawawī’s Rawḍa,¹¹⁶ and it is mentioned in his commentery on the
Muhadhdhab.
Yet others hold that using a siwāk in this fashion is not reprehensible for superogatory pray-
ers but reprehensible for required prayers, to guard against ostentation (al-riyāʾ). Al-Rāfiʿī
mentioned this in his chapter on fasting on the authority of al-Qāḍī l-Ḥusayn.¹¹⁷ You will
learn, in the Chapter on Funerals that cleansing the blood of a martyr is forbidden by
the rules laid out therein. The purpose of this is what the Prophet alluded to: “On the
Day of Resurrection, they will come and their jugular veins will spurt liquid the color of
blood but with the scent of musk.”¹¹⁸
Here, one might ask, “What is the distinction between the prohibition here, in the case of
martyrdom, even though the scent of breath is like the scent of musk, and its only being
reprehensible there, in the case of prayer, even though it is better smelling than it (aṭyab
minhu), i. e. better than the scent of musk?”
 The citation is likely from al-Rāfiʿī’s al-Sharḥ al-kabīr, although there is a verbatim passage
found in Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī’s al-Muhadhdhab as well as al-Nawawī’s commentary al-Majmūʿ
sharḥ al-muhadhdhab and the Nihāyat al-muḥtāj by Shams al-Dīn al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1595). Abū
Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, al-Muhadhdhab fī fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, ed. Muḥammad al-Zuḥaylī (Damas-
cus: Dār al-Qalam, 1416/1996), 1:67; Abū Zakariyyāʾ Muḥyī l-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Kitāb
al-Majmūʿ sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab li-l-Shīrāzī, ed. Muḥammad Najīb al-Muṭīʿī (Jedda: Maktabat
al-Irshād, 1992) 1:330 – 31; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ramlī, Nihāyat al-muḥtāj
ilā sharḥ al-Minhāj fī l-fiqh ʿalā madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī wa-maʿahu Ḥashiyat Abī l-Ḍiyāʾ
Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī l-Shabrāmallisī l-Qāhirī l-mutawaffī 1087 H [wa‐] Ḥāshiyat Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-
Razzāq ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-maʿrūf bi-l-Maghribī l-Rashīdī, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003), 1:182.
 Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī (d. 694/1295).
 See n. 113, above. For more on al-Nawawī, see Fachrizal A. Halim, Legal Authority in
Premodern Islam: Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī in the Shāfiʿī School of Law (Abingdon, Oxon: Rout-
ledge, 2015).
 Al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Marwazī (d. 462/1069).
 This hadith can be found in the Sunan of al-Nisāʾī, in his chapter on Taḥrīm and Qasāma, in
al-Tirmidhī’s Jāmiʿ on his Tafsīr of Q al-Nisāʾ 4, and in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. See
Wensinck, Handbook, 3:73.

Authenticated
Perhaps the distinction is the certainty regarding that topic [i. e. martyrdom] and its height-
ened importance, since it involves them exposing their souls to death because of their glo-
rification of the religion. Therefore, a prohibition on the removal of all traces of martyrdom
serves to help proclaim the wondrousness of his fate. The blood’s remaining on his body is
like a banner that demonstrates his true nature for anyone who is unaware or unmindful of
it.¹¹⁹
As this excerpt demonstrates, al-Asnawī’s work contains straightforward compar-

ison of substantive laws together with their legal rationales, not a presentation of
a curious or unexpected circumstance requiring a clever interpretation. In other
words, this is not a riddle. This is a straightforward legal distinction, which even
includes a long defense in the style of those used in legal disputation.
Similarly, al-Asnawī’s work on legal riddles does not reflect the convergance
of riddles with distinctions. His Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil contains set of legal riddles the
tradition of question and answer writing (al-asʾila wa-l-ajwiba). One question it
asks about the permissibility of fact-patterns that are seemingly impermissible or
the identity of a seemingly impossible legal entity clarifies the obstacles given in
the question:
Riddle (masʾala): A prayer that must be performed, but cannot be made up. Indeed, making
it up is not permissible.
Solution (ṣūratuhu): The Friday prayer, which is not made up if it is missed. Rather, you
make up the noon prayer. The noon prayer is a different prayer, not a replacement for
the Friday prayer.
Someone may then say: “Why can it not be made up on a different Friday?” Neither travel
nor another legitimate reason require this (li-qāʾil an yaqūla limā lā yaṣiḥḥu qadạāʾahu fī
jumʿa ukhrā ghayr wājiba bi-sabab safar wa-naḥwihi).¹²⁰
This riddle hinges on the peculiar status of the jumʿa prayer. It is required at the
same time as the noon prayer (al-ẓuhr), but has an additional requirement that it
be performed in a communal mosque with others. Since a communal prayer
must be performed in a communal mosque (jāmiʿ) at the required time, a missed
communal prayer cannot be made up.¹²¹ There is only one opportunity for com-
munal prayer each week. However, this riddle assumes that communal prayer is
 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:22– 23.

 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, al-Alghāz al-fiqhiyya wa-huwa l-kitāb al-musammā Ṭirāz al-mahāfil
fī alghāz al-masāʾil, ed. Muḥammad ʿUthmān and Ṭaha ʿAbd al-Ruʾūf Saʿd (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-
Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 1433/2012), 109.
 For more on the history of communal mosques, see Baber Johansen, “The All-Embracing
Town and Its Mosques,” Revue de l’Occident musulman et de la Mediterranée 32 (1981): 139 – 61.

Authenticated
an additional requirement added to the Friday noon prayer, so that while miss-
ing the communal prayer cannot be rectified, the noon prayer can. Presumably,
the audience is aware that missing a jumʿa prayer does not excuse a Muslim from
performing the noon prayer, but solving the riddle requires knowledge of the dif-
ference between the jumʿa and the ẓuhr prayers. As a mark of the play involved in
this text, this riddle ends with a follow-up question that attempts to undermine
the solution and the answer to this question. While posed as a riddle, this is
again a style similar to that of legal disputation.
In terms of content, al-Asnawī does not—indeed, refuses—to bring together
riddles and distinctions in these two works. Yet, the activities of solving riddles
and distinctions writing intersect, as distinctions by definition rest on initially
confusing details and riddles demand differentiating among confusing legal mi-
nutiae. Nevertheless, al-Asnawī did not present his distinctions as intractable
problems nor his riddles in the form of distinctions. As a result, his works remind
us that not all works of this type come together in this period. Rather, the con-
vergence of distinctions and riddles signals the beginning of new possibilities
within these two legal genres, as this chapter has shown.
Comparison of the introductions to these two works does reveal that al-
Asnawī understood them to belong to almost identical traditions of legal writing,
in spite of the way he composed these works. Al-Asnawī begins by situating each
book in a well-known written tradition in order to provide readers a framework
for each book. In his Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, he claims that there are two kinds of
works in the Shāfiʿī school that deal with legal distinctions. The first deals direct-
ly with the topic, such as his own Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, the al-Farq wa-l-jamʿ by
ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, and al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil by Abū l-Khayr Salāma
ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa l-Maqdisī (d. 480/1087– 88) as his predecessors. These
are the only two books that directly tackle the subject of legal distinctions in
the Shāfiʿī madhhab, according to al-Asnawī.¹²² A second strand of writing
deals with legal distinctions indirectly, encompassing “something broader
than legal distinctions per se (mā huwa aʿamm minhu).”¹²³ In this second tradi-
tion, he cites al-Muṭāraḥāt by Abū ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Qaṭṭān (d. 359/970), al-Muskit
by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Zubayrī (d. 317/929 – 30), and al-Muʿāyāt by Abū l-ʿAbbās al-
Jurjānī (d. 482/1089 – 90).¹²⁴ Al-Asnawī both affirms the idea of furūq as a distinct
genre and highlights that this genre held for him and his readers, working within
 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq, 2 vols., ed. Naṣr
al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007), 2:8.
 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:7.
 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:8 – 9.

Authenticated
the expectations towards a particular discipline. This discussion also shows how
permeable the genres of distinctions and riddles could be.
Al-Asnawī introduces Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, similarly, naming books that deal di-
rectly with legal riddles as well as those that tackle the subject only indirectly. He
places this work of legal riddles within a tradition that includes al-Muṭāraḥāt by
Abū ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Qaṭṭān, al-Muskit by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Zubayrī, al-Ḥiyal by
Abū Ḥātim al-Qazwīnī (d. ca. 440/1048 – 49), al-Muʿāyāt by Abū l-ʿAbbās al-
Jurjānī, al-Iʿjāz fī l-alghāz by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Mufīd al-Jīlī (fl. 629/1231– 34),
and Simṭ al-farāʾid wa-ghurar al-fawāʾid by Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī (d. 694/
1295).¹²⁵ Ironically, this list includes all of the works listed in Maṭāliʿ al-
daqāʿiq. l-Asnawī further conflates these genres by adding “works of distinctions,
stratagems (ḥiyal), and difficult to answer questions (al-asʾila dhāt al-ajwiba al-
ʿawīṣa).”¹²⁶ In each of these lists, he brings these two traditions together, though
he does not equate them.
As mentioned above, one method of thinking about the classification of gen-
res in the Arabo-Islamic tradition depends on the titles of works.¹²⁷ Al-Asnawī,
however, operates with a different approach, assuming that genres are porous
and that books can belong to multiple traditions. He therefore mentions several
of the same works as belonging to both genres and alludes to the permeability of
genre by saying that some books fall in “this genre exclusively” (li-hādhā l-nawʿ
bi-khuṣūṣihi) while others “cover something broader (yashtamilu ʿalā mā huwa
aʿamm minhu).”¹²⁸
Ibn Farḥūn, al-Asnawī’s approximate contemporary who also lived in Egypt,
also uses the word nawʿ to refer to “genre” in his book of legal riddles, Durrat al-
ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ. “I have not found a book of this genre,” he
writes “within the writings of the Mālikī school (lam aqif li-l-mālikiyya ʿalā
taʾālīf min hādhā l-nawʿ).”¹²⁹ His use of the term nawʿ to describe his Durrat
al-ghawāṣṣ suggests an awareness of various modalities of writing, much like
al-Asnawī. Their use of the same term to describe something akin to literary
 Al-Asnawī, Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, 32– 36.

 Al-Asnawī, Ṭirāz al-maḥāfil, 32.
 Bio-bibliographical sources use criteria similar to this as a shorthand when discussing writ-
ten works. Thus, in the ṭabaqāt tradition, the distinctions work by ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī is known
as al-Furūq, while in the manuscript record it is known as al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq. Further evidence of
the important of titles can be found in the existence of rhyming titles, both those that create a
rhyme with the contents of the work (as in Qarāfī’s Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq) and com-
mentaries rhyming with the title of the work on which they are commenting (as in the commen-
tary on al-Qarāfī’s text, Idrār al-shurūq ʿalā Anwāʾ al-furūq).
 Al-Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq, 2:7.
 Ibn Farḥūn, Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ, 65.

Authenticated
genre, however, points to a shared understanding of genres and legal genres be-
tween these two authors.
Conclusion
This chapter explored interactions between styles of legal writing and the social
consumption of knowledge from the late Abbasid period until the beginnings of
Ottoman control in Egypt, identifying the Mamluk period as when interests in
riddles as an art form and the proliferation of intellectual majālis collided to
serve as venues for the performance of knowledge. The spread of literary salons
and the attendant growth in a market for riddles as a form of social capital be-
came characteristic of cultural life. The effect of such developments on intellec-
tual production can easily be seen in the changes undergone by legal distinc-
tions in this period. These trends affected the writing of works of legal
distinctions by promoting their integration with riddles and pushed books of rid-
dles towards greater popularity. These two trends were not confined to legal writ-
ings, nor to the composition of original works.
Everett Rowson has addressed some of the conjunctions between majālis
and the consumption and production of knowledge during this period. He stress-
es that commentaries on the works of Ibn Zaydūn written in Mamluk Cairo
aimed, in part, to be encyclopedic. Of their two authors, he says:
[B]oth Ibn Nubātah and al-Ṣafadī were addressing several audiences, and accomplishing
several intentions, at once. Their commentaries offered students a panorama of the
world of literary learning … At the same time, peers … were expected to congratulate them-
selves on recognizing, and even anticipating, the information and allusions as they were
presented … A broader audience was offered a smorgasbord of “fawāʾid,” “useful bits,”
which they could savor and incorporate into their dinner conversation.¹³⁰
Rowson highlights some of the themes discussed in this chapter, namely the im-
portant links between social practices relating to the production and manipula-
tion of legal knowledge and the composition of scholarly literature. His work
also underscores the reciprocal interactions between socio-cultural develop-
ments and writing, underlining the relationship of a reading public to legal rid-
dles. The rhetorical style of riddles, both adapted and adopted by books of legal
distinctions, offers various levels of engagement. Riddles can be enjoyed by
 Everett Rowson, “An Alexandrian Age in Fourteenth-Century Damascus: Twin Commenta-
ries on Two Celebrated Arabic Epistles,” Mamluk Studies Review 8 (2003), 109 – 10.

Authenticated
Conclusion 155
“peers … recognizing, and even anticipating, the information and allusions” con-
tained in the riddles and their solutions.¹³¹ Riddles can also offer enjoyment for a
reader when looking at the answer and working backwards to understand its
connection to the riddle. While some majlis participants may have recognized
the content of these commentaries and solutions to riddles, others were exposed
to and entertained by new information, which they could later deploy.
The later history of legal distinctions shows how social factors could lead to
changes in the aesthetics of scholarly writing. The convergence of riddles and
distinctions was a minor development in this genre but is indicative of a larger
change in the history of legal writing. The changes that brought about increased
interest in riddles were not limited to a narrow corpus. Instead, the integration of
this corpus of riddle-distinctions into the fiqh tradition made the rhetoric of rid-
dles a new style of legal writing. In other words, the reification of this tradition,
as seen in Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, denudes the aesthetics of riddles
from the context of performances and makes this another rhetorical mode of
legal writing.
We saw the beginnings of this trend at work in al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt. This
work deploys legal distinctions in a novel manner, to perplex and to provoke the
reader into a deeper contemplation. The use of three different legal forms—furūq,
qawāʿid and ḍawābiṭ, and questions—to convey riddles underscores the creative
potential of the Islamic legal tradition as different concepts are employed for the
sake of intellectual play. Al-Jurjānī’s legal play in centered on repackaging legal
distinctions, maxims, and precepts as legal riddles for dual purposes of peda-
gogy and entertainment.
While these trends impacted legal writing, they did not dominate the pro-
duction of written legal scholarship during the Mamluk period. Indeed, much
of the legal-literary output of this period was driven by the institutional needs
of the madhhabs, madrasa educational practices, and even the personal interests
and concerns of individual scholars.¹³² At the same time, the personal needs and
interests of individual jurists and perceived institutional needs of the madhhab
shaped the conditions for texts that sought to rewrite the tradition according
to a new aesthetic.¹³³ This chapter shows that the social uses of legal knowledge
and its various forms contribute to a convergence between legal riddles and legal
 Rowson, “Alexandrian Age,” 109 – 10.

 On the institutional background, see El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya” for a discussion of the impor-
tance of commentaries for Islamic law.
 See, for instance, Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence, especially Chapter 2 and Éric
Chaumont “L’autorité des textes au sein du šāfi‘isme ancien” (paper presented at the conference
“Rethinking Islamic Law: Can Fiqh be Applied Law?,” Rabat, Morocco, 13 – 15 November, 2013).

Authenticated
distinctions, and how a variety of social and institutional settings contributed to

the production of Islamic legal knowledge.

Authenticated
Chapter Five: A Bibliographic Survey of the
Distinctions Genre
This chapter presents a critical narrative bibliography of the genre of legal dis-
tinctions and their known manuscripts.¹ This bibliography takes a three-pronged
approach to its discussion of the legal distinctions genre: It considers printed ed-
itions of furūq works, extant manuscripts and manuscript catalogs, and discus-
sions of specific works within the Arabo-Islamic heritage. A printed or manu-
script edition of a work of legal distinctions is the best evidence of a work of
legal distinctions, since it can be read and analyzed, and indeed, printed
works of legal distinctions were the starting point for this bibliography.
An analysis of extant manuscripts and manuscript catalogs, that is, of the
material history of legal distinctions writing, adds two facets to our understand-
ing of this tradition.² First, as material history, these manuscripts give evidence
of the widespread interest in works of legal distinctions. Manuscripts of legal dis-
tinctions were made throughout the classical Muslim world: from North Africa to
the Eastern Mediterranean through Central Asia into the Indian subcontinent.
Manuscripts were produced into the eighteenth century, well after new works
of legal distinctions stopped being written. The factors that go into manuscript
production are many and vary across time and space, although it was universally
costly and time-intensive. Given the resources that went into the production of a
manuscript, each manuscript of a furūq treatise should be understood as an en-
dorsement of the intellectual project of furūq. ³
In addition, a close look at the manuscript evidence reveals a tradition of at
least two semi-anonymous, untitled works of legal distinctions that circulated
alongside the better-known works discussed in the previous chapters. The clas-
sical Arabic bio-bibliographical tradition is concerned primarily with original
works written by known authors. The bio-bibliographies are much less interested
in the copying and spread of manuscripts, let alone of texts with unknown au-
 See Appendix I and Appendix II.

 I use the term material history broadly, as defined by Ian Woodward: “objects are the material
things that people encounter, interact with and use. Objects are commonly spoken of as material
culture … The field of material culture studies … incorporates a range of scholarly inquiry into
the uses and meanings of objects.” Ian Woodward, Understanding Material Culture (London:
Sage, 2007), 3.
 While the manuscript record does not necessarily tell us the role that these manuscripts had
in the societies or specific social or curricular contexts in which they were produced, the con-
tinuous production of these works indicates steady interest in these works.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-008

Authenticated
158 Chapter Five: A Bibliographic Survey of the Distinctions Genre
thors. It is not, therefore, surprising that the classical tradition does not discuss
these two anonymous texts. Their existence in numerous manuscript copies,
however, shows that we cannot rely solely on the bio-bliographical works to re-
construct the history of genres of legal (and probably other kinds of) writing.⁴
These works may also elude us when using manuscript catalogs, which operate
under similar assumptions to bio-bibliographies. Equally important, these two
works sound a note of caution in regard to assumptions about authorship and
Islamic legal culture.
Finally, this catalog also considers mentions and discussions of works of
legal distinctions within the Arabo-Islamic heritage.⁵ The interest in this heritage
is first focused on locating works which do not appear to be extant. Most works
of legal distinctions have not survived, so references to these works or citations
from them in other books from the Arabo-Islamic heritage provide a valuable re-
source for better cataloging the totality of furūq works produced. There are, of
course, issues with providing the generic identity of works based only on a
brief discussion or a title, since we do not have access to the entirety or even
the majority of the actual text. These issues make this task more difficult, but
do not render it fruitless.
The below analysis builds on earlier, partial, accounts of the literary history
of legal distinctions, in particular on the work of ʿUmar al-Sabīl, Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥu-
sayn, Wolfhart Heinrichs, and Necmettin Kızılkaya.⁶ These four lists complement
 The bio-bibliographical tradition, in particular works of legal ṭabaqāt, is concerned with re-
cording the names of those who wrote novel works of legal distinctions, but largely unconcerned
with the copying of already existing works. Ṭabaqāt works have been discussed in various stud-
ies, see, for instance, Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry, rev. ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 187– 209; R. Kevin Jaques Authority, Conflict, and
the Transmission of Diversity (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1– 23; and Chase F. Robinson, Islamic
Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 55 – 82.
 My search through the classical tradition relied on close reading of shorter bio-bibliographical
texts, citations in secondary scholarship, and full-text searches on the Windows version of the
text database al-Maktaba l-Shāmila, available at http://www.shamela.ws, accessed May 2, 2019.
 In addition, almost every modern edition of a book of legal distinctions includes a partial bib-
liography of furūq texts. Most of these lists are not comprehensive, but they nevertheless help
point to how the works have been received in Arabophone scholarship. Yaʿqūb al-Bāḥusayn,
al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: muqawwamātuhā, shurūṭuhā, nashʾatuhā, taṭawwuruhā;
dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya tārīkhiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1419/1998), 83 – 105; Heinrichs,
“Structuring the Law,” 341– 44; Necmettin Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar: Furûk literatürü
üzerine bir inceleme (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2016), 89 – 208; ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAb-
dallāh al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” in ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbdallāh Zarīrānī, Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-
farq bayn al-masāʾil, ed. ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sabīl (Mecca: Wizārat al-

Authenticated
each other and each is worth consulting. Al-Sabīl’s list of works is extensive, al-
though he lists several books that are not really works of legal distinctions.⁷ Al-
Bāḥusayn’s bibliography includes brief discussions of the contents of each work,
when known, either through his own inspection or through secondary reports
from contemporary and post-classical authors. Heinrich’s list is the most prelimi-
nary and is in part derived from that provided in the introduction to Muslim al-
Dimashqī’s Kitāb al-Furūq. ⁸ Finally, Kızılkaya’s discussion builds on the previous
works and provides insightful analysis into most of these works and their au-
thors.
All of the above-mentioned catalogs build on the work of the Ottoman bib-
liographer Ḥājjī Khalīfa (d. 1068/1657) and his comprehensive Kashf al-ẓunūn. His
bibliography is indispensable, although not without some errata. Kashf al-ẓunūn
aimed to provide a complete bibliographical survey, organized alphabetically by
title, of the entirety of Islamicate scholarship up to the author’s lifetime. It con-
tains a mention of all of the manuscripts inspected by Ḥājjī Khalīfa, as he tells
us, “the names of many thousands of volumes in the libraries that I personally
examined.”⁹ He also includes works to which he has seen reference to, but which
may not have been extant. Kashf al-ẓunūn, however, presents a skewed picture of
the field of distinctions literature. For instance, judging only by Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s
work it would seem that both the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī did not participate in com-
posing works of legal distinctions as “Distinctions in the Shāfiʿī School” (al-
Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya) and “Distinctions in the Ḥanafī School” (al-Furūq fī
Taʿlīm al-ʿĀlī, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī,
1414/1993), 1:28 – 41.
 He cites, for example, al-Istighnāʾ fī l-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ, also known as al-Iʿtinā ʾ fī l-farq wa-l-
istithnā ʾ, by Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Sulaymān al-Bakrī (d. ninth/fifteenth c.), a work on
legal maxims, and Qurrat al-ʿayn wa-l-samʿ fī bayān al-farq wa-l-jamʿ by Badr al-Dīn ibn
ʿUmar ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-ʿĀdilī l-ʿAbbāsī l-Shāfiʿī (d. ca. 970/1562– 63), a work on
Sufism, not Islamic law.
 See Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris “Dirāsa” in Abū l-Faḍl Muslim al-Di-
mashqī, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār
al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992), 37– 43. Heinrichs also builds on the list provided in Joseph Schacht,
“Aus zwei arabischen Furūq-Büchern,” Islamica 2 (1926), 508 – 10.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Mīzān al-ḥaqq fī khtiyār al-aḥaqq, (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat Abū l-Ḍiyāʾ, 1306/1889),
142. This translation comes from Eleazar Birnbaum, “Kātib Chelebi (1609 – 1657) and Alphabet-
ization: A Methodological Investigation of the Autographs of his Kashf al-Ẓunūn and Sullam al-
Wuṣūl,” in Scribes et manuscrits du Moyen-Orient, ed. François Déroche and Francis Richard
(Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1997), 241.

Authenticated
furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya) are the only two madhhab-specific titles he includes.¹⁰ More
problematic, however, are the several errors and misattributions in his work.¹¹
I list here one representative problem with the Kashf as it relates to the study
of distinctions writing. One error in Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s text is his listing of Talqīḥ al-
Maḥbūbī as an alternate title for Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s book. He says, “Furūq al-
Karābīsī, also called Talqīh al-Maḥbūbī; the author of the Ashbāh [i. e. Ibn Nu-
jaym (d. 970/1563)] mentions this at the beginning of his section on furūq.”¹²
This information comes from Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, the sixth
chapter of which is devoted to legal distinctions. In introducing that chapter,
Ibn Nujaym says, “This is the chapter on furūq, and I discuss here something
from every legal topic. I selected and compiled this chapter from al-Furūq of
[Asʿad?] al-Karābīsī, which is called Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī.”¹³ The identification of
al-Karābīsī’s Furūq by Ibn Nujaym as the Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī is erroneous on
two levels. First, as mentioned above, al-Karābīsī’s book is entitled Kitāb al-
Furūq, and this seems to be the only name this book has in the historical record
up to the time of Ibn Nujaym. The alternate title that he gives, however, “Talqīḥ
al-Maḥbūbī,” is the title of a different work of legal distinctions. The Talqīḥ is a
furūq work entitled Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl, which is written by Aḥmad
ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī (d. 630/1232– 33), also known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-
Awwal.¹⁴
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn, 2 vols., ed. Şerefettin Yaltkaya and
Kilisi Rifat Bilge (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), 2:1257– 58. He does mention, however,
al-Qarāfī’s Furūq under the title Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʿ al-furūq (Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-
ẓunūn, 1:186).
 Other authors have noticed specific errata in the Kashf al-ẓunūn, but there has not been
much scholarship that has explored the limits of this work. Frank Griffel, for instance, notices
a “confusion of names” in an entry for a book on arithmetic, but does not extend his observa-
tion, see Frank Griffel, “On the Character, Content, and Authorship of Itmām Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-
ḥikma and the Identity of the Author of Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma,” Journal of the American
Oriental Society 133.1 (2013), 11n53. Similarly, Jan Just Witkam has noted that “[a] number of
doubtful readings and dubious bibliographical references in the Kashf al-Ẓunūn … can only
be explained and corrected by comparison with Ibn al-Akfānī’s [Irshād al-Qāṣid].” Jan Just Wit-
kam, “Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348) and His Bibliography of the Sciences,” Manuscripts of the
Middle East 2 (1987), 40. The best study of the reliability of this work is Birnbaum, “Kātib Chelebi
(1609 – 1657) and Alphabetization.”
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Furūq al-Karābīsī,” 2:1258.
 Ibrahīm Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir printed with Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir Sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-nazāʾir, no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya, 1985/1405), 4:284.
 There are many alternate titles given as well for this book, see Appendix I.

Authenticated
This error is repeated in the various editions of Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh that I
consulted. It seems, indeed, to be an error made by Ibn al-Nujaym himself, faith-
fully transmitted across manuscripts. Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī (d.
1099/1687– 88) makes a note of this error in his commentary on this work,
Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir.
The correct thing to say would be al-Maḥbūbī’s book on furūq, which is called Talqīḥ al-
Maḥbūbī. These are two separate books, not one book. The claim that he was confused
about these two books is unlikely to be correct, owing to the contents of this chapter.
What probably occurred is that there was a slip of the pen of the original scribe (al-
nāsikh al-awwal).¹⁵
Still, the error has been enshrined into the text by later copyists, inscribed into
the bibliographical tradition by Ḥājjī Khalīfa, and normalized by Ismail Bāshā l-
Baghdādī (d. 1922) in Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, where, under Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-
Karābīsī, his work of legal distinctions is cited as “Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūd fī l-furūq min
al-furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya.”¹⁶
It is unclear how exactly this confusion came about. The origin of the error
was perhaps an unwitting mistake from Ibn Nujaym or from the original scribe of
this work. It is also possible that Ibn Nujaym and his circle were confused about
the identity of these two works. In either case, it is worth nothing that later copy-
ists refused to correct this error and that the tradition came to accept this erro-
neous identification.
Earlier attempts to list all works of furūq have been led astray by the inclu-
sion of works whose titles seemingly indicate their membership in this genre, but
actually are not part of the genre. Some of the works that have been erroneously
included have not survived, yet external evidence suggests that they were in fact
works of law in related genres, such as riddles, question and answer, and legal
maxims.¹⁷ Some catalogers have erred by including works of applied lexico-
graphical distinctions, some regarding Arabic lexicography in general and others
 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir: Sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-
nazāʾir printed with Ibrahīm ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir, 4 vols. no ed. (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1985/1405), 4:284.
 Ismāʿīl Bāshā l-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn: Asmāʾ al-muʾallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn, 2
vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 1:204.
 These works include al-Muskit by al-Zubayrī, which is perhaps a work of legal riddles, al-
Muṭāraḥāt by Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (d. 359/970), which is likely a work in the genre of question-and-an-
swer, and al-Naẓāʾir al-fiqhiyya by Abū ʿImrān al-Qayrawānī (d. ?), a work of legal maxims.

Authenticated
dealing with technical vocabulary in Sufism or Islamic law.¹⁸ In addition, several

books have been published recently that attempt to extract legal distinctions
from discussions in early works of Islamic law. These books can appear to be
part of the genre of legal distinctions, but are not since they are modern con-
structions of the furūq books certain authors could have written.¹⁹ This category
includes books such as al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik edited by Ibrāhīm Is-
māʿīl Jalāl, the legal distinctions of al-Shāfiʿī’s Kitāb al-Umm, and the legal dis-
tinctions of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350).²⁰
While most works of legal distinctions were authored by Sunni jurists, I have
identified two works, neither extant, that appear to be Shi‘i works of legal dis-
tinctions. The first is in Ibn al-Nadīm’s (d. 380/990) entry for al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥ-
mūd al-Sarrād (or al-Zarrād, fl. mid second/eighth c.), where Ibn al-Nadīm attrib-
utes a Kitāb al-Furūq to Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. third/ninth c.).²¹ The
work’s early date, however, renders this identification as a work of legal distinc-
tions implausible.²²
 For instance, al-Furūq by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, a work of lexicographic distinctions, not

legal distinctions; Qurrat al-ʿayn wa-l-samʿ fī bayān al-farq wa-l-jamʿ by Badr al-Dīn ibn
ʿUmar al-Ḥuraythī (d. ca. 970/1562– 63), a work of applied lexicographic distinctions about Suf-
ism, Furūq al-uṣūl attributed to Kemalpaşazade (d. 940/1534), a work of applied lexicographic
distinctions about legal theory, and al-Furūq by ʿUmar ibn Raslān al-Bulqīnī (d. 805/1403), likely
a work of applied lexicographic distinctions about Islamic law. The authorship of Furūq al-uṣūl is
unclear. Most manuscripts do not attribute the book to any author, although some attribute it to
Kemalpaşazade, as does the printed edition. Kemalpaşazade, Furūq al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad ibn
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Mubārak (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009). Al-Furūq by al-Bulqīnī most likely refers to
his al-Farq bayn al-ḥukm bi-ṣiḥḥa wa-l-ḥukm bi-l-mūjib, see al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya,
160.
 It is likely, however, that detailed and careful work such as this on the specific doctrine of
individual jurists can give us a better understanding of the changes and dynamism inherent in
legal compendia.
 Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl Jalāl, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
2007); Sāmī Muḥammad Ṣubḥ, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿind al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī fī Kitāb al-Umm (Bei-
rut: Dār al-Muqtabas, 2018). I thank David Vishanoff for alerting me to this last book. Ibn
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s legal distinctions have been collected and published twice, Yūsuf al-
Ṣāliḥ, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya muntazaʿ min aghlab kutub Ibn Qayyim
raḥimahu llāh taʿālā (Riyadh: Yūsuf al-Ṣāliḥ, 2009) and Abū ʿUmar Sayyid Ḥabīb ibn Aḥmad
al-Madanī l-Afghānī, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿind Imām Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya jamʿan wa-l-
dirāsa, 3 vols (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd Nāshirūn, 2009).
 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist li-l-Nadīm, 2 vols., ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-
Furqān li-l-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1430/2009), 2.1:73.
 Unfortunately, the published edition of al-Maḥāsin that I consulted did not have a section
entitled Kitāb al-Furūq, see Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid al-Barqī, al-Maḥāsin, 2 vols.,
ed. al-Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya 1370/1951). While

Authenticated
The other possible Shi’i work of legal distinctions is al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAlī
ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī l-Zaydī l-Yamanī (d. 777/1375 – 76). As his nisba al-
Zaydī indicates, ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā was almost certainly a Zaydī Shi’i. Al-Sabīl, how-
ever, in his bibliography of legal distinctions, includes ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā as a Shāfiʿī
scholar and omits “al-Zaydī” from ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā’s name. Al-Sabīl does not cite a
death date for ʿAlī ibn Yaḥya, only noting that he was born in 662/1264 – 65.²³
Very little information is recorded about this work. Writing in the middle of
the twentieth century, Muḥammad ibn Zabāra mentions this work in his appen-
dix to Muḥammad al-Shawkānī’s al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ. He includes it as one of ʿAlī ibn
Yaḥyā’s works and says, “In his al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, he wrote things that no one
previously has written.”²⁴ ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā does not seem to be particularly prom-
inent in the historical record but appears primarily as a hadith transmitter.²⁵
Since I cannot rule out the possibility that either of these two works belongs
to the genre of distinctions writing, I include them in my survey. At the same
time, the existence of only two works that may be part of the genre may prove
the rule that there is, generally speaking, no Shi’i tradition of writing books of
legal distinctions.
The critical bibliography I present below represents a marked advance over
previous efforts, partly because it draws heavily on them and partly due to recent
technological advancements. The digitization of manuscript catalogs has made it
possible to search a greater number of catalogs more efficiently than ever be-
fore.²⁶ Any bibliography is always preliminary, and I look forward to seeing
this list improved as further collections are digitized. Nevertheless, as will be
seen below, I have “discovered” many manuscripts unattested in other pub-
there are other editions of this text, which I have not been able to consult, it seems unlikely that
al-Maḥāsin, a work of hadith, would include a section on legal distinctions.
 Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Jandārī, Tarājim al-rijāl al-madhkūra fī sharḥ al-azhār (n.p.: Maṭ-
baʿat al-Tamaddun, 1332/1913), 25. A birth date of 662 makes a death date of 777 unlikely, though
by no means impossible.
 Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Zabāra al-Ḥasanī l-Yamanī, Mulḥiq al-badr al-ṭāliʿ bi-
maḥāsin man baʿd al-qarn al-sābiʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.), 1:183 – 84.
 See, for instance, the citations in Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-
qawāṣim fī l-dhabb ʿan sunnat Abī Qāsim, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla,
1415/1994).
 This is particularly true for most manuscript libraries in the United States, Europe, and Tur-
key. As of the writing of this chapter, however, the already digitized catalog of the Suleymaniye
Library is not available online, but only accessible in the reading room at the Suleymaniye li-
brary. The catalogs of the other public libraries in Turkey, however, are all available via
http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr, accessed May 2, 2019.

