GIANFRANCESCO PICO DELLA

MIRANDOLA

(r 4 6 9- r 533)

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

CHARLES B. SCHMITT

GIANFRANCESCO PICO DELLA

MIRANDOLA
(14 6 9- 1 533)
AND

HIS CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE

Directors: P. Dibon (Paris) and R. Popkin (Univ. of Cali fomi a, La Jolla)

Editorial Board: J. Aubin (Paris); J. Collins (St. Louis Univ.); P. Costabel (Paris);
A. Crombie (Oxford); I. Dambska (Cracow); H. de la Fontaine-Verwey (Amsterdam);
H. Gadamer (Heidelberg); H. Gouhier (Paris); T. Gregory (Rome); T. E. Jessop (Hull);
A. Koyre t (Paris); P. O. Kristeller (Columbia Univ.); Elisabeth Labrouose (Paris); S.
Lindroth (Upsala); P. Mesnard (Tours) ;J. Orcibal (Paris); I. S. Revah (Paris); G. Sebba
(Emory Univ., Atlanta); R. Shackleton (Oxford); J. Tans (Groningen); G. Tonelli (Pisa).

CHARLES B. SCHMITT

GIANFRANCESCO PICO DELLA

MIRANDOLA
{I469- 1 533)
AND

HIS CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. - 1967

ISBN 978-94-011-9681-9
ISBN 978-94-011-9679-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-9679-6
Copyright 1967 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. NetherlandY in 1967
Ali rights reseroed, inciuding the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or paris thereof in any form

FOR KATE

PREFACE

The origins of this book go back to I956 when it was suggested to me

that a study on the philosophy of Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola
would furnish an important addition to our knowledge of the philosophy of the Italian Renaissance. It was not, however, until I960 that I
could devote a significant portion of my time to a realization of this
goal. My work was essentially completed in 1963, at which time it was
presented in its original form as a doctoral dissertation in the Philosophy Department of Columbia University. Since then I have made
many minor improvements and several chapters have been extensively
reworked.
This study represents the first attempt in fifty years to give a
detailed account of even a portion of Gianfrancesco Pico's life and
thought. The most comprehensive previous study, Gertrude Bramlette
Richards, "Gianfrancesco Pico della lv1irandola" (Cornell University
Dissertation, I 9 I 5), which I have found very useful in preparing my
own book, is largely based on secondary literature and is mistaken in a
number of details. Furthermore, Miss Richards' treatment of Gianfrancesco Pico as a thinker is very sketchy and is not an exhaustive
study of his own writings. It is hoped that my present study, built in
part on her extensive bibliographical indications, brings forth a certain
amount of new information which will be of value for further research.
In the course of my research on Gianfrancesco Pico I have incurred
numerous debts which it is now my pleasant duty to acknowledge. It is
hoped that the end result is worthy of the inconvenience which it has
caused so many people. The opportunity to consult many of the manuscripts and rare editions, as well as the opportunity to devote my undivided attention to this study for two full years, would hardly have
been possible without generous grants from the United States Government for study in Italy during the years I96I-63. Especially am I

VIn

PREFACE

grateful to Miss Cipriana Scelba and her staff of the Commissione

Americana per gli Scambi Culturali con l'Italia for contributing in so
many ways to making my stay in Italy both pleasant and fruitful. I
would also like to thank Fordham University for making a grant available to me for aid in defraying the cost of the final preparation of the
manuscript.
The libraries and archives in which the research for this book was
carried out have in almost every case proved to be most helpful in
providing the necessary materials. Special mention is due those two
great establishments where by far the larger part of research was carried
out: The Columbia University Libraries (with particular mention of
the staff of Special Collections) and the Biblioteca N azionale Centrale
of Florence (especially the staff of the "Sala di Consultazione" and the
"Sala del Rinascimento"). The other libraries in which I have worked
for periods of time varying from less than an hour to more than a month
are many, but I feel that each should be given the proper credit. In the
United States, I wish to thank the Boston Public Library; the Harvard
University Libraries and the Andover Theological Seminary Library
of Cambridge; the Yale University Library of New Haven; the Union
Theological Seminary Library, the New York Public Library, the
Pierpont Morgan Library, and the New York Academy of :Medicine
Library, all of N ew York; the Princeton University Library; and the
University of Chicago Library and the Newberry Library of Chicago.
Among the many Italian libraries which I used the following must be
remembered: the Biblioteca Comunale and the Biblioteca Universitaria in Bologna; the Biblioteca Comunale in Carpi; the Biblioteca
Comunale in Ferrara; the Archivio di Stato, the Biblioteca Marucelliana, the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, the Biblioteca Riccardiana,
the Biblioteca della Facolta di Lettere e Filosofia, the Library of the
Kunsthistorisches Institut, and the Library of the Harvard University
Center for Renaissance Studies (Villa I Tatti) in Florence; the Biblioteca Governativa in Lucca; the Archivio di Stato, and the Biblioteca
Comunale in Mantua; the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, the Biblioteca
N azionale Braidense, and the Biblioteca Trivulziana in Milan; the
Biblioteca Comunale in Mirandola; the Archivio di Stato, the Biblioteca Estense, and the Biblioteca Universitaria in Modena; the Biblioteca Antoniana, the Biblioteca Comunale, the Biblioteca del Seminario, and the Biblioteca Universitaria in Padua; the Biblioteca Palatina
in Parma; the Biblioteca Comunale in Perugia; the Biblioteca Angelica, the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuale II, the Biblio-

PREFACE

IX

teca Vallicelliana, and the Biblioteca del Convento di Santa Sabina in

Rome; the Biblioteca Comunale in Siena; the Biblioteca N azionale
Marciana in Venice; and the Biblioteca Bertoliana in Vicenza. The
courteous and efficient staff and the incomparable collection of the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana made my task much easier in many ways.
The other European libraries of which I made use and to which I must
render thanks include: the Bodleian Library at Oxford and the British
Museum Library in London; the Bibliotheque Royale in Brussels; the
Bibliotheque N ationale and the Bibliotheque Mazarine in Paris; the
Stadtbibliothek in Nuremberg, the Bayrische Staatsbibliothek and
Universitatsbibliothek in Munich; and the Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna; and the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid, the Biblioteca del Escorial, and the Biblioteca Universitaria in Barcelona. I
would also like to thank the following libraries (in addition to some of
the above) for providing me with photographic reproductions of materials in their possession: the Cornell University Library, the Folger
Shakespeare Library of Washington, D.C., the University of Illinois
Library, and the Biblioteca Casanatense in Rome.
Of those persons who aided me in the preparation of this study I
should like to thank above all Professor Paul Oskar Kristeller of Columbia University, who first suggested that I undertake this study and
whose patient and knowing help at all stages of the work has been as
generous as it had been illuminating. Thanks are also due to Professors
Joseph Blau, Arthur Hyman, Joseph A. Mazzeo, John C. Nelson, and
John Herman Randall, Jr., all of Columbia University, for many
helpful suggestions. Especial thanks must go to Professor Sears R.
Jayne of Queens College of the City University of New York and
Professor Neal Ward Gilbert of the University of California (Davis)
for having read the entire manuscript with care and thereby making
many improvements - both stylistic and factual - on an earlier draft.
Professor Edward P. Mahoney of Duke University has offered many
helpful suggestions for the improvement of the manuscript and our
many long discussions - both in Italy and in New York - of the Renaissance philosophy, have increased immeasurably my own understanding of the whole period. Dr. C. H. Clough's careful reading of
Chapter I has saved me from several serious errors and several of his
suggestions have resulted in major improvements. Professor Paul F.
Cranefield of Rockefeller University and Professor Joseph I. Budnick
of Fordham University have made helpful suggestions regarding the
technical aspects of medicine and physics in so far as they touch my

PREFACE

book. Professor Robert C. Fox of St. Francis College (Brooklyn),

Professor Richard Goldthwaite of Kent State University, Professor Paul Grendler of the University of Toronto, Professor Jerrold
Seigel of Princeton University, and Professor Donald Weinstein of
Rutgers University have all read parts of the present study and
have given me suggestions which have made it better than it otherwise would have been. To Mr. Herbert }'1atsen of Converse College I
am indebted for many helpful aids, both regarding the techniques of
scholarly research in the Renaissance period and regarding practical
hints for fruitful study in Italy. Professor Richard Popkin of the University of California (San Diego) gave me several useful indications on
the study of early modern scepticism. The members of that learned
assembly, the Columbia University Seminar in the Renaissance, patiently heard me read a portion of one chapter and their ensuing discussions clarified several important points. Mr. Philip vVeimerskirch of
the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Library has called to my attention
more than once to items of bibliographical importance which otherwise
might have escaped my notice. Professor Renzo Amedeo of Garessio,
Reverend Thomas Kaeppeli, O.P. of the Convento di Santa Sabina in
Rome, Professor Eugenio Massa of the University of Pis a, and Professor
Alessandro Perosa of the University of Florence helped to make my stay
in Italy more fruitful by aiding my studies in various ways. To my
friends at Mirandola, the late Giovanni Cavicchioli and Dott. Arrigo
Marazzi, I am indebted for several kindnesses and I can only hope that
this book in some way recalls the past glory of that citta antica e nobilissima. To Miss Eva Hoenig of New York, who has twice typed this difficult manuscript, I tender my sincerest thanks; the inconveniences
that she had to undergo to meet various deadlines few will know. Finally, to my wife Catherine, who bore our son in a then unfamiliar country
and who had to undergo many hardships for the sake of this study, I
offer my gratitude which must of necessity fall short of what which is
due her.
The author gratefully acknowledges permission granted by the
Renaissance Society of America to use substantial portions of the
article "Who Read Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola?", which
first appeared in Studies in the Renaissance XI (1964).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Opera
Cron An

Papazzoni

Papotti

Sanuto
Cron Mod I

Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ... opera quae extant omnia. .. (Basel, 16o I).
Cronaca della nobilissima Jamiglia Pico scritta da autore anonimo, Memorie storiche della cittil edell' antico ducato della
Mirandola, II (1874).
Cronaca della Mirandola dei figli di ManJredi e della corte di
Quarantola scritta da Ingrano Bratti continuata da Battista
Papazzoni, jVfemorie storiche ... della Mirandola, I (1872).
Annali 0 memorie storiche della Mirandola raccolte dal P.
Francesco Ignazio Papotti 1\1. O. con note critico-illustrative,
Memorie storiche ... della Mirandola, III (1876).
I diarii di Marino Sanuto, ed. G. Berchet et al. (Venice,

18 79- 193).
Cronaca modenese di Jacopino de' Bianchi detto de' Lancellotti,
Monumenti di storia patria delle provincie modenesi (Parma,

1862).
Cron Mod II Cronaca modenese di Tommasino de' Bianchi detto de' Lance/lotti, Monumenti di storia patria delle provincie modenesi

(Parma, 1862 f.).

Ceretti BP

Biografie pichensi, Memorie storiche ... della Mirandola,

Ceretti BME

XVII-XX (1907-13).
Felice Ceretti, "Bianca Maria d'Este," Atti e memorie
della RR. deputazioni di storia patria per Ie provincie dell'
Emilia, new series, vol. III, part I (1878), pp. 119-67.

Ceretti AMP Felice Ceretti, "Anton Maria Pico della Mirandola,"

Atti e memorie ... per le provincie modenesi e parmensi, new
series, vol. III, part II (1878), pp. 237-87.
Ceretti FT
Felice Ceretti, "Francesca Trivulzio," Atti e memorie ...
per Ie provincie dell' Emilia, new series, vol. V, part II,
(1880), pp. 103-76.

XII

Ceretti LP

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Felice Ceretti, "Lodovico I Pico," Atti e memorie ... per

Ie provincie dell' Emilia, new series, vol. VII, part II
(1882), pp. 93-198.
Ceretti GIIP Felice Ceretti, "Galeotto II Pico," Atti e memorie ... per
le provincie modenesi e parmensi, series III, vol. I, part II
(1883), pp. 225-330.
Ceretti GIP Felice Ceretti, "Galeotto I Pico," Atti e memorie ... per
le provincie modenesi e parmensi, series III, vol. II, part I
(1884), pp. 70 - 10 1.
Ceretti LI
Felice Ceretti, "Lettere inedite del conte Giovanni
Francesco II Pico," Atti e memorie .. . per le provincie
modenesi, series V, vol. III (1904), pp. 123-39.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

VII

List of Abbreviations

XI

Introduction
CHAPTER I

GIANFRANCESCO PICO'S LIFE

Early Life (1469-1491)

Pico Emerges as a Humanist and Philosopher (1491-99)
The Prince of Mirandola (1499-1502)
Gianfrancesco's Exile (1502-15 I I)
Success and Exile Again (1511-1514)
The Return to Mirandola (1514-1533)
CHAPTER II

II

12
16
18
24
26

GIANFRANCESCO PICO'S GENERAL

ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

Giovanni Pico
Girolamo Savonarola
The Solution Worked Out in the "De Studio" (1496)
The First Three Books of the "Examen Vanitatis" (1520)
Conclusion
CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

The Historical Context of Pico's Critique

The Orientation of Pico's Critique
Humanist Criticisms of Aristotle
Criticism of Aristotle by his School
The Obscurity of Aristotle's Style
Criticisms of Aristotle by Other Schools
Criticisms of Aristotle's Dependence on Sense Experience
Aristotle's Own Uncertainty
CHAPTER IV

32
34
37
43
54

55
56
63

68
69

73
75

82

THE REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN

"SCIENCE"

Introduction
The First Way
The Second Way

84
86

96

XIV

TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Third Way
The Fourth Way
The Fifth Way
General Conclusion to the Chapter

CHAPTER V

lI8
J22

THE CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

Introduction
Motion

128
131

TI~

1~

Place
Vacuum
Conclusion
CHAPTER VI

101
110

138
144
158
THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXAM EN

VANITATIS ON LATER THOUGHT

Introduction
Mario Nizolio
Giulio Castellani
Latin Translations of SexLUs Empiriclls
Giovanni Battista Bernardi
Paolo Beni
The Coimbra Commentaries
Filippo Fabri
Pierre Gassendi
Tommaso Campanella
Martin Schoock
Leibniz
APPENDICES

Appendix A. The Works of Gianfrancesco Pi co

List of Abbreviations Used in this Appendix
Introduction
I. The Writings of Gianfrancesco Pico
II. Printed Primary Sources
III. Manuscript Sources
IV. Selected Secondary Sources
Appendix B. A Comparison of Gianfrancesco Pico's Translation of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism with Henri Estienne's Translation
Appendix C. Did Gianfrancesco Pico Influence Agrippa?

Index

183
185
187
19 1

203
2 17
227

23 I
237
243

INTRODUCTION

The Renaissance was a many-faceted occurrence. All attempts to reach

a definitive characterization of it seem to have fallen short in some way.
Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that there does not seem to be an
identifiable unity which runs throughout the period. Certain styles
may characterize Renaissance painting, architecture, or literature, but
usually the unifying themes actually found there are limited to the
output of a small portion of the whole spatial-temporal limits of the
age. While the artistic and literary products of the Renaissance have
received a good deal of attention from various scholars and interpreters,
philosophy has not been so fortunate, having been studied only in a
limited way and mostly during the past thirty years. Consequently, we
are not yet in a position to evaluate the philosophical contributions of
the Renaissance period as a whole, although several attempts, based on
the evidence now available, have been made to state some of the various
dominant trends. We are now at the point when we should devote
ourselves to discovering and printing unpublished texts, to establishing
critical editions of the important philosophical writings of the age, and
to writing monographs on individual thinkers and on specific philosophical problems and traditions which mark the epoch. Vague general histories and interpretive essays based upon secondary works and
upon traditional evaluations can do little or nothing to increase

our knowledge and understanding of the unique philosophical significance of the period.
In the present study, which focuses on one philosophical thinker of
the sixteenth century, I hope to be able to add something to our detailed knowledge of the Renaissance. The subject of this monograph,
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533), has not yet been

INTRODUCTION

carefully evaluated as a philosopher, nor have either the biographical

facts of his life or the bibliographical basis for a study of his thought
been hitherto established. I can only hope that my work both sets down
a solid foundation for later studies on Gianfrancesco Pico and that
it helps to clarify certain previously misunderstood tendencies of
sixteenth century thought. I should like to point out especially how
Pico brought some original ideas to the philosophical discussions of his
century and how he fits into the general intellectual context of his time.

II
We are, of course, forced to see Gianfrancesco in relation to his
famous uncle, Giovanni Pico, one of the key figures of Quattrocento
philosophy. Both Picos were from the same ruling family of the small
duchy of Mirandola situated in the midst of the rich farmland of the Po
Basin. Both had extraordinary interests in learning and philosophy, as
well as in literature and theology. The two also had many friends in
common, spread throughout the varied fields of intellectual endeavor.
Gianfrancesco Pico was only six years younger than his uncle, but was
indebted to the latter to a remarkable degree, apparently inheriting
from Giovanni the inordinate desire to absorb as many of the intellectual currents of the Renaissance as he could.
It is perhaps this close relationship between the two Picos which has
led many later writers to make the initial - and satisfyingly simple assumption that Gianfrancesco Pico was merely a follower of the
Neoplatonically oriented syncretism of his uncle. Other historians,
commentators, and critics have committed the less pardonable fault of
confusing the two men. Such a confusion is a fate which all who are
born into a family of a famous man are susceptible, and there can be no
doubt that Giovanni Pi co della Mirandola was a famous man in Quattrocento Italy and has remained one down to the present day. Although
there are certainly similarities in the philosophical and religious outlooks of the two Picos, there are also very definite differences in the
opinions which they expressed in the course of their lives. Indeed, regarding certain issues the two were poles apart, although a good case
can be made that Gianfrancesco's philosophical writings bear a strong
similarity to his uncle's later writings. On the other hand, Gianfrancesco's Examen Vanitatis is of a completely different orientation than
Giovanni's most characteristic works such as the Oratio or the Apologia.
The nephew, after coming under Savonarola's overpowering influence

INTRODUCTION

early in his career, never escaped the friar's intellectual domination.

The Examen Vanitatis bears eloquent testimony to this. Gianfrancesco
makes no attempt to establish the pax philosophica proposed by his uncle,
perhaps with the exuberance of youth, but also with a certain maturity
of purpose; rather, his endeavor in the Examen Vanitatis is to show that
philosophy in general is mistaken. Whereas Giovanni Pico had often
argued that all philosophies and all religions have attained a portion
of the truth, Gianfrancesco said, in effect, that all religions and all
philosophies - save the Christian religion alone - are mere collections
of confused and internally inconsistent falsehoods. In holding such a
view, he sided not only with Savonarola, but with certain of the Fathers
and with the Reformers as well. On this point, he was insistent.
Christianity is a self-subsistent reality and it has little if anything to
gain from philosophy, the sciences and the arts. This central thesis
diffuses itself through nearly the whole of Gianfrancesco's literary output. He writes not to praise or extend the realm of philosophy but to
demolish it. Aristotle, "maestro di color che sanno," receives the brunt
of Pico's attack, and the Mirandolan argues that such knowledge as
Aristotelian philosophy affords avails us little in our major quest for
sanctity and salvation. In maintaining such an opinion Gianfrancesco
did not differ markedly from several theologians, mystics, and humanists contemporary with him. What sets him off as more interesting than
the others tb historians of philosophy, of science, of religion is that he
entered into the arena of philosophical dispute and met the Aristotelians on their own terms. Although Pico resorts to religious and theological arguments time and again to refute Aristotle and the profane
science which he represented, this was not done before he had countered the Aristotelian positions with specifically philosophical arguments,
often of an original or highly unusual nature.

III
Gianfrancesco Pico's judgment of the value of Peripatetic philosophy seems to have changed in the course of his life. Although we have
no evidence that he was ever an enthusiastic Aristotelian, an early work
like his De imaginatione clearly indicates that as a young man he had a
healthy respect and perhaps even admiration for the Stagirite. Eventually all of this changed, however, so that by the time the Examen
Vanitatis was published in 1520, Pico had little but scorn for Aristotle.
It is to this later treatise, the most extensive and mature philosophical

INTRODUCTION

work we have from Pico's pen, that we shall direct our attention III
the present study.
Pico's criticisms of Aristotelianism involve three major points: (I) a
critical philological and textual analysis of the corpus Aristotelicum, (2) a
searching and exhaustive critique of Aristotle's method of scientific
demonstration, and (3) a criticism of certain key Aristotelian doctrines
of natural philosophy. In each of these three areas of discussion Pico
takes his point of departure from different earlier critics of Aristotle
and approaches the Aristotelian doctrines themselves from a variety of
critical viewpoints. Each individual criticism offers us adequate reasons
to re-evaluate the evidence in favor of Aristotelian philosophy.
His textual criticism of the corpus Aristotelicum indicates that Gianfrancesco was conversant with the techniques of literary humanism
which had been developed in the previous century and a half. He uses
these philological tools as keen instruments to dissect the writings attributed to Aristotle. The conclusions which he reaches are clear, and
in many ways they foreshadow those obtained by Francesco Patrizi
more than a half century later in his Discussiones peripateticae. Humanist
philology, combined with an initial doubt regarding the validity of the
Peripatetic system, produces perhaps the expected result. Careful
scrutiny of the philological and historical evidence at hand induces
Gianfrancesco Pico to conclude that the writings which have come
down to us under the name of Aristotle are not what they claim to be.
Insisting that what passes for Aristotle's works is largely made up of
forgeries and later interpolations, Gianfrancesco contends that we cannot rely on such a confused mass of contradictory statements to establish
the true and valid science which Aristotelians claim that their master
has given us. Such a philosophy cannot be a handmaid to Christian
theology, but must be held in abhorrence, Pico argues. Although we
may still possess some of the genuine works of Aristotle we have no
criterion by which to separate these from the forgeries, interpolations,
and corruptions with which they have become adulterated during the
long centuries of the tradition.
Gianfrancesco's searching analysis of Aristotelian epistemology is
probably from a philosophical point of view his most significant contribution. Cast within the framework of the important methodological
discussions of the early sixteenth century, Pico's critique raises a number of questions of far-reaching importance. Randall, Gilbert, and
others have indicated just how fruitful the Renaissance discussions of
method were on the course of later philosophy and science. In Gian-

I NTROD U eTI ON

francesco Pico we have a hitherto unstudied element of these controversies. Pico, christianissimus and anti-Aristotelian, utilizes the sceptical
arguments from antiquity to combat the Aristotelian sense-based
epistemology and the scientia derived from it. Pico's sceptical critique, calling into question some of the most time-honored of Aristotelian principles, points the way to the complete re-evaluation of
scientific and philosophical methodology of the next century. Gianfrancesco himself was quite content to cut away in the name of Christianity whatever reliability Aristotelian philosophy might have had. He
was furthermore satisfied that once "science" - Aristotelian or otherwise - had been demolished, it would not arise again like the Phoenix
or the Hegelian Aujhebung, based on a different set of principles and
with different objectives. In this he was mistaken, for a new science - or
rather new sciences - replaced the old one, often having as a starting
point some of the very objections which Pico had raised against Aristotelian scientia. Of course Pico himself could not have found the "New
Science" any more satisfactory than Aristotle's. On the grounds of
battle set forth by Pico, no science could be satisfactory, for none of
them could offer the degree of certitude which he required. He set such
a high standard for scientia, absolute certitude, that no knowledge other
than that given us directly by God could ever form an acceptible basis.
Probable knowledge is no knowledge at all, as far as he was concerned.
Scripture is the one reliable source of truth; to look to Aristotle for
certainty is foolhardy. Aristotelian science cannot rise above probability, for it is entirely grounded in sense knowledge and as such cannot
overcome the mutable, deceptive, ever-changing character of the
material world. Moreover, man himself, victim of a fallen nature, does
not have as his own a fully reliable criterion by which to judge what is
true and what is false . On these matters only the word of Scripture is to
be trusted.
The doctrines resulting from Aristotle's mistaken and fallacious approach to knowledge fill his works as the fruit of such misguided endeavor. Although after Gianfrancesco's critical attack on Aristutle's
theory of knowledge and methodology further criticism of individual
doctrines might almost be called superfluous, he, nevertheless, does
question other tenets of Peripatetic philosophy. Of his objections, particularly noteworthy are those regarding several key doctrines of natural philosophy; Pico rejects four of Aristotle's most fundamental
teachings - those regarding motion, time, place, and vacuum. Although
~h.e Mirandolan does not show himself to be a brilliant scientist, fore-

INTRODUCTION

runner of Galileo in the strict sense, he does present several criticisms

from earlier writers which did eventually have an important role to
play in the overthrow of the Aristotelian world view at the end of the
sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries. Pico brought to
the fore the very serious and very astute arguments of two yet unheralded critics of Aristotle, John Philoponus and Hasdai Crescas. If
Pico himself cannot claim much originality on this point, he can at
least be credited with having selected several of the more significant
suggestions which had been proposed as alternatives to some of the
more dubious teachings of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In fact, the
full impact of Philoponus' and Crescas' contributions were not recognized until several generations after Pico's reintroduction of their
teachings. Consequently, perhaps without a full realization of what he
was doing, he anticipated in some measure the direction of later sixteenth century discussions of natural philosophy.

IV
In Pico's rejection of Aristotle and the basic tenets of his philosophy
we can see the emergence of several significant tendencies which came
more and more to characterize later philosophy and science. Some of
these are brought out in the body of the monograph. Of one in particular, however, I would like to make mention here. Running through
the whole of Gianfrancesco's critique is the implication - sometimes
tacit, sometimes expressly stated - that general laws are invalid unless
they are true of all of the instances which they claim to cover. This is
merely one of the critical doctrines which he learned from the study of
Sextus Empiricus' sceptical writings and which he applied with great
vigor especially to the principles of Aristotelianism. Pi co envisioned
that his use of various sceptical tropes (or modes) to question Peripatetic principles would have a no more significant consequence than
securing the downfall of Aristotelianism as a philosophy. In his view
the destruction of the validity of the general laws of philosophy and
science could have only the effect of inducing his contemporaries and
successors to withdraw their confidence in Aristotelianism and to place
it rather in the undemonstrated, yet unquestionable, truths of Christian
Scripture. Pico saw scepticism as a service to Christianity; it could serve
the function of destroying the claims of dogmatic philosophers, thereby
allowing Christian doctrine to become recognized as the one valid

INTRODUCTION

source of knowledge. Understanding for him, as for Augustine, came

through faith and not through reason.
The workings of history, however, are sometimes rather strange. The
results of Pico's method ultimately proved to be much more fruitful in
ways which he apparently had not anticipated. Whereas for him the uncertainty of the general principles of dogmatic philosophy foreshadowed
the downfall of philosophy in general, for others it indicated the necessity of re-evaluating the principles themselves. From this ensued a
new and more careful examination of natural phenomena and a fresh
attempt to reinterpret the data in terms of revised post-Aristotelian
principles or laws. In short, the questions which Pi co raised regarding
the validity of the then-accepted principles of Peripatetic philosophy
were reformulated by others in what ultimately proved to be a much
more advantageous way. One example of such an attempt was that of
Pierre Gassendi, whose starting point in his critique of Aristotelian
science derived directly from the Examen Vanitatis. Telesio, Bruno,
Galileo, and others also employed the same arguments which Pico had
brought to the consciousness of Renaissance Europe. Gianfrancesco
Pico's sceptical techniques did not die with him, but lived on to produce a tangible, recognizable influence on the intellectual ambiance of
early modern Europe. The scepticism, which in the Examen Vanitatis
was wholly destructive, became in later centuries largely constructive.
Besides doubts, uncertainties, and "suspension of judgment," scepticism can also occasion a calculus of probabilities, a spirit of careful,
determinate observation, and a healthy sense of checking all information at the source from which it derives. As well as producing the
"lost soul" with not a straw to grasp, scepticism might provide an
immediate way to tie theory to reality and to make "laws" reflect the
true nature of the individual events which they seek to summarize.

v
The philosophical issue of scepticism in the context in which Pi co
brought it to our attention raises a whole series of significant questions.
The use which Pico made of sceptical arguments might appear somewhat startling to those who tend to identify scepticism with the antireligious. The sceptic can certainly be one who entertains religious
doubts or disbelief, but as Pico's writings indicate so well, scepticism
can also be used in the service of religion. In fact, a careful examination
of the reintroduction of scepticism into the West during the sixteenth

INTRODUCTION

century discloses that it was used far more often in behalf of Christianity than in opposition to it. Gentian Hervet's Preface to his translation of Sextus Empiricus (1569) clearly indicates that he was of one
mind with Pi co on this point. Moreover, Giulio Castellani's attack on
Pico's scepticism (1558) is in Aristotle's defense rather than Christianity's. Justin, Tertullian, Augustine, Bernard, Nicholas of Cusa, and
many others have attacked dogmatic philosophy in the name of
Christianity. It was only the nineteenth century Church which condemned Pico's position as "fideism" under the rather strained circumstances of competing nationalistic and ideological interests at the
Papacy. Pico was in good company in his own time; it remained for a
later century to condemn his approach to the faith-reason problem.
While it is true that Pico'f; own views were generally closer to those of
the Reformers than they were to the formulations of the Council of
Trent, this does not seem to prove anything in particular about his
orthodoxy. The same might be said of Cardinal Cusanus or Erasmus.
In a period of history in which increasingly emphasis was being placed
both on reason and on the importance of natural knowledge, Pico's as well as Savonarola's and Luther's - insistence that religion must be
based onfides rather than ratio is understandable. A like situation arose
in the nineteenth century with Kierkegaard coming on the heels of
Hegel, and Bautain and Bonnetty, Catholic fideists, reacting against
the rationalized theology being taught in the seminaries.
I t is now beginning to be realized, although the process has been
painfully slow, that we cannot make a simple equation between
scepticism and irreligion. Regardless of the fact that there was a pronounced tendency in many of the seventeenth and eighteenth century
thinkers to do this, such a connection was almost completely absent in
the fifteenth and sixteenth century "sceptics." Pico is but one example
of a Christian who utilized sceptical arguments to defend his faith. He
is a most important example, however, for he carried his scepticism
further than did most of his contemporaries. Moreover, he imbibed
Pyrrhonic doctrine from its source, something that probably cannot be
said for any other Christian before 1560. Scepticism can be used in
defense of Christianity. Why not? St. Paul certainly offers a good
precedent for doubting the quibblings of the various dogmatic schools.
Scepticism and agnosticism or atheism may be conjoined in a single
philosophy, but not necessarily. The uses to which Hume put scepticism
must not be allowed to obscure the very real fact that it often functioned
in a much different way in the sixteenth century. Scep ticism per se is

INTRODUCTION

neither religious nor anti-religious, but it may be either. The Examen

Vanitatis shows us unequivocally that it can be used in the service of
Christianity; the praise that was given the work by later writers indicates further that Pico was not alone in this opinion.
We have been given a variety of epithets to characterize the various
combinations of interests in early modern philosophy. One speaks of
"Christian humanism," "Christian philosophy," "the Christian Renaissance." Could we not with as much justification speak of Gianfrancesco Pi co and others as "Christian sceptics"?
Pico, on the other hand, was not entirely typical of his age; no man
is. In a sense he was "out of joint" with the Renaissance - at least with
many interpretations of the Renaissance which have gained wide popular acceptance. He was a humanist, but not quite a Platonist, and
certainly he did not write paeans on the abilities of man. He was a
staunch Catholic, yet wholly unfriendly to Aristotle. He was closely
tied to the Papacy, dedicated works to four pontiffs, rode into battle
with the popes against their enemies, but wrote two works so critical
of the organization and abuses of the Church that they are well-worthy
of a Luther. In another sense, he was a typical representative of the
Renaissance. He "revived" the teachings of two ancient authors (Sextus Empiricus and John Philoponus), who were practically unknown
at his time. He knew Greek well and applied all of the philological
techniques of literary humanism to his critique of Aristotle.
What emerges from this whole complex picture of Gianfrancesco
Pico is a strange mixture of new and old. Certain of his methods and
techniques of criticism, certain of the philosophical doctrines which
he rejects or calls into question mark him as a "modern man," forward
looking and non-traditional. On the other hand, his most basic assumptions and his own conception of the world mark him as a traditionalist and as one who missed the significance of many of the more
important elements of the modern civilization which was emerging
during his own lifetime.
In the final analysis, Pico adds a new facet to our view of the Renaissance. His philosophical outlook shows us an approach to the

criticism of Aristotelianism which is different from the more usual one

issuing from Platonic, humanist considerations. Moreover, an analysis
of his philosophical position in relation to his religious belief gives us a
new insight into one of the forms which the faith-reason problem took
in the epoch of the Reformation. Again, Pico as a layman having no
official connection with the university teaching of philosophy gives us

10

INTRODUCTION

another glimpse of a new type of philosopher; this kind of philosopher,

just now coming into his own, will be a dominant force in early modern
philosophy with the advent of Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz. Pico's rejection of the school-philosophy foreshadows one
dominant tendency of the major figures of the sixteenth and seventeenth century intellectual world.
These are some of the general conclusions which come from our
study of Gianfrancesco Pico. Many of the more interesting and more
enlightening points can be realized only after careful consideration of
Pico's own detailed arguments. Hopefully, some of these will be made
apparent in this study. The wealth of material at hand has made it
necessary to be selective. Consequently, as the title indicates, I have
focused upon what I consider to be Pico's most significant contribution,
his critique of Aristotle. In working out his arguments against Peripatetic philosophy, Gianfrancesco applied principles drawn from his
extensive learning. Some of these, which he utilized for the first time
in the Renaissance, later played a significant role in the critique of
scholasticism from which modern philosophy emerged.

CHAPTER I

GIANFRANCESCO PICO'S LIFE

Certamente fu gran danno la perdita di tanto huomo ai letterati, conclO

fosse cos a ch'era peritissimo in ogni grado di dottrina ed in graeco, hebreo,
caldeo, ed arabico, in humanita, poesia, logica, filosofia, e theologia, come
chiaramente dalle opere da lui scritte vero giudizio dar si puo.
Leandro Alberti, Descrittione di tutta Italia (ca. 1535)

(J) Early Life (J469-J49J)

The precise date of Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's birth is

unknown, but the year must have been 1469.1 He was the son of
Galeotto I Pico, brother of the famous Giovanni, and of Bianca Maria
d'Este, the illegitimate daughter of Niccolo III d'Este. 2 Of Gianfrancesco's early years we know practically nothing, but it is generally
supposed that he received at least part of his education at the Court of
Ferrara. 3 We get our first glimpse of him at the age of twenty-one,4
taking part in a tournament at the Sforza Court of Milan during the
1 The inscription cited by Ceretti BP, II, p. 187 says that in 1524 he was 55 years old.
This means that he could have been born either in 1468 or 1469. The letter to Gregorio
Giraldi of 1520 (Opera, p. 880) which says that at that time he was 50 years old rules out the
former. There is also a letter to Thomas Wolf (Opera, pp. 863-66), dated November 24,
1505, which gives his age at that time as being 35 years.
2 For the genealogy of the Pi co family see Pompeo Litta, Famiglie celebri italiane (Milan,
1819 f.), the section "Pico della Mirandola" (the series is bound differently in different
libraries) with the corrections made by Ceretti in "La genealogia del conte Giovanni Francesco II Pico" in Atti e memorie ... per Ie provineie modenesi, series IV, vol. I (1892), pp. 103-22.
For the various members of the Pico family see always Ceretti BP. On the iconography of the
Pico family see Vilmo Cappi, Ieonografia dei prineipi Pieo (Modena, 1963), pp. 14,34,43-44,
and figs. 4, 13-14 for Gianfranceso II.
3 So says Girolamo Tiraboschi, Biblioteea modenese (Modena, 1781-86), IV, p . 108 and
Ferrante Borsetti, Historia Almi Ferrariae Gymnasii ... (Ferrara, 1735), II, p. 303 without
citing any evidence. A number of his early correspondents and friends were from Ferrara
and the Duke of Ferrara was Pico's uncle, so such a supposition seems reasonable. There
were also close ties with the Court of Milan. See note 5.
4 The reference to Gianfrancesco in 1483 cited in Ester PastorelIo, L' epistolario manuziano
inventorio cronologico-analitieo (f,j83-I597) (Florence, 1957), p. 319 seems to be in error. It
refers rather to Giovanni Pico. See Eugenio Garin, La cultura filosofiea del Rinaseimento italiano
(Florence, 1961), p. 256.

12

LIFE

celebration of the marriage of Lodovico il Moro and Beatrice d'Este

(January 26, I49I).5
In March of the same year he married Giovanna Carafa of Naples. 6
With the dowry which he received on this occasion, he bought the
hereditary title to the principate of Mirandola. The person from whom
he bought the title was his famous uncle, Giovanni Pico, 7 and this
transaction is the first evidence we have of an association which was
to be the most important single influence upon Gianfrancesco's career
as a philosopher. 8

(2) Pico Emerges as a Humanist and Philosopher (1491-99)

In the years immediately after his marriage, Gianfrancesco emerged
as an important figure in his own right. Between I491 and the end of
the century he entered into correspondence with several men of intellectual and political prominence. He also began writing his first literary
and philosophical works, several of his compositions being printed
before the turn of the century.
Above all, Gianfrancesco was guided in his early literary endeavors
by his uncle. The mutual affection between the two Picos at this period
is shown not only in the fact that Giovanni indicated in his will (I 49 I)
that Gianfrancesco should have the first opportunity to buy his library,9
but also in letters between the two men, dated 1492.10 At this time
Giovanni himself was only twenty-nine, and only six years older than
his nephew, but his tone in these early letters is distinctly paternal, and
Gianfrancesco's tone is correspondingly grateful, respectful, and affectionate.1 l After Giovanni's death in I494, Gianfrancesco wrote an
5 Giulio Porro, "Nozze di Beatrice d'Este e di Anna Sforza. Documenti copiati dagli
originali esistenti neII'Archivio di Stato di Milano," Archivio storico lombardo IX (1882) pp.
530-32. Litta (op. cit.) says that he was in the Sforza Court as a youth but gives no evidence
for this.
6 Ceretti BP, II, pp. 58-60; Ceretti BME, p. 125; F. Ceretti, "Giunte a monografie
pubblicate ... " in Aui e memorie ... per le provo modenesi e parmensi, series III, vol. III, par. I
(1885), p. 238 .
7 Document printed in F. Calori Cesis, Giovanni Pica della Mirandola detto la Jenice degli
ingegni (Bologna, 1872) pp. 58-64.
8 We do not know how close the two Picas were during the 1480s when Giovanni was
away from Mirandola most of the time. See Eugcnio Garin, Giovanni Pica della Mirandola:
vita e dottrina (Florence, 1937), pp. 20-48.
9 Calori Cesis, op. cit., pp. 51-55.
10 Printed in Opera, pp. 817-19, 850-51.
11 This is particularly evident in Giovanni's lctter dated May 15, 1492 (Opera, pp. 81719), of which we will speak more extensively in the next chapter, pp. 33-34. Its great popularity is attested to by the numerous times it was copied in manuscript and was printed and
by the early;translations of it. It was translated into French in 1498 by Robert Gaguin and
into English by Thomas More before 1510.

LIFE

13

admiring biography of his uncle designed to introduce the first edition

of the Opera of Giovanni (Bologna, I496).12 For that edition he also
wrote brief introductions to the Oratio (On the Dignity of Man) and
the Adversus Astrologiam.1 3 In addition Gianfrancesco took over a philosophical discussion which his uncle had left unfinished: the debate
with Antonio Cittadini of Faenza which had been initiated with Giovanni's treatise De ente et uno.1 4
The friendships which Gianfrancesco inherited from his uncle were
of the highest importance to his later career. Among the friends whom
Gianfrancesco presumably owed to the influence of Giovanni were
Girolamo Benivieni, Marsilio Ficino, Aldo Manuzio, Matteo Bosso,
Pietro Crinito, Domenico Grimani, Filippo Beroaldo the Elder, Lodovico Bigi Pittorio, Ercole Strozzi, and Battista G u arino.1 5
In addition to these men, who are generally considered to be associated more with the uncle than with the nephew, Gianfrancesco
had a number of other close personal ties before 1500. Certainly important are the friends and acquaintances he had from his association
12 For Gianfrancesco's editorial activities see Eugenio Garin (ed.), Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola. De hominis dignitate ... (Florence, 1942), pp. 52-59. For precise information
concerning the date of composition, printing history, and manuscripts of Gianfrancesco
Pico's various works, I refer the reader to Appendix A.
13 These are printed in Ioannis Piei ... Opera (Basel, 1601), pp. 207, 278-79.
14 The correspondence between Gianfrancesco and Antonio continued until 1496. The
entire discussion, beginning with Giovanni's treatise De ente et uno, is printed in the various
editions of the uncle's Opera. Gianfrancesco's contribution to the polemic is also printed in
the editions of his own works (e.g. Opera, pp. 74-89,840-42). For the polemic in general
see Garin, Giovanni Pieo della Mirandola. De hominis dignitate ... , pp. 34-40.
15 Girolamo Beni vieni dedica ted an edition of his writings to Gianfrancesco (G K W 3850).
Ficino wrote a letter of consolation to Gianfrancesco upon the death of his uncle (Ioannis
Piei ... Opera, p. 275).
Aldo Manuzio, an early friend of Giovanni (Garin, G. P. d. M., vita e dottrina, p. 14), was a
correspondent and friend of Gianfrancesco (letters in Ant. - Aug. Renouard (ed.), Letter.
inedite di Paolo Manuzio (Paris, 1834)), dedicated to him an edition of Urbano Bolzano's
Institutiones Graecae Grammatices (H 2763 = H 16,098), and was the printer of the 1501
edition of Pico's De imaginatione.
Matteo Bosso of Verona corresponded with the younger Pico and praised his early works
(Opera, pp. 837-39).
Pietro Crinito was also a correspondent (Opera, pp. 839-40) and a letter of his to Gianfrancesco was included with Poliziano's translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' Problemata
(in Angeli Politiani Opera ... (Lyon, 1533) II, 291-93; first edition, H 13,218).

To Domenico Grimani, who purchased the bulk of Giovanni's famous library, was deci-

cated Gianfrancesco's De providentia Dei. See Giovanni Mercati, Codiei latini Pico-Grimani-Pio
... (Vatican City, 1938), pp. 1-38.
At least three letters passed between Gianfrancesco and Filippo Beroaldo the Elder (Opera,
pp.844-45)
Ludovico Bigi Pittorio dedicated no less than four early editions of his works to Gianfrancesco (GKW 4354, 4355, 4358, 4359) and mentioned him often in his poems.
Ercole Strozzi exchanged letters with Gianfrancesco (Opera, pp. 855,861,872,873).
Battista Guarino, an early teacher of Giovanni, was consulted by the nephew at the time
he was composing his Life of the uncle (Opera, p. 827).

14

LIFE

with the Court of Ferrara. The most famous name of this group is that
of Lodovico Ariosto, to whom Gianfrancesco addressed a letter in
which he expressed an attitude not wholly favorable to vernacular
poetry.l6 Gianfrancesco also exchanged letters for many years with the
Carmelite humanist Battista Spagnuolo of Mantua 17 and addressed
at least one letter to Battista's pupil, Giambattista Refrigerio.l 8
The important court physicians of the Este, Niccolo Leoniceno and
Giovanni Manardo, perhaps taught him some of the medical theory
which he later utilized in working out his sceptical position in the
Examen Vanitatis. Leoniceno, who was also one of Giovanni Pico's
earliest friends,19 dedicated his work De morbo gallico (1497) to Gianfrancesco. 20 Pico had extremely close ties with Manardo 21 and had a
great admiration for him. Gianfrancesco considered him to be one of
his teachers, referring to him as noster praeceptor 22 in the Examen Vanitatis. Moreover, Manardo helped Gianfrancesco to prepare his uncle's
work against astrology for the press. 23 In 1493 Gianfrancesco called his
friend and teacher from Ferrara to Mirandola, where he remained as
his personal physician during the period prior to Gianfrancesco's first
exile. 24 The relations between the two remained close, apparently,
16 Opera, p. 884. The letter is of uncertain date, but published already in 1507. In it Pico
recalls earlier days when he and Ariosto were together in Ferrara and quotes some of his
own vernacular verse. Gianfrancesco is mentioned once in the Orlando Furioso (XLVI, 17).
The relation between Pico and Ariosto seems to have escaped the attention of most Ariosto
scholars. It is not mentioned, for example, in the standard work by Michele Catalano, Vita
di Ludovico Ariosto (Geneva, 193 I).
17 Many letters passed between the two. See Opera, pp. 834-36, 862, 869, 873-74' For a
complete list of the letters and the various printings of them see Graziano di S. Teresa,
"N uova cronologia della vita del b. Battista Mantovano," Ephemerides carmeliticae, IX (1958),
PP42 3-42 .
18 Opera, p. 819.
19 Garin, La cultura filosofica ... , pp. 254-55.
20 The dedicatory letter and Pico's letter of thanks are in Opera, pp. 843-44. On Leoniceno
see especially D. Vitaliani, Della vita e delle opere di Niccola Leoniceno vicentino (Verona, 1892).
Arturo Castiglioni, who says that Leoniceno cited Gianfrancesco Pico in 1493, apparently
has confused the latter with his uncle. See his "The School of Ferrara and the Controversy
on Pliny," Science, Medicine, and History: Essays . .. in Honour ofCharles Singer, ed. E. A. Underwood (London, 1953), I, pp. 269-79, esp. 274-76.
21 On Manardo see Atti del convegno intemazionale per la celebrazione del V centenario della nascita
di Giovanni Manardo, I462-I536, Ferrara 8-9 dicembre 1962 (Ferrara, 1963); Giannandrea
Barotti, Memorie istoriche di letteratiferraresi (Ferrara, 1792), I, pp. 307-21; and Paola Zambelli, "Giovanni Mainardi e la polemica sull'astrologia", in L'opera e il pensiero di Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell' Umanesimo (Florence, 1965), II, pp. 205-79.
22 V, 5; Opera, p. 720. See Barotti,op. cit., pp. 312-15. Gianfrancesco also mentions him,
along with Giovanni Pico, as being his philosophy teacher. See the letter, dated about 1496,
in Opera, p. 842.
23 Letter to Battista Spagnuolo dated February I, [1496], Opera, p. 862. See Barotti, op.
cit., pp. 313-14 and Vincenzo Busacchi, "G. Manardo, maestro e medico di Gianfrancesco
Pico della Mirandola", Atti del convegno ... Giovanni Manardo ... , pp. 97--98.
24 He seems to have been in Mirandolafrom 1493 until 1502. Andrea Ostoja, "Notizie

LIFE

15

until Pico's death. Manardo revisited Mirandola at least once and

Gianfrancesco dedicated two works to his friend. 25
These relationships put Pico in contact with some of the foremost
men of his time. Among his friends and acquaintances were scholars
and poets, philosophers and physicians, humanists and clerics. As important as these contacts were for Gianfrancesco, none of them proved
ultimately to be as important for the development of his own outlook
toward philosophy as did his contact with Girolamo Savonarola.
According to the preface of his Vita of Savonarola,26 Pi co claims he
first knew the friar only six years before his death. The Savonarola
name, however, must have been well-known to Pico before this since
Bianca Maria Pico, his mother, like the Savonarola family, was from
Ferrara; and, in the Vita, Gianfrancesco recounts that she was once
treated by Girolamo's grandfather, Michele, one of the most noted
physicians of the fifteenth century.27 In 1496 Gianfrancesco dedicated
his De morte Christi to the friar, addressing him as pater religiosissime in
the prefatory letter. 28 Both Gianfrancesco and his wife corresponded
with Fra Girolamo,29 but the extant letters all date from after 1496
and do not shed light on the earlier years of their acquaintance.
In I497 Pico published a defense of Savonarola in reply to an attack
by a Franciscan friar, Samuel Cascini.3o But in May of the same year
Savonarola was excommunicated, and Pi co again undertook to defend
him.31 In both of these first two defenses Pico wrote in Latin, giving
lengthy, detailed replies to individual charges, and addressing himself
inedite sulla vita del medico e umanista ferrarese Giovanni Manardo," Atti del convegno ...
Giovanni Manardo ... , pp. 99-140, esp. 106-09, 132.
25 Ostoja, art. cit., pp. 1 IO states without citing evidence that Manardi visited Mirandola
between Is09 and ISI2. For the correspondence see Opera, pp. 823, 826, 837 and Ioannis
Manardi ... epistolarum medicinalium libri XX (Venice, IS42), pp. 217-18. Pi co also dedicated
two works to his friend: the Strix (first edition, Bologna, 1523, fol. Aiiii) and a Quaestio de
falsitate astrologiae (Folger Library Ms, V.a. 123, fol. 3'). The latter has previously been presumed to have been lost. See Zambelli, art. cit., p. 238.
26 Ioannes Franciscus Picus, Vita R. P. Fr. HieronymiSavonarolae ... (Paris, 1674), I, p. 2.
27 Ibid., I. p. 4.
28 Opera, p. 29.
29 Roberto Ridolfi (ed.), Le lettere di Girolamo Savonarola (Florence, 1933), pp. 108,119-21,
ISO-SI, 16S, 193
30 [nvectiva in prophetiamfratris Hieronymi Savonarolae [Milan, 1497], H 4566. It was reprinted
at Milan a year later (R 456). Pico's work is entitled Defensio Hieronymi Savonarolae adversus
Samuelem Cassinensem (H 13,003).
31

Opusculum de sententia excommunicationis iniusta pro Hieronymi Savonarolae prophetae innocentia.

This work was dedicated to Ercole d'Este, who apparently did not take kindly to it and who
in a later letter to Pope Alexander VI denied any connection with Pico's work. See documents 14S-46 in Antonio Cappelli, "Fra Girolamo Savonarola e notizie intorno al suo tempo", Aui e memorie ... per Ie provincie modenesi e parmensi, IV (1868), pp. 399-400. On the
problem of Ercole d'Este's sincerity see Roberto Ridolfi, Vita di Girolamo Savonarola (Florence, (952), I, p. 3SO and note 18.

16

LIFE

primarily to church authorities. In the Spring of 1498, however,

Savonarola's situation had so far deteriorated that Pico felt obliged to
enlist the help of the citizens of Florence, and so he wrote a third
defense of Savonarola, a briefletter in Italian designed to arouse public
opinion on Savonarola's side. 32
But, despite the efforts of Gianfrancesco and others, Girolamo
Savonarola was burned on May 23, 1498. As is well known, this did not
end the debate over the friar's merits. Savonarola's defenders still
fought his cause quite as avidly - perhaps even more avidly, for now
they had a "martyr" to praise. Gianfrancesco continued to be a firm
believer in Savonarola, and in 1501 he wrote a defense of one of the
friar's followers,33 dedicating it to Domenico Benivieni. Pico's best
known work concerning Savonarola, however, is his version of the
friar's life. Although not printed until 1674, there are literally dozens of
sixteenth and seventeenth century manuscripts of this work still to be
found throughout Italy and, indeed, even throughout Europe. The
Vita underwent several revisions during Pico's lifetime. 34 The version
which was ultimately printed was completed only in 1530 and there is
evidence that Gianfrancesco made a later redaction before his death
three years later,35 indicating that he retained an interest in the friar's
cause until the end of his life. Moreover, because of Pico's close association with Savonarola, the Florentine humanist Giovanni Nesi, a
friend of Ficino and a follower of Savonarola, dedicated a work to him.
This dialogue, Oraculum de novo saeculo,36 completed September I, 1496,
and printed May 8 of the following year, considers Savonarola to be a
true prophet.
(3) The Prince of Mirandola (I499-I502)
About a year after the death of Savonarola, Pico's own father died,
precipitating him into a struggle which was to occupy most of his
32 Epistola del conte Zoanfrancesco da fa Mirandufa infavore defra Hieronymo da Ferrara dappoi fa
sua captura. It is dated "in die dominice resurrectionis 1498." R132I.
33 Operecta dello M. S. Johanfrancesco Pico della Mirandola in difensione della opera di Pietro
Bernardo da Firenze servo di Jesu Cristo. This work which is found in MagI. XXXV. 116 remained unpublished until 1943 when it was edited and privately printed by Paolo Cherubelli
for the Nozze Bellini-Marifredi, Aprile I943 (Firenze). For further information see Cesare
Vasoli, "Pietro Bernardino e Gianfrancesco Pico," in L' opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola ... , II, pp. 281-99.
34 See J. Schnitzer, "La vita del Savonarola scritta dal Conte Gianfrancesco Pico della
Mirandola", Ricerche religiose, I (1929), pp. 429-34.
35 Ibid., p. 43 2 .
36 H I 1,693. Manuscripts are to bc found in the Biblioteca Riccardiana, nos. 383 and 384.
The former is a dedication copy on vellum, the latter is an autograph. Pico also wrote some
poems in praise of Savonarola. See Appendix A.

LIFE

17

energies for the rest of his life, the struggle to retain title to the Principate of Mirandola. As we shall see, these political affairs played an
important role in Gianfrancesco's life after about 1499. Time and time
again they forced him to set aside his studies to engage in diplomacy or
war.
In the generation before that of Gianfrancesco, there had been disputes in Mirandola over the rights of inheritance and the rights of
rule. 37 The ruler of the state remained, however, Gianfrancesco's
father, Galeotto I Pico. In 1491 Gianfrancesco's two younger brothers,
Lodovico and Federico, had renounced any claim to the estate of
their father ;38 and, in the same year, Galeotto had obtained an investiture from Emperor Maximilian for Mirandola and certain surrounding territories. 39 Included in this was a provision for the legal
inheritance of Galeotto's realm by Gianfrancesco, his first born son.
Two years later this investiture was renewed by the Emperor, who
rejected the claim of Galeotto's brother Antonmaria to the inheritance. 40
Galeotto Pico died on April 9, 1499 41, and Gianfrancesco inherited the
land to which he was entitled by virtue of the renunciation of his
brothers and the investiture of the Emperor. On May 16 of the same
year, Gianfrancesco obtained a new investiture from the Emperor
which again granted him the sole right to the territories ofMirandola. 42
All these precautions were of no avail, however. Gianfrancesco's
brothers, Lodovico and Federico, contended that they had renounced
their rights in 1491 only under constraint and that they still properly
were entitled to a share of the inheritance. 43 Enlisting the aid of their
disgruntled uncle, Antonmaria,44 and relying on the help of their
mother, Bianca Maria Pico, who lived with Gianfrancesco but favored
the claims of the other children,45 the two brothers set out to take
Mirandola by force. Their first attempt, made in 1499, failed,46 and
37 See Papazzoni, pp. 98-114; Ceretti GIP; Ceretti AMP. The disputes are concisely
summarized in Giuseppe Silingardi, Contesi dei Pica della Mirandola nel secolo decimosesto
studiate nelle lettere di Filippo de' Ncrli (Mirandola, 1892) pp. 3-6.
38 Girolamo Tiraboschi, Memorie storiche modenesi (Modena, 1793-94), IV, p. 196.
39 Papazzoni, p. 114; Ceretti GIP, p. 84.
40 Tiraboschi, Mem. star. mod. IV, p. 196.
41 Papazzoni, p. 118; Cron An, p. 47, where the date is given incorrectly. See, however,
pp. 169-70 where a letter is cited giving the correct date.
42 Tiraboschi, Mem. star. mod. IV, p. 198.
43 Ceretti LP, pp. 95ff.
44 Cron An, p. 49; Sanuto II, cols. 1014, 1159; doc. XXII in Ceretti AMP, p. 285.
45 See the note and document in Cron An, pp. 170-7 I and also Ceretti BME, esp. doc VI,
p. 143
46 Cron An, pp. 49-50. For a general survey of the events which ensued see Felice Ceretti,
L'aSIedio della Mirandola nel [502 (Mirando la, 1877).

18

LIFE

successive efforts throughout 1500 and 1501 also came to nothing. 47

In 1501 the uncle, Antonmaria, died,48 leaving the two brothers to
carryon alone; but, they found new and encouraging support from a
source outside the family when Lodovico married the daughter of a
powerful Milanese condottiere, Gian Giacomo Trivulzio.49 With the
help of Trivulzio and other friends from Ferrara and Mantua,50
Lodovico and Federico launched a major offensive against Mirandola
inJune, 1502.51 After a siege of about fifty days, Mirandola finally fell
on August 6. 52 Gianfrancesco was captured 53 and forced to go into
exile for the next eight and a half years. Before recounting the events of
these years of exile, let us pause to mention Gianfrancesco's chief
publications during the period before the fall of Mirandola.
In addition to those works of Pico of which we have already spoken,
several other of his writings were printed before his exile from Mirandola. His two early philosophical works, De studio divinae et humanae
philosophiae and De imaginatione, date from this period. The first ofthese,
dedicated to Alberto Pio of Carpi,54 shows certain indications of
Savonarola's influence and gives us the first glimpse of Pico's unfavorable attitude toward secular philosophy, a viewpoint which will
be developed in greater detail in his Examen Vanitatis, published in
1520. The De imaginatione, dedicated to Emperor Maximilian and
beautifully printed by Aldus in 150 I, still is largely derived from
Aristotle, a philosopher whom Pico will sharply criticize in later works.
(4) Gianfrancesco's Exile (I502-I5II)
Although Gianfrancesco's right to Mirandola had been reaffirmed
with the addition of certain privileges by the Emperor in 150 1,55
Lodovico, upon seizing Mirandola, went to Maximilian with a plea to
Ceretti, L'assedio ... ; Cron An, pp. 49-51; Ceretti LI, pp. 123-30, 136-39.
The date is given as March 6 in Cron Mod I, p. 262.
49 Ceretti FT, doc. I and II, pp. 149-50.
50 Cron An, p. 51; doc. VII in Ceretti LP, p. 147.
51 Cron An, p. 51; Diariofirrarese dall'anno 1409 sino al 1502 diautori incerti, Rer. Ital. Scrip.,
XXIV, part VII (Bologna, 1928-33), p. 288.
52 Letter printed in Ceretti LP, p. 109. Also see Papazzoni, p. I 18; Cron An, p. 53; Letter
from Gianfrancesco to Pirckheimer in Opera, p. 829; Bernardino Zambotti, Diario firrarese
dall'anno 1476 sino al 1504, Rer. Ital. Scrip., XXIV, part VII, p. 341. Details of the skirmishes
which occurred during the siege can be found in Ceretti, L'assedio ... , pp. 7-10; Ceretti LP,
pp. 100-09 and docs. VI-XXV, pp. 147-62.
53 His release was secured soon afterward through the combined efforts of his mother and
wife. See Cron An, p. 52 and Papazzoni, p. 118.
54 Alberto was the son of Leonello Pio and husband of Caterina Pico, Gianfrancesco's aunt
and Giovanni's' sister. See Litta, op. cit., "Pio" and "Pico".
55 Diploma printed in Ceretti BP, II, pp. 52-58.
47
48

LIFE

19

legitimize his own claim. 56 In the meantime, after he had been driven
from Mirandola, Gianfrancesco repaired to Novi, which was in the possession of the Pio of Carpi. 57 He tarried there, however, only a few
days and by August 14, had already gone to Guastalla, from whence
he was to proceed to Cremona and then to Pavia. 58 He then continued
north, reaching Innsbruck on September 26, in time to be there when
Lodovico's request for recognition reached the Emperor. 59 He next
proceeded to Augsburg,60 but returned to Italy in time to be back in
Carpi again on February 16, 1503.61
Reassured by a new investiture that he had procured from the
Emperor,62 Gianfrancesco set about to enforce his claim. In October
of I503, while Lodovico was absent from Mirandola, Gianfrancesco,
aided by Alberto Pio and Giovanni (son of Annibale) Bentivoglio of
Bologna, attempted to enter the fortress, having at his disposal 500
infantrymen and 100 light cavalry.63 Bianca Maria and Federico, who
were in control of Mirandola during Lodovico's absence, obtained aid
from the Marquis of Mantua and were able to repulse Gianfrancesco's
attempt. 64 Later in the same year Gian Giacomo Trivulzio sent help,
in the form of more soldiers, to Mirandola to discourage further attempts on the part of Gianfrancesco to recover the fortress. 65 At the
same time, however, Gianfrancesco was able to win the support of the
Marquis of Mantua to his side. 66 It seems that no serious outbreaks of
hostility occurred during I504, but Bianca Maria complained about
certain suspicious activities of Gianfrancesco and his men in the vicinity of Mirandola. 67 Nothing seems to have come of this, however. Later
in the same year Federico Pico died after an illness of several months. 68
In the Spring of I505 Gianfrancesco went again to Germany, perhaps primarily to gain further support from the Emperor,69 but also to
Doc. XXVI in Ceretti LP, pp. 162--63.
Cron An, p. 53.
58 Ceretti LP, doc. XXVII, p. 163.
59 Sanuto, IV, col. 334.
60 Sanuto, IV, col. 462; letter to Pirckheimer in Opera, p. 82g.
61 Letter in Archivio Gonzaga, Filza 1332 (anno, 1503).
62 Cited in Ceretti LP, p. 121.
63 Sanuto, V, col. 221; Ceretti BME, p. 134 and doc. VIII, p. 144.
64 Doc. LII and LIII in Ceretti LP, pp. 181-82.
65 Doc. LIV in Ceretti LP, pp. 182-83; Sanuto, V, col. 253.
66 Ceretti LP, p. 122 and doc. LV, p. 183.
6? Doc. X in Ceretti BME, p. 147.
68 Doc. IX, XI, XII in Ceretti BME, pp. 146-48; doc. XLVI in Ceretti LP, p. 177.
69 Letters to Adolphus Phrisius (February 14), Matthew Lang (April 28) and Emperor
Maximilian (May 24) in Opera, pp. 830, 860, 846. He had returned by the end of May. See
the letter dated May 22 in Ceretti LP, pp. 130-31.
56

5?

20

LIFE

enjoy the company of various literary friends he had there. 70 The same
year also saw the betrothal of Roberto Boschetti to Susanna Pico,
daughter of Galeotto I Pico. 71 Since Susanna was attached to those
actually in possession of Mirandola, this brought into the camp of
Gianfrancesco's opponents the strength of another important condottiere.
In January of the next year, Bianca Maria died,72 leaving only
Lodovico of the three who had originally opposed the claim of Gianfrancesco. In her will 73 she vehemently condemns the recent actions of
Gianfrancesco, thus indicating the bitterness of feeling to which the
prolonged struggle between the two factions had already led. In March
of 1505, again with the aid of Alberto Pio, Gianfrancesco made another
futile attempt to take the fortress. 74 By June, it was being rumored that
Lodovico wished to attempt a reprisal against the territory of the Pio,
but apparently nothing came of this.75 At any rate, Alberto went to
Milan in August and then on to France in an attempt to straighten out
Gianfrancesco's affairs. Probably at Alberto's behest, Pi co was sent 700
scudi by the Marquis of Mantua. 76 Gianfrancesco must have been in
contact with Julius II while Alberto was away, for on October 12 he
wrote to the Marquis of Mantua expressing the hope that the Pope
would soon take Bologna; then he would be able to aid Pi co in his attempt to recover Mirandola. 77 Although Bologna fell to the Pope's
army on November 10,78 Gianfrancesco had to wait over four years for
his aid in winning back Mirandola. Gianfrancesco, along with Alberto
Pio, who had returned from France, and Francesco Gonzaga, seems to
70 Charles Schmidt, Histoire litteraire de l'Alsace (Paris, 1879), II, p. 76. Of these literary
and cultural relations we shall say more below.
71 The marriage actually took place the following year. See Pietro Balan, Roberto Boschetti e
gli avvenimenti italiani de' suoi tempi Cz191-1529) (Modena, 1879-84), I, I, p. 45. There is a copy
of this rare book in the Vatican Library. For evidence that Susanna is really the natural
daughter of Galeotto, and not of Gianfrancesco as Balan says, see Ceretti BP, IV, pp. 68-70.
72 Ceretti BME, pp. 136-37 and doc. XIV, p. 167; Papotti, p. 8.
73 Doc. XIII in Ceretti BME, pp. 148- 67. Itis dated January II, 1506 (one day before her
death), but was actually made on March 20 of the preceding year (pp. 150-51). Note
particularly the strong language that is directed against Gianfrancesco on pp. 161-62.
74 Letter XVI of AlbertoPio inPolicarpo Guaitoli, "Lettereinedite dei Pio signori di Carpi
dall'anno 1480 al 1529," Memorie storiche e documenti suUa ciud e suU' antico principato di Carpi, II
(1879-80), pp. 308-11. See also Ceretti LP, pp. 123-24.
75 Guaitoli, "Lettere inedite ... ", letter XVII, pp. 312-13.
76 Ibid., letter XXII and XXIII, pp. 327-3 I. Gianfrancesco's receiving of the 700 scudi
through the help of Alberto Pio is also confirmed by a letter in Vaticano latino 3214, fol. 336
(284)r.
77 Doc. LVII in Ceretti LP, p. 184; For Julius II's decision to march against Giovanni
Bentivoglio and his later excommunication of him see L. Pastor, Storia dei Papi, new Italian
version edited by A. Mercati (Rome, 1958 f.) III, pp. 707-15.
78 Pastor, op. cit., III, p. 717.

LIFE

21

have given assistance to the Pope in his campaign against Bologna.?9

Precisely what Gianfrancesco did during the next year, 1507, is not
entirely clear, although he was in Novi part of the time. 8o His followers
must have been making periodic incursions into the territory of Mirandola to do what damage they could to Lodovico. 81 During 1508 and
1509, Gianfrancesco spent some time in Rome,82 although he was in
Novi and the surrounding territory a good deal of the time. 83 While at
Rome men were sent by Lodovico to attempt to kill him, but this
proved to be unsuccessful. 84 The second half of I 509 saw Gianfrancesco
in the service of the Emperor as Imperial Councillor in Vicenza during
the war of the League of Cambrai. 85 In the meantime, Lodovico, who
was in the service of the Pope, also participated in the war. 86 On
December 15, 1509, while aiding the Duke of Ferrara against Venice,
Lodovico was killed by a Venetian artillery shell in the Battle of
Poles ella in Veneto. 8 ?
With this development, Gianfrancesco wasted no time in attempting
to re-establish his claim to Mirandola. In the same letter to his sister-inlaw, Francesca Trivulzio Pico, in which he expressed the condolences
for the death of his brother, he expressed his wish to re-enter Mirandola. 88 Simultaneously, he made other moves to bring about this end:
attempting to get help from Mantua and attempting to win the citizens
of Mirandola over to his side. 89 These were to no avail and Francesca
79 Cron Mod II, I, p. 3; Sanuto, VI, cols. 471, 490. Gianfrancesco was in Bologna on
December I I, apparently to ask the Pope's aid (Sanuto, VI, col. 507).
80 Archivio Gonzaga, Filza 1332 (anno 1507) has letters of his from Novi, dated May 12,
May 16, and November 3.'
81 Ceretti LP, doc. LVIII, pp. 184-85'
82 Cron An, p. 54 says that he was at Rome from 1508 to 1510. This, however, cannot be
true since there is much evidence for his being elsewhere, as we shall see below.
83 Archivo Gonzaga, Filza 1332 (anni 1508,1509, and 1510) contains numerous letters by
Gianfrancesco sent from Novi and the surrounding towns. We also know that he was in Novi
in August, 1508 when the German humanist Ringmann Philesius visited him there (Schmidt,
op. cit., II ,po 117).
84 Cron An, p. 54 and note 135, p. 173.
85 Sanuto, IX, cols. 273- 74, 304, 328; Bartolommeo Bressan (ed.), Lettere storiche di Luigi
da Porto dall'anno 1509 al 1528 (Florence, 1857), no. 20, pp. 108-1 J; Gerolamo Zugliano,
Annali della guerra di Camhray, MS in Biblioteca del Seminario di Padova, 189, fols. 24r, 25r,
36v. I am indebted to Dr C. H. Clough of Birmingham University for these references.
86 Ceretti LP, pp. 129- 34 and doc. LXI- LXX, pp. 187-96.
87 Cron An, p. 55 and notes 136-38, pp. 173-74 (the date is incorrectly given as 1508);
Papazzoni, p. J 19 and note 98, pp. 157-60; Papotti, pp. 8-9; Sanuto, IX, cols. 397-400
(Here it is mistakenly stated that it was Gianfrancesco Pico who was killed); Cron Mod II,
I, p. 74; Ceretti LP, pp. 134-35; Antonio Cappelli, Lettere diLudovico Ariosto, 3rd ed., (Milan,
1887), p. g.
88 Ceretti FT, doc. III, pp. 150-5 I.
89 ;For a detailed account of the various events that took place in December 1509 see
Ceretti FT, pp. 105-{)8 and doc. III-VI, pp. 150-54;

22

LIFE

continued to act as regent in behalf of the heir to the countrY,90 her son,
Galeotto, then less than two years 01d. 91 The Emperor, however, accorded Gianfrancesco his protection on July 6, 15 ro. 92 About the same
time, the Pope had decided to drive the French from Italy and Gianfrancesco received his assurance that he would have aid in winning
back Mirandola,93 since Trivulzio and Mirandola were allied to the
French and were under the protection of King Louis XII. 94
Gianfrancesco seems to have been in the service of the Pope in his
campaign against the French a good part of the second half of 15 ro. 95
Alberto Pio, then a papal counselor, prevailed upon the Pope to attack
Mirandola before proceeding to Ferrara, a more difficult objective. 96
Francesca, realizing the danger, sought help from her father, who sent
a nephew, Alessandro Trivulzio, to aid Boschetti in the defense of
Mirandola. 97 The siege of the small town began on December 19 98
and lasted until January 20, 151 I, when Julius was finally able to
enter. 99 The Pope remained there until February I, at which time he
left, after having re-established Gianfrancesco Pico as legal ruler. This
he did not do, however, before Pico promised to pay him 600 ducats
for his troubles.1 o
90 The citizens of Mirandola chose Galeotto II as their ruler by common consent (Doc. VI
in Ceretti FT, pp. 153-54)' The Emperor also seems to have recognized Francesca as the
legal ruler at this time, for he promised to send someone to help her govern the state (letter
in Papazzoni, pp. 158-59). This was confirmed on January 6 of the following year when a
formal investiture arrived from the Emperor (doc. XII in Balan, Roberto Boschetti ... I, II,
P45)
91 He was baptized October 31, 1508. See Ceretti BP, II, p. 6; Papotti, p. 8.
92 Papotti, pp. 10-11.
93 Ceretti FT, pp. 108-og. The letters cited are in the Archivio Gonzaga, Filza 1332 (anno
1510), datedJ anuary 10 and August 23. For a general survey ofJulius II's activities from the
time he turned against the French until the taking of Mirandola see Pastor, op. cit., III, pp.
756- 6g.
94 Cron Mod II, I, p. 114; Papotti, p. II; Francesca received a formal recognition of her
rights to Mirandola from King Louis XII on October 3, 1510. See Ceretti, "Diploma di
Luigi XII re di Francia a Francesca Trivulzio-Pico contessa della Mirandola," Atti e memorie ... per Ie provincie modenesi, series IV, vol. VIII, pp. 147-50. For the French side see
Lettres du Roy Louis XII et du Cardinal George d' Amboise (Brussels, 1712), II, pp. 88, gl, 94, gg,
101, 103-04.
95 Letters dated August 2 and August 23 in Archivio Gonzaga, Filza 1332 (anno 1510) are
from Bologna and "ex foelicibus castris." He was with the Pope in Bologna on October 31,
Luigi Frati (ed.), Le due spedizioni militari di Guilio!II traUe dal diario di Paride Grassi bolognese, in

Documenti e studi pubblicati per cum della R. deputazione di storia patria per le provineie di Romagna,

vol. I (1886), p. 205; Sanuto IX, cols. 548,550.

96 Cron An, pp. 55-56.
97 Balan, Roberto Boschelti ... I, I, p. 73; Sanuto, XI cols. 740-42, 743-45'
98 Cron An, p. 56.
99 The details of the siege need not detain us. See Papazzoni, pp. I Ig-20; Cron An, pp.
56-59,175-93; Sanuto, XI, cols. 676-788, passim; Ceretti FT, pp. 110-15; Cron Mod II, I,
p. 128; Pietro Balan, Gli assedii della !l1irandola di Papa Giulio II nel I5II . . . (Mirandola,
1876), pp. 9-18.
100 Cron An, p. 59; and document on p. 191.

LIFE

23

During the troubled years when Gianfrancesco was attempting to

recover his inheritance he still had some time to devote to study and
the intellectual life. His two trips to Germany (in 1502 and 1505)
brought him into close contact with some of the foremost German
humanists. It is quite possible that he knew some of these men before
his trips to the north, for several of them had already visited Italy or
had studied there. Among those with whom Pico was in contact during
this period are Willibald Pirckheimer, Conrad Celtes, Johann Reuchlin, Thomas Wolf, Ulrich Zasius, Conrad Peutinger, Beatus Rhenanus,
Johann Essler, Matthias Ringmann Philesius, and J aco b Wimpfeling .1 01
It was through these men, Wolf in particular, that many of his works
came to be printed in Germany.1 02 During the years 1506 and 1507 an
edition of Gianfrancesco Pico's Opera issued from the press of Johann
Knobloch of Strasbourg in several instalments. In addition to the
works which had already been printed, in this edition appeared for
the first time De rerum praenotione, the Theoremata de fide, the poem
Staurostichon, four books of letters, a translation of a work attributed to
Justin Martyr, and an explanation of a passage from St. Hilary of
Poitier's De trinitate. This was but the first of many printings of
Gianfrancesco's works north of the Alps in the course of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.
101 There is a letter from Pi co to Pirckheimer dated December 2, 1502 (Opera, p. 829).
There is also a letter to Celtes from the same year (Hans Rupprich (ed.), Der Briefwechsel
des Konrad Celtis (Munich, 1934, p. 524). For other associations between the two see Ibid.,
pp. 530, 533, 622, 649
There is a letter from Gianfrancesco to Reuchlin dated April 5, 1505 (Opera, p. 834) and
others from later.
Gianfrancesco wrote a letter to Wolf on November 24, 1505 (Opera, pp. 863-66) after
having visited him the preceding April (Schmidt, op. cit., II, p. 76).
A single letter from Pico to Zasius is known, dated November 21,1505 (Opera, p. 866).
Gianfrancesco wrote Peutinger from Mantua on August 15, 1506 (Opera, p. 885).
Rhenanus addressed a letter to Pico from Schlettstadt on December 31,1507 (Horawitz &
Hartfelder (eds.), Briefwechsel des Beatus Rhenanus (Leipzig, 1886), p. 124). He also speaks of
Pico's Hymni heroici tres in a letter to Jacobus Fullonius in 1508 (p. 15) and wrote a dedication
letter for a later edition (Strasbourg, 1511) of the same work (p. 40). See also Gustav Knod,
Aus der Bibliothek des Beatus Rhenanus (Leipzig, 1889), p. 38.
There is a letter from Pico to Essler, dated August 29, 1508 from Novi, which was prefaced
to an edition of Ptolemy's Geographia (Claudii Ptolemei ... Geographiae opus [Strasbourg, 1513],
fo!' A,v).
Ringmann, a young student of Wimpfeling's, wentto Italy in 1505 in behalf of Wolf to
obtain manuscripts of Gianfrancesco's works to be printed in Germany (i.e. the Strasbourg
edition of 1506-07). See Schmidt, op. cit., I, p. 60; II, p. 76; Opera, pp. 863--66 (letter to
'Wolf), and 866 (letter to Zasius). He also returned to Italy in 1508 to see Gianfrancesco a
second time (Schmidt, op. cit., II, p. 117).
Wimpfeling wrote a preface to the 1504 Strasbourg edition of Giovanni Pico's Opera in
which he recalls having met Gianfrancesco during his 1502 visit to Germany.
"':1;-/J
102 See the letters to Wolf and Zasim (Opera, pp. 863-66), which also list the works which
had been completed by Pico by that time.

24

LIFE

He also published new works in Italy during the time of his exile.
At Milan, in 1507, Alessandro Minuziano printed the first edition of
Pico's Hymni lzeroici tres, which was accompanied by a long commentary by Gianfrancesco himself and two other poems, Argumentum hymnorum carmine elegiaco and Votum pro salute coniugis. A year later appeared
a philosophical treatise, De providentia Dei, which was dedicated to
Cardinal Domenico Grimani, who had purchased Giovanni Pico's
famous library. This work was printed in Novi under the auspices of
Gianfrancesco's protector, Alberto Pio. Of the works published during
the time of his exile, it is worth noting that one is dedicated to Alberto
Pio, his protector, and one each to Pope Julius II and Emperor Maximilian, whose aid he was constantly striving for.
Gianfrancesco also continued his correspondence with old friends
and developed several new friendships. He dedicated his translation of
a work attributed to Justin Martyr to Zanobi Acciaiuoli with whom he
also exchanged letters discussing scholarly questions. 103 Pico became
close friends with Celio Calcagnini and Lilio Gregorio Giraldi, both of
Ferrara.1 04

(5) Success and Exile Again (I5II-I514)

Although it took Gianfrancesco more than eight years to recover his
land, and he had had to divert himself time and again from his scholarly pursuits to see to his political affairs, his stay in Mirandola was a
short one. His difficulties were far from over. Already, a few days after
the Pope had left Mirandola, early in 151 I, Gianfrancesco sensed that
the French might attack again. In compliance with his request, Julius
dispatched troops to aid in the defense of Mirandola should this
occur.1 05 And Gianfrancesco's fears were not unfounded, for Gian
Giacomo Trivulzio, upon hearing of the fall of Mirandola to the Pope,
determined to retake it.1 06 After obtaining from the King of France
From 1502 we have two letters by Pico and one by Acciaiuoli (Opera, pp. 820-22).
Letters between him and Cakagnini are to be found in Opera, pp. 825, 873 and in
Caelii Calcagnini ... Opera aliquot (Basel, 1544), pp. 104, 106-07, 111-12.
Giraldi was already mentioned in the earlier letters between Pico and Cakagnini (Opera,
pp. 825, 873) and later himself exchanged letters with Gianfrancesco (Opera, p. 877). He
also saw to the education of Gianfrancesco's eldest son, Giantommaso, and dedicated works
to both Picos, father and son. See Lilii Gregorii Gyraldi .. operum quae extant omnium ... tomi
duo (Basel, 1580) I, p. 639; II, pp. 1,422,445-46,465.
105 Sanuto, XI, col. 800; Cron An, p. 59; J. S. Brewer (ed.),LettersandPapers, Foreign and
Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, Preserved in the Public Record Office, the British Museum and
Elsewhere, 2nd ed. (London, 1920), I, pp. 413, 587.
106 Papazzoni, pp. 120-2 I.
103

104

LIFE

25

the right to take command of the French Army,107 Trivulzio proceeded

first to take Concordia,lo8 and, on June 4, he entered Mirandola. 109
Driven out again, Gianfrancesco escaped to Modena. 110 It is not
certain what he did during the next two years. He seems to have been
in Rome part of the time,lll for this is when he had his famous debate
with Pietro Bembo on the matter of imitating classical authors. On the
other hand, he visited Bernardo Dovizi in Budrio on January 12,
1512.112 He fought with the army of the Holy League in the Battle of
Ravenna in April of the same year, at which time he was apparently
taken prisoner by the French,l13 During all of this, however, attempts
were being made by both Gianfrancesco and Francesca to reach some
sort of accord in their dispute. 114
Finally, with the aid of the diplomatic abilities of Matthew Lang,
bishop of Gurk and Imperial Vicar and Plenipotentiary in Modena,
an agreement acceptable to both parties was arrived at,l15 The terms
of the agreement are basically simple,l16 Francesca had the right to
divide the state into two parts and then Gianfrancesco had the obligation to choose one of these parts for himself, within a year. There
was the added provision that whichever of the parties selected Mirandola pay the other 10,000 ducats in gold within forty days of the choice.
On August 20, 1514, Gianfrancesco chose Mirandola and the surrounding territory, while Francesca was left with Concordia. 117 This
provisional agreement, however, in no way meant that the disputes
between the two had come to an end, for the next years were still
107 Carlo de' Rosmini, Dell'istoria illtomo aile militari imprese e alia vita di Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio
.. . (Milan, 1815) I, pp. 416- 17.
108 Sanuto, XII, col. 167; Papazzoni, p . 121.
109 Cron An, p. 61 ; Papazzoni, p. 121; Sanuto, XII, cols. 221, 223; Cron Mod II, I, p. 131.
110 Cron Mod II, I, p. 131.
111 The absence of correspondence to Mantua from April 25, 1511 to October II, 1513 (in
Archivio Gonzaga, Filza 1332) indicates that he probably was away from Novi during this
time. We have evidence tha t he was in Rome on November 13, 1511 (letter to Peutinger in
Erich Koenig (ed.), Konrad Peutingers Briefwechsel (Munich, 1923), pp. 172-73); about July
26, 1512, when another attempt was made on his life (Ceretti FT, doc. XXII, p . 163);
August I, 1512 (letter to Giraldi in Pico's De venere et cupidine expellendis carmen (Rome, 1513),
fol. Bivr); September 29,1512 (letter to Bembo in Opera, p. 123); and November 9,1512
(letter from Joannes Pierus Valerianus to Matthew Lang in Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores
(Strasbourg, 17 17), p. 477).
112 He was there with the forces of the Holy League. See G. L. Moncallero (ed.), Epistolario
di Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena (Florence, 1955f.), I, p. 441.
113 Sanuto, XIV, cols. 229, 272; Cron An pp. 62-63.
114 Ceretti FT, pp. 122-25 and doc. XX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, pp. 161-64; CronAn, pp.
61-62; Sanuto, XV, cols. 107, 125,129,164,173,212-13.
115 Sanuto, XVII, cols. 229, 272; Cron An, pp. 62-63.
116 Balan, Roberto Boschetti . . . , I, I, pp. 78-81 and doc. XXI in I, II, pp. 54- 63 gives the
full details. See also Ceretti FT, pp. 125-28 and Sanuto, XVII, col. 229.
117 Balan, Roberto Boschetti ... , I, I, p. 82; Cron An, p . 63.

