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List of Cases:

1.) Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs City of Manila 20 Scra 849
2.) Rubi vs Provincial Board 39 Phil 660
3.) Orquiola vs Tandang Sora Development Corporation 386 SCRA 301
4.) Galman vs Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 43
5.) Stonehill vs Diokno 20 SCRA 383
6.) US vs Bustos 37 Phil 731
7.) Narciso vs Cruz 328 SCRA 505
8.) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686
9.) Subayco vs Sandiganbayan 22 Aug 1996
10.) Valmonte vs Devilla 29 Sept 1989
11.) Guazon vs De Villa 30Jan 1990
12.) Ordonez vs Dir of Prisons 4 Aug 1994
13.) Umil vs Ramos 9Jul 1990; 3Oct 1991
14.) Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile 20Apr 1983
15.) Morales vs Enrile 26Apr 1983
16.) People vs Galit 20Mar1985
17.) People vs Opida 13Jun1986
18.) People vs Capitin 30Aug 1988
19.) People vs Pecardal 24Nov 1986
20.) People vs Poyos 19Nov 1986
21.) People vs Compil 15 May 1995
22.) People vs Losero
23.) People vs Vuscato
24.) People vs Cabrera
25.) People vs Magasala
26.) People vs Ramos

1.) Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs City of Manila 20 Scra 849

Facts:

On July 5, 1963, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel
del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu filed petition against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila. It was alleged that the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved by the Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of
Manila. The assertion of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was to regulate motels, it w ould impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in
the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the demographics would be specified, and affixed his
signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity
of their patrons. The ordinance also made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or
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portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring
that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process.

The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. The lower court as well as the
appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.

In the answer filed, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor
and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of
the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid
and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the
assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor
prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is against the due process clause.

Held:

Court ruled in favor for Astorga. What called for the reversal of the assailed decision was the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. It is a valid
exercise of police power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
"provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit. The challenged ordinance then
proposes to check these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration
form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several
provisions to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would
appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the
need for the public. The Court ruled that it cannot be considered arbitrary or oppressive when there appears
a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt
to correct such.

The violation of due process contention, ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty, is
also untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, it cannot be
defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. The Court
reiterated the principle that has been consistently upheld which states that what makes a statute susceptible
of being vague is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The Court relied on the
citation by Justice Holmes stating that there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean.

2.)Rubi vs Provincial Board 39 Phil 660

Facts:
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Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) ["non-Christian" which was intended
to relate to degree of civilization: members of uncivilized tribes] in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to
that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe
with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends
over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes
are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the
provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been
illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
reading: “With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,” was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1) Religious discriminating;
2) Petitioners were illegally deprived of their liberty;
3) Violation of due process of law;
4) Violation of the equal protection clause;
5) Invouluntary servitude (petitioners were deprived of their freedom);
6) Misuse of police power (As there can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of
Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government. - jurisprudence)

HELD:

By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of section 2145
(Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor) of the Administrative Code.
Among other things, it was held that the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian”
it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the
Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands,
acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers,
the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance
the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary
to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the
public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the
people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the
natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a
special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated
among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back
to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike
to all of a class.” The Court further ruled that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section
does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
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3.) Orquiola vs Tandang Sora Development Corporation 386 SCRA 301

Facts:

Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266,
in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad
Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos.
16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano
Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them
into smaller lots.

Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the
subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33 Doña Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora,
Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and
other third persons.

Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation
replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor
of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades.

On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally
liable for encroaching on plaintiff’s land.

Issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether
petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.

Held:

On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against them.
They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz in
holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by
the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto.
Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different
from the circumstances in the present case.

Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina
acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced
and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement
of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El
Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the
right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized
Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the
petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove
her alleged ownership of the land. He can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the
petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
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Coming now to the second issue, A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a
full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. The determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which
generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is when
the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot.
Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was
still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in
Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners.

4.) Galman vs Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 43

Facts:

Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had
just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the
back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the
man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down
in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who
joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for.
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision . The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
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Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines
to due process of law.