Authenticated
lished bibliographies, identified manuscripts of works considered to be no lon-

ger extant, and erased some doubts about the identity of several manuscripts.²⁷
Important works that were frequently copied constitute a problem for any
bibliographer. The abundance of copies of Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir
(Turkey’s digital portal alone contains 127 copies!) would overshadow all of
the other works here.²⁸ Similarly, the Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq by Shihāb
al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) also survives in seemingly infinite copies through-
out the world. Despite the popularity of these works, it does not appear that they
are central to the furūq tradition.²⁹ These two works were, however, the subject of
many commentaries complicating the matter further. These two works, together
with their commentaries, have nearly become genres unto themselves and de-
serve a separate study. Additionally, neither of these two works fits squarely
within the genre of legal distinctions. This survey acknowledges the existence
of these two works, but does not treat them as comprehensively as the other
works of legal distinctions.³⁰
 It should go without saying, but the works of catalogers and librarians is invaluable for proj-
ects such as this.
 Indeed, this would be sufficient material for a study devoted only to the manuscripts of this
work, and is beyond the brief critical bibliography presented here.
 In fact, al-Qarāfī’s work is likely not a work of legal distinctions at all, as discussed below.
 A brief mention should be made here regarding al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Jalāl al-Dīn al-
Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505). Although al-Suyūṭī’s text seems to serve as a model for Ibn Nujaym’s
text, the two works differ in notable ways. One such way is the lack of a section on legal distinc-
tions in al-Suyūṭī’s text. The sixth chapter of his work is titled “On Similar Legal Topics and What
Distinguishes Them” (fī abwāb mutashābiha wa-mā ftaraqa fīhi). This seems to correspond to the
third chapter in Ibn Nujaym’s text, “Assimilation and Distinction” (al-jamʿ wa-l-farq). Despite not
discussing legal distinctions, al-Suyūṭī nevertheless seems to understand his al-Ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir as related to legal distinctions. Towards the end of the introduction of this work, al-
Suyūṭī states that “sometimes a case opposes its similar cases in regards to their ruling because
of a particular discernable attribute (min al-naẓāʾir mā yukhālifu naẓāʾirahu fī l-ḥukm li-mudrak
khāṣṣ). This is the discipline (al-fann) known as furūq, which distinguishes between similar cases
which are united (mutaḥḥida) because of their fact-patterns and general implication, but differ
in their ruling and legal rationale”; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī qawāʿid wa
furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyyah, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Faḍīlī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1411/1990), 7.
This statement seems to indicate a close connection between al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir and the dis-
cipline of furūq. Ibn Nujaym makes a similar claim in his introduction, when he calls his sixth
chapter, the chapter on furūq, “the sixth chapter: al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir.” (Ibn Nujaym, al-
Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 1:38). In spite of the close connections that may have existed between al-
ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir and furūq, al-Suyūṭī’s text should not be considered a work of distinctions.
This issue is discussed further in the Conclusion.

Authenticated
Narrative Listing of Furūq Works 165
Narrative Listing of Furūq Works
In this bibliography, I identify thirty-six works of legal distinctions. The spread of

these works among the legal schools is somewhat uneven, thirteen for the Shāfiʿī
school, nine for the Ḥanafīs, eight for the Mālikīs, and four for the Ḥanbalīs, and
two works, which may or may not belong to the genre, authored by Shi’is. Organ-
izing these works chronologically uncovers two periods of intense writing of
books of furūq: the fifth/eleventh century and the late seventh/thirteenth
through mid-eighth/fourteenth centuries. It is important to keep in mind that
the data is vague; the lifetime of the author serves as a rough estimate of the
date of composition when precise dates of the composition of a furūq work is
missing.³¹ Because of this imprecision, the bibliography is organized by chrono-
logically by century. This organization is somewhat arbitrary, but seems to be the
most logical for later reference.
The permeability of the genre of legal distinctions is one of the most impor-
tant observations of this study and therefore the classification of later well-attest-
ed, and even published works, can be difficult. In general, I have chosen to be
overly inclusive regarding such difficult-to-classify works. I chose to include two
types of suspect works: works no longer extant about which little is known, and
works seemingly at the boundaries of the genre of legal distinctions. For in-
stance, I include both al-Furūq by Ibn Surayj and al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt in my
bibliography, even though I believe it is unlikely that Ibn Surayj wrote such a
book and that al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt fits in the genre.³²
This chapter presents a narrative version of the critical bibliography, includ-
ing a brief discussion of each furūq work and its author. The critical bibliography,
however, is also presented in two alternate formats in Appendix I and Appendix
II. Appendix I organizes furūq works chronologically by legal school (madhhab),
and includes a final section on works incorrectly said to be works of legal dis-
tinctions. Appendix I also preserves all of the bibliographic and reference infor-
mation contained in this narrative. Appendix II arranges these works chronolog-
ically, but excludes all references.
 The precise date of composition is unknown for the vast majority of furūq treatises.
 See below and Chapter Four, pp. 144– 48.

Authenticated
The Fourth/Tenth Century
Identifying the first work of legal distinctions is not easy. There are several can-
didates that could have written the first work of legal distinctions: Ibn Surayj (d.
306/918),³³ al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad al-Zubayrī (d. 317/929 – 30),³⁴ al-Ḥakīm al-Tir-
midhī (d. ca. 298/910),³⁵ Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawī (d. ca 320/
932),³⁶ and Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī (d. 322/933 – 34).³⁷ This early period
is further complicated by later inter-madhhab polemics. Did Shāfiʿīs first discov-
er the usefulness of thinking through distinctions and therefore write the earliest
works in this genre? Or was it Ḥanafī scholars who have pride of place in devel-
oping this new style?
None of these works can be easily categorized as an early work of legal dis-
tinctions. In spite of its title, Kitāb al-furūq, Ibn Surayj’s book seems only to be a
commentary on al-Muzanī’s Mukhtaṣar. ³⁸ The surviving selections of al-Zubayrī’s
book do not talk about legal distinctions.³⁹ Al-Nasawī is mentioned only in the
al-Fihrist and not remembered by any other premodern author.⁴⁰ Al-Tirmidhī’s
book of distinctions is about lexicography.⁴¹ The book attributed to al-Karābīsī’s
survives, but this attribution is almost certainly spurious and the text itself is
highly corrupt and riddled with lacunae.⁴² Finally, the lack of discussion of
these works in the earliest extant sources also throw their veracity in doubt.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 72– 73, 84; al-
Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:34.
 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 73 – 74; Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 142– 43; al-
Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:35.
 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69 – 70.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 143; Schacht,
“Furūq-Büchern,” 509; Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:55.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69, 74, 84; Kızılkaya,
İslâm hukukunda farklar, 143 – 45; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1257– 58.
 Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā, 3:296.
 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:55.
 Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī l-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf, ed. Muḥammad Ibrā-
hīm al-Juyūshī (Cairo: al-Nahār, 1998).
 Throughout the text, ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Zahrānī, the editor, finds himself forced to insert
whole clauses and sentences in order for this text to convey correct meaning. These are all mo-
ments where al-Zahrānī has added one or more sentences, with a footnote that reads: “This is
not found in any of the manuscripts (laysat fī jamīʿ al-nusakh).” The additions, he reasons,
are required by (1) the context (al-siyāq), (2) Ḥanafī tradition (al-marājiʿ; lā yastaqīmu al-
ḥukm illā bihi), (3) the comparison made in the distinction (al-farq). The problems with the
text discussed in this section are problems with the text as it is in the manuscript. Al-Zahrānī’s

Authenticated
A more critical evaluation of the evidence suggests that the origins of this
genre should be interrogated as a construction of self-justifying narratives
about the past. Why did it become important to claim in the Mamluk and
early Ottoman periods that so many fourth/tenth-century jurists were the first
to have written these works? These claims often also reflected competition
among the different Sunni legal schools, with a desire to claim primacy in differ-
ent areas of legal development. Indeed, it is only in the ninth/sixteenth century
that Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī becomes credited with his book, an attri-
bution that not only appears suddenly in several bibliographic sources, but also
on several manuscripts.⁴³
The Fifth/Eleventh Century
The fifth/eleventh century was momentous for the history of legal distinctions;
during this century the genre of legal distinctions became established and wide-
spread. The Shāfiʿī madhhab produced five works of legal distinctions during this
century: al-Kifāya fī l-furūq wa-l-laṭāʾif by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAb-
dallāh al-Ṭabarī (d. ca fifth/eleventh c.); ⁴⁴ al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Abū Muḥammad
editorial editions are indeed essential for this text to be readable in any sensible fashion. See
Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, Kitāb al-Furūq, ed. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd Aḥmad al-Zahrānī
(Ph.D Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1418/1997), 191, 202, 331, 365, among other examples.
 See ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd Aḥmad al-Zahrānī, “Dirāsa,” in Kitāb al-Furūq by Muḥammad ibn
Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, ed. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd Aḥmad al-Zahrānī, (Ph.D Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā,
1418/1997), 47– 53.
 The author of this work is Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī. This is con-
firmed by all of the biographies of al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh, with the exception of that written
by Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, who does not mention this work. See al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya,
90 – 91; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 4 vols., ed. al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm Khān (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407[/1986]), 1:181, no. 142; Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt al-
shāfiʿiyya, 2 vols., ed. Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407/1987),
2:61– 62, no. 767; Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-
Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1970), 126. Other sources, however, attribute this work to Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥu-
sayn ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥannāṭī l-Ṭabarī (d. ca 495/1101– 02), see al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:37; ʿUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn: Tarājim muṣannifī l-kutub al-
ʿarabiyya, 4 vols. (Damascus: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1376/1957), 1:636, no. 4795; Ḥājjī Khalīfa,
Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1499; Ismāʿīl Bāshā l-Baghdādī, Hadiyat
al-ʿārifīn, 1:311. These sources, however, are all late. Earlier biographies of al-Ḥannāṭī do not at-
tribute this work to him, see Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:179 – 81, no. 141; Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī,
Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya l-kubrā, 10 vols, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad Ḥulw and Maḥmūd

Authenticated
ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī l-Shāfiʿī (d. 438/1047);⁴⁵ al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-
masāʾil by Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa l-Maqdisī l-Shāfiʿī (d. 480/
1087– 88);⁴⁶ al-Muʿāyāt by Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Jurjānī;⁴⁷ and al-Furūq by Abū l-Maḥā-
sin ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Ismāʿīl al-Rūyānī l-Ṭabarī (d. 501/1107 or 502/1108).⁴⁸
ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī’s book is by far the most important work of legal dis-
tinctions in the history of the Shāfiʿī school. Al-Juwaynī’s claim that it was one
of the first works written on legal distinctions within the Shāfiʿī school is further
evidence that Ibn Surayj’s book was not in fact in this genre. Al-Zarkashī (d. 794/
1392), in his al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid, lists the works of al-Juwaynī and Salāma ibn
Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa as the two exemplars of this style of writing.⁴⁹ Unfortunately,
it seems that this latter work has not survived, so it is difficult to ascertain any-
thing about its form or content. The evidence from the Arabo-Islamic biblio-
graphical tradition, however, points toward it being a work of legal distinc-
tions.⁵⁰ Similarly, al-Kifāya fī l-furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn
ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī and the Kitāb al-Furūq by al-Rūyānī do not appear to be ex-
tant, so their place in the furūq genre remains uncertain.⁵¹ Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad
ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī also wrote his al-Muʿāyāt in the fifth/eleventh century.
While I argue that al-Jurjānī’s work is perhaps best understood as a work of legal
riddles, it nevertheless consists overwhelmingly of legal distinctions and has
Muḥammad al-Tannāḥī (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-ʿArabiyya, 1994), 4:367– 71, no. 397; al-Asnawī,
Ṭabaqāt, 1:193 – 94, no. 362; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, 118.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 87; Kızılkaya, İslâm
hukukunda farklar, 151– 54; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:35 – 36.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88 – 89; Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 161– 63; al-
Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,”1:36.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, 89 – 90; Kızılkaya,
İslâm hukukunda farklar, 163 – 65; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:36 – 37.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 92; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37.
 Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid, 3 vols., ed. Taysīr Fāʾiq Aḥmad Maḥmūd
and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/
1982), 1:69.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq,” 1:601 and “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-
shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258; GAL 1:385 – 86, S1:667; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:307, no. 8443; Shihāb al-Dīn
ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab, 10 vols.,
ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ and Maḥmūd al-Arnāʾūṭ (Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1406/1986 –
1414/1993), 5:176 – 77; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:165 – 66, no. 305; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 5:73 – 94,
no. 439; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:209 – 11, no. 171.
 For al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī, see references in note 44 above. For al-Rūyānī, see Ibn al-Subkī,
Ṭabaqāt, 7:193 – 204, no. 901; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:272, no. 518; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:332,
no. 8626. Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 6:8; Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām 4:175; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba,
Ṭabaqāt, 1:287, no. 256.

Authenticated
been considered part of the genre. For example, it is identified as such on the
cover of a manuscript of this work catalogued as 915 fiqh shāfiʿī in the Dār al-
Kutub al-Miṣriyya in Cairo.⁵²
There was only one Ḥanafī work of distinctions written in this century: al-
Ajnās wa-l-furūq by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Nāṭifī l-Ṭabarī l-
Ḥanafī (d. 446/1054– 55).⁵³ This work exists in at least two copies at the Süleyma-
niye Library in Istanbul.⁵⁴ It is also mentioned in most of the biographical liter-
ature, although no information is given as to its contents. Ḥājjī Khalīfa records
the alternate title al-Ajnās fī l-furūʿ. ⁵⁵ ʿUmar Riḍā l-Kaḥḥāla’s Muʿjam al-
muʾallifīn seems to suggest that al-Ajnās and al-Furūq are two separate works,
even though most other sources consider this the title of one book.⁵⁶ While
the title indicates a work of legal distinctions, the phrase al-ajnās wa-l-furūq
could also mean something like “[Legal] Types and the Differences between
Them,” in which case the book might have explained different ways to group
and categorize substantive doctrine or legal-theoretical principles. While furūq
can have a very specific technical legal meaning, it also retained its general
meaning of “differences.”
The Mālikī madhhab produced four works of legal distinctions in this centu-
ry: Furūq masāʾil mushtabiha fī l-madhhab by Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn
Muḥammad ibn al-Kātib (d. 408/1017),⁵⁷ al-Jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb al-Baghdādī (d. 422/1031),⁵⁸ al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū l-Faḍl Muslim
 In addition, Carl Brockelmann referred to this work as a “furūq work in the strictest sense”
(GAL S1:505). I discuss this book in Chapter Four, pp. 144– 48.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88; Kızılkaya, İslâm
hukukunda farklar, 157– 59; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28. See also GAL 1:372, S1:636; Zayn al-
Dīn Qāsim ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafiyya: Die Krone der
Lebensbescheibungen enthaltend die Classen der Hanefiten, ed. Gustav Flügel (Leipzig: In Com-
mision bei F. A. Brockhaus, 1862), 6 – 7, no. 16; Muḥyī l-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir
ibn Muḥammad al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafiyya, 5 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-
Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw (Giza: Hajr, 1413/1993), 1:297– 98, no. 221; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 1:213;
Taqī l-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafiyya, 4
vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad Ḥulw (Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1983), 2:71– 72, no. 343.
 See al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28; MS Nuruosmaniye 1371, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul;
MS Esad Efendi 542, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Ajnās fī l-furūʿ,” 1:11.
 Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:287, no. 2086.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 84– 85.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 85 – 86; Kızılkaya,

Authenticated
ibn ʿAlī al-Dimashqī (d. fifth/eleventh c.),⁵⁹ and al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-
Mudawwana by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī (d. 466/1073 – 74).⁶⁰ All of these works,
save the earliest by Ibn al-Kātib are extant. Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149) describes
Ibn al-Kātib’s work as a work of distinctions, and writes that he has heard from
Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṭābithī (d. ?) that this book contains forty-one distinctions.⁶¹
Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī and one of his students, Abū l-Faḍl
Muslim al-Dimashqī, also wrote works of legal distinctions. Muslim’s book is vir-
tually identical to that of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Although al-Baghdādī’s text
was once presumed lost, Jalāl al-Jihānī has shown that MS 588 at the Markaz Dir-
āsāt al-Mujāhidīn al-Lībiyīn in Tripoli, Libya, is actually a copy of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd
al-Wahhāb’s work.⁶² Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris had considered the manuscript in
question to be a copy of al-Dimashqī’s Kitāb al-Furūq and used it in their edition
of al-Dimashqī’s Kitāb al-Furūq. ⁶³ This manuscript, MS 588, even preserves the
attribution to al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.⁶⁴ Al-Jihānī presents compelling evidence
that this is indeed a copy of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s work of distinctions, in-
cluding the fact that al-Mawwāq (d. 897/1492) includes a verbatim quotation
from al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s Furūq in his al-Tāj wa-l-iklīl. The passage cited
by al-Mawwāq is found in the manuscript bearing al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s
name, but not in the copies attributed to Muslim al-Dimashqī.⁶⁵ Maḥmūd al-Ghir-
yānī, who discusses the relationships between these two texts in more detail,
also concludes that the Libyan manuscript in question should be attributed to
al-Qā ḍ ī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.⁶⁶
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86 – 87; Kızılkaya,
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88; Kızılkaya, İslâm
hukukunda farklar, 159 – 61.
 See al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb al-masālik li-maʿrifat aʿlām madhhab Mālik, 8
vols., ed. Saʿīd Aḥmad Aʿrāb ([Rabat?:] Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982),
7:253. Other editions, however, refer to Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṭābithī as Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṭāʿī. Heinrich’s
claim that al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ knew this “by autopsy” may be a misreading (Heinrichs, “Structuring
the Law,” 341).
 It is unclear to me whether the manuscript is now at the Markaz al-Lībī li-l-Maḥfūẓāt wa-l-
Dirāsāt al-Tārīkhiyya or al-Hayʾat al-ʿĀmma li-l-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islamiyya.
 Jalāl al-Jihānī, “Muqaddima,” in Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī ibn ʿAlī l-
Qāḍī, al-Furūq al-Fiqhiyya, ed. Jalāl ʿAlī l-Qadhdhāfī l-Jihānī (Dubai: Dār al-Buʿūth li-l-Dirāsāt
al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 1424/2003), 17– 21.
 Al-Jihānī, “Muqaddima,” 18. See also MS 588, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Mujāhidīn al-Lībiyīn, Tripo-
li.
 Al-Jihānī, “Muqaddima,” 35.
 See Maḥmūd Salāmah al-Ghiryānī, “al-Qism al-dirāsī,” in ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī, al-
Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq al-Dimashqī,

Authenticated
The Sixth/Twelfth Century 171
The final Mālikī work of legal distinctions is al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-
Mudawwana wa-l-Mukhtalaṭa by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq was a ju-
rist from Sicily, who studied Mālikī jurisprudence with “the scholars of Qara-
wiyīn” in North Africa.⁶⁷ ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq travelled twice to Mecca for the ḥajj. In
these travels, he met various scholars including al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Baghdādi and Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq is a straight-
forward work of legal distinctions drawn from the substantive doctrine of the
foundational schools of the Mālikī madhhab, the Mudawwana and the
Mukhtalaṭa. ⁶⁸
The literary record thus shows that the genre of legal distinctions had fully
emerged by the end of the fifth/eleventh century, while the fourth/tenth century
was a time when this genre was underdeveloped or perhaps not yet underway.
The only surviving work from the fourth/tenth century is the Kitāb al-Furūq by
Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, although the attribution of this work is prob-
lematic. The fifth/eleventh century, however, saw a tremendous burst of activity
in the composition of works of legal distinctions, primarily by Shāfiʿī and Mālikī
jurists, and by one Ḥanafī. The Ḥanbalī madhhab would only adopt distinctions
later. Furūq works of this period display the organization and presentation that
comes to define the genre, that is, they are mostly organized in a traditional legal
style (al-tabwīb al-fiqhī), with chapters dedicated to particular areas of the law,
starting with ritual matters (ʿibādāt) and moving to transactions (muʿāmalāt).
The characteristic rhetoric of books of legal distinctions involves comparing
and contrasting two (or more) laws that appear to, but do not actually, contradict
each other.
The Sixth/Twelfth Century
Only one book of legal distinctions, the Kitāb al-Furūq by Abū l-Muẓaffar Asʿad
ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Naysābūrī l-Karābīsī l-Ḥanafī was written in
ed. Maḥmūd Salāmah al-Ghiryānī (Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-
Turāth, 1424/2003).
 Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlīibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab fī maʿrifat aʿyān ʿulamāʾ al-madhhab, 2
vols., no ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), 2:56.
 On these texts, see above, Ch. 1, 37 n. 84. Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 2:56; Muḥammad ibn Muḥam-
mad Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-mālikiyya, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿat al-Sal-
afiyya wa-Maktabatihā, 1349[/1930 – 31]), 1:116.

Authenticated
the sixth/twelfth century.⁶⁹ This work is the first extant furūq work from the
Ḥanafī madhhab that can be both securely attributed to its author and is un-
doubtedly part of the legal distinctions tradition. In his introduction, al-
Karābīsī mentions that he came across the distinctions contained in his book
through his studies with Abū l-ʿAlāʾ Ṣāʿid ibn Muḥammad (d. 502/1109):
“These legal cases I gleaned from books … I heard the imam and judge Abū l-
ʿAlāʾ … bring out the distinguishing factor (iẓhār al-furqān) between them.”⁷⁰
Al-Karābīsī does not mention, however, his knowledge of this writing style as
a genre nor any precedents for distinctions writing within the Ḥanafī school. It
is curious that he would be unaware of the book by Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ
since Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ was a Ḥanafī scholar who lived in Samarqand,
where Asʿad al-Karābīsī also lived. Asʿad’s silence on this matter is one piece
of evidence that calls into question the authenticity of the attribution of a
book of legal distinctions to Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī. Asʿad al-Karābī-
sī’s book became quite important as a work of Ḥanafī distinctions. Ḥanafī au-
thors used it as a model when writing later works of legal distinctions, and it
is the main book for which Asʿad al-Karābīsī is remembered. It is frequently men-
tioned in the classical sources, and there exist many manuscript witnesses of
this work.⁷¹ It has been edited and published three times in the late twentieth
century, while other important Ḥanafī works of legal distinctions continue to
exist only in manuscript form, signalling its continued importance.
The Seventh/Thirteenth Century
The seventh/thirteenth century inaugurated a second flurry of activity in the

composition of works on legal distinctions. Two Shāfiʿī books were written in
this period, al-Fuṣūl wa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥam-
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 91– 92; Kızılkaya,
İslâm hukukunda farklar, 166 – 67; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28 – 29.
 Asʿad ibn Muḥammad al-Karābīsī, al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī, 2 vols., ed. Muḥammad Ṭumūm and
ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982), 1:33.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; GAL 1:375, S1:642;
Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:351, no. 2603; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 508; al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-
muḍiyya, 1:386, no. 314; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 4:4; al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt
al-saniyya, 2:171, no. 473; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:204; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-
tarājim, 12, no. 44.

Authenticated
mad ibn Khalaf ibn Rājiḥ al-Maqdisī l-Ḥanbalī l-Shāfiʿī (d. 638/1241)⁷² and al-
Furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kashāsib al-Shāfiʿī l-Dizmārī
(d. 643/1245).⁷³ Neither of these two works survives, but both authors are men-
tioned frequently in the biographical literature.
Ibn Kashāsib was a jurist in Damascus known for his piety and virtue. Sig-
nificantly, he was also an avid traveler, and the biographical sources quote Abū
Shāma’s statement that Ibn Kashāsib “goes on the pilgrimage often and performs
many good deeds.”⁷⁴ Ibn Kashāsib’s many pilgrimages likely brought him into
contact with scholars and ideas from throughout the Islamic world, potentially
providing both inspiration for his book on legal distinctions and opportunity
to promote his book.
Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī was a Ḥanbalī jurist who lived in Damascus, Bagh-
dad, Hamadan, and Bukhara. The sources indicate that it was in Bukhara, after a
thorough education in the Ḥanbalī school, that Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī trans-
ferred allegiance to the Shāfiʿī school. He returned to Damascus after this “con-
version,” enjoying a successful career as a jurist and teacher. In this period, he
wrote his al-Fuṣūl fī l-furūq. Al-Asnawī notes that he remained known by his
nisba al-Ḥanbalī in spite of his later adherence to the Shāfiʿī school.⁷⁵
Only one Ḥanafī book of legal distinctions was written in the seventh centu-
ry, Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī l-
Ḥanafī, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal (d. 630/1232– 33).⁷⁶ This should be considered
the most important work of Ḥanafī distinctions before the twentieth century. A
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 95; Kızılkaya, İslâm
hukukunda farklar, 167– 68; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:331; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,”
1:37.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 95 – 96; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37.
 See Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Shāma ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Maqdisī, Tarājim rijāl al-qarnayn al-sādis
wa-l-sābiʿ al-maʿrūf bi-l-Dhayl ʿalā l-Rawḍatayn, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIl-
miyya 1422/2002), 5:270, although in this edition his name is erroneously listed as “Aḥmad
ibn Kātib al-Zumārī.” For citations of this phrase, see Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 8:30, no. 1054;
al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:152, no. 289; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 2:100, no. 401. See also
Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:232, no. 1695; and al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:94.
 It is perhaps the repeated references to him as “al-Ḥanbalī” that led Heinrichs to include
Najm al-Dīn as a Ḥanbalī scholar in his bibliography. See, however, al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt,
1:211– 12, no. 404; Ibn Qādī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt 2:71, no. 371; and Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:262– 63,
no. 1896. For references to this work, see Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Bahādur al-Zarkashī,
al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, no ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutubī, 1414/1994), 7:220; 7:245; 7:394; and
8:38.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; Kızılkaya, İslâm
hukukunda farklar, 172– 73; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:29. These sources all agree on this date,
although I am unable to locate a premodern source for this datum.

Authenticated
large number of manuscript witnesses for this work are preserved, and this work
is mentioned frequently in the secondary literature, although it remains unpub-
lished.⁷⁷ The lack of a readily-available published edition of al-Talqīḥ, however,
has made Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s text the most popular Ḥanafī work of legal distinc-
tions today.⁷⁸
Though his work was important, al-Maḥbūbī seems to have been a relatively
obscure figure. Ibn Quṭlūbughā in his Tāj al-tarājim tells us that “ʿUbayd Allāh
ibn Masʿūd ibn Maḥmūd ibn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Maḥmūd, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa l-
Maḥbūbī was a critical and meticulous scholar.”⁷⁹ This is likely a reference to
Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allah’s father, although here the father is referred to as
Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa. This is odd since scholars make a point of referring to Aḥmad
al-Maḥbūbī as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal, that is, “the first,” in contrast to
ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd ibn Aḥmad al-Maḥbūbī l-Bukhārī (fl. 747/1346 – 47),
his descendent, who is known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa l-Thānī, “the second,” or al-
Aṣghar, “the younger.” Ibn Quṭlūbughā also mentions a book titled Talqīḥ al-
ʿuqūl fī l-furūq, the title of which bears very close resemblance to that by
Aḥmad al-Maḥbūbī. However, this title is attributed by Ibn Quṭlūbughā to
Aḥmad ibn Ḥubb Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm and no further information is given about
the author.⁸⁰ Similarly, al-Tamīmī l-Dārī’s al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya has two listings
that seem to refer to this author. The first is for “Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn Ibrā-
hīm Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ḥanafī” who wrote Tanqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl. ⁸¹ A
different entry also exists for “Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn
Aḥmad … al-Maḥbūbī” to whom is attributed a book entitled “Tanqīḥ al-ʿuqūl
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v.v. “Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl,” 1:481, “Furūq fī furūʿ
al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; GAL 1:380; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:191, no. 1415; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-
fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:29. Al-Sabīl and al-Bāḥusayn state that this work was
edited as part of an MA thesis at al-Azhar University by ʿAbd al-Hādī Shīr al-Afghānī, but online
resources suggest that this edition was completed as an MA thesis at Ain Shams University. See
http://research.asu.edu.eg/handle/987654321/9953, accessed April 29, 2019. The edition, howev-
er, has not been published.
 It is difficult to understand the causality in this situation. Was al-Karābīsī’s work printed so
many times because of its contemporary importance to Ḥanafī scholars? Or, is al-Karābīsī so
well-known among Ḥanafī scholars because this work is readily available in a printed edition?
A study of this issue would shed much light into the processes by which the classical tradition
has been and continues to be received by contemporary scholarship.
 Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 29 – 30, no. 118.
 Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 9, no. 29.
 Al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqat al-saniyya, 1:364, no. 208.