26

LIFE

marred by incursions by one and then the other into the opponent's
territory. 118

(6) The Return to Mirandola (I514-I533)

After his restoration to Mirandola, Gianfrancesco was again in
familiar surroundings and he could again devote himself to study. He
had written relatively few works during the period of his exile, for he
was compelled to channel most of his energies into non-intellectual
activities. He did however manage to print two additional poems, De
expellendis venere et cupidine and a Hymn to St. Lawrence, at Strasbourg in
1513. These were dedicated to Gianfrancesco's friend from Augsburg,
Conrad Peutinger. Probably later in the same year these same poems
were reprinted in Rome with the addition of a Hymn to St. Geminianus.
Gianfrancesco also seems to have composed his De riformandis moribus
oratio about the same time. This work, dedicated to Leo X, is an exhortation to the Pope and to the assembled Lateran Council to see to the
reformation of morals within the Church. It was not printed until
15 20 119
In 1516, Pico published in Rome his De amore divino, which was dedicated to Pope Leo X, the first of four works to be directed to the Medici
Pope. Two years later his exchange of letters with Bembo, the De
imitatione, appeared in print for the first time at Basel. With it appeared
also his Physici libri duo, which consists of two short treatises on physical
questions, De appetitu primae materiae and De elementis. The first of these
was dedicated to Cardinal Bernardo Dovizi of Bib bien a and the second
to Matthew Lang, who had been instrumental in bringing about accord
with Francesca Trivulzio.
In 1519, Leo X gave Gianfrancesco the right to establish a printing
press in Mirandola.l 20 In August of the same year appeared the first
product of the press, De veris calamitatum causis nostrorum temporum,
dedicated to the Pope. The following year, appeared the first edition of
118 We shall not recount the tiresome details of these struggles here. See Cron An, pp. 64-75,
194-98; Ceretti FT, pp. 133-45, 167-76; the letters in Petri Bembi .. , Epistolarum Leonis
Decimi ... nomine scriptarum libri sexdecim (Cologne, 1584), pp. 297-302; Ceretti, "Una pagina
da aggiungere alla storia delle discordie tra la contessa Francesca Trivulzio, madre e tutrice
del conte Galeotto II Pico, ed il cognato conte Giovan Francesco II," Francesco Ravagli:
Miscellanea di erudizione e belle arti, I (191 I), pp. 187-89.
119 On this work aee Pastor, op. cit., IV, part II, p. 5; Hefele-Hergenroether-Leclercq,
Histoire des conciles d' apres las documents originaux, French trans., (Paris, 1907f.) VIII, part I, pp.
539-41; Charles B. Schmitt, "Gianfrancesco Pica della Mirandola and the Fifth Lateran
Council", forthcoming in R. J. Schoeck (ed.), Studies in the Fifth Lateran Council.
120 Printed in Opera, foJ. aaii r and often elsewhere. On the Mirandola press see F. J. Norton, Italian Printers 1501-1520, an Annotated List with an Introduction (London, 1958), p. 53

LIFE

27

Pico's largest and most important work, the Examen vanitatis doctrinae
gentium, also dedicated to Leo. The year 1520 also saw the first printing
of four more works at Hagenau. These are the treatise De reformandis
moribus, and three new religious hymns, dedicated to St. Martin, St.
Mary Magdalen, and St. Anthony.
During this period Gianfrancesco continued his correspondence with
old friends and also exchanged letters with several new ones. His
correspondence with Pirckheimer from the second decade of the century indicates that Gianfrancesco sent him the Greek copy of Theophrastus' Characters, which the German humanist later translated into
Latin.1 21 Other letters during these years also passed between Pico and
Giraldi 122 and Reuchlin. 123 One of the letters to the former, dated
I514, is one ofthe more interesting and important of Pi co's epistles. In
it, Gianfrancesco gives a list of his works that had been completed by
that time, and, from this letter we can see how many of his writings
have been 10st.1 24 From the same period we have two letters to the
prominent Hebrew scholar, Sante Pagnini,125 from whom Gianfrancesco probably got help in his study of the writings of Crescas and of
other Hebrew works. There is also a single extant letter to the famous
French humanist, Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples.1 26 Although brief, this
letter is of some importance, for it discusses the Examen Vanitatis.
Gianfrancesco also received a letter from the Friuli humanist and papal
legate, Girolamo Rorario (or Rarario). This is prefaced to a dialogue,
Fortuna, which was dedicated to Pico shortly after his participation in
the Battle of Ravenna.1 27
Gianfrancesco's political affairs did not change markedly after 1520.
Constant skirmishes took place between his men and those of the enemy.
121 Opera, p. 880; Emil Reicke (ed.), Willibald Pirckheimers Briefwechsel (Munich, 1940-56),
II, pp. 564-67. Also see Pirckheimer's dedication letter to Albrecht Duerer for his translation (Willibald Pirckheimer, Tractatus politici, historici et philogici, quotquot in vetustis operibus et
chart is manuscriptibus reperiri potuerunt (Frankfurt, 16 IO) p. 2 I 3) and the indications in De vita
Pirckheimeri (ibid., pp. 15,23).
122 Opera, pp. 8n-80. This letter was first written in 1514, it seems. See the version printed
in Ioannis Francisci Pici ... de amore divino (Rome, 1516), fols. Oil-Olv. It was also reprinted
with dates of 1516 and 1520.
123 Ludwig Geiger (ed.), Johann Reuchlins Briefwechsel (Tubingen, 1875), pp. 275-n.
124 For a list of Pico's lost works see Appendix A.
125 Opera, pp. 880-83. These letters are also printed in Pagnini's Latin translation of the
Bible (Biblia. Habes in hoc libro prudens lector utriusque instrumenti novam translationem aeditam a
reverendo sacrae theologiae doctore Sante Pagnino Lucensi ... (Lyon, 1527), fols. div-dil').
126 Opera, p. 876.
127 This seems never to have been printed. It is preserved in manuscript S. Gregorio 16 of
the Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome, fols. IOv-I I'. See also Gian-Giuseppe Liruti, Notizie delle
vite ed opere scritte da' letterati del Friuli (Venice, 1760- I 830), II, p. 274. The letter and dialogue
are dated 1513 in Pio Paschini, "Un pordenonese nunzio papale nel secolo XVI, Girolamo
Rorario" in Memorie storicheforogiuliesi, XXX (1930), fasc. II, p. 47.

28

LIFE

At the same time there were other troop movements in the vicinity of
Mirandola as a result of the continuing Italian Wars, and Pico himself
seems to have again taken up the sword to participate in warfare.l 28
Rather than go into these events in detail, I shall say a few words about
certain other activities of our author during these years. One of these
activities was the pursuit of certain religious interests, possibly in consequence of his early involvement with the career of Savonarola. In 1507
we hear of his having some kind of religious association with a Mantuan
nun of the Dominican order, Beata Osanna Andreasi.l 29 In 1519 we
hear of another Dominican nun, Beata Caterina da Racconigi,130
whose reputation as a mystic apparently attracted him. He went to
visit her in 1526, and in 1529 provided her with a place to live in Mirandola. 131 He later wrote a life of Beata Caterina, which apparently
gained some success as a popular religious biography.l32
Most of Pico's other writings from this period have been published.
They include a literary dialogue entitled Strix sive de ludificatione
daemonum, a work written primarily against witchcraft and printed in
1523. In the same edition are also printed for the first time two other
short works, a poem, Ad excitandum genus humanum a vitae !zuius somno ad
futurae vigiliam, and a long letter to Giampietro Carafa in defense of
Dionysius the Areopagite. Later in the same year appeared, again at
Bologna, a short treatise De animae immortalitate digressio, which is
principally an attack on the Averroist teaching regarding the individual
human soul.
In 1524, there appeared an I talian translation of the Strix, made by
Pico's friend Leandro Alberti, who had also written a prefatory letter
to the original edition of the same work. From the same year we have
128 For the details of these things see Cron An, pp. 75-79; 199-200; Sanuto, XXVIII, cols.
205-06,578-79,617; XXIX, cols. 50, 155-56; XXXIII, col. 121; XXXVIII, cols. 219,
222, 273, 336; XXXIX, col. 449; XXXXI, cols. 289,431; XLII, col. 763; XLIV, col. 205;
XLVII, cols. 462, 505; XLIX, col. 356; LI, col. 150; LIV, col. 520.; LV, cols. 170,259;

Cron Mod II, II, pp. 260-62, 309; III, p. 285; IV, p. 128; Ceretti GIIP, pp. 236-50, 30621, Ceretti LI, pp. 131-36; Silingardi, op. cit., pp. 7-2I.
129 Carlo Dionisotti, "E. Barbaro e la fortuna di Suiseth" in 114edioevo e Rinascimento, Studi
in onore di Bruno Nardi (Florence, 1955), I, p. 223.
130 For a recent study of Caterina with ample documentation and bibliographical indications see Renzo Amedeo, Operai nella vigna del Signore, santi, vescovi, e religiosi garessini (Carro,
1962), pp. 35-88.
131 Ibid., pp. 54-56.
132 On Pico's Compendio and the latter additions to it by Pietro Martire Morelli, O. P. see
Amedeo, op. cit., pp. 80-86. Other manuscripts of this work not listed by Amedeo will be given
in Appendix A. As to the date of composition of the work, we read, for example in ms. Conventi Soppressi B. VIII. 1648 of the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence, on the final page, " ...
Pensando dunque che questa basti, faro fine infino a questa hora, nella quale scorre I'anno
di sua vita quadragesimo settimo et io del mio sestagesimo tertio, il quale e di Christo nato
1532 ... "

LIFE

29

two other minor works. The first is Insulae suae descriptio, a poem dedicated to his son Giantommaso; the second, Depulsoria calumniae romaniensis oratio is Pico's defense against the Roman Curia, who had forced
him to pay a large sum of money owed for Julius II's taking of Mirandola in 151 I. Neither of these two was published during his lifetime.
Also in 1524 he dedicated a dialogue De adoratione to Pope Clement
VII; this work survives but has never been published. In 1531, under
the editorship of Lilio Gregorio Giraldi, another edition of his hymns
appeared at Bologna. In this edition, besides the poems that had already appeared in print, were published for the first time five new
religious hymns. In the same year he wrote a will; this proved to be of
no value since his property was eventually confiscated by his nephew
Galeotto.
During these last years, Gianfrancesco corresponded with the prominent humanist J acopo Sadoleto, a man he had known earlier as the
secretary of Leo X;133 with Lodovico Nogarola ofVerona;134 and with
Alessandro Minuziano,135 the Milanese printer. In general, however
the extant correspondence from his later years is very meager, probably mostly having perished with Gianfrancesco himself.l 36
The end finally came on October 16, 1533, when his nephew Galeotto II Pi co with forty armed men broke into the castle of Mirandola,
murdered Gianfrancesco and his son Alberto, sacked the castle, and
imprisoned the other members of the family.137 Gianfrancesco's body
was presumably buried without a marker 138 and still today no monument exists for him at Mirandola or elsewhere.
133 A letter from Sadoleto to Pico is dated November 24, 1530 and refers to an earlier letter
written to Pico which is lost. See Iacobi Sadoleti ... opera quae extant omnia (Verona, 1737-38),
I, pp. 72-73. The letter granting Gianfrancesco the privilege of establishing a press at Mirandola (see above note 120) was written by Sadoleto.
134 There is copy of a letter from Gianfrancesco datedJuly 27, 153 I and of Pico's letter in
defense of Dionysius made by Nogarola himself in Laurenziana, Ashburnham 279, fols.
2Ir-2 9r.
135 MS Braidense AD.IX. 31, fols. 149, 155 r , 162 contains three letters from Minuziano to
Pi co from 1519 to 1521. See Carlo Dionisotti, "Notizie di Alessandro Minuziano," Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati (Vatican City, 1946), IV, pp. 327-72, esp. pp. 347-48.
136 Otherletters from the period 1520-1533 are from Giovanni Manardo (in Manardi, op.
cit., pp. 2 I 7-18), dated December 27, 1524, and those from Celio Calcagnini (in Calcagnini,
op. cit., pp. 104,106-07, I I 1-12). We also know that Pi co was in Bologna in February, 1530
for the coronation of Emperor Charles V. See Gaetano Giordani (ed.), Della venuta e dimora a
Bologna del sommo pontifice Clemente VII per la coronazione di Carlo V Imperatore celebrata l' anno
MDXXX. Cronaca con note, documenti ed incisioni (Bologna, 1842), part I, pp. 93, 139.
137 Details of the episode can be found in Cron An, pp. 79-82; Papazzoni, pp. 125-26;
Cron Mod II, IV, pp. 316- 17; and Alessandro Luzio, Un prognostico satirico di Pietro Aretino
(MDXXXIIII) (Bergamo, 1900), pp. 8, 64- 66, which utilizes unpublished documents.
138 It seems as though his body was found in Mirandola in 1834, when excavations were
made in the church. See the note in Papazzoni, p. 166.

30

LIFE

As our brief sketch indicates, the life of Gianfrancesco Pico is primarily the story of a minor nobleman's efforts to retain his little principate
against the wishes of the rest of his family. What distinguished Pico's
story, however, from that of hundreds of other petty princes of the
Italian Renaissance are his religious devotion and his scholarly interests. Such energies as he could spare from his struggle to retain his hold
on Mirandola he devoted to a defense of Christianity. Among the
principal enemies of Christianity in his view were the various pagan
philosophies which had been resuscitated in the revival of classical
learning. It is as a defender of Christianity against these philosophies
that the prince of Mirandola becomes a figure in the history of philosophy.

CHAPTER II

GIANFRANCESCO PICO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE

TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

Obsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia gentium, quam nostra Christiana,
quae una est vera philo sophia, quandoquidem studium vel amor sapientiae
significatur hoc nomine.
Augustine, Contra Julianum, IV 72.

Our major emphasis in this study will be a consideration of Gianfrancesco Pico's attack upon Aristotle and the Aristotelians as expressed in
his major work, the Examen Vanitatis Doctrinae Gentium. Implicit and
explicit in Pico's critique are certain attitudes toward empirical science
and the theory of knowledge which are characteristic of at least one
important trend of sixteenth century philosophy. As we hope to
be able to show, Gianfrancesco's critique, while built on a series of
premises which represent one of the more conservative trends of Renaissance philosophy, actually utilizes certain techniques of criticism
and raises certain specific objections which will ultimately prove to
have far-reaching effects in early modern philosophy. Consequently,
this author cannot be characterized simply as medieval or modern.
Rather, in him, we find a strange mixture of both elements. His general
orientation was certainly traditional- one might even say reactionary.
On the other hand, some of the questions which he raised in connection
with Aristotelian philosophy, were again raised by a Bruno, a Patrizi,
a Galileo, or a Gassendi. Regardless of whether Pico was "medieval"
or "modern," the Examen Vanitatis stands out as one of the more
interesting philosophical documents of the sixteenth century.
Besides the polemic against Aristotle and the many ties that it had
both with the past and the future, certain other elements of Pico's
thought are not without interest. We can ask other questions about his
philosophy. Why did he undertake his extensive critique of Aristotle?
Why did he attempt to discredit philosophy in general? What were the
sources from which his inspiration came? How did his attitude toward

32

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

philosophy develop during his lifetime? All of these are worth taking
up before cur discussion of his consideration of Aristotle and the Aristotelians.
In order better to be able to evaluate Pica's polemic against Aristotle,
we shall briefly go into some of these questions, before turning to the
central concern of our study. We shall, first of all, analyze briefly
several key doctrines of the two men who influenced him most profoundly, Giovanni Pico and Girolamo Savonarola. Then, we shall
trace our author's own intellectual development, emphasizing his
changing attitude toward the desirability of pursuing secular knowledge and toward the role which secular knowledge has in the life of
the Christian.

( I) Giovanni Pico
Certainly the closest intellectual tie that Gianfrancesco Pica had
early in his life, during the formative years, was with his famous uncle.!
The letters which passed between the two Picos indicate the extent to
which Giovanni took an interest in the intellectual and spiritual formation of his nephew. And it was Gianfrancesco, who, after the death
of his uncle, saw to the publication of his Opera and composed a biography of him.
Apparently during the last few years of his life (1492-94) Giovanni
Pico came increasingly under the spell of Savonarola. His writings
from this period generally show a somewhat changed outlook, a more
ascetic and religious, and a less intellectual, interest. Gone, to a large
extent, are the aspirations of the eighties, when the elder Pica was
engaged in such ambitious projects as preparing his famous disputation
to be held against all comers (planned for 1487) and his program for a
pax philosophica (conceived already in the early 1480's but left unfinished
at his death). Gone, too, is the desire to compose a Platonis Aristotelisque
concordia or a Theologia Poetica. In place of the strong desire for secular
learning and philosophical disputation, is a much greater emphasis on
scriptural study and on living the sort oflife advocated by Savonarola.
1 We cannot here mention all of the important literature on Giovanni Pico. The following
are basic to the study of the elder Pico and further bibliographical indications will there be
found: Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Vita e dottrina (Florence, 1937); idem,
La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano (Florence, 196 I) ; idem, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
(Parma, 1963); E. Anagnine, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Bari, 1937); Pearl Kibre, The
Library ofPico della Mirandola (New York, (936); E.Monnerjahn, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola:
Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Theologie des italienischen Humanismus (Wiesbaden, 1960); L'opera
e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella stoTia dell' Umanesimo (Mirandola: 15- 18
settembre 1963) (Florence, 1965).

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

33

This shift in emphasis will help us to understand the difference between

Giovanni's earlier attempt to find truth in all philosophy and Gianfrancesco's basic opposition to philosophy as a whole. It will become
increasingly apparent as we proceed that certain aspects of Giovanni's
later attitude nourished Gianfrancesco's youthful mind. These seeds
developed and ultimately sprang forth in the comprehensive worldview we find in the Examen Vanitatis. One might almost say that the
philosophical position which reaches maturity in the Examen Vanitatis is
nothing other than a logical progression from that which was expressed
more and more clearly during the last few years of Giovanni Pico's life.
Nowhere is such an outlook more concisely and illuminatingly expressed than in the letter from Giovanni Pico to his nephew, dated May
15, 1492.2 Basically pious in tone, there is little in this letter to hint
that the author is one of the most learned men of his time and one
whose name will become for future generations a symbol of wide
learning and genius. The way to heaven is difficult, the uncle admonishes his nephew, and many are the traps to ensnare the unwary.
The desires of the flesh, the devil, and a deceiving world (Fallax mundus)
can lead one astray.3 But, great will be the victory for the Christian
when these things have been overcome and he attains the Beatific
Vision.
The role of reason in religion is touched on but once in this letter and
certainly not in the way that one might expect to hear a philosopher
speak of it. Giovanni Pi co here regards reason as somehow identifiable
with God and natural law. The path to heaven must be sought out, he
continues, but for this he does not advise the study of philosophy and
theology, as we might have expected the author of the Oratio, the
Conclusiones, and the Apologia to do. Rather, two quite different ways
are recommended to overcome the world and Satan, alms and prayer. 4
There is no specific mention that the intellect can lead to religion, nor
that philosophy should be cultivated. It is suggested only that Scripture
2 The text of this letter is printed in the 1601 edition of Gianfrancesco Pi co's Opera, pp.
817-19. I follow, however, the recently edited text in Eugenio Garin, ed., Prosatori latini del
Qpattrocento, pp. 824-33, where it is accompanied by an Italian translation.
3 "Quantum illud potius esset miraculum si tibi uni inter mortales sine sudore via paterel
ad caelum, quasi nunc primum et fallax mundus et malus daemon esse desineret, aut quasi
tu in carne adhuc non esses, quae concupiscit adversus spiritum et, nisi saluti nostrae vigiles
perspexerimus, circaeis ebrios poculis in prodigiosas brutorum species illecebrosa deformat."
Prosatari Latini ... p. 824.
4 "Tu vero, fili, con ten de intrare per angustam portam, nee quid multi agant attende,
sed quid agendum ipsa tibi naturae lex, ipsa ratio, ipse Deus os tend at ... Erunt autem duo
praecipue praesentissima tibi remedia adversus mundum et Satanam ... eleemosyna scilicet
atque oratio." Ibid., p. 830.

34

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

be read. The nephew is exhorted to have it "always in your hands" and

to give no time to reading frivolous poetry and fables. 5
The viewpoint that is emphasized in this letter later becomes incorporated in Gianfrancesco's own philosophical writings - in even a more
exaggerated form. The mundus fallax of which Giovanni spoke becomes
central in Gianfrancesco's critique of Aristotle and in his rejection of
all rational forms of inquiry into natural knowledge. The suggestion to
turn to Scripture is reiterated often by the nephew, appearing at the
end of each book of his Examen Vanitatis, as well as elsewhere.

(2) Girolamo Savonarola

A second major influence on the intellectural formation of Gianfrancesco Pi co came from his close contact with Girolamo Savonarola.
Of Gianfrancesco's relation to Savonarola and of his concern with the
Ferrarese friar's cause even after his death we have already spoken.
Here we shall merely try to trace certain of Savonarola's key attitudes
and show how close approximations of these later found their way into
the younger Pico's own thought.
Girolamo Savonarola is a man most difficult to characterize in a few
words. Many are the contrasts and contradictions in his own writings
and even more are those among the historians who have tried to interpret him. Arguments over his merit or lack of it raged unabated
during the last years of his life, continued after his death, and, even
today, continue as though it were still a living issue. Here we shall not
discuss the wider meaning of the man's life and work, but shall merely
try to characterize briefly his attitude toward philosophy and worldly
learning. 6 In this, as well as in certain of his pious and otherworldly
attitudes toward religion, is to be found a clear connection with certain
outlooks and emphases given ample expression in the works of Gian5 " , suggeret et sacra lectio, quam ut omissis iam fabulis nugisque poetarum semper
habeas in manibus etiam atque etiam rogo. Nihil Deo gratius, nihil tibi utilius facere potes
quam si non cessaveris litteras sacras nocturna versare manu, versare diurna." Ibid., p. 830.
This is in contrast with an earlier Giovanni Pico who had written vernacular poetry and a
commentary on a love poem of Girolamo Benivieni and who had proposed a work entitled
Theologia poetica (see Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et
uno, ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence, 1942), p. 150).
6 The Savonarola literature is enormous and we cannot begin to discuss it here. For a
discussion of his own philosophy and his attitude toward philosophy, the arts and sciences, see
Pasquale Villari, La storia di Girolamo Savonarola e de' suoi tempi, New edition (Florence, 1930)
I, pp. 95-113; Giuseppe Schnitzer, Savonarola (Milan, 1931) II, pp. 337-78. (This is the
Italian translation which contains additions not found in the original German version);
Eugenio Garin, "Ricerche sugli scritti filosofici di Girolamo Savonarola. Opere inedite e
smarite," La culturafilosofica . .. , pp. 201-12. For further indications see the annotated bibliography in Mario Ferrara, Bibliografia savonaroliana, Biblioteca di Bibliografia Italiana, XXXI
(Florence, 1958).

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

35

frances co Pico. Although Savonarola did not always show a consistent

attitude toward reason and learning, certain of his basic opinions are
clear. It seems evident, for example, that in his view, human reason
has very little place in religion. This is made apparent in the First Book
of his treatise De simplicitate vitae Christianae. 7 Here he says:
Moreover, if the Chris tian life should proceed from the na turalligh t of reason,
(since those things which the Christian believes and loves and for which he
works could not be proven by reason) it is necessary to say that he would
have opinion regarding these things and not science. Moreover, opinion is a
habit of the mind which does not render the mind perfectly firm for assent. 8
Fra Girolamo continues by arguing that if faith came from natural
light it would not rise above the status of mere opinion. Furthermore,
in that case God's love would have no role to play in religion. This
leads him to the conclusion that, "Ergo necesse est dicere quod ab alia
radice quam a ratione procedat." 9 A very similar attitude is expressed
in the Trionjo della Croce 10 where he focuses upon faith as a "gift of God
(Ephes. II, 8-g)." Furthermore, Savonarola contends that faith cannot
be demonstrated from natural causes and reasons alone, but is dependent upon God's will.ll
Certainly these notions are by no means original with Savonarola,
but follow the orthodox Christian trends, although we might say that
the emphasis on the non-cognitive nature of religion is rather pronounced. This emphasis becomes more evident when he speaks out in
the Book IV of the Trionjo against the religion which philosophers can
reach. He here insists that the Christian religion is a unique source of
truth.l 2 His attitude becomes clearer when he contends that "The
7 The work dates from about 1496. See Lucia Giovanozzi, Contributo alla bibliografia delle
opere del Savonarola: edizioni dei secoli XV e XVI (Florence, 1953), pp. 34-39. I use the following
edition: Girolamo Savonarola, De simplicitate Christianae vitae, ed. Pier Giorgio Ricci, vol. 7 of
the national edition (Rome, 1959).
8 "Praeterea si vita Christiana procederet a lumine naturali rationis, cum nulla ratione
probari possint efficaciter ea quae Christianus credit et amat et pro quibus operatur, necesse
est dicere, quod de illis opinionem habeat non scientiam. Opinio autem est habitus mentis
qui non perfecte firmat ani mum ad assensum." De simplicitate I, 5, pp. 25-26.
9 Ibid., I, 5, p. 27.
10 This work was written in 1497. See Giovanozzi, op. cit., pp. 123-26. It was composed in
Latin and translated by the author himself into the vernacular. I follow the Latin text given
in Girolamo Savonarola, Triumphus Crucis, ed. Mario Ferrara, vol. 8 of the national edition
(Rome, 1961). See Serafino Prete, "Savonarola apologista: il Triumphus crucis," Studia picena (Fano), XXI (1952), pp. I-51.
11 "Licet autem fides ex causis principiisque naturalibus demonstrari non possit, ex manifestis tamen effectibus validissimas rationes adducemus, quas nemo sanae mentis inficiari
poterit. Non quod fides his tan tum modo innitatur, cum, teste Apostolo, 'donum' illa sit 'Dei
non ex operibus, ne quis glorietur' (Ephes. II, 8-9) ... " Triorifo, p. 3.
12 In the prooemium, ibid., pp. 208-09. He here seems to be speaking out against the attempt
at a reconciliation of the ancient religions and philosophical traditions such as we find in
Giovanni Pico's youthful works and in Ficino. See Bohdan Kieszkowski, Studi sui platonismo

36

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

religions which were transmitted by the philosophers were full of defects

and errors." The philosophers are condemned for attempting to discover the end of human life through the use of reason, for the natural
light of reason is completely insufficient for the achievement of man's
well being. The efforts of the philosophers to define religion do not lead
to something stable, but to a religion which is uncertain, imperfect,
and full of errors. 13
Such an outlook will be taken over with little change, as we will see,
by Gianfrancesco Pico. The latter will merely apply his erudition to
this basic principle and will then discourse at great length about the
uncertainty and imperfection of the philosophy and religion of the
gentes. In Savonarola's eyes these early philosophies and religions are
by no means a preparation for Christianity, as Ficino or the younger
Giovanni Pi co thought. Rather, they are quite the opposite, full of
internal conflicts and contradictions. Christianity alone is a stable and
unchanging body of truths.
Savonarola also argues that secular learning is insignificant, compared to the teachings of the Scriptures. In fact, in his view other
branches of knowledge are quite useless and there is little reason to
cultivate them. Sacred Scripture far surpasses all other forms of
knowledge. This is clearly expressed in a sermon to the Florentines of
August 15, 1496:

La scienzia adunque, che e bene dell' anima, e molto maggiore beneficio che
non sono tutte Ie cose terrene. Tra Ie scienzie adunque di Logica, Filosofia,
Metafisica ed altre scienzie, la maggiore di tutte e quella della scrittura
sacra ... Tra'doni della intelligenzia, quel dono che fa l'uomo piu propinquo a Dio, e maggiore d'ogni altro tal dono: rna la intelligenzia delle scritture sacre, massimamente quando a quella e congiunto illume della fede,
fa piu propinquo I'uomo a Dio quanto allo intelletto, che ogni altra cosa.
Adunque e maggiore dono e maggior beneficio quanta alla intelligenzia che
I'uomo possa avere.l 4
del Rinascimento in ltalia (Florence, 1936), pp. 113-27; Garin, Giovanni Pico ... (1937), pp.
73-89. Savonarola also had a strong aversion to Platonism - more than Aristotelianism, it
seems. For a general survey ofthis movement see Charles B. Schmitt, "Perennial Philosophy:
From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz", Journal of the History of Ideas, XXVII (1966), pp. 505-32.
See Garin, "Ricerche sugli scritti ... "
13 Especially in Book IV, chap. 2, "Relligiones a philosophis traditas defectuum et errorum
plenas fuisse." Trionfo, pp. 212-20. On pp. 217-18 we read the following: "His igitur et
huiusmodi circumveniuntur difficultatibus, qui per rationem naturalem humanae vitae
finem investigare volunt; ideoque patet nil stabile ac certum de relligione diffinire philosophos potuisse, cum circa huiusmodi positiones in ambiguo semper in tenebrisque versentur.
Si quam ergo relligionem unquam statuerunt, aut aliquando statue nt, imperfectam incertamque, ac errorum plenam esse oportet ... Sed cum illi [i.e. the philosophers], ut dictum
est, in multis deficientes erraverint, patet natural is lumen rationis ad hominis salutem satis
non esse."
14 Prediche di F. Girolamo Savonarola (Firenze, 1889) per cura di Giuseppe Baccini, pp. 399-

400

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

37

From the few passages analyzed here we can gather some indication
of Savonarola's attitude toward secular learning as compared to faith
and Scripture. In short, faith is a free gift of God and reason has no role
in its attainment. The religions of the non-Christians and of the philosophers are not approximations to the truth or preparations for it, as
not only Giovanni Pico and Ficino, but also St. Thomas had held. They
are, instead, perversions of the truth. They are religions "imperfect,
uncertain, and full of errors." Finally, all science, all knowledge, is
subject to that knowledge afforded by Sacred Scripture. Other kinds of
knowledge may lead to some good, but certainly the results they give
are in no way to be compared to the results obtained from the study of
the Scriptures.
We could trace these ideas through the thought of Savonarola with
greater precision, but our major concern here is not with the friar's
philosophy. Rather, we shall now turn to our analysis of Gianfrancesco
Pico's general philosophical outlook, giving special attention first to his
attitude toward the relation of religion and philosophy, for this was
certainly one of the central philosophical problems with which he
concerned himself. In so doing we shall see that in his solution to this
problem he treats a number of other philosophical problems that are
of no small interest. His polemics against philosophy in general and
against Aristotelianism in particular are outgrowths of his solution to
this main problem. And it is that question in which we are primarily
interested.
(3) The Solution Worked Out in the "De Studio" (I496)

We shall first look at Gianfrancesco Pico's early work, the De Studio

Divinae et Humanae Philosophiae, which has a dedicatory letter from 1496
and which was first printed in 1497,15 In this work, written already
before Savonarola's death, we find indications of close ties to the friar
in an attitude toward philosophy that will be given expa,nded treatment in the Examen Vanitatis two decades later.
In the De Studio our author clearly distinguishes "human" from
"divine" philosophy. The former encompasses those branches of philo15 The first printing was at Bologna in 1497 (HC-13002) and it was reprinted in the editions of the Opera at Strasbourg in 1506~07 and Basel 1572~73 and 1601. I shall follow the
text in the last of these, where it is printed on pp. 1~28. This edition, Ioannis Francisci Pici,
Mirandulae Domini . .. Opera quae extant omnia .. (Basel, 1601) will be used for all further
references to the writings of Gianfrancesco Pico unless otherwise stated. I will cite book and
chapter of the various works, in addition to page number. This will facilitate reference to
other editions. I have not hesitated, however, to utilize the earlier editions to emend the text
of difficult passages.

38

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

sophy which do not specifically focus on God and upon his attributes,
e.g. natural philosophy and logic. If these parts of philosophy do tell us
something about God, it occurs only secondarily. Human philosophy
takes its starting point from the materials of sense experience, which as we shall much more fully see below - cannot and does not give us
reliable knowledge. This type of philosophy is doomed to failure from
its very beginning, according to Pico, for it does not take its starting
point from God. Divine philosophy, on the other hand, begins with
God and can furnish us with reliable knowledge. This type of philosophy is based on the Sacred Scriptures, which are the word of God,
and which present to us the Truth in its proper order. The Scriptures
teach us about God and this is far more important than the knowledge
about natural things which human philosophy gives us. Furthermore,
this second type of philosophy concerns itself with nothing other than
that which is divinely revealed, that is, with Eternal Wisdom. 16
Pico's separation of the two is clear cut. What he calls divine philosophy is in actuality nothing other than what we would call study of the
Scriptures; what he names human philosophy is everything which falls
into the category of secular learning, e.g. the arts, sciences, and various
branches of philosophy. After making the basic distinction, our author
continues by analyzing further the two philosophies, their relation to
one another, and the extent to which it is desirable for the Christian to
devote himself to human philosophy. Just how far human philosophy
can be considered useful is one of his primary considerations.
We shall show that the end of human philosophy is put to its proper use only
in the attainment of divine philosophy, which surpasses it in all regards.
16 "Nos autem humanam appellandam censuimus, tum quod humano ad Deum gradu
promovet, hoc est, initio et adminiculis sensu urn, tum quod paucula quaepiam de Deo rimata est. Sacrae vero literae, quae divina philosophia vere nominatur, retrogrado procedunt
ordine. Nam et a Deo exordiuntur, et in Deum finiunt, et semper de Deo loquuntur, nihilque
pertractant quod ad ips ius cuItum in hac vita, et in alia ad fruitionem non pertineat, nee

humano ingenio comprehcnsae, sed revelataedivinitus, ut ad veram aeternamque sapientiarn.,

quae nihil aliud est quam Deus, perveniremus." De studio,prooem.; p. 3. See Antonio Corsano,
Ii pensiero religioso italiano (Bari, 1937), pp. 54-64'
The distinction between human and divine philosophy seems to have a long history which
has not been studied to my knowledge. Cicero (Tusc. Disp., IV, 26, 57) says, " ... sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque ... " See the note on
the history of this distinction in ancient times in the edition of this work by T. W. Dougan and
R. M. Henry (Cambridge, England, 1934), II, p. 167 and also Seneca, Ep. LXXXIX, 5;
Plutarch, De placitiis philosophorum, 874E. Thomas Aquinas makes a distinction similar to
Pico in the Summa contra gentiles, II, 4, when he uses the term "humana philosophia" repeatedly and contrasts it "sapientia divina." He concludes, "Et ideo interdum ex principiis philosophiae humanae sapientia divina procedit ... " There are, of course, significant differences
between Thomas' distinction and that of Pico. What we want to emphasize here is merely
that the distinction is not original with Pico. A distinction similar to Pico's was later made by
St. Lorenzo da Brindisi. See Silvestro da Valsanzibio, Una nuoua oprra di S. Lorenzo da Brindisi: il commento sulia "Sacrafilosofia delia natura" di Mose (Rome, 1963), pp. 23-35.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

39

Then we will prove that our endeavor is purposeless unless we use the one as
well as the other for arriving at the contemplation and love of God.!7

Throughout his treatise Pico expresses the opinion that human

philosophy is but of limited value. It is not to be studied for its own
sake, but is to be pursued only when it is of positive value as an aid in
the understanding of divine philosophy. It is basically good in itself,
although it can also easily be misapplied for evil purposes. Human
philosophy may be useful for the Christian in achieving his end, but
not necessarily so.1 8
There are several reasons why human philosophy may be of little
use or even absolutely harmful for the Christian. First of all, it places
a strong emphasis on sense knowledge, and such knowledge is not
always reliable.1 9
Although barely mentioned here in Pico's early work, this will become one of his favorite themes and will be discussed in minute detail
in the Examen Vanitatis. This aspect of the limitations of human philosophy is not here insisted on with great persistence, but it is worth
noting that Gianfrancesco already has his doubts regarding the reliability of knowledge gained from sense experience.
In the De Studio he frames the major part of his polemic in somewhat
different terms. Although philosophy and the liberal arts may be of
limited use to the Christian, they are in no way to be considered as
necessary for salvation. Nowhere in the Scriptures are they mentioned as
being a prerequisite for beatitude. 2o In fact, certain of the arts and
sciences can be positively harmful. Physics, logic, and metaphysics
have some value as an aid to the study of Scripture; but geometry,
17 "Monstrabimus finem eius non recte poni nisi in adeptione divinae, quae illam numeris
omnibus supergreditur. Demum probabimus inanem esse conatum nostrum nisi tam hac
quam ilia ad Dei contemplationem, et amorem capessendum usi fuerimus." Ibid., prooem.;
P4
18 "Cum autem ostenderimus philosophiam ipsam seu veri scientiam bonam esse per se, et
quispiam forte compererit earn, quae revelata est (ut Thomas Aquinas aliique permulti docent) esse neeessariam Christiano ad capessendam felieitatem; poterit idem ambigere an
etiam ea quam humanam dieimus, utpote ab homine inventam et per naturae vestigia proeedentem ad beatitudinem comparandam sit necessaria." Ibid., I, 2; p. 7. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theo!., la, q.l, a.1.
19 "De ea tamen cognitione loquimur, quae a sensibus trahit originem, nee ordinem discendi nobis congenitum supergreditur, quo solo nisi superno illo lumine fuerimus eollustrati,
perfeetam et exactissimam intelligentiam non assequemur." Ibid., I, 2; p. 7. See also note r6
above.
20 "Patet itaque quadamtenus prodesse humanas seientias eonducibilesque esse nobis non
proprie necessarias ad beatitudinem. Alioquin Deus nobis perfecta dogmata non tradidisset,
et in monstrando nobis coelesti itinere aberravisset. Cum nullibi mentionem feeerit, oportere
eos, qui bus supernae Hierosolymae ostium aperietur, liberales artes seu primam aut naturalem philosophiam percalluisse ... " Ibid., I, 2; p. 7.

40

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

arithmetic, and poetry have little if any affinity to scriptural studies.

Poetry, in particular, is singled out as being deleterious to Christians
unless it is cautiously approached, for the pagan poetry is often obscene.
Pico concludes that it definitely should not be cultivated by the
Christian. This is not to say that there are no good Christian poets,
but there are far too few when their influence is compared to that of
the great pagan poets. 21
Even those arts and sciences which have some affinity to the Sacred
Scriptures are only of limited value. They are certainly not to be
studied by all Christians, for not everyone can pursue them without in
some way endangering his faith. Certain teachings of the philosophers
such as the Aristotelian doctrine that the world is eternal or Alexander's and Averroes' position on the unity of the intellect are apt to
cause a weakening of their faith. 22 On the other hand, the study of the
arts and sciences can be helpful for certain persons. Philosophy, for
example, must be studied by medical men, theologians, and teachers
of philosophy. Physicians must be well acquainted with natural phi.
losophy if they are to practice their healing art; those who study theology find that the understanding of divine things is easier when approached through a knowledge of natural things. Teachers of philo sophy must study the subject if they are to teach it to the physicians and
theologians. 23 Human philosophy is also beneficial to Christianity in
certain other ways, for it may be helpful in refuting false doctrine or
heresy, in the cultivation of sacred eloquence, or in the understanding
21 "Hoc autem diligenti consideratione pensandum, esse quasdam philosophiae partes,
quas sacris literis aliis conducibiliores sunt et cognatiores atque idcirco Christiano homini
prae caeteris excolendas, ei praesertim qui se ad divina eloquia transferre cupit. Alias minus,
quales videntur geometrica, arithmetica, et poetica: non enim earn cum divina Scriptura
quasi dixeris affinitatem habent, quam et physica habet et logica et methaphysica ... Sed
quid est detestabilius plerique poetarum turpitudines maximas et obscoenitates suis versibus immiscuerunt, quae Christiano homini non modo attrectanda, sed prorsus eliminanda."
Ibid., I, 6; pp. '3-'4' Among the Christian poets who are considered suitable are Prudentius,
Sedulius, and Damasus and of the more recent ones Battista Mantovano, Ludovico Bigi
Pittorio, and Ugolino Verino. On Pico's attitude toward poetry in general see Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1961), pp. 255-57. For
his relations with Battista Mantovano and Ludovico Bigi Pittorio see the preceeding chapter,
pp. 13-14. See also his letter to Ariosto (Opera, pp. 884-85) and note 16, p. 14.
22 De Studio I, 5; p. 12.
23 "Illud quoque animadversione dignum trifariam dari opportunum aditum ad philosophiam: Aut medicinae percallendae gratia; aut docendi in scholis ipsam philosophiam, aut
theologiae noscendae ... His ergo omnibus licere per philosophiae campos vagari manifestum est. Medicus enim a philosopho principia ct fundamenta haurit medicinae multaque
mutuatur, quibus ad conciliandam aegrotis sanitatem utatur. Ei vero qui theologiam perdiscere cupit, facilius ad id quod quaerit accessus patet ope philosophiae, quando per res
naturales quasi gradu facto ad divina conscendimus. Eum autem qui doc ere et enarrare
philosophorum libros instituit, manifestum est in eis ipsis versari oportcre." Ibid., I, 5; p. 13.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

41

of the sacred writings. 24 Even though a knowledge of these subjects is

sometimes useful and even desirable for those who are engaged in
combatting heresy and rooting out false dogma, this is not always the
case. A study of history will show us that heretics have never been
convinced of their errors by the use of logic or by the persuasion of
rhetoric. God does not save his people by the use of dialectic. Rather,
the kingdom of God consists in a simple faith, in which arguments and
disputes about words have no place. 25
In actuality, however, there are two separate ways to convince the
heretics of their errors regarding church doctrine. As examples of these
two approaches, Gianfrancesco cites the works of Giovanni Pica and
Girolamo Savonarola. The former wrote learned works in a polished
Latin style, whereas the latter wrote his works in a simple style or even
in the vernacular for the benefit of the unlearned. 26 In spite of his great
esteem for his uncle, for the enormity of his learning and the brilliance
of his eloquence, Gianfrancesco is forced to conclude that Savonarola
and many other eminent men like him demonstrate that a wide knowledge of secular learning is not necessary for the Christian. When the
Christian has the Scripture, "it is necessary to borrow neither the
knowledge of things nor eloquence from the pagans." 27 Christianity
alone is self-sufficient.
Still, despite all of the pitfalls that must be avoided in the use of the
human philosophy and the fact that it is not necessary for the Christian,
certain aspects of it have a somewhat more positive contribution to
make. It can lead one from a less noble consideration of the things of
the world to a contemplation of what Plato called "the highest being."
24 "Quantum vero pertinent ad confutanda falsa dogmata, ad eloquentiam discendam, ad
sacra eloquia facile intelligenda, quibus muneribus obeundis, gentilium literas utiles diximus," Ibid., I, 7; p. 15.
25 "Sed percurramus historias veteres actaque eo rum qui cum haereticis pugnavere inspiciamus, Ego, ut de me fatear, numquam legi, nec arbitror invenitur qui legerit ullum unquam
haereticum vi aut logicae devictum aut rhetorices persuasum haeresim abiurasse, ita ut in
ipso disputationum conflictu manus dederit et mutarit sententiam ... Non in dialectica placuit Deo salvare populum suum. RegnumDei in simplicitate fidei est, non in contentione
sermonum." Ibid., I, 3; p. g.
26 This discussion of Giovanni Pi co and Savonarola is found in De Studio I, 7; pp. 16-18.
About Giovanni we read for example: "Libri disputationum adversus Astrologiam omnem
laudem superant sive doctrinam spectes novasque philosophiae quaestiones ab eo enucleatas
sive eloquentiam (p. 1])." About Savonarola, we read:" ... ex Epitomate, quod Hieronymus Savonarola vir celeberrimus conscripsit ct vernacula lingua ut ineruditis opcm ferret
(p. 17)." The two writers are neatly compared by saying "Interim quod Ioannes Picus pro
doctis et Latina lingua pollcntibus, quod Hieronymus Savonarola pro rudibus Latini sermonis effecerunt (p. 17).
27 "Quibus facile corrogari poterit, ncc scientiam rerum, nee eloquentiam necessario nos a
Gentibus mutuari." Ibid., I, 7; p. 18. This seems to be written against both the scholastic
philosophers who utilized pagan scientia and the humanists who utilized pagan eloquentia.

42

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

That is, it can lead us to God, the origin and cause of all beings. 28 But,
even here where human philosophy reaches its highest value as an aid
to the apprehension of God himself, it falls short of divine philosophy.
Besides leading us to the contemplation of God, divine philosophy is
also valuable in the formation of the faculty of religious understanding
and in the development of the will; and these things far surpass that
which is acquired through worldly pursuits. In addition, the Scriptures
allow even the unlettered to understand God's teachings, thus opening
to them the wonderful secrets of the faith. In brief, the study of Scripture brings to us all of the benefits of human philosophy and many
more in addition. From the smallest excerpt taken from any of the
books of the Bible all is available to the reader that can be taught by
human philosophy. Each small part of Scripture grants to the reader
that which he can grasp by virtue of his own capacity to know and
understand. 29
In concluding this very revealing work, our author gives an example
of the potency of the divine philosophy of the Scriptures. St. Francis
became a very holy man, so high did he rise that his theology, as it
were, transcended the heavens themselves. Yet this most holy man was
not imbued with the commentaries of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus,
who had not even been born at his time, but with the Scriptures. 3o
Here is a most significant passage. It is not the philosopher or the
theologian who is the Christian to be emulated, but the simple and
pious man. Learning and study have dubious value at best. It is preferable by far for one to concentrate his efforts on studying the Scriptures.
We see that already in this early work Gianfrancesco Pico has made
28 "Diximus utilem nobis esse utranquephilosophiam, si ea uti voluerimus, non abuti; nam
humana ope ex ignobiliori omnium entium consideratione quasi gradu facto per scalas ad ens
(ut in quit Plato) ipsissimum. Hoc est, Deum entium originem et causam, quamvis ascendere
rerum naturae ordinem speculantes; divino vero adiumento et haec eadem et multo maiora
sublimioraque cognoscimus." Ibid., II, 7; p. 27.
29 "Mira profecto Divinae Scripturae profunditas, stupendus ordo, quando non solum
per Bibliae ordinem discurrentes, ex quibuscunque libris summas in Deum contemplationes
eruere possumus; sed nec est cuiuscunque libri tam parva portio ex qua non detur (modo
simus capaces) excerpere quicquid docet humana philosophia; addita etiam num magna
religionis capessendae formandaeque voluntatis facultate et hoc postremo munere mundi
superatur sapientia, nec aliquo.i tam parvum in ea caput reperire possumus (si modo in ea
aliquid parvi) quod nos ad Dei cognitionem elevatos non illuminet et illuminatos accendat.
Caeterum ut etiam meminimus, in Divinis eloquiis hoc praecipuum quod ad intelligentiam
ineruditorum se demittunt, adeo ut miros arcanosque sibi ex eis intelligentiae haustus accumulent." Ibid., II, 8; p. 28.
30 "Notum illud de beato Francisco a theologis quibusdam proia tum, eius videlicet theologiam coelum transcendere, suam autem humili gradu reptare terram. Quam tamen vir
divinus et Christi amOre mirum in modum flammatus non de commentariis Thomae aut
Scoti, qui nondum nati fuerant; sed de divinis literis divino amore examinatis eruerat." Ibid.

11,8; p. 28.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

43

clear his position, a position that will gain greater definition in the
Examen Vanitatis. All knowledge is divided into two classes, divine
knowledge and human knowledge. The former, which is based on the
indisputable truth of Scripture is good per se; the latter, which is built
up from purely human resources and takes no account of revelation, is
neither completely good nor bad in itself. It can be beneficial if it is
used to deepen and extend our knowledge or religion and theology or
ifit is utilized to defend the faith. On the other hand, it can be harmful
if relied on excessively or if considered to be an end in itself. Human
philosophy is not necessary for salvation. It can be useful, as it was for
many of the Fathers, but men such as St. Francis of Assisi rose to great
holiness without its benefits. Even the apostles themselves who followed
Christ were simple men (idiotae), for the most part fishermen. 31
(4) The First Three Books of the "Examen Vanitatis" (1520)
If in the De Studio Pico focuses upon the ambivalent character of
human philosophy, pointing out its good and useful characteristics as
well as its corrupting and useless aspects, he takes a somewhat different
stance in the Examen Vanitatis. Here the importance of Scripture is
still strongly emphasized. His attitude toward human philosophy
changes somewhat, however. In the Examen Vanitatis it becomes
difficult for our author to find anything good to say about the various
arts and sciences of pagan learning. In fact, the entire work is conceived
as a polemic against the philosophy of the gentes, which comes to have a
meaning roughly similar to what was called human philosophy in the
earlier work. He rebukes the various schools of pagan philosophy and
the different arts and sciences as well. He singles out Aristotle for a
particularly thoroughgoing analysis and refutation. This is primarily
because the Stagirite's philosophy happened to be the predominant
one in the schools of sixteenth century Italy. Philosophy in general is
found to be a major source of error and Gianfrancesco discourses at
length with great erudition, attempting to show that to base knowledge
upon any foundation other than the revealed Scriptures is foolhardy
and self-deceiving.
At least in part, this more severe attitude toward the gentes is derived
from the sceptical notions found in the works of Sextus Empiricus, a
fact that will become more evident as we proceed. Pico enlists arguments of the sceptic philosophers in behalf of Christianity. All of the
31 "Christum autem qui sequebantur Apostoli simplices fuere idiotae et plurimum piscatores: quod nemo est fere, qui nesciat." Ibid., I, 3; p. 8.

44

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

arts, sciences, and philosophies can be challenged on the grounds set

forth by the sceptics, Pi co argues. As a result, only the divinely revealed
truths of the Christian faith escape this criticism untouched.
The program which the author sets out for himself in the Examen
Vanitatis is an ambitious one. Essentially it involves an attempt to
discredit all knowledge, except that of the Christian Scriptures. It is a
project which the author, who has already expressed a deep-seated
mistrust of secular knowledge in the De Studio, undertakes with enthusiasm and vigor:
Not only against the depraved religion or superstition of the pagans, but also
against the teaching, with which that superstition itself is encased, I have
taken it upon myself to speak, to examine all of the sects of philosophy, and
to weight them in a balance, as it were. This is so that I will be able to demolish, as far as I can, every root and the fibres of this great vanity, which has
spread itself forth beyond measure during our own age. 32

The Examen Vanitatis was first published in 1520, but the original
idea of composing the work probably dates from somewhat earlier. 33
As we have said, the first three books of this works are an attack on
pagan philosophy and learning in general and the last three specifically
criticize Aristotelian philosophy. We shall now briefly summarize some
of the more important ideas found in these first three books before
turning to a more detailed study of Gianfrancesco's critique of Aristotle.
Our author begins by praising truth in a way that belies the sceptical
character of the rest of the work. In reading the first few sentences of
the Preface, one feels as though he is reading an Aristotelian treatise.
Indeed, there are reminiscences of the first lines of the Metaphysics
when we read, for example, "Humanum ipsum genus ad hanc veri
notitiam natum, eiusque capessendi suapte natura desiderio exaestuans ... " 34 But, we soon see that the author's intent is far different
32 "Ego vero, non solum contra gentium religionem pravam superstitionemve, sed contra
doctrinam, cuius ambitu illa ipsa etiam clauditur superstitio, disserere institui, et omnes
philosophiae sectas sub examen revocare, et tanquam in libra append ere, ut omnem omnino
radicem, fibras omneis huiusce vanitatis, quae nostra aetate plus nimio pullulavit, quibus
potero viribus excindam." Ex. Van., prooem.; p. 474.
33 According to the Preface to Book III (pp. 600-01), Pico intended to express his views
a good deal earlier, but his varying political fortunes (see the previous chapter for a discussion
of this) prevented him from doing so. When the Examen Vanitatis did finally see the light of
day it was printed at Mirandola's recently established press. A papal privilege from Leo X,
dated April 10, 1519 (in Pico's Opera, ed. cit., fol. aa2 r ) gave to Gianfrancesco the right to
publish his works and those of his uncle. The Examen Vanitatis, however, was the second and
last book to issue from this short-lived press. It carries a dedication letter dated July 13,
1520, addressed to Leo X (ed. cit., p. 880). The work is reprinted in the Opera of 1572-73
and 1601. It was completed, although perhaps not in the form in which it ultimately
appeared, by 1514. See below, Appendix A, p. 193.
34 Ex. Van., prooem.; p. 473.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

45

from a vague praise of truth. To him truth means but a single thing. It
is the truth of religion, and of a single religion, Christianity. There
only, truth must be sought; to look elsewhere is vain. The term vanitas
has a prominent place in the title of the work and it is a word which
Pico uses time and again to describe the search for truth directed elsewhere than toward the Christian Scriptures. The vanity of the pagans
lies in accepting superstition in place of religion, incertitude in place of
certainty, and falsity in place oftruth. 35 They have, in short, accepted
false criteria for the determination of the true. They search for truth
where a sincera veritas cannot be found. As our author says further:
As to religion, we will call that vain, which has a depraved beginning, vain
and fallacious middle terms, and a conclusion that does not really follow.
Vain can also be said and held with reference to other things when something does not yield what it promises and offers ambiguity for certainty.
Likewise vain is that which introduces the false under the appearance of the
true. 36
The author's endeavor in the Examen Vanitatis is to show systematically that not only the other religions, but also the various philosophies, arts, and sciences are vain. He will argue that all knowledge
which takes its origin from a source other than Scripture is, if not false,
at least extremely susceptible to error. He also argues that the various
philosophies, arts, and sciences of the gentes carry little weight, for there
is almost universal disagreement among the various sects of philosophers. In so doing Gianfrancesco Pico displays an enormous erudition
and a detailed knowledge of a very wide range of sources of philosophy,
the arts, sciences, and religion. He utilizes not only the commonly
known sources, but numerous little known sources, including a number
of works that had not yet been printed. 37
The First Book of the Examen Vanitatis is devoted principally to
35 " . . . quod equidem non difficulter posse fieri arbitror, si universam gentium doctrinam,
superstitione, incertitudine, falsi tate, lab are, hoc ipso quod in manibus habemus, opere
monstraverimus; ut enim veritas est religionis, ita superstitionis est vanitas, et si verum dixisse
probamur, cum certo a nobis ea patefiunt quae certa esse nos ostensuros recepimus, ita
vanitatis arguemur si et pro certis incerta, et pro veris falsa tradidisse deprehendamur.'
Ibid., praaem.; p. 473.
36 "Quare quod attinet ad reiigionem, vanum id appellabimus, quod pravum habet initium, vana et fallacia media, finemque minime consequitur. Quo ad alia etiam vanum et
dici et haberi potest, id quod non stat promissis et pro certo praebet ambiguum. Vanum item,
quod veri specie praetenta, falsum inducit." Ibid., praaem., p. 473.
37 In the Preface (p. 475) are mentioned the following commentators on Aristotle, whom
he will use: Alexander, Porphyry, Ammonius, Philoponus, Leo Magentinos, Simplicius,
Theodorus Metochites, Joseph Rhacendites, Michael of Ephesus, Michael Psellos, Georgios
Pachymeres, Sophonius (Sophonias?), Iamblichus, Damascius, Dexippus, Olympiodorus,
Syrianus.

46

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

pointing out disagreements among different schools of philosophy. We

can look at any branch of philosophy, Pico contends, and we do not
find the various schools in fundamental agreement. The various sects
do not differ merely in words, as Antiochus of Ascalon had held, but
there is a genuine lack of concord among the ideas of the various
thinkers. This discord has lasted through many centuries and shows no
signs of abating. There have been disputes among the leaders of the
different sects and even among the disciples of the same master. These
disagreements are not confined to a small area, but they encompass all
branches of philosophy and learning. 38 Many are the examples that
our author gives of the conflicts. He takes, for example, an issue such as
the divisions of philosophy, gives the differing views that have been
expressed by philosophers concerning this question, and argues that it
is hopeless to attempt to reconcile these widely divergent viewpoints. 39
After discussing a number of such instances he concludes that the whole
philosophy which has been formulated by the gentes is marked by
internal inconsistency and discord. Instead of these having been resolved in time, they have only become more pronounced through the
centuries.
Furthermore, these disputes which have occurred among the pagans
are also responsible for some of the arguments and disagreements that
have arisen among Christian theologians. The teachings of the faith
are true, but when the theologians attempt to combine them with
certain of the teachings of philosophers, difficulties arise. For example,
there is the question of whether or not the world is eternal that has arisen
since the introduction of Aristotelian philosophy. Such a question,
which causes discord and strife, certainly does not come from the
teachings of the Bible, but from the philosophy of the gentes. 40 The
strife that has sometimes been evident within the ranks of the Christian
theologians is reducible ultimately to the doctrines that they have absorbed from pagan learning. 41 For Pico, there is and can be no basic
38 "At quanta ilia quaeso et quam multiplex etquam interminata discordia? Vidimus enim
quanquam nec omnes dissensiones collegisse fateamur, nec ips is in dissensionibus enarrandis
uno modo scribant authores, quam et magna est, et quam multiplex variarumque ambiguitatum foeta dissensio. Vidimus sectarum principes et consectaneos et in universum, et per
partes dissidisse." Ex. Van,. I, 20; pp. 533- 34. Similar passages can be found elsewhere
without difficulty. For example see the chapter titles of Book I (printed together pp. 467-68) .
39 Ibid., I, 3; pp. 487-88.
40 "Sed undenam hae manarunt discordiae [i .e. concerning the eternity of the world]?
Certe non ex Moyse aut duodecim Prophetis quod meminerim, nec quod sciam ex Evangelio; at ex philosoph is gentium prodiere praesertimque de Peripateticorum doctrina fluxere,
qui adeo locuti sunt ambigue, ut eorum ex dictis quisque propriam confirmare sententiam
sategerit." Ibid., I, I I; p. 503.
41 This is developed more fully in Book IV. See our chapter III, PP.73-74.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

47

disagreement on matters of religion. Heresy and error have entered

into the history of Christianity because of the adulteration of the
Scriptures with pagan learning or because through vanity some have
turned away from the truths of the faith.
We might ask how Gianfrancesco came to criticize secular learning
so vehemently. Even in the De Studio, his attitude was not quite so
negative toward learning as it appears in the Examen Vanitatis; and, in
the De Imaginatione (1500),42 he even treated a specific problem in
basically Aristotelian terms. He has become definitely more critical
toward non-Christian learning by the time the Examen Vanitatis was
completed.
Gianfrancesco gives us at least a partial answer to this in the preface
to Book III. 43 The Greek painter Apelles, our author narrates, when
he became angry because after repeated attempts he could not accurately paint the foam in a horse's mouth, hurled his sponge at the
painting. The resulting impression of the sponge left a most excellent
representation offoam.44 A similar thing happened to our author, he
averts, for he was long doubtful whether he should write down his
opinions on pagan philosophy, for he did not wish to be judged a
censorious person or one overbold. But, "stimulated by public utility
and the love of truth," he undertook the task. 45 Its completion, however, has taken a long time, for he has been forced to interrupt his work
many times.
But once our author has decided to put his views down on paper
and has been granted the leisure to do so, he does not waste much time
on peripheral matters, but turns immediately to the task at hand. In
doing so he must diverge from the intentions expressed by his beloved
and esteemed uncle, who had attempted to bring into concord the
divergent strands of the philosophical tradition. Regardless of what his
42
100.
43

On this work see our discussion below chapter III, p. 57 and chapter IV, pp. 97-

pp. 600-or.
This anecdote appears in several ancient writings. Pi co probably took it from Sextus
Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 12, 28-30; Sextus Empiricus, Loeb ed. by R. G. Bury
(Cambridge, Mass., 1933-49), I, pp. 18-21. All further page references to Sextus Empiricus
will be to this edition, unless otherwise noted. Sextus uses the story here in much the same
way as Pi co uses it.
45 After relating the story of ApelIes, out author continues, "Ita mihi magna ex parte in re
dissimili contigisset si dicerem, iure fortassis non cui parer, quanquam non casui quod sum
dicturus, sed et certis causis et divinae demum providentiae acceptum referri yolo. Fueram
ego diu animi dubius si quae de philosophia gentium concepissem, an chartis committere
deberem et aliis legendum tradere. Movebant me hinc inde multa, et quod non defuturos
zoilos arbitrarer, et quod audacius factum qui carperent suboriri muitos, coniectura plusquam mediocri deprehendebam. Sed stimulabar et publica utili tate et amore veri tat is urgebar, quae caeteris propendere proculdubio fas est." Ex. Van., III, prooem.; p. 600.
44

48

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

uncle had tried to do, Gianfrancesco sees it as incumbent on himself to

point out the wide divergence of philosophical traditions. And, more
important, he sees it as his task to demonstrate that Christianity is
unique, having little if any resemblance to other religions and philosophical systems.
In the interpretation [of philosophy] there are diverse sects, diverse leaders,
although there was Giovanni Pico, brother of my father Galeotto. He, by
his genius, memory, indefatigable study, his singular learning, his preeminent
eloquence in writing of the highest things, has gained the wonder and admiration of the men of our time. Whereas it has been believed that this could be
accomplished by others more than it has been proven, he promised (and
would have carried out his promise) to reconcile the teachings of Aristotle
and Plato. But this task has been believed by many to be most difficult, even
to the present day, and by some even to be beyond the grasp of human
ability. It occurs to me, however, that is is more proper and more useful to
render the teachings of the philosophers uncertain than to reconcile them as
my uncle wished to do. For, I prefer to follow in this matter those ancient
theologians of our faith who held that some action must be taken against the
pagan philosophers and that their teachings must be demolished. This I
prefer to philosophizing from pagan teachings, as some who have cultivated
doctrinal studies in later centuries have done; although, of these later thinkers there are some who have agreed with the teachings of the earlier theologians. 46
This statement is clear enough. Not only did Gianfrancesco, like
ApeHes, finally decide to give up in his quest to do the impossible (i.e.
to reconcile the philosophies of the gentes with one another and with
Christianity), but he decided to act in direct opposition to the program
of his eminent uncle. The attempt of the Concordia of Giovanni is cast
aside and the polemical outlook of the Adversus Astrologiam and the
pietistic view of the letter of which we have spoken above become
central directives for Gianfrancesco's endeavors. Besides his uncle's
later views and the tradition which Savonarola sums up, the other
46 ~' . . .

in quo interpretando divcrsae sectae, diversi duces, quanquam extitit Ioannes

Picus Galeotti patris mei frater, qui et ingenio et memoria et indefesso studio et doctrina
singulari et praecellenti inter scribendum de rebus maximis facundia, nostri temporis hominibus et admirationi fuit et stupori. Hic quod ab aliis fieri posse creditum est magis quam
probatum et pollicitus fuerat et servasset, hoc est, Aristotelis et Platonis dogmata conciliare,
quod negocium ad praesentem usque diem multis difficillimum, nonnullis etiam supra humani captum ingenii creditur esse. Mihi autem venit in mentem consentaneum magis esse et
utile magis incerta reddere philosophorum dogmata, quam conciliare, ut patruus volebat.
Sequi enim in hac re malo antiquos illos ex nostra fide theologos qui in gentium philosophos
potius agendum duxere et eorum excindenda dogmata, quam ipsorum ex dogmatis philosophari nonnullorum more, qui seculis posterioribus doctrinae studia percoluerunt, quanquam
et inter hos fuerunt, qui priori bus illis accesserint." Ibid., I, 2; p. 486. Also see Our chapter
III, pp. 61-62 for a similar statement and Charles B. Schmitt, "Gianfrancesco Pico's Attitude toward his Uncle," in L'opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola ... , II, pp. 305-

13

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

49

major source from which the younger Pico drew inspiration was the
writings of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus' works, as they have come down
to us, form the basis of our knowledge of ancient scepticism. They are
largely a compilation of the various teachings and opinions of the
sceptical schools from the time of Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 360-275 B.C.),
the originator of the movement, to the time of Sextus himself (ca.
I60-2IO A. D.); Sextus adds little new material to the tradition but
from all indications transmits accurately what went before him.47
Gianfrancesco Pico seems to be the first to have given serious consideration to Sextus' writings after the end of Greek philosophy. 48
Precisely from which manuscript Pi co studied the works of Sextus is a
question that we have not yet been able to resolve. He says several
times, however, that he does not know of a translation of Sextus. 49
Regardless of what his source was, Pico came to have quite an extensive knowledge of Sextus' compilation of ancient scepticism from
whom he quotes often, and whose teachings he discusses at length and
applies to the philosophical questions which he considers. 50 In fact, of
the six books of the Examen Vanitatis, only the last shows little influence from scepticism. Books I, II, and III are predominantly devoted
to reproducing Sextus' arguments against the various ancient sects of
philosophy. Books IV and V apply the sceptical doubts concerning the
validity of philosophical knowledge to the system of Aristotle.
47 On ancient scepticism see Raoul Richter, Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie (Leipzig,
1904), vol. I; Victor Brochard, Les sceptiques grecs, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1923); Leon Robin, Pyrrhon
et Ie scepticisme grec (Paris, 1944) ; Mario dal Pra, Lo scetticismo greco (Milan, 1940).
48 For a brief discussion of the revival of scepticism during the Renaissance and the knowledge of it during the Middle Ages see below our chapter VI, pp. 160-61, 167. References for
further details will be found in the notes to these pages.
49 For example, Ex. Van., I; 10; p. 500 " . . . uti ex Sexto philosopho et Theodorito ... et
quoniam libri horum authorum omnibus noti, quia in Latinam linguam nunquam fuere
(quod sciam) conversi, sed et Graeca quoque illorum exemplaria rarissima haberentur."
There are but two extant Latin translations that it seems likely that Pico may have seen and
both are fragmentary. The first is Venezia, Biblioteca Marciana, Lat. X. 267 (3460). This
manuscript contains substantial parts of the three books ofthe Outlines of Pyrrhonism and very
brief extracts from certain of the other works (usually only a page or two). The second manuscript is Vaticano latino, 2990. This translation is attributed to Giovanni Lorenzi of Venice
(15th century) and contains the six books Against the Professors. For further information on
the manuscripts of the writings of Sextus Empirius see note 28 p . 167 in our chapter VI below.
50 In Ex. Van., I, 2; p. 485 he says, "Decem et ego Sexti sceptici libros perlegi, qui etiam
empirica scripsit monumenta, idemque dictus empiricus." Just what these ten books are we
do not know. He mentions the Outlines of Pyrrhonism often (II, 21, p. 560; III, 1 I, p . 642, etc.),
but also speaks of the Contra Logicos (II, 34, p . 588; II, 35, p. 59 I), the Contra Physicos (III, 7,
p. 624; III, 1 I, p. 642; III, 12, p. 642), the Contra Arithmeticos (III, 7, p. 624), and the Contra
Ethicos (III, 13, p. 648). The extant writings of Sextus include the following: Outlines of
Pyrrhonism (3 books); Against the Dogmatists (5 books comprising: Against the Logicians, in 2
books; Against the Physicists, in 2 books; and Against the Ethicists, in one book); and Against the
Prrifessors (6 books dealing with grammarians, rhetoricians, geometers, arithmeticians,
astrologers, and musicians).

50

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

These latter two books we will discuss in detail below when we consider the critique of Aristotle. The first three books of the Examen Vanitatis closely follow the arguments of Sextus himself. Groups of thinkers
such as the logicians, astrologers, mathematicians, and grammarians
are criticized along the same lines as those set out by Sextus. Often
Pico follows the Outlines of Pyrrhonism nearly word for word, translating
some passages directly from the Greek and incorporating them into
the text of the Examen Vanitatis. 51 But along with this he adds other
material derived from the experiences of himself and others 52 or from
the writings of other authors, ancient or modern. 53
In addition to the critique of the arts and sciences and of the various
philosophical schools, which he draws from Sextus, our author also
carefully considers what the Empiricist had to say about the all important question of the criterion by which a judgment can be made.
Book II of the Examen Vanitatis is completely devoted to a discussion of
the criterion and of the sceptic "modes," which essentially are arguments evoked to show that a reliable criterion or standard by which
knowledge is to be judged as true or false does not exist. As we shall see,
Pico's emphasis on this doctrine is not without purpose, for it will be a
major rallying point when he undertakes to discredit Aristotelian
science in Book V. Since our author's treatment of these questions is
important, not only for understanding his own philosophical position,
but also for understanding the nature of his arguments against the
Aristotelians, we shall consider what he says in some detail.
Gianfrancesco begins Book II by considering the problem of the
criterion. The word itself, which in Greek is XPL't"~pLOV, is carefully
considered. It must not be translated merely as judgment, Pico insists,
51 As he specifically says in Ex. Van., II, 21; p. 560, "Scepticos apud antiquiores, decem
sive modi sive loci sive typi, ad assensum cohibendum custodiebantur, de quibus mentionem
facit in Pyrrhone Diogenes, sed nec explicat eos, nec eo utitur ordine quo Sextus in primo
1tUPPCilVLWV UltOTUltWOECilV quem nos magna ex parte, quantum ad hoc praesertim attinet,
secuti et ex Graecis ipsius libris transferemus; et aliis ex authoribus addemus, quae opportuna
et consentanea rei, de qua agimus, videbuntur." As examples of how closely he follows the
Greek text of Sextus at certain places compare the following: Ex. Van., II, 21 ; p. 560 and
Out. of Pyrr., I, 14, 36-39; vol. I, pp. 24-27; or Ex. Van., II, 22, p. 560-64 and Out. of Pyrr.,
I, 14,40- 58; vol. I, pp. 26-37. See our comparison in Appendix B.
52 See Ex. Van., II, 23; p. 565, where he speaks of several examples drawn from his own
experience, which show the variability of the temperaments and senses. Also interesting is
pp. 566-67 where he discusses the differences of the people of the New World as compared
with Europeans. On Pico's early discussion of the Spanish discoveries see Adolf Schill,
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola und die Entdeckung Amerikas (Berlin, 1929) and Margaret
Munsterberg, "Early Allusion to America," Boston Public Library Qarterly III (1951), pp.
165-67.
53 For example in II, 22, pp. 560-64, which is almost completely derived from Sextus (see
note 51). But, along with the examples which are copied from Sextus, others are included
from Pliny (p. 562) and Jacopo da ForU (p. 563).

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

51

for it is the instrument ofjudging rather than the judgment itself. Thus
it is best translated as iudicatorium, in the same way as the Scholastics
have used the term sensorium to refer to the instrument of sensing.
Therefore, whenever we speak of this (i.e. of the instrument ofjudging)
we use the term iudicatorium to refer to it, for by it is understood that
by which something is judged; and, furthermore, it can also mean the
locus by which an argument or disagreement is resolved. 54
Our author then follows very closely what Sextus said regarding the
criterion, presenting his arguments in what amounts to a direct translation from the Outlines of Pyrrhonism,55 although he does add a few
embellishments of his own. There are basically three types of criteria:
(I) anything which is used in perception, as the senses, (2) anything
which grasps or measures something by use of an art, e.g. a ruler or
compass, and (3) anything which brings us to a clearer cognition of
something, i.e. the rational standards 56 or criteria which the dogmatic
philosophers use. This latter can in turn be divided into three classes.
These are the agent, the instrument, and the "according to which."
The first of these, "agent," is, for example, man; the second, "instrument," is the mind or sense which is the instrument of judgment; the
third, "according to which" is the phantasia or imagination, by which
man is brought to pronounce his judgment. 57
Gianfrancesco goes on for many pages, basically repeating the arguments given by Sextus, but also adding additional arguments, to show
that the ancient philosophers' various attempts to find a stable criterion for the discovery of truth were unsuccessful. The pre-Socratics,
Plato and his school, the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, the Epicureans,
Aristotle and the Peripatetics have all failed to overcome the obstacles
which the Sceptics introduced. He, therefore, concludes that the philosophers have not yet found a reliable criterion of truth upon which
judgments can be based.
Although such a criticism takes away the foundation on which the
54 "Occurrit autem primo veritatis )(f'~T~f'~OV quod dicitur a Graecis, cuius vice iudicatorium transferimus potius quam iudicium, verbum reddentes verbo. Ut enim Peripatetici

Latini aesthitirion apud Aristotelem, transferunt sensorium et etiam instrumentum sentiendi;

ita et criterion, iudicatorium vertamus, et instrumentum iudicandi sive locum iudicii.

Quare semper cum de criterio erit mentio iudicatorii utemur nomine et instrumentum quo fit
aliquod iudicium dabitur intelligi et etiam locus quoque modo, in quo causa sive lis iudicatur." Ex. Van., II, 1; p. 537. For a comparison of Pico's translation of this term with those
used in the earliest printed translations of Sextus, see our discussion below in chapter VI,
pp. 168-70.
55 II, 3, 14-17; ed. cit., I, pp. 160-63.
56 Called by Sextus TO AOY~)(OV )(f'~~f'wv, by Pi co rationale iudicatorium.
57 Besides II, 1; pp. 537-38 see II, 20; p. 558 where Pico describes the three rational criteria in greater detail.

52

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

various philosophical schools base themselves, Pico argues, it does

nothing whatever to damage the principles upon which the Christian religion is based. These principles upon which Christianity is based do not
depend on man or on his sense, imagination, or inventiveness, but on
divine revelation. They are not established by the materials of sense experience, but by the light of faith and by miracles, which neither the
sceptical critique nor any other critique can touch. Such is the strength
of the divine truth and of the Christian doctrine that human arguments can in no way affect them. On the other hand, the pagan
philosophies which are mere human inventions, can be completely
demolished by such a critique. 58
Here is one of our author's clearest statements of his philosophical
orientation. 59 The traditions of the different philosophical schools do
not offer truth, for all of their systems are susceptible to the criticisms
given by the sceptics, which demolish the very basis of rational human
knowledge. The Christian religion, by virtue of the fact that it is not a
human, but a divine philosophy, rises above these criticisms and stands
firm against the man-made arguments.
After his ample discussion of the criterion, our author turns to a
lengthy treatment of the "modes" or loci by which the sceptics suspend
judgment. 6o These he treats in largely the same terms as they were
dealt with by Sextus, but again introduces some material from other
sources. Certain of these modes, such as the first and second, which
deal with the wide variety of characteristics found in different animals
and in different men, playa central role in his critique of Aristotle. 61
58 "Neque enim nostrae principia fidei pendent ab homine, sed ab ipso Deo, nec sensu
habentur aut phantasia aut humana inventione, sed revelatione divina; nec experimentis
artium sensibilibus, sed fidei lumine stabiliuntur et prodigiis atque miraculis, in quae nec
argumentari valide possent, aut Pyrrhon aut Sextus aut quivis alius philosophorum, quantovis ingenio, quantavis copia literarum. Tanta enim divinae veritatis vis, ut quaecunque in
eam oppugnandam parentur arm a retundantur atque resiliant, quare non ad nostram doctrinam, hoc est, Christianam, quae praestantior et modis omnibus sublimior est, sed ad
gentium philosophiam quae humanitus inventa est vel demoliendam vel infirmandam,
Sceptica consideratio potest conducere, quorum finis erat ex suspensione iudicii nullo pac to
perturbari." Ex. Van ., II, 20; p. 559.
59 Clear also are the opening words of chapter 37 of Book II, p. 597, "Sine lite autem sacrae utriusque divini testamenti literae, ex quibus nos tram, id est, Christianam disciplinam
petimus, ubi sine dissensione veritas, sine vago et anxio discursu et unius Dei cognitio et
plurium abdicatae superstitiones deorum et vana pugnantiaque quibus ad felicitatem existimabant Philosophi iter patere, dogmata refutata."
60 Ibid., II, 21-31; pp. 560- 78; cf. Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 14-16,36- 179; vol. I, pp. 24103.

61 See Ibid., II, 22-23; pp. 560-67 and compare it with his critique of Aristotle based on
the variability of sense experience which is found at V, 2-3; pp. 695- 707. Also see our discussion of this in chapter IV, pp. 86-96. For the proximity of Pi co's presentation to the original
of Sextus, see above note 51 and Appendix B.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PHILOSOPHY

53

In his discussion of these things in Book II Pi co directs little attention

toward the shortcomings of Aristotelian epistemology, but largely
concentrates on presenting to his readers a faithful statement of Sextus
Empiricus' arguments. We have seen that our author leans heavily on
Sextus' writings in his attempt to destroy the validity of the various
philosophical systems. From his considerations, Pi co has concluded that
the lack of reliability found in the pagan literature makes Christianity
stand out all the more obviously as the unique source of sincera veritas.
But, what, we might ask, was Pico's own opinion of Sextus and the
sceptical philosophy? Did it have any other merit than that of serving
the purely pragmatic function of reducing all non-Christian sources of
knowledge to a hopeless mass of confused inconsistencies? He certainly
does not seem to be willing to call himself a sceptic. On the other hand,
however, he does not attack and abuse the sceptics with the same
vehemence as he does certain other ancient schools of philosophy. The
statement which comes closest to representing a more or less definitive
attitude toward the Sceptics is the following:
Even if in many things I certainly do not approve of the sceptic philosophers,
nevertheless, I do not disapprove of them up to a certain point; that is, up to
the point that they diminish the arrogance of those who declare that they
know and are in possession of all or at least most things ... The sceptics
refute those other philosophers who declare that they know something by
virtue of human philosophy.62
The Christian then should not particularly admire or follow the
example of the sceptics. Still, to destroy the arguments of the other
schools of philosophy by the sceptics' arguments can be useful. It gives
one a starting point from which to begin the erection of an edifice of
sincera veritas based on the Christian Scriptures. Basically, Pi co subscribes to the fides quaerens intellectum formula of the Middle Ages and
considers the mistake of the pagan philosophers to lie in the fact that
they took their starting point in intellectus rather than fides. For him, the
sceptic critique of philosophy has shown conclusively that the former
cannot be a legitimate starting point, and, in writing the Examen Vanitatis, he hopes to convince his fellow Christians of this fact, So, in the
final analysis, the sceptics furnish a useful method that is applicable to
the conditions of his own time and for that reason he has studied it
62 "Quos quid em Philosophos Scepticos tametsi in plerisque non probo, eatenus tamen non
improbo, quatenus corum qui vel omnia vel plurima scire se tenereque profitebantur, arrogantiam obtunderent ... Improbant alios philosophos sceptici, qui scire quicquam profitentur vi humanae philosophiae." Ex. Van., III, 14, p. 654.

54

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOW A RD PHILOSOPHY

carefully and given it extended consideration in his work. To go beyond

this and to say that Pi co attempted to revive scepticism as an end in
itself would be incorrect. It is merely an instrument to be used in the
demonstration that the unique source of truth is found in Christianity
and beyond this function it is of no interest to him.
(5) Conclusion

After making the distinction early in his career between human and
divine philosophy, our author's more mature thought was given over
to a further contrasting of the two and to an attempt to demonstrate
that only divine philosophy is in possession of a legitimate criterion for
determining the truth. The contrast between the human and divine is
rooted perhaps ultimately in the writings of the Fathers, but was
transmitted to Gianfrancesco from the more proximate sources of
Girolamo Savonarola and from certain aspects of his uncle's later
thought. The contrast between the two types of philosophY became
more clear when a means of actually demonstrating the inept nature of
human philosophy came into his possession. The instrument by which
this became possible was the sceptical critique of all knowledge as
transmitted in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. By the skillful manipulation of this tool, Gianfrancesco Pico was able to demonstrate to his
own satisfaction that the foundation of human philosophy rests necessarily on the shifting sands of human intellect, imagination, and sense.
This done, he can reassert with renewed assurance that "praebent ...
Sacrae literae multo firmius quam Peripatetici aut alii ex Dogmaticis
Philosophis sua proloquia." 63 But, because the predominant philosophical tendency which Pi co saw around him was that of Aristotelianism, he felt compelled to make a special effort to show in a detailed way that this philosophy could not provide the same degree of
certitude as could the Christian faith. It is with this aspect of his critique, which covers the last three books of the Examen Vanitatis, that
we are here particularly concerned.

63

Ibid., III, 14; p. 654.

CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

Ego Aristotelem summo ingenio, doctrina, eloquentia, rerum peritia, prudentiaque et, ut semel dicam summum hominem, sed hominem tamen,
fuisse puto.
Rudolph Agricola, De inventione dialectica, book I, chapter 3.

(I) The Historical Context of Pico' s Critique

Gianfrancesco Pico is certainly not the first western philosopher to
attack Aristotle. The long history of anti-Aristotelianism has yet to be
written. Pico, as we might expect, draws extensively from his predecessors' criticisms of peripatetic philosophy. What must be considered
significant about his long attack, however, is that it seems to be more
comprehensive by far than any of the earlier anti-Aristotelian criticisms. Pico does not merely attack Aristotelian doctrine from a sceptic,
Platonic, or Stoic point of view, nor merely from rhetorical-humanist
considerations, nor only from the aspect of its incompatibility with
Christian teaching, but combines all of these. The result is that Pico
gives us an exhaustive compendium of anti-Aristotelian lore in the
second half of his Examen Vanitatis.
Gianfrancesco Pico focuses his critique, as we shall see, on the
basically doubtful character of all forms of natural knowledge. In
large part, Pico's questioning of all knowledge not explicitly contained
in the Scriptures derives from his reading of Sextus Empiricus; but
this is not the only source from which our author drew. The critique
extends much further than Pyrrhonic uncertainty. Along with his
utilization of the then nearly unknown arguments of ancient scepticism,
Gianfrancesco also extensively criticizes Aristotelian natural philosophy, primarily by introducing arguments from the writings of Hasdai
Crescas and John Philoponus, other writers virtually unknown to
European philosophers before Pico's discussion of their ideas. He also

56

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

owed much to Cusanus' "learned ignorance" and other aspects of

northern mysticism as well as to Savonarola's Italian brand of antiintellectualism. Various Scholastic currents such as Henry of Ghent's 1
careful consideration of the problems connected with obtaining a sincera veritas impressed him as did Valla's and others' critiques of
Scholastic logic. He gained something, too, from certain of the objections raised against Aristotle's philosophy by the Peripatetics themselves and from the medieval Christian criticism of Bonaventure and
others.
Pico's rejection of Aristotle stands at the threshold of the real
struggle. 2 In the course of the century and a half after the publication
of the Examen Vanitatis many were the polemics between Aristotle's
defenders and his detractors. Nearly all aspects of the Aristotelian
canon were called into question. The struggle cut across the lines of the
intellectual disciplines: Humanism was pitted against Scholasticism,
scepticism against dogmatism, the "new science" against the old,
Catholicism against Protestantism, medicine against philosophy. In all
of these controversies, and still others, the authority of Aristotle and
the validity of his philosophy were the points at issue. Aristotle's cosmology was questioned by Copernicus, his physics by Galileo, his logic
by Ramus. Philosophical thought gradually turned from his inspiration
and a new era was hailed by Bacon and Descartes. But even then the
controversy was not dead. Indeed, until the end of the seventeenth
century and later, Aristotle's philosophy continued as an important
influence in European thought. 3
(2) The Orientation if Pica's Critique
Pico's extended critique of Aristotle, which occupies the last three
books of the Examen Vanitatis, is divided into three major parts. Book
IV is a general attack on Aristotelian philosophy (i.e. specific doctrines
1 On Henry of Ghent see Charles B. Schmitt, "Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination," Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), pp. 231-58.
2 Here we can mention only several of the more prominent examples of later attacks on
Aristotelian philosophy. Among them are Petrus Ramus' (1515-72) Aristotelicae Animadversiones, first printed in 1543 and often reprinted thereafter; Francesco Patrizi's (1529-97)
Discussiones Peripateticae, printed, 1571-81, and Pierre Gassendi's (1592-1655) Exercitationes
Paradoxicae Adversus Aristoteleos, first printed in 1624.
3 The tradition in Germany has been studied by Peter Petersen, Geschichte der Aristotelischen
Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1921); Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des [7. Jahrhunderts (Tuebingen, 1939); idem, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter deT
Aujklaerung (Tuebingen, 1945). See also the general observations in William F. Edwards,
"The Logic ofIacopo Zabarella (1533-1589)", (Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University,
1960 ), pp. 323-53.

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

57

are not attacked so much as certain confusions and problems which

surround the works). Book V is more specific. It attempts to invalidate
Aristotle's theory of scientific demonstration. Finally, in Book VI, Pico
criticizes specific errors of which he feels Aristotle has been guilty.
In the preface and first two chapters of Book IV, our author outlines
his program. Aristotle's doctrines cannot be accepted as they stand.
Certain of his followers have done this and have fallen into error,4 Pico
argues. If they are to be accepted at all, the Aristotelian writings must
be subjected to a careful and critical evaluation. They must always be
accepted or rejected on the basis of the truth-value which they contain.
Therefore, I, who do not deny having learned many things from Aristotle
and having gone through his books for about twenty years for the sake of
coming to knowledge of the truth, should like to obtain the pardon of those
who are now in our Church and who love and praise Aristotle too much; if
I assert that his teaching, placed on a balance, as it were, and subjected to
examination, does not have the weight which many judge it to have. If I
show it is deprived of the end of philosophy, is uncertain and in many places
false, may they excuse me and ascribe it rather to my love of truth and
worship of piety.5

Pico restates his love of truth several times, emphasizing that he

accepts Aristotle's teachings when they are true, but rejects them when
they are false. He cites instances when he has done this. For example,
in the short treatise On the Imagination,6 the Aristotelian position is
generally followed. 7 What our author objects to, is not the acceptance
4 "Vitia vera illius quae circumferri solent, alii non admittunt, alii quoquomodo possunt
extenuare conantur," is how Pico expresses it. Ex. Van., IV, prooem.; p. 657.
5 "Propterea illud ego ab Aristotelis nimiis amatoribus et laudatoribus qui nunc in ecclesia
nostra vivunt libenter impetrarem, ut me qui ab Aristotele multa didicisse et viginti circiter
annos eius volumina comperiendae gratia veritatis versasse non diffiteor, si eius doctrinam
quasi libra appensam et diutius in examine versatam, non id habere ponderis quod pieri que
existimarunt assevero, si frustrari fine Philosophiae, si incertam, si plerisq ue in locis falsam
monstravero, pariter excusent, potiusque id amori ascribant veritatis et pietatis cultui."
Ibid., pp. 657-58.
6 This work was printed in a separate edition at Venice in 1501 by Aldus. An earlier
edition at Rome (1500) is mentioned by Hain (1304) and other bibliographers, but neither
Professor Caplan nor I have found a copy still in existence. The De Imaginatione is one of the
few of Pico's works to appear in a modern edition. See Harry Caplan, Gianfrancesco Pico della
Mirandola On the Imagination (New Haven, 1930). This is accompanied by a valuable introduction, notes, and an English translation by Professor Caplan. See our further remarks on
this work in the next chapter.
7 In fact Aristotle is highly praised in several places in this work. For example, Aristotle's
brilliant speculations on the imagination are praised and he is said to be the first to distinguish clearly imagination from sense, opinion, and the intellectual powers of the soul. " ...
Aristoteles qui que eum secuti ... , exquisitissimis speculationibus decernentes differre imaginationem a sensu opinioneque, atque ab intellectualis animae potestatibus, utpote quae
propriam in animali sedem propriasque functiones sortiatur." Caplan, op. cit., p. 26. Aristotle is also generally defended against his interpreters, Alexander and Averroes, in Pico's
Digressio de immortalitate animae, completed by 1514 and published in 1523.

58

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

of whatever truth there might be in Aristotle, but the blind acceptance

of Aristotle's philosophical teachings without further investigation. This
latter position is attributed to certain of Aristotle's followers;8 but,
such a position must be avoided, Pico argues, for we must always
measure a philosophy by the truth which it contains.
Nothing has been more important to me than truth, which should be of
greater importance for everyone than other things. I stand prepared not only
to write against the works of Aristotle, but against my own as well, if I should
ever find them to be in error. Am I greater than Augustine who retracted
and corrected his writings which were already published? 9 . . . Or greater
than Giovanni Pico 10 my own uncle ... ? 11
Even if he has elsewhere praised Aristotle or defended his teachings
as being true, Pico asserts that he must here say that Aristotle's doctrine
is not certain, but only probable. It is not wholly true, but in some
parts false, not supported by religion, but weakened by superstition.
Although Aristotle was perhaps the greatest of the pagan philosophers,
he did not know the true religion.1 2 Furthermore, Aristotle was vain: 13
"I do not deny that there is much erudition in Aristotle, much elegance
in his writings, perhaps even much truth, but certainly not a small
amount of vanity ... "14 Gianfrancesco goes on to say that the Greek
8 What Pico is objecting to is perhaps best described by the following remarks, " ... quia
vel ita sese res habere videretur, ut ipse decreverat, vel quia tanta ferebatur eius authoritas,
ut disquirendum eius de veri tate doctrinae in sese non succurreret, neque enim philosophum
sed philosophiae legem plerique omnes arbitrabantur." Ex. Van., IV, prooem.; p. 658.
9 A recent and extensive discussion of the Retraetiones is in Gustave Bardy's introduction
to the edition, Oeuvres de Saint Augustine, 1st ser., vol. xii, Les Revisions (Paris, 1950), pp. 1-255.
Also see John Burnaby, "The 'Retractiones' of St. Augustine: Self-Criticism or Apologia?,"
Augustinus Magister: Congres international augustinien (Paris 2 1-24 septembre 1954), pp 85-92
for a discussion of the meaning of retraetalio, as Augustine used the term.
10 Giovanni Pico seems to have changed his position later in life, as we have tried to
indicate in the preceding chapter, pp. 32-34. On these last years see Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Pieo della Mirandola: vila e dottrina (Florence, 1937), pp. 37-48. Gianfransceso Pico's
Vita also emphasizes the change.
11 "Nihil enim apud me potius fuit quam veritas, quae maioris apud omnes momenti debet

esse quam caetera, pro qua non modo contra Aristotelem, sed contra mea opera scribere me

paratum profiteor, si quando me deerrasse deprehenderem. An ego maior Augustino? qui

retractavit et emendavit sua ipsius iam emissa scripta ... An loanne Pi co patruo maior?
Ex. Van., IV,prooem.; p. 658.
12 Ibid.; p. 659. " ... nam si laudavi alias aut defendi Aristotelem veri tate duce, non tamen
aut religiosam aut penitus certam aut omnino veram doctrinam eius asserui, sed innui
saepenumero et quandoque etiam subsignavi certam non esse, sed probabilem, non veram
omnino, sed aliqua ex parte falsam, non religione fultam, sed superstitione labefactam, utpote hominis et quanquam inter Gentes magni et forte maximi, hominis tamen, et verae lucis
verae religionis ignari."
13 See chapter II, p. 45.
14 Ex. Van., lV,prooem., p. 658. Also see p. 660 and p. 663 where Aristotle's different "vanities" are explained. For example, "Prima igitur haec vanitas, quoniam et malum fuit initium,
finis quoque malus, non vitae solum, sed ipsius doctrinae, quae ad bonum fin em syncere non
ducit; et intermedium quod docuit finis acquirendi non religio est, sed superstitio. Secundam

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

59

xe:v6cppwv, an appellation given the Stagirite by Theocritus of Chios,15

is even sharper in tone than the Latin word vanus.
Although Aristotle discovered certain significant truths by the use of
natural light, Pi co argues, perhaps the knowledge of these truths is not
original with him, but rather is derived from Plato and the Pythagoreans, who, in turn, learned them from Moses in Egypt. I6 Thus our
author again tries to argue that the Hebreo-Christian Scriptures are
the unique source of Truth. Aristotle's contribution lies, not so much
in the theoretical aspects of his philosophy, but in his extraordinary
attention to detail and exhaustive experiments (non tam doctrina, quam
eximia cura, ac diligentibus experimentis) which can be seen in the books on
natural science.!7
Pico outlines the method by which he intends to discredit Aristotle
as follows:
When we have shown that in the previous centuries there has not been such
a high esteem of Aristotle as now there is, we shall then show that his books
which are held in the highest esteem are uncertain; that is, it is not certain
whether or not we still have any book written by him. And even if this is
conceded ([hat we do actually have one of Aristotle's books), it is still not
clear that there is anything in these books which can be attributed to him
without controversy. And, then with regard to the teaching itself, even if it
is his and considered genuine and not forged and spurious, we will discredit
it by the authority of his followers, by his way of writing, by the perpetual
disagreement of his expositors, by the judgment of Christian Theologians of
great name, by the viciousness of his errors, by the fallacy of sense, and finally
by his own testimony.1 8
vanitatem monstrabimus, quoniam et si certa eius literarum monument a, quae ducentur in
controversiam, in eis tamen po\licetur certa, nee stat promissis, incerta videlicet et ambigua
comminiscens, idque authoritatibus compluribus et rationibus confirmatum iri volumus."
15 Ibid., p. 658. Theocritos of Chi os was a poet, contemporary with Aristotle. This quotation
is found, for example in Diogenes Laertius, V, I I (Loeb Edition, I, p. 454). On Theocritus in
general see Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopaedie, 2nd ser., vol. V (1934), cols. 2025-27.
16 The notion that Plato came in contact with the Scriptures has a long tradition. Numenius (ca. 150-200), a Christian Platonist or Pythagorean, emphasized the close connection
between Platonism and Christianity, calling Plato an "Attic-speaking Moses." This is cited
by several of the Fathers, including Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, I, 22, 150) and Eusebius (Praep. Evan., XI, 10, 14). It was often repeated in the Renaissance, e.g. by Giovanni
Pico (Heptaplus, praaem., in Garin ed., pp. 170-72) and Ficino (Thealagia Platonica, XV;
OPera (Basel, 1576), p. 394).
17 Ex. Van., IV, prooem., p. 659. Also see pp. 72-73 below.
18 "Quapropter ubi docuerimus non tantae prioribus saeculis fuisse quantae nunc est aestimationis Aristotelem, subinde aperiemus incertos esse ips ius libros, qui maximo habeantur in
precio, hoc est, non cons tare adhuc, an ullum habeamus librum ab eo compositum. Quod et
si concedatur, non liquere tamen aliquid esse eis in libris quod illi possit extra controversiam
attribui. Inde ad doctrinam ipsam etiamsi eius sit et habeatur legitima, non supposititia et
notha, infirmandam sumus progressuri, auctoritate sectatorum, scribendi modo, bello expositorum perpetuo, Christiano rum Theologorum magni nominis iudicio, errorum pernicie,
sensus fallacia, eius demum ipsius testimonio." Ex. Van., IV, I. p. 663.

60

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

This, in brief, is the procedure upon which Gianfrancesco Pico

embarks in Book IV of the Examen Vanitatis. At least partially, his critique consists in what might be called a "humanist" criticism of the
Aristotelian corpus, wherein the writings are criticized regarding their
style, clarity, and provenance. 19 Certain of these criticisms show Pico a
rather astute classical scholar, having the same aversion to barbarous
language and poor style as did the literary humanists. At the same time,
he has the profound desire to establish a correct text of the author he is
reading. 20 Other difficulties, which one encounters, are the seeming
contradictions and disagreements among Aristotle's followers and
commentators;21 the criticisms of the other schools ofphilosophy;22 the
criticisms of Christian theologians, ancient and modern;23 the philosophical errors of Aristotle ;24 the uncertainty of sense experience upon
which the Aristotelian philosophy is based;25 and, finally, the internal
uncertainties found in the writings themselves. 26
Before embarking on his detailed consideration of each of these
points, Gianfrancesco attempts to give a historical explanation for the
increasing dependence on Aristotle as a source of philosophical inspiration in Europe.27 The main lines of the Aristotelian tradition proceeded from the Greek to the Arab, and finally to the Latin world, he
argues. But, whereas in the past a number of schools of philosophy have
flourished and these were often more important than the Aristotelian,
these traditions have to a large extent now been obscured by Peripatetic
philosophy. It is further noted that the center of philosophy was at one

19 These criticisms are carried outin detail in chapters 4,5, and 7 of Book IV; pp. 668-74,
676-78.
20 As examples we can cite his concern for determining which works were actually written
by Aristotle and which ones by his commentators (IV, 4; pp. 668-72), his concern for
precision in translation (IV, 5; p. 674), or his concern with the textual variants in different
versions of the Metaphysics, i.e. of the Aldus edition and of a manuscript of the work in the
Library o[S. Marco in Florence (IV, 5; p. 673). See below, note 44, pp. 66-67
21 This criticism is expanded in chapter 6 and 8 of Book IV; pp. 675-76, 678-80.
22 This is considered in chapter 3, pp. 667-68.
23 Ancient Christian criticism is dealt with in chapter 9 (pp. 680-83) and later Christian
criticism is covered in chapter IO (pp. 683-85).
24 In chapter I I (pp. 685-87), but a much more detailed attack constitutes the greater part
of Book VI of the Examen Vanitatis.
25 In chapter 12 (pp. 687-89). This, however, is merely a summary of the material in Book
V, and to a certain extent of that in Books I, II, and III.
26 In chapter 13 (pp. 690-9 I). This criticism of course focuses on texts such as Nieomaehean
Ethier 1094b 11-28, where Aristotle admits that certain of his teachings must be considered as
only probable
27 " .. Unde nam tanta illi facta fuerit authoritatis accessio ... " Ex. Van., IV, 2; p. 664.
The summary we give here is based on pp. 664-66.

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

61

time in Spain 28 but has since shifted to Paris.29 Pico feels that the
Aristotelian movement has gained momentum from two principal
sources. First, there were the followers of Maimonides (whom Pico calls
Moses Aegyptius), who attempted to explain the Old Testament by
means of Aristotle's philosophy. This attempt, however, has been attacked by Hasdai Crescas,30 an author upon whom Pi co will depend
heavily in Book VI for his attack on Aristotelian physics. Secondly, the
high regard which Averroes and his followers had for the Aristotelian
works has been of great moment in promoting the spread of Peripatetic
philosophy. Particularly important, Pico holds, has been Averroes' vain
opinion (vana haec opinio) that error could not be found in Aristotle.
Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle are held in particularly high
esteem by those who have gone from Italy to France to philosophize,
according to Pico. There are some, however, he notes, who have turned
aside from these commentaries, Duns Scotus being cited as one example. 31 But, apart from a few such exceptions, it must be concluded
that the highly regarded name of Aristotle has persuaded Italy and is
influential also in France and Spain. There has been, however, a revival of interest in Plato during the pontificates of Eugenius IV (143147) and Nicholas V (1447-55), when Pletho, Bessarion, Nicholas of
Cusa, and, later, Ficino began to place Plato before Aristotle. There are
others as well who, although they esteem Plato less than Aristotle,
realize that the former is closer to Christianity. This, according to our
author is because Plato relied more on faith and less on reason than
did Aristotle.
On the relation of Plato to Aristotle, Gianfrancesco makes the following very clear statement of his own position:
28 This is presumably during the twelfth century when translators such as J oannes Hispalensis (fl. 1140), Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. 1151), and Gerard ofCremona (d. 1187) and
philosophers such as Averroes (1126-98) were active in Spain. For a brief summary see C.H.
Haskins, Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp.
3- 1 9.
29 A good general summary of the introduction of Aristotelianism into the West is found
in Martin Grabmann's article "Aristoteles im 12.Jahrhundert" in MillelaUerliches Geistesleben
(Munich, 1956), III, pp. 64-128. For the development of Aristotelianism, particularly at
Paris, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, trans. LeonardJohnston (Louvain,
1955) and idem, The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1955).
30 See Harry A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, :Mass., 1929). Crescas
will be discussed more fully in chapter V.
31 Pi co has in mind Opus Oxoniense, pro!., p. 3,q.2, text 136 (Ioannis Duns Scotus, OPera
Omnia (Vatican City, 1950f.), I, p. 93). Here Scotus turns aside from the method of Averroes
in favor of that of Avicenna in his attempt to prove the existence of God. See Etienne Gilson,
"Avicenne et Ie point de depart de Duns Scot," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litttraire du moyen
lige, II (1927), pp. 89-149.

62

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

Giovanni Pico, brother of my father Galeotto, as I have said in the First Book
had taken on himself the conciliation of the two philosophies of Plato and
Aristotle; and so great was the power and extent of his genius, so great was his
learning that, unless he had been prevented by death, easily (in my opinion)
the desire for this conciliation would no longer remain for those of the succeeding generations. I, however, to repeat what has already been indicated
in the first volume, have not attempted in the previous books to reconcile
the entire teaching of the gentes, but to invalidate it. However, in these
[books] which follow, we shall invalidate [the teachings] of Aristotle so that
following the example of the early theologians we may devote more study
hereafter to the Sacred Scriptures, so that the truth of these writings, through
human wisdom about the highest [things], might shine forth more and
more. 32
Here Gianfrancesco makes a very definite break with his uncle's attempt at a pax philosophica. Giovanni's dream of a reconciled Plato and
Aristotle is abandoned. Rather than attempting to show that all forms
of philosophical and theological knowledge share a common basis, the
younger Pi co returns to the attitude of suspicion which we find in
certain of the Church Fathers. There is a full scale de-emphasis of
philosophical knowledge and an exhortation to turn to Scripture rather
than to the writings of the philosophers for the discovery of the nature
of God. 33 With this objective in mind - a mind nourished already by
the humanist criticism of the Peripatetic philosophy and by the pietism
of Savonarola - Gianfrancesco sees in the dominance of Aristotle the
major obstacle to the realization of his purpose. Many Christians, he
argues, are devoting too much attention to the writings of Aristotle and
placing too much confidence in their reliability. Gianfrancesco feels
that it is his task to dissuade them from this by pointing out some of the
errors, uncertainties, and obscurities in the Aristotelian corpus. In reiterating what he has said before, he shows a certain optimism that his cry
may not go unheeded. Referring certainly to the revival of Platonism
mentioned above, he says, "There are some today who begin to open
their eyes and think that they should proceed to better things; and they
32 "Joannes Picus Galeotti patris frater quod primo dixi libro utranque se conciliaturum
philosophiam Platonis Aristotelisque receperat ac, ni morte praeventus fui~set, facile (ut arbitror) eius rei desiderium posteris non reliquisset, tanta erat illius ingenii vis atque dexteritas,
tanta doctrina. Ego vero, ut quae primo etiam sunt volumine indicata, repetam, non conciliare, sed infirmare universam gentium doctrinam tentavi libris superioribus, his autem qui
sequentur Aristoteleam, ut maius inde studium sacris literis possimus impartiri exemplo
veterum theologorum, ut earum quoque veritas literarum, humana sapientia de summo ...
magis, magisque resplendeat." Ex. Van., IV, 2; p. 666. See Chapter II, p. 48 and note 46.
33 This aspect of Pi co's thought is perhaps best expressed in his early work, De studio divinae
et humanae philosophiae, which was completed in 1496. See above pp. 37-43 and also the De
mOTte Christi in Opera, pp. 29-73.

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

63

do not think that Aristotle should be esteemed so much as was customary." 34 We should not take this to mean, however, that the younger
Pi co was a Platonist. H there is a certain sympathy for Plato in his
writings, it is because he saw in Plato a compatibility to religion which
he felt was absent in Aristotle. Still, there is much to which Pico objected in Plato. The bulk of Gianfrancesco's critique of "pagan philosophy" was directed toward Aristotle merely because the Peripatetic
philosophy was dominant in the West. Hit had been, through historical
accident, another of the non-Christian philosophies, his attack would
have been directed primarily toward that philosophy.
After his general introductory remarks, Gianfrancesco launches into
the tenfold attack on Aristotle. As we have said, many of his arguments
are not so much philosophical reasons as the sort of criticisms we might
expect from any of the contemporary humanists. But we shall see also,
that at least some of his arguments contain serious philosophical
criticisms of Aristotelian doctrine.

(3) Humanist Criticisms of Aristotle

These arguments occupy a central position in Book IV (chapters 4,
5, and 7), and many of them will be repeated later by other opponents
of Aristotle. Some, however, were already commonplace by Pico's time,
being drawn from earlier writers, and a few seem to be original with
him, or at least presented in a novel manner.
His first argument aims at cutting away any reliable basis for the
authority of Aristotle by casting doubt on the very authenticity of the
writings themselves. He contends that "it is doubtful whether we have
an original work of Aristotle's." As he says:
I do not know any book possessed by Aristotle which was one among his
own belongings. I do not speak sophistically or amphibolously, but of any
book which might be derived from Aristotle's own originals, written and
edited by him. The variety in treating and arranging the Aristotelian books
gives occasion for this doubt and uncertain feeling. 35
34 "Sunt et ad hanc diem nonnulli qui aperire oculos incipiant et ad meliora pergendum
arbitrentur; nec existiment Aristotelem tanti esse faciendum, quanti solebat." Ex. Van., IV,
2; p. 667. On Gianfrancesco's tendency to Platonism see below pp. 72-73 and Schmitt,
"Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico ... ", p. 257. On his disagreement
with Ficino and the Renaissance Platonists on magic and the interpretation of the prisca
theologia, however, see D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella
(London, 1958), pp. 146-47 and Frances A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition
(Chicago, 1964), pp. 157-58.
35 "Nec nunc Aristotelis librum ab Aristotele possessum et qui olim in eius bonis fuerit
intelligo, nec sophistice loquor, nixus amphibologia, sed librum, qui ab exemplaribus Aristotelis propriis, ab eoque compositis editisve, deduct us unquam fuerit. Dubitationi huic et

64

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

This seems to be a somewhat startling statement for a philosopher of

the early sixteenth century to make, especially when we compare it to a
remark of a modern student of the history of the Aristotelian text.
Richard Shute says, " ... we cannot assent with certainty that we have
ever got throughout a treatise in the exact words of Aristotle ... " 36
Pico cites an imposing array of evidence to cast doubt on the authenticity of the Aristotelian writings. Some authors, he begins, such as
Diogenes Laertius, list many works of Aristotle which we do not have;
whereas other works, which we do have, they fail to mention. 37 Further,
certain writings are attributed to Aristotle which some later writers do
not consider to be from his pen. Our author offers several explanations
for such uncertainties: (r) there were many Aristotles,38 (2) books were
later falsely attributed to him,39 (3) some of the Peripatetics have
imitated the works of Aristotle so well that these have later become
confused with the real works. Under this third conjecture, Pico is able
to cite several examples. For instance, he says that the Preface to
Themistius' Physics, as translated by Ermolao Barbaro, he has read
word for word in the Greek edition of Simplicius (at ego idem prooemium
ad verbum legi in Graeco Simplicio). Pico argues that either Simplicius
secretly stole this from Themistius or he said the same thing word for
word as Themistius, which is very unlikely.4o Pico's argument is not
incertae sententiae dedit occasionem varietas Aristotelicos libros tractandi et in ordinem
redigendi." Ibid., IV; 4, p. 669. Pico apparently was one of the first scholars of the Renaissance to question the legitimacy of Aristotle's writings. The history of this criticism in the
sixteenth century does not seem to have been studied in detail. For other examples see Ottaviano Ferrari, De sermonibus exoteric is (Venice, 1575) and Francesco Patrizi, Discussiones
peripateticae (Basel, 158 I) .
36 Richard Shute, On the History of the Process b)1 which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their
Present Form (Oxford, 1888), p. 176. For more recent discussions of the question see Felix
Grayeff, "The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle's Text," Phronesis, I (1955-56), pp. 105-22
and Josef Zuercher, Aristoteles' Werk und Geist (Paderborn, 1952). Zuercher, who concludes,
"Das Corpus Aristotelicum . .. , so wie es heute vorliegt, ist als Ganzes in dieser Form nicht
von Aristoteles geschrieben, sondern von Theophrast (p. (7) ," represents the extreme position on this still-debated matter.
3? Diogenes Laertius names over '50 works of Aristotle, V, 22-27 (Loeb edition, pp. 46475). Conspicuously absent from the list are such well known works as the Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, and De Anima.
38 Pico could have been led to this conjecture by Diogenes Laertius who mentions no
fewer than eight Aristotles. Ibid., V, 35 (Loeb edition, pp. 480-83).
39 This conjecture is attributed to Ammonius(?).
40 This story is related in Ex. Vall., IV, 4; p . 670. The problem arose because a number of
the manuscripts of Themistius' paraphrase of the Physics contained Simplicius' preface. See
the introduction by Henricus Schenkl to Themistius, III Aristote!is physica paraphrasis, CAG, V
(Berlin, 1905), p. XIX. When Ermolao Barbaro translated Themistius (1480), he included
the preface of Simplicius under the name of Themistius. See, for example, Themistius,
Libriparaphraseos ... (Venice, (502), fol. 18r. Pico may have been one of the first to recognize
the similarity. The editor of the edition Themistius, Paraphrasis in Aristotelis posteriora ...
(Venice, 1542) notes, however, "Non est Themistii prohoemium hoc quamvis illi id Hermolaus ascripserit, sed Simplicii sicuti illi facile cognoscere qui callent literas graecas (p. 49) ."

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

65

completely without point, for he is able to cite numerous similar examples from the Peripatetic School, and the bulk of such instances does
carry some weight. He concludes that it is most difficult to distinguish
the genuine Aristotelian texts from those written by his later followers:
It is difficult to distinguish by the style those books edited in the same century
by learned men who delight in writing in the same way; and it is more difficult when the disciples take great care to emulate the writing style of their
masters.41
Still greater confusion exists, he contends, from what happened
during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt (309-246). This
ruler, who was much interested in Aristotelian philosophy, offered a
reward to anyone who brought him a book of Aristotle for the famous
Alexandria Library. This, according to Gianfrancesco, led to widespread misrepresentation and forgery, thus confusing matters still
more. 42 With this evidence in view, Gianfrancesco concludes that it is
doubtful whether we have any works which are unquestionably from
Aristotle's pen.
We are then confronted with the situation in which the genuine
works (if, indeed, there are any) have been confused with the spurious
ones. It is a state of affairs roughly similar to the situation when we look
to our sense experience for reliable knowledge. In the same way as
(according to the sceptic) some sense experience is perhaps reliable but
other sense experience is unreliable, there are genuine writings of
Aristotle and spurious ones. And again, the old sceptic bugaboo of the
criterion rears its head to cast doubt on the whole of the Aristotelian
corpus, much in the same way as it renders doubtful all our natural
knowledge. Therefore, being faced with essentially the same problem
in each of the two cases, Pico's conclusions are similar. He follows
Sextus Empiricus and the other ancient sceptics in holding that there is
no reliable criterion by which to separate valid sense knowledge from
invalid and, consequently, all must be rejected as doubtful. Here a
similar conclusion is drawn. Although some of the writings of Aristotle
possibly survive, there are so many irregularities and inconsistencies
within the corpus as to make us doubt the whole, part and parcel. In the
41 " Difficile enim ex phrasi discern ere Iibros eodem editos seculo a viris doc tis, qui eodem
scribendi genere de1ectantur, difficiliusque cum discipuli magistrorum in scribendo stylum
aemulari et effingere magna cura contendunt." Ex. Van., IV, 4; p. 671.
42 Ibid., pp. 670-71. Most of the facts of Pica's account comes from Diogenes Laertius,
Strabo (Geography, XIII, I, 54), and Plutarch (Sulla, XXVI). For modern accounts see note
36. On the library at Alexandria see Edward A. Parsons, The Alexandrian Library (Amsterdam,

I957)

66

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

absence of a criterion by which we can separate the genuine from the

spurious, we must conclude that the whole is irremediably in doubt.
We have here an interesting application of Pico's theoretical scepticism to a more practical matter. It might be observed, however, that
his sceptical tendencies are not always quite so pronounced - even
leaving aside the matter of religious belief. When it suits his purpose,
he is content to be sceptical, but when it does not, he seems not to search
so carefully for justification of his views. This can easily be documented
by investigation of his position on certain other matters. For example,
he does not raise the same questions about the reliability of the texts of
other ancient writers, some of whose works have undergone the same
dubious history as has the Aristotelian corpus. Nor does he question the
numerous rather strange stories which he repeats rather uncritically
from Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and other ancient authors.
And, indeed, to these he adds a number of his own, often supposedly
drawn from the experiences of the citizens of his own Mirandola. If
these have a grain of truth, rvIirandola, at the time of his rule, must
have been a strange place indeed. 43
Aristotle's philosophy may have had a certain validity at some time
in the past, while the master still lived and his true writings were still
available, Pico continues. But, the intervening centuries have seen the
ruin of these works by mutilation, by the destruction of bookworms, of
damp and dew. In no case are the writings which have come down to
us under the name of Aristotle to be relied on. When the later collectors
and compilers of the Aristotelian works put together their editions,
there was a great deal of variation both in the order of the works and
the texts themselves. For example, the Arabic and Latin translations of
the Eleventh and Twelfth Books of the Metaphysics do not agree. Moreover, there are certain textual variations within the work, which can
be seen by simply comparing the different printed editions and manuscripts. 44 The same sort of criticism can be brought against a number
of the other individual works attributed to Aristotle.
43 See for example Examen Vanitatis II, 23 (p. 565) or for even a more extreme case see the
story told in Gianfrancesco's Strix (Bologna, 1523), fols. E 2- Fr. The latter is repeated in
summary form in Ioannis Wierii de praestigiis daemollum . " (Basel, 1583), col. 359. On Pico's
Strix and his relation to Wier see Charles B. Schmitt, "Who Read Gianfrancesco Pico della
Mirandola,"? Studies in the Renaissance, XI (1964) pp. 105- 32, at p. 116, esp. note 59 for
a rather startling example given by Pico.
44 His comments on the state of the Metaphysics are of some interest so we shall cite them
in extenso. "Accedit quod et aliis in voluminibus par, si non maior quando que dissonantia
reperitur. Metaphysicorum libri quantum ad undecimum et duodecimum pertinet, in
Arabicis et Latinis tralationibus non conveniunt; et pars duodecimi, ubi Pythagoraeorum
opinio, Homerico carmine de unitate principatus explosa cernitur, apud Graecos et Latinos

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

67

Much of the confusion and the difference between the various versions of the writings can be ascribed to the Latin and Arabic translations, which make the text even more obscure and doubtful than it is
in the Greek original. But, the translations can be corrected, whereas
the originals cannot. As he concludes:
But even if we should grant freely and through no external compulsion that
the Greek books of Aristotle are genuine and in them are preserved the true
Aristotelian meaning and the actual ideas of Aristotle's mind, when we come
to the Latin Aristotle, it is not Aristotle at all. I always except those books
which Theodore Gaza has translated from the Greek. And if I am silent of
the others, in that context which Averroes explained, in the translation from
Arabic into Latin, as many errors as words are to be beheld. You can see
how true an interpreter of Aristotle, Averroes, whom it has been customary
until now for the unskilled to praise, can or should be considered; and also
how much should be made of his testimony that has been placed in the preface of his exposition of natural philosophy. Not for I500 years has an error
of any importance been found in the Aristotelian writings, he claims. But he
[Averroes], who through his ignorance of the Greek language did not read
Aristotle's books, can give no judgment either of truth or falsehood; for he
has used the Arabic translations, full of lies, on which he wrote his commentaries. And, if perchance he did read these books, he did not read the books
of Aristotle, but those of Apellico Teius, of Tyrannico Grammaticus, and of
those who afterward adopted the name of Peripatetics to themselves. 45
extat, apud Averrois codicem non invenitur. Et quoad pertinet ad Graecos quintus liber
aliter sese habet in aliquibus antiquis ac in his qui sunt formis stanneis excusi Venetiis. Illud
quoque sit indico quod in Marciana Florentina biblioteca, extat codex vetustus satis, in quo
repetuntur quae in quinto dicta sunt, secus ac in aliis. Sed et Michael Ephesius in scholiis
in primum de partibus Animalium librum citat modos necessitatis varios ex quarto Metaphysico rum, quos tamen constat esse apud plerosque in quinto, non quarto libro collocatos;
et mirum hoc videri non debet iis qui Graecos Aristotelis codices ab Aldo Venetiis impressos
legerint, ubi numtXus librorum Metaphysicorum variatur omnis. Nam qui in Averrois
translatione et aliis plerisque secundus est liber, ibi primus habetur; et qui tertius secundi loco repositus atque ita deinceps multa varietas cernitur." Ex. Van., IV, 5; p. 673. On the
history of the text of the Metaphysics, see Franz Pelster, "Die griechisch-Iatein Metaphysikilbersetzungen des Mittelalters," Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des -'vIittelalters, Supplementband II (1923), pp. 89-118, and also Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaplrysics (2nd. ed., Toronto, 1963), esp. pp. 69-106.
45 "At qui, si gratis nulla prorsus extorquente ratione concedamus, Graecos Aristotelis
libros legitimos fuisse et legitima in eis Aristotelea sensa propriosque animi conceptus asservari; ad Latinum Aristotelem ubi venerimus, mirum quam ipse non erit Aristoteles. Libros
eos semper excipio, quos Theodorus Gaza convertit e Graeco. Atque ut de reliquis taceam in
eo contextu, quem exposuit Averrois de Arabico sermone in Latinum verso, tot pene errores,
quot verba spectantur. Vide quam versus possit aut debeat Aristotelis interpres haberi, qui
adeo ab imperitis celebrari solet Averrois; et quanti sit eius faciendum testimonium hoc ab
eo positum in prooemio expositionis in naturalem philosophiam; non esse a mille et quingentis annis inventum cuiusquam momenti errorem in Aristotelicis literarum monumentis;
cum nullum ipse ferre iudicium queat aut veritatis aut erroris, qui Aristotelis libros non legit
ob ignorationem Graecae linguae, Arabica usus translatione plena mendaciis, in qua et sua
commenta refudit; et si forte legit, Aristotelis libros non legit, sed Apelliconis Teii et Tyrannionis Grammatici et illorum qui inde sibi Peripateticum postea nomen arrogavere." Ibid.,
IV, 5; p. 674

68

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

(4) Criticisms of Aristotle by his School

After casting a veil of uncertainty over all the extant writings of

Aristotle, Pi co collects a number of specific instances where various
later authors, who are characterized as Aristotle's followers, disagreed
with their master. Gianfrancesco contends that "not only is Aristotle
sometimes attacked and held to be uncertain by his followers, but also
to be defective." 46 This argument will play an important role in Pico's
critique. Gianfrancesco considers it to be significant to point out that
what Aristotle said on any particular topic was not the last word on
that subject, but could reasonably be disagreed with. This is evident
from the way in which Pico approaches a number of problems throughout his critique. Besides his sceptical arguments against the Aristotelian
epistemology, he considers it equally important to point out any uncertainty in the mind of Aristotle himself which might have led to a
controversy among his followers. As it appears from reading the Examen
Vanitatis, Pico's opponents - imagined or real - were a group who
held the Aristotelian philosophy to be certain and complete. Thus, he
felt it his job to signal the aspects of Aristotelian teaching which were
not clear or were in error. One way in which he does this is to point to
the various Aristotelian doctrines which were questioned by the Peripatetics themselves.
Included in Gianfrancesco's examples offollowers and interpreters of
Aristotle who differed somewhat on the master's meaning or even went
so far as to disagree with him are Theophrastus, Andronicus of Rhodes,
Themistius, Porphyry, Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus,
Simplicius, Leo Magentinus,47 Olympiodorus, and Peter of Abano. In
considering this list, it should be noted that, while the names cited
cannot all be considered Aristotelians, they are not opponents of Aristotle either, but men who have taken a serious interest in the Aristotelian writings. Only Theophrastus, Andronicus, Themistius, Alexander, and Peter could be properly called "Aristotelians." Still the others
all wrote commentaries on one or more of Aristotle's works.48 The
46 "Nunc tantum ostendimus Aristotelem a sectatoribus quandoque vexatum et habitum
incertum, atque etiam mancum." Ibid., IV, 6; p. 675.
47 This is a fourteenth century Byzantine writer, whose commentary on the De Interpretatione was printed in Venice in 1503. He has not been studied very carefully, but is given
brief mention in Karl Krumbacher, Geschichte der Byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum
Ende des Ostroemische Reiches, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1897), p. 43I.
48 Porphyry (233/4-305)' the most important follower of Plotinus, is the author of the
famous Isagoge, a work discussing the Categories of Aristotle which became one of the standard
philosophical texts of the Early Middle Ages. John Philoponus, or Grammaticus (VI century), a prolific commentator on the Aristotelian writings, was one of the first Christians to

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

69

criticisms of the authors mentioned by Pico are not all large scale rejections of Aristotelian philosophy, but rather, for the most part, they
are disagreements on somewhat minor details or an admission that
some point of Aristotle's philosophy is not completely clear. Somewhat
more far reaching is Gianfrancesco's argument that there are not only
Platonists but also Peripatetics who hold that the study of "natural
things" is not to be considered science, but merely opinion. 49 Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this beyond mentioning several (commentators on Aristotle rather than "Aristotelians" in the strict sense)
who say that Aristotle's teaching is not precise on one or another
particular issue.
All things considered, this criticism is not carefully worked out and
the examples cited are not entirely convincing. Pico tries to make a
case for the position that there was a large scale disagreement among
the Aristotelian commentators. This may be true up a point, but it
must be kept in mind that they all found Aristotle's philosophy to be
predominantly to their liking and of a positive intellectual value or
they would never have commented on it in the first place. The divergence in opinion between the various members of the Aristotelian
school is certainly great; but, on the other hand, there is not the widespread disagreement over basic tenets of the system which Pico tries to
find there.

(5) The Obscurity of Aristotle's Style

Pi co next considers the question of the ambiguities of Aristotle's
writing style and its effects. The major part of this criticism is directed
toward the basic obscurity of the Greek text of the works which have
come down to us. Their literary merit is not considered to be of particular importance in this context, although Gianfrancesco Pi co has shown
some interest elsewhere in the question of literary style. 5o Our author
take a serious interest in Aristotle. Simplicius (VI century), a Neoplatonist in orientation,
wrote commentaries on De Caelo, the Physics, De Anima, and Categories. Olympiodorus (VI
century), another Neoplatonist, numbers among his works commentaries on the Categories
and Meteorology. Leo Magentinus (XIV century), bishop of Mytilene, wrote commentaries
on the De interpretatione and the Prior Analytics.
49 "Possem innumeros citare vel Platonicos philosophos vel aliis philosophorum sectis
addictos; at suspectos afferrem testes, qui affirmarent rerum naturalium cognition em (in qua
maxime laudatus AristoteIes) scientiam non esse, sed opinonem sive credulitatem seu mavis
opinativam rationem, sicut et cogitationem esse, mathematicam notitiam rerum, solaque
intellectilia quae ratione et intellectu concipiuntur scientiam parere, naturalia quae sensu et
ratione coniecturam. Sed et Peripatetici non desunt qui etiam res naturales sub sci entia
non claudunt." Ex. Van., IV, 6; p. 676. Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Leo r-.1agentinus, and
Peter of Abano are mentioned as disagreeing with Aristotle on this point.
50 For example in the famous letters On Imitation which he wrote to Pietro Bembo.

70

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

begins by referring to the many ancient philosophers who have condemned Aristotle for his style. It is not the literary form to which they
objected, he argues, citing Cicero and Justin Martyr who had high
praise for Aristotle as a writer. 51 Rather, they object to the lack of
clarity of the Stagirite's writings. As Pica will say, Aristotle has purposely written in an ambiguous style, for he himself was uncertain of the
true solution to a number of problems which he treated. As evidence of
this he refers to the frequent disputes which arose within the school
after Aristotle's death concerning various points of interpretation.
It is sufficient here to mention the ambiguous text of Book III of the
De Anima which deals with the famous question of the immortality of
the soul. Aristotle's view on this question has been debated from the
time of his earliest followers and commentators to the present day
without a final resolution of "what Aristotle really thought." According
to Pica, who mentions this and other examples, such disputes arise
from a genuine ambiguity and obscurity in the style of Aristotle. This is
attributable to several things. There was a real lack of care on Aristotle's part; Greek dialect words rather than pure Attic Greek ones are
often used; and, Aristotle wrote in a condensed and concise way, which
is not always free of ambiguity. Aristotle's works are not written in the
enigmatic fashion of the Pythagoreans, Gianfrancesco admits, but
rather have an external clarity and polish, which on closer investigation
turns out to belie their true abstruse and recondite character. 52 In a
particularly incisive passage Pi co cites the second-century Platonist Attic us 53 in support of his contention concerning the obscurity of the
meaning of some of Aristotle's writings. Atticus compared Aristotle to a
51 Cicero praises the literary and rhetorical style of Aristotle several times in his writings.
See for example De Oratore I, 11,49. However, Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle was primarily
though the more literary works, rather than through the numerous "esoteric" or "scientific"
writings which passed into the tradition in the later centuries and which form the bulk of the
Corpus Aristotelicum as we know it today. For a stylistic criticism similar to Pico's see Ludovicus
Vives, Opera (Basel, 1555), I, pp. 336-38, the work De causis corruptarum artium.
52 "Et sane consensu omnium fere veterum philosophorum damnatus olim fuit Aristotelis
scribendi modus; utpote qui ea quae ambigua minime viderentur, multis verbis pluribusque
argumentationibus prosequeretur. Quae autem multa egerent cura ut tractarentur et in
qui bus esset inter doctos aliqua disceptatio, ea paucis absoluerit; atque in hoc genere quaestionum eleganti quidem, sed concisa nimium verborum serie usus esset, nec Attica solum,
sed plusquam Laconica atque etiam plusquam Chilonica, ut Aristagorae Milesii verbo
utar: Quid enim brevius. Sed neque aenigmatibus, more Pythagoraeorum uti voluit, descivisset enim ab instituto. At verbis vel ambiguis in sese tametsi prima facie viderentur expositissima, vel artificiose adeo compositis concinnatisque disserebat, ut primori fronte ipsoque in
lectionis vestibulo pervia satis apparerent; ubi admitti volebas, excludebaris recondito sensu
et nimis quam abstruso, saepe quidem perplexo, semper nihilominus eleganti." Ex. Van., IV,
7; pp. 676-n
53 See]. Baudry, Atticos: Fragments (Paris, 1931).

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

71

cuttlefish "whose nature it is, that when fishermen seek to capture it,
the more it feels hands being laid upon itself, it dyes the water with
that ink of the blackest kind, which it has in itself by nature, and soon
eludes the eyes and hands of the fishermen." 54
In some of his works Aristotle spoke clearly enough and treated the
subjects adequately, Pico continues. This is said to be true of The
History of Animals, the Politics, and the Economics. 55 But, when Aristotle treated speculative philosophy, e.g. in the Physics, Metaphysics, and
De Anima, "he cut short, suspended, and truncated his opinions" and
did not always work out in detail what he promised to do. 56 He also
tended to rely on the opinions of others, which were often later judged
to be false. 57 Pico does not here suggest that Aristotle's works may be of
two types written for different occasions, one type more clearly expressed than the other. He is content to argue that the works in which
Aristotle was "observer" are clearer than those in which he was
"theorizer." Again Pico betrays a strong anti-theoretical bias. In his
own characteristic way, Gianfrancesco then expresses metaphorically
the same argument regarding Aristotle's obscure style. This time,
however, he adds a second comparison, that of the chameleon, which is
drawn from Aristotle's own work, On the Parts of Animals:
From all of these things [which have already been mentioned] insofar as
they pertain to his way of writing, it can be deduced that Aristotle's teaching
is uncertain and obscure like the cuttlefish, speading forth its inky fluid, and
even resembling the changing colors of the chameleon. 58
54 "Atticus enim quod et supra [i.e. IV, 3] dicebamus philosophus, similem eum [i.e.
Aristotelem] dicebat sepiae, cuius ea natura proditur, ut dum quaeritur a piscatoribus ut
capiatur, iam iamque admoveri manus persentit, atramentum illud humoris nigerrimi,
quod in sese habet congenitum spargens, inficit aquam ut ab oculis mox et a manibus piscatoribus elabatur." Ex. Van., IV, 7; p.677. The earlier reference to Atticus is on p. 668. The
source of Atticus' statement is to be 'found in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica, XV, g, 13.
Atticus' comparison seems to have caught the attention of a number of the humanists and
philosophers of the Renaissance. It was already cited by Poliziano in his Miscellanea (in
Opera, Lugduni, 1533; vol. II, p. 574) and in the sixteenth and succeeding centuries was
repeated often by the opponents of Aristotle. I am indebted to Professor Alessandro Perosa
for the reference to Atticus in Poliziano. See chapter VI, pp. I 79-80 and Charles B. Schmitt,
"Aristotle as a Cuttlefish: The Origin and Development ofa Renaissance Image," Studies in
the Renaissance, XII (lg65), pp. 60-72.
55 The Economics is now considered to be work of the Peripatetic School, rather than by
Aristotle himself. See Aristotelis, Quaeferuntur Oeconomica, ed. F. Susemihl (Leipzig, 1887),
pp. V-XXX.
56 This doubtlessly refers to Aristotle's often repeated promise to take up problems peripheral to a given discussion elsewhere in his works. Apparently this was not done in some
cases.
57 "Alienis etiam nititur opinionibus, quae postea falsae decursu temporum iudicatae sunt
... " Ex. Van., IV, 7; p. 677.
58 "Quibus omnibus ex rebus quantum ad scribendi modum pertinet, Aristotelis doctrinam incertam esse colligi potest et sepiae spargentis atramentum more obscuram et etiam

72

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

It seems as though Pico tended toward a Platonic-Augustinian metaphysics, if we must try to characterize his attitude. This does not mean
that he has gone over into the camp of the Platonists. On the whole,
Gianfrancesco was not a particularly metaphysically oriented thinker;
and, as we've said before, he has a strong anti-theoretical tendency.
Rather than the positive elements of Platonism, what seemed to appeal
to him, was what we might call the negative elements of the tradition.
For, after all, besides engendering an elaborate system of metaphysics,
the mystical, negative, enigmatic aspect of Platonism was never absent from the tradition. This side of Platonism, which could make
Augustine look into himself rather than at the world for certitude,
which could lead Nicolaus Cusanus to formulate his theory of "learned
ignorance," or which could bring the members of the Academy (particularly the Middle Academy) to doubt the reliability of sense knowledge, was the aspect which fascinated and influenced Gianfrancesco.
In accepting such a negative, critical attitude, Gianfrancesco did precisely what most Platonists had done - including such eminent ones as
Plotinus and Ficino - and accepted almost at face value the Aristotelian
natural philosophy, while rejecting the metaphysics and certain aspects
of the methodology and logic. This is not to say that he did not criticize
the Aristotelian physics, for he did, and severely. But, significantly, he
did so almost wholly within the framework of the very physics he partially rejected. When he disagreed with Aristotle on a particular point of
natural philosophy (as we will see more clearly when we discuss Book
VI of the Examen Vanitatis) his counter-arguments almost always
presuppose other Aristotelian principles. Consequently, a determined
attempt is made to disassociate Aristotelian theory from observation
regarding the interpretation of the natural world. Thus the Physics,
which discusses the theoretical aspects of natural philosophy, is held to
be questionable, while the On Parts of Animals, which is mainly the
recording of observations, is considered to be of significant value. Of
course, such a separation cannot be made completely, but the fact that
an attempt is made reveals something important about Pico's attitude
toward Aristotle. It shows above all a mistrust for generalizations
based on physical phenomena, what we would call "scientific laws or
theories." In adopting such a position, Pico shows himself to approach
certain attitudes of the ancient sceptics. The sceptics, for all of their
chameleontis instar versicolorem ... " Ibid., IV, 7; p. 678. Aristotle speaks of the chameleon
in the De partibus animalium (IV, I I, 6g2a), but more extensively in the De animalium histaria
(II, I I). The cuttlefish is also mentioned in Book IV of the De partibus animalium (chap. 5,
678b) and in many other places, notably De animalium histaria (IV, I).

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

73

doubts, placed a high value on observations, although they had little

confidence in theories. It was for good reason that Sextus was called
"the Empiricist" as a member of the group of Alexandrian physicians
who were called "the Empirics." 59

(6) Criticisms of Aristotle by Other Schools

Besides the disagreements which have occurred in Aristotle's own
school of philosophy, numerous have been the criticisms that have
come from the members of the other philosophical schools. It has not
always been the case, Gianfrancesco argues, that Aristotle has enjoyed
the vogue which he now has among philosophers. Rather, in the past
there have always been many who have disagreed with him. His
teachings have been disputed by the leaders of the other schools, which
then abundantly flourished. Formerly there were many competing
schools of philosophy, and the Aristotelians did not have the field to
themselves as they have had recently. But, in general, the situation is
not hopeless; and perhaps Pico's own attack will induce some to turn
aside from Aristotle.
If you look at the number of his followers, [you will see that] now he holds
very many, formerly fewer, and perhaps in the future fewer still, since many
followers of Plato have risen up against him; and perhaps some will arise
who agree with me and will say with me that neither in him, nor in other
pagan philosophers is enduring and genuine truth to be found, as the majority - even of the learned - believc. 6o

So Gianfrancesco sees his own epoch as the high point of Aristotelian

influence in the 'Vest and calls out for others to come to his support in
rejecting the Aristotelian doctrines. He looks to the past as a time of
greater opposition and expresses the wish that in the future the same
might again hold true.
In the ninth and tenth chapters of Book IV Pi co attempts to summarize the feeling against Aristotle which the Christian theologians have
expressed from the earliest times until the fifteenth century. Here again
a rather impressive list of names is cited. Our author emphasizes the
Christian theologians' rejection of certain Peripatetic teachings as being
59

On this school see M. Wellmann, "Empirische Schule," in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Ency-

clopaedic, ser. I, vo!. V (1905), cols. 2516-24.

60 "Si multitudinem consectaneorum spectes, nunc ipse pluribus abundat, olim paucioribus, et in futurum fortasse paucissimis, quando multi iam contra ipsum insurrexerunt Platonis asseclae; et forte alii extabunt qui mecum sentient et mecum dicent, nee in eo, nee in
aliis gentium philosophis solidam synceramque veritatem quemadmodum vulgus etiam
literatorum existimat reperiri." Ibid., IV, 3; p. 668.

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

74

incompatible with their religion. Aristotelian doctrines such as those

concerning Providence, the eternity of the world, and the soul, which
were condemned at Paris, are discussed. Pico cites the Greek Fathers,
Justin, the two Gregories, and Theodoretus, as well as Latin writers,
including Augustine, Thomas, Henry of Ghent, and Duns Scotus. Also,
many of the later Scholastics, who have shown some hostility to Aristotle (e.g. John Baconthorpe, Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson, William of
Ockham, and Nicholas of Lyra) are cited for their opinions. The examples which Pico gives are sometimes rather significant indicating
basic disagreement with Aristotle by the theologians, but all too often
they turn on a rather trivial point which does not have the importance
that our author tries to give it. Essentially he attempts to point out
every objection to Aristotle which he can find and to contrast this
uncertainty with the infallibility of Sacred Scripture. 61
As defenders of the view he rejects, he may have in mind the socalled "School of Padua," the founder of which, Pietro d'Abano, he
had criticized severely in his earlier work De Rerum Praenotione. 62 The
secular, rather than religious, interests of these philosophers have been
recognized by several later scholars. It is almost certain that secular
interests would be held in low esteem by someone like Pico. At any rate,
whether his remarks are directed against a particular group of individuals or not, Gianfrancesco interprets the turning away from Scripture and the increased reliance on the sense-based philosophy of Aristotle as a symptom of the increasing irreligion of his time. 63
Having reached the point where he has collected abundant evidence
against the certainty of Aristotelian philosophy, Pi co again reflects and
asks the following questions of his readers. "Can we agree with a man
erring in so many things? He has deceived us in some things, might he
not also deceive us in others? Shall we not rather suspend judgment
and consider as uncertain what remains?" 64 The key to this passage is
the well-known sceptic formula of "suspending judgment." Aristotle
has deceived us before, it is argued, and he is capable of deceiving us
This can be seen for example in the Epilogue of Book IV, p. 69!.
Printed in the Opera (1601) pp. 248-466. On Pico's criticisms of Pietro d'Abano see
Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science (New York, 1923-58) VI, 467 and
Bruno Nardi, Saggi sul!' aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI (Florence, 1958), pp. 23-25.
63 His whole attitude has a somewhat Savonarolian ring to it. He certainly was heavily
influenced by the Ferrarese friar and while it would be incorrect to derive the whole inspiration for the Examen Vanitatis from his early contact with Savonarola, reflections of the
influence are still there. See my forthcoming article cited in note 119, p. 26.
64 "An homini plerisque erranti assentiemur? Ita ut quemadmodum nos fefellit in illis,
fallere quoque possit in aliis? Annon magis suspend emus iudicium et incertum quod relinquitur habebimus?" Ex. Van., IV, I I ; p. 685.
61
62

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

7S

further. The basis of certainty is absent from his writings, so we must

suspend judgment regarding him, as we must do with all human philosophy. Only in Sacred Scripture is certainty to be found, Pico again
repeats.
(7) Criticism of Aristotle's Dependence on Sense Experience

The major part of the criticism of Aristotle - and one of Gianfrancesco's more significant contributions to the development of philosophical
thought in the sixteenth century - is his contention that Aristotelian
philosophy is based on sense experience and is hence bound to be
uncertain. The experience of the senses is fallible, Pico maintains, using
the arguments developed by the ancient sceptics, because it is subject
to a myriad of uncertain conditions. Be draws the bulk of criticisms
from the writings of Sextus Empiricus; but, as we shall see, he elaborates on these with some originality. The criticism that Aristotelian
philosophy takes its starting point from the fallible basis of sense experience is treated in detail in the Book V of the Examen Vanitatis. We
will treat it in detail when we discuss that book.
Before embarking upon an exhaustive critique of Aristotle from a
sceptical point of view, Gianfrancesco neatly summarizes the arguments which will follow. In the opening words of chapter twelve of
Book IV we find one of the clearest statements of his objections to
Aristotelian philosophy:
Indeed since the teaching of Aristotle is based on sense, it is therefore easily
proven to be uncertain; for sense is not only uncertain in many ways, but
often deceptive; and, in many other ways than Aristotle realized, it can
deceive and be deceived. By its very nature, sense is true unless it is variable.
However, it is variable in different men and from one time to another in the
same man and often many doubt their own sensations, which will become
evident as this work proceeds. And from this no general rule for the truth
of sense experience, which can always be applied both to man in general and
to individual men (unless I am mistaken, indeed), is to be found ... " 65

We should not make the mistake of believing that we have a sixteenth century Burne, but what Pico has said is rather startling. The
65 "Verum enimvero cum Aristotelis doctrina fundetur in sensu, ideo facile convincetur
incerta, quia non incertus modo plurimum sensus sed saepenumero fallax ac pluribus modis
aliis quam putaverit Aristote1es et decipere potest et deeipi. Est enim sensus suapte natura
verus ni sit varius, varius autem in diversis hominibus est, et quandoque in eodem, et saepenumero de suis sensionibus ambigunt plurimi, ut opere procedente patefiet; unde nee generalis regula sensilis veritatis quae et universis et singulis hominibus et semper aptari queat
(ni ego quidem fallor) invenietur." Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 687.

76

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

strengths and weaknesses of his sceptical position will become evident

as our analysis proceeds.
After stating his position, Gianfrancesco documents it with several
texts from the writings of Aristotle. These are meant to demonstrate
that the whole of Aristotelian philosophy is derived from sense experience. The two most important of these are from the Posterior
Anafytics and the Physics. 66 Since these two texts are central to Pico's
argument and references to them will occur repeatedly throughout the
remainder of our study, we will here attempt to analyze them in detail.
They stand at the center of the Aristotelian methodology, and, as Pico
rightly recognized, are pivotal to the whole of Peripatetic philosophy.
On them depend to a large extent the criticisms of the Aristotelian
methodology, which Pico analyzes with such great care.
The Posterior Anafytics, the work in which Aristotle outlines his
method of proof and "scientific demonstration," is particularly susceptible to the type of criticism that argues against the reliability of
sense experience. Consequently, it is this book upon which Pico's criticism focuses. It serves as a starting point for his critique - the vulnerable
spot into which a wedge can be inserted. From his critique of this work,
Pico expands his criticism to encompass other parts of Aristotelian
philosophy. We shall here briefly summarize Aristotle's position, before
considering Pico's rejection of it.
It will be noticed that throughout Pico's critique of Aristotle he
consistently overemphasizes the Stagirite's reliance on sense experience.
Gianfrancesco has a decided tendency to make Aristotle much more of
an empiricist than a critical reading of the texts will allow. The result is
that Aristotle turns out to be much more Lockean than in fact he was.
Whether this interpretation by Pi co is due to the Aristotelianism that
was being taught in Italy at his time is a question we will touch upon
in the next chapter. More specifically, Pico consistently underestimates
the role which vouc; plays for Aristotle in the formation of the principles
of scientific knowledge. It is true that for Aristotle all knowledge
ultimately derives from sense experience, but sense experience in itself is
not sufficient for knowledge. The mind has a certain activity, a certain
66 " Est itaque apud Aristotelem ubique videre hoc sensus fundamentum magna cura iaci
solere; atque ut ab Analyticis logicae libris posteriori bus fiat exordium, quibus omnis nititur
Aristotelica doctrina, quibusque reliqua reddere certa magna cura molitur, sensum unicum
esse totius aedificii fundamentum comperimus, totiusque demonstrationis initium. Earn
enim demonstrationem ex propositionibus universalibus communit, propositiones universales ex singularibus per inductionem colligit, singularia sensu deprehendit. Porro Physicis
quoque libris id praestituit principium, innatum esse nobis viam a notioribus nobis ad ea
quae naturae sunt notiora, nobis autem nota, quae sensibus haurimus." Ibid., p. 687.

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

77

structure, which has a much more important role in knowledge than

Pi co seems willing to admit.
The Posterior Ana(ytics deals with the origin, evolution, and validity of
different types of knowledge and demonstration. A central concept of
his work, and obviously a key one of the Aristotelian philosophy as a
whole, is the notion of Ema't"~fLYl or scientific knowledge, which is basic
to all proof and demonstration, has a certainty equal to vouc; or intuitive
knowledge, and is second only to it in accuracy.67 It is further held that
it is possible to obtain scientific knowledge 68 and that it proceeds from
demonstration. 69 'Ema't"~fLYl itself cannot be derived directly from sense
experience,70 but must be obtained through demonstration which proceeds from the &.px.a.[ or first principles. 71 This leaves him in the position
that he must determine from where the first principles come. After
exhausting the other possibilities, Aristotle decides that the ultimate
origin of these (i.e. the &.PXa.[) must be from a habit U:~~c;) innate in all
animals, i.e. sense perception (a.'la8Ylmc;).72 There is also, however,
another faculty involved in grasping the first principles. This is vouc;,
which is a part of the soul and which seems to be capable of immediately intuiting the first principles. 73
Aristotle is thus reduced to the position that the basis of scientific
demonstration is rooted in sense perception. The faculty of vouc; gives
some aid, it is true, but without sense experience to "trigger" it we
could never formulate a first principle. This is the position to which he
Post. An. 100b 7-9.
Ibid., 72b24-2S.
69 Ibid., 7 I b 17-20.
70 Ibid., 87b28.
71 Ibid., 7 I b20-24.
72 The reasoning of this passage is not straightforward and consequently cannot be outlined
in a few words, but the argument is found in detail at Post. An. 99bI5-lOob4. The key passage that gives the conclusion is at 100alO-l4. That is, the individual sense perceptions combine to form the abilities (~;t~) to construct first principles (&:pxcd). The military simile that
Aristotle here uses is quite apt. When retreat is called in battle, the line reforms when one
man takes a position and the others do likewise until it is completely reestablished. In the
same way the ability to form first principles is established by a series of sense impressions.
Thus, the 'individuals" of the unitary sense impressions unite, after many repetitions, to
form a universal. And, as Aristotle continues, it is by the process of induction (t1tCt.YwY"~)
that we come to know the first principles. Cf. 100b2-4' This process of induction whereby
the universals are derived from particulars is also discussed at Post. An. I, 18 (8Ia38-b9).
Here it is argued that if a person's sense perception is lost for some reason, induction and
hence scientific knowledge is impossible. See also Prior An., 46al 7-22, where Aristotle tells
why the principles must be learned by experience.
73 Post. An. I oobS- 17. There is a certain ambiguity which runs throughout Aristotle's treatment of this question. Can knowledge of the first principles be derivable from experience and
dependent upon intuition at the same time? See the discussion of this in Eduard Zeller,
Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. Costelloe and Muirhead (New York, 1962), I, pp.
194-212 .
67

58

78

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

is led in his attempt to go beyond the Platonic notion of &vaf1.\lYJm~ and

to escape the uncomfortable position expounded in the Meno. For
Aristotle, the paradox of the Meno, that one can only either learn
nothing or learn that of which he already has an unconscious knowledge, is unacceptable and an alternative must be found. 74 This compels him to search for the &pXa[ upon which science is to be based.
Ultimately he reaches the position described above, which focuses
upon the role of sense knowledge in the formation of first principles.
The other key passage to which Gianfrancesco refers is the brief, but
very important first chapter of the Physics. 75 Here Aristotle argues that
the normal way in which we obtain knowledge is by proceeding from
those entities which are clearest and most knowable to us to those
which are clearest and most knowable in themselves. For, as he continues, these are usually not the same. 76 The process of acquiring
knowledge is passing from the general to the particular. 77 And, as he
continues the exposition, he explains that the whole is more knowable
by sensation and the whole is a kind of general entity.78 The meaning
of this somewhat condensed explanation is made clearer by several
specific examples. For instance, in the case of a young child, all men
are called "father" and all women "mother" before he has learned to
distinguish his own father and mother from all the other men and
women whom he sees. 79 In this example the child has not yet learned
to distinguish the particular (xO(6' eXM't'O(, as Aristotle here uses the
term) from the general (x0(86AOU). It is only by repeated sensations that
he learns to distinguish the specificity of father from the generality of
man.
It will be noticed that here again Aristotle is reduced to the position
This was rejected at 7Ia2g-30.
This chapter consists of only about twenty lines in the Bekker Edition, but is one of the
most important of the Aristotelian texts for determining his basic ideas on methodology.
76 Physics 184aI6-18.
77 Ibid., I 84a23-24. Here it must be noted that Aristotle is not using the terms xlX66:Aou and
xIX6'~XlXcrTIX in their technical philosophical senses of universal and particular. He is, rather,
using them in a somewhat different sense to signify that our knowledge proceeds from the
generality (xIX66:Aou) of the multitude of sense experiences to the individual (XIXa' ~xlXcrTIX)
concept which results from a certain number of them. If these words are taken in their
usual philosophical senses, the whole chapter is rendered unintelligible. This is particularly
true when is contrasted with other passages such as Post. An. 72a4-6 or Post. An. 8Ib6-7
where the words are clearly used in a logical context which requires that they be interpreted
in their technical sense.
78 Physics I 84a24-2S. This is almost in complete contradiction to the passage from the
Posterior Analytics cited in the footnote above if xlX66).ou is taken in the same sense in both
cases. I t see~s clear that the 8:Ao'l is the whole realm open to sense experience and xlX66:Aou
the generality of this experience, rather than a general concept abstracted from particular
experiences.
74

75

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

79

of beginning his methodology from the particulars of sense experience.

For, although the clear distinction was made between things most
knowable to us (-ra YVWpLfL0.m:pa ~fL[V) and those most knowable in
themselves (-ra yvwpLfL0m:plX -rn CPUcrEL), 80 he says that under ordinary
circumstances man proceeds from the former to the latter. Furthermore, the way in which the things are "most knowable to us" is
through the channels of sense experience, as we saw above. 81
In this way, Aristotle's general statements about how man receives
knowledge are ultimately reducible to the oft-repeated maxim that
"nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu." As Aristotle
argues in the Posterior Ana[ytics, "we learn either by induction or by
demonstration." 82 But the principles by which demonstration proceeds are attained by induction 83 and the materials of induction are
sense experiences. As a result, Aristotle's entire system of knowledge
is rooted in the perceptions of the senses.
Seeing this, we might raise the question, "Can the senses ever fail to
render truth or are they infallible?" Aristotle, as Pico quickly points
out,84 admits that they can fail. But, what precisely is the way in which
they fail? Aside from admitting that there are certain relatively minor
imperfections in some of man's senses 85 and that too-intense sensations
harm the sense organs themselves,86 Aristotle seems content with accepting the infallibility of the senses, at least as far as individual perceptions are concerned. As he says in the De Anima, "For, perception of

Physics. IS4bI2-14.
Ibid., IS4al6-IS.
81 See note 7S above. The general which is more knowable to us becomes known by sense
(XIXTcX TIJv &.lcr8"1)<Hv). This also agrees with other passages in Aristotle, for example De Anima
432a2-Io. Especially important is 432a7-S. The note to this passage in R. D. Hicks, Aristotle
De Anima (Cambridge, Ig07) p . 546 is also instructive on this point. The same is to be found
in chapter IS of Book I of the Posterior Anarytics (Sla3S-bg).
79

80

82 SI~o-bl.

Post. An. I, IS. This was also discussed above.

"Ipse [i.e. Aristoteles] certefatetur aliquibusmodis falli sensum posse, idque trahicum ex
secundo libro de Anima potest, tum ex aliis operibus ... " Ex. Van. IV, 12; p . 6SS. For
examples taken from the Second Book of the De Anima, see the following discussion and notes.
On the question of error according to Aristotle see Leo W . Keeler, The Problem of Error from
Plato to Kant (Rome, 1934), pp. 22-40 and Irving Block, "Truth and Error in Aristotle's
Theory of Sense Perception," Philosophical Quarterry, XI (lg61), pp. I-g. On the question
of what Aristotle means by "perception" see Thomas]. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review, LXX (lg61), pp, 470-S4.
85 For example, that man's sense of smell is defective (de. An. 42Ia9-13) or that some of
man's senses are inferior to those of certain aniIpals in which these are highly developed (de
An. 42Ia20-22).
86 For example at De An. 422a31-33.
83

84

80

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

the special objects of the senses is always true and is found in all animals." 87
Error, on the other hand, can arise in several ways. One source is
in the imagination,88 the faculty mediating between sense and intellect. Although, sense cannot err regarding the whiteness of an object,89
Aristotle contends, it can err regarding whether the whiteness is attributable to this or that object. 9o That is, one cannot be mistaken
about undergoing a sense experience of perceiving white, but he can be
mistaken on attributing whiteness to Peter or Paul. Finally, Aristotle
states that sense is most likely to be deceived in the perception of the
common attributes or accidental qualities which inhere in things and
which are not the proper objects of the special senses. 91 In other words,
there might be perceptible qualities, which are accidental or common
attributes 92 in the same objects which are perceived as the correlative
objects of the special senses. In such a case, it is only about the latter
(i.e. the correlative objects of the special senses) that the senses cannot
fail. 93
Aristotle's meaning here is best understood by referring to the end of
the first chapter of Book III of the De Anima. 94 Here, he distinguishes
between the proper objects of the senses Claw:) and the common ones
(xo~v6:).95 The proper objects of the various senses are things such as
color for sight, sound for hearing, etc. As far as these are concerned
there is little chance of error, as we said above. However, in the case of
the common sensibles, such as motion, magnitude, or number, which
we come to know through several of the senses,96 error is possible,
87 Ibid., 427bl 1-13. The translation is taken from Hicks, op. cit., p. 123. Similar opinions
are stated elsewhere in the same work at 4,8a, 1-14 and 428a1 1-12.
88 De An. 428a1 1-12,16-18. Some attention was given in the treatise De Imaginatione to
the question of error arising from the imagination. Cf. particularly chapter 7 (Caplan
edition, pp. 42-48) and passim. See also our discussion in the next chapter.
89 The sceptics, of course, would not even grant this to Aristotle. There are many passages
in the works of Sextus Empiricus that could be cited on this point. The deception of visual
perception is treated, for example, in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 44-9 (Loeb Edition, pp.
27-3 1).
90 De An. 428blg-22. Very similar is 418a14-16 and 425b3-4' On the general problem of
error arising from sensation in Aristotle some interesting remarks are made in the section
"L'c<ccr8'YJmc; erronea" in Paolo Coscenza, L'inizio e 10 sviluppo della conoscenza sensibile in
Aristotele (Napoli, 1958) pp. 8g-95.
91 De An. 428b22-25.
92 xmv(;)\1 ... t7tofLE\lU)\I has the meaning of "of those common things present in a secondary way," hence accidents.
93 As stated above in note 87.
94 425aI4-bIO.
95 See also Zeller, op. cit., II, p. 68.
96 For the question of why there are several senses instead of one, see 425 b5-9' Also valuable here is Hicks' observation "'TIX G:xoAou8ou\I'TCC xccl xm\leX, 'the accompaniments of the

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

81

particularly when the object being sensed is far from the organs sensing
it. 97
In summary to this important, but condensed, analysis of the types
of sense perception and their susceptibility to error, we might cite the
opinion of R. D. Hicks:
The subsequent movement, generated by actual sensation, will differ in
kind, according to the nature of the sensible object which has produced the
original movement, that is, according as the percept is (I) a special sensible
quality (tOWV); (2) a thing which happens to possess such quality (crufL~'Y)~'Y)XOC; cJ> u7tCfpXe:~ '"0 towv); or (3) one of the "common sensibles" (xo~vov)
... The movement and consequently the mental image produced by (I) is
true during the presence of the sensible object which produces it. In the images produced by (2) or (3) there may be falsehood or error especially if the
object is perceived from a distance. 98
Although several details of Aristotle's theory of sense knowledge have
been left unexplored here, we have outlined his general teaching on
the subject. From what we have said it will be apparent that such a
psychology is susceptible to the type of criticism that calls into question
the very ability of the sense organs to perceive the "real." This is precisely the criticism that Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola uses
against it, following the program of the ancient sceptics.
After citing the passages we have just analyzed in which Aristotle
admits that certain types of error are possible, Gianfrancesco attacks
several of the interpreters of the Aristotelian philosophy who hold that
according to their master the senses cannot be deceived. 99 Error,
however~ can enter through the sensus communis and the intellectus, a
matter given little attention by Aristotle, Gianfrancesco claims. These
things have been treated elsewhere,lOO he continues, for he spoke of them
when he spoke of the first of the sceptic "tropes," and there Pico's discussion of the matter was largely drawn from Sextus Empiricus.l o1 This
trope deals with the fact that the differences in physical make-up of aniobjects of the special senses which are common to all senses.' The 'common sensibles' are fitly
called axoAOUeOU'n"<X because the 'special sensibles' (colour, sounds, tangible qualities) are
always accompanied by one or more of them. Thus everything perceptible has number, is
either at rest or in motion, and things in space have magnitude (p.sydloc;) and shape." op. cit.,
P433
97 428b2g-30.
98 o.b. cit., p. 467.
99 " ut hinc longe fallantur qui sensum non decipi ex Aristotelis sententia censeant."
Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 688.
100 In the Ex. Van., II, 22; pp. 560-64.
101 Ibid. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 14 and 40-78 (Loeb Edition, pp.
10-11 and pp. 26-47).

82

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

mals make it impossible for the same objects to produce the same sense
impressions in different animals. The point that Gianfrancesco is trying
to make here is that Aristotle did not pay enough attention to such differences, which are so serious as to make one man different from another.
Hence his whole system is susceptible to error, for it assumes men to
possess equal faculties of sensation. Pico's argument is summed up as
follows:
Certainly many truths can be known by sense, but that they can be known
was not demonstrated beyond controversy by those Aristotelian reasons. In
many ways sensible cognition is uncertain and many conditions must be
present, lest the sense err in its judgment. When Aristotle and his followers,
who have a wonderful faith in sense, noticed this, they indicated many exceptions about which we have already spoken. 102
Here Gianfrancesco does not go to the extreme position that nothing
can be known whatever, nor does he quite adopt the Academic formula
of "suspension of judgment," although at other places in his work he
tends toward both. Rather, he is concerned with the lack of certitude
that creeps into Aristotelian epistemology. Several important questions
about the reliability of our knowledge are left unresolved by the Peripatetic philosophy; and, according to Pico, on these rests the whole
edifice, and when they are seriously called into question the structure
is likely to crumble. But, this will be discussed more fully in the next
two books of the Examen Vanitatis and we will reserve fuller discussion
of the matter until we analyze those books.
(8) Aristotle's Own Uncertainty

Pi co devotes a rather brief chapter to showing that even though

Aristotle did not realize that it was possible for certain types of error to
come into his system (e.g. those arising from the variability of the
senses), he did recognize that perfect truth is not possible in all matters.
He points out that Aristotle and his early followers had more reservations about the certitude of his philosophy than do his modern
followers. Essentially what Pico attempts to do is to list Aristotle's own
doubts and reservations with regard to philosophy and, by doing so,
hopes to show that the Aristotelian system is not as certain and as allencompassing as some of the later Peripatetics consider it to be.
102 "Cognosci enim veritates multae per sensum queunt, sed ut cognosci possint rationes
illae Aristoteleae extra controversiam non probaverunt. Incerta enim plurimum sensilis
cognitio multasque adesse conditiones oportet, ne labatur sensus et in iudicando, quod et
Aristoteles et sectatores qui sensui mirum in modum fidunt, cum animadvertissent, excepiones attulerunt multas, de quibus iam verba fecimus." Ex. Van., IV, 12; p. 689.

GENERAL ATTACK ON ARISTOTLE

83

Let us give a sampling of a few of the passages which Pico calls to

the reader's attention. There is, of course, the famous passage from the
Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle says that we cannot expect the same
degree of certitude in all fields of study.l03 Then, there is the first
chapter of Book II of the Metaphysics which raises further doubts. Here,
Aristotle holds that part of truth is easy and part is difficult.l 04 Later in
the same chapter 105 occurs the famous "Platonic" passage where the
relation of our intellect ('t"~c; ~[Le:'t"EpOCC; ~UX~c; 0 vouc;) toward the things by
nature most apparent 106 ('t"a 't"n cpuae:L cpocve:p(hoc't"oc) is compared with
the relation of the eyes of the bat toward the light of day. This comparison casts a certain amount of doubt on our own ability to reach the
highest truths. Furthermore, Aristotle left some questions open to the
reader by emphasizing that there are several possible answers to them.
Examples such as his doubts concerning the number of spheres in the
Metaphysics 107 and the nature of the generation of bees in the On
Generation of Animals,108 further show that Aristotle himself was not so
dogmatic as some of his followers are inclined to be.
Pico then concludes Book IV as he concludes all of the books of the
Examen Vanitatis. In the epilogue we find the moral of Pico's religiousoriented endeavor. The doubts which have been exposed in the preceding book should be a lesson to the readers that confidence cannot be
placed in natural modes of knowledge. He exhorts them rather to rely
less on the writings of the pagan philosophers and more on the solidity
of the Scriptures of Christianity.

Nicomachean Ethics I, 3, esp. I094bI2-13.

Metaphysics, alpha, I, 993a30-31. Modern criticism usually considers this book of the
Metaphysics to be by an early follower of Aristotle rather than by Aristotle himself.
103

104

993b 7- 1 [.
For the distinction in Aristotle between those things most knowable to us and those
most knowable by nature see our discussion above, pp. 78-79 and the corresponding notes.
107 XII, 8; 1074a6-14.
108 III, 10; 759a8-61all.
105
106

CHAPTER IV

THE REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN "SCIENCE"

Quanto usui autem esse possit Sexti Empirici commentarius ad tuenda

Christianae religionis dogmata adversus externos philosophos, pulchre docet Franciscus Picus Mirandulanus in eo libro quo Christianam tuetur philosophiam adversus dogmata externorum philosophorum.
Gentian Hervel, Preface to his translation rif Sextus (I569)

( I) Introduction
It is in the Fifth Book of his treatise that Gianfrancesco Pico examines
carefully the Aristotelian theory of "scientific demonstration." We have
spoken of this briefly already.l It now remains for us to analyze his
argument systematically. We might say at the outset that the loss of
Pico's Institutiones Logicae to some extent impairs our present study. This
work, which seems to have been one of Pico's more important philosophical writings, apparently was never printed and no manuscript of
it is known to exist. 2 Almost certainly it treated many of the key
problems which are also discussed in the Examen Vanitatis. However,
the major lines of Pico's position are evident from the latter work; and,
although some fine points of his logic may escape us, we can still learn
much about his attitude regarding demonstrative science from a study
of the Examen Vanitatis.
Pico's arguments against Aristotelian "science" form the basis of his
entire critique and are perhaps his most original and significant contribution to the philosophy of the sixteenth century. His strengths and
weakness as a philosopher, the sources which he favored and those with
which he was in disagreement, his own originality and his preconSee particularly the discussion in the preceding chapter, pp. 75-82.
This work is mentioned in the often reprinted letter from Gianfrancesco Pico to Lilio
Gregorio Giraldi (ed. cit., pp. 877-80) which lists the writings of the two Pico. It is one of the
works most often cited by Gianfrancesco. See for example Ex. Van., I, 13, p. 510; II, 32, p.
576; III, 10, p. 636; IV, prooem., p. 658; V, 1, p. 694; V, 7, p. 724; V, 8, p. 728; V, 12,
P749
1

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

85

ceptions all become evident here. We will also see that certain of the
issues raised in Book V and certain of the new applications of philosophical principles made by him clearly foreshadow similar developments in thinkers of the next century and a half. His originality is
limited by his own very traditional attitudes. Nevertheless, certain
novel aspects emerge.
Gianfrancesco begins his critique by telling us that he will not rely on
commonplaces alone, nor simply on what other philosophers have said;
but, he will also bring forth his own weapons to use against the Stagirite. 3 He anticipates that his criticism of Aristotle's theory of demonstration will "render it uncertain in its foundation, as well as in its
cause, means and end." 4 Pico intends to show that "scientific demonstration" is untrustworthy, that the very foundation upon which it is
based is deceitful, and that the results obtained therefrom are not
worthy of our confidence. His "five ways" of disabling it may be summarized as follows: (I) The senses are susceptible to error in many more
ways than were ever thought of by Aristotle. (2) Even if no errors are
possible other than those admitted by Aristotle, these are enough to
render uncertain our sense knowledge and the demonstration based on
it. (3) According to Aristotle, demonstration proceeds from definitions
which are more certain than demonstration itself; but it is not only
difficult for man to know which of the two is more certain, but also to
determine if a definition is actually certain in itself. (4) Even if a definition has certitude, this cannot be known by us according to Aristotle's teaching. Furthermore, what Aristotle says about these matters
is not clear, but confused. (5) The method and end of demonstration
can not be admitted since they are not possible unless universal affirmative propositions are admitted. It will be shown that these cannot be
admitted. 5

3 "Nec locis communi bus et translatitiis utendum, nec principibus aliarum sectarum, qui
Aristotelem confutavere omnino insistendum. Non Carneadis tormenta, non Ephecticorum
philosophorum copiae, non Sexti Empirici machinae conficiant praelium. Non Galeni, non
Avicennae particulares in illum excursiones bellum indicant, sed ipsi nostro aere licet minus
canoro bellum canamus, nostra promamus arma, licet acuminata minus. Demus quae etiam
operam ut ipsemet Aristoteles se magna ex parte armet in semet, ac eius in illum familia
validis arietet lacertis, deque ipsorum armamentario eliciantur instrumenta, quibus oppugnetur ad hanc agnoscendae veritatis expeditionem." Ex. Van., V, I; p. 693. For Pico's
rejection of Aristotle see Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (Berlin, 1922), I, pp. 145-49.
4 Ibid., V, I; p. 693.
5 Ibid., V, I; p. 694.