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
 Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no
longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-
Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered
then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the
presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held
in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were
with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting
was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President.
During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro
na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and
uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-
accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television
that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore,
not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with
his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the
doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear
when President Marcos is no longer in office.
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More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of
witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran;
no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp,
instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by
Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos
had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and
disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer
who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after
fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided
ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools
of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the
people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued
without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing
out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents',
including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them
before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government,
is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no
majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office,
guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

5.) Stonehill vs Diokno 20 SCRA 383

Facts:
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Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” By the
strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The
warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).”

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners’ consent; and that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot
assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper
party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation.
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar,
none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a
“violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
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“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant
is emphasized.

6.) US vs Bustos 37 Phil 731

Facts:

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of
Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga , with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The
specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have
pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false,
scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech
and free press.

Held:

Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one
owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty
of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public
officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in
its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be
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true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to
secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse
the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A
privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.

7.) Narciso vs Cruz 328 SCRA 505

Facts:

After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito
Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed,
the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991, with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutor's resolution [before] the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito Narciso moved for reconsideration, which
was still denied by the DOJ. The Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro found no reason to disturb the
findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for arraignment
and trial.

On August 3, 1992, accused filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito
Narciso to Post Bail". The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the
same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00. The private prosecutor representing private
complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused's deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail". Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a
"Motion to Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion to Lift
Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail". The trial set for today is hereby cancelled and re-set on November 16,
1992 at 10:30 o'clock in the morning, as previously scheduled.

Issues: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Order of the Regional
Trial Court which granted bail to the petitioner is substantially and procedurally infirm notwithstanding the
absence of any opposition from the public prosecutor.

Held:

The Petition is devoid of merit.

The petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua. He argued before
the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the
prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence
against him was not strong.

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been
conducted on the application for bail — summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten
minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of
time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree
with the CA.
11 | P a g e Human Rights Law

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong,
being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things,
may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion
is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited
or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will
it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross examination." If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process. (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecutor has the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be
decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is left to the
sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing should
be held but in the. appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. . . .
A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether
the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.

8.) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686

Facts:

SSS and petitioners filed with the Social Security Commission seeking to be declared as employees
of COSMOS. The petitioners here are peddlers of Mafinco. Mafinco contended that they are independent
contractors.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship

HELD:
No. Under the peddling contract, Mafinco would provide the peddler with a delivery truck and the peddler
is responsible for compensation of his driver and helpers. In addition, the peddler would also bear the cost
of gasoline and maintenance of the truck and secure their licenses and permits. The petitioner would also
post a cash bond and the contract may be terminated upon 5 days prior notice. On the basis of the peddling
contract, no employer-employee relationship was created. Thus, the petitioner is an independent contractor.

9.) SUBAYCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
12 | P a g e Human Rights Law

The year was 1985, the month, September. The Marcos government was fast sliding into its sunset days.
Yet, it was again set to celebrate with pomp, September 21, the day it proclaimed martial law some thirteen
(13) years ago. The people, however, were not in the mood to be joyous. They planned massive public
protests in different parts of the country. One of the biggest protest rallies was blueprinted as a Welga ng
Bayan at Escalante, Negros Occidental. It ended in tragedy which will not easily recede in the mist of our
history. Twenty (20) demonstrators were shot dead and twenty-four (24) others were wounded by the
military and para-military forces of the Marcos government. Of several persons charged with various counts
of murder and frustrated murder, only three (3) were convicted -- Generoso N. Subayco, Alfredo T. Alcalde
and Eleuterio O. Ibañez were convicted by the respondent Sandiganbayan. They now come to this Court
insisting on their innocence and pleading to be set free. We deny their petition and we warn our military
and police authorities that they cannot shoot people who are exercising their right to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievance.

As aforestated, twenty (20) demonstrators were killed and twenty-four (24) others were seriously wounded
by gunshots during the Welga ng Bayan held on September 20, 1985 at Escalante, Negros Occidental.
Twenty (20) counts of Murder and twenty-four (24) counts of Frustrated Murder[2] were filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan against those allegedly responsible for the death and injuries of the victims.
Charged were several civilian government officials, personnel from the Philippine Constabulary and the
Integrated National Police, and from the para-military group Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF).