Authenticated
fī furūq al-manqūl.”⁸² Unfortunately, al-Tamīmī l-Dārī does not give death dates
for either scholar.
The noted Egyptian jurist Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī also wrote
his Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq, sometimes referred to as Kitāb al-Furūq, in
the seventh/thirteenth century.⁸³ This is perhaps the best-known work titled al-
Furūq, as more manuscripts and printed editions of this work exist than for al-
most every other work of legal distinctions combined. Yet it is a very peculiar
work, leading to disagreement among scholars as to whether it is really a
work of furūq. ⁸⁴ This is likely because al-Qarāfī’s work does not fit neatly into
the genre of legal distinctions, but is more similar to a work of legal maxims
(al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya). The author himself states that he “made the beginnings
of research into legal maxims (qawāʿid) by discussing distinctions and asking, in
a disputation, for the distinction between two derived cases (al-furūq wa-l-suʾāl
ʿanhā bayn farʿayn) or two legal maxims.”⁸⁵ His work is as concerned with max-
ims and general principles as it is with minute distinctions between rules of pos-
itive law. Indeed, al-Qarāfī’s use of the term furūq seems more aligned to the
usage of lexicographical distinctions than legal ones.⁸⁶
 Al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqat al-saniyya, 1:376, no. 220.

 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341– 42; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 152– 54;
Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar, 173 – 90; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:32– 33.
 While Heinrichs includes this work in his bibliography, along with a brief list of commenta-
ries on it, al-Bāḥusayn omits it from his own survey of works of legal distinctions, considering it
instead a work of “al-furūq al-uṣūliyya.” With this term, al-Bāḥusayn means something quite
similar to the notion of “applied linguistic distinction” developed in the Excursus. Kızılkaya
does include this work in his list, along with many of commentaries and supercommentaries,
but acknowledges that this work is not like other works of legal distinctions. Heinrichs, “Struc-
turing the Law,” 341– 42; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 152– 154; Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda
farklar, 173 – 90.
 Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī, al-Furūq aw Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq, print-
ed with Idrār al-shurūq ʿalā anwāʾ al-furūq by Ibn al-Shāṭṭ, Tahdhīb al-Furūq and al-Qawāʿid al-
sanniyya fī l-asrār al-fiqhiyya by Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Ḥusayn al-Makki, 4 vols., ed. Khalīl Mansūr
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1418/1998), 1:9.
 See the discussion of applied lexicographic distinctions above, Excursus, pp. 110 – 12. Al-
Qarāfī is sometimes credited with a second work on legal distinctions, al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz al-
fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām wa-taṣarrufāt al-qāḍī wa-l-imām, Kızılkaya, İslâm hukukunda farklar,
175 – 77. This work, however, is not a work of legal distinctions, but rather, as its title indicates,
a work on judges, muftis, and their procedures and rulings. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley
Messick, and David S. Powers, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” in Islamic
Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick,
and David S. Powers (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 18 – 19. See also
the recent translation of this work, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, The Criterion for Distinguishing Legal

Authenticated
In this century, members of the Ḥanbalī school also began writing works of
legal distinctions. I have identified three such Ḥanbalī works: al-Furūq fī l-
masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAlī ibn Surūr al-Maqdisī
l-Ḥanbalī (d. 614/1218);⁸⁷ al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh
al-Sāmarrī l-Ḥanbalī, also known as Ibn Sunayna (d. 616/1219);⁸⁸ and al-Furūq
by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī ibn Badrān al-Maqdisī l-
Ḥanbalī (d. 699/1299 – 1300).⁸⁹ The first of these works is no longer extant. Its au-
thor, a prominent Ḥanbalī jurist, was born in a small village called Jammāʿīl on
the West Bank of the Jordan River.⁹⁰ He lived most of his life in Damascus,
though he traveled widely. The title of his work, al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqhiyya,
indicates that his work was indeed on legal distinctions.⁹¹
The history of Ibn Sunayna’s work is more complicated. According to
Schacht, this work was written by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū l-Fatḥ ʿAbdallāh ibn
Hibat Allāh al-Sāmarrī (d. 545/1150).⁹² But this work was in fact written by
Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī,⁹³ as evidenced by the
manuscript of al-Sāmarrī’s Kitāb al-Furūq in the Ẓāhiriyya Collection in the Asa-
diyya Library in Damascus, together with the biographical tradition, which at-
tributes a work of legal distinctions to Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad al-Sāmarrī,
but not to Abū l-Fatḥ ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī.⁹⁴
Opinions from Judicial Rulings and the Administrative Acts of Judges and Rulers, trans. Moham-
mad Fadel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:40.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93 – 94; Kızılkaya,
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:40.
 At present, this village is called Jamma’in.
 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rajab, al-Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, 5
vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn (Mecca: Maktabat al-ʿUbay-
kān, 1425/2005), 3:198 – 220, the book itself is mentioned on 3:200; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:42,
no. 312; Mujīr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-ʿUlaymī, al-Durr al-Munaḍḍad fī
dhikr asḥāb al-imām Aḥmad, 2 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn
([Riyadh(?)]: Maktabat al-Tawba, 1412/1992), 1:339, no. 969; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab,
7:105 – 108.
 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 507– 508. Heinrichs accepts this attribution in Heinrichs, “Struc-
turing the Law,” 343.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93 – 94; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:40.
 Heinrichs lists this work as being written by Abū l-Fatḥ in his bibliography, even though in a
footnote he admits that it is more likely that it is by Ibn Sunayna. Heinrichs, “Structuring the
Law,” 343. For Abū l-Fatḥ, see Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 7:126 – 27; Dhayl, Ṭabaqāt
al-ḥanābila, 3:249 – 51. Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn’s name is written on the cover page of the manuscript
in Damascus; this can be seen on the reproduction printed in al-Yaḥyā’s edition of this text, see

Authenticated
The Eighth/Fourteenth Century
The eighth/fourteenth century continued to see the production of many works of

legal distinctions. The Shāfiʿī madhhab witnessed three works of legal distinc-
tions in this century: al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd
ibn ʿAlī l-Hudhalī l-Armantī l-Shāfiʿī (d. 725/1325);⁹⁵ al-Furūq by Abū Umāma
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Yaḥyā l-Dukkālī l-
Maghribī l-Miṣrī l-Shāfiʿī, also known as Ibn al-Naqqāsh (d. 763/1361);⁹⁶ and
Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-Asnawī l-Shāfiʿī (d. 772/1370).⁹⁷ Of these, only Jamāl al-
Dīn al-Asnawī’s is extant. Al-Asnawī was the head of the Shāfiʿī school in
Cairo and wrote works in nearly all areas of Islamic law.⁹⁸ Al-Asnawī’s book
on distinctions is particularly interesting since it opens with a brief history of
legal distinctions writing. The author does not include mention of the other
two Shāfiʿī works from the eighth century, even though his book was likely
the last of the three to be written.⁹⁹
Sirāj al-Dīn al-Armantī was a Shāfiʿī who held judicial posts throughout
Egypt, specifically in Qus (Qūṣ), Cairo, Ikhmīm, al-Bakhnasā,¹⁰⁰ and Bilbeis.
His nisba, Armantī, refers to the village of Armant in Upper Egypt where he
was born. Al-Armantī’s work is remembered in the bibliographical tradition
and appears to be a work of legal distinctions but is no longer extant.¹⁰¹
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā, “Muqaddima,” in Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā
madhhab al-imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī, ed. Mu-
ḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā (Riyad: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, 1997), 112. This work
has been edited in two parts. The first, edited by al-Yaḥyā contains only the section on ritual du-
ties (al-ʿibādāt), al-Sāmarrī, Furūq, ed. Yaḥya. The rest of the book was edited by Anas ibn ʿUmar
ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil as a master’s thesis for Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā in Mecca in 1435/2014,
Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh ibn Sunayna al-Sāmarrī, al-Furūq min awwal kitāb al-jināyāt ilā
nihāyat al-kitāb dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan, ed. Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil (MA
Thesis, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā1, 1435/2014). Joseph Schacht also edited and published short selec-
tions from this text, Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 525 – 37.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96 – 97; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96 – 97; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; Kızılkaya,
İslâm hukukunda farklar, 191– 94; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:38.
 I discuss him and his works in more detail above, in Chapter Four, pp. 148 – 54.
 The Maṭāliʿ appears to have been written late in al-Asnawī’s life, by which time al-Armantī
had already passed. It is less clear that he wrote this work before that by Ibn al-Naqqāsh.
 Known also today as Bahnasa and by its ancient name, Oxyrhynchus.
 See Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 10:430 – 33, no. 1419; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:85 – 86, no. 149; Ibn
al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:125 – 26; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:193, no. 18608; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf

Authenticated
The nature of Ibn al-Naqqāsh’s work is less clear. Ibn al-Naqqāsh was also a
Cairene Shāfiʿī who travelled throughout the Levant, with stays in Damascus and
Hama. His work is mentioned often in the bibliographical tradition, but is given
several names: al-Furūq,¹⁰² al-Farq,¹⁰³ al-Naẓāʾir wa-l-furūq, and al-Naẓāʾir fī l-
furūq. ¹⁰⁴ It seems likely that al-Naẓāʾir fī l-furūq was the first title of his book,
since the earliest sources mention it as the name of this treatise.¹⁰⁵ By this
late date, legal distinctions had become a fully formed and widely recognized
genre. I therefore understand that Ibn al-Naqqāsh titled his book al-furūq as a
way of signaling that it belonged to this genre.¹⁰⁶ A similar assumption, based
on the word furūq in the title, may have led Ḥājjī Khalīfa to give al-Furūq as
the title for this book and drop the word “al-Naẓāʾir.”¹⁰⁷
As in the previous century, only one Ḥanafī work of legal distinctions was
written in the eighth/fourteenth century, al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUth-
mān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā l-Turkumānī l-Mārdīnī l-Ḥanafī, known as Ibn al-
Turkumānī (d. ca. 744/1343 – 44).¹⁰⁸ This work is likely not extant, although a
manuscript on legal distinctions in the Ẓāhiriyya collection in the Asadiyya li-
brary in Damascus is attributed to him.¹⁰⁹ Little is known about Ibn al-Turkumā-
nī. The sources relate only that he was a notable Ḥanafī from a scholarly family
who lived in Cairo.¹¹⁰
al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 1:601; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 2:301– 302,
no. 574.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258.
 Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 2:162.
 Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:339; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 3:132; Kaḥḥāla,
Muʿjam, 3:521.
 Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-kāmina fī
aʿyān al-miʾa l-thāmina, 4 vols., no ed. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [197–]), 4:71– 74. Al-
ʿAsqalānī says it is “a book about distinctions (ṣannafa … kitāban fī l-furūq).”
 It is also possible that given this assumption, later authors, in particular Ḥājjī Khalīfa, mis-
categorized this work as belonging to the genre of legal distinctions and that I am continuing
this error by maintaining this assumption.
 Kashf al-ẓunūn does not include any books with the title “al-Naẓāʾir wa-l-furūq,” see Ḥājjī
Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2:1920.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 98 – 99; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 1:29.
 It is unlikely that this work was actually written by Ibn al-Turkumānī. This manuscript is a
copy of the work that I call Furūq-A, see below pp. 188 – 89.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; al-Qurashī, al-
Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 1:197– 98, no. 139; al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-kāmina, 1:198; Ibn al-ʿImād,
Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:243; al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 1:389, no. 240; GAL 2:64,
S2:67– 68; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 9, no. 30.

Authenticated
The Ḥanbalī madhhab saw one book of legal distinctions written in this cen-
tury, Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil by Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn
ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Zarīrānī l-Baghdādī l-Ḥanbalī (d. 741/1341).¹¹¹
Al-Zarīrānī was a Baghdadi jurist and hadith scholar who traveled to Damascus
and Cairo. His nisba almost certainly connects him to Zarīrān, a small village
south of Baghdad.¹¹² The edition of Ibn Rajab’s Dhayl al-ṭabaqāt that I cite
gives his name as ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Zarīrānī, but notes that the variant al-
Zarīrātī is found on at least some of the manuscripts.¹¹³ Other sources, such as
al-Durar al-kāmina and Shadharāt al-dhahab refer to him as al-Zarīrānī.¹¹⁴ The
unicum manuscript in Princeton gives his name as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zarīrānī
and is likely the source for the name given in the printed edition.¹¹⁵ Further,
this work is sometimes referred to as Tanqīḥ al-Furūq. This title alludes to the
fact that this work is a commentary on and expansion of Ibn Sunayna’s Kitāb
al-Furūq. This self-conscious referencing suggests that writing works of legal dis-
tinctions had become a part of the Ḥanbalī legal-literary repertoire by this time.
The eighth/fourteenth century represents the high-water mark in the produc-
tion of works of legal distinctions. Additionally, legal distinctions literature
seems to have spread to many regions during this time. It was also during this
century that ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī l-Zaydī l-Yamanī wrote his al-
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 97– 98; Kızılkaya,
İslâm hukukunda farklar, 171– 72; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28. There is some uncertainty as to
the name of this author. In “Structuring the Law,” Heinrichs refers to him as al-Zarīrātī and says
that in the introduction to al-Dimashqī’s book of legal distinctions, this author’s “name [is]
wrongly given as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Zarīrānī,” although he amends his reading in “Qawāʿid,”
saying that the reading “‘al-Zarīrātī’ is apparently incorrect” (Heinrichs, “Qawāʿid” 383n37).
Both nisba, however, are given to this author in the biographical sources. Kızılkaya refers to
this author as al-Zurayrānī (lit: “Züreyrânî”). Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Qawāʿid as a Genre of Legal
Literature,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 383n 37.
 Shihāb al-Dīn Yāqūt ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-buldān, 7 vols. No ed. (Beirut:
Dār Ṣādir, 1397/1977), 3:140.
 Ibn Rajab, Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, 5:104. Al-ʿUthaymīn says that this variant appears in
the manuscript abbreviated “ṭāʾ,” but in his introduction, does not label any manuscripts with
this letter. See ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn, “Muqaddimat al-
muḥaqqiq,” in Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, by Ibn Rajab, ed ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Su-
laymān al-ʿUthaymīn (Mecca: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1425/2005), 1:112– 35.
 Ibn al-ʿImād has his name as ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbd al-Malik. This spelling likely reflects
what was on the manuscripts since the editor notes that he is usually known as ʿAbd al-Raḥīm
ibn ʿAbdallah. Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:228.
 MS Garrett 4577Y, Princeton University Library, Princeton, 2b.

Authenticated
Jamʿ wa-l-farq. ¹¹⁶ This work, discussed above, seems to have dealt with legal dis-
tinctions. Its title, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, is both a direct allusion to the work written
by ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī and also seemingly places it in conversation with the
Shāfiʿī tradition.¹¹⁷ Apart from this work by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā, this title appears to
be confined to works by Shāfiʿī authors.¹¹⁸ Unfortunately, this work has not sur-
vived and other sources do not preserve excerpts from it.
The Ninth/Fifteenth Century
Production of works of furūq decreased in the following centuries. The ninth cen-
tury saw only two works on legal distinctions, one from the Mālikī madhhab and
one unusual Ḥanafī work. The Mālikī work is al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥam-
mad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī l-Gharnāṭī l-Mālikī, al-Mawwāq.¹¹⁹ This work appears
no longer to be extant, although a manuscript of a book of Mālikī distinctions
at the Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī in La Marsa is attributed to an author
with a similar name, Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī.¹²⁰ The manuscript in
La Marsa is mentioned by Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, the editors of al-Dimashqī’s
Furūq al-Dimashqī, and consequently by both al-Bāḥusayn and Heinrichs. Abū l-
Ajfān and Abū Fāris believed that this was a separate person because of the
missing nisbas in the name given in the manuscript.¹²¹ Al-Bāḥusayn agrees
that the author of this manuscript is not al-Mawwāq. He mentions it at the
end of his survey and treats it as an anonymous work because the name associ-
ated with it, Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf, is so common.¹²² Heinrichs, meanwhile,
finds it “highly unlikely” that the La Marsa manuscript is by someone other
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:38; Kaḥḥāla, 2:543,
no. 10254.
 Such a dialogue, between Zaydī scholars and Shāfiʿī scholars in Yemen in the eighth/four-
teenth century, would not be unusual. See Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The
Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkānī (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 12– 15.
 The main source of information on this work is a biographical dictionary by Muḥammad
Zabāra. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Zabāra al-Ḥasanī l-Yamanī, Mulḥiq al-badr al-ṭāliʿ bi-
maḥāsin man baʿd al-qarn al-sābiʿ, 2 vols., no ed. (Beirut: Dār Maʿrifa, n.d.), 1:183 – 84.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101– 102; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 1:31.
 MS fāʾ-alif 98 – 90, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī, La Marsa.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 40.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 105.

Authenticated
The Ninth/Fifteenth Century 181
than al-Mawwāq, but nevertheless grants both works separate entries in his bib-
liography.¹²³
There is, however, one mention of a Mālikī work of legal distinctions by an
otherwise unknown Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf. In Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī’s ʿAlam al-
jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, the author attributes a work of Mālikī legal distinctions
to al-Shaykh Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī l-Anṣārī l-
Mālikī.¹²⁴ This may seem to refer to al-Mawwāq, but this is impossible, as al-
Ṭūfī died in 716/1316, almost 180 years before the death of al-Mawwāq. Al-Ṭūfī
could not have known of al-Mawwāq’s work. This indicates that there were at
least two scholars named Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf from al-Andalus
who wrote works of Mālikī legal distinctions.¹²⁵
Nevertheless, al-Mawwāq certainly wrote a work of legal distinctions.
Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī l-Balawī (d. 938/1532), in his Thabat, mentions that Abū Jaʿfar
Aḥmad al-Baqanī (fl. 9th/15th c.) received from al-Mawwāq himself a general li-
cense (al-ijāza l-ʿāmma) to transmit several works by al-Mawwāq, including al-
Furūq. ¹²⁶ If al-Mawwāq granted a license to teach his Furūq, he must have auth-
ored such a work, and the fact that the Arabo-Islamic heritage preserves this de-
tail is strong evidence that he wrote this work and that it was well-known by
other scholars.
The other work of legal distinctions from this century, entitled simply al-
Furūq, was a peculiar work written in 802/1399 – 1400 by the Ḥanafī scholar
Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd Marghāyatī(?) (d. early ninth/fif-
teenth c.). This work has only been discussed by modern authors. Al-Bāḥusayn,
based on consultation of a microfilm version of the manuscript, says that it is
thirty-two folios long, although the first ten folios of the manuscript are miss-
ing.¹²⁷ While he does not give any other information about the original manu-
script, a complete copy of this work is found in MS Arabe 812 in the Bibliothèque
nationale de France. Al-Sabīl says that Marghāyatī “is a minor author who fol-
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342.

 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, ed. Wolfhart Heinrichs (Wiesbaden:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1408/1987), 73.
 Based on this information, it seems likely to me that the La Marsa manuscript is not by al-
Mawwāq, but only a study or edition of the text would help to answer this question.
 See also Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Balawī, al-Thabat, ed. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿImrānī (Beirut: Dār al-
Gharb al-Islāmī, 1403/1983), 190. I thank Josef Ženka for this reference.
 “wa-huwa kitāb mūjiz yaqaʿa fī 32 waraqa saqaṭa min al-nuskha llatī aṭṭalaʿnā ʿalayhā
ʿasharat awrāq min awwalihā.” Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101. It is not clear from his
statement whether this manuscript was originally forty-two folio and only thirty-two survive,
or if it was originally thirty-two folios and only twenty-two survive. The copy in the Bibliothèque
nationale de France is copy takes up twenty folios, from 12b–32a.

Authenticated
lowed the style of Asʿad al-Karābīsī,” and goes on to describe the work as “writ-
ten by a foreigner with poor style and grammar (uslūb al-kitāb rakīk wa-fīhi
laknat al-aʿājim).”¹²⁸ Marghāyātī is unknown aside from this text. The colophon
of this work mentions that it was finished in Shaʿbān 802 / 28 March – 26 April
1400, a date that both al-Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl mention. From its contents, it
appears that Marghāyatī was a Ḥanafī scholar.¹²⁹
The Tenth/Sixteenth Century
Furūq writing slowed significantly during the tenth/sixteenth century. Two works
written during this century which are part of the tradition of furūq-literature: al-
Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Ibn Nujaym; and ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab
min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā l-Wansharīsī l-Mālikī
(d. 914/1508). Al-Wansharīsī’s text is a book in the genre of legal distinctions; Ibn
Nujaym’s only has a section devoted to legal distinctions. Both of these works
can be approached as an end-point for the tradition of distinctions writing.
ʿIddat al-burūq, a massive work of legal distinctions, was written by Aḥmad
al-Wansharīsī, one of the most celebrated North African Mālikī scholars of the
period. While it may not have eclipsed al-Qarāfī’s work, which enjoyed great pop-
ularity and exercised tremendous influence, it was a very important work for the
Mālikī madhhab. The title of al-Wansharīsī’s book is a clear allusion to, and
rhymes with, the title of al-Qarāfī’s book Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq, but
these works are nonetheless fundamentally different. As discussed earlier, al-
Qarāfī’s book is not quite a work of legal distinctions, but a broader work encom-
passing applied linguistic distinctions, legal distinctions, legal maxims, and
more. While there are traces of al-Qarāfī’s style and presentation in Wansharīsī’s
ʿIdda, the ʿIdda is much more straightforwardly a work of legal distinctions. Sty-
listically, this later work differs slightly from other books in the distinctions tra-
dition, most notably by omitting the standard phrase “the distinction between
these is…” Despite this difference, ʿIddat al-burūq reads much like other works
of legal distinctions.¹³⁰
 Al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:29.

 Al-Bāḥusayn says that occasionally “he reveals the distinction by way of a question, as
though it were a riddle or examination (lughz wa-mtiḥān),” al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya,
101.
 Interestingly, although the title of his work suggests a relationship between his work and
that by al-Qarāfī, the introduction to this book has many resonances with the other Mālikī
furūq texts, see Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā l-Wansharīsī, ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-

Authenticated
Works of Indeterminate Date 183
The other work from this century, by Ibn Nujaym, is entitled al-Ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir. It is not exclusively dedicated to legal distinctions, but it does include a
chapter devoted to legal distinctions.¹³¹ This chapter is essentially a small work
of legal distinctions, not noticeably different from many of the other works on
this list. This works is significant, however, for how Ibn Nujaym includes recog-
nizable treatments of legal distinctions into broader conceptual legal organiza-
tions.
Both works from this century were written by figures who remained highly
influential long after their deaths. It is intriguing that a genre so often character-
ized by little-known authors and texts of uncertain provenance terminates with
works by two authors of such renown. Ibn Nujaym’s work in particular became a
cornerstone of Ḥanafī legal study in the Ottoman Empire, which officially adopt-
ed the Ḥanafī school, achieving a level of canonicity within Ottoman legal cul-
ture similar to that attained by al-Qarāfī for the Mālikīs a few centuries earlier. ¹³²
There are numerous commentaries on Ibn Nujaym’s text, which continued to be
written well into the nineteenth century.¹³³
Works of Indeterminate Date
In addition to the above, I found at least three separate works of legal distinc-
tions that cannot be securely dated and that have an uncertain authorial attribu-
tion. One of these is a Shāfiʿī work of legal distinctions found in the British Li-
brary. The codex in the British Library, MS Or 6278, is an incomplete copy of a
Shāfiʿī distinctions text that was finished on 18 Dhī al-Ḥijja, 854 / 22 January
1451.¹³⁴ Given the date this manuscript was copied and the repeated references
to al-Rāfiʿī’s Muḥarrar and al-Nawawī’s Sharḥ al-muhadhdhab, this treatise
was likely composed between 1300 and 1450.¹³⁵ Given this date, it is possible,
madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq, ed. Ḥamza Abū Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990/
1410), 79 – 80.
 See the “Sixth Chapter” (al-fann al-sādis) of this work
 According to Samy Ayoub, “the works, opinions, and fatāwā of [Ibn Nujaym] define the dis-
cussions of Ḥanafī legal development over the 17th–19th centuries”; see Samy Ayoub, “We’re not
in Kufa Anymore: The Construction of Late Ḥanafism in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 16th–
19th Centuries CE” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Arizona, 2014), 24.
 See Muḥammad Abū l-Fatḥ al-Ḥanafī, Itḥāf al-abṣār wa-l-baṣāʾir bi-tabwīb Kitāb al-Ashbāh
wa-l-naẓāʾir (Alexandria: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Waṭaniyya, 1289[/1872– 73]).
 MS Oriental 6278, British Library, London, 108b.
 The catalogue entry for this work states that it was “compiled about a.h. 700[/1300-01].” It
is not clear to me what exactly led the catalogers to this conclusion, although perhaps it was a

Authenticated
though by no means certain, that this work is a copy of the furūq work of either
Sirāj al-Dīn al-Armantī or Ibn al-Naqqāsh. The manuscript does not contain in-
formation on the author of the text, perhaps because the cover and introduction
are missing.¹³⁶
In addition, I also located two Ḥanafī works of distinctions, each with multi-
ple manuscript witnesses. These two texts, which exist only in manuscript, are
identified in the bibliographies complied by al-Bāḥusayn, al-Sabīl, and Kızıl-
kaya. These texts have either no authorial attribution or are attributed to an oth-
erwise unknown author. Because of the problems of attribution, the time and lo-
cation from which these works originated is not easily discernable. Although the
titles and authors vary, the indeterminate Ḥanafī works are all copies of one of
two books, which I refer to as Furūq-A and Furūq-B.¹³⁷ The indeterminate Ḥanafī
works include the following: al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Arzustānī (d.
?), al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Urdustānī (d. ?); al-Furūq fī l-furūʿ by
Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn al-Sayyid Abī Bakr al-Naysābūrī l-Ḥanafī (d. ?); and al-Furūq
ʿalā madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa, which has no authorial attribution.
I have consulted all of the extant manuscripts of all of these works, save the
one attributed to al-Urdustānī (MS 3677, Maktabat al-Awqāf, Baghdad). Al-Sabīl
says that this work by al-Urdustānī exists in two copies, the manuscript in Bagh-
dad and a manuscript in Berlin, MS Peterman II Nachtrag 4 at the Staatsbiblio-
thek zu Berlin.¹³⁸ The manuscript in Germany is not attributed to any author, so
“al-Urdustānī” must be mentioned in the manuscript in Baghdad. This Berlin
manuscript, however, is a copy of Furūq-A.¹³⁹ If this Berlin and Baghdad manu-
scripts are copies of the same work, then the Baghdad manuscript attributed to
al-Urdustānī must be a copy of Furūq-A as well.
similar set of assumptions. They also give the 854 [/1450–51] date as the date of composition of
the manuscript. Alexander G. Ellis and Edward Edwards, A Descriptive List of the Arabic
Manuscripts Acquired by the Trustees of the British Museum since 1894 (London: British Museum,
1912), 25.
 The manuscript has clearly marked quiration. Each quire, starting with the fourth (al-rābiʿ),
is clearly marked and each of the following quires consists of ten folios, save the last one which
only has six folios. The pages on which the second and third quire should be marked are missing
the corner on which the quiration note is written. It seems, however, that this codex is missing
most of the first quire, but is otherwise complete. The second quire starts on 2a, the third on 12a,
and then quiration can be seen starting on 22a.
 I discuss these works below.
 I have been unable to ascertain the current name of the Baghdadi library in question. The
Germany manuscript is often referred to as Berlin 4848, its number in the Ahlwardt catalog.
 See below for a discussion of Furūq-A.

Authenticated
Historical and Geographical Trends 185
Finally, Chester Beatty 4507, al-Furūq fī l-aḥkām ʿalā madhhab al-mālikiyya is

not attributed to an author and the Chester Beatty catalog lists no author. Al-
Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl treat this as a separate and otherwise unknown work
of legal distinctions.¹⁴⁰ This manuscript is, however, a copy of Muslim al-Di-
mashqī’s book of legal distinctions.¹⁴¹
Historical and Geographical Trends
There do not seem to be particular geographical trends in the composition of

works of legal distinctions, although Baghdad in the fifth/eleventh century
seems to have been a center of distinctions writing. The Mālikī jurist al-Qāḍī
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb lived in Baghdad and Muslim al-Dimashqī was his student.¹⁴²
It was, however, a center for most kinds of legal writing and intellectual produc-
tion and scholarly activity in general at this time. The Shāfiʿī scholars al-Ḥusayn
al-Ṭabarī and ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī lived in Baghdad.¹⁴³ The genre of furūq
crossed school, as both Mālikī and Shāfiʿī authors wrote these works. When
ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣiqillī performed his pilgrimage, he is said to have met and
had discussions with Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, the son of ʿAbdallāh al-Ju-
waynī.¹⁴⁴ Baghdad was not, however, the only center of legal learning and dis-
tinctions writing. Several Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī scholars spent time in Khurasan,
notably in Nishapur, and Ibn al-Kātib lived in North Africa.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the centers
of furūq-writing in the fifth century seem to reflect the centers of intellectual pro-
duction more broadly and, like other intellectual activities, most works of legal
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 103 – 104; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:34.

 It was used by Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris in their edition of this work, Abū l-Ajfān and Abū
Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 49 – 50. A comparison between MS 4507, Chester Beatty Library, Dublin and the
printed edition of Muslim al-Dimashqī’s Kitāb al-Furūq make this evident.
 For al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, see Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khallikān,
Wafāyāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān, 8 vols., ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār Sādir, 1398/
1978), 3:219 – 22, no. 400; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 5:112; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:344,
no. 8711; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 103 – 104; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik
7:220 – 27. For Muslim al-Dimashqī, see Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab, 2:347; al-Qāḍī
ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 8:57.
 For al-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī, see Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:181, no. 142; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt,
2:61– 62 no. 767; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt, 126. For ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī, see Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt
al-dhahab, 5:176 – 77; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:165 – 66, no. 305; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 5:73 – 94,
no. 439; al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid, 69; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:209 – 11, no. 171.
 Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 2:56; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 1:116.
 Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 7:252; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 106.

Authenticated
distinctions emerged from large urban centers. In the eighth/fourteenth century,

Cairo emerged as a center of distinctions-writing. Of the six works of legal dis-
tinctions composed during this period, four were written in Cairo.¹⁴⁶ The other
two works are Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil by Sharaf al-Dīn al-Zarīrānī and al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq
by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā l-Zaydī. Although Sharaf al-Dīn al-Zarīrānī spent the majority
of his life in Baghdad, the sources tell us that he also travelled to Cairo and Dam-
ascus.¹⁴⁷ Little is known about ʿAli ibn Yaḥyā, aside from the fact that he lived in
Yemen; he does not appear to have had any connection to Cairo.¹⁴⁸
The historical movement of these texts is not entirely clear. The results of this
bibliographic survey demonstrate sustained interest in legal distinctions; manu-
script copies of earlier works were produced with some regularity long after the
sixteenth century.¹⁴⁹ These results also show a certain amount of geographic
spread for individual texts, with a large grouping of Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī texts in
both Cairo and Istanbul.¹⁵⁰ The presence of texts in various imperial centers
also suggests that works of legal distinctions were important enough to preserve
in capital cities.
Some curiosities do emerge from an initial exploration of the manuscripts.
The presence of al-Qarāfī’s al-Furūq in Istanbul and al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt in
Rabat is peculiar. Istanbul was not a center of Maliki law, nor was Rabat a
hub for Shāfiʿī jurists. The preservation of these two works perhaps signals
their historical importance or popularity. Al-Qarāfī’s al-Furūq was perhaps the
most important work of Mālikī law from the post-formative period, so it is per-
haps not surprising to find it in Istanbul, but al-Jurjānī’s work does not appear
to have had a notable impact in the Shāfiʿī school. More research is needed to
 These works are (i) al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Mujīd ibn ʿAlī l-
Hudhalī l-Armantī l-Shāfiʿī; (ii) al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn
Muṣṭafā l-Turkumānī l-Mārdīnī l-Ḥanafī, also known as Ibn al-Turkumānī; (iii) al-Furūq by
Abū Umāma Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Yaḥyā l-Dukkālī l-Magh-
ribī l-Miṣrī l-Shāfiʿī, also known as Ibn al-Naqqāsh; (iv) and Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ
wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-Asnawī.
 Ibn Rajab, Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, 5:104– 15, no. 581; al-ʿAsqālānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina,
2:357, no. 2390; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 8:228 – 29.
 Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:543, no. 10254; Muḥammad ibn Zabāra, Mulḥiq al-badr al-ṭāliʿ,
1:183 – 84.
 See Appendix I for information on all of the manuscripts of these works.
 Owing to the large number of manuscripts surveyed, this study has not taken ownership
marks, reading notes, and other marginalia into consideration. This limits, to a great extent,
my capacity to discuss geographic spread. Further study on the paratextual elements of these
manuscripts will shed great light into the use and spread of these works.

Authenticated
understand the role of these works and the historical distribution of particular
books of legal distinctions.
The lack of a clear early center of distinctions-writing may indicate that the
prehistory of legal distinctions was robust and widespread. Otherwise, it would
be surprising that early works emerging from disparate parts of the world are re-
markably similar in style and content. In addition, distinctions-writing had cur-
rency throughout the premodern and Ottoman Muslim world. The reasons for its
relevance have shifted over time and across geographies, from use in legal dis-
putation to use as intellectual entertainment in literary salons, but the distinc-
tions genre nevertheless remained enduringly relevant.
A Note on Manuscripts
As important as it is to understand the contexts in which new works of legal dis-

tinctions were written, it is necessary as well to determine their manuscript his-
tories, or where these works were being copied and recreated. The history of the
spread of these texts is an oft-overlooked aspect of the study of intellectual his-
tory but my analysis so far allows me to make some preliminary remarks on the
spread and rewriting of legal distinctions manuscripts.¹⁵¹ As Dagmar Riedel re-
minds us, “the reception of a work can be traced indirectly through its transmis-
sion and indicates how audiences utilized it, so that the evidence of its transmis-
sion documents its circulation and use.”¹⁵² The results of my survey into the
material history of legal distinctions are echo the above review of the composi-
tion of works of legal distinctions.
The most interesting discovery I made through my survey of the material his-
tory of legal distinctions was not about material history at all. Generally speak-
ing, it was easy to identify relevant works of legal distinctions based solely on
the manuscript catalog. I did, however, consistently come across works of
legal distinction cataloged under an ambiguous title, such as Risāla fī l-fiqh,
or treatise on Islamic Law, and/or without authorial attribution. Many of these
works are not catalogued completely, perhaps because some works do not pre-
 My analysis is largely based on visits to the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Leiden Uni-
versity Libraries, the Princeton University Libraries, the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, and the Sü-
leymaniye Library. In addition, I consulted scanned images of manuscripts or scanned micro-
films from the website Jāmiʿ al-Makhṭūṭāt al-Islāmiyya. Jāmiʿ al-Makhṭūṭāt al-Islāmiyya,
http://wqf.me, accessed May 2, 2019.
 Dagmar A. Riedel, “Searching for the Islamic Episteme: The Status of Historical Information
in Medieval Middle-Eastern Anthological Writing” (PhD Diss., Indiana University, 2004), 25.

Authenticated
serve enough information for proper cataloguing. Indeed, I noticed that upon
closer examination, most of these works were actually different copies of the
same two texts. These may be two different versions of a similar text, but the
manuscript families can be identified with a fair degree of confidence. The
first of these, which I label Furūq-A, I found in six different manuscript libra-
ries.¹⁵³ The second, which I label Furūq-B, is found only in the Süleymaniye Li-
brary in Istanbul and in Leiden University.
The anonymous, untitled manuscripts on the topic of legal distinctions de-
mand further study. Al-Bāḥusayn mentions these works in his survey, writing:
“Finally, we know of no later works [after al-Wansharīsī] other than a few manu-
scripts with no known author (muʾallifāt qalīla majhūlat al-muʾallaf). It is unclear
when they were written.”¹⁵⁴ These manuscripts, however, are important works of
legal distinctions. My research has revealed copies of these manuscripts in sev-
eral major manuscript repositories. Moreover, I have discovered at least one
anonymous work of legal distinctions in every major repository of Arabic manu-
scripts that I have consulted.¹⁵⁵ Because of the lack of information about these
works or their authors, they are difficult to date or locate, although based on
their content, page layout, and hands I suspect they were written in the Eastern
Mediterranean and not before the seventh/thirteenth century. The results from
this partial sample tell us a great deal about these two works and alerts us to
the importance of the material history of legal distinctions. The widespread ex-
istence of manuscripts of two anonymous works on distinctions signals that
they played an important role in Islamic legal culture.
I have found six witnesses for the distinctions text that I call Furūq-A: Halet
Efendi 807 (HE 807), in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul; Peterman II Nach-
trag 4 in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin; Garrett 4185Y (G 4185Y) in the Princeton
University Library; Ẓāhiriyya 4501 in Damascus;¹⁵⁶ Fiqh Ḥanafī 2089 in the Mak-
tabat al-Ḥaram al-Makkī in Mecca; and Khazāʾin Kutub al-Awqāf 3677 in Bagh-
 See below and Appendix I. Al-Sabīl and al-Bāḥusayn attribute this work to al-Urdustānī,
presumably based on a manuscript in Baghdad. MS Garrett 4185Y, Princeton University Library,
Princeton however, attributes the work to al-Arzustānī (MS Garrett 4185Y, 64b). The only trace
remaining of these authors is their nisbas. I discuss this issue below. Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq
al-fiqhiyya, 103; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:30.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 76.
 I have found such manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, British Library, the
Princeton University Library, the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, the Süleymaniye, and the University
of Leiden Library.
 MS Ẓāhiriyya 4501, Asadiyya Library, Damascus is heavily damaged, a fact which partly ex-
plains many of its large differences from the other MSS of this work.

Authenticated
dad.¹⁵⁷ These manuscripts share a common title, Kitāb al-Furūq, but otherwise
display a high degree of variance.¹⁵⁸ Although they begin with similar chapter
divisions, the manuscripts disagree on the placement of subdivisions and the or-
dering of subsections within the text, and on the number and ordering of distinc-
tions within the text.¹⁵⁹ The Princeton manuscript also includes a unique section,
not found in other manuscripts, masāʾil farqiyya fiqhiyya (issues of legal distin-
guishing). This suggests that the extant manuscripts are based on different
manuscript stems for this work, but closer examination is required in order to
understand the relationship between them.
In terms of content, Furūq-A is very reminiscent of other works of legal dis-
tinctions, particularly Asʿad al-Karābīsī’s Kitāb al-Furūq and al-Maḥbūbī’s Talqīḥ
al-ʿuqūl. It is written in a very concise style that quickly presents each legal prob-
lem in the legal distinction and minimally explains the distinction between
them. There are few references to other books of law or other scholars. Unsurpris-
ingly, Abū Ḥanīfa, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, and Abū Yūsuf, the three founding
figures of the Ḥanafī school, are the three jurists who appear most often. The
three founding figures are the only scholars mentioned in the Princeton manu-
script, while the Sulaymaniye’s HE 807 mentions both “Naṣīr ibn Yaḥyā [al-
Balkhī (d. ca. 268/881– 82)]”¹⁶⁰ and “Abū l-Layth [al-Samarqandī (d. ca. 383/
993 – 94)?].”¹⁶¹ The manuscripts also contain occasional references to passages
from the Qur’an or to the hadith, as well as statements on the authority of un-
named individuals or the Ḥanafī school as a whole. The manuscripts of Furūq-
A also demonstrate the permeability of the genre of legal distinctions; in partic-
ular the section on “Miscellaneous Legal Issues” (masāʾil mutafarriqa; masāʾil
mutashābiha) contains some distinctions in the form of question and answer,
and HE 807 ends with a section on legal stratagems, (ḥīla).¹⁶² The final sections
of HE 807 and G 4185Y are quite different, and seem to be works added append-
ed to the end of each respective manuscript.
 Of these, I have only been unable to consult the copy in Baghdad. I rely on the brief de-
scription given by al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:30.
 The Princeton and Damascus manuscripts have this exact title. The Istanbul and Berlin
copies are titled Kitāb al-Furūq fī l-fiqh.
 See Appendix III for the tables of contents of these manuscripts.
 MS Halet Efendi 807, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul, 7b l.16. See also Abū l-Ḥasanāt
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, al-Fawāʾid al-bahiyya fī tarājim al-ḥanafiyya, ed.
Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn Abū Firās al-Naʿsānī (Cairo: Aḥmad Nājī l-Jamālī wa-Muḥammad
Amīn al-Khānjī, 1905), 221.
 MS Halet Efendi 807, 19b l.3.
 MS Halet Efendi 807, 30b–33b.

Authenticated
Furūq-B is work is a book of legal distinctions normally titled Kitāb al-Furūq,

occasionally attributed to an Abū Bakr Najm al-Dīn al-Naysabūrī.¹⁶³ The manu-
script of this work in Leiden, Leiden Or. 481 (LO481), is one of the two works
that Joseph Schacht relies on in his article on distinctions.¹⁶⁴ Besides the Leiden
copy, I have identified seven other copies, all of which are held at the Süleyma-
niye Library in Istanbul: Giresun Yazmalar 44 (GY44), Halet Efendi 780 (HE780),
Esad Efendi 884 (EE884), Esad Efendi 542 (EE 542), Aşir Efendi 453 (AE453),
Osman Huldi 50 (OH50),¹⁶⁵ and Yazma Baǧışlar 1187 (YB1187). These manuscripts
are all in good condition and complete, they start with the basmala and seem to
end without any missing pages.¹⁶⁶ The manuscripts in the category of Furūq-B
exhibit a much higher degree of completeness and similarity than those of
Furūq-A.¹⁶⁷
The text itself does not reveal much about its author, other than his having
been a Ḥanafī. The title pages for these works similarly lack information about
the author. Two of these manuscripts, GY44 and LO481, attribute this work to
a certain Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī l-Naysābūrī,¹⁶⁸ who cannot be identified with confi-
dence.¹⁶⁹ This name consists of an honorific (laqab), a patronym, and a geo-
graphic marker. Further, while the author’s honorific and geographic origin are
given in three manuscripts, his patronym is given alternatively as “ibn Abī
Bakr” and “ibn Bakr.”¹⁷⁰ His death date is never mentioned, even though the au-
 It is most easily recognized from its opening phrase, “Praise be to God, who guides us with
Islam and commands us to submit to Him (al-ḥamd lillāh alladhī hadānā bi-l-islām wa-amaranā
bi-l-istislām),” and the first distinction in the book, which begins, “When a man prays wearing
an impure garment that is in his possession … (rajul ṣallā fī thawb kāna ʿindahu ghayr ṭāhir).”
 See Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern.”
 This is listed in the catalog as Furūq Ibn Nujaym, which is the title written on the outer and
inner cover of the manuscript.
 The only partial exception is OH50, of which the top of the first page is missing, affecting
the first eight lines of the text on the first folio.
 See Appendix IV for tables of contents of these manuscripts.
 In the bibliographies compiled by al-Bāḥusayn and al-Sabīl, his first name (ism) is added,
and given as ʿAlī. They do not cite a source for this, but it is likely from Ismāʿīl Pāshā l-Baghdādī,
Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-maknūn fī l-dhayl ʿalā Kashf al-ẓunūn (Istanbul: Millî Eǧtim Basımevi, 1972), 1:232
and 2:188.
 Scholars who have discussed this manuscript have also been at a loss when attempting to
identify this individual See Peter Voorhoeve, Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts in the University of
Leiden and Other Collections in the Netherlands, 2nd ed. (The Hague; Boston: Leiden University
Press, 1980), 85; GAL S2:956; P. De Jong and M.J. De Goeje, Catalogus Codicum Orientalium
Bibliothecae Academiae Luguno Batavae, vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1861), 155; Schacht “Furūq-
Büchern,” 506; Kızılkaya, İslâm Hukukunda Farklar, 196 – 98.
 For “ibn Abi Bakr,” see LO 481; for “ibn Bakr,” see GY 44.

Authenticated
Conclusion 191
thor’s name is sometimes written multiple times on a single manuscript.¹⁷¹ It is

possible that the author was well-known when these manuscripts were copied,
although such a supposition also raises questions about the reliability of the bib-
liographic sources. It is surprising that a work which is seemingly so popular has
almost entirely escaped recent notice. For now, however, the author of this text
remains a mystery.
Furūq-A and Furūq-B overlap considerably. Both are terse works, and Furūq-
B, like Furūq-A, mentions just a few jurists, primarily Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767),
Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥ asan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/
804), and, less frequently, Muḥammad ibn Muqātil al-Rāzī (d. 248/862),¹⁷² al-
Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933),¹⁷³ Abū Bakr al-Iskāfī (d. 333/944),¹⁷⁴ Naṣīr ibn Yaḥyā (d.
ca. 250/864)¹⁷⁵ and “al-Faqīh Abū l-Layth,” presumably al-Samarqandī (d.
ca. 383/993).¹⁷⁶ There are noteworthy similarities in content between Furūq-A
and Furūq-B. The mentions of Ḥanafī authorities or books are rare; these texts
assume the reader is already familiar with Ḥanafī doctrine. The similarities
may be due to the fact that they are both short works of Ḥanafī legal distinctions.
Alternatively, their similarities may signify that these works were written in a
similar cultural context; that is, it may be that the two works may have been
composed around the same time and for similar purposes.
Conclusion
This chapter establishes the corpus of works of legal distinctions, identifies the
authors of these works, and traces their remaining records. While the number of
works of legal distinctions is relatively limited, these works were compiled for
much of Islamic history. The genre’s vitality was reflected in both the composi-
tion of new works and the production of manuscripts of existing books.
This survey further suggests avenues for future study. For example, why did
interest in works of legal distinctions even with dubious attribution, as exempli-
 See LO 481.

 GY 44, 4b, l. 7. Muḥ ammad ibn Muqā til was a student of Muḥ ammad al-Shaybā nī, see Fuat
Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums, 9 vols., (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 1:436.
 GY 44, 6a, l.13.
 GY 44, 10a, ll.3 – 4. The passage in which Abū Bakr al-Iskāf appears is found in GY 44 and
HE 807, although he is not mentioned in HE 807.
 GY 44, 10a l.9. The passage in which Naṣir ibn Yaḥya appears is found in GY 44 and HE 807.
 GY 44, 30a l.15. The passage in which Abū l-Layth appears is found in GY 44 and HE 807,
see Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schriftums, 1:445 – 50.

Authenticated
fied in particular by Furūq-A, Furūq-B, and the Kitāb al-Furūq attributed to Mu-
ḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī, have such staying power in the Ottoman context?
Ironically, this interest dovetailed with an almost complete lack of new works of
legal distinction. Such a study may also yield insights into larger issues pertain-
ing to the role of Islamic law in Ottoman-era intellectual culture.
Ibn Nujaym seems to be a central figure in the story of legal distinctions in
the Ottoman Empire. He was an outsider in the Ottoman legal system, not having
graduated from the Ottoman madrasa system. Nevertheless, as Guy Burak writes,
his “al-Asbāh wa’l-naẓāʾir … drew the attention of senior members of the Otto-
man learned hierarchy and was eventually incorporated into the imperial juris-
prudential canon.”¹⁷⁷ Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir was eventually sanc-
tioned as a part of the Ottoman canon by the chief mufti, Ebû’s-Suʿûd (d. 982/
1574). After receiving his blessing, “the text entered circulation, which means
that it was taught within … the imperial madrasa system.”¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, Ibn
Nujaym’s text was not universally admired, however, as Burak notes, “several
members of the Ottoman learned hierarchy remained perplexed as to the status
of al-Ashbāh wa’l-naẓāʾir in the decades following its completion and its appro-
bation by Ebû-Sʿûd.”¹⁷⁹ As a canonical text for the Ottoman educational system,
the final work of Ḥanafī legal distinctions was disseminated widely by Ottoman
scholars. A look at the reception of and commentaries on the al-Ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir and particularly the sixth section on distinctions would be worthwhile.
Another line of inquiry could analyze the manuscript record more intensive-
ly. A richer history than the one undertaken herein could look into the ownership
history of several manuscripts, thereby identifying who was interested in them
and where and when they moved. Combined with the bio-bibliographical record
and the general history of legal distinctions uncovered in the present study, this
avenue could yield insights into the later history of Islamic law. An intellectual
history based largely on manuscript evidence could also help us understand the
social role that these texts had. What were the motivations behind textual pro-
duction and textual spread?
In particular, Furūq-A and Furūq-B deserve greater scrutiny. There seems to
be two strands of inquiry relevant to these texts. The first involves the relation-
ship between these two works. Have these always been separate works? Did their
textual traditions merge? Although the manuscripts categorized as Furūq-A vary
considerably, at this point, there is sufficient reason to believe that they comprise
 Guy Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the Early Modern
Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 136.
 Burak, Second Formation, 138 – 39.
 Burak, Second Formation, 136, see also 137– 39.

Authenticated
Conclusion 193
one work. There seems clearly to be a relationship between these two texts, but
what is the nature of this relationship? The second strand involves what seems to
be the widespread popularity of these two woks. Furūq-A and Furūq-B are as
popular as any other work of legal distinction, yet they seem to challenge our
assumptions about the importance of authorship for the spread and popularity
of intellectual production.

Authenticated
Conclusion
This study has focused on the history of the genre of legal distinctions. It has
shown that this genre was a small but significant component of the literature
of Islamic law. It also demonstrated the value of genre as a framework for Islamic
legal research. Through our analysis of this genre, we gained a great deal of in-
sight into Islamic legal history. Some of the findings of this study reinforce al-
ready understood facts about the development of Islamic law, such as the
close formal connections between the disciplines of law and grammar, the im-
portance of the fifth/eleventh century as a turning point in the development
of legal literature, and the importance of formalized disputation in advancing
legal thought and legal writing. At the same time, however, it has made several
new contributions to the study of Islamic legal history and suggested a few lines
of future inquiry.
Perhaps the primary finding of this study is the close connection between
changes in the social uses of Islamic legal knowledge and in the intellectual pro-
duction of legal scholars. A sustained analysis of treatises of legal distinction
has revealed a close connection between social history and the rhetoric of Islam-
ic legal texts; this can be seen both in the performance of legal knowledge at for-
mal disputations and the connections with the rise of the distinctions genre and
with the performance of legal knowledge in majālis and the proliferation of rid-
dles and the rhetoric of riddles. It was through a sustained focus on the genre of
legal distinctions that we gained this insight into Islamic legal history. In this
way, this book has demonstrated the relevance of genre as a productive frame-
work for Islamic legal research.
In studying the genre of legal distinctions, an understanding of genre as a
kind of Wittgensteinian language game was productive. The idea of genre as a
language game takes genre as a recurring activity that is structured by rules
but open to change over time.¹ The first three chapters of this book laid down
some of the rules that govern the particular game that is the genre of legal dis-
tinctions. Some of these rules are readily apparent: organization by legal topic,
the comparison of two or more apparently similar but different legal problems,
the disconnected narrative between one comparison and another, and the word-
ing of book titles. Other rules, however, were more clearly tied to developments
in the public demand for particular presentations of knowledge. In part, the
legal logic of comparison found in works of legal distinctions is directly tied
 I discuss this idea in the Introduction, pp. 7–8. See also R. Kevin Jaques, Authority, Conflict
and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic Law (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 17– 23.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-009

Authenticated
Conclusion 195
to the institution of formalized disputation, as shown by the handbooks of dis-

putation studied in Chapter Three. Moreover, the logic of legal distinctions is
closely connected to the popularization of formal disputation among Muslim ju-
rists in the fifth/eleventh century and the need for resources to participate suc-
cessfully in these disputations. Similarly, the convergence between riddles and
distinctions was fueled by the popularization and spread of majālis and the
changing aesthetic preferences that accompanied the spread of majālis.
At the same time, however, the focus on the genre has also helped us to un-
derstand legal distinctions more clearly. In particular, we have seen how they
have a life independent of their relationship with the concepts of legal maxims
(al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya), legal purposes (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa), or al-ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir. ² In other words, the term al-furūq al-fiqhiyya is more than just another
term for other genres or concepts in Islamic law. Musa’s statement that al-
ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir is synonymous with furūq is based on a statement of equiv-
alency between both terms first by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) and later by
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ḥamawī (d. 1098/1687).³ It is clear that these authors under-
 The specific meaning of the phrase al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir remains unclear to me. There are
several legal books titled al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, primarily by Shāfiʿī scholars, among them:
Ibn al-Wakīl (d. 716/1317), Tāj al-Dīn ibn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370), and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d.
911/1505). Ibn Nujaym also wrote a work with this title. Does this phrase indicate a particular
kind of legal genre? If so, what separates this legal genre from works of legal maxims
(qawāʿid)? Perhaps this phrase refers to a particular kind of intellectual activity, but if so,
what does it entail and when did it gain currency? Finally, what is the relationship, if any, be-
tween these legal works and the other lexicographic and linguistic works with similar titles,
such as: al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī l-Qurʾān al-karīm by Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767),
Alfāẓ al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir attributed to Ibn al-Anbārī (d. 577/1181), Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-
naẓāʾir min ashʿār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-jāhiliyya wa-l-mukhaḍramīn by Abū ʿUthmān Saʿīd al-
Khālidī (d. 350/961) and Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Khālidī (d. 380/990), also known as the
Ḥamāsat al-Khālidiyayn, and Kashf al-sarāʾir fī maʿnā al-wujūh wa-l-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by
Ibn al-ʿImad (d. 887/1482). It should not be taken for granted that these lexicographic works
themselves form a coherent unit. It does, however, seem likely that al-Suyūṭī’s four-volume al-
Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī l-naḥw has some relationship with his legal work. Nevertheless, there
are many questions about these works that still need to be addressed.
 Jalāl al-Dīn l-Suyūṭī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī qawāʿid wa furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyyah, ed. ʿAbd al-
Karīm al-Faḍīlī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1411/1990), 7 and Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-
Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir: Sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 4 vols., no ed. (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405/1985), 489. Khadiga Musa has recently cited these statements
as proof that “al-ashbāh wa’l-naẓāʾir is actually the science of al-furūq.” While this statement
may be true by the ninth/sixteenth, the history of al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir and the connection
of that discipline to that of legal distinctions. Khadiga Musa, “Part One: The Genre of al-
Qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya,” in A Critical Edition of ‘Umdat al-Nāẓir ‘alā al-Ashbāh wa’l-Naẓā‘ir by
Abū l-Suʿūd al-Husaynī, ed. Khadiga Musa (Sheffield: Equinox, 2018), 14; idem, “Legal Maxims

Authenticated
196 Conclusion
stood al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir to somehow be equivalent to al-furūq al-fiqhiyya. It

remains, however, that works of al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir cover much more materi-
al than just legal distinctions and that at least until the time of al-Suyūṭī, legal
distinctions are not commonly referred to as al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. It is, per-
haps, more accurate to state that by the time al-Suyūṭī wrote his al-Ashbāh
wa-l-naẓāʾir, that genre had come to be inextricably linked to legal distinctions.
Indeed neither the al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir of Ibn al-Wakīl (d. 716/1317) nor that of
Ibn al-Subkī contain a discussion of legal distinctions.⁴ The reason for this dis-
crepancy is likely, as Musa suggests, that “discipline of al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir
was not fully developed in Ibn al-Subkī’s time.”⁵ Indeed, she also suggests
that al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir could also be seen as “the science of al-qawāʿid al-
fiqhiyya.”⁶ It is clear that more research is needed to understand the identity,
contours, and function of these genres, and that genres and the rules that gov-
erned them shifted across time, as we saw with the case of legal distinctions and
legal riddles.
This study demonstrates this change clearly for legal distinctions and for
legal riddles. It should not be surprising to see Islamic legal literature change
in response to shifting demands from reading publics. The changes documented
here, however, are changes in the presentation or packaging of legal informa-
tion, not necessarily substantive changes to the legal content itself. The changes
described here should not be understood as mere aesthetic changes, but rather
the aesthetic changes inform us about shifts in the consumption of Islamic legal
knowledge. These findings suggest that an increased focus on genre as a histor-
ically contingent phenomenon—looking at genre as a concept and changes with-
in individual genres—would likely contribute greatly to our understanding of Is-
lamic law and legal development. Genre, at least in the post-formative period
(after the fifth/eleventh c.), responded to the demand of consumers of legal
knowledge and their interests likely contributed to formal innovation of ideas,
reasoning strategies, and the organization of knowledge.
as a Genre of Islamic Law: Origins, Development, and Significance of al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyya,”

Islamic Law and Society 21 (2014), 334.
 Muḥammad ibn Makkī ibn al-Wakīl, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī fiqh al-shāfiʿiyya, ed. Muḥam-
mad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002); Tāj al-Dīn
ibn al-Subkī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir, 2 vols., ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥam-
mad ʿAwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1411/1991).
 Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 338. Of course, one could also understand that al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir
was simply constituted in a different way in the time al-Subkī, without understanding this differ-
ence as a lack.
 Musa, “Legal Maxims,” 339.

Authenticated
Conclusion 197
This study also contains a brief survey of lexicographic distinctions. Lexico-

graphic distinctions have not received much scholarly attention, yet they can
shed light on many issues important for understanding the development of Ara-
bic philological practices. A more thorough analysis of the Kitāb al-Furūq al-
lughawiyya by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī is desirable. It seems likely that a contextual-
ization of al-ʿAskarī’s work would help shed light on the important connections
between lexicography and theology. Al-ʿAskarī is a well-known figure (today)
about whom not much is known (historically); a study of his work on lexico-
graphical distinctions could be helpful in further understanding his theological
views, which in turn may shed light on his other writings, and grant us new in-
sights into the linguistic worldview of Muʿtazilite theology at the end of the
fourth/tenth century.
Similarly, the history of lexicographical distinctions deserves further scruti-
ny. As understood in Chapter Two, lexicographical distinctions could be seen in
two ways: as theological treatises on synonymy and as thesauruses concerned
with proper usage. That chapter speculates that the thesauric aspect gave the
genre longevity; nevertheless, it may be that works of lexicographical distinc-
tions retained their theological resonances throughout their history. A study of
the lexicographic distinction books by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī and İsmail Hakkı
Bursevi may help in understanding Sunni theological developments in the
early modern period.
Finally, the critical bibliography of the genre of legal distinctions raises
questions about our understandings of the written traditions of Islamic law.
As concerns legal distinctions, the prevalence of works with dubious or un-
known authorship is high. It is not clear to me whether the popularity of such
works is something particular to the genre of legal distinctions, or if other genres
of legal literature also have various popular works with unclear authorship. This
is a question that should be pursued as it may help to clarify the role and and the
relationship between authorship and the possible production of anonymous
study texts. Chapter Five showed the importance of claims to authorship in
the bio-bibliographical tradition. Certain claims known to be erroneous, such
as the existence of a Talqīḥ al-Maḥbūbī attributed to Asʿad al-Karābīsī, were nev-
ertheless preserved in the bibliographic tradition. It appears that there may be a
tension between the importance of authorship and the prevalence of works with
no known author.

Authenticated
Appendix I: Bibliography of Furūq Works by
Madhhab
Below in outline form is a comprehensive list of works on legal distinctions, which is based on
my research into the genre of al-furūq al-fiqhiyya. It contains all of the published editions and
manuscripts known to me. The outline is arranged by legal school (madhhab), and then chro-
nologically by author within each school. Authors for whom death dates are unknown are listed
last within each legal school. The footnotes for each main entry contain the relevant biblio-
graphical information about the author and/or the work described. If printed editions discuss
particular manuscripts, I include a reference to the description for the manuscript in a footnote.
For the reasons noted in the main text, this survey includes al-Furūq by al-Qarāfī and al-Ashbāh
wa-l-naẓāʾir by Ibn al-Nujaym, but does not mention their manuscripts or editions. All other
works are treated in detail.
Shāfiʿī
. Al-Furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar ibn Surayj al-Shāfiʿī (d. /).¹
a. Not extant.
 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law: Remarks on the Furūq Literature,” in Studies in
Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth Volume I: Hunter of the East; Arabic and Semitic Studies,
ed. Ian Richard Netton (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 342; Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bāḥusayn, al-
Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: muqawwamātuhā shurūṭuhā nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā; dirāsa
naẓariyya waṣfiyya tārīkhiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1419/1998), 68, 72– 73, 84; ʿUmar
ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” in ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-
Zarīrānī, Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil, ed. ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-
Sabīl (Mecca: Wizārat al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀlī, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya
wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1414/1993), 1:34; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub
wa-l-funūn, 2 vols., ed. Şerefettin Yaltkaya and Kilisi Rifat Bilge (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi,
1971), s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1257– 58; Joseph Schacht, “Aus zwei arabischen
Furūq-Büchern,” Islamica 2 (1926), 509; ʿUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn: Tarājim
muṣannifī l-kutub al-ʿarabiyya, 4 vols. (Damascus: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1376/1957), 1:218,
no. 1596; Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya l-kubrā, 10 vols, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥam-
mad Ḥulw and Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Tannāḥī (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-ʿArabiyya, 1994),
3:21– 39, no. 85; Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-
Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1970), 108 – 109; Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 2 vols., ed.
Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407/1987), 1:311, no. 593; Shihāb al-Dīn
ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab, 10 vols.,
ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ and Maḥmūd al-Arnāʾūṭ (Damascus: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1406/1986 –
1414/1993), 4:29 – 31; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 4 vols., ed. al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm
Khān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407[/1986]), 1:89 – 91, no. 35.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-010

Authenticated
Shāfiʿī 199
. Kitāb al-masāʾil wa-l-ʿilal wa-l-furūq by Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawī (d. ca /
).²
a. Not extant.
. Al-Kifāya fī l-furūq wa-l-laṭāʾif by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī (d. ca.
fifth/eleventh c.).³
a. Not extant.
. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī l-Shāfiʿī (d. /
).⁴
a. Alternate Titles:
i. Al-Furūq
ii. Al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil. ⁵
b. Editions:
i. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq. Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāma ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī.
 volumes. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, .
ii. Partial edition: Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mazīnī. MA Thesis, Sharīʿa College,
Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd Islamic University, /.⁶
c. MSS:
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 509; Ibn al-Nadīm, al-
Fihrist li-l-Nadīm, 2 vols., ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān li-l-Turāth
al-ʿArabī, 1430/2009), 2.1:55.
 The author of this work is Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī. This is confirmed
by all of the biographies of al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh, with the exception of that written by Abū
Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, who does not mention this work. See al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 90 – 91;
Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:181, no. 142; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:61– 62, no. 767; al-Shīrāzī,
Ṭabaqāt, 126. Other sources, however, attribute this work to Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥannāṭī l-Ṭabarī (d. ca 495/1101– 02), see al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:37; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn, 1:636, no. 4795; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-
ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1499; Ismāʿīl Bāshā l-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn:
Asmāʾ al-muʾallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.),
1:311. These sources, however, are all late. Earlier biographies of al-Ḥannāṭī do not attribute
this work to him, see Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:179 – 81, no. 141; al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt,
4:367– 71, no. 397; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:193 – 94, no. 362; al-Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt, 118.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 87; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:35 – 36; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal, ed. Wolfhart Hein-
richs (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1408/1987), 73; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-
Jamʿ wa-l-farq,” 1:601 and s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258; GAL 1:385 – 86, S1:667;
Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:307, no. 8443; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 5:176 – 77; al-Asnawī,
Ṭabaqāt, 1:165 – 66, no. 305; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 5:73 – 94, no. 439; Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī,
al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid, 3 vols., ed. Taysīr Fāʾiq Aḥmad Maḥmūd and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda
(Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982), 1:69; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt,
1:209 – 11, no. 171.
 MS Garrett 824H, Princeton University Library, Princeton.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 87.

Authenticated
200 Appendix I: Bibliography of Furūq Works by Madhhab
i. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,  Fiqh Shāfiʿī, n.d.⁷

ii. Cairo, al-Maktaba l-Azhariyya,  fiqh shāfiʿī, n.d.⁸
iii. Cairo, al-Maktaba l-Azhariyya,  fiqh shāfiʿī, n.d.⁹
iv. Dublin, Chester Beatty , copied /.¹⁰
v. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi , n.d.¹¹
vi. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Turkhān v Sultan , eighth C / fourteenth
C.¹²
vii. Princeton, Princeton University Library Garrett H, /.
. Al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil by Abū l-Khayr Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa l-Maqdisī l-
Shāfiʿī (d. / – ).¹³
a. Not extant.
. Al-Muʿāyāt by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī l-Shāfiʿī (d. / – ).¹⁴
a. Alternate titles:
i. Al-Furūq
ii. Al-Muʿāyāt fī l-ʿaql
iii. Al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh
iv. Al-Muʿāyāt wa-l-imtiḥān
b. Editions:
i. Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh. Edited by Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir al-Bashar. PhD Diss.,
Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, [/].
ii. Al-Muʿāyāt fī l-ʿaql aw al-Furūq. Edited by Muḥammad Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya, .
 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāma ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī, “al-Bāb al-thānī fī dirāsat al-kitāb,” in
Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sal-
āma ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 2004), 1:35.
 Al-Mazīnī, “al-Bāb al-thānī,” 1:36.
 Al-Mazīnī, “al-Bāb al-thānī,” 1:36.
 Al-Mazīnī, “al-Bāb al-thānī,” 1:35 – 36.
 In GAL S1:673 incorrectly attributed to Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī.
 Al-Mazīnī, “al-Bāb al-thānī,” 1:35.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88 – 89; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:36. GAL S1:505;
Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:772, no. 5741; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:218, no. 1069; al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr,
1:69; al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:245, no. 207; Ḥājjī Khalīfa,
Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:2007– 2008; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 7:99, no. 794.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 89 – 90; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 36 – 37; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:241, no. 1747; GAL S1:505; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt,
4:74– 76, no. 271; al-Ziriklī, Aʿlām 1:214; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “al-Muʿāyāt fī l-ʿaql,”
2:1730; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba Ṭabaqāt 1:260, no. 222; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:165, no. 306.

Authenticated
Shāfiʿī 201
c. MSS:
i. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya  Fiqh Shāfiʿī, Shaʿbān  /  September – 
October .¹⁵
ii. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Fiqh Shāfiʿī Ṭalaʿat , n.d.¹⁶
iii. Rabat, al-Khizāna l-Malikiyya  dāl, n.d.
. Al-Furūq by Abū l-Maḥāsin ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Ismāʿīl al-Rūyānī l-Ṭabarī l-Shāfiʿī (d. /
 or /).¹⁷
a. Not Extant.
. Al-Fuṣūl wa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khalaf ibn
Rājiḥ al-Maqdisī l-Ḥanbalī, al-Shāfiʿī (d. /).¹⁸
a. Not Extant.
. Al-Furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kashāsib al-Shāfiʿī l-Dizmārī (d. /
).¹⁹
a. Not Extant.
. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Majīd ibn ʿAlī l-Hudhalī l-Armantī l-Shāfiʿī
(d. /).²⁰
a. Not Extant.
 Ibrāhim ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar, “al-Muqaddima,” in Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn
Muḥammad al-Jurjānī, al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh, ed. Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar (PhD
Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1415[/1994]), 109. This manuscript was previously cataloged under
1569 ʿumūmī, and 915 khuṣūṣī.
 Al-Bashar, “al-Muqaddima,” 110 – 11.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 92; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37. Al-Bāḥusayn says that
this book must be similar to al-Jurjānī’s al-Muʿāyāt since al-Subkī cites them together in his al-
Ashbāh w-al-naẓāʾir. See also Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 7:193 – 204, no. 901; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt,
1:272, no. 518; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:332, no. 8626; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 6:8; al-Zir-
iklī, al-Aʿlām, 4:175; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 1:287, no. 256.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 95; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:37. This scholar was first a Ḥanbalī but later became a Shāfiʿī. This work
seems not to be extant, but I believe it is a work in the Shāfiʿī tradition since it is cited in
Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, no ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutubī, 1414/
1994), 7:220; 7:245; 7:394; and 8:38; See also al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:211– 12, no. 404; Ibn Qādī
Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 2:71, no. 371; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:331; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam,
1:262– 63, no. 1896.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 95 – 96; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37; Ibn al-Subkī,
Ṭabaqāt, 8:30, no. 1054; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:152, no. 289; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 2:100,
no. 401; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:232, no. 1695.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96 – 97; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:37; Ibn al-Subkī,
Ṭabaqāt, 10:430 – 33, no. 1419; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:85 – 86, no. 149; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt
al-dhahab, 8:125 – 26; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:193, no. 18608; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1:601;
Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 2:301– 302, no. 574.

Authenticated
. Al-Furūq by Abū Umāma Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Yaḥyā l-
Dukkālī l-Maghribī l-Miṣrī l-Shāfiʿī, Ibn al-Naqqāsh (d. /).²¹
a. Not Extant.
b. Alternate Titles:
i. Kitāb al-Farq. ²²
ii. Al-Naẓāʾir wa-l-furūq. ²³
. Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-
Ḥasan al-Asnawī l-Shāfiʿī (d. /).²⁴
a. Editions:
i. Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq. Edited by Naṣr Farīd
Muḥammad Wāṣil. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, .²⁵
b. MSS:
i. Baghdad, Maktabat al-Awqāf, , n.d.²⁶
ii. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,  Fiqh Shāfiʿī,  Rabīʿ II  /  March
.²⁷
iii. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya  Fiqh Shāfiʿī, n.d.²⁸
iv. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,  Fiqh Shāfiʿī, n.d.²⁹
v. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,  Uṣūl al-fiqh, n.d.³⁰
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 99 – 100; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 1:38; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,”
2:1258; Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-
Kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa l-thāmina, no ed. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [197–]),
4:71– 74; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 3:131– 32, no. 670; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab,
8:338; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:521, no. 14780; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām, 6:286; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-
ʿārifīn, 2:162; GAL S2:348.
 Al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 2:162; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:338.
 Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:339; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 3:132; Kaḥḥāla,
Muʿjam, 3:521.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:38; GAL 2:90 – 91, S2:107; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī l-furūʿ
al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258; ibid. s.v. “Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq,” 2:1718; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab,
8:383 – 84; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 510; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Ṭabaqāt, 3:98 – 101, no. 648.
 According to al-Bāḥusayn, Naṣr Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil produced a study and edition of
this work as his PhD Dissertation from al-Azhar University in 1392/1972– 73 (al-Bāḥusayn, al-
Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100). The Dār al-Shurūq printing is likely the publication of his dissertation.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 41.
 Naṣr Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil, “Dirāsa” in Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan al-
Asnawī, Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq, 2 vols., ed. Naṣr Farīd Muḥammad
Wāṣil (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007), 1:17– 18.
 Wāṣil, “Dirāsa,” 1:19 – 20.
 Wāṣil, “Dirāsa,” 1:18.
 Wāṣil, “Dirāsa,” 1:18 – 19.

Authenticated
Ḥanafī 203
vi. Cairo, Khizānat Makhṭūṭāt al-Jāmiʿ al-Azhar,  Fiqh Shāfiʿī, n.d.³¹
vii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Murat Molla , / – .
. Kitāb al-Furūq by Anonymous (d. ?).

a. MS:
i. London, MS Oriental , British Library,  Dhī l-Ḥijja,  / January , .
Ḥanafī
. Al-Furūq by Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī l-Ḥanafī (d. / – ).³²
a. Editions:
i. Kitāb al-Furūq. Edited by ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd Aḥmad al-Zahrānī. Ph.D Diss.,
Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, /.
b. MSS:
i. Baghdad, Maktabat al-Awqāf, , n.d.³³
ii. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Or. , /.
iii. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya; Fiqh Ḥanafī , after /.
iv. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar  Rāfiʿī , Fiqh Ḥanafī , /.
v. Istanbul, Suleymaniye, Ahmet III , /.³⁴
vi. Istanbul, Suleymaniye, Feyzullah Efendi, , th/th century (?).³⁵
. Al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Nāṭifī l-Ṭabarī l-
Ḥanafī (d. / – ).³⁶
a. MSS:
i. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Esad Efendi .³⁷
ii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Nuruosmaniye .³⁸
 Wāṣil, “Dirāsa,” 1:20.

 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69, 74, 84; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 28; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257;
GAL 1:442– 43, S1:295; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:355, no. 13711; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 508; al-Zir-
iklī, al-Aʿlām, 6:162; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 2:33.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:28; al-Laknawī, al-Fawāʾid al-bahiyya, 36; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:287, no. 2086;
Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Ajnās fī l-furūʿ,” 1:11; GAL 1:372, S1:636; Ibn Quṭlūbughā,
Tāj al-tarājim, 6 – 7, no. 12; al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 1:297– 98, no. 221; al-Ziriklī, al-
Aʿlām 1:213; Taqī l-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya fī ṭabaqāt al-
ḥanafiyya, 4 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad Ḥulw (Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1983), 2:71– 72,
no. 343.
 Al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28.
 Al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:28.

Authenticated
. Al-Furūq by Abū l-Muẓaffar Asʿad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Naysābūrī l-Karābīsī l-
Ḥanafī (d. / – ).³⁹
a. Editions:
i. Al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī. Muḥammad Ṭumūm and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda.  vols.
Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, /.
ii. Al-Furūq fī l-furūʿ fī fiqh al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa l-Nuʿmān raḍiya Allāh ʿanhu. Printed
with Ikhtilāf Abī Ḥanīfa wa-Ibn Abī Laylā by Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb ibn Ibrāhīm al-
Anṣārī and Tarjamat Abī Ḥanīfa wa-Abī Yūsuf wa-Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-
Shaybānī by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī. Edited by Aḥmad
Farīd al-Mazīdī. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, /.
iii. Kitāb al-Furūq. Edited by Muḥammad Ṭumūm. Cairo: Dār al-Salām, /.
b. MSS:
i. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,  fiqh ḥanafī, n.d.⁴⁰
ii. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya,  fiqh ḥanafī, /.⁴¹
iii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Carullah , / – .⁴²
iv. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Fatih , / – .
. Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm al-Maḥbūbī l-
Ḥanafī, also known as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa l-Awwal (d. / – ).⁴³
i. Kitāb talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī l-furūq bayn ahl al-nuqūl.
b. Editions:
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 91– 92; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:28 – 29; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257;
GAL 1:375, S1:642; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:351, no. 2603; Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 506 – 508; al-
Qurashī, Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 1:386, no. 314; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 4:4; al-Tamīmī
l-Dārī, Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 2:181, no. 473; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 1:204; Ibn Quṭlūbughā,
Tāj al-tarājim, 12, no. 44.
 Muḥammad Ṭumūm, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” in al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī by Asʿad ibn Muḥam-
mad al-Karābīsī, ed. Muḥammad Ṭumūm (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya,
1982), 1:23 – 24.
 Ṭumūm, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” 23.
 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 508.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:29; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl,” 1:481
and s.v. “al-Furūq fī furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; GAL 1:380; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:191, no. 1415;
Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, 9, no. 29; al-Qurashī, Jawāhir al-muḍiyya 1:196, no. 137; al-
Tamīmī l-Dārī, Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 1:364, no. 208; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn 1:204. Interest-
ingly, al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya lists two works with this title by two different authors, Shihāb al-Dīn
Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn Ibrāhīm al-Maḥbūbī (al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 1:364,
no. 208) and Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿUmar
ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Muḥammad ibn Jaʿfar ibn Hārūn ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Maḥbūb
ibn al-Walīd ibn ʿIbāda, al-Imām Shams al-Aʾimma l-Maḥbūbī l-Bukhārī (al-Tamīmī l-Dārī,
Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya, 1:376, no. 220).

Authenticated
Ḥanafī 205
i. Kitāb Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl li-Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh
al-Maḥbūbī Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa l-Awwal dirāsa wa-taḥqīq, ed. ʿAbd al-Hādī Shīr al-
Afghānī, MA Thesis, Cairo University, .⁴⁴
c. MSS:
i. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Landberg , /.⁴⁵
ii. Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya Fiqh Ḥanafī , n.d.
iii. Istanbul, İstanbul Millet Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi , / – .
iv. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Beyazid , n.d.
v. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Carullah , n.d.
vi. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Haci Mehmud Efendi , / – .
vii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Murat Molla .
viii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Șehid Ali Pașa .
ix. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe , n.d.
x. Princeton, Princeton University Library, New Series, no. , n.d.
. Al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā l-Turkumānī l-Mārdīnī l-
Ḥanafī, Ibn al-Turkumānī (d. ca. / – ).⁴⁶
a. Not extant
b. MSS:
i. Damascus, al-Maktaba l-Asadiyya, Ẓāhiriyya (?).⁴⁷
. Al-Furūq by Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd Marghāyatī (? d. early ninth/fif-
teenth c.).⁴⁸
a. MSS:
i. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Arabe .
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:29n2. Both of these sour-
ces say that this thesis was submitted to al-Azhar University, but it seems to be from Cairo Uni-
versity. See http://research.asu.edu.eg/handle/987654321/9953, accessed April 30, 2019.
 Available online at http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/SBB00016C2300000000 ac-
cessed April 30, 2019.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 98 – 99; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 1:29; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:192, no. 1420; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “al-
Furūq fī furūʿ al-ḥanafiyya,” 2:1257; al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya, 1:197– 98, no. 139; al-ʿAs-
qalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina, 1:198; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 8:243; al-Tamīmī l-Dārī,
Ṭabaqāt, 1:389, no. 240; GAL 2:64, S2:67– 68; Ibn Quṭlūbughā Tāj al-tarājim, 9, no. 30.
 Although this work is attributed to Ibn al-Turkumānī, this attribution seems erroneous. This
is a copy of Furūq-A, which has been attributed to many different jurists, see above Chapter Five,
pp. 188 – 89.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 29. This text is also avail-
able in microfilm at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, microfilm
812. Neither al-Bāḥusayn nor al-Sabīl mention the manuscript reflected in the microfilm.

Authenticated
. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Zayn al-Dīn ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī (d. /).⁴⁹
. Furūq-A; al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa. ⁵⁰

a. MSS:
i. Baghdad, Khazāʾin kutub al-awqāf, , n.d.⁵¹
ii. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Peterman II Nachtag  p.
iii. Damascus, Asadiyya Library, Ẓāhiriyya , n.d.
iv. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Halet Efendi , n.d.
v. Mecca, Maktabat al-Ḥaram al-Makkī, Fiqh Ḥanafī , n.d.⁵²
vi. Princeton Garrett Y, n.d.⁵³
. Furūq-B; al-Furūq fī l-furūʿ attributed to Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Naysābūrī l-Ḥanafī
(d. ?).⁵⁴
a. Alternate title
i. Taḥrīr al-furūq. ⁵⁵
b. MSS:
i. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Aşir Efendi .
ii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Esad Efendi , / – .
iii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Esad Efendi , / – .
iv. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Giresun Yazmalar .
v. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Halet Efendi .
vi. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Osman Huldi , /.⁵⁶
vii. Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kutuphanesi, Yazma Bağişlar , / – .
viii. Leiden, Leiden University Library, Or. 
Mālikī
. Furūq masāʾil mushtabiha fī l-madhhab by Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī ibn
Muḥammad al-Kanānī l-Mālikī, also known as Ibn al-Kātib (d. /).⁵⁷
a. Not extant.
 Al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:30; GAL 2:310 – 11, S2:425 – 27; Ḥajjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v.
“al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī l-furūʿ,” 1:99 – 100; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab 10:523; al-
Tamīmī l-Dārī, Ṭabaqāt, 3:275, no. 894.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 103 – 104; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:30.
 Attributed to Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Urdustānī.
 Attributed to Ismāʿīl Ḥaqqī.
 Attributed to al-Arzustānī.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 103; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:29; al-Baghdādī, Īḍāḥ al-
maknūn, 1:232 and 2:188. GAL S2:956. See also excerpts in Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 515 – 24.
 Al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 29.
 This manuscript is attributed to Ibn Nujaym in the catalog.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 84– 85; al-Qāḍī
ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 7:252; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 106.

Authenticated
Mālikī 207
. Al-Jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī l-Baghdādī l-Mālikī (d. /).⁵⁸
i. Kitāb al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqh. ⁵⁹
ii. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya.
b. Editions:
i. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. Edited by Jalāl ʿAlī l-Qadhdhāfī l-Jihānī. Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth li-
l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, /.
ii. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq
al-Dimashqī. Edited by Maḥmūd Salāmah al-Ghiryānī. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī,
/.⁶⁰
iii. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq
al-Dimashqī. Edited by Maḥmūd Salāmah al-Ghiryānī. Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth li-l-
Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, /.
c. MSS:
i. Tripoli, Libya, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Mujāhidīn al-Lībiyīn , n.d.⁶¹
. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn

Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Qurashī l-Sahmī l-Ṣiqillī l-Mālikī (d. / – ).⁶²
a. Editions:
i. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana. Edited by Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn
ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb. Ph.D. Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, /.⁶³
ii. Kitāb al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana wa-l-Mukhtalaṭa.  volumes.
Edited by Abū Faḍl al-Dimyāṭī Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī. Casablanca: Markaz al-Turāth al-
Thaqāfī l-Maghribī; Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, .
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 85 – 86; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 1:31; Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 2:26 – 29; al-Mawwāq, al-Tāj wa-l-iklīl, 2:7; Ibn Khal-
likān, Wafāyāt al-aʿyān, 2:387; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 5:112; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:344,
no. 8711; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 103 – 104; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik,
7:220 – 27; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341.
 Although it appears that this edition is the original of the next edition, the Dubai volume
includes numerous citations of works printed after 1991. I have been unable to consult this ed-
ition.
 Neither edition of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s Furūq gives an accession number, al-Jihānī,
“Muqaddima,” 17– 19 and al-Ghiryānī, “al-Qism al-dirāsī,” 19 – 20. This is the same manuscript
attributed al-Dimashqī by Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, which they refer to as Maktabat al-
Awqāf bi-Ṭarābulus 588 (Abū al-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 49). It is unclear to me whether
the manuscript is now at the Markaz al-Lībī li-l-Maḥfūẓāt wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Tārīkhiyya or al-Hayʾat
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islamiyya.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 88; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:31; GAL 1:471, S1:661; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:6635, no. 6635; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām
3:282; Ibn Farḥūn, al-Dībāj, 2:56; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 1:116; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ,
Tartīb al-madārik, 8:71– 74; Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73.
 See Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 38.

Authenticated
b. MSS:
i. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhariyya, Rawwāq al-Maghāriba , n.d.⁶⁴
ii. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España  (autograph copy), written /.⁶⁵
iii. Marrakesh, Khizānat Ibn Yūsuf , written / – .⁶⁶
iv. Rabat, al-Khizāna l-Malikiyya , n.d.⁶⁷
v. Rabat, al-Khizāna l-Malikiyya  qāf/, written / – .⁶⁸
. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū l-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī l-Dimashqī l-Mālikī (d. fifth/eleventh c.).⁶⁹
i. Furūq muttafiq ẓāhirihā mukhtalif bāṭinihā
b. Editions:
i. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. Edited by Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Beirut:
Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, .
c. MSS:
i. Dublin, Chester Beatty , n.d.⁷⁰
ii. Fez, Khizānat al-Qarawiyīn, , n.d.⁷¹
iii. Tunis, Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, , Shaʿbān [sic] / December .⁷²
iv. Tunis, Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, , n.d.⁷³
v. Tunis, Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, , / – .⁷⁴
 Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb “al-Muqaddima,” to ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Siqillī, Abū
Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Sahmī, al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana,
ed. Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb (Ph.D. Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1416/1996),
127– 28.
 According to GAL, this is Madrid 78, but this appears to be an old designation. Aḥmad ibn
Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb gives the new number based on his visit to the library, see
Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “al-Muqaddima,” 124– 25. The manuscript can be accessed digitally, see
http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000014499, accessed April 30, 2019.
 Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “al-Muqaddima,” 127– 28.
 Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “al-Muqaddima,” 126.
 Aḥmad al-Ḥabīb, “al-Muqaddima,” 125.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86 – 87; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 31. See also al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik, 2:765, 8:57; Ibn Farḥūn, Dībāj al-
mudhahhab, 2:347.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 49 – 50. This manuscript is identified by al-Bāḥusayn as
al-Furūq fī l-aḥkām ʿalā madhhab al-Mālikiyya by an anonymous author since this is what ap-
pears on the title page of this manuscript (al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 104). However, it
is clearly identified by Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris as a copy of Muslim al-Dimashqī’s Furūq.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 47.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 48.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 50.
 Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 48 – 49. According to Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, it was
3217 in (min raṣīd) the al-Maktaba al-Aḥmadiyya collection.

Authenticated
Mālikī 209
. Al-Furūq aw Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn
Idrīs ibn al-Raḥmān al-Qarāfī (d. /).⁷⁵
. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī l-Gharnāṭī l-Mālikī, also known
as al-Mawwāq (d. /).⁷⁶
a. MSS:
i. La Marsa, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī fāʾ-alif  – , n.d.(?)⁷⁷
. ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab min al-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn
Muḥammad al-Wansharīsī l-Mālikī (d. /).⁷⁸
a. Editions:
i. ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq. Edited by Ḥamza
Abū Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, /.
ii. ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab min al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq fī madhhab al-Imām
Mālik wa-yalīhi Īḍāḥ al-masālik ilā qawāʿid al-Imām Mālik kilāhumā taʾlīf al-ʿAbbās
Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā l-Wansharīsī l-Tilimsānī. Edited by Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazyadī. Bei-
rut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
iii. Fez Lithograph edition.⁷⁹
b. MSS:
i. Rabat, al-Khizāna l-Malikiyya , n.d.⁸⁰
ii. Tunis, al-Maktaba l-Waṭaniyya , n.d.⁸¹
iii. Tunis, al-Maktaba l-Waṭaniyya , / – .⁸²
iv. Tunis, al-Maktaba l-Waṭaniyya , n.d.⁸³
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341– 42; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 152– 54; al-
Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:32– 33; GAL 1:385, S1:665; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:100, no. 750; Schacht,
“Furūq-Büchern,” 509; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya, 188 – 89.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 341; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 101– 102; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 31; GAL S2:375 – 76; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:787, no. 16479; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-
nūr al-zakiyya, 262. See also Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Balawī, al-Thabat, Ed. ʿAbdallāh al-ʿImrānī. (Bei-
rut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1403/1983), 190. I thank Josef Ženka for this last reference.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342. This manuscript is likely not a copy of the work by al-
Mawwāq, but is often attributed to him.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 102; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:32; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:325, no. 2389; GAL 2:248, S2:348; Makhlūf, Shajarat al-
nūr al-zakiyya, 274– 75.
 Abū Fāris mentions this edition in his introduction. He claims it is “the famous and widely
circulated Fez lithograph edition (ṭabaʿat Fās al-mashhūra l-mutadāwala),” but I have not been
able to find another reference to this work.
 Ḥamza Abū Fāris, “al-Qism al-Dirāsī,” in ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab min al-jumū
ʿwa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad al-Wansharīsī, ed. Ḥamza Abū-
Fāris (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990/1410), 56 – 57.
 Abū Fāris, “al-Qism al-Dirāsī,” 55.
 Abū Fāris, “al-Qism al-dirāsī,” 56.
 Abū Fāris, “al-Qism al-dirāsī,” 56.

Authenticated
v. Tunis, al-Maktaba l-Waṭaniyya , n.d.⁸⁴
. Furūq bayn masāʾil fiqhiyya mutashābihat al-aḥwāl mutakhālifat al-iʿtibār by Abū ʿAb-
dallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf (d. ?).⁸⁵
a. MSS:
i. La Marsa, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī fāʾ-alif  – , n.d.⁸⁶
Ḥanbalī
. Al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by ʿImād al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAlī ibn Surūr
al-Maqdisī l-Ḥanbalī (d. /).⁸⁷
a. Not extant.
. Al-Furūq by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī l-Ḥanbalī,
also known as Ibn Sunayna (d. /).⁸⁸
a. Alternate title:
i. Al-Furūq al-mushtabih ṣuwarihā l-mukhtalif aḥkāmihā.
b. Editions:
i. Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. Edited by Muḥammad
ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā. Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, .
ii. Al-Furūq min awwal kitāb al-jināyāt ilā nihāyat al-kitāb dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan.
Edited by Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil. MA Thesis, Jāmiʿat Umm
al-Qurā, /.
c. MSS:
i. Basra, ʿAbbāsiyya Library,  jīm, n.d.⁸⁹
 Abū Fāris, “al-Qism al-dirāsī,” 55 – 56.

 This is perhaps the author referred to by al-Ṭūfī in his ʿAlam al-jadhal as “al-Shaykh Abū
ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī l-Anṣārī l-Mālikī” (al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73). Al-
though this may appear at first glance to be a clear reference to al-Mawwāq, al-Ṭūfī died in 716/
1316, while al-Mawwāq died almost two hundred years later, in 897/1492.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 342.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 94; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:40; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl
Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila 3:198 – 220; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 1:42, no. 312; al-ʿUlaymī, al-Durr al-
Munaḍḍad, 1:339, no. 969; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:105 – 108.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 93 – 94; al-Sabīl,
“al-Muqaddima,” 1:40; GAL S1:689; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:126 – 27; Najm al-Dīn
al-Ṭūfī, ʿAlam al-jadhal, 73; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, 3:249 – 51.
 Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā, “Muqaddima,” in Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū
ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī, Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad
ibn Ḥanbal, ed. Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī),
99; Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil, “al-Taḥqīq” in al-Furūq min awwal kitāb al-
jināyāt ilā nihāyat al-kitāb dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan, Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad

Authenticated
Ḥanbalī 211
ii. Damascus, Asadiyya Library, Ẓāhiriyyah,  Muḥarram  / February , .⁹⁰

iii. Leipzig, Leipzig University Library, Vollers , n.d.⁹¹
. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī ibn Badrān al-Mardāwī l-Maqdisī l-
Ḥanbalī (d. / – ).⁹²
a. Not extant.
. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil by Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn
ʿAbdallāh al-Zarīrānī l-Baghdādī l-Ḥanbalī (d. /).⁹³
a. Alternate title:
i. Tanqīḥ al-furūq. ⁹⁴
b. Editions:
i. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil. Edited by ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn
ʿAbdallāh al-Sabīl.  volumes. Mecca: al-Mamlaka l-ʿArabiyya l-Saʿūdiyya, Wiz-
ārat al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀlī, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ
al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, [/ – ].
ii. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil. Edited by Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad
Ḥasan Ismāʿīl. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, /.
iii. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil. Edited by ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Sabīl.
Dammam, [Riyadh(?)]: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, [/ – ].
c. MSS:
i. Princeton, Princeton University Library, Garrett Y, n.d.⁹⁵
ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī, ed. Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Subayyil, (MA Thesis, Jāmiʿat
Umm al-Qurā, 1435/2014), 90.
 al-Yaḥyā “Muqaddima,” 99. The editions of this book cite this manuscript but do not give its
accession number.
 Schacht, “Furūq-Büchern,” 507– 508; al-Subayyil, “al-Taḥqīq,” 89. This manuscript is availa-
ble digitally, http://www.refaiya.uni-leipzig.de/receive/RefaiyaBook_islamhs_00000858, ac-
cessed April 30, 2019.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 96; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:40; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl
Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, 2:343; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 7:789 – 90; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām,
6:214; al-ʿUlaymī, al-Durr al-Munaḍḍad, 442, no. 1176; al-Baghdādī, Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn, 2:139.
 Heinrichs, “Structuring the Law,” 343; al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 97– 98; al-Sabīl, “al-
Muqaddima,” 1:28; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 2:132, no. 7117; Ibn Rajab, Dhayl, 5:104– 15, no. 581; al-ʿAs-
qalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina 2:357, no. 2390; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 8:228 – 29.
 This title is given on the cover page of Princeton University Library, Garrett 4577Y.
 This is likely a unicum, as implied by the printed editions. See al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,”
1:126 – 27; Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl, “al-Dirāsa” to Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-
Raḥīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Zarīrānī, Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq bayn al-masāʾil, ed. Muḥammad
Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003), 9.

Authenticated
Shi’i Works
. Kitāb al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. third/ninth c.).⁹⁶
a. Not extant.
. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī l-Zaydī l-Yamanī (d. /
 – ).⁹⁷
a. Not extant.
Works Incorrectly Said to Be of Legal Distinctions
. Al-Muskit by al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad ibn Sulaymān ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Zubayrī (d. /
 – ).⁹⁸
a. There is not enough information to classify this work.
. Al-Furūq [wa-manʿ al-tarāduf] by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī l-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d.
ca. /).⁹⁹
a. This work is on lexicographic distinctions.
. Al-Muṭāraḥāt by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Baghdādī, also known as Ibn al-
Qaṭṭān (d. /).¹⁰⁰
a. This is a work of law, but not on distinctions.
 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 2.1:73.

 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 100; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:38; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam,
2:543, no. 10254.
 Al-Bāḥusayn al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 68, 73 – 74; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:35; al-Shīrāzī,
Ṭabaqāt, 108; Ibn Khallikān, Wafāyāt al-aʿyān, 2:69; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2:1626; Ibn
al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 3:295; al-Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 1:606
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69 – 70; Ibn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:20; GAL S1:356; al-Ziriklī,
al-Aʿlām, 6:272; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:502, no. 14648; Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Furūq fī
furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyya,” 2:1258. Al-Bāḥusayn also claims that the attribution of a book of legal dis-
tincitons to al-Tirmidhī is doubtful, but most likely a confusion stemming from his having writ-
ten a book of lexicographic distinctions and having been considered a Shāfiʿī jurist.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 69, 71– 72; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:35; Ibn al-Subkī,
Ṭabaqāt, 3:295; Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 4:306; Hājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn 2:1714.
But also, see al-Zarkashī, al-Manthūr, 1:70. Al-Bāḥusayn says that it is erroneously attributed
to this Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, but instead was by Abū ʿAbd ʿAllāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Qaṭṭān
who died between the fifth and sixth centuries, and that it is not a work of furūq, but rather
question and answer. See also al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 3:163; and Asnawī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:146.

Authenticated
Works Incorrectly Said to Be of Legal Distinctions 213
. Al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz al-fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām wa-taṣarrufāt al-qāḍī wa-l-imām by Abū l-ʿAbbās
Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī (d. /).¹⁰¹
a. This is a work on fatwas and legal rulings.
. Al-Furūq by al-Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn Kāmil ibn Muḥammad ibn Tammām al-Tadmurī l-Shāfiʿī
(d. after /).¹⁰²
a. The only mention I could find for this work was in the Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn.
. Al-Furūq by ʿUmar ibn Raslān al-Bulqīnī (d. /).¹⁰³

a. This is a work on Sufism.
. Furūq al-uṣūl attributed to Kemalpaşazade (d. /).¹⁰⁴

a. This work is on applied linguistic distinctions in law.
. Qurrat al-ʿayn wa-l-samʿ fī bayān al-farq wa-l-jamʿ by Badr al-Dīn ibn ʿUmar ibn Aḥmad ibn
Muḥammad al-ʿĀdilī l-ʿAbbāsī l-Ḥuraythī(?) al-Shāfiʿī (d. ca. / – ).¹⁰⁵
a. This is a work on Sufism.
. Talqīḥ al-Karābīsī. ¹⁰⁶

a. This work does not exist, but was erroneously cited by Ibn Nujaym in his al-Ashbāh wa-
l-naẓāʾir, at the beginning of section six (al-fann al-sādis).
. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik by Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl Jalāl

a. This is a work of legal distinctions, but compiled by a modern scholar from the works of
Mālik.
 Al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:34, Abū l-Ajfān and Abū Fāris, “Dirāsa,” 39; Ḥājjī Khalīfa,
Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “al-Iḥkām fī tamyīz al-fatāwā ʿan al-aḥkām wa-taṣarrufāt al-qāḍī wa-
imām,” 1:21. See also Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, The Criterion for Distinguishing Legal Opinions
from Judicial Rulings and the Administrative Acts of Judges and Rulers, trans. Mohammad
Fadel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
 This work is only mentioned in Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:606, no. 15326. This scholar has entries
in al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina, 5:411; and al-ʿUlaymī, al-Uns al-jalīl bi-taʾrīkh al-Quds wa-l-
Jalīl, 2:140, but they do not mention this book.
 Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab, 9:80 – 81.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn s.v. “Furūq al-uṣūl,” 2:1257. He describes this work as “a useful
(mufīda) treatise by a later jurist (baʿḍ al-mutaʾakhkhirīn).”
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 104; al-Sabīl, “al-Muqaddima,” 1:39; ʿAlī Abā Ḥusayn,
ed., Fihrist makhṭūṭāt al-baḥrayn, 2 vols. (Manama: Markaz al-Wathāʾiq al-Tārīkhiyya, 1404/
1983), 1:99; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam, 3:557, no. 14995. Al-Bāḥusayn says this is actually a work of sufism,
not a legal work and therefore is not a work of legal distinctions. I have not been able to examine
this work myself.
 Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, s.v. “Furūq al-Karābīsī,” 2:1258.

Authenticated
. Al-Furūq li-Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: Muntazaʿ min aghlab kutub Ibn Qayyim raḥimahu Allāh
taʿālā by Yūsuf al-Ṣāliḥ.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.
. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿind Imām Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya jamʿan wa-l-dirāsa by Abū ʿUmar
Sayyid Ḥabīb ibn Aḥmad al-Madanī l-Afghānī.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.
. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿind al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī fī Kitāb al-Umm by Sāmī Muḥammad Ṣubḥ.
a. This is a work of legal distinctions, but compiled by a modern scholar from al-Shāfiʿī’s
Kitāb al-Umm.
. Al-Naẓāʾir al-fiqhiyya by Abū ʿImrān Mūsā ibn ʿĪsā l-Fāsī l-Ṣanhājī l-Qayrawānī (d. ?).¹⁰⁷
a. This is a work of legal maxims.
 Al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya, 86.

Authenticated
Appendix II: Chronological Furūq Bibliography
This appendix includes a bibliography of all known works of legal distinctions, arranged chro-
nologically by death date of author. For more information on a specific work or its author, refer
to Appendix I.
Third/Ninth Century
1. Kitāb al-Furūq by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Barqī (Shiʿī, d. third/ninth c.).
Fourth/Tenth Century
2. Al-Furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar ibn Surayj (Shāfiʿī, d. 306/918).
3. Kitāb al-masāʾil wa-l-ʿilal wa-l-furūq by Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Nasawī (d. ca
320/932).
4. Al-Furūq by Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī (Ḥanafī, d. 322/932 – 34).
Fifth/Eleventh Century
5. Al-Kifāya fī l-furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ṭabarī (Shāfiʿī, d. ca.
fifth/eleventh c.).
6. Furūq masāʾil mushtabiha fī l-madhhab by Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad
al-Kanānī, also known as Ibn al-Kātib (Mālikī, d. 408/1017).
7. Al-Jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī l-Baghdādī (Mālikī, d. 422/1031).
8. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū l-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī l-Dimashqī (Mālikī, d. fifth/eleventh
c.).
9. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī (Shāfiʿī, d. 438/
1047).
10. Al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Nāṭifī l-Ṭabarī (Ḥanafī, d.
446/1054 – 55).
11. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn
Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Qurashī l-Ṣiqillī l-Mālikī (Mālikī, d. 466/1073 – 74).
12. Al-Wasāʾil fī furūq al-masāʾil by Abū l-Khayr Salāma ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Jamāʿa l-Maqdisī
(Shāfiʿī, d. 480/1087 – 88).
13. Al-Muʿāyāt by Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (Shāfiʿī, d. 482/1089 – 90).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-011

Authenticated
216 Appendix II: Chronological Furūq Bibliography
Sixth/Twelfth Century
14. Al-Furūq by Abū l-Maḥāsin ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Ismāʿīl al-Rūyānī l-Ṭabarī (Shāfiʿī, d. d.
501/1107 or 502/1108).
15. Al-Furūq by Abū l-Muẓaffar Asʿad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Naysābūrī l-Karābīsī
(Ḥanafī, d. 570/1174 – 75).
Seventh/Thirteenth Century
16. Al-Furūq fī masāʾil al-fiqhiyya by ʿImād al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAlī ibn
Surūr al-Maqdisī (Ḥanbalī, d. 614/1218).
17. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī, also known as Ibn Su-
nayna (Ḥanbalī, d. 616/1219).
18. Al-Fuṣūl wa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khalaf ibn
Rājiḥ al-Maqdisī l-Ḥanbalī (Shāfiʿī, d. 638/1241).
19. Talqīḥ al-ʿuqūl fī furūq al-manqūl by Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh al-Maḥbūbī, also known
as Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Awwal (Ḥanafī, d. 630/1232 – 33).
20. Al-Furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Kashāsib al-Shāfiʿī al-Dizmārī (Shāfiʿī,
d. 643/1245).
21. Al-Furūq aw Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī
(Mālikī, d. 684/1285).
22. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī ibn Badrān al-Maqdisī (Ḥanbalī,
d. 699/1299 – 1300).
Eighth/Fourteenth Century
23. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Mujīd ibn ʿAlī al-Hudhalī l-Armantī
(Shāfiʿī, d. 725/1325).
24. Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī al-farq bayn al-masāʾil by Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm
ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Zarīrānī al-Baghdādī (Ḥanbalī, d. 741/1341).
25. Al-Furūq by Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā l-Turkumānī l-Mārdī-
nī, also known as Ibn al-Turkumānī (Ḥanafī, d. ca. 744/1343 – 44).
26. Al-Furūq by Abū Umāma Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Yaḥyā
l-Dukkālī l-Maghribī l-Miṣrī l-Shāfiʿī, also known as Ibn al-Naqqāsh (d. 763/1361).
27. Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-
Ḥasan al-Asnawī (Shāfiʿī, d. 772/1370).
28. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā ibn Rāshid al-Washlī l-Zaydī l-Yamanī (Zaydī, d. 777/
1375 – 76).

Authenticated
Appendix II: Chronological Furūq Bibliography 217
Ninth/Fifteenth Century
29. Al-Furūq by Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd Marghāyatī? (Ḥanafī, d. early
ninth/fifteenth c.).
30. Al-Furūq by Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī l-Mawwāq al-Gharnāṭī (Māli-
kī, d. 897/1492).
Tenth/Sixteenth Century
31. ʿIddat al-burūq fī jamʿ mā fī al-madhhab min al-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā
al-Wansharīsī (Mālikī, d. 914/1508).
32. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir by Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī (Ḥanafī, d. 970/1563)
Unknown
33. Furūq-A or al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa by Anonymous (Ḥanafī).

34. Furūq-B or al-Furūq fī al-furūʿ attributed to Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn al-Sayyid Abī Bakr al-
Naysābūrī l-Ḥanafī (Ḥanafī, d. ?).
35. Al-Furūq bayn masāʾil fiqhiyya mutashābihat al-aḥwāl mutakhālifat al-iʿtibār by Muḥam-
mad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī al-Anṣārī (Mālikī, d. ?).
36. Kitāb al-Furūq by Anonymous (Shāfiʿī).¹
 MS Oriental 6278, British Library, London.

Authenticated
Appendix III: The Manuscripts of Furūq-A: Table
of Contents
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-012

Authenticated
Garrett Y, Princeton Peterman II Nachtrag , Staats- Halet Efendi , Suleyma- Fiqh Ḥanafī , Maktabat al- Ẓāhiriyya ,
University Library bibliothek zu Berlin niye Library, Istanbul Haram al-Makki, Mecca Damascusa)
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra Kitāb al-Ṭahāra
Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt Kitāb al-Ṣalāt
Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt Kitāb al-Zakāt
Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm Kitāb al-Ṣawm
Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj Kitāb al-Ḥajj
Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ Kitāb al-Nikāḥ
Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq Kitāb al-Ṭalāq
Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq Kitāb al-ʿItāq
Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Aymān Kitāb al-Ṣayd
Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ Kitāb al-Buyūʿ
Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa Kitāb al-Shufaʿa
Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn Kitāb al-Rahn
Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra Kitāb al-Ijāra
Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Ṣayd Kitāb al-Hiba
Appendix III: The Manuscripts of Furūq-A: Table of Contents
Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Hiba Kitāb al-Waṣāyā
Kitāb al-Waṣāyā Kitāb al-Waṣāyā Kitāb al-Waṣāyā Kitāb al-Waṣāyā

Authenticated
Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa-l-saraqa Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa-l-saraqa Kitāb al-Ḥudūd Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa-l-saraqa
219
Continued
220
Garrett Y, Princeton Peterman II Nachtrag , Staats- Halet Efendi , Suleyma- Fiqh Ḥanafī , Maktabat al- Ẓāhiriyya ,
University Library bibliothek zu Berlin niye Library, Istanbul Haram al-Makki, Mecca Damascusa)
Kitāb al-Wakāla Kitāb al-Wakāla Kitāb al-Wakāla Kitāb al-Wakāla
Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn Kitāb al-Maʾdhūn
Kitāb al-Ḥawāla wa-l-kafāla Kitāb al-Ḥawāla wa-l-kafāla Kitāb al-Ḥawāla wa-l-kafāla Kitāb al-Ḥawāla
Masāʾil mutafarriqa Masāʾil mutafarriqa Kitāb al-Daʿwā Masāʾil mutafarriqa
Kitāb al-Iqrār Kitāb al-Shahāda
Kitāb al-Diyāt Kitāb al-Iqrār
Masāʾil shattā Kitāb al-Diyāt
Masāʾil mutashābiha Masāʾil shattā
Masāʾil farqiyyah fiqhiyya Kitāb al-Muḍāraba
Masāʾil mutashābiha
Masāʾil al-ḥīla
a)
This manuscript has been heavily damaged. It has significant wear around the binding, the pages are out of order, and the end is missing.
Appendix III: The Manuscripts of Furūq-A: Table of Contents

Authenticated
Appendix IV: The Manuscripts of Furūq-B (Najm
al-Dīn Naysābūrī, attrib.): Table of
Contents
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-013

Authenticated
Giresun Yazmalar Halet Efendi , Leiden Esad Efendi , Esad Efendi  Aşir Efendi , Osman Huldi , Yazma Baǧışlar
222
, Suleymaniye Suleymaniye Li- Or. , Lei- Suleymaniye Li- Suleymaniye Li- Suleymaniye Li- Suleymaniye Li- , Suleyma-
Library, Istanbul brary, Istanbul den University brary, Istanbul brary, Istanbul brary, Istanbul brary, Istanbul niye Library, Is-
Library tanbul
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction [missing] Introduction
Ṣalāt [Bāb al-Ṣalāt] Ṣalāt Masāʾil al-ṣalāt [Ṣalāṭ] [Ṣalāt] [title, if any, [ṣalāt]
wa-l-zakāt missing]
Zakāt Zakāt Zakāt Kitāb al-zakāt Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-zakāt
ṣawm
Ṣawm Ṣawm Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ṣawm Kitāb al-ḥajj Kitāb al-ṣawm
ṣawm ṣawm ṣawm
Ḥajj Ḥajj Masāʾil al-ḥajj Kitāb al-ḥajj Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ḥajj Kitāb al-nikāḥ Kitāb al-ḥajj
ṣawm
Nikāḥ Masāʾil al-nikāḥ Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-nikāḥ Kitāb al-ṭalāq Kitāb al-nikāḥ
nikāḥ nikāḥ nikāḥ
Ṭalāq Masāʾil al-ṭalāq Masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ṭalāq Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ṭalāq Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṭalāq ṭalāq ʿitāq
ʿItāq Masāʾil al-ʿitāq Masāʾil al-ʿitāq Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ʿitāq Kitāb al-buyūʿ
ʿitāq ʿitāq
Aymān Masāʾil al-aymān Masāʾil al- Kitāb al-aymān Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-aymān Kitāb al-shufaʿa
aymān aymān
Buyūʿ Buyūʿ Buyūʿ Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-buyūʿ Kitāb masāʾil al-

Authenticated
buyūʿ buyūʿ rahn
Appendix IV: The Manuscripts of Furūq-B (Najm al-Dīn Naysābūrī, attrib.): TOC
Continued
Library tanbul
Shufaʿa Masāʾil al-shu- Masāʾil al- Kitāb al-shufaʿa Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-shufaʿa Kitāb masāʾil al-
faʿa shufaʿa shufaʿa ijāra
Rahn Masāʾil al-rahn Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-rahn Kitāb masāʾil al-
rahn rahn rahn ṣayd
Ijārāt Masāʾil al-ijāra Masāʾil al-ijāra Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ijāra Kitāb masāʾil al-
ijāra rahn hiba
Ṣayd Masāʾil al-ṣayd Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāil al- Kitāb al-ṣayd Kitāb masāʾil al-
ṣayd ṣayd ṣayd waṣāyā
Hiba Masāʾil al-hiba Masāʾil al-hiba Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-hiba Kitāb masāʾil al-
hiba hiba ḥudūd
Waṣāyā Masāʾil al- Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-waṣāyā Kitāb al-wakāla
waṣāyā waṣāyā waṣāyā waṣāyā
Ḥudūd Masāʾil al-ḥudūd Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ḥudūd Kitāb masāʾil al-
wa-l-saraqa ḥudūd wa-l- ḥudūd ḥudūd wa-l-sar- maʾdhūn
saraqa aqa
Wakāla Masāʾil al- Masāʾil al- Kitāb al-wakāla Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-wakāla Kitāb al-ḥawāla
wakāla wakāla wakāla wa-l-kafāla
Maʾdhūn Masāʾil al- Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al- Kitāb masāʾi lal-

Authenticated
maʾdhūn maʾdhūn maʾdhūn maʾdhūn maʾdhūn daʿwā
223
Continued
224
Library tanbul
Ḥawāla wa-l- Masāʾil al- Masāʾil al-ka- Kitāb al-ḥawāla Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-ḥawāla Kitāb masāʾil al-
Kafāla ḥawāla fāla wa-l- wa-l-kafāla ḥawāla wa-l- iqrār
ḥawāla kafāla
Daʿwā Masāʾil al-daʿwā Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-daʿwā Kitāb masāʾil al-
daʿwā daʿwā daʿwā diyāt
Iqrār Masāʾil al-iqrār Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-iqrār Kitāb masāʾil
iqrār iqrār iqrār shattā
Diyāt Masāʾil al-diyāt Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-jināyāt Kitāb masāʾil al-
diyāt diyāt diyāt muḍāraba
Masāʾil Masāʾil shattā Masāʾil shattā Kitāb masāʾil Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb al-muzā- Kitāb masāʾil
shattā muḍāraba raʿa mutashābiha
Masāʾil ukhrā Masāʾil al- Al-Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil Kitāb al-muḍāra-
muḍāraba mutāshabiha muḍāraba mutashābiha ba
Masāʾil al-mutā- Masāʾil al- Kitāb masāʾil Kitāb al-mushā-

shabiha ḥiyal mutashābiha biha
Kitāb al-ḥīla
Kitāb al-ḥiyal

Authenticated
Works Cited
Manuscripts
Anonymous. Al-Furūq fī l-fiqh. MS Halet Efendi 807, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Anonymous. Furūq Ibn Nujaym. MS Osman Holdi 50, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Anonymous. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Esad Efendi 884, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Anonymous. Kitāb al-Farq. MS Yazma Baǧışlar 1187, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Anonymous. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Halet Efendi 780, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Anonymous. Masāʾil [= Kitāb al-Furūq]. MS Oriental 6278, British Library, London.
Anonymous. Risāla fī l-fiqh [= Kitāb al-Furūq]. MS Halet Efendi 780, Suleymaniye Library,
Istanbul.
Al-Arzustānī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Garrett 4577Y, Princeton University
Library, Princeton.
Al-Dimashqī, Abū l-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. MS 4507, Chester Beatty Library,
Dublin.
Al-Gharnāṭī, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿAbdarī l-Mālikī. Al-Furūq. MS fāʾ-alif
98 – 90, Maktabat Āl Ibn ʿĀshūr al-Tūnisī, La Marsa.
Ibn Ḥalwān al-Ṭabīb, Aḥmad. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Ayasofya 4838, Suleymaniye Library,
Istanbul.
Ibn al-Kutubī, Yūsuf ibn Ismāʿīl. Kitāb fī l-farq bayn al-amrāḍ al-mushtabiha fī l-ṭibb. MS
Ahmet III 2120, Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Ibn al-Kutubī, Yūsuf ibn Ismāʿīl. Mā lā yasaʿu l-ṭabīb jahluhu. MS Mansuri Collection
R128.3.I127 1682, Library of Congress, Washington DC.
Ibn al-Turkumānī, Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muṣṭafā. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS
Ẓāhiriyya 4501, Asadiyya Library, Damascus.
Al-Jurjānī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh ʿalā madhhab
al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. MS Fiqh Shāfiʿī 915, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo.
Marghāyatī(?), Shaykh Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī Dāwūd. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Arabe 812,
Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.
Al-Nāṭifī, Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq. MS Nuruosmaniye 1371,
Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Al-Nāṭifī, Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Al-Ajnās wa-l-furūq. MS Esad Efendi 542,
Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul.
Al-Naysābūrī, Najm al-Dīn. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Giresun Yazmalar 44, Suleymaniye Library,
Istanbul.
Al-Naysābūrī, Najm al-Dīn. Kitāb al-Furūq. MS Or. 481, Leiden University Libraries, Leiden.
Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ibn ʿAlī l-Baghdādī l-Mālikī. Al-Jumūʿ wa-l-furūq. MS 588, Markaz
Dirāsāt al-Mujāhidīn al-Lībiyīn, Tripoli.
Al-Sharīf, Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad. Nafāʾis majālis al-sulṭāniyya fī ḥaqāʾiq asrār al-qurʾāniyya.
MS Ahmet III 2680, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Istanbul.
Al-Zarīrānī, Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn ʿAbdallāh. Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī
l-farq bayn al-masāʾil. MS Garrett 4577Y, Princeton University Library, Princeton.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-014

Authenticated
226 Works Cited
Printed Sources
Abā Ḥusayn, ʿAlī, ed. Fihrist makhṭūṭāt al-baḥrayn. 2 vols. Manama: Markaz al-Wathāʾiq
al-Tārīkhiyya, 1404/1983.
ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, Ramaḍān. “Kitāb al-Farq li-Ibn Fāris wa-turāth al-farq fī l-ʿarabiyya,” In
Kitāb al-farq by Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī. Edited by Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, 39 – 43. Cairo:
Maktabat al-Khātimī; Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1402/1982.
Abū l-Ajfān, Muḥammad and Ḥamza Abū Fāris. “Al-Dirāsa.” In al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū
l-Faḍl Muslim al-Dimashqī. Edited by Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris
9 – 58. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992.
Abū l-Ajfān, Muḥammad and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh. “Dirāsa tamhīdiyya.” In Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī
muḥaḍārat al-khawāṣṣ by Ibn Farḥūn. Edited by Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and ʿUthmān
Baṭīkh, 5 – 53. Cairo: Dār al-Turāth; Tunis: al-Maktaba l-ʿAtīqa[, 1980].
Abū Fāris, Ḥamza. “Al-Qism al-dirāsī.” In ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab min
al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad al-Wansharīsī.
Edited by Ḥamza Abū Fāris, 9 – 76. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990/1410.
Abū Shāma Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Maqdisī. Tarājim rijāl al-qarnayn al-sādis
wa-l-sābiʿ al-maʿrūf bi-l-Dhayl ʿalā l-Rawḍatayn. 5 vols. Edited by Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn.
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1422/2002.
Al-Afghānī, Abū ʿUmar Sayyid Ḥabīb ibn Aḥmad al-Madanī. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿind Imām Ibn
Qayyim al-Jawziyya jamʿan wa-l-dirāsa. 3 vols. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd Nāshirūn,
2009.
Ahmad, Ahmad A. Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of
Six Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Ali, Samer. Arabic Literary Salons in the Islamic Middle Ages. South Bend, IN.: Notre Dame
University Press, 2010.
Al-ʿĀmilī, Muḥsin al-Ḥusaynī. Aʿyān al-Shīʿa. 28 vols. Edited by Ḥasan al-Amīn and Muḥsin
al-Amīn. Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf, 1960–.
Aristotle. On Sophistical Refutations. On Coming-to-be and Passing Away. On the Cosmos.
Edited and translated by E.S. Forster and D.J. Furley. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1955.
Al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl. Al-Furūq al-lughawiyya. Edited by Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Salīm. Cairo: Dār
al-ʿIlm wa-l-Thaqāfa, 1998.
Al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl. Kitāb al-Awāʾil. 2 vols. Edited by Muḥammad al-Miṣrī and Walīd Qaṣṣāb.
Damascus: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1975.
Al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl. Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn al-kitāba wa-l-shiʿr. Edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad
al-Bajāwī and Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm. [Cairo:] Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya,
1371/1952.
Al-Aṣmaʿī, ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Qurayb. Kitāb al-Farq. Edited by Ṣabīḥ al-Tamīmī. Beirut: Dār
Usāmah, 1987.
Al-Asnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan. Al-Alghāz al-fiqhiyya wa-huwa l-kitāb
al-musammā Ṭirāz al-mahāfil fī alghāz al-masāʾil. Edited by Muḥammad ʿUthmān and
Ṭaha ʿAbd al-Ruʾūf Saʿd. Cairo: al-Maktaba l-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 1433/2012.
Al-Asnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan. Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ
wa-l-fawāriq. 2 vols. Edited by Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq,
2007.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 227
Al-Asnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn al-Ḥasan. Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya. 2 vols. Edited by
Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407/1987.
Al-ʿAsqalānī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥajar. Al-Durar al-kāmina fī
aʿyān al-miʾa l-thāmina. 4 vols. No ed. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [197–].
Al-ʿAsqalānī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥajar. Fatḥ al-bārī. 18 vols.
Edited by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1970.
Ayoub, Samy. “We’re not in Kufa Anymore: The Construction of Late Ḥanafism in the Early
Modern Ottoman Empire, 16th–19th Centuries CE.” Ph.D. Diss., University of Arizona,
2014.
Al-Azem, Talal. Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition.
Leiden: Brill, 2016.
Baalbaki, Ramzi. The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition: From the 2nd/8th to the 12th/18th
Century. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
Baalbaki, Ramzi. “Kitāb al-ʿAyn and Jamharat al-Lugha.” In Early Medieval Arabic: Studies on
al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad, edited by Karin C. Ryding, 44 – 62. Washington D.C.: Georgetown
Badawi, Muhammad, ed. Modern Arabic Literature: The Cambridge History of Arabic
Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Al-Baghdādī, Ismāʿīl Bāshā. Hadiyat al-ʿārifīn asmāʾ al-muʿallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn. 2
vols. 1951 – 55. Reprint, Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.
Al-Baghdādī, Ismāʿīl Bāshā. Kitāb Īḍāḥ al-maknūn fī l-dhayl ʿalā Kashf al-ẓunūn. Istanbul:
Millî Eǧtim Basımevi, 1972.
Al-Bāḥusayn, Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya:
muqawwamātuhā shurūṭuhā nashʾatuhā taṭawwuruhā; dirāsa naẓariyya waṣfiyya
tārīkhiyya. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1419/1998.
Al-Bājī, Sulaymān ibn Khalaf. Kitāb al-Minhāj fī tartīb al-ḥijāj. Edited by ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī.
Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1987.
Al-Bakrī, ʿĀdil. “Taqdīm al-kitāb.” In al-Furūq bayn ishtibāhāt al-ʿilal by Ibn al-Jazzār. Edited
by Ramziyya l-Aṭraqjī, ‫ﺃ‬-‫ﺝ‬. Baghdad: Wizā rat al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀ lī wa-l-Baḥ th al-ʿIlmī, Jā miʿat
Baghdā d, Bayt al-Ḥ ikmah, 1989.
Al-Bakrī, Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr. Al-Istighnāʾ fī l-farq wa-l-istithnāʾ. Edited by Saʿūd ibn
Musʿad ibn Musāʿid al-Thubaytī. Mecca: al-Mamlaka l-ʿArabiyya l-Saʿūdiyya, Jāmiʿat Umm
al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, Markaz Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth
al-Islāmī, 1988.
Al-Bakrī, Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr. Al-Iʿtināʾ fī l-farq wa-l-istihnāʾ kitāb yabḥathu fī qawāʿid
al-fiqh al-islāmī wa-furūʿihi. Edited by ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad
Muʿawwad. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1991.
Al-Baqqūrī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. Tartīb al-furūq wa-khtiṣārihā. 2 vols. Edited by ʿUmar
ibn ʿAbbād. Morocco: al-Mamlakah al-Maghribiyya Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn
al-Islāmiyya, 1414/1994.
Al-Barqī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid. Al-Maḥāsin. 2 vols. Edited by al-Sayyid Jalāl
al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī. Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya 1370/1951.
Al-Bashar, Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm. “Al-Muqaddima.” In Kitāb al-Muʿāyāt fī l-fiqh ʿalā
madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, by Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī. Edited
by Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bashar, 3 – 106. PhD. Diss.: Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā,
1415[/1994].

Authenticated
228 Works Cited
Bauer, Thomas. “al-Azharī, Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by
Kate Fleet et al. Leiden: Brill 2008–.
Bauer, Thomas. Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine Andere Geschichte des Islams. Berlin: Verlag
der Weltreligionen, 2011.
Becker, Carl H. “Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung.” Zeitschrift für
Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete 26 (1912): 171 – 95.
Bencheneb, Mohamed. “Lughz.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960 – 2004.
Berkey, Jonathan P. “Popular Culture under the Mamluks: A Historiographical Survey.”
Mamluk Studies Review 9.2 (2005): 133 – 46.
Bernards, Monique. “Grammarians’ Circle of Learning: A Social Network Analysis.” In
ʿAbbasid Studies II: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Leuven, 28
June – 1 July 2004, edited by John Nawas, 143 – 64. Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters en
Departement Oosterse Studies, 2010.
Bernards, Monique. “Ṭalab al-ʿIlm amongst the Linguists of Arabic during the ʿAbbāsid
Period.” In ʿAbbasid Studies: Occassional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies,
Cambridge, 6 – 10 July 2002, edited by J.E. Montgomery, 111 – 28. Leuven: Uitgeverij
Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2004.
Birnbaum, Eleazar. “Kātib Chelebi (1609 – 1657) and Alphabetization: A Methodological
Investigation of the Autographs of his Kashf al-Ẓunūn and Sullam al-Wuṣūl.” In Scribes
et manuscrits du Moyen-Orient, edited by François Déroche and Francis Richard,
236 – 63. Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1997.
Blachère, Régis. Un poète arabe du IVe siècle de l’Hégire (Xe siècle de J.-C.): Abou ṭ-Ṭayyib
al-Motanabbî. Paris: Adrien-Maissonneuve, 1935.
Blecher, Joel. “Ḥadīth Commentary in the Presence of Students, Patrons, and Rivals: Ibn
Ḥajar and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī in Mamluk Cairo.” Oriens 41 (2013): 261 – 87.
Blecher, Joel. “In the Shade of the Ṣaḥīḥ: Politics, Culture and Innovation in an Islamic
Commentary Tradition.” Ph.D. Diss., Princeton University, 2013.
Blecher, Joel. Said the Prophet of God: Hadith Commentary Across a Millenium. Oakland:
University of California Press, 2018.
Bosworth, C. E. “Muʿammā.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et
al. Leiden: Brill, 1960 – 2004.
Brockelmann, Carl. Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur. 2 vols and suppl. Second revised
edition. Leiden: Brill, 1943.
Brookshaw, Dominic P. “Palaces, Pavilions, and Pleasure-Gardens: The Context and Setting of
the Medieval Majlis.” Middle Eastern Literatures 6.3 (2003): 199 – 223.
Brown, Jonathan A. C. “New Data on the Delateralization of Ḍād and its Merger with Ẓāʾ in
Classical Arabic: Contributions from Old South Arabic and the Earliest Islamic Texts on
Ḍ / Ẓ Minimal Pairs.” Journal of Semitic Studies 52.2 (2007): 335 – 68.
Brunschvig, Robert. La Berbérie orientale sous les Ḥafṣides des origines à la fin du XV siècle.
Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1940 – 47.
Burak, Guy. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the Early Modern
Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Cahen, Claude and Charles Pellat. “Ibn ʿAbbād.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited
by H.A.R. Gibb et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960 – 2004.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 229
Calder, Norman. Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era. Edited by Colin Imber and Robert
Gleave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Calder, Norman. “Al-Nawawi’s Typology of Muftis and Its Significance for a General Theory of
Islamic Law.” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 (1996): 137 – 64.
Carter, Michael. “Arabic Grammar.” In Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: Religion,
Learning and Science in the ʿAbbāsid Period, edited by M.J.L. Young et al., 118 – 38.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Carter, Michael. “Lexicography, Medieval.” In Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature. 2 vols. Edited
by Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey. London: Ashgate, 1998.
Cavitch, Max. “Genre.” In The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 4th edition,
edited by Roland Greene et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Chaumont, Éric. “L’Autorité des textes au sein du šāfi’isme ancien.” Paper presented at the
conference “Rethinking Islamic Law: Can Fiqh be Applied Law?” Rabat, Morocco, 13 – 15
November, 2013.
Chaumont, Éric. “Préface.” In Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī uṣūl al-fiqh; le Livre des Rais illuminant les
fondements de la compréhsion de la Loi; Traité de théorie légale musulmane by
Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī, 3 – 35. Translated by Éric Chaumont. Berkeley:
Robbins Collection, 1999.
Cohen, David. “Koiné, langues communes et dialectes arabes.” Arabica 9.2 (1962): 119 – 44.
Cook, Michael A. “The Origins of ‘Kalām.’” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies 43.1 (1980): 32 – 43.
Coulson, Noel J. Succession in the Muslim Family. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1971.
Davidson, Arnold. The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of
Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
De Jong, Pieter and Michael Jan de Goeje. Catalogus Codicum Orientalium Bibliothecae
Academiae Lugduno Batavae. Vol. 4. Leiden: Brill, 1861.
Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ. 25 vols. Edited by
Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ, Ḥusayn Asad et al. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1317/1996.
Al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. Taʾrīkh al-islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr
wa-l-aʿlām. 53 vols. Edited by ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb
al-ʿArabī, 1497/1987 – 1424/2004.
Al-Dimashqī, Abū l-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya. Edited by Muḥammad Abū
l-Ajfān and Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1992.
El Shamsy, Ahmed. The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
El Shamsy, Ahmed. “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of Shāfiʿī Literature.” Oriens 41
(2013): 289 – 315.
El Shamsy, Ahmed. “Al-Shāfiʿī’s Written Corpus: A Source-Critical Study.” Journal of the
American Oriental Society 132.2 (2012): 199 – 210.
Ellis, Alexander G. and Edward Edwards. A Descriptive List of the Arabic Manuscripts
Acquired by the Trustees of the British Museum since 1894. London: British Museum,
1912.
Endress, Gerhard. “The Cycle of Knowledge: Intellectual Traditions and Encyclopaedias of the
Rational Sciences in Arabic Islamic Hellenism.” In Organizing Knowledge: Encyclopaedic

Authenticated
230 Works Cited
Activities in the Pre-Eighteenth Century Islamic World, edited by Gerhard Endress,

103 – 34. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Escovitz, Joseph H. The Office of Qāḍī al-Quḍāt in Cairo under the Baḥrī Mamlūks. Berlin:
Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984.
Fadel, Mohammad. “The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar.” Islamic Law
and Society 3.2 (1996): 193 – 223.
Feest, Uljana and Thomas Sturm. “What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors’
Introduction.” Erkenntnis 75 (2011): 285 – 302.
Fowler, Alastair. “Genre.” Encyclopedia of Literature and Criticism. Edited by Martin Cole.
Detroit: Gale Research, 1990.
Frank, Richard M. Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the
Muʿtazila in the Classical Period. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1978.
Al-Ghazzī, Najm al-Dīn. Luṭf al-samar wa-qaṭf al-thamar min tarājim aʿyān al-ṭabaqāt al-ūlā
min al-qarn al-ḥādī ʿashr. 2 vols. Edited by Maḥmūd al-Shaykh. Damascus: Wizārat
al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1981.
Al-Ghiryānī, Maḥmūd Salāmah. “Al-Qism al-dirāsī.” In al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Qāḍī ʿAbd
al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī wa-ʿalāqatuhā bi-Furūq al-Dimashqī by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb
al-Baghdādī. Edited by Maḥmūd Salāmah al-Ghiryānī, 13 – 72. Dubai: Dār al-Buḥūth
li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 1424/2003.
Gimaret, Daniel. “Muʿtazila.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et
Goodmann, L.E. “Rāzī vs Rāzī – Philosophy in the Majlis.” In The Majlis: Interreligious
Encounters in Medieval Islam, edited by Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Mark R. Cohen, Sasson
Somekh, and Sidney Griffith, 84 – 107. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 1999.
Griffel, Frank. “On the Character, Content, and Authorship of Itmām Tatimmat Ṣiwān al-ḥikma
and the Identity of the Author of Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma.” Journal of the American
Oriental Society 133.1 (2013): 1 – 20.
Gruendler, Beatrice. “Al-ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by Kate
Fleet et al. Leiden: Brill, 2008–.
Gruendler, Beatrice. “Al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by Kate
Fleet et al. Leiden: Brill, 2008–.
Haarman, Ulrich. “Arabic in Speech, Turkish in Lineage: Mamluks and Their Sons in the
Intellectual Life of Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria.” Journal of Semitic Studies 33.1
(1988): 81 – 114.
Al-Ḥabīb, Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh. “Al-Muqaddima.” In al-Nukat wa-l-Furūq
li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana qism al-ʿibādāt by ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣiqillī.
Edited by Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb, 1 – 147. PhD Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm
al-Qurā, 1416/1996.
Hacking, Ian. Historical Ontology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Ḥājjī Khalīfa. Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn. 2 vols. Edited by Şerefettin
Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge. Istanbul: Milli Eğ itim Basımevi, 1971.
Ḥājjī Khalīfa. Mīzān al-ḥaqq fī khtiyār al-aḥaqq. Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat Abū l-Ḍiyāʾ, 1306/1889.
Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī. Al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf. Edited by Muḥammad
Ibrāhīm al-Juyūshī. Cairo: al-Nahār, 1998.
Halim, Fachrizal A. Legal Authority in Premodern Islam: Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī in the
Shāfiʿī School of Law. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 231
Hallaq, Wael. Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge
Hallaq, Wael. “From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law.” Islamic
Law and Society 1 (1994): 29 – 65.
Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 2005.
Hallaq, Wael. Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
Hallaq, Wael. “Takhrīj and the Construction of Juristic Authority.” In Studies in Islamic Legal
Theory, edited by Bernard Weiss, 317 – 35. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Hallaq, Wael. “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 16 (1984): 3 – 41.
Al-Ḥamawī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir: Sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh
wa-l-nazāʾir printed with Ibrahīm ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir. 4 vols. No
ed. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405/1985.
Hämeen-Anttila, Jaakko. “Al-Aṣmaʿī, Early Arabic Lexicography, and Kutub al-Farq.” Zeitschrift
für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften 16 (2005): 141 – 48.
Hämeen-Anttila, Jaakko. Maqama: A History of a Genre. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002.
Al-Ḥanafī, Muḥammad Abū l-Fatḥ. Itḥāf al-abṣār wa-l-baṣāʾir bi-tabwīb Kitāb al-Ashbāh
wa-l-naẓāʾir. Alexandria: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Waṭaniyya, 1289[/1872 – 73].
Hanna, Nelly. In Praise of Books: A Cultural History of Cairo’s Middle Class, Sixteenth to
Eighteenth Century. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004.
Al-Ḥarīrī, Abū Muḥammad al-Qāsim ibn ʿAlī. Maqāmāt al-Ḥarīrī. No ed. Beirut: Maktabat
al-Maʿārif, 1873.
Haykel, Bernard. Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkānī.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Haywood, John. Arabic Lexicography: Its History and Its Place in the General History of
Lexicography. Leiden: Brill, 1965.
Heinrichs, Wolfhart. “Qawāʿid as a Genre of Legal Literature.” In Studies in Islamic Legal
Theory edited by Bernard Weiss, 365 – 84. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Heinrichs, Wolfhart. “Structuring the Law: Remarks on the Furūq Literature.” In Studies in
Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth: Volume I, Hunter of the East; Arabic and Semitic
Studies, edited by Ian Richard Netton, 332 – 44. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
Hirschler, Konrad. The Written Word in the Medieval Arabic Lands: A Social and Cultural
History of Reading Practices. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization.
3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
Humphreys, Stephen. Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry. Revised edition. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. Risāla fī l-farq bayn al-nafs wa-l-rūḥ. Edited by Louis Cheikho, reprinted in
Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq: Texts and Studies, edited by Fuat Sezgin et al. Frankfurt am Main:
Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe
University, 1999.
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Aḥmad ibn al-Qāsim. ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ. Edited by Nizār
Riḍā. Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, [1965].

Authenticated
232 Works Cited
Ibn al-Akfānī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Sāʿid al-Anṣārī, al-Ḥakīm al-Mutaṭayyib. Irshād
al-qāṣid ilā asnā l-maqāṣid fī anwāʿ al-ʿulūm. Edited by ʿAbd al-Munʿim Muḥammad
ʿUmar and Aḥmad Ḥilmī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, [1990].
Ibn ʿAlī al-Balawī, Aḥmad. Al-Thabat. Edited by ʿAbdallāh al-ʿImrānī. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb
al-Islāmī, 1403/1983.
Ibn Farḥūn, Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī. Al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab fī maʿrifat aʿyān ʿulamāʾ al-madhhab. 2
vols. No editor. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004.
Ibn Farḥūn, Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAlī. Durrat al-ghawāṣṣ fī muḥāḍarat al-khawāṣṣ. Edited by
Muḥammad Abū l-Ajfān and ʿUthmān Baṭīkh. Cairo: Dār al-Turāth; Tunis: al-Maktaba
l-ʿAtīqa[, 1980].
Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī, Abū l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad. Kitāb Futyā faqīh al-ʿarab. Edited by Ḥusayn ʿAlī
Maḥfūẓ in Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī l-ʿArabī 33.3 (1377/1958): 441 – 66; 33.4
(1377/1958): 633 – 56.
Ibn Fūrak, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn. Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī Imām Ahl
al-Sunna. Edited by Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Sāyiḥ. Cairo: Maktabat li-l-Thaqāfa
l-Dīniyya, 1425/2005.
Ibn al-ʿImād, Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad. Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man
dhahab. 10 vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ and Maḥmūd al-Arnāʾūṭ. Damascus:
Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1410/1989.
Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī. Al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk
wa-l-umam. 11 vols. Edited by Suḥayl Zakkār. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1415/1995 – 96.
Ibn al-Jawzī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAlī. Talbīs Iblīs. No ed. Beirut: Dār al-Qalam,
1403[/1983].
Ibn al-Jazzār, Aḥmad ibn Jaʿfar. Al-Furūq bayn ishtibāhāt al-ʿilal. Edited by Ramziyya l-Aṭraqjī.
Baghdad: Wizā rat al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀ lī wa-l-Baḥ th al-ʿIlmī, Jā miʿat Baghdā d, Bayt al-Ḥ ikmah,
1989.
Ibn Jinnī, Abū l-Fatḥ ʿUthmān. Sirr ṣināʿat al-iʿrāb. 2 vols. Edited by Ḥasan Hindāwī.
Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1985.
Ibn Juljul, Sulaymān ibn Ḥassān. Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibba wa-l-ḥukamāʾ. Edited by Fuʾād Sayyid.
Cairo: Imprimerie de l’Insitut Français d’Archéologie orientale, 1955.
Ibn Khālawayh, al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad. Names of the Lion. Translated by David Larsen.
Seattle: Wave Books, 2017.
Ibn Khaldūn. Taʾrīkh Ibn Khaldūn al-musammā Dīwān al-mubtadaʾ wa-l-khabar fī taʾrīkh
al-ʿarab wa-l-barbar wa-man ʿāṣarahum min dhawī l-shaʾn al-akbar. 8 vols. Edited by
Khalīl Shaḥāda and Suhayl Zakkār. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981 – 83.
Ibn Khaldūn. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. 3 vols. Translated by Franz
Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958.
Ibn Khallikān, Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Ibn Khallikan’s Wafayat al-A’yan wa
Anba’ Abna’ al-Zaman (M. de Slane’s English Translation). Translated by Mac-Guckin de
Slane. Edited by S Moinul Haq. Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1961.
Ibn Khallikān, Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ
al-zamān. 8 vols. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1397/1977 – 1398/1978.
Ibn al-Nadīm, Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq. Al-Fihrist li-l-Nadīm. 2 vols. Edited by Ayman Fuʾād
Sayyid. London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān li-l-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1430/2009.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 233
Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn Ibrāhīm. Kitāb al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir printed with
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir sharḥ Kitāb al-Ashbāh
wa-l-naẓāʾir. No ed. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405/1985.
Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Taqī l-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Aḥmad. Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya. 4 vols. Edited by
al-Ḥāfiẓ ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm Khān. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1407[/1986].
Ibn al-Qifṭī, ʿAlī ibn Yūsuf. Taʾrīkh al-ḥukamāʾ wa-huwa Mukhtaṣar al-zūzanī al-musammā
bi-l-Muntakhabāt al-multaqaṭāt min Kitāb Ikhbār al-ʿulamāʾ bi-akhbār al-ḥukamāʾ.
Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthannā, 196[?]; reprint of Ibn al-Qifṭīs Taʾrīh al-ḥukamāʾ, auf
Grund der Vorarbeiten Aug. Müllers. Edited by Julius Lippert. Leipzig: Dieterich’sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903.
Ibn Qutayba, ʿAbdallāh ibn Muslim. Adab al-kātib. Edited by Muḥammad al-Dālī. Beirut:
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1967.
Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Zayn al-Dīn Qāsim. Tāj al-tarājim fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafiyya, Die Krone der
Lebensbescheibungen enthaltend die Classen der Hanefiten. Edited by Gustav Flügel.
Leipzig: In Commision bei F. A. Brockhaus, 1862.
Ibn Rajab, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥanbalī. Al-Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt
al-ḥanābila. 5 vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn.
Mecca: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1425/2005.
Ibn Rajab, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥanbalī. Al-Farq bayn al-naṣīḥa
wa-l-taʿyīr. 3rd edition. Edited by Najam ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Damascus, Beirut: Dār
al-Maʾmūn li-l-Turāth, 1405[/1980].
Ibn al-Shiḥna, ʿAbd al-Birr ibn Muḥammad. Alghāz al-ḥanafiyya li-Ibn al-Shiḥna l-musammā
l-Dhakhāʾir al-ashrafiyya fī alghāz al-ḥanafiyya. Edited by Fāṭima Shihāb. Cairo:
al-Maktaba l-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2014.
Ibn Sikkīt, Yaʿqūb ibn Isḥāq. Kitāb al-Alfāẓ: aqdam muʿjam fī l-maʿānī. Edited by Fakhr al-Dīn
Qabbāwa. Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān, 1998.
Ibn al-Sunayna, Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī. Al-Furūq min awwal kitāb
al-jināyāt ilā nihāyat al-kitāb dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan. Edited by Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn
Muḥammad al-Subayyil. MA Thesis, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā University, 1435/2014.
Ibn al-Sunayna, Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī. Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā madhhab
al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. Edited by Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā.
Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, 1997.
Ibn al-Wakīl, Muḥammad ibn Makkī. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī fiqh al-shāfiʿiyya. Edited by
Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2002.
Ibn al-Wazīr, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim fī l-dhabb ʿan sunnat Abī
Qāsim. 9 vols. Edited by Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1415/1994.
Ibn Zabāra, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥasanī l-Yamanī. Mulḥiq al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ
bi-maḥāsin man baʿd al-qarn al-sābiʿ. 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.
Ibrahim, Ahmed Fekry. “The Codification Episteme in Islamic Juristic Discourse between
Inertia and Change.” Islamic Law and Society 22 (2015): 157 – 220.
Ibrahim, Ahmed Fekry. Pragmatism in Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015.
Iskandar, A.Z. A Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts on Medicine in the Wellcome Historical
Medical Library. London: The Wellcome Historical Medical Library, 1967.
İsmail Hakkı Bursevi. al-Furūq. No ed. Dersaʻādet: Şirket-i Ṣaḥḥāfīye-ʼi ʻOsmānīye,
1308/1890 – 91.

Authenticated
234 Works Cited
Jackson, Sherman. Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb
al-Dīn al-Qarāfī. Leiden: Brill, 1996.
Jackson, Sherman. “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in
Post-Formative Theory Muṭlaq and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn
al-Qarāfī.” Islamic Law and Society 3.2 (1996): 165 – 92.
Jalāl, Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-l-Imām Mālik. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
2007.
Al-Jallad, Ahmad. “New Evidence from a Safaitic Inscription for a Late Velar/Uvular
Realization of *ṣ́ in Aramaic.” Semitica 58 (2016): 257 – 70.
Al-Jandārī, Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdallāh. Tarājim al-rijāl al-madhkūra fī Sharḥ al-Azhār. n.p.:
Maṭbaʿat al-Tamaddun, 1913/1332.
Jaques, R. Kevin. Authority, Conflict, and the Transmission of Diversity in Medieval Islamic
Law. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Al-Jihānī, Jalāl. “Muqaddima.” In al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya by Abū Muḥammad al-Qāḍī ʿAbd
al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī ibn ʿAlī. Edited by Jalāl ʿAlī l-Qadhdhāfī l-Jihānī, 9 – 26. Dubai:
Dār al-Buʿūth li-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya wa-Ihyāʾ al-Turāth, 1424/2003.
Johansen, Baber. “The All-Embracing Town and Its Mosques.” Revue de l’Occident musulman
et de la Mediterranée 32 (1981): 139 – 61.
Johansen, Baber. The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants’ Loss of Property
Rights under the Hanafite Doctrine. London: Croom Helm, 1988.
Johansen, Baber. “Legal Literature and the Problem of Change.” In Islam and Public Law:
Classical and Contemporary Studies, edited by Chibli Mallat, 29 – 47. London: Graham
and Trotman, 1993. Reprinted in Baber Johansen. Contingency in a Sacred Law,
446 – 64. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
Al-Jurjānī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Al-Muʿāyāt fī l-ʿaql aw al-Furūq. Edited by
Muḥammad Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1993.
Al-Juwaynī, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh ibn Yūsuf. Al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq. 3 vols. Edited by ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān ibn Salāmah ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1424/2004.
Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh. Al-Kāfiya fī l-jadal. Edited by
Fawqiyya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd. Cairo: Maṭbaʿa ʿĪsā l-Bābī l-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakāʾuhu,
1399/1979.
Kaḥḥāla, ʿUmar Riḍā. Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn: Tarājim muṣannifī l-kutub al-ʿarabiyya. 4 vols.
Damascus: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1376/1957.
Kanazi, George. Studies in the Kitāb aṣ-Ṣināʿatayn of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī. Brill: Leiden, 1989.
Karabela, Mehmet. “The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-Classical
Islamic Intellectual History.” PhD Diss., McGill University, 2011.
Al-Karābīsī, Asʿad ibn Muḥammad. Al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī. 2 vols. Edited by Muḥammad
Ṭumūm and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda. Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn
Al-Karābīsī, Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ. Kitāb al-Furūq. Edited by ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd Aḥmad
al-Zahrānī. Ph.D Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1418/1997.
Al-Kāsānī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd. Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartīb al-sharāʾiʿ. 10 vols.
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/1998.
Kemalpaşazade. Furūq al-uṣūl. Edited by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Mubārak. Beirut:
Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 235
Kızılkaya, Necmettin. İslâm hukukunda farklar: Furûk literatürü üzerine bir inceleme. Istanbul:
İz Yayıncılık, 2016.
Kraus, Paul and George Vajda. “Ibn al-Rāwandī or al-Rēwendī.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New
Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960 – 2004.
Al-Laknawī, Abū l-Ḥasanāt Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥayy. Al-Fawāʾid al-bahiyya fī tarājim
al-ḥanafiyya. Edited by Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn Abū Firās al-Naʿsānī. Cairo: Aḥmad Nājī
l-Jamālī wa-Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī, 1905.
Lane, Edward William. An Arabic-English Lexicon in Eight Parts. 8 vols. Beirut: Librarie du
Liban, 1968.
Larkin, Margaret. “Popular Poetry in the Post-Classical Period.” In Cambridge History of
Arabic Literature: Arabic Literature in the Post-Clasical Period, edited by Roger Allen and
D.S. Richards, 191 – 244. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Lowry, Joseph E. “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ on Interpretation, Authority,
and the Structure of the Law.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 128 (2008):
25 – 40.
Lowry, Joseph E. Introduction to The Epistle on Legal Theory by Mụ hammad ibn Idrīs
al-Shāfiʿī, translated by Joseph E. Lowry, xv-xx. New York: New York University Press,
2013.
Lowry, Joseph E. “Is There Something Postmodern about Uṣūl al-Fiqh? Ijmāʿ, Constraint, and
Interpretive Communities.” In Islamic Law in Theory: Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor
of Bernard Weiss. Edited by A. Kevin Reinhart and Robert Gleave, 285 – 315. Leiden: Brill,
2014.
Lowry, Joseph E. “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A Reconsideration.”
Islamic Law and Society 11 (2004): 1 – 41.
Lowry, Joseph E. and Devin J. Stewart, “Introduction,” in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography
1350 – 1850, edited by Joseph E. Lowry and Devin Stewart, 1 – 11. Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009.
“Madjlis.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et al. Leiden: Brill,
1960 – 2004.
Makdisi, George. The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981.
Makdisi, George. The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West: With
Special Reference to Scholasticism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990.
Makhlūf, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. Shajarat al-nūr al-zakiyya fī ṭabaqāt al-mālikiyya. 2
vols. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Salafiyya wa-Maktabatihā, 1349[/1930 – 31].
Al-Mardāwī, Alāʾ al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Sulaymān. Al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifat al-rājiḥ min
al-khilāf ʿalā madhhab al-imām al-mubajjal Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. 12 vols. Edited by
Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī. Cairo: Maṭbūʿat al-Sunna l-Muḥammadiyyah,
1374/1955 – 1377/1958.
Marʿī, Yūsuf, ed. Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa-l-qalb wa-l-fuʾād wa-l-lubb al-mansūb li-Abī
ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī l-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, attributed to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī,
Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī. Amman: al-Markaz al-Malikī li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya,
2009.
Markaz al-Malik al-Fayṣal li-l-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyyah. Khizānat al-turāth: Fihris
shāmil li-ʿanāwīn al-makhṭūṭāt wa-amākinihā wa-arqām ḥifẓihā fī maktabāt al-ʿālam.
n.d. CD-ROM.

Authenticated
236 Works Cited
Al-Mashāyikh, Amal. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī nāqidan. Amman: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa, 2002.
Masud, Muhammad Khalid, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers. “Muftis, Fatwas, and
Islamic Legal Interpretation.” In Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas.
Edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Powers, 3 – 32.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Al-Mazīnī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāma ibn ʿAbdallāh. “al-Bāb al-thānī fī dirāsat al-kitāb.” In
al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq by ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī. 3 vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Salāma
ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Mazīnī, 1:19 – 36. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1424/2004.
Melchert, Christopher. The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law: 9th – 10th Centuries C.E.
Miller, Larry B. “Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study in the Development of Dialectic in Islam
from the Tenth through Fourteenth Centuries.” PhD Diss., Princeton University, 1984.
Montgomery, James E. “Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175 – 207,”
Parts 1 – 4, Middle Eastern Literatures 11.2 (2008): 169 – 91; 12.1 (2009): 1 – 25; 12.2
(2009): 107 – 25; 12.3 (2009): 213 – 32.
Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt. Al-Fihris al-shāmil li-l-turāth al-ʿarabī l-islāmī l-makhṭūṭ. Second
edition. Amman: Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt, n.d.
Muranyi, Miklos. Die Rechtsbücher der Qairawāners Saḥnūn B. Saʿīd: Entstehungsgeschichte
und Werküberlieferung. Stuttgart: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft; F. Steiner,
1999.
Musa, Khadiga. “Legal Maxims as a Genre of Islamic Law: Origins, Development, and
Significance of al-Qawāʿid al-Fiqhiyya.” Islamic Law and Society 21 (2014): 325 – 65.
Musa, Khadiga. “Part One: The Genre of al-Qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya.” In A Critical Edition of
‘Umdat al-Nāẓir ‘alā al-Ashbāh wa’l-Naẓā‘ir by Abū l-Suʿūd al-Husaynī. Edited by Khadiga
Musa. Sheffield: Equinox, 2018.
Al-Musawi, Muhsin. “The Medieval Islamic Literary World-System: The Lexicographic Turn.”
Mamluk Studies Review 17 (2013): 43 – 71.
Al-Musawi, Muhsin. “Pre-Modern Belletristic Prose.” In Cambridge History of Arabic
Literature: Arabic Literature in the Post-Clasical Period, edited by Roger Allen and D.S.
Richards, 101 – 33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Al-Nābulusī, ʿAbd al-Ghanī. Taḥqīq al-qaḍiyya fī l-farq bayn al-rishwa wa-l-hadiya. Edited by
ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd. Cairo: Maktabat al-Zahrāʾ,
1412/1991.
Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, Sulaymān ibn ʿAbd al-Qawī. ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal. Edited by
Wolfhart Heinrichs. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1408/1987.
Naṣṣār, Ḥusayn. Al-Muʿjam al-ʿarabī: nashʾatuhu wa-taṭawwuruhu. Expanded edition. 2 vols.
Cairo: Dār Miṣr, 1408/1988.
Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Muḥyī l-Dīn ibn Sharaf. Kitāb al-Majmūʿ sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab
li-l-Shīrāzī. 23 vols. Edited by Muḥammad Najīb al-Muṭīʿī. Jedda: Maktabat al-Irshād,
1992.
Neuberger, Max. “The Early History of Urology.” Translated by David Riesman. Bulletin of the
Medical Library Association 25.3 (1937): 147 – 65.
Nicholson, Reynold. A Literary History of the Arabs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1907.
Petry, Carl F. The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages. Princeton: Princeton

Authenticated
Printed Sources 237
Pfeifer, Helen. “Encounter after the Conquest: Scholarly Gatherings in 16th-Century Ottoman
Damascus.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47 (2015): 219 – 39.
Pomerantz, Maurice. “Ebn ʿAbbād, Emāʾīl, al-Ṣāheb Kāfī al-Kofāt.” Encyclopaedia Iranica.
Edited by Ehsan Yarshater. London: Routledge, 1982–.
Pomerantz, Maurice. Licit Magic: The Life and Letters of al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995).
Pormann, Peter E. and Emilie Savage-Smith. Medieval Islamic Medicine. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
Powers, David S. Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300 – 1500. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ ibn Mūsā. Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb al-masālik li-maʿrifat aʿlām madhhab
Mālik. 8 vols. Edited by Saʿīd Aḥmad Aʿrāb. [Rabāt?:] al-Mamlaka l-Maghribiyya Wizārat
al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1402/1982.
Qāḍīkhān, al-Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr. Sharḥ al-Ziyādāt. 6 vols. Edited by Qāsim Ashraf Nūr
Aḥmad, Muḥammad Taqī l-ʿUthmānī, and Wahbat al-Zamīlī. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth
al-ʿArabī, 1426/2005.
Qaṭāya, Salman. “Taṣdīr.” In Kitāb Mā l-fāriq aw al-Furūq aw Kalām fī l-furūq bayn al-amrāḍ
by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. Edited by Salmān Qaṭāya, ‫ﺝ‬. Aleppo: Jāmiʿat Ḥalab, Maʿhad
al-Turāth al-ʿIlmī l-ʿArabī, 1398/1978.
Al-Qarāfī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs. Al-Furūq aw Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʾ al-furūq.
Printed with Idrār al-shurūq ʿalā Anwāʾ al-furūq by Ibn al-Shāṭṭ; Tahdhīb al-Furūq; and
al-Qawāʿid al-sunniyya fī l-asrār al-fiqhiyya by Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Ḥusayn al-Makki. 4
vols. Edited by Khalīl Mansūr. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1418/1998.
Al-Qarāfī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Idrīs. The Criterion for Distinguishing Legal Opinions from
Judicial Rulings and the Administrative Acts of Judges and Rulers. Translated by
Mohammad H. Fadel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017.
Al-Qirqisānī, Yaʿqūb ibn Isḥāq. Kitāb al-Anwār wal-marāqib: code of Karaite law. 5 vols.
Edited by Leon Nemoy. New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939 – 43.
Al-Qurashī, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad. Al-Jawāhir al-muḍiyya fī ṭabaqāt
al-ḥanafiyya. 5 vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw. Giza: Hajr, 1413/1993.
Qusṭā ibn Lūqā. Risāla fī l-farq bayn al-rūḥ wa-l-nafs. Edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad Isbir.
Damascus: Dār al-Yanābīʿ, 2006.
Quṭrub, Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr. Kitāb al-Farq. Edited by Khalīl Ibrāhīm al-ʿAṭiyya
and Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb. Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa l-Dīniyya, 1987.
Quṭrub, Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr. Das Kitāb al-wuḥūsh mit einem Paralleltexts von
Quṭrub. Edited by Rudolf Geyer. Vienna: F. Tempksy 1888.
Rabb, Intisar. “Doubt’s Benefit: Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, 7th–16th centuries.” Ph.D. Diss.,
Princeton University, 2009.
Rabb, Intisar. Doubt in Islamic Law: A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic
Criminal Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Rabb, Intisar. “Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction:
Ḥudūd-Avoidance in Cases of Doubt.” Islamic Law and Society 17 (2010): 63 – 125.
Al-Ramlī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. Nihāyat al-muḥtāj ilā sharḥ al-Minhāj fī l-fiqh
ʿalā madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī wa-maʿahu Ḥashiyat Abī l-Ḍiyāʾ Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī
l-Shabrāmallisī l-Qāhirī l-mutawaffī 1087 H [wa‐] Ḥāshiyat Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Razzāq ibn

Authenticated
238 Works Cited
Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-maʿrūf bi-l-Maghribī l-Rashīdī. 8 vols. No ed. Beirut: Dār
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2003.
Rapoport, Yossef. Marriage, Money, and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society. Cambridge:
Raz, Joseph. The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System.
2nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyāʾ. Kitāb Mā l-fāriq aw al-Furūq aw Kalām fī l-furūq
bayn al-amrāḍ. Edited by Salmān Qaṭāya. Aleppo: Jāmiʿat Ḥalab, Maʿhad al-Turāth
al-ʿIlmī l-ʿArabī, 1398/1978.
Riedel, Dagmar A. “Searching for the Islamic Episteme: The Status of Historical Information
in Medieval Middle-Eastern Anthological Writing.” Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 2004.
Rippin, Andrew. “Aaron.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by Kate Fleet et al. Leiden:
Brill, 2008–.
Robin, Christian Julien. “Les inscriptions de l’arabie antique et les études arabe.” Arabica
68.4 (2001): 509 – 77.
Robinson, Chase F. Islamic Historiography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Rowson, Everett. “Alexandrian Age in Fourteenth-Century Damascus: Twin Commentaries on
Two Celebrated Arabic Epistles.” Mamluk Studies Review 8 (2003): 97 – 110.
Al-Sabīl, ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh. “Al-Muqaddima.” In Īḍāḥ al-dalāʾil fī l-farq
bayn al-masāʾil by ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ʿAbdallāh Zarīrānī. Edited by ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad
ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sabīl, 1:17 – 121. Mecca: al-Mamlaka l-ʿArabiyya l-Saʿūdiyya, Wizārat
al-Taʿlīm al-ʿĀlī, Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth
al-Islāmī, 1414/1993.
Al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl ibn Aybak. Ikhtirāʿ al-khurāʿ. Edited by Fārūq Asalīm. Damacus: Ittiḥād
al-Kuttāb al-ʿArab[, 2000].
Al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl ibn Aybak. Al-Wāfī bi-l-wafāyāt. 28 vols. Edited by Aḥmad al-Arnaʾūṭ and
Turkī Muṣṭafā. Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 2000.
Al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿAbbād, Abū l-Qāsim Ismāʿīl. Al-Farq bayn al-ḍād wa-l-ẓāʾ. Edited by Muḥammad
Ḥasan Āl Yā Sīn. Baghdad: Maktabat al-Nahḍa; al-Maktaba l-ʿIlmiyya; Maṭbaʿa l-Maʿārif,
1377/1958.
Al-Ṣāliḥ, Yūsuf. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya li-Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya muntazaʿ min aghlab kutub Ibn
Qayyim raḥimahu Allāh taʿālā. Riyadh: Yūsuf al-Ṣāliḥ, 2009.
Sālimān, Muḥammad. Fann al-alghāz ʿind al-ʿarab wa-maʿhu l-Lafẓ al-lāʾiq wa-l-maʿnā l-rāʾiq
[wa‐]l-Alghāz al-naḥwiyya [wa‐]l-Ṭāʾir al-maymūn fī ḥall lughz al-Kanz al-madfūn. Edited
by Muḥammad Sālimān. Cairo: al-Hayʾa l-Miṣriyya l-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 2012.
Schacht, Joseph. “Aus zwei arabischen Furūq-Büchern.” Islamica 2 (1926): 505 – 37.
Schacht, Joseph. “Classicisme, traditionalisme et ankylose dans la loi religieuse de l’Islam.”
Classicisme et decline culturel dans l’histoire de l’Islam. Edited by R. Brunschvig and
G.E. von Grunebaum, 141 – 61. Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1977.
Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1982.
Schacht, Joseph. “Ikhtilāf.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et al.
Leiden: Brill, 1960 – 2004.
Schoeler, Gregor. The Genesis of Literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read. Translated
by Shawkat M. Toorawa. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
Seidensticker, Tilman. “Lexicography: Classical Arabic.” Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and
Linguistics. Edited by Lutz Edzard et al. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 239
Seyed-Gohrab, A. A. “The Art of Riddling in Classical Persian Poetry.” Edebiyat 12 (2001):

15 – 36.
Sezgin, Fuat. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. 9 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1967 – 94.
Al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs. The Epistle of Legal Theory. Edited and translated by Joseph
E. Lowry. New York: New York University Press, 2013.
Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Isḥāq. Al-Muhadhdhab fī fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. 3 vols. Edited by Muḥammad
al-Zuḥaylī. Damascus: Dār al-Qalam; Beirut: al-Dār al-Shāmiyya, 1416/1996.
Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Isḥāq. Ṭabaqāt al-fuqahāʾ. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾid
al-ʿArabī, 1970.
Shoshan, Boaz. Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Al-Ṣiqillī, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-Mudawwana
wa-l-Mukhtalaṭa. 2 vols. Edited by Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī. Casablanca: Markaz al-Turāth
al-Thaqafī; Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009.
Al-Ṣiqillī, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq ibn Muḥammad. Al-Nukat wa-l-furūq li-masāʾil al-mudawwana qism
al-ʿibādāt. Edited by Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥabīb. PhD Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm
al-Qurā, 1416/1996.
Sluga, Hans. Wittgenstein. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
Stetkevych, Suzanne P. Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ʿAbbāsid Age. Leiden: Brill, 1991.
Stewart, Devin. “Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence: Al-Wuṣūl ilā
maʿrifat al-uṣūl.” In Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, edited by Bernard G. Weiss,
99 – 158. Leiden: Brill, 2002.
Stewart, Devin. “Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-aḥkām and the Genre of
Uṣūl al-Fiqh in Ninth-Century Baghdad.” In ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the
School of ʿAbbasid Studies, Cambridge 6 – 10 July 2002, edited by James Montgomery,
p. 321 – 49. Leuven: Peeters, 2004.
Al-Subayyil, Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad. “al-Taḥqīq.” In al-Furūq min awwal kitāb
al-jināyāt ilā nihāyat al-kitāb dirāsatan wa-taḥqīqan by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī. Edited by Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad
al-Subayyil. MA Thesis: Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1435/2014.
Al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir. 2 vols. Edited by ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd
and ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿAwaḍ. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1411/1991.
Al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn. Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya l-kubrā. 10 vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ
Muḥammad al-Ḥulw and Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Tannāḥī. Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub
al-ʿArabiyya, 1994.
Ṣubḥ, Sāmī Muḥammad. Al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya ʿind al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī fī Kitāb al-Umm. Beirut:
Dār al-Muqtabas, 2018.
Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn. Al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir fī qawāʿid wa-furūʿ al-shāfiʿiyyah. Edited by
ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Faḍīlī. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1411/1990.
Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn. Kutub Khalq al-insān maʿ taḥqīq kitāb Ghayāt al-iḥsān fī khalq
al-insān li-l-Suyūṭī. Edited by Nihād Ḥasūbī Ṣāliḥ. Baghdad: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa
wa-l-Iʿlām, 1989.
Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn. Al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lugha wa-anwāʿihā. 2 vols. Edited by Muḥammad
Aḥmad Jād al-Mawlā Bek, Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī.
Cairo: Maktabat Dār al-Turāth, n.d.

Authenticated
240 Works Cited
Al-Tamīmī l-Dārī, Taqī l-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir. Al-Ṭabaqāt al-saniyya fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafiyya. 4
vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad Ḥulw. Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1983.
Ṭaşköprüzāde, Aḥmad ibn Muṣtafā. Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt
al-ʿulūm. 3 vols. No ed. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405/1985.
Thābit ibn Abī Thābit. Kitāb al-Farq. Edited by Ḥātim Ṣaliḥ al-Ḍāmin. Beirut: Muʾassasat
al-Risāla, 1408/1988.
Todorov, Tzvetan. Genres in Discourse. Edited and translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge:
Ṭumūm, Muḥammad. “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq.” In al-Furūq li-l-Karābīsī by Asʿad ibn
Muḥammad al-Karābīsī. Edited by Muḥammad Ṭumūm and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abu Ghudda,
5 – 29. Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1982.
Tuttle, Kelly. “Expansion and Digression: A Study in Mamlūk Literary Commentary.” PhD
Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2013.
Al-ʿUlaymī, Mujīr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad. Al-Durr al-munaḍḍad fī dhikr asḥāb
al-imām Aḥmad. 2 vols. Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn.
[Riyadh(?)]: Maktabat al-Tawba; Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanī, 1412/1992.
Al-ʿUthaymīn, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān. “Muqaddimat al-muḥaqqiq” in
Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila by Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī. Edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-ʿUthaymīn, 1:11 – 135. Mecca: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān,
1425/2005.
van Ess, Josef. Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte
des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam. 6 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991 – 97.
van Ess, Josef. “Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by H.A.R. Gibb et
van Gelder, Geert Jan. “al-Abīwardī, Abū al-Muẓaffar Muḥammad.” Encyclopaedia of Islam,
THREE. Edited by Kate Fleet et al. Leiden: Brill, 2008–.
van Gelder, Geert Jan “Badīʿ.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by Kate Fleet et al.
Leiden: Brill, 2008–.
Vishanoff, David R. “A Reader’s Guide to al-Shāfiʿī’s Epistle on Legal Theory (al-Risāla).”
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 28.3, 145 – 69.
Voorhoeve, Peter. Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts in the University of Leiden and Other
Collections in the Netherlands. 2nd edition. The Hague: Leiden University Press, 1980.
Walzer, Richard. Introduction to Galen on Medical Experience. First Edition of the Arabic
Version with English Translation and Notes by R. Walzer by Galen. Edited and translated
Richard Walzer. London: Pub. For the trustees of the late Sir Henry Wellcome by the
Oxford University Press, [1947].
Al-Wansharīsī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā. ʿIddat al-furūq fī jamʿ mā fī l-madhhab min
al-jumūʿ wa-l-furūq. Edited by Ḥamza Abū Fāris. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī,
1990/1410.
Wāṣil, Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad. “Dirāsa.” In Maṭāliʿ al-daqāʾiq fī taḥrīr al-jawāmiʿ
wa-l-fawāriq by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī. Edited by Naṣr al-Dīn Farīd Muḥammad Wāṣil,
vol. 1. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007.
Weiss, Bernard et al. “Alta Discussion.” In Studies in Islamic Legal Theory. Edited by Bernard
Weiss, 385 – 429. Leiden: Brill, 2002.

Authenticated
Printed Sources 241
Welsh, Andrew and Eric J. Rettberg. “Riddles.” In The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and
Poetics, 4th edition, edited by Roland Greene et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2012.
Weninger, Stefan. “More Sabaic minuscule texts from Munich.” Proceedings of the Seminar
for Arabian Studies 32 (2002): 217 – 23.
Wensinck, Arent Jan. Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane: les six livres, le
Musnad d’al-Dārimī, le Muwatta’ de Mālik, le Musnad de Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. 8 vols.
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1933 – 38.
Wild, Stefan. Das Kitāb al-ʿain und die arabische Lexicographie. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,
1965.
Witkam, Januarius Justus. De Egyptische Arts Ibn al-Akfānī (gest. 749/1348) En Zijn Indeling
Van de Wetenschappen. Leiden: Ter Lugt Pers, 1989.
Witkam, Januarius Justus. “Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 749/1348) and His Bibliography of the Sciences.”
Manuscripts of the Middle East 2 (1987): 37 – 41.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”; Generally
known as The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe. Translated by Denis Paul
and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
Woodward, Ian. Understanding Material Culture. London: Sage, 2007.
Al-Yaḥyā, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad. “Muqaddima.” In Kitāb al-Furūq ʿalā
madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal by Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Sāmarrī, ibn
Sunayna. Edited by Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Yaḥyā, 2 – 114. Riyad: Dār
al-Ṣumayʿī, 1997.
Yāqūt al ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī, Shihāb al-Dīn. Muʿjam al-buldān. 7 vols. No ed. Beirut:
Dār Ṣādir, 1397/1977.
Yāqūt al ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī, Shihāb al-Dīn. Muʿjam al-udabāʾ: irshād al-arīb ilā
maʿrifat al-adīb. 7 vols. Edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās. Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993.
Young, Walter E. The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law.
Cham: Springer, 2017.
Young, Walter E. “The Dialectical Forge: Proto-System Juridical Disputation in the Kitāb Ikhtilāf
al-ʿIrāqiyyīn.” 2 vols. PhD Diss., McGill University, 2012.
Al-Zabīdī, Muḥammad Murtaḍā l-Ḥusaynī. Tāj al-ʿarūs min jawāhir al-Qāmūs. 40 vols. Edited
by ʿAbd al-Sattār Aḥmad Farrāj et al. Kuwait: Maṭbaʿat Ḥukūmat al-Kuwayt,
1384/1965 – 1422/2001.
Al-Zahrānī, ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad. “Al-Dirāsa.” In Kitāb al-Furūq by Muḥammad ibn
Ṣāliḥ al-Karābīsī. Edited by ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad al-Zahrānī, 2 – 84. Ph.D.
Diss., Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, 1417[/1996].
Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad. Al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh. 8 vols. No ed. Cairo:
Dār al-Kutubī, 1414/1994.
Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad. Al-Manthūr fī l-qawāʿid. 3 vols. Edited by Taysīr Fāʾiq
Aḥmad Maḥmūd and ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda. Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn
Al-Ziriklī, Khayr al-Dīn. Al-Aʿlām qāmūs tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-l-nisāʾ min al-ʿarab
wa-l-mustaʿribīn wa-l-mustashriqīn. 15th printing, 8 vols. Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn,
2002.

Authenticated
242 Works Cited
Zysow, Aron. The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal
Theory. Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013.

Authenticated
Index
Aaron 85 – 87 Andalus 24
Abbasid 2, 9, 58, 60, 123, 127, 154 Aristotle 75, 91 f.
ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar 133 Armant 177
ʿAbd al-Tawwāb, Ramaḍān 61 – 63 al-Armantī, Sirāj al-Dīn Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-
al-Abīwardī, Abū l-Muẓaffar Muḥammad ibn Mujīd ibn ʿAlī l-Hudhalī 177, 184, 216
Abī l-ʿAbbās 66 al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir 5 f., 8, 35, 119, 164,
al-Abīwardī, Abū Yaʿqūb 66 195 f.
Abū l-Ajfān, Muḥammad 5, 31, 39, 43, 73, al-ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAb-
132, 135, 159, 170, 180, 185, 202, 207 f., dallāh 65 – 68
213 al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbdallāh
Abū l-ʿAlāʾ Ṣāʿid ibn Muḥammad 172 55 – 57, 65 – 68, 113, 197
Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Aṣmaʿī 63 – 65
67 al-Asnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn 39 f., 148 f., 151 –
Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanīr, see 153, 167 f., 173, 177, 185 f., 198 – 202,
Quṭrub 212, 216
Abū Bakr al-Abharī 24 al-ʿAsqalānī, Ibn Ḥajar 124, 128, 178, 202,
Abū Bakr al-Iskāfī 191 205, 211, 213
Abū Bakr al-Khallāl 24 al-Aṭraqjī, Ramziyya 47
Abū Fāris, Ḥamza 5, 31, 39, 43, 73, 159, al-Azharī, Khālid ibn ʿAbdallāh 134
170, 180, 183, 185, 202, 207 – 210, 213 al-Arzustānī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad 184,
Abū Ḥanīfa l-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit 24 188, 206
Abū Hurayra 149
Abū ʿImrān al-Qayrawānī 161 Baalbaki, Ramzi 58 – 60, 65
Abū Jaʿfar al-Baqanī 181 Badr al-Dīn ibn ʿUmar al-Ḥuraythī 162
Abū Naṣr 63 Baghdad 2 f., 9, 24, 46, 50, 66, 71, 173,
Abū l-Qāsim al-Ṭābithī 170 179, 184 – 186, 188 f., 202 f., 206
Abū Shāma 173 al-Baghdādī, Ismail Bāshā 170, 172 f.,
Abū Ṭayyib al-Lughawī 61 202 – 204, 206 f., 211 f., 215 f.
Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Salām 63 al-Bāḥusayn, Yaʿqūb 5, 16 f., 31 – 35, 40,
Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb ibn Ibrāhīm 204 158 f., 162, 166 – 170, 172 – 182, 184 f.,
Abū Ziyād al-Kilābī 63 188, 190, 198 – 214
adab 56, 62, 67, 112, 122 – 124, 135 al-Bakhnasā 177
Ahmad, Ahmad A. 8, 10 f., 24, 70 al-Bakrī, ʿĀdil 47 f.
Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Balawī 181, 209 al-Bakrī, Badr al-Dīn 32, 159
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal 10, 24, 31, 39, 102 f., al-Balkhī, Abū l-Qāsim 189
139, 150, 177, 210 al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr 43
Aḥmad ibn Ḥubb Allāh 174 al-Baqqūrī, Muḥammad 40
alghāz 5, 14, 119, 135, 143 al-Barqī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad 2, 162,
ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib 10, 132 f. 212, 215
ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā bn Rāshid al-Yamanī 2, 163, al-Bashar, Ibrāhīm ibn Nāṣir ibn Ibrāhīm
179 – 80, 186, 212, 216 136, 144 f., 200 f.
analogy 21, 33, 89, 93, 104 Basra 68, 210
Anatolia 56
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110605792-015

Authenticated
244 Index
Berlin 3, 5, 68, 82, 98, 149, 184, 187 – Egypt 26, 123, 125, 130, 134, 148, 153 f.,
189, 203, 205 f., 219 f. 177
Bilbeis 177 El Shamsy, Ahmed 8 – 11, 13, 27, 96, 149,
biobibliographic writing. See ṭabaqāt 155
Blecher, Joel 5, 124, 128 f. epistemology, historical 23, 44, 120
Brockelmann, Carl 98, 169 ethics 12, 45, 76 f.
Brown, Jonathan 9, 69 – 72
al-Bukhārī 124, 128, 133, 149 fatwa 4 f., 135, 140, 175, 213
al-Bulqīnī, ʿUmar ibn Raslān 162, 213 furūʿ al-fiqh 1 f., 11
Bursevi, İsmail Hakkı 56, 197 furūq. See distinctions
Furūq-A 178, 184, 188 – 193, 205 f., 217
Cairo 2, 14 f., 40, 49, 57 f., 63 f., 67, 85, Furūq-B 184, 188, 190 – 193, 206, 217
89, 100, 103, 110, 119 – 121, 124 – 128,
130 – 132, 134 f., 137, 141, 148 f., 151 f., Galen 45 f.
154, 166, 168 f., 171, 173, 177 – 179, 186, genre 1 f., 4 – 14, 16 – 18, 30 f., 34 – 41,
189, 198, 200 – 205, 208 43 – 45, 47, 49, 51, 54 – 57, 61, 65, 70,
79, 81, 94 – 96, 103, 109 f., 114, 117 –
dābiṭ, ḍawābiṭ 30, 32, 145 f. , 155 121, 125, 134 – 137, 140, 144 f., 149,
Damascus 66, 70, 74, 76, 126 f., 150, 154, 152 – 155, 157 f., 161 – 169, 171 f., 175,
167 f., 173, 176, 178 f., 186, 188 f., 198, 178 f., 182 f., 185, 187, 189, 191, 194 –
205 f., 211, 219 f. 198
al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn 46, 68, 73, 204 grammar 43, 55, 58, 73, 111, 113 f., 148,
diagnostics. See distinctions, differential di- 182, 194
agnostics
dialectics. See disputation hadith 10, 61, 66 f., 76 f., 85, 92, 111, 124,
al-Dimashqī, Abū l-Faḍl Muslim ibn ʿAlī 32, 128 f., 131 – 133, 135, 139, 149 f., 163,
38 f., 159, 170, 179 f, 185, 207 f., 215 179, 189
al-Dimashqī, Aḥmad ibn Asʿad Ibn Ḥalwān hajj 145 f.
46 Ḥājjī Khalīfa 73, 97 – 102, 134 f., 159 – 161,
disputation 12 – 14, 16 f., 23, 25 – 30, 34, 166 – 169, 172, 174, 177 f., 198 – 205,
38, 41 f., 46, 53, 80 – 87, 89 – 109, 114, 212 f.
118, 120, 122, 124 f., 136, 145, 149, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī 57, 65, 73, 162, 166
151 f., 175, 187, 194 f. Hallaq, Wael 1, 4, 24 f., 36, 96, 140
distinctions 2, 5 f., 11 – 20, 22 – 45, 47, Hama 178
49 f., 52 – 57, 60 – 65, 69, 73 – 75, 77, Hamadan 66, 173
79 – 81, 86, 103 – 105, 107 f., 110 – 114, al-Ḥamawī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad 73,
116 – 123, 131 f., 136 f., 141 – 149, 151 – 142, 160 f., 179, 195
192, 194 – 198, 212 – 215 Ḥanafī school 24, 159, 172, 183, 189, 192
– applied lexicographic distinctions 13, 43, Hanna, Nelly 130
45, 74, 76 f., 79, 144, 162, 175 al-Harawī, Shams al-Dīn 128
– differential diagnostics, see also medicine al-Ḥarīrī 135
12, 43 – 50, 79, 112 al-Ḥasan al-Būrīnī 127
– lexicographic distinctions 12 f., 43 – 45, al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥmūd al-Sarrād (or al-Zarrād)
56 f., 75, 77, 79, 111 f., 116 – 118, 162, 162
197, 212 ḥāshiya 9,

Authenticated
Index 245
Heinrichs, Wolfhart 6, 17, 27, 29, 31, 34 f., Ibn al-Rēwandī 82 – 84

43, 49, 158 f., 166, 168 – 170, 172 f., Ibn al-Shiḥna 137 f.
175 – 181, 198 – 211 Ibn Shujāʿ, Muḥammad 115
ḥīla 189, 220, 224 Ibn al-Sikkīt 63 f.
Ibn Sunayna, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh al-
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa 46, 49 f. Sāmarrī 6, 31, 39, 176 f., 179, 210 f.,
Ibn al-Akfānī 98, 100 – 102, 160 216
Ibn al-ʿĀlima, see al-Dimashqī, Aḥmad ibn Ibn Surayj 24, 37, 165 f., 168, 198, 215
Asʿad Ibn Ḥalwān Ibn Surūr, Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Maq-
Ibn ʿAsākir 126 disī 176, 210, 216
Ibn Bābawayh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī 68 Ibn Taymiyya 31, 110
Ibn Badrān, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Ibn Ṭūlūn Mosque 148
ʿAbd al-Qawī l-Maqdisī 176, 211, 216 Ibn al-Turkumānī, Tāj al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn
Ibn Farḥūn 38, 132 f., 135 f., 141, 153, 171, ʿUthmān 178, 186, 205, 216
185, 207 f. Ibn Zaydūn 154
Ibn Fāris al-Lughawī 63, 135 Ikhmīm 177
Ibn Ḥazm 38, 77, 83, 162, 207 Ikhtilāf. See khilāf
Ibn al-ʿIzz 137 f. ʿilla 13, 42, 77, 87 f., 90, 93, 95, 104 f.
Ibn al-Jawzī 67, 135, 211 inheritance 147
Ibn al-Jazzār 46 – 49, 51 – 54, 73 Iraq 26
Ibn Juljul 48 – 50 ʿĪsā ibn Dīnār 24
Ibn Kamāl Pāsha. See Kemalpaşazade Isbir, ʿAlī Muḥammad 74 f.
Ibn Kashāsib, Abū l-ʿAbbās Kamāl al-Dīn Isfahan 66
Aḥmad al-Dizmārī 173, 201, 216 Istanbul 5, 35, 41, 46, 94, 97, 121, 129,
Ibn Kathīr 168, 198 131 f., 158 – 160, 169, 186, 188 – 190,
Ibn al-Kātib 170, 185, 206, 215 198, 200, 203 – 206, 219 f., 222 – 224
Ibn Khaldūn 100
Ibn Khallikān 66, 185, 207, 212 jadal. See disputation
Ibn al-Kutubī, Yūsuf ibn Ismāʾīl 46 f. Jalāl, Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl 162, 170, 195, 207,
Ibn al-Nadīm 50, 63, 98, 162, 166, 199, 213
212 Jammāʿīl 176
Ibn al-Naqqāsh, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Jamma’in 176
ibn ʿAlī 177 f., 184, 186, 202, 216 al-Jarbādhqānī 71
Ibn Nujaym 5, 33, 141 – 144, 155, 160 f., al-Jihānī, Jalāl 170, 207
164, 182 f., 190, 192, 195, 206, 213, 217 al-Jīlī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 153
Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba 145, 148, 167 f., 173, 178, Johansen, Baber 4, 140, 151
185, 198 – 202 al-Jurjānī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad 136, 144 –
Ibn al-Qā sim 37 148, 152 f., 155, 165, 168, 186, 200 f.,
Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Abū ʿAbdallāh 152 f., 161, 215
212 al-Juwaynī, ʿAbdallāh 12, 17 – 30, 32,
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 162, 214 35 – 37, 39, 81, 103 – 108, 145, 149,
Ibn al-Qifṭī 50, 73 152 f., 168, 180, 185, 199 f.
Ibn Qudāmā, Muwaffaq al-Dīn 102 – 103 al-Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū l-Maʿālī
Ibn Qutayba 56, 62, 112 f., 135 89 f., 104, 108, 171, 185, 200
Ibn Quṭlūbughā 169, 172, 174, 178, 203 –
205
Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī 76, 110

Authenticated
246 Index
Kaḥḥāla, ʿUmar Riḍā 167 – 169, 172 – 174, Miller, Larry B. 82 – 86, 89 – 93, 96, 101
176 – 178, 180, 185 f., 198 – 205, 207, Mongol 3, 126
209 – 213 Moses 85 – 87
Kanazi, George 65 – 68 Muḥammad ibn Muqātil al-Rāzī 191
al-Karābīsī, Asʿad ibn Muḥammad 32, 39, Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī l-Anṣārī l-
115 f., 142, 160 – 161, 171 f., 174, 182, Mālikī 181, 210
189, 197, 204, 216 Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Andalusī l-Anṣārī l-
al-Karābīsī, Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ 166 f., Mālikī l-Mawwāq. See al-Mawwāq
171 f., 192, 203, 215 Muḥammad ibn Zabāra 163, 180, 186
al-Karkhī, Abū l-Ḥasan 24 Muḥammad (the Prophet) 9, 17 f., 28 f.,
Kemalpaşazade 77 – 79 32 f., 38 – 40, 43, 46, 56 f., 61 f., 64,
Khalīl ibn Aḥmad 58, 64 f. 66 – 68, 70 f., 74, 77, 85 f., 97, 100, 103,
khilāf 39, 81, 94 – 103, 109, 125 110 – 112, 129, 133, 135 – 137, 139, 144 f.,
Khurasan 185 149 – 152, 158 f., 162 f., 166 – 173, 175 –
181, 183, 185 f., 189, 191, 195 f., 198 –
La Marsa 180 f., 209 f. 204, 206 – 217
legal stratagem. See ḥīla Muḥammad al-Shawkānī 163
the Levant 178 mukhtaṣar 24, 50, 140, 166
lexicography 43, 45, 49, 51, 55, 58 f., 61, Musa, Khadiga 8, 10 f., 195 f.
64, 73, 79, 110 f., 114, 118, 161, 166, 197 al-Musawi, Muhsin 129
Lowry, Joseph 3, 5, 13, 95 f., 135 Muslim 5, 31 – 34, 38 f., 43, 58, 66, 72, 76,
lugha. See lexicography 81 – 87, 97, 101, 112, 121, 126, 133, 138,
143, 147, 149, 152, 157, 159, 170, 185,
mabsūṭ 140 187, 195, 208
madrasa 38, 122, 155, 192 Muʿtazila 67 f.
al-Maḥbūbī, Aḥmad ibn ʿUbayd Allāh 142, al-Muzanī, Ismāʿīl ibn Yaḥyā 166
160 f., 173 f., 189, 204 f., 216
al-Maḥbūbī, ʿUbayd Allāh ibn Masʿūd ibn naḥw. See grammar
Aḥmad 174 Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Kha-
majlis 122, 124 f., 127 – 131, 137, 146, 155 laf ibn Rājiḥ al-Maqdisī 173, 201, 216
Makdisi, George 82, 91, 95, 97, 122 al-Nasawī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad
Mālik ibn Anas 10, 24, 37, 133 166, 199, 215
Mālikī school 24, 40, 153 Naṣīr ibn Yaḥyā l-Balkhī 189, 191
maqāṣid al-sharīʿa 119, 195 Naṣṣār, Ḥusayn 58, 62
al-Maqdisī, Abū l-Khayr ibn Jamāʿa 29, al-Nāṭifī, Abū ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad
152, 168, 200, 215 al-Ṭabarī 169, 203, 215
al-Maqdisī, Muṭahhar ibn Ṭāhir 83 al-Nawawī, Muḥyī l-Dīn ibn Sharaf 25,
al-Mardāwī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Sulaymān 149 f., 183
102 f., 211 al-Naysābūrī, Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Bakr 6,
Marghāyatī(?), Bāyazīd ibn Isrāʾīl ibn Ḥājjī 31, 40 f., 131, 171, 184, 204, 206, 216 f.
Dāwūd 181 Nishapur 185
al-Mawwāq 170, 180 f., 207, 209 f., 217 North Africa 157, 171, 182, 185
Mecca 32, 158, 171, 176 f., 179, 188, 198,
206, 211, 219 f. Ottoman 15, 101, 123, 126 f., 130, 140, 154,
medicine, see also distinctions, differential 159, 167, 183, 187, 192
diagnostics 12, 43 – 45, 47 – 49, 51, Oxyrhynchus. See al-Bakhnasā
73, 112, 122

Authenticated
Index 247
Pfeifer, Helen 126 – 128 al-Sāmarrī, Muʿaẓẓam al-Dīn Abū l-Fatḥ ʿAb-
philosophy 12 f., 45, 74, 77, 82, 101, 124 dallāh ibn Hibat Allāh 176
Plato 75 al-Sarakhsī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥam-
Powers, David 4 f., 25, 140, 175 mad 43, 73
Schacht, Joseph 4 – 6, 17, 31, 34, 36, 41,
al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baghdādī 169 f. 94, 96, 159, 166, 172, 176 f., 190, 198 f.,
al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ 170, 185, 206 – 208 202 – 204, 206, 209, 211
al-Qāḍī l-Nuʿmān 48 Sezgin, Fuat 74, 191
al-Qanṣūh Ghawrī 129 Shāfiʿī school 2, 19, 22, 24, 29 f., 36 f.,
al-Qarāfī, Shihāb al-Dīn 5, 24 f., 40, 153, 149 f., 152, 159, 165, 168, 173, 177, 186
160, 164, 175, 182 f., 186, 198, 209, al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs 10, 13,
213, 216 18 – 24, 26, 91, 95 f., 100, 121, 135 f.,
Qaṭāya, Salmān 46 f., 49 – 51 150, 162, 173, 198, 201, 213 f., 216
al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya 8, 119, 175, 195 f. Shahrastānī 98
al-Qazwīnī, Abū Ḥātim 153 al-Shaybānī, Abū ʿAmr 58
Qipchak 125 al-Shaybānī, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan 10,
al-Qirqisānī, Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb 83 – 87 189, 191, 204
qiyās. See analogy Shi’i 2, 10, 68, 162 f., 165, 212
Qurʼan 60, 67, 69, 78, 85, 110, 129, 135, al-Shīrāzī, Abū Isḥāq 37, 93, 114, 150,
145 f., 189 167 f., 185, 198 f., 212
Quṭrub 61 – 65 al-Silafī, Abū Ṭāhir Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad
Qus 177 66
Qusṭā ibn Lūqā 74 – 77 al-Ṣiqillī, ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq 37 f., 94, 170 f.,
185, 215
Rabat 155, 170, 186, 201, 208 f. al-Subayyil, Anas ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad
Rabb, Intisar 8, 10 f. 177, 210 f.
al-Rabīʿ ibn Sulaymān 105 al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn 166 – 168, 173, 177,
al-Rāfiʿī, ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad 185, 195 f., 198 – 201, 212
149 f., 183 Sufism 45, 159, 162, 213
al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Zakariyyāʾ 46 – 54 sunna, see hadith
al-Rāzī, Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad 124 al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn 64, 164, 195 – 197
al-Rāzī, Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyāʾ 124
riddles, see alghāz ṭabaqāt 46, 127, 153, 158, 169, 171, 179,
al-Rūyānī, Abū l-Maḥāsin ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn 203
Ismāʿīl al-Ṭabarī 168, 201, 216 al-Ṭabarī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdallāh
9, 150, 153, 167 f., 185, 199, 215 f.
al-Sabīl, ʿUmar 158 f., 163, 166 – 170, 172 – al-Ṭaḥāwī 191
182, 184 f., 188 – 190, 198 – 213 al-Tamīmī l-Dārī 169, 174
al-Ṣadūq. See Ibn Bābawayh takhrīj 8, 23 f.
al-Ṣafadī, Khalīl ibn Aybak 130, 154 taqlīd 4 f., 24 f., 29
al-Ṣāhib Ibn ʿAbbād 71 Ṭaşköprüzāde, ʿIṣām al-Dīn 98 – 103
Saḥnūn ibn Saʿīd 37 al-Thaʿālabī 62
Sālimān, Muḥammad 135 Thābit ibn Abī Thābit 60, 63
Samarqand 172 theology 13, 66 – 68, 73, 82 – 84, 96, 122,
al-Samarqandī, Abū l-Layth 189, 191 197
al-Sāmarrī, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Todorov, Tzvetan 6 f.
ʿAbdallāh, see Ibn Sunayna

Authenticated
248 Index
al-Ṭūfī, Najm al-Dīn 12, 17, 27 – 30, 181, Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī 66

199 f., 207, 210 Yemen 180, 186
Young, Walter E. 58, 81 – 84, 87 f., 91 – 94,
ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb 133 96, 101, 125, 174
al-Urdustānī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad 184,
188, 206 al-Zahrānī, ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad
uṣūl al-fiqh 1 f., 5, 11, 30, 35, 96, 100, 111, 166 f., 203
114, 173, 201 f. Zarīrān 179
al-Zarīrānī, Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahīm ibn
al-Wansharīsī, Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad 32, ʿAbdallāh 32, 179, 186, 198, 211
182, 188, 209, 217 al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn 12, 17, 28 – 30,
Wāṣil ibn ʿAṭāʾ 66 168, 173, 185, 199 – 201, 212
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 7, 9, 36 Zaydī 2, 163, 179 f., 186
al-Ziriklī, Khayr al-Dīn 46, 73, 169, 200 –
Yaḥyā ibn Yaḥyā l-Laythī 10, 24 203, 207, 211 f.
al-Yaḥyā, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn al-Zubayrī, al-Zubayr ibn Aḥmad 152 f., 161,
Muḥammad 39, 176 f., 210 f. 166, 212

Authenticated

Harmonizing Similarities

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Harmonizing Similarities

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Harmonizing Similarities

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Elias G.

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

A History of Distinctions Literature in Islamic Law

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019946400

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Excursus: The Logic of Legal Distinctions 110

Chapter Five: A Bibliographic Survey of the Distinctions Genre 157

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Works Cited 225

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Joseph Schacht, perhaps the most important twentieth-century scholar of Is-

 Joseph Schacht, “Classicisme, traditionalisme et ankylose dans la loi religieuse de l’Islam,” in

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Sherman Jackson rejects Schacht’s assertion of “ossification,” seeing the

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

The Role of Genre in Islamic Law

 In particular, I am indebted to Ahmad A. Ahmad’s Structural Interrelations, which analyzed

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Ahmed El Shamsy has recently discussed legal genre in a study devoted to

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

 El Shamsy, “Ḥāshiya,” 303.

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Having established some of the parameters of the genre of legal distinctions,

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

 Yaʿqūb ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bāḥusayn, al-Furūq al-fiqhiyya wa-l-uṣūliyya: muqawwamātuhā

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

After exploring premodern and modern definitions of legal distinctions, this

Defining Legal Distinctions

Ironically, the paucity of premodern definitions of what constitutes a legal dis-

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh al-Juwaynī

The earliest theoretical discussion of legal distinctions appears in a work of legal

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:41.

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

In this example, the doctrinal difference centers on making an intention to per-

 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:39.

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

Al-Juwaynī distinguishes between two types of workers, arguing that an inde-

 Al-Juwaynī, al-Jamʿ wa-l-farq, 1:40 – 41.

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

it seems that al-Juwaynī locates an instance of apparent doctrinal contradiction

Brought to you by | UCL - University College London

here is equivalent to category two above, al Juwaynī omits a fuller discussion of