86

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

(2) The First Way

Pico often says that the senses are susceptible to error in many more
ways than were ever considered by Aristotle. In fact, he tries to hammer
this home to the reader time and again. In his polemic against Aristotle's method of demonstration, which occupies Book V of the Examen
Vanitatis, Pico discusses the matter more fully and more penetratingly
than elsewhere.
As we argued in the previous chapter, Pico interprets Aristotle's position as "nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu." Gianfrancesco uses this well-worn formula several times in the Examen Vanitatis 6
to identify the Aristotelian epistemological position. Although in such
terms it perhaps makes Aristotle somewhat more empirical and less
speculative than in fact he was, nevertheless, this is how the younger
Pico tends to view his adversary's position. Pico cites as evidence for his
interpretation the passage from the De Anima 7 which states that, without sense, knowledge is impossible. Many prominent Peripatetics hold
this to be the position of their master, Pico continues. He is able to citerightly or wrongly - Themistius, Simplicius, Philoponus, and Alexander in support of his position, not to mention that highly esteemed Latin
student of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas. But, to those who defend
Aristotle in this, Pico has the following to say:
How do you defend all those things which rise from sense and from which
Aristotle constructed his demonstrative art? How do you sayan art is certain
which uses uncertain principles? And is based on an uncertain foundation?
You contend perhaps that sense is not always deceived. What then? For even
if sometimes it is not deceived, nevertheless, at other times it is, either in
pointing out or in judging or in both. And, therefore, it is uncertain. You
say that error is corrected afterwards by other sense experiences or sensations, as most are accustomed to say. But I say that you are always uncertain,
whether you are deceived in this or that sensation, for sense itself, as we have
said, and as we will soon say more extensively, although it can be true, is
nevertheless various, ambiguous, and doubtful; and it is often considered so
by experience itself, when it performs its function. s
6 See for example I , 5, p. 492; V, 2, p. 695; V, 10, p. 735; V, 10, p. 737; V, 13, p. 759.
Also see De Elementis 3, p. I IS.
7 432a7-S. Cf. Post. An. I, IS (Sla37-bIO).
8 " . reliquas omnes quae a sensu oriuntur et de qui bus proprie conficit al'tem Aristoteles, quo pacto defendes? Quomodo certam dices artem quae incertis principiis utatur? Incertis nitatur fundamentis? Contendes fortasse non semper decipi sensum, quid tum? Nam
etsi quandoque non decipitur, tamen et quandoque etiam decipitur, sive in indicando sive
in iudicando, sive in utroque. Ideoque incertus. Dices corrigi errorem aliis postea sensionibus
sensationibusve, ut dici plerisque solet. Dicam ego te semper incertum, an in hac an in illa
videlicet sensione fueris deceptus, nam sensus ipse ut diximus, ut mox etiam latius dicemus,
in se ipso, quanquam vents esse potest, varius tamen et ambiguus dub ius que et est et habetur
saepenumero ipsa experientia, cum suo officio defungitur." Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 696.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

87

Precisely to whom these remarks are addressed is not clear; but, from
what is said here and elsewhere, it becomes apparent that it is the
Aristotelians of the universities of Northern Italy to whom our author is
speaking. This we will discuss later. Suffice it to say here that the second
position ("that error is corrected afterwards by other sense experiences
and sensations") to which Pi co refers is one of the arguments used by
Duns Scotus to refute Henry of Ghent's incipient scepticism. 9
Let us look more closely at Pico's criticism of the Aristotelian position.
First and foremost, the indication (indicium) and judgment (iudicium) of
sense are uncertain and, therefore, so too is the art of demonstration, he
contends. Our author devotes a good deal of attention to the analysis
of these two parallel terms (indicium and iudicium). By the first, indicium,
he understands "the taking in and reception of the sensible form by which
the object itself is indicated to the higher faculty." 10 On the other
hand, he says that it is not clear precisely what Aristotle meant by
iudicium, for Aristotle confused the functions of sense and intellect.
Consequently there has been no end of confusion in the Peripatetic
School. The basic difficulty occurs, according to Gianfrancesco, in a
passage in the De Anima where judging ('ro xpmx6v) is described as the
function of both thought (IM.vow.) and sensation (atcr8Y)(nc;).11 Sense,
therefore, has the double function of judging and indicating. As Pico
puts it, "The sense indicates to the superior and higher faculty what it
senses, what it takes in from without through those five entryways of the
sensible species. This it judges by its own faculty and power." 12 Besides
the passive function of merely receiving information from without, two
other functions of sense can be distinguished: indicium, by which it
transmits its information to the higher faculty of the intellect, and
iudicium, by which it is able to judge or discriminate to a certain extent.
9 See Charles B. Schmitt, "Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico on
Illumination," Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), pp. 231-58.
10 "Indicium appello haustum receptionemque sensilis formae qua res ipsa indicatur
altiori potestati." Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 695.
11 Ti;> TE }(P~Tt}(ii'), I) IlLCXVO[CXC; ~Pyov ~C;Tt }(cxt cxtc;e~m:Q)C; 432a16. Although Aristotle
usually speaks of sense as being passive, in certain contexts a more active nature is attributed
to it. For example, it is spoken of as judging (xplvE'v) several times in the De Anima. See
418a14, 422a21, and also De motu an. 700bI9-2I. In fact, this ability to judge might be
considered the common element that connects the powers of sense and intellect. See De Anima
427a20-2 I. Also interesting is the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias cited by Hicks (op.
cit., p. 361) in his note to 418a14. According to this, the nature of the judgement seems to
rest on the ability to distinguish the various range of qualities possible within the object
sensed: that is, whether it is sweet, sour, or bitter, for example. Cf. De Anima 426b8-12.
12 "Indicat enim sensus superiori altiorique vi quod sentit, quod forinsecus hausit per ilia
quinque ceu canalicula sensilium specierum, idque ipsum etiam sua ipse vi et potestate
diiudicat." Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 695.

88

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

Up to this point Gianfrancesco seems to be following Aristotle's analysis. That sense has these two functions which are attributed to it by the
Stagirite our author does not deny. As we have said elsewhere, Pico's
general method is to attack Aristotle from within the system rather than
from without. He does not attempt to overthrow the Aristotelian philosophy by offering an alternative one. Rather, he tries to show that
certain imprecisions in the system, while seeming at first sight to be of
relatively minor import, ultimately render the system doubtful. In the
case under consideration, this means that by and large Aristotle's
psychology is accepted; but, after its bare acceptance, a determined
attempt is made to show that due to the fallibility of our senses, the
reliability of the knowledge derived by means of such a psychology is
extremely doubtful. That the indicium and iudiciuTll give us some valid
information, Gianfrancesco Pico does not seem to doubt, but they do
not give us certitude sufficient to warrant our complete confidence. 13
There are numerous reasons why we cannot give our unmitigated belief
to the materials provided by the senses. Some he discusses in great
detail, others are passed over with a bare mention. We shall take up
each of these in turn.
Pico's first two arguments - (I) that Aristotle admitted the senses to
be in some ways unreliable and (2) that many other philosophers,
especially the sceptics, held the senses to be doubtful - we treat elsewhere and we shall not discuss them here.
The third argument states that "men often are in doubt about their
own senses." That is, they often doubt whether they are actually seeing
or hearing what they seem to be. Gianfrancesco does not expand on
this criticism very fully, but it seems to be drawn partially from the
sceptic critique of sense knowledge and partially from Pico's own experience. Aristotle's opinion is that the senses are never mistaken in
their perceptions, but errors may enter concerning the "common sensibIes."

14

In other words, according to Aristotle, we cannot mistake the

fact that we are actually sensing white or black, but only that the white

13 "Nam sensus quidem verum esse aliquando et indicium et iudicium non ambigo, nullumque homini, qua carneus est, omnino verius, tum, scilicet, cum non fallitur, cum non in
ambiguo versatur, cum in sua duntaxat sensione persistit, nec ad aliorum sensa et iudicia
refertur, quanquam fere semper adsunt conditiones ipsius sensorii varii quae res ipsas ob
divers urn temperamentum secus ac se habeat apud alios, saepe etiam aliter ac se habeat
veritas, prae se ferunt; ob diversam etiam rei ipsius sensilis fluxamque naturam ea ipsa, quae
obiiciuntur sensorio, diversae sese habent temporis diversitate." Ex. Van., V, 3; p. 704.
14 See De Anima 428bI8-22. Also see our discussion of this in the previous chapter, p. 80.
Cf. De Anima II, 6.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

89

or black is attributed to this or that object. As we have said,15 the

ancient sceptics would not even grant this to him and neither does Pico.
Of course the point at issue here is one of the thorniest that we encounter in the matter of perception. If one, during a sickness - to use a
favorite example of the sceptics and one often repeated by Gianfrancesco - considers something bitter to be sweet, what we can say? Is he
actually having a "bitter" sensation and committing a mistake about
his own experience? Or, on the other hand, is he actually having a
"sweet" sensation brought about by the psychological and physiological changes wrought by his sickness? One notable thing about such a
question, which can be answered in two completely opposite ways, is
that the way in which a given thinker answers it often tells us something
significant about his own philosophical position. A "naive realist" such
as Aristotle tries to maintain that we are not mistaken about what we
are actually sensing, but rather that mistakes enter for other reasons. The
sceptic, Pico included, approaches the problem with more than a touch
of doubt. Even of the most trustworthy sensations we cannot be completely sure, he holds; therefore, we do not have complete certainty
even about our own psychological states. Pi co has argued elsewhere 16
against the same Aristotelian position, but, there too, he has treated
the problem in summary fashion. These two passages are evidence
enough to place our author in the extremely difficult position of
doubting about his own psychological state. The difficulties of this
position we need not go into here. Let it be sufficient to point out the
problems that this raises when considered in connection with religious
belief. It most certainly leads to conclusions which Gianfrancesco Pi co
would not be willing to defend. It is quite as easy to doubt that we are
believing in the Christian F1.ith as to doubt that we are sensing a white
image; but, the philosophical positions of the younger Pico do not
always meet a high standard of consistency.
The fourth objection is one to which our author devotes somewhat
more attention. According to it, even when men sense properly, just
how they sense, how many senses they have, and what precisely these
senses are, are issues which still remain in doubt. Pica contends that
when Aristotle discussed these things in the De Anima he did not give
15 See our discussion in the previous chapter, note 8g. The same question arises again in
connection with Pico's disagreement with Duns Scot us on the reliability of sense knowledge.
See Schmitt, "Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination,"
Mediaeval Studies, XXV (1963), pp. 244-55.
16 Ex. Van., IV, 12; pp. 688-89. See our discussion of this in the previous chapter, pp.

79-82 .

90

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

clear and definitive answers to them. Consequently, his interpreters

have had constant disagreements about them. For example, Alexander
and Themistius disagree with the De Anima and hold that there is but
a single sense which takes various names from its different functions.
Others say that there are only four senses instead of five. In general,
there has been no agreement on the question. Furthermore, there is
the problem of where the sensitive faculty resides: Aristotle placed it
in the heart, Galen in the brain, and Averroes in both. This question
has puzzled many philosophers and physicians.17 This is but the beginning. Our author points out numerous additional problems concerning the senses: does the sense know its own essence? is the sense
active as well as passive? etc. According to Gianfrancesco, all of these
things combine to demonstrate that we know very little about the
senses and the process by which they operate. Such a state of affairs is
not desirable, particularly if our whole edifice of knowledge is based
upon the materials of sense.
But these arguments are of relatively little importance, it seems,
when compared with Pico's fifth reason for mistrusting the senses. This
is based on the physiological and physical variations which occur for
different reasons and at different times both in the object being sensed
and in the organ which does the sensing. This argument is derived
principally from Sextus Empiricus with some added help being obtained from other sources, ancient and medieval. Major among these
are the medical writings with which our author seems to have been
reasonably well acquainted. He was close to several prominent physicians and medical theoreticians of his time including Ni.ccolo Leoniceno, Giovanni Manardo, and Ludovico Carro.IS It was probably
from these men that our author was introduced to the latest medical
theories.
One of Gianfrancesco's favorite arguments against the reliability of
sense knowledge is based on the variation of the humors in the body.
The theory of the "four humors" is an old one, coming down to modern
times from Hippocrates, but certainly not original even with him.l 9 It
17 Pico says very much the same thing in the De Imaginatione. See Caplan's edition, pp. 3437, where the editor also gives references to the sources in Aristotle, Galen, and Averroes and
adds several useful notes. Also cf. Ex. Van ., 1,14; p. 515. On the history of this question see
Arthur Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des Crossen, Beitrage zur Ceschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters, IV,S (1903), pp. 173-84.
18 On Leoniceno and Manardo, see chapter 1. Ludovico Carro is mentioned several times
by Pico in the Examen Vanitatis (V, 4; p . 714, for example). For further information, see
Giulio Bertoni, La Biblioteca Estense e la culturaferrarese ai tempi del duca Ercole I (I47I-I505)
(Turin, 1903), pp. 97,190-91. See also notes 19,22, and 31 below.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

91

was the dominant physiological scheme of ancient, medieval, and

modern medicine until Harvey, and not even then was it completely
abandoned. It was bound up with the Greek view of the world based
on four qualities (hot, dry, cold, and moist) and four elements (air,
earth, fire, and water). The medical analogy to these are the four
humors which are organized in the following way:
Hot and moist - Blood
Hot and dry - Yellow bile

Cold and moist - Phlegm

Cold and dry - Black bile

Health is defined by the proper balance of the proportion of the humors

and sickness by an imbalance. Various types of sickness are attributable
to the preponderance of one or another of the four basic humors. Although the theory can thus be stated in a simple and brief manner,
after it had been discussed and theorized on for many hundreds of
years by Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Jews, and Christians it came to have
many complicated and detailed ramifications. This is how matters
stood when Gianfrancesco Pico began to elaborate on the theory in the
course of his critique of Aristotelian epistemology.
As an imbalance of the proportion of the humors brings sickness,
Pico argues, it also makes the sense organs receive their impressions in
a peculiar and unreliable way. Furthermore, the proper balance of the
humors, which keeps the sense organs in good working order, is rather
delicate and may be easily disrupted. Moreover, the proportion of the
humors varies from one individual to another.
However, the proportion itself [of the humors] can undergo variations in
many ways. Because of aging, because of mere chance, and likewise at the
same age because of diet, growth or withdrawal of some or of all of the
humors, others may take their place. And, from this a different proportion
results. Even if this proportion might remain the same, it is, nevertheless,
different from that of another individual. So, consequently, one cannot
reach any certain universal rule regarding sense perception, upon which
demonstration might be based. 2o

So the operation of a sense organ is determined by the proportion of

the humors in the organ. If the balance is proper, the organ will func19 The earliest detailed discussion of the theory of humors and temperaments is in the work
De natura hominis (ca. 420 B.C.), attributed to Hippocrates. A convenient edition is W. H. S.
Jones (ed.), Hippocrates (London, 1923-31), IV, pp. 1-41. See also George Sarton, "Remarks
on the Theory of Temperaments," Isis, XXXIV (1943), pp. 205-208. For a detailed study
of melancholia, as one of the humors, and its influence see Klibansky, Saxl, and Pan ofsky,
Saturn and Melancholy (Edinburgh, 1964).
20 "Proportio autem ipsa multis variari modis potest, per aetatem, per casum, item eadem
in aetate, nutritione, auctione, detractione, vel omnium, vel aliquorum, quorum videlicet in
loco caeteri succedant humores, unde et varia quoque proportio dissuitet, quae etsi eadem
esset, ab alio tamen individuo diversa fuerit, ut propterea certa uila, et universalis regula
sensilis, super qua fundetur demonstratio, trahi non queat." Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 702.

92

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

tion as it should. If the balance is disrupted for some reason - which

may easily happen - the organ will not function properly but will receive a deformed species of the object sensed. 21 Pico gives several examples and, as is usual when he discusses such a problem, devotes
greater attention to sight than to the other senses. If change and diversity affect the body as a whole, they affect the eye to a much greater
degree, for, by Aristotle's own testimony the eye is not solid and unchangeable, but tenuous and mutable. 22 Moreover, it consists in large
part of an aqueous substance,23 it being necessary that the humor of
the eye is aqueous if sight is to be possible, as Aristotle argued in chapter
3 of the treatise De Sensu. Furthermore, the nature of the covering
(cutis) of the eye and its location (situs) 24 are very important if it is to
sense properly, our author contends. For the eye to render the sharp
perception of which it is capable a delicate balance of conditions is
necessary. The aqueous humor must be pure, the location of the eye
must be concave and recessed (reductum) and not protruding (prominufum). But, because of the differing temperaments of different men, their
eyes differ in color, in the aqueous humor which fills them, and in
the quality of their covering. Furthermore, the locations of the eyes
also vary from man to man (i.e. sunken, protruding, etc.). Because of
these variables, the indicium (that is, the sensible species indicated to the
higher faculties) and the iudicium (the judgment by the eye that an
object is white or black) do not accurately refer to the original object
which was sensed. Consequently, not only does the eye see differently
because of age, but also because the organ itself is variable and does
not present its indicium to the higher powers always in the same way,
but variably.25
21 The root of such an argument can be found in the Outlines ofPyrrhonism, but is not there
spelled out in great detail. See I, 14,51-52 (Loeb Ed., pp. 30-33) where it is argued that,
for example, when we have a cold and phlegm is excessive, our sense impressions are different
than they are under normal conditions. Sextus does not develop this argument in as much
detail as Pica late r does.
22 Pica cites several texts on this point, which state that the eye is affected by external
objects, which of course is how the eye perceives. The one decisive argument is based on a
text from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, 887a24-27, which says that the eye is the most
movable (EUXLV1)1:-61:-ccrov) part of the body. See also the important discussion of eye diseases
in Galen's De symptomatum causis, book I, chapter 2, in Claudii Galeni, Opera omnia, ed. C. G.
Kuehn (Leipzig, 1821-33), VII, pp. 86-101.
23 "Quod si corporis totius, certe et oculi ipsiusque pupillae, eoque magis quod non ita
solida est natura atque compacta, sed tenui fluxilique; quando ex aquea plurimum substantia constat ... " Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 699.
24 From the way the word situs is used in this context it seems to mean the way in which
the eye is situated in the head. That is, whether it is sunken, protruding, etc.
25 "Ad haec et pupillae purum humorem in percipiendis exquisite eolorum differentiis et
oeulorum situm, non prominulum, sed eoncavum et reductum, ad procul videndum asciscir.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

93

Pico's attempt to prove the variability of visual perception is really

based on physiology. Here again we have an example of his working
within the framework of Aristotelianism to strike away at the underpinnings of the system. In his most detailed physiological and physical
analysis of the eye and visual perception, Aristotle had emphasized the
fact that it is necessary that a translucent (OLcx.cpcx.\lE:<;) substance, water,
be contained within the eye. 26 This is because light is necessary for
sight and light must pass through a translucent medium in order to be
visible. Aristotle also said that when the eye begins to lose the power of
sight, because of age or injury, it is because the translucent character
of the aqueous humor had been taken away.27 With such a theory of
vision before us, it is not difficult to see how Gianfrancesco Pico nourished on Pyrrhonic scepticism and on the detailed physiological
theory of the four humors - began to carry the analysis a step further.
What would be the effect of the entry of one of the four humors into
the eye? Would not this affect the vision in the same way as an imbalance of the humors in the entire body brings about a sickness of
some sort? These two questions were answered by Pico in such a way
as to bring him from the camp of Aristotle into the camp of his opponents.
Pico applies similar, but less detailed, critiques to the other senses.
The current, predominantly Aristotelian, theory of the operations of
the senses is adopted and then questions are raised concerning the ideal
conditions upon which Aristotle's analysis is based. Aristotle's account
of sense experience and of the operations of the sense organs is accepted,
but grave doubts are cast upon his conclusions by the introduction of
problematic conditions under which the senses do not function as they
should if the optimum results are to be obtained.
Nowhere is Pico's argument more convincingly given than in his
discussion of the effects ofjaundice (icterus) upon sense perception. This
argument was already used by Sextus Empiricus 28 and occurs several
Ilia vero humoris et colorum varietas et cutis multiplex qualitas et diversus oculorum situs in
diversis hominibus, a divers a humani corporis temperatione dimanant. Hac igitur sensus
mutatione, hoc est, varietate sensilis potesta tis atque sensorii, et de re sensili, cum indicium,
tum iudicium permutatur. Id est, non solum quatenus sensus diverse atque aliter quam se
habet res, de ea indicat, sed etiam quatenus sensus tali est natura, hoc est, mutabili et in sese
frequentissime varia, atque ideo sese offeret altiori potestati non uno semper modo, sed vario
atque diverso, pro varia videlicet dispositione, proque ea etiam rem obiectam speciemque
illius varie perspicit." Ex. Van., V, 2; p. 700.
26 De sensu 438b6-8.
27 Ibid., 438bI2-16.
28 Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, 14,44 (Loeb ed., pp. 28-29).
Humor theory, as a basis of difference, was used as late as La Mettrie: "II est vrai que Ia
Melancolie, la Bile, Ie Phlegme, Ie Sang, &c. suivant la nature, l'abondance & la diverse

94

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

times in the Examen Vanitatis. For example, it is argued that, if one is

afflicted with jaundice, honey does not taste sweet to him, but bitter. 29
Even more interesting for our present discussion is Pico's insistence
that jaundice also affects the vision. It is well established - and known
even in Pico's time - that the first visible sympton of a jaundiced
condition is the appearance of a yellow color in the "white" of the eyes.
Moreover, in extreme cases, patients complain of having yellow vision.
Could there by anything that would fit better into Gianfrancesco's
argument?
Since there is an imbalance of humors in the man sick of jaundice
(as is evidenced by the yellow hue of the whole body) the sense organs
will be affected, Pico argues. This will be especially true of the eye,
which is more delicate and more easily disrupted than the other sense
organs. 30 As our author said earlier in translating directly from Sextus
Empiricus, "those who have jaundice consider the things which seem
white to us to be surrounded by a pallor." 31 Other variables which
may affect our sense perception are also listed. These are generally
fitted into Pico's conceptions of humoral physiology which we have
already discussed. We might single out for brief mention the fact that
Gianfrancesco, like most of his contemporaries, fell under the influence
of the late medieval discussion of intension and remission of forms. 32
combinasion de ces humeurs, de chaque Homme font un Homme different". La Mettrie's
L'Homme Machine: A Study in the Origins of an Idea, ed. A. Vartanian (Princeton, 1960), p. 152.
29 See for example Ex. Van., II, 33; p. 585; IV, 12; p. 688.
30 The line of argument here is involved and difficult to follow. We need not present it in
detail, for it is not essential to our purpose to give a detailed analysis of the physiology of the
sceptical position. The most detailed exposition of it is to be found in Ex. Van., V, 3; pp.
702-703.
31 " . . . qui enim sunt icterici, pallore circumfusa putant, quae nobis alba videntur ... "
Ex. Van., II, 22; p. 561. This, as is much of chapter 22 of Book II, is a direct translation from
the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cf. I, 14,44 (Loeb ed., pp. 28-29). In the same chapter other details are repeated from Sextus. For example: for similar reasons it can be supposed that those
who have hemophthamia see red; if one gazes for an extended period at the sun he will see
yellow; if the eyeball is deformed by pressing it out of shape, the visual image will also come
to us in a deformed way. See the Galen text cited above in note 22, esp. p. 99, where Galen
speaks of jaundice and hemophthalmia affecting the eye in terms very similar to those used
by Pico. There are numerous passaged in Galen from which Pico may have drawn some of
his material. See also De temperamentis (ed. cit., I, pp. 509-694, esp. pp. 588-94) and Quod
animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur (ed. cit., IV, pp. 767-822). In his work, De locis affectis,
Galen says, "And it is confessed by the most eminent physicians as well as philosophers that
the humors as well as the temperament of the body completely alter the actions of the soul;
by which it has been shown that the faculties of the soulfollow the temperament of the body."
op. cit., VIII, p. 19I. For an Aristotelian attempt to cope with this argument see below,
pp. 162-68 and my paper cited in note 10, p. 163. I plan to study the physiological basis
of Early Modern scepticism in greater detail in a subsequent study. Cf. La Mettrie, ed. cit.,
p. 185.
32 For general discussion of this complicated, but important, aspect of medieval thought
see Pierre Duhem, Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci (Paris, 1906-13), III, pp. 314-46; Anneliese
Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2nd ed., (Rome, 1951), pp. 1- 109;

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

95

This aspect of natural philosophy, which was the subject of numerous

treatises from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, is basically an
attempt to analyze qualities in terms of levels of intensity. In other
words, it is a crude attempt to quantify qualities such as "hotness" or
"whiteness," something which Aristotle had not done, having kept the
categories of quantity and quality quite separate. For Pico, who is not
interested in the theoretical aspects of the discussion, it is merely
another way of talking about the variability of things. Although he
never discusses this theory in detail, he uses it to emphasize the change
in quality oflight and its effect on visual perception;33 or, to speak of
the possibility of a changing proportion of the humors within the body
or a particular part of it. 34
The physiological basis of Pico's scepticism had already been expressed in nearly the same terms in an earlier work De Elementis. 35 This
work is concerned with a discussion of the primary qualities, elements,
and humors. Particularly in Chapter V and VI he deals with the
humors and temperaments, arguing that there is a very wide variation
in men of the relative proportion of humors in their bodies; and, consequently, their temperaments will show the same variation. Although
he does not draw out the same implications of the dubious nature of
sense knowledge as he does in the Examen Vanitatis, he carefully and
effectively sets the stage for it. The unity and uniqueness of man, which
was so eloquently argued by Plato and Aristotle, and by the great medieval theologians, is here called into doubt:
For the differing proportion of the mixture [of humors] produces different
temperaments. And, since these mixtures are not just four, but many more,
there will be also many more than four temperaments of both human bodies
and those of brute animals. Thus, the diverse ratio and 'proportion of the
mixture has the function of a proper difference, which constitutes the species,
for the proportions are taken instead of numbers. Consequently, a different
kind oftemperament will be produced whenever the proportion is different. 36
and E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, trans. C. Dikshoorn (Oxford,
1961), pp. 186-88.
33 See Ex. Van., V, 3; p . 704.
34 Ibid., V. 2; pp. 701, 703; see also De Elementis 6; pp. 121-23.
35 The work was probably composed during Pico's stay at Rome in 1512, the same period
during which the famous letters on imitation were written. It is dated January I, IS 1 3 in the
printed editions. This would perhaps put it in his "pre-sceptical" p eriod, i.e. before he became
acquainted with the writings of Sextus Empiricus. The first edition of the De Elementis of
which I know is Basel, 1518. It is printed in the 1601 edition of the Opera, pp. 115-23.
36 "Nam proportio diversa mixtionis diversas temperaturas parit; et cum hae mixtiones
non quatuor duntaxat habeantur, sed multo plures multo etiam plures habebuntur temperaturae humani aut etiam brutorum corporis. Ipsa etiam mixtionis diversa ratio diversave
proportio vicem habet propriae et speciem afferentis differentiae (nam proportiones numerorum instar habentur) quare ubi diversa fuerit proportio, diversa prodibit species tempera-

96

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

What does such a statement mean? It means first of all that we are well
on the road to a scepticism and nominalism that will become increasingly
apparent in the next centuries. Man no longer has the fixed position in the
hierarchy of beings which he had held with few exceptions throughout
the Middle Ages. Rather, Pica emphasizes the differences between individual men and not the similarities. With such a view it becomes increasingly difficult to define man; and, as we shall see, it is a problem
which offers difficulties to Pica himself. But besides, we are well on the
way to an empirical view of man. It is not too distant from Pica's view
to see man in the terms of Locke or Hume. To say that man's perceptions are controlled by the physiological constitution of the body is
to say in addition that each man's experience is unique and puts us
well on the road to subjectivism.
This is not to say that our author either adopted such positions or even
thought of his analysis in these terms. It was manifestly unthinkable that
he should do so. His whole world view, no matter how shaky or inconsistent, was held together by an omnipotent and omniscient God. But,
when positions such as Pica's are adopted, it is not long before later
thinkers begin to ask other questions; and, for example, when one does
begin to doubt whether God can really bring into accord all of the disparate strands of the system, the Pandora's Box is opened and a whole series
of new philosophical problems emerge and the synthesis must begin
anew. On the other hand, the doubting of the old system, besides the confusion that it brings with it, is often accompanied by advances in other
areas of endeavor, particularly the sciences in which doubt and empirical study constitute, if not the life blood, at least major constituents.
(3) The Second W cry

If Gianfrancesco could give such an elaborate analysis of the failures

of the senses in terms not considered by Aristotle, he also could build up
a case for arguing that even the master did not have the confidence in
sense knowledge which the theoretical underpinnings of his scientia
require. Herein lies the secunda via by which Aristotle's demonstrative
science is to be demolished. We must admit at the outset, however,
that Pico's arguments here are by no means as cogent as those which
we have just outlined. His procedure is to cull sections from Aristotle's
menti." De Elem. 6; p. 122. Pico also ties the diversity of literary style to diversity of temperament in his De imitatione. See Le epistole 'De imitatione', ed. G. Santangelo (Florence),
1954), pp. 35-36. My attention was called to this passage by Donald R. Kelley, "Legal
Humanism and the Sense of History", Studies in the Renaissance XIII (1966), pp. 184-99, at
p. 19 1

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

97

works in which some doubt concerning the reliability of sense knowledge is expressed, repeating some of the same arguments which we
have encountered before. 37 New material is added, but this is generally
of minor importance.
In the treatise De Sensu, Aristotle says that no sensible quality can be
infinitely subdivided. 38 In the [pseudo-Aristotelian] treatise On Colors,
however, it is stated that the variety of colors is infinite. 39 From these
two conflicting statements our author concludes that our perception of
colors is rendered doubtful. This argument is not really to the point
and indicates merely a minor inconsistency in phraseology. A more
serious argument is the charge that Aristotle held that error could
enter through the imagination. Of this we have spoken briefly before,
but since it does playa rather important role in Gianfrancesco's rejection of the Aristotelian epistemology we shall now give it more
careful consideration. As our author puts the question in the Examen
Vanitatis:
But this imagination or plzantasia, more variable and more inconsistent than
sense, where it has been deceived, will affect the intellect, whose judgment
will waver and go astray. And this is not in disagreement with Aristotle,
who decreed in his book De Sensibus that external objects could be understood
only with the aid of sense. And in the second book of the De Anima he decreed that there is the following distinction between sense and intellect: that
sense is always true concerning its proper objects, but it is possible that the
understanding be false. 4o

Several points in this passage require further comment. First of all,

Pico's contention that according to Aristotle the imagination is less
reliable than the senses seems to be correct. However, after his extended
critique of sense knowledge, it is to be wondered if Aristotle or the
Aristotelians would still consider imagination more variable than the
account of sensation given by Gianfrancesco. Regardless of this, the
failings of imagination are easily documented from Aristotle. In the
De Anima,41 for example, at one point Aristotle goes so far as to say that
imagination is mostly false (at 1tAdouc; tJieu3sic;).
It is interesting to note the shift in emphasis that has taken place in
See our discussion of this in the previous chapter pp.8o-82.
4gga2of.
39 792a33.
40 "Sed et ipsa imaginatio sive phantasia variantior sensu, ac desultoria magis, ubi decepta
fuerit, imponet intellectui et ex ea vacillabit et aberrabit eius iudicium, ipso Aristotele non
repugnante, cum in eo de Scnsibus libro quicquam eorum quae sunt extra sanxerit non posse
nisi ipso cum sensu intelligi . Qui et secundo de Anima libro decrevit hoc esse inter sensum
intellectumque discriminis, quod ille propriorum semper verus sit, contingat autem et falso
intelligere." Ex. Van ., V, 5; p. 722.
41 427b27-42gag, esp. 428a12.
37

38

98

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

Pico's thought since his early work, De Imaginatione. This work, which
carries a dedicatory letter dated 1500, was written in what we have
called his "presceptical" period. This is not to say that he does not
show abundant doubts even in this early work, but apparently it was
composed both before he had studied the works of Sextus Empiricus
and before his determined effort to destroy the theoretical framework
of Aristotelian philosophy. The De Imaginatione takes its point of departure from the De Anima, and it is both favorable to and in general
accord with Aristotelian doctrine. We already see, however, the roots
of the critique which will be developed more fully in the Examen
Vanitatis. Whereas sense perception is singled out for criticism in terms
of humoral physiology in the later work, in the De Imaginatione the
failings of imagination - a point, which, after all, is more in accord
with Aristotelian teaching - are discussed in essentially the same
terms.42 We read, for example, in the earlier work:
I have said above that the variety of opinions, the faults of opinion, and all
the defects of the rational soul, cannot come from reason itself and the intellect (be it understood, that they exist qua intellect and reason), but proceed
from the defect of the imagination. 43
One notes, first of all, that the burden of error falls on the imagination, rather than on sense. It is said, however, that the variety of
phantasms depends, among other things, on the objects perceived by
sense.
Again, that varied and false phantasies arise in us from objects appearing
from without and affecting us is fully evident from the fact that objects often
change and variously affect the senses; for since imagination follows sense
and is guided by it, necessarily when sense is varied, imagination is varied,
and when sense fails, imagination fails.44
Nothing whatever is said here of the possibility of the senses erring
regarding their proper objects,45 which is quite possible according to
42 This is discussed in chapter 8 of the work, "Unde imaginationum varietas." Caplan
ed., pp. 48-57. The translations which I cite here will generally be taken from this edition.
43 "Diximus ante opinionum varietatem eiusque culpas atque rationalis animae defectus
omnis ab ipsa ratione et intellectu (qua scilicet intellectus et ratio est) provenire non posse,
sed ab imaginationis vitio derivari." De. Imag., 8; pp. 50-5I.
44 "Ab rebus item extrinsecus occursantibus quibus afficimur, varias oriri easdemque falsas imaginationes in nobis hinc liquido constat, quod objecta sensus identidem mutant
varieque afficiunt. Cum enim imaginatio sequatur sensum ducaturque ab eo, consentaneum
est ut et variato sensu varietur imaginatio, eoque labente, et ipsa labatur." Ibid., 8, pp. 54-55.
45 The basic Aristotelian position is stated thus: "Sensus autem propriorum sensilium,
quamquam aut semper verus aut rarissime falsus, in iis tamen quae subjecta sunt ipsis
sensilibus, hoc est, quibus accidunt ipsa sensibilia, fallitur saepenumero." Ibid., 8, pp. 54-55.
For Aristotle's arguments from the De Anima see our discussion in the previous chapter (pp.
79-81) and the corresponding notes. For a good statement of Pi co's view on this see particularly note 65.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

99

the destructive analysis presented in the Examen Vanitatis. Although

Pico admits that error can enter through the senses, he allows it only
in the mild form conceded by Aristotle; and the heady brew of Pyrrhonic scepticism, which will call all sense knowledge into question, lies
still in the future.
Nevertheless, we already find the seeds of sceptical doubt in the De
Imaginatione. Error is spoken of in a context that fits in rather well
with Aristotelian opinion on the subject. Pico considers error to originate primarily in the imagination, and only to a relatively minor
extent in the senses.
It is the testimony of philosophers and medical men that one's imagination

is determined by the relative supply of blood, phlegm, red bile, or black bile.
Thus, in correspondence with the diversity of humors, one's imagination is
stimulated to diverse images; cheerful, dull, grim, sad. Influenced by these
humors in the act of cognizing, the spiritual eye of the soul, the intellect,
changes and is deceived, just as the bodily eye experiences illusions through
tinted, parti-colored lenses ... Although to the intellect truth itself is of one
and its own nature, pure and unmixed, yet, on account of diverse and contrary phantasms, truth appears manifold, corrupted, and mixed. Moreover,
those men are doubtless more fitted to perceive the verity of things, who,
through bodily temperaments or through skill and practice, or by the special
privilege of divine bounty, have obtained purer and simpler phantasms. 46

This passage, written some fifteen or twenty years before the Examen
Vanitatis, is of great interest for the ways in which it is similar to, and
those in which it is different from, the later work. It already shows a
strong tendency to doubt the verity of knowledge attained by natural
means. Here the major reason for doubt resides in the variability of
temperament to which the human bodyis subject. Because of this, "the
spiritual eye of the soul, the intellect, changes and is deceived"; and
we see already the possibility for a variety of errors to enter the human
intellect. Pi co has accomplished this without straying too far either
from the text or spirit of Aristotle.
Why is the major burden of error later heaped upon the senses rather
than upon the imagination? This is not easy to answer. By the time of
46 "Quem ad lllodurn sanguine, pituita, bile rubra, aut atra abundat quispiam, sic et eius

imaginatio philosophorum medicorumque testimonio huius modi naturam sectatur, ut pro

eorum diversitate ad diversas imagines - hilares, torpidas, truculentas, maestas - exstimuletur, a quibus non secus intellectus, spiritualis ani mae oculus, in cognoscendo variat atque
decipitur ac corporeus depictis variegatisque specillis hallucinatur ... Ita et intellectui
evenit quod, ei veritas ipsa quamquam suapte natura una est pura atque impermixta, ob
diversa tamen contrariaque phantasmata multiplex, infecta, permixtaque praesentetur.
Qui autem vel temperatura corporis, vel arte et exercitio, vel speciali divinae largitatis privilegio, puriora simplicioraque phantasmata adepti sunt, ii ad percipiendam rerum veritatem
aptiores procul dubio sunt." De [mag., 8; pp. 50-53.

100

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

the composition of the Examen Vanitatis, Pico had definitely moved out
of the sphere of Aristotelianism into that of anti-Aristotelianism. The
answer to the question perhaps lies in the fact that the origin of all of
our natural knowledge - at least in Gianfrancesco's interpretation of
Aristotle - is to be derived from sense experience. After seeing that
Aristotle's epistemology rests on the slogan "Nihil est in intellectu ... ,"
it is a significantly more telling blow to show that all which we derive
from sense experience is doubtful, than to show that the link between
sense and intellect (i.e. imagination) is untrustworthy. When the source
of the stream is polluted, there remains little hope of finding a healthy
draught along the way.
There is, however, a further significant change that takes place in
our author's position, one that perhaps marks the transition from mere
doubt to scepticism. In the De Imaginatione, a chapter is devoted to
"How the Disorder of the Imagination, and the Falsity Originating in
the Temperament of the Body and the Objects of the Senses, Can Be
Corrected and Cured." 47 In this chapter an attempt is made - still in
terms of humoral physiology - to provide corrections for the maladies
that cause a defective imagination. "The disorders which arise from
the temperament of the body are to be cured by bodily things," 48 our
author says. Such a statement stands in bold contrast to the Examen
Vanitatis. Practically nothing is said in the latter work about remedying
the problems which confront us in our quest for natural knowledge. 49
Rather, after each book of the later work, there is an exhortation to
turn aside from the quest for natural knowledge and to turn to the
infallible knowledge of Scripture.
This, I think, marks a significant change in the younger Pico's intellectual orientation. If there is a single factor that marks the boundary
between mere doubt and true scepticism, it is the fact that for the
sceptic the situation cannot be remedied; for the doubter, remedy may
be difficult, but is, nevertheless, possible. To turn to Scripture, as Pico
recommends, is no real solution in the philosophical sense (though in a
religious sense it may be), but merely an admission that such insurmountable problems are not, in the final analysis, of prime importance
for the salvation of the soul. The contrast between the two stages of
Pico's thought is clear. In the first stage the Aristotelian system, al47 "Quo modo imaginationis morbus falsitasque de corporis temperatura deque object is
sensuum proveniens corrigi curarique possit." Ibid., 9; pp. 56-57.
48 "Qui de corporis temperatura manant morbi corporeis rebus curandi." Ibid., 9; pp.
58-59
.
49 The attempt of the De Imaginatione is given bare mention, but nothing further is said of
it. See Ex. Van., IV, 12 ; p. 689.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

101

though containing inconsistencies and flaws, is considered, nevertheless,

to be a useful working hypothesis from which to take a point of departure. Although it does not give the same final answers as does
Christianity, it still offers a useful approach to certain types of questions.
In the second, or "sceptical," stage Pi co judges the Aristotelian system
to be unreliable to its very core. All knowledge gained through the
principles of this system has a character that is irremediably doubtful.
The only solution to this situation is to turn completely away from
Aristotelian philosophy and to rely wholly upon the truths of the
Christian Scriptures.

( 4) The Third W cry

A further serious charge, which Gianfrancesco brings against Aristotle, is that true and certain definitions cannot be found by the
methods taught by Aristotle. HPico's objection could be substantiated,
this would be a serious flaw, for the entire Aristotelian discussion of
scientific demonstration is based on the presupposition that the true
definitions of things can be known. We cannot go into the many involved questions which surround the problem of definition in the
Aristotelian writings, but we shall try to give a summary of the major
points in so far as they are dealt with in Pico's critique.
Mter considering the possibility that demonstration and definition
are the same thing, Aristotle concludes that they are in fact quite
different. He holds this for several reasons, including the fact that
demonstration proceeds from definitions and of definition there can be
no demonstration. 50 Consequently, definitions are outside the realm of
demonstration, but themselves are necessary for valid demonstration.
But how do we reach a definition if it is accessible neither by demonstration nor induction,51 as is said later? First of all, "definition is of the
essence and of the substance" 52 and must be framed in terms of genus
and difference. 53 Therefore, the definition of an object will consist in
placing it in a genus and progressively differentiating it from other
50 Post. An. goh24-25. Also see gOh28-33. Note especially 1. 30. The reasons for Aristotle's
holding these positions are explained at 72h18-25 and 84a29-h2 and are ultimately hased on
the impossibility of demonstrating everything. As the opening sentence of the Posterior Anarytics so aptly says, "All teaching and all intellectual knowledge arises from pre-existent knowledge" (7Ial-2). Also see De An. 402b25-26.
51 Because induction merely shows that and not why. Cf. Post. An. 92a37-h2.
52 Post. An. goh30-31.
53 Topics 14Ib26-27. Cf. Topics 103b15. On definition in Aristotle see Zeller, op. cit., I,pp.
265-73 and G. Vailati, "La teoria aristotelica della definizione", in his Scritti (FlorenceLeipzig, Igl I), pp. 485-96. On definition as it refers to the classification of animals seeD. M.
Balme, "Aristotle's Use of Differentiae in Zoology," Aristote et les problemes de methode: Symposium Aristotelicum (Louvain, Ig61), pp. Ig5-212.'

102

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

members of that same genus. 54 But such a method of definition depends

also on three other rules in order to be adjudged properly executed. 55
These rules may be stated as follows: (I) the attributes selected upon
which the differences are to be based must be of the object's essence
(ev 't"c{) 't"[ e:Q"'t"L); (2) they must be arranged in order of priority; and (3)
the selection must be complete. The process of definition should be
carried out in such a way that "the genus ought to separate the subject
from all other things and the differentia from something in the same
genus." 56 Therefore, if we want to define man, according to the Aristotelian system, we will first place him in the genus of "animal"; we
will then progressively differentiate him from other animals by following one or more lines of distinguishing characteristics. For example, we
might begin by making the first difference "two-footed" and so on until
we reach the ultima differentia wherein "man" has been distinguished
from all other members of the genus "animal." The classical pictorial
representation of this process is to be found in the so-called Tree of
Porphyry. Needless to say, this process, which was exhaustively discussed by both Porphyry and Boethius, was one of the most debated philosophical questions of the Middle Ages. What does Gianfrancesco Pi co
have to say about the matter? Although he does not place as much
emphasis on the faults he finds in the Aristotelian method of definition
as on those he finds in basing scientific knowledge on the materials of
sense, he does not lightly pass over the subject. For Aristotle, if true
definition cannot be found, nothing can be truly demonstrated. 57 In
Book V of the Examen Vanitatis Pico tries to prove that there is no
way in which we can arrive at a true definition. The arguments of the
sceptics, which our author recalls having used before, he will not use
here. Rather, he will give his own reasons for disagreeing with Aristotle. 58
54 This process is described in several places in Aristotle's writings. For example see Metaph. Z, 12 (I037b8-I038a35); Post. An. II, 13-14 (96a20~98a23); Topics VI-VII (139a24155a39). The latter considers specific problems that are encountered in formulating a definition.
55 Post. An. 97a23-b8.
56 Topics 140a27-28. The translation is from the Loeb edition of this work, p. 569.
57 " .. nam si non est reperire veram definitionem, fieri neutiquam poterit, ut quicquam
vere demonstretur, quomodo in posterioribus Analyticis demonstrandum Aristoteles docuit".
Ex. Van., V, 7; p. 723. For Aristotle's statement see our note 50 above.
58 "Primo sump tum probemus, ostendendo nullam dari vere definiendi certam facultatem, non iam scepticis excursionibus usi adversus ipsam definitionem, quarurn tertia
huius operis libra mentionem fecimus, sed in Lyceo vel stantes vel passu nil concitato deambulantes. Dixi vere definiendi, quoniam et describendi et quoquo pacto non tamen vere et
exacte definiendi, multos et ipse modos tradidi in secundo libra Logicarum Institutionum.
Sane apud Aristotelem vere definiendi facultas minime tradita est, quanquam ipse multis
locis definitionis meminit ... " Ibid., V, 7; pp. 723-24. For Pico's discussion of the sceptic

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

103

Pico asks several penetrating questions with regard to the ultimae

differentiae, which play so important a role in Aristotelian definition.
Some feel that it is not humanly possible to arrive at a definition by the
method set forth by Aristotle, our author argues. For example, St.
Thomas in the De Ente et Essentia says that we cannot come to know the
essential differences and the proper accidents of things. 59 In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, when discussing the Aristotelian process of definition, the same author says that it is sometimes necessary that the
differences used in defining must be per accidens, if the essentials upon
which they are based are unknown to us. 60 Thomas' argument is of
course a valid one and points to one of the fundamental problems of
the Aristotelian system as a whole. The question, "How do we know
the substance of things, if our knowledge is gained primarily through
their accidents?," Pico will consider later. Aristotle does not consider
the question in contexts where he discusses definition, but rather gives
the impression that the essence of things can be known and thereby
their definition. 61 That Aristotle also held that a large part of our
knowledge of substances is gained through their accidents, is easily
documentable from Aristotle's writings and will be discussed later.62
We see again that in the final analysis the critique ofthe problems of
knowing the ultimae differentiae hinges on the fact that these must be
known through sense experience and this is subject to the many fallacies which we have already discussed. Another of the Aristotelian modes
of knowledge has been found to rest on the support of the sense world
and therefore, to Pico's mind, becomes doubtful with all of the rest.
notions on the subject of definition see Ex. Van ., III, 10; pp. 638- 39. Cf. Sextus Empiricus,
Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 205-12 ; vol. I, pp . 284-89. The Logicae Institutiones is lost as we
mentioned before.
S9 "In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales nobis ignotae sunt;
unde significantur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa
significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem
propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt ; unde differentiae earum nee per se
nec per aecidentales nobis signifieari possunt."De ente et essentia, 6, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis
. .. Opera Omnia (Parma, 1865) XVI, p. 336a.
60 "Sed tamen quandoque aliquis dividens difFerentias "faciet hoc" ut scilicet dividat per
ea quae sunt secundum accidens, propter hoc quod non potest invenire proprias et per se
differentias. Aliquando enim necessitas cogit, ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum, differentiis per accidens, inquantum sunt signa quaedam:differentiarurn essentialium nobis igno-

tarum." Comm. in libros metaph. VII, 12; ed. cit. XX, p. 495a. The Metaphysics text commented
on is 1038a8- 24. Pico's comments appear in Ex. Van ., V, 7; pp. 724-25.
61 Aristotle states clearly that neither genus nor differentia are accidental qualities. See
Topics 144a22-27 and Post. An. 93a21-29. It is also quite apparent from the Metaphysics
argument (VII, 12) that this is the case. It is worth noting that Averroes specifically rejects
division per accidens in his commentary on the Metaphysics passage in question. See Aristotelis
Stagiritae Omnia quae extant Opera (Averrois Cordubensis in ea opera omnes qui ad nos pervenere Commentarii) (Venice, 1573- 75) vol. VIII , fol. 196.
62 See our discussion below, pp. 1 iO-1 7.

104-

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

On the other hand, there are some who argue that the ultimae
differentiae can be known, Pi co continues, but they never tell us precisely how one comes to know them. Or, furthermore, how do they
know that what they call the last differences are actually the last? 63
Do they claim to know these last differences by sense or by intellect? If
they claim to know them by sense, they do not escape the criticisms of
Pico's previous arguments. If by intellect, how does the intellect come
to know the accidents of things? Conseq uen tly, there are difficul ties in
the Aristotelian scheme which cannot be overcome. Pico therefore
concludes that a mode of definition which depends upon knowledge of
the ultimae differentiae is no adequate definition at all. 64
Pico also raises the question of how we are to know that what we
consider to be the last difference is actually the last. This point must be
given careful consideration when we attempt to define by division. Our
modern Linnean system of scientific nomenclature might be looked
upon as an application of the Aristotelian method, although there are
marked differences between the two. Within this system, now universally accepted by scientists, there has been by no means complete
agreement on all items defined. In such a system there arise several
problems which Pico does not consider. First, what is our criterion for
division? It is not always easy to know along which lines to divide,
especially if one takes a more or less nominalistic position that there is
no essential nature which unites all members of the same genus.
Secondly, how do we know that further division will not be discovered
after we have found the "last difference?" This is a particularly difficult
problem in certain branches of natural science, e.g. fresh water mollusca or tropical birds. These problems did not occur to Gianfrancesco
it seems, although with his sceptical orientation it somehow seems
63 "Nec me latet quibusdam placuisse fieri posse, ut cognoscantur, sed quaenam sint illae
differentiae ultimae, neutiquam verbum factum est ab eis, quod sciam; solas etiam accidentium differentias ultimas cognosci quidam asseveraverunt, a quibus libenter peterem, quo
pac to cognoverunt, quod ultimae videlicet sint differentiae, quas afferunt tanquam ultimas"?
Ex. Van. V, 7; p. 725.
64 "Nam si sensu id se dicant discriminis depraehendisse, tam erit incertum illas esse
ultimas, quam incerta erit sensus ipsa sententia,quam supra docuimus incertam, ambiguam et
nutabundam. Si vero intellectu dicant se potius id assequi de modo, quo intellectus accidentia cognoscit, primo quaeram et an sensu duce? ut tandem a coeno nequeant avellere
plantam. Nec item me praeterit ultimas specierum ultimarum differentias ignotas dici a multis, non tamen nesciri eas, quae sunt generum specierumque subalternarum differentiae. At cur
nam hoc? cum quas fatentur neseiri proximiores sunt sensui, quibus prim as deferunt in cognoscendo parteis? Sed et eadem quoque eos cireumstat difficultas, sensu ne videlicet, an intellectu eas ipsas depraehenderint? Si sensu, cum differentiae generum et specierum substantiae
sint, quomodo, cum et ipsa quoque genera et species substantiae habeantur, sensus eas non
agnoscet? quem tamen constat solis accidentibus immorari. Si intellectu? sensu fuit opus in
primis, qui quam fallax est, tam erit et fallax indagatio et incerta depraehensio." Ibid., V, 7;

P7 2 5

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

105

strange that they didn't. The problem of the "criterion" is certainly an

apparent one here; even Aristotle admits that it is difficult to determine
the legitimate line of division to follow - i.e. the essential, as opposed to
the accidental. It would seem that this should offer a perfect opportunity
for Pico to use one of his favorite weapons, the problem of the criterion.
Pico raises other objections of varying degrees of importance. It is
noted that Aristotle at one place maintains that definition consists
merely in the ultima differentia 65 and elsewhere says that it is both genus
and ultima differentia. 66 Moreover, Aristotle argues that the singular (i.e.
the species) is more easily defined than is the universal (i.e. the genus), 67
whereas many of Aristotle's followers, particularly Themistius, hold
the opposite. 68 Pico also defends Speusippus against Aristotle's CrIticism in the Posterior Anarytics. The former apparently had argued
that in order to define something, a knowledge of that thing's relation
to everything else is necessary. Aristotle argued that such exhaustive
knowledge is not necessary.69 Pico, of course, goes to the defense of
Speusippus, citing Nicholas of eusa to the effect that "if precise knowledge is had of anyone thing, it is necessary that it be had of everything." 70
The criticisms of Aristotle's theory of definition seem to be preliminary to Gianfrancesco's main argument. He tries to show by the most
pragmatic of means - i.e. by pointing out the great disagreement that
there has been in the history of philosophy concerning the definition of
man - that clear and precise definition is impossible. Following one of
his favorite forms of argument, he says:
It certainly seems to me, if the differences of things could be found by man,
there should at least have been found long ago that one, by which man himself is properly constituted and by which he is separated from the other
animals. That there has been a controversy about this from the earliest times,
we shall soon show .... Who is there who does not see that from this it follows that Aristotle's demonstrative art is uncertain, since he uses definition
as a means? ... And likewise he advises that definition must be attended to
in each individual demonstration. Consequently, if the definition is not
known, it is necessary that the demonstration be taken away. 71
Metaph. I038a19.
Post. An. 96b33-35.
67 Ibid., 97b28- 29.
68 Paraphrasis in Post. An. II, 13 (Teubner ed. I, p. 93, lines 29- 30).
69 Post. An. 97a6-22. See Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy
(Baltimore, (944) I, pp. 59-64.
70 "Cui quidem Speusippo, quanquam aliud agens Nicolaus Cusa, in tertio Idiotae libro,
ubi agitur de mente, videtur aperte suffragari, cum scribit, quod si de una re precisa
scientia habereur, omnium rerum scientia necessario haberetur." Ex. Van ., V, 7; p . 726. Cf.
Idiotae III, 3 in Nicolai De Cusa, Opera Omnia (Lipsiae, 1932f.), vol. V, pp. 51-54.
71 "Mihi certe videtur, si inveniri possent ab homine rerum differentiae, debuisset utique
65
66

106

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

Here Pico attempts to show the widespread disagreement among the

various philosophers and philosophic schools. This is the predominant
method used in the first three books of the Examen Vanitatis, where Pico
attempted to show the unreliability of non-Christian philosophy by
demonstrating that the whole history of pagan philosophy has been
marked by constant disagreement between the various schools. Again,
our author argued in Book IV that Aristotelian philosophy is unreliable
because of the cons tan tly varying in terpretation of the master's wri tings.
Here he tries to do the same thing with regard to the definition of man.
Actually such a procedure is but a subcategory of the argument from
authority. It is an argument from lack of authority. It is a method that
certainly has precedents in Sextus Empiricus and, to a lesser extent, in
certain of Plato's or Cicero's philosophical dialogues, a technique that
will appear on nearly every page of Montaigne and other sceptics after
Pico. To argue that there is constant disagreement regarding a given
subject and, consequently, that we can never know the truth about it, as
Pico here does, is but another mark of scepticism - albeit, a rather naive
type of scepticism. It is, after all, just another instance of arguing that
something is uncertain because of conflicting evidences. There is little
difference between saying that we cannot really know that honey is
sweet because to some men with jaundice it tastes bitter and saying
that we cannot know the definition of man because our most esteemed
authorities do not agree on it. The second is merely a step further
removed from the experiential world.
What use does Pico make of his argument in the case of the definition
of man? First of all, Aristotle had held that man is the best known of
the animals and that from our knowledge of man we can proceed to the
study of the other animals. 72 But, our author continues, Aristotle admits shortly afterwards that there is a good deal of uncertainty regarding the internal parts of man and often we must learn about these
by comparing them to those of other animals similar to man. 73 Furthermore, St. Ambrose held that man must learn about himself by first
learning about the other animals. 74 Moreover, when Aristotle spoke of
ea, quae sua est ipsius differentia, qua proprie homo constituitur, qua dispescitur a caeteris
animalibus, iam diu esse inventa, super qua tamen a prima est antiquitate certatum, uti
paulo post monstrabimus ... Ex hac re quis est qui sequi non videat, artem demonstratricem Aristotelis incertam esse, quoniam definitione utitur ipse tamquam medio ... Atque
identidem monet observandum in omni particulari demonstratione. Quare ignorata definitione demonstrationem subIa tam iri necesse est." Ex Van., V, 7; p. 725.

De Hist. An. 49IaI9-23.

Ibid., 494b21-22.
I have not been able to find a passage that spells this out in precisely the same terms
indicated by Pico. Chapters 3 and 4 of Book VI of the Exameron (GSEL, XXXII, pp. 209-23)
72
73
74

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

107

the definition of man in the Metaphysics,75 he used the example of

distinguishing man by his characteristic of being two-footed. Would
he have passed over a more proper distinction had he known one? Pico
asks. Others say, however, that man is animal rationale. He will then
infer that this is man. Someone a little more skilfull will then deny this
inference. 76 Thus Pico argues that there is no end to the quarrels which
occur over the matter of precise definition. We can never "reach
bottom," as it were. Additional refinements can always be found which
will modify any given definition. All definitions are only provisional
and not "essential" as Aristotle held.
Is there only one species of rational animal? "That there are many
species of irrational animal no one denies; what is to prevent there
being many species ofrational ones as well?" 77 Porphyry has argued
this, Gianfrancesco goes on to explain. In the Isagoge,78 he distinguishes
between animals which are rational and mortal (e.g. man) and those
which are rational and immortal (e.g. God). Moreover, the same
author argues in the De Abstinentia that the term "rational" should
be attributed to all living things which are endowed with memory and
sense. 79 Furthermore, there is the problem of the classification of the
demones. Are these creatures, which are supposedly between God and
man, to be considered rational animals? Although this concept (i.e. of
the demones) pervades principally the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition
and was discussed by essentially all of those who fell under its influence,80 such notions have also been discussed by Aristotle and his
followers, continues Gianfrancesco. In order to make his point that the
notion of the demones pervades the whole of the philosophical tradition
give numerous examples from which man is bidden to pay attention to the actions of animals
and learn thereby, It seems that this is what our author has in mind.
75 I037b8-1038a35.
76 "Aristoteles in septimo Primae Philosophiae de hominis locutus definitione, bipedis exemplo est usus: putamus ne illam quae est vera et propria differentia, si non ignorasset, ab eo
fuisse sub silentio praetermissam? At dicet quispiam, num tu es animal rationale? Quid tum
ergo homo subinferet. Negabit consecutionem quispiam paulo peritior." Ex. Van., V, 8; p.

72 7.

77 "Cum multae sint species irrationalium animantium, quod nemo negat, multas etiam
rationalium esse debere, quid prohibet"? Ibid. , V, 8; pp. 727-28.
78 Porphyrii Isagoge, ed. Adolphus Busse in CAG (Berlin, 1887), vol. IV, pars I, p. IO, lines
10-12.
79 In Book III, I; Porphyrii . .. Opuscula Selecta ed. A. Nauck, (Leipzig, 1886), p. 187,
lines 14-17. Here Porphyry attributes the view that all souls which partake in memory and
sense are rational to the Pythagoreans. He himself endorses it also, however.
80 This is true of a later Christian Platonist such as Ficino, who still devoted a good deal
of attention to speculating about demones. See e.g. the commentary on the Symposium in
Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur Ie Banquet de Platon, ed. Raymond Marcel (Paris, 1956), esp.
pp. 201 - 205 and D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magicfrom Ficino to Campanella (London,
1958), pp. 42-53.

108

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

and offers a serious challenge to the definition of man as rational

animal our author goes to rather ridiculous extremes. Since this is a
prime example of the weakness of Gianfrancesco's method, we shall
discuss it in some detail. Pico first argues that Aristotle held that there
are such things as demones. This contention is based principally on a
text in the Metaphysics which says that the term substance is predicated
both of simple bodies and of composite bodies such as animals (~Cl)IX)
and demones (OIX~fL6v~IX).81 From this context and others it seems clear
enough that Aristotle did not use the term demones in the way which
Pico thought. 82 Nevertheless, our author holds that it is Aristotle's
considered opinion that there are demones and that they can divided
into parts. 83 Pico further argues that Aristotle several times spoke of
God as being an animal. 84 With such evidence in view, Pico concludes:
Thus, if according to Aristotle the demones have parts, if he called God an
animal and a species of animal, and if in the last book of the Metaphysics,
"He [i.e. God] is the most divine of the things which appear to us," it
follows that according to him these things [i.e. the demones and God] are
rational animals. Therefore, doesn't it follow that Aristotle's opinion regarding the demones and gods doesn't differ from that of the Platonists, who
said that the demones are corporeal and rational? Certainly in this matter
there would have been no difficulty for my uncle Giovanni Pi co to reconcile
Plato and Aristotle. 85

Additional evidence is given to prove that St. Thomas also supported

Gianfrancesco's view that Plato and Aristotle were basically in agreement regarding this.86 From the bulk of the evidence cited, Pi co
Metaph. 1017blO-13.
Ross argues that Aristotle here refers to the "heavenly bodies" when he uses the term
8ClL[.LOV[Cl and gives parallel texts to support this view. See W. D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle's Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, 1924) I, p. 310. It is evident
that the word is used in an off-hand way and certainly not with the fixed terminological
significance that it found in Plato and the Pythagoreans. This is also apparent from Bonitz'
Index Aristotelicus.
83 St. Thomas (Comm. in libros Metaph. V, lectio 10; ed. cit., XX, p. 403a) is cited also as
commenting on this text. Thomas, also seemed to recognize it as more Platonic than Aristotelian.
84 For example Metaph. 1072b28-29, De An. 402b7. See Hicks' (op. cit., p. 188) nott.: on the
latter.
85 "Si daemones itaque, Aristotele authore, partes habent, si Deum esse dixit animal et
animal is speciem, si et in Metaphysicorum etiam postremo, tern, 1l1: -r:&v 'f'ClLVO[.LEVWV
8EL6-r:Cl-r:OV; est autem divinissimum eorum, quae apparent; sequitur eos esse secundumipsum rationalia animalia. Num et hinc deducitur Aristotelis de daemonibus et diis opinionem
non differre a Platonicis? Qui et corporeos dixerunt et rationales. Hac in re certe nullus fuisset
labor Ioanni Pico patruo meo in conciliando Platone et Aristotele." Ex. Van., V, 8; p. 729.
The quotation is from Aristotle's Metaphysics, I074b16.
86 In addition to the text cited above (note 82), Pico mentions Sum. Theol. I, I, q. 70, a.3
(ed. cit., I, pp. 273-74) and De Spirit. Creat. a.1 (ed. cit. VIII, pp. 425-30). It should be noted
that our author conveniently neglects to mention a most interesting and pertinent text in the
81

82

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

109

concludes that we cannot attribute to Aristotle the opinion, "animal

rationale, ergo homo." 87
What has our author proven here? Or better, what has he attempted
to prove? He has attempted to show that the commonly held definition
of man as a rational animal is inadequate, for it does not sufficiently
distinguish man from other beings which also have these characteristics
of animality and rationality. Has he actually succeeded in doing this?
It seems not. In his eager attempt to attribute to Aristotle a view that
would tend to make the definition animal rationale inadequate to describe man, he has taken enormous liberties in interpreting the Aristotelian text. Aristotle does say what Pico attributes to him. On the
other hand, there is a clear difference between the spirit and the letter
of many an Aristotelian passage. This is a most important consideration
that our author seldom allows to enter into his own reasoning. In fact,
here it seems as though he has done little else than to seize upon certain
texts where Aristotle was imprecise in his terminology and to try to
make this Aristotle's considered opinion. The feebleness and even
foolishness of such an approach is apparent and is but a single instance
of the many in which Gianfrancesco Pico did not use sound judgment.
Other arguments of an equally trifling nature are offered. Contingent cases of various sorts are mentioned in further efforts to show
that the rational animal definition is not specific enough to characterize man. For example, Pi co points to the intelligence of different
animals, a favorite argument of the sceptics. 88 Furthermore, philosophers like Anaxagoras, Porphyry, Plutarch, or Plato have indicated
that all animals, and not only man, partake of reason to a greater or
lesser degree. 89 In view of such conflicting evidence, we must reject
the Greek definition of man as one receptive of intelligence and science
(voG xcx.l E:mcr't'~fL"1]<; oex-nx6v), Pi co says, following Sextus Empiricus. 9o
work De Substantiis Separatis. Here Thomas devotes an entire chapter to the differences between the opinion of Plato and that of Aristotle on the matter. Particularly incisive for the
present discussion is the following: " ... quia Aristoteles non posuit aliquas animas medias
inter caelorum animas et animas hominum, sicut posuit Plato: unde de daemonibus nullam
invenitur nee ipse nee ejus sequaces fecisse mentionem." ed. cit., XVI, p. 187a.
87

"Quare videtur Aristoteles ipsam connexionem, animal rationale, ergo homo, per ea,

quae dicta sunt, aperte reprobare." Ex. Van ., V, 8; p . 729.

88 Many examples of this are to be found throughout the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, nor are
they absent from many other ancient works such as Aristotle's naturalistic writings, Aelian,
or Pliny. Pico's argument is often repeated by later sceptics, e.g. Montaigne in his Apologie de
Raimond Sebond offers many examples of animal intelligence in his effort to minimize man's
preeminent place in the universe. See note 127 below.
89 Numerous examples of this sort are given in Ex. Van., V, 8; pp. 731-32.
90 Ibid., V, 8; p. 733. This seems to be taken from Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 26 (Loeb ed.,
pp. 168- 69) which argues that some hold that "man is a rational mortal animal, receptive of

110

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

Gianfrancesco Pi co has argued that there is uncertainty in the matter

of definition; and, consequently, Aristotle's theory of demonstration, in
which precise definition plays a central role, must be abandoned. Beyond the doubts concerning Aristotle's technique of definition, Pica
tries to argue that we must remain uncertain about definition, for even
such a key notion as "man" has by no means been given a definition
that is both unambiguous and generally accepted by all philosophers.
If the principles upon which demonstration is based are clearer and
more certain than the demonstration derived from them, as Aristotle
held, and if the definitions which make up these principles are themselves uncertain; then, our author can conclude that woefully little
confidence can be placed in the demonstrations themselves.
(5) The Fourth Way
After his long harangue that precise definition is impossible, Gianfrancesco attempts to seal off any other avenue of escape by arguing
that "even if we can reach a definition, it cannot be done by Aristotle's
rules." He, therefore, tries to show that Aristotle's concept of definition
(i.e. 't"OU 't"L ecr't"~ xoct oucrLOCC;) is such that it it can never be attained
through the means allowed by Aristotelian philosophy. We have already seen that Pi co has noted that there is a difficult problem involved
in knowing the essence of things from sense experience alone. He now
raises the question, "If definition lies in the essence of things, how are
we to reach a knowledge of this essence from Aristotle's sense-based
epistemology?" The problem is sharpened by the fact that Aristotle
says in several places that we come to a knowledge of the essence of
something through the accidental qualities of that thing. For example,
in a passage from the De Anima cited by Pico it is put as follows: "For
when we are able to give an account of all, or at any rate most of the
attributes ('t"wv crufL~7J~7Jx6't"UlV) as they are presented to us, then we
shall be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the
thing." 91 Although this passage is not unambiguous,92 Pico accepts it
more or less at face value and tries to make it fit in with what Aristotle
says about definition elsewhere. Gianfrancesco's view is also colored by
intelligence and science." Such a definition is rejected by Sextus who says that "all animals are
receptive of intelligence and science."
91 De. An. 402b22-25. The translation is taken from Hicks, op. cit., p. 7. This difficulty of
knowing the essences of things agrees with many other statements of Aristotle. For example,
see the passages cited in the previous chapter, notes 103-108.
92 Some ofthe problems are discussed by Hicks, op. cit., pp. 191-93 in his notes to 402b1825

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

111

the Thomistic teaching that we cannot know the essence of things in

this life, but we can only approach them through their accidents. 93
Here, as elsewhere, he follows Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle,
which strongly emphasizes this unknowability.
Although Pico adds a good deal of argument and counter-argument
to his discussion of the problem, the key to his objection may be stated
quite simply: (I) Aristotle's theory of demonstration is based on sound
definitions. (2) Definitions are of the essences of things. (3) Aristotle
further says that we come to know the essences through the accidental
qualities inherent in the things. (4) But this is impossible for two
reasons, (a) the knowledge gained through the senses is unreliable for
the reasons previously given and (b) there is an infinite gulf between
knowledge per accidens and knowledge of the essence, and we can never
approach the latter through the former.
Just what Aristotle's position was on the matter is very difficult to
assess. He certainly speaks of definition as though it were possible to
attain and, indeed, it is necessary for "scientific demonstration." On
the other hand, there is Aristotle's distinction between those things
"most knowable to us" and those "most knowable by nature" and the
De Anima passage cited above, which implies that accurate definitions
are hard to come by. These seem to represent two conflicting viewpoints within the writings of Aristotle himself and do represent two
strands within the tradition. The more "scientific" and "naturalistic"
thinkers (e.g. Theophrastus, Averroes, and Zabarella) often tend
toward the first view, while the more "theological" and "metaphysical"
interpreters (e.g. the N eoplatonic commentators and Thomas Aquinas)
tend toward the second view. There is certainly a good deal oflatitude
for both interpretations. In an overall view, it seems as though Aristotle
wanted to hold that the knowledge of essences is possible, for otherwise
there could be no "science." On the other hand, the difficulty of
knowing such essences is recognized often and it seems that the recondite and enigmatic character of the Platonic "ideas" was still in the
back of Aristotle's mind whenever he mentioned the '1:0 '1: ~v dV<X:L.
As we might expect beforehand, Gianfrancesco Pico will tend

toward the more Platonic view of reality. In doing so, he recognizes the
problems raised by the other aspect of Aristotle's methodology. He
93 In addition to our notes 59 and 60 above, see also Thomas' comments on the text in
question in Comm. in libros de Anima I, I (ed. cit., III, p. 46). The key passage here says, "Sed
quia principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota, ideo oportet quod utamur differentiis
accidentalibus in designatione essentialum . " Et per eas, scilicet per differentias accidentales, devenimus in cognitionem essentialium."

112

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

finds it difficult to reconcile these two aspects of Aristotle, particularly

since his own general view of the unintelligibility of the physical world
found solace in the more theological interpreters of Aristotle such as
St. Thomas. For Gianfrancesco, knowledge of accidental qualities is no
knowledge at all, for between accident and substance lies an unbridgeable gap which no epistemology can traverse. Consequently, for him,
the Aristotelian technique of approaching substance through accident,
where the "most knowable per se" is approached by the "most knowable
quoad nos" is untenable, for it merely tries to connect the sense world
to the world of essences, a feat that cannot be done.
The problems raised for the younger Pico by this dichotomy are
perhaps nowhere better to be seen than in a brief chapter which he
devotes to a discussion of demonstration quia and demonstration
propter quid. 94 Aristotle makes this distinction when he speaks of knowing
(btlcr't"cx.cr6IXL) a fact (5't"L) and knowing its reason (oL6't"L).95 The first type
of knowledge does not playa central role in Aristotelian science and is
little discussed by the master himself. When the Christian theologians
became increasingly interested in Aristotle, the distinction became
clearer and clearer, for in their view God is the prime example of a
being whose existence can be demonstrated (quia, 5n), but the reason
for it (propter quid, oL6't"L) cannot be given. 96 This distinction became
extremely important in the later Middle Ages (often being called
demonstration a posteriori and a priori by that time 97 ), becoming one of
94
95

Ex. Van., V, II; pp. 743-46.

Post. An. I, 13, 78a22f. Also II, I 89b23-31.

96 For example we read the following very clear statement in Thomas Aquinas: " ...
duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora
simpliciter; alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt
priora quoad nos. Cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. Es quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam ejus esse, si tamen ejus effectus sint magis noti quoad nos; quia cum effectus
dependeant a causa, posito effectu, necesse est causam praeexistere. U nde Deum esse secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos."
Sum. Theol. I, I, q .2, a.2 (ed. cit., I, p. 8b)
This is not to say that the distinction did not play an important role in the methodology of
the "naturalistic" followers of Aristotle. Perhaps more than in the "theological" tradition it
became significant through Galen, Averroes, and the Italian Aristotelians from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. This aspect is traced in John Herman Randall, Jr.,
"The Development of the Scientific Method in the School of Padua," in his The School of
Padua and the Emergence of Modern Scierzce (Padua, Ig61), pp. 13-68. Here I mean to emphasize
the unknowable aspect that essences had for the theologians and the impact of this on Pico.
Of the treatment of these concepts by the "scientific "tradition of Aristotelianism we will
say more below.
97 The distinction is perhaps nowhere so clearly drawn as in Albert of Saxony, who says,
"Demonstratio quaedam est procedens ex causis ad effectum et vocatur demonstratio a
priori et demonstratio propter quid et potissima; ... alia est demonstratio procedens ab
effectibus ad causas et tal is vocatur demonstratio a posteriori et demonstratio quia et demon-

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

113

the favorite topics of discussion among Aristotelians and non-Aristotelians alike.

As elsewhere, our author tends to read certain questions of later
philosophy back into Aristotle. Although Aristotle did make the distinction between the two types of knowledge, it was not as clear-cut a
separation as it later became. Pico, however, maintains the Scholastic
separation of these two modes of knowledge and attempts to point the
accusing finger at Aristotle for certain problems which arise when it is
coupled with his own philosophy.
Pica has argued that Aristotle's rules for reaching the definition of
something were inadequate because of the gulf between the world of
sense and the world of essence; here he wants to do likewise. He maintains, for example, that if we proceed by the a priori method we will not
be proceeding according to Aristotle's own rules. It must be remembered, our author argues, that things are most knowable to us through
the senses (or at least so Aristotle holds) and this is the usual way in
which we gain knowledge of them. But, if the process begins with
knowledge of the effect and proceeds to knowledge of the cause, how
do the senses reach the knowledge of the cause, which is of the essence?98
The problem involved here is twofold according to Gianfrancesco.
First, if we proceed by the a priori method (from cause to effect), how
can we begin with the cause, which is of the essence and not of the
accidentals, if the Aristotelian principle of "nihil est in intellectu ... "
is to be upheld ? Secondly, if we proceed by the a posteriori method (from
effect to cause) the problem is reversed. How can we ever come to
know the essential nature of the cause from the contingent character
of the effects? Again, these two are reducible to the same basic difficulty
which we have noted before, the difficulty of relating sense knowledge
to knowledge of the essence. Pica specifically rejects any type of"pragmatic" or "inductive" process whereby, little by little, we come to
stratio non potissima." As cited in Rudolf Eisler, Woerterbuch der Philosophischen Begrijfe, 4th
ed., (Berlin, 1927) I, p. 86.
98 "ltaque a priori simpliciter et absolute cum procedit Aristoteles, quaeri ab eius nimiis
amatoribus posset, quomodo effectum depraehendit? Quo pacto ipsius effectum causae,
quisquis ille fuerit effectus decernit? Nam si primo a causa procedit ad effectum ni suas deserat regulas, sensibiliter procedere ilium omnino necesse est; neque enim principia ilia intellectilia, nisi a sensu collegit, cognitis rebus singularibus, quoniam supra satis explicuimus.
Si sensibiliter, quaero primum quo modo prius causam agnovit? Nam si intellectilis est causa,
sensili opus fuit in primis, cum voluerit nos egere sensu, tamquam paedagogo. Quo pacto
enim per intellectum causa priusquam effectus cognoscetur? Si nihil in intellectu esse voluit,
quod prius non fuit in sensu, et ab effectu sensus cognitionem trahit. Si sensilis vero causa
fuerit, nihilominus earn nisi coniectura non potuit apprehendere, intermediis videlicet accidentibus, cum sensus ipse ad rei essentiam non pervadat." Ex. Van., V, II; p. 743.

114

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

know the one through the other. Such a method would simply be
circular reasoning.
If you say that you have come to recognize the one through the other [i.e.
cause through effect], and this in different ways and confusedly at first and
then distinctly, you go around in a circle. For, if you say that he first uses
sense and then, intellect, how will what he stated be true, that the demonstration per causam is more certain than demonstration per iffectum, since to
prove this he uses no other foundation that than of sense? But surely you
will say that sense is the prior way, intellect the surer and more proper. But
you cannot deny that it is credited to sense. Therefore, all certitude will
depend on sense, which perceives the effect through which the cause IS
known. 99

To the problem of connecting sense with intellect there are two

possible solutions. The first would be to reach intellectual knowledge
through a purely inductive and abstractive procedure. This, more or
less, was Aristotle's view. The second way would be to derive intellectual knowledge ab alto, by way of illumination as the Augustinians
held or by way of an &vcXfLYfJmc;, as in Plato. That Pico rejects outright
the first method is apparent from what has already been said and will
become more apparent when we discuss in greater detail his views on
induction. That he has some sympathy with the second approach is
shown by his defense of Henry of Ghent's theory of illumination. It
must be noted, however, that his sympathy for Henry goes only so far
as to allow illumination in matters offaith and religion; as far as rational knowledge of the physical world is concerned, our author remains in
the sceptical predicament.l oo
Let us now consider the question "Against whom is Pico's argument
directed?" To determine this precisely would be very difficult, for he
does not usually mention the names of living authors, particularly
when he is in disagreement with them. It seems, however, that we can
pinpoint quite accurately the group of thinkers against whom his
remarks here are directed. It must certainly be that group of northern
Italian Aristotelians who imprecisely go under the name of the "School
of Padua." For our purposes here we will take Agostino Nifo's Commen99 "Si alterum altero dicas agnovisse, idque diverse, confuse primum, mox et distincte,
circulo revolveris. Nam si sensu primum mox intellectu dicas illum fuisse usum, quo pacto
illud verum fuerit, quod ab eo proIa tum est, quod certior est, quae per causam quam quae per
effectum ducitur demonstratio, cum ad id monstrandum alio non nitatur fundamento quam
sensu? Dices sensus qmdem viam priorem esse, intellectus vero certiorem et digniorem. At
negare non potes quin sensui feratur accepta omnis, igitur certitudo pendebit a sensu qui
effectum percipit ex quo causa cognoscitur." Ibid., V, I I ; p. 743.
100 This is discussed in detail in Charles B. Schmitt, "Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and
Gianfrancesco Pico on Illumination", Mediaeval Studies; XXV (1963), pp. 231-58.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

115

tary on Aristotle's Physics as a representative work of the Aristotelians

during the early years of the sixteenth century.1 01 The orientation of
Gianfrancesco's remarks becomes apparent when he speaks of two
counter objections that might be raised against his critique. First, it
might be said that his arguments are valid only for those things which
are known by us in one way and by nature in another, since there are
some things which are simultaneously known both by us and by nature.
In these things we do not proceed from cause to effect or from effect to
cause, but the one is known when we know the other.1 02
The question whether the same thing can be equally known by us
and by nature is taken up in Nifo's Commentary. After discussing several
different points of view on the problem, he concludes that the same
thing can be equally known by us and by nature. This is primarily true
in mathematics, for in that field there is no contradiction involved in
saying that the same thing is known at the same time both by us and by
nature.1 03 In making such a statement, Nifo has to distinguish between
mathematical objects and physical objects. Such a distinction Pico will
not agree to, suddenly at this point abandoning the Platonic urge and
becoming more Aristotelian than Aristotle, so to speak. Aristotle sharply distinguished between the notiora nobis and the notiora naturae, Pico
insists, citing the opening chapter of the Physics. Nor does the distinction fail to hold in the realm of mathematics, he continues. Geometrical or arithmetical concepts (e.g. circle or number) can be known
101 This work, compiled in 1506, treats in abundant detail the important first chapter of
the Physics. We use the following edition: Augustini Niphi . .. Super octo Aristotelis Stagiritae
Libras de Physico Auditu . .. (Venice, 1559). Although our choice here is somewhat arbitrary,
Nifo's commentary gives a "typical" Aristotelian view and also the range of the questions
being debated in the early years of the sixteenth century. For example, Nifo specifically
rejects Pico's charge that the use of the "double procedure" is circular reasoning (see note
99). See Niphus, ed. cit., lib.i, text 4, pp. In- b. For other examples see Randall, op. cit. Nifo's
significance as more than a "timeserver" is clearly brought out by Edward P. Mahoney,
"The Early Psychology of Agostino Nifo" (Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University,
1966) , 2 vols. The loss of Pico's Logic is felt here, since his discussion of these important
problems is very sketchy in the Examen Vanitatis.
102 " . .. Primum quod non de omnibus demonstrationibus quia et propter quid nostra
in Aristotelem argumenta probent, quod probare tentavimus, sed de iis tantummodo quae
aliter nobis aliter naturae sunt nota. Sunt autem quaedam quae simul nobis simul naturae
cognita, in qui bus videlicet ex effectu non procedimus as causam, nec a causa remeamus ad
effectum, sed altero cognito cognoscitur et aiterum." Ex. Van. V, I I; p. 744
103 Niphus, op. cit., lib. i, text. 2, pp. 8a- b . Note especially, " . .. Dicerem igitur media
mathematica esse naturae nota per se, per accidens vero, non quatenus media, sed quatenus
possunt scribi in pulvere, sunt nota nobis. Averroes vero opinatus est enuntiatum Aristotelis
esse legendum indefinite, et sic hae duae subcontrariae sunt simul verae. Eadem non sunt
nobis nota et naturae, ut in naturalibus: secunda, eadem sunt nobis nota ret naturae], ut in
mathematicis: ubi medium quatenus causa est, naturae notum dicitur, quatenus vero accidens per se sensiie, nobis notum dicitur, qua ratione evenit, ut in illis non fiant duo processus,
sed unus tantum e causa ad effectum." Cf. Averroes' commentary on this same text (ed. cit.,
IV, fol. 6 vb ) .

116

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

only by knowing the sensible objects in which they inhere. They are
abstracted from natural things and cannot be known separate from
sensible objects. 104
Here our author has taken a more extreme position than Aristotle
regarding the empirical nature of mathematical notions.1 05 Again, we
must not take such statements too seriously, for certainly Pico adopts
this position only to refute his adversaries, even though it is not consistent with what he says elsewhere. This is certainly not the position
we would expect him to take here, but it must have been what seemed
to him the easiest way to demolish the distinction between "mathematical" and "natural" objects upon which his opponents' argument
depends. The second possible objection which might be brought against
Pico's arguments he states as follows:
The second, that from regress, and, as they themselves say, by examination,
a clearer and more evident knowledge of the cause is acquired. Indeed, if we
have rejected these two things, they have either nothing or very little upon
which to base themselves.l 06
Nifo's treatment of the various ways of attaining knowledge seems
to be extremely close to the opposition here anticipated by the younger
Pico.1 07 One of the four ways to knowledge mentioned by Nifo is
knowledge "of the same cause through an examination (negociatio) of
the intellect, from which at first the knowledge of the cause increases in
such a way to be worthy to serve as the middle term in a demonstration
simpliciter." 108 The method of negociatio is through composition and
104 "Nam nihil tale est in rebus quae sub obtutum cadunt, quod et nobis simul et naturae
sit notum, si ab Aristotele nolunt recedere, apud quem in principiis physicis illud potissimum
ponitur innatam esse nobis viam a notioribus nobis ad ea quae sunt ipsi notiora naturae. Nec
mathematica nobis ingeras, cum quod naturalia ita non sunt, ut etiam diversa putentur,
diversaeque de utrisque scientiae constItuantur, tum quod super rebus etiam naturalibus, si
quicquam habent pensi omnino fundantur, quomodo enim circulum aut triangulum (verbi
causa) cognoveris, ni prius ea delineata fuerint in sensili materia. Et numerum pariter quo
pacto animo capies, nisi res numeratas apprehenderis. Quapropter dicuntur abstrahi a
naturalibus rebus ea quibus mathematicarum nomen obtigit." Ex. Van., V, I I ; p. 744.
105 Aristotle discusses the question of the status of mathematical concepts most fully in the
last two books of the Metaphysics. His position is not completely clear, for he rejects both the
view that mathematical objects exist apart from sensible things (Platonist-Pythagorean view)
and that they are in sensible things.
106 "Secundum quia ex regressu ilIo et ut ipsi loquuntur negociatione acquiritur causae
notitia quaepiam clarior et dilucidior, quae quidem duo si reprobaverimus vel nihil vel certe
parum habituri sunt quo nitantur." Ex. Van., V, I I ; p. 744. Again Pi co is indebted to Sextus.
Cf. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 164-72; ed. cit., I, pp. 94--g7 on "regress." See also William F.
Edwards, op. cit., pp. 256-86 where Zabarella's De regressu is discussed.
107 Nifo's discussion of the salient points is treated in Randall, op. cit., pp. 42-47. We here
touch on Nifo's discussion only in so far as it relates to what Pi co has to say.
108 " . "
est eiusdem causae per intellectus negociationem, ex qua dum prima crescit
notitia causae in tantum, ut digna sit effici medium d~monstrationis simpliciter." Niphus,
op. cit., lib. I, text 4, p. 12b.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

117

division. After the cause of something has been discovered, a clearer

knowledge of it is obtained by examination.1 09
Nifo also defends the notion of "regress," that is the "double procedure" of effect to cause and cause to effect. He argues that it is not a
circular argument as some hold, but rather a legitimate method of
scientific procedure.1 10 The method of "regress" Pico has rejected as
being nothing more than a circular proof,lll and he does not elaborate
further on it. He says something more concerning the method of negociatio, however. No further examination of the cause, he argues, will
ever reveal more information about it than do the effects. For if one
tries to learn something further, he will encounter the problems which
have already been pointed out, e.g. the problem oflearning about the
essence from accidental properties. 1l2
We see that essentially all of Pi co's objections to demonstration and
methodological procedure are reducible to his rejection of sense knowledge as a legitimate source of information. As the methodology of the
Italian Aristotelians evolved it began to take on an increasingly empirical aspect. The distinction between mathematical and physical
demonstration became more clear cut. The "double procedure" of
regressus became more and more a central notion of physical demonstration. In sum, the procedures in physics began to rely increasingly
on the raw materials of empirical data. It was to such a state of affairs
that Gianfrancesco hoped to come as "voice in the wilderness," so to
speak, to offer the sceptical arguments against such a methodology. In
large part his critique failed to stem the rising tide of materialism - or
atheism, as he, in terms not too different from Berkeley, thought. In
fact, the same scepticism which Pico utilized to combat Aristotelian
science, was later enlisted by a man like Pierre Gassendi in the service
of the "new science." But that is another story and we will save the
discussion of it until later.
Ibid., pp. 12b-13a. Cf. Randall, op. cit., pp. 42-47.
Ibid., p. 12. Cf. Randall, op. cit., pp. 42-47. Also see the opinions of other Aristotelians
on the matter in Randall, pp. 38-41. That "regress" involves circular reasoning had already
been argued by the ancient sceptics. See the passage from Sextus cited in note 106.
111 See above p. 114 and note 99.
112 " . . . effectus illi ... et quod attinet ad illiam suam negociationem nihil certe (ut mihi,
ut aliis etiam videtur) lucrantur ... Nunquam etiam causa sese illis patefaciet magis quam
effectus, ipsius videlicet index assiduus et si Aristoteles vere hac in re decrevit, necessarius;
quod si cognita re, quae est causa, et cognita re quae est effectus, posse a te effectum in
causam referri dixeris, eaedem te difficultates circumstabunt, quas initio capitis huius tetigimus; nam tu ipsas res sensu prius cognoveris et coniectura deprehenderis, intermediis accidentibus; unde si quicquam demonstrare volueris, ad effectum et sensus notitiam pro certitudine habenda, nisi ab Aristote1e desciscas, illico tibi recurrendum fuerit." Ex. Van., V, I I ;
P744
109

110

118

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

(6) The Fifth Way

As we have already said, the universal proposItIOns upon which
Aristotelian science is based are derived from sense experience by what
amounts to induction. Aristotle discusses this at some length in the
Posterior Anafytics. Pico, however, argues that induction does not necessarily give true universal propositions, but may - and often does - give
propositions which have a taint of error. Moreover, if the universal
propositions are not correct, the whole procedure of syllogism and proof
is rendered false. Let us consider a demonstration such as:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

It is necessary that the premise "All men are mortal" be always true.
If this is not so, the whole proof crumbles. Our author maintains that
the method by which such universal propositions are obtained is one
that is not entirely reliable and, consequently, all proofs that follow
from universal propositions so obtained are equally unreliable.
Definitions and sense knowledge have been shown to be uncertain,
Pi co begins. Now we must turn to other considerations:
It remains for us to show that the general procedure and end [i.e. of demonstration] are uncertain. That is, the proper attribute of the subject, which is
said to be demonstrated, and the universal propositions, which are most required for demonstration, are uncertain. Hence, Aristotle said that the
propositions upon which demonstration is based must be specifically and
universally so, since it is inferred in the conclusion itself - that is, the end or
completion of demonstration - that such a property belongs to each subject
in the species. It can only be deduced, however, from propositions which precede the conclusion. Consequently, it is appropriate that those propositions
and assumptions which constitute the argument are universal and relate to
each individual. But those propositions which Aristotle though must necessarily be both certain and universal we shall prove to be by no means certain,
especially those which are called affirmative. But, according to Aristotle, no
demonstration can be carried out without two, or at least one, affirmative
proposition.ll 3
113 "Restat enim ut progressum etiam universum et fin em monstremus incertum, hoc est,
incertam esse affectionem ilIam subiecti propriam, quae dicitur demonstrari, et universales
propositi ones quae maxime per dernonstrationern exiguntur, idque in ipsa specie et universim, adeo ut Aristoteles, propterea censuerit propositiones, qui bus dernonstratio conficitur,
de omni dici oportere, quoniam omni etiam subiecto talem affection ern speciatim inesse ipsa
in conclusione, hoc est, demonstration is fine terminove colligitur. Colligi autem nequit, nisi
ex propositionibus, quae ipsam praecedunt conclusionem. Quapropter et illas ipsas, quae
negocium conficiunt propositiones assumptionesque et de ornni et universales esse convenit.
Has ergo propositiones quas et certas et universales esse oportere censuit Aristoteles, mini me

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

119

The propositions necessary for scientific demonstration are attained

through induction according to Aristotle.1 14 Pico argues that we cannot
reach such universal propositions with any degree of certainty, because
they are based on induction which is itself uncertain. Nor can we know
these propositions a priori, for they would not be derived by the method
advanced by Aristotle; but, they would be known through the lumen
naturale. 1l5
Why does Pico object to induction? Knowing what he has said on
the other topics we have discussed, we can almost determine beforehand what his position will be. First of all, our author does not have
much that is original or striking to say about the subject, but rather
gives some of the standard arguments against it. While his arguments
do not show a great deal of originality there are certain emphases and
methods of arguing that are not without interest. Therefore, we shall
give some attention to his words.
The "problem of induction" is one which has vexed philosophers and
theoreticians of science from Aristotle's day until our own. Many have
had their doubts about the procedure,1l6 but nearly all have used it as
the most satisfactory means at their disposal for approaching a certain
class of problems. Certainly natural science is impossible without it.
Our author is probably quite C0rrect in holding that certain knowledge
cannot be reached by induction. Assuredly many of his adversaries
would not quarrel with him on this. It seems, however, that he goes to
an uncommon extreme in his argument. But, as he has mentioned
repeatedly, his aim is to destroy the foundations of natural knowledge
and he is extreme in his application of the sceptical principles in attempting to do so.
We need not discuss in detail his views on the subject, but will merely
give a few indications of the direction his polemic takes, focusing on
what seem to be the most characteristic and interesting aspects of it.
He argues in several places that a universal must be based on knowcertas convincemus; et maxime quae dicuntur affirmatrices, cum tamen sine duabus, vel ad
minus sine aitera, nequeat ulla, authore Aristoteie,confici demonstratio ... " Ex. Vall., V, 12;
P746.
114 Post. All. IOob3-4'
115 "At quo pacto certam universalem probationem habebimus, cumincerta sit ars inductionis, sine qua incerta est universalis propositio? Si dixeris universalem propositionem te a
priori (ut aiunt) probaturum te ipsumAristotelis authoritate repellam, non qua nuper sumus
multipliciter usi, sed qua priores eas et nullo intermedio probandas voluit, neque admisit, ut
communes illae animi concepti ones omnibus notae demonstrationem ipsam proprie ingrederentur, quas quidem initio operis satis innuimus non Aristotelis doctrina, sed naturalis
Iuminis beneficio cognosci." Ex. Vall., V, 12; pp. 746-47.
116 Pico cites quite a number, including Themistius, Philoponus, Boethius and Thomas.

120

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

ledge of all of the individuals and not merely on some of them, regardless of how many individuals there happen to be. As long as one
individual remains unknown, the universal is in doubt.l 17 This is, of
course, the basic argument against induction and one which seems
always to have been known to philosophers. There is nothing particularly novel in Pico's use of it. It should be noted, however, that there
are few who insist on it so strongly as he does. His feeling on the matter
certainly reflects the same strong opinion that we find expressed by the
ancient sceptics.l 18 Pico supports this criticism of induction by citing
several examples where commonly held "universal propositions" are
not really universal. For example, the old logical proposition of "Ali
crows are black" is disputed since some white crows have been
found.l 19 Or there is the famous case of the crocodile which renders
false the universal proposition that "All animals move their lower
jaw," another favorite example of philosophers throughout history.l20
Our author also takes great pains to show that certain commonly
held opinions are not always true, because exceptional cases arise. This
is something that he insists on often throughout his writings. For example, it is generally thought that poisons are harmful to everyone, but
Gianfrancesco argues that this is not the case. He cites examples to the
contrary from a variety of sources.l 21 These and other things make it
very difficult to generalize about any subject, he concludes. Pico's position on the matter is simple and straightforward, "No proposition is
117 "Dices si duorum vel trium individuorum proprietatem affectionemve cognovero, cur
et ilia aliis etiam individuis inesse non collegero? 1110, inquam, pacto non collegeris, quo si
tres vel quatuor, ad do et centum et mille etiam Myriadas huminum, albo colore, succulenta
et vivida carne, promissoque capillo spectavcris, omnes propterea collegisse ita esse homines
affectos non potuisti." Ex. Van., V, 12; p. 748. Cf. also p. 750.
The notion that the universal is derived from merely two or three cases quite possibly derives from Pico's reading of the Peripatetics, who, usually when discussing induction, mention only two or three particulars in the examples they give. For example, they say that we
learn the universal "man" from knowledge of Socrates, Callias, etc. Such an example is to be
found in Themistius' Paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics II, cap. 35 (in Themistii philosophi
acutissimi Commentaria (Venice, 1520), fol. 11vb; this is Ermolao Barbaro's translation often
cited by Gianfrancesco) or Nifo's commentary on the same text (in Augustinus Suessanus Super
Posteriora Aristotelis (Venice, 1572), lib. II, com. 144, fo!' 83 va ).
118 See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 195-204 (Loeb ed. , I, pp. 276-83).
Especially note section 204 where the two basic reasons for rejecting induction are given.
These are (I.) if only a part of the individuals are used in formulating the universal, one of
those omitted may contradict it ; and (2 .) if it is attempted to use all of the individuals,
there are an infinity of them and hence it is impossible.
119 Ex. Van ., V, 12; p . 749; See also V, 5; pp. 719-20 where this is discussed at length.
120 Ibid., V, 13; p. 753; mentioned in Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 195 (cd. cit., I, pp. 276-77) .
121 Ex. Van., V, 13; pp. 756-57; also II, 22; pp. 562-63. Pico was fascinated by the subject
of poisons as were many of his predecessors and contemporaries. See Thorndike, op. cit. , V ,
pp. 472-87, and passim for a consideration of some of the many discussions on this subject
during the later Middle Ages.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

121

truly and without qualification universal, which is not either said of

each individual or is said of none of them." 122 He again tries to anticipate the objections which others may have to his own views; and,
in doing so, he shows a certain grasp of the problems involved, which
indicates that he was not so naive a thinker as it sometimes appears.
He says, for instance, that it may be argued that neither he nor anyone
else can improve the method of induction, for it is based on the observation of very many, if not all, men for many centuries. Our author
says that certain qualifications are in order if this claim is to be acceptable. Perhaps these previous observations have been made through
simple human faith and include only the favorable cases and not the
unfavorable ones, he argues. Furthermore, the observers may have
been deceived by their own senses or by their faith in past observations.
An example of this is to be seen in the case of the motion of heavenly
bodies, which is not at all as it has previously been reported.l 23 Such a
statement shows a certain amount of philosophical sophistication which
at other times Gianfrancesco seems to lack. Particularly interesting is
the use here of an empirical example over which there has been some
disagreement. This must certainly count as a premonition - albeit a
very faint one - of the use to which sceptical doubt will be put in the
next century when it will lead to a radical form of empiricism which
vvill have an important role in philosophy and science in the seventeenth and later centuries. 124
On the other hand, the entire rejection of induction reveals a wholly
unscientific and non-empirical attitude. Pico was not seriously interested in discussing the problem of induction, it seems certain. Induction, like most of the other topics of which he speaks, is not one that
offers him an intellectual challenge and incites him to find an answer.
Rather, it is but another opportunity to apply the sceptical critique to
contemporary Aristotelianism. If he makes remarks concerning the
problem which appear unusual or interesting to us, it must be realized
122 " . . . nullam propositionem vere et simpliciter esse universal em, quae vel non dicatur
de omni . . . vel de nullo ... " Ex. Van., V, 12; p. 753.
123 "At dicet quispiam sit aut ego aut alius inductionem perficere nequivero, tamen multis retro saeculis, ab omnibus, vel plurimis, hoc vel ilIo observatum est modo: quare universim potero ego colligere, etiamsi universim singula non percensuerim. Sed non est ita, namque ad historiam te aliorum remittis observatorum et fide simplici humana duceris, et
praeterea non omnes potuisti observatores p ercalluisse, quid si alii diverse observavenmt?
quid si decepti sunt vel proprio sensu vel fide historiae? U tin depraehendendis motibus globorum coelestium multos non recte recensuisse, quod observatum fuerat, retro est a nobis comprobatum." Ex. Van., V, 13; p. 754.
124 This has recently been pointed out in the case of Mersenne and Gassendi. See particularly Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen, 1960),
pp. 131 - 53, and Tullio Gregory, Scetticismo ed Empirismo: stli.dio su Gassendi (Bari, 1961).

122

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

that they are cast in a framework that is basically backward-looking

rather than forward-looking.
(7) General Conclusion to the Chapter

From our detailed analysis of Pico della Mirandola's critique of the

Peripatetic notion of scientia a number of more general conclusions can
be drawn concerning his own philosophical orientation. It becomes
increasingly apparent upon reading Book V of the Examen Vanitatis
that the author's overall attempt is to reduce all forms of knowledge
realizable within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy to the single
source of sense experience. On his ability to do this rest in large measure
the debilitating results he will obtain. It is not our task here to say
whether in fact this was Aristotle's view or not, but, suffice it to say,
that his writings can be interpreted in that way and many of his most
competent and penetrating commentators have considered this interpretation to be valid.
Although Pico is not consistent in this - as we saw in his reliance on
the Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle in some instances - he tends
for the most part to hold such a view. Precisely why he was led to interpret Aristotle in such a radically empirical way is not altogether
clear. The solution certainly lies in the fact that he chose at one point
to consider Aristotle as the enemy and thenceforth tried to develop a
method of attacking him. It is certainly true that Christian thinkers
more friendly to the Stagirite have tended to bend Aristotle toward a
less empirical, more Platonic viewpoint in the process of making him
more Christian and theological than in fact he was. Pico, on the other
hand, wanted to make Aristotle appear as hostile as possible to
Christian theology and tended to make him a complete empiricist in
whose philosophy was left no room for faith. In Gianfrancesco we
have a reversal of the thirteenth century process of assimilation of
Aristotle into the Christian tradition - his "canonization" as some
hold. With the younger Pica, Aristotle becomes the enemy of Christianity - he is "diabolized," as it were.
Let us for a moment consider the effect of this. An undercurrent of
opposition to Aristotle and to his philosophy was practically never
absent from the death of the Stagirite until the publication of the
Examen Vanitatis. From the twelfth century onward, however, the interest in and reliance on Aristotle became increasingly great in Christian
Europe. The high point of such influence might be considered the
famous "five ways" of St. Thomas where basically Aristotelian notions

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

123

were employed to formulate arguments for the existence of God. These

proofs had already been criticized before Pico's time by Scotus, Ockham, and others within less than a century after their formulation by
the Angelic Doctor. In the early years of the sixteenth century, Gianfrancesco Pico also speaks of "five ways"; but these are five ways to
destroy the very foundation of Aristotelian philosophy upon which
Thomas built. To go too far in insisting on the comparison of the "five
ways" of the two authors separated by two and a half centuries would
be arbitrary and capricious. But if we consider the two opposed attitudes of these men briefly, some light should be shed on the significance
and individuality of Pico's position.
Thomas had hoped to make God demonstrable by the techniques of
Aristotelian philosophy and thereby convince the unbeliever. Gianfrancesco Pi co held that Aristotelian proof offered no legitimate demonstration at all, re-echoing Ambrose's outcry that "Non in dialectica
complacuit Deo facere salvum populum suum." In place of Thomas'
rational and philosophical approach to religious knowledge, Pi co affirms the sole legitimacy of faith in religious matters and retreats into
the sealed compartment of "fideism." Aristotle is no longer a member
of the Church Militant, but becomes one of its bitterest enemies. Aristotle's proof becomes no proof at all, but merely argumentation based
on illusory data. The cycle is complete. The "five ways" of Thomas
have made Aristotle a Christian, the "five ways" of Gianfrancesco
Pico have made the sceptic a Christian. Instead of leading to God as
Thomas had held, the Aristotelian techniques lead away from him,
Pico argues; they are based on illusion and can lead only to illusory
knowledge. Such illusory knowledge can serve no useful purpose and
must be recognized for what it is. Pico clearly rejects the Thomistic
approach to God through reason, just as Crescas had rejected Maimonides' proofs before in the Jewish tradition.l 25
The emphasis on sense knowledge to which the Aristotelian philosophy leads is of no avail to the Christian. This is something that Gianfrancesco feels compelled to reiterate time and again. That the failure
of Aristotelianism is actually rooted in its foundation on the data of the

sense world, is a conclusion that Pico reached slowly, as we have seen.

It is something, however, that he does not let the reader of the Examen
Vanitatis forget. "He denies Aristotle, who holds that all human cognition does not have its origin and basis in sense," 126 our author says.
125 See Wolfson, op. cit., and our discussion of the relation of Crescas to Pico in chapter V
of the present study.
126 Ex. Van., V, 13; p. 758.

124

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

The destruction of Aristotle has been completed, Pico feels, for (I)
according to the Stagirite all knowledge is from sense and (2) according
to the sceptic's destructive criticism it has been shown that all knowledge derived from sense is untrustworthy.
Although our author's critique of Aristotelian "science" does have
a certain force and explores some of the assumptions and preconceptions upon which demonstrative science is based, the critical remarks do not themselves exhibit an internal consistency of their own.
Certainly Gianfrancesco Pico raises a number of interesting questions
which do not find an immediate answer in the Aristotelian canon, but
it must be admitted that the critique amounts largely to rejecting a
number of individual Aristotelian principles with little attempt to
suggest better principles to replace those rejected. The rejections are
not consistent or systematic. They often presuppose a Platonic outlook,
but not always - as, for example, in the case of the critique of the Aristotelian view of mathematical demonstration. Often the arguments
given to refute Aristotle are quite as dependent on sense data as those
criticized. Furthermore, it is everywhere evident that many of the
presuppositions upon which Pico's critique is based are nothing other
than the principles of Aristotle's own philosophy. Pico often lashes out
at one part of the philosophy with a weapon fashioned by the very
philosophy he is attacking.
But this very lack of consistency belies some of the more important
observations that can be made about it. Main among these is the fact
that Gianfrancesco is at the same time anti-intellectual and philosophical. Although his procedure has a certain mystical element which
considers scientific and philosophical knowledge to be of no avail when
the One and Reality are confronted, there is also a genuinely philosophical approach to the problem at hand. His approach to the "vain
philosophy of the Gentiles" bears certain similarities to the attitudes of
Tertullian, Bernard of Clairvaux, Savonarola, and many other
Christians who have engaged in a combat with secular learning. What
is interesting in Pico's case is that, at the same time, he argues against
specific philosophical problems. His own training prepared him well
for this. He shows a clear awareness of the philosophical currents of his
time and, if sometimes he misinterprets a thinker on an issue, more
often he is able to relate them to their historical and intellectual context
quite accurately. As Berkeley will do, he feels it necessary actually to
point out what is wrong with the current philosophy, if the anti-religious aspects are to be rooted out. But, unlike Berkeley, he cannot

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

125

offer a philosophical alternative that will eliminate the undesirable

characteristics of the philosophy being opposed.
Evident throughout his destructive remarks concerning scientia is
the already mentioned contrast between sensibles and essences. This is
a problem which Pi co feels to be inherent in the Peripatetic approach
to philosophy and one for which he can offer no solution. Knowledge of
essences and knowledge of sensibles form two worlds which cannot be
conjoined. The sceptic had argued that sense knowledge is unreliable:
Pico does likewise, but adds a proviso that allows for a Christian God,
and for faith and prophecy. Such a solution is possible, but it leaves one
without any real operational procedure - "pragmatic" or otherwise with which to approach the affairs of everyday life. It is, in a word,
impractical. All science, all knowledge ex puris naturalibus, has been
questioned and nothing has been given to replace it. Pico's answer to
Aristotle may offer a religious solution, but offers no practical philosophical solution. This is merely a further indication of the fact that
Gianfrancesco was not interested in replacing Aristotelianism with an
alternative, but only in seeing to its downfall.
The very attitude expressed in the pages we have just discussed
indicates something important about the philosophical environment of
sixteenth century Italy. Even allowing for exaggeration and hyperbole
on Pico's part, the empirical orientation of the Italian Aristotelians of
the time must have been quite strong. This has already been signalled
by Nardi, Randall, and others, but the vehemence of Pico's opposing
attitude gives another indication of the situation. Gianfrancesco Pico
was perhaps alone in opposing these thinkers, but there is something
in his polemic that indicates that he had a reasonable understanding
of the current situation.
Another thing that emerges from Pico's critique, although not manifest particularly in him, is that in it is indicated the concern which
grows in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the
relation of man to the other animals. His repetition of the stories from
various sources on the intelligence of animals when compared to man
finds its way ultimately to Gassendi and seventeenth century psy-

chology and physiology.l27 When Pica discusses the fact that possibly
127 On Gassendi's importance in this respect see the interesting example given in Paul F.
Cranefield, "A Seventeenth Century View of Mental Deficiency and Schizophrenia:
Thomas Willis on 'Stupidity and Foolishness," in Bulletin of the History of Ivledicine xxxv
(1961), pp. 291-316, esp. pp. 292, 305-306. It is also interesting to note that Pico's correspondent, Girolamo Rorario, was the author ofa work on the intelligence of animals (dated 1547)
See Hieronymi Rorarii, Quod animalia bruta ratione utantuy melius homine (Paris, 1648), the first

126

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

man is not the only rational animal 128 he is perhaps unwittingly paving
the way for a more empirical approach to the study of intelligence. We
are not here saying that such influence by Pico was necessarily direct,
but it indicates one direction in which his sceptical attitude can be
developed.
Included in Pico's sceptical outlook is a strong tendency to pick out
the exceptions to general rules. For example, a known poison is almost
always harmful to human beings. There may be one or two exceptions,
however, to such a rule. It is on these exceptions that Pico fixes his
attention. "Does not such a thing invalidate the theory that the poison
is harmful?," he asks. Does it not further show that such theorizing and
attempts to formulate general rules and universal propositions is hopeless? This is the end of Pi co's scepticism. From such instances, he comes
swiftly to the conclusion that reliable knowledge is not to be had from
the materials available to man from the physical world. Certainty is
to be derived only from the Beyond. It is in Revelation where truth is
to be found. In this there are no exceptions. It is true because it is the
Word of God. Consequently, we must conclude that it is foolhardy
and distracting to look elsewhere for sincera veritas.
But scepticism is a many-pronged fork. What made Pico a fervent
believer in Christianity, made Hume as fervent a disbeliever in all
religion. What made Pico singularly unsympathetic to natural philosophy, made Gassendi a diligent oberver and acute formulator of a
"mitigated scepticism," where to the uncertainty of sense knowledge
could be attached a certain degree of probability. The line between
constructive and destructive scepticism is a thin one, often difficult to
detect, and always more difficult to defend rationally.
To Pico, the exceptions to general rules of which we spoke above
meant only the destruction of the general rule. When he had shown
that a sufficient number of these are invalid, down tumbled the whole
structure of Aristotelian science - or so he thought. But let us reflect for
an instant. Can not such destruction lead to a reformulation of concepts? Can not the antithesis lead also to a synthesis? The answer to
both of these is "yes." Although Pi co did not look in that direction
others did. If there are exceptions, why are there exceptions, they
asked? Can not a new general rule be formulated to include the exprinting, edited by Gabriel Naude. The book was reprinted at Amsterdam in 1654 and 1666
and at Helmstedt in 1728. Bayle devoted a long article to Rorario and his work. See Pierre
Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, new ed. (Paris, 1820), XII, pp. 588-622.
128 Ex. Van., V, 8; pp. 731-33. The example of the prudence and intelligence of animals
are drawn from a wide range of sources.

REJECTION OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE

127

ception? Or, if not, do we not look at the exception and see why it does
not fit into the general classification? It is in this way that the scepticism of the early modern period led to a progress and a development in these observational disciplines which we call with misleading
ambiguity "modern science." In this Pico had no part, but some of
those who read and profited from him did.

CHAPTER V

THE CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

Tanta est certe Aristotelis amplitudo atque authoritas, ut difficillimum ac

periculosum sit quidpiam scribere contra quam ipse docuerit, et mihi praesertim cui semper visa est viri illius sapientia admirabilis. Verumtamen
studio veritatis impulsus, cuius ipse amore in seipsum si viveret excitaretur,
in medium proferre non dubitavi, in quibus me inconcussa mathematicae
philosophiae basis, cui semper insisto, ab eo dissentire coegit.
Giambattista Benedetti, Diversarum speculationum mathematicarum et physicarumliber
(I585)

(I) Introduction
Having completed his critique of scientific demonstration, Gianfrancesco Pico next sets his sights on certain other doctrines of Aristotle,
which he considers to be in error. In Book VI of the Examen Vanitatis,
our author focuses upon some of the weak points he finds in the Aristotelian system.
In discussing these specific philosophical problems, our author is not
so sceptical as he was when arguing against "scientific demonstration."
He here sometimes endorses an alternative philosophical position to
replace the Aristotelian one which he opposes. Airstotle and the Aristotelians still receive the brunt of the attack, but occasionally Pico
defends the position of another philosopher with such conviction that
one might suppose that he is actually adopting this position to replace
the Aristotelian one which he has rejected. Still his endeavor is largely
critical. Although he may seem to be in agreement with Philoponus or
Crescas, his principal aim is to show the errors of Peripatetic philosophy. In conclusion to this task, Pico attempts to refute certain individual doctrines, which he contends are in error because they themselves
have been improperly demonstrated.!
1 "Hactenus demonstrandi artem ab Aristotele positam, multa labare vanitate demonstravimus, quintoque operis libra terminum posuimus. Restat ut male demonstrasse, quae se
ille recte putaverat, aperiamus et reliquas etiam vanitates insinemus, ut explodantur." Ex.
Van., VI, I; p. 761.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

129

The criticisms contained in Book VI involve many Aristotelian

writings - the Ethics as well as the Physics, and the Metaphysics as well as
the De Goela and De Generatione. We have chosen to discuss here, however, only those which deal specifically with the Physics. Our choice is
somewhat arbitrary, but is also determined to a certain extent by both
internal and external criteria. First of all, our author devotes more
space to discussing Aristotle's natural philosophy than to the other
branches of his system. Secondly, the sources from which he draws his
criticisms have a special interest because of the incisiveness of the objections they raise against the Peripatetic teachings. Thirdly, the topics
discussed by Pico are among those which became central to the discussions of natural philosophy in the centuries after the publication of the
Examen Vanitatis and, when placed in their historical context, are of
no small interest.
The first of these reasons is self-explanatory and there is no need to
discuss it further. The second and third are in need of additional clarification. Gianfrancesco Pico draws his criticisms of Aristotle's physics
principally from two sources, John Philoponus (fl. 529) and Hasdai
Crescas (1340- I 4 10). The first, John Philoponus, was certainly one of
the most original minds of the late ancient world, and one whose importance is often bypassed in histories of philosophical and scientific
thought. Still today there is no adequate study of the greater part of
his work. 2 Among the most important contributions of the Grammarian, as he was called, are the long "digressions" in his commentary on
the Physics, where he sharply disagrees with Aristotle on several issues.
Particularly notable are the discussions of place and vacuum, about
which we will have more to say below, and his discussion of projectile
motion. Philoponus was little known throughout the Middle Ages, but
some of his ideas had quite an impact on sixteenth century European
thinkers when they were reintroduced.
2 Of the most important general literature on Philoponus, we might mention W. Kroll,
"Joannes Philoponus," in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopaedie, ser. I, vol. IX (1916), cols.
1764-95; Gustave Bardy, "Jean Philopon", in Dictionnaire de tMologie catholique, VIII (1924),
cols. 831-39; Basile Nicolas Tatakis, La philosophie byzantine (Paris, 1949), pp. 39-50; S. Sambursky, The Physical World cif Late Antiquity (London, 1962), pp. 154-75. On the knowledge of
Philoponus during the Middle Ages see Martin Grabmann, "Mittelalterliche lateinische
Uebersetzungen von Schriften der Aristoteles-Kommentatoren Johannes Philoponos, Alexander von Aphrodisias und Themistios," Sitzungsgberichte der Bayerischen Akademie derWissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung (1929), Heft 7, esp. pp. 1-48. In his De animae immortalitate, Pi co refers to Philoponus as "germanissimus peripateticus," an appellation the
meaning of which should become apparent from what we say below. See Ioannis Francisci
Pici ... De animae immortalitate digressio (Bologna, 1523), fol. 7v. Pico seems to have heen the
first Western thinker after Antiquity to give serious attention to Philoponus' Commentary on
the Physics. See below, esp. note 65. The influence of Philoponus on early modern natural
philosophy and science has yet to be studied.

130

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

Hasdai Crescas 3 also had an importance for the sixteenth century.

His criticism of Aristotelian physics summed up this tendency in the
Jewish tradition, with Crescas himself adding a certain amount of new
material. His major work, Or Adonai (The Light if the Lord), apparently
was not translated into a European language until the twentieth century. It was probably known to Pico through a Hebrew scholar. 4 This
work considers a number of physical problems, which were much discussed in the sixteenth century; and it quite probably exerted some
influence on the thought of Giordano Bruno.
Gianfrancesco Pico's critique of Aristotle's Physics is also worthy of
detailed examination because of the very importance of the particular
issues involved. These are motion, time, place, and vacuum. Motion, it
seems safe to generalize, was the key problem of physics discussed during
the early years of the modern period. Mechanics was the first branch of
physics to show itself capable of accurate and reproducible experimental and mathematical analysis. From Benedetti and Tartaglia to Galileo and Newton the study of mechanics gradually became a predictable, demonstrative science capable of mathematical analysis. The importance of time and space in the philosophies and sciences of Newton,
Kant, and Einstein is too well known to require further comment.
Notions of space in particular, underwent a tremendous change in the
course of the sixteenth century and certain of the formulations of
Philoponus, Crescas, and Pico had a central role in the transformation
from the traditional Aristotelian conception to more modern views.
Lastly, vacuum occupies an important position in the discussions of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, iffor no other reason than because
it was transformed from an essentially abstract concept of theoretical
philosophy to a realizable actuality. "Vacuum" achieved a key role in
early modern physics because it unmistakably represented the power
of the "new science" to realize through mechanical manipulation that
which hitherto had been spoken of only in vague and abstract terms.
It became, in short, a symbol of the newly found idea of changing nature for one's own purpose, for, although "nature abhors a vacuum,"
by the proper use of mechanical devices, one can be created by man.
3 Harry A, Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass. 1929). Further bibliography on various aspects of the man's life and work are to be found there.
4 This is Wolfson's supposition (op. cit., p. 34), for he concludes that it is very doubtful
whether Pico's knowledge of Hebrew was adequate to handle the difficult work of Crescas.
A possible intermediary might have been Sante Pagnini, a renowned biblical scholar who was
a correspondent of Gianfrancesco (see the letters in Pico, Opera, pp. 880-83). On their
relations see Cecil Roth, The Jews in the Renaissance (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 146.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

131

Gianfrancesco Pico discussed and transmitted a number of important

ideas on these subjects. It appears, however, that he did not fully appreciate the significance of what he was doing. Certainly he had little
interest either in the scientific or philosophical consequences of the
ideas he was discussing. On the other hand, the very fact that he chose
to discuss what he did is not without significance. It indicates that Pico
had some realization of the meaning of the questions which he treated.
His major aim in writing the Examen Vanitatis was to set forth material
against Aristotle and the Aristotelians. As we have seen, his arguments
are often superficial, but those which he raises against Aristotle's
physics are almost always cogent, standing in the mainstream of early
sixteenth century natural philosophy. If he was not an orginial thinker
in these matters himself, here at least, he showed extremely good sense
in selecting sources from which to draw his criticism.
(2) Motion

The first specific question which our author takes up in connection

with Aristotle's Physics is that of motion. Aristotle's basic definition of
motion is "the actualization of that which exists potentially." 5 In the
broadest sense motion embraces every type of change. It is the most
general category with which the natural philosopher concerns himself.
Motion is divided into four major categories (1.) quantitative motion
(increase and decrease), (2.) qualitative motion (alteration), (3.) generation and corruption, and (4.) local motion. Aristotle says that, of these,
only the latter type (local motion) is capable of continuing eternally
and therefore is the only type of motion of which eternal beings are
capable. And, only circular local motion has the quality of perfection
which allows it to be eternal. It is, therefore, prior by nature to every
other type of motion. 6
It is with this last contention that Pico disagrees, saying that it is not
true that local motion is prior to every other type of motion, as Aristotle holds. In fact, both qualitative and quantitative motion are prior
to local motion. 7 We shall describe in detail just how he argues his case.
5 7j -roG I)U'l<i[1-~ /)'1'1"0C; E'I-rd,ex~oc, 'Ii -rowG-rO'l, y.lY']alc; Ean'l Physics 201aJO-II. The
most complete discussion of motion in Aristotle is in Book III of the Physics, chapters 1-3.
See vVilliam Barrett, Aristotle's AnalYsis rif Movement: Its Significance for Its Time (New York,
1938) and Friedrich Solrnsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Ithaca, New York, 1960),
pp. 174-26 5.
6 Book VIII of the Physics deals with eternal motion.
7 "Multa quoque de motu dogmata improbata sunt, inter quae ilia: motum qui est ad
locum priorem esse natura omni specie mutation is ... Motus item qui spectatur in quanti-

132

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

According to the Aristotelian scheme, circular motion is the only

type of motion that can continue eternally. All other types of motion
can come to be and can pass away. This theory forms the basis of the
Aristotelian argument for the eternity of the world. The eternal beings
in the world, i.e. the animated spheres, each are moved in a uniform
circular way by a "mover," and are composed of a fifth essence, which
is subject neither to corruption nor to qualitative nor quantitative
change. The motion of the spheres can continue forever without undergoing any other type of change. From this primal movement all other
types of motion ultimately derive.
Pico, following the arguments of Crescas almost to the letter, argues
for the non-eternity of the world. This he does by attempting to show
that other types of motion can be eternal as well as circular local motion.
If this can be done, Gianfrancesco feels, then the unique quality of circular motion will be challenged and the Aristotelian proof for the
eternity of the world will be placed in doubt. Aristotle's doctrine has
always been one of the major stumbling blocks in attempts to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with Christian or Jewish theology, both of
which steadfastly hold to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Attempts
have been made by various Christian and Jewish theologians to interpret Aristotle in terms compatible with religious teaching. To Pico's
mind these have not been successful. Rather than trying to integrate
a part of Aristotle's teachings into Christianity, our author prefers to
argue that the Stagirite's reasons for maintaining the eternity of the
world are faulty. Gianfrancesco contends (I.) that circular motion is
not necessarily prior ro all other types of motion and (2.) that the Aristotelian arguments, showing that other types of motion cannot be eternal, are not conclusive. Pico does not try specifically to give a philosophical argument that circular motion is not eternal. Rather, he tries
only to say that it is not impossible that other types of motion are
eternal as well. Crescas went further and tried to show that the Aristotelian analysis, in which the different types of motion were arranged
according to priority, was incorrect and actually inverted. s Pi co does
not repeat this part of the argument, but is content to hold that Aristotle was incorrect in assigning a pre-eminent place to ciruclar local
tate et in qualitate praecedere videtur eum, qui est ad locum, prius enim quantitate fulcitur
et qualitatibus conditur, quam ut mutet locum." Ex. Van. VI, 2; p. 764. Cf. Physics 26oa26hS and Crescas' Proposition XIV in Wolfson, op .cit., pp. 280-83 and the corresponding notes.
8 Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 282-83. Crescas does not argue the point in any great detail, however, and his argument is not particularly convincing.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

133

motion. As a result of this, his proof for the eternity of the world is
erroneous.
Following closely what Crescas said, Gianfrancesco argues in two
main ways against the unique'1ess of circular local motion. Both of these
involve the development of arguments which are designed to show that
other types of motion can qualify theoretically as eternal. That is to
say, there is no reason a priori why other types of motion cannot continue for eternity as well as circular local motion. Pico first rejects the
principle that "whatever is moved accidentally, necessarily must come
to rest." 9 The precise origin of this principle is not known, but it certainly is to be found in Averroes.1 0 This position was questioned by
Crescas, who said that although it is true that no accidental motion
can be eternal in itself, it is possible for an accidental motion to be eternal if it is inseparable from some eternal essential motion.1 1 Gianfrancesco repeats the same argument, going so far as to repeat also the same
example. He argues that it is possible that the motion of the "fiery
sphere" (i.e. the sphere of fire which marks the boundary line between
the corruptible sub-lunar world and the non-corruptible celestial
world), whose motion is determined by the eternal motion of a celestial
sphere, could also have eternal motion, although such motion would be
per accidens and not per se. 12
Secondly, it is argued that other types of motion besides circular
motion can be continuous. Aristotle held this to be impossible, because
every other type of motion proceeds from a terminus a quo to a terminus ad
quem and when the latter is reached the motion stops. Aristotle further
argued that there cannot be a continuity of motion between opposite
motions, for there must always be an instant of rest between one opposite and another (e.g. if an object which is becoming black begins to
whiten, there must be a rest between the two processes of whitening
and blackening).1 3 Crescas and Pico give two objections to this. First,
Probably based on Physics 256bg-IO, as Wolfson (p. 551) says.
"Cum posuerimus quod iste motor non movet, nisi moveatur, et posuerimus ipsum moveri per accidens, possibile est ut aliqua hora veniat, in qua non movebitur, quod enim est
per accidens, non est semper neque necessarium. Et cum fuerit possibile ut non moveatur,
9

10

erit possibile ut non moveat, cum sit ita, quod suum moveri est necessarium in suo movere."

Comm. in Libros physicorum VIII , text. 36, ed. cit., IV, fo!' 375 vb . See Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 55155
11 Proposition VIII in Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 248-53 and corresponding notes.
12 "Falsum quoque et illud esse Hebraeus Hasdai contendit, quicquid ex accidenti movetur, quandoque necessario quiescere. Nam ex Aristoteleo dogmate sphaera ignis ex accidenti mota, videlicet ad orbis superioris motum, non quiescet coelo agitato; quod noluit Aristoteles posse quiescere. Superficies quoque coeli extima et partes ipsius semper agitatae non ex
se, sed ex accidenti ad motum corporis in quo sunt moventur." Ex. Van., VI , 2; p. 764.
13 Physics 26Ia3-b7. Also see Averroes' commentary on this text, cd. cit., IV, fols. 40Ir&-

134

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

taking the example of the black and white, they say that it is not true,
that if an object, which is becoming white, begins to become blacker,
that there will have necessarily been two separate motions (whitening
and blackening), separated by an interval of rest, as Aristotle and Averroes had said. Nor would the absurdity follow that, if there were no
period of rest, the object would be whitening and blackening at the
same time. Instead, these two processes must be considered as different
aspects of the same motion, separated by the now which makes up the
terminus ad quem of the one and the terminus a quo of the other,14 Secondly, the same thing is true in the case of rectilinear motion. If Aristotle's
analysis of the problem were correct, it would follow that if a very light
object were moving upward and suddenly a very heavy object, such as
a mountain, descended upon it, an instant in which both were stationary would be necessary. According to Aristotle, this would be because
the lighter object would successively undergo two opposite motions and,
consequently, they must be separated by an instant of rest. But, Pico
contends, this obviously would not be the case and therefore Aristotle's
theory is not correct. I5
By these two rather convincing arguments, Pico feels that he has
succeeded in showing that qualitative motion and rectilinear motion as
well as circular motion can be eternal. He has not proven that these are
actually eternal, but he has tried to show that there is no theoretical
reason why they should not be eternal. He has not proven precisely that
quantitative and qualitative motion are necessarily prior to local motion, as he said that he would do. Rather he has shown - if his arguments are considered convincing - that circular motion does not have
a unique claim to eternity. If other types of motion can be eternal as
well as circular motion, the Aristotelian argument for the eternity of
402vb. The example of motion from black to white, which will be used also by Crescas and
Pico, is to be found on 402r.
14

"Non recipitur et illud, solum motum orbicularem esse continuum, atque rationes

Aristotelis qui bus id probare sategerat fabulas appellat Hasdai; et nigrum cum movetur ad
albedinem lieet non quiescat in ea, sed denigretur, non tamen sequitur propterea ut dealbetur simul et denigretur, sed ratione diversa, hoc est quantenus dealbatur potest id asseri et
quatenus denigratur hoc etiam potest affirmari: nec absurdum est ullum." Ex. Van., VI, 2;
p. 764. Crescas' argument, which is more detailed and easier to follow, is in Wolfson, op. cit.,
pp. 272-81 (Proposition XIII) and corresponding notes. Esp. see note 20, pp. 623-25 which
clarifies the argument and points out the analogy between it and Aristotle's own argument
for a single continuous motion (Physics 263b9-15). This seems to have been a widely discussed problem in the Middle Ages. See Alexandre Koyre, "Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVsiecle," in his Etudes d'histoire de la pensee philosophique (Paris, Ig61) p. 57.
15 "Illud quoque falsum inter duos contrarios motus necessario quietem intercedere, alioqui sequeretur ut pondus ingens, ut mons altissimus, super re levissima ascendente procumbens, sisteret motum et quietis interponeret morulam et ipso in aere conquiesceret." Ex. Van.,
VI, 2; pp. 764-65. For the use of this argument by later thinkers see below pp. 135-36.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

135

the world is weakened somewhat. Although, as we have said, Crescas

went on to argue that other types of motion are prior to circular motion,
Gianfrancesco does not fully draw out this implication. Crescas had
contended that generation is the primary form of motion, thus opening
the way very definitely for creation ex nihilo. Pico, however, is content
to pursue the matter no further, having shown that other types of motion as well as circular motion can be eternal.
What are the results of Pico's efforts? First, he has attempted to
show that an eternal motion does not necessarily have to be a motion
eternal per se, but can be an accidental motion dependent on another
motion which is itself eternal per se. Secondly, he has tried to show that
various types of motion - and not just uniform circular motion - can be
eternal. The implication of this is that the Aristotelian position, which
argues for the eternity of the world by demonstrating the uniqueness
of one type of eternal motion, must be re-evaluated. But, aside from
the obviously theological implications of our author's discussion, certain of his counter arguments against Aristotle are not without philosophical and physical significance.
After many new things had been said about motion and mechanics
in the course of the fourteenth century, discussion on the subject apparently showed few signs of originality and vitality through the fifteenth and part of the sixteenth centuries. Men like Leonardo da Vinci
in the beginning and Giambattista Benedetti and Niccolo Tartaglia in
the middle of the sixteenth century began with renewed interest to
investigate some of the problems studies by the foutreenth century
Parisian natural philosophers. Others in the same century spoke of
motion in more traditional terms but, nevertheless with some originality. Finally, it was Galileo in the late 1580's, who brilliantly studied
some of the problems of motion, and began his revision of the entire
methodology of mechanics by utilizing mathematical procedures to
study the "laws of motion." Although in his later works Galileo speaks
of mechanics in terms approaching those we see today in a textbook of
elementary physics, his early works show a greater connection with the
past. It is to these latter that we shall now turn.
In his early work, De Motu (ca. 1590),16 the great physicist devotes an

entire chapter to discussing whether there is an instant of rest when two

16 Printed in the Edizione Nazionale, that is Le opere di Galileo Galilei (Florence, 1929-39)
I, pp. 251-419. On the dating of this work see 1. E. Drabkin, "A Note on Galileo's De Motu,"
Isis LI (1960), pp. 271-77. See also Raffaele Giacomelli, Galileo Galilei giovane e suo "de motu"
(Pisa, 1949). For an English translation of the De motu see Galileo Galilei, On Motion and On
Mechanics, [rans. 1. E. Drabkin and S. Drake, (Madison, Wise., 1960), pp. 1-131.

136

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

bodies moving in opposite directions meet. According to Galileo's

chapter title, the Aristotelian position was still commonly held even at
that time. I? Several arguments are given against this view, among
them the one ofCrescas and Pi co concerning the large body descending
on a smaller and lighter body. By that time this argument was apparently well known, for Galileo calls it common (vulgatum).18 He, of
course, rejects the Aristotelian view as false, giving a number of reasons
in addition to the one of Crescas and Pico. Besides Galileo, others toward
the end of the century used the same argument against the position of
Aristotle and Averroes. Pico's argument is reproduced word for word
in Giambattista Bernardi's Seminarium Totius Philosophiae (1582-85).19
A similar argument is advanced by Francesco Piccolomini in his own
treatise De Motu. 20
Pi co did not make an enormous contribution to the overthrow of the
Aristotelian theory of motion; but he, nevertheless, played a small role
in the process. He certainly represents a most traditionally oriented opposition to Aristotle. But, in the sixteenth century, it was not always
the harbingers of "free thought" and of novel ideas who made the
greatest contributions to the eventual downfall of the medieval world
VIew.
(3) Time
Gianfrancesco Pico's argument against Aristotle's definition of time
is again largely drawn from Crescas' Or Adonai. 21 As in the case of the
discussion on motion, only Crescas' conclusions are repeated and the
details by which they were worked out are not given.
Aristotle's motion of time is closely tied with that of motion. In
fact, he argues that time cannot exist if there is no motion, for time
cannot be perceived without motion (i.e. motion in its widest sense).
Time is defined by the Stagirite as "the number of motion with respect
17 The chapter in question is entitled "In quo contra Aristotelem et communem sententiam ostenditur, in puncto reflexionis non dari quietem." This chapter is printed in ed. cit.,
I, pp. 323-28.
18 "Quartum est vulgatum argumentum de magno lapide ex turri descendente, qui a
calculo sursum vi impulso non firmabitur, ad hoc ut sinat calculum aliquantisper quiescere
.. . " Ibid., I, p. 326. Wolfson, op. cit., p . 626 gives references to the same argument in Joannes
Versor (d. 1485), a Thomist commentator on Aristotle, and in Descartes.
19 Ioannis Baptistae Bernardi . .. Seminarium Totius Philosophiae (Venice, 1599) III,fol. 271 vb .
This work and its author will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
20 In Francisci Piccolominei, Librorum ad Scientiam de Natura attinentium pars. 1- V (Venice,
1600), fol. 219.
21 Proposition XV in Wolfson,op. cit., pp. 283-9' and corresponding notes. Also see
chapter 4 of the introduction (pp. 93-98).

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

137

to the before and after." 22 Pico, in opening his discussion of the problem, says first of all that motion is not necessary for time, for the latter
can be measured by rest as well. 23 He cites Crescas' definition of time
as "the measure of continuity, motion, or quiet between two instants."
In this way, Crescas, and Pico after him, hoped to show that time is
possible even if there is no possibility of motion. The two critics of
Aristotle make measure rather than motion the primary genus of time.
The reason given for this is that number pertains to discrete quantity,
while measure is continuous. 24
Such an argument as it stands hardly shows a clear deviation from
Aristotle. To distinguish between time as number and time as measure
is to make a distinction that Aristotle did not make, for he uses the two
interchangeably.25 To reject Aristotle's definition of time as number
and to attempt to replace it simply by putting time in the genus of
measure does nothing to discredit the Aristotelian definition. Furthermore, the criticism that the Aristotelian definition deals with discrete
particles rather than with a continuous process shows an incomplete
knowledge of the Aristotelian doctrine. The Greek master says clearly
that when number is spoken of in relation to time it is continuous
rather than discrete. 26 Aristotle may be charged with being inconsistent regarding this, since he says at one place that number is discrete
and elsewhere says that it is continuous. Gianfrancesco Pico, however,
22 (, xp6vo~ &pdl[L6~ eO"'nv XlV~crE:(i)C; XetTa TO 7tp6tHEPOV XctL UO"'t'EPOV Physics 220a2425. The discussion of time is to be found in Physics IV, 10- 14,
23 See Physics 221 a 7-19, Aristotle also held that time is a measure ofrest as well as motion,
but only per accidens (Physics 221 a 7- 8). In o ther words, something at rest can be measured in
time, but only ifit is capable of motion. In a universe where no motion is possible there can
be no time. As is said a little further, those things which neither move nor are at rest, are not
in time (Physics 22Ib~20- I). Consequently eternal things which do not move (and cannot be
said to be at rest either, since for Aristotle this implies a possibility of movement) are not in
time.
24 "Neque autem omnia recenseo, nam cunctam fere de naturalibus principiis Aristotelis
doctrinam evertere tentarunt multi , inter quos etiam R . Hasdai Mosi Aegyptio minime
assensus, qui propositi ones peripatetieas tanquam solido nix as fundamento receperat, inter
quas illam: tempus esse numerum motus. Quiete namque mensurari tempus affirmat, etiam
si nunquam motus inveniretur, magnam siquidem quietem vocari saepenumero est advertere, cum quicquam longo tempore conquiescit. Definit autem ipsum tempus ita (ut eius
verbis agam) mensura continuitatis vel motus vel quietis, quae inter duo momenta; ut genus

sit ipsa mensura viderique iure affirmat nume rurn genus esse primo non posse, cum sit dis-

cretae quantitatis, mensura continuae." Ex. Van., VI, 3; p . 765. This is very similar, interestingly enough, to the view of Aristotle's pupil Strato, as reported by Sextus Empiricus (Against
the Physicists, II, 177-80; cd. cit., III, pp. 298- 301). See S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics
(New York, 1959), pp. 100-101 and Pierre Duhem, Le systeme du morzde (Paris, 19'3-59), I,
PP245-46.
25 See Physics 221b7.
26 This is explained in Physics 2Igb5-9. The continuous (crUVEX1)~) quality of time is definitely stated at 220a24-6. The problem arises for Crescas and Pico presumably because of
the passage (4b2o-5) in the Categories where number is spoken of as discrete.

138

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

criticizes him for something else. Consequently, we must say that out
author's criticism is ill-founded. Crescas developed his argument further and arrived at a somewhat original concept of time. 27 However,
Pico does not follow him that far. The end result of Gianfrancesco's
disagreement with Aristotle on this point is that he used some of the
arguments of Crescas to oppose him, seemingly without understanding
fully either the theory of Aristotle or the alternative offered by Crescas.
(4) Place

28

Our author next turns to a consideration of Aristotle's doctrine of

place. Again Hasdai Crescas plays an important role in Pico's treatment
of the subject, but ample material is also drawn from other critics of
Aristotle, especially John Philoponus.
Aristotle defines place as the "limit of the surrounding body with
respect to that which it surrounds." 29 This means that place must
completely surround that of which it is place, it must be equal dimensionally to that which is surrounded, and it must be separable from the
thing surrounded:(i.e. it cannot move with it). In terms of the Aristotelian
world and of the doctrine of "na tural place," 30 the earth has its fixed
place in the center of the universe. The other elements form concentric
spheres about the earth in order of their density - water, air, and fire.
The sphere of fire is bounded by the sphere of the planets. The outer
sphere is bounded by the ones contiguous to it. Therefore, each sphere
and each of the elements has a fixed place which it occupies, its "natural place." The meaning of this concept of place can perhaps be more
easily seen in the case of smaller bodies. A stone, for example, when
moved, occupies first one place and than another, but the place occupied does not move with it. That is to say when it is moved it displaces
air (or water) from the new place and the former place itself becomes
occupied by air (or water).
27 See particularly Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 93-98 and the notes there referred to for a discussion of his contribution.
28 For this section I cite once and for all the following sources: Max Jammer, Concepts of
Space (Cambridge ,Mass., 1954) pp. 1-91; Alexandre Koyr':, From the Closed World to the
Infinite Universe (Baltimore, 1957); Concetta Orsi, II problema dello spazio (Naples, ca. 1958),
pp. I-51; Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren
Zeit 3rd ed., (Berlin, 1922-29), I, pp. 257-71; and Werner Gent, Die Philosophie des Raumes
und der Zeit, 2nd unchanged ed., (Hildesheim, 1962).
29 &:v&:yx"Yj ">OV ">67tOV dVLn ">0 7tEPQ(<; ">OU m:pLEXOV">O<; <JWf.LQ(">o<; Ibid. 2 12a5-6. Aristotle's most detailed discussion of place is in Physics, IV, 1-4. See H. R. King, "Aristotle's
Theory of Topos", Classical Quarterly, XLIV (1950), pp. 76--96 and Solmsen, op. cit., pp. 11835
30 We shall not discus in detail the important notion of "natural place" and its implications. See A. Hayen, "La theorie du lieu naturel d'apres Aristote," Revue neoscolastique de philosophie, XL (1937), pp. 5-43 and note 55 below.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

139

Crescas discusses the Aristotelian doctrine in detail, devoting some

attention to refuting it and to substituting for it a theory of his own. 31
His objections to Aristotle's position are mostly based on the premise
that, given the Aristotelian doctrine, it is impossible to maintain the
existence of an infinite. Gianfrancesco Pi co repeats certain of Crescas'
arguments, but again without the detailed reasoning. Pi co argues, first
of all, that if the Aristotelian conception of place were correct, a problem would arise concerning the place of the invididual parts of the
various elements. For example, let us consider air. According to Aristotle air is "naturally" bounded by the sphere of fire on the outside and
by earth and water on the inside. What, then, will be the place of a
particular particle of air which lies in the center of the band of air? The
entire band has its place, for it is bounded by other elements and thereby fulfills the Aristotelian requirements. An individual particle in the
center, on the other hand, will be surrounded only by other air and will
thereby not have a "natural" place, it the Aristotelian definition be
strictly followed,32 for it will not be bounded by elements different
from itself.
Exception is also taken to Aristotle's contention that when a body
moves to its own place, it moves to that which is similar (ofLOWV) to
itself. That is to say that the succeeding elements in the series (earth,
water, air, fire) are each similar to the ones next to themselves. 33 Our
author rejects this for two reasons. First, the celestial bodies, which are
not composed of the four elements, would have no similarity or affinity
to their proper places, since the divine has no similarity to the natural.
Secondly, the earth, which is composed of the lowest and heaviest
element, must occupy the lowest place. But the lowest is a point and
the name "place" cannot be given to that which is a point, but only to
that which has a surface. 34
At this point the aid of the sixth century commentator, John Philo'Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 43-50, 153-57, 195-203, and corresponding notes.
quoniam proprius partium locus quae ad totius motum agitantur non est superficies circundans aequalis adeo, ut seorsum habeat cum partibus loci convenientiam. Nam si
(causa exempli) suprema pars aeris conveniet imae continentis et circumvallantis ignis, media
tamen pars ei non ita conveniet, nec In suo naturali reponetur loco, qui si assereretur parti
ipsi suapte natura congruere, tamen diversus habebitur a loco totius et integri corporis collocati ... " Ex. Van., VI 4; pp. 766-67. Cf. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 196-97 for Crescas' argument.
33 De Coelo 3IOblO-12.
34 " . . . praeterea omnia quae collocantur corpora, suis congruere locis falsum esse aperiri
et ex supremi coeli circunferentia et etiam ex terra, cui locus assignatur non superficies, sed
punctus imus, cui loci nomen iure non congruit." Ex. Van., VI, 4; p. 767. Cf. Wolfson, op.
cit., pp. 196-99.
31

32 "

140

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

ponus, is enlisted. Following the Grammarian, Pico argues that a body

must occupy a place which has three dimensions, and the "lowest
point" spoken of does not qualify. Philoponus had insisted on the threedimensional quality of place and a point obviously cannot be said to
have three dimensions. 35 According to the Grammarian's argument,
place is "a certain interval, measurable in three directions, different
from the bodies which occupy it, and incorporeal in its very nature.
Place consists of the dimensions alone and is empty of every body. In
fact, vacuum and place are essentially the same thing."36 Such a
definition shows a radical departure from that of Aristotle.
It will be noticed that the conception of place here offered by Philoponus approaches our own common-sense notion of space. The qualities
of receptivity, incorporeality, three-dimensionality, and emptiness are
much less determinate than the properties which Aristotle attributed to
place, i.e. boundary, directionality, similitude to the thing occupying
the place, and non-emptiness. The influence of Philoponus' view on
sixteenth and seventeenth century discussion of the subject will become apparent as we proceed. Particularly significant is his tendency
to identify place with vacuum. This will be discussed more fully below.
Philoponus admits the theoretical possibility of a vacuum, be it noted,
although in fact one never exists. That is to say, there is always some
body to fill space. The two (i.e. body and empty space), however, can
be intellectually distinguished. This Aristotle would not admit, denying
even the theoretical possibility of the void. Philoponus, on the other
hand, says that space is never without body, but that it can be distinguished from body. This he explains as being analogous to the case of
matter and form. Although matter is never found to exist without
having some particular form, the two can, nevertheless, be intellectually distinguished. 37 Gianfrancesco Pico reproduces essentially the same
argument, summing it up rather neatly by saying: "Thus place is
space, vacant (vacuum) assuredly of any body, but still never existing
as a vacuum alone of itself. It is like the case of matter, which is some35 "Revertor ad Philoponum. Id absurdi constanter deducentem, ut corpus in loco
quatenus corpus collocari nequeat, quoniam finis sive superficies aut extremum continentis
tres non habet dimensiones, quae corpori quatenus est corpus am bien do competant. Corpus
enim quatenus corpus in loco est. Tria vero sunt intervalla corporis ; quare pro loco triplex
intervallum habere necesse est, ut corpus suscipiatur." Ex. Van., VI, 4; p . 767. Cf. VI, 20;
P 80 7
36 Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros (Berlin, 1888), in GAG XVII, p. 567, lines
29-33 . This work is hereafter referred to as Philoponus, Physics (Greek). On Philoponus'
discussion of place see Duhem, Systeme ... I, pp. 3 I 3-20.
37 Philoponus, Physics (Greek), p. 569, lines 5-1 I.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

141

thing other than form; but, nevertheless, never without form." 38 Pi co

argues further that vacuum (or emptiness) must be three dimensional
to be intelligible. He poses a most interesting theoretical situation. Let
us suppose, he says, that place as Aristotle conceives it were changed
in such a way that all of the elements which fill it would be taken away.
What would then remain? To this very crucial question, he answers
that there would remain merely "the space in which those things were
previously contained."39
Aside from the criticisms of Aristotle's doctrine of natural place and
his challenging of various minor details of the teaching, Pico is on the
track of a wholly new conception of place and space. To say that "place
is space, vacant (vacuum) ... of any body'" and to speak of space in
terms of a "container" implies a wholly new outlook in Western natural
philosophy. Pico's view marks a significant advance over the Aristotelian notion of place. It certainly is not yet a completely modern conception, but does bear a remarkable similarity to the idea of space which
was so important in early modern physics. The fact that Pico acted as a
transmitter of the ideas of both Philo po nus and Crescas in the early
years of the sixteenth century is not without importance. It was later
in the sixteenth century that wholly new attitudes were expressed regarding space. The Aristotelian doctrines were ultimately rejected by
all but the staunchest of the Peripatetic philosophers. A number of
these newer ideas on space bear a clear relationship to the traditions
transmitted by the younger Pico and, therefore, we shall briefly trace
this development.
As Cassirer has pointed out, it was only gradually that Italian natural philosophy rejected the Aristotelian teaching of place. 40 Even a
thinker like Girolamo Cardano (ISO 1-76), who in so many ways heralded a new philosophical outlook by criticizing traditional attitudes,
had a completely Aristotelian conception of place and space. Newer
ideas were expressed by others like Bernardino Telesio (I 50g-88),
38 Spatium itaque locus est ex sese corpore quidem vacuum, sed numquam tam en re ipsa
vacuum, sicuti materia aliud est quam forma, numquam tamen sine forma." Ex. Van., VI,
4; p. 768.
39 " .. et vacuum sine altitudine, latitudine, et profunditate nequeat intelligi; quod et ab
ipso etiam Aristotele, vel aliquando est admissum; sed et admitti videtur necessario illis
quibus mens non adempta est, cogitantibus si elementa recederent divino nutu, relinqui
spatium, quo ilia continebantur oportere." Ex. Van., VI, 4; p. 768. The same question was
also raised by several thirteenth and fourteenth century thinkers. See Korye, "Le vide et
l'espace infini au XIV siecle," pp. 33-84 and Duhem, Systeme ... , VIII, pp. 48, 55-57. It is
also repeated by Descartes. See Principia philosophiae, II, 18, in Oeuvres, ed. Adams and Tannery (Paris, 1897-1913), VIII, p. 50.
40 Cassirer, Das Erkenntllisproblem, I, p. 257. No note is taken here, however, of Pi co's view.

142

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639).

Certain of the notions of these men are very similar to the ideas on space
and place which we have already seen expressed by the younger Pico.
Telesio, in his De Rerum Natura (composed 1544-53), draws some of
his inspiration from the revived philosophies of Epicureanism and
Stoicism, but still owes a good deal to other sources. When he talks of
place, his debt to John Philoponus is quite evident.41 Telesio sees place
as characterized primarily by its quality of receptivity - that is, as a
container, as Pico had said. Moreover, he considers place to be something completely different from and separable from the things it contains.42
This quality of space as a receptacle of bodies is also given clear expression by Giordano Bruno, who devotes a good deal of attention to
refuting the Aristotelian doctrine in his Latin work against the Parisian
natural philosophers. 43 One of Bruno's major influences on later philosophical and scientific thought was to frame this notion of empty space
in terms of infinite extension. The characteristics of Bruno's space comprise: (r.) it is empty or a vacuum, (2.) it is infinite in extent, and (3.)
it is a receptacle of corporeal objects. 44
The same idea is reiterated perhaps even more clearly in his Italian
dialogue, De l'infinito, universo e mondi, when he says, speaking through
Filoteo:
Perche noi abbiamo un cielo, nel quale hanno gli lor spacii, regioni e distanze competenti gli mondi; e che si diffonde per tutto, penetra il tutto ed e
continente, contiguo e continuo al tutto, e che non lascia vacuo alcuno;
41 Compare, for example, the way in which space is described by Telesio in Bernardini
Telesii, De Rerum Natura ed. V. Spampanato (Modena, 1910-23) 1,25; vol. I, p. 87 with how
it is described in the Latin translation of Philoponus in Aristotelis, Physicorum Libri Quatuor,
Cum Ioannis Grammatici ... Commentariis, trans. Giambattista Rasario (Venice, 1585), p. 19 I.
This latter work is hereafter referred to as Philoponus, Physics (Latin).
42 "Itaque locus entium quorumvis receptor fieri queat, et inexistentibus entibus recedentibus expulsisve, nihil ipse recedat expellaturve, sed idem perpetuo remaneat et succeden-

tia entia prornptissirne suscipiat omnia tantusque assidue ipse sit, quanta, quae in ipso locan-

tur, sunt entia; perpetuo nimirum iis, quae in eo locata sunt, aequalis, at eorum nulli idem
sit nec fiat umquam, sed penitus ab omnibus diversus sit. Spatium porro, quod corpore nullo
prorsus repletum as propterea inane vacuumque sit ... "Telesio, op. cit., I, 25; vol. I, p. 87.
43 In the work entitled Camoeracensis Acrotismus adversus peripateticos Parisiis, printed in
Jordani Bruni Nolani, Opera Latine Conscripta (Naples, 1876) arts. 28-32; vol. I, part I, pp.
123-30. Also see arts. 33-34, pp. 130-35. For the similarities between Bruno's views and those
ofCrescas, see Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 35-36 and passim. On Bruno's work against the Parisian
physicists in general see Felice Tocco, Le opere latine di Giordano Bruno (Florence, 1889), pp.
102-18. This work of Bruno's was first published in 1588.
44 Art. 27, p. 123 reads "Translatio corporum indicat magis locum esse spacium, quam
quidcunque aliud. Est igitur receptaculum corporum magnitudinem habentium, ad nullam
quatuor causarum reducibile, sed per se quintum causae genus referens." Also art. 29, p. 125,
"Loci nimirum continere est, minime terminare." Also see arts. 33-34, pp. 130-35 where it
is said that space is a vacuum. More will be said of this below.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

143

eccetto se queUo medesimo, come in sito e luogo in cui tutto si muove, e

spacio in cui tutto discorre, ti piacesse chiamar vacuo, come molti chiamorno.45

Much the same view is advanced a few years later in Tommaso Campanella's Physiologia,46 where he clearly states that place has the capacity to receive bodies. In fact, the earth is situated in place. Moreover,
place is incorporeal and has a somewhat metaphysical character, being
called the "basis of existence". 47
The metaphysical conception of space, which we find in Campanella
and Patrizi, had a certain influence on the late sixteenth and seventeenth century nature philosophers. It also has certain similarities to
the notions of space later held by Newton and Kant. The more
"physical" side of space which we have traced here - receptivity, emptiness, three-dimensional extent - forms, however, the basis of most
early modern conceptions of space. The rejection of the Peripatetic
doctrine of place (with the attendant concepts of "natural place,"
levity and gravity, natural and violent moti(~m, and the horror vacui) is
one of the keys that led to a revised world view in the course of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Copernican Revolution and
the reassessment of ancient Atomism had no small part on the change
that occurred. On the other hand, the tradition that was transmitted by
Gianfrancesco Pico - that of Crescas and Philoponus - also had a role
in providing an environment in which new views of space and place
could flourish. Still in the seventeenth century, Gassendi could express
a regard for Philoponus and his views, while concluding with the epitome of simplicity that "place is nothing other than empty space." 48
45 Giordano Bruno, Opere italiane (Bari, 1925) I, p. 413. This dialogue was first published
in 1584, during Bruno's stay in England.
46 I use following edition: Thomae Campanellae ... philosophiae realis libri quatuor (Paris
1637). The Physiologia was at least in part completed in 1592. For the complicated history of
the text and the various printings see Luigi Firpo, Bibliografia degli scritti di Tommaso Campanella (Torino, 1940 ), pp. 73-95.
47 "Hoc est locus, qui basis existentiae, in quo pulchrum Opificium, hoc est Mundus, sedet;
quem si non esse imaginabitur, fateri oportet spatium vacuum iIIius remanere. Locus ergo
est substantia prima aut sedes aut capacitas immobiIis, et incorporea apta ad receptandum
omne corpus. "Campanella, ed. cit., cap. I, art. 2, p. 3. This "metaphysical" concept of space
is also developed by Francesco Patrizio See for example the chapter De spacio physico in the
Pancosmia in Francisci Patritii ... Nova de Universis Philosophia (Venice, 1593), fols 61-8. An
English translation of this is to be found in Benjamin Brickman (translator), "On Physical
Space [by] Francesco Patrizi," JHI IV (1943), pp. 224-45. See Francesco Fiorentino,Bernardino Telesio ossia studi su l'idea della natura nel risorgimento italiano (Florence, 1872) I, pp.
393-414.
48 "Locum nihil esse aliud, quam spatium hactenus descriptum [i.e. the vacuum or empty
space]." This is the chapter title to his brief discussion of locus (three and a half pages) , after
a much longer one on vacuum (thirty-two pages). Quoted from Petri Gassendi, Opera Omnia

144

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

Such a view differs little from Pico's opinion that "place is space,
vacant ... of any body." The major difference between the conceptions
of the two is that Pico had little realization of the implications of
his view and, more basically, did not particularly care what the implications were so long as the Aristotelian view on the matter was discredited. Gassendi, and not only Gassendi but also many others of the more
"scientific" minded thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
began to see the implications of such a view and directed his own
studies and research accordingly. As a consequence, in the course of the
century or so after the publication of the Examen Vanitatis, the common
conceptions of place, space, and vacuum underwent a far-reaching
change. Place became more or less absorbed into the single notion of
space; and the Aristotelian notion of "natural place," if not completely abandoned,49 was certainly on the way out, and nearly all of
the more forward looking thinkers no longer accepted it.
Vacuum is another story. As we have said, unlike space or place, it
proved to be susceptible to empirical demonstration and consequently
proved to be a key issue in the early modern struggle between natural
philosophy as a philosophical discipline and physics as an empirical,
scientific discipline. Let us now turn to a discussion of what Gianfrancesco Pico has to say about vacuum and how the notion was developed
in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
(5) Vacuum 50
The philosophical discussion of the vacuum has a long and detailed
history.51 It was one of the most discussed physical concepts from the
(Lyon, (658) III, p. 216a. (All other references to the works of Gassendi will be to this edition unless otherwise stated.) This is from the Syntagma pars II, sectio I, lib. 2, cap. 6. Philoponus is mentioned several times in this discussion (p. 21 7a, two times) besides being spoken
of in the discussion of vacuum, of which see below note 103.
49 Although Zabarella does not speak about locus at any great length, what he has to say
on the matter clearly presupposes a close adherence to the Aristotelian formula. See Iacobi
Zabarellae, De Rebus Naturalibus Libri XXX (Venice, 1590), p. 207. The Aristotelian view is
also defended in the Coimbra Commentaries, although certain objections against it are listed
and then refuted. See Commelltariorum Conimbricensis ... In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis
Stagiritae (Cologne, 1625), II, cols. 29-34. Gianfrancesco Pico is mentioned as a source for
views opposed to Aristotle's on the subject of place (col. 30) . More will be said of Pi co's
relation to these commentaries in the next chapter. Zarabella's work carries a dedicatory
letter from 1589. The Coimbra Commentaries were first printed between 1592 and 1606, but
were probably in classroom use a number of years before. For GaliIeo's rejection of the Aristotelian position see our discussion below pp. 154-56.
50 In this section I shall use the English terms "vacuum," "void" and "empty space"
interchangeably. The Latin equivalents (vacuum and inane) are sometimes given a terminological distinction by a particular author, but not consistently. The idea is almost always expressed in Greek by the single term xe:"6,,.
51 Still basic for the study of the history of the notion of vacuum is Kurd Lasswitz, Ge-

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

145

time of the pre-Socratics until the demonstration of the vacuum as a

reality in the seventeenth century. In early Greek philosophy the notion
was defended principally by Leucippus (fifth century B.C.), Democritus (fifth century B.C.), and their followers who held a generally
materialistic view of the universe. According to their doctrine there
exist only atoms (a1"o[LO() and the void (xEv6v), infinitely extended. 52
The same doctrine was later accepted by Epicurus (342/I-270 B.C.)
and, among the Latins, by the poet Lucretius (96-55 B.C.). The existence of a void was also defended by the Pythagoreans, who held a much
different view of the universe than did the Atomists, but still agreed
with them on the existence of an empty space. The Pythagoreans held
that such a void exists only beyond the last of the celestial spheres, also
maintaining that it is infinite in extent and that from it the earth
draws its breath. 53
Aristotle was probably the most prominent Greek critic of the notion
of the vacuum or void. We shall not here give a complete analysis of
his discussion of the question, but we shall merely consider the aspects
of it which are pertinent to Pico's treatment of the issue. 54 These are
principally the ones derived from Aristotle's doctrine of motion. For
Aristotle there can be no motion in a vacuum. There are only two
basic categories oflocal motion, natural motion (X(x.1"c{ cpu ow ) and forced
or violent motion (~[Cf). The latter is not possible if there is no natural
motion, since something non-natural presupposes something natural.
Moreover, there can 'be no natural motion in a vacuum, he continues,
for in that case it wo~ld not differ from the infinite (i.e. there would be
no directional differentiation to determine what course "natural
motion" would take). If this were true, there would beno absolute directions (i.e. there would be no up or down) .55 As a result, there would be
schichte der Atomistik vom Mitte/alter bis Newton (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1890), 2 vols. and
Duhem, Systeme ... , VIII, pp. 1-168. For some brief comments on the significance of the
vacuum discussions during the Renaissance see Charles B. Schmitt, "Changing Conceptions
of Vacuum: 1500-1650," to appear in Proceedings of the Xl International Congress of the History
of Sciences (Warsaw-Cracow, August 24-31, 1965) and "Experimental Evidence for and
against a Void: the Sixteenth Century Arguments", forthcoming in Isis.
52 The basic fragments dealing with the doctrine of Leucippus and Democritus are printed with an English translation and commentary in G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presacratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 406-409. See also Cyril Bailey, The Greek Atomists
and Epicurus (London, 1928).
53 Aristotle, Physics, 213bI8-22. See also Kirk and Raven, op. cit., pp 252-53.
54 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 6-9. On Aristotle's view see Duhem, Systeme ... , I, pp. 189-97
and Solmsen, op. cit., pp. 135-43.
55 It will be recalled that according to Aristotelian physics motion is defined in terms of
such absolute directions. For example, light bodies (e.g. fire) would "naturally" move in
the "up" direction, whereas heavy bodies (e.g. earth) would "naturally" move in the "down"
direction. Correspondingly, violent or forced motion is a type of motion imposed on an ob-

146

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

no natural motion, since the tendency for the various elements to move
in their "natural" directions would be lacking. But, according to
Aristotle's way of thinking, such a thing would be quite impossible and,
consequently, he concludes that the existence of a vacuum is untenable.
A further, and historically more important, argument based on
motion is also given. Aristotle argues that the velocity at which an object
travels (when following "natural motion") is dependent upon two factors: (1.) its heaviness or lightness and (2.) the resistance which it encounters when it moves. Consequently, if there were a vacuum, no
resistance whatever would be encountered and an object would move
instantaneously through a finite distance. 56 Such an argument can be
expressed perhaps more intelligibly in algebraic terms. If" V" represents the velocity of the object travelling through a medium, "P" the
power of the motive force, and "R" the resistance of the medium, the
Aristotelian formulation can be roughly expressed as follows:

P
Vex: R
The velocity will be, therefore, a variable directly proportional to
the motive force and inversely proportional to the resistance of the
medium. From such a formulation, it can readily be seen that, as the
resisting medium becomes less, the velocity will increase to the point
that, if a perfect void could be attained, all objects would move at an
infinite velocity. Aristotle concludes - inadvertently formulating one of
the basic principles of early modern physics - that in a vacuum all
objects would travel at the same rate of speed. Incorrectly, however, he
holds that this velocity would be infinite.
In opposition to the well known Aristotelian position, Pico argues
that the existence of a vacuum is possible. The material with which he
attempts to refute the Aristotelian position is again drawn principally
from the writings of Philoponus and Crescas. After presenting Aristotle's arguments against the possibility of the existence of a void, our
author carefully gives Philoponus' counter arguments. 57 It is true as
Aristotle said, Philoponus argued, that the speed at which an object
ject that would make it move in a way different than it would through its "natural" tendency,
e.g. if a heavy projectile were shot upward by means of a sling. See particularly De Coelo I,
2; Phys. IV, 4-5; Duhem, Systeme ... I, pp. 205-10.
56 See our discussion below (pp. 150-51) on how Averroes defends Aristotle on this point.
57 For Philoponus' arguments see Philoponus, Physics (Greek) pp. 675-95. Latin translation in Philoponus, Physics (Latin) pp. 225-33. Also see Duhem, Systeme I, pp. 351-71.
There is a partial English translation of Philoponus' argument in M. R. Cohen and I. E.
Drabkin (eds.), A Source Book in Greek Science (New York, 1948), pp. 217-22.

147

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

moves is dependent upon two factors: its own heaviness and the resistance of the medium through which it travels. It is not true, however,
that an object will move at an infinite velocity ifit encounters no resistance, for the lightness or heaviness (i.e. the motive power) of the moving
object will still be a determining factor, even though there be no opposition to movement by the medium. The resistance encountered follows from the heaviness or lightness of the body and from its configuration, and it does not itself determine the velocity of the moving
body without reference to the nature of the body itself.58
This theory can be restated in terms of a mathematical expression as
follows:
Voc (P - R)

Perhaps more precisely,

VOC (PI!

+ R)

The velocity at which the object moves will be proportional to the motive power less the effect of the resisting medium. A significant difference emerges between this and the Aristotelian formulation. In the
Aristotelian system, as the resistance of the medium approaches zero,
the velocity:of the object approaches infinity. In Philoponus' formulation, as th~ resistance approaches zero, the velocity becomes solely a
function of the motive power, which, in turn, is a function of the shape
and heaviness of the moving body.
Pico gives a further argument against Aristotle's contention that all
bodies would move at the same speed in a vacuum. Ifsuch a thing were
true, he argues, then the spheres which are above the moon would all
move at the same velocity, for they are above the realm of the four
elements and move freely throughout space, encountering no resistance
at al1. 59
It is worth noting, however, that in his discussion of the question
58 Pi co presents Philoponus' argument as follows: "Cum nulla sit ex parte rei motae differentia, quando per vacuum inaequalis ponder is corpora moveri dixerunt aequaliter. Quod
si verum est, verum esse non potest dogma Aristotelis, falsum certe erit et sibi ipsi prorsus
adversum. Scribit enim duas esse causas inaequalis motus medii videlicet mobilisque rei diversitas mediumque ipsum per quod mobile fertur, causam esse quae impedit et contra nititur,
utpote divisione fracturaque indignum, quocirca agens et praecipua causa rei mobili fertur
accepta adeo, ut ipsa mane at etiam si subtrahatur impediens. Magis itaque et minus gravia
corpora vergunt ad imum suapte natura et gravitatis proportione inclinabunt magis et
minus, unde motus prodit inaequalitas, etiam si nihil resistat, nihil impediat, quod dividi
penetrarique oporteat. Sequitur enim divisio non praecedit, sequitur dico tamquam effectus,
delapsi corporis gravitatem atque figuram." Ex. Van., VI, 5; p. 770.
59 "'Nec contentus rationes Aristotelis dissolvisse, argumentatur ipse fieri posse motum per
vacuum, hoc est per nullum corpus, immo et fieri semper nulla per corpora coelestes matus,
diversitate multa celeritatis et tarditatis. Manifestum enim sphaeras mundi superiores globosque syderum semper agitari, alios quidem celerius ali is, nec per ullum meare corpus;
neque enim per elementa subtus collocata, neque per se ipsos incedunt, findi enim aut dividi
nequit coeleste corpus superiorque sphaera, illa omnium extima, extrinsecus non tangitur."
Ex. Van., VI, 5; p. 770.

148

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

Philoponus adds that the speed with which they move is dependent not
on the medium through which they are travelling, but rather on factors
attributable to the nature of the bodies themselves. 6o Strangely enough,
Pico does not consider it important to mention the Grammarian's
seemingly valid reasons, but is content to supply a somewhat less forceful argument of his own. He merely says that in celestial motion all
things are possible - apparently because of the divine nature of the
superior world of the spheres - a fact which Aristotle had not realized. 61
Further discussion of the question is also drawn from Philoponus. If
circular motion of the incorruptible spheres is possible in a vacuum,
Pi co asks, what is to prevent rectilinear motion of corruptible objects
from taking place in a vacuum in like manner? 62
Pico is perhaps the first to discuss these arguments of Philoponus in
Western Europe. 63 This is not to say that an almost identical argument
was not known and debated throughout the Middle Ages, but only to
say that it was not generally identified with the name ofJohn Philoponus. A similar argument against Aristotle's rejection of the possibility
of a void was voiced already in the Arabic world by Avempace (d.
1139), was considered but rejected by Averroes, and became a much
debated issue in Europe during the later Middle Ages. 64 Whether or
not Avempace's own formulation had its ultimate source in Philoponus
is unknown, no evidence having been found to answer the question in
one way or the other. What is clear however is that in the "pre-Galilean" period of the sixteenth century, the two criticisms were of separate traditions and were both well known. 65
60 Philoponus, Physics (Greek), p. 690, lines 8-16. The movement of the spheres is depen~
dent on the force of each of the different moving bodies and on their type of motion.
61 "Quare in coelestibus motibus omnia fieri compraehendimus, quae fieri non posse censet Aristoteles." Ex. Van., VI, 5; p. 770.
62 Ibid., VI, 5; p. 770. See also Koyre, "Le vide et l'espace infini au XIVe siecle."
63 See the article of Grabmann cited in note 2.
64 See especially Ernest Moody, "Galileo and Avempace," JHI XII (I95I), pp. I63-93,
375-422, who discusses the development of this from Averroes to Galileo. Also important for
the discussion in the West during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is Anneliese Maier,
An deT Grenze von Scholastik und NatuTwissenschaft, 2nd ed., (Rome, 1952), pp. 219-54; idem,
Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik (Rome, 1958), pp. 239-85; and Marshall Clagett, The
Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison, Wise., 1959), pp. 421-44- For the basic text
through which Avempace's opinion was transmitted to the West see Averroes, Comm. in
Libros. Phys., in ed. cit., IV, fols. 158'-162r, esp. 160 v- r . It is worth noting, however, that
Averroes mentions that Philoponus holds the existence of a vacuum to be possible, although
he does not furnish any details on the Grammarian's arguments (lib. IV, text 43, fo!' 141rb).
65 Averroes' commentaries were too well known in the sixteenth century to require comment. The extent to which his comments - and in this case what he says of Avempace's
position - were in the consciousness of the sixteenth century natural philosophers is evidenced
by the very long discussion of this passage (text 71 of book IV) which we find in a work like
Nifo's commentary on the Physics (ed. cit., pp. 319-25). Averroes (ed. cit., IV, fo!' 161 Vb )

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

149

Precisely why Pico chose to express his opinion by citing Philoponus

as an authority rather than Avempace is not a question that is easy to
answer. He certainly must have known Avempace's opinion on the
matter, for Book IV of Averroes' commentary on the Physics is even
mentioned in the same chapter in which he presents Philoponus'
position. 66 Regardless of why he did so, he seems to have been one of
the few philosophers of the century who attributed the view to the
Grammarian. As :r./Ioody says, even in the sixteenth century when it
was fashionable to attribute opinions to ancient, rather than to medievalor contemporary authorities, the view which we have just discussed
went under the name of "Avempace's opinion."67
A possible explanation why Pico chose to attribute the theory to
Philoponus rather than Avempace may lie in the fact that Philoponus
treated the question in a good deal more detail and gave several other
accompanying arguments (besides the basic one of V oc PIR vs. Voc
(P - R)). Avempace's argument, on the other hand, as it has come
down to us by way of Averroes is known only in summary form, although a huge number of detailed commentaries on it were available
by the beginning of the sixteenth century. A further explanation, and
perhaps a more likely one, might lie in the fact that Gianfrancesco
seemed to take a good deal of delight in citing esoteric sources such as
Sextus Empiricus, Hasdai Crescas, Theodorus Metochites, Joseph
Rhacendites, etc., who were by no means well known in the early sixteenth century. Neither was Philoponus well known as a defender of
"Avempace's opinion" and it is possible that Pico felt that his argument gained a certain amount of prestige by connecting a startling
and different name to it.
Pico also gives other reasons in support of his contention that the
existence of a vacuum is possible. These are derived from Crescas 68
again, although probably the majority of them were already known in
the West by Pico's time. What Crescas had to say on the matter is interesting since he more or less summed up the discussions of the vacuum
specifically says that Avempace was the first to advance this criticism, indicating that he was
not aware of Philoponus' critique.
Although Philoponus' arguments do not seem to be well known at the time when Pi co
published his work (1520), his commentary on the Physics was published not long afterward,
at Venice in 1535. Latin translations appeared rapidly and were often reprinted during
the century, indicating a certain amount of popularity. Printings of Latin editions appeared
at Venice in 1539, 1546, 1550, 1554, 1558, 1569, and 158!.
66 Ex. Van., VI, 5; p. 769.
67 Moody, op. cit., p. 414. But see our note 87 below.
68 Proposition I, Part II, "The First Speculation" in Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 178-9!. Also
see the accompanying notes (pp. 391-424) and the Introduction (pp. 54-62).

150

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

as it developed in the Arabic and Hebrew traditions. These arguments

also complement those of Philoponus and add something to Pico's
case against Aristotle. Our author begins by arguing with Crescas that
it is possible, even if there is a vacuum, for the elements to have their
proper places. Even though the elements (i.e. air, earth, fire, and
water) might be intermixed with a void (as was the Atomists' view),
they can still have termini a quo and ad quem at the center and the circumference of the world. 69 Regardless of the fact that there be a vacuum,
the terminus a quo for fire would be at the center and its terminus ad quem
would be the periphery or the "sphere of fire."
This argument has a certain similarity to one of those used by Philoponus but seems to be directed primarily against Aristotle's contention
that in a vacuum there would be no differentiation of direction. According to Crescas, although there would be empty space in the world,
this would not prevent there also being a center and circumference
which would act as termini for the natural motion of the elements. In
short, it does not follow that, if one argues that there is a vacuum, he
must also hold that there is no differentiation of direction.
After bypassing Crescas' discussion of what we have called "Avempace's opinion," Gianfrancesco turns to a problem closely related to it.
He reproduces Crescas' counter argument against Averroes' rejection
of Avempace's position. 70 Averroes had rejected Avempace's argument,
because he felt that the latter had given an absolute status to the "natures" of moving bodies instead of always treating them in relation to
their medium. According to Averroes, one cannot speak of the heavy
or light quality ofa body qua body, but can only discuss it in relation to
a particular medium
Averroes had used the following argument to support his position.
The keenness of an iron blade is greater than that of a bronze blade,
but one cannot think of an "absolute keenness" without thinking of it
inhering in a particular material. In the same way qualities such as
"heaviness," "lightness," and "motion" can be thought of only in
relation to the medium in which they occur. In Averroes' eyes when
69 "Nunc ex Graecis expositoribus digressi, parumper videamus quid Hebraeus Rabi
Hasdai de eodem vacuo senserit. Arbitratur nihil iuvare Aristotelem earn quae dicitur loci
ad collocatum corpus convenientiam, cum fieri queat ut elementa etiamsi sint immixta
vacuo earn possideant et diversos etiam habeant et suos terminos, qui bus factum est nomen a
quo et ad quem, ex propinquitate videlicet atque distantia ad circumferentiam et centrum."
Ex. Van ., VI, 6; p. 771. This argument was also given by Philoponus. See Duhem, Systeme
. . . , I, pp. 352-53.
70 This is not precisely true, since Crescas argues against Averroes' rejection as given by
Gersonides. See Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 403[., note 13 and p. 409, note 17,

CRITIQUE OF ARIS1;:OTLE'S PHYSICS

151

Avempace speaks of such terms in the absence of a medium, it does not

make sense. 71
Crescas and Pico reply to this charge by saying that heaviness and
lightness in themselves are sufficient to produce a motive power and
there is no necessity for a medium. All bodies can move by virtue of
their quality of heaviness or lightness and their relative motion is determined merely by their relative heaviness. 72
Another argument against the possibility of a vacuum is then considered. Some have held that if there were a vacuum, the vacuum itself
would be a body since it is three-dimensional. They further argue that
to say that a body is in a vacuum is to say that one body is in another,
which is obviously false, for two bodies cannot occupy the same place
at the same time. 73 In opposition to this, Pico argues that the impenetrability of matter is not based on the fact that three-dimension ali ties
cannot interpenetrate, but rather on the fact that only when these dimensionalities are conjoined to matter they cannot interpenetrate. 74
71 See Averroes, ed. cit., IV, fols. 160V-162 r ; Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 403-408, note 13a; pp.
409-1O, note Ig; Moody, op. cit., p. 18g. What Averroes is arguing here might be made
clearer by the adoption of a physical example. In the case of Ohm's Law, the current flow
through a circuit is the ratio of the voltage drop to the resistance of the circuit. Thus, algebraically it might be expressed as I = E/R. As the resistance is reduced, the current flow
increases, if the voltage is held constant. So, when the circuit is made up of different media
or materials (i.e. iron, copper, silver, etc.) the resistance varies. Certain high-conductivity metals held at extremely low temperatures offer very low resistances, but there is no
such thing as an "ideal conductor" which would have no resistance. For the law to be valid
there must be a complete electrical circuit and whenever there is a complete circuit, there
is necessarily a resistance to current flow. Thus, resistance is inherent in the nature of the
system and one cannot speak of a circuit without resistance.
Similarly conceived is the Aristotelian theory of local motion, which we have expressed
algebraically as V oc PIR. The expression (PIR) , though theoretically analyzable (P X 1IR),
in fact can never be separated if motion is to take place. Motion must be through a medium
just as electrical current must be through a circuit.
72 Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 184-85; Ex. Van., VI, 6; p. 771 where Pi co puts it as follows,
" ... et praeterea nihil efficere eas quae sunt excogitatae contra vacuum rationes et fundatae
super motu recto, quando intermedium nullum sit necessarium; et dici queat gravitatem et
levitatem naturaliter corporibus inesse mobilibus, nec ea mediis indigere. Dici etiam possit
omnibus corporibus inesse gravitatem eaque vocari levia, quae videlicet gravia sint minus,
eaque ipsa moveri sursum ex eorum, quae magis gravia sunt, impetu et violentia." Following
the same analogy as in the previous footnote, we might say that they view the situation as
being similar to that of our modern conception of the passage of light through a medium.
According to this theory, light travels at a given velocity in a vacuum and when travelling
through other media (e.g. air, water, or glass) this velocity is reduced by the optical characteristics of the medium. Therefore light has per se a particular velocity which will be at its
maximum when it travels through no medium (i.e. a vacuum) and will be somewhat reduced
when travelling through other types of physical media.
73 Aristotle hints at such an argument against the vacuum (Phys. 216a26-b2), but it is
made much clearer in the later commentaries, e.g. Averroes, ed. cit., IV, fols. 165v-66v.
Further opinions of the commentators are to be found in Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 415-16, note 28.
74 "Parvi facit etiam non penetratorum corporum ob dimensiones ration em, cum dimensiones materiae iunctas id efficere posse dicendum sit, non seiunctas et ab omni prorsus
materia separatas." Ex. Van., VI, 6; p. 771; Cf. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 184-87.

152

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

This amounts to saying that it is true that three dimensional objects

cannot interpenetrate only when they are material objects. A threedimensionality, such as a vacuum, can contain another three-dimensionality, since the former has no material accidents, but rather is
"pure" three-dimensional space, having no quality other than tridimensional extension. This problem is somewhat analogous to that of
determining the place of a spiritual substance. A soul can exist in man
or an infinite number of angels on the head of a pin simply because they
do not have material qualities and therefore are not governed by the
same laws regarding the occupation of space as are material entities.
The same thing was already hinted at before by Philoponus in his
discussion of place, where it was noted by Gianfrancesco. 75 Philoponus'
notion of place as pure three-dimensionality in which a body can be
does not differ markedly from the conception of vacuum as threedimensional extension devoid of matter. In fact these qualities of threedimensionality ('rP~x.7i ow:cr'r<x:,ov), incorporeality (acrW!-LIX-roV), and privation of body (XEVO:[ crw!-Ll1..,oc;) led Philoponus to say that place and
vacuum are essentially the same thing.
Pi co introduces a further sub-argument which attacks the position
that "those who hold that the vacuum exists say that it is the cause of
motion." This apparently revolves around the Aristotelian rejection
of the Democritean theory of motion in a vacuum. Democritus argued
that a vacuum is necessary for motion of any sort, for otherwise there
would be the interpenetration of bodies. 76 In opposition to this, Aristotle said that vacuum cannot be the cause of motion. This opinion
was expanded and elaborated on by his followers and commentators. 77
Crescas and Pico argue against the Aristotelian position by saying that
vacuum is meant to be the cause of motion only in an accidental way.
It is not an efficient or final cause of motion, but we might call it a
necessary condition (or a necessary reason, as opposed to a sufficient
reason) for motion. That is, vacuum is necessary if there be motion and
still no interpenetration of bodies. 78
See above pp. 140 - 41 and notes 35-38.
Given in Aristotle's Physics 213b2-12. See also 214a24-5 where the term ",'(nov
l<WijcrE:CUC; is used. The Stoics, however, argued that 1tvsufLC( penetrated all bodies an filled
the universe. See Duhem, Systeme ... , I, pp. 301-308; S. Sambursky, The Physical World of
the Greeks (London, 1956), pp. 134-37; idem, Physics of the Stoics, pp. 1-48 and Emile Brehier,
La tMorie des incorporeals dans l'ancien stofcisme, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1962), pp. 37-53.
77 See for example Averroes' commentary on text 64 of Book IV (ed. cit. IV, fols. IS3 vbIS4ra ) or Nifo's commentary on the same passage (ed. cit., pp. 314b-3ISa).
78 "Negat et eos qui vacuum astruxere, id ipsum causam motus asseruisse, praeterquam
ex accidenti, ne videlicet fieret corporum penetratio." Ex. Van., VI, 6; p . 771. This is somewhat :truncated, as is often the case in Pico's reproduction of Crescas' arguments. For
Crescas' fuller treatment see Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 180-83. Aristotle is still able to explain
75
76

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

153

Pico also reproduces the Pythagorean argument for the possibility of

a vacuum beyond the last sphere of the fixed stars. In all, he gives three
arguments for the existence of a vacuum outside the world. First, even
if the argument that in a vacuum there is no terminus a quo and terminus
ad quem were valid,79 this would still not prevent there being a vacuum
outside the world, where there are no termini, since the bodies would be
moving in circular motion. This would be especially true, if we accept
the Aristotelian conception of the universe, which has no beginning,
but is eterna1. 80 Analogously, Pi co says that even if the arguments
against the necessity of a medium for motion were not valid for the
material world, they would still be valid for the possibility of a vacuum
outside the world. 81
Finally, Pico gives a third argument to demonstrate the necessity ofa
vacuum outside of the world. 82 If the world is not infinite in extent, as
Aristotle himself held, 83 and there is no body outside the confines of the
world, there must be a vacuum there. 84 This certainly seems like a
convincing argument, but it is one that could not be accepted by the
Aristotelians. Both infinity and vacuum were refuted by Aristotle along
somewhat theoretical lines, but these refutations assumed such a key
position in the later tradition that the discussions of them sometimes
went far beyond the concepts as envisioned by Aristotle himself. For
example, the Jewish thinker, Gersonides (I 288- I 344), had already
motion without the necessity of a vacuum in terms of the replacement of one body with
another and by means of condensation and rarefaction. These .things he discusses when he
undertakes a specific refutation of Democritus' view (see Phys. 214a26-bI2).
79 For the discussion of this argument against the vacuum see above p. 150.
80 " . atque ut caetera obstarent vacuo, nihil tamen officere, quin orbiculare corpus in
eo moveatur, cum in motu circulari, nes terminus a quo, nec terminus ad quem motus tendat, inveniatur; et secundum Aristotelem maxi me qui motum nunquam voluit incepisse ... "
Ex. Van., VI, 6; p. 771. Cf. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 182-83.
81 " . . . nee impediri ex intermedio quin vacuum extra mundum reperiri queat." Ex.
Van., VI, 6; p. 771. Cf. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 184-85' For the argument that a medium is not
necessary for motion even in the world see our discussion above pp. 146-51. Pico does not
reproduce Crescas' reasons for this view. TheJew argues that the circular motion of spherical
bodies is a movement that does not involve the change of place and is therefore possible even
if there is no medium.
82 It will be noted that here we have said "necessity" instead of "possibility," as we did
in regarding the two prior arguments. That is because this third one seems to be a more conclusive argument of necessity, whereas the other two merely argue that it is not impossible
for a vacuum to exist outside the world.
83 Aristotle argues at length against the possibility of infinity (Phys., III, 4-8).
84 " . . . imo accersiri vacuum ab eis vel nolentibus, qui bus asseritur non inveniri corpus
infinitum. Nam si nullum est extra mundum corpus, nec plenum ibi esse convincitur, vacuum
potius et seiuncta dimensio." Ex. Van., VI, 6; p. 771. Cf. Wolfson, op. cit., pp. I 88-8g. This
question was much discussed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See Duhem, Systeme
... , VIII, pp. 35-60, passim, and Koyre, "Le vide ... ," pp. 70-71, 75. The Stoics also held
that a vacuum exists outside the world (Duhem, Systeme ... , I, pp. 308-13 and Sambursky,
Physics of the Stoics, pp. 110- 15, 128-2g, 143-44).

154

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

answered this argument by saying that outside the world there is only
privation or non-being. 85 Privation or non-being has a wholly negative
significance; that is, one cannot even form a mental concept of this
"non-being," which would be beyond the last sphere. On the other
hand, vacuum as envisaged by the Epicureans, Pythagoreans, Crescas
and Pico was not privative, but merely indeterminate. It has the single
quality of dimension and is hence capable of receiving those accidents
of which pure dimension is susceptible.
To establish more clearly here the distinction we are trying to make
between the vacuum of Pythagoras, Epicurus, etc. from the privation
or non-being spoken of by the Aristotelian school, we shall resort to a
somewhat facetious example. Assuming that a space rocket were operating in the Ptolemaic~Aristotelian universe, let us see how this would be
interpreted by the two opposing conceptions. For the upholders of the
vacuum r.o problem would arise if the rocket went beyond the "world,"
for it would move freely in a boundless vacuum that is capable of
receiving a moving object. On the other hand, such a thing could not
take place in the Aristotelian world, for other than the impossibility of
it passing through the spheres of the celestial bodies, there is no possibility to interpret what would happen when it passed the last sphere of the
fixed stars.
With these arguments for the existence of a void beyond the world,
Pi co ends his discussion of the vacuum. He has drawn his material for
this exposition from two philosophers who were little known to Europeans of the early sixteenth century. In combining the material from
these two sources, our author more or less summarized the available
arguments showing that a vacuum is not an impossibility
Let us return again to the problem of motion in a vacuum. Philoponus, Crescas, and Pico, besides Avempace and many twelfth and thirteenth century writers, both Eastern and Western, opposed Aristotle
on this. Through the Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and Christian philosophical traditions much effort had been expended on this question. It
still retained currency throughout the sixteenth century. Finally, about
1590 Galileo began speaking of motion through a vacuum as a reality.
The Philoponus-Avempace hypothesis is discussed in his De 1Iiotu in
mathematical terms.86 He clearly opposes Aristotle's contention that in
a vacuum all bodies would move at the same rate of speed (i.e. infinite
85 Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 419-21, note 35, where Gersonides' and others' objections to the
Pythagorean position are given.
86 In the treatise De Motu in ed. cit., I, pp. 245-419; esp. pp. 276-89, 294-96. See Moody,
op. cit., pp. 166-83.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

155

velocity) and supports the Philoponus-Avempace position that the

"natural" velocity of the elements through a vacuum would be finite
and would depend only on the relative densities of the elements in
question. He further replaces the Aristotelian duality of levity and
gravity by the single force of gravity. So, for Galileo, even the lightest
of the elements (fire) would move downward in a vacuum, since it is
heavier than nothing, although it is lighter than air and the other elements.
The errors in such a position are now evident, but, at the same time,
there are several significant advancements over the Aristotelian theory.
First, an important step has been made by recognizing the single determining factor of gravity in place of the Aristotelian duality. Secondly,
to follow Philoponus and Avempace in holding that motion can occur
in a vacuum at a finite velocity is an important realization, even if
Galileo had not yet correctly formulated the gravitational theory that
the velocity of all free-falling objects in a vacuum is equa1. 87
At precisely the same time as Galileo was arguing against the Aristotelian objections to motion in a vacuum and conducting experiments
to attempt to verify his own theory of gravity, 88 the Aristotelian position
was still being staunchly defended by so acute a thinker as J acopo Zabarella. In his De Motu Gravium et Levium, contained in his De Rebus
Naturalibus,89 the author cites Avempace's position and then attempts
to refute it. But what is even more interesting than this is what he says
about the recent defenders of Avempace's position who go so far as to
"conduct many experiments against Aristotle's doctrine." 90 Precisely
to whom Zabarella is here referring is not clear. What is clear is that
Zabarella's "empiricism" did not go quite far enough for him to disagree with Aristotle on this. Rather, from our vantage point, he seems to
be an arch-conservative in defending Aristotelian physics.
The Aristotelian arguments were still being defended at the end of
87 Galileo certainly knew the arguments of both Avempace and Philoponus. In De Motu
(ed. cit., I, p. 410) he says, "Philoponus, Avempace, Avicenna, D. Thomas, Scotus, et alii,
qui tueri conantur in vacuo fieri motum in tempore ... " See also p. 284.
88 See Moody, op. cit. for a discussion of these experiments and their results.
89 ZabareUa, op. cit., pp. 2 I 3-59.
90 "Adversus Aristotelem et Averroem hi recentiores insurgunt, et aperte profitentur
Aristotelem non cognovisse quae sit resistentia in motibus elementorum, immo et multa falsa
dixisse in septimo physciorum de proportionibus in motu: adversus quae ipsi plura adducunt
experimenta, qui bus se cognovisse testantur falsas esse iUas proportiones, et hanc falsitatem
processisse ex hoc falso fundamento, quod forma elementi movens ipsum nOn habeat a mobili
aliquam internam resistentiam, sed solum externam a medio pleno." Ibid., p. 221. Some of
the key problems involved here will be discussed in detail in my forthcoming paper, "Experiment and Experience: A Comparison of Zabarella's View with that Expressed in Galileo's De motu".

156

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

the century by the more conservative branch of Aristotelians (if we

can consider Zabarella to represent the "progressive strand"). The
famous Coimbra Commentaries on the Physics give several interesting indications on this question. 91 Here we have a clear division of the opinion
on motion into two camps. Those listed as holding the impossibility of
motion in a vacuum include Albert the Great, Gregory of Rimini,
Averroes, Giles of Rome, Walter Burley, John of J andun, and Albert
of Saxony. On the other side are listed Avempace, Avicenna, Thomas,
Scotus, and "many others" (aliique complures).92 Avempace's argument,
however, is not given as careful consideration as it had been by Averroes, but is rejected with little ado. 93
But, by the time that Galileo was challenging Aristotle's horror vacui,
certain ancient defenses of the vacuum had been given currency. Giordano Bruno and others adopted the Democritean-Epicurean philosophy
as a basis for defending the existence of the void. 94 In addition to
bringing the arguments of the Atomists to bear against Aristotle, the
traditional arguments of Philo po nus, Avempace, and others were by no
means neglected. 95
It was, however, in the decade of the 1640'S that the vacuum was
finally demonstrated as a physical reality by Otto von Guericke (160286), Evangelista Torricelli (1608- 47), Pierre Gassendi, Blaise Pascal,
See above note 49 and our discussion of this in the next chapter pp. 172-74.
Neither Pico nor Philoponus is here mentioned. The fact that they were included in the
aliique compluTes is beyond doubt. At the beginning of the discussion of the subject of vacuum,
Gianfrancesco Pico is mentioned in a marginal note as a source for information regarding
those who assert the possibility of the vacuum (ed. cit., II, col. 78). He is also mentioned often
elsewhere in the Commentaries. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
93 The clarity and conciseness with which the Aristotelian argument is here presented is
rather remarkable. For example, "Si motus in vacuo tempus consumeret, sequeretur, duo
corpora quantumlibet inaequali pondere posse aequali tempore quodcunque spacium vacuum decurrere, quod falsum est." (II, col. 94) or "Etenim quia nulla est proportio spacii
vacui ad plenum, quoad medii resistentiam; cum in vacuo nullum corpus medium interiaceat, recte sequitur ob resistentiam medii nullum in vacuo tempus consumi." (II, col. 95).
94 In his work Camoeracensis Acrotismus he argues very clearly for the existence of a vacuum. See the text in Jordani Bruni Opera . .. , vol. I, pars I, articles 33-37, pp. 130-43. The
vacuum is also supported in a rather original way by Bernardino Telesio. See De Rerum Natura I, 25; ed. cit., I, pp. 87-91. On the influence of Epicureanism see Tullio Gregory, "Studi
sulI'atomismo del Seicento: I. Sebastian Basson," Giornale critico dellafilosofia italiana, 3rd ser.,
XVIII (1964), pp. 38- 65.
95 See for example Francesco Piccolomini's (1520-1604) defense of the vacuum in F.
Piccolomini, op, cit., I, fols . 183v-194 v where the views of Philoponus as well as those of
Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and the Stoics (for the Stoic theory of the void
see Duhem, Systeme I, pp. 301-13) are given. See also Francisci Piccolominei Senensis ... De
Rerum Definitionibus (Venice, 1600), fol. 167Y-168T. Another opponent of Aristotle was Giambattista Benedetti, author of a treatise against the Aristotelian position, Demonstratio propoTtionum motuum localium contra ATistotelem et omlles philosophos .. . (Venice, 1554). See particularly
A . Koyre, Etudes galiliennes (Paris, 1939), I, pp. 41-54 and idem, "Jean-Baptiste Benedetti,
critique d'Aristote," Melanges O.ffeTts aEtienne Gilson (Toronto-Paris, 1959), pp. 351-72.
91
92

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

157

and others.96 The ground had been paved on a theoretical plane for
these men by the various arguments against Aristotle, both by thinkers
such as Galileo, who had scientific interests, and others such as Pico,
who had no interests other than destroying the confidence in Aristotle's
philosophy. Pico cannot, certainly, claim a central role in the demonstration of the possibility of a vacuum, but he does provide one connection to the seventeenth century which is not without some interest.
One of the key figures of seventeenth century science and philosophy
was Pierre Gassendi. Early in his career (ca. 1620) he conceived the
idea of writing a huge work against the still predominant Aristotelian
philosophy and science. That this book was to be organized along the
same lines as the Examen Vanitatis we will show in the next chapter. The
sections of this work which were to be concerned with a detailed analysis of Aristotelian physics either were never completed or do not
survive. From the two books which do survive we can see that Gassendi's early ideas regarding a criticism of Aristotle's rejection of the void
were in large measure derived from Pico's work,97 and from the tradition which it summed up.
In the preface to the First Book of his Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus
Aristoteleos,98 Gassendi sets out the program for the other books which
were to follow. In Book III, Aristotelian physics was to be treated. 99
Although this book does not survive, Gassendi's plan was to treat motion, place, time, and vacuum, precisely the things criticized by Gianfrancesco Pico in the Examen Vanitatis. In the First Book of the Exercitationes, Gassendi outlined briefly his program and several times gives us a
brief glimpse of what he thinks of Aristotle's criticism of the vacuum,lo
Later in the same work he reiterates the same thing,lol Gassendi never
96 For the experimental and technological development of vacuum producing apparatus
see Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in Ihrer Entwickelung, 6th ed., (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 107-'25;
Charles Singer, et. al. (eds.), A History of Technology (Oxford, 1954-53) III, pp. 330-34; and
most interesting ofal! Gassendi, ed. cit., I, pp. '203-16, the chapter entitled "De nupero grandiusculi coacervative inanis, ope hydrargyri, experimento." For the early seventeenth century
discussions of vacuum see Cornelis de Waard, L'experierzce barometrique: ses antecedents et ses explications (Thouars, 1936); E . .J. Dijksterhuis, The Mecharlization of the vVorld Picture, trans.
C. Dikshoorn, (Oxford, 1961), pp. 444-57; and the articles by Michelle Sadoun-Goupil and
Bernard Rochot in Revue d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications, XVI (1963), pp. 23-76.
97 Gassendi will be treated more fully in the next chapter and further bibliographical
information will be given there.
98 Ed. cit., III. pp. 98-210.
99 Exercitationes, preface; III, p. 102.
100 In Exercitatio V, "Quod apud Aristotelem innumera deficiant" section 7, he says the
following, "Capite 9 [i.e. book IV of the Plrysics] quando ex motus celeritate probat non dari
vacuum: concludit contra vacuum separatum, non contra respersum, quale ponebant veteres." Ibid., III, p. 1'28a
101 "Libro IV [i.e. of the Plrysics] , falsum videtur et quod Locus sit superficies, et quod non

158

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

did quite develop his argument in the terms he envisioned when he

wrote the First Book of the Exercitationes. Rather, during the next decades he came to derive more and more inspiration from the Epicurean
physics and from the contemporary experimental view of natural philosophy which was just developing.
The mature expression of his thought on the subject of vacuum is
quite different from his early, sketchy discussion of the matter.1 02 He
tends to think much less in terms of simply a refutation of Aristotle, but
rather in terms of physical reality. The historical sources which he
favors are those of the atomistic tradition, but it is significant that he
still mentions Philoponus as being important.1 03 By this time Gassendi
devotes himself primarily to the empirical side of the problem, rather
than to theoretical considerations. Much of his discussion is devoted to
enumerating various mechanical means - some which of had been
utilized, others not - of actually achieving a vacuum (or at least approaching one) in fact.l o4

(6) Conclusion
Pico acted as an intermediary for both the Arabic-Hebrew tradition
of Hasdai Crescas and for the important "digression" ofJohn Philoponus. The problem of the vacuum was already an old one by the beginning of the sixteenth century, but it was a crucial one, for it proved to
be a philosophical concept, which was ultimately accessible to experimental verification. Technological development in the course of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries reached the point at which a
vacuum was actually realizable.l 05 The "philosophical" or "theoretical" side of the issue evolved at the end of the sixteenth century on the
one hand to Benedetti and Galileo and on the other to the defenders of
the Aristotelian position (e.g. J acopo Zabarella and the Coimbra Commentators). The question was not ultimately resolved until nearly the
middle of the next century and, even then, a major figure in the final
acceptance of the vacuum as a physical reality, such as Gassendi, was
still nurtured on Pico's completely "unscientific" anti-Aristotelianism.
detur vacuum, et quod Tempus sit mensura motus." Exercitationes V, 6; vol. III, p . 14oa. The
I talics are in the edition cited.
102 He treats the subject at length in the Syntagmatis Philosophici Pars Secunda, quae est
Physica, lib. II, cap. 2-6 (ed. cit., I, pp. 185- 216).
103 " quod videtur adnotatum dignum, Philoponum, unum ex praecipuis Aristotelis
interpretibus, instituta una sat is longa adversus Aristotelem digressione ut ostendat Locum
esse non Superficiem, sed Intervallum Veterum, quod sua natura incorporeum, ac Inane sit;"
Ibid., I, p. 186b.
104 Ibid., cap. 4-5; pp. 196- 216.
105 See above our note 96.

CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

159

Again, Pi co achieved a role - one which would have doubtlessly displeased him greatly - in the establishment of the "new science", which
was to eventually replace that of Aristotle, and to prove in the long run
to be even more damaging to Pico's values of philosophy and religion
than the old one had been.
Gianfrancesco Pico, in his determined effort to demonstrate Aristotle
to be in error, hit upon some rather important notions. In Pico's rather
confined view, however, the demonstration that Aristotelian philosophy was in error was considered to be sufficient to show that human
reason could never reach sincera veritas. For him, such a demonstration
would be adequate to show that the reliance on "human philosophy"
should be abandoned forever. Apparently it never occurred to him that
such a destruction of the foundations of Aristotelian science might have
another consequence, that from it could develop a "new science" to
take the place of the one which had been discredited. Little did he
realize that this various criticisms might themselves be utilized as key
notions in a quite different science which would eventually make just
as many claims as the Aristotelian one had ever made.
His counter arguments to Aristotelian physics soon became absorbed
in the sixteenth century discussions of these problems. Whereas he
combatted Aristotle in the name of religious truth, these same arguments were utilized by many of his successors in the name of scientific
truth. But his criticisms of Aristotle also gained wider attention than
merely as part of the scientific discussions of the century. Let us now
turn to an evaluation of the impact that the Examen Vanitatis had on the
philosophy of the next decades.

CHAPTER VI

THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITATIS ON

LATER THOUGHT

Illustre exeunte seculo decimo quinto et ineunte sexto erat nomen Picorum.
Nec enimJoannes Picus solum Mirandulanus magnam nominis sui farnam
fui~ adeptus, sed etiam hicJoannes Franciscus Mirandulanus, illius ex fratre
Galeoto Pi co nepos, licet ad Joannis patrui gloriam frustra adspiraret.
B. G. Struve, Rerum Germanicarum scriptores (1717)

( I) Introduction
We have had occasion already to mention certain of the later thinkers
who were influenced in one way or another by the Examen Vanitatis.
It now remains for us to indicate more precisely and in greater detail
just what effect the printing of Pico's work had on the intellectual
world of the sixteenth century. The publication of the Examen Vanitatis
in 1520 by no means had an earthshattering effect on contemporary
intellectual life. On the other hand, little by little it was absorbed into
the general philosophical tradition and, as we shall see, was not without
influence.
The thesis was advanced early in the present century that Pico's
work was a major source for the sceptical attitude portrayed in Montaigne's Apologie de Raimond Sebond. Later, more careful, study has
shown that although there are certain similarities between the works of
Pi co and Montaigne, there is no evidence to indicate a direct connection between the two. Rather, it appears that they both drew upon
a common source, Sextus Empiricus. 1 It has also been argued that
Pica's Examen Vanitatis exerted a major influence on Cornelius Agrippa
of Nettesheim's work of similar title, De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum
(1527). Although the matter deserves a more careful investigation than
we have been able to give it, we find that little or no conclusive evidence
1 The case for Pico's influence was argued by Fortunat Strowski, Montaigne (Paris, 1906),
pp. 124-34; 2nd ed., 1931. The opposite position was presented by Pierre Villey, Les sources
et l'evolution des essais de Montaigne (Paris, 1908), II, pp. 166,324-25.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITATIS ON LATER THOUGHT 161

has thus far been advanced in support of this thesis. 2 We find that Pico's
and Agrippa's respective works are significantly different in outlook
and inspiration and that the new material which Pico added to the
sixteenth century discussions finds no place in Agrippa.
In a recent attempt to evaluate the effect which scepticism had on
early modern thought, Popkin 3 denies that the Examen Vanitatis had
much impact. He sees it, rather, as an isolated example of scepticism
and finds little connection between it and later manifestations of
scepticism. In this, Popkin seems to go too far, for although Pico's work
did not have the immediate impact of the writings ofMontaigne, Bayle,
or Descartes, it was by no means unknown. As we hope to be able to
show, the Examen Vanitatis exerted a definite, if modest, influence on a
number of thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was
not always influential as a fountain of scepticism; more often it was
seized upon as a sourcebook for the rising tide of anti-Aristotelianism.
But even leaving aside other lines of influence derived from the work,
we find that the development oflater scepticism draws upon Pico to a
greater extent than Popkin seems willing to admit.
In writing this chapter we plan to focus specifically on the fortuna of
the Examen Vanitatis, leaving aside Pico's influence in other areas. We
shall cover chronologically a number of later thinkers who seem to
have made use of Pico's work in one way or another.
(2) Mario Nizolio

One of the earliest writers to make use of Gianfrancesco Pico's

philosophical writings was the humanist Mario Nizolio 4 (1488-1567).
Nizolio became famous in his own day as a Ciceronian, primarily
through his well~known and much disputed Thesaurus Ciceronianus
(1535), a Latin lexicon containing only those words appearing in the
Ciceronian writings. It went through many editions 5 and gained for
the author a wide reputation as a Ciceronian. Indeed, much of his
2 The thesis was given by Villey, op. cit., II, p. 166 and has been repeated by Paola Zambelli, "A propos ito di 'de vanitate scientiarum et artium' di Cornelio Agrippa," Rivista
critica di storia della filosofia, XV (1960), p. 179. Our reasons for disagreeing with Villey and
Zambelli require a somewhat more extensive discussion than we give here. See Appendix C
for a detailed discussion.
3 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticismfrom Erasmus to Descartes (Assen, 1960), pp.
19-22. Although I disagree somewhat with Popkin's evaluation of Pico, I have found his
book very useful in preparing my study.
4 For a recent survey of the life and works of Nizolio and an ample bibliography see
Quirinus Breen's introduction (pp. I-LXXIV) to his edition, Mario Nizolio, De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos (Rome, 1955), 2 vol.
5 Breen, op. cit., I, pp. XXIII-XXVI.

162 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

later activity was taken up with controversies arising from this work,
the author becoming one of the century's most prominent defenders
of Ciceronianism.
Nizolio's most important later work was the De veris principiis et vera
ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos (1553), a work in the rhetorical, anti-metaphysical tradition of Lorenzo Valla and the humanist
logicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This work was reprinted in the next century by Leibniz, 6 who praised Nizolio highly in
his introduction. The work is essentially a criticism of the more traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy and a defense of the humanist-rhetorical tradition of Bruni, Valla, Agricola, Vives, and Ramus.
In the first chapter 7 entitled "Summatim quaenam sint principia
generalia veritatis investigandae recteque philosophandi," Nizolio
indicates his strong emphasis on rhetoric, grammar, and the study of
the approved authors. He proposes this program in place of the Scholastic emphasis on dialectic and metaphysics. This theme runs throughout the book. It is a focus somewhat different from that of Gianfrancesco Pico, whose polemic against the pagan philosophers, especially
Aristotle, revolves around their alleged incompatibility with Christianity. The censure of the pagan philosophers as being fundamentally
at odds with Christianity, which appears on nearly every page of the
Examen Vanitatis, is not to be found in Nizolio's work.
The point of contact between Nizolio and Pico lies in Book IV of the
Examen Vanitatis, where Gianfrancesco assembles a large number of
humanist criticisms against Aristotle. This is only a part of his polemic
and not the focal point of his treatise, as it is with Nizolio and others
whose chief concern is that of the professional grammarian and rhetorician. Included in Pico's critique is an attempt to show that the
textual tradition of the corpus Aristotelicum leaves grave doubts concerning the authenticity of many, if not all, of the works therein contained. Nizolio repeats this same criticism in his De veris principiis. s
After citing many of the same arguments that Pico had cited forty
6 Marii Nizolii De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos, libri IV.
Inscripti illustrissimo Baroni a Boineburg. Ab editore G. G. L. L. qui dissertationem praeliminarem de
instituto operis atque optima philosophi dictione, epistolam de Aristotele recentioribus reconciliabili notasque
a/que animadversiones marginales leniendo textui adjecit (Frankfurt, 1670). It was reprinted four

years later with only the title page being altered. For a recent study of this work, besides
Breen, see Paolo Rossi, "La celebrazione della rettorica e ]a polemica antimetafisica nel
'De Principiis' di Mario Nizolio" in La Crisi dell'uso dogmatieo della ragione, ed. Antonio Banfi,
(Rome-Milan, 1953), pp. 99-121. We will discuss Leibniz below pp. 180-81.
7 Breen, op. cit., I, pp. 21-30.
8 Ibid., II, pp. 165-75, chapter 6 of Book IV.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT 163

years earlier, he refers to Gianfrancesco as a source to be consulted by

the reader wishing to pursue the matter further:
But I can now put an end to this topic, if I here briefly mention the titles of
some chapters pertaining to the uncertainty of Aristotle's books, which
writings Gianfrancesco Pi co della Mirandola left us in Book IV of his Examen
vanitatis doctrinae gentium. The first of these is: "It is proven in many ways that
it is uncertain whether we have any book, the originals of which were truly
composed by Aristotle. " [And] Chapter 4: "That even if we have some books,
which were justly and legitimately written by Aristotle, it is nevertheless uncertain whether there is anything in these books which is genuinely Aristotle's; and, what is actually his and what is not his cannot be distinguished."9

In playing the tradition of humanist rhetoric as epitomized by Cicero

Philosophicus against the tradition of the philosophy of Aristotelian
Scholasticism, Nizolio mentions Pico only as a humanist critic of Aristotle, neglecting his more serious metaphysical, physical, and epistemological criticisms. This becomes particularly apparent in the chapters
of the De veris principiis which deal with topics to which Pico devoted
particular attention, such as the Aristotelian doctrine of scientific
demonstration.

(3) Giulio Castellani

If Nizolio drew from Gianfrancesco's "humanist criticism" of Aristotle and paid little attention to the bulk of his polemic, much different
was the philosopher from Faenza, Giulio Castellani (1528-86).10 After
completing his studies at Bologna and Ferrara, Castellani published a
work which attacked Cicero's Academica because of the sceptical arguments there presented. This book, Adversus Marci Tullii Ciceronis acade9 "Sed jam fin em huic capiti imponam si breviter hic subjecero inscriptiones quorundam
capitum ad incertitudinem librorum Aristotelis pertinentium, quas Joannes Franciscus
Picus Mirandula in quarto libro Examinis sui vanitatis doctrinae gentium scriptas reliquit.
Quarum haec est prima: "Probatur multipliciter incertum esse an ullum habeamus librum
cuius exemplaria vere fuerint ab Aristotele composita." Capitulum quartum: "Quod et si
aliquos etiam habeamus libras, qui juste atque legitime inscribantur Aristoteli, incertum
nihilominus esse utrum eis in libris aliquid sit quod syncere sit Aristotelis; nec internosci
posse quid eius proprium quid alienum." Ibid., II, p. 175. Here are quoted the precise titles
of chapters 4 and 5 of Book IV of the Examen Vanitatis. See Pi co, ed. cit., pp. 668-74 and
chapter III, pp. 63-67.
10 Little attention has been given this man by modern scholars. Some information is
available in Opuscoli Volgari di Mes. Giulio Castellani editi e inediti pubblicati per cura di F( rancesco) Z(ambrini) F(aentino), (Faenza, 1847), pp. VII-XXI; Antonio Montanari, Gli
uomini illustri di Faenza (Faenza, 1882-86), I, part I, pp. 63-66; and Garin, Lafilosofia, II,
pp. 39-43. See also Charles B. Schmitt, "Giulio Castellani (1528-1586): A Sixteenth Century
Opponent of Scepticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, V (1967), pp. 15-39.

164 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

micas quaestiones disputatio (1558),11 is devoted largely to a defense of

Aristotle against the Academica, which contains extensive sceptical arguments directed against dogmatic philosophy. Although Cicero's work
deals especially with Stoicism, Castellani interprets the criticism as
being directed against the Aristotelian theory of knowledge and attempts to defend it.
In the dedication letter to the work,12 Castellani states that recently
he has found the leisure to read the Academica; but, he has found that
Cicero said much about the fallibility of the senses with which he cannot agree. Therefore, he will explain the opinion of the Peripatetics
(sententiam Peripateticam) on the matter. "All [the dogmatic philosophers], in my judgment," he continues in Chapter One, "were more
rightly philosophers than the sceptics, ... but we have not decided
here to attack all of the arguments of the sceptics, but only to show
that the reasons of Cicero are false and to answer them in an Aristotelian fashion." 13 Included in Castellani's counterattack on the Academica is a chapter 14 devoted to refuting the arguments of Gianfracesco Pico drawn from the more deep-seated scepticism of Sextus
Empiricus. He characterizes Pico as an opponent of Aristotle, also
stating the opinion of his uncle, Pier Nicola Castellani,15 regarding
him:
Sense (as Aristotle says) is certainly true regarding its proper objects, or at
least it rarely incurs falsity.16 On this point Gianfrancesco Pico very boldly
opposes Aristotle and all of the Peripatetics. My uncle Pier Nicola Castellani, an outstanding man in both Greek and Latin literature, in the art of
healing, and in every philosophical study (would that he were alive !), considered him to be very outstanding both in teaching and in keenness of wit,
and would have called him "the philosopher par excellence" among the philosophers of his age, unless he had brought forth many things against Aristotle,
11 The full title of this work which was printed at Bologna for the first, and apparently
only, time is Iulii Castellanii Faventini adversus Marci Tullii Ciceronis academicas questiones disputatio, qua omnium pene philosophorum opinio de percipienda veritate comprehenditur et Aristotelis prae
omnibus celebratur philosophia (Bologna, 1558).
12 Ibid., pp. 19-2 4.
13 "Qui omnes [i.e. dogmatici) rectius quidem, mea iudicio, quam Sceptici, fuerunt
philosophati ... hic enim argumentorum omnium, quae a Scepticis afferuntur, acervum
facere non decrevimus, sed Ciceronis rationes tantum refellere, eisque Aristoteleo quodam
more respondere." Ibid., pp. 34-35.
14 Ibid., Chapter X, pp. 93-103. The title is "Confirmantur Luculli dicta de sensuum
perspicuitate et Ioannis Francisci Pici argumentis respondetur, quae Aristotelis philosophiam videntur destruere."
15 I have not been able to identify the source of this. Less information is available on Pier
Nicola than on Giulio Castellani. See, however, Antonio Montanari, op. cit., I, part II, pp.
61-62.
16 De anima 427bI 1-13.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TISON LATER THOUGHT 165

his senior and the teacher of all learned men, and unless he had tried with
all of his might and zeal to destroy such a man's philosophy. But, so help me
heaven, learned and clever men are not lacking in our own age, who explore
new methods of philosophizing and who toil to diminish the immortal glory
of Aristotle. The judgment of how much these men accomplish shall be left
to others.I7
The picture of Pico which Castellani gives us is of a man with great
ability, but of one who has devoted his gifts to a destruction of philosophy rather than to its praise. Here already is a faint premonition of the
abuse that will be heaped on the revivers of scepticism later in the same
century and even more intensely in the next.
Castellani then discusses Gianfrancesco's scepticism in greater detail.
He first considers the sceptical arguments as set forth in the Examen
Vanitatis - the senses of individual men are different, the senses of the
same man are different at different times, etc. For these and other
reasons, Pi co has concluded that there is no certainty to be found in
sense experience, but only "great variety and frequent change." 18
Pico contends furthermore, Castellani continues, that the different
temperaments (temperamenta) of a man at different times make the
senses perceive in an ever changing way.19 Here, in summary form,
are Pico's most characteristic and most forceful arguments, drawn
from the Examen Vanitatis. What does Castellani have to say about
them? He does not reject Pico's scepticism by merely giving us a vague
praise of truth or a blanket condemnation of the evils of the sceptical
position. He focuses clearly on the real issue and tries to meet Pico on
his own terms by arguing that he has not correctly analyzed the empirical data. He attempts, in short, to give arguments which are
meaningful to the sceptic, saying, "Yes, there is a grain of truth in
what you say, but you have not correctly interpreted the data, which
we both have before us."
17 "Nam sensus (ut ait Aristoteles) propriorum quidem est verus, aut raro admodum
suscipit falsitatem. Hie Aristoteli omnibusque Peripateticis loannes Franciscus Picus multum audacter obstitit. Quem Petrus Nicolaus Castellanius patruus meus, vir quidem Graecis
et Latinis literis, medendi arte, et omni philosophiae studio clarissimus (qui utinam viveret)
et doctrina et acumine ingenii praestantissimum valde admirabatur, eumque inter suae
aetatis philosophos qnAocrocp6H<X"OOV appellasset, nisi multa adversus Aristotelem protulisset
maximum illius et eruditorum omnium praeceptorem, nisique tanti viri destruere philosophiam omni labore et studio contendisset. Sed ita me Dii ament, hac nostra aetate non desunt
eruditi ac ingeniosi homines, qui novas indagarunt method os philosophandi immortalemque
Aristotelis gloriam imminuere elaborarunt. Qui sane quantum profecerint, aliorum sit iudicium." Castellani, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
18 Ibid., p. 97. Such arguments are to be found throughout Pica's work. Perhaps one of the
most characteristic statements is to be found in Ex. Van. IV, 12; p. 687. See also II, 22; pp.
560-64 and our discussion above in chapter IV, pp. 86-96.
19 Pico treats this in chapters two and three of Book V (pp. 695-707).

166 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

Castellani first insists that in every mixture of the four elements (by
which the temperaments of men are determined), there must be one
that dominates and this determines how the impressed species will be
received. Therefore, he continues, there cannot be as many and as
diverse temperaments of the human body as Pico claims. Averroes and
Galen admit that there are some discrepancies in the received species,
but they never say that there is an infinite variety, as Pico implies.
Moreover, they never assign these to what properly are called the
organs of sense. The sensoria are disposed in nearly all men in the same
way, if they are not injured or defective, argues Castellani. He attempts
to substantiate this remark by giving what seems to be a series of rather
sound arguments. Particularly convincing and noteworthy for its
strongly empirical ring, as contrasted to much of the argument from
authority which runs through sixteenth century philosophy, is the
following:
... certainly that organ of sight in individuals, which is called the pupil, is
so constituted by the four elements that in it water largely dominates, which
is easily distinguished in the dissection of human bodies; for nothing purer,
nothing whiter, nothing more transparent can be seen, as I remember having
formerly seen myself in the very famous school at Padua, when it was done
in the public anatomy [demonstration] by Gabriele Falloppio. 20

Although based upon an outdated medical theory, Castellani's reliance on the data of observation has a distinct similarity to the attitude
which empirical philosophers will increasingly assume in the succeeding centuries. 21 Instead of relying on authorities to refute the
sceptical arguments concerning the fallibility of the senses, Castellani
has looked to the anatomical dissecting room to learn something about
the operation of the sense organs themselves. He then concludes that,
with rare exceptions, the senses are generally reliable and what pertains to them is "true and certain." 22 "Why," Castellani asks, "if the
20 " quippe quod in singulis visus organum quod pupilla dicitur, ita ex quatuor elementis constitutum est, ut in eo maxime aqua dominetur, quod facile in humanorum corporum
sectione conspicitur: nihil enim purius, nihil candidius, nihil magis perspicuum videri potest, ut quondam memini me vidisse in celeberrimo Patavino gymnasio, cum ab excellentissimo Gabrieli Falloppio publica ana tome fieret." Castellani, op. cit., p. 99. Gabriele Falloppio
(1523-62) was, of course, the famous Italian student ofVesalius and one of the foremost anatomists of his time. He was professor of anatomy at Padua from 1551 until his death. On his
particular contributions to the study of the anatomy of the eye see Giuseppe Ovio, Storia dell'
oculistica (Cuneo, 1950), I, pp. 241, 243, 259, 260, etc. Falloppio's career at Padua is treated
by Giuseppe Favaro, Gabrielle Falloppia, modenese (Modena, 1928), esp. pp. 85-146.
21 For one example see the works cited below on Gassendi.
22 " .. Cum ergo sensoria naturalem suam in cunctis hominibus et semper temperationem conservent, profecto sensus vera et certa, quod ad eos attinet, pronunciare poterunt:
quoniam tametsi aliquantulum eorum organa mutentur: non tamen proprium et naturale

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMENVANITA TISON LATER THOUGHT 167

organs of my senses change hour by hour and day by day, do my ears

always grasp the same measured verse in hymns ... ?" 23 In view of
these things, they who attempt to censure Aristotelian philosophy by
merely indicating a variability in sense knowledge must beware lest
they do so too arrogantly and too rashly. It is not quite as easy as they
may think to refute "Aristotle, the prince of all philosophers." 24
A further echo of the polemic against Pico appears in chapter 22,
which is directed against the sceptics' abhorrence of dogmatic philosophy. Besides what Cicero has told us about scepticism, similar arguments have been expounded by other writers, Castellani continues. He
singles out for particular mention Diogenes Laertius, who wrote a
Life of Pyrrho, and others "who have added many arguments from
Sextus Empiricus' opinion and have investigated them extensively and
judiciously." 25 The "others" of whom Castellani speaks here seems
certainly to refer to Pico, who was perhaps the only man of his time to
pay much attention to the writings of Sextus Empiricus. 26 The first
printed edition of the writings of this author appeared more than forty
years after the first edition of the Examen Vanitatis; 27 and, although a
number of manuscripts were available,28 there is little evidence that
they were much read. Gianfrancesco Pico, as we have seen, made
copious use of the writings of Sextus in the Examen Vanitatis and
mentions him often.
ipso rum temperamentum variabitur, ac de illis perinde evenire crediderim, ut de cerebra
accidit ... Ita profecto sensu urn instrumenta in diversis hominibus, ac in iisdem diversis
temporibus aliquantulum in suo naturali temperamento intendi ac remitti possunt. Verum
eiusmodi mutatio tantas non habebit vires, ut diversas fallacesque sensuum operationes
reddere possit." Ibid., pp. 100-101.
23 Ibid., p. 102.
24 "Caveant igitur isti, ne philosophorum omnium facile principem Aristotelem nimis
arroganter ac temere reprehendant, dum conantur iis suis diversis temperamentis perspicuitatem sensus destruere, quae est demonstrandi artis ac ornnis nostrae cognitionis origo et
fundamentum." Ibid., pp. 102-103.
25 "Verum, cum Laertius Diogenes in Pyrrhonis vita ac alii ex Sexti Empirici sententia
multas adduxerint causas et eas copiosius elegantiusque pertractarint, ego istas brevi bus
explicare decrevi." Ibid., p. 170.
26 See Popkin, op. cit., p. 2 I. Although there are translations of Sextus which date fram an
earlier period, they do not seem to have been much used. See for example Clemens Baeumker, "Eine bisher unbekannte rnittelalterliche lateinische Uebersetzung der IIupp6lVe:Lm

'U7tOTU7tCUO"E:LC; des Sextus Empiricus" in Archiufuer Geschichte der Philosophie, IV (1890-91),

PP574-77-

27 The first Latin translations of Sextus' works appeared in 1562 and 1569. The Greek
text was not printed until 162 I. See our discussions of the translations below. For further
information see Popkin, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
28 On this point see Hermann Mutschmann, "Die Ueberlieferung der Schriften des Sextus
Empiricus," Rheinisches Musellmfller Philologie LXIV (1909), pp. 244-83,478, who lists and
describes most of the extant manuscripts of Sextus. For a few additions not known to Mutschmann, see Popkin, op. cit., pp. 17-18, esp. note 3, p. 17.

168 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VA NITA TISON LATER THOUGHT

In Castellani we have seen a rare attempt to meet Pico's criticism of

Aristotelian epistemology. It is somewhat strange that Pico's critique
did not arouse greater opposition, because a great deal of effort was
expended by the philosophers of the sixteenth century in various
controversies over methodology.29 Although Pico's polemic followed a
somewhat different pattern than was usual, the center of its focus was
on the important Posterior Ana[ytics and a major part of his effort was
aimed at discrediting the Aristotelian theory of "scientific demonstration." Why it did not catch on is a problem which we cannot go
into here, but the Examen Vanitatis is by no means a rare work even
now,30 and it must have gained a certain amount of diffusion. It
certainly reproduces the major sceptical arguments from antiquity, the
same ones which will have great success after the publication of translations of Sextus' writings. 31 Perhaps early sixteenth century philosophers were more interested in debating the question of methodology on
the familiar grounds of a three-way battle between Galen, Aristotle,
and Cicero - to simplify the struggle to its major components. Although
the sceptical question is one of the most obvious that can be asked in
philosophy, it is not always the most obvious to the philosophers embroiled in a particular controversy. It is perhaps the most basic problem
per se, but it is seldom the first one asked by philosophers, for dogmatism must come first before the sceptical question is really meaningful.
The normal course of philosophical thought in an epoch is to proceed
from dogmatism to scepticism.
(4) Latin Translations oj Sextus Empiricus

This leads us into the problem of what, if any, relation there is between the revival of interest in the writings of Sextus Empiricus by Pico
della Mirandola and the first Latin editions of the works of Sextus by
Henri Estienne and Gentian Hervet. No mention is made of Gianfrancesco in Estienne's preface to the first of Sextus' works to be printed
in 1562, and there is no clear indication that he knew of Pico's work.
When the larger work against the mathematicians was published seven
years later, however, the translator, Gentian Hervet, has the following
to say in his preface:
29 For a recent survey of these arguments and ample bibliographical notations see Neal
Ward Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York, 1960).
30 See above chapter II, note 33, and Appendix A.
31 For the extent of this influence see Popkin, op. cit.
32 The Latin translation of The Outlines ~l Pyrrhonism which first appeared in 1562, at
Paris.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAAfEN VANITATIS ON LATER THOUGHT 169

Just how useful Sextus Empiricus' commentary can be in upholding dogmas of the Christian religion against outside philosophers, Gianfrancesco
Pi co della Mirandola has beautifully taught us in that book in which he
upholds Christian philosophy against the dogmas of outside philosophers. 33

Here perhaps we have a clearer and more accurate evaluation of

Pico and his endeavor than we have hitherto encountered. Hervet
seems to be one of the few who realized precisely what Pico was getting
at. He sees Gianfrancesco as one who has safeguarded the Christian
religion against the onslaught of dogmatic philosophers. Hervet believed, as Pico did, that a sceptical attitude toward the various polemics
among dogmatic schools of philosophy is the best safeguard for Christianity.34 The truth of this, of course, has been argued many times since.
In addition to this single reference to Gianfrancesco Pico, it would
be interesting to determine if he might have had further influence on
the translations of Sextus, but this would carry us somewhat beyond
the confines of this chapter. Suffice it to say that there are significant
terminological differences in the way Pico, Estienne, and Hervet
translate key sceptical terms. Such an example is the word xP~TIJPwv,
which means the "standard of judgment" or, perhaps even better,
"criterion," if we wish to use an English cognate. Pico rendered this
term by iudicatorium, as he said, analogously with the translation of
&~cre'Y)'t"~pwv by sensorium. 35 Estienne, on the other hand, generally used
criterium, and iudicatorium only rarely.36 Hervet preferred the clause
quod iudicat, but in the index to his translation and in his marginal
annotations, he used iudicatorium to render the same idea. 37 There may
be any of a number of reasons for these various translations of the term
and we cannot say with any degree of assurance that knowledge of
Pico's works had anything to do with it.
The introduction of the term iudicatorium by both Estienne and
Hervet may be derived from Pico's preference for it, but we do not
33 "Quanto usui autem esse possit Sexti Empirici commentarius ad tuenda Christianae
religionis dogmata adversus extern os philosophos, pulchre docet Franciscus Picus Mirandulanus in eo libro quo Christianam tuetur philosophiam adversus dogmata externorum philosophorum." Sexti Empirici ... Adversus Mathematicos ... Gentiano Herveto interprete ... (Paris,
1569), fol. a. v.
34 On Hervet see the article by A. Humbert in Dict. de theol. cath., VI (1920), cols. 2315-20.
35 He does this neatly in Ex. Van. II, I; p. 537 See our discussion above in chap. II, pp.
50--51. The word iudicatorium, although rather rare, had been used to render ){PL--r~pWV at
least once before. See Sancti Thomae Aquinatis ... Opera (ed. cit.), XX, p. 496a, line 4. This
is the translatio antiqua of the Metaphysics, I063a3. For a fuller discussion of the relation of
Pico's translation to the later ones see Appendix B.
36 Sextus Empiricus, (1569 edition), p. 498. Also see p. 574a for Estienne's considerations
on the various possibilities for translating ){PL--r~PLOV.
37 For example see the marginal notes in the Paris, 1569 edition, pp. 120-21.

170 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

have any definite evidence to substantiate this. At any rate, the word
was not completely accepted by them and it was "criterium" which was
taken into the European vernacular languages to render the idea. 38

(5) Giovanni Battista Bernardi

Let us now consider the discussions of the Examen Vanitatis toward
the end of the century. It, along with Pico's other writings, was given
some attention by the Venetian Giovanni Battista Bernardi. 39 Bernardi
is responsible for a sort of "dictionary of philosophical quotations," the
Seminarium totius philosoplziae. 4o This enormous work, consisting of over
4,000 folio columns, collects the opinions of a number of philosophers
on a wide variety of topics, arranged alphabetically by subject. The
first two volumes contain the opinions of the philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition, the third those of the Platonic tradition, and the
fourth principally those of the other ancient schools and of Avicenna.
The printing history indicates that this work had some success, although it seems that relatively few copies survive 41 and its compiler
has been nearly forgotten.
What is interesting about this work with regard to Gianfrancesco
Pico is that he is included in the third volume with the philosophers of
the Platonist tradition. In all probability, this is because his uncle had
Platonist leanings and the works of both were published together ill! 57273. In fact, when one reads through the list of authors cited in volume
three of the Seminarium,42 he is struck by the incompatibility of the
inclusion of Gianfrancesco with the others, although his anti-Aristote38 See however, the work of Bernardi discussed below which continues the transmission of
Pico's term.
39 Of the scanty information available on Bernardi, perhaps best, but by no means satisfactory, is Giammaria Mazzuchelli, Gli scrittori d' Italia . .. (Brescia, 1753-63) II, pp. 966-67.
40 The full title of the work is Seminarium totius philosophiae: Opus sane admirabile et omni

ernditorum generi perquam utile: Quod Platonis ac Aristotelis eorundemque interpretum tam Graecorum,
quam Latinorum ac etiam Arabum questiones, conclusiones, sententiasque omnes integras et ahsolutas miro

ordine digestas complectitur; ut quivis uno intuitu et sine ullo lab ore , quicquid unquam a summis sapientiae
magistris dictum fuit, perspicere, et eorum opera omnia in unum velut locum collecta habere possit. Nunc
etiam nova appendice infinitisque theorematibus ex antiquorum philosophorum et universa Avieennae logica
ae philosophia eolleetis auetum et loeupletatum. The first edition of this work appeared in Venice in

1582- 85.
41 According to Mazzuchelli (op. cit., II, p. 966), it was printed three times at Venice and
once at Lyon. Although no copy is listed in the British Museum catalogue, that of the Bibliotheque Nationale lists three copies and there is one at the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in
Florence.
42 Ioannis Baptistae Bernardi . .. Seminarium ... (Venice, 1599), I, fol. 3 L 4r. The pagination
refers to the copy in the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Florence. The list is included in
volume I, but refers to volume III. I do not know whether all of the copies of the Venice,
1599 edition are bound in this way or whether it is a peculiarity of only this copy. All further
references are to this copy.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT 171

lianism puts him in good company with Francesco Patrizio One is

further struck by the fact that Pico is among the dozen or so writers of
the sixteenth century included in the work as a whole. It is quite possible that a number of later references to Gianfrancesco were copied
from this source, for each of the entries is accompanied by an indication
of chapter and page.
Bernardi recognized what Gianfrancesco Pico had been trying to do
and cited a surprising number of his most characteristic opinions. Here
we can give only a sampling of many opinions which Bernardi cites
from the 1573 edition of Pico's Opera. His anti-Aristotelianism and
scepticism are adequately summarized by citing his opinion on Aristoteles,43 iudicatorium'
44fialsum
"45 sensus 46 Sce'jJtici,47 and veritas.48
The Examen Vanitatis - and the anti-Aristotelianism and scepticism
which it contained - was well represented in Bernardi's dictionary-like
work. This, of course, makes Pico's thought more accessible to later
writers. It also increases the problem of tracing his direct influence,
since a work like Bernardi's, which cites even chapter and page number, could well have been used by any writer who wanted to cite a
range of opinions on a particular subject.
(6) Paolo Beni
The writings of Gianfrancesco were also known and discussed by another Italian contemporary of Bernardi, Paolo Beni (ca. 1552-1625).49
Born in Crete, but moved to Gubbio young enough to be called Eugubinus, Beni taught theology at Perugia, philosophy at Rome, and literature at Padua. Of his philosophical works, perhaps most important is
his long commentary on Plato's Timaeus. 50 In the preface to this work,
Beni discusses the various aspects of the controversy between the Aristotelians and Platonists that had taken place in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, astutely summing up the situation at the time the In Platonis
Timaeum was written. 51 Among other things, Beni mentions the Examen
Vanitatis as spurning Peripatetic philosophy,52 but also signals the key
Ibid., III, fols. 54 v b- 5 5 rs ; 21 entries.
Ibid., III, fols. r84vb-r85ra; r r entries.
45 Ibid., III, fols. 133 v"-133 vb ; 4 entries.
46 Ibid., III, foIs. 28g", 2go va -2go vb , 2gl v., 2g2 rb ; 15 entries.
47 Ibid., III, fol. 285"; 2 of 3 entries cited.
48 Ibid., III, foIs. 318rv-3Igrb; 8 entries.
49 For a general discussion ofBeni's life and works see Mazzuchelli, op. cit., II, pp. 842-4g.
50 Pauli Beni Eugubini ... In Platonis Timaeum sive in naturalem omnem atque divinam Platonis
et Aristotelis philosophiam decades tres (Rome, 1594). This work was reprinted in 1605 and 1624.
51 Ibid., pp. 3-6.
52 Ibid., p. 3.
43
44

172 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VAN/TA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

passage where Gianfrancesco turns aside from his uncle's attempt at

a pax philosophica. 53 In the first book, moreover, he cites the younger
Pico, along with Francesco Patrizi, as accumulating many examples of
confusion and doubt of authenticity regarding the Aristotelian corpus. 54
The reference here is to the same Fourth Book of the Examen Vanitatis to
which Nizolio had referred his readers. Beni and Nizolio, however,
show different attitudes toward Aristotle, and, consequently, also different attitudes toward Pico. Whereas Nizolio might almost be considered to be a "professional anti-Aristotelian, "Beni was more favorably
disposed toward Aristotle and the scholasticism which developed
from the tradition he initiated.

(7) The Coimbra Commentaries

In the last decade of the sixteenth and in the first few years of the
next century appeared the influential and widely used Commentarii Conimbricenses, prepared by the Jesuits of the University of Coimbra as
texts for their courses in Aristotelian philosophy. Almost immediately,
these long and detailed commentaries on the Aristotelian writings
spread into use throughout Europe and were reprinted numerous times
within the next half century. 55 This series of textbooks is literally filled
with citations from the multitude of earlier commentators on Aristotle.
In addition to quotations from the usual ancient and medieval authors,
one finds frequent references to sixteenth-century philosophical writers.
Included in the latter are a surprising number of references to Gianfrancesco Pico. It is interesting to see here the extent to which is thought
had penetrated even into Portugal by the end of the century. Furthermore, it is interesting to note how the authors of the Commentaries
characterized him. Pico was not a run-of-the-mill Christian philosopher. That he was a fervent religious believer there is no doubt. At the
same time, however, he was a relentless foe of Aristotelianism, the very
Ibid., p. 4; see above chap. II, pp. 47-48.
"Nisi tamen quae de Aristotelicorum librorum iactura, confusione, ac varietate ab
Andronico et Strabone (ne antiquiorum suspiciones attingam) sunt dubitationes excitatae a
Plutarcho, Athenaeo, Adrasto et Magentio repetitae; ab Olympiodoro, Ammonio, Philopono, et Simplicio auctae; ab aliis denique multis, praesertim vera a Iohanne [marginal note:
Pic. I. 4 de vanit. gent.] Francisco Pico et Francisco Patritio [marginal note: Patr. in disc.
Perip.] altius exaggeratae ... " Ibid., p. 28. See our discussion above, pp. 63-67.
55 The various commentaries appeared first in print between 1592 and 1606 at Coimbra.
Later printings were for the most part at Cologne and Lyon. For the printing history of the
Commentarii see Carlos Sommervogel, S. J., Bibliotheque de la Compagnie de Jesus, Nouvelle edition (Brussels-Paris, 1890-1932) II, pp. 1273-78; IX, pp. 62-63. A comprehensive analysis
of the Commentaries and a careful evaluation of their influence on seventeenth century
intellectual life still remains a major desideratum. For some indications see Etienne Gilson,
Etudes sur le rOle de la pensee midiivale dans la formation du systeme carthien (Paris, 1951).
53

54

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT 173

Aristotelianism which formed the basis of the Coimbra philosophical

curriculum.
In the commentary on the logical writings of Aristotle, there are
several references to Pico, but none refer to his substantial and quite
serious attack on the Posterior Anarytics, a criticism already recognized
and opposed by Giulio Castellani at the middle of the century. Here,
rather, are two somewhat feeble references to the same Book IV of the
Examen Vanitatis, cited by Nizolio and others. The prooemium to the commentary on the Categories raises a doubt whether the work is genuine.
Gianfrancesco Pico, whose opinion about the peculiar language of the
work is referred to, is mentioned as one of those who had been dubious
of the authenticity of the Categories. 56 Likewise, Pico's doubt regarding
the authenticity of the Prior Anarytics is referred to in the preface to the
Coimbra edition of that work. 57
In other books of the Commentarii an interesting transformation takes
place. Rather than being cited as an anti-Aristotelian or sceptic, Gianfrancesco turns out to be an important source for the history of philosophy.58 His Examen Vanitatis is cited often, both in the text and in the
copious marginal notes of the Commentaries, as a background source for
the various philosophical disputes which are discussed. For example, in
the commentary On the Physics, the appropriate chapter of the Examen
Vanitatis (VI, 4) is cited as a source for information on the various
opinions that have been held on the nature of place (locus).59 Again,
when the subject of vacuum is discussed, Pico's work (III, 12; VI, 5)
is mentioned as presenting the position of those who hold that a vacuum
is possible. 60 Again, in the commentary on the De Coelo and on the Meteorology, Gianfrancesco's long chapter on astronomical and meteorological matters is referred to in several different contexts, particularly as
a source for various opinions on the different questions. 61 Pico's own
56 Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e societate Jesu: In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Cologne, 1630) I, p. 297. Cf. Ex. Van. IV, 7; p. 677.
57 Ibid., II, p. 236; cf. Ex. Van. IV, 4; pp. 670-71: "Refert hoc libro Philoponus et Miran-

dula libro 4 de examine vanitatis capite 4: quadringenta libros analyticos sub nomine
Aristotelis fuisse olim inventos in bibliotheca Philadelphi Ptolomaei regis Aegypti."
58 Pico is also mentioned in a similar way several times by the] esuit Antonio Possevino
(1533-1611) and by the Paduan philosopher Fortunio Liceto (1577-1657). Cf. Antonii Possevini ... Bibliotheca selecta ... (Cologne, 1697), I, p. 53; II, pp. 7, 17, 50 and Fortunio Liceto,
De animarum rationalium immortalitate !ibri quatuor (Padua, 1629), p. 191. I am indebted to Prof.
Edward P. Mahoney of Duke University for calling my attention to the latter reference.
59 Commentarii ... in octo libros physicorum (Cologne, 1630) II, p. 30.
60 Ibid., II, p. 78. Similar examples may be found at I, pp. 17, 315; II, pp. 127, 129, 312,
376. Also see Commentarii ... in tres libros de anima (Cologne, 1629), pp. 120,209.
61 Commentarii ... in quatuor libros de coelo, meteorlogica et parva naturalia (Cologne, 1631) I,
p. 268; II, pp. 33,43,49,83,115, I'll. Pico is also cited concerning other points at I, pp. 195,
244. Cf. Ex. Van. I, 12; pp. 504-10.

174 INFLUENCE 0 F THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

philosophical opinion is also mentioned in several places, for example,

regarding his contention that all things come from a single source. 62
We see, therefore, that Pico's opinion was given some consideration
even by the conservative branch of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition.
This is of some significance, for even a casual reading of the Aristotelian
commentaries of the period reveals a singularly reluctant disposition to
quote authors of other than the school tradition: and it is not often
that the more recent of these are given serious consideration. For the
most part, the Aristotelian commentary had changed remarkably little
over a period of several centuries, when contrasted which the philosophical water that had passed under the bridge since the beginning of
the humanist criticisms of the schools. This is not to say that there were
no changes in school philosophy, for there were and they were important. On the other hand, the continuation of the school philosophy was
rather remarkable and it was much more traditionally oriented - both
in form and in: content - than the other philosophical movements that
emerged in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

(8) Filippo Fabri

For this reason it is all the more surprising to find the works of Gianfrancesco Pico taken cognizance of by a man like Filippo Fabri (15641630) of Faenza. 63 A Franciscan and ardent Scotist, Fabri taught at
several universities in northern Italy, notably at Padua. Among his
works is a posthumously published commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. 64 One of the first things that Fabri takes up in his exposition and
commentary is a discussion of various objections which have been advanced against Aristotelian metaphysics. 65 He divides those who reject
metaphysics into three classes: (1.) those who say that metaphysics is of
no use, (2.) those who disagree with Aristotle's presentation of the
science, and (3.) those who contend that Aristotle's Metaphysics contains many false doctrines .66 It is into the third category that he places
Gianfrancesco Pico.
Under the third heading rise up the Academics and defenders of ancient
philosophers, like Gianfrancesco Pico, in his book Examen vanitatis doctrinae
Commentarii .. . in octo libros physicorum I, p. 175.
On Fabri see Joannes Hyacinth Sbaralea, Supplementum et castigatio ad scriptores trium
ordinum SanctiFrancisci a Waddingo, aliisve descriptos ... (Rome, 1921), new ed., II, pp. 378--79;
Dict. de thiol. cath. V, coIs. 2060-61; Montanari, op. cit., I, II, pp. 68-72.
64 Philippi Fabri Faventini ... Expositiones et disputa1iones in XII libros Aristotelis Metaphysicorum; quibus doc/rina Ioannis Duns Scoti magna cum facilitate illustratur et contra adversarios omnes
tam veteTes, quam recentiores defenditur ... (Venice, 1637).
65 Ibid., pp. 10-12; "Obiectio adversariorum Aristotelis contra scientiam metaphysicae."
66 Ibid., p. lOa.
62

63

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT 175

gentium, finally Patrizi, here and there in his works, and others [who hold]

that Aristotle was in these books both unjust and false - unjust, since he
many times attributed opinions to ancient philosophers, which they themselves did not dream of; false, because his assertions and teaching in those
books about the highest things are in many ways false. 67

Fabri cites several examples from Pico's works to back up his charge.
Although Pico's arguments against Aristotle are nowhere given the
same attention by Fabri as are those of philosophers more closely connected to the school tradition, it is nevertheless rather interesting to
see that he knows of them. It is also not without significance that Pico is
here coupled with Patrizi, as he had been by Beni.

(9) Pierre Gassendi

About the same time as Fabri was lecturing on the MetapJrysics in
Italy, a young French teacher was looking at Aristotelian philosophy
in a much different way at Aix-en-Provence. This man was to hold a
central position in many of the scientific and philosophical controversies of the first half of the seventeenth century. His name was Pierre
Gassendi (I592-I655). From his early work at Aix in the years I6I622, Gassendi worked out an extensive critique of the philosophy of
Aristotle, using a sceptical approach similar to that employed by Gianfrancesco Pico. 68 Although Gassendi announced seven books of this
work against Aristotle, only two of them ever appeared; and, only one
of these was printed during his lifetime. 69 What did appear of this work,
67 "Ex tertio capite insurgent Academici et antiquo rum philosophorum defensores, ut
Ioannes Franciscus Picus libro Examinis Vanitatis doctrinae gentium, ultimo Particius, passim in suis operibus, et alii, quod Aristoteles in his libris et iniquus et falsus fuerit. Iniquus,
quia ut plurimum antrquis philosophis opiniones ascripserit, quas nec ipsi somniarunt. Falsus, quia eius asserta et doctrina in his libris de rebus altissimis est ut plurimum falsa." Ibid.,
p. lib.
68 Gassendi has not been studied as much in the past, perhaps, as he deserves; and, to a
large extent, the earlier studies have been concerned primarily with his "Epicureanism".
In the last several decades, however, greater attention has been paid to the man in general
and to his anti-Aristotelian polemic and his scientific work in particular. Of the earlier
scholarship in this connection, still valuable is the pioneering study of Henri Berr, Anjure inter
Scepticos Gassendus numeratus fuerit (Paris, 1898) (This work has recently appeared in a French
translation, Du Scepticisme de Gassendi (Paris, 1960)). Among recent studies should be mentioned the work of Bernard Rochot, especially his edition of the Exercitationes, published as
Pierre Gassendi, Dissertations en forme de paradoxes contre les Aristoteliciens (Paris, 1959) with a
French translation and an important introduction; the various contributions in the Centre
international de .rynthese publication, Pierre Gassendi (1592-l655) sa vie et son oeuvre (Paris, 1955)
by Berr, Rochot, A. Koyre et al. are important. Most recent and most detailed with respect
to Gassendi's "scepticism" is TuIIio Gregory, Scetticismo ed empirismo, studio su Gassendi
(Bari, 1961) with ample bibliography and a survey of earlier scholarship. See also Popkin,
op. cit., pp. 99-111,142-48 and passim.
69 The first book appeared as Exercitation.s paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (Grenoble, 1624)
and was reprinted separately in 1649 and 1656. The second book appeared separately in
1659, although both had been printed together already in the Opera of 1658 (Lyon). They

176 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN V ANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT

the Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos, sums up the various

threads of the rising disenchantment with Aristotle that had been growing in the course of the past two centuries. In it we can see the elements
of Charron's scepticism, Vives' and Ramus' humanistic criticism, and
Patrizi's critique of natural philosophy. But, perhaps more than any of
these, we find a bright reflection of Gianfrancesco Pico's criticisms
which had been leveled at Peripatetic philosophy a century earlier.
Much in the same way as Gianfrancesco had collected the disparate
currents of fifteenth century anti-Aristotelianism - those of Pletho,
Bruni, Valla, Cusanus, and Hasdai Crescas - and combined them with
the ancient sceptical critique in his Examen Vanitatis, Gassendi summarized the same movement a century later in his Exercitationes. Although certain connections between the two works have been noted
previously,70 their proximity to one another in both language and
thought is perhaps more remarkable than has been hitherto realized,
and we shall briefly consider it here.
Gianfrancesco is mentioned only twice in the Exercitationes. 71 One of
these references to Pico clearly indicates to us, however, the extent to
which Gassendi was indebted to him. It occurs in the Preface, where
Gassendi speaks of those by whom he had been influenced:
Nevertheless the deadly arrow of general prejudice persisted, in which I saw
that all of the [religious] orders approved of Aristotle. However, the reading
of Vives and of my Charron gave me courage and removed all fear, from
which it seems I do not unjustly suspect that that sect is not to be completely
approved because it is approved by almost all. But my powers have been
further increased from Ramus especially and the Mirandulan. I mention these
because I have always publicly declared those through whom I have progressed. 72
Although this reference to "the Mirandulan" could possibly refer to
someone other than Gianfrancesco Pico,73 the intellectual compatibiwere again printed together in the Opera of 1727 (Florence). For further details of the printing
history see Pierre Gassendi, Dissertations ... , p. vii. For a list of the titles of the proposed
seven books of the work see the introduction to Book I in Petri Gassendi ... opera omnia (Lyon,
1658), III, p. 102.
70 Gregory, op. cit., pp. 24-25, 33, 40-4I.
71 Gassendi, Opera, III, pp. 99, 142a.
72 "Haerebat tamen lethalis arundo generalis praeiudicii, quo videbam ordines omnes
probare Aristotelem. Verum mihi animos adiecit timoremque omnem depulit et Vivis et mei
Charronii lectio, ex qua visus sum non iniuria suspicari sectam illam non esse penitus probandam, quod probaretur quam plurimis. Sed et vires accrevere ex Ramo praesertim ac
Alirandulano. Quorum idcirco mentionem facio, quod ingenuum semper duxerim profiteri
per quos profecissem." Ibid., p. 99.
73 Besides his uncle Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) there was also a professor

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANIT A TIS ON LA TER THOUGHT 177

lity of the two seems clear enough. The actual extent to which Gassendi
is indebted to Pico becomes more apparent when we closely compare
their writings against Aristotle.
From the range of subjects covered by the two authors we see the
close connection between them. By taking just a few examples, we can
see that Gassendi's critique of Aristotle was fashioned at least partially
after Pico's model. Both devoted chapters of their respective works to
the following topics: (I) the uncertain legitimacy of the Corpus Aristotelicum, (2) The ambiguity of Aristotle's style, (3) Aristotle's own lack
of certainty, and (4) the uncertainty of Aristotle's teachings as indicated by the constant disagreement among his followers.74 Other examples abound. In the attack on Aristotelian science, Pico says, "Quod
doctrina Aristotelis in examine appensa, plus inanis, quam veri ponderis prae se ferat. ... " 75 Gassendi puts it as follows, " ... quia scilicet
examinantes omnia huius scientiae Aristotelicae fundamenta experimur nulla esse solida." 76 Or further, when Gassendi announced in the
preface to the first book of the Exercitationes the titles of the other books
that were to follow, one of the books was to be an attack on Aristotelian
physics. The topics which Gassendi planned to treat in that book are
precisely those treated by Gianfrancesco Pico in the first seven chapters
of Book VI of the Examen Vanitatis: motion, place, time, and vacuum.
These evidences, combined with Gassendi's specific reference to
Gianfrancesco as one to whom he was indebted, make it quite evident
that he knew the Examen Vanitatis well and relied on it heavily at the
time when he was composing his own work. There are whole sections
of Gassendi's work which, while not copied from Gianfrancesco, certainly make few points which Pico had not made a century earlier. In
of philosophy at Bologna in the middle of the sixteenth century whose name was Antonio
Bernardi della Mirandola (1503-65). This man is often referred to as Mirandulanus.
74 The following chapter headings are from Book IV of Pi co's work and Exercitatio IV of
Book I of Gassendi's work:
(I) Gassendi: art. 1- Incertum est extetne liber Aristotelis ex dubitatione ipsa Aristoteleorum circa eos qui habentur.
Pieo: chap. 4 - Probatur multipliciter incertum esse, an ullum habeamus librum cuius
exemplaria fuerint ab Aristotele composita.
(2) Gassendi: art. 6 - Sint ipsius omnia: incertitudo tamen est ex stylo truncato et ambiguo.
Pieo: chap. 7 - Incertam esse Aristotelis doctrinam ex modo scribendi ipsius.
(3) Gassendi: art. 9 - Quin et saepenumelO ab Aristotele ipso incertitudo proditur.
Pieo: chap. 13 - Quod ipsemet Aristoteles fatetur sui ipsius doctrinam incertam esse.
(4) Gassendi: art .10 - Haec praetereantur: ac incertitudo restat ex perpetuis Aristoteleorum dissidiis.
Pieo: chap. 8 - Doctrinam Aristotelis incertam ostendi, ex ipsius asseclarum expositorumque perpetua pugna: quae quam multiplex sit, et quam magna ostenditur.
75 Ex. Van. IV, I; p. 660.
76 Gassendi. Opera, III, 206a.

178 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMENVANITATIS ON LATER THOUGHT

fact it is difficult to find a paragraph of the Exercitationes which does not

immediately invite comparison with a very similar passage in the Examen Vanitatis.

Whereas the Examen Vanitatis was Pico's mature philosophical expression, the Exercitationes is but the beginning of Gassendi's. It was
merely the springboard from which he launched his own fruitful philosophical and scientific career. After expressing a highly sceptical attitude early, he "mitigated" it, as Popkin says,77 and developed a rather
effective empirical approach to knowledge. The mature formulation
of his thought is to be found in the Syntagma, which, as we have already
noted, retained certain ties with various philosophical traditions. At
the same time, however, it expressed a view of physical reality which
was grounded in intelligent observational experience. Pi co cannot
claim to have inspired this aspect of Gassendi's thought, but the Examen
Vanitatis did nevertheless provide a starting point from which the somewhat stagnant Aristotelian tradition of natural philosophy could be
superseded by a new approach to problems of physics, an approach
which was rooted in the data of experience.
We might say that Gassendi was the first to recognize the full philosophical significance of Pico's sceptical critique of the Peripatetics. It is
most important to note, however, the differences in his use ofPyrrhonic
criticism. The entire emphasis of Pico's endeavor was on questioning
the reliability of knowledge derived within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy. In doing so, Pico attained a position that comes remarkably close to both that Justin Martyr (or pseudo-Justin), whom
he translated; and of Nicolaus Cusanus, whom he took more seriously
than anyone in Italy up to his time. In Gassendi, there is a decided
change in outlook. The sharp criticism of Aristotle is still there, but not
the strong emphasis on its role in safeguarding the Christian faith which
we find in Pico. Rather, there is a greater emphasis on the evolution
and validation of knowledge, an emphasis that had increasingly begun
to characterize both the scientific and philosophical endeavor in the
century after the publication of Pico's work. 78 For a continuation of
Pico's rather pietistic brand of religion we must look elsewhere.

(IO) Tommaso Campanella

A slight echo of it appears in Gassendi's contemporary, Tommaso
Campanella (1568-1639). Much of Campanella's later life was devoted
Op. cit., pp. 142-48.
The similarities and differences in the attitudes of the two men are discussed by Gregory, op. cit., pp. 121-25.
77

78

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VAN/TAT/SON LATER THOUGHT 179

to apologetics in behalf of Catholicism. One of his smaller, and not too

widely known, writings of this type is the De gentilismo non retinendo
(1636), a work of some importance in the history of anti-Aristotelianism
during the Renaissance. 79 This book, although written a century after
the Examen Vanitatis, is perhaps its closest intellectual heir. Campanella's
polemic against Aristotle has the same tone as Pico's. Here is the same
attempt to show the vanity of profane learning and the same return to
the emphasis of the Fathers, whose philosophy, as one of them put it,
was Christianity. so This latter emphasis is even more pronounced than
it had been in Pico. In Campanella, there is not the same involvement
in argument with individual philosophical doctrines (at least in the De
gentilismo non retinendo) , which we found in Pico's work and which had
been developed further by Gassendi. Nor is there the humanistic concern which had moved Nizolio. Rather, the aspect of Pico's thought
which emphasized the vanity of profane knowledge with its overtones
of not only the Fathers and Cusanus, but of Savonarola as well, is here
taken up anew. Augustine, Ambrose, Basil, Clement, Jerome, Justin,
Origen, and Tertullian are the authorities upon whom Campanella
draws. s1 Gianfrancesco Pi co is mentioned but once, and not in a particularly important context. This single reference does show that his
name was known to Campanella and the similarity of the outlook of the
two is readily apparent. The single criticism of Aristotle which Campanella takes from Pico and credits to him deals with the obscurity of
the Aristotelian style. He says, in listing those who have rejected one or
more things about Aristotle:
Francesco Pi co [rejected Aristotle], for he is replete with subtle and tedious
verbosity, lacking in necessary things, and abounding in worthless ones, and
is like the sepia fish, fleeing various difficulties and hiding by means of his
ink. 82
79 The work seems to have been written in 1609-10, but was not printed until 1636 at
Paris. It was reprinted in 1693. For further details see Firpo, BibliograJia degli scritti di T. C.
(Turin, 1940), pp. 110-11. There is a large literature on Campanella, but, as many of his
writings are only now appearing in print, the last word has not yet been said. We sould like
to mention the recent Italian translation of the De Gentilismo with an introduction and useful
notes in Tommaso Campanella, Della necessita di unaJilosoJia cristiana, trans. Romano Amerio
(Turin, 1953). It is interesting to note that, although the name of Aristotle does not appear
in the title of the work, Campanella cites it in a letter as De Gentilismo Praesertim Aristotelico
non Retinendo. See Tommaso Campanella, Lettere, ed. Vincenzo Spampanato (Bari, 1927), p.
336.
80 Tertullian, who said, "Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Iesum nec inquisitione post evangelium. Cum credimus nihil desideramus ultra credere. Hoc enim prius
credimus non esse quod ultra credere debeamus." De Praescriptione Haereticorum in Corpus
Christianorum Series Latina, Tertulliani Opera Pars / (Tumhout, 1954), I, p. 193.
81 Instructive regarding the sources for this work is the index of names given in Amerio's
edition, pp. 93-95.
82 "Franciscus Picus, quoniam [sc. Aristoteles] est plenus subtili verbositate et taediosa,

180 INFLUENCE OF THE EXAMEN VANITA TISON LATER THOUGHT

(II) Martin Schaack

About the middle of the century, brief consideration is still given to
Gianfrancesco Pico by Martin Schoock (1614-ca. 1665).83 In his work
De Scepticisma,84 which traces the history of the sceptical movement and
considers various aspects of scepticism, Pi co is mentioned several times.
Schoock's attitude toward Gianfrancesco is somewhat ambivalent. He
doesn't quite know whether to praise or censure him. In the historical
part of the work, Pi co is commended for rising up and speaking out
against the sceptics in the Examen Vanitatis. 85 Later in the De Scepticisma,
however, Pico is mentioned as one of those who does not have confidence in sense knowledge. "Otherwise a fine man," Schoock says of
Pico, but he cannot approve of Gianfrancesco's attack on Aristotle
which used the sceptical arguments against the reliability of sense
knowledge. 86
(I2) Leibniz
Less than two decades after the publication ofSchoock's work, when
Leibniz brought out his edition ofNizolio's De Veris Principiis, he briefly
mentioned Gianfrancesco Pi co in the Preface. 8? Here, Leibniz sums up
in necessariis deficiens, et in futilibus abundans, difficultates varias instar piscis sepiae fugiens,
atramentoque obnubilans." Ad Doctorem Gentium Thomae Campanellae Stylensis Ordinis Praedicatorom De Gentilismo non Retinendo ... (Paris, 1636), p. 24. This reference is signaled by
Thorndike (op. cit., VI, p. 467), who, however, misinterprets the passage, translating it to
mean that Campanella had called Pico, rather than Aristotle, a sepia. As true as this may be,
Campanella did not here say so, although the passage out of context is ambiguous. It is correctly translated by Amerio (op. cit., p. 38). The text referred to in Gianfrancesco's writings
is to be found in Ex. Van. IV, 7; p. 677. See above chap. III, pp. 69-'73 and Charles B.
Schmitt, "Aristotle as Cuttlefish," Studies in the Renaissance, XII (1965), pp. 60-72. The similarity between Pico and Campanella has also been recognized by Giovanni di Napoli, L'immortalita dell'anima nel Rinascimento (Turin, 1963), pp. 413-14.
83 On Schoock's relation to scepticism and for further bibliography see Popkin, op. cit.,
pp. 200-201 and Paul Dibon, La philosophie nierlandaise au siecle d'or (Paris, 1954f.), I, pp.
180-88.
84 The full title is Martini Schoockii de scepticismo pars prior sive libri quatuor: quibus, quam antiquorum, quam recentiorum scepticorum deliria, ex suis principiis solide discutiuntur, atque certitudo non
minus disciplinarum universalium quamphilosophiae theoreticae asseritur (Groningen, 1652), pp. 473.
85 "Ex recentioribus multi quidem pro re nata in Scepticos insurrexere, (inter quos praecipuus est Franciscus Picus Mirandulae Comes in eximio opere de vanitate doctrinae gentium) nulli autem plane omnia, quae de iis, atque eorum qualibuscunque dogmatis (si modo
ita vocari debeant) dici possent, proponere instituerunt." Ibid., p. 76.
86 "Ex recentioribus in eadem sententia fuit vir alias summus Franciscus Picus Mirandulanus; libro enim 4 de vanitate doctrinae gentium capite 12 perstringit Aristotelicam physiologiam, quod in sensu fundetur ac ex eo originem trahat. 'Cum,' inquit, 'Aristotelis doctrina
fundatur in sensu, ideo facile convincitur incerta: quia non incertus modo ut plurimum, sed
saepenumero fallax, et pluribus modis a1iis, quam putaverat Aristoteles, et decipere potest
et decipit.'" Ibid., p. 181. The quotation is taken with minor modifications from Ex. Van.
IV, 12; p. 687, the first sentence.
87 The title is "Dissertatio praeliminaris, de alienorum operum editione, de scopo operis
de philosophica dictione, de lapsibus Nizolii". ed. cit., fols a3r-fr.

INFLUENCE OF THE EXAM EN VANITA TIS ON LATER THOUGHT 181

the philosophical history of the past two centuries so well that it can
still today be read with profit by the historian of philosophy. Besides
being mentioned as one of those who has criticized Aristotle's logic,88
Gianfrancesco Pico is cited as one of the first critics of the Corpus Aristotelicum. 89 These citations indicate that Pico was still thought of as an
early critic of Aristotle at the time of Leibniz in the second half of the
seventeenth century.
With Leibniz, we shall end our summary of the influence of the
Examen Vanitatis. The date of r670 in which Leibniz's edition appeared
marks a century and a half from the date of the first publication of Pi co's
work and is a good terminal point for our study. The results has been
that, although Gianfrancesco Pi co della Mirandola was not one of the
most influential thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
nevertheless, there were philosophers who wrote in one way or another
about his work, and several at least were of more than secondary importance. If his influence as a source of sceptical ideas was not immediate, its latent power still could not be neglected in the seventeenth
century; ifhis anti-Aristotelian polemic did not have the striking originality of Bruno's or Galileo's, he did summarize, perhaps better than
anyone before Patrizi, the increasing body of arguments critical of the
Aristotelian tradition. It was not mere whim that led Gassendi to
utilize the Examen Vanitatis to the extent he did. The work was a
century old, its author did not know the criticisms of Nizolio, Ramus,
Bruno, Patrizi, or Charron. If some of Pico's criticisms were weak, the
sheer bulk of their number and the variety of the sources from which
they were drawn was sure to make an impression on a man like Gassendi, who was planning an exhaustive work against the Aristotelians.
It is in this way, then, as the best general summary of the critique of
Aristotelianism available at the time, that we must consider the Examen Vanitatis. Capable of, and given, many interpretations by thinkers
of a wide range of persuasions, its lasting importance as a historical
document is to be found in the role it had in the general turning away
from Aristotle in the course of the century and a half after its publication.

Ibid., fol. daY.

"Mihi genuitatem operum Aristoteleorum, quicquid dicantJohannes Franciscus Picus
in Examine Vanitatis doetrinae gentium, quicquid Nizolius, qui equid Petrus Ramus, quicquid Patrieius, quicquid in Apologia magnorum virorum Magiae suspeetorum, ubi et hune
Nizolii librum citat, Naudaeus ... " Ibid., fo!' ea V
88

89

APPENDIX A

THE WORKS OF GIANFRANCESCO PICO

THE MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTED EDITIONS
WHERE THESE MAY BE FOUND,
AND THE SECONDARY LITERATURE
WHICH REFERS TO HIM

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS

APPENDIX

(A) REFERENCE WORKS

H
C
R

GKW
Opera

L. Hain, Repertorium Bibliographicum ... (Stuttgart, I826-38).

W. A. Copinger, Supplement to Hain's Repertorium Bibliographicum
(London, I 895-I 902).
D. Reichling, Appendices ad Hainii-Copingeri Repertorium Bibliographicum (Munich, I905-I4).
Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke (Leipzig, I925 f.).
Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ... Opera quae extant omnza

(Basel, I 60 I).
Renzo Amedeo, Operai nella vigna del Signore (Carru, I962).
] acq ues-Charles Brunet, Manual du Libraire ... (Paris, I86080).
Gibson
R. W. Gibson, St. Thomas More: A Preliminary Bibliography of
His Works to the Tear 1750 (New Haven-London, I96I).
Graesse
]. G. T. Graesse, Tresor de livres rares et precieux (Dresden, I85969)
Inventari
Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia, I890 f.
Kristeller
P. O. Kristeller, Iter Italicum (London-Leiden, I 963), vol. I.
Niceron
J. P. Niceron, Memoires pour servir a l'histoire des hommes illustres
... (Paris, I729-45), vol. XXXIV, pp. 147-56 on Gianfrancesco Pico.
Panzer
G. W. Panzer, Annales typographici ... (Nuremberg, I793I 803).
Renouard A. A. Renouard, Annales de l'imprimerie des Alde, 3rd ed., (Paris,
I834)
Ritter
Fr. Ritter, Repertoire bibliographique des livres imprimis en Alsace au
I6me siecle (Strasbourg, I935 f.).
Sander
Max Sander, Le livre afigures italien depuis 1467 a 1530 (Milan,
I942).
Santangelo Giorgio Santangelo (ed.), Le epistole "De imitatione" di GianAmedeo
Brunet

186

APPENDIX A

francesco Pico della Mirandola di Pietro Bembo (Florence, 1954),

the list of editions at pp. 20-23.

F. R. Goff, Incunabula in American Libraries(New York, 1964).

Goff
Tiraboschi

Girolamo Tiraboschi, Biblioteca modenese (Modena, 1781-86),

IV, pp. 108-22 on Gianfrancesco Pico.

(B) LIBRARIES

European

BM
BN
BBC
BBU
FBM
FBN
FBR
FerBC
MilA
MirB
MunS
PBP
PaM
RBA
RBV
VL

British Museum, London

Bibliotheque nationale, Paris
Biblioteca Comunale, Bologna
Biblioteca Universitaria, Bologna
Biblioteca Marucelliana, Florence
Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence
Biblioteca Riccardiana, Florence
Biblioteca Comunale, Ferrara
Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan
Biblioteca Comunale, Mirandola
Staatsbibliothek, Munich
Biblioteca Palatina, Parma
Bibliotheque Mazarine, Paris
Biblioteca Angelica, Rome
Biblioteca Valli celli ana, Rome
Vatican Library, Vatican City

American

CtY
ICN
ICU
IU
MH
NjP
NML
NN
NNC
NNUT

Yale University Library, New Haven

Newberry Library, Chicago
University of Chicago Library, Chicago
University of Illinois Library, Urbana
Harvard University Library, Cambridge
Princeton University Library, Princeton
Morgan Library, New York
New York Public Library, New York
Columbia University Library, New York
Union Theological Seminary Library, New York

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to list the various writings of Gianfrancesco Pi co, the printed editions and manuscripts where they may be found,
and the principal secondary works which deal with the life and works of that
author. By attempting to be as complete and accurate as possible I hope to
make this appendix the basis of further studies on the thought of Gianfrancesco Pico. Materials dealing with Pi co as a political figure have been omitted. There are several reasons for this. First, my present study focuses primarily upon him as a philosopher and scholar. Secondly, the amount of
material that relates to him as a political figure is sufficient for a separate
study in Itself. Some indications have been given in the first chapter of my
study, but there is an abundance of unstudied manuscripts material which is
probably as extensive as the material which I have utilized.
The appendix is divided into four major sections. I shall say a few words
about the aims and limits of each of these sections in turn. Before doing this,
however, I shall briefly outline the principles which I have used in bringing
together this appendix. Those editions and manuscripts which I have not
been able to examine are preceded by an asterisk, and those which we have
consulted by means of microfilm or photostat are preceded by an "F." Information contained in square brackets is not to be found in the editions themselves, but has been supplied from other sources (e.g. from the various
studies of early typography). In the case of translations, the abbreviation
"Tr." will be used, followed by I (Italian), E (English), or F (French).

1. The Writings oj Gianjrancesco Pico. Here I shall try to give the complete
title of the different works of the author, the date of composition where possible, the name of the person to whom each work was dedicated, and, by a
system of cross-reference to Sections II and III, the various printed editions
and manuscripts of the work which are known to exist. Where there are
different versions of the same work or translations into other languages this
is likewise noted. I also list Pico's "lost works," along with the information
we have about them and references to them in Pico's own extant works.
I have made no attempt to discuss individual letters, save in the cases where

188

APPENDIX A

they might be considered as works in themselves (as with the exchange

with Pietro Bembo or the long letter written in defense ofDionysius the Areopagite). The manuscripts and printed editions, where each work can be
found, are indicated by numbers which refer to Section IIA (in the case of
printed editions) and Section III (in the case of manuscripts). The list of
works is divided by subject matter and the arrangement is chronological
within each of these divisions.
The most important single source of information concerning the date of
composition of Pico's various works, both extant and lost, is the letter to
Lilio Gregorio Giraldi. I have accepted the date of this letter as 1514,
although there is a peculiarity with regard to it, which I feel should be
mentioned. In the first printed edition (De amore divino. Rome, 1516, fols.
OllLOivV) of the text we read that the letter was completed in 1514. At the
end of the letter, the date January 25, 1516 is given. To further complicate
the matter the same letter was published virtually unchanged (although
some of the content was rearranged) in other editions of Pico's works (e.g.
Opera, Basel, 1601, pp. 877-80) with the date of 1520 given in the text of the
letter. From all of this conflicting information, I have decided to accept the
earliest date, viz. 1514, as the date of composition. Hence, this is the basis of
my dating a number of Pico's works.
II. Printed Editions of Pico's Writings and of the Works Dedicated to Him. This
section will consist of three parts.
A. Editions oj Pico's Works. Here I shall try to list every edition of all of
Gianfrancesco Pico's writings, save the political correspondence and fugitive
letters which are spread through various collections. I have made an attempt
to add bibliographical references to these works where possible. I have
usually followed the principle of giving two references to each edition, but
in the case of incunabula I felt that a single reference is often adequate. I
have also listed locations where the various editions can be found, limiting
myself to the British Museum and Bibliotheque Nationale in the cases when
a book is to be found in one of these two major libraries. In those instances
in which there is no copy in either of these libraries, I have listed one or two
libraries where the book may be found. I have tried to give the most accessible libraries in these cases, but occasionally I have had to refer to relatively
small and out-of-the-way collections which happen to have a rare edition. In
addition to this, I have given American locations, when they are known to
me, although my own researches in this respect have been largely limited to
the great East Coast libraries and Chicago; consequently, the American
locations I give reflect this.
I list here only those editions which either I have inspected personally or
for the existence of which I have found convincing evidence. Consequently,
several editions listed in various bibliographical works have been omitted
from my list. In most cases the "ghost editions" have proven to be the result

APPENDIX A

189

of simple confusions with legitimate printings. In only one case (Reichling

679) is there a persistent bibliographical tradition in behalf of a "ghost edition."l It is quite possible that I have overlooked one or another edition of
one of Pico's works. It has proven to be especially difficult to run down all of
the printings of those works which appeared often in anthologies. I have
tried to be conservative in listing printed editions of questionable legitimacy,
holding to the opinion that in matters of bibliography sins of omission are
preferable to sins of commission.
By a system of cross-numbering, which refers to Section I, I indicate which
of the author's works can be found in each of the editions listed. The list is
chronological. In the cases where works of Pi co are contained in anthologies
and collections of more than one volume, the volume and page numbers,
where the work is to be found, are given.
B. Fugitive Letters. Here I list editions where those letters, - both written
by Gianfrancesco and addressed to him - which cannot be found in any of
the editions listed in Part A of this section, are to be located. I make no attempt to be complete, but list only a single source where a particular letter
is to be found. This section is arranged alphabetically by correspondent.
C. Dedications. Here I list the printed works of other authors which were
dedicated to Gianfrancesco Pico. Again I do not attempt to be complete,
but I list only the first printing of each work. Where this is not possible I list
the edition which I have examined. This section is arranged alphabetically
by author.
III. Manuscripts Relating to Gianfrancesco Pico. 2 Here I list the most important manuscripts which relate to Gianfrancesco Pico as a philosopher and
scholar. Again I, omit those of his political correspondence and those of
pi:edominantly political interest. Include are: (I) all manuscripts which contain writings by Pico himself, even though these may have been made later
than the printed editions of the material they contain; (2) unpublished
letters addressed to Gianfrancesco Pico; (3) any other unpublished documents, either addressed to him or discussing him and his activities in some
way; and (4) other manuscripts which fall into none of these categories, but
which are nevertheless important for the study of Gianfrancesco Pico. I have
attempted in every case to give a brief description of the manuscript and
some indication of its scope; I also indicate, where possible, the part of the
manuscript which relates to Pico. Where possible I add a reference to where
a description of the manuscript may be found. Those which are followed by
the abbreviation "(POK)" have been indicated to us through the courtesy
1 For the demonstration that Reichling 679 is a "ghost" that arose over two variants of
the [507 edition of the Hymni heroici lres see Charles B. Schmitt, "A Note on the First Edition
of Gianfrancesco Pico's 'Hymn; heroici lres'," Papers of lhe Bibliographical Society of America,
LIX ([965), pp. 45-48.
2 I am presently preparing an edition of the unpublished works which should appear
shortly.

190

APPENDIX A

of Professor Paul Oskar Kristeller of Columbia University; they will be more

fully described in the later volumes of his Iter Italicum, only the first volume
of which has appeared as I write this.
This list will be arranged alphabetically by city and library, both written
in the form used in the country in question. If nothing is said concerning the
language, it may be assumed that the manuscript is written in the original
language of the work (which can be found by reference to Section I). Generally, only in the case of translations will the language be mentioned.
IV. Selected Secondary Works. Here I shall not list those works which' are
cited with regard to Pico in the study itself. This list merely contains a few
additional items which I did not have occasion to cite previously. Some of
these deal with matters peripheral to the focus of this book and others have
been superseded by later, more authoritative studies of the same subject. My
list is highly selective; I have made no attempt to be complete, for few of the
older works are really valuable to the modern scholar. As an aid to the
reader, I have briefly indicated the scope of each of the works listed here.

SECTION I

THE WRITINGS OF GIANFRANCESCO PICO

A. PHILOSOPHY

( I) Difensio de ente et uno

As the name implies this work was written in defense of Giovanni Pico's
work De uno et ente. It was first printed in the 1496 edition of the elder Pico's
Opera. It was completed by December, 1495, when Antonio Cittadino mentioned it in a letter to Gianfrancesco (Opera, p. 74). It was thereafter reprinted in the various editions of Giovanni Pico's works. The single known
manuscript seems to be of later date.
Manuscript: 64
Printed editions: I, 6, 9, IO, I I, 26, 29, 55, 56, 62, 63, 7 I, 72.

(2) De studio divinae et humanae philosophiae, libri duo

This work sets the foundation for the longer and more comprehensive
treatment of the same subject in the later Examen Vanitatis. The first edition
bears a dedication letter to Alberto Pio, dated December 24, 1496 and was
printed the next year. The only extant manuscript is from the year 1513.
Other references to this work by Pi co are after the date of the first printed
edition.
Manuscript: 63
Printed editions: 2, 8, II, 39, 63, 72,93.

(3) De imaginatione, tiber

This work, which is based on Aristotle's discussion of imagination in the
De anima, seems to have been completed about the end of the year 1500. The
dedication letter to Emperor Maximilian is from December 1 of that year.
Pi co does not refer to it earlier than this and the first printed edition appeared
in April of 1501. There are no known manuscripts, but it was printed several
times in the sixteenth century and has been translated into French (by JeanAntoine de Baifin 1557) and English (by Harry Caplan in 1930).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 7, 1 I, 45, 54 (Tr.F), 63, 65 (Tr.F), 69, 72, 106 (with
Tr.E).

192

APPENDIX A

(4) De rerum praenotione libri novem

This is a lengthy work (second in length only to the Examen Vanitatis among Pico's works) against pretended modes of prophecy. It is of the same
genre as Giovanni Pico's work against astrology and is dedicated to the
author's cousin and protector, Alberto Pio. It was first printed in the Opera
of 1506-07. It was already completed, however, several years before this,
being mentioned in the letters to Zanobi Acciaiouli of May 28, 1502 (Opera,
p. 82 I) and to Reuchlin (p. 834), Zasius (p. 866), and Wolf (p. 864) from
the year 1505. There is no substantial portion of the work extant in manuscript.
Manuscript: 6 (excerpts).
Printed editions: 11,63,72.
(5) Liber de providentia Dei contra philosophastros
This work was first printed in November, 1508, and does not seem to have
been completed much before that date, for it was not included in the Opera of
1506-07. It was dedicated to Domenico Grimani.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 13, 15, 84.
(6) Physici libri duo. This consists of (A) De appetitu primae materiae and (B) De
elementis
The first of these is dedicated to Cardinal Bernardo Dovizi of Bibbiena
and is of uncertain date. It most probably was written after Pico's return to
Mirandola in 1514. The dedication manuscript is extant, but gives no indication of the date. The De elementis is dedicated to Cardinal Matthew Lang in
appreciation of his help in restoring Mirandola to Gianfrancesco. (It is dated
1513 in the printed editions). These works were first printed in 1518.
Manuscript: 77 (A only).
Printed editions: 27, 35, 63, 72.
(7) De falsitate astrologiae genethliacorum confutatio
This work, which is dedicated to Giovanni Manardo, is probably the same
as the one which Gianfrancesco refers to as Quaestio de triplici astrologia (e.g. in
De causis calamitatum ... (15 I 9 ed.), foh. Bv, Fill v and in the letter to Giraldi
of 15 14, Opera, p. 880) or De presensionibus genethliacis (letter to Giraldi, p.
878). It was probably written sometime between 1505 and 1514.
Manuscript: 98.
Printed editions: none.
(8) Liber de veris calamitatum causis nostrorum temporum
This work was dedicated to Leo X and was first printed at Mirandola in
1519. It seems to have been written about 1515 (See 1860 ed., p. 21).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 28, 100.

APPENDIX A

193

(9) Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis Christianae disciplinae: Distinctum in libros sex, quorum tres omnem philosophorum sectam universim: reliqui
Aristoteleam et Aristoteleis amzis particulatim impugnant: Ubicunque autem
Christiana et asseritur, et celebratur disciplina
This is the longest and most important work. It was dedicated to Leo X
and first printed in Iy:W at Mirandola. The precise date of composition of
the work is uncertain. It was probably begun before Gianfrancesco's first
exile from Mirandola in 1502, but was not completed until after his final
return in 1514 (Opera, pp. 600-01). It is mentioned in the letter to Giraldi
of 1514 (Opera, pp. 878-79).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 31, 63, 72.

( IO) Do animae immortalitate digressio

This work seems to have been extracted from a largc;f commentary on
Aristotle's De anima. It was first printed in 1523, but was already completed
in 1514 as we know from the letter to Giraldi from that year (Opera, p. 879).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 34, 47, 48.

(II) De auro libri tres. Opus sane aurem in quo de auro tum aestimando, tum conficiendo, turn utendo ingeniose et docte disseritur
This work is of doubtful authenticity. It was not printed until 1586 and
no manuscript connecting it with Gianfrancesco Pi co is known. It is considered to be a spurious work by Tiraboschi, Ceretti, and Thorndike. There
is, at the same time, strong internal evidence (e.g. frequent mention of
persons well-known to Gianfrancesco Pico and an acquaintance with Mirandola) that indicates that if the work is not genuine it is a very clever forgery.
Manuscript: 73 (book I only).
Printed editions: 67, 68, 70, 74,81,87,92.

B. THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS WORKS

([2) De morte Christi et propria cogitanda, libri tres

This is a religious work dedicated to Savonarola and seemingly written
under the influence of the friar. I t was completed by October 20, 1496, as we
know from the dedication letter (Opera, p. 29) and a copy of the work was
sent to Ercole Strozzi on November 12 of the same year (Opera, p. 855). It
was first printed with the De studio in July of 1497.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 2, 8, 11,39,63,72.
([3) Theoremata nurnero XXV de fide et ordine credendi
This is a work of medium length, principally theological, but of some
philosophical importance. It was dedicated to Pope Julius II in the first

194

APPENDIX A

printed edition of 1506-07. The date of composition seems to have been

somewhat earlier. It was already mentioned in a letter to Ercole Strozzi
from 1496 (Opera, p. 855), in a letter to Zanobi Acciaiuoli of 1502 (Opera,
p. 821), and in letters of 1505 to Ulrich Zasius (Opera, p. 866) and Thomas
Wolf (p. 864).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: I I, 63, 72.
(14) Declaratio capitis in Christo Pater, et Christus in nobis, quod ex octavo de Trinitate libro Hilarii sump tum est et positum a Gratiano in decretis de consecutione,
distinctio II
This brief work was first printed in the edition of the Opera of 1506-07. It
was dedicated to Cosmus Passetus and was completed by 1505, when it was
mentioned in the letters to Wolf (Opera, p. 864) and Zasius (p. 866).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: I I, 63, 72.
(15) De amore divino libri quattuor
This work, which is dedicated to Pope Leo X, seems to have been finished
in 1516, when it was first printed. There is also a de luxe dedication manuscript of the work.
Manuscript: I I.
Printed edition: 23.
( 16) De riformandis moribus oratio
This short oration was addressed to Pope Leo X and the assembled Lateran Council. A draft of the work was completed by September, 1514, when
Pico showed it to Pirckheimer in Innsbruck (see Willibald Pirckheimers Briifwechsel, ed. E. Reicke (Munich, I940f), II, 565), and it is mentioned in the
letter to Giraldi of the same year (Opera, 879). It was first printed in 1520 and
several times thereafter, particularly in Germany, indicating that it was
used as propaganda for the cause of the Reformation.
Manuscript: 74.
Printed editions: 30, 33, 43, 72, 76, 79, 9 I, 98.
C. POLEMICAL WORKS

(17) Opusculum de sententia excommunicationis iniusta pro Hieronymi Savonarolae

innocentia
This work was first published in 1497 or 1498 after the excommunication
of Savonarola and was dedicated to Ercole d'Este. There is also an Italian
translation of the work which survives in manuscript.
Manuscripts: 33 (Tr.I, fragment), 59, 80 (Tr.I).
Printed editions: 3, 8, 32, 75, 82, 88.
(18) Difensio Hieronymi Savonarolae Ferrariensis adversus Samuelem Cassinensem
This defense of Savonarola against the attack of Samuele Cascini (or Cas-

APPENDIX A

195

sini) seems to have been written in 1497 shortly after Cascini's attack. It is
dedicated to Girolamo Tornelli. Manuscript Riccardiana 420 is said to be an
autograph, but is undated.
Manuscripts: 38, 59, 69 (fragment).
Printed editions: 4, 8, 83
(19) Epistola infavore di Fra Hieronymo da Ferrara dappoi la sua captura
This is an "open letter" directed to the people of Florence, printed as a
pamphlet, and dated Easter Sunday, 1498. It was printed but once in an
edition extant in very few copies (perhaps only two).
Manuscript: 23.
Printed edition: 5.

(20) Operecta in difensione della opera di Piero Bernardo da Firenze servo di Jesu
Cristo

This work, dedicated to Domenico Benivieni, is dated September, 1501.

It survives in a single manuscript which remained unpublished until 1943.
Manuscript: 22.
Printed edition: 108.

(21) Pro asserendis a calumnia libris Dionysii Areopagitae ... epistola

This long letter in defense of Dionysius was printed as a separate work;
it is of uncertain date, but was first printed in 1523. The manuscripts do not
help in the dating. It is addressed to the Bishop of Chieti, Giampietro Carafa,
the future Paul IV and a relative of Gianfrancesco's wife, who was bishop of
that city from 1505 to 1524.
Manuscripts: 13, go.
Printed editions: 33, 37.
(22) Depulsoria calumniae romaniensis oratio
This work, which is as yet unpublished, seems to have been written about
1524. See No. 57 below, however.
lYfanuscripts: 2, 57.
Printed editions: none.

D. BIOGRAPHIES

(23) Vita loannis Pici Mirandulae

The life of the uncle was written expressly for Gianfrancesco's 1496 edition
of the Opera. Therefore, the date of composition must be placed in 1495 and
1496. It was reprinted often thereafter. An English translation was made
about 1500 by Thomas More and was printed about 15 IO. There is also an
Italian translati on by Sorbelli (I 963).
Manuscripts: 7 (fragment), 2I, 46 (Tr.E).
Printed editions: I, 6, 9, IO, I I, 16 (Tr.E), 17 (Tr.E), 26, 29, 44, 53 (Tr.E)
55, 56, 62, 72,89, I04 (Tr.E), I07 (Tr.E), I IO (with Tr.I).

196

APPENDIX A

(24) Vita Fratris Hieronymi Savonarolae Ferrariensis

This work has the most complicated textual history of all of Pico's works.
Gianfrancesco made several revisions of the work during his lifetime, only
one of which has been printed. Although not printed until 1674, it apparently was very popular and widely read during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. There are approximately forty known manuscripts of the work
and certainly others are to be found among the many unstudied documents
relating to Savonarola. Besides the three different Latin redactions of the
work, there are several different Italian translations, possibly a French
translation, and at least one compendium based on it. Much additional
study is needed regarding this work and its textual tradition.
Manuscripts: I (Tr. 1),3,4 (Tr. I, compendium), 5 (Tr. I), 10 (Tr. I),
14 (fragment), 15 (Tr. 1),16 (Tr. 1),17, 18 (Tr. I), Ig (Tr. I, compendium),
24,26,28 (Tr. I), 2g, 31, 32, 34 (Tr. 1),35 (Tr. I, fragment), 40, 41 (Tr.I) ,
42 (Tr. 1),43,45 (Tr. 1),48 (Tr. I, abridged), 49 (Tr. I, compendium), 51,
52 (Tr.F?), 53, 58 (Tr. I), 65 (Tr. I), 66, 68 (Tr. I), 6g (Tr. I), 70, 71 (fragment), 78,81,82,87, 8g, 94, 99
Printed editions: 88, 8g.
(25) Compendium rerum admirabilium coelicae virginis Catherinae Raconisiae de
tertio habitu divi Dominici
This work, apparently originally written in Latin, is better known in the
Italian translation. There is a single Latin manuscript of the work, but there
are several Italian manuscripts and three Italian printed editions. The work
was completed in 1532, but additions were made after Pico's death by the
Dominican Pietro Martire Morelli (in 1552). This Latin version with Morelli's additions (found in Torino ms. H.VI.ro) was then printed in an Italian
translation about 1681. Pico's original (without Morelli's additions) also
exists in an Italian translation in several manuscripts. No copy of the Latin
original without the additions of Morelli is known to exist.
Manuscripts: 27 (Tr. 1),39 (Tr. 1),50 (Tr. I), 72 (Tr.I), 79 (Tr. 1),83
Printed editions: 85 (Tr. I), 90 (Tr. I), 99 (Tr. I).

E. POETRY

(26) Heroicum carmen de mysteriis dominicae crucis nuper in Germaniam delapsis,

titulus staurostichos
This religious poem, dedicated to Emperor Maximilian, was first printed
in the Opera of 1506-07, but was completed by 1505 as we know from the
letters to Reuchlin (Opera, p. 834), Wolf (p. 864), and Zasius (p. 866). The
extant manuscript seems to have been made after the first printed edition.
Manuscript: 62.
Printed editions: I I, 18, I g, 63, 72 , 73, 94.

APPENDIX A

197

(27) Sylva votum pro salute coniugis

This poem was first printed in the collection of 1507 and we have no
evidence for its completion before that date.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 12, 18, 58, 59.

( 28) Hymnus ad Chris tum

This, along with the two following items, makes up the Hymni heroici tres.
They were first printed in 1507, but were already partially finished in the
latter part of 1505, as we learn from the letter to Wolf (Opera, p. 865).
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 12, 18,22,24,25,58,59.
(29) Hymnus ad Virginem
See item No. 28.
Manuscript: 93.
Printed editions: 12, 18,22, 24, 25, 58, 59.
(30) Hymnus ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem
See item No. 28.
Manuscripts: 62, 93.
Printed editions: 12, 18, 22, 24, 25, 58, 59.

(31) Argumentllm hymnorllm carmine elegiaco

This poem is included in the collection of 1507 and we have no evidence
for its completion before that date.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 12, 18, 22, 24, 58, 59.
(32) De expellendis venere et cllpidine carmen heroicum
This was first printed in 1513 and we have no evidence for its completion
before that date.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 20, 21, 77, 95.
(33) In D. Geminianum hymnus
This was first printed in 15 I 3 and we have no evidence for its completion
before that date.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 2 I, 4 I.
(34) In D. Lallrentium Martyrem hymnus
This work was first printed in 15 I 3 and we have no evidence for its completion before that date.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 20, 21,41,95.

198

APPENDIX A

(35) Ad S. Antonium hymnus

This was first printed in 1520, but had been completed by 1514 as we
know from the letter to Giraldi (Opera, p. 878).
Manuscripts: 20, 75, g8.
Printed editions: 30, 41.
(36) Ad S. Mariam Magdalenam hymnus
This was first printed in 15'20, but had been completed by 1514 as we
know from the letter to Giraldi (Opera, p. 878).
Manuscript: 75.
Printed editions: 30, 41.
(37) Ad S. Martinum hymnus
This poem was first printed in 1520 but had been completed by 1514 as
we know from the letter to Giraldi (Opera, p. 878).
Manuscripts: 75, g8.
Printed editions: 30,41.
(38) Ad S. prophetam Davidem (or Danielem) hymnus
This poem was first printed in 1531, but had already been copied in the
manuscript dated 1524. The manuscripts give the hymn as being directed to
David, while the printed edition addresses it to Daniel. From the text, the
former seems to be correct.
Manuscripts: 75, g8.
Printed edition: 41.
(39) Ad SS. Ioannes Baptistam et Evangelistam hymnus
This was completed by 1524 since it is included in the manuscript of that
date. It was not printed until 1531.
Manuscripts: 75, g8.
Printed edition: 41.

(40) In S. Paulum Apostolum Iesu Christi hymnus

This was first printed in 1531, but had been completed by 1514 as we
know from the letter to Giraldi (Opera, p. 878).
Manuscripts: 75, g8.
Printed editions: 41.
(41) Ad S. Franciscum hymnus
This poem was first printed in 1531, but was completed in 1514 when it
was mentioned in the letter to Giraldi (Opera, p. 878).
Manuscripts: 75, g8.
Printed editions: 41.

(42) Ad Angelum Custodem hymnus

This was printed in 1531, but had already been completed by 1514 when
it was mentioned in the letter to Giraldi (Opera, p. 878).
Manuscripts: 75, g8.
Prin ted edition: 41.

APPENDIX A

199

(43) A misero moribundae vitae somno ad perpetuamfoelicis vitae vigiliam excitatio

This poem was first printed in I 523 and we have no evidence for its having
been completed before that date.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 33, 4I.
( 44) Insulae suae descriptio
This descriptive poem about the territory of Mirandola was complete by
I524 as we know from the manuscript copies. It was dedicated to Gianfrancesco's son Giantommaso Pico, and it remained unprinted until the nineteenth century.
Manuscripts: 56, 75.
Printed editions: I02, I03 (with Tr. I).
(45) Poems to Savonarola: (A) Inc.: Nunc mihi non opus est ... , (B) Inc:
Sacrum concinite ... , (C) Inc: Gaudium nobis socii ... , (D) Inc: Quo te
sancte pater ...

These poems are of uncertain date and have never been printed. They
vary in length ,the first being several hundred lines long and the others much
shorter.
Manuscripts: 3, I4, 24, 25 (incomplete), 43, 5 r , 69, 70, 84, 94 (incomplete) .
Printed editions: none.

F. OTHER LITERARY WORKS

(46) In suorum hymnorum adnotationes et interprementa exordium

This is a long and detailed commentary which Gianfrancesco wrote for
his first three hymns (i.e. Ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem, Ad Virginem, Ad Christum). It accompanies these hymns in the first printed edition of I507 and was
dedicated to his son Giantommaso. There is no evidence that it was completed before the date of the first printing.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: I2, I8.

(47) De imitatione libellus

One of the most popular of Pico's writings, the De imitatione consists of a
letter addressed to Pietro Bembo, Bembo's reply to this, and a second letter
by Gianfrancesco which apparently was never actually sent to Bembo. These
letters date from the years I5I2-I3, which Pico spent in Rome with Bembo.
The originals seem to have been lost, but there are several manuscripts of
the first letter. The first printed edition dates from I 5 I 8 and contains all
three of the letters. Many of the later editions omit Pico's second letter.
There is an English translation of Pico's first letter and of Bembo's reply
(by Izora Scott, I 9 I 0).

200

APPENDIX A

Manuscripts: 9 (First letter only), 85 (First letter only) .

Printed editions: 27, 35,40,42,50,51,60,63,64,66, 72, 78,86,95,97,
105 (Tr. E), 109.
(48) Dialogus in tres libros divislls: Titulus est strix sive de ludificatione daemonllm
This is a dialogue written against witchcraft and dedicated to Giovanni
Manardo. It was first printed in 1523 and we have no evidence or its having
been completed before that date. It has also been translated into Italian
twice, the first time in 1524 by Leandro Alberti, the second time in 1555 by
Turino Turini.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: 33, 36 (Tr. I: Alberti), 49 (Tr. I: Turini), 52 (Tr. 1:
Alberti),80, 101 (Tr. I: Turini).
(49) Dialogus de ado ratione
This work was completed in 1524 as we know from the single extant manuscript. It was dedicated to Pope Clement VII and has never been printed.
Manuscript: 86.
Printed editions: none.

G. TRANSLATION

(50) Iustini philosophi et martyris admonitorius gentium liber

This work, which is no longer attributed to Justin Martyr, was translated
by Pi co sometime before 1505. It was first mentioned by him in the letters
to Zasius (Opera, p. 866) and Wolf (p. 864) from that year. The first printing of the translation, which is dedicated to Zanobi Acciaiuoli, was in the
Opera of 1506-07. It was often reprinted, remaining a standard translation
for most of the sixteenth century.
Manuscripts: none.
Printed editions: I I, 14,38,46,57,61,63, 72.

H. LETTERS

(51) The letters are scattered throughout the works and elsewhere. Those
which can be found in none of the editions of Pico's work are listed in Section
lIB below. In the three editions of the Opera are printed four books ofletters.
These were prepared for the edition of 1506- 07 and were reprinted with few
additions in the later editions. Consequently, it seems that the bulk of Pico's
personal letters written after 1505 have not come down to us. See item 65,
below.

APPENDIX A

J.

201

LOST AND DOUBTFUL WORKS

(52) Dialogus de serena conscientia

This work was already completed in 1496. Refs.: Letter to Ercole Strozzi
(1496), Opera, p. 855; Letter to Wolf, Opera, p. 865.
(53) Nostrorum temporum historia or De historia meorum temporum universa

This work is perhaps identifiable with an early version of the work entitled Liber de veris calamitatum causis nostrorum temporum (No.8 above). The
latter was not completed until about 1515 and the former was already mentioned in 1505. Refs.: Letter to Wolf, Opera, p. 865; Letter to Giraldi,
Opera, pp. 878-79.
(51) De dialectica libri quinque or Institutiones logicae

This seems to be the most important of Pico's lost works. He mentions it

often. It was completed by 1505 and was dedicated to his son Giantommaso
Pi co for whom it was meant as a guide to the study oflogic. Refs.: Letter to
Wolf, Opera, p . 865; Letter to Giantommaso Pico, Opera, p. 876; Letter to
Giraldi, Opera, p. 877; Examen vanitatis, Opera, pp. 5IO, 579, 636, 658,
694, 724, 728 , 749
(55)

Translation into Latin

if Theophrastus'

Liber de igne

This translation is mentioned in 1505. The "translation of Theophrastus"

referred to in 1514 is probably the same. Refs.: Letter to Wolf, Opera, p.
865; Letter to Giraldi, Opera, p. 880.
(56) Commentaria de anima rationali in Aristotelem

The only mention we have of this work is in the letter to Giraldi, dated
1514. The extant De immortalitate animae digressio is quite possibly a fragment
of this longer commentary. Refs.: Letter to Giralcli, Opera, pp. 878, 879.

(57) Resolutio potestatis ecclesiasticae

This work is mentioned in the letter to Giraldi of 1514, but at that time
was not yet completed. It may be the same as his Depulsoria calumniae romaniensis oralio (No. 22 above). The description which Pico gives of the lost work
seems to indicate this. Ref.: Opera, p. 878.
(58) Adnotationes in sacra eloquia Veteris et Novi Testamenti

The only references to this work are in the letter to Giraldi of 15 14. Refs. :
Opera, pp. 878, 879.
(59) Adnotationes in leges civiles et pontificias

This work is referred to only in the letter to Giraldi of 1514. Refs.: Opera,
pp. 878, 879

(60) De human a pelfectione

This work is mentioned only in the letter to Giraldi from 15 I 4. Refs.:
Opera, pp. 878, 879.

202

APPENDIX A

(6r) De anathemate, libri duo

This work, mentioned in the letter to Giraldi of 1514, seems to be the same
as Pico's Opusculum de sententia excommunicationis (No. 17 above). It is a work
dealing with Savonarola in two books, which seems to fit the description of
the known work dealing with Savonarola. Ref.: Opera, p. 879.

(62) Regulae adversus scrupulos

This work is mentioned only in the letter to Giraldi of 1514. Ref.: Opera,
p.879
(63) Translation of St. John Chrysostom
We have no indication of what works were translated by Pico, but only a
single reference in the letter to Giraldi of 1514. Ref.: Opera, p. 880.
(64) T riplici de causa
This work, which was to continue the polemic of Giovanni Pi co against the
pseudo-sciences, was proposed already in 1505, but we have no evidence
that it was ever completed. Ref.: Letter to Wolf, Opera, p. 865.
(65) Letters
In the letter to Giraldi in 1514 Pico mentions among his works Epistolarum
varii generis libri septem. Only four books ofletters were published in the Opera
of 1506-1507 and only scattered letters were published after that. This would
seem to indicate that at least three books of letters have been lost. Ref.:
Opera, p. 878.

SECTION II

PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES

A. EDITIONS OF GIANFRANCESCO PICO'S WORKS

(I) Commentationes Ioannis Pici Mirandulae in hoc volumine contentae:

qui bus anteponitur vita per loannem Franciscum illustris principis Galeotti
Pici filium conscripta. Bologna: Benedictus Hector, 1496. Refs.: HC 12,992;
Goff P632. Copies: BM, BN, ICN.
Contents: 1,23.
(2) loannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae de morte Christi et propria cogitanda libri tres. Eiusdem de studio divinae et humanae philosophiae libri duo.
Bologna: Benedictus Hector, 1497. Refs.: HC 13,002; Goff P644. Copies:
BM, BN (a copy on vellum), ICN.
Contents: 2, 12.
(3) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae opusculum de sententia excommunicationis iniusta pro Hieronymi Savonarolae viri prophetae innocentia.
[Florence: Societas Colubris or Compagnia del Drago, 1497]. Refs.: CR
4753, GoffP642. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 17.
(4) Defensio Hieronymi Savonarolae Ferrariensis ordinis predicatorum
adversus Samuelem Cassinensem: per loannem Franciscum Picum Mirandulanum edita: ad Hieronymum Tornielum ordinis fratum minorum generalem vicarium. [Florence: Laurentius de Morgianis et Ioannes Petri or
Bartolommeo de'Libri, I 497). Ref.: HR 13,003. Copies: FBN, FerBC.
Contents: 18.
(5) Epistola del conte Zoanfrancesco de la Mirandula in favore de fra
Hieronymo da Ferrara dappoi la sua captura. [Modena: Domenico Roccociola, I498]. Ref.: R 1321. Copies: FBR, PBP.
Contents: 19.
(6) loannis Pici Mirandulae omnia opera ... Venice: Bernardinus Venetus de Vitalibus, 1498. Refs.: HC 12,993, Goff P634. Copies: BM, BN,
MH, NNC, ICN.
Contents: 1,23.

204

APPENDIX A

(7) Ioannis Francisci Pici liber de imaginatione. Venice: Aldus, ISO I.

Refs.: Renouard, 32; Brunet, IV, 638. Copies: BM, BN, MH.
Contents: 3.
(8) loannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae nepotis opera ... [Venice.: Bernardius Venetus de Vitalibus, 1503]. Refs. : R 4752 (dated 1496); Goff
P645. Copy: BM.
Contents: 2, 12, 17, 18.
(9) Opera Ioannis Pici Mirandulae
nOVlSSlme accurate revisa
Strasbourg:Johann Pruess, 1504. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 31; Ritter, 111,119495. Copy: BM.
Contents: 1,23.
(IO) Ioannis Pici Mira ndulae omnia opera ... [Reggio in Emilia]: Ludovicus de Mazalis, 1506. Refs. : Panzer, VIII, 244. Copies: BM, NjP.
Contents: 1,23.
(1 1) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis, de
rerum praenotione libri novem pro veritate religionis contra superstitiosas
vanitates editi ... Strasbourg:Johann Knobloch, 1506- 07 .(Issued in several fascicles with different signatures and bound in different order in different
copies). Refs.: Ritter, III, 1195- 98; Panzer, VI, 35 & 37. Copies: BM,
BN.
Contents: I, 2, 3,4, 12, 13, 14,23,26,50, 5I.
(12) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulani principis Concordiaeque comitis
hymni heroici tres ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem, ad Christum, et ad Virginem Mariam: una cum commentariis luculentissimis ad Ioannem Thomam
ilium. Milan: Alexander Minutianus, 1507. Refs.: Panzer, VII, 383; Graesse, V, 284, GoffP64Ia. Copies: BM, NN.
Contents: 27, 28, 29, 30, 3 1, 46.
(13) loannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini Concordiaeque co mitis
liber de providentia Dei contra philosophastros. Novi: Benedictus Ducibellus
Mangius Carpensis, 1508. Refs. : Panzer, VII, 486: Graesse, V, 284. Copies:
BM, BN, MH, NNC, ICN.
Contents: 5.
(14) Symphoriani Champerii de triplici disciplina cuius partes sunt: philosophia natural is, medicina, theologia, moral is philosophia ... contenta in
hoc volumine ... Lyon: Claudius Davost, 1508. Refs.: Panzer, VII, 290;
Graesse, II, 114. Copies: BM, BN, MH.
Contents: 50 (fols. mmLnn6v).
(15) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini Concordiaeque comltis
liber de providentia Dei contra philosophastros. Strasbourg: Johann Gruninger, 1509. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 43; Ritter, III, 1198. Copy: BM.
Contents: 5.
(16) Here is conteyned the lyfe of Johan Pic us ErIe of Myrandula a grete
lord ofItaly an excellent conning man in all sciences and verteous oflyving
... London: John Rastell, [I5IO]. Refs.: Graesse, V, 285; Gibson, no. 67

APPENDIX A

205

Copy: BM. According to Gibson this is the original edition, and no. 17
below was based on this one.
Contents: 23 (Tr. E).
(I7) Here is conteyned the lyfe of Johan Picus Erie of Myrandula a grete
lorde of Italy an excellent connynge man in all sciences and verteous of
lyvynge ... London: Wynkyn de Worde, [ISlO]. Refs.: Graesse, V, 28S;
Gibson, no. 68. Copies: BM, NML.
Contents: 23 (Tr. E).
(I8) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulani principis Concordiaeque comltls
hymni heroici tres ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem, ad Christum, et ad Virginem Mariam, una cum commentariis luculentissimis ad Ioannem Thomam
filium ... Strasbourg: Matthias Schurer, ISI1. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 53; Ritter, III, 1199. Copies: BM, BN, MH, NN.
Contents: 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,46.
(I9) Staurostichon, hoc est carmen de mysteriis dominicae crucis nuper in
Germaniam delapsis. Tuebingen: Thomas Anshelm, ISI2. Refs.: Panzer,
VIII, 323; Ritter, III, 120. Copies: BM, EN, MH, NN, CtY, ICN.
Contents: 26.
(20) Ioannis Francisci Mirandulae domini de expellendis venere et cupidine carmen heroicum. Eiusdem hymnus de divo Laurentio ... Strasbourg:
Johann Schott, ISI3. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 6I; Ritter, III, 1200. Copies: BM,
MH.
Contents: 32, 34.
(2I) Illustrissimi ac doctissimi principisJoannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae
domini et Concordiae comitis de venere ct cupidine expellendis carmen.
Item eiusdem Laurentius et Geminianus hymni. Rome: Jacobus Mazochius, ISI3. Ref.: Tiraboschi, I IS. Copies: BN, CtY, ICN.
Contents: 32, 33, 34
(22) (F)Joannis Francisci Pici Mirandulani principis Concordiaeque com itis hymni heroici tres ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem, ad Christum, et ad Virginem Mariam. Leipzig: Melchior Lotter, 1514. Refs.: Panzer, VII, 184;
Tiraboschi, 115. Copy: ID.
Contents: 28, 29, 30, 31.
(23) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis de
amore divino. Libri quattuor. Rome: Jacobus Mazochius, 1516. Refs.:
Sander, 5679; Tiraboschi, I IS. Copies: BN, CtY.
Contents: 15.
(24) Ioannis Francisci Pici 11irandulani principis Concordiaeque comitis
hymni heroici tres, ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem, ad Christum, et ad Virginem Mariam. Leipzig: Valentin Schuman, 1517. Refs.: Panzer, VII, 199;
Tiraboschi, II5. Copy: BN.
Contents: 28, 29, 30, 3 I.
(25) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulani principis Concordiaeque comitis
hymni heroici tres ad Sanctissimam Trinitatem, ad Christum, et ad Virgi-

206

APPENDIX A

nem Mariam ... Vienna: Hieronymus Vietor, 1517. Refs.: Panzer, IX, 33;
Tiraboschi, 114. Copy: BN.
Contents: 28, 29, 30.
(26) Ioannis Pici omnia opera ... Paris: Jehan Petit, 1517. Refs.: Panzer,
VIII, 39; Graesse, V, 283. Copies: BM, CtY.
Contents: 1,23.
(27) Ioannis Francisci Pici Miranclulae domini Concordiaeque comltls
physici libri duo, I. De appetitu primae materiae ad cardinalem S. lVIariae
in Porticu. II. De elementis ad cardinal em Gurcensem. Et rhetorici duo de
imitatione ad Petrum Bembum. Petri Bembi Veneti de imitatione liber
unus. Basel: Johann Froben, ISI8. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 20S; Santangelo, r.
Copy: BN.
Contents: 6, 47.
(28) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis liber
de veris calami tatum causis nostrorum temporum ad Leonem X Pontificem
Maximum. Mirandola: Ioannes Mazochius, ISI9. Refs. : Graesse, V, 2848S; Brunet, IV, 638; Copies: BM, BN, MH, ICN.
Contents: 8.
(29) Ioannis Pici Mirandulae opera omnia ... Venice: Gulielmus de
Fontaneto, ISI9. Ref.: Panzer, VIII, 4S7. Copy: BM.
Contents: 1,23.
(30) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concorcliae comitis ad
Leonem Pontificem Maximum et Con cilium Lateranensem de reformandis
moribus oratio. Eiusdem hymni tres D . Martino, Magdalenae et Antonio
decantati. Hagenau: Thomas Anshelm, 1520. Refs . : Panzer, VII, 90; Ritter, III, 1200. Copies: BM, BN, MH.
Contents: 16, 3S, 36, 37
(31) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis Christianae disciplinae distinctum in libros sex, quorum tres omnem philosophorum sectam universim,
reliqui Aristoteleam et Aristoteleis armis particulatim impugnant ubicunque
autem Christiana et asseritur et celebratur dlsciplina. Mirandola: Ioannes
Mazochius, IS20. Refs.: Panzer, VII, 406; Graesse, V, 28S. Copies: BM,
MH,NN,NNC.
Contents: 9.
(32) Iohannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae opusculum de sententia excommunicationis iniusta pro Hieronymi Savonarolae viri prophetae innocentia.
Wittenberg: Melchior Lotter, IS2 r. Refs.: Panzer, IX, 78 ;Graesse, V, 284.
Copy: BM.
Contents: 17.
(33) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comiti &c
dialogus in tres libros divisus: Titulus est strix sive de ludificatione daemonum. Eiusdem ad Leonem X et Concilium Lateranensem de reformandis
moribus oratio. Eiusdem pro asserendis a calumnia libris Dionysii Areo-

APPENDIX A

207

pagitae epistola. Eiusdem ad excitandum genus humanum a vitae huius

somno ad futurae vigiliam carmen. Bologna: Hieronymus de Benedictis,
1523. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 334; Graesse, V, 285. Copies: BM, BN, MH, NN,
ICN.
Contents: 16,21,43,48.
(34) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis &c
de animae immortalitate digressio. Bologna: Hieronymus de Benedictis,
1523. Refs.: Graesse, V, 285; Niceron, 154. Copies: MH, NNC.
Contents: ro.
(35) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini Concordiaeque comltIs
physici libri duo. De appetitu primae materiae. De elementis et rhetorici
quoque duo de imitatione ad Petrum Bembum cum uno ipsius Bembi ea de
re libro. Bologna: Hieronymus de Benedictis, 1523. Ref.: Graesse, V, 285.
Copies: BN (under Giovanni Pico), NNC.
Contents: 6, 47.
(36) Libro detto strega 0 delle illusioni del demonio del signore Gianfrancesco Pi co della Mirandola. Bologna: Hieronymus de Benedictis, 1524. Refs.
Panzer, VI, 335; Graesse, V, 285. Copies: BM, NN, CtY.
Contents: 48 (Tr. I).
(37) Francisci Pici Mirandulani ac Concordiae domini epistola apologetica pro S. Dionysio Areopagita. Ingolstadt:?, 1526. Ref.: Panzer, VII, 128.
Copies. VL, MunS.
Contents: 21.
(38) Antidotum contra divers as omnium fere seculorum haereses. Editor:
Johannes Sichardus. Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1528. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 26667; Tiraboschi, 120. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 50 (fols. 112-122).
(39) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae de morte Christi et propria cogitanda libri tres. Eiusdem de studio divinae et humanae philosophiae libri
duo: nunc denuo ad veteris exemplaris fidem per Franciscum Zampinum
plene restitutio Paris: In clauso Brunello, ad insigne Geminarum Cipparum,
1528. Ref.: none. Copy: PaM.
Contents: 2, 12.
(40) Ioannis Francisci Pici ad Petrum Bembum de imitatione libellus.
Venice: Ioannes Antonius eiusque fratres de Sabio, 1530. Refs. : Panzer, XI,
533; Santangelo, 2. Copy: BM.
Contents: 47.
(41) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis &c
hymni heroici decem post tres priores ad divers os coelites. Item eiusdem
principis poema eodem metro quo excitamur a somno miseriae vitae ad
tranquillam et perpetuam vigiliam. Bologna: Ioannes Baptista Phaellus,
1531. Ref.: Tiraboschi, II5. Copy: BM.
Contents: 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,40,4 1 ,42,43.

208

APPENDIX A

(42) Petri Bembi opuscula aliquot. Lyon: Gryphius, I532. Refs.: Panzer,
VII, 353; Santangelo, 4. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 47 (pp. 68-IOg).
(43) Fasciculus rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum ... Editor: Ortuin
Gratius. Cologne:?, I535. Refs.: Panzer, VI, 43I; Graesse, III, I40. Copies:
BM,BN,NNC.
Contents: I6 (fols. 208v-2IOV).
(44) Virorum qui superiori nostroque seculo eruditione et doctrina illustres atque memorabiles fuerunt vitae iamprimum in hoc volumen collectae.
Editor: Joannes Fichardus. Frankfurt: Christianus Egenolph, I536. Ref.:
Panzer, VII, 53. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 23 (fols. 58v- 72V).
(45) De <PANTA~IA Ioannis Francisci Mirandulae libel', in quoque imaginationis facultas, natura, quaeque ei erroris causa sit, quibusque remediorum praesidiis occurri possit. Basel: Henricus Petrus, I536. Refs.: Panzer,
VI 3I4; Tiraboschi, 114. Copies: BM, NNUT.
Contents: 3.
(46) Justini philosophi et martyris admonitorius gentium liber, Joanne
Francisco Pico Mirandulae domino interprete, nunc denuo ad exemplar
Graecum collatus et qua licuit fide recognitus. Paris: In aedibus Carolae
Guillardae ad solem aureum, 1538. Ref.: Niceron, I52. Copy: BN.
Contents: 50.
(47) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini et Concordiae comitis &c
de animae immortalitate docta et arguta digressio numquam prius in Galliis
excusa. Paris: Ioannes Roygni, I 54 I. Refs.: Tiraboschi, I I8 (date given as
1542), Niceron, 154-55. Copy: BN (under Giovanni Pico).
Contents: IO.
(48) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini Concordiaeque comitis in
tertium Aristotelis de anima librum extracta digressio, de animae immortalitate. Padua: Ioannes Baptista Amycus, 1553. Copies: FBM, RBA, RBV.
Contents: IO.
(49) Dialogo intitolato la strega ovvero degli inganni de' demoni tradotto
in lingua toscana per il signor abate Turino Turini da Pescia. Pescia: Lorenzo Terrentino, 1555. Refs.: Brunet, supp!., II, 233-34; Tiraboschi, 118.
Copies: MH, NN.
Contents: 48 (Tr. I: Turini).
(50) De elocutionis imitatione ac apparatu liber unus auctore Jacobo Omphalio .. His acesserunt Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ad Petrum Bembum et Petri Bembi ad Ioannem Franciscum Picum Mirandulam de imitatione epistolae duae. Paris: Gulielmus Iulianus, I555. Refs.: Tiraboschi, 115;
Santangelo, 7. Copies: BN, ICU.
Contents: 47 (pp. 232-72).
(5I) Petri Bembi patritii Veneti ... opera. Basel: [Thomas Guarinus],
I556. Ref.: Santangelo, 8. Copies: BM, BN.

APPENDIX A

209

Contents: 47 (in vol. III, pp. 3-41).

(52) Libro detto strega overo delle illusioni del demonio del signor Giovan
Francesco Pi co de la Mirandola ... Venice: "nella contrada di Santa Maria
Formosa, al segno de la speranza," 1556. Ref.: Niceron, 155 (dated 1456).
Copy: BN.
Contents: 48 (Tr. I: Alberti).
(53) The works of Sir Thomas More ... sometime Lorde Chauncellour of
England, wrytten by him in the Englysh tonge. London:J. Cawod,J. Waley,
and R. Tottell, 1557. Refs.: Graesse, V, 285; Brunet, IV, 639; Gibson, no.
73. Copies: BM, BN, CtY, NNC.
Contents: 23 (Tr. E).
(54) Traite de l'imagination tire du latin de Pic de la Mirandole par
J(ean)-A(ntoine) dee) B(aif). Paris: Andre Wechel, 1557. Refs.: Graesse, V,
284; Brunet, IV, 638. Copy: MunS.
Contents: 3 (Tr. F).
(55) Opera omnia Ioannis Pici Mirandulae ... Basel: Henricus Petrus,
1557. Ref.: Graesse, V, 283. Copy: BN.
Contents: 1,23.
(56) Ioannis Pici Mirandulae ... omnia quae extant opera. Venice: Hieronymus Scotus, 1557. Copies: BM, CtY.
Contents: I, 23.
(57) MIKPOTIPELBYTIKON. Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1560. Copy:
BM (under Justin Martyr).
Contents: 50 (pp. 31-47).
(58) Farrago poematum ex optimis quibusque et antiquioribus et aetatis
nostrae poetis selecti per Leodegarium a Quercu ... Paris: Hieronymus de
Marnef, 1560. Ref.: Niceron, 156. Copy: BN (under Duchesne, Leger).
Contents: 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 (fols. 84r-II3r).
(59) Farrago poematum ex optimis quibusque et antiquioribus et aetatis
nostrae poetis selecti per Leodegarium a Quercu ... Paris: Gulielmus Cavelat, 1560. (This edition differs from the preceding only in the name and
device of the printer on the title page). Copy: BN (under Duchesne, Leger).
Contents: 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 (fols. 84r-II3r).
(60) Petri Bembi Patricii Veneti quaecunque usquam prodierunt opera in
unum corpus collecta ... Basel: Thomas Guarinus, 1567. Ref. : Santangelo,
9. Copy: BN.
Contents: 47 (in vol. III, pp. 3-41).
(6I) Monumenta S. Patrum Orthodoxographa ... Editor: Joannes J.
Grynaeus. Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1569. Refs.: Graesse, III, 165; Tiraboschi
120. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 50 (in vol. III, pp. 1947-66).
(62) Opera omnia Ioannis Pici ... Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1572. Refs.:
Graesse, V, 283; Brunet, IV, 636. Copies: BM, BN, MH, NN, NNC, NNUT
CtY, ICN.

210

APPENDIX A

Contents: 1,23.
(63) Opera omnia Ioannis Francisci Pici ... Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1573.
(Uniform with the preceding).
Contents: I, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 26,47,50,51.
(64) De elocution is imitatione ac apparatu liber unus auctore Jacobo
Omphalio ... His accesseruntJoannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ad Petrum
Bembum et Petri Bembi ad Joannem Franciscum Picum Mirandulam de
imitatione epistolae duae. Paris: Gulielmus Iulianus, 1575. Ref.: Santangelo,
I I. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 47.
(65) *A reprint of no. 54. Paris: Andre Wechel, 1577. Refs.: Graesse, V,
284; Brunet, IV, 638; Caplan, 10.
Contents: 3 (Tr. F).
(66) De elocutionis imitatione ac apparatu liber unus. Auctore Jacobo
Omphalio ... His acesseruntJoannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ad Petrum
Bembum et Petri Bembi ad Joannem Franciscum Picum Mirandulam de
imitatione epistolae duae. Paris: Gulielmus Iulianus, 1579. Ref. : Santangelo,
12. Copy: BN.
Contents: 47 (fols. 276r-306v).
(67) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae et Concordiae domini de auro
libri tres ... Venice: Ioannes Baptista Somaschus, 1586. Refs.: Graesse, V,
285; Tiraboschi, 118. Copies: BM, BN, NN.
Contents: I I.
(68) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae et Concordiae domini de auro libri
tres ... Ferrara: Victorius Baldinus, 1587. Refs.: Graesse, V, 285; Tiraboschi, 118. Copies: BM, NN, NNC, CtY.
Contents: I I.
(69) De phantasia aureolus sane Iohannis Francisci Mirandulae liber.
Wittenberg: Matthias Welack, 1588. Ref.: Caplan, 8. Copy: ICN.
Contents: 3.
(70) Joannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ... libri III de auro, opus in quo
de auro ... disseritur ... Ursel: Cornelius Sutorius, 1598. Refs.: Tiraboschi, 118; Niceron, 156. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: I I.
(71) Ioannis Pici Mirandulae ... opera quae extant omnia. Basel: Henricus Petrus, 1601. Refs.: Graesse, V, 284; Brunet, IV, 636. Copies: BM, BN,
MH.
Contents: 1,23.
(72) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ... opera quae extant omma.
Basel: Henricus Petrus, 160 I. CU niform with the preceding).
Contents: 1,2,3,4,6,9, 12, 13, 14, 16,26,47,50,51.
(73) Germanicarum rerum scriptores aliquot insignes hactenus incogniti
... Editor: Marquard Freher. Frankfurt-Hanover: Typis Welchianis, 1600I I. Refs.: Graesse, II, 632; Brunet, II, 1388. Copies: BM, BN, NNC.

APPENDIX A

211

Contents: 26 (in vol. II (Frankfurt, 1602), pp. 242-50).

(74) Theatrum chemic urn praecipuos selectorum auctorum tractatus de
chemiae et lapidis philosophici antiquitate ... Ursel: Cornelius Sutorius,
1602. Copies: RBA, RBV.
Contents: I I (in vol. II, pp. 357-432).
(75) Apologia Joannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae nepotis pro Hieronymi
Savonarolae viri prophetae innocentia ad Herculem Aestensem. [Leipzig]:
Gotthard Voegelin, [c. 1605]. Refs.: Brunet, suppl., II, 234; Tiraboschi,
113. Copies: BM, BN, ICU.
Contents: 17.
(76) Speculum ecclesiae pontificiae Nicolaus Clemangis archidiaconus
Baiocensensis ... Editor: Edward Bulkeley. London: George Bishop, 1606.
Copies: BM, NNUT.
Contents: 16 (pp. 250-74).
(77) Delitiae CC Italorum poetarum huius superiorique aevi illustrium.
Editor: Jan Gruter. [Frankfurt]: Jona Rosa, 1608. Ref.: Niceron, 156.
Copies: BM (under Ranutius Gherus), BN (under Janus Gruter), NN, NNC.
Contents: 32 (in vol. II, pp. 205-16).
(78) Petri Bembi Patritii Veneti cardinalis omnia quotquot reliqua praeter
Venetam historiam et epistolas extant opuscula. Nempe de imitatione libelIus. Strasbourg: Lazar Zetzner, 1609. Ref.: Santangelo, 14. Copy: BM.
Contents: 47 (in vol. III, pp. 7 I 3-50).
(79) Discursus epistolares politico-theologici de statu reipublicae Christianae degenerantis: Tum de reformandis moribus et abusibus ecclesiae '"
Frankfurt: Egenolphus Emmelius, 16 I o. Ref.: Niceron, 153. Copies: VL,
RBA.
Contents: 16 (pp. 1-13).
(80) Johannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini Concordiaeque comltIs
strix sive de ludificatione daemonium dialogi tres nunc primum in Germania
eruti ex bibliotheca M. Martini Weinrichii. Strasbourg: Paul Ledertz, 1612.
Refs.: Graesse, V, 285; Tiraboschi, lI8. Copies: BM, BN, ICU.
Contents: 48.
(81) Theatrum chemicum praecipuos selectorum auctorum tractatus de
chemiae et lapidis philosophici antiquitate, veritate, jure, praestantia et
operationibus continens ... Editor: Lazar Zetzner. Strasbourg: Lazar Zetzner, 1613. Ref.: Niceron, 156. Copies: BM, NNC.
Contents: I I (in vol. II, pp. 337-408).
(82) Monarchiae S. Romani Imperii sive tractatus de iurisdictione imperiali seu regia ... Editor: Melchior Goldast. Frankfurt: Nicolaus Hoffman,
1614. Refs.: Graesse, III, 110; Brunet, II, 1649. Copies: BM, BN, NNC.
Contents: I7 (in vol. II, pp. 1635-48).
(83) Defensio Hieronymi Savonarolae ... adversus Samuelem Cassinensem per Joannem Franciscum Picum edita ... "In metropoli qua Francia
mixta Suevis," 1615. Refs.: Graesse, V, 284; Niceron, 154. Copies: BM, BN.

212

APPENDIX A

Contents: 18.
(84) Joannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae ... liber de providentia Dei contra
philosophastros. [Leipzig or Heidelberg]: Gotthard Voegelin, [c. 16 I 5] .
Refs.: Brunet, suppl, II, 233; Tiraboschi, 114. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 5.
(85) Vita della Beata Caterina Mattei da Racconisio Monaca del terzo
ordine di S. Domenico cavata da gli scritti latini del Signor Gio. Francesco
Picco [!], Signore della Mirandola, dal R . P . maestro Serafino Razzi dell
'Ordine de' Predicatori. Turin: Giovanni Antonio Seghino, 1622. Ref. :
Amedeo, 7 I. Copy: MilA.
Contents: 25 (Tr. I) .
(86) Cardinal is Petri Bembi
omnia quaecumque usquam ill lucem
prodierunt opera ... Strasbourg : Lazar Zetzner, 1652. Ref.: Santangelo,
16. Copy: BN.
Contents: 47.
(87) Theatrum chemicum praecipuos selectorum author urn tractatus de
chemiae et lapidis philosophiae antiquitate, veritate, jure, praestantia et
operationibus continens . .. Strasbourg: Eberhard Zetzner, I65g. Refs. :
Graesse, VI, II, IIO; Brunet, V, 773. Copies : BM, NNC.
Contents : I I (in vol. II, pp. 312-77).
(88) Vita R. P . fratris Hieronymi Savonarolae Ferrariensis ordinis praedicatorum authore illustrissimo domino Ioanne Francisco Pico Mirandulae
Concordiaeque principe. Editor: J. Quetif. Paris: Ludovicus Billaine, 1674.
Refs.: Tiraboschi, IIg; Niceron, 154. Copies : BM, BN, NNUT.
Contents: 17, 24.
(89) Vitae selectorum aliquot virorum qui doctrina, dignitate, aut pietate
inclaruere. Editor : William Bates. London: George Wells, 1681. Refs. :
Graesse, I, 310; Brunet, V, 1322- 23. Copies: BM, BN, NNC.
Contents: 23 (pp. gO- I05), 34 (pp. 10 7- 40) .
(90) Compendio delle cose mirabili della venerabile serva di Dio, Catterina
da Raconisio vergine integerrima del sacro ordine della penitenzia di S.
Domenico, distinto in dieci libri e compos to dall'illustrissimo signor Giovanni Francesco Pi co ... et ultima to da ... frate Pietro Martire Morelli da
Garressio ... [Bologna, c. 168 I] . Refs. : Tiraboschi, I I g; Amedeo, 82 .
Copies: BBC, BBU.
Contents: 25 (Tr. I).
(9 I) Fasciculus rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum prout ab Orthuino
Gratio . . editus est Coloniae A. D. MDXXXV .. . London: Richard
Chiswell, I6go. Refs.: Graesse, III, 140; Brunet, II, 1715. Copies: BM, BN,
NNC, ICN.
Contents: 16 (in vol. I, pp. 417-21) .
(92) IoannisJacobi Mangeti ... bibliotheca chemica curiosa seu rerum ad
alchemiam pertinentium thesaurus instructissimus. Geneva : Chouet, G. de

APPENDIX A

213

Tournes, Cranmer, Perachon, Ritter, & S. de Tournes, 1702. Refs.: Graesse,

IV, 363; Brunet, III, 1365. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: II (in vol. II, pp. 558-84).
(93) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae de studio divinae et humanae
philosophiae libri duo. Editor: Ioannes Franciscus Buddeus. Halle:?, 1702.
Refs.: Tiraboschi, I 13; Niceron, 151. Copies: BM, IU.
Contents: 2.
(94) Rerum Germanicarum scriptores ... Editor: B. G. Struve. Strasbourg: Johann Reinhold Dulssecker, 1717. Refs.: Graesse, II, 632; Brunet,
II, 1388. Copies: BM, BN, NNC.
Contents: 26 (in vol. II, pp. 493-506).
(95) Carmina illustrium poetarum Italorum. Florence: Ioannes Cajetanus
Tartinius & Santis Franchius, 17 I 9-24. Copy: FBR.
Contents: 32, 34 (in vol. VII (1720), pp. I 94ff.).
(96) Collectio praestantissimorum opusculorum de imitatione oratoria.
Editor: Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer. J ena: Christianus Franciscus Buschius, 1726. Ref.: Santangelo, 17. Copy: RBA.
Contents: 47 (pp. 234-74)
(97) Opere del Cardinale Pietro Bembo ora per la prima volta tutte in
un corpo unite. Venice: Francesco Hertzhauser, 1729. Refs.: Graesse, I, 332;
Brunet, I, 764. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 47 (in vol. IV, pp. 329-41).
(98) Vita e pontificato di Leone X di Guglielmo Roscoe ... tradotta e
corredata di annotazioni e di alcuni documenti inediti dal conte Cav.
Luigi Bossi milanese ... Milan: Tipografia Sonzogno, 18 I 6- 17. Copies:
BM,BN, NNC.
Contents: 16 (in vol. VIII, pp. I09-I7).
(99) Compendio delle cose mirabili della Beata Caterina da Racconigi ...
composto da Giovanni Francesco Pico ... e ultima to dal ... frate Pietro
Martire Morelli da Garressio. Chieri & Turin: Tipografia Fory e Dalmazzo,
1858. Ref.: Amedeo, 82. Copy: MirB.
Contents: 25 (Tr. I).
(IOO) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae domini Concordiaeque comitis
liber de veris calamitatum causis nostrorum tempo rum ... Editor: Fernando Calori-Cesis. Modena: Antonio & Angelo Cappelli, 1860. Copies: BM, BN.
Contents: 8.
(IOI) La strega ovvero degli inganni de'demoni. Dialogo di Giovan Francesco Pico della Mirandola tradotto in lingua toscana da Turino Turini.
Milan: G. Daelli, 1864. Ref.: Brunet, IV, 638. Copies: BM, NN, MH, CtY.
Contents: 48 (Tr. I: Turini).
(I02) Ioannis Francisci Pici Mirandulae insulae suae descriptio. Editor:
Felice Ceretti (per nozze Molinari-Vandelli). Mirandola: Caragelli, 1879.
Copies: BM, NNC.
Contents: 44:

214

APPENDIX A

(103) Descrizione latina dell'isola della Mirandola del conte Giovanni

Francesco II Pico tradotta in versi italiani da Ercole Sola. Editor: Felice
Ceretti (nearly the same as the preceding, but with an Italian translation
and a slightly different editorial introduction). Mirandola: Cagarelli, 187g.
Copies: BM, NNC.
Contents: 44 (with Tr. I).
(104) Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: His Life by His Nephew Giovanni
Francesco Pi co ... Translated from the Latin by Sir Thomas More, edited
with an Introduction and Notes by J. M. Rigg. London: D. Nutt, 18go.
Copies: BM, BN, NNC, etc.
Contents: 23 (Tr. E).
(105) Izora Scott, Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero. New York:
Teachers College, Columbia University, IgIO. Copy: NNC.
Contents: 47 (in vol. II, pp. 1-18).
(106) Gianfrancesco Pi co della Mirandola On the Imagination. The Latin
Text with an Introduction, an English Translation, and Notes by Harry
Caplan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930. Copies: BM, NNC, etc.
Contents: 3 (with Tr. E).
(107) The English Works of Sir Thomas More. Editors: W. E. Campbell
et at. London and New York: Eyre and Spottiswoodie, and Lincoln MacVeagh, Ig27-31. Copies: BM, NNC, etc. This is a photographic reprinting
of the 1557 edition.
Contents: 23 (Tr.E; vol. I, pp. 1-20).
(108) Operecta dello M. S. Johanfrancesco Pico della Mirandola in defensione della opera di Pietro Bernardo da Firenze servo diJesu Cristo. Editor:
Paolo Cherubelli (per nozze Bellini-Manifredi). Florence: Stamperia Rinaldi, 1943. Copies: FBN, FBM.
Contents: 20.
(109) Le epistole "de imitatione" di Giovanfrancesco Pico della Mirandola e di Pietro Bembo. Editor: Giorgio Santangelo. Florence: Leo S. Olschki, Ig54. Copies: BM, NNC, etc.
Contents: 47.
(IIO) Ioannis Pici Miranduale viri omni disciplinarum genere consumatissimi vita per Ioannem Franciscum illustris principis Galeotti Pici filium
conscripta. In the series: Deputazione di storia patria per Ie antiche provincie modenesi. Biblioteca - nuova serie, n. 1. Editor: Tommaso Sorbelli.
Modena: Aedes Muratoriana, 1963.
Contents: 23 (with Tr. I).
B. FUGITIVE LETTERS

See also Section III, nos. I3, 30, 33, 44, 55

(I) Pietro Bembo - Petri Bembi ... epistolarum Leonis Decimi ... nomine scriptarum libri sexdecim (Cologne, 1584), pp. 297-98, 417. Two letters
to Pico, dated 1516 and August 27, 1517.

APPENDIX A

215

(2) Celio Cakagnini - Caelii Calcagnini ... opera aliquot (Basel, 1544),
pp. 104, 106-07, I I 1-12. Three letters to Pico. One is dated January 5,1522.
The others are undated but seem to be from the period 1523-24.
(3) Conrad Celtes - Hans Rupprich (ed.), Der Briefwechsel des Konrad
Celtis (Munich, 1934), p. 524. One letter by Pico, dated 1502.
(4) Pietro Crinito - Angeli Politiani opera ... (Lyon, 1533). II, pp. 29193. A single letter from Crinito to Pico, dated April I, 1497.
(5) Johann Essler - Claudii Ptolemei ... geographiae opus (Strasbourg,
1513), fol. Alv. A single letter by Pico, dated August 29,1508. (An Italian
translation is printed in Felice Ceretti, Sulla Geografia di Claudio Tolmeo.
Lettera del conte Giovan Francesco II Pico della Mirandola ... (Mirandola, 1903), per nozze Christini-Zani. Copies of both these rare editions are in
the Bibl. Estense in Modena).
(6) Marsilio Ficino - Paul Oskar Kristeller (ed.), Supplementum Ficinianum (Florence, 1937), II, p. 93. One letter from Ficino, dated November I,
1495
(7) Giovanni Manardo - Ioannis Manardi ... epistolarum medicinalium
libri XX . .. (Venice, 1542), pp. 217-18. One letter from Manardo, dated
December 13, 1524.
(8) Aldo Manuzio - Antoine-Augustin Renouard (ed.), Lettere di Paolo
Manuzio ... (Paris, 1834), pp. 338-45. Six letters by Gianfrancesco Pico,
dated February 10, 1498, November 29, 1498, June I, 1502, January 5,
1506, September 30, 1506, and February 15, 158.
(9) Willibald Pirckheimer - Emil Reicke (ed.), Willibald Pirckheimers
Briefwechsel (Munich, 1940--56), II, pp. 564-67. One letter from Pirckheimer (before September 8, 15 I 5) and one to Pirckheimer, dated September 8, 1515.
(IO) Johann Reuchlin - Ludwig Geiger (ed.), Johann Reuchlins Briefwechsel (Tuebingen, 1875), pp. 275-77. One letter to Reuchlin, dated
March 30, 15 17, and one by Reuchlin, dated June 30, 1517.
(II) Beatus Rhenanus - A. Horawitz & K. Hartfelder (eds.), Briefwechsel
des Beatus Rhenanus (Leipzig, 1886), pp. 12-14. One letter to Pico, dated
December 31, 1507.
(I2) J acopo Sadoleto - Jacobi Sadoleti ... opera quae extant omnia (Verona, 1737-38), I, pp. 72-73. One letter to Pi co, dated July 24, 1530.

C. WORKS DEDICATED TO GIANFRANCESCO PICO

(1) Urbanus Bellunensis, Institutiones Graecae grammatices. Venice: Aldus, 1497. H 2763 = H 16,098.
(2) Commento di Hieronymi Benivieni sopra a piu sue canzone et sonetti
dello amore et della belleza divina. Florence: Antonio Tubini, Lorenzo di
Francesco Veneziano, & Andrea Girlandi, 1500. GKW 3850.

216

APPENDIX A

(3) Lilius Gregorius Giraldus, Progymnasma adversus literas et literatos.

Printed in Giraldi's Operum quae extant omnia ... tomi duo. Basel: Thomas
Guarinus, 1580, II, pp. 422-43.
(4) Lilius Gregorius Giraldus, De sepulchris. Printed in Giraldi's Operum
quae extant omnia . .. tomi duo. Basel: Thomas Guarinus, 1580, I, pp. 639-66.
(5) Nicolaus Leonicenus, Libellus de epidemia quam vulgo morbum Gallicum vocant. Venice: Aldus, 1497. H 10,019 (Reprinted twice before 1500,
H 10,018 and H 10,020).
(6) Iohannis Nesii Florfntini (sic) oraculum de novo saeculo. Florence:
Laurentius de Morgianis, 1497. H 11,693.
(7) Ludovicus Bigus Pictorius, Candida. Hymnus ad Beatam Virginem
Mariam. Modena: Domenico Roccociola, 1491. GKW 4354.
(8) Ludovicus Bigus Pictorius, Tumultuaria carmina. Modena: Domenico
Roccociola, 1492. GKW 4355.
(9) Ludovicus Bigus Pictorius, Opuscula Christiana. Modena: Domenico
Roccociola, 1496. GKW 4358 (reprinted in 1497, GKW 4359).

SECTION III

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Barcelona (Spain)
(I) Biblioteca Universitaria, 391; paper, 16th century, 81 fols. An Italian
version of Pico's life of Savonarola in 30 chapters (fo1s. 1-76) .
Benedello (Italy)
(2) Raccolta di Ca d'Orsolino, 1582; paper, 17th and 18th century, 20S
fols. A miscellaneous collection of material concerning Mirandola, including
an eighteenth century copy of Pico's Oratio depulsoria calumniae Romaniensis.
Ref.: Inventari, vol. LXXII (1940), pp, 67-68.
Bologna (Italy)
(3) Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio, A. 169; paper, 18th century, 107 fo1s. A Latin copy of the life of Savonarola in 32 chapters and the four
poems to Savonarola. Ref.: Inventari, vol. XXX (1942), p. 79.
(4) Biblioteca Universitaria, 6; paper, 18th century, 1S8 fols. A miscellaneous manuscript which contains an Italian compendium based on Pico's
life of Savonarola (fols. 69r-92r) . Ref.: Inventari, vol. XV (1909), p. 18.
Bruxelles (Belgium)
(5) Bibliotheque Royale de Belgique, 14,009; paper, 16th or 17th century,
53 fols. An Italian translation of Pico's life of Savonarola in 29 chapters
(POK).
(6) Bibliotheque Royale de Belgique, IS,771-1S, 813; paper, IS81-84, 6
vols. There are brief excerpt from Pico's De rerum praenotione (vol. IV, fols.
Isor-1S3v) copied by Petrus Cornelisson Bockenbergius of Gouda (POK).
El Escorial (Spain)
(7) Real Biblioteca del Escorial, &.IV.18; paper, beginning of the 17th
century, 118 fols . A miscellaneous MS. which includes an excerpt from
Gianfrancesco Pico's life of his uncle. Ref.: P. Guillermo Antolin, Catalogo
de los COdices Latinos de la Real Biblioteca del Escorial (Madrid, 1910-23), II, p.
402.
Ferrara (Italy)
(8) Biblioteca Comunale Ariostea, 1.396; paper, sixteenth century, 23

218

APPENDIX A

fols. The Carmina of Ludovicus Bigus Pictorius. Many are addressed to

Gianfrancesco Pico. Refs.: Giuseppe Antonelli, In dice dei manoscritti della
Civica Biblioteca di Ferrara (Ferrara, 1884), p. 191; Kristeller, I, 56.