Only twenty-eight (28) of the above accused were arrested and tried as the others remained at large. The
twenty-eight (28) were all members of the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police.

Upon conclusion of the trial, respondent court acquitted all the accused except petitioners Alfredo Alcalde,
Eleuterio Ibañez and Generoso Subayco.

The same evidence, however, has established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused who stood
trial and the Court hereby renders judgment CONVICTING them.

Petitioners now come before us by way of certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting the petitioners
based merely on alleged implied conspiracy to perpetrate the crimes charged and not on clear,
positive and convincing proof of conspiracy
2. Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious error of law in convicting the petitioners
despite that the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt - that is proof beyond reasonable
doubt - was not satisfied.

Ruling:

The petition must fail.

It was the thesis of the prosecution that the whole dispersal operation was an unlawful conspiracy, that the
firing at the crowd was part of the dispersal operation, and that all those who took part in the dispersal
operation should be held liable for each death and each injury that resulted therefrom.
13 | P a g e Human Rights Law

The accused denied the existence of conspiracy. Subayco and Ibañez claimed that they merely fired into the
air but not toward the crowd. On his part, Alcalde admitted that he fired his weapon to prevent the rallyists
from climbing the Cadiz City firetruck.

In its Decision, the respondent court ruled there was no sufficient evidence to prove general conspiracy of
the forty-five (45) accused as alleged by the prosecution. It then examined the individual acts of the accused
during the dispersal operation to determine their liability for the death and injuries of the victims. It found
implied conspiracy only on the part of all the accused who fired at the demonstrators.

Per finding of the respondent Sandiganbayan, the firing came from the Cadiz City firetruck and the jeep
which witnesses referred to as a "weapons carrier". After the rallyists were hosed with water, the Cadiz City
firetruck attempted to move back, but was trapped by the logs and rocks ostensibly put by the rallyists
under its wheels. The "weapons carrier" was then maneuvered behind the Cadiz City firetruck. Thereafter,
teargas canisters were lobbed at the rallyists. Jovy Jaravelo, a rallyist, picked up one of the canisters and
threw it back where it came from. Hell broke loose. CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis) shot
Jaravelo. Successive gunfire followed. Several witnesses saw the CHDF personnel and the PC men on board
the Cadiz City firetruck and the "weapons carrier" fire their guns. Some fired into the air while the others
directed their gun shots at the rallyists. When the dust settled down, twenty (20) of the demonstrators were
dead, twenty-four (24) others were wounded and seventy-nine (79) empty shells were recovered from the
scene of the crime. They were later traced to four firearms belonging to CHDF Cañete, CHDF Parcon, C2C
Lerado and CIC Ibañez.

The following were identified by witnesses to have fired their guns: CHDF Alfredo M. Quinatagcan alias
Pidong Bagis, CHDF Elias Torias, CHDF Jimmy Mayordomo, CHDF Teddy Magtubo, CHDF Jeremias
Villanueva, CHDF Jose "Boy" Parcon, Roming Javier, C1C Eleuterio O. Ibañez, T/Sgt. Generoso N. Subayco,
C1C Alfredo Alcalde.

On the basis of the evidence adduced and following its theory of implied conspiracy, the respondent Court
held petitioners liable for the deaths and injuries of all the victims. It is this finding of implied conspiracy
that petitioners assail in the petition at bar.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
committed. The concerned acts of petitioners to achieve the same objective signify conspiracy.

ll these circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose among the petitioners and their
companions, that is, to fire at the demonstrators. This common purpose was pursued by the petitioners and
their companions who used firepower against the rallyists. As proved, the plan to disperse the
demonstrators did not include the use of guns, yet, petitioners and their cohorts did. At the first crack of
gunfire coming from CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis), petitioners and their companions
commenced firing at the demonstrators, as if on signal. They fired indiscriminately toward the
demonstrators who were then already lying prone on the ground. There was no imminent danger to their
safety. Not just one or a few shots were fired but several. The firing lasted a few minutes and cost the lives
and limbs of the demonstrators. We agree with the respondent court that the collective acts of the
petitioners and their companions clearly show the existence of a common design toward the
accomplishment of a united purpose. They were therefore properly convicted for all the crimes they were
charged with.

