DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE G.R. No. 90625 May 23, 1991 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN, accused. FACTS: The information was filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused. When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty. At the scheduled hearing, new counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that the accused had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The court issued an order acknowledging the manifestation of the de oficio counsel and noted there are two mitigating circumstances that maybe applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no objection but also manifested that he has to look into the penalty applicable. The hearing was reset to another date. Upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset again. However, counsel de oficio for the accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected settlement of the civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was reset again which schedule was later on cancelled due to the compulsory retirement of the presiding judge. In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court. The initial reception of evidence took place on 4/24/1987 with the accused-appellant represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon. Thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the presentation of their evidence. TRIAL COURT: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide The accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. However, Judge Cipriano de Roma erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The CA transmitted to this Court on the records which were erroneously transmitted to it. The accused is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and conclusion of facts by the trial court. But that, the trial court erred in not applying the indeterminate sentence law. Accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate sentence" with "all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the accused . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian reasons."

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was denied? RULING: There was no denial of due process. REQUISITES: Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. People vs. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has had due process. All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of 2/10/1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him and to present his own evidence. If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for more. Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC or of any other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases. The same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus: Sec. 19(l). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We agree with the Solicitor General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the RPC is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC shall apply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, except as modified above in respect to the civil indemnity, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.

EFFECT OF DEATH OF WITNESS G.R. No. L-61570 February 12, 1990. RUPERTO FULGADO, substituted by his heirs, JULIANA, JOSE, MAXIMO, PACITA and SEVERO all surnamed FULGADO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINO CUSTODIO, SIMPLICIA CUSTODIO, ARSENIO PIGUING, ISMAEL PORCIUNCULA and DOMINGA MACARULAY, respondents. FACTS: Ruperto Fulgado filed an action in the CFI against private respondents for the annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. The private respondents filed their answer to the complaint with special and affirmative defenses and a counterclaim. During the PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, private respondents and their counsel failed to appear on time and were subsequently declared as in default. Fulgado was then allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Private respondents immediately filed a motion to lift the order of default on the same day that the order was issued. The TRIAL COURT DENIED the motion, as well as their MR. Respondents then filed a petition for relief from the default order, but it was denied. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. However, the CA set aside the decision on the ground that private respondents were deprived of their day in court by the unjust denial of their motion to lift the order of default. CA remanded the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits. The private respondents moved that the trial court "include the case in any date of the August and September calendar of the Court." The case was set for hearing on September 16, 1975. Unfortunately, the presiding judge went on official leave and the hearing was postponed anew to January 15 and February 15, 1976. In the meantime, plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado died on November 25, 1975 and was substituted by his children as party plaintiffs. Fulgado's witness, Jose Fulgado, had earlier migrated to the United States on September 16, 1974. When the case was heard on May 4, 1976, private respondents moved to strike out the testimonies off the record of the witnesses who testified on the ground that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine them. Counsel for plaintiff opposed, on the ground that the defendants committed laches in their failure to cross-examine the witness. The trial court dismissed the case and ordered for the striking off the records the testimonies of witnesses. CA affirmed the order. Hence, the instant petition for review. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Such testimonies are wholly inadmissible for being hearsay, because respondents were not able to cross-examine the witnesses. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: While the right to cross-examination is an essential part of due process, the same may however be waived as the private respondent have done when they allowed an unreasonable length of time to lapse from the inception of the opportunity to cross-examine before availing themselves of such right and likewise when they failed to exhaust other remedies to secure the exercise of such right.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to exclude the testimonies given by the deceased Rupert Fulgado and his witness, Jose Fulgado? NO HELD: The right to cross-examination is a vital element of due process The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. o However, the right is personal, which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. o If a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. o The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. o RULE ON IMPLIED WAIVER is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. Where there was no such opportunity (to cross examine) and the want of it was caused by the party offering (plaintiff), the testimony should be stricken out. However, if the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross examiner's fault, the lack of cross-examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.