Firenze (Italy)
(9) Archivio di Stato, Carte Strozziane, Serie I, Filza 137; paper, miscellaneous collection. Included is the first letter of Pico's De imitatione, addressed
to Pietro Bembo (fols. 66-70). Ref.: Le carte Strozziane del R. Archivio di Stato in
Firenze (Florence, 1884), I, p. 593.
(10) Archivio di Stato, Bardi III.36; paper, 18th century, unnumbered
folios. Pico's life of Savonarola in Italian (in 29 chapters). Ref. : Kristeller, I,
65
(II) Biblioteca Laurenziana, pluto LXXXIII. 19; vellum 16th century,
pages unnumbered, illuminated. Gianfrancesco Pico's De amore divino, dedicated to Pope Leo X. Ref.: A. M. Bandinius, Catalogus codium latinorum
Bibliothecae Medicae Laurentianae (Florence, 1774-8), III, col. 218.
(12) Biblioteca Laurenziana, Acquisti e Doni, 368; paper, 16th century. A
miscellaneous MS. dealing with humanism in Cesena. Included are three
orations by Julius Budus dedicated to Gianfrancesco Pico, dated 1533 (fols.
57-63). Ref:. Kristeller, I, 103.
(13) Biblioteca Laurenziana, Ashburnham, 279; paper, 16th century, 155
fols. Autograph MS. of the correspondence of Lodovico Nogarola, including
a letter from Gianfrancesco Pico to Nogarola, dated July 27, 1531 (fol. 2rr)
and a copy of Pi co's Pro Dionysio Areopagita ... Epistola (fols. 2 IV-29r). Refs.:
Kristeller, I, 84; C. Paoli, I codici Ashburnhamiani della R. Biblioteca MediceoLaurenziana di Firenze (Rome, 1887 f.), fasc. 5, pp. 334-45.
(14) Biblioteca Laurenziana, S. Marco, 429; paper, 16th and 17th century,
353 fols. A miscellaneous MS. dealing with Savonarola. Included are Pico's
four poems to Savonarola (fols. 339-349r) and a short fragment, consisting
of the preface and a part of the first chapter, of the life of Savonarola (fols.
35Ir-353r). Ref.: Kristeller, I, 77.
(15) Biblioteca Marucelliana, A. Conventi Soppressi. 24, paper, 17th century, 527 pages. A miscellaneous MS., containing biographies offamous men
of Florence. Included is Pico's life of Savonarola translated into Italian in 30
chapters (pp. 125-208).
(16) Biblioteca Marucelliana, C. 131; paper, 18th century, 50 + 2 I 0 fols.
A miscellaneous MS., which contains Pico's life of Savonarola in 30 chapters
in Italian translation (foIs. 1-45 of the first pagination). Ref.: Kristeller, I,
10 7.

(17) Biblioteca Nazionale, II.II.437; paper, 15th century and later, 113
fols. A miscellaneous MS. dealing with Savonarola. Included is Pico's life
of Savonarola in 32 chapters (fols. 13-32). Ref.: Inventari, vol. IX (1899). p,
126.
(18) Biblioteca Nazionale, II.III.282; paper, 16th century, 389 pages. A

APPENDIX A

219

miscellaneous :MS. containing various writings about Savonarola, including

an Italian translation of Pico's life of him in 2g chapters (pp. S-188). Ref.:
Inventari, vol. X (1 goo), p. 3 I.
(19) Biblioteca Nazionale, II.X. 162; paper, dated 167S, 30 fols. An Italian
compendium based on Pico's life of Savonarola. Ref.: Inventari, vol. XII
(Ig02-3), p. 6S.
(20) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. VII. I024; paper, 16th and 17th century,
2 I I fols. A miscellaneous MS. of poetry which includes Pico's Hymnus ad S.
Antonium (fols. 203r-206v).
(21) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. IX.g6; paper, 17th and 18th century,
3 I 2 unnumbered fols. A miscellaneous MS. which contains biographies of
various Italians. Included (no.7) is a copy of Pico's biography of Giovanni
Pico (14 fols., written in a 17th century hand). Ref.: Kristeller, I, 137.
(22) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. XXXV. 116; paper, 16th century. A miscellaneous MS., which contains the Operecta in defensione della opera di Pietro
Bernardo da Firenze ... (see item I07 of Section II A). Ref.: Kristeller, I, 123.
(23) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. XXXV.20S; paper, 16th century, 212
fols. A miscellaneous MS. dealing largely with Savonarola. Included is the
Lettera infavore di Hieronymo Savonarola (fols. 12Ir-123v) in a copy made
about I SOO. Ref. : Kristeller, I, 128.
(24) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. XXXVII.6S; paper, 16th century. A
copy of Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters and the poems dedicated to
Savonarola. Ref.: Kristeller, I, 123.
(25) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. XXXVII.66; paper, ISth century. A
miscellaneous MS. which contains part of the four poems dedicated to Savo,
narola. Ref.: Kristeller, I, 123.
(26) Biblioteca Nazionale, MagI. XXXVII.299; paper, 17th century, 20S
unnumbered fols. A copy of Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters. Ref.:
Kristeller, I, 123.
(27) Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi, B.VIII.I648; paper, 16th
century. An Italian copy of Pi co's life of Beata Caterina without the additions of Morelli. Ref.: Kristeller, I, ISS.
(28) Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi, F.VII.868; paper, 17th
century. An Italian version of Pico's life of Savonarola in 28 chapters. Ref.:
Kristeller, I, ISO.
(29) Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi, F.IX.869; paper, 17th century. A copy of Pi co's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters. Ref.: Kristeller, I, 150.
(3 0 ) Biblioteca N azionale, Conventi Soppressi, J. I .46 ; paper, 17th century.
A miscellaneous MS. of writings dealing with Savonarola. Included is a copy
of a letter said to have been found among the belongings of Gianfrancesco
Pico, inc: Alhora comparve un huom ...
(3 1) Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi, J.VII.26; paper, late 16th
or 17th century, 122 fols. Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters. Ref.: Kristeller, I, 1S I.

220

APPENDIX A

(32) Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi, J.VII.31; paper, 16th

century. A copy of the life of Savonarola in 32 chapters. Ref.: Kristeller, I,
lSI.

(33) Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi Soppressi, J.VIII.2S; paper, 17th

century, I 16 fols. A miscellaneous MS. of apologies for Savonarola. Included
is an Italian summary of Pico's Opusculum de sententia (fols. If-8r) and a copy
of a letter said to have been found among Pico's belongings, inc: All'hora
comparve un'huomo ...
(34) Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gino Capponi, 166; paper, 16th century,
lOS pp. An Italian version of Pico's life of Savonarola in 29 chapters. Ref.:
C. Milanesi, Catalogo dei manoscritti posseduti dal marchese Gino Capponi (Florence I 84S), p. 23.
(35) Biblioteca Nazionale, Fondo Gino Capponi, 324; paper, 16th century, 3S fols. A fragment of an Italian translation of Pico's life of Savonarola
(from the middle of chapter 4 to chapter 19). Ref.: C. Milanesi, op. cit., p.
110.
(36) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 383; vellum, Isth century, S3 fols., illuminated. Giovanni Nesi's Oraculum dedicated to Gianfrancesco Pico. Ref.: Inventario e stima della Libreria Riccardi: Manoscritti e edizioni del secolo XV (Florence, 1810), p. 12.
(37) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 384; paper, dated Septemben, 1496,78 fols.,
autograph. Giovanni Nesi's Oraculum, dedicated to Pico. Ref.: Inventario ... ,
p. 12.
(38) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 420; paper, ISth century, 16 fols., autograph.
Gianfrancesco Pico's Difensio Hieronymi Savonarolae. Refs.: Inventario ... , p.
13; Kristeller, I, 178.
(39) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 20SI; paper, 16th century, 143 fols. Pico's
life of Beata Caterina, in Italian, without the additions of Morelli. Refs.:
Inventario ... , p. 43; Kristeller, I, 181.
(40) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 20S3; paper, 16th century, 119 fols. A miscellaneous MS. dealing with Savonarola. Included is Pico's life in 22 chapters
(fols. 66r-90r). Refs.: Inventario ... , p. 43; Kristeller, I, 215.
(41) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 2099; paper, 17th century. An Italian version
of the life of Savonarola. Refs.: Inventario ... , p. 44; Kristeller, I, 181.
( 42) Biblioteca Riccardiana, 2 I 30; paper, 17th century, 108 fols. A miscellaneous MS. dealing with Savonarola. Included is Pico's life in Italian in 30
chapters. (fols. If-6sv).
(43) Biblioteca Riccardiana, Moreniana, Acquisti Diversi 109; paper,
17th century, 99 fols. Contains Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters (fols.
1-87) and his poems dedicated to Savonarola (fols. 89r-98r). Ref.: Kristeller, I, I I I.
Frascati (Italy)
(44) Archivio della Congregazione di Monte Corona, Liber in folio N.

APPENDIX A

221

Primus; paper, 16th century. A MS. containing the writings of Paolo Giustiniani. Included is a letter to G. F. Pico, dated September 14, 151 I (fo1. 23 I)
Refs . : Jean Leclercq, Un humaniste ermite: le bienheureux Paul Giustiniani (14761528) (Rome, 195 I), p. 154. Ref.: KristeHer, I, 235

Gra;:; ( Austria)
(45) * U niversitatsbibliothek, 920; 16th century. 77 fols . An Italian
translation of the life of Savonarola. Ref.: Anton Kern, Die Handschrijten der
Universitiitsbibliothek Gra;:; (Vienna, 1956), II, p. 129.
London (England)
(46) British Museum, Sloane 848; paper, 17th century, 32 fols . A brief
summary of the life of Giovanni Pico which seems to have been extracted
from Thomas More's translation of Gianfrancesco's Vita (fo1. 12). Ref. : Edward 1. L. Scott, Index to the Sloane Manuscripts in the British Museum (London,
19 0 4), p. 4 22 .
(47) British Museum, Add. 12,034; paper, 16th century, 234 fols. Contains a single letter from G. F. Pico to Aldo Manuzio, dated September 30,
1506. Ref.: Catalogue of Additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum, 18411845 (London, 1850), p. 27.
(48) British Museum, Add. 20, 064 ;paper, 17th century, 22 fols. An Italian
compendium of Pico's life of Savonarola, not divided into chapters. Ref.:
Catalogue of Additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum, 1854-1860
(London, 1875), I, p, 35.
(49) British Museum, Add. 23,987; paper, 17th century, 34 fo1s. An
Italian compendium of Pico's life of Savonarola, not divided into chapters.
A different version than Add. 20,064, Ref.: Catalogue of Additions . .. , 1854186o, I, p. 927.
Lucca (Italy)
(50) Biblioteca Governativa, 1314; paper, dated 1548, 164fols. An Italian
version of Pico's life of Beata Caterina without the additions of More Hi.
Ref.: Kristeller, I, 257.
(51) Biblioteca Governativa, 2566; paper, 16th century, 141 fols. Pico's
life of Savonarola in 32 chapters and the four poems to Savonarola. Ref.: A.
Mancini, "Index codicum latinorum Publicae Bibliothecae Lucensis," Studi
italiani di filologia classica, VIII (1900), p. 285.
Marseille (France)
(52) * Bibliotheque de la Ville, 1246; paper, dated 1747-9, 288 fols. A
miscellaneous MS. of material concerning Savonarola. Included is the following: "La vie du P. Jerome Savonarolle (sic) de l'ordre des Freres Pr:cheurs, par Jean-Fran<;:ois Pic de la Mirandole". Ref.: Catalogue general des
Manuscrits des Bibliotheques Publiques de France: Departements (Octavo Series),
vol. XV (r892), by Albanes, p. 350.

222

APPENDIX A

Milano (Italy)

(53) Biblioteca Ambrosiana, E. 30 inf.; paper, late 15th and 16th century,
I 15 fols. A manuscript of the correspondence of the Manuzio family, including five letters of Gianfrancesco Pico to Aldo Manuzio (fols. 17-2 I).
These are printed in Renouard's edition. See Section II C. Refs. : Ester Pastorello, L' epistolario manuziano: inventorio cronologico-analitico ([483-[597) (Firenze, 1957), pp. 22-23, 25, 29-31; Kristeller, I, 323.
(54) Biblioteca Ambrosiana, N. 89 sup.; paper, late 16th century, 98 fols.
Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters. Ref.: Kristeller, I, 302.
(55) Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, AD.XI.3 I ; paper, 16th century, 2 I I
fols. A miscellaneous manuscript which contains the correspondence of Alessandro Minuziano. Included are three letters to Gianfrancesco Pico (fols.
149, 155f, 162). Ref.: Kristeller, I, 355.
Modena (Italy)

(56) Biblioteca Estense, Alpha.H.LIO (Ita!. 840); paper, 18th century. A

miscellaneous manuscript which contains a copy of Pico's poem Insulae suae
descriptio (fols. 293r-296v). Ref.: Felice Ceretti, Descrizione latina dell'isola
della Mirandola del Conte Giovanni Francesco II Pico (Mirandola, 1879), p. 5.
(57) Biblioteca Estense, Gamma.A.3.1 3 (Campori 173); paper, 16th century, 16 fols. Pico's Oratio depulsoria calumniae romaniensis. The last few pages of
the MS. are damaged. It is accompanied by a transcription made in 1812.
Refs.: L. Lodi, Catalogo dei codici e degli autograft posseduti dal Marchese Giuseppe
Campori (Modena, 1895), p. 124; Kristeller, 1,387.
(58) Biblioteca Estense, Gamma.U.2-4- (Campori 195); paper, 17th
century, 165 fols. An Italian version of Pico's life of Savonarola. Ref.: R.
Vandini, Appendice seconda al catalogo dei codici e manoscritti posseduti dal Marchese Giuseppe Campori (Modena, 1894), p. 571.
Miinchen (Germany)

(59) Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, codex latinus 434; paper, dated 150,

illuminated. A miscellaneous MS. which includes Pico's Opusculum de sententia (fols. I 13r-I46v) and his Difensio Hieronymi Savonarolae (fols. 184r-214r).
Ref. : Catalogus codicum latinorum Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis, 2nd ed., (Munich, 1892-94), I, part I, pp. 118-19.
(60) Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, codex latinus 953; paper, 16th century,
70 fols. Miscellaneous MS. containing a letter from Gianfrancesco Pi co to
Willibald Pirckheimer (fols. 64r-65v), dated December 14, 1502. Ref.: Catalogus ... Monacensis (2nd ed.) I, part I, p. 215.
(6[) * Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, codex latinus 4008; paper, 16th century, 42 fols. A miscellaneous MS. which includes a letter from G. F. Pica to
Conrad Peutinger. Ref.: Catalogus ... Monacensis (2nd ed.) I, part II, p. 157.
(62) Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, codex latinus 11,804; paper, 16th century, 116 fols. A miscellaneous MS. which contains Pica's Staurostichon (fols.
931'- I08r) and his Hymnus ad SS. T rinitatem (fols. I09r- I I 6r). There are

APPENDIX A

223

marginal and interlinear notations. Ref.: Catalogus

Monacensis (I st ed.;
1868-81), II, part, p. 4I.
(63) Universitatsbibliothek, 2.682; paper, early 16th century, 424 fols.
This is a miscellaneous manuscript containing both early Christian writings
and works of fifteenth and sixteenth century authors. There are ample marginal and interlinear annotations. Included are Pico's De studio (fols. 32 rr3551'; at the end we read, "finit secundus liber Joannis Francisci Pici in
vigilia S. Pelagii anno 1513."), a letter from Gianfrancesco to Giovanni Pico
C329v) and one from Giovanni to Gianfrancesco (392v-394v). (POK).
Napoli (Italy)

(64) * Biblioteca Nazionale, VII.G.62; paper, 16th century. A miscellaneous MS. which includes Gianfrancesco Pico's Responsio ad Antonium Faventinum (fols. 85v-88). This is probably the Dl!fensio de uno et ente. Ref.: Kristeller, I, 423-24.
(65) * Biblioteca Nazionale, Brancacciano, I.D.5; paper, 16th century, in
two parts (I04 + 58 fols.). A miscellaneous MS. which includes an Italian
version of Pi co's life of Savonarola in 29 chapters (fols. 1-35 of the first part).
Refs.: Alfonso Miola, Catalogo topografico-descrittivo dei manoscritti della R.
BibliotecaBrancaccianadi Napoli (Napoli, 1918), pp. 93-96; Kristeller, I, 435.
(66) * Biblioteca Nazionale, gia Viennesi, Lat. 62; paper, 16th century,
109 fols. A miscellaneous MS. containing Pico's life of Savonarola. Refs.:
Emilio Martini, "Sui codici napoletani restituti dall'Austria", Atti della
Reale Accademia di archeologia, lettere, e belle arti (Napoli), new series, IX (1926),
p. 180; Kristeller, I, 437.
Nurnberg (Germany)

(67) Stadtbibliothek, Nachlass Pirckheimer, 485; paper, 16th century.

The correspondence of Willi bald Pirckheimer, including three letters from
Gianfrancesco Pico. All have been printed. (POK).
Osimo (Italy)

(68) * Biblioteca del Collegio Campana, 20; 17th century. An Italian

version of Pico's life of Savonarola. Ref.: Inventari, vol. VI (1896), p. 10.
Paris (France)

(69) Bibliotheque Mazarine, 1926; paper, 17th century, 428 numbered

pages and some unnumbered ones. A miscellaneous MS of writings concerning Savonarola, which comes from the collection of J. Quetif. Included
are Pico's life of Savonarola in Italian translation (pp. 329 [misnumbered
429]-427), some of his poems dedicated to Savonarola (p. 428), and a brief
fragment from the Dejensio Hieronymi Savonarolae (on an unnumbered page
near the end). Ref.: A. Molinier, Catalogue des Manuscrits de La BibLiotheque
Mazarine (Paris, 1886) II, pp. 285-86.
(70) Bibliotheque Nationale, latin 15,072; paper, 16th century, 69 fols.

224

APPENDIX A

Contains Pico's life of Savonarola in Latin in 32 chapters (fols. 2r-64v) and

one of the poems dedicated to Savonarola (fol. 6y).
Perugia (Italy)

(71) Biblioteca Comunale Augusta, F.8; paper, Isth and later centuries,
66 fols. Pico's life of Savonarola. It breaks off in the middle of chapter 3 I.
Ref.: Inventari, vol. V (189S), p. 118.
(72) * Badia di San Pietro, C.M.4S; dated ISS6. Pico's life of Beata Caterina in Italian (POK).
Pesaro (Italy)

(73) * Biblioteca Oliveriana, 313; paper, 18th century, 471 fols. A miscellaneous MS. which contains Book I of Pico's De auro. Ref.: Inventari, vol.
XXXIII (192S), p. 77
Roma (Italy)

(74) Biblioteca Casanatense, 2672; paper, 16th and 17th century. A miscellaneous manuscript of correspondence between the Roman Curia and
the European courts. Included is a copy of Pico's De reformandis moribus,
written in an early 16th century hand (fols. 37sr-383"v). Ref.: L. Pastor,
Storia dei papi, Italian trans., newed., (Rome, 19S8f.), III, p. s.
(75) Biblioteca Nazionale, Vittorio Emanuele, 1017; paper, dated IS24,
47 fols. A collection of poems by Gianfrancesco Pico. Included are (I) Ad S.
Martinum (fols. rr-y) , (2) Ad S. Mariam Magdalenam (sv-1oV), (3) Ad S.
Antonium (I rr-16r), (4) Ad S. Franciscum (16v-20v), (S) Ad Angelum Custodem
(2Ir-24r), (6) In S. Paulum Apostolum (24v-3or), (7) Ad 10. Baptistam et Evangelistam (3ov-3Sv), (8) Ad S. Prophetam Davidem (36r-40r), (9) letter by Gianfrancesco Pi co to his son Giantommaso, inc: Superioribus diebus ... (4Ir4IV), (10) Insulae suae descriptio (42r-47v). Refs.: Giovanni Andres, Catalogo
de' codici manoscritti dellafamiglia Capilupi di Mantova (Mantua, 1797), p. 225;
Tullia Gasparini Leporace, "I manoscritti capilupiani della Biblioteca
Nazionale Centrale di Roma", R. Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo. Guida
storica e bibliografica degli archivi e delle biblioteche d'Italia, V (1939), pp. 20-21.
(76) Biblioteca Nazionale, S. Gregorio, 16; paper, 18th century, 107 fols.
A manuscript containing various writings of Girolamo Rorario. Included is
a letter to G. F. Pico, inc: Fortunam plurimum ... (fols. 1OV-I rr) and a dialogue entitled Fortuna, dedicated to Pico (I rr ff.) (POK) .
(77) Biblioteca Nazionale, Sessoriano, lSI; vellum, 16th century, 13 fols.
illuminated. A de luxe dedication copy of Pico's De appetitu primae materiae.
(POK).
(78) Biblioteca Valli celli ana, C.S6; paper, 16th century and later, 230
fols. A miscellaneous MS. which includes a Latin copy of Pico's life of Savonarola (fols. 6r-56r). It seems to be from the sixteenth century and has 32
chapters. (POK).
(79) Convento di S. Sabina, X.664; paper, 16th century, 198
24 un-

APPENDIX A

225

numbered fols. A copy of Pico's life of Beata Caterina, which includes the
additions of Morelli. Ref.: Amedeo, p. 85.
(80) Com/ento di S. Sabina, XIV.284; paper, 15th-18th century. A miscellaneous MS. mostly relating to Savonarola. Included is a copy of Pico's
Opusculum de sententia in 15 fols.

Siena (Italy)
(81) Biblioteca Comunale, K.IV.33; paper, 18th century, 231 fols. A miscellaneous manuscript which contains Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters
(fols. 1-64). (POK)
(82) Biblioteca Comunale, K.IV.34; paper, 16th century, 85 fols. A copy
of Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters. (POK).
Torino (Italy)
(83) * Biblioteca Nazionale, H.VI.ro; paper, 16th century, 184 fols.,
slightly damaged by fire. A Latin copy of the life of Beata Caterina with
the additions of Morelli. Refs.: Analecta Bollandiana, XXVIII (IgOg), p. 443;
Inventari, vol. XXVIII (I924), p. 135.
Toulouse (France)
(84) * Bibliotheque Municipale, 832; paper, 16th century, Ig8 fols.,
written in an Italian hand. A miscellaneous MS. concerning Savonarola.
Included are Pico's four poems to him. (fols. ro9- 29). Ref.: Catalogue general
des Manuscrits des Bibliotheques Publiques des Departments (Quarto Series), yol.
VII (1885), p. 483.
Vaticano, Citta del
(85) Vaticano latino, 2847; paper, 14th-16th century. A miscellaneous MS
of different periods and materials. Included is the first letter of the De imitatione (fols. 176-179) in a sixteenth century copy. Ref.: Santangelo, p. 20.
(86) Vaticano latino, 3735; vellum, dated 1524,30 fols., with gold initials.
Gianfrancesco Pica's Dialogus de adoratione (POK).
(87) Vaticano latino, 4723; paper, 16th century, 59 fols. Contains a copy
of Pi co's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters (fols. Ir-54r). Ref.: B. Montfaucon,
Bibliotlzeca Bibliothecarum Manuscriptorum Nova (Paris, I739) I, p. II6c.
(88) Vaticano latino, 5171; paper. A miscellaneous MS. of poetry. Included is a single four-line poem attributed to G. F. Pico, inc: Sanguine si
princeps ... (fol. 59v) (POK).
(89) Vaticano latino, 5426; paper, 16th and 17th century, 517 fols. A
miscellaneous MS. which includes a copy of Pico's life of Savonarola in 32
chapters (fols. I-43r) (POK).
(90) Vaticano latino, 6216; paper, 16th century. A miscellaneous MS.
which includes Pico's letter in defense of Dionysius (fols. 406r-4I4r) (POK).
(91) Vaticano latino, 7507; paper, 18th century. A miscellaneous MS.
which contains a brief fragment of one of Pico's writings in defense of Savonarola (fols. 348r-34gv) .

226

APPENDIX A

(92) Vaticano latino, 11,556; vellum, dated 1534, 20 fols. Contains the
wills of Giovanna Carafa Pico (1 r-3r) and of Gianfrancesco Pico (3r- 19v).
Ref. : Jose Ruysschaert, Codices vaticani latini: codices II ,4I4-II ,709 (Vatican
City, 1959), pp. 297-98.
(93) Fondo Barberini latino, 1868; paper, 16th century. A miscellaneous
MS. which contains Pico's hymns Ad Trinitatem (fols. 14r-2ov) and Ad Virginem
(fols. 20v-23v) (POK) ..
(94) Fondo Barberini latino, 2252, paper, 17th century, 138 fols. A copy
of Pico's life of Savonarola in 32 chapters (1-134v) and a part of his four
poems to Savonarola (fols. 13Y-138r) (POK).
(95) Fondo Capponi, 235; paper, 16th century. A miscellaneous MS. of
letters written in different hands. Included are four letters from Battista
Mantovano to G. F. Pi co (fols. 146v-148r). One of these, inc: Meas pollicitationis ... , dated February 23, 1495, appears to not have been printed.
Ref.: G. Salvo Cozzo, I codici capponiani della Biblioteca Vaticana (Rome, 1897),
PP3 08- 22 .
Venezia (Italy)

(96) Biblioteca Marciana, III, 70 (2620); paper, 16th century, 535 fols. A
miscellaneous manuscript of philosophical and theological questions, written
in many different hands. There are several mentions of Gianfrancesco Pico
and discussions of some of his teachings (e.g. fols. 271-437 passim). Ref.:
Giuseppe Valentinelli, Bibliotheca manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum (Venice,
1868-73), II, p. I09.
Vicenza (Italy)

(97) Biblioteca Bertoliana, 487; paper, late 15th-early 16th century, 171
fols. A collection of the writings of Bar tho lome us Paiellus (Pagello). Included
is an Apologia qua et amor et elegiarum scriptores non modo sed commendatur, directed
to Gianfrancesco Pico (fols. 122r-127v). Ref.: Inventari, vol. II (1892) by
Mazzatinti, p. 77.
Waslzington (United States)

(98) (F) Folger Library, V.a.123; paper, 16th century, 313 fols. A miscellaneous MS. from Ferrara which contains the following writings of G. F.
Pico: (1) De falsitate astrologiae in genethliacorum corifutatio with a preface to
Giovanni Manardo (fols, 3r-12v), (2) Ad S. Martinum (269r-272v), (3) Ad S.
Antonium (273r-275r), (4) Ad S. Franciscum (275v- 277r), (5) Ad Angelum
Custodem (277v-278v), (6) Ad S. Paulum Apostolum (278v-281v), (7) Ad David
(281V-283r), (8) Ad Johannem Baptistam (283v-285v) (POK).
Wien (Austria)

(99) * Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, 5883; paper, 16th century, 109

fols. A miscellaneous MS. regarding Savonarola which includes "aliqua
notabilia ex gestis fratris Hieronymi Savonarolae (fols. lr-28r)" by G.F. Pi co
Tabulae codicum manuscriptorum praeter graecos et orientales in Bibliotheca Palatina
Vindobonensi asservatorum (Vienna, 1864-1912), IV, pp. 215-16.

SECTION IV

SELECTED SECONDARY SOURCES

(I) Bartolus, Richardus. In Joannem Franciscum Pi cum praeclari ingeniorum Phoenicis nepotem ... allocutio. Bologna: I 793, 54 pp. A general monograph on Gianfrancesco Pico, somewhat outdated, but still useful. Copies
of this rare book are in the British Museum and in the Biblioteca Universitaria in Bologna.
(2) Bodin, Jean. De la Demonomanie des Sorciers ... Paris: I580, fol. 209
et passim. Gives some consideration to Pico's attitude toward astrology and
the occult sciences.
(3) Camerini, Eugenio. Nuovi profili letterari. Milan: I876, vol. IV, pp.
86-92. A brief discussion of Pico's dialogue La strega.
(4) Cantimori, Delio. Eretici ita Ii ani del Cinquecento; ricerche storiche.
Florence: I939, pp. 5-9. Discusses Pico's religious views as compared with
those of other I talians of his time.
(5) Colomesius, Paulus. Italia et Hispania Orientalis ... Hamburg: I 730,
pp. 46-5 I. Quotes a number of sixteenth century authors on Gianfrancesco
Pico.
(6) Farner, Oskar. Huldrych Zwingli, seine Entwicklung zum Reformator
I506-I520. Zurich: I946, II, pp. I22, I36. On Zwingli's use of Pi co's writmgs.
(7) Giovanni, Vincenzo di. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia del
Rinascimento e della filosofia in Italia. Mirandola: I899, pp. I98-209. A
general summary of the life and works of Gianfrancesco Pi co is added.
(8) Harvey, Gabriel, in A. B. Grosart (ed.). The Works of Gabriel Harvey D.
C. L. London: I884, vol. I, pp. 64f. Reprint ofa letter to Edmund Spenser
from Three proper and wittie Familar Letters, London: 1580, in which the
De Rerum praenotione is discussed. Gianfrancesco Pi co is confused, however, with his uncle.
(9) Hoenigswald, Richard. Denker der Italienischen Renaissance. Basel:
I938, pp. 39f. A discussion of Gianfrancesco's critique of the Aristotelian
epistemology in which the difference in outlook between Gianfrancesco and
his uncle is recognized.
(IO) Imbart de la Tour, P. Les origines de la Reforme. Paris: I905 f., II, pp.

228

APPENDIX A

400-04, 413-14, 568-72, et passim. Several of Pico's works are briefly discussed in the context of the religious controversies of the times.
(II) Koehler, Walter. "Huldrych Zwinglis Bibliothek," Neujahrsblatt zum
Besten des Waisenhauses Zurich filr 1921, no. 84, pp. *31, *43. On ZwingIi's use of Pico's writings.
12) Maini, Luigi. "Di un opusculo di Gianfrancesco Pico stampato aHa
Mirandola, in 1519," Annuario storico modenese. Modena: 1851, pp. 16791. Discusses the first printing of the De veris calamitatum causis ... There is
also a discussion of the work itself and excerpts from it are printed.
(13) Mazonius, Jacobus. De triplici hominum vita, activa nempe, contemplativa, et religiosa methodi tres . .. Cesena: 1577, fo1. 362r. Thesis 46 I 2
discusses an opinion of Pico's concerning Divine Providence.
(14) Niceron, J. P. Memoires pour servir a l'histoire des hommes illustres
... Paris: 1729-45, XXXIV, pp. 147- 56. A general survey of Pico's life and
works.
(IS) Papadopolus, Nicolaus. Historia gymnasii Patavini. Venice: 1726, II, p.
42. Inaccurately contends that Gianfrancesco Pi co attended the University
of Padua. This has led later scholars to the same error (e.g. Hans Rupprich,
Willi bald Pirckheimer und die erste Reise Duerers nach I talien. Vienna:
1930, pp. 18 et passim).
(16) Picciolus, Antonius. De manus inspectione libri tres. Bergamo: 1587,
preface and fo1. 3v. A brief consideration of Pico's attitude toward occultism.
(17) Pusino, Ivan. "Ein neues Dokument zur Geschichte Savonarolas,"
Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte XLIII (1924), pp. 159-68. Attempts to
attribute an anonymous defense of Savonarola to Gianfrancesco Pico. This
attribution is contested by Schnitzer (in "Ein neues Dokument ... " in
Z.F.KG, XLIX (1930), pp. 336-42).
(18) Saitta, Giuseppe. II pensiero italiano nell' Umanesimo e nel Rinascimento, 2nd. ed., Florence, 1961, I, pp. 635-43. A general survey of Pico's
thought and an analysis of some of his most characteristic opinions.
(19) Santangelo, Giorgio. II Bembo critico e il pensiero d'imitazione. Florence:
1950, pp. 59-87. A detailed discussion of the Pico-Bembo controversy on
imitation.
(20) Santangelo, Giorgio. "La polemica fra Pietro Bembo e Gian Francesco
Pico intorno al principio d'imitazione," Rinascimento I (1950), pp. 323-39.
Contains basically the same material as does the introduction to Santangelo's
edition of the De imitatione.
(21) Sirenus, Iulius. De fato libri novem ... Venice: 1563, fols. 62r, 74v7sr. Considers Pico's critique of the Aristotelian rejection of Divine Providence.
(22) Thorndike, Lynn. A History of Magic and Experimental Science. New
York: 1923-58, V, pp. 121-2, 164,540-1; VI, pp. 467f., 503. Discusses the
various works in which Pico considers the occult sciences. Also gives some
attention to his sources and influences in these matters.

APPENDIX A

229

(23) Tiraboschi, Girolamo. Storia della letteratura italiana, new edition.

Venice: 1822-25, VII, pp. 600-06. A general survey, less detailed than the
same author's Biblioteca modenese.
(24) Trinkaus, Charles E. Adversity's Noblemen. New York: 1940, pp. 13032. Discusses the De veris calamitatum causis in relation to other prophetic
literature at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries.
(25) Walker, D. P. Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella. London: I958, pp. I46 f. et passim. Discusses Pico's attitude toward occultism in the context of that of his contemporaries.
(26) Wier, Joannes. De praestigiis daemonum et incantationibus ac veneficiis libri sex ... Basel: I583, p. 5, cols. I 47-49, 155, I59-60, 213, 359-60, et
passim. Makes use of Pico's De rerum praenotione.
(27) Wind, Edgar. Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance. New Haven: I958,
pp. 45-58. Treats Pico's opinion toward occult science and magic.
(28) Zimmels, B. Leo Hebraus ein judischer Philosoph der Renaissance:
sein Leben, seine Werke und seine Lehren. Breslau: 1886, pp. 27-28. A not
entirely accurate discussion of Pico's relation to Leone Ebreo.

APPENDIX B

A COMPARISON OF GIANFRANCESCO PICO'S

TRANSLATION OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS'
OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM WITH
HENRI ESTIENNE'S TRANSLATION

Section I: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 14, sections 36- 37 (Loeb ed., p. 24)

Gianfrancesco Pico, Examen Vanitatis, II, 21; form the Opera (Basel, 1601),
P5 60 .
Primus itaque authore Sexto pertinebat ad animalium differentias. Secundus ab hominum diversa natura sive habitudine varia sumebatur. Tertius excipiebatur differentibus affectibus seu praeparationibus quae in sensoriis inveniebantur. Quartus a circumstantiis et dispositionibus manabat.
Quintus a positu rei vario, a loco, et locorum intercapedie pendebat. Sextus
a mixtione trahebatur. Septimum quantitas et praeparatio subiecti constituebat. Octavus de iis quae sunt ad aliquid sive de relatione sumebatur. Noni
rarae vel frequentes aggressiones fecere vocabulum. Decimum variae disciplinae, diversi mores, differentes leges, fabulosae narrationes, opiniones,
et coniecturae philosophorum dissidentes, constituerunt.
Henri Estienne's translation from Sexti Empirici Opera quae extant (ParisGeneva, 1621). p. g.
Primus ex animalium varietate. Secundus ex hominum differentia. Tertius ex diverse constitutis sensuum instrumentis. Quartus ex vario habitu.
Quintus ex positionibus et intervallis ac locis. Sextus ex permistionibus. Septimus ex quantitatibus et constitutionibus subiectorum. Octavus ex eo quod
ad aliquid refertur. Nonus ex iis quae frequentur aut raro contingunt. Decimus ex institutis, consuetudinibus, et legibus, fabulosisque persuasionibus,
et dogmaticis opinionibus.

Section II: Outlines ofPyrrhonism, I, 14, sections 44- 45 (Loeb ed., pp. 26-28).

Gianfrancesco Pico, Examen Vanitatis, II, 22; from the Opera (Basel, 1601),
pp. 561 - 62 .

234

APPENDIX B

Enimvero principalium corporis partium tantam diversitatem, maximeque in sensu: num parituram putaverimus magnam nobis sive visorum sive
phantasmatum diversitatem? Num et magnum praebituram momentum et
in assensu cohibendo et in opponendo censibimus? Qui enim sunt icterici
pallore circumfusa put ant, quae nobis alba videntur, et iis qui rubore sunt
et sanguine oculos infecti, sanguinae praesentantur, quae nobis alba. Quoniam vero inter animantes inveniuntur qui pallentes et affectos colore subviridi
habent oculos et qui sanguineos et qui subalbidos et qui alio colore suffusos,
consentaneum est differentum apud illos colorum conceptum fieri. Ad haec
si oculos intendamus in solem perseveremusque mox eos ipsos vergamus in
librum aureae videbuntur literae et in gyrum commotae. Praeterae cum
animantes quaepiam suapte natura lampada quampiam gestare videantur
in oculis, ita ut appareant lucem fund ere subtilem et facile missilem nocturasque tenebras effugantem, iniuriane putabimus, non illis ac nobis, quae
extrinsecus in pupillas incidunt, formas similes videri?
Henri Estienne's translation from Sexti Empirici Opera quae extant (ParisGeneva, 1621), p. 10.
Sed et differentia praecipuarum corporis partium earumque potissimum
quae a natura ad diiudicandum et sentiendum datae sunt, maximum potest
excitare phantasiarum discordiam pro animalium varietate. Exempli gratia,
icterici pallida esse dicunt quae nobis alba videntur: et qui hyposphagma
habent, sanguinea. Quoniam igitur animalium etiam alia pallidos habent
oculos, alia sanguinis colorem referentes, alia albicantes, alia alium colorem
habentes: non sine causa diverso modo colores percipiunt. Quinetiam nos
si diutius defixos habeurimus in solem oculos, deinde in librum eos demittamus, aureae nobis literae videntur esse et in orbem circumagi. Quandoquidem igitur aliqua etiam animantia fulgorem quendam in oculis habent et
lumen tenue et versatile ex eis emittunt, adeo ut etiam noctu cernant: merito
existimemus non similia nobis et illis externa sub sensum cadere.

Section III: Outlines

of Pyrrhonism, I, 14, sections 81-83 (Loeb ed. P48).

Gianfrancesco Pico, Examen Vanitatis, II, 23; from the Opera (Basel, 1601),

P5 65
Anus Attica etiam triginta sine vitae incommodo pertulit, eodem Sexto
authore, et Alexandri minister quid am praefectus mensis nomine Demophoon, in sole balneoque rigebat et aestuabat in umbra; ac ut Psillos mittam
Aphricae populos qui a serpentibus et aspidibus icti non pereunt. Argivus
Athenagoras a phalangis et scorpionibus percussus nihil dolebat; qui Tintytae dicuntur incolae Aegypti inter crocodylos impune versantur. Est et

APPENDIX B

235

quaedam Aethiopum gens ex adverso Meroes, adusque fluvium Hydaspem

protenta, qui absque ullo periculo et scorpiones et aspides et caetera id genus
serpentia comedunt, non solum non laeduntur ab eis, quod etiam admitteret
Aristoteles qui scribit in octavo de historia animalium in Pharo et locis aliis
scorpiones non laedere.
Henri Estienne's translation from Sexti Empirici Opera quae extant (ParisGeneva, 162I), p. 17.
Quinetiam fuisse aiunt anum quandam Atticam, quae cicutae tngmta
holcas sine damno sorberet; Lysis autem etiam succi papaveris quatuor
holcas nulla cum molestia hauriebat. Et Demophon quidem, qui Alexandro
mensae structor erat, quum ad solem stab at aut in balneo erat, algebat; in
umbra autem calescebat. Athenagoras autem Argivus nullum ex scorpiorum et araneorum ictu dolorum sentiebat. Quinetiam ii qui Psylli vocantur,
ne si a serpentibus quidem aut etiam aspidibus mordeantur, laeduntur. At
Tintyritae Aegyptiorum crocodilorum. Sed et Aethiopes illi qui adverso
Meroes habitant, Hydaspis fluvii accolae, scorpios et serpentes, et huius
generis alia citra periculum comedunt.

APPENDIX C

DID GIANFRANCESCO PICO INFL UENCE

AGRIPPA?

The question of what if any influence Gianfrancesco Pico's Examen Van itatis (I 520) had on Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim's De incertitudine et
vanitate scientiarum (I526) is not easy to answer. There are certainly similarities between the two works. Both attack many of the same arts and sciences
as being useless for the attainment of truth; both express similar tendencies
toward scepticism. There also seem to be close parallels between the attitudes expressed toward Christian religion, although Pi co seems to have been
perhaps a little more insistent in his separation of faith from reason and to
have been somewhat more decided in his emphasis on the superiority of
religion over rational knowledge.
The thesis of Villey, recently supported by Paola Zambelli, argues that
there is clear evidence that Agrippa knew Pico's work well and drew a number of key teachings from it.l Although I should not want to rule out the
possibility of Agrippa's having been influenced by Pico's Examen Vanitatis, I
must say that in my opinion the evidence which has thus far been produced
in favor of the thesis is not convincing. One certainly finds passages in Agrippa which closely approximate similar ones in Pico. 2 Both emphazise that the
human arts and sciences are all too susceptible to error, whereas faith provides the unique road to truth. 3
Agrippa's work resembles Pico's enough that we might raise the question
1 Pierre Villey, Les sources et l'evolution des essais de Montaigne (Paris, Ig08), II, p. 166;
Paola Zambelli, "A proposito del 'de vanitate scientiarum et artium' di Cornelio Agrippa,"
Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, XV (I g60), pp. 166-80.
2 For example the following passages should be compared: De incert., I, pp. 1-6 and Ex.
van., V,peroratio, pp. 759-60; De incert., 7, p. 27 and Ex. van., IV, 12, esp. p. 687; De incert.,
operis peroratio, pp. 245-47 and Ex. van., VI, 21, pp. 813-14.
Agrippa's work is cited from Henrici Cornelii Agrippae ab Nettesheym .. , Opera (Lyon: per
Beringos fratres, n.d., but this imprint is false), II, pp. 1-247. All further references are to
this edition. For a summary of some of Agrippa's doctrines which closely approximate some
of Pico's see George H. Daniels, Jr., "Knowledge and Faith in the Thought of Cornelius
Agrippa," Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXVI (lg64), pp. 326-40, esp. 328-32.
3 "Tanta autem est veritatis ampla libertas liberaque amplitudo, ut nullius scientiae speculationibus, non uEo sensuum urgenti iudicio, non ullis logici artificii argumentis, nulla
probatione evidente, nullo syllogismo demonstrante, nec ullo humane ration is discursu
possit deprehendi, nisi sola fide." Agrippa, op. cit., I, p. 5. "Unde fidei praecellentia supra
sensilem cognitionem sese exerit ac multo etiam clarius ... " Pico, Ex. van., V, 10; p. 742.

240

APPENDIX C

of whether there is in fact a relation between them. On the other hand, there
are strong reasons to question whether there was any influence. It seems
strange, for example, that Agrippa never once cites the name of Sextus Empiricus, whereas Pico not only cites him often, but translates whole sections
of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism for inclusion in his own work. This is not because
Agrippa is bashful about citing ancient authors, for he mentions them by the
dozen. This seems to me to be a decisive element which would allow us to
determine for sure that Agrippa was acquainted with the Examen Vanitatis.
Sextus Empiricus was almost wholly unknown when Pico introduced his
name and doctrines to the Western intellectual world in 1520; 4 it would
seem likely that a "sceptic" like Agrippa would focus upon the new source
material introduced by Pico. At any rate, he does not appear to have known
Sextus, although he refers to the "Pyrrhonists" and "Academics" in his
work. 5
Villey bases his conclusion regarding Pico's alleged influence on Agrippa
on the similarity between several parallel chapters of their respective works. 6
The same judgment was repeated by Miss Zambelli, but, again like Villey,
she did not give us an analysis of the chapters upon which her conclusion is
based. 7 In the hope of uncovering some decisive information regarding the
question at hand, I have carefully compared portions of Pi co's (I, 14) and
Agrippa's (52) chapters concerning the opinions of various philosophers
regarding the soul. A cursory examination indicates that the two cover
somewhat the same ground; both contend that we have no certainty regarding many questions about the soul, since the philosophers themselves have
been in serious disagreement on this issue. In substantiating this argument
they both cite the opinions of various earlier philosophers on the question of
what is the precise part of the body in which the human soul resides. 8 Both
Pico and Agrippa list numerous philosophers' opinions on this point. Moreover, the list of ancient philosophers cited is nearly identical in each, indi4 Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen, 1960), pp.
17,20.
5 On Agrippa's sceptical tendencies see Auguste Prost, Les sciences et les arts occultes au
XVIe siecle: Gorneille Agrippa, sa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris, 1881-82), I, pp. gO-117; Giuseppe
Rossi, Agrippa di Nettesheym e la direzione scettica della filosofia nel Rinascimento (Turin, 1g06) ;
Popkin, op. cit., pp. 22-25; Zambelli, op. cit.; Daniels, op. cit., and Charles G. Nauert, Jr.,
Agrippa and the Grisis of Renaissance Thought (Urbana, 1965). The latter came out too late to
be fully utilized in this study. The Academici and Pyrrhonici are both cited by Agrippa at I, p.
5
6 "Corneille Agrippa fait des emprunts a Pic ... Qui voudra se reporter dans Ie 1er livre
I' Examen vanitatis, au chap. 14 et surtout au chap. 16, trouvera des phrases qui prouvent d'abord la dette d'Agrippa envers Pic de la Mirandole." op. cit., II, p. 166n.
7 "E a confermare questo vecchio giudizio [of Morhof] bastera tener presenti i riecheggiamenti fedeli, e quasi i plagi, che per Ie parti teorico-metafisiche la indebitano all ,Examen
vanitatis doctrinae gentium di Gian Francesco Pico, da cui son tratti per intero i capitali sull'
anima e sulla metafisica, con i loro elenchi di opinioni contrastanti ... " op. cit., p. 17g. She
then cites chaps. 52 and 53 of Agrippa's work and the same chapters of Pi co's work which
Villey had cited (I, 14 and 16).
8 Pico, Ex. van., 1,14, pp. 512-16, esp. pp. 515-16; Agrippa, De incert., 52, pp. 85-go, esp.
p.86.

APPENDIX C

241

eating the possibility that Agrippa may have drawn from Pica. An important point, however, which both Villey and Zambelli seem to have overlooked is that the content of Pico's and Agrippa's analyses must be taken into
consideration. Let us for a moment compare what doctrines the two sixteenth
century sceptics attribute to the ancient philosophers in question. Both cite
the opinions of approximately fifteen ancients regarding the sedes animae.
What they have to say about approximately half of these authors is in general
agreement. What they say about the others is almost in direct contradiction
In Pico we find the following set of attributions:
Democritus, Hippocrates, Plato earn in cerebro collacarunt ... Hierophilus in cerebri concavo ... Empedodes et Aristoteles in corde. Stoici itidem in corde vel in spiritu circum cor.9

Agrippa has the following to say on the same subject:

Hippocrates et Hierophilus in cerebri ventriculis illam ponunt ... Democritus in toto corpore ... Stoici cum Chrysippo in toto corde ac spiritu circa cor versante ... Empedodes in
sanguine ... Plato et Aristoteles et reliqui nobliores philosophi in toto corpore. lO

Even allowing for some originality on Agrippa's part, one can scarcely
believe that this information was drawn from Pico. "Quasi i plagi," as Miss
Zambelli contends? Hardly! Moreover, Pico's chapter 16 of Book 1,11 a long
biological discussion of the human body with an extensive section on human
generation apparently finds no equivalent in Agrippa's work. 12
As I have indicated, I am not saying with certitude that Pico's Examen Vanitatis had no influence whatever on Agrippa's De incertitudine. Rather, I
suspend my judgment and wait for convincing evidence to be produced by
those who feel that there was a definite influence. Pico's distinctive contributions to sixteenth century philosophical discussions are nowhere in evidence
in Agrippa's work. Pico devotes a significant portion of the Examen Vanitatis
to refuting certain Aristotelian doctrines of natural philosophy.l3 Agrippa
hastily covers the topic of natural philosophy in less than two pages,14 and
he does not mention the names of the two chief critics of Aristotle of whom
Pico made such abundant use, John Philoponus and Hasdai Crescas,
The conclusion must be that I am still unconvinced of the purported
influence of Pico on Agrippa. The similarities between their writings perhaps stem from several common sources.l 5 After all, attacks on reason with
9 P.5 1 5.
10 p. 86.

We have omitted here in the quotations of both Pico and Agrippa the attributions of doctrines on which there is general agreement. By the citations we mean to emphasize the very real differences between their treatments of the same material.
11 pp. 5 20- 2 7.
12 Villey (II, p. 166) cites this chapter as one of the connecting points between Pico and
Agrippa; Zambelli repeats this opinion (see above n. 7). It is also puzzling how Miss Zambelli places importance on Agrippa's brief chapter 53, "De metaphysicis" (ed. cit., II, pp.
9o--g2), which does not seem to have any distinguishing elements which would indicate the
influence of Pico.
13 Esp. Ex. van., VI, 2-7, pp. 764-74'
14 De incer!., 49-50, pp. 82-84.
15 I would be much more inclined to single out passages such as the following to indicate a
possible influence by Pico: "Omnis etiam notitia (ut aiunt) ortum habet a sensibus et ex-

242

APPENDIX C

an emphasis on faith were not uncommon at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries. One thinks i~mediately of Savonarola,
Adriano da Corneto, Erasmus, and Luther, or even earlier writers like Tertullian, Augustine, Nicholas of Cusa, and the author of the Imitatio Christi.
The writings of these men and others had many elements in common with
Pico and Agrippa. The distinctive characteristics of Pi co's Examen Vanitatisabove all the long sections copied directly from Sextus Empiricus and the
specific application of these criticisms to Aristotelian philosophy in behalf of
Christianity - are missing from all the others. They can be found in Pico's
work alone. 16

perimentum sermonum verorum, ut ait Averroes, est ut eoneordent sensatis. Et illud notius
in quod plures sensus eonveniunt. Ex sensibilibus itaque eorum seientia manu dueimur ad
omnia ea quae a nobis seiri possunt. lam enim quum sensus omnes saepe fallaees sunt, certe
null am nobis synceram pro bare possunt experientiam. Praeterea, quum sensus inteIlectualem naturem nequeant attingere et rerum inferiorum causae ex qui bus iIlarum naturae effectus et proprietates seu passiones demonstrari deberent, sint omnium consensu nostris sensibus
penitus ignotae non nec convincitur veritatis via sensibus esse praeclusa? Quare etiam omnes
iIlae deductiones et scientiae, quae in ipsis sensibus radicitus fundatae sunt, omnes incertae
erunt et erroneae et fallaces." De incer!., 7, p. 27. Cf. note 65 of our chap. III for a similar
statement by Pico.
16 I am pleased to note that Nauert's conclusions on this point (op. cit., pp. 148-52) are
largely in agreement with mine.

INDEX OF NAMES

Not included in this Index, generally, are the following: (I) proper names which occur in
book titles, (2) the names of translators of modern scholarly works, (3) the printers of Pi co's
works and bibliographical references to the editions of his works (as mentioned on pp. 20316), unless they are mentioned elsewhere, and (4) the names of Gianfrancesco Pico and
Aristotle, which occur on nearly every page.
Acciaiuoli, Zanobi, 24, Ig2, Ig4, 200
Adams, Charles, 14In
Adrastus Aphrodisiensis, 172n
Aelianus, IOgn
Agricola, Rudolph, 55, 162
Agrippa von Nettesheim, Cornelius, 160,
161,239-42
d' Ailly, Pierre, 74
Albert of Saxony, 112n, 156
Alberti, Leandro, I 1,28,200
Albertus Magnus, 156
Alexander Aphrodisiensis, I 3n, 40, 45n, 57n,
68, 86, 87n, go
Alexander VI, Pope, 15n
d'Amboise, George, 22n
Ambrose, St., 106, 123, 179
Amedeo, Renzo, X, 28n, 185,225
Amerio, Romano, 17gn, 180n
Ammonius, 45n, 64n, 172n
Anagnine, Eugenio, 32n
Anaxagoras, 109
Andreasi, Osanna, 28
Andres, Giovanni, 224
Andronicus of Rhodes, 68, 172n
Antiochus of Ascalon, 46
Antolin, P. Guillermo, '2 I 7
Antonelli, Giuseppe, 2 18
ApelJes, 47, 48
Appellico Teius, 67
Aquinas, Thomas, 37, 38n, 3gn, 42, 74, 86,
103, 108, Iogn, I I I, 112, IIgo, 122, 123,
155n, 156, 16gn
Ariosto, Lodovico, 14, 21n, 40n
Athenaeus, 172n
Atticus Platonicus, 70, 7 I n
Augustinus Aurelius, 7, 8, 31, 58, 72, 74,
179, 242
Avempace, 148-51, 154-56

Averroes, 40, 57n, 61, 67, go, 103n, I I I,

I 12n, I 15n, 133, 134, 136, 146n, 148-51,
152n, 156, 166
Avicenna, 6In, 85n, 155n, 156, 170
Baccini, Giuseppe, 36n
Bacon, Francis, 10, 56
Baconthorpe, John, 74
Baeumker, Clemens, 167n
de Baif, Jean-Antoine, I 9 I, 20g
Bailey, Cyril, 145n
Balan, Pietro, 20n, 22n, 25n
Balme, D. M., lOin
Bandini, Angelo Maria, 218
Banfi, Antonio, 162n
Barbaro, Ermolao, 64, 120n
Bardy, Gustave, 58n, 12gn
Barotti, Giannandrea, 14n
Barrett, William, 13In
Bartolus, Richardus, 227
Basil, St. (The Great), 179
Bates, William, 2 I 2
Baudry,J,70n
Bautain, Louis Eugene Marie, 8
Bayle, Pierre, 126n, 161
Beatus Rhenanus, 23, 2 I 5
Bembo, Pietro, 25, 26, 6gn, 188, Igg, 206,
207, 208, 20g, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214,
218, 228
Benedetti, Giambattista, 128, 130, 135,
156n, 158
Beni, Paolo, 171-72, 175
Benivieni, Domenico, 16, Ig5, 215
Benivieni, Girolamo, 13, 34n
Bentivoglio, Giovanni di Annibale, Ig, 20n
Berkeley, George, I 17, 124
Bernard of Clairvaux, St., 8, 124
Bernardi, Antonio, Inn
Bernardi, Giambattista, 136, 170-71

244

INDEX OF NAMES

Bernardino, Pietro, 16n, 195,214,219

Beroaldo, Filippo (the Elder), 13
Berr, Henri, 175n
Bertoni, Giulio, 90n
Bessarion, joannes, 61
Bigi Pittorio, Lodovico, 13, 40n, 216, 21S
Blau, joseph, IX
Block, Irving, 79n
Bockenbergius, Petrus Cornelisson, 2 I 7
Bodin, jean, 227
Boethius, 102, I 19n
Bolzano, Urbano (Urbanus Bellunensis),
13n, 215
Bonaventura, St., 56
Bonitz, Hermann, 10Sn
Bonnetty, Augustin, S
Borsetti, Ferrante, lin
Boschetti, Roberto, 20, 22, 25n
Boschetti, Susanna(Pico), 20
Bossi, Luigi, 213
Bosso, Matteo, 13
Breen, Quirinus, 161n, 162n
Brehier, Emile, 152n
Bressan, Bartolommeo, 21 n
Brewer, j. S., 24n
Brickman, Benjamin, 14.3n
Brochard, Victor, 49n
Brunet, jacques-Charles, IS5
Bruni, Leonardo, 162, 176
Bruno, Giordano, 7, 31, 130, 142, 143, 156,
lSI
Buddeus, j oannes Baptista, 213
Budnick, joseph 1., IX
!ludus, julius, 2 [S
Bulkeley, Edward, 211
Burley, Walter, [56
Burnaby,john,5Sn
Busacchi, Vincenzo, 14n
Busse, Adolphus, 107n
Calcagnini, Celio, 24, 29n, 215
Calori-Cesis, Felice, 12n
Calori-Cesis, Fernando, 213
Camerini, Eugenio, 227
Campanella, Tommaso, 142, 143, 17S-So
Campori, Giuseppe, 222
Cantimori, Delio, 227
Caplan, Harry, 57n, Son, 90n, 9Sn, 19[,214
Cappelli, Antonio, [5n, 21n
Cappi, Vilmo, [[ n
Capponi, Gino, 220
Carafa, Giampietro, see Pope Paul IV
Cardano, Girolamo, 14[
Carneades, S5n
Carro, Ludovico, 90
Cascini, Samuel, [5, 194,203,211
Cassirer, Ernst, 85n, 138n, 141
Castellani, Giulio, 8, 163-6S, 173
Castellani, Pier ?'<icola, [64, 165n
Castelesi, Adriano da Corneto, 242

Castiglioni, Arturo, 14n

Catalano, Michele, 14n
Cavicchioli, Giovanni, X
Celtes, Conrad, 23, 215
Ceretti, Felice, XI-XII, 11-2S, 193, 213,
21 4, 21 5,222
Champier, Symphorian, 204
Charles V, Emperor, 29n
Charron, Pierre, 176, 181
Chern iss, Harold, 105n
Cherubelli, Paolo, 16n, 214
Chrysippus, 241
Cicero, l\1arcus Tullius, 38n, 70, 106, 161,
163, 164, 167, 168, 21 4
Cittadini, Antonio (Faventino), 13, 191,223
Clagett, Marshall, 14Sn
Clamenges, Nicolas de, 21 I
Clement of Alexandria, 59n, 179
Clement VII, Pope, 29, 200
Clough, Cecil H., IX, 2m
Cohen, M. R., 146n
Coimbra Commentators, 144n, 156, 15S,
172-74
Colomesius, Paulus, 227
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 56
Cop inger, W. A., IS5
Corsano, Antonio, 3Sn
Coscenza, Paolo, 80n
Cranefield, Paul F., IX, 125n
Crescas, Hasdai, 6, 27, 55, 61,123,128,129,
130, 132-39, 141, 143, 146, 149-54, 15 8 ,
17 6 ,24 1
Crinito, Pietro, 13, 2 I 5
Cusanus, Nicolaus, 8, 56, 61, 72, 105, 176,
178, 179, 242
Damascius, 45n
Damasus I, Pope, Saint, 40n
Daniels, George H., 239n, 240n
Democritus, 145, 152, 153n, 156n, 241
Descartes, Rene, 10,56, 136n, 141n, 161
Dexippus, 45n
Dibon, Paul, 180n
Dijksterhuis, E. j., 94n, 157n
DiNapoli, Giovanni, 180n
Diogenes Laertius, 50n, 59n, 64, 65n, 66,
16 7
Dionisotti, Carlo, 28n, 29n
Dionysius the Areopagite, 28, IS8, 195,206,
207,218,225
Dominicus Gundissalinus, 6m
Dougan, T. W., 38n
Dovizi, Bernardo, 25, 26, 192, 206
Drabkin, 1. E., 135n, 146n
Drake, Stillman, 135n
Duchesne, Leger, 209
Durer, Albrecht, 27n
Duhem, Pierre, 94n, 137n, 140n, 141n, 145n
146n, 150n, 152n, 153n, 156n

245

INDEX OF NAMES
Edwards, William F., 56n, 116n
Einstein, Albert, 130
Eisler, Rudolf, 113n
Empedocles, 241
Epicurus, 145, 154, 156n
Erasmus, Desiderius, 8, 242
Essler, Johann, 23, 215
d'Este, Ercole I, 15n, 194,21 I
d'Este, Niccol6 III, I I
Estienne, Henri, 168, 169, 233-35
Eugenius IV, Pope, 61
Eusebius Caesaricnsis, 59n, 71n
Fabri, Filippo, 174-75
Falloppio, Gabriele, 166n
Farner, Oskar, 227
Favaro, Giuseppe, 166n
Ferrara, Mario, 34n, 35n
Ferrari, Ottaviano, 64n
Fichardus, Joannes, 208
Ficino, Marsilio, 13, 16, 35n, 36, 37, 59n,
61, 63n, 72, 107n, 215
Fiorentino, Francesco, 143n
Firpo, Luigi, 143n, 179n
Fox, Robert C., X
Francis of Assisi, St., 42, 43
Frati, Luigi, 22n
Freher, Marquard, 210
Fullonius, Jacobus, 23n
Gaguin, Robert, 12n
Galenus, Claudius, 85n, 90, 92n, 94n, 112n,
166,168
Galilei, Galileo, 6, 7,31,56, 130, 135, 136,
148n, 154-58, 181
Garin, Eugenio, I In, 12n, 13n, 14n, 32n,
33n , 34n, 36n, 58n, 163n
Gasparini Leporace, Tullia, 224
Gassendi, Pierre, 7, 31, 56n, 117, 121n, 125,
126,143,144,156,157,158,166n, 17578, 179, 181
Gaza, Theodorus, 67
Geiger, Ludwig, 27n, 215
Gent, Werner, 138n
Gerard of Cremona, 61n
Gerson, Jean, 74
Gersonides, 150n, 153
Giacomelli, Raffaele, 135n
Gibson, R. W., 185
Gilbert, Neal Ward, IX, 4, 168
Giles of Rome, 156
Gilson, Etienne, 6 I n, 172n
Giordani, Gaetano, 29n
di Giovanni, Vincenzo, 227
Giovanozzi, Lucia, 35n
Giraldi, Lilio Gregorio, I In, 24, 25n, 27, 29,
84, 188, 192, 193, 194, 198,201,202,216
Giustiniani, Paolo, 22 I
Goff, F. R., 186
Goldast, Melchior, 2 I I

Goldthwaite, Richard, X
Gonzaga, Francesco, 20
Grabmann, Martin, 61n, 129n, 148n
Graesse, J. G. T., 185
de Grasis, Paris, 22n
Gratius, Ortwin, 208, 212
Grayeff, Felix, 64n
Graziano di S. Teresa, 14n
Gregory Nazianzen, St., 74
Gregory of Nyssa, St., 74
Gregory of Rimini, 156
Gregory, Tullio, 121n, 156n, 175n, 176n,
178n
Grendler, Paul, X
Grimani, Domenico, 13,24, 192
Grosart, A. B., 227
Gruter, Jan, 211
Grynaeus, J oannes J., 209
Guaitoli, Policarpo, 20n
Guarino, Battista, 13
Guericke, Otto von, 156
Hain, Ludwig, 57n, 185
Hallbauer, Friedrich Andreas, 2 I 3
Hartfelder, K., 23n, 215
Harvey, Gabriel, 227
Harvey, William, 91
Haskins, C. H., 6In
Hayen, A., 138n
Hefele, Karl Joseph von, 26n
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 8
Henry, R. M., 38n
Henry VIII, King of England, 24n
Henry of Ghent, 56, 74, 87, 114
Hergenriither, Joseph von, 26n
Hervet, Gentian, 8, 84, 168, 169
Hicks, R. D., 79n, 80n, 81, 87n, 108,
Hierophilus, 241
Hilary of Poi tier, St., 23
Hippocrates, 90, 9In, 241
Hobbes, Thomas, 10
Hoenig, Eva, X
Hoenigswald, Richard, 227
Homer,66n
Horawitz, A., 23n, 215
Humbert, A., 169n
Hume, David, 8,75,96, 126
Hyman, Arthur, IX

IOn

Imbart de la Tour, P., 227

Jacopo da Forli, 50n
Jamblichus, 45n
Jammer, Max, 138n
Jayne, Sears R., IX
Jerome, St., 179
John Chrysostom, St., 202
John of Jandun, 156
John Philoponus, 6, 9, 45n, 55, 68, 86, I19n ,

246

INDEX OF NAMES

128, 12g, 130, 138-44, 146-52, 154-56,

158, 172n, 173n, 241
Johnson, Leonard, 61n
Jones, W. H. S., gIll
Julius II, Pope, 20, 21, 22, 24, 2g, Ig3
Justin Martyr, 8, 23, 24, 70, 74, 178, 179,
200, 208, 20g
Kaeppeli, Thomas, X
Kant, Immanuel, 130, 143
Keeler, Leo W., 79n
Kelley, Donald R., g6n
Kern, Anton, 22 I
Kibre, Pearl, 32n
Kierkegaard, Soren, 8
Kieszkowski, Bohdan, 35n
King, H. R., 138n
Kirk, G. S., 145n
Klibansky, Raymond, gIll
Knobloch, Johann, 23, 204
Knod, Gustav, 23n
Koehler, Walter, 228
Koenig, Erich, 25n
Koyre, Alexandre, 134n, 138n, 14Ill, 148n,
153n, 156n, 175n
Kristeller, Paul Oskar, IX, 185, IgO, 215,
218,2Ig,220,221,222,223,224,225,226
Kroll, W., 12gn
Krumbacher, Karl, 68n
Kuhn, C. G., 92n
La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, 93n, 94n
Lang, Matthew, Ign, 25, 26, Ig2, 206
Lasswitz, Kurd, 144n
Leclercq, Jean, 26n, 22 I
Lefevre d'Etaples, Jacques, 27
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 10, 162, 180-81
Leo X, Pope, 26, 2g, 44, Ig2, Ig3, Ig4, 206
21 3, 21 4,218
Leonardo da Vinci, 135
Leone Ebreo, 22g
Leoniceno, Niccolo, 14, go, 2 16
Leucippus, 145, 156n
Liceto, Fortunio, 173n
Liruti, Gian Giuseppe, 27n
Litta, Pompeo, I In, 12n, 18n
Locke, John, 96
Lodi, L., 222
Lorenzi, Giovanni, 4gn
Lorenzo da Brindisi, St., 38n
Louis XII, King of France, 22, 24
Lucretius, 145, 156n
Luther, Martin, 8, g, 242
Luzio, Alessandro, 2gn
Mach, Ernst, 156n
Magentinos, Leo, 45n, 68, 6gn
Magentius, 172n
Mahoney, Edward P., IX, II5n, 173n
Maier, Anneliese, 94n, 148n
Maimonides, Moses, 61, 123

Maini, Luigi, 228

Manardo, Giovanni, 14-15, 2gl1, go, Ig2,
200, 2 I 5, 226
Mancini, A., 221
Manget, Jean-Jacques, 212
Manuzio, Aldo, 13, 18, 57n, 67n, 204, 215,
221, 222
Manuzio, Paolo, 13n, 2 I 5
Marazzi, Arrigo, X
Marcel, Raymond, 107n
Martini, Emilio, 223
Massa, Eugenio, X
Matsen, Herbert, X
Maximilian I, Emperor, 17-19, 22, 24, Igl,
Ig6
Mazzatinti, Giuseppe, 226
Mazzoni, J acopo, 228
Mazzeo, Joseph A., IX
Mazzuchelli, Giammaria, 17on, 171n
I\iercati, Angelo, 20n
Mercati, Giovanni, 13n
Mersenne, Marin, 121n
Metochites, Theodorus, 45n , 14g
Michael of Ephesus, 45n, 67n
Milanesi, C., 220
Minuziano, Alessandro, 24, 29, 204, 222
Miola, Alfonso, 223
Molinier, A., 223
Moncallero, G. L., 25n
Monnerjahn, E., 32n
Montaigne, Michel de, 106, 109n, 160, 161
Montanari, Antonio, 163n, 164n, 174n
Montfaucon, B., 225
Moody, Ernest A., q8n, 149, 151n, 154n,
155n
More, Thomas, 12n, Ig5, 20g, 214, 221
Morelli, Pietro Martire, 28n, Ig6, 212, 213,
21g, 220, 221, 225
Morhof, Daniel Georg, 240n
Moses, 46n, 59n
Munsterberg, Margaret, 50n
Mutschmann, Hermann, 167n
Nardi, Bruno, 74n, 125
Nauck, A., 107n
Naude, Gabriel, 126n, 181n
Nauert, Charles G., Jr., 240n, 242n
Nelson, John C., IX
de' Nerli, Filippo, 17n
Nesi, Giovanni, 16,216,220
Newton, Isaac, 130, 143
Niceron,J. P., 185,228
Nicholas of Lyra, 74
Nicholas V, Pope, 61
Nifo, Agostino, 114-17, 120n, 148n, 152n
Nizolio, Mario, 161-63, 172, 173, 179, 180
181
Nogarola, Lodovico, 2g, 218
Norton, F. J., 26
Numenius,59n

INDEX OF NAMES
Ockham, William of, 74, 123
Ohm, Georg Simon, 15In
Olympiodorus, 4Sn, 68, 6gn, 172n
Omphali us, jacobus, 208, 210
Origen,17g
Orsi, Concetta, 138n
Ostaja, Andrea, 14n, 15n
Ovio, Giuseppe, 166n
Owens, joseph, 67n
Pachymeres, Georgios, 45n
Pagello, Bartolommeo, 226
Pagnini, Sante, 27, 130n
Panzer, G. W., 185
Pano~ky, Erwin,9ln
Papadopoli, Niccolo, 228
Papazzoni, Battista, XI, 17n, 18n, 21n, 22n,
25n, 2gn
Papotti, Francesco Ignazio, XI, 20n, 2 In,
22n
Parsons, Edward A., 65
Pascal, Blaise, 156
Paschini, Pio, 27n
Passetus, Cosmus, 194
Pastor, Ludwig, 20n, 22n , 26n, 225
Pas torello, Ester, lIn, 222
Patrizi, Francesco, 4, 31, 56n, 64n, [43, 17 1,
172,175,176,181
Paul IV, Pope (Giampietro Carafa), 28, Ig5
Paul, St., 8
Pelster, Franz, 67n
Perosa, Alessandro, X, 71 n
Petersen, Peter, 56n
Peutinger, Conrad, 23, 25n, 26, 222
Philesius, Matthias Ringmann, 21n, 23
Phrisius, Adolphus, Ign
Picciolus, Antonius, 228
Piccolomini, Francesco, 136, 156n
Pico della Mirandola, Alberto, 2g
Pi co della Mirandola, Antomaria, 17, 18
Pico della Mirandola, Bianca Maria( d ' Este)
11,15,17,19,20
Pico della Mirandola, Caterina, 18n
Pico della Mirandola, Federico, 17, 18, Ig
Pico della Mirandola, Francesca(Trivulzio),
18, 21n, 22n, 25, 26
Pico della Mirandola, Galeotto I, I I, 16- 17,
20,48,62, 160, 203, 21 4
Pico della Mirandola, Galeotto II, 22, 26n,
2g
Pica della Mirandola, Giantommaso, 24n,
2g, Ig9, 201, 204, 205, 224
Pica della Mirandola, Giovanna(Carafa),
12, Ig5, 226
Pi co della Mirandola, Giovanni, 2, 3, II, 12,
13,23n , 24,32-34, 35n,36,37,41,44,48,
54, 58, 59n, 62, 108, 160, 170, 172, 176,
Igl, Ig2, 195, 202, 203, 204, 206, 20g,
21 4, 21 9,221,223

247

Pico della Mirandola, Lodovico, 17, 18, Ig,

20,21

Pietro d' Abano, 68, 6gn, 74

Pio, Alberto, 18, Ig, 20, 22, 24, Igl, Ig2
Pia, Leonello, 18n
Pirckheimer, Willi bald, 18n, Ign, 23, 27,
Ig4, 215, 222, 223
Plato, 32, 41,48,51 , 5gn, 61, 62-63, 73,106,
108, 109, 114, 17on , 17[,241
Pletho, Giorgius Gemistus, 61 , 176
Plinius, 14n, 50n, IOgn
Plotinus, 68n, 72
Plutarch, 38n, 65n, 109, 172n
Poliziano, 13n, 7In, 215
Popkin, Richard, H., X, 12In, 161, 167n,
175, 178, 240n
Porphyry, 45n, 68, 102, 107, 109
Porro, Giulio, 12n
da Porto, Luigi, 2In
Possevino, Antonio, 173n
dal Pra, Mario, 4gn
Prete, Serafino, 35n
Prost, Auguste, 240n
Prudentius, 40n
Psellos, Michael, 45n
Ptolemaeus, Claudius, 23n, 215
Ptolemaeus Philadelphus of Egypt, 65, 173n
Pusino, Ivan, 228
Pyrrho of Elis, 49, 52n, 167
Pythagoras, 154
Quetif,j., 212, 223
da Racconigi, Caterina, 28, Ig6, 212, 213 ,
21g, 220, 221, 224, 225
Ramus, Petrus, 56, 162, 176, 181
Randall, john Herman jr., IX, 4, 112n,
115n, 116n, 117n, 125
Rasario, Giambattista, 142n
Raven , j. E., 145n
Razzi, Serafino, 212
Refrigerio, Giambattista, 14
Reichling, Dietrich, 185
Reicke, Emil, 27n, Ig4, 215
Renouard, Antoine-Augustin, 13n, 185, 215,
222
Reuchlin, johann, 23, 27, Ig2, 196,215
Rhacendites,joseph,45n , 149
Ricci, Pier Giorgio, 35n
Richards, Gertrude Bramlette, VII
Richter, Raoul, 4gn
Ridolfi, Roberto, Isn
Rigg,j. M., 214
Ritter, Fr., 185
Robin, Leon, 4gn
Rochot, Bernard, IS7n, 17Sn
Rorario, Girolamo, 27, 12sn, [26n, 224
Roscoe, William, 213
de' Rosmini, Carlo, 25n
Ross, W. D., 108n

248

INDEX OF NAMES

Rossi, Giuseppe, 240n

Rossi, Paolo, 162n
Roth, Cecil, 130n
Rupprich, Hans, 23n, 215
Ruysschaert, Jose, 226
Sadoleto,Jacopo, 29, 215
Sadoun-Goupil, Michelle, 157n
Saitta, Giuseppe, 228
Salvo Cozzo, G., 226
Sambursky, S., 129n, 137n, 152n, 153n
Sander, Max, 185
Santangelo, Giorgio, 96n, 185,214,225,228
Sanuto, Marin, XI, 17n, 19n, 21n, 22n, 24n,
25n, 28n
Sarton, George, 91n
Savonarola, Girolamo, 2, 3, 8, 15-16, 18,28,
32, 34-37, 4 1, 48, 54, 56, 62, un, 124,
179, 193, 194, 196, 199, 202, 203, 206,
211,212, 21 7,218, 21 9,220,221,222,
223, 224, 225, 226, 242
Sanovarola, Michele, 15
Saxl, Fritz, 91n
Sbaralea,Joannes Hyacinth, 174n
SCelba, Cipriana, VIII
Schenkl, Heinrich, 64n
Schill, Adolf, 50n
Schmidt, Charles, 20n, 2 In, 23n
Schmitt, Charles B., 26n, 36n, 48n, 56n, 63n,
66n, 71n, 87n, 89n, 114n, 145n, 155n,
163n, 180n, 189n
Schneider, Arthur, 90n
Schnitzer,Joseph, 16n, 34n, 228
Schoock, Martinus, 180
Scotus, Joannes Duns, 42, 61, 74, 87, 89n,
123, 155n, 156
Scott, Edward 1. L., 221
Scott, Izora, 199, 214
Sedulius, 40n
Seigel, Jerrold, X
Seneca, 38n
Sextus Empiricus, 8, 9, 43, 47n, 49-54, 55,
66, 72, 75, 80n, 81, 84, 85n , 90, 92n, 93,
94, 95n , 98, lo3n, 106, 109, I IOn, 116n,
117n, 120n, 137n, 149, 160, 164, 167,16870, 233-35, 240, 242
Sforza, Anna, 12n
Sforza, Beatrice( d'Este), 12
Sforza, Lodovico il Moro, 12
Shute, Richard, 64
Sichardus, Johannes, 207
Silingardi, Giuseppe, 17n, 28n
Simplicius, 45n, 64, 68, 69n, 86, 172n
Singer, Charles, 157n
Sirenus, Julius, 228
Slakey, ThomasJ., 79n
Socrates, II8, 120n
Sola, Ercole, 2 14
Solmsen, Friedrich, 131n, 138n, 145n
Sommervogel, Carlos, 172n

Sophonius, 45n
Sorbelli, Tommaso, 195,214
Spagnuolo, Battista(Mantovano), 14, 40n,
226
Spampanato, Vincenzo, 142n, 179n
Spenser, Edmund, 227
Speusippus, 105
Spinoza, Baruch, 10
van Steenberghen, Fernand, 61n
Strabo, 65n, 172n
Strato, 137n
Strowski, Fortunat, 160n
Strozzi, Ercole, 13, 193, 194, 20 I
Struve, B. G., 160,213
Susemihl, F., 7In
Syrianus, 45n
Tannery, Paul, 141n
Tartaglia, Niccol6, 130, 135
Tatakis, Basile Nicolas, 129n
Telesio, Bernardino, 7, 141, 142, 156n
Tertuliian, 8, 124, 179, 242
Themistius, 64, 68, 86, 90, 105, I 19n, 120n
Theocritus of Chios, 59
Theodoretus, 74
Theophrastus of Eresos, 27, 64n, 68, I I I ,
201
Thorndike, Lynn, 74n, 120n, 193,228
Tiraboschi, Girolamo, I In, 17n, 186, 193,
229
Tocco, Felice, 142n
Tornelli, Girolamo, 195,203
Torricelli, Evangelista, 156
Trinkaus, Charles, 229
Trivulzio, Alessandro, 22
Trivulzio, Gian Giacomo, 18, 19,22,24-25
Turini, Turino, 200, 208, 213
Tyrannico Grammaticus, 67
Vailati, Giuseppe, lOIn
Valentinelli, Giuseppe, 226
Valerianus, J oannes Pierus, 25n
Valla, Lorenzo, 56, 162, 176
da Valsanzibio, Silvestro, 38n
Vandini, R., 222
Vartanian, Aram, 93n
Vasoli, Cesare, 16n
Verino, Ugolino, 40n
Versor, Joannes, 136n
Vesalius, Andreas, 166n
Villari, Pasquale, 34n
Villey, Pierre, 16on, 161n, 239-42
Vitaliani, D., 14n
Vives, Ludovicus, 7on, 162, 176
de Waard, Camelis, 157n
Walker, D. P., 63n, 107n, 229
Weimerskirch, Philip, X
Weinberg, Bernard, 40n
Weinrich, Martin, 211

INDEX OF NAMES
'Weinstein, Donald, X
\Vellmann, M., 73n
Wier, Joannes, 66n, 229
Wimpfeling, Jacob, 23
Wind, Edgar, 229
Wolf, Thomas, I In, 23, 192, 194, 196, 197,
200, 20 I, 202
Wolfson, Harry A., 6In, 123n, 130n, 132n,
133n , 134n, 136n, 138n, 139n, 142n, 149n,
150n, 151n, 152n, 153n, 154n
Wundt, Max, 56n
Yates, Frances A., 63n

249

Zabarella,Jacopo, I I I, I 16n, 144n, 155,158

Zambelli, Paola, 14n, 15n, 16Ill, 239-42
Zambotti, Bernardino, 18n
Zambrini, Francesco, 163n
Zampinus, Franciscus, '207
Zasius, Ulrich, 23, 192, 194, 196, 200
Zeller, Eduard, 77n, 80n, !OIll
Zetzner, Lazar, 2 I I , 2 I 2
Zimmels, B., 229
Zurcher, Josef, 64n
Zugliano, Gerolamo, 21n
Zwingli, Huldrych, 227, 228

ADDENDA

The following material came to our attention too late to be included in the
text of the book.
To note 102, p. 23:
Pico's reputation in Germany is clearly indicated in the letter of Johannes
Murmellius to Johannes Bugenhagen of 15 12, which reads as follows: "Quod
vero certior a me fieri cupis, qui hujus aetatis philosOphofum et theologorum
quibus anteferendi sint, tametsi id arbitrii nimis quam impudenter mihi
arrogem vix illius memor adagii: 'ne ultra crepidas sutor', sententiam meam
accipe. Duo hac aetate clarissimi philosophi theologique et qui proxime ad
veteres accedunt meo judicio sunt Joannes Franciscus Picus comes Mirandulanus, qui variae doctrinae multa scripsit opera, inter quae tres hymn os
heroicos cum eruditionis reconditissimae commentariis: et Jacobus Faber
Stapulensis, qui in Aristotelis plerosque libros, carmina Davidis et Pauli
Tarsensis epistolas commentarios scripsit. His addo Carolum Bouillum et
Capnionem Phorcensem. Scribendi autem charactere et eloquentia graecorum interpretatione librorum Erasmus Roterodamensis - et hic non contemnendus theologus - cedit nemini." O. Vogt, Dr. Johannes Bugenhagens
Briifwechsel (Stettin, 1888), p. 6. I am indebted to Professor Eugene F. Rice
of Columbia University for supplying me with this reference.
TOp.221:
Manchester (England)
(51A) *John Rylands Library, Ital. 13 (Crawford 13); paper, 16th century,

250 fols. A miscellaneous MS of materials relating to Savonarola. Included

are: Pico's life of Savonarola in Italian (fols. 40-124); his Hynnus de beato
Hyeronimo martire, inc.: Quo te, sancte pater . . . (fol. 145 v ); and his Opusculum
de sententia (fols. 208-13). Ref.: Moses Tyson, Hand List qf the Collection of
French and Italian Manuscripts in the John Rylands Library, 1930 (Manchester,
1930), pp. 41-43 [also in Bulletin qf the John Rylands Library, XIV (1930)].
To p. 223:
Oxford (England)
(68A) Bodleian Library, Selden Supra 41 (STC 3429); paper, written by

252

ADDENDA

John Bale ca. 1540-1550, 402 fols. A miscellaneous MS relating to the history
of the Carmelites. Included are five letters of Battista Spagnuolo Mantovano
addressed to Gianfrancesco Pi co (fols. 39 r -43 r ). Ref.: F. Madan et aI., A
Summary Catalogue rif Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, vol.
II, part I (Oxford, 1922), pp. 630-32.