The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but be
bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a
brake on official abuses, people empowerment was codified in various provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
14 | P a g e Human Rights Law

It is high time to remind our officials that under our Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a
gun but from the ballots of the people. It is thus important to know the unexpurgated will of the people for
in a republican government, it is the people who should truly rule. Consequently, the right of the people to
assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance should not be abridged by officials momentarily
holding the powers of government.

The Constitution did not engage in mystical teaching when it proclaimed in solemn tone that "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." It should be clear even to those
with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all
should listen, especially the government. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf
to their grievances are ciphers.

Our affirmance of the conviction of the petitioners does not give complete justice to the victims of the
Escalante massacre, subject of the cases at bar. Until today, sixteen (16) of the other accused have
successfully eluded arrest by the authorities. Not until they have been arrested and tried will justice emerge
triumphant for justice cannot come in fraction.

10.) VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA

Facts:

Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or
elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct
the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the
people.

According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches and seizures
without the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident happened, where a
certain Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself
to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.

Issues: WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search
and seizures.

Ruling:

NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of
each case.

In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media,
most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly
15 | P a g e Human Rights Law

consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner, that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of
the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient
to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search
and seizure.

Hence, petition dismissed.

11.) Guanzon vs De Villa

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro
Manila.

The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "areal target zoning" that were conducted in their
place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional.

The alleged acts committed during the raid are the following:

1. Petitioners alleged that there is no specific target house to search and that there is no search warrant or
warrant of arrest served.
2. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
3. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses.
4. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows.
5. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.
6. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying
their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation.

7. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings, and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information.

The 41 petitioners alleged that the “saturation drive” or “aerial target zoning” that were conducted in their
place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search
and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by
16 | P a g e Human Rights Law

banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns
and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo
marks. The residents complained that they’re homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The
residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained
also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations.

The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants
to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the
state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to
witness and record such event.

Issue/s: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.

Ruling:

It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods
which “offend even hardened sensibilities” .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been
no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
individuals roused from sleep were arrested.

There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the “aerial zoning” could not be achieved
even as the rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should
not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged.

In the circumstances of this taxpayers’ suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can
order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint
the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

12.)

13.) Umil vs. Ramos G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990

Facts:

On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification,
it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually
Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view
of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car. As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando
Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
17 | P a g e Human Rights Law

crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” The case was docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was
amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was
still unidentified. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Issue: Whether an arrest and search warrant is required for the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy
or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State.

Held:

No, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law
and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving
a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well
within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture
is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while
any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In this case, whatever may be said about the
manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty.
The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error.
Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been
released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested
him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

14.) Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

FACTS:
18 | P a g e Human Rights Law

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong,
NV, were arrested by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid of the house was authorized by a
search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no
warrant of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and
companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina
petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al were valid.

HELD:

Yes. In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president.
The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the
president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government
efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

15.) Morales v. Enrile

FACTS:
On April 21, 1982, the petitioners were arrested by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the AFP. Since
then, they have been under detention. Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus.
Subsequently, on July 20, 1982, they were charged with rebellion before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
which was filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ continued detention is legal.

HELD:

Yes. Their continued detention is legal for the reason that a proper case of rebellion had been filed against
them in the proper court and the trial has yet to be terminated.

Although martial law was terminated on Jan 17, 1981 by the President, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus continues to be suspended in all other places with respect to certain offenses such as rebellion or
insurrection, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, among others. Thus the right to
bail is also suspended.

The petitions are without merit and hereby dismissed.

16.) PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had beendetained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistentlymaintained his innocence. There
was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,something drastic had to be done. A confession was
19 | P a g e Human Rights Law

absolutely necessary. So the investigatingofficers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on hisinnocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued tomaltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet
bowlfull of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endurethe pain
inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. Headmitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confessionthey prepared. Later, against his
will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silentand to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that
the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Insteadthere should be several
short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in adialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and thereis no showing that he understands Tagalog.
Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused wasnot permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
a friend. In fact, his sisters andother relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it wasonly about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visithim. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during
theinvestigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was notassisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

17.)