Private respondents have impliedly waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses Private respondents had enough opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado before his death and Jose Fulgado before his migration to the United States. When the Court of Appeals set aside the default judgment and remanded the case to the court of origin for trial on the merits, the private respondents should have proceeded with the cross-examination of the two Fulgados, a right previously withheld from them when they were considered in default. However, despite knowledge of Ruperto's failing health (then 89y/o) and Jose's imminent travel to the United States, private respondents did not move swiftly and decisively. They tarried for more than one year from the finality of the Appellate Court's decision to ask the trial court on July 3, 1975 to set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any date of August and September. The inaction on the part of private respondents cannot be easily dismissed by the argument that it is the duty of the plaintiff to always take the initiative in keeping the proceedings "alive." o The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right. It is because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. It was gross error for the lower courts to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was an alleged failure of crossexamination. The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only fault during the entire proceedings was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 10256 and to allow the direct testimonies of plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado and his witness Jose Fulgado to remain in the record. WHAT IS SEARCHING INQUIRY? G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant. FACTS Alicando was charged of rape with homicide for the death of Khazie Penecilla on June 12, 1994 in Iloilo City. In the process of raping Khazie, he choked her thus causing her death. o Khazies father Romeo was having a drink with two friends in Romeos house. Alicando eventually joined them. At around 4:30 PM, Romeos friends left. o At around 5:30 PM, Rebada, one of Penecillas neighbors, spotted Khazie by the window of Alicandos house. Khazie offered to buy yemas from Rebada but Alicando closed the window. Rebada then heard Khazie crying so she approached the house and saw through an opening between the floor and the door that Khazie was being raped. o Khazie did not come home so Romeo and his wife looked for her. Rebada did not tell them what she saw. o In the morning, Khazies corpse was found under the house of Santiago, another neighbor. Rebada then told the Penecillas what she knew. o Alicando was arrested and her verbally confessed his guilt to PO3 Tan without the assistance of counsel. Based on his confession and follow-up interrogations, Khazies slippers were recovered from Alicandos home along with a stained T-shirt and pillow. June 29, 1994 Alicando was arraigned and pleaded guilty. After the plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. July 20, 1994 The trial court sentenced Alicando to death by electric chair or, if the penal facilities would be available by then, by gas poisoning. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was properly meted the sentence of death NO HELD: Arraignment of the accused was null and void During arraignment, the complaint or the information should be read in a language or dialect which the accused understands. The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC. The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. It could not be said with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The plea of guilt was null and void Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt, the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, in addition, the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.

This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. o The records do not clearly illustrate the personality profile of the accused. o The age, socio-economic status and educational background of the accused were not examined. o With regard to voluntariness, questions regarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemed insufficient when a record of events in the penal facility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematoma from being locked up in a cell with violent inmates upon his arrest. o With regard to comprehension, the trial court inadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guilt would result to a mandatory of penalty of death without explaining to him what mandatory meant. The rule requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituis prudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. Prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court convicting the appellant Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. In other words, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. The Court admitted as evidence the things seized in Alicandos house. These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Tan of as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. This is in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel for the accused as well as provides for the right of the accused to remain silent and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and that these rights cannot be waived subject to exceptions. A violation of this provision renders the evidence gathered inadmissible. Even if the evidence gathered were admissible, they are still insufficient as evidence. o The alleged bloodstains on the pillow and shirt were never proven with laboratory tests. o There was no testimony that the shirt in question was worn by the accused when he committed the crime. It was not unnatural for him to have a shirt with bloodstains because he was a butcher. The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree."

The Decision convicting accused of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. PLEA MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL G.R. No. L-77969 June 22, 1989 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICK DE LUNA, defendant-appellant. FACTS: The accused De Luna was charged with Murder before RTC Branch 10 of Cebu City and was arraigned on 12/23/1986. During the arraignment, the charge was read and the accused pleaded guilty with the qualification: hindi ko sinasadya. The Court asked the prosecution to present evidence in order to determine the culpability of the accused, but the counsel manifested that De Luna was admitting to charge of Murder and that he does not want evidence to be presented. When asked again by the Court, accused De Luna stated that Yes, I am guilty but I have no intention to kill the child. The COURT convicted the defendant-appellant of the crime of Murder on the same day. The decision partly reads: o xxx Being informed of the charge and having understood the said accusation, the accused waived his right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for this court the degree of culpability of the accused under the present charge. Aside from the plea of Guilty, the records is replete with evidence strongly and indubitably showing that on the 12/17/1986 at about 7:00pm, the accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one little, small girl named Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries: Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Secondary to Severe Multiple Injuries, Traumatic' and as a consequence of said injuries, Tricia died the next day. ISSUES: Whether or not (1) The defendant-appellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the offense as charged in the information; (2) Assuming that there was a valid plea of guilty, whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. HELD:

Plea of guilty is not valid plea The ESSENCE of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including the aggravating and qualifying circumstances, the repeated qualification stated by the accused as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its consequences. To be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt and must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law . The appellant's qualified plea of guilty is not a valid plea of guilt . An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him. In such cases, the information should first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant, or the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty. On occasion, the Court ruled that it is permissible for an accused to enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating circumstances. However, considering the gravity of the offense charged in the case at bar, it is more prudent for the trial court reject the plea made by the appellant and direct the parties to submit their respective evidence. Even assuming that the plea was in fact to the lesser offense of Homicide and not Murder, the Court cannot sustain appellant's request for an immediate reduction of the penalty imposed. The consent of the fiscal and the offended party is necessary. If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former information. The accused cannot waived the presentation of evidence for the prosecution After a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged. 3 things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: (1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. Notwithstanding the waiver made by the appellant, the presentation of evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court or the SC on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 23, 1986 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to said court for a new arraignment and further proceeding. No costs. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION G.R. No. L-52728 January 17, 1990 AVELINO C. AGULTO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: An INFORMATION for bigamy was filed against the petitioner Avelino C. Agulto: That on or about December 30, 1968, x x x the accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Maria Pilar Gaspar, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Andrea Suico. After the trial was finished and the parties had rested, but before judgment was promulgated, the accused filed a MOTION TO REOPEN THE TRIAL on the ground of newly discovered evidence , a copy of a marriage contract between Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire contracted on July 19, 1960, before Andrea's marriage to the petitioner. The COURT denied the motion: It was filed too late because the accused, with due diligence, could have discovered the socalled newly-discovered evidence sooner and could have presented it during the trial, it appearing that he was appraised of the alleged marriage of Andrea Suico and Romeo Vergeire on October 17, 1972. Petitioner's MR was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. PETITIONER: The evidence was not available to petitioner at the time of the presentation of his evidence but only after the parties had rested their case. RESPONDENTS: The alleged newly discovered evidence does not bear the seal of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Moreover, the document does not indicate the municipality and the province where the municipal court is located. The xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract is not properly certified and authenticated and on its face, it appears that the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. CA denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely abused their discretion in refusing to reopen the trial NO HELD: A distinction should be made between a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Reopen Trial. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: o May be filed after judgment but within the period for perfecting an appeal (1, Rule 37) o In civil or criminal actions, it may be applied for and granted only upon specific, well-defined grounds set forth respectively in Rules 37 (1) and 121 (2). MOTION TO REOPEN TRIAL: o There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court for motions to reopen trial. However, it is a recognized procedural recourse or devise, deriving validity and acceptance from long established usage. The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence before judgment is not the granting of a new trial o May be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment. o The reopening of a case for the reception of additional evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered is controlled by no other rule than that of the paramount interests of justice, resting entirely in the sound judicial discretion of a Trial Court; and its concession or denial, by said Court in the exercise of that discretion will not be reviewed on appeal, unless a clear abuse thereof is shown. Petitioner's motion to reopen the trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was not supported by evidence that marriage was still existing when Andrea Suico wed the petitioner. Considering the defects of the xerox copied document which the accused Agulto claims to be his "newly-discovered evidence," the trial court's order denying his motion to reopen the trial was properly sustained by the CA. PERIOD TO APPEAL

G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011 JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. FACTS: Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an INFORMATION for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner and it imposed the penalty of 3 months of imprisonment, a fine of P3.8M and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine. 14 days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted, but the Respondent Judge denied the motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. CA, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from 11/3/2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to 11/18/2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. The respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance. The prosecution filed a MTDF the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. The prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. The RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. Consequently, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision. PETITIONER: The RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes. OSG: Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules. SPOUSES: Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.

ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases YES HELD: The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. The PERIOD TO APPEAL is specifically governed by 39 of BP 129, 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal , thus: The "FRESH PERIOD

RULE" shall also apply to RULE 40 governing appeals from the MTC to the RTC; RULE 42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA; RULE 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and RULE 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC. It is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. The 15-day period is counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: (1) BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. 39 of BP 129 states that "the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be 15 days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." (2) The provisions of 3 of Rule 41 and 6 of Rule 122, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration . It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. (3) While the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under 6, Rule 122 since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under 3 of Rule 41 and 6 of Rule 122 of the should be treated differently. It would be an absurd situation because a